FORCIBLY URBAN: INTERNALLY DISPLACED

PERSONS’ EXPERIENCES OF BOGOTÁ’S

NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION

By

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Submitted to

Central European University
Department of Gender Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Gender studies

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Budapest, Hungary

2017
To Carine

To Mercedes

To the memory of my father Efrain
DECLARATION

I hereby state that the thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degree in any other institution. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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Sonia Garzón Ramírez
ABSTRACT

This research explores the extent to which neoliberal urbanization being implemented in the global South allows marginalized populations, and specifically displaced people, to enjoy the right to the city. Drawing on the narratives of forcibly displaced people living in Bogotá, this research highlights the links between the dynamics of race, gender, class, sex and ethnicity that lie beneath this city’s spatial order and the mechanisms of violence and intra-urban displacement that shape displaced people’s urban experiences. Despite the expectations that Bogotá’s urban renewal would bring about a homogenous city, this research shows that this process has not been able to overturn the city’s segregated spatial order north-rich-white vs. south-poor-mestizo. It highlights that, in so doing, the existing urban order has allowed a continuum of gendered violence to flow from rural areas of armed conflict to the city as well as the re-emergence of forms of exploitation. This research therefore examines how such mechanisms hinder forcibly displaced people, particularly displaced women, from overcoming victimization and participate in deepening their socio-spatial exclusion.

Through this research, I seek to contribute to the existing literature on global South cities by excavating the spatial and gender-related challenges faced by urban societies undergoing democratic transitions such as post-conflict situations. Based on eight months of fieldwork conducted in 2012, combined with media and discourse analysis as well as archival research undertaken up to 2016, the analysis brings to the fore displaced people’s itineraries of displacement, including the paths they have covered through their experiences of mourning, survival or resistance. Inspired by feminist political thinkers and geographers as well as postcolonial urban scholars, this research proposes a gendered right to the city aimed at two interrelated purposes. First, as a methodological platform from which to identify the hurdles faced by displaced people in their struggles to overcome their condition of victim and, second, as
a venue to enable this population the chance to access transformative transitional justice in the cities they have come to inhabit.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While writing these acknowledgments, I bear in mind Patricia Tuit’s words (2004b), as she states that “those who are mentioned by name are unfairly burdened with the task of representing” numerous people who have influenced and contributed to the completion of a long-term project like this. Nonetheless, at the risk of forgetting someone, I will attempt to thank all of those who have influenced the path I have covered along these years of academic work.

I am especially indebted to my supervisor, Sara Merger, who took on the enormous challenge of supervising this dissertation in the midst of the writing process. Many thanks for your faith in this project, for your intellectual support, challenging questions and your encouraging words. In a most particular manner, I thank you for having pushed me to engage with a stronger feminist approach and for having re-sparked my feminist curiosity. Perhaps the many strands of this project would not have achieved to be one sole piece without your guidance.

I am also glad to have the opportunity to express my thanks to many people I met at the CEU Department of Gender Studies. My thanks go first of all to Allaine Cerwonka whose guidance, full of kindness, humanity and intellectual brilliance, accompanied the first years of my research. This dissertation owes much to your course in gender and geography. This course was such a significant experience that it is one of the academic spaces I have appreciated the most while being a student at CEU.

I also wish to thank many professors at the Gender Studies Department, in particular Francisca de Haan, Andrea Peto, Susan Zimmermann, Hadley Renkin, Elissa Helms, Éva Fodor, Eszter Timár and Jasmina Lukic. I really appreciate the way in which you have made this Department such a cosmopolitan, nomadic, and intellectually rich space. I feel really honored for having had the chance to be part of it.
A special thanks also goes to the staff members of CEU department, especially Natalia Versegí, and to my fellow PhD students Dorotty Réday, Rahel Turai, Rita Béres-Deák, Barna Szamosi, Eva Zekany, Edit Jeges, Irina Chereshcheva, Heather Tucker, Marianna Szczygielska, who during these years have made my life easier in ways too numerous to mention.

I should like to thank also the supervisors of my GEMMA M.A. thesis, Dorota Golanska from the University of Lodz and Soleda Vieitez from the University of Granada. A large part of this dissertation is related to the reflections I developed in my M.A. thesis. But also, I must say that it was your vote of confidence that pushed me to believe that I could undertake the challenge of pursuing a Doctoral program.

I especially acknowledge the Gender Department of the National University of Colombia, where I took my very first courses on feminist theory, and the support of other scholars of this university, Sylvia de Castro Korgi and Claudia Mosquera Labbé. I am deeply grateful to feminist researchers and activists Maria Eugenia Ramírez and Osana Medina, to urban architect Carmenza Orjuela and Javier Torres who provided me with invaluable knowledge about the city during the fieldwork in Bogotá. I remain grateful for the feminist insights I gained from feminist researchers and activists Milena Gonzales and Ochy Curiel.

I should like to thank the many women of social movements and organizations such as the Pacific Route of Women, the Women’s House, the women of CPC-FASOL, and the women of the ESCR in Bogotá. Thank you for your generosity in courageously sharing part of your lives that enormously enriched my research.

I do not have enough words to thank the many displaced women and men who, with generosity and bravery, share with me and Carine their stories, life and experiences. Various contrivances at play, even reenacted by those who are expected to provide them with protection, have stripped displaced people of the chance to speak out about their plight, to name their victimizer, or even
to keep the memory of the loved ones they lost. Despite this compulsory anonymity, they let me into their life, oftentimes into their own places, and allowed me to see their memory objects. This research and my feminist spatial consciousness have grown out of your struggle for justice.

Other special persons participated or influenced this project in different phases. My heartiest thanks also to my friends Sanja Kajinic, John Hubbard, Lina Lozano, Eileen Mcloughlin and Marie Claire Delcros. Thanks again John for having read and revised many of my manuscripts.

Of course I also thank my Garzon and Middelbos family members who, by virtual means, were with me at every stage of this project. Especially, I am indebted to my brother and sisters, Omar, Lulu, Derly, Nelcy, to Marcela and Anita and to all my nieces and nephews. My warmest thanks go to Maryvonne, Estelle and Serge who have shown to Carine and me their invaluable moral and material support along these ten years of rhizomatic academic life in Europe.

This dissertation is especially dedicated to my wife Carine, to my mother Mercedes and to the memory of my father Efrain. Thank you for your faith in me. Carine, this dissertation would not have become real without your unfailing faith and investment in this project. Thank you for your passionate activism, for the feminist-French touch you put in the revision of all the manuscripts time and again and for the blissful vie en rose that you share with me.
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AFRODES – National Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (Asociación Nacional de Afrocolombianos Desplazados).

ANMUCIC – National Association of Peasant, Black and Indigenous Women of Colombia (Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Negras, y Indígenas de Colombia)

AUC – United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)

BACRIMs – Criminal Gangs (Bandas Criminales)

CADEs – District Specialized Attention Centers (Centros de Atención Distrital Especializado)

CCAJAR – José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective (Corporación Colectivo de Abogados ‘José Alvear Restrepo’)

CCJ – Colombian Comission of Jurists (Comisión Colombiana de Juristas)

CNMH – National Center of Historical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica)

CODHES – Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento)

CPC-FASOL – Centre for the Promotion of Culture - Families in Solidarity (Centro de Promoción y Cultura - Familias Solidarias)

ESCR – Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Derechos Económicos, Sociales Y Culturales)

FARC-EP – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo)

IDU – Urban Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano).

IEU – Urban Studies Institute of the National University of Colombia (Instituto de Estudios Urbanos de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

ILSA – Latin American Institute for an Alternative Society and an Alternative Law (Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativos)

MOVICE – National Movement of Victims of State-Sponsored Crimes (Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de Estado)

MTMCA – Working Group ‘Women and Armed Conflict’ (Mesa de Trabajo ‘Mujer y Conflictio Armado’)

OFP – Women’s Popular Organization (Organización Femenina Popular)

PCN – Black Communities Process (Proceso de Comunidades Negras)

POT – Territorial Ordering Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial)

QoL – Quality of Life (Calidad de Vida)

RPM – Pacific Route of Women (Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres)

SAP – Structural Adjustment Program (Programa de Ajuste Estructural)
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1 Timely Recognition, Spatial Unwelcome

In line with his endeavor of “catching up to be a normal country” (Santos 2010), and specifically in his attempt to address Colombia’s human rights record, President Juan Manuel Santos announced in June 2011 the so-called Victims and Land Restitution Law. In his announcement of the Law, Santos stated: “I wish this day will mark a before and an after in our life as a nation, that the victims, tired of claiming into the emptiness, feel at last recognized, protected and rewarded” (Santos 2011). Such an announcement signified the turning of a new page. First, it represented the government’s official recognition of the internal armed conflict. Second, because the law itself was described as a pilot model of transitional justice whose implementation would take place amidst an internal armed conflict that has lasted for almost 60 years (AI 2012: 5). But the words of President Santos also hint at the expectations for a societal and political shift raised by the issue of this law, because for almost 7 million victims left by the Colombian War, it should provide an opportunity to be recognized and to access long after mechanisms of justice, truth and reparation. This became all the more true when, in 2012, Santos engaged in peace talks with the guerrilla FARC, which culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in 2016.

However, during the peace talks and the Victims’ Law’s implementation, the project promoted in 2013 by the then Bogotá administration, which intended to make reparation for the victims of forced displacement by providing housing in this city, was strongly criticized by Santos’s Housing Minister who qualified it as a “provocation.”¹ The Minister’s claim was not isolated, quite the opposite. It added to other similar objections raised among Bogotá’s long-term

inhabitants since at least 2012. Such objections were not only addressed to the Victims’ Law itself, but also to the idea of building social housing units in Northern areas, where the upper class is prevalent, and to the perspective of having as new neighbors displaced populations. Yet, given the high expectations for the path opened by the Victims’ Law in particular and, in general, for President Santos to implement mechanisms of transitional justice, to what extent is the urban integration into Bogotá facilitated for those victims of forced displacement who have arrived in this city fleeing from the effects of the war?

Among the universe of the victims of this conflict, displaced people make up as many as 6 million (IDMC 2015: 8; Correa 2015), which accounts for 12% of the Colombian population (Semana 2015; see Appendix 5). Yet despite the magnitude of the tragedy, the plight of their displacement—as human rights researchers, journalists and scholars have outlined—has been rendered invisible, hidden and unnoticed (CNMH 2015a, 2014; Romero 2014; Korovkin 2008; Sánchez and Cardona 2005). The National Center of Historical Memory, for example, asserts that the “invisibilization of forced displacement … was justified under the pretext that it was a consequence or a collateral effect of five decades of continued armed conflict” (CNMH 2015a: 26). To this must be added the fact that for almost a decade, the former administration of ex-President Uribe (2002-2010) denied the armed conflict by calling it a terrorist menace (Idler and Paladini-Adell 2015: 130). Throughout that decade, Uribe mobilized the claim that in Colombia forced displacement did not exist, and that the movement was simply economic migration (Rojas 2008). The denial of the tragedy of displacement resulting from these discourses and practices brought about a general climate of stigmatization over displaced people and a lack of adequate protective mechanisms, which have led many of them to seek refuge in urban centers and to remain anonymous in their attempt to rebuild their lives.

It is against this background that between 1985 and 2015, an estimated 400,000 displaced people arrived in Bogotá, making it the Colombian city with the largest number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Nevertheless, the idea according to which the war did not exist became widespread among Bogotá’s citizenry, and the hopes of IDPs of finding a host location, protection, and of integrating into urban life have been dashed upon their arrival in a city which is first and foremost concerned with a process of urban restructuring. Indeed, Bogotá’s renewal was preceded by pedagogical campaigns introduced in 1996 which sought to induce citizens into processes of self-regulation, linking from the beginning issues of violence and insecurity with the production of orderly spaces. It is worth noting that such intertwinement grew out of a strategy allegedly aimed at both enabling Bogotá’s integration into the global economy and achieving social and territorial equality (Beuf 2011b: 94).

Sold with the promise of killing these two birds with one stone, the rejuvenation of Bogotá entails a more complex situation than a simple history of gentrification. Rather, in the name of making The Bogotá We Want and insisting that Life is Sacred, Bogotá has engaged in a process of territorial disciplining, securitization of urban life and modernization which intertwines in an endless spiral the regeneration of urban space, the transformation of citizens’ behaviors, and economic competitiveness. Observed through this prism, the opposition to the provision of housing to displaced people in upper-class areas, exemplified in the episodes above mentioned, does not merely illustrate the refusal to have as new neighbors a population who has been long stigmatized. More than that, it is symptomatic of a growing trend among Bogotanos, which has turned both the renewal of the city into a symbol of their hope for a better life, and the city’s long-term inhabitants into the defenders of the achievements of such a process.

Hence, whereas the crusade of the national government to normalize the country has taken up the challenge of improving its human rights record—especially through mechanisms aimed at addressing the country’s debt with the victims and by engaging in peace talks—it has involved,
too, a focus on extractive industries, the development of infrastructure, and the improvement of its institutions. All of them have been defined by Santos (2010) as strategies aimed at increasing the country’s competitiveness and foreign investments, and the re-urbanization of Bogotá increasingly falls within the latter axes of this endeavor. However, given that Bogotá has become the urban center with the largest number of displaced people, the integration of this population into its urban space represents a litmus test for whether the city’s urban renewal and its society are actually in line with the whole set of challenges entailed in the country’s path towards normalcy and, particularly, with those concerns related to IDPs’ human rights such as making accessible social and spatial justice for them.

Thus, it is an approach to the urban experiences of displaced people inhabiting Bogotá, and in particular displaced women’s right to the city, that pays attention to the oppression they face, to their spatial practices and to the ways in which they make sense of the city's urban normalization which provides the empirical focus of this research. Following Allaine Cerwonka (2004: 4), I use the term spatial practices to refer to the “cultural practices by which people construct or define place,” and specifically as an analytical category to signify the practices through which IDPs territorialize culture and attempt to participate in producing Bogotá’s urban space. The gendered perspective I developed on the right to the city is drawn from the work of Henry Lefebvre and the complexities of this right could be summarized as the right to fully enjoy and to participate as political subjects in shaping urban life, both in terms of its material forms and structures but also in terms of its symbolic means (Amin 2006; Fernandes 2007; Fenster 2010; Buckingham 2010).

While my development of a gendered right to the city is elaborated in chapter 3, in the following section I will move ahead to develop the justification of this research. Thereby, I will point out why the study of the transformation of Bogotá as a global South city starting from the perspective of the displaced population is an advantageous standpoint from which to analyze processes of urbanization in the global South, and more particularly, why a gendered right to the
city is an important analytic framework from which to identify how to facilitate the path of displaced people living in global South cities to overcome their condition of victim.

1.2 Why Urban Space? Why Internally Displaced People?

Why examine Bogotá’s process of urban renewal by focusing attention on and by following the urban experiences of displaced people in Bogotá? What does it tell us about the production of global South cities and the extent to which oppressed urban dwellers enjoy the right to the city in neoliberal times?

Bogotá represents a particular example of a city of the global South which has bet on its urban renewal and on the disciplining of its urban space in order to play a role in the global economy, but whose aspirations are overwhelmingly intertwined with the need to overcome issues of inequality and socio-spatial justice in the midst of a democratic transition. In this regard, the specific and urgent challenge faced by cities such as Bogotá is to balance the tensions between achieving benchmarks of urban efficiency and competiveness, while overcoming the legacies of injustice and an enormous human rights deficit stemming from the country's internal armed conflict. This implies the need to implement mechanisms of transitional justice aimed, at least, at draining the shameful past of having neglected some of those who suffered the most, or in the best case, at bringing about social reconciliation, inclusion and redress for the victims.

By bringing the perspectives of displaced people to the fore, this research aims to contribute to the debate lying at the intersection of these trajectories, namely displaced people’s urban experience and contemporary processes of urban renewal in the global South, focusing on the extent to which Bogotá’s transformation allows displaced people’s right to the city and, by this means, access to transitional justice. In their struggles to be recognized as IDPs and to gain access to the benefits and rights granted by law and in their attempts to make a livelihood in the city, displaced people are compelled to appropriate the public space and to make use of urban facilities. As Colombian displaced people have a predominantly rural background—almost 87%
according to the National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH 2015a: 27; Vidal 2011: 5)—for many of them, their former ways of making a living was mostly through informal practices and in the partial or total absence of state institutions. By the same token, their experiences of displacement have been determined by the absence of the state or by its failure to guarantee citizens’ protection (CNMH 2014: 11).

How do IDPs negotiate this background in a city self-proclaimed as unrelated to the violence of the conflict and where the state as well as its dwellers are invested in a process of territorial disciplining and cultural modernization? Do subject positions stemming from IDPs’ conditions of gender, class, race/ethnicity, rural or urban condition as well as their experience of victimization provide them certain leverage in terms of spatial and political mobility to subvert spatial modalities of exclusion or to access mechanisms of socio-spatial justice? What can displaced people’s urban gendered experiences tell us about the links between the violence of the internal armed conflict and the violence taking place in urban areas? By excavating these concerns, this analysis aims to establish the extent to which the displaced population inhabiting Bogotá has the chance to exercise the right to the city in all its complexities. Or is IDPs’ right to the city undermined by the disciplinary yoke of urban happiness, orderly spaces, and citizen security mobilized by Bogotá’s hegemonic narrative of urban renewal?

Wedded to the notion of modernity and rationality, the discourse of the dreamed city strives to capture the process of Bogotá’s rejuvenation (chapter 4). Such attempt has been mobilized by ascribing the status of common sense to the current model of urban renewal and, simultaneously, by imposing a politics of consensus that displaces urban concerns out of the political realm. Positioned as apolitical, the implementation of Bogotá’s urban renewal, on the one hand, participates in overshadowing the connections between the violence of the conflict and urban violence and, on the other, overlooks long-entrenched spatial hierarchies built on
systems of oppression such as sex, gender, class, race and ethnicity which, as I show, have turned Bogotá into a highly segregated urban space.

In such a landscape, this research sets out to explore the following questions: To what extent do Bogotá’s politics of urban space and the spatial model it is aimed at bringing about enable or disenfranchise displaced people from integrating into the city in dignified conditions? What are the main concerns regarding displaced people’s right to the city and might they be different from the concerns of long-term urban dwellers? Are displaced people denied the chance to inhabit Bogotá as legitimate urban beings and therefore condemned to become the new urban poor?

IDPs’ everyday urban experiences in Bogotá offer a suitable standpoint from which to identify how the issues at stake raised from the desires to build an inclusive and durable peace with social justice counteract, conflict with, or shape the material and symbolic processes entailed in the city’s urban renewal. A closer look at IDPs’ narratives offers an advantageous lens through which to analyze the extent to which contemporary urban restructuring taking place within societies undergoing a process of transitional justice participates in sustaining exclusionary patterns of socio-spatial segregation and in enabling a continuum of violence from areas of conflict to cities. Or might it provide a certain leverage for enhancing the right to the city of those at the bottom of the social ladder?

The advent of a transitional justice process has opened a new platform for the IDPs’ claims to be heard. However, for many IDP women and/or for their relatives, the return to the places from which they were displaced, or their return to a rural life is not a suitable or sustainable solution (see chapters 5 and 6). Therefore, the right to remain in conditions of safety and dignity as well as to rebuild their lives in the urban centers where they found refuge should be understood as a legitimate claim. It is my belief that the extent to which this right is recognized and materialized gives a sense of the commitment of the Colombian urban society in the transitional justice and in the post-conflict process.
The ambition of this analysis is to disrupt both the assumption according to which IDPs are diametrically opposed to Bogotá’s urban contemporary life and the idea that the rebuilding of the city can go on while ignoring the city’s relatedness with the armed conflict. Drawing on the experience of displaced people and other oppressed populations, I show the fissures of the notion of Bogotá’s public space as classless and universal and as a result of a supposed pure rationality. I claim that such constructions have been instrumental in prompting the notion that Bogotá and its residents should do almost nothing else but reinforce urban security and order public space in the process of bringing about peace and democratic change.

By looking at IDPs’ narratives, and especially at displaced women’s itineraries of displacement, and by excavating their intersections with the implementation of Bogotá’s model of urban redevelopment, my analysis brings specific empirical findings regarding the functioning of emerging forms of oppression and the crystallization of a continuum of violence that flows from rural areas of conflict to the urban space. In so doing, my research adds to the existing literature on the development of global South cities, and especially shows evidences of existing democratic and gender-related challenges that urban societies emerging from political conflicts or facing post-conflict situations need to address. As my analysis shows, whether they are gendered regimes, spatial artifacts or socio-spatial hierarchies lying behind contemporary models of urban renewal, their effects are crystallized in the regeneration of forms of exploitation and in episodes of intra-urban displacement and gender-based violence that particularly shape displaced women’s itineraries of displacement. Along with that, these spatial and symbolic devices participate in deepening gender inequalities and spatial exclusion, and in depoliticizing oppressed urban dwellers.

Therefore, by examining these spatial devices embedded in contemporary urban restructuring from the perspective of displaced women, my research aims to contribute to including the concerns of forcibly displaced people in the existing debate on global South cities, focusing on
the ways in which the development of these neoliberal urban spaces hampers marginalized groups, and in particular displaced people, from fully exerting their right to the city. The rationale for this research is to provide evidence about the inextricable relation between the phenomenon of forced displacement and the construction of Bogotá as a global city. Therefore, throughout this analysis, I will insist on pointing out that while Bogotá remakes itself as a global city, it is not isolated from the dynamics and the violence of the internal conflict. Indeed, as I show, the current implementation of the model of urban renewal has not reversed but actually reinforced the city’s segregated spatial order (south-poor-mestizo vs. north-rich-white). As long as this persists, this segregated order allows the occurrence of intra-urban displacement and the re-configuration of forms of socio-economic exploitation that hinder displaced population’s enjoyment of the right to the city.

My research adds to the current discussions about the building of global cities which have hinted at the exploration of the right to the city as a framework from which to produce more relevant accounts to speak about the urban from somewhere else than from Western hegemonic locations (Parnell and Robinson 2012, 2013; Roy 2011a, 2013; Parnell and Oldfield 2014; see also chapter 3). On the whole, these works have challenged parochial and ethnocentric urban theory, thus contributing to generate a more relevant knowledge to interpret the formation of global cities taking place in Southern urban centers. They, however, have not particularly incorporated feminist ethnographic perspectives from which to tackle issues of gender- and race-based discriminations. This dimension of research, in which my work has sought to participate, is guided by my interest in engaging with the feminist curiosity prompted by Cynthia Enloe (2004). This entails proposing a gendered right to the city as a window from which to investigate how such urban transformations are implemented, while simultaneously examining how women relate to these processes. By looking through the lenses of this feminist curiosity, my research takes forward the urban scholarly branch mentioned above and applies specific epistemological
feminist tools, a discussion of which I offer in sections 1.3 and 3.3. By now, it is worth mentioning an engagement with a focus on the intersectional oppressions that shape displaced women’s subject positions. Borrowing Patricia Hill Collins (see section 1.3), such intersectional approach involves considering displaced women’s conditions of sex, gender, class, ethnicity, postcoloniality, along with their condition of displacement, as power intersectional relations that are being reshaped by the dynamics of power taking place in Bogotá. Second, this also involves drawing inspiration from feminist political thinkers, geographers and philosophers (see sections 1.3 and 3.3), thereby paying attention to the ways in which material processes and devices mediating the production of global cities such as gentrification and monumentality, on the one hand, and spatial narratives such as quality of life and urban happiness, on the other, participate in shaping the very same intersecting forces of oppression at work on women’s urban experiences.

A similar interest on gendering the research on the global South could be traced in the analysis of Chant and McIlwaine (2016), which sheds light on the intra-urban heterogeneity of global cities, thereby responding to the challenge of addressing the growing feminization of slums and poor areas in the global South. By exploring the “gender-urban-slum interface,” these scholars succeed in reflecting the uneven urban conditions of the global South by showing how gender inequalities, often stemming from cultural norms and customs, are exacerbated by harsh spatial conditions related to connectivity, insecure access to land and housing, limited access to basic services and infrastructure, difficulties to access paid jobs, among other spatial constrains prevailing in slum and poor areas.

Through their analysis, Chant and McIlwaine (2016) join feminist works on the right to the city such as those of Fenster (2005, 2010) and Buckingham (2010) on which my gendered approach to the right to the city is grounded (see section 3.3). This branch of literature takes an interest in overcoming the gender biases and color blindness entailed in the original Lefebvrian notion of
the right to the city. And in particular, Chant and McIlwaine insist on encompassing “micro-level spaces as households” and on bringing into the scope of the right to the city reproductive and sexual health and rights (2016: 53). These authors are keen on underlining how gender inequalities increase when it comes to women immigrating to urban areas as, more often than not, they lack of network support, experience stigmatization, and face isolation and major risks of violence which render them more vulnerable (Ibid.). Taking this into account, my research aims to enlarge the gender analysis on global South cities by bringing into discussion the experience of forcibly migrant women, as their condition of displacement in a context where peace and conflict overlap most likely results in increasing their vulnerability. Therefore, as I claim, displaced people’s urban experiences constitute a litmus test against which to identify the uneven spatial conditions and mechanisms of socio-spatial exclusion brought about through the formation of global South cities.

In the Colombian context, the platform of the right to the city as a tool from which to provide reparation to the victims of displacement and as a means to overcome their victim’s condition has been put forward by urban scholar Maldonado (2009). Her work tallies with an extensive feminist research on forced displaced people living in urban settings elaborated, for instance, by authors such as Meertens (2010, 2012), Meertens and Zambrano (2010; see also chapter 2) and Claudia Mosquera (2005, 2012). This branch of literature, which informs my discussion of the victim’s recognition of displaced people in chapter 2, has been avant-garde in prompting a gender- and race-based perspective and thus the inclusion of a transformative approach in the development of law and jurisprudence in the Colombian context (see for instance Uprimny and Saffon 2009; Uprimny and Sánchez 2013).

My research, and approach to the right to the city, takes this debate into the analysis of the development of Bogotá as a global city, by enquiring the extent to which the implementation of such a transformative justice intersects, collides or finds its condition of possibility in the midst
of a process of urban rejuvenation. In this way, my research falls again within the branch of literature concerned with investigating processes of urban transformation in the global South. But more specifically, it tallies with those works whose approach to the right to the city is focused on societies facing post-conflict situations or emerging from a democratic transition (e.g., Parnell and Pieterse 2010; Oldfield et al. 2004).

These studies, however, have neither specifically involved the links between the rural and the urban nor have particularly dealt with the existing continuum of violence and reemerging forms of gender oppression, the effects of which are exacerbated on the lives of the forced migrant population located at the bottom of the social ladder and enduring spatial segregation. By tracing the links between a gendered right to the city, forced displacement and transitional justice, this research aims to contribute in filling this gap. Therefore, my research stands for an inclusion of gender mainstreaming on the right to the city which, along with civil rights such as participation in decision making and representation, tackles spatial issues such as women’s safety in public and private spaces, sustainable housing (i.e., secure tenure, location, access to services and infrastructure), availability of transport facilities and the enduring dilemma of proximity between housing, work places and public places.

Through the following chapters, I trace the connection between the above-mentioned axes of gendered right to the city and the urban experiences of displaced people living in Bogotá. In so doing, I excavate specific socio-spatial concerns and challenges faced by the displaced population, and particularly those that hinder forcibly displaced women from overcoming their victim’s condition and/or integrating urban life in dignified conditions. I will insist on pointing out that while Bogotá remakes itself as a global city, it is also shaped by displaced people, whether it be by their cultural practices, their “itineraries of urban displacement,”3 their paths of survival, or by performing acts of resistance. I contest the idea that Bogotá’s urban society can

3 I owe this concept to María Eugenia Ramírez, feminist social researcher at ILSA (Latin American Institute for an Alternative Society and an Alternative Law), interviewed in Bogotá, July 12, 2012.
urge the demobilization and disarmament of the guerillas, whereas it resists carrying out the urban transformations that the building of a sustainable peace and spatial justice requires. I argue that post-conflict processes and/or democratic transitions being implemented in countries of the global South would better succeed if their urban societies are not blind to the gender- and race-based spatial concerns of the victim population and thus involve such concerns into their agenda of urban redevelopment. Otherwise displaced population could be at risk of re-victimization and, in worst cases, be condemned to join the ranks of the historic urban poor.

1.3 Epistemological and Methodological Considerations

My starting point is a wide framework that considers space as a medium and outcome of social relations of power with special attention to gender, race, ethnicity, class and urban/rural condition. My analysis embraces a postcolonial critique of urban studies and insights from feminist geography, and therefore joins the endeavor to speak about the construction of the urban in contemporary times from elsewhere and outside of a dominant narrative hegemonized by Western critiques of urban neoliberalism (Parnell and Robinson 2012; Massey 1994, 2005). To this end, and in my attempt to tackle the intersections between neoliberal urban transformation and internal displacement, I strive to exercise what Cynthia Enloe has called “feminist curiosity” (2004). I bring it into play, for example, as I investigate the urban experiences of displaced people—a population whose rural condition has been taken for granted—and, second, as I seek to unveil the political dimension of contemporary urban space’s transformations in a context where such a process is deemed to be universal and classless. By adopting Enloe’s feminist curiosity, I will interrogate how this urban transformation occurred and focus on how women relate to such processes. In the endeavor to tackle this challenge, in chapter 3, I build a synthesis of theoretical tools that strongly relies on insights from feminist political philosophy and integrate insights from feminist geography and feminist contributions to security studies.
My research acknowledges the privileged position of displaced people to give an account of the disciplinary spatial process endured by Bogotá. It therefore embraces Sandra Harding’s standpoint epistemology (1993), who also builds on Patricia Hill Collins’s thoughts on those who, while living inside a community, inhabit its margins and experience intersecting forms of oppression (Collins 1986; Tanesini 1999: 152). Consistent with this epistemological approach, I maintain the belief that the construction of knowledge from the position of displaced people offers advantages when we start asking questions about Bogotá’s process of urban renewal. As a marginalized group, displaced people—rather than those Bogotá’s inhabitants located in hegemonic positions, whose perspective is taken as representing the universal—inhabit a suitable stance from which to investigate the extent to which this urban process enables the right to the city for this population located at the bottom of the social ladder. Their position is all the more relevant as, in line with postcolonial urbanism, I aim to contribute to the dissonant attempt to speak about the building of global cities from somewhere else than from a hegemonic Western location and beyond a class-centered analysis.

Yet, despite inhabiting a preferable knowledge position, displaced people—as any other subject of knowledge—first, hold a partial perspective and “situated knowledge” and, second, are shaped by “the same kind of social forces” that shape urban space (Harding 1993: 64; Tanesini 1999; Collins 2000: 270). That said, I do not limit the condition of agent to the subject of knowledge (chapter 3). Rather, drawing on Donna Haraway’s poststructural critique of binary thinking (1988: 591), I extend this condition to urban space. Borrowing her words, space “is not raw material for humanization” (Ibid.: 593). Therefore, as I argue throughout this analysis, it is not only urban dwellers who, through their spatial practices, participate in shaping urban spaces, but their lives are also shaped by urban space and architectural form. As Massey (2005: 93, 1994) and Kingwell (2008) suggest, space and architecture shape us, for instance, by enabling confinement, segregation, symbolism, circulation or de/localization.
In addition, I mean to take seriously Allaine Cerwonka’s concern about the risks of taking the experience of the marginalized as transparent evidence (2011), which touches upon what Haraway has called “the danger of romanticizing” the knowledge of the subjugated (1988: 584). The standpoints of the subjugated, as Haraway writes, are preferable because “they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world,” but they are not innocent, and they should also be subjected to “critical reexamination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation” (Ibid.).

In the light of these analyses, IDPs’ experience should neither be assumed as the “end product” of the country’s process of normalization, nor can their identities be seen as impermeable to its forces (Cerwonka 2011). Indeed, a poststructural approach to IDPs’ perspective requires reviewing the genesis of the IDP category and considering the relational dynamic of power through which their condition of victim has been denied or recognized, in particular with regard to the specific sociopolitical context as well as to other actors. Consistent with this premise, I involve throughout my analysis the accounts of members of NGOs, feminist researchers and activists, bureaucrats, and actors from public institutions as they constitute a “piece of the complex social location” inhabited by the IDP population (Ibid.: 67).

1.4 Fieldwork Methodology

This research strongly relies on ethnographic data collected during eight months of fieldwork from April to December 2012. Media analysis and archival research, along with other secondary sources revised since 2010 and throughout the writing of my dissertation, also feed the results of my research. Before discussing the data collection in more detail, as it is one of the aims of this section, I want briefly to note that, as other researchers, I do have a particular background that shapes the choice of my research. Indeed, the relation between the researcher and the object of knowledge, in this ethnographic experience, echoes a dialogic relatedness which Cerwonka refers to as a “fusion of horizons” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 23). In “Improvising Theory,”
Cerwonka explains this fusion as “a co-influencing of the historical specificity of the researcher, on the one hand, and of the history and character of the object of research, on the other” (Ibid.). The object of my research did not come naked of values nor is it at odds with my own history, but rather intersects with and is shaped by it. Therefore, as with the data and sources collected through my fieldwork and analytical writing process above mentioned, the fabric of my research owes part of its texture to this fusion between my own specific socio-historical location and the object’s history. This despite having been myself one of the many Bogotá’s inhabitants who used to observe the city’s urban renewal as the commonsense response to what was defined in the mid-1990s as an urban crisis (chapter 4), and as the ineluctable path that this city was meant to follow. Inhabiting such a social location would likely undermine the possibilities for me to put into question this process. Add to this the fact that I myself have been an urban dweller for whom, until the end of the 1990s, the internal armed conflict was a marginal concern. Against this background, my interest with both phenomena which I crystallize in this dissertation emerged in the early 2000s, as I had the opportunity to work in a women’s project of economic solidarity in Lomas, a Southern neighborhood of Bogotá. I worked in this project for almost five years, and meanwhile, during the period 2005–2007, I joined the Bogotá’s branch of the feminist pacifist movement la Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (hereinafter the Pacific Route of Women).

Over time, both experiences became somehow entangled. I owe to the first, and particularly to the insights provided by the women of Lomas I worked with, the awakening of my curiosity on how the city’s urban transformation was unevenly affecting the city’s inhabitants, especially working-class women’s lives. This curiosity began to be tinged with feminist tones as I started socializing with local feminist activists and researchers, most of whom were involved in pacifist movements. Without intending to prompt an essentialist understanding of women’s experience (Tanesini 1999: 147), I might say that I find the articulation of these two paths to be closely related to the process by which women’s individual experiences became a suitable standpoint. By
this I mean that the standpoint from which I started to interrogate Bogotá’s urban renewal and its intersection with feminist perspectives on the armed conflict emerges from a process of shared consciousness that located my individual experience in a political context (Collins 2000).

Over time, such initial trajectories—that is, my concerns over the uneven effects of urban renewal and its marginalizing outcomes, on the one hand, and the imbrications between the Colombian War and urban life, on the other—gained greater maturity through my gender courses, especially through Allaine Cerwonka’s course on social geography and gender. The identification of displaced people’s location as a suitable standpoint that provides a window from which to raise questions about the ideal of neoliberal urbanism as a neutral process, and the interest to analyze it as an outcome of power relations saw the light of the day through the discussions that took place in this course. Certainly, I am in debt with numerous feminist political philosophers and postcolonial thinkers whose works enrich the theoretical background of this dissertation, but in parallel, I have tried to never leave the gendered critical reading about the construction of space that this course in social geography and gender offered me the chance to engage with.

1.4.1 People, Location, and the Uses of Improvisation

Originally, I identified local feminist organizations, such as the Women’s House and the Pacific Route of Women, as spaces in which to conduct participant observation and as starting locations for conducting in-depth interviews as well. My strategy involved snowball sampling, so as to get in contact with displaced people, feminist activists and researchers I planned to interview. Besides this branch of my research’s informants which I see as representing the civil society, I planned to interview government officials and experts working in both areas: forced displacement and armed conflict, on the one hand, and urban issues, on the other.

In the first case, my acquaintance with feminist actors and displaced people’s organizations was strengthened by the support of Carine Middelbos, whom I introduced in the acknowledgements
of this dissertation. The main reason for bringing to the fore this collaborative experience is to call attention to the role of improvisation, an “indispensable” factor of ethnography practices often related to the researcher’s own positionality (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 163), and which despite its importance, as Malkki asserts, has “gone without saying” in anthropology (Ibid.: 180). Throughout the fieldwork, Carine undertook various tasks, some of which could be assembled under the label of research assistance. But given both her (French) foreign status as well as her previous participation in the Women’s Pacific Route—to which she belonged between 2005 and 2007—Carine’s support went often beyond logistical matters, as she not only facilitated my contact with, and helped me to earn the trust of, members of feminist movements, but also to draw my attention toward key issues or informants.

Indeed, numerous subsequent conversations I shared with Carine following the interviews have opened up new avenues of thought, arising for instance from the emotions or emphasis accompanying the answers which were manifested through the interviewee’s body language, implicit expressions, or references to objects. I venture to assert that, because of my previous relation with the field which located me in a certain insider-outsider position, my ability to wonder about these forms of implicit language could have been not so keen. Instead, Carine’s condition of foreigner might have provided her with a particular sensibility that stirred her capacity to be surprised regarding such facts or evidence which, at that moment, seemed normal or irrelevant to the research, and which I may therefore have overlooked. For instance, while placing major focus on understanding some of the practices through which displaced people appropriate urban spaces on an everyday basis, I found myself paying less attention to the individual’s circumstances that surrounded their forced displacement. Fortunately, some a posteriori conversations with Carine had the effect of drawing my attention to the extent to which the specific circumstances through which displaced people have been turned into victims were playing a role in shaping the way in which they exert their right to the city and the different
subject positions they have occupied throughout their urban experiences (chapter 6). Cerwonka touches upon this dynamic when, while referring to the researcher, she asserts that “one’s personhood is also a condition for knowledge claims, rather than a deterrent to understanding” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 28). So, this example illustrates how—especially when it comes to the fieldwork—findings and their understanding are configured, among other things, by the researcher’s subjectivity, motivations, and her/his historical relation vis-à-vis the research object (Ibid.: 31).

Another aspect relates to the fact that displaced people, the organizations supporting them, as well as numerous experts I met were scattered throughout the city. Therefore, the collection of data meant carrying out trips across the city on an almost daily basis. Whereas conducting interviews with displaced people often involved making a trip to a Southern neighborhood, hanging out with them could also involve participating in public space political activities such as peace rallies, memory performances and public space demonstrations, most of which took place in the city center. This multiplicity of public time-spaces added complexity to the role of the ethnographer as they became events in which her role shifted from that of a participant observer to that of an activist-researcher.

Indeed, on such occasions, my role as ethnographer was far from reflecting a stark separation with the research object, and instead, it became a conscious co-fusion of horizons between the ethnographer and the ‘object’ (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 31). Illustrative of this activist-researcher role were, for instance, demonstrations aimed at prompting the Colombian government to engage in peace negotiations, at urging the investigation of cases of forced disappearance, and a public hearing at the Colombian Parliament organized by displaced women (see Appendices 1 and 2). My involvement in such events was not just prompted by my interest in understanding the experience of the displaced people I was interacting with, but also by an interest in supporting the achievement of the victims and displaced people’s claims. The
participant observer, as Malkki recalls, is not like “a fly on the wall” (Ibid.: 173). There is no such thing as observing without being observed in participant observation and therefore, even though acting in good faith, the performance of the researcher also participates in shaping the object. Thus, as these public events occurred, the extent to which I might consciously participate in shaping the way displaced people I met use urban spaces and the extent to which they feel entitled to claim their right to the city became more and more explicit.

While interacting with the women of the Pacific Route, I had the opportunity to attend some meetings at the feminist NGO Casa de la Mujer (hereinafter Women’s House) and at the grassroots organization Centro de Promoción y Cultura FASOL (hereinafter CPC-FASOL) These sceneries gave me the chance to be invited to participate in the Tribunal on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR), whose meetings took place monthly at the Latin American Institute for an Alternative Society and an Alternative Law (hereinafter ILSA). Through taking part in this group, I was able to access information, collect documents and get familiar with reports on armed conflict and the implementation of mechanisms of transitional justice, especially the Victims and Land Restitution Law, commonly known as the Victims’ Law. But also those meetings involved discussions about the city’s politics of gender equality, one of which I was invited to moderate. Prior to the fieldwork, I had undertaken archival research on some of these issues, however, being in the field—and especially acting as participant observer in feminist activist groups—gave me the opportunity to grasp some of the gaps between these laws and politics and their actual implementation.

In general, those groups were also a platform from which I could arrange interviews with some displaced people as well as with some leaders of IDP organizations. But particularly, hanging out with the women of the Pacific Route, attending with them political meetings and taking part in peace demonstrations allowed me to map the way in which women’s pacifist movements have

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4 The Tribunal on Women’s ESCR is a working group whose main objective is to develop and promote strategies for the enforceability of women’s economic, social and cultural rights.
been able to build a spatial network across the city, thereby reaching displaced women and grassroots organizations located in the periphery (chapter 6). Importantly, it was thanks to the women of the Pacific Route that I had the chance to meet Maria Eugenia Ramírez, an activist-researcher and recognized member of the Colombian feminist movement, who was also leading the Women’s ESCR Tribunal. I would define Ramírez not only as a key informant but also as the key-keeper of this fieldwork. Maria Eugenia shared generously her insights about the conflict and politics of forced displacement, but her support was also of great value in order to be aware of the events related to the process of transitional justice and to broaden the range of displaced people I was interviewing (see Appendix 1, Photo 5). Specifically, it was through her that I was able to contact most Afro-Colombian women I interviewed, since until that moment, and through the Bogotá branch of the Pacific Route, most of the people I had interviewed were White-mestizo.

Indeed, it is worth noting that the search for an ideal sample was not always a smooth process. After a couple of months of fieldwork, I realized that the route I had adopted to get in contact with displaced people was driving me to meet the same kind of profile. By which I mean that most of the interviewees had somehow been able to cover a path from their experience of victims until a position of survivors (chapter 6) and, specifically, most of them had built a strong relation with NGOs and feminist organizations located in the city center. This realization meant that I was missing the perspective of displaced people who occupied more disadvantageous positions and who were likely far from achieving urban integration.

It was not only the interviewees’ closeness to NGOs that led me to this conclusion, but also the knowledge they have shown about the institutional arrangements set by the government to serve displaced people, and most importantly, the appropriation that some of them have made of institutional language. Whether it was a conscious choice or not, I understand this appropriation as a strategy that allows displaced people to navigate welfare services and access social benefits
that public institutions are aimed at providing. Furthermore, the use of institutional language by displaced people has facilitated the goal of making their claims heard before the ruling authorities and their fellow citizens.

In the attempt to also reach displaced people who were experiencing major spatial marginalization, I decided to ‘improvise’ by acting out of the fieldwork script I had originally set. For instance, I took the opportunity of attending an open-door event taking place in the periphery, which was organized by the Mayor’s office. The event was officially aimed at launching the available services offered by the city, in particular, and by governmental institutions, in general. But simultaneously, it was a means for the city to conduct a census of the displaced population living in Bogotá. As the event was massively attended by displaced people, regardless of their gender, sex, ethnicity or race, the place they inhabit in the city or, even, their causes of victimization, it turned out to be a suitable time-place to expand the scope of my potential informants. Indeed, while being there, I engaged in informal conversation with the attendants, asking them about the kind of assistance they were looking for and following up with more specific questions (e.g., the place they inhabited, their history of displacement). At the end of the day, I had been able to arrange interviews with a diverse sample of displaced people, most of whom were living at that moment in more marginalized socio-spatial conditions than the people I had previously interviewed.

At the same event, in addition, I conducted participant observation and had the chance to interview some officials in charge of implementing the city’s politics of forced displacement. By following the same strategy, throughout the fieldwork, I found other similar opportunities, some of which concerning the city’s urban politics, where I had the chance to interview some city officials. The length of this section does not allow me to explain them in detail, however, I have chosen some examples which provide a sense of the strategies I applied and the challenges I
encountered during the fieldwork while conducting participant observation and in-depth interviews.

But beyond providing a perspective about my fieldwork methodology, I wanted to take this opportunity as a chance to show some ethnographic practices that, although important, might be relegated to “the things that go without saying” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 185). Ethnographic practices and elements—e.g., the capacity of being surprised or of sparking others’ curiosity, finding ourselves playing the role of an activist-researcher and facing challenges to reach a representative sample—may not be uncommon events in the fieldwork. However, they might take the researcher out of her/his script. Improvising, as Malkki recalls, does not mean a lack of methods (Ibid.). However, as she suggests in her analogy of jazz, it is as difficult to talk about “the things that go without saying in anthropology” as it is to “tell a musician how to improvise” (Ibid.)

1.4.2 Data Collection and Processing

The ethnographic data for this research was collected through the eight-month fieldwork I conducted in Bogotá in 2012. In the course of this fieldwork, I spent time in very heterogeneous places including public buildings and open-air public spaces, ranging from headquarters of NGOs located in the main center, to displaced people’s homes and grassroots organizations located in peripheral areas. In these spaces, I conducted participant observation during meetings and events, held informal conversations, collected documents and printed material, and conducted in-depth interviews. Among those NGOs, I often visited ILSA where the monthly meetings of the ESCRs group took place as well as the Women’s House where I conducted interviews with displaced women leaders, attended formal meetings of the Pacific Route of Women and participated in a session devoted to the presentation of the Victims’ Law. I also held informal conversations and conducted interviews with some members of the Movement of Victims of State-Sponsored Crimes (MOVICE), and had the chance to participate in a meeting
that gathered the members of this Movement. Other interviews were also carried out with members of the National Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES).

I crisscrossed a great part of Bogotá in my attempt to map how displaced people were scattered throughout the city, the places where they live, the areas of the city in which they frequently spend time, and the interactions of their grassroots organizations with NGOs (see Appendix 4, Map 1). Throughout this journey, I had the opportunity to visit FASOL in the locality of Kennedy (Bogotá, D.C.), where I attended the presentation of a report on the effects of conflict-related violence on women’s lives, took part in public space demonstrations led by FASOL, and had informal conversations and interviews with displaced women. Overall, interviews with displaced people’s leaders and feminist researchers took place in public spaces as those mentioned above, but, as most displaced people live and spend their time in peripheral areas, another number of interviews were also conducted in their own places, in areas such as Bosa, Usme, San Cristóbal, and Kennedy.

I recorded all in-depth interviews and, frequently, during seminars and meetings I recorded public officials’ and researchers’ presentations. I made handwritten notes during the interviews and fieldnotes during participant observation. Throughout the fieldwork, I transcribed fieldnotes on an almost daily basis and, starting from the end of the fieldwork, I developed the habit of listening to the audiotapes several times. I did not transcribe all in-depth interviews, but prioritized those whose content I considered as having major relevance to the scope of this analysis. I made this selection as I went through the writing process and on the basis of handwritten notes and fieldnotes. The practice of listening to the tapes in conjunction with the revision of fieldnotes has been instrumental in drawing my attention to essential information and identifying key quotations and issues raised by the interviewees. Therefore, listening to the audiotapes helped me to decide which interviews I needed to transcribe or summarize.
I conducted a total of 45 in-depth interviews, 16 of them with researchers, scholars, officials, and NGO workers, on the one hand, and 29 with displaced people, on the other. Among the displaced people I interviewed, 25 were women and 4 men. Out of this total, 10 IDPs interviewed identified themselves as belonging to a racial/ethnic minority (Indigenous or Afro-Colombian people). I asked all my interviewees about their consent or refusal to be identified by their real name or a pseudonym and, in appropriate cases, about the position they hold in the organization they belong to. Whenever a person is quoted or referred to by her/his full name, it is her/his real name; first names are used to identify people who asked to be given a fictional name.

When it came to displaced people, I used an interview guide consisting of a number of questions divided in three sections. One set of questions pointed to the circumstances surrounding their displacement. Another set explored their current life in Bogotá, investigating the social links and spatial relations they have built. The third set of topics referred to their political participation, and mechanisms of transitional justice (for more details regarding interview topics, see Appendix 6). Concerning interviews with researchers, scholars, officials and NGO workers, I prepared individual interview guides according to each person’s area of expertise and position. Expertises included urban spatial issues, policies on armed conflict, forced displacement and mechanisms of transitional justice, and their intersection with gender and racial politics (for a list of interviewees, see Appendix 6).

The ethnographic material collected through these interviews exceeds the content presented in this analysis. This is due to adjustments I have made to the original writing proposal which, without overlooking the gender analysis of space, aimed at providing a narrative primarily intended for the immediate audience of this dissertation, who might not likely be familiar with Bogotá’s context. For this very reason, I devote a significant length of this dissertation to giving an account of the initial steps of Bogotá’s processes of urban renewal which took place throughout the mid-1990s. Whereas such spatial processes are not often reflected in IDPs’
narratives, their implementation involves a set of gendered dynamics that strongly affected the lives of other oppressed groups, for example, homeless people and urban dwellers gentrified from the center (see chapter 4). To be sure, among Bogotá’s inhabitants, displaced people occupy one of the most socially and spatially marginalized positions, and their position stems from—and is concomitant with—the ongoing dynamics of social segmentation occurring in the center. However, besides focusing on displaced people’s lives, I reflect on the experience of other oppressed populations, all of whom have become the killjoys of the dreamed city, revealing the wounds left behind through the process of urban renewal.

Taking the above into consideration, I also turned to the use of secondary data, especially available internet sources such as newspapers, online journals and magazines, reports from public and private agencies and feminist NGOs, as well as scholarly articles, many of them published by scholars associated to the Urban Studies Institute (IEU) of the National University of Colombia. By relying on these sources, I have obtained statistical and historical data and, in a major extent, I have conducted media and discourse analysis as well. As Rédai argues, building on Foucault, “discourse produces knowledges which are taken as ‘truth’, and knowledge has the power to make itself true” (2015: 19). Drawing from this perspective, I analyzed political discourses looking at how the productive force of power is articulated in both political language and spatial practices, so as to enable the process of urban renewal. An exploration of Bogotá’s urban ‘regime of truth’ coming out of political discourses, as I discuss in chapter 4, allows to identify how Bogotá’s urban space is framed as a problem and therefore as a space for action, who can speak and what can be said about public space, as well as the meanings attached to the urban model that the city has endeavored to build.

1.5 Outline

In light of the above discussion, in chapter 2, I provide an overview of how forcibly displaced people find themselves confronted with Bogotá’s urban space and in the midst of the city’s
neoliberal restructuring. I illustrate the spatial dissonance triggered by the displaced population’s attempts to remain in Bogotá, providing insight into the circumstances that caused IDPs’ forced migration to the city. Building on feminist perspectives, I place emphasis on the deployment of a militarist discourse that worked to overlook the protection of the civilian rural population and has yielded the tragedy of forced displacement. The chapter turns to a discussion of the reasons lying behind Colombia’s political shift into transitional justice undertook since 2011, focusing especially on the issue of the so-called Victims’ Law and on the recognition of the armed conflict. I conclude that, while these mechanisms open a window through which both the city and the national government strive to normalize IDPs’ lives, they also contribute to the city’s neoliberal globalization and to Colombia’s endeavors to achieve the country’s normalcy.

In chapter 3, I introduce some elements of three analytical clusters dominating the narrative on urban studies (global cities, critical urban theory and the Chicago School of Urban Sociology), which privilege the role of capital and global flows as primary driving forces acting upon the city, including its inhabitants and the state itself. Drawing upon feminist urban theory and postcolonial urban critiques, I shed light on the limits of such dominant narratives to explain processes of urban renewal occurring worldwide. Afterwards, I trace the emergence of discourses of quality of life and urban happiness, unmasking the role played by these discourses in enhancing the building of global cities and in fostering particular forms of urban subjectivity. Seeking to counteract these discourses, I propose a gendered right to the city as a lens through which to view, and a tool with which to enable, the spatial practices of oppressed and disenfranchised urban inhabitants. The second part of this chapter focuses on the relations between power and space, explaining how the management of life becomes a political issue and a technology for social control. The end of the chapter turns to the analysis of the right to the city and urban informality through the lens of “acts of citizenship” (Isin 2008). My purpose is to test the possibilities of this methodology to understand the strategies of resistance through which
inhabitants of the so-called Global South participate in shaping the places in which they live and vindicate the right to be and inhabit the city where they dwell.

The cultural and physical metamorphosis of Bogotá into a global city is the focus of the following two chapters. In chapter 4, I revisit in particular the changes carried out from the mid-1990s until the beginning of the 2000s. I analyze, first, the uses of discourses on the protection of life in the so-called Citizen Culture program and, second, the dynamics of spatial segregation and human disposability underpinning the beginning of Bogotá’s downtown gentrification. In contrast to the generally accepted assumption that the Citizen Culture program grew up through an apolitical consensus, I argue that this program brought about an overarching depolitization of the politics of urban renewal. Building on gendered approaches to security, I show that this depolitization was leveraged by the conjunction of two processes: the gendered regimes of masculinization and feminization and the securitization of public space. I argue that both processes worked to position the management of space as a rational, urgent, and technocratic process. In such a way, the defenders of Bogotá’s urban renewal have achieved to exonerate urban politics from being exposed to political debate, and to mobilize people’s support for the city’s rejuvenation.

Chapter 5 draws attention to the role of happiness in maintaining the engagement of Bogotá’s citizens in the transformation of the city and in reinforcing the role of urban space as a means to further proceed with the civilizing process of Bogotá’s inhabitants. Drawing on Sara Ahmed’s work, I disentangle the ways in which happiness is embedded in Bogotá’s spatial politics so as to turn the so-called project of the City We Want into a container of the expectations and wants of the city’s residents. With this analysis in mind, the chapter moves on to examine the program Bogotá Mission and the rationale of Bogotá’s urban planning and its architectural forms. Looking at the functioning and imbrications of these elements, I explore how they participate in the construction of a polycentric model of city and contribute to circulate the ideal of the dreamed city.
In chapter 6, I test the idea of Bogotá as a happy city by building on displaced people’s paths of “nomadic activism” and urban survival (Braidotti 2006). Taking a close look at ethnographic data, I establish how along their itineraries of displacement, displaced people engage in networking forms of activism through which they strive to navigate decision-making political processes. Simultaneously, I map a continuum of violence which operates as the violence of the conflict that triggered their displacement permeates and mutates into other forms of violence through Bogotá’s spatial order. This geography of violence is apparently more visible in the experiences of IDP women who, by engaging in political activism, challenge gender regimes underpinning the armed conflict. However, by drawing on the narratives of less politicized displaced women, I provide evidences of other forms of violence and exploitation which flow through layers of race, ethnicity, class, and gender entrenched in Bogotá’s spatial order. Thus, I show that the distributive justice that public space’s renewal has promised to bring about ends up hindering displaced people’s right to the city. First, it falls short in addressing the city’s socio-spatial segregation, and rather induces displaced people to join the ranks of the traditional urban poor. Furthermore, it forecloses the growth of political subjectivities that might allow this population’s access to mechanisms of transitional justice. I devote the end of the chapter to exploring moments of resistance through which displaced people challenge precisely their depoliticization and vindicate their access to transformative justice. But in performing those acts, displaced people also expose the wounds of exclusion and oppression that the city’s urban renewal has overlooked.

In the conclusion section, I underscore the potential of the gendered right to the city as a window through which to explore the effects of neoliberal processes of urban renewal, particularly on the lives of urban oppressed groups and on societies facing post-conflict situations. I argue that the dynamic of redistribution of flows through which Bogotá’s urban renewal is being implemented fails to render this city homogeneous and perpetuates its spatial
segregated order. In such circumstances, the city is not in tune with the endeavor of enabling displaced people’s access to transformative socio-spatial justice. However, I argue that transitional justice mechanisms constitute an avenue through which displaced people exert their right to the city, as these acts allow them to reenact themselves as political actors and give back to public space the agonistic character of which it has been stripped.

In the final remarks of the conclusion, I sketch the main contributions of this research by making a more general case about the uses of a gendered right to the city in building social-spatial justice in global South cities. With a special emphasis on gendered challenges in a post-conflict context, these final remarks take the gendered right to the city as a platform to shed light on emerging forms of exploitation and a continuum of violence that undermine displaced people’s chances of overcoming their victim’s condition. It concludes by mapping some links between transitional justice and the gendered right to the city, underlining the need of integrating mechanism of traditional justice in the agendas of global South cities emerging from internal conflicts.
CHAPTER 2 – BRINGING DISSONANCE INTO THE BOGOTÁ WE WANT:
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND IDPs AS A KEY SOCIAL PROBLEM

2.1. Introduction

In his inaugural speech on 1 January 2012, the recently elected Mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, reasserted his intention to build a city that would place the human being at the center of its development, and then challenged the audience by asking them to consider whether “life is ensured in the city’s territory” (Petro 2012). After this opening, Petro used the signifier water—defined as synonymous with life—as the leitmotif of his speech and, by doing so, reiterated his commitment to guaranteeing a minimum amount of free water supply for the poorest sector of the population. But the Mayor’s speech built on water management was also instrumental in addressing issues that go beyond this single project. Actually, Petro went forward, asserting that the city should be organized around water resources, and ultimately called into question the current model of Bogotá re-urbanization. As he pointed out, while the renovation of the city was serving the interests of big real estate projects bringing about the gentrification of poorer downtown residents, social interest housing projects aimed at relocating poorer sectors were being developed in flood-prone lands located in the peripheral areas of the city. Although this latter subject went initially almost unnoticed by the media, it introduced the main flags of Petro’s development plan, namely the fight against spatial segregation and the socio-spatial inclusion of the internally displaced population inhabiting Bogotá, which throughout his administration became some of the most controversial subjects.

The following chapter does not seek to provide an extensive description of the material spatial transformations carried out throughout Bogotá’s urban space, or to enter into an in-depth analysis of the Colombian armed conflict and the narratives of the facts surrounding IDPs’ forced displacement. What this section strives to develop is a meaningful narrative context aimed
at explaining how the production of urban space in Bogotá undertaken from the mid-1990s relates to a wider project of Colombian neoliberal globalization, how this normative project is achieved through spatial practices but yet goes beyond the transformation of the material space, and in addition, to identify some symbolic and material mechanisms involved in the process of urban regeneration which particularly seek IDPs’ normalization. I will show how the country’s normalization and Bogotá’s urban rejuvenation particularly affect displaced people, and the differential ways in which IDPs’ conditions of gender, race/ethnicity, class and place of origin play a role in shaping or reinforcing their urban exclusion.

The chapter consists of six sections including this introduction. Starting with a mention of the initial uses of discourses on life in Bogotá, in the first section I sketch some elements of the process of Bogotá’s urban renewal. The second section locates Bogotá’s rejuvenation within the spectrum of Colombia’s process of neoliberalization, and furthermore shows how both processes have been shaped and enabled by a socio-political transformation undergone by the country since the 1990s, which crystallized in a new constitutional regime. In section three, I provide a perspective on how the displaced population, despite the reluctance of the city’s political leaders and its long-term inhabitants, has steadily turned into a subject of concern for local politics, to the point of becoming a chief character in political discourses aimed at challenging the model of the city’s rejuvenation. I then turn towards the Colombian internal armed conflict and the dynamics that have triggered one of the greatest displacement crises in the world. Hence, while section four explains the local understating of the IDP condition and some of the struggles and debates that preceded the recognition of the IDPs’ victim status, section five outlines the main features of the armed conflict. It also explains some of the reasons why, despite the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, IDPs’ return does not appear to be a sustainable solution. In section six, I lay out the puzzle of Colombia’s normalization, by establishing the linkages between Bogotá’s urban restructuring, the country’s
neoliberalization, and the shift undertaken by Santos’s government towards human rights issues and towards a negotiated peace. In the conclusion, I offer a perspective of the roles assigned to displaced people in the paths of both Bogotá to attain the status of global city and Colombia to become a normal country.

As this chapter attempts to illustrate, IDPs are not absent from the country’s and the city’s transformative project, but are rather a productive subject induced into a self-regulatory process that is useful to maintain the engagement of Bogotá’s inhabitants in the transformation of the city to secure the Colombian path towards normalcy.

Let me begin by asserting that the use of life as a recurrent signifier in Bogotá’s politics is by no means new. In fact, discourses around life, as that elaborated by Petro, have been reiteratively deployed to articulate the enterprise of the city’s rejuvenation initiated in the mid-1990s; the very same model which Petro’s administration attempted to reformulate. The proliferation of discourses about life in Bogotá highlights one of the main features of the city’s regeneration process, that is, that such a process does not merely involve the physical transformation of the city, but instead consists in a biopolitical process that, along with territorial disciplining, takes the protection of life as its main political concern. In the name of making the Bogotá We Want and insisting that Life is Sacred, Bogotá has endured a process of regeneration whose first step consisted in launching a pedagogical campaign called Citizen in Formation. Through this strategy, the philosopher and former Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus aimed at struggling against what he called the ‘contagion’ of an ‘epidemic of violence’ brought about by the drug trafficking culture. The campaign took public space as the “common ground where urban citizens learn to interact” (Pasotti 2010: 118), and in this way, linked from the beginning the governance of space with citizens’ behavior. In fact, among the elements involved in Citizen in Formation, the Mockus administration included thumbs-up and thumbs-down cards which were used to approve or disapprove other citizens’ behavior; life-size cardboard cutouts of police figures into which
anyone could place her/his head as a simulacrum to embody a police officer, and from this location, could observe others; as well as mimes whose role was to regulate the relation between pedestrians and motorists and eventually to imitate citizens’ behavior in order to ridicule inappropriate conduct. In such a way, the *Citizen in Formation*’s campaign avoided any repressive means and instead used methodologies proper to biopolitics, in which “interaction with others is thought to influence the internal standards that individuals use to regulate their own behavior” (Hindess 2005: 396).

Consistent with this biopolitical approach, the achievements of Mockus’s initiatives were statistically demonstrated through indicators that emphasized their impact on protecting life such as “the number of lives saved” per year and “coexistence indicators” (Pasotti 2010: 123–128). Moreover, the disciplinary methods triggered what the Mayor called a ‘civic pride,’ thereby overcoming the former adverse image of Bogotá through which it was frequently described as “the home of all and nobody’s land” (Rueda-García 2003: 5). Such a sense of belonging fueled Bogotanos’ will to engage in the next step of the city’s urban modernization. Afterwards, the urban renewal program was prompted by Mayor Enrique Peñalosa with the slogan *For the Bogotá We Want* and advertised as a citizen engagement aimed at improving the quality of life of all the city’s inhabitants. In legal terms, the city’s rejuvenation has been guided by a territorial development plan—known by its Spanish acronym POT (*Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* – Territorial Ordering Plan)—formally issued in 2000 and revised in 2003 (Beuf 2011a: 149). In general, the POT focuses on the development of a sustainable and productive city, by emphasizing strategies such as the regaining of control over public space and slum areas, the creation of vast pedestrian areas, the setup of a modern and efficient mobility system, the development of green areas and the protection of the so-called “Primary Ecological Structure” (Pasotti 2010: 172). But in a broader perspective, the POT provides for the ordering of Bogotá’s space through a so-called polycentric model, which involves the consolidation of the center as
well as the consolidation and creation of 21 urban nodes (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá 2004: Art. 23; see Appendix 4, Map 2). Specifically, the latter are “places with attributes of centrality” but located in peripheral areas which were previously in disadvantage (Beuf 2011a: 149; Salazar-Ferro 2009: 17). In such an urban design, while the downtown is intended to serve as hub for international flows and other centralities are aimed at attracting regional flows, peripheral centralities are meant to fulfill the needs of local population by bringing public services (e.g., education, health, cultural events) and employment closer to the communities. This model of polycentric city, also prompted by some urban analysts, was thus promoted as a means to redistribute opportunities throughout urban space (Beuf 2011a: 149; Noriega 2000: 132).

As a matter of fact, the more the re-urbanization process proceeds, the more it receives support. Indeed, Pasotti (2010) underlines the way in which political parties in Bogotá witnessed their own decline as electors chose to give their support to pragmatic leaders based on their commitment to the continuation of the city’s urban modernization. The trend described by Pasotti is currently referred to as ‘technocracy’ and ‘anti-partisan politics,’ both of them seen as conditions that enabled Bogotá’s successful transformation and made this city an example of good governance (Gilbert 2015; Pasotti 2010). Best embodied in Mockus and Peñalosa, these modes of governing have gained ample support among Bogotá’s constituencies and have granted enormous credibility to those mayors. Nevertheless, despite the hegemonic nature of this political approach, it did not prevent the city’s residents from electing between 2004 and 2012 mayors supported by the left. However, leftist administrations have permanently faced suspicion of attempting to derail the seemingly apolitical commonsense rationality on which the city’s project of redevelopment is, allegedly, grounded. And it is perhaps for this reason that at the beginning of his term in 2004, Lucho Garzón hastily asserted “I will not indulge in populism in the mayor’s office” and afterwards detached himself from the most radical sector of the left (Gilbert and Garcés 2008: 61).
Certainly, Garzón’s leftist orientation could be traced in social programs (e.g., anti-hunger program and gender policies, see chapter 5). However, Garzón and his successor Samuel Moreno never addressed concerns about the city’s socio-spatial segregation, and were depicted as mayors that fully endorsed the continuation of the model of city rejuvenation laid out by their anti-partisan predecessors (see Tixier 2010: 48–49, 2011). On the contrary, the objections to this model raised by Petro’s leftist government since its entry into office in 2012 were routinely dismissed by the media, and his attempts to reformulate the project were systematically blocked by the city council. To the point that at the end of Petro’s administration, a revanchist campaign led by allegedly anti-partisan supporters turned the city into a technocratic rule and brought Peñalosa back into the Bogotá Mayor’s office. Hence, at the end of the day, the city was driven by a self-disciplinary movement that reinstalled in Bogotanos’ mind the ideal of building the *City We Want* (see chapter 5).

However, it is crucial to take into account that neither the model of city rejuvenation that Mockus and Peñalosa defended nor their hegemonic political anti-partisan posture could have taken place without the social and economic shift undertaken by Colombia since the early 1990s, which provided a favorable terrain for the building of Bogotá as a neoliberal city. In the next paragraphs, I will turn towards this shift, focusing my attention on the most relevant elements for the subject of this research.

How was the Colombian government able to shift from a protectionist model of development to a neoliberal one? Were the pursuit of peace and the extension of human rights to excluded groups or oppressed communities a mere smokescreen to enable such a neoliberal turn? Or has it opened up possibilities for building a more democratic society? What are the implications of both economic and social shifts in shaping the politics of urban space? Do these transformations modulate the right to the city of populations disproportionally affected by Bogotá’s segregated urban order? Given the current situation where local and national powers
strive to articulate the requirements of transitional justice and their efforts to become global players, one can have the impression that history repeats itself. If this is the case, it is timely to consider whether the discourse of spatial order and urban planning are really a means for increasing spatial sustainability and for bringing about spatial justice, or if, instead, they are precisely instruments of intervention aimed at building a space where the free market and laissez-faire govern.

2.2. Neoliberalism, Human Rights, and the Colombian Constitution: A Model to Build Colombia’s Future or a Contentious Puzzle?

The motto Colombians: Welcome to the Future is often evoked in order to refer to the turning point undertaken by Colombia in the 1990s (Hernández 2013). Pronounced by ex-President Cesar Gaviria in his inaugural speech, this sentence became a symbolic frame through which Gaviria simultaneously led the country to enact a new Constitution and to undergo economic liberalization. Internally called economic opening (apertura económica), this reform strongly reflected the neoliberal policies prompted through the Washington Consensus (see chapter 3). Oriented by this agenda, the package of measures adopted by Colombia included, among others, ―trade openness, privatization, labor market reform, [and] capital account opening‖ (Olivera et al. 2010: 19). Evident effects of this neoliberal turn are the increasing dominance of private investors in “bank, health, energy sector and telecommunications” at the national level (Gilbert and Garcés 2008: 53). However, it is worthwhile emphasizing that both constitutional and economic transformations were closely imbricated and that perhaps none of them could have seen the light of the day without the other.

Over time, however, few analyses of Colombia’s neoliberal turn refer to the enormous transformations that it brought about in the labor market. And this is not because its effects are invisible, but perhaps because the idea of the need to flexibilize the labor force as a requirement for competitiveness has turned into an uncontested truth for which there is no alternative.
Beginning in the early 1990s, neoliberal labor reforms focused mainly on offering new forms of contracts. So, besides measures that reduced employment guarantees, labor costs, and lowered legal protection against pregnancy discrimination, labor reforms enhanced the use of subcontracting, outsourcing and temporary employment, even in the public sector. Some consequences of such changes have been the undermining of job security, loss of purchasing power, promotion of competition among workers, weakening of workers’ resistance, as well as the erosion of the power of trade unions (Talcott 2004: 474). To this must be added the privatization of public enterprises, the loss of formal jobs and the multiplication of informality. In 2012, self-employment reached 43% at the national level, among these jobs 85% were informal and 95% lacked of social protection (Vásquez 2012). Therefore, the shift to the neoliberal model has produced a group of what is cynically called “expected winners” composed of unqualified and informal labor, to the detriment of an “organized labor” depicted as the expected “losers” (Rettberg et al. 2014).

According to Gilbert and Garcés, the “neoliberal regime” introduced in Colombia by Gaviria sought to increase international trade and was promoted by arguing the need to reduce fiscal deficit (2008: 35). Hence, the imperative of “reducing the size of the state” and narratives according to which corruption would be tackled by lowering politicians’ influence on issues such as infrastructure and public services were the order of the day (Ibid.). Nevertheless, according to Olivera et al., there was simultaneously the recognition that “Colombia’s public sector was too weak and small to deal effectively with security, globalization, and social challenges” (2010: 2). Therefore, unlike other Latin American countries, pro-market measures introduced in Colombia since the 1990s have been accompanied by the reinforcement of political and financial powers of local units (i.e., departments, cities, townships), an increase of basic social services coverage and the strengthening of the judiciary (Ibid.). The increasing coverage of welfare services did not necessarily entail the direct involvement of the state, as social services have been more and
more delivered through outsourcing or through public-private partnerships. Hence, the advent of neoliberal globalization in Colombia cannot be described as an absolute “roll-back” and “roll-out” of institutional arrangements of the type suggested by the critiques of neoliberalism discussed in chapter 3. In contrast, and in line with the reflections of Colombian ex-Finance Minister, Guillermo Perry, what could be claimed is that Colombian neoliberalism has attempted to echo the idea of “as much market as possible and as much state as necessary” (2011).

But no doubt such state intervention has primarily sought to allow the dominance of laissez-faire economic ideology (Benería 1999). When asked about how his government managed to introduce such a neoliberal package, also referred to as a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), ex-President Gaviria asserted that his political party (Liberal) had a majority in the congress. But more importantly, he added that the opposition was “distracted” with the drafting of the new Constitution (Olivera et al. 2010: 18). In order to better understand Gaviria’s words, it is illustrating to turn toward the socio-political background in which the 1991 Constitution was enacted and to attempt to make sense of the great hopes placed upon it by a large part of the Colombian population.

The enactment of a new Constitution had been envisaged since Barco’s administration (1986-1990) and was pursued by Gaviria (1991-1994), as both of them saw this instrument as a means to overcome the fragile legitimacy of political elites. According to Uprimny and Sánchez (2013: 34), social exclusion and intolerance, limited political participation, and recurrent violations of human rights—most of them committed through “the uses and abuses of the state of exception”—were some of the markers of ruling elites’ political illegitimacy. At that time, they constituted both the main symptoms that the new Constitution was aimed to tackle and some of the circumstances that justified the existence of guerrilla movements (Gillin 2015). Thus, the new Constitution came to be understood as the cornerstone of a political and social pact that would enable the disarmament and reincorporation of the guerrilla M-19, the first guerrilla
group that engaged and reached a peace agreement with the Colombian government (García et al. 2008: 7). The building of the Constitution involved the formation of a constitutional assembly which allowed the participation of democratically elected ex-M19 guerrilla members, and culminated in July 1991 with the approval of a new Constitution that sealed the peace agreement (Sánchez 2006: 24). But the formation of the constitutional assembly was also actively supported by other constituencies, among them Indigenous groups, Black communities, women’s groups, and student movements for whom the new Constitution opened up possibilities to overcome a precarious democratic system and to enhance democratic participation (Uprimny and Sánchez 2013: 34).

For the women’s social movement, the constitutional process was an opportunity they could not afford to miss. Working through a network that they called Women for the Constitutional Reform, and under slogans such as “without women, democracy doesn’t function” and “democracy in the country and at home,” women submitted a draft to the constitutional assembly. According to Diana Gómez (2011), the diversity of women (e.g., academics, activists, peasants, militants of political parties, members of trade unions) was one of the strengths of the movement. However, confronted with the dilemma of double militancy (i.e., simultaneously belonging to two groups), the women’s movement failed to achieve direct representation in the constitutional assembly. Yet, through their advocacy during the constitutional process, they achieved the inclusion of articles aimed at the effective incorporation of the CEDAW (Thomas 2006). Although their proposals in terms of sexual and reproductive rights—for instance voluntary motherhood and the recognition of alternative forms of family—were not incorporated in the Constitution, they achieved advances in political participation and decision-making positions as well as in anti-discriminatory measures (Gómez 2011: 185).

Besides the affirmation of civil and political rights, the 1991 Constitution defined the country as multicultural and multiethnic and, along this line, also included social and cultural rights. It is
with this concern in mind that the Constitution laid the basis for the subsequent development of positive action laws which, ideally, seek the cultural protection of Indigenous groups and Afro-Colombian communities (Mosquera and León 2009: 49; Escobar 1998). Such laws involve ownership rights over traditional lands and the right to prior consultation with respect to laws and projects related to these communities and their lands (Ocampo and Agudelo 2014). Furthermore, striving to provide guarantees for political participation of minority parties, the new Constitution stipulates that “international treaties and agreements ratified by Congress that recognize human rights and that prohibit their limitation in states of emergency have priority domestically” (OCW: Art. 93).

But, as the slogan Welcome to the Future suggests, the new Constitution attempted to go much further than to improve the legitimacy of the central government and to address human rights issues. Underlying the enactment of the new Constitution, there was also the intention to foster political modernization. The Constitution therefore provides mechanisms to increase political accountability and to enable political decentralization and economic autonomy of political entities (Ibid.). The decentralization fostered by the Constitution can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Establishment of popular elections of mayors and governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary</td>
<td>Transfer of 50% of national current revenues to subnational governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i.e., departments, cities and townships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Local governments’ management of policies concerning health, education,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>water supply and basic sanitation, recreation, culture and sports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Botero and Suárez 2010: 14)

As it can be inferred from this balance, the augmentation of available financial resources came with major responsibilities for local governments. According to the Constitution, such responsibilities include for instance “[t]o adopt the appropriate plans and programs of economic and social development and of public works. … To vote for taxes and local expenditures,” to issue its annual budget, as well as “[t]o regulate the uses of the land and … control the activities connected with the construction and sale of housing slated for residences” (OCW: Art. 313).
Much of these functions are reflected in the requirement for cities to formulate instruments of urban planning as those previously mentioned, namely development plans and territorial ordering plans POTs (Beuf 2011b: 59).

The support given by the Constitution to the political and budgetary autonomy of local governments transformed not only the relation between the city’s Mayor and the national government, but, in Bogotá, it also modified the relations of power between the mayoral office and the legislative power of the city represented by the city council. The so-called Bogotá’s Organic Statute (Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá) issued in 1993 provides the city with managerial autonomy from the rest of the country by setting limits between the executive branch and the legislative branch, thus increasing the Mayor’s power, giving him/her autonomy to appoint his/her own government staff and administrative heads and to draft the city development plan (Santos 2007: 11). In addition, Bogotá’s Statute went even further, endowing the Mayor with the power to “pass district development plans and territorial organization plans by decree”; a measure explicitly aimed at giving the Mayor the means to overcome political blockages (Pasotti 2010: 53). Indeed, this power was used by Peñalosa in order to pass his development plan. However, the same faculty was denied to Petro when he tried to make use of it in order to pass his reform of the POT, the aim of which was to overturn the city’s socio-spatial segregation (see chapter 5).

But coming back to the changes brought about by the new Constitution, it is pertinent to point out that this Constitutional Charter incorporated social and ecological functions into the notion of property (OCW: Art. 58; Maldonado 2008, 2004). This movement disrupted an unbalanced and entrenched conception that, according to Maldonado, “still tends to overemphasize the rights of owners to the detriment of their responsibilities” (Fernandes and Maldonado 2009: 15). Governed by a laissez-faire rationale, in Latin America such conception of property has reduced the land to productive and consumerist uses and has fostered the idea that all the territory should
be urbanized or exploited (Ibid.: 16). Unlike such pervading belief, the social and ecological dimensions of land should ideally allow the state to enforce fiscal and spatial measures crucial for the building of a more democratic urban space; perhaps, borrowing Maldonado’s words, it would be one that strives “to conciliate the right of landlords with the very real needs of the community” (2004: 257). But what does this dimension allow in practical terms? The possibilities opened up by the inclusion of the social and ecological dimensions in the notion of property involve, for example, determining the criteria for the calculation of compensation in cases of expropriation, enforcing uses of land that promote the building of social housing projects or that allow the creation of public spaces and infrastructure, as well as the government’s capacity to recapture part of the increasing value resulting from public investments and changes in the uses of land (Fernandes and Maldonado 2009: 18; Maldonado 2004).

After having considered some legal tools stemming from the inclusion of these dimensions, we can enquire about their possibilities for shaping representations about the city. What challenges do social and ecological functions of land pose regarding the right to the city? And, furthermore, how do such functions conflict, or imbricate, with the construction of Bogotá as a neoliberal city? In order to address these questions, it is illuminating to consider the way in which the right to the city has been understood in the local context. As Maldonado explains:

In Latin America and particularly in Colombia, the closest representation of the city is not one linked to access to freedom and emancipation against arbitrariness. On the contrary, it is one of a space from where benefits can be obtained, where what counts first is the ability to take advantage of the opportunities; just as it was delineated during the Spanish Conquest and comfortably maintained by our elites. (2004: 359)

At first, Maldonado seems to hint at the shortcomings of non-democratic regimes in Latin America which remained in power until the 1990s, or of states of exception which have systematically repressed and criminalized social protests. But simultaneously, her analysis

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5 The term ‘criminalization of social protest’ refers to a political strategy used by governments through which social and civil rights struggle is presented as a criminal offense, and social actors who take part in it are framed as offenders/delinquents (Rojas-Páez 2014).
touches upon a limited notion of urban space which, imbued by the dimension of ownership, has worked to undermine aspects such as the enjoyment of the city, community participatory processes, and even more, has jeopardized a sense of urban solidarity (see also Kern 2010).

According to Maldonado, an emphasis on property that overshadows the social and ecological dimension of land has ended by reducing the right to the city to access to housing ownership, and in so doing it has positioned extensive urbanization as a sign of “progress and civilization” (2004: 359). This discourse, that serves the interest of the building industry, has been deployed with the concurrence of ruling authorities (Ibid.: 361). Against this background, it is worth returning to consider how local people make sense of the right to the city, and how their perception could be in entire opposition to the notion of land based on ownership entailed in politicians’ developmentalist perspective. Speaking from her experience, Maldonado asserted in 2004:

My recent research on the meaning of the right to the city indicates, among other urban factors in Bogotá, that the struggle for urban inclusion of the most disadvantaged inhabitants lies not so much in the access to entitled and registered property, but in a space or a place where to exist. This is facilitated by access to public and social services, and is complemented by access to work (which is not necessarily access to job). Hence, although it is not manifest or explicit, the claim for the right to the city is above all about being considered as subjects, who demand to be heard and taken into account. (2004: 36)

The discrepancy between the people and the politicians’ understandings of the right to the city and, by the same token, the tension between access to property on the one hand, and the social and ecological dimensions of land, on the other, are not at odds with the contradictory tenets enshrined in the Constitution. This, perhaps, is also the result of the ambitious expectations placed in this Charter, since, while for some it was aimed at addressing human rights concerns and at bringing about a better democracy, for others it sought to provide the tools for allowing the country’s integration into the global neoliberal economy. In light of this, it is pertinent to ask: what are the implications of these tensions in Bogotá’s urban politics?
Besides the general measures discussed above, the neoliberal model conveyed by the Colombian economic liberalization implied serious reconfigurations in the spatial administration of the city. They included the transformation of the role of the state in the production of housing, the introduction of the notion of economic freedom and other norms such as the state mandate to strengthen and “stimulate enterprise development,” as well as the prohibition of almost any monopoly (OCW: Art. 333, 336). These measures ended by preventing Bogotá’s government from participating in the supply of social housing, and have also prompted the state withdrawal from areas such as garbage collection and health care, and the partial privatization or creation of private-public partnerships for the provision of services such as transport, energy, and education (Estrada 2006: 261; Gilbert and Garcés 2008: 35; Gonzáles and Noguera 2016). Abandoning direct involvement in the building of housing, with the advent of neoliberalism, the role of the state shifted to facilitating the participation of private investors in the building industry and focused on the provision of demand-side subsidies for housing (Beuf 2013: 61).

Such approach to the production of housing has brought about an increase in land prices and a shortage of affordable housing for the poorest sectors. A tangible shortcoming of such approach is that, between 2000 and 2009, only 6% of the housing produced in Bogotá was affordable to households earning less than twice the minimum wage (Maldonado 2009). In addition, by 2005 the quantitative deficit of social housing was estimated in 369,874 units (Beuf and García 2016: 393). This shortage, according to Maldonado (2011), has direct implications in the persistence of urban informality (see chapters 5 and 6). Another consequence of this policy is the widespread acceptance of the idea that social housing should be built only in the peripheries of the city, since those are the areas where prices are lower. Furthermore, it works to privilege urban expansion over policies oriented towards the densification of the built city (Maldonado 2011). Whether it is intentional or not, the addition of all of these factors brings about a dynamic, which works to

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maintain the city’s socio-spatial segregation. A serious implication of such geography is the reduction of women’s chances to access job opportunities, as well as the difficulty to articulate reproductive and productive activities, which thereby perpetuates the exclusion of those located in the lower social layers, particularly displaced households headed by women, who in 2014 represented 49% of IDP families, while in the general population female-headed households were estimated at 23% (Ferris 2014: 14).

The neoliberal turn thus achieved the hegemonic acceptance of the supposed efficiency and neutrality of the ‘free-market’ and managed to keep intact the city’s socio-spatial geography, while simultaneously bringing into the city the discourse of urban competitiveness. Relying on mechanisms facilitated by the new Constitution such as citizen participation and decentralization, the discourse of urban competitiveness was implanted in Bogotá through the process of participatory urban planning. Boosted with great strength by the administrations of ex-Mayor Mockus (1995-1997 and 2001-2003), it is in this scenery of strategic participatory urban planning where the polycentric model that Bogotá strives to build emerged. Besides spatial material changes, the making of the neoliberal city has involved the building of marketing strategies, most of them mobilized by Invest in Bogotá; an agency related to Bogotá Chamber of Commerce whose role is to attract foreign investors and to provide sustained advice before and during the implementation of their business activities.

At its starting point, the design of the polycentric model aimed at articulating two main objectives: the integration of Bogotá into the global economy and social and territorial equality (Beuf 2011b: 94). However, the social aspect ended by being subordinated by the discourse of urban competitiveness (see chapter 4). Despite the displacement of equality concerns, it has not prevented leftist city administrations from granting their support for the continuity of the project of urban redevelopment (Ibid.: 95). Hence, it was not until Petro’s administration that the
model of city was called into question, when concerns about increasing urbanization were linked to the way in which it hindered IDPs’ attempts of social and spatial integration.

It is in this politico-economic context that this analysis raises the following questions: Are there sufficient reasons to include IDPs’ experience of urban exclusion as a concern of the city? Do attempts to render justice, peace and reparation to those victims of the armed conflict have something to do with Bogotá’s urban renewal? These are the main questions guiding the analysis that I develop in the following section.

2.3 Challenging the Dream of The City We Want

The Colombian armed conflict and the plight of displaced people are subjects largely addressed by human rights researchers, scholars in refugee literature and even within analyses concerned with the so-called war on drugs. But in parallel, some authors have referred to it as one of the so-called “protracted conflicts,” meaning that “it has been ongoing for a relatively long period of time” (Nilsson and Kreutz 2010: 6), or as “forgotten conflicts,” meaning that it has been neglected by the government or that it has been absent from mass media coverage (Wallensteen 2012: 252). This despite the peace agreement signed between the Colombian government and the guerrilla FARC in 2016, which attempts to put an end to the internal war that has lasted for almost 60 years. However, the paradoxical invisibility or indifference towards the internal conflict, implied in the descriptors introduced above, also takes place at the very heart of Bogotá’s urban space. Indeed, it has been asserted for a long time that the war stops at the doors of the city; a city where, moreover, the majority of media attention switches easily from the coverage of national and international politics to debates around the city administration and its process of urban renovation whilst sidestepping the conflict issue. In such a landscape, it is likely that the only sort of experience that reminds Bogotanos that the armed conflict does exist would be an encounter with a displaced person—whether he/she is begging on the street or participating in a public demonstration. Among these instances are public space occupations
aimed at calling attention to the lack of social protection for IDPs, or rallies supported by women’s movements or other members of the civil society aimed at pressuring the Colombian government to carry out dialogue to put an end to the armed conflict. Both kinds of public demonstrations challenge the idea that the city can go on turning a blind eye to the plight of displaced people who live in it.

For a long time, the deep-rooted trivialization of the tragedy of forced displacement provided reluctant city administrations with an excuse to exclude the IDP population as key actors of its social policy (Oslander 2016). Instead, the city’s authorities were given overwhelming support to keep their focus on the process of urban renewal. But despite this orientation, in 2009, the city administration was abruptly forced to recognize that the Bogotá We Want was leaving to their own fate hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants, and in particular, at least 300,000 forcibly displaced people who had heretofore arrived in the city fleeing the ravages of the internal armed conflict. Indeed, in March 2009, IDPs were able to draw public attention by carrying out a massive and long-term occupation of the Third Millennium Park, gathering about 1,000 displaced families. Confronted with the difficulties of dealing with the demonstration and of dispersing such amount of people camping in the very center of the city, the district Secretary, Clara López, was led to declare the humanitarian emergency faced by the displaced population and urged the national government to intervene (Semana 2009).

Hence, whereas IDPs became a political hot potato between the city and the national government, the Third Millennium Park—one of the iconic landmark of the city’s gentrification—turned into a “symbol of the tragedy of forced displacement” (Ibid.; see chapter 6). However, the divergences between the Mayor’s office and Uribe’s government were reflected in the perception of Bogotá’s inhabitants who see IDPs as a threat to the achievements of the process of the city’s transformation. While for a large proportion of Bogotanos, displaced people embody the menace of violence that they believe they have overcome, simultaneously, IDPs
represent a threat that jeopardizes the progress the city has made with respect to recovering public space and improving economic and environmental sustainability, advances in which Bogotanos have symbolically and materially invested and that they want to protect.

Indeed, Bogotá is the city with the largest number of displaced people in the country and, according to the district Housing Secretary, between 2002 and 2011 the city received about 366,000 people forcibly displaced. The Colombian non-governmental organization Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (hereinafter CODHES) estimates that in 2011 alone, 41,246 IDPs arrived in Bogotá (2012: 4). Even though, in general, displaced people are scattered throughout the city, most of them are clearly located on the outskirts of Bogotá, drawing a geography notoriously organized along ethnic and racial lines. In particular, while the majority of Afro-Colombian people tend to live in peripheral areas or even on the edge of the city, Indigenous IDPs have settled mainly in central impoverished areas—places in decline near the center. In an interview with Margarita Gil, adviser at Bogotá’s High Council for Victims’ Rights, Peace and Reconciliation between 2012 and 2015, the official explained such a spatial distribution by asserting that inhabiting the center allows the Indigenous population to access administrative services and public institutions, and furthermore, because “they might have a different sense of space, so they are not used to taking public transport.” By the same token, Gil points out that “indigenous people are more likely to walk,” therefore such proximity to the city’s downtown gives them the possibility to sell their handicrafts and, in many cases, to resort to begging as means of livelihood. In contrast, Afro-Colombian IDPs from both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts are mostly located in border neighborhoods such as Suba and Ciudad Bolívar due to the web of social relations they have re-created in such spaces. However, it is important to note that for displaced Indigenous people, selling handicrafts has brought about men and

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7 Public presentation of Helga Maria Rivas, official of the district housing secretariat, Bogotá’s Summit “Cities and Climate Change,” November 20, 2012.
8 Interview with Margarita Gil, Bogotá, 27 July 2012.
9 Ibid.
women’s differential use of Bogotá’s public space. It is so because, while both of them participate in the making of handicrafts, it is Indigenous women who are in charge of selling them in downtown streets (see Appendix 3, Photos 1–3). In general, Gil underlines that IDPs seek out places where people of the same regional origin live, but frequently, people from Southern regions of the country settle in Southern areas of Bogotá (e.g., Ciudad Bolívar, Bosa) because these are entry points to the city (see Appendix 4, Map 3).

While the strategic and subjective reasons highlighted by the official play a role in determining IDPs’ location throughout the city, additional findings of my fieldwork point to other additional conditions, mainly concerned with poverty and security, which might have a strong impact in determining the places in which IDPs are driven to inhabit. Indeed, mapping the areas where the greatest number of IDPs reside shows that these coincide with the areas of the city where land prices are lower. But, furthermore, such areas are those with “the worst social conditions of Bogotá” as reflected in the “lowest level of urban amenities … and lowest number of police stations per habitant” (Barrios and Lazarevski 2009: 11). Actually, the violent circumstances that have triggered IDPs’ forced displacement as well as the poverty-stricken conditions of the places where the majority of IDPs live have greatly contributed to a dramatic decline in their standard of living. As scholar Marcela Ceballos (2012) notes, about 60% of family households owned their own land before they were forcibly uprooted, and moreover, 24% of displaced people belonged to a community or political organization. In contrast, after being displaced, IDPs’ incomes are reduced by about 50%, so that nearly 94% live below the poverty line and, in 2012, the rate of unemployment among them reached 35.5%. The losses of material assets and the social disruption endured by IDPs are rarely overcome, which plays a pivotal role in the process of marginalization and long-term pauperization of the IDP population. As a result, the

10 Interview with displaced Indigenous women, Bogotá, December 29, 2012.
11 This is more than three times the national average unemployment rate, which was estimated at 10.2% in 2012. See PNUD Colombia, “Población Desplazada y Mercado de Trabajo,” Red de Observatorios Regionales del Mercado de Trabajo –Red ORMET, Boletín no.1, February 2014. See also “Desempleo entre los Desplazados Es del 35,5%,” Portafolio, February 20, 2014, accessed January 14, 2015, http://www.portafolio.co/economia/desempleo-los-desplazados.
positioning on IDPs tends to be tied up with that of the poor population whether in political or ordinary day-to-day discourses. In fact, during an interview, a Mayor’s office adviser underlined the difficulties to consider IDPs differently from the so-called ‘historically impoverished population,’ insofar as the latter category consists mostly of people—and their descendants—who arrived in the city after they had fled from the so-called partisan violence that occurred in the country between the mid-1940s and the mid-1950s.13

In order to emphasize its commitment to ensure the restoration of the rights IDPs have been stripped of as a result of their forced uprooting, the city administration had set up by December 2014 six offices, so-called Dignify Centers, specifically intended to serve the IDP population (Shultz et al. 2014). Those Centers provide information aimed at facilitating and ensuring IDPs’ priority access to services such as education, health, community dining rooms and kindergartens. During Petro’s administration, a significant effort was made by the Mayor’s office in order to set up provisional shelters. However, these places had only the capacity to accommodate about 300 people, and during 2012, they were basically assigned to Indigenous people on the basis of their high level of health vulnerability. Notoriously, the central changes introduced by Petro’s administration through the setting up of the Dignify Centers consisted of bringing together in one place officials able to provide orientation about every social program—of the city and the nation—to which IDPs may be entitled. This includes functionaries before whom displaced persons must state the facts surrounding their displacement, which is a compulsory process in order to be granted official recognition as IDPs and to receive humanitarian aid. Some of the Centers provide legal support to IDPs so that they could obtain benefits administered by the national government, such as humanitarian aid and different kinds of monetary compensation,

12 The Violence—La Violencia—is the period during which the Colombian Liberal and Conservative parties engaged in a bloody struggle for state power.
as well as access to the land restitution program and cash transfer programs (e.g., *Families in Action*).

In 2012 Petro’s administration launched a district agreement aimed at improving the support to displaced people, denouncing the non-existence of financial resources specifically allocated to the IDP population, which implied that the attention to IDPs’ needs would compete with that of the poor population.\(^{15}\) Thereupon, the city administration submitted a tax reform to the city council, which included an allocation meant to fund the program for victims’ protection. However, despite repeated attempts, the reform was never granted council approval.\(^{16}\)

In fact, while the then Mayor Petro manifestly included IDPs throughout his plan of development, this population became a sort of scapegoat for both the city administration and the national government, not just to differentiate their political orientations, but primarily in order to stress the urgency and indispensability of their political programs. For example, the report aimed at giving an account of the lack of social housing in Bogotá prepared by the then district Housing Secretary Maldonado highlighted the extent to which such situation disproportionately affected IDPs and was, at the same time, being exacerbated by the continuous flow of this population into the city. As Maldonado pointed out (2010), the current model of social housing based only on demand-side subsidies and carried out by private developers has not resulted in the building of affordable houses, to such an extent that not even IDP families to whom some kind of subsidies were granted could benefit from these projects.

Inevitably, the approach of the Mayor’s office to address this situation became more complex as the divergences between the city’s and the national government’s political agendas were emphasized, showing that they did not act as a monolithic power. For instance, while the


national government announced the building of 100,000 free houses—6,000 of which would be developed in Bogotá— the district Housing Secretary called on the national government to assign at least 40% of them to the IDP population. In doing so, the city administration contradicts the criteria chosen by the national government which sees other vulnerable populations, such as the very poor population and victims of environmental disasters, as the main beneficiaries of the project (Gilbert 2014: 258). In addition, while the national government persisted in building those social housing projects in the city’s periphery, Petro and his Housing Secretary, Maldonado, insisted on their commitment to stop the urbanization of rural areas. Therefore, prompting what the Petro administration termed *the revitalization of the center* or the *re-densification of the center*, the Mayor’s office assigned a land situated in the so-called *Extended Centre* for the building of some of these free houses. However, faced with the prospect of having displaced people as their new neighbors, the current inhabitants of this area voiced their discontent.17 The unease and dissatisfaction expressed by area residents give an account of the persistence of unfavorable stigmas attached to the IDP population as reflected in the social representations of IDPs which, according to Guevara, oscillate between “displaced criminals” and “displaced victims” (2005: 245). Indeed, whether they are deemed a threat which brings violence and insecurity to the city or viewed as a population that embodies the persistence of the armed conflict and socio-economic inequality, in both cases IDPs have come to represent an obstacle that might threaten to set back the process of city renewal or even undermine the achievements towards urban modernity.18

But beside issues of security and violence, IDPs have become linked to other biopolitical concerns in the city’s and government’s discourses. In particular, although the Petro administration placed IDPs at the center of the debate on the city’s urban spatial organization, its

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18 “Vecinos, Insólito Obstáculo a Casas para los Más Pobres.”
arguments about the scarcity of land and the unsustainability of the ongoing increasing urbanization ended up positioning IDPs as a surplus population. In turn, the national government dismissed the Mayor’s spatial debate invoking the responsibility of the city administration for the declining growth rate of the housing industry, and instead, while taking the so-called *Victims and Land Restitution Law* as its flagship policy, drove the management of the displaced population also towards spatial strategies, but not surprisingly, those that seek their return (see DNP 2010: 191; ABColombia 2012: 3).

Later on, the national government decided to include IDP families in its Free Housing Program. However, in their case, the allocation of free housing is conditioned on their participation in a program called *Red Unidos* (United Network) addressed to households in extreme poverty. Through this program, IDPs are required to participate in workshops that promote self-reliance and in other activities related to saving, banking, productive work and production projects. Nevertheless, the program does not incorporate any differential approach that attends the needs of the IDP population. For instance, it overlooks the fact that because of displacement, IDPs have lost their social networks, or that because of their racial/ethnic background, they might be more vulnerable to discrimination. In addition, *Red Unidos* and other anti-poverty programs such as *Families in Action* primarily target female-headed households. In doing so, they rely on and perpetuate an essentialist representation of women as caregivers while overlooking men’s roles in the household (Puyana 2012: 219).

In the following section, I will provide a description of the IDP condition, looking at the discrepancies of international perspectives against local understandings. Then I will provide a review of the circumstances that have triggered the forced displacement of about 5.9 million people in Colombia, aimed at giving an account of the obstacles that hinder most of them from returning to their former lands. Despite the public engagement of the current national
government in prompting IDPs’ return and, all the same, the signing of a peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas in 2016, as an adviser of the Mayor’s office pointed out during an interview:

“There is, I would say, no articulation between the macro-economic policies [which are aimed at the development of extensive production of biofuels and exploitative mining] and the policy of comprehensive reparation in relation to the displaced population, which is a barrier because it does not make of IDPs’ return a durable solution.”

The official, as many human rights defenders, fears the inability of the government to guarantee IDPs’ return in the middle of a transitional context where war and peace overlap (Stone 2011). As has been evident throughout the last three years, such a fear is justified since the violent mechanisms that once caused IDPs’ displacement have been re-adopted by many of those who are invested in taking advantage of the government economic model, and for whom IDPs’ return represents a significant inconvenience (CODHES 2014: 17; MTMCA 2012: 15).

2.4 Displaced People in Colombia and Their Long Road to Recognition

The approach to the IDP population as a particular category in international refugee law emerged in the early 1990s, triggered by the recognition of an exponential growth in the number of internally displaced persons and of the failure of the existing international law to provide adequate protection and assistance to IDPs (Vincent and Refslund-Sorenson 2001: 2). The UN response to address this crisis was the enactment of a legal framework, the so-called Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which established two main criteria that distinguish the IDP category from the refugee definition: the first criterion emphasizes the involuntary or forced character of the displacement, while the second specifies that the displacement occurs within national borders (OCHA 2004). The Guiding Principles identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs against and during displacement, as well as during the phases of return, local integration, and resettlement (Kälin 2008: 3).

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Unlike the status of refugee, the notion of IDP relates more to a descriptive definition than to a legal one; that is why the category IDP does not confer a special legal status under international law. This distinction is explained by the fact that refugees require special international protection “by virtue of their being abroad” and due to their lack of access to the protection of their state; whereas IDPs, on the other hand, remain in their own country, and therefore the rights and guarantees to which they are entitled “stem from the fact that they are human beings and citizens or habitual residents of a particular state” (Ibid.: 4, 8). In consequence, IDPs are not necessarily considered to be of concern to the international community, except in the cases where their protection and assistance are denied by their national government. In fact, the whole Guiding Principles do not constitute a binding legal instrument; instead, they are described as a “morally binding statement” aimed at raising awareness and providing guidance to those agents involved in their protection and assistance (Deng, quoted in Kälin 2008: xiii). These aspects have raised concerns among legal scholars such as Franke (2008) and Tuitt (2004a), who suggest that, by virtue of these ideals and the respect of the principle of sovereignty, IDPs are trapped within the borders of nation-states that in many cases have failed to guarantee their protection. Displaced people are thus tacitly abandoned in a limbo by a humanitarian system unable to intervene and to protect them effectively (Tuitt 2004a: 50).

This leads us to think about the time and conditions that determine when a person ceases to be considered internally displaced. Although for some, displacement ends “only upon IDPs’ return and the effective reversal of their displacement” (Mooney 2005: 22), there is currently no consensus concerning the cessation of the IDP condition. The main obstacles to achieving a satisfactory ending of the situation of displacement are related to the difficulties of guaranteeing a return in safety and with dignity, conditions that depend largely on the willingness and capacity of the governments. To this must be added the challenges involved in the (re)building of local capacities and infrastructure in IDPs’ places of origin. Thus, because of the difficulties of
meeting such conditions and because of the long period of time during which they may have been displaced, IDPs increasingly tend to remain in the urban centers where they sought refuge. Hence, IDPs’ return has become a “relative term” (Fagen 2009: 35) which, in order to be a durable solution, should be considered through the lens of sustainability.

In Colombia for instance, IDP women are less likely to return to their land, which is to a large extent due to the better access to education and health services for their children provided by urban centers (see Meertens 2012: 9). Hence, while displaced people face social and spatial segregation in Bogotá, such difficulties pale in comparison with the uncertainties of returning to rural areas with few, if any, guarantees regarding health care and education provision, access to income or livelihood assets, not to mention safety conditions. Indeed, there is an enormous concern about the sustainability of IDPs’ return, insofar as the internal war paradoxically continues to overlap with attempts of carrying out processes of post-conflict peace building. So far, solutions aimed at the integration of displaced people in urban settlements in conditions of dignity entail several challenges. Undoubtedly, the end of the conflict highly depends on the will of armed actors and, as I explain below, on those whose interests are defended by illegal armed groups. However, at the heart of the problem of building IDPs’ successful integration is the internal recognition of the IDP condition from both ruling authorities and the whole Colombian society.

Despite the non-binding character of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, they were adopted in 2002 as part of the Constitution by the Colombian Constitutional Court and have a compulsory legal force (CCJ 2005: 10). This stems from the 1991 Constitution which gives recognition to international human rights treaties and agreements (OCW: Art. 93), and from the fact that the Constitutional Court established human rights conventions together with the constitutional law to form a “block of constitutionality” (Uprimny 2005; ICG 2013: 7). However, as I will show below, the power of this legal framework has been dismissed insofar as
in institutional and juridical instruments designed by successive national governments to circumvent the humanitarian law have brought about the failure to implement those Principles in practice.

According to Osorio (2001), forced displacement was committed in Colombia as early as 1985; however, it was not until 1995 when it came to be considered a national problem. In stark terms, before the mid-1990s the main victims of forced displacement were ‘solely’ leftist or social movement leaders, who were labeled as a threat according to the national security doctrine; therefore, it was referred to as drop-by-drop displacement. But in the mid-1990s, it shifted into a massive practice of targeting peasant families and communities who arrived at the edge of cities and were occupying parks, schools and other public spaces (Ibid.). This moment constitutes the beginning of a balance of power between, on the one hand, the civil society constituted of scholars, social movements, NGOs and Catholic Church’s pastoral social and, on the other hand, the Colombian state. Against a climate of “collective disavowal” regarding this emergent phenomenon of violence (Pécaut 2000: 90), civil society members focused their efforts on raising awareness and, simultaneously, on achieving government recognition, with the ultimate goal of enforcing the state to take its responsibilities to protect the population being displaced (Osorio 2001).

The Law 387 issued in 1997 represents the first tangible fruit of these efforts, as it was the first legal instrument related to internally displaced people. It established that displaced people have the right to humanitarian assistance after submitting a declaration of the facts surrounding their displacement. Later on, with the issue of Decree 2569 in 2000, the government subjected the registration—and therefore the recognition of the IDP condition—to the evaluation of the veracity of the testimony provided by the displaced person, and established a deadline of one year after displacement for submitting the declaration (IDMC 2009: 22). In doing so, the norm
was in contradiction with the principle of non-prescription of crimes against humanity, which is the case of forced displacement (Andreu-Guzmán 2012: 9; CCJ 2010).

In practice, the submission of this declaration became a kind of ‘trial’ for displaced people, in which they were placed in the position of demonstrating thoroughly that he/she had been a victim of forced displacement. To this must be added ex-President Uribe’s prohibition of news outlets to cover armed conflict-affected areas and his smear campaign against journalists, activists and NGO workers, through which Uribe depicted them as accomplices of terrorism. The sum of this panoptical apparatus brought about a climate of self-censorship that contributed to invisibilize the extent of the tragedy of forced displacement (Morris 2011: 6; Himmelbach 2012: M15).

But the procedures introduced through these laws and discursive artifacts reflect a crucial example of the disjuncture between the Colombian government and the Colombian Constitutional Court, since, according to the latter, internal displacement is a *de facto* condition which requires the two basic elements determined within the *Guiding Principles*—forced migration and migration without crossing national borders (CCC 2006). Therefore, from the perspective of the Court, the recognition of the IDP condition should not be subjected to certification of any authority or to a declaration (CCC 2004, 2012; Dalto 2010). The impact of the tightening of the registration criteria in provoking high levels of under-registration was such that in 2007 the office of the general prosecutor claimed that 40% of the requests for registration were being turned down (IDMC 2009: 22). Hence, by 2004 the official register indicated that 927,000 people have been forcibly displaced, whereas the NGO CODHES asserted that the IDP population was almost 2.7 million (Londoño 2004). It is therefore not surprising that Bogotá’s interim Mayor Clara López (2009) asserted that, in 2010, only 49% of the displaced population inhabiting this city was included in the official register.
Thus, this complex mechanism of registration, along with other ‘legal tools’ and the denial of the armed conflict, worked to prevent the recognition of the IDP condition for particular groups, among them Afro-Colombian IDPs, intra-urban IDPs, victims of drop-by-drop displacements, and people whose displacement was caused by aerial fumigation to control illicit crops—insofar as the latter forms of displacement were excluded from the recognition of the government (Poveda 2004).

In 2004, the Constitutional Court issued the decision T-025, through which it declared an “unconstitutional state of affairs,” and asserted that because of the “action or omission by the authorities in providing the displaced population with … effective protection, thousands of people suffer multiple and continuous violations of their human rights” (CCC 2004; CM 2006). Through this decision, the Court compelled the reluctant Colombian government to implement programs of land restitution and for the protection of the population against, during, and after forced displacement (Londoño and Pizarro 2005: 231).

Furthermore, the struggle of IDP women, feminist pacifist movements (e.g., Pacific Route of Women) and various feminist NGOs achieved that the Court enacted in 2008 a gender-sensitive decision called Auto 092 that specifies gender risks and vulnerabilities faced by Colombian women in the context of the armed conflict (MNSA 092&009 2016). Through this significant ruling, the Court ordered the Colombian government to design and implement specific programs aimed at “filling the critical gap in terms of gender in public policy for forced displacement” (MNSA 092 2009: 8). Such programs include measures especially aimed at preventing sexual violence, and at guaranteeing access to health services and education. Although the implementation of the norm has fallen short, as Meertens notes, the norm sets the tone for positive actions as it asserted the “disproportionate impact of the armed conflict on women” (2012), and, moreover, it linked the condition of displacement to the category of victim. In line with this, the responsibly of the state should not be limited to providing humanitarian aid, but
must involve mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing access to transitional justice processes (i.e., justice, truth, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition) (Meertens and Zambrano 2010). I will return to this ruling in chapters 5 and 6, but for now, it is important to note that this ruling has become a sort of battle horse for IDP women in Bogotá, which allowed them to advance their right to housing in this city.

Simultaneously, the insistence of the Court and civil society on the need to implement a comprehensive land restitution program and reparation for the victims continued and was finally crystallized in the actual Victims’ Law that entered into force in 2012. Worth mentioning, the claim for the effective restitution of lands and housing for displaced people, to which the program of land restitution included in the Victims’ Law sought to answer, is drawn from the Pinheiro Principles for refugees and IDPs (COHRE 2005). From a feminist perspective, the implementation of the land restitution program has been seen as a window through which to bring about changes in discriminatory gender patterns (Meertens 2012). Specifically, it might tackle historical practices that have prevented many displaced women from exerting formal land or house ownership. Indeed, drawing on Uprimny and Saffon (2009), in theory the Victims’ Law is a good example of the transformative model of transitional justice, which was not the case for the so-called Justice and Peace Law issued in 2005, to which as I will refer below. The Victims’ Law privileges mechanisms of reparations and puts the victim at the center, whereas the Justice and Peace Law was primarily focused on offering reduced sentences to paramilitaries in exchanges of their demobilization and confession of crimes, and overlooked the rights of the victims. In addition, while the former legal framework on forced displacement subjected the recognition of the IDP condition to the evaluation of IDPs’ declaration, the Victims’ Law establishes administrative programs that ‘ideally’ allow victims easy access to comprehensive reparations. In this framework, democratic transformations, as for instance women’s access to property, as well
as the right to reparation, truth and justice depend on the recognition of IDPs’ condition of victims, which in Colombia has been a feminist vindication (see chapters 5 and 6; CM 2006: 35).

The recognition of the victim status of displaced people is the biggest step ever made by Colombian society in response to the tragedy of forced displacement and, from many perspectives, the *Victims and Land Restitution Law* meets the standards set by international humanitarian law (ICG 2013; Summers 2012). However, in practical terms, there are still many obstacles that displaced people have to overcome before achieving recognition and in order to access comprehensive reparation as well as guarantees of non-repetition. In what follows, I aim to shed light on some of these obstacles by providing a perspective on the circumstances and dynamics that have shaped the Colombian internal armed conflict. In so doing, I plan to identify how the elements and interests at play in this conflict have made it a mutating phenomenon that, despite the efforts to achieve peace, hindered displaced people from accessing the benefits that the *Victims’ Law* wants to provide.

2.5 *In Colombia, the War Does Exist: A Meaningful Recognition for a Whole Universe of Displaced People*

The humanitarian plight of about 6 million people forcibly driven from their lands is one the darkest effects of the Colombian conflict (IDMC 2015; see Appendix 5). Forced displacement is a war strategy pursued by illegal armed actors from leftist and rightist groups who target the civilian population in order to increase their territorial domain. Although the armed conflict has been going on for more than 50 years, it was from the mid-1990s that forced displacement reached its highest levels and was reinforced as a means for illegal armed actors to seize valuable lands, to expand activities related to drug trafficking, to ensure the development of infrastructure projects and to protect the interests of investors in projects of extensive agriculture and mining. Given the overlapping of these dynamics, the Colombian conflict has been defined as
multifactorial and multidimensional, meaning that the armed actors are internally fragmented and that their greed and grievance have mutated over time.

The main guerrilla group, self-identified as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC–EP), emerged in the 1960s guided by a Marxist ideology and claiming such political goals as social justice and land redistribution. The paramilitary groups emerged in the late 1970s publicly self-proclaimed as a response to the armed action of the guerrilla forces (Orozco et al. 2012: 140; Salinas and Zarama 2012). Although these paramilitary forces initially consisted of regional self-defense groups dispersed throughout the national territory—some of them “private armies of large landholders and drug barons” (Meertens 2010: S151)—in 1997, they merged into the so-called AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), supposedly moved by their interest in building “a sense of national organization and a political profile” (Orozco et al. 2012: 103). Between 1997 and 2003, this strategy allowed the paramilitaries to achieve their highest level of growth and territorial expansion (Valencia 2007), which, in the face of the collapse of the state system in the regions, was cynically seen by some local political elites and economic sectors as a “model of pacification” (Ibid.).

But such a paramilitary model worked in perverse harmony with the so-called Democratic Security Policy, a military-centered strategy promoted by the then President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010), which provided a discursive ground for members of the Colombian army, allowing them to frequently overlook the condition of neutrality of civilian populations (Rojas 2006, 2009). Built in the name of achieving the ‘pacification’ of conflict zones, this policy was deployed by denying the armed conflict and instead by claiming that the country was victim of a terrorist menace (Idler and Paladini-Adell 2015). Lurking behind this discourse, and avoiding addressing IDPs’ humanitarian crisis, Uribe literally suspended the state of law for almost a decade, and this not just in conflict-related areas but also in urban milieux.
In light of Agamben’s biopolitical approach (2005: 57), the rule brought about by the
Democratic Security Policy could be seen as the instauration of a state of exception, in which
millions of victims were placed in a threshold position, excluded from the protections provided
by international humanitarian law and neither protected by the Colombian legislation. But in
addition, borrowing Enloe (2010: 1109), it could be argued that instead of democratizing
security, Uribe’s regime rather instituted a militarized democracy; this despite the hegemonic
acceptance given to Uribe’s policy in urban milieux. But in fact, Uribe’s militarization of
democracy was less about the dismissal of the rule of law, than about the sense of worthiness
and normalcy accorded to military—and paramilitary—ideas (see CNMH: 2012a, 2000: 3). It is
against this background, and as a response to the abuses carried out in the name of Uribe’s
Democratic Security Policy, that between 2002 and 2012 the “demilitarization of the territory
and civil life,” the recognition of the victims, and the initiation of peace talks became the main
foci of feminist pacifist movements (Sánchez 2015, 2006; RPM 2003: 49).

In 2005, during Uribe’s administration, the Colombian Congress approved Law 975—known as
the *Justice and Peace Law*—which was issued as an instrument to facilitate the process of
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of paramilitary groups. The main marker of the
*Justice and Peace Law* was the reduction of penalties in exchange for confession, with maximum
sentences of up to 8 years (IDMC 2009: 18–17; Gallón 2014). Nevertheless, because of logistical
constraints or because it did not protect the victims against paramilitary retaliation, the process
did not allow victims to effectively participate in the hearings (Summers 2012: 225). But perhaps
what is more surprising is that for an important part of the victims, and specifically for Afro-
Colombian people of the Pacific coast, this law went almost unnoticed, so much so that they
neither took part in the process nor benefit from it (Mosquera et al. 2012: 29). Hence, the *Justice
and Peace Law* became rather a mechanism for paramilitaries’ impunity and, for Uribe’s
government, a useful means in its attempt to turn the page on its alleged links with the
paramilitaries. As some evaluations have shown, the *Justice and Peace* process allowed that at least 90% of demobilized paramilitaries (out of 30,000) were granted a de facto amnesty (IDMC 2009: 41; Gallón 2014), and according to Amnesty International, by 2014 “only 63 paramilitaries have been sentenced for human rights violations” (AI 2014: 20; Gallón 2014; *Verdad Abierta* 2015).

Thus for some, the *Justice and Peace* process was more effective in producing a historical ‘truth’ than in bringing about judicial truth (CNMH 2012b). By this they mean that despite the few sentences that have been pronounced, the process allowed the country to know only “a partial truth” (Gallón 2014). What is certain, though, is that *Justice and Peace* allowed Uribe to claim that “Paramilitaries no longer exist” (HRW 2010: 3), and moreover, to trivialize forced displacement describing it as related to a “generic process of migration” (CODHES 2012: 2). Echoes of these declarations were reflected in expressions that could be heard in urban milleux, such as “if you were displaced, there was a reason” or “are they truly displaced persons or just making it up?” (Cardona and Sánchez 2005: 9).

However, so far, neither have paramilitary forces been fully dismantled nor has forced displacement ceased. After the demobilizations under *Justice and Peace*, new paramilitary structures have emerged, which include about 5,000 demobilized paramilitaries (Summers 2012: 225). As researcher and politician Claudia López claimed in 2010, “forced displacement continues to increase … not only for the benefit of drug trafficking, but for the benefit of ‘legal’ activities as well” (2010: 48).

According to the NGO CODHES, forced displacement brought about 219,405 victims during 2012 and 259,146 during 2011 (2014, 2012). Fortunately, because of the peace talks between the Colombian Government and the FARC, the number of forced displacements has decreased significantly. However, in 2015 there were about 166,000 new victims, and because of territorial disputes “the end of forced displacement is not in sight” (Ditta 2016). The majority of displacements occurring since 2012 has been committed by post-demobilized paramilitary
groups, which are termed by the government BACRIMs, meaning criminal gangs\(^20\) (Ibid.; Rojas and Hurtado 2014: 5; CODHES 2012: 5; see also HRW 2010: 3–7; ICG 2012: 1). Those groups are illegal armed forces, successors of paramilitary organizations, that emerged after the AUC demobilization and which resumed their war strategies in order to defend the interests of new landowners, nowadays invested in extensive agricultural projects, mining and exploitation of natural resources, whose interests—hereinbefore mentioned—collide with the land restitution program (see Fox 2012).

After an eight-year tenure during which the ex-President Alvaro Uribe banned the use of the term *armed conflict* from political discourses (López 2010), his former Defense Minister, Juan Manuel Santos, won the presidential elections in 2010. Against the expectations of those who saw in him the continuation of Uribe’s hard-line security policies, Santos veered away from Uribe’s approach and branded his government as Third Way (*Semana* 2010). Santos’s political rupture from Uribe’s approach became more evident in June 2011, when Santos made the so-called *Victims and Land Restitution Law* a cornerstone of his agenda. This meant the immediate recognition of the existence of an internal armed conflict (AI 2012: 11), and brought about the partial dismantling of the aforementioned state of exception instituted by Uribe.

Insofar as the *Victims and Land Restitution Law* was supported by many politicians, who asserted that “it was time to build peace with the victims rather than with the victimizers,”\(^21\) it symbolized the intention of political elites to break with a past in which about 30% of the members of the Congress were allegedly tied to paramilitary groups (López 2010; Valencia 2007: 26, MacManus and Ward 2015: 322). For some, the law has been described as an ambitious land reform through which the Santos administration seeks the restitution of 2.5 million of hectares spoiled between 1998 and 2010 in a term of ten years (MTMCA 2012: 14). For this purpose, the Law created the

\(^{20}\) For an overview of these emergent criminal bands or BACRIM, see Romero and Arias (2011)

Land Restitution Unit to implement the land restitution program; but, besides this Unit, the Law also created an extensive institutional apparatus aimed at bringing about mechanisms of transitional justice. It includes on the one hand the Unit for Attention and Reparation of Victims, which is responsible for coordinating programs aimed at providing victims’ access to assistance (e.g., humanitarian aid, economic stabilization) and comprehensive reparation (e.g., rehabilitation, monetary compensation, guarantees of non-repetition) (Dixon 2015: 7; CNMH 2015b: 27). On the other hand, it involves the National Center of Historical Memory, which embodies the state’s obligation to provide truth and reparation to the victims by collecting memories related to the armed conflict and by encouraging public reflection and political debate about these memories (CNMH 2015b: 11; Riaño and Uribe 2016).

At the same time, the *Victims and Land Restitution Law* has brought the generalization—on the political scene and in the public opinion—of the term *victim*. This entailed that the term victim became a broader concept aimed at encompassing—along with IDPs—a whole universe of people affected by any of the about 15 recognized victimization acts committed throughout the armed conflict. As a result, besides internally displaced persons, this category includes people who were subjected to other war crimes, among them kidnapping, extortion, forced recruitment, sexual violence, or forced disappearance. According to Juliana Cano, gender adviser at the Victims’ Unit, “the Victims’ Law does not only allow to identify a bigger universe of victims, but also introduces the recognition that victims of displacement are victims of other war crimes.”

22 Accurately, the changes pointed out by Cano during the interview are aimed at bringing benefits to the IDP population, for instance, to ease the path to obtaining official IDP recognition, to receive monetary compensations as well as to access other forms of reparation. Nonetheless, there are risks involved in the generalization of the ‘victim category’ in concealing a complex range of dimensions (e.g., class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation) that have played a key

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22 Interview with Juliana Cano, Bogotá, September 26, 2012.
role in determining the reasons why a subject could have been turned into a victim. As a Mayor’s office adviser argued:

The only form of victimization that has been made visible in the mass media and therefore recognized by public opinion is kidnapping. In Colombia, kidnapping has targeted firstly wealthy families, secondly members of institutions such as the police and national army, and thirdly it is the preferable form of victimization conducted by the guerrillas. … Therefore, focusing mass media attention on kidnapping is a way to focalize all the problems of the armed conflict and human rights on the guerrillas, shadowing the responsibility of the state in the emergence of paramilitary groups.\(^{23}\)

In addition to the political interests and class issues she highlighted, it is crucial to draw attention to further concerns at stake in the process of victims’ universalization. For instance, displaced people represent between 80% and 90% of the victims (Dixon 2015; Hanson 2012), and this crime has disproportionately affected Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations (CODHES 2014: 16). Furthermore, a huge and unspoken number of Afro-Colombian children and teenagers have been victims of forced recruitment and it is likely that their plight will never be recognized. After the *Victims’ Law* was approved, Afro-Colombian organizations expressed their concern as the Colombian government failed to conduct a prior consultation with Afro-Colombian IDPs (AI 2014: 49; Ocampo and Agudelo 2014). However, political participation of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous IDPs in the implementation of the *Victims’ Law* has steadily bridged this gap. Those spaces have sought the design of assistance programs that take into account their cultural ethno-racial differences.

However, this is just one of the difficulties non-Mestizo IDPs have had to deal with. Additional challenges are related to the process of land restitution. As it has been clear in various assessments, its implementation has fallen short of achieving the expectations it generated (AI 2014), all the more as this project has been conducted in the midst of the conflict. However, when it comes to the restitution of lands and the return of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities, the shortcomings of the program are even more glaring (Ibid.: 50). Mirroring

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\(^{23}\) Interview with a Mayor’s office adviser, district planning secretariat. Bogotá, August 31, 2012.
Uribe’s economic focus, Santos’s development plan defined the mining industry and agro-industry as “locomotives of development,” driving forces of the Colombian economy (Ibid.: 51). As the lands of various Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are currently, or are likely to be, under mining operations and agro-industrial projects, new landlords who grabbed IDPs’ lands are not willing to allow their return and have boycotted the land restitution process. It is for this purpose that they have recycled former paramilitary combatants into BACRIMs or more precisely into “anti-restitution armies” (Ibid.: 35).

As with other advances achieved by Afro-Colombians and Indigenous people, their access to transitional justice process—including land restitution—has been undermined by the persistence of a color-blind way of thinking, also referred to as the “myth of the mestizo nation”; that is, a nation which would be ‘naturally’ exempt from race tensions and conflicts (Mosquera and León 2009: 14). This way of thinking has counteracted the actual application of positive actions stipulated by law, especially territorial rights. But this too has worked to prevent the collection of ethno-racial statistics, which renders invisible the impact of forced displacement on the Afro-Colombian population (Oslander 2016; Rodríguez et al. 2009; Paschel 2013). The case of Afro-Colombian IDPs is perhaps only one among other instances of the tragedy of forced displacement, but it demonstrates that, despite the recognition of the victim status, there is still a long way to go in order to truly guarantee access to mechanisms of transitional justice. This path is particularly arduous for those IDPs whose race, gender, class, sex, ethnicity, place of origin or experience of victimization does not fit within the imaginary of the country’s normalcy and modernity. In numerous cases, the return of IDPs is not a sustainable solution, but the attempt to remain in Bogotá is not an easy endeavor either; all the more if their claims to inhabit the city in condition of dignity and socio-spatial inclusion seem to imply the transformation of the city’s class-racial pattern of spatial segregation (see chapters 5 and 6).
2.6 Building the Path towards the Country’s Normalcy: Economic Liberalization, Bogotá’s Urban Regeneration, and the Human Rights Discourse

Although some of the gaps and obstacles mentioned above were underlined by human rights activists when the Victims’ Law was issued, it is however the rightist former President Uribe who over the years has become one of its main opponents. Notably, his criticism covers aspects concerned with the recognition of the armed conflict by the government and the land restitution project. Yet, Uribe’s opposition to Santos’s government became even fiercer between 2012 and 2016, when the peace talks with the FARC took place. But in the meantime, it is President Santos who has already reaped the harvest of this policy. In October 2011, and just five months after the enactment of the Victims’ Law, Santos achieved the approval of a Free Trade Agreement with United States and, some months later, signed another Free Trade Agreement with the European Union; these agreements foreground the process of internationalization of the Colombian economy. In particular, the FTA with the United States was largely delayed by the Democrats in the U.S. Congress, until the Colombian government would “show concrete and sustained results in addressing human rights and labor rights problems.”

Indeed, this longed-for Free Trade Agreement with the United States had been sought from the beginning of the 1990s, when the country introduced the neoliberal agenda that shifted the Colombian economy from a protectionist model into a so-called “economic opening” (Estrada 2006; Holmes et al. 2008: 44–46). In fact, at the time when Colombian economic liberalization was being introduced, Santos was Foreign Trade Minister and, anecdotally, he recalls that the armed conflict was one of the factors that prevented the country from attracting foreign investments:

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In 1992 when I was minister of foreign trade, I was in New York, we had just opened up the economy, and we wanted to attract investments. We were with some investors, the few who had accepted the invitation to hear us, trying to sell them the idea of investing in Colombia. But in the meantime, we heard the news of a bomb attack that had just occurred in Colombia and this mini conference was obviously suspended, thereby burying any intention to come and invest in the country. This event deeply impacted me. I recall that one of the investors told me: “Do not insist on this, at least not until Colombia is a normal country, a country in peace.” From that moment onwards, my commitment to work toward achieving peace became a constant in my public life. (Santos 2014)

What Santos means by *peace* is not explicitly mentioned in this speech, but it could be inferred that his definition of peace refers to the absence of conflict-related violence. But worth mentioning, far from being one-dimensional, the meaning of peace like any other definition is full of nuances. To mention just a few of its intricacies, when it comes to the absence of violence or absence of war, we might refer to negative peace, on the contrary, when it is about building a sense of social justice that guarantees a sustainable peace, we might refer to positive peace (Megoran 2011: 179). Negative peace could take place amid a climate of uneasy and untrusting truce or where violence is avoided, while positive peace is likely to be transformative, overcoming ingrained inequalities (Ibid.).

Indeed, feminist Colombian movement the Pacific Route of Women hints at this difference by claiming “Neither war that kills us, nor peace that oppresses us.” Coined at the beginning of the 2000s, this motto represented a cry of protest against Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, through which Uribe strived to ‘pacify’ the country by militarizing civil life, or in other words, by submitting civil life to military values, often blurring the line between combatants and civilian population.

For example in 2004, Salvatore Mancuso, a paramilitary leader, was allowed to address a speech before the National Congress. In his speech, broadcasted by the public television, Mancuso said to the whole nation that his men were “heroes,” who were “forced to take up arms because the
state failed to defend the people against guerrilla kidnapping and extortion.”

Moreover, whereas Uribe claimed in 2006 the demobilization of paramilitaries, women’s groups such as the Organización Femenina Popular (OFP) continued to receive death threats from de-mobilized paramilitaries (Ramírez 2006: 8).

At the time of the Uribe’s Democratic Security rule, Santos acted as Defense Minister and, accordingly, his engagement to achieving peace was not exactly oriented towards a negotiated solution to the conflict. Reflecting on the role he played during Uribe’s government, Santos says: “While acting as Defense Minister, I understood that in order to achieve peace, paradoxically, it was imperative to intensify the war” (2009). In trying to grasp Santos’s position, it is worth recalling that while serving as Defense Minister, Santos dealt the most significant blows ever delivered to the FARC, killing three of its top military leaders. It was asserted that these military successes were key in getting the FARC to sit down at the negotiating table (Beittel 2015: 7).

Hence, Santos’s commitment to achieving peace has a great deal of pragmatism and, according to the circumstances, his strategy might vary from war to dialogue. On the contrary, the other axis of Santos’s engagement to make Colombia a normal country, which is that of completing Colombia’s neoliberal model and integration to the global economy, has been rather immutable. Mirroring the neoliberal approach of the economic liberalization initiated by Gaviria’s government (Estrada 2006: 253–279), Santos has pursued the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), including further economic measures, so as to consolidate “one of the most flexible labor regimes of Latin America.” Indeed, his government introduced in 2013 a tax reform which, although sold as a means for increasing employment, reduced the cost of labor and taxes over capital, and moreover, involved advantages for the mining industry (Duarte 2012; Barreto 2012).

Beginning in 2010, Santos devoted the development plan of his first term to what he defined as the five ‘locomotives’ of economic growth: mining and energy, transport infrastructure, agro-industry, scientific innovation, and the housing sector (MTMCA 2012). The firsts two ‘locomotives’ reflect the project of expansion of an extractive economy (Ibid.; Doughman 2016). In order to enhance investor confidence, Santos’s government has prompted policies aimed at speeding up the licensing process and facilitating bureaucratic procedures (Vélez-Torres 2014: 74). However, the locomotive of the agriculture sector has ended by counteracting the sustainability of IDPs’ return (MTMCA 2012). It is so because the so-called ‘agro-locomotive’ has had nothing to do with food security, but is rather aimed at large-scale cultivation of agrofuels. As with the mining industry, the agriculture sector is export-oriented and a capital-intensive industry, dominated by multinational corporations. It is therefore not surprising that, as Amnesty International asserts, lands occupied by these companies have not been included in the process of land restitution (2014: 31). As a matter of fact, in 2015, less than 5% of the land restitution goals had been achieved, while instead at least 69 social leaders of this process had been assassinated by anti-restitution armies (Valencia 2015). Without providing real support to small-scale farmers so that they can remain in their lands, the few of them who would have the chance to return will have no other option but to sell or rent their property and to become the new urban poor (Doughman 2016: 456; Suárez 2015; AI 2014: 40).

Actually Santos’s emphasis on the extractive economy has followed the path traced by former President Uribe. Focusing mainly on coal ferronickel and gold, Uribe was able to increase foreign investments by 74% between 2006 and 2009 (MTMCA 2012: 8); no matter that he gained control over territories and offered security to these investments through the deployment of military operations, often acting in concomitance with paramilitary forces (Vélez-Torres 2014: 75). However, unlike Uribe’s denial of the country’s worrying human rights record, Santos placed his promise to address human rights issues on the same level as his focus on the locomotives of
economic growth. So, while he has reiteratively asserted the government’s commitment to “catching up to be a normal country in terms of infrastructure,” he also added in the same interview that “the issue of human rights I hope will disappear, become a nonissue, and be a normal country also in that respect” (Santos 2010). It is precisely in this obsession with catching up with the country’s normalcy that the issue of the Victims’ Law and Santos’s efforts to sign a peace agreement with the FARC and to consolidate the country’s global integration intersect.

Indeed, expectations about the growth of extractive industries and the transport infrastructure ‘locomotive’ have increased as the peace agreement with the FARC is implemented (Doughman 2016). So, although at the beginning, middle and upper urban classes were skeptical about the outcomes of the peace talks, the government has gained their support as well as that of investors by advancing the economic growth that peace will bring about.

At the time when Santos was Foreign Trade Minister, Colombia created in 1992 an agency called ProColombia for promoting foreign investments and international trade.28 In the same vein, and following the introduction of Bogotá’s strategic urban planning, the city set up in 2003 its own agency called Invest in Bogota (Beuf 2011b: 95).29 The agency is a private-public partnership whose main activities involve the management of the city’s marketing strategy and the provision of support to foreign investors. Its website largely relies on information about the city, emphasizing on the city’s spatial features achieved through the program of urban renewal (e.g., air connectivity, urban transport network, green spaces, cultural and gastronomic offerings). But along with that, Invest in Bogota puts also forward strategic advantages brought about through the country’s economic liberalization. Hence, the agency emphasizes the fact that “Colombia has one of the most flexible labor regimes in Latin America” and offers guides to understand the country’s labor laws.30 In addition, it spotlights nine Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed by

29 http://en.investinbogota.org/.
Colombia, which include the above mentioned with United States and the European Union, and highlights as well another six FTAs which are pending ratification or under negotiation.\(^3\)

The marketing mix for branding Bogotá, which involves both investments in infrastructure and institutional changes as well as improvements in security issues, is clearly reflected in the vision of President Santos. They are specifically mentioned in his narrative when he emphasizes the fundamental role of these aspects, in addition to the effort of his government to tackle human rights issues, as a strategic means of “catching up to be a normal country” (Santos 2010). In such a normative vision, the investment of the city in infrastructure as well as its institutional modernization should not be seen as a pure outcome of neoliberal globalization in the local landscape, nor as an isolated number of local initiatives for making Bogotá an attractive platform for global flows. As in the framework developed by Massey, the city experiences a “juxtaposition of greed and need” in its endeavor to participate in the neoliberal globalization under competitive conditions (2007: 9).

Consequently, in the face of the leftist approach drawn by ex-Mayor Petro which sought to reverse the city’s processes of privatization, to increase the governmental intervention in the building industry and to stop the city’s gentrification, it is not surprising that various initiatives to remove him from the Mayor’s office were carried out. All the more as Petro linked his proposals as a necessary means to allow the IDP population to remain in Bogotá in conditions of socio-spatial justice. It is even less surprising that President Santos himself engaged in defensive strategies which aimed at demonstrating that the city is not in the Mayor’s hands but in those of the national government. Since Mayor Petro challenged the commonsense notion granted to the city’s regeneration process, called into question the universality of some public services privatized since the 1990s (Santana 2013), allegedly instigated a discourse that highlighted the gaps between rich and poor populations, whilst along the way involving IDPs in his political

\(^3\) http://en.investinbogota.org/invest-Bogotá/why-invest市場-access.
battles, President Santos thence decided to appoint a high presidential adviser for Bogotá’s affairs. Through this controversial decision, the government expressed its interest in following up the investments of the nation in the city; however, in the reading of Saldías (2012) and other political analysts, such measure connoted the undermining of the proud autonomy of the city proclaimed in the 1990s and unveiled what is really at stake. In the path towards internationalizing the national economy, Bogotá represents a sort of “golden goose” that Colombian traditional elites are not willing to risk (Massey 2007: 18).

2.7 Conclusion

In such a contentious landscape, the city awakens as a terrain of power-laden relations, where the main holders of the political power do not hesitate to instrumentalize the IDP population as a scapegoat in the name of the protection of the Bogotá We Want. In doing so, the road of the displaced population to remain in Bogotá unfolds a more complex landscape than one in which they would be subject to systematic vilification. Instead, it draws a path that involves IDPs’ instrumental victimization and which predictably drives them towards invisibility. From my perspective, three interrelated IDPs’ representations underlie this transition from victimization to invisibility.

The first one concerns the representation of the IDP as a subject who suffers from revictimization in the city, which is especially based on portrayals of IDP women heads of households. This representation fits the interests of those who want to cast light on the grey areas that the Bogotá We Want fails to address, insofar as the IDPs’ painful experience allows them to underscore the gaps of that model of city to benefit all members of the Bogotá society. At first glance, the iterative use of such a representation may prove to be counterproductive as it ends up positioning IDPs as a surplus population, and thus prompts social polarization within the most disadvantaged groups.
But second, for those engaged in the city’s regeneration, the displaced population represents a threat to the city’s biopolitical achievements (e.g., civic culture, recovered public space, mobility, efficiency, budgetary and environmental sustainability). In this view, IDPs stand in symbolic opposition to the sustainability of pivotal achievements on which the competitiveness of the city and its participation in the global economy have been built.

From a third position, the specter of having the second largest number of internally displaced people in the world represents an unspoken reminder of the shameful past in which at least two forces operated: on the one hand, a state allegedly involved in a paramilitary project, and on the other hand a negationist society that, while tacitly accepting the paramilitary solution as the answer to a guerrilla menace, turned its back to the victims.32

However, in particular by issuing a comprehensive *Victims’ Law*, and in general by engaging in processes of transitional justice, the national government clears the path to build its legitimacy, and simultaneously, overcomes barriers that for a long time prevented the country from ‘catching up its normalization.’ With this aim in view, the process of transitional justice as a whole entails a shift in the management of IDPs’ lives. Indeed it reflects a governmental platform through which the Colombian state reduces the spectrum of IDPs’ exclusion and opens up a process aimed at achieving their normalization. Nevertheless, despite the good intentions of social movements, forced displacement within this normative frame ceases to be a condition and, instead, is considered as a violent fact through which a subject became a member of a whole universe of victims. Consequently, the current implementation of the transitional justice framework weakens the ground of their subject positions and political affiliation, thereby hampering IDPs’ mass demonstrations and bringing about their political neutralization. Furthermore, as the mechanisms of transitional justice are intermingled with anti-poverty social programs aimed at an indistinct population in extreme poverty, IDPs are driven to achieve their

own socio-economic inclusion according to the standards of the urban market economy and to overcome their vulnerability by means of self-reliance and self-governance.

In this landscape, IDPs function as subjugated figures, such as the *critical beings* or the *protagonists* elaborated by Tuitt who explores the productive role of subjugated subjects in being “‘chief character[s]’ in the story of the development of law” (2004b: 5), but nonetheless, excluded from the structures or institutions they contribute to create. Viewed through the lens of the Foucauldian framework, IDPs illustrate a dramatic example of a population whose normativization serves as an instrument to disclose everyone’s vulnerability. Such instrumental dynamics works to subject Bogotanos to permanent self-examination and encourage the self-affirmation of long-term Bogotanos as legitimate inhabitants of the city who are entitled to defend the *Bogotá We Want* in which they have invested.

Despite its particularities, the making of the *Bogotá We Want* is not at odds with urban renewal processes occurring throughout the world. In the next chapter, I present a theoretical framework that aims to shed light on how these neoliberal urban transformations have been interpreted. My analysis will touch not only upon the narratives and spatial dynamics underlying these processes, but also upon the ways in which these transformations affect the lives of ordinary city dwellers and their right to shape the place they inhabit.
CHAPTER 3 – THEORIZING THE URBAN: FROM THE GLOBAL CITY TOWARDS A GENDERED RIGHT TO THE CITY

3.1 Introduction

A city is a means to a way of life. And that is what we want to promote: a better way of life, a way of life more conducive to happiness.

The quality of our city is an end in itself, but it is also a means: it is the most important factor to generate modern economic development. In our predominantly urban country, the most critical factor of competitiveness will increasingly be the cities’ quality of life: only by improving our quality of life will it be possible to attract and retain qualified people, investors and tourists who generate the global city we aspire to have. (Peñalosa 2016)

The desire to become a global city has been an explicit driver of Bogotá’s urban restructuring. Whether mediated by the register of quality of life or by the register of urban happiness, the discourse of Bogotá’s urban renewal is straightforward when it comes to the role it gives to foreign capital, investors and other global flows. As exemplified in Peñalosa’s speech quoted above, such kinds of flows are depicted as the makers of the city’s global position, while the city’s residents are essentially placed in a passive role, as mere recipients of the crumbs dropped from the table of the neoliberal globalization. Urban space, likewise, is depicted in this discourse as a two-dimensional surface, stripped of the dimension of time and from manifold trajectories that any endeavor to transform urban space should not overlook.

Curiously enough, the same can be said about the rationality behind processes of urban transformation taking place in many other cities invested in being competitive nodes in the global economy. So for example, it is not surprising that in her analysis of the transformation of London into a world city, feminist geographer Doreen Massey underlines that the notion of space as “a [simple] surface … across which investments/migrants/connections flow and forces march … [has been] the necessary geographical correlate of the economic imaginary of trickle-down” (2007: 22). Hence, the line of thought stressed in the rationality of urban planners and
decision makers that Massey calls into question privileges the role of capital and global flows as driving forces acting upon the city, including its inhabitants and the state itself. And on the other hand, it is rife with depictions of the urban space as malleable platforms in the neoliberal race for competitiveness.

Embracing Massey’s critique, this chapter aims to challenge this narrative interrogating the ways in which forces of capital and neoliberal economy become dominant in the construction of contemporary urban forms. To this end, I will explore narratives about the global city, bringing to the fore social relations of gender, race, sex, class, ethnicity, postcoloniality, among other forms of domination that stretch over space and shape the contemporary urban space as well as people’s urban experience. Questions of central concern to this chapter include: How does urban restructuring occurring in places other than traditional Western urban centers relate to the formation of neoliberal urban spaces? Do processes of urban restructuring carried out in Southern cities have something to tell us about urban theory? How do women, forced migrants, postcolonial and non-heterosexual people and other non-normative subjects participate in shaping the cities in which they dwell? Echoing feminist and postcolonial critiques of dominant narratives on contemporary spatial restructuring (Massey 2011, 2007; Spain 2002; Peake and Rieker 2013; Robinson 2006; Roy 2015), I will focus on the ways in which gender relations participate in shaping urban space, and how spatial processes mobilized by neoliberal globalization negotiate, or are hybridized, with the multiplicity of forces or with spatial trajectories that, besides neoliberalization, have historically shaped the fabric of urban space.

Therefore in the first part of this chapter, I look critically at approaches to the global city, showing some of the ways in which these narratives have overestimated the role of disadvantaged and oppressed urban dwellers in shaping urban space. Then, I will explore discourses of quality of life and urban happiness, unmasking the role they play in enhancing the building of global cities and in fostering particular forms of urban subjectivity. Afterwards, I
adopt the right to the city as a window through which to suggest a gendered postcolonial analytical framework aimed at making visible the spatial practices of oppressed and disenfranchised urban inhabitants.

The second part of this chapter is devoted to exploring the complex mechanisms or techniques of urban governance underlying the building of neoliberal urban space. Looking through the lenses of biopolitics and governmentality, I will attempt to disentangle how the spatial order prompted by the neoliberal common sense is granted hegemonic status by urban dwellers. However, whereas this part of my analysis sheds light on the processes through which urban subjects are led to participate in the maintenance of this socio-spatial order, the second part of this section focuses on analytical tools suitable for studying forms of spatial resistance. It is my belief that any attempt to study urban resistance should endeavor to shed light on the transformative potential of these acts and, in addition, should strive to make visible the political subjectivities of those individuals who participate in bringing about spatial justice.

3.2 The Making of the Global City: Which City? Made by Whom?

3.2.1 A Network of Cities or the Return of Space

Unlike Massey’s critique to urban perspectives centered on the role of neoliberal capitalism, attempts to map the geography of neoliberal globalization from a critical spatial perspective included the contribution of numerous authors, who illustrate a geography featuring a grid of cities or nodes which are connected together by flows of investments, media, ideas, people as well as products (Bell 2007; Sassen 2002; Castells 2010; Rutherford 2008; Low and Smith 2006; Harvey 1990; Appadurai 2002). Observed from this geography, the growth of cities and their relevance in a global landscape would not depend as much on their population size but on their capability to concentrate capital, trade, information, tourism, and others flows mentioned above (Soja 2005).
Terms such as ‘world city’ and ‘global city’ were correspondingly elaborated by Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and by Sassen (2002) in order to describe the emergence of such urban nodes and the global network of cities. The first one, World City, was “a point of departure,” or an approach to the character of the contemporary urban condition (Friedmann and Wolff 1982: 320). Following Brenner and Keil (2006), its relevance resided in its capacity to reflect the trans-urban scale in which the transformations occurring in the urban space were embedded (see also Brenner 1998).

The World City framework, according to Friedmann and Wolff (1982: 329), puts forward the idea that cities or regions rather than territorial economies of national states are the most fundamental units of world capitalism. In their view, the race of transnational corporations for attaining control over economic space has given rise to a hierarchical system of urban integration. Characterized by levels of “dominance/subdominance,” such system is composed, on the one hand, by core and semi-peripheral areas and, on the other, by the “world periphery” (Ibid.: 311). Observed through this lens, world cities emerge in core and semi-peripheral areas. Cities falling in the core category are most likely postindustrial cities housing the majority of headquarters, while semi-peripheral cities are industrial areas, greatly dependent on technical knowledge and capital mobilized from the core (Ibid.). In this taxonomy, the so-called periphery is described as typically agrarian and its inhabitants as “poor, technologically backward and politically weak” (Ibid.).

Over time, the concept of global city developed by Saskia Sassen has taken the place of the world city framework. While still emphasizing the deindustrialization process, it pays special attention to the imbrications of informal sectors within core urban centers (Ibid. 334). This is a key point regarding gender analysis to which I will return later in this chapter, as it has shaped the conditions in which women, immigrant populations and other disadvantaged populations have entered the labor market and have become essential, not just for the building of core global
cities but also to the functioning of the global economy. Sassen sees the specificity of global city
in its capacity to cluster advanced producer and financial services industries as, for instance,
banking, accounting, advertising and insurance. Such functions are, according to Sassen, key
factors that allow headquarters to handle the complexities involved in operating in more than
one “national legal system, national accounting system, advertising culture etc.” (2002: 16).
Unlike Friedmann and Wolff who stressed the role of transnational corporations, Sassen
underlines the role of “willing and not-so-willing states” which, given the reconfiguration of a
geography articulated around national states into a network of places or cities, “have had to
participate in creating the enabling institutional and legal environments” in order to facilitate the
development and reproduction of such configuration (Ibid.: 1–2). In this regard, the strategic
advantage of any city depends on its ability to offer a key mix of specialized functions needed to
serve an increasing number of economic activities of an increasing number of firms and
markets.

But importantly, whether it will be for global cities or for cities aspiring to become one of them,
the implantation of global activities implies serious consequences in their urban economy and in
their social fabric. Most of these consequences are related to processes of gentrification which
are characterized by an increasing competence for urban space and the consequent displacement
of traditional activities and dwellers, as well as mutations in the cultural meaning of places. In
particular, this takes place in neighborhoods where shops and businesses which used to target
the needs and tastes of long-term residents are replaced by new investors and transnational
brands. Those newcomers enter in competition for the same spaces long occupied by others
deemed to be locals, and frequently bring about the growth of rent and property prices. Elderly
people, single mothers, sexual minorities, informal workers, among other inner-city dwellers
unable to purchase or rent renovated properties, are some examples of a emergent category of
urban displaced produced by neoliberal gentrification (Sassen 2006; see Deutsche 1988; Zukin
Sassen’s work introduced into the spatial analysis the notion of what she called “survival circuits,” on which processes of high-income gentrification—and therefore the building of global cities—rely. By survival circuits, Sassen refers to bi-polar structures of employment, home-work industries, low-wage service jobs and various types of informal jobs which according to her constitute “a sizable portion of the day-to-day work in global cities’ leading sectors” (2009: 186, 2008: 27).

As a constitutive layer of the global cities, survival circuits represent the tip of the iceberg of the dialectic in which neoliberalization has ‘enabled’ the participation of women in the labor market. The emergence of global cities has entailed a growing demand for high-level professional workers, among them highly educated women who have been able to find a job or struggle to obtain one. However, the difficulties of women to conciliate their professional activities with the domestic work they used to perform have resulted either in the relocation of homecare services in the market, or in the return of “serving classes” now mainly constituted by immigrant women or by women with postcolonial background (Sassen 2002: 259; Falquet 2011, Falquet et al. 2010). Whether they are maids, nannies or nurses, they become part of new forms of exploitation in the informal economy embedded in, but strategic for, the functioning of global North and South cities. In the meantime, migrant women turn a high proportion of their low income into remittances sent to their families, which alleviate the burden of indebted countries. Indeed, as feminists have pointed out, those remittances are likely to cover education, health and other social services that those indebted states fail to provide (GFMD 2015).

By shedding light on these layers of the global city’s urban fabric, Sassen’s approach disrupted the so-called First World/Third World dichotomy since, in her view, “the global city is many cities at once … [and] simultaneously contains multiple cities: the corporate, the postindustrial, the third world – layered over each other, and often in conflict” (Sassen, cited in Bell 2007: 73).
Such an assembling of differentiated layers into a single urban space is, among others factors, produced by what the deindustrialization and the transition into a global city is leaving behind.

Sassen’s global city notion has been further expanded by urban theorist Edward Soja (2005). According to him, the contemporary urban assemblage reflects a polycentric city, as in many cases it has not necessarily implied the disappearance of manufacturing industry but the incorporation of information, the cultural industry and industry-oriented services (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, according to feminist geographer Daphne Spain, the so-called Los Angeles School of Urban Studies—to which Soja’s work belongs—has failed to include gender relations among the drivers of urban redevelopment. This since, according to Spain, transformations in the relations of power within the home have also been “as powerful agent[s] of urban change as the global economy” (2002: 155). Instead, looking through the lenses of Sassen’s survival circuits embedded in global city networks has allowed the possibility to bring to light gender- and race-based narratives (e.g., narratives of low-paid women and immigrants working as maids, nannies, janitors, or in other activities conducted within informal sectors), which can be overlooked in economic approaches to global cities or considered as contained within analyses of class (Sassen 2009).

However, according to Peake and Ricker (2013), challenges introduced by Sassen through her analysis of the global South and North divide have not been adequately explored by feminist scholars. Echoing postcolonial geographer Jennifer Robinson (2006) and postcolonial urban scholar Ananya Roy (2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2015), Peake and Ricker assert that academic work on women inhabiting global South cities continues to be treated with an “urban global South/North divide” (2013: 6), which works to confine those subjects to an ethnographic realm, without reaching the level of theory. In addition, they are analyzed through the lens of developmentalism as opposed to a perspective of urban modernity, which is still reserved to Northern cities’ inhabitants (2013). Despite this balance, resonances of the destabilization of the First
World/Third World dichotomy pioneered by Sassen are currently reflected within postcolonial urban scholars; for instance, in the approach undertaken by Ananya Roy. As Roy (2013) claims: “The global south is of course not just in the south. It is everywhere, in border neighborhoods, in military urbanism, in ghettos, in foreclosed suburbs.”

Despite the many contributions of the world and global city framework, totalizing assumptions entailed in the local/global binarism are still persistent in research drawn on the lines traced by these perspectives. Therefore, this analytical branch has been problematized by critical approaches, most of them informed by postcolonial analyses as those mentioned above, which have called into question the emphasis of global city’s research on the economic debate. For instance, Robinson is concerned with the actual outcomes of research oriented by the world city and global frameworks, as most of them have been led, or have turned towards, the hierarchies and criteria set by the GaWC (Globalization and World Cities) research network (2006). Indeed, GaWC categorizes top ranked world cities based on their external relations and their availability to provide services needed by the global economy (Luke 2006: 277). Because of its primary focus on economic criteria and on the extent to which cities are involved in transnational business, the globalization and world city framework offers a “limited window” into the cities that achieve top positions (Robinson 2006: 98).

Robinson’s argument points to the dangers emerging from the promotion of a specific path and specific economic activities. Such focus turns those activities into an appealing recipe for other cities, and for its political and urban planning leaders wishing to fill the requirements to become global (e.g., banking, insurance advertising, accountancy). Her concern is not so much about the expansion of the range of criteria the world city rankings include so that nontraditional Western cities might have a place on it, as in fact rakings of the GaWC have been widened so as to include Southern cities having global city functions. But despite this, such classification entails

33 GaWC, http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/group.html.
the fictional presumption that there are urban areas excluded from the effects of contemporary globalization (Robinson 2006). As Massey puts it while critically addressing Sassen’s term advanced producer services, it too conveys the inevitability and one directionality implied in the ideal of the global city, as if there were no “other way in which the economy might have developed” (2007: 34) This despite the fact that the global city frame aimed to offer a “decentered map of the global economy” (Sassen 2002), and despite the claims advanced by Taylor for whom there is no such things as “non-global cities” since “globalization is considered to be a worldwide process” (Taylor and Derudder 2016: 39). The maintenance of such categories (i.e., North/South, local/global, center/periphery) favors the enactment of a single imaginary about the future form of urban centers and, on the other hand, marginalizes the possibilities of the local—and in particular of its inhabitants—to have an impact on shaping its own urban space (Robinson 2006).

This takes us back to the critiques made by Massey regarding the geography of global city networks. Made up of flows and nodes, this geography suggests a polarized local–global imagery in which the global is seen as “an abstract dimension of space,” a place of modernity and universality that subordinates the local to the forces it produces (2007: 165–166). On the contrary, the local (whether it is city, territory, people, uses and meanings of space, culture, etc.) must be considered as constituted by links that transcend its own boundaries, but without disregarding the role of the local in its own constitution (Appadurai 2003; Massey 1994, 2007; M.P. Smith 2001). Among its most serious consequences, the totalizing assumptions prevailing in the local/global binarism could mobilize defensive politics aimed at protecting the local from the global, which are crystallized in the “rejection of any arrivals from ‘outside’” (Massey 2007: 166). For instance it gives room for the reenactment of a patriarchal relation of protected/protector through which—as I discuss later—local populations are feminized, as the discourse of fear leads them to accept limitations to their autonomy and freedom for the sake of ‘protecting their
communities’ or maintaining an oppressive peace (Enloe, interviewed by Schouten and Dunham 2012: 7). But moreover, the binary relation local/global favors the portrayal of an “undifferentiated” and nonpolitical neoliberal project, thereby obscuring both “the sources of power from which it emanates” and the populations that it excludes or marginalizes (Massey 2007: 166).

Massey’s critique further stresses that an analysis of the contemporary production of space should not be restricted to a focus on the development of capitalist relations; rather, it ought to consider other perspectives regarding axes of domination such as gender, race/ethnicity, location or class which are meaningful in the production of space (1994: 182). Those axes, as Massey argues, are “deeply implicated” in our experience and understanding of a place, as well as in the ways in which we inhabit spaces (Ibid.: 164). But along with those dimensions, Massey stresses the impossibility of conceiving space in isolation, as the notion of time must be incorporated in its definition. Space without temporality is according to her a representation, a “static slice through time” (2005: 23, 1994: 265). Time, for Massey, is the dimension of multiplicity and simultaneity of a variety of trajectories that participate in shaping space (2012: 10). Therefore, its obliteration within the urban analysis is instrumental to the portrayal of neoliberal globalization as an ineluctable and undifferentiated process.

But the world and global cities research, stemming from Sassen and Taylor’s works, is neither the only venue attempting to grasp the globalization of urban space, nor the only that falls into the trap of depicting globalization as a single trajectory. Perhaps, as I will test in the next section, one of the challenges to overcome such traps is precisely the difficulty of decentering the urban critique from analysis focused on class, and therefore of recognizing urban space as a place of coevality and multiplicity (Massey 2005), shaped simultaneously by trajectories of sex, gender, ethnicity, race, postcoloniality, and place of origin.
In Massey’s view, forms of exclusion and otherness depend not just on distance but also on the “relational content of spatial form” (2005: 93). Hence, Massey pushes the debate towards the analysis of the productive and political dimensions of material spatiality. Her analysis emphasizes the need to examine spatialized forms of power such as gated communities, industrial relocations, architectural monumentalism and other spatial manipulations aimed at organizing the city and at turning people into an instrument of neoliberal interests. The urban spaces we inhabit shape us insofar as their spatial forms enable, among other spatial practices, “location, confinement, [and] symbolism” (Ibid., 1994).

3.2.2 Critical Urban Theory and the Male-Centered Critique

Another branch of scholarly literature addressing neoliberal urban transformations is exemplified by Marxist critiques, illustrated in the works of Harvey *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1990), and works edited by Brenner and Theodore in *Spaces of Neoliberalism* (2002). This stream of urban thought is characterized by its rejection to consider contemporary capitalist urbanism as transhistorical and as the outcome of technocratic rationality and economic efficiency. Therefore, this branch of spatial theory emphasizes the political and ideological character of urban space and defines space as a “malleable” and “contested” terrain of power-laden social relations (Brenner 2009: 199). In its various manifestations, critical urban theory has sought to antagonize urban approaches that convey the maintenance of market-driven urban development. Furthermore, reflecting an interest in making visible the “disjunction between the actual and the possible” (Ibid.: 201), it has endeavored to shed light on “alternative, radically emancipatory forms of urbanism” that, although “latent,” are “systematically suppressed” in the current urban development (Ibid.: 204).

Unlike the world and global city framework, critical urban theory emphasizes the fact that while the neoliberal project involves a worldwide arrangement which is developed from a broad geographical scope, it interacts, is hybridized, and even coexists with inherited contextual...
regulatory frames (Peck et al. 2013: 1093). The critical urban approach draws on the Schumpeterian notion of “creative destruction” in order to conceptualize the dynamics of neoliberalism (Harvey 1990: 106). The notion of creative destruction illustrates neoliberalism’s dialectic dynamic which is initiated with the “roll-back” or “destruction of extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market-oriented reform initiatives,” and is followed by the “roll-out” or “creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 15).

The outcome unfolded by this neoliberal turnaround is nowadays denominated globalization; however, this new round of capitalism is not in essence new. What can be claimed as distinctive about it are the intensification of interconnectedness (Inda and Rosaldo 2002: 5) and increasing dispersion as well as centrality boosted by communication technologies (Sassen 2002: 4; Haraway 1991: 164–67; Bell 2007: 103), which have favored the “further development of trends and forces at work for centuries” (Marcuse 2002: 133). Among these forces, Marcuse underlines transnational mobility of persons and capital, power of dominant business groups vis-à-vis labor and social movements, as well as “commodification of goods, services and cultural production” (Ibid.). However, feminist approaches have been sharp in unveiling the nuances of these flows. For instances, while Sassen was a pioneer in shedding light on the significance of flows constituted by low-wage workers, often migrant women in the informal economy which were previously disregarded as an important actor of the global economy (2002), Jules Falquet points out that “the specificity of the current neoliberalism is the overwhelming weight that finance has gained over the real economy” (2011: 83)

Vis-à-vis critical urban perspectives, the origin of the neoliberal urban restructuring can be traced back to the urban crisis of the 1960s which reflected the dysfunctionalities of the model of the Keynesian–Fordist city conceived to enhance capitalist accumulation as well as efficient social reproduction (Smith 2002: 85). In response to such crisis, aggressive neoliberal reforms that
swept aside the Fordist mass-production model as well as Keynesian welfare policies were implemented. The measures fostered by this new round of capitalism in order to supposedly allow the free market to rule—and which were particularly implemented since the early 1980s—have entailed processes of deregulation, market liberalization, privatizations, state retrenchment from welfare state provisions or commitments, cuts in government subsidies, devaluation (Antrobus 2005: 103), and the subordination of urban development and the uses of land to the logic of the market (Brenner and Theodore 2002: vii). Reflecting on the effects that these neoliberal policies—also referred to as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)—have brought about in women’s lives, Antrobus recalls the active role of supranational organizations in pressuring states to adopt these policies and in preparing the path for trade liberalization:

“[During the decade of the 1980s], the spread of the policy framework of neo-liberalism, embodied in the so-called Washington Consensus through the mechanism of the conditionalities attached to IMF and World Bank loans to indebted countries, exposed the gender ideology underlying capitalism in ways that had not been as clear before.” (2004: 67)

The spread of the Washington Consensus was not limited to indebted countries and neither were its effects restricted to economic dimensions. By mobilizing the idea that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA), SAPs were implemented across all countries willing to catch up with modernity (Benería 1999, 2012; Antrobus 2004: 68). And consubstantially, SAPs were promoted too by waving the flag of the supposed efficiency of the market as a tool for generating productivity and development, as well as for distributing resources and dealing with poverty. The implementation of the Washington Consensus, however, undermined the redistributive functions of the state, reduced its role in the provision of basic services (e.g., health, education), thus reaching social, spatial, and cultural aspects affecting the majority of citizens, but especially women and “those for whom they cared” (e.g., children, elderly people) (Antrobus 2004: 68). In addition, neoliberal policies have had enormous implications in bringing about what is

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34 Phrase originally coined by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.
commonly called the feminization of the labor force. Cornwall et al. characterizes this term as the deterioration of working conditions, by facilitating “casualisation, flexibilisation, violation of international labour standards and low wages” (2008: 2). When considered through this perspective, the feminization of labor force mirrors what in political discourses is often both presented as the flexibilization of labor force and sold as a necessary requirement for attracting foreign investments.

Furthermore, Cornwall et al. (2008) underlines that neoliberalism has not been homogeneously experienced by women, since for some of them it has opened paths for empowerment. However, it certainly has not had the same advantageous effects on the lives of women located in the lower layers of the social scale. For instance, after the implementation of SAPs, women became a suitable labor force in export-oriented manufacturing and agriculture, as the competitiveness of those sectors became greatly dependent on cheap and docile labor. Simultaneously, the increasing participation of female as well as migrant workers in labor-intensive and export-oriented industry has had strong resonance in how places have been reassigned or realigned within systems of geographic representation (Massey 1994: 161). In particular, Cynthia Wood emphasized that, as a result of the implementation of SAP policies in Latin America, “women compensated for falling income by spending more time on day-to-day management of the household and by substituting unpaid work for commodities they could no longer afford” (2003: 212).

In a broader scope, SAPs turned “people-friendly states” into “market-friendly states” (Antrobus 2004: 71), whereas in a local scale this shift took local governments from a concern with urban welfare towards a concern with local development and competitiveness. Depicting this shift as the emergence of “urban entrepreneurialism,” Harvey underlines the growing concern of governmental urban authorities with the city’s quality of life (1989: 9), and with the incorporation of cultural, architectural and aesthetic values into a process of urban up-scaling. Furthermore, the
neoliberal city’s form encompasses, too, the building of tourist facilities and shopping centers, as well as the implementation of strategies on entertainment and cultural events (Ibid.). However, the extent to which urban cultural policies are likely to benefit local dwellers is a matter of debate (Bell and Oakley 2015). Masked with labels such as “quality of life” and “happy city,” oftentimes these strategies are actually aimed at attracting highly educated workers and new residents with higher social status, while in the meantime disenfranchise disadvantaged populations of the right to inhabit and to participate in their city.

Given the rich literature inspired by, and produced within, the debates on urban critical theory, its contribution to the understanding of neoliberal urban forms is undeniable. However, analyses from postcolonial urban scholars such as Susan Parnell and Jennifer Robinson have called attention to the “parochialism” showed by the focus of its urban analysis, which they insist need to be “recalibrated” in order to provide relevant urban knowledge for urban spaces and populations often left off the map (Parnell and Robinson 2012: 595; Robinson 2016: 12).

Parnell and Robinson, for instance, are concerned with the prevalent visibility that authors belonging to this strand have given to North American and Western European cities, and with the consequences in terms of “representation, processes, and voices” that might result from such a focus (2012: 596). In their view, often speaking from their own “backyards” (i.e., their Western experience), these authors position Northern cities as the leading producers of urban space theory (Ibid.). To this aspect, Parnell and Robinson add the fact that, in many non-Western cities, Keynesian welfare state policies were weakly applied. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to interpret the “roll-back” of welfare mechanisms and state as the universal canon of contemporary urbanism.

To be sure, critical urban theory has set the tone for urban analyses to address the effects of SAPs on the transformation of urban space and has shed light on the possibilities of neoliberalism to be globalized; that is, to adapt itself to local context. However, Echoing
Massey’s power-geometry approach and her concern for a “global sense” of the urban space (1994: 146), Robinson highlights the dismissal of a multiplicity of historical spatial practices, imaginaries and hierarchies that stretch out and coexist with contemporary forces in shaping urban restructuring, whether counteracting, contesting or enhancing them (2012: 600).

Inspired by the perspective of what Roy calls “postcolonial urbanism” (Roy 2011a, 2011b), the efforts for advancing a more global sense of the urban space convey the hope for a more relevant theoretical framework that allows an account of the multiplicity of trajectories, dynamics and imaginaries that, besides neoliberalization, shape the fabric of contemporary processes of urbanization (Parnell and Robinson 2012). This in a world increasingly urbanized and where most urbanization processes are taking place elsewhere rather than in the global North. Such array of drivers overlooked by the hegemonic urban neoliberal critique may involve, for instance, the role of informality (AlSayyad 2004), human rights activism and gender regimes as generators of symbolic and material spatial practices as well as of social struggles of women of non-normative ethnic, sexual, class, or postcolonial condition who vindicate the right to the city vis-à-vis modalities of exclusion and marginalization brought about through the deployment of neoliberalism. Other driving forces include the process by which traveling discourses on security deployed to legitimate the creation of ordered spaces and antipoverty strategies are hybridized and negotiated with local cultural practices such as religion, informality, and traditional authority (Parnell and Robinson 2012; Robinson 2014).

With this in mind, I will attempt to offer a perspective of what a gendered postcolonial urban analysis, suitable to comprehend these variables, might look like. But before, I will present some features of the so-called Chicago School, a group who emerged during the 1920s and whose ideas continue to both permeate urban thinking in Latin America and to prompt a universal notion of what is to be urban (AlSayyad 2004).
3.2.3 Defining the Urban and Its Sole Way of Life

The omission of urban aspects, trajectories, and subject positions from the map of mainstream urban analyses is closely linked to the construction of the notion of the urban space and to a definition of the urban life mediated by the filter of modernity. Such a way of thinking about the urban, prompted by the works produced by the Chicago School of Urban Sociology between 1915 and 1945, oriented discourses about Third World cities and still continue to influence practices and understandings of urban space (AlSayyad 2004: 8; Robinson 2013, 2006).

The Chicago School emerged in a context of urban population growth and immigration from Europe and rural areas into North American cities. Its leading scholars Park, Burgess, and Wirth borrowed ecological metaphors such as invasion, survival, adaptation, assimilation, and cooperation in order to describe what they identified as patterns of social organization and processes of urban life occurring amidst the city’s apparent confusion. But they too drew on Darwinist and Malthusian ideas which are reflected in the evolutionist tone and in the links this School built between problems such as poverty, crime, delinquency, promiscuity on the one hand, and subjective, ethnic and racial features on the other (Burgess 1925: 59).

The Chicago School promoted a positivist vision of the city, strongly differentiating between the urban and rural population (Ibid.: 47). The city, from this perspective, was a site of modernization in which the center organizes its hinterlands (Bridge and Watson 2010). Immigrants, according to Burgess, would arrive in transitional districts and inhabit in conditions of social disorganization; thereafter, they would move into “natural areas” as they achieve economic stability (Burgess referred by Bridge and Watson 2010: 171). The expansion of the city would involve, in Burgess’s words, the relocation of “individuals and groups by residence and occupation” (1925: 54). As a result, the division of labor works as a mechanism of organization and differentiation with spatial implications, through which spatial distance becomes an equivalent to social distance (Bridge and Watson 2010: 172).
Taking as a starting point the differentiations between urban and rural populations, the Chicago School inscribed the signifier of the city with notions such as modernity, rationality, innovation, individualism, secularism and others alike, so that an ideal of urban life was a “blasé outlook” (Simmel [1903] 1972: 329). Reserved to the city, the blasé metropolitan attitude was marked by an “indifference toward the distinctions between things,” since in the urban life any feature (e.g., color, shape) would be rendered meaningless vis-à-vis the criterion of “how much” which is dominant in the money economy (Ibid.: 330). The other side of this coin—and without which the signifier of the city, prompted by this School, could not be generated—is the re-enactment of a notion of urban otherness made of imaginaries such as tradition, poverty, emotional relationships and collectivism which has been attached to rural areas, as well as of the construction of a primitive figure or rural-folk people conceived as the antithesis of the “modern man” (Robinson 2006: 22–24; Simmel [1903] 1972: 325). To such constructions, Park and Wirth attached the imaginary of a unique “urban way of life, characteristic of all cities,” which is still embedded in the understanding of cities prompted by urban planners and politicians (Robinson 2006: 45).

Over time, rigorous models of zoning of the kind promoted by the Chicago School are falling into disuse, as nowadays urban planners and a concern with urban sustainability are challenging restricted zoning codes and are instead “promoting diverse, mixed-use guidelines” (Moser 2014). However, the male-centered and ethnocentric footprints of this School, denounced by Deutsche’s feminist standpoint (1996: 132–133), could be traced back in antipoverty discourses and housing policies implemented during the post-Second World War period in what were at the time referred to as ‘developing countries’ (Bayat 2004). But besides these spatial dimensions, the Chicago School’s postulates remain active in discursive practices through which “other cities” are cast as “not-urban” or as “not modern” (Robinson 2013: 660), and their inhabitants are submitted to the yoke of what Escobar terms “developmentalism” (1995: 5).
Disrupting the footprints of the Chicago School’s developmentalist narrative, Roy advocates for “new geographies of theory” by arguing that the task at hand for postcolonial urbanism is not about adding more empiricism or varieties to urbanism (2015: 207). Speaking from elsewhere in urban theory has implied to fall within the label of ‘development’ as opposed to modern, or to generate data as opposed to theory. But it has also implied the persistence of supposedly superseded categories such as the Third World city. Hence, one of the main challenges posed by postcolonial thinking is to produce a located urban knowledge and to dislocate or decenter the places from where it is produced (Roy 2009a: 828).

In what follows, I illustrate how Chicago School’s concepts have been revitalized in neoliberal traveling narratives that are locally translated and that work to enforce the formation of the global city model worldwide.

### 3.2.4 Urban Malaise, Quality of Life, and the Happy City: Discursive Artifacts to Shape the Urban

“It is a popular belief,” asserted Claude Fischer in 1973, “that the nature of cities affects men in such ways as to lead to unhappiness and malaise” (1973: 221). These words are symptomatic of a period in which urban sociology was concerned with identifying and managing the urban conditions that make cities symbols of an unhealthy and unhappy life (Okulicz-Kozaryn and Mazelis 2016). From this perspective, cities were places where strategic advantages such as specialization of labor force, scale economies and creativity were developed, but on the other hand—and because of their inherent conditions, namely density, heterogeneity and size—cities where places of anonymity, withdrawal from social life and deviance. In Wirth’s view, unlike rural environments where kinship relations exerted social control over members of the society, cities lacked such mechanisms, as well as particular social norms and forms of solidarity, the absence of which, in turn, led to the proliferation of deviance and higher levels of suicide, crime, corruption, disorder and delinquency. Therefore, according to Wirth, the development of a blasé
outlook characterized by detachment, rationality, freedom and an emotional control to which we referred before, was a device that would immunize the population against risks linked to deviance.

The Chicago School’s focus on the relations between behavior and urban life was revived at the end of the 1980s and 1990s, and grew in parallel with the so-called ‘revanchist city’ movement in North American cities. As Neil Smith (1996) suggests, through this movement, marginalized urban populations, and particularly multi-ethnic communities, were turned into scapegoats by middle classes and political elites who blamed them for the deterioration of inner cities and the lack of safety in urban public spaces. But this movement was all but accidental, as in fact it was instrumental for implementing spatial economic strategies which, by diagnosing the “urban malaise” of the inner city, sought to transform inner cities into spaces for development of urban enterprise zones and other spaces for neoliberalism (Smith 1996: xviii).

Best illustrated in cities like New York at the time of Giuliani’s administration in the 1990s, politicians engaged in actions framed as zero tolerance policies, which they sold as a way to bring about a better quality of life and which allowed the spatial deployment of police in order to exert control. Thanks to the road paved by these policies, the gentrification of the poorest areas of inner cities expanded, processes of urban regeneration became generalized and cities could enter into the race of global competitiveness. In response, urban research has multiplied too. In this scenario, researchers reframed their terms under the slogan quality of life, known as QoL, and directed their focus to identifying what factors make cities attractive for living and working (Ballas 2013). Hence the dystopian idea of city as a place of unhappiness was turned into a myth and the narrative of quality of life took up its place.

QoL research designs have sought to explain, for instance, household immigration into a city, and oftentimes explicitly investigate what factors would make a city attractive for highly educated workers. But in fact, such focus is telling of how the actual target and beneficiaries of the quality
of life rhetoric are all but traditional city dwellers. Thus, it is not exaggerated to claim that the QoL discourse has been instrumental to regenerate urban spaces and to the formation of global cities. It has yielded spatial urban changes, which allow cities to target populations with higher socio-economic standards and to enhance their urban competitiveness.

Research about cities’ quality of life is mainly conducted through positivist quantitative tools, which define QoL as a function of indicators such as the number and quality of amenities (Ballas 2013). Among these amenities, they include ‘natural’ elements such as climate, topography and proximity to mountains, but amenities can also be human-created places such as public spaces, theaters, restaurants, parks, health services and education centers. Hence, in accordance with increasing cities’ investment in building public spaces and in designing cultural agendas, QoL takes the developments of these amenities and cultural events as rendering cities particularly attractive and as “correlated with how the inhabitants of the city subjectively feel about their quality of their life” (Ibid.: S40–S43). QoL involves as well factors such as fiscal prudence, crime levels, management of land use, wages, housing values, public transport, shops (Ibid.: S40). But insofar as QoL includes more and more factors, it also extends traditional notions of housing leaving behind the idea of home as “a place to raise a family and have a secure living environment” (Ibid.: S42). QoL narratives have participated in turning housing into a positional good. In other words, housing has become a signifier of socio-cultural and economic status, determined by contextual factors that made housing a luxury good and/or an investment that should generate return.

At the heart of these methodologies lies a vision of the ‘rational economic man,’ whose behavior is encouraged through QoL narratives. Defined by classic economics as representing the “norm in human behavior” and guided by a selfish conduct, the rational economic man is embodied in the “employee [who] seeks to attain the highest earnings possible, and [in] the consumer … [who] maximize[s] his or her [own] utility” (Benería 1999: 64). Indeed, feminists have shown the
blindness of this model, as it assumes that individuals are immune to other kind of motivations as for example “altruism, empathy, love, the pursuit of art and beauty,” and are rather driven by a propensity to achieve maximum gains (Ibid.: 65). Since the 1980s, according to Benería, the rational economic man is embodied in a character marked by individualism and competitive behavior, who has come to tolerate social inequality and to accept it as unavoidable (Ibid.: 68).

Recently, an increasing interest in the study of happiness has permeated both urban studies and quality of life research. Called by Sarah Ahmed “the happiness turn” (2010a, 2008), the research on happiness is mostly fostered by behavioral psychologists and by economists who stress the limits of GNP per person to give an account of individuals’ well-being. Therefore, according to economist Richard Layard, a happiness index is the best way to measure growth and advancement (Layard, cited in Ahmed 2010a: 5). Attracted by the happiness turn, QoL research has attempted to include measures of “subjective happiness and well-being” (Ballas 2013: S43). But actually, as Okulicz-Kozaryn and Mazelis point out, they use the terms “happiness, life satisfaction and subjective wellbeing interchangeably” and included in their survey only one item specifically concerned with happiness (2016: 4–5). This item is a self-reported question asking informants: “In general, how satisfied are you with your life? … 1 is ‘very dissatisfied’, 2 ‘dissatisfied’, 3 ‘satisfied’, and 4 ‘very satisfied’” (Ibid.; Ballas 2013: S44). Those surveys are collected in comparative charts that reflect, for instance, the top 10 happiest and unhappiest cities.

Although still in development, those methodologies strive to identify geographical and social variables which would affect people’s happiness and well-being (Ballas 2013: S44). Among preliminary factors, availability of and access to green spaces seem to play a significant role, but people’s happiness is also highly determined by social comparison. The debate of whether happiness can really be measured is still ongoing; however, what is certain is that the interchangeable use of the terms quality of life, well-being, life satisfaction and happiness is
telling of how citizens’ happiness is, as Foucault asserts, instrumental for the achievement of the government’s goals. In other words, whereas urban regeneration is a mechanism for increasing city competitiveness, on the other hand, its instruments, as urban design, are positioned by the defenders of the happy city movement as conducive to make people happier (Montgomery 2013a).

Borrowing Ahmed’s term, cities have become another terrain of the “happiness industry,” another feel-good product (2010a: 3). But, as Simone de Beauvoir claimed, “it is not too clear just what the word happy really means and still less what true values it may mask” (1949: 33). And it is here where the perversity of the use of happiness can be found, because happiness promises everything that is deemed to be desirable and worthwhile, thereby dictating social norms and enacting the duty of being happy (Ahmed 2010a). From Ahmed’s perceptive, this condition renders the notion of happiness tautological, since “what is good is happy and what is happy is good” (2010a: 202). Thus, happiness turns things, including cities, into containers of wants whose proximity means a promise for a better life.

As Ahmed recalls, Beauvoir was pioneer in showing happiness as a “wishful politics” aimed at making others live according to values that are granted a universal and general character (2010a: 2; Beauvoir 1949: 33). Hence, as I discuss in chapter 5, urban happiness becomes a disciplinary politics that works to maintain a relation of attachment of urban dwellers to the process of city regeneration. The tautological functioning of happiness leads citizens to endorse and behave according to hegemonic values and desires that would bring about the building of the happy city, and simultaneously citizens’ proximity to the city is the condition of possibility for the actualization of such values, hope, and wants that they believe make life better.
3.3 A Gendered Right to the City as a Window for a Postcolonial Urban Gender Theory

Is there a way out of the hegemonic discourse on quality of life and urban happiness that allows ordinary dwellers to speak about their spatial practices in their own terms? How can the experiences of dwellers inhabiting the city in disadvantaged conditions be voiced? In this section, I outline the elements of a feminist analytical framework of neoliberal urban restructuring by taking as a starting point a gendered right to the city. My approach echoes the suggestion of Parnell and Robinson (2012), who point at the right to the city as one of the viable analytical venues to overcome some of the limits of the neoliberal critique explored above.

By exploring neoliberal spatial processes through the lens of a gendered right to the city, I hope to participate in the development of a more nuanced and less universalizing focus that sheds light on urban development practices and policies engaged by local governments. Furthermore, a gendered right to the city carries a transformative and inclusive potential as it provides paths for making visible the ways in which all city dwellers participate in the making of the urban. My reflection will be nurtured by a double perspective on the study of urban space, which encompasses postcolonial urban thinking while simultaneously relying on the works of feminist geographers, philosophers, and sociologists.

Introduced by Henri Lefebvre in March 1968—that is, on the eve of the cultural turn—the claim for the right to the city emerged as a reaction to the overwhelming power of functionalist urban planning largely influenced by Le Corbusier’s ideas, which saw architecture as a vehicle of social progress (Costes 2010: 178). Through his pioneering claim, Lefebvre strived to challenge power relations that reasserted the domination of technocracy and capital over the production of the city (Ibid.). Therefore, defining the right to city as a “cry and a demand” aimed at counteracting such a dominant power, Lefebvre’s vindication strived to give back to those who inhabit the city the right to participate in the production of the space in which they live (1967: 34; Costes 2010: 178).
Systematized in the *Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne* (CIAM) and implemented throughout the urban reconstruction taking place after World War II, the technocratic understanding of urban space that Lefebvre sought to challenge defined four main urban functions: living, working, recreation, and circulation. Such functions continue to foreground current urban planning practice, having serious implications in the production of “homogenous, single-use urban landscapes … where daily life can become difficult” (Sánchez de Madariaga 2013: 33). One of the problematic assumptions stemming from the prevalence of this functionalist rationality is the use of narrow concepts such as work understood as paid employment and the conflation of care activities with leisure, but also the definition of housewife and head of household as two opposite poles, which therefore reify the ideal of a male breadwinner with a small share in the reproductive activities (Ibid.: 34). Add to this the disregard of political participation and community activities, which, as geographers England and Lawson (2005) argue, should be included in order to expand the spatiality of work.

Given such a landscape, and after more than 40 years of being enacted, Lefebvre’s right to the city is all the more pertinent to engage in a gender analysis of the production of the neoliberal city, as in fact it was from the beginning aimed at unveiling the non-neutral character of urban spaces. Moreover, it has drawn attention to how urban forms reflect existing social relations of power and the effect of these relations in producing spatial-related phenomena such as socio-spatial segregation and peripheral fragmentation (Costes 2010: 179). However, feminists objected to Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city for being sex and color blind. As Fenster (2005) points out, Lefebvre’s right to the city failed to pay attention to a large range of populations who inhabit and participate in shaping the city and who therefore should be entitled to this right. Indeed, the right to the city was, in its initial conception, centered on the working class, which Lefebvre defined as the agent that “gathers the interests of the whole society” (1967: 35). By
asserting that Lefebvre’s notion maintained a hierarchical order that subordinates to the primacy of class other social struggles, and in particular those of subjugated groups such as women, non-masculine, non-White, non-Western and non-heterosexual people (Fenster 2005: 220). In doing so, it also reasserted the male standpoint as the privileged position from which to understand what the urban space should look like. In addition, and despite his critique of the functionalist compartmentalization of spaces, Lefebvre did not problematize the ways in which such management of space participates in reinforcing the public/private division. By disregarding this aspect, his claim for the right to the city turned a blind eye to the ways in which spatial urban order has relegated women to the private sphere and therefore have participated in sustaining women’s spatial confinement (Fenster 2005).

Despite these initial handicaps, since the 1970s the right to the city has been reappraised as a battle horse, precisely by some of these disadvantaged groups who were once disregarded in the original notion. Thus, grassroots organizations, women’s groups, environmentalists, immigrants, homeless people, LGBT groups, ethnic and racial minorities, elderly people are among those who have drawn on Lefebvre’s idea in order to vindicate that it is exactly those who inhabit and who use the city who can legitimately claim this right (Costes 2010; Fenster 2010: 71; Purcell 2003; Mayer 2009).35 These groups have reshaped the right to the city so as to make it a more inclusive vindication, related to a multilayer web of distinct social relations, and into an instigator for sociopolitical action (Fernandes 2007).

In general terms, the right to the city “consist[s] of the right of all city dwellers to fully enjoy urban life with all its services and advantages – the right to habitation – as well as taking direct part in the management of cities – the right to participation” (Fernandes 2007: 208). Two main axes can be distinguished in this definition: the right to participate and the right to inhabit, which Purcell (2003) defines as the right of appropriation. The right to participate seeks to allow all

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35 [http://righttothecity.org/about/member-organizations/](http://righttothecity.org/about/member-organizations/)
inhabitants, regardless of their condition of citizenship, to play a role in the making of any decision concerned with the production and use of urban space, while the right to inhabit or to appropriate is related to enfranchisement and the capacity to be present in the city. In other words, the right to appropriate space consists of the right to physically access, use, and occupy urban space.

The capaciousness of this notion has led some authors to depict the right to the city either as “abstract” (Mitchell and Heynen 2009: 614) or “vague” (Purcell 2003). Nonetheless, it is precisely the ambiguity of the concept that has enabled the right to the city to be adapted to the needs or particular goals of different social struggles (Jouffe 2010: 50). In the Latin American context, this ample scope has served as a starting point for political struggles that seek to overturn the prevalence of exchange value of urban space over its use value, and the social and ecological functions of the land over the right to ownership (Fernandes 2007; Maldonado 2008, 2004; Purcell 2003).

Bearing these reflections in mind, I will gender this concept by imbuing it with what Enloe has called “feminist curiosity” (2004). In other words, I adopt the right to the city in order to understand women’s relationships to urban neoliberal spaces (Enloe 2004: 10). Thus, this analytical framework encompasses an exploration of how women’s conditions are shaped by the urban spatial ordering and architectural forms of global cities and how the public/private division is being redefined in this urban order. In addition, it requires deciphering what discourses and narratives are used in order to foster people’s support for neoliberal processes of urban renewal, and their attachment to a specific model of the city, as well as to identify the ideals of masculinity and femininity encouraged or marginalized through these narratives.

In this endeavor, I will not presume a homogeneous women’s experience, neither will I promote a straightforward assessment of women’s urban spatial needs, or define how the fulfilling of those needs should be articulated in urban spaces. Embracing Chantal Mouffe’s claim, my
analysis conveys the belief that every woman is constructed by the articulation of various subject positions related, for instance, to class, gender, race, ethnicity, age, postcoloniality, and that such articulation is not fixed but rather contingent, precarious, and shaped by diverse forms of discourse (1992: 28). Nonetheless, I draw on previous analysis concerning particularly women’s urban experiences, which have hinted at important aspects of the right to the city. They are useful referents in order to outline what a gendered analysis of women’s right to the city should focus on and, by the same token, to shed light on the failures and gaps brought about by neoliberal urbanization that hinder or counteract the building of places with gendered spatial justice.

Women’s right to the city can be organized along the lines of the right to inhabit and the right to participate. The right to inhabit involves dimensions such as women’s safety in public and private spaces, availability of transport facilities, access to secure housing tenure, proximity between housing, workplaces and public services, and access to public services and facilities (Buckingham 2010). On the other hand, the right to participation refers to women’s involvement in the definition and creation of what an inclusive and egalitarian city should be, so as to meet the needs of its inhabitants. However, to actualize the right to participate requires having the means and the entitlement to do so (Amin 2006). Therefore, an analysis of the right to the city should also consider and include the narratives and discourses through which the ideal of an urban dweller is constructed. That is, the specific kind of urban residents to whom the global city is more likely to provide with the means and entitlements to shape the city in which they dwell.

3.3.1 Proximity between Housing, Workplaces, and Public Services

The distance between women’s homes and workplaces was one of the earlier concerns of feminist analyses on the urban space. The works of Ericksen (1976) and England (1993) illustrate how feminist geographers have called attention to the effects of growing urbanization in North American cities in increasing the length of women’s journey to their workplaces. As this
research suggested, the augmentation of the distance between workplaces and homes brought about by suburbanization, as well as the low availability of social services, highly constrained women’s choices and forced many of them to search for job opportunities close to their homes or to take part-time jobs, even though it implied to lower their income or undermined their career prospects. But do those concerns still play a role in determining women’s experiences of neoliberal urban spaces?

Driven by what Massey describes as a “juxtaposition of greed and need” (2007), in the current race to become global actors, cities are reshaped by clustering specific infrastructure and services aimed at serving the needs of multinationals and corporate actors (Sassen 1991). According to Robinson, such hubs are actually concentrated in small parts of the city (2006: 118). However, it does not mean that the consolidation of these hubs does not affect the whole urban space and the lives of the whole city’s inhabitants. On the contrary, enabled by urban planning and architectural form, the building of the global city simultaneously entails processes of gentrification and suburbanization, which play an enormous role in exacerbating spatial segregation and in deepening urban space’s fragmentation.

At the heart of these spatial phenomena is the fact that the global city entails an increasing compartmentalization of activities, especially of advanced producer services, which pronounces the rupture between places where paid and unpaid activities take place. This makes access to labor markets and job-related activities more difficult, particularly for women living in suburbs. Even more, as England (1993) suggests, such difficulty undermines women’s employability and renders them vulnerable, thereby turning them into cheap labor force.

This vulnerability is also deepened by the withdrawal of states from the provision of welfare services, which has resulted in the relocation of care work and social services formerly supplied by the state to the unpaid economy, that is, to households or community-based organizations (England and Lawson 2005: 79). Thus, whereas discourses about neoliberal globalization are
presented as an opportunity to increase the participation of women in the market economy, on the other hand, it is not exaggerated to assert that “women have been sent to the labor market without anyone replacing them in ‘their’ traditional tasks” (Falquet 2011: 84). In other words, the entry of some women in the labor market—often migrant, poor, or less qualified women—has been surrounded by the worsening of welfare conditions stemming from the implementation of SAPs. Pushed to compensate for welfare state retrenchment, women become a vulnerable labor force, who “by will or by force” are more likely to accept underpaid and undervalued jobs (Falquet 2008).

Very often, gentrification of core centers is aimed at upgrading or rescaling the class status of the residents’ area, and this in turn gives rise to one of the reasons why gentrification runs in parallel with increasing suburbanization. In fact, the gentrification process seldom involves strategies that allow long-term poor residents to remain, and rather erodes the existing social fabric. As illustrated in chapter 5, in most cases, gentrification of central neighborhoods and historical centers have resulted in the pauperization and displacement towards peripheral suburbs of elderly people, single mothers, informal workers, ethnic and sexual minorities unable to purchase or rent renovated properties in the places in which they used to live (Beuf 2011b; Rose 1984). But the effects of gentrification on women’s lives do not stop there. Through the use of architecture, revitalization programs trigger centripetal and centrifugal forces that allow not only to attract global flows towards core centers, but also to expel towards the periphery the poorest residents and diverse forms of delinquency which do not fit the standards of urban modernity. So, besides exacerbating spatial fragmentation, gentrification entails an elitist segmented redistribution of flows which leads to the denial of the benefits of social mixing, job opportunities, and quality public services to those people living in poor peripheral areas. As the experiences of the women of Kennedy (Bogotá) that I present in this research show, the revitalization of global South cities, as it happens in the global North, frequently occurs at the expense of the decline and exclusion of
peripheries.

Following Robinson (2006), it could be asserted that instead of taking the city as a whole, urban policies might fall in the trap of implementing a double standard, which works to reproduce within the same city spatial hierarchies such as center/periphery, modern/developing, inner city/slum areas. Reifying a colonial paternalism, neoliberal policies of urban space apply to peripheries and poor areas a developmentalist approach focused strictly on poverty and on what their inhabitants lack, while in the meantime these policies reserve to global hubs and core centers the benefits of modernity, cultural innovation and creativity (Ibid.). Insofar as such double-standard approach persists, for those living in poor peripheries, and especially for women with domestic tasks and who perform care work as well as for those who depend on them, their conditions of social-spatial exclusion and stigmatization turn into barriers difficult to overcome.

3.3.2 Availability of Transport Facilities: More Than a Journey to Work

The compartmentalization of activities and the social segregation prompted by neoliberal technocratic urban planning is clearly related to the organization and deployment of transport facilities. Feminist research in these fields—namely transport and urban planning—emerged since the 1960s, moved by a concern for the perpetuation of the illusory model of “women’s suburban home and men’s city work” (Rose 1993: 123; Hanson and Pratt 1988: 302). According to Law (1999), feminist debates held between the 1980s and 1990s were divided into two main branches: one informed by a radical feminism and closely linked to the women’s movement “Take Back the Night”—which I will refer to later in this section—and a branch oriented by a Marxist approach focused on the conditions of women’s travel to and from workplaces which prompted the so-called “journey-to-work’ research” (1999: 569–70).

Indeed, the extent to which available transport models facilitate or hamper women’s mobility is a telling aspect of the extent to which women actually enjoy the right to the city. On the one hand, despite the shift from a monocentric city model to a polycentric one, urban transportation
models continue to be primarily centered on facilitating mobility from the suburbs towards the city core center, thus following supposed ‘universal’ patterns of commuting between home and paid employment. Although this emphasis is followed by an interest in serving trips related to education and leisure activities, such focus has overlooked mobility modalities most likely relevant to women, such as trips related to care work and trip chaining which they undertake on a daily basis, for instance delivering children to after-school activities (Sánchez de Madariaga 2013: 40; Preston and Ustundag 2005: 217). In addition, the privatization of transport services has led to overlook, and sometimes to suppress, connectivity between and within suburbs, or to bypass poor neighborhoods. The outcomes of such connectivity rational has brought about new forms of “female spatial entrapment” (Hanson and Pratt 1988: 307; Preston and Ustundag 2005: 217). For instance, in global South cities, the lack of available and affordable transport services helps to confine women to peripheral areas where precarious jobs in the informal economy—for example in home-sewing industries—are the only prospect to earn an income (Young and Keil 2010: 92; ECWC 1994: 23), and moreover jeopardize community participation, traditional forms of association, and “instrumental kinship” on which women, ethnic minorities and forcibly displaced people frequently rely (Robinson 2006: 47).

### 3.3.3 Access to Secure Housing Tenure and the Dilemmas of Feminist Politics of Home

“Men were to receive ‘family wages’ and become home ‘owners’ responsible for regular mortgage payments, while their wives became home ‘managers’ taking care of spouse and children.” (Hayden 1980: S173)

Used critically by Hayden in 1980, this sentence illustrates the politics set by housing industry and corporations in United States since the 1920s, which saw home ownership as a means to contain industrial conflict and to secure the sexual division of labor (1980: S173). By pointing this politics, Hayden hinted at one of the pillars of patriarchy which French feminism—exemplified in Guillaumin—described as “women’s confinement to a space” owned by men (2005). Thus, according to Young, because of its linkage to the idea of confinement to a place where women
are deprived of their own self (1997: 134) and with no room of their own (Ibid.: 141), it is not surprising that some feminists rejected the idea of “home as a value” (Ibid.: 134). But should feminist politics today reject the idea of home? Young’s approach to home and homemaker, the richness of which I cannot fully explore here, is illuminating in order to address this question and to explore aspects of women’s experiences to housing in the frame of women’s right to the city—that is, women’s access to, appropriation and use of housing in the neoliberal age.

As Young points out, the idea of home to which feminist thinkers such as Beauvoir, Irigaray, and de Lauretis have referred corresponds mostly to a “bourgeois-dominated meaning of home,” whose values have become hegemonic in Western societies (1997: 159). But such a notion is not universal. Young recalls that, in many non-Western societies, the idea of home is not confined or restricted to a house but stretches out to include a series of interstitial spaces where activities related to “preservation,” to “sustaining life” take place (Ibid.: 155, 148). While in those societies, a house could be a place “for sleeping, making love and giving birth,” other activities usually assigned to the private sphere take place in communal enclosures (Ibid.: 142). They could involve cooking, eating, taking care of children, transferring traditions or passing on memories. A similar argument that disrupts a unified notion of home and brings nuances to the public/private binary has been made by Black feminist thinkers. For example, as Collins (2000) claims, the notion of private sphere in Black women’s experiences may not refer strictly to home, but instead could refer to places where reproductive or community activities were shared or to places that were beyond the reach of the White population. Besides that, it is not just the notion of home as an enclosed private space which is not universal, but also the very idea of house as a symbol of status. Young points out that in many societies people’s status is correlated to other places, as for instance churches or meeting places, and to this we can add abandoned buildings turned into squats by collectives of artists or activist groups from which their members take pride.
Thus, Young resists endorsing a feminist politics that totally rejects the idea of home, and in which home is devalued and narrowly defined in terms of confinement, immanence, and reproduction as opposed to freedom, transcendence, and creativity. Unpacking the work of Heidegger, Young repositions the notion of building as a twofold act consisting of constructing and preserving, and connects those dimensions to the idea of home (1997: 135). Challenging the devalued meaning given to preservation, Young redefines it as a “critical human value,” asserting that:

Homemaking consists in the activities of endowing things with living meaning, arranging them in space in order to facilitate the life activities of those to whom they belong, and preserving them, along with their meaning. Dwelling in the world means we are located among objects, artifacts, rituals and practices that configure who we are in our particularity. (Ibid.: 152–153)

Young’s account on preservation should not be taken as a quest for fixed unified identities, nor is it an equivalent to nostalgia or a longing for the past. And neither does it elude the fact that homes can also be places where violence and abuse take place (Weir 2008: 8). However, the value of preservation attached to home, from Young’s perspective, involves both “the affirmation of what brought us here” (1997: 152), and simultaneously the renewal of meanings and connections with peoples’ histories, but observed in light of current events and their political context. The material objects that we keep at home or, borrowing Ahmed’s queer phenomenology (2006), the objects we are oriented towards, are, as Young suggests, sources of agency and political resistance.

At the present time, when the idea of a unified subject has splintered into multiple others, it is useful to look through Young’s lens in order to bring to the fore some cases in which the home has become a site of collective and political struggles. For example, viewed from queer perspectives, the notion of home and the home/community binary might acquire an affirmative potential. In fact, the frequent investment of lesbian and gay people in decorating and creating spaces is explained by queer geographers as manifestations of self-affirmation and belonging to
places in which they feel sexually free vis-à-vis the hostility of public spaces (Valentine 2002: 152–153). Often for migrant people, the home becomes a source of stability, self-affirmation and a place of cultural expression amidst the uncertainties of inhabiting a host but foreign country. And for forcibly displaced people frequently depicted as “uprooted” (Malkki 1992, 1995), the home could be a crucial place for rebuilding their lives and for asserting their legitimate status to enjoy the right to inhabit the city in which they dwell.

Certainly, the conflation of home and housing ownership, along with the ideal of single-family house, has worked to position specific forms of access to household as symbols of privilege, personal accomplishment, success, family security, wealth accumulation and other signifiers; most of them increasingly turned into markers of life satisfaction and, therefore, of happiness (Fox 2008: 424). But despite these misappropriations, according to Young, the meaning of home could be reoriented towards values which, besides preservation, should be extended to everyone; these are safety, privacy, and individuation, when the latter does not entail a stable atomistic notion of the self (1997: 136; Weir 2008: 10).

As with preservation, the value of safety is also an object of contention, especially because, as Weir argues (2008: 7), people’s safety is frequently achieved through discriminatory practices of exclusion and oppression. However, the recognition of such risk does not mean that struggles for the right to have a safe home for those to whom it has been denied should be given up. In particular, the endeavor of guaranteeing forcibly displaced women the right to access secure housing might entail addressing specific gender biases, as for instance practices that make access to housing dependent on heterosexual marriage, or access to housing credit conditional on having a formal job or savings, as well as discriminatory urban planning practices that confine racial or ethnic minorities to live in conditions of socio-spatial segregation.
3.3.4 Women’s Safety in Public and Private Spaces: Crafting the Urban between Desire, Fear, and Surveillance

Some of the most recognized rallying cries aimed at denouncing women’s experiences of sexual harassment and other patriarchal forms of violence in the streets have been “Take Back the Night” and “Reclaim the Night.” Demonstrations run with these slogans have multiplied since the 1970s in cities around the world. And in 1977, British women joined the campaign in reaction to Yorkshire Ripper cases and to the police response, which advised women that in order to avoid attacks, they should stay home at night (Hubbard and Colosi 2015: 594). I would like to use this political demonstration as an avenue to explore how women’s safety and the construction of fear participate in shaping neoliberal spaces, and conversely, how neoliberal spaces produced out of discourses of fear and safety work to discipline women’s urban lives. The intersections between women’s experience of fear and contemporary spatial politics for managing patriarchal desire are suitable starting points to identify women’s and men’s differential experience of space and time. And at the same time, they offer a window from which to identify aspects of women’s uses and appropriation of space that can enhance or undermine women’s right to the city.

British women’s rally Reclaim the Night in 1977 constituted a reaction against women’s curfew advocated by the police,36 and to the idea that to confine themselves to their homes at night was the only solution against sexual violence. But by engaging in this rally, women also challenged two gendered presumptions about space-time and its dwellers. The first of these is to consider the city’s streets at night as essentially male and that men are not susceptible to experiencing fear (Hubbard and Colosi 2015), and the second is to assume that home is always a safe haven for women and that fear is essentially feminine. While reflecting on these assumptions, it is worth having in mind that until recently the definition of home as a safe haven and as a private realm

allowed public discourses and authorities to turn a blind eye towards domestic violence (Weisman 1994).

The above beliefs about space-time and its dwellers prompt a dialectic construction in which men are entitled to be the “flâneur” and the detached observer able to stroll through the streets “tasting all its pleasures with curiosity and interest” (Wilson 1992: 97). Meanwhile, because of their domesticity and the alleged inevitability of sexual assault, women should be good and stay home at night, their place ‘assigned by nature.’ Perhaps, as Wilson suggests, for some, the feminine equivalent of the flâneur, or in other words the “flâneuse,” would be presumably embodied in “a women of the street” (Ibid.: 105), or in a woman in prostitution. However, as she recalls, such belief is misleading because a prostitute will never inhabit the streets in the same conditions as the masculine flâneur (Ibid.). To a great extent, women’s struggles have made societies and authorities’ attitude regarding sexual assault on women and domestic violence change over time; however, the dialectic assumptions hinted above (i.e., man-flâneur-street and woman-domesticity-home or male-violence and female-victimization) are not totally overcome. Behavioral codes that discipline women’s public exposure illustrate instances in which sexual assault continues to be seen as inevitable. Such prescriptions remain at work, oftentimes making women responsible for their own sexual violation.

Certainly, women’s safety and fear are not the only forces shaping women’s right to the city. For instance, feminist geographers Bondi and Rose (2003) assert that feminists’ approaches to women’s experiences of urban spaces have oscillated between two poles. One of them has seen the city as a source of women’s fears and oppression, while the other has explored the city as a place in which women find opportunities of emancipation and solidarity. Such ambivalences point also to movements and struggles in which urban women have been invested (e.g., access to housing, defense of informal neighborhoods, rent strikes, provision of social and public services, anti-gentrification protests) and to women’s experiences of safety and fear. Both of these venues
have had an impact in shaping the material form of neoliberal spaces.

That being said, and returning to feminists’ concerns on women’s safety, scholars such as Koskela and Young have shed light on the ways in which this subject has worked as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it has been useful for reducing sexual harassment and violence against women in urban spaces (Koskela 2005: 257), but on the other, it has been turned into a logic that pushes women into a position of obedience, encourages their dependence and undermines their spatial mobility, to the point that in the name of their own protection, oftentimes women have been condemned to spatial exclusion (Young 2003; Koskela 2005, 1997).

According to Koskela, the effects of these spatial politics are materialized in three kinds of space. The first is exemplified in the designation of red light districts or zones of tolerance, which this geographer depicts as “elastic space” (2005: 258). These are distinctive places of “regulation and containment” in which female street prostitution and activities related to it are concentrated and marginalized as others (Hubbard 2005: 325). These areas destabilize the public/private binary insofar as they disturb assumptions according to which women’s sexuality should be ‘domesticated.’ Nevertheless, in those spaces power is extremely heterosexual and patriarchal and women’s and men’s roles are clear cut. For instance, this is the place par excellence of the flâneur, as men are the subjects who take “visual possession” of the street and of its dwellers (Wilson 1992: 98), while women are objects of their gaze. But, those spaces are also zones of transition marked by liminality as the boundaries between the legal and illegal are diluted. Especially, in such environments, sexual harassment is often trivialized and taken as “non-criminal street violence” (Koskela 2005: 258).

The second kind of space Koskela refers to are “tamed spaces” (2005). Women construct those spaces by negotiating the dynamics of fear and boldness. This negotiation entails being confronted with questions about space-time and other social dimensions, which take the form of “where to go … when to go … and with whom to go” (Ibid.: 261). Individual feelings of fear
are complex constructions made of an individual’s experiences, memories and relations to space (Koskela 1997: 304). Simultaneously, the notion and rhetoric of danger are culturally constructed through a number of social institutions. But these facets (feelings, notions, rhetoric) could be laden with race, class, gender, ethnic and aesthetic bias regarding who or what could be dangerous (Koskela 2005: 262). To this must be added rhetoric about being wise, which might fill women with a certain remorse and prevent them from daring to be in the ‘wrong’ space or at the ‘wrong’ time (1997: 311). Still the cultivation of women’s mobility and the extent to which women reclaim spaces for themselves and made it available for other women could be built through “everyday practices and routinized uses” of space, which therefore constitute political acts (Koskela 2005: 263, 1997: 316).

A third kind of urban space produced out of the politics of fear is mediated by the deployment of means of surveillance and security, which has increasingly become a normal condition in cities of the global South and North. Although the generalized use of these means is meant to create safe spaces accessible to everyone, it actually becomes a system of power that, insofar as it is internalized, shapes human conduct, controls human bodies, and suppresses spatial access for an increasing number of dissonant others (Koskela 2005: 266). The multiplication of those targeted for surveillance occurs because the surveillance business tends to “inflate stereotypes” by imbuing their observation with their own interpretations of normality and cultural codes (Ibid.: 265).

But as Young suggests, in order to function and to operate hegemonically, the politics of surveillance and security requires at least two subject positions. One of them is the male protector, who can only achieve his status insofar as there are others who depend on his protection. Hence, it follows that others are put into the “position of women and children under the charge of the male protector” (Young 2003: 9). Young traces a parallel between the authoritarian security paradigm and the logics of the patriarchal family, since in this structure the
subordination of the “good woman” who stands under the protection of the father, husband, or brother does not come out of a repressive domination but from both the gratefulness for the protection offered and the admiration for the male character who embodies such a role (Ibid.).

But the production of this economy of subordination, and the erosion of liberty and other civil rights, lie in the “mobilization of fear,” which lead us to undermine democracy when “we allow the rhetoric of fear to label any foreigners as enemies within” (Ibid.: 13). However, as Young cautions, the state functions as a “protection racket,” by which she means that as long as women and others put in the position of protected are quiet and ‘ready’ to pay the price of submission, they are relatively safe (Ibid.: 14). But insofar as those protected criticize or raise their voice against the state or become dissonant voices, the line between the “good woman” and the “bad woman,” or between those subordinated and those who refuse to “trade” their autonomy for protection, turns out to be a thin one (Ibid.).

3.3.5 Women’s Right to Participate in Decision Making: Disrupting Universal Traps

In his reflections around Lefebvre’s right to the city, Purcell (2003) expresses his concern regarding the disenfranchisement of urban residents from the decision-making process. As this process is increasingly colonized by the forces of neoliberal globalization, social movements and some scholars have directed their hopes to the right to the city as an avenue for resistance to counteract the hegemony of this neoliberal power in producing global cities (e.g., Amin 2006; Isin 2000). In these accounts, Lefebvre’s right to the city re-emerges as a platform for giving back to citizens and to city dwellers the right to shape the urban spaces they inhabit. Isin’s starting point echoes Lefebvre, as he argues that “urban citizenship” is not related to a membership to a polity but to the practice of dwelling in the city through spatial practices linked to the use, appropriation, and transformation of the city space (Isin 2000).

In so doing, Isin tackles a strategic element from which to bring into the hands of city inhabitants urban decision-making processes. Nonetheless, when it comes to people’s inclusion
and participation in urban political life, the extension of urban citizenship to all city dwellers should also take into account the critiques of oppressed groups to the notion of universal citizenship. By this I refer to the struggles of women, Black people, Indigenous groups, postcolonial people, lesbian and gay people, which have arisen since the cultural turn, and those of other disadvantaged groups, such as migrants, who after them have claimed recognition (Young 1989). As their experiences demonstrate, the extension of universal citizenship to everyone has not brought about social justice and equality (Ibid.). Young suggests that the roots of this problem lie in a tension between two additional meanings attached to the notion of universal citizenship. As she notes, extending citizenship status also involves the idea that citizenship expresses or creates a general will which transcends particular differences and, second, the rule of providing equal treatment for all regardless of their differences or conditions (Ibid.). However, these two senses have often led to the perpetuation of existing oppression and have enforced homogeneity (Ibid.).

This occurs because the idea of equal treatment is blind to individual and group differences; therefore, it ends by making homogeneity a requirement for inclusion or participation and by subtly excluding those who do not fit standards positioned as the norm (Ibid.). In the same vein, the general will is built on the values, standards, and behavioral styles of privileged groups. Therefore citizenship, defined as something that we have in common and which is impervious to particular differences and interests, is a “myth” that reflects the situated experience of the privileged (Ibid.: 257).

Feminists have long pointed out that the universality of citizenship, as opposed to the particular, is directly related to the duality public and private (Young 1989). What counts as universal is deemed to be a general point of view produced in the public realm and through a dispassionate rational process, in which individuals have detached themselves from their particular interests. From this follows the identification of the private sphere as the realm of affect, bodily needs,
interests, affiliations and other elements understood as particular, which in the name of protecting the ‘neutrality’ of the general will are left aside in the universal citizenship. The rule of universal citizenship works to exclude not only women, but other oppressed groups. However, insofar as citizenship continues to be defined as a generality opposed to the “particularity of private interest” and is sustained through the exclusion of the private (Ibid.: 253), it hinders women’s participation in the city’s political life. The actual extension of citizenship to women and other subjugated groups, and thereby their participation in the city’s political life, requires mechanisms that take into account their individual differences and through which their particular group’s perspective could be represented (Ibid.: 252). Rather than promoting undifferentiated communities, according to Young, what is needed is the building of participatory democracies, which instead of extending citizenship in universal and homogeneous terms, recognize differentiated citizenship (Ibid.: 258–259).

The affirmation of group identity must not, however, be built by ignoring differences that cut across every social group; otherwise, groups would end up recreating within themselves niches of exclusions (Young 1990: 236). In strategic terms, women’s participation and representation is often referred to as allowing the necessary material conditions and entitlements so that women can play a central role in decision-making processes related to the production of urban space (ECWC 1994). Yet, as Fenster argues, women’s right to participate begins at home, since for many of them, the home is a place where the right to inhabit or to appropriate is contested or denied (2005: 221). Therefore, particularly when it comes to women’s participation, I share Fenster’s claim that public and private should be analyzed as a whole space (Ibid.: 227). Again, inasmuch as citizen participation is strictly framed within a notion of universal and unified citizenship that pretends to be sterilized of concerns deemed to belong to the private sphere, the risk of exclusion and oppression, not merely of women but of other groups located in subordinated positions, is unavoidable.
The global city and its survival circuits are increasingly dependent on the work of an important number of disadvantaged groups often working in informal and precarious jobs (e.g., domestic workers, immigrant laborers, forced migrants), whose inclusion, participation and political representation is therefore often denied. For these populations, urban citizenship in the sense prompted by the right to the city is an avenue of resistance and a window through which to improve their living conditions. However, the perpetuation of oppression and some forms of socio-spatial exclusion are, in turn, a function of the dominance of hegemonic groups of population. Therefore, privileged groups would rarely be concerned with bringing about social justice, as it would put in jeopardy their own existing advantages. More often than not, the interests of privileged groups coincide with those of so-called interest groups which have seized democratic processes by privatizing urban decision-making processes (Young 1990: 254). In the view of this hegemonic power, the right to the city has “become redefined as a threat to urban order” (Amin 2006: 1018).

But what could be the tools to bring the right to shape the urban space back into the hands of city dwellers? City life, as Young suggests, is not antithetical to the existence of “subcultural communities” and networks of solidarity. Rather, democratic societies should provide mechanisms of institutional and financial support for the effective representation of disadvantaged and oppressed groups. And these tools should be aimed at supporting three specific activities:

“(1) self-organization of group members … (2) voicing a group’s analysis of how social policy proposals affect them, and generating policy proposals themselves … (3) having veto power regarding specific policies that affect a group’s directly.” (Young 1989: 261–262)

Against the predictions of modernity, and the anonymity attached to the notion of urban life, social and cultural group differences appear to be encouraged in the city, in the rise of gay or ethnic neighborhoods (Young 1990: 239). More often than not, such spatial differentiation does
not depend on separatist strategies constructed on the basis of single and static notions of identity. Instead, the absolute absence of these spaces might be a reflection of political and social intolerance which would drive non-normative or dissonant subjects to conceal their identities or negotiate them over space and time (Valentine 1993; Falquet 2006: 73). As long as they “recognize and affirm the group and individual differences within the group” (Young 1990: 236), oppressed groups assert their cultural affirmation through space could be a resort that enables resistance against the privatization of the decision-making processes in contemporary times (Ibid.).

3.4 Building (and Contesting) the Urban Form

The models of the neoliberal city previously explored and the normative ways of life they bring about are not necessarily imposed on urban dwellers from above, neither are they promoted by a disembodied power. And this is one of the main challenges that the endeavor to actualize a feminist postcolonial right to the city faces. Contemporary neoliberal urban forms and the social and cultural order they convey are rather deployed with the complicity or participation of local elites and ruling authorities. Yet, how do these models become hegemonic among the population? What mechanisms or ways of governance are deployed in order to achieve their hegemony? These are questions that we have not yet addressed, and which will be the focus of the next section. Nevertheless, as Mouffe claims, “every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. … and therefore every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities” (2008a: 9, 2008b). Embracing Mouffe’s perspective, this analysis will also be concerned with the identification of modes of operation and actions carried out by urban residents aimed at counteracting hegemonic spatial orders.

But before this, I will provide some analytical tools pertaining to feminist poststructuralism. I will narrow my focus to those elements that allow us to understand the reasons why the formation of global cities could be better understood from the perspective of those located in
subjugated positions, and by investigating the ways in which power operates through space shaping people’s lives.

3.4.1 Learning from a Diffractive Feminist Vision

Man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings in general; whereas woman represents only the negative. ....

Humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being … ‘Woman, the relative being …’ (Beauvoir 1949: 16–17)

Initially exemplified in the works of such French theorists as Derrida, Irigaray, Foucault and Deleuze, poststructuralism is characterized by recovering what was left aside in the construction of taken-for-granted cultural forms, concepts and objects of knowledge (Bondi 1990: 157), and by revealing that such universal and ahistorical metanarratives were actually dependent on their own “non-knowledge” and on their own ‘others’ which they marginalize (Ibid.: 161–62). Knowledge, according to traditional accounts of science, was therefore held to be “a view from nowhere,” value-neutral, produced by an objective vision sterilized of the influence of subjectivity and thus transcending particular points of view (Tanesini 1999).

Against these assumptions, feminist poststructuralists challenge the definition of the self, or the knower, as an independent agent from the ‘other,’ and show how universal narratives are not produced from a position of nowhere, but instead are related to masculinity, to the position of a male White Western heterosexual subject, and thereby endorse the values attached to it. But feminists too point to the objectification entailed in the production of knowledge and to the fact that it is through power that such scientific knowledge was granted the status of absolute truth. In other words, and as Beauvoir’s entering quotation hints, poststructuralist feminists show that what are deemed to be universal narratives or objective knowledge are, in fact, the outcome of domination through which the masculine self—or the knowing subject—claims its autonomy and negates the subjectivity of the other or of its object of knowledge (Tanesini 1999).
Haraway, for instance, points out Cartesian dualisms previously taken for granted upon which metanarratives such a progress, development and free market depend: “self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female … active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man,” machine/organism, animal/human (1991:177, 1988: 594). Poststructuralism dilutes the boundaries through which objective knowledge keeps the others of these categories into a passive position, and recasts them (the others) as agents or actors in the production of knowledge and social culture. In consequence, the subject cannot be seen anymore as an autonomous self-made being but as a result of socio-historic processes (Young 1990: 45), and second, knowing is no more a disembodied process detached from the context in which it is produced. Instead, “knowing becomes a way of engaging with the world, and to understand it we must study the patterns created by interactions” (Tanesini 1999: 184).

The world from this perspective cannot be assumed as “raw material for humanization” (Haraway 1988: 593). And the same goes with other objects such as nature, body, space, place and scale previously portrayed as natural givens. Space, for instance, was formerly “treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile,” while time was the master category depicted in terms of “richness, fecundity, life, dialectic” (Foucault 2007: 177). Body is repositioned as an “historical artifact constituted by human as well as organic and technological unhuman actors” (Haraway 1992: 311). Such realizations bring about a focus on the relation between social processes and material form, and on the role of the material form in shaping the subject’s body and mind (Harding 1993: 64). From this, it follows that both cultural life and knowledge are historical and located, produced by the action of time and space (Soja 1987).

The main lessons taught by poststructuralism, as Tanesini argues, are first that the world is best observed through a “diffracted” vision that involves the experience of the other and its “interferences,” which traditional scientific knowledge suppressed (1999: 184; Haraway 1992: 310); and second that the politics of power operates not through the action of a tyrannical
power, but through institutions and everyday practices over both the lives of those situated in advantageous positions and the lives of the oppressed. This is so because, by disciplining, controlling, and shaping the ‘other’—or the deviant body—who fails to conform to the norm, the privileged is faced with his/her own vulnerability and, therefore, is also induced into processes of self-regulation and improvement in order to protect the standards, values, and norms of the order that the ‘other’ is deemed to threat.

As Haraway sustains, “the world is precisely what gets lost in doctrines of representation and scientific objectivity” (1992: 313). And these experiences of otherness excluded from the doctrines of representation are what the situated knowledge of the subjugated is likely to provide. Whether she experiences spatial segregation or symbolic exclusion, the urban subjugated is certainly not innocent, and her experience of the city is a partial account. But by observing the global city from her standpoint and by looking at the material and symbolic processes through which the city shapes her life, we are likely to have a more reliable vision about how this space is produced. This is so because her vision will be “least likely to allow denial” of the power behind progress, modernity, free market, growth and globalization, all of which are master narratives that allow the positioning of the global city as ineludible and as the only desirable future (Haraway 1988: 584).

3.4.2 Governing the Urban

At the core of Foucault’s work lies the analysis of the relationships between power and space which, according to Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, focuses on how the management of space becomes a political issue and how architecture is used as a political technology for social control (2003: 30). In Foucault’s perspective, power in the form of government does not refer to an institution, and neither is it a structure (1990: 93). Rather, in the modern state emerging since the eighteenth century, power is made of a multiplicity of forces, relations, and technologies through which individuals turn themselves into subjects (Foucault 2000: 327). Power, according to
Lemke, becomes foremost a sense of “guidance” concerned with “governing the forms of selfgovernment, structuring and shaping the field of possible action of subjects” (2002: 52). By asserting this perspective, Foucault links the exercise of power to processes of subjectification (Ibid.: 50), that is, to “the construction of particular forms of human subjectivity” (Tuitt 2004b: 1). This implies an understanding of government as the “‘conduct of the conducts,’” as the way in which individuals’ behaviors are transformed or individuals might be led to behave according to specific governmental ends (Foucault 2000: 341; Huxley 2007: 187; Lemke and Baele 2008: 50).

Underlying the development of these techniques of self-regulation, there is a concern with the environment and with the management of the population which gives rise to what Foucault refers to as ‘biopolitics.’ In his words, biopolitics describes a political power that “assigned itself the task of administering life” (1990: 139). Lemke clarifies this concept:

“[biopolitics is linked to a] ‘political modernity’ that comes up when life is taken into account by political strategies, when population emerges as an object for politics, as something that can be transformed, that can be optimised, on which one can intervene, which can be used to achieve certain ends.” (Lemke and Baele 2008: 48)

The transition towards a regime of power engaged in a biopolitical governance of space is triggered by emergent problems related to urban space, such as cohabitation, contamination, epidemics and diseases. Additionally, it is prompted by the need to respond to economic concerns, such as the supply of adequate labor force for the machinery of production and the need for regulating the growth and flow of a population. This shift marks the beginning of a biopower era focused on the administration of life, and particularly on the management of the body and sexuality of various populations within a polity (Foucault 1990: 126). As such, biopower is a system consisting of two poles, which are not diametrically opposed but rather “linked together by a … cluster of relations” (Ibid.: 139). One of these forms of power refers to the regulation of the population as a whole and involves biological issues such as birth rate, health and the conditions that affect these variables. The other pole, called disciplinary power,
focuses on “the body as a machine” (Ibid.) and seeks to impose on it a relation of “docility-utility” which consists of increasing its forces in terms of economic utility while its forces in political terms are undermined (Foucault 1979: 137).

According to Foucault, disciplinary power is exercised through a constant process of examination that he labels a “normative gaze,” and which combines techniques of surveillance as well as a process of normalization (1979: 184). Thus, Foucault identifies as an underlying instrument of disciplinary power, “a system of intense registration” and documentation that traps the subject into “a compulsory visibility” through which he becomes an object to be seen and analyzed (Ibid.: 187–189). Such systems allow the tracking of each individual, to establish her habits, to follow her transformation and performance, or even more, seek to make the subject “available in time and place” (Ibid.). This network of information is thus mediated by techniques of surveillance whose point of departure are systems of standards defined in reference to norms. Hence, surveillance works as a comparative mechanism that measures degrees of qualification, providing a “whole range of degrees of normality” that indicate the belonging of an individual to a social group while simultaneously hierarchizing his location within a whole (Ibid.: 184).

The transition from the rule of the law as instrument of social control into a regime where the norm prevails represents a different modality of power in the modern era. Hence, the condition for biopolitics to emerge is the shift of modern societies from an exercise of power which relies on a sovereign rule into a governmental reasoning or “govern-mentality” (Ong 2011: 20), in which liberal modes of government prevail (Foucault 2008: 22). Distinct from power related to mechanisms of repression and exclusion (Foucault 1979: 194), disciplinary power thus entails a (re)conceptualization of power as productive and in which social control is achieved by techniques that invite and entail self-regulation. Governmentality, therefore, is used by Foucault in order to “show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual
Foucault connects the techniques of surveillance in disciplinary societies with the setting up of analytical and functional spaces which work to induce in subjects a “psychological state of conscious and permanent visibility” (1979: 201), and allow their circulation, individualization, articulation and the mapping of their distribution. Accordingly, the analysis of space is introduced for the purpose of neutralizing the formation of groups and breaking up collectivities or any mass demonstration. In order to implement techniques of surveillance, the biopolitical management of space departs from an ostentatious architecture to be seen, and instead involves the setup of calculated, transparent and functional spaces that render individuals visible and allow for control over their process of transformation.

The nexus between the management of space and individual’s behavior underlined by Foucault has been the focus of criminal justice theorists. Among them, Bernard Harcourt traces echoes of the Chicago School in research concerned with the production of crime, which mobilized the thesis that “arrangements in social space may significantly affect human behavior” (Harcourt and Ludwig 2006: 278). As he notes, according to those studies, certain neighborhoods would be more affected by crime because they are home to a significant number of “crime-prone people” (Ibid.: 279). To this hypothesis, these studies added that the occurrence of crime would be related to the lack of social control and cohesion, to inadequate conditions to exert surveillance over specific individuals, and simultaneously to the prevalence of spatial disorder (Ibid.: 280). Indeed, Harcourt emphasizes the fact that it is on the nexus between neighborhood disorder and crime postulated by this research that the so-called Broken Windows theory emerged in the early 1980s. I will provide an overview of this theory in chapter 4; for now, suffice it to say that the Broken Windows theory states that minor signs of spatial disorder create a sense of spatial abandonment and insecurity, and thereby work as precursors for the generation of crime. Such a chain of events, according to Wilson and Kelling (1982), brings about neighborhoods’ social and
spatial deterioration.

Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of subjectification, Harcourt argues that the implementation of the *Broken Windows* theory through order-maintenance policies, quality-of-life initiatives, zero tolerance strategies and anti-homeless laws, has as a starting point the “subject creation” (2001: 160). This notion refers to the identification of specific categories of individuals and their classification under the label of “disorderly” or as people prone to crime. Those categories may include the homeless person, the drunk, or the graffiti artist. However, these subjects are not submitted to regimes of punishment, as for instance criminal law procedures; instead, they are submitted to processes of improvement, rehabilitation and/or normalization.

In fact, the production of the “disorderly” individual through *Broken Windows* initiatives allows governing authorities the instauration of systems of permanent surveillance, control, and exclusion (Ibid.: 150). Thus, the transition from a generalized sense of fear to the implementation of so-called community policing programs leads neighborhoods and communities to move in endless cycles of what Enloe would call “militarization” of civilian life and reenacts the patriarchal dualism protected/protector discussed before (as interviewed by Schouten and Dunham 2012). Furthermore, laws and programs oriented by the *Broken Windows* theory have also served the purpose of creating so-called ordered urban spaces, thereby legitimizing process of urban redevelopment (Mitchell 2003; Kramer 2012).

Such perverse dynamic is enabled by the fact that *Broken Windows* programs are generally built on the basis of community participation, which allows those initiatives to receive broad support among local residents. Moreover, they work to boost a hegemonic commonsense notion about public space that privileges spatial aesthetics and order, as well as social homogeneity, over the right to the city (Mitchell 2003: 189). Hence, it is this common sense about spatial and social homogeneity which constitutes the conditions for inducing the flow of capitals into core urban areas (Ibid.: 177; Kramer 2012).
The analysis of how the needs of local dwellers are subordinated to, or aligned with, the aesthetic and socio-economic standards of global cities’ competition takes us back to the notion of governmentality explained above, and specifically to what Roy refers to as “regimes of civic governmentality” (2009, 2011c: 266). In the first place, civic governmentality could be depicted as a governmental apparatus enabled by “norms of self-rule” or self-governance illustrated in notions such as civickness and citizen culture, as well as on the protection of life and the pursuit of human happiness hereinbefore analyzed (see chapters 4 and 5). The insertion of this vocabulary in the political terrain and in the making of urban politics represents what Mouffe (2003) describes as the “end of politics” or a “post-political view.” By this term, she refers to the actual state of affairs, in which the moral colonizes the political while the political is geared towards a model of consensus. In such a post-political scene, any attempt to reincorporate adversarial politics or conflict is portrayed as obsolete or archaic (Mouffe 2002a).

In the second place, the functioning of civic governmentality also depends on the dominance of ‘allegedly’ rational or technocratic knowledge which is given the “status of truth” (Escobar 1995: 45). This knowledge can be depicted as “regime of truth”; that is, discursive systems or fields that create their own objects of knowledge, define what count as truth, and who can speak about those objects (Ibid.). In the context of neoliberal urban renewal, the building of regimes of civic governmentality—and particularly in the global South—are often mediated by discourses and mechanisms of citizen participation, in which the post-political view is becoming widely accepted (Huxley 2013; Mitchell et al. 2015). However, urban policies resulting from participatory planning are determined by discursive terrains or epistemic fields as well as by moral assumptions about communal participation, all of this shaping the formulation of the problems and their condition of possibility (Huxley 2013: 1536).

Showing a more radical view, Mitchell et al. assert that citizen “participation is limited and channeled towards pre-determined outcomes” (2015: 2636), and because of this, the role of
participants is reduced to “shaping the design, not the fact, of that development” (Ibid.). Thus, they urge us to identify the political in the making of urban space, whether it is hidden by “structural constraints,” or whether it is foreclosed by the idea that “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) to the rule of capitalism and the market economy).

Therefore, a Foucauldian approach provides a useful framework to analyze the process of disciplining space, as it addresses “the maintenance of power of one group over another” (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003: 31), allows us to dismantle the presumption that neoliberal urbanization is neutral and ineluctable, and sheds light on the role played by agents and actors in enhancing such process. However, this perspective omits the study of forms of resistance to spatial mechanisms of social control. In an attempt to grasp these spatial practices aimed at eluding the disciplinary grid of contemporary urban planning, in the next section I will take a brief look at acts of citizenship, as it is my belief that this perspective has the potential to provide a diffracted and situated knowledge about the practices of urban resistance carried out by those urban dwellers facing oppression.

3.4.3 Conclusion: How to Read Spatial Resistance in a ‘Post-Political’ Age?

Biopolitics and governmentality seem to offer a suitable lens through which to analyze the building of this neoliberal urban space, and the disciplinary rule through which this process imbricates processes of self-government and spatial practices aimed at shaping human behavior. But, the intensification of global flows have also brought about new forms of subjectivity, platforms of political identification and shared struggles aimed at transforming or counterbalancing the rule of neoliberal capitalism. However, as Isin claims, there is a shortage of analytical tools through which acts or forms of resistance could be interpreted. Indeed, social and political thought has been mostly concerned with the study of orders, practices, and with the construction of behaviors and habits (Isin 2008: 21). It is on this note that I would like to conclude this chapter.
As a starting point, I want to argue that acts of resistance cannot be reduced to isolated tactics and ephemeral maneuvers conducted in the interstices of time left by a technocratic omnipresent power. On the other hand, the subject who performs acts of resistance should be recognized for her political subjectivity, all the more if her actions have consequences over time. White (2008) relates the endurance of acts of resistance to the notion of creativity. According to her, creativity is a condition “expressed in terms of an aspiration to change,” as an impulse to transform, and as an “expression of movement through time-space” (2008: 45). It means that for resistance to occur, a rupture, a will to break habits, to disrupt sedimentary practices should exist (Ibid.: 46). This will to transform requires an agent who has a reason or a motivation to perform that act, and for this very reason, the agent cannot be separated from the act she performs (Isin 2008). The agent is an actor who is “responsible for the scene,” for the act of rupture; she is an actor who remains in the scene that she creates herself (Ibid.: 27). The agent is answerable for the act and simultaneously becomes an actor insofar as the act is actualized or carried out.

An approach to the study of such acts of rupture or transgression should enable the analysis of the actions through which those acts are performed, as well as allow the historicization of the actors who engage in such acts. Or, put in another way, it should recognize the political subjectivities that these acts generate. By turning to this discussion, I am drawing on the work of Isin (2008), who provides a guidance to investigate political acts. From his perspective, acts disrupt or break “orders, practices and habitus” (2008: 36), which, ultimately, are ways through which subjects are constituted by politics. Therefore, if acts are ruptures of politics, “acts constitute the conditions of possibility of the political” (Ibid.). The process through which subjects come into being is not just mediated by technologies of conduct as it is suggested in the biopolitics framework, but also by orientations (i.e., motivations, desires) through which we enact ourselves as political beings (Ibid.: 37).

Concerned, as we are, with the limited number of analytical tools available to study resistance
vis-à-vis an overwhelming preoccupation towards the study of orders and disciplinary regimes, Isin proposes the concept of ‘acts of citizenship,’ which he defines in the following terms:

“Acts of citizenship [are] those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle.” (2008: 39)

The lens of acts of citizenship has the potential to study acts that disrupt habits or practices, and through which subjects—regardless of their status—constitute themselves as political actors “to whom the right to have rights is due” (Ibid.: 18). Traditional accounts of citizenship based on prefixed rights and responsibilities are not relevant in this approach, since it is through these very acts of citizenship that “citizens and their others” are produced (Nyers 2010: 130). Thereby citizenship, in traditional terms, is not a precondition to perform these political acts. With this assertion, Nyers builds upon Jacques Rancière and points to the fact that the study of acts of citizenship implies to come to grips with “what counts as political” (Ibid.: 129). This, in the terms of Rancière, refers to the notion of ‘partition of the sensible’ (le partage du sensible), by which he means an aesthetic order of inclusion and exclusion concerned with “what is visible, what can be said, who can speak” (Ibid.: 130), with what is seen as discourse and what is considered as noise, with the things that can be heard and those that cannot (Rancière and Lie 2006). The ‘Partition of the Sensible,’ Rancière says, is:

The way in which forms of inclusion and exclusion which define participation in community life are first and foremost configured within the sensible experience of life. ... This is primarily a political question, since, for a long time, the categories excluded from community life were left out under the pretext that, apparently, they were not part of it. (Rancière and Palmiéri 2002: 34)

Rancière is thus concerned with the redistribution of this order, which are produced through what he denominates a “police order” (Rancière and Lie 2006). The building of this redistribution requires assuming “first and foremost that politics is an activity of reconfiguration of that which is given in the sensible” (Rancière and Panagia 2000: 115). The disruption of “the
police order’s ‘consensual’ system” is a political action, that will take place insofar as those who are not visible, who do not speak, or who have no part in decision-making processes of a political community (i.e., “the proletariat, women, non-whites, immigrants, refugees”) enact themselves as political beings and are included in the political domain (Rancière and Lie 2006). Hence, politics occurs through transgression or interruption, when those who do not take part, or are not expected to intervene, speak (Ibid.; Nyers 2010: 131).

When it comes to the analysis of the deployment of neoliberal urban order and the acts through which people engage in forms of resistance, the task at hand requires stripping the neoliberal common sense of its post-political disguise. That means critically examining the terms through which this common sense is promoted and to shed light on the acts of citizenship carried out by those subjects who have not been allowed a voice. Those agents are disregarded and their acts of resistance—whether they are practices, actions, discourses or poetics—are left aside by analyses that primarily focus on behavioral techniques through which urban dwellers are led to participate in the constitution and maintenance of the neoliberal urban order.

A key argument of the present research is that an analysis of spatial forms of resistance conducted through the lens of acts of citizenship will contribute towards the building of a postcolonial and feminist urban theory. Perhaps, this urban theory could be built on a gendered right to the city as I have proposed here, one which seeks to disrupt patriarchal dualities such as public/private, productive/reproductive, protector/protected, modern/developing, inner city/slum areas, men-transcendence/women-immanence and self/other. But specifically, an analysis of spatial forms of resistance as acts of citizenship will allow bringing to the fore acts of interruption and spatial transgressions, showing the ways in which they coexist, imbricate with, or even pierce the hegemonic contemporary urban space. Based on the above arguments, I embrace acts of citizenship as an analytical tool that enables us to recognize the capacity and agency of urban dwellers to transform, resist, or counterbalance the deployment of the
hegemonic neoliberal spatial governance.

I will read urban acts of citizenship as forms of spatial resistance through which oppressed and disadvantaged dwellers reclaim the right to be and to appropriate the city in which they live. Refusing a regard which positions neoliberal capitalism as the main force shaping contemporary urban space and which insists that there is no alternative to the spatial deployment of neoliberal forms, I argue that acts of citizenship could contribute to the disruption of the current ‘partition of the sensible,’ and therefore to dismantle such narrative. This because it allows unpacking a multiplicity of subject positions of gender, race, ethnicity, or location which underlay actors’ political subjectivities.

In so doing, this analysis fosters the inclusion of those actors and subject positions who have not had a voice in the political, and brings to the fore the motivations and desires that lead these urban dwellers to engage in acts of spatial resistance (Rancière 2000). As this dissertation has thus far endeavored to show, they have been suppressed through hegemonic narratives such as quality of life, compulsory urban happiness, the inevitability of neoliberal globalization and other discursive devises. These motivations and desires are, for instance, claims related to the right to the city of forced immigrants, homeless women and men, Black and Indigenous people, single mothers, or other oppressed and disadvantaged urban dwellers who often live in informal housing. In the current scenery of urban redevelopment, those claims and practices are systematically dismissed, neutralized, or delegitimized by the rational and technocratic thought of the neoliberal rule. As I illustrated in the previous chapters, such rule has colonized not merely the practices through which the contemporary cities are built, but also a large part of the narratives aimed at providing theoretical accounts about this process.

The dynamics through which this rational and technocratic rule has become hegemonic in Bogotá is indeed the focus of the chapter that follows. There, I will address the narratives and material practices through which Bogotá’s urban renewal process was introduced. I will therefore
analyze how the implementation of the *Citizen Culture* program, sold in the name of protecting life in Bogotá, has entailed the enactment of gender regimes and the spatial exclusion of the city’s most oppressed dwellers.
CHAPTER 4 – UNDER THE CLOAK OF THE BOGOTÁ WE WANT

4.1 Bogotá’s Dystopian Landscape & Neoliberal Redressing

Bogotá’s transformation has been considered a successful process from various theoretical standpoints. For instance, it has been depicted as the experience of a model city (Gilbert 2006, 2008), as a pedagogical city from which other cities could learn (Berney 2010), as an example of a city that defeated the political machine (Pasotti 2010) or as a case study of a city promoted through a place branding/marketing strategy (Kalandides 2011). Nonetheless, and as it is recognized by the analyses mentioned above, the successful story of Bogotá’s urban regeneration was preceded by an urban crisis which had been incubating during the two previous decades, reaching its worst point in the early 1990s (Salazar-Ferro 2011: 311).

Indeed, a broad number of symptoms underlie Bogotá’s urban crisis: a significant deficit in the provision of public services, such as electricity and water, the collapse of public finances, which almost led to the city’s bankruptcy (Gilbert 2006; Salazar-Ferro 2011; Pasotti 2010), the high prevalence of corruption in public administration, and low credibility of traditional parties triggered by the infiltration of drug-trafficking money into the campaign of President Samper in the mid-1990s (Pasotti 2010: 46). The other set of factors was related to institutional failures, such as a weak system of urban planning, which permitted the supremacy of private interests over the public interest, thereby allowing an uncontrolled growth of the city while the center was neglected by the city administration (Salazar-Ferro 2011).

In their descriptions of such scenery, Rueda-Garcia (2003) and Pasotti (2010) point out that while “the upper classes and the center of economic activities [were] moving north,” low-level economic activities and illegal activities were gradually abounding in the center, and consequently low-income neighborhoods and slums were growing in the downtown areas and spreading in the South (Pasotti 2010: 45). Not to mention the fact that a great part of the growing urbanization
toward the South consisted of informal settlements, which lacked public services including water supply or sewerage (Hataya 2007: 132; Salazar-Ferro 2011: 318). Reflecting on these informal developments, Rivas, an official of the district housing secretariat, underscores the lack of public spaces and public amenities—which continues to be a challenge for the city administration. However, as she asserts, those spontaneous settlements “have been of great importance in the development of the city, in the sense that it is through them that the demand for low-cost housing from the poorer segments of the population was [more likely to be] met in Bogotá.”

Certainly, such an urban reshaping deepened the segregation between the richer population living in the North and the poor population living in the South, whose roots, according to urban architect Carmenza Orjuela, are related to the binary spatiality depicted in historical-colonial urban narratives as the division between the “city of creoles” vs. the “city of indigenes” (“ciudad de los criollos” vs. “ciudad de los indios”). Despite this class/race based spatial geography—to some extent already naturalized in the minds of the city’s inhabitants—major claims of the population concerned spatial manifestations related to public spaces, such as the obsolescence of the system of public transport, poor maintenance of road infrastructure and parks, overcrowded occupancy of scarce public space by cars, street vendors, wide disregard of traffic laws, and high levels of insecurity and crime (Gilbert 2006; Pasotti 2010: 46; Salazar-Ferro 2011).

But how did Bogotá overcome such a dystopian landscape? To what extent was this process shaped by global trends? It is asserted that one of the particularities of Bogotá’s rejuvenation has been its pedagogical approach, but this focus was also intermingled with a shift in citizen security policies. Therefore, it is important to ask: How were these discourses translated into spatial transformations? And how did the city’s inhabitants relate to this process? Has this transformation led city dwellers to assume particular subject positions? And if it is so, in which ways are those subject positions shaped by gender? What power relations are at play? These are

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37 Helga Maria Rivas, Bogotá’s Summit “Cities and Climate Change,” November 20, 2012.
38 Interview with Carmenza Orjuela, urban architect of the district planning secretariat, Bogotá, November 9, 2012.
some of the questions that guide the inquiry in this chapter. In addressing them, this chapter will revisit Bogotá’s urban transformation undertaken from the 1990s until the beginning of the 2000s, looking in particular at biopolitical discourses through which these spatial changes have been prompted and to the masculine and feminine subject positions encouraged through this process. In so doing, I will introduce some of the implications that this urban design generates in the lives of oppressed city dweller and displaced people.

At first glance, the overcoming of the above-described urban crisis is currently visible in the city’s physical appearance; thus, the “almost heroic status” assigned to Antanas Mockus (1995-1997 and 2001-2003) and to Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000 and 2016-2019)—mayors who initiated those transformations—is not surprising (Kalandides 2011: 283). However, it would be inaccurate to disregard institutional reforms that preceded this urban regeneration, which were not related to physical changes, but instead entailed a shift in the management of the city. Jaime Castro, Bogotá’s former Mayor who initiated this turning point in 1992, asserts that at that time his “priority was to give back to Bogotá the governability that it had lost” (Devlin and Chaskel 2009: 2), and with this in mind he took advantage of the tools provided by the 1991 Colombian Constitution which gave substantial autonomy to the Capital District (Santos 2007: 11).

As discussed in chapter 2, these tools included the introduction of direct mayoral elections, neoliberal economic management and decentralization, which were seen as a means of promoting citizen participation in local decision making, increasing local accountability, and decreasing levels of clientelism and corruption (Gilbert 2006; Hataya 2007; Pasotti 2010). Besides these strategies—namely democracy, decentralization, and privatization—Gilbert provides a broader assessment. As he argues (2015), although these global trends were necessary, the achievements of Bogotá between the mid-1990s and 2008 were the result of a complex amalgam that also included local processes and features. Within this broad spectrum, it is worth mentioning the implementation of fiscal adjustments, including a Taxpayer Culture program.
launched by Mayor Mockus under the slogan “all pay, all gain” (Salazar-Ferro 2011: 327), and the overall continuity of policy so as to ensure consistent investment in long-term projects of infrastructure and public space.

Indeed, these spaces increasingly became the locus of continuous campaigns clearly aimed at promoting their preservation and the transformation of citizen culture (Gilbert 2006: 415). This emphasis is reflected in analyses conducted by Pasotti (2010), Martin and Ceballos (2004), and Berney (2011), which address the efforts that *The Bogotá We Want* has deployed in the transformation of public space, and above all, in linking from the beginning such transformation with the modification of citizens’ behavior. But behavioral transformations are not ineluctably gender neutral. Thus in the course of the next section, I will explore some strategies of the *Citizen Culture* program, unveiling how this link between urban space and people’s conduct was actually achieved through the deployment of a gendered process of masculinization and feminization.

4.2 Urban Pedagogy in Bogotá’s Public Space: A Gendered Civilizing Path towards the City’s Regeneration

From the beginning of his term in office in 1995, Mayor Mockus was able to cast many of the issues underlying the city’s crisis—such as respect for the law, public behavior, spatial order and corruption of the city administration—as related to public space and security in his plan, the so-called *Citizenship Culture: Program against Violence in Santa Fe de Bogotá*. In his approach, Mockus started from the premise that such concerns were the result of a gap between legal norms, moral norms and cultural norms which, in many cases, had left room for Colombians to break the law based on cultural or moral reasons (2002a: 22). Mockus recognizes that law, morality, and culture in contemporary societies “[do not] govern exactly the same thing” (Ibid.); however, he insists that the gap between these regulatory systems had created the opportunity for people to excuse themselves for not complying with the law. Hence, drawing on Rawls’s theory of justice, and
particularly on his concept of “overlapping consensus” (1987), Mockus regarded morality, culture and law as perspectives from which individuals can draw reasons to support a law or, in his terms, to reach and comply with agreements or common rules (2002b). On these bases, Mockus designed various strategies framed within what he called “harmonization of law, morality and culture” (Ibid.), and which were thought to work either by weakening or delegitimizing the cultural or moral justifications for illegal behaviors, or by increasing the moral and cultural support for the law. But how was the moral dimension introduced in the political scene through this harmonizing crusade?

In fact, according to Puar and Rai (2002), processes of normalization are commonly mediated by the construction of deviant or pathologized characters, who should be quarantined or corrected as they are representing a threat to a civilized society or subjects whom we should protect. But on the other hand, following Enloe’s feminist curiosity, any crusade or war would not be possible without a feminized victim (quoted in Sjoberg and Via 2010), and thus we need to “keep a close eye on the processes of feminization” in order to understand how masculinization is produced over time (Enloe 2007: 52).

When observed through this lens, it is interesting to see how Mockus’s crusade against violence involved the construction of both characters: feminine victims to be protected, and deviant or abnormal figures who menace such feminine character and who therefore should be corrected or quarantined. In Bogotá, one of these feminized subjects in danger was the very city, which Mockus pictured in advertising pieces as ‘Coquettish Bogotá’ (Bogotá Coqueta). Such construction was a feminization of the city as it entailed the portrayal of Bogotá as a woman, whom the citizens should love, but whose beauty was being undermined by the uncivil behavior of some of its dwellers (Duque 2011: 35). The slogan of the Coquettish Bogotá was printed in thumbs-up and thumbs-down cards particularly distributed during public events and which were used to approve or disapprove of other citizens’ behavior (Ibid.). The dissemination and generalization of this
practice was implemented by intensifying the opportunities and spaces of interaction between people, and turning such moments and spaces into occasions for self-regulation among citizens and officials (Mockus 2002b: 7). Cultural and civic initiatives, such as the open-air cinema, music festivals, a Day Without Car, sports and physical activities, were then deployed in the streets, squares, parks and avenues of high-income neighborhoods as well as poorer areas, turning public sceneries into platforms for learning citizen interaction (Pasotti 2010: 121).

Other public performances involved the symbolic vaccinations against the “epidemic of violence” ‘administered’ to 45,000 children and adults (Humphrey 2014), a women’s night out to raise awareness on gender biases and gender-based violence, as well as signs bearing the slogan Life is Sacred attached to empty graves in the central cemetery to visualize the number of lives saved as a result of the Mayor’s anti-violence initiatives (Pasotti 2013: 48). Thus, besides the feminized city, these performances worked to produce two additional femininized icons—children and women—who needed to be protected against the violence of uncivil city dwellers and especially from aggressive masculinity. These performative strategies contributed to denaturalizing a culture of violence, and brought into public discourse the need to tackle insecurity not by increasing punishment but by means of self-regulation (Jaramillo 2010).

The success of Mockus’s strategies relied on the exaggeration in these—often offbeat—performances, and therefore on the power they had to surprise, raise awareness and in particular to cause discomfort so as to drive people to modify their internal standards. Among them, for instance, are the use of mimes who imitated pedestrians’ behavior in order to ridicule inappropriate conduct and the creation of masculine public characters who embodied gentle and kind behaviors. One of these characters was the Super Citizen, performed by the Mayor himself who, wearing a Superman costume, taught citizens how to keep the city clean. Or, in another broadcasted performance, Mockus gave tips on how to save water by showing himself while taking a shower (Pasotti 2013: 49). Another masculinity was embodied in the Knights of the Zebra
Crossing performed by more than 40,000 taxi drivers, who were prized by the Mayor’s office for demonstrating kindness to their clients.

To sum up the functioning of this strategy, the production and use of feminized figures in need of protection (i.e., the coquettish city, women victims of gender-based violence and children who should be vaccinated against aggressive behaviors) was concomitant with the production of masculinities that demonstrated civility, for instance, by being polite and kind, non-violent, law-abiding and, moreover, rational in the use of public resources. Such masculinities exemplify the way in which Mockus’s Citizen Culture strived to cast masculinities which did not fit these behaviors as backward. But more than that, insofar as the mimes were able to ridicule those who show violent, improper or aggressive behaviors and the super citizen was positioned as a valuable and rational maleness, subjects of uncivil behavior and lacking of self-control were feminized as their characters were devalorized. Following Peterson’s analysis on feminization (2010: 23), it is possible to claim that, by casting traditional masculinity as uncivilized, backward and inferior, and by exposing the irrationality and dangerousness of conducts attached to it, the good citizen was positioned as a role model with a rational character, superior morality, and heterosexual masculinity.

In addition, the use and transposition of words with moral or religious connotations in unexpected public spaces—such as the inscription of the word Life in the central cemetery, the place that society has designated to bury its dead, and the word Sacred to adjectivize public concerns where corruption prevailed—underscored the corrosive implications of clientelist relationships and overexposed the dangerous consequences of dishonest, aggressive, and violent behaviors. In this way, the tolerance towards these practices was weakened and the individuals who embodied them were cast as backward, thus giving room for a sort of civility project that increasingly took place in public spaces.
Because of its use of art and public performative actions as a means for promoting common social goals, Mockus’s *Citizen Culture* illustrates “what Chantal Mouffe describes as the central role emotions and passions have in the creation of collective political identities” (Warsza 2014). However, the work of Rawls (1997), and in particular his concept of overlapping consensus from which Mockus’s methodology to harmonize law, morality and culture was inspired (Mockus 1999, 2002a, 2002b), has been thoroughly criticized by Mouffe (1993, 2009, 2012a). In her view, Rawls’s liberal rationalism attempts to displace the political towards the judicial and moral terrain, thereby leaving little room for political debate (Mouffe 2004: 182, 2002b: 3). According to her, insofar as these fields—moral and judicial—are seen as arenas where impartial decisions can be reached, the political is displaced and stripped of conflict, losing in this way indispensable requirements for building political identities and a pluralist democracy (2002b: 1, 16).

Mouffe advocates for an agonistic debate in the public sphere with visible distinctions between right and left, which she sees as a necessary condition in order to provide citizens with forms of political identification and to mobilize their passions. Political identities, according to her, are always collective and constructed through difference (for instance, between “an ‘Us’ opposed to a ‘Them’” or between adversaries (2002b: 5, 2004: 183)), and therefore the consensus based on the absence of confrontation and on the denial of relations of power would not have the potential to mobilize passions (2004, 2002b).

As Mouffe claims, the achievement of consensus and the absence of conflict—nowadays mainly embodied by the so-called *Third Way* (2004: 182)—have been promoted as reflecting processes of decision making based on technocratic or universal criteria and on the prevalence of the common sense, and for such reason they have been deemed indicators of advanced democracies. Mirroring Mouffe, Rancière also makes explicit the role of consensus in eroding the demos (1999: 107). Moreover, following Young’s critique of Rawls, it is impossible to present a moral point of view as unsituated, and therefore it cannot be universal (1990: 104). Such decisions are
clearly exclusionary as they overshadow the asymmetric relation between the subjects of a community and work to silence the situated knowledge of marginalized groups, which can have a different account about the problems at hand and their possible solutions (Young 2002: 144–145).

Hence, despite many achievements of the Mockus administration (e.g., decrease in the levels of violence and corruption, as well as increase in city tax revenues and in people’s participation in programs related to public space), it is useful to analyze the harmonization of law, morality, and culture conducted by Mockus, bearing in mind these reflections. In general, it offers a window from which to see some of the outcomes that his civilist approach has brought about in Bogotá’s spatial politics and, in particular, it sheds light on some important aspects that disenfranchise oppressed groups, such as displaced people, from the right to shape the urban spaces they inhabit.

Mirroring Mouffe’s perspective, Mockus’s transposition of morality into the public sphere was accompanied by an anti-partisan posture and by playing the technocratic card. These features were seen as the conditions that allowed his administration to defeat generalized corruption and clientelistic practices, as well as to govern by applying rational decision making (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 221; Gilbert 2015). In addition, because of its achievements in security, civility and increasing cultural and leisure offerings in public spaces, Mockus’s administration stirred up a sense of belonging and civic pride among Bogotanos (Pasotti 2010: 135, 122; Berney 2011: 17, 2010: 553). A similar anti-partisan approach was adopted by Mayor Peñalosa who, although less keen on the pedagogical methods of his predecessor, put also forward his managerial approach and, taking advantage of Bogotanos’ renewed interest in the city’s public space, concentrated all his efforts on the city’s urban regeneration (Pasotti 2010; Gilbert 2006, 2015).

As explained in chapter 2, because of the consistency of these political flags (technocratic and partisan-free democracy), along with the continuity of their programs on public space, the
Mockus and Peñalosa administrations have both been recognized in Latin America as examples of good governance (Gilbert 2006; Martin and Ceballos 2004: 147). At the local level, those features—and especially the technocratic approach—have favored the view that the project of Bogotá’s rejuvenation, enacted during these administrations, is the result of common sense and, by the same token, that the renewed public spaces are attached to the criteria of universality and classlessness (Berney 2011). Given these qualifications, it is therefore no coincidence that the so-called project *For the Bogotá We Want* turned into an ideal of a dream city, where it is assumed that the dreams and lives of all Bogotanos would have a place. All these reasons contribute to a great extent to shield the project against any attempt to reform it. In this landscape, it is not surprising either that the debate about Bogotá’s socio-spatial segregation and the need to address the shortage of social housing for the displaced population were dismissed by the political elite and by the hegemonic middle class.

In the next section, I will revisit the genesis of the *Citizen Culture* program by exploring the discourses and approaches to violence introduced by Mockus, which created fertile ground for public acceptance of a securitizing crusade for the protection of life and the participation of Bogotanos in these spatial practices. The deployment of discourses on the protection of life and citizen coexistence in public space worked to resignify those places, to reorient their use, and to give them major visibility. As I attempt to demonstrate, the later revitalization of such spaces through physical transformation and the creation of additional public spaces were understood as necessary in order to reinforce social interaction, to decrease inequalities and to boost competitiveness, yet maintaining the concern of Bogotanos in the protection of life. In this way, the promotion of citizen culture and the transformation of public space became intertwined, “one perpetuating the other in a virtuous circle” (Pasotti 2010: 122).
4.3 Hybridizing Ideoscapes of Security into Bogotá’s Citizen Culture

According to Martin and Ceballos (2004: 273), the nexus between security and public space was not explicit in official documents, either during the Moeckus administration or during the first Peñalosa administration (i.e., 1995-2003). But certainly, concerns regarding the effects of urban decline in bringing about insecurity underlie the process of Bogotá’s urban gentrification. Silva-Nigrinis—the city’s Deputy Mayor for six years—explains:

“For Peñalosa, it was clear that the recovery of public space had a significant impact on urban insecurity, because [in his view] an orderly environment … makes criminal activities more difficult and facilitates the enforcement of norms.” (2009: 105)

The analyses of Pasotti (2010: 193) as well as Martin and Ceballos (2004: 159) testify to the role played by the criminological theory of *Broken Windows*, previously adopted in the zero tolerance strategy implemented by New York Mayor Giuliani, in influencing the politicians who championed the process of urban space’s regeneration in Bogotá. As Peñalosa asserts:

Taking into account the growing problem of criminality in developing cities, it is worth pointing out the correlation between public space and security. In orderly and amiable public spaces, criminality is greatly reduced. There are several explanations for this. The ex-Mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani, referred frequently to a theory of some scholars from Harvard so-called ‘broken windows theory.’ (2003a)

In what follows I will discuss various elements pertaining to the *Broken Windows* concept, attempting to disentangle the ways in which the *Broken Windows* metaphor was implemented in Bogotá and brought about the securitization of public space.

*Broken Windows* is the name given to a concept first coined by the academics Wilson and Kelling in 1982. This theory takes as its starting point the assumption that “if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken” because this first unrepaired broken window will be seen as a signal that, in this place, nobody cares (Wilson and Kelling 1982). These authors use the image of the broken window as a signifier in order to draw attention to a series of minor offenses—such as public drunkenness, begging, littering, graffiti,
vandalism, etc.—that these authors consider to be “disorderly behaviors” (Kelling and Coles 1997: 16). In their view, such acts are not necessarily committed by habitual offenders, but also by common people who consider themselves as law-abiding citizens. From this perspective, by leaving those activities and their effects untended and by letting them gain visibility in a given area, the notion of disorder will spread; therefore, people will have the perception that vandalism is increasing and will be discouraged from using its public spaces. Thereafter, the inhabitants who can afford it will move to another neighborhood while the others will avoid getting involved because they feel intimidated, thereby leaving room for crime to flourish (Wilson and Kelling 1982).

Wilson and Kelling draw up some recommendations that seek to build a sense of order, which were primarily based on strengthening linkages between police and citizens. Their framework basically proposes a shift in policing strategies which, instead of focusing on criminal apprehension and law enforcement, embrace a model of “community policing” (Kelling and Coles 1997: 104, 82).

Although at first glance, community policing seems to rely on the implementation of simple changes—e.g., taking police officers out of their patrol cars and instead assigning them to foot patrol—these tactics are meant to involve the police in multiple neighborhood concerns. In this way, it is expected that the neighbors actively participate in the maintenance of public order, so that the police and the community develop a cooperative relationship aimed at maintaining public order and a “safe environment” (Ibid.: 160). Coming back to the geographical locus of this study, in Silva-Nigrinis’s words (2009: 106), “there were a lot of broken windows in Bogotá”; nevertheless, from her perspective, such a theory was implemented according to local needs and through pedagogical programs—introduced by Mockus—which sought to incorporate community participation and involvement in the solution of local problems. It remains, however,
unclear whether or not the term *Broken Windows* was explicitly mentioned in political discourses supporting Bogotá’s transformation.

Nonetheless, instead of the *Broken Windows* metaphor, since the end of the 1990s the term *quality of life* has flooded political discourses; a name that according to Harcourt was used “interchangeably” by Mayor Giuliani along with various other terms including broken windows, community policing, and zero tolerance policy (2001: 50; Harcourt and Ludwig 2006: 282). The discursive adoption of *quality of life*, aimed at translating Giuliani’s initiatives into Bogotá’s urban practices, reflects an interesting example of the dynamics traced by cultural global flows analyzed by Appadurai, and in particular, of certain ideoscapes that “are directly political” (2002: 53). By those ideoscapes, Appadurai refers to ideological narratives embedded in ideas, terms, and images which are locally reoriented in order to maintain or “capture state power or a piece of it” (Ibid.).

In Bogotá, the formal inclusion of *quality of life* could be traced back to the Peñalosa administration in 1998; however, to find traces of those ideoscapes (e.g., quality of life, community policing, zero tolerance policy) in the practices adopted throughout the process of the city’s transformation—and even from the initiation of the pedagogical approach introduced by Mockus—is not surprising. In the following, I will show how the *Citizen Culture* program strongly relied on a process of securitization. How did the use of terms such as life, epidemic, contagion feed into this process of securitization? To what extent did *Citizen Culture* participate in fostering military gendered regimes among civil society? Answering these questions will also allow us to see the links between security and the depoliticization of public space in Bogotá.

### 4.3.1 Dissecting Bogotá’s Civilist *Broken Windows* Approach with Feminist Tools

Shortly after taking office, Mayor Mockus expressed its administration’s concern over the fact that the police were applying in the city the same strategies used to fight against guerillas or drug-traffickers, while, in his view, security in the streets of Bogotá was not being threatened by
serious criminals but by petty thieves (Pasotti 2010: 126). This realization triggered a shift in the methods and goals of police forces that was framed in a program called Police: Citizen Trainers. Unlike previous approaches, the Mockus administration sent police officers to universities to attend courses on local management and development, community participation, conflict resolution, as well as citizens’ rights, areas that were seen as a way to provide the police with tools to improve their relations with citizens (Mockus 2002b: 14).

Mirroring the community policing approach by turning police officers into citizen trainers, the Mockus administration took advantage of the police’s position as the closest state representatives to the population, and on this basis, assigned them a “preventive and civilist” role (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 386). The incorporation of the notion of civility—and conversely incivility—into quality-of-life initiatives has been the subject of critical analysis. For example, Kramer traces how such notions have provided the upper classes with a means to differentiate themselves from the lower and working classes. Indeed, Kramer goes further by pointing out how the current use of incivility in political realms functions as an umbrella term to encompass minor misbehaviors and to position them as a threat to quality of life (2012: 238).

In asserting that, Kramer’s analysis on quality-of-life initiatives dovetails with feminist standpoints which reveal how civilizational crusades have overlapped with the continuum of violence. For instance, Cynthia Cockburn sheds light on the relation between civilization, war, and state security, as she recalls “the more ‘civilized’ people bec[o]me the more warlike they bec[o]me” (2010: 151–152). Cockburn hints at the patriarchal hierarchy entailed in the notion of civilization which, as she emphasizes, is caused and shaped by the intersection of economic, ethnic and gender institutions. Cockburn depicts this relation as an ever present “gender drama” that encompasses “the male as subject, the female as alien, the alien as effeminate (both the one a man perceives out there, and the one he fears inside himself)” (Ibid.).
In fact, by positioning the community police officer as the state representative closest to neighborhood dwellers, Mockus’s civilizatory crusade constructed what can be depicted as a disciplinary role model, whose superior citizenship served at least two functions. On the one hand, by being the bearer of ‘rational’ managerial tools with which to solve community problems, to anticipate risks, to mobilize community participation or to orient them in finding solutions, the community police officer becomes an exemplary character positioned as neutral, and to whom inhabitants could turn for help or support. Identified by the community as its protector, he was able to delegitimize or turn into aliens ‘careless’ or ‘asocial’ males as well as masculinities that embodied aggressive, less-rational or less-responsible conducts, as those described in the previous section. Simultaneously, and borrowing Mulvey’s reading of the mirror stage (2006: 348), the community police officer functioned as an “ego ideal” with whom male dwellers were driven to compare themselves, and whose masculinity they were encouraged to adopt. Otherwise they would risk being cast by the community as uncivil or backward.

Such a move set the tone for multiple forms in which community police officers have served as a link to militarize Bogotá’s civilian life. Militarization, as Enloe’s feminist curiosity has revealed, is impregnated in civilian life, not merely in the ways in which masculinity is militarized creating a hierarchy of masculinities, or in the involvement of military and police forces in tasks that go far beyond law enforcement. Militarization of civilians is also carried out through strategies that seek to encourage civilians to adopt a military culture (Enloe 2007: 111–112), and when the divide between the police and masculine protectors of the community and those who are cast as enemies of the community is entrenched (Enloe interviewed by McLean and Peck 2015: 8).

By playing the role of citizen trainers, community police officers actively participate, for instance, in convincing neighborhood dwellers of the need to increase securitarian measures in their everyday life and implement neighborhood surveillance as a means of improving or maintaining public space order and avoiding neighborhood decline. For instance, researcher Bello (2004)
describes two interrelated initiatives through which community police officers have been able to extend both security tasks and securitarian values to civilian people: the *Local Security Fronts* (LSF) initiated in 1995 and the *Schools of Citizen Security* created a year later.

LSF are neighborhood groups closely supervised by police agents who are in charge of identifying block coordinators and therefore of initiating the groups. Block coordinators are “civic leaders who know and keep good relations with other neighbors, and who are able to identify household composition, schedules and work routines” (Bello 2004: 67). Civic leaders also participated with the police in identifying particular security issues that could affect their communities and in promoting the implementation of warning and alert systems in their neighborhoods. LSF were complemented with the *Schools of Citizen Security*, which began in 1996. These Schools were sessions held in universities during the weekends, in which citizens were taught about crime prevention, conflict resolution, alcoholism, drug addiction and neighborhood security (Ibid.). By 2004, more than 37,000 Bogotanos attended these Schools and the city had at least 9,119 LSFs made of about 166,000 households and 897,000 people, covering 49.5% of the total city blocks (Ibid.: 67–69).

Bello’s research is telling of how civilian dwellers, and especially civic leaders, have become active actors in mapping communities through time and space and in the building of surveillance systems in Bogotá. But along with that, it illustrates how police agents have become increasingly involved in community life and gained the respect of city dwellers. Reflecting a concern raised by Enloe, it is not surprising that being a police officer has turned to be an attractive career option among some displaced adolescents, as in fact being part of police or military forces is seen as a way of accessing “full citizenship status” (2000: 245, 2007: 111).

So far, I have used some feminist tools in order to unpack the gendered dimensions of Mockus’s pedagogic program *Citizen Culture*. However, I have not identified the reasons why such strategy

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39 Interview with Chela and her daughter, Bogotá, November 7, 2012.
sought to position public space and security as central themes of Bogotá’s administration. After all, in the diagnosis of Bogotá’s urban crisis described at the beginning of this chapter, insecurity was recognized along with other symptoms such as corruption, lack of urban planning, economic bankruptcy and public space occupancy. But embracing a feminist curiosity “is a political act,” and implies “refusing to take something for granted” (Enloe 2007: 1). Hence, following this curiosity, it is pertinent to ask: Why did security become the chief factor among a multiplicity of concerns? And, in particular, why was the link between security and public space so strategic for clearing the path for Bogotá’s rejuvenation?

In order to address these questions, it is useful to turn towards Buzan et al. (1998) and Meger’s thoughts on securitization (2016), as it can be asserted that the application of the Broken Windows approach in Bogotá illustrates a process of securitization of urban public space. Securitization takes place initially when a political issue is represented as a security threat, and subsequently when a “referent subject” or empowered subject convinces a relevant audience that this issue requires a security paradigm or an extraordinary police response (Meger 2016: 152). Importantly, as Buzan et al. underline, in order for an issue to be securitized, it needs to be positioned as an urgent and “existential threat”; in other words, as something that menaces our life, that threatens our survival (1998: 26). In light of this, we can outline at least two reasons it is so important to keep an eye on how the term life as well as others related such as epidemic, contagion, and prevention have been used in Bogotá.

First, those terms worked as biopolitical tools to position both public space disorder as an existential threat and the actions to tackle it as a matter of survival, and to emphasize the urgency of the actions to be taken. In so doing, those terms became key discursive devices to protect public space politics from being exposed to public debate and in the endeavor to clear the path to the urban regeneration process. Second, the use of the term life in Bogotá’s politics of urban space allowed urban disorder to be framed in terms of bad, wrong, and dangerous, or in other
words, to position it in the terrain of the moral, the rational, and the technical. Thus, borrowing Buzan et al., it allows to lift public space disorder/order to a level “above politics,” “as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics” (1998: 23, 29). So, as suggested above in the first point, such a move justifies taking an immediate action outside of the normal procedures while mobilizing people’s support (Ibid.: 23). Hence, despite Mockus’s insistence on the use of technocratic and managerial methods and on achieving apolitical consensus, securitization of public space is indeed a political act (Ibid.; Meger 2016: 151), which furthermore allows to depoliticize such a political issue.

Complementing this dimension, Meger has demonstrated how securitization produces fetishization of the objects of security (2016: 152). Among other reasons, this is because it requires the “decontextualization” of the issue at hand by defining it as a “homogenous and discrete phenomenon” stripped of the social relations and underlying circumstances through which it has been produced (Ibid.). Decontextualization, as Meger claims, “is necessary in securitization because it requires an act to pose a threat sufficient in immediacy and scope to warrant an extraordinary response” (Ibid.). Echoing this economy, the securitization of public space in Bogotá has allowed for the dismissal or marginalization of other possible causes underlying the city’s urban crisis. For instance, poverty, socio-spatial exclusion, lack of job opportunities, and forced displacement are, among others, reasons that explain the extent to which street vendors have occupied public space (Delgado et al. 2008). In addition, the development of informal housing in areas designated as ecological reserves is to a great extent a consequence of the shortage of affordable housing solutions for disadvantaged and poor populations (Maldonado 2009, 2010). However, whereas these problems are dismissed as unavoidable or ahistorical, the production of orderly public space and its security are, borrowing Meger’s term, “fetishized” (2016), depicted as “discrete” concerns but prompted, however, as chief issues on which the building of the dream city depend.
Hence, the translation of Bogotá’s *Broken Windows* into what Mockus called *Citizenship Culture* opened a door to “subsume” public space deterioration under a security agenda and, since then, has allowed to “disassociate” it from other contextual matters (see Meger 2016: 150). Such disassociation and the positioning of public space order/disorder as an existential concern have allowed the city administration to circumvent political opposition, or to undermine the exposition of this concern and securitarian solutions to political debate. In the terms of Mouffe, it strips the political arena of the dimension of conflict and displaces public space from the political terrain. With the concurrence of *life* in the management of public space, the city government is thus able to adopt extraordinary means beyond normal procedures (Does 2013: 4).

### 4.3.2 Civility, Protection of Life, and the Creation of Subjects to Correct

Now, let me apply some of the analytical tools previously discussed to one of the initial ways in which the securitization of public space was positioned as an existential concern. In his endeavor to increase the collaboration between the police and city dwellers, in 1997 Mockus launched an initiative to reform the Police Code (Moncada 2009). But unlike the conventional procedures, which at the time would require this reform to be enacted by the legislative branch of the city—namely the city council—Mockus framed this process in a program called *Civility Letter* (1999).

The backbone of the program was a series of workshops called *Coexistence Seedbeds* in which 18,000 people participated, including members of civil society and human rights organizations, members of the police, and citizens (Ibid.). Almost one third of the participants invited were identified by the city administration as prone to disorderly behavior, such as people working as prostitutes and owners of animal-drawn carts, who surprisingly were iteratively mentioned by Mockus without specifying the exact nature of their misbehavior (1999: 21, 2002b: 15). Indeed, it would be difficult to single out the reasons why owners of animal-drawn carts were problematized, given that they have been widely stigmatized based on the implications of their

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40 The city administration and the citizenship analyzed the “norms that should govern the city on issues such as street sales, invasion of public space, homosexuality, prostitution, management of transport, parking spaces and other issues where citizens’ coexistence is at stake” (*El Tiempo* 1997).
livelihoods (as trash collectors or recyclers) on a series of biopolitical issues linked to public space order/disorder such as public hygiene, mobility, animal welfare and the protection of parks.

Using pedagogical tools such as role playing, the workshop sessions aimed to build a set of norms of coexistence, which involved problematizing as existential concerns many behaviors previously naturalized among Bogotanos and of some activities of the informal economy. On the other hand, the program explicitly sought to promote pedagogical functions of the police and to encourage self- and mutual regulation among citizens as a means of correction, while punitive or administrative measures were downplayed. As a result of this process, the norms collected through the workshops were issued in the Civility Letter, which later on constituted the raw material for a new Police Code. Given that the proposal was issued through a citizen participatory process, the city council could not deny its legitimacy. This, added with Mockus’s self-definition as anti-partisan and technocrat, ended by forcing the council to approve the Police Code in 2003 (2002b: 14; Martin and Ceballos 2004: 210).

Even though the Civility Letter’s workshops have allowed police agents to engage in dialogue with marginalized groups whose rights they often overlooked (e.g., LGBT population), this process was not exempt from being captured by political and socio-economic elites who were in the position to impose their perspectives about what the more correct and orderly uses of the city’s public space should be (Moncada 2009: 440.). This dynamic gives a sense of the mechanisms that Mockus had in mind in his crusade to bridge the gap between legal, moral, and cultural norms mentioned above, which, in his words, would be achieved by “weakening the cultural or moral legitimacy of actions [or behaviors] contrary to the law” (1999: 12, 2012, 2002b).

That said, the result of such participatory mechanism reflects one of the concerns raised by Harcourt in his critiques of quality-of-life initiatives: the risk of blending together disorder and crime, or, what is more, of framing disorder as “a degree of crime” (Harcourt 2001: 149). In fact,
this was the case in the transition operated through the informal enunciation of disorderly behaviors and their articulation into the *Civility Letter* until their systematization in the Police Code, which reframed and resignified minor, major, naturalized and socially accepted misbehaviors within a spectrum of practices that jeopardize citizen coexistence and thus run counter to the “respect for life” (Mockus 1999: 29). It is pertinent to consider the extent to which their particularization serves as an ethnocentric vehicle to stigmatize specific ways of mothering or parenting as irresponsible, or dangerous. Given the shortage of social services available, the fact that oftentimes women and men making a living as recyclers, street vendors, beggars, or people working in informal street jobs are obliged to be in the streets with their children cannot be overlooked.

The implementation of these strategies discussed above provided the *Citizen Culture* program with a suitable platform to modify citizens’ behaviors, while contributing to the government goal of producing ordered public space. Indeed, the emphasis placed on prevention and means of correction, such as collective and individual self-regulation, marked a paradigm shift from the previous system based on an economy which was “indexed to the acts which breach the law. The law [that] only sanctions acts” (Foucault 2008: 249). Instead, the *Citizen Culture* program shifted the focus towards the subject by reframing as disorderly behaviors that the society should tackle by subjecting the responsible actors to collective and self-regulation, or by inducing groups identified as prone to these behaviors to follow pedagogical programs aimed at their correction and improvement.

Reading through a Foucauldian lens, the focus of the city administration was therefore not directed towards the sanction of disorderly acts, but towards the correction or improvement of activities so that they would no longer constitute a threat to the preservation of public spaces or the protection of life. Thus, this process—that Harcourt calls “subject creation” (2001)—worked to position specific urban issues in the frame of security and thus as existential concerns that
menaced life in the city. But in doing so, subject creation worked to regain people’s attention towards their city: this feminized object pictured by Mockus as coquettish but vulnerable, and in the name of whom a line between civic, rational protectors vis-à-vis others cast as backward and dangerous has been erected.

4.4 The Subject to Normalize and the Child to Protect: Between Securitization and Fetishization

Rethinking Mockus’s *Citizen Culture*, Maria Eugenia Ramírez, a researcher at ILSA, underlines the effect of this approach in raising “people’s consciousness about the city space and mutual respect.” However, regarding the policies of citizen security that have been implemented since then, Ramírez is less optimistic describing them as “the control that you exert over the life of others.” Moreover, concerning the ways in which these policies have affected displaced populations, and especially Afro-Colombian people, Ramírez states:

Here in Bogotá, since ours is [considered as] a reserved society where people do not talk, then playing loud music, well, that becomes a misdemeanor. This has caused tensions and very serious conflicts within communities, including demanding that they leave. … This gradually creates very tense relations between newcomers and residents of the area, in some cases, also very aggressive, very stigmatizing. Then, from one moment to the next, even though they may share in some ways a class identity, it ends up in class contradiction. … So, on this issue of citizen security, the “bad guys” are also those who “make a racket.”

Ramírez’s narrative highlights crucial outcomes of Mockus’s civilizing project. In particular, she provides an account of the ways in which a constructed notion of order and of norms of coexistence are embedded in Bogotá society and become conditions proper to urban space. The establishment of such norms depicts a spiral sparked by a desire for civility which, starting with a spatial homogenization, has moved towards the production—and reproduction—of spatial identities shaped by a rigid cultural frame that leaves no room for negotiation. Echoing Young’s

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41 María Eugenia Ramírez, July 2012.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
concerns on the irony of the formation of identities, this homogenizing process “turns the merely different into the absolutely other” and instead of unity produces “a distinction between inside and outside” (1990: 99). Importantly, as mentioned above, in Bogotá new forms of otherness organized along class lines and informed by ethno-racial constructs have arisen among area residents and are endorsed by the ‘locals’ to differentiate themselves from newcomers and to exert their power over them. In doing so, the host population seeks to transform their character and behavior in accordance with the so-called norms of coexistence, otherwise they run the risk of being driven out of the neighborhood.

I will expand this discussion in chapter 6; for now, it is crucial to address the formation of these spatial standards and normative subjectivities, focusing on the extent to which they are symptomatic of another consequence brought about by the securitization of Bogotá’s public space. Here, I am referring to the fetishization of this space which, according to Meger (2016), is a phenomenon that goes in tandem with securitization. In fact, mirroring Meger’s analysis, public space in Bogotá has been detached and isolated from its use-value (Ibid.). By this I mean that, after its securitization, Bogotá’s public space is less and less defined by the social needs it satisfied or by the social relations through which it is produced. Rather, public space has turned into a fetish insofar as it has become a positional good, a marker of status whose market value is fueled by hierarchies organized along lines informed by class, ethnicity, race, sexuality, gender and place of origin.

The production of subjects, through the binary of rational, moral protectors vs. backward, uncivil or irrational aliens, has been instrumental in directing people’s attention towards the ultimate goal of Bogotá’s urban politics: the rejuvenation and the production of public space. This despite conceptual differences between Mockus and Peñalosa whose administrations enabled this transition. Indeed, according to Robledo and Rodríguez,
“For Peñalosa, social ordering is achieved as a result of the ordering of urban space; while for Mockus security is achieved by shaping subjects’ conducts.” (2008: 161)

But, I argue, Peñalosa’s focus on public space redevelopment would not have been possible without Mockus’s emphasis on the protection of life and securitization of public space which obscured the social causes underlying crime or disorderly behaviors and, in so doing, enabled the fetishization of public space. But still, it is crucial to scrutinize the transition from the production of subjects, whose behavior in public space should be normalized, to the fetishization of public space. To be more precise, we might ask, how have the production of subjects resulted in a politics of public space primarily focused on urban renewal and the production of new public space? Why has this process overshadowed the concern for the lives of those whom the city was intended to protect or improve?

Foucauldian perspectives, such as Huxley and Escobar, have viewed the term problematization as a window into investigating the process by which certain behaviors, subjects, events, phenomena are identified as problems for which a solution should be found (Huxley 2013: 1529). This process, according to Escobar, determines what is “visible and expressible” about a subject, while exiling other concerns to the shadows (1995: 155). Huxley’s and Escobar’s perspectives shed light on how what can count as truth about Bogotá’s public space is determined using a series of concepts, theories, standards and other tools of knowledge through which this ‘problem’ is both transformed into a discourse and, borrowing Huxley’s words, constitutes spatial practices (2007: 189).

Both discursive tools and practices emerge in parallel with a platform of professionals and experts in urban planning, urban security, public administration and other areas alike. Armed with their “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1979, 2008: 18) and in the name of prioritizing general will over particular wills, those experts are somehow entitled to push into the background the experience of ordinary dwellers inhabiting urban space and to leave aside those subjects whose
stigmatization was useful to position public space as a security concern. Such a positioning, as impartial, natural or rational, made their knowledge dominant, and this notwithstanding the fact that Mockus’s administration marked the starting point for processes of citizen participation in urban decision making.

As Beuf recalls (2011b), the introduction of strategic planning in Bogotá was framed within an overarching trend that started in Latin America in the 1990s, according to which the support to the most disadvantaged people should be taken into account by economic competitiveness policies. In accordance with this trend, participatory strategic planning has been encouraged in the urban sector, as it is presumed that it “allows to formulate programs and projects aimed at achieving equity and competitiveness” (Beuf 2011b: 59). Notwithstanding the hopes that it raised, over time social equity is not pursued as an objective by itself anymore, but only to the extent to which it serves urban competitiveness (Ibid.: 86). Not by chance, as discussed in chapter 2, urban critical thinkers have called attention to the extent to which the outcomes of participatory planning have been determined on the grounds and in the spaces set out by those who initiate these processes, namely experts, NGOs, urban planners, politicians and interest groups (Huxley 2013: 1536; Mitchel et al. 2015).

So, it is worth reflecting on what conditions do the regimes of truth held by urban experts become privileged over the everyday experiences of ordinary urban inhabitants? In her feminist analysis of participatory democracy (see chapter 2), Young explains the flaws of public deliberative processes by pointing to the pursuit of a universal “general will” they are aimed at achieving (1990: 101). This general will is supposed to privilege moral reason (Ibid.: 102) and is therefore deemed to be impartial and impersonal, or in other words “opposed to desire and affectivity” (Ibid.: 111). Conceived in this way, the pursuit of moral reason justifies “hierarchical decisionmaking structures” (Ibid.: 97), excludes the particular, and dismisses the experience of those subjects associated with the private, affect, and heterogeneity (e.g., women, homosexuals,
Black people, working-class people). So again, and as it happens with the irony of identity, the search for impartiality tends to suppress difference as it is believed that, in deliberative processes, all participants are able to leave behind their differences. But in pretending that, bureaucratic decision makers position as universal the point of view of the privileged, thereby standing above citizens’ particular interests; however, they do represent a situated knowledge, a partial point of view. Thus, the quest for impartiality of bureaucratic decision makers is impossible precisely because “they never do comprehend all relevant points of view from the outside”; rather, their quest is shaped by the government context (Young 1990: 114–115).

Through this lens, we can try to understand how the bureaucratic discourse of quality of life succeeded in flooding participatory urban planning, and that at the expense of the pursuit of social equity (Beuf 2011b: 61). In order to clarify this puzzle, consider the way in which quality of life is defined by Peñalosa, and to the referent subject he uses to define what he considers to be an impartial and general will:

The way urban life is organized can be a powerful tool in building a more equal and integrated society and to ensure that the general interest prevails ... For our model, more than the distribution of income, what matters is the distribution of quality of life. Even more specifically, the equality that matters is that which matters to children. ... What matters to children is the access to green spaces, libraries, sports facilities, violin lessons, and anything else that can serve to develop their human potential (quoted in Robledo and Rodríguez 2008: 160–161).

In this rhetoric, Peñalosa positions the kid as a universal subject and his experience as neutral. And it is on the basis of the child’s epitomized experience that he builds a regime of truth about urban space. Speaking from a queer perspective, Edelman warns against the use of the kid as a political signifier. According to Edelman, the kid is presented in political discourses as an innocent figure in need of protection vis-à-vis whom it is almost impossible to assume an oppositional side (1998: 19). The child “has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and has been enshrined as the figure for whom that order must be held in perpetual trust” (Ibid.: 21).
Mirroring this economy, Peñalosa uses the child to build a coercive consensus around his own regime of truth and, by the same token, to fetishize public space. On the one hand, Peñalosa’s rhetoric depicts a regime of truth on urban space whose main criterion is the quality of life, measured in terms of access to, quantity and quality of public spaces, and whose universal referent is embodied in the child. But moreover, Peñalosa’s rhetoric works to position quality of life as an all-inclusive goal, whose achievement will eventually bring about a form of social equality. However, whereas it does away with income redistribution and overlooks the underlying causes of social inequality, it bestows an equalizing function on public space.

Yet, the child figure participates in this securitization-fetishization dynamic. Edelman adopts a Lacanian approach to explain how, in political discourse, the child is turned into a signifier, as a token, as a promising identity that we will never fulfill as it belongs to our past, but that nevertheless embodies a vision of futurity. In that way, the child figure prevents us from opposing or threatening the symbolic order that, in Foucauldian terms, I interpret as produced by a regime of truth. Insofar as the child embodies an imaginary, or, to put it otherwise, insofar as the child is an “ensign of the future” that is never achieved (Edelman 1998: 19), his protection, as well as the continuity of the process of ordering urban space, is therefore presented as a matter of survival, but at the same time as an endless pursuit.

Thus, while the production of abnormal, uncivil subjects whose conduct should be normalized is useful to turn public space disorder/order into as a security concern, as well as to lead Bogotá’s inhabitants to become obedient subjects and to take the side of those who want to protect the city, the child works as a figure that yields a coercive consensus about public space politics. These politics prioritize public space’s beautification and turn it into a fetish, an end in itself, a symbol of the city competitiveness, thereby turning social equity issues into subsidiary concerns.
4.5 Between Civility and Urban Redevelopment: Making Sense of Their Overlaps

Mockus and Peñalosa coincide in problematizing the very same object: public space; however, Robledo and Rodríguez identify conceptual differences among their politics, by asserting:

“For [Peñalosa], the priority was to transform the city in urban terms so as to produce development and equity, whereas for [Mockus], the priority was placed on the protection of life and the spatial deployment of devices to enhance citizen culture.” (2008: 160)

I have argued that Mockus’s and Peñalosa’s politics, though different, have participated in bringing about public space’s securitization and its fetishization. In this section, I aim to demonstrate how, despite their differences, there are overlaps in their approaches which produced the same spatial practices. In the above quotation, the focuses on life and on development—the first appealing to morality and the second to rationality—exemplified Mockus’s and Peñalosa’s invocation of the securitization-fetishization dynamic. Mockus insists on the protection of life, which he links to civility, whereas Peñalosa’s perspective prompts a notion of urban space related to development and to wealth generation. But, as Maldonado suggests, in Colombia, such understanding of land that separates it from its ecological and social function has positioned urbanization as a sign “of progress and civilization” (2004: 359, 2003). So, when viewed through these lenses, Peñalosa’s and Mockus’s perspectives are interlocked, since the consolidation of a politics of public space in which land is turned into an object of consumption and generation of wealth is the continuity of, rather than a rupture with, Mockus’s civilizing process.

From this perspective, it is possible to understand that, despite their conceptual differences, both Mockus and Peñalosa participated in the public space’s fetishization and were invested in the same projects. But before revisiting one of the iconic projects of Bogotá’s gentrification exemplifying their convergences, let us take a brief look at the emergence of Bogotá model of urban renewal. As I interpret this process, there are several overlaps between Mockus’s and
Peñalosa’s politics which render competitiveness a dominant goal and turn the pursuit of equity into a subsidiary aim.

The origins of Bogotá’s current urban design could be found in the *Bogotá Strategic Plan 2000: Pact for a Competitive City with Equity*, conceived during Mockus’s first administration and issued in 1997 (Beuf 2011b: 60). The Plan as such was not adopted, nevertheless key elements introduced by Mockus’s original Plan—namely the discourse of strategic planning, criteria of centrality, competitiveness and equity—were definitely influential in the current model of city formulated by Peñalosa’s first administration (Beuf 2011a). In fact, it is important to consider the syntax of the very title of Mockus’s Plan mentioned above: a *Pact for a Competitive City with Equity*, and, in so doing, to reflect on the place given to the term equity which is relegated to a subsidiary role. This aspect is symptomatic of a hierarchical relation that subordinates equity to competitiveness, and leads me to agree with Beuf that this subordination was settled down even from Mockus’s first administration (Beuf 2011b: 61).

The current model, for its part, reflects an imagined city promoted by the Peñalosa administration in his development plan named *For the Bogotá We Want*, which was approved in 1998 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá 1998). Nowadays, the model is laid down in the so-called POT (Territorial Ordering Plan) which was enacted in 2000 and revised in 2003. In chapter 2, I explain the main features of this polycentric model as well as the attempts made by former Mayor Petro to reform this POT. However, as Orjuela points out, “every new Mayor must follow the very same model of city,” and the only possibility to negotiate this model is related to the “emphasis that each administration chooses to give, for instance by adopting a more sustainable, a more social approach.”

It is important to say that the current model was preceded by a debate over whether to focus on the densification of the built city or to allow urban expansion, and therefore involved the

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44 Carmenza Orjuela, November 2012.
delineation of where to expand the urban perimeter (Beuf 2011a). Broadly speaking, the liveliest debates reflected the interests of Peñalosa’s administration and the construction industry in expanding the urban perimeter vis-à-vis the claims of environmental authorities, researchers, and ecological associations (Ibid.; Maldonado 2003). At that time, as now when the debate has been reopened by Peñalosa, the environmental side sought to impede the incorporation of ecological reserves into the urban perimeter so as to avoid their urbanization, guarantee the sustainability of the city’s ecological system, and to prevent conurbation. After these debates of 1999, the zoning plan agreed upon the protection of ecological reserves located in the North, but in 2016, as soon as Peñalosa was reelected, the debate was brought back to the table (Saenz 2016; Mondragón 2016; Buckley 2016). Now, the current model strives to foster a polycentric but compact city, which entails the development of new centralities outside the metropolitan center, both in the periphery as in the already built city (Beuf 2011b: 69).

In the following paragraphs, I revisit the genesis of the Third Millennium Park, which laid the cornerstone for the implementation of the city’s urban renewal. By focusing on this project, I strive to test the Foucauldian approach explained before, according to which the production of subjects would have served in Bogotá as an enabler for the production of space, and specifically for the gentrification of Bogotá’s downtown.

4.5.1 For the Sake of the Children: Producing Disposable Lives

The inaugural megaproject of Peñalosa’s spatial transformation was the development of the so-called Third Millennium Park whose construction signified a kind of shock therapy applied to a dystopian area located in the heart of Bogotá’s historical center, just a few blocks from the presidential palace. The area—formerly called El Cartucho (The Cartridge) by its inhabitants—could be depicted as a black hole in the sense elaborated by Castells (2010: 2), that is, a place of social exclusion which, despite having been in the line of sight of urban experts for about 40
years, continued to decline without any attempt on the part of any other city administration to intervene (Semana 2002).

Initiated by Peñalosa in 1999, the project was completed by Mockus’s administration. Nevertheless, each administration pursued a different purpose:

“For Peñalosa the objective was to rescue an area, especially for children, while for Mockus it was a social renewal process aimed at protecting lives.” (Robledo and Rodríguez 2008: 161)

Oftentimes, Bogotanos referred to El Cartucho’s inhabitants as “disposables,” although they might not have a clear idea of the origin of the term. In the eyes of the average Bogotano, what they might have in common is that they were poor people who took the public space of this area and occupied its abandoned houses to live there and to make a living. In this landscape, El Cartucho’s people made a living through a recycling chain, in which they were able to sell recyclable items (e.g., paper, bottles, metals) that they picked up throughout the city (Ibid.). Rather than money, they were often paid in drugs, which led to a perverse dynamic that maintained many El Cartucho’s dwellers in a cycle of dependence and oppression.

But this is just a single story about what made them disposable in the eyes of Bogotanos. Allow me to consider this term through the lens of Enloe’s feminist curiosity. “To be disposable,” Enloe says, “is to be nameless in somebody’s eyes. Not originally in your own, not in your families, not in your neighbors … but in the people who imagine you were disposable” (2015). Enloe’s reflection touches upon the reasons why El Cartucho’s people came to be seen as disposable in the eyes of their fellow citizens, as people with no name, whose histories, ideas, and memories do not deserve to be recovered (Ibid.).

Almost twenty years after the eviction of El Cartucho’s dwellers, some scholars have attempted to recover their memories and have, for example, unveiled the instances through which the term disposable became widespread in Colombia (Garzón and Morris 2010). As they reveal, the term
became widespread in the aftermath of a case of social cleansing that occurred in the 1990s, through which private security guards of a university took the lives of homeless peoples. When the judge asked the guards responsible for the murders why they committed such crimes, the perpetrators cynically responded, “what is the matter if those people are just disposable?” (Ibid.; HRW 1994). After this event, the term disposable became generalized to designate homeless people, but more than that, it became almost socially accepted and unproblematized (Graham 2016). Enloe’s feminist curiosity also exposes us to the moments in which we can turn into disposers once “[we] begin to talk about people as categories” (2015). Thus, following her line of thinking, Bogotanos became disposers once we began to refer about El Cartucho’s people as disposables, refusing “to tolerate their complexities” (Ibid.) because they make us feel uncomfortable and denying them a place in the city as they jeopardize the beautification of the ‘coquettish’ Bogotá.

Thus on the other hand, to describe El Cartucho as an area of social exclusion is not unreasonable. But in order to fairly scrutinize the nuances of El Cartucho inhabitants’ lives, we can also rely on Robledo and Rodríguez’s reading of them. Rather than being subjects of exclusion operating from the outside, the authors see the inhabitants of El Cartucho as a population who resisted being “urbanized” (2008: 163). In their words, this was a “population who for decades had adopted the strategy— as a form of resistance—not to be counted, not to be known, [and] to make themselves invisible” (Ibid.: 162). Speaking from a biopolitical framework, the functioning of modern societies relies on the transformation of individuals into docile bodies; that is, into productive subjects whose activities and behaviors are channeled towards the government’s aims, and who are traceable—and available—in time and space (Foucault 1979: 189; Robledo and Rodríguez 2008). Therefore, the construction of docile bodies depends on, and is also instrumental to, the emergence of space as a political category, which

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should be “owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered, controlled” (Elden, quoted in Huxley 2008: 1645). In this landscape, *El Cartucho* inhabitants’ strategy of resistance had however counterproductive results. As I show later, it was a double-edged sword used against them in 1999, once the Peñalosa administration turned this place into a tabula rasa, a blank page ready to be written on (Massey 2005), thereby stripping it of the layers shaped by its inhabitants.

But I argue that they were subjects of oppression even in this resistance, and that such condition was fueled as they were evicted. As Young explains (1990: 48–63), a group is oppressed if it experiences any of these “five faces of oppression”: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, violence, and cultural imperialism. And this is what my analysis has attempted to show. *El Cartucho*’s people were exploited, marginalized and denied a voice in this economy of recycling and exclusion. But even more, the desire for urban civility that claims to protect life and to create a city for children brought about a politics of social cleansing that made their lives disposable. It rendered hegemonic a governmentality that reduced *El Cartucho*’s inhabitants to individual pathologies, such as deviants and dangerous, thereby obscuring the social causes underlying their lives. But moreover, the pursuit for civility and progress made us believe that the only way to ensure the achievement of a beautiful and competitive city implied to deny them humanity and, for us, to become disposers by turning a blind eye to the violence of disposability.

4.5.2 Urban Order and the Utility of Producing Disposable People

We need not to look far to find the way in which the demolition of *El Cartucho* is embedded in Peñalosa’s rhetoric. This despite the fact that, among the spatial strategies implemented since Peñalosa’s and Mockus’s administrations, the upgrading or normalization of poor neighborhoods is also included. However, *El Cartucho* and the adjacent neighborhood of *Santa Ines* were directly designated as an urban renewal area, dismissing any possibility that would allow the residents to stay there (Robledo and Rodriguez 2008: 161). Thus, referring to this area, Peñalosa’s campaign pledged that the construction of the Third Millennium Park will give back the center of the city
“to the children of Bogotá and the whole country” (Ibid.: 133, 150). The use of this rhetoric that described children as the main beneficiaries did not prevent the Third Millennium’s project from being promoted by also invoking rational and symbolic aims. In this economy, El Cartucho was depicted as a territory that put in jeopardy the city’s dreams of modernity, and the intervention in the area as a matter of urban planning and security, but not as a social concern (Ibid.: 151). Such framing, as I explain below, would have obvious repercussions in the design of the strategies to be undertaken, as well as in the budget of the project (Ibid.: 136).

In the press, the then district Secretary promised that, in this territory, the city will build a commercial center and the most important metro station (Navia 1998). But in addition, the official pointed to Bogotanos’ imaginary, by asserting that the project will give room to a park as significant as the Champs-Élysées for Parisians (Ibid.). This imaginary has not yet been achieved, as for the time being the Third Millennium Park is far from being the spatial signifier that Peñalosa’s team had dreamed. Instead of the metro, the city administration built a Bus Rapid Transport system known as TransMilenio, and the development of the metro is still a campaign pledge of every new administration. However, in terms of urban strategic planning, the Third Millennium project that took the place formerly occupied by El Cartucho reflects the function of public space—and particularly of monumentality—as an architectural device able to order the city, trigger a dynamic of urban revitalization and enhance competitiveness (see chapter 5).

Before commencing the demolition of El Cartucho, the Mayor’s office commissioned a census. According to the initial report, there were in the area “1,352 households, among them 964 families at social risk; 4,433 people; and 2,248 floating population” (Robledo and Rodríguez 2008: 163). Among the dwellers, an estimated 1,170 were children and 1,880 women (Morris 2011: 104). However, throughout the development of the project, social workers involved in it reported almost 13,000 people (Robledo and Rodríguez 2008: 163). Such differential gives a sense of the extent to which El Cartucho was a territory out of the state’s governance and
illustrates that the limitations for accessing the area were so challenging that it was almost impossible to have a real census of the population (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, the census “made visible to the city” ancient professions that the city believed were out of practice in its territory, among them rag-and-bone men, market-stall women, saddlers, healers and herbalists (Ibid.: 162). Memories recently collected in ethnographies conducted by Morris (2011) and Garzón and Morris (2010) give an account of family business such as typographies and recycling warehouses. About 1,000 families (men, women and children) worked in recycling for their livelihoods, not to spend their money for drugs but to subsist by recycling about 60% of the garbage produced by the city (Salcedo, as interviewed by Morris 2011: 62).

On the other hand, these ethnographies unveil stories of domestic, sexual and political violence, poverty, and even forced displacement that pushed many people to find refuge in *El Cartucho* (Morris 2011; Salcedo 2001; Garzón and Morris 2010: 54). Their narratives did not elude referring to the drug economy, as well as prostitution, circles of exploitation and criminal practices that spread over this area. On the contrary, they reflect how those activities, along with governmental neglect, turned this place into a trap from which it was almost impossible to find a way out once having fallen there. Such complexity, I argue, provides nuances to perspectives that regard this place and their inhabitants through the lens of resistance, and thereby sheds light on the ways in which forms of resistance are also intermingled with mechanisms of oppression.

Thus, the memories collected by these ethnographies show that *El Cartucho* was a liminal space with both legal and illegal economies that extended far beyond its boundaries. More often than not, they were part of regular operations that involved both legal and illegal actors (Salcedo 2012). Even more, in 1998, in the prelude of the destruction of *El Cartucho*, social cleansing increased taking the lives of elderly people, women, children and families (Morris 2011: 110). At that time, according to Morris, this practice was committed by people related to *El Cartucho* who
profited from its criminal economy but who, in view of the imminent and irremediable end of *El Cartucho*, sought to discredit Peñalosa (Ibid.).

By collecting these memories, Morris’s work allowed some ex-*El Cartucho*’s dwellers to reconstruct a cartography of the place, providing a perspective of social hierarchies, economic activities that took place inside and, importantly, of family dynamics where the divide between public/private had no meaning (Ibid.). At the time of *El Cartucho*’s siege and bulldozing, however, the information resulting from the census was not what the mass media aimed at making visible. Neither was it in the mayoral office’s interest to give a voice to the experiences of *El Cartucho*’s inhabitants. References to the ancient professions and its practitioners were rarely published by the media, nor were the narratives of families making a living out of recycling. Thus, allow me to turn back to Enloe’s reflection and to draw on her insistence about the power of memories as a weapon against disposability. As she says,

> “If people have names, if they have stories, if they have voices, if they have ideas about their experiences, it is much harder to dispose of them. It is much harder for any of us to dispose of somebody who has a name, has a story, has an idea.” (2015)

The elision of *El Cartucho* inhabitants’ memory could have been facilitated whether by the socio-spatial exclusion and faces of oppression this population was subjected to, or it could be a non-expected consequence of *El Cartucho* people’s own strategies of resistance. But most likely, the elision of their memories and their disposability was enabled by the confluence of both. This imposed or voluntary absence of memories, stories and experiences was in fact a double-edged sword, which facilitated to render the lives of *El Cartucho*’s people not only redundant but disposable and to deny them their right to the city. In other words, it facilitated to erode the meaning of the places they inhabited and to raze all the spatial layers shaped by the social relations occurring there.
Instead of complex stories and memories, and in order to accelerate the gentrification of *El Cartucho*, Peñalosa’s administration sought to render visible a single story that would allow the securitization of the area. Strategically, the main rationale laid out in the documents of the project relied on the characterization of this place as “the locus of drug dealing and consumption in the city, with the lowest life expectancy and the highest levels of delinquency and criminality in Bogotá” (IDU 2002). The project counted on the mass media’s support through prolific articles that granted legitimacy to the project; for instance, by quoting urban experts who described this area as a “cemetery of the living” whose colonial houses had lost their architectural value, or by echoing social experts who asserted that the razing of the area was a necessary means by which “to remove the water from the fish” (*Semana* 2002), by which they meant to clear the area of the frame and means through which its residents generated their illegal or disorderly livelihoods.

The project explicitly urged the social reintegration of about 10,000 residents, one-quarter of whom were categorized as living in a state of indigence (IDU 2002). After identifying the dwellers in such a way, the formulation of the project followed a biopolitical approach that included everything seen as necessary to reshape the lives of the residents. Consequently, the project enumerated a series of programs to correct the disorderly conduct of the inhabitants and to improve their capabilities, such as psychosocial assistance, drug rehabilitation programs, business development courses and economic support for initiating self-employment initiatives, and of course, the sheltering of the residents of *El Cartucho* in other areas of the city.

However, a review of the project budget gives an account of Peñalosa’s main priority: the recovery and physical transformation of this central area. In fact, while the total cost of the project that covered 70 hectares was estimated at 79 million dollars, only 17 million dollars (i.e., 21.5%) was allocated to cover the social integration of the 10,000 residents (IDU 2002; see also Robledo and Rodríguez 2008: 170). Not surprisingly, today’s critics of Peñalosa’s strategy argue

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that the razing of El Cartucho resulted in the dispersal of its inhabitants throughout the city (Pacheco 2008) and, according to journalist León (2011), in the “almost immediate emergence of about 1,000 stewpots scattered over the 20 localities of the city.” 47

At that time, the mass media underscored the challenges of the process by asserting that “the district cannot compel anyone to participate in its social inclusion programs” (Semana 2002), somehow anticipating the possible failure of the process while paving the way to maintain public opinion’s support. But certainly, those claims sought to shift the responsibility of the social reintegation’s success or failure onto El Cartucho’s inhabitants themselves. Echoing Giroux’s and Evans’s analysis (2015), the production of the residents of El Cartucho as pathological subjects and as the individuals responsible for the failure of their own recovery proved to be a successful tool insofar as, more than a park for Bogotá’s children, it enabled the initiation of Bogotá’s downtown gentrification.

Opinions regarding the social approach of the project are highly controversial. By 2003, when the last house of El Cartucho was demolished, in an article entitled “The end of a shame,” the ex-director of Bogotá’s public welfare office, Gilma Jiménez (2003),, reflected on some of the social achievements of the project; for instance, 300 families were able to buy a house, 850 children were attending school, 800 elderly people received attention, and 1,000 families had been hosted in transitory shelters. But in 2005, an article published in El Tiempo reported that about 300 ex-El Cartucho’s dwellers were still wandering around central neighbourhoods and asserted that, in the last five years, the number of homeless people in Bogotá had increased by 30%.48 Perhaps some Bogotanos share the perspective of Ramírez, who asserts:

Apparently, they managed to drive out the “bad people” in quotation marks … that is, that which was not allowing the city to be beautiful, well, was displaced. Now [in its

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47 Referred to as ollas in Spanish, stewpot is the term used to define deprived and marginal places where drugs are dealt.
place] there is a park. My feeling when I go to these places is that I am walking over something that was never fully resolved.⁴⁹

To say that the intervention in *El Cartucho* could have been put on hold might be inaccurate, and that not with regard to Bogotá’s majority (e.g., hegemonic) population, but to the dwellers of the place who were trapped in its spiral of oppression. However, it is hard not to agree with Robledo and Rodríguez, as they note that discourses on security and progress occupied a dominant place, and that the social measures implemented were not the main concern of Peñalosa’s administration but “a means of achieving the purpose of building the Third Millennium Park” (2008: 172).

Thus, it seems clear that the project was not intended “to remove the water from the fish” but, quite the opposite, to purge *El Cartucho* of those who used to be called *disposables* and from any trace that reflected the multiplicity of experiences that constituted this place. Indeed, Peñalosa’s approach for the development of this park relies on a notion of space that sees this area as a flat surface deprived of time experience, thereby falling into representations of space that Massey calls “static slice[s] through time” (2005: 59). The analysis of geo-ethnographer Till confirms this perspective, describing the Third Millennium Park as sterile (2010, 2012), since in fact its design is reduced to an empty expanse of lawn, devoid of vegetation and austere in its architecture, where everybody could be seen. In this regard, I would venture to say that this panoptical atmosphere might seek to neutralize any attempt on the part of the area’s former residents to return or to prevent the formation of ‘undesirable’ groups of similar conditions who could threaten the beautification of the park. Anyway, with such a minimalist landscape, it is not surprising that ten years after its construction, urban experts were still in 2013 trying to figure

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⁴⁹ María Eugenia Ramírez, July 2012.
out how to integrate the Third Millennium Park into the area, and how to transform it into a lively space that Bogotanos are willing to appropriate.\textsuperscript{50}

In the next chapter, I analyze how the gentrification of Bogotá’s center has resulted in a centripetal force that expels toward poor peripheral neighborhoods the remnants of poverty, crime and misery that the renovated and global city center is not willing to host. Perhaps, it is this centripetal force which will define the fate and spatial destiny of homeless and poor people who inhabited \textit{El Cartucho}. But it could dictate, too, the next lives to make disposable and the next neighborhood to be securitized.

\textbf{4.6 Conclusion}

From the perspective of many Bogotanos and the city’s official memory, Mockus’s civic culture is a pedagogical process which, combined with Peñalosa’s focus on urban renewal, allowed to overcome Bogotá’s urban crisis. This chapter offers a more complex reading of civic culture by dismantling its neutral and apolitical positioning and by unveiling its gendered and civilizing face. It also shows its implications in opening the path for the securitization and fetishization of public space and in turning Bogotá’s rejuvenation into a machine for rendering people disposable.

Three moments could be singled out in this dynamic. In its initial stage, civic culture put in motion self-regulatory processes which took public space as their main scenery and led citizens to align themselves along a triad of characters. This ternary encompassed effeminate deviants or backward masculinities, rational masculine subjects of superior morality, and feminine subjects who should be protected. At first glance, this triad fostered the normalization of citizens’ behaviors, but insofar as it was mobilized in the name of protecting life, it served the purpose of

casting public space disorder as an existential concern and brought about public space’s securitization.

Second, once portrayed as a security concern, the production of orderly public space became conveniently placed above politics, namely, in the terrains of moral and strategic planning. Although allegedly dominated by the pursuit of impartiality and universality, strategic planning has relegated social justice and equity to a subsidiary role and has privileged the achievement of competitiveness. As competitiveness is bestowed with the status of being a neutral goal and standard norm, decisions regarding the politics of public space have ended up benefiting the interest of those located in privileged positions while casting the needs of oppressed groups as particular or as lacking of rationality. It is at this very moment that public space has begun to be fetishized as its market value has been disconnected from the social relations through which it is produced.

The pinnacle of this process takes place in a third stage enabled by the production of disposable lives. Drawing on the path traced by Mockus, Peñalosa continued betting on the same two horses: the building of a competitive city and the reenactment of Mockus’s civilizatory project. At this stage, Peñalosa was armed with an order of things—later on issued in the so-called POT—which dictated and positioned as a security matter the razing of central areas that have endured physical decline. In order to make it happen, Peñalosa recast and reenacted Mockus’s civilizing ternary. He placed children as the subjects to be protected, and rather than subjects to be corrected, this ternary focused on the most oppressed long-term inhabitants of these areas. The lack of stories, names, and voices of El Cartucho’s dwellers in the eyes of their fellow citizens allowed their lives to be made disposable. It is only in this way that it would be possible to erase the spatial trajectories drawn on Bogotá’s center by its dwellers and to turn its geography into a tabula rasa.
Perhaps it was accidental, perhaps not, but what is certain is that rendering lives of oppressed people disposable has been instrumental for laying down the cornerstone projects of the *City We Want*. Echoing Bauman (2014), I argue that, insofar as the race for competitiveness and the obsession with spatial order colonize the never-ending project of the *Bogotá We Want*, other inhabitants will be rendered redundant for the city and obliterated from its official memory. For many Bogotanos, to inhabit and appropriate the city will cease to be a right but it may be turned into a privilege for a few who fit into this fetishized object.

Insofar as the obsession with ordered spaces suppresses from the city the lives and memories of those dwellers who have become redundant, the politics of protecting life is superseded by a politics aimed at maintaining people’s attachment to the urban renewal process. In the analysis that follows, I scrutinize the narrative of this politics and the uses of architecture through which this fetishized city is turned into an object whose proximity means the promise of a better life.
CHAPTER 5 – A SPACE FOR HAPPINESS: THE BUILDING OF THE CITY WE WANT

5.1 Introduction

In the middle of a highly controversial administration which, by waving the flag against socio-spatial segregation, dared to call into question the common sense of Bogotá’s ongoing urban restructuring (e.g., Castrillón 2014), the then Mayor Petro announced the results of the first edition of the survey entitled Citizens’ Happiness and Satisfaction (CEACSC 2014). “The majority of Bogotanos are happy in their City,” asserted the Mayor’s office in September 2014, as the survey concluded that “77% of the citizens were satisfied with the life they lead in Bogotá.”

Although Petro’s enthusiasm was dampened by local media, which pointed out some paradoxes in the results of the survey (El Tiempo 2014, Semana 2014a), it was not the first time that a Bogotá Mayor brought the term happiness into political discourse. In fact, happiness has been recurrently used by former—and recently reelected—Mayor Peñalosa (1998-2000 and 2016-2019), both to put forward the achievements of his administration and to explain the paramount role that his urban politics has given to public space (e.g., Peñalosa 2003b). Urban restructuring, and in particular the production of public space, is a sensitive subject in Bogotá’s politics, to the point that it has become a sharp lens through which to assess the city administrations (Berney 2011: 17). Against this background, it is therefore worth asking: What does happiness have to do with Bogotá’s spatial politics? And how does citizens’ happiness become a sort of thermometer of the mayors’ contributions to the process of urban restructuring?

In this chapter I explore the role of happiness in, on the one hand, maintaining the engagement of the city’s inhabitants in the transformation of Bogotá into a competitive global city and, on the

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other, in making urban space an instrument for preserving the continuity of the civilizing process of citizens’ normalization as introduced by Mayor Mockus’ administrations (1995-1997 and 2001-2003). Drawing on Ahmed’s work on Happiness (2010a), I attempt to disentangle the ways in which happiness is embedded in Bogotá’s spatial politics so as to turn the ongoing project of urban rejuvenation into a container of the expectations and wants of the city’s residents. In doing so, I will identify some of the ways in which internally displaced people’s urban experiences become imbricated in this process. I argue that Bogotá’s narrative of urban happiness ends up being an oppressive universalistic moral project that encourages both spatial and cultural homogeneity. In other words, the happy city becomes a disciplinary tool useful to tell Bogotanos how they have to use and behave in public space, and which things and urban criteria they should be inclined towards in order to deserve the happiness that the city promises (Ahmed 2010a: 199).

To this end, I start by applying discourse analysis to Bogotá’s politics of public space, and particularly, to the urban politics of Mayor Peñalosa. Focusing on Peñalosa’s reiteration of the term happiness, I identify resemblances between his discourse and the utilitarian thinking where happiness, conceptualized as “pleasure and the absence of pain,” becomes the governing rule of human action (Mill 1863: 5–8). In doing so, I lay out how Peñalosa’s discourse merges the notion of people’s happiness with the pursuit of economic goals. This allows me to identify the way in which Peñalosa’s discourse positions the production of public space, and the model of city this space brings about, as an uncontestable means for achieving both residents’ happiness and city’s competitiveness. Then, inspired by Ahmed’s concept of happy objects, I attempt to shed light on the process through which the notion of the City We Want promoted by Peñalosa becomes a cluster of the values, expectations, and desires that Bogotanos have for a better life. As I suggest, endowed with this function, Bogotá turns into a means of residents’ happiness and into an object that they feel compelled to defend. Afterwards, I turn towards the uses of monumentality in
Bogotá’s urban renewal and the program *Bogotá Mission* through which community policing strategies were implemented. Looking at the functioning of these elements, I shed light on how they participate in the material construction of the polycentric city that Bogotá strives to become and the role they play in propagating and in keeping alive the interest of the city’s population in the ideal of a city to come and to boost residents’ attachment to the process of urban renewal. In doing so, I address the role of architecture and urban planning in shaping people’s lives and in fostering binaries that reenact gendered relations of power such as public/private and center/periphery.

### 5.2 In Quest of Happiness in Bogotá’s Politics of Space

As a point of departure to tackle the questions posed above, I will analyze the function that the Mayor Peñalosa confers on public space as a means to enable human happiness. This view is illustrated by Peñalosa’s statement that “Public space is one way to lead us to a society that is not only more equal but also much happier” (Peñalosa and Ives 2004). In this perspective, I propose to consider what Mayor Peñalosa—who inspired the model of the *Bogotá We Want*—believes to be the duty of political leaders, namely “to promote human happiness” (Walljasper 2010). Let’s take a look for example at the following assertion from Peñalosa, when he is asked about Bogotá’s priority in creating parks:

> “We need food and housing for survival, but there are even higher types of needs—needs related to happiness. If you look at it that way, parks become as necessary to a city’s health—physical and spiritual—as the water supply.” (Peñalosa and Ives 2004)

In his words, the role of politicians in fostering citizens’ happiness and the instrumental use of public space in achieving this goal come to the fore. In doing so, Peñalosa’s perspective mirrors a trend currently taking place in political agendas, which has recaptured the work of utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham and Stuart Mill. According to Mill’s thinking, the greatest happiness is “the end of human action” and “the standard of morality” (1863: 8), where the greatest happiness does not refer to the happiness of an individual or an agent but that of all
included in a community (Ibid.: 12). Reflecting this view, in the statement quoted above Peñalosa gives a meaningful place to the production of public space, which he sees as the means for achieving citizens’ happiness. The adherence of Peñalosa’s politics to this utilitarian thinking is not confined to pursue its principles but is also extended to its criteria of assessment. Therefore, just as in Mill's perspective “the promotion of happiness” is described as “the test by which to judge all human conduct” (Ibid.: 26), so too the effectiveness of Bogotá mayors to produce public space as a way to lead to a much happier society has turned into a benchmark for assessing the mayors’ competence (Martin and Ceballos 2004; Berney 2010: 540; Salazar-Ferro 2011: 336).

Utilitarianism and its search for happiness do not prescribe a specific moral reason (Young 1985). However, as Young accurately claims, in capitalist societies there is no such thing as a principle of impartiality. In fact, as I show in this chapter, despite utilitarianism’s pursuit of the “greatest happiness” (Mill 1863), the building of urban happiness takes the interests of the more powerful as representing the universal reason, while the postures of oppressed groups, such as women inhabiting the periphery, pauperized dwellers of central areas, racial and sexual minorities and migrants, are downplayed as they are considered as representing the particular (Young 1985).

Indeed, the posture of impartiality entailed in what Peñalosa defines as the role of politicians, namely that of promoting human happiness (Walljasper 2010), exemplifies the position of the ‘impartial observer’ defined by Jeremy Bentham in his utilitarian notion of happiness. As Young accurately asserts, in her feminist critique of such figure, this observer supposedly embodies a moral point of view abstracted from any personal context. He pretends to be an “impartial calculator,” who evaluates “each individual happiness and weights them all in relation to one another, calculating the overall amount of utility” (Young 1985: 379), or in other words, designating what the greatest human happiness is made of (Ibid.: 399).
By mirroring this scheme, Peñalosa’s urban happiness turns out to be what Enloe would call one of patriarchy’s “many guises” (2007: 8), since in its pretensions to satisfy what Peñalosa calls “highest needs,” it ends by suppressing heterogeneity, that is, privileging what is considered as, or related to, the masculine reason over what is seen as feminine or as stemming from desire and affectivity.

As explained in chapter 3, the inclusion of happiness as an urban concern stems from the revival of the utilitarian focus on happiness occurring since the mid-1990s that has been supported by a large number of researchers, giving rise to what feminist philosopher Ahmed calls the “happiness turn” (2008, 2010a: 3). Often clustered in the so-called happiness studies, this branch includes the work of several economists who have seen the possibility of measuring happiness as a window through which to assess the well-being of countries’ populations. Among them are Frey (2008) and Stiglitz (2009), who recall that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the aggregated economic activity, and because of that, its use has been expanded to reflect the welfare of the population (Frey 2008: 159). However, as Stiglitz (2009) underlines, the GDP takes into account just the market economy but disregards the economic activity that takes places within the home, which contributes enormously to people’s well-being.

Feminist economists have also long raised similar concerns regarding the GDP and have long advocated for the inclusion of unpaid economy in national accounts (Elson 2002; Elson and Cagatay 2000; Jain and Elson 2010: 15; Massey 2013a: 15). However, in recent years it has been the academic boom gathered in the happiness turn which has succeeded in calling public attention to the limitations of the GDP to measure the well-being of the population. This to the extent that in 2012 the echo of this boom took the United Nations to encourage the development of measures that “capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness and well-being in development better” (UN 2012). Some contributions to this endeavor have been produced by economist Layard (2006) who, drawing on insights from positivist psychology, has
striven to develop models to measure happiness. Layard takes as a starting point the paradox consisting in that increases in people’s incomes do not necessarily make individuals happier (see also Lin et al. 2014). In fact, the relation between happiness and income would be largely influenced by social comparison and, accordingly, a rise in personal income will increase the individual’s happiness mostly in cases where such an increase is not generalized in the community in which an individual lives (Frey and Stutzer 2002: 9; Layard 2006; Frey 2008: 31, 38).

Indeed, referring back to Bogotá, one might argue that Peñalosa’s politics has taken these findings into account, especially when it seeks to use Bogotá’s public space as a means to avoid the chances of social comparison among the city’s residents. In other words, when the ordinary functions of some public spaces are extended so as to seek the reduction or management of the number of situations in which people compare themselves with others. Consider, for example, the next quotes from Peñalosa in which, after recognizing poverty as a problem in Bogotá, he focuses on how to render poverty less visible by using public space, rather than on how to tackle the causes of poverty:

Parks and other pedestrian places are essential to happiness in our cities.

....

At first, it may seem that in Third World cites, with so many unmet needs, parks would be a frivolity. But in practice, where citizens lack so much in terms of amenities and consumption, it is quicker and more effective to elevate the quality of life through public goods such as parks, than by increasing people’s incomes. ... Parks and other public pedestrian spaces are critical if we desire to make Third World societies more equal. Indeed, it is during leisure time that income differences in our cities are felt most acutely. (2003b: 30–31)

In another interview, Peñalosa reiterated his vision:

“It is during leisure time that income differences are most keenly felt. ... This is the least a democratic country should provide its citizens. It is not a frivolous need. Public spaces are as necessary as hospitals and schools, since man needs to walk to be happy.” (quoted in Khan 2009; emphasis added)
While in these quotations, Peñalosa points out the social equalizer function of public space, he also positions leisure activities at the same level of other needs, such as education and health. Hence, the description of Bogotá’s public space in public discourses as an equalizer of class difference does not come about by chance. On the contrary, it seeks to make sure that people’s satisfaction with life and their pursuit of happiness are favorably affected by their experiences in using public space. That includes to control or to minimize the occasions in which people compare each other and which, therefore, could counteract their feeling of happiness.

The above discussion does not mean that economic aspects, as for instance productivity, investments, competitiveness or even personal income, do not play an important role in the city’s public discourse on urban renewal. As discussed in chapter 4, the project of Bogotá’s rejuvenation and the very polycentric model of city that it involves have been promoted as a means for increasing competitiveness throughout the city, including those areas located in the periphery, by means of public investment on public space of such areas (González 2014: 45).

Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that the harvest of such desired economic growth can be reaped directly by a wide range of population. This is evident in the next statement, in which Peñalosa refers to the actual function of this spatial strategy:

> If we in the Third World measure our success or failure in terms of income, we would have to classify ourselves as losers. … So with our limited resources, we have to invent other ways to measure success. This might mean that all kids have access to sport facilities, libraries, parks, schools, nurseries. (quoted in Walljasper 2012)

Peñalosa’s discourse mirrors the concerns mobilized by the happiness turn regarding the limitations of the GDP to measure the well-being of the population. At the same time, his perspective resonates with what Foucault calls “political arithmetic,” a term by which Foucault alludes to the use of statistics aimed at producing knowledge about each state forces. According to Foucault, the reason of state (raison d’état) “refers to the state, to its nature and to its own

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52 This goal was also mentioned by Orjuela.
rationality,” therefore “the aim of the government is to strengthen the state itself” (1988: 150). Following that, “the art of governing,” which feeds into this reason of state, implies that the state’s strengths must be known. And it is here when political arithmetic (i.e., statistic) plays a paramount role since, according to Foucault, its main functions turn out to be to produce knowledge about the state’s strengths and, on the other hand, to give an account of the government’s effectiveness in increasing these forces. This, in brief, is what Foucault describes as “the true nature of the state”:

“It is conceived as a set of forces and strengths that could be increased or weakened according to the politics followed by the governments. These forces have to be increased since each state is in a permanent competition with other countries, other nations, and other states.” (1988: 151)

Looking through these lenses, it is possible to claim that what lies behind Peñalosa’s search for alternative ways to measuring the government’s success is his concern for the city’s competitiveness, so that paraphrasing his words, we (Bogotanos) would not have to “classify ourselves as losers” (Walljasper 2012). Those are challenges that Bogotá’s government addresses by identifying public spaces as one of its competitive advantages and by strengthening such an advantage. However, despite the position of impartial observer that Peñalosa pretends to incarnate, it is worth bearing in mind the extent to which the focus on public space is detrimental to other needs seen as particular. As I will discuss in the next chapter, while the city emphasizes public space’s investments, it fails to address the shortcomings of its policy of social housing.

The idea of using urban renewal—and particularly to produce new public spaces throughout the city—as a tool for increasing Bogotá’s competitiveness follows the leitmotiv if you build it they will come (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 163). That is, in the words of Orjuela, “that enterprises and the [market] economy would come to those centers transforming them into development hubs, thereby creating employment opportunities, and in general fulfilling the needs of local
population.” Nonetheless, the construction of public spaces as a strategy to face inter-urban competition is not so enthusiastically viewed by authors such as Harvey:

“Innovations and investments designed to make particular cities more attractive as cultural and consumer centres have quickly been imitated elsewhere, thus rendering any competitive advantage within a system of cities ephemeral” (1989: 12).

Following the same line, Bell and Oakley point out that projects of urban regeneration require establishing links between local residents and the national and international flows they aim to serve and attract, otherwise, “mixed feelings” may arise between the locals (2015: 82). Having this in mind, it is possible to argue that the link between Bogotá’s politics of public space and the government’s concern for people’s happiness lies in the extent to which one feeds into the other; in other words, on how people’s happiness is instrumental in order to maintain residents’ support, and to avoid the risk of opposition to the continuous development of Bogotá’s urban renewal. In doing so, the ruling authorities secure the path for improving public space, which is a key strength in the city’s race for competitiveness.

Discourses of happiness, according to Ahmed, have been used to defend various cultural institutions, including marriage, family, as well as “gendered forms of labor” (2010b: 573), specifically by arguing that women’s happiness is behind these places or forms of work. However, as Beauvoir asserts, while there is no clarity about what happiness means or masks, it is instead used as a disciplinary tool in order to make others live according to a supposed impartial universal wish (Ahmed 2010a: 3). In Bogotá, by echoing these stories, happiness is also recalled in the name of defending the vision of the city that the project of urban rejuvenation entails. In such a landscape, the city’s bet on people’s happiness turns out to be not so much the purpose of the government suggested by the utilitarian thinking, but rather people’s happiness “becomes an element of state strength” (Foucault 1988: 158), and a necessary ingredient for the

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53 Carmenza Orjuela, November 2012.
city’s success in its pursuit of neoliberal economic goals. This, despite the fact that Peñalosa asserts:

“A premise of the new city is that we want society to be as egalitarian as possible. For this purpose, quality-of-life distribution is more important than income distribution. ... [O]ur goal is not to generate as much income as possible, but to generate as much happiness as possible.” (quoted in Cervero 2005: 27)

But in substance, Peñalosa’s political approach entails a careful imbrication of people’s pursuit of happiness and some of the most traditional economic standards. Hence, as Cervero writes:

“Peñalosa felt that Bogotá had to create a more livable and functional city than anywhere in the western Hemisphere, to stop the brain drain and entice foreign capital and investment. Invoking trickle-down theory, the poor, he reasoned, will eventually reap the benefits of economic expansion.” (2005: 27; see also Dinero 2015)

So, in the disguise of an “impartial calculator” who speaks from a universal point of view (Young 1985), Peñalosa seems to weave a discursive collage which allows him to articulate and to pass on an adequate argument in accordance with the interests or demands of his diverse constituencies, including conservative stakeholders. But despite the contradictions that his rhetoric conveys, its model of city continues to be widely accepted. This is due in large measure to Peñalosa’s allegedly technocratic approach and anti-partisan posture which, like in the case of Mockus and as discussed in chapter 4, contributed to position both administrations as examples of good governance and the model of city that their administration conceived as universal, classless, and genderless (Berney 2011).

Partisan-free democracy is central to the political language recurrently used in Bogotá politics, including in the last mayoral debate that took place in 2015 and which cemented the reelection of Peñalosa (Arenas 2015). Indeed, as soon as his reelection was announced, Peñalosa hastened to assert “we will govern without politics,” thereby waving again the anti-partisan flag (Riveros

54 Rosenman, President Roosevelt’s speech writer, coined this term referring to “the philosophy that had prevailed in Washington since 1921, that the object of government was to provide prosperity for those who lived and worked at the top of the economic pyramid, in the belief that prosperity would tickle down to the bottom of the heap and benefit all” (Sowell 2012: 2).
But as Mouffe underlines, good governance and partisan-free democracy have been some of the “fashionable notions” prompted by political figures of the third way (2005: 2). By endorsing such terms, they have been able to enact an anti-political or post-political vision (Mouffe 2002b; see chapter 4), through which they manage to position themselves as technocrats and to promote a politics of consensus which denies “the antagonistic dimension constitutive of ‘the political’” (Mouffe 2005: 2, 2008a).

But, the political narrative woven by Peñalosa is just an example of how this commonsense rationality has been translated into Bogotá’s political arena so as to confiscate the process of urban regeneration. Consider for instance the words of a Colombian ex-Housing Minister during an interview published in November 2014, at the time when a heated debate was raging over Mayor Petro’s announcement to build social housing for the IDP population in the northeast of Bogotá, an area mostly inhabited by upper-class residents:

“The problems of the city are not a matter of left or right but of administration, management, and results on people’s quality of life.” (Semana 2014b)

Given the hegemonic status that the anti-political discourse displayed in this assertion has achieved in Bogotá, and the power it has to position the current city project as uncontested and as the outcome of a process guided by a supposed pure rationality (e.g., Salazar-Ferro 2011: 328–331; Córdoba 2013a), it is timely to recall Massey’s reflections on the language mobilized through the hegemonic neoliberal common sense. This language, Massey claims, has allowed the removal of economic and social concerns from the sphere of the political debate (2013a: 20), and precisely, in her view, “one of the most political things you can do is to try to spot things as not political, as just common sense, as just an automatic truth” (2013b).

But now, after having unpacked some of the narratives through which Bogotá’s authorities instrumentalize happiness in their attempts to depoliticize the politics of public space, it is worth asking: how does the city government manage to make public space a means of happiness in the
perspective of Bogotá’s inhabitants? Or, borrowing the terms of Ahmed, how is Bogotá’s public space endowed with happiness so as to become a “happy object,” a “happiness means”; or in other words, a means for making people happy (2010a: 21–26, 2010b: 576)? Ahmed’s “phenomenology of happiness” (2010a: 23) offers a useful framework to understand this process, as she explores the conditions of arrival of those things that are given the status of “objects of happiness” (2010b: 576).

According to Ahmed, the construction of happy objects occurs by means of associating them with things (e.g., practices, notions, values, institutions, feelings) which are hegemonically considered as good (2010a: 28). Thus, to include an object into our “horizon of likes” or into “our near sphere” is “to be directed not only toward an object but to what is around that object” (Ibid.: 24–25); or, in other words, to the affective value that the object accumulates, which is gathered and increases as the object is shared and circulates (Ibid.: 19, 25). Our orientation towards an object that has turned into a “happy means” would therefore depend on the extent to which “we imagine [this object] will bring happiness to us” (Ibid.: 26) and, according to this logic, happiness will come as a result of our proximity to this object.

In Ahmed’s phenomenology, temporality is a crucial aspect, because objects could become “happiness-causes” even before we come in contact with them (2010a: 28, 2009: 3). This implies not only a judgment about certain things and to consider them good, but that these objects are granted positive values even before they arrive in our near space through different forms of mediation (2009: 3). It also means that there is an expectation about the future, which causes us to get in contact with specific objects (Ibid., 2012a: 46). However, the sharing of a happy object does not imply that an object gathers the same feelings for those people among whom the object circulates. For this reason, happy objects become container of wants and by the same dynamic, the tautology that hunts the pursuit of happiness—whereby “[w]e desire things, because of
happiness. Because of happiness, we desire things”—is defeated, as happiness itself becomes the stopping point to the question of why we desire certain things (Ahmed 2010a: 203).

In Bogotá, just as the commonsense narrative exemplified in Peñalosa rhetoric has been drawn on ideas cut and pasted from a multiplicity of sources, so too succeeding city administrations—including those supported by left parties—have propagated the ideal of the city that we want (e.g., Lewin 2012), and have thereby managed to gather around the polycentric vision of the city a manifold of citizens’ desires and values. Most of these wants and notions have taken the form of achievements and expectations about what the dreamed city would bring for everyone and for the Bogotá society as a whole once this long-term project would be completed. However, the extent to which these values, allegedly resulting from universal reason, aim at increasing the city’s competitiveness while hindering the right to the city of those located at the bottom of the social scale is an important concern.

To give a few examples of the supposed achievement of the implementation of the POT, it is currently asserted that Bogotá has significantly recovered and renewed its public space (Córdoba 2013b; Salazar-Ferro 2011: 338). Hence, although not exclusively, improvements in safety and security indicators have been attributed to the recovery of many public spaces (Zeiderman 2013a; Salazar-Ferro 2011; Silva-Nigrinis 2009: 83, 99; Pasotti 2010: 20, 2012: 72). Along with that, the construction of public libraries and bicycle routes combined with a growing public cultural agenda have made that Bogotá’s public space has been portrayed as a platform for people’s interaction and, therefore, for enhancing citizens’ self-regulation and civility (Salazar-Ferro 2011: 332; Sáenz-Obregón 2006; Pasotti 2010: 20). This argument is frequently put forward by politicians, who assert that Bogotá’s public space is universal and classless, and claim that its regeneration have brought about the return of middle and upper classes to public spaces (Berney 2011: 18–22; Salazar-Ferro 2011).
Another achievement is the greater connectivity of some peripheral areas with the traditional center, which is a direct outcome of the building of transport facilities. As the new transport facilities involve the construction of transport hubs in these areas, it has also brought about an increasing number of shopping centers in the periphery. While the first transformation is associated with notions such as efficient mobility and productivity, in general those changes are seen as symbols of urban upgrading and economic integration of peripheral areas (Dureau et al. 2013). Such changes have gone in parallel with the construction of at least 55,000 new houses per year and the increase in cadastral values; evidences that are underscored by the city observer as they have allowed Bogotá to improve its tax revenues and therefore to secure its economic sustainability (Córdoba 2013a, 2013b).

Yet, from the perspective of politicians and urban planners, the ongoing shift of the monocentric city into a polycentric structure and the adoption of politico-administrative measures also constitute the means to accomplish standards seen as essential ingredients of good governance. They included institutional decentralization and privatizations in the provision of public services which, as analyzed in chapter 2, are framed in a neoliberal agenda implemented by the national government and the city since the mid-1990s. Those ingredients have been sold to Bogotanos as bringing about transparency, increasing democracy and defeating clientelism, but also as requirements to enhance the city’s competitiveness (Gilbert 2015; Berney 2011; Salazar-Ferro 2011).

Observed from this perspective, it can be argued that security, civility, a sense of universality and modernity, efficiency, competitiveness, transparency, economic prosperity and sustainability are just some of the values and feelings that bind Bogotá’s residents to the city’s regeneration process and to its public spaces. Thus, the wish and will to defend and strengthen this range of values and achievements make Bogotanos place their hopes for happiness in the completion of the city project.
However, the permanence of these accumulated achievements has been recently hindered by various obstacles. Among them, a system of corruption set up by ex-Mayor Moreno (2008-2012), a leftist politician who, despite having embraced the same model of city, took advantage of the huge flow of investments made by the city and seized the opportunity to bring back into local politics clientelistic practices that the city believed were overcome (Gilbert 2015; Pasotti 2013: 51). This episode of corruption meant a serious damage in terms of transparency and democracy, and a setback in the urban renewal process, as various projects were delayed or slowed down.

Following Moreno’s fraudulent government, the Petro administration (2012-2016) called into question the model of city, and therefore issued a reform of the POT. However, Petro’s plan to transform Bogotá’s order of things was immediately contested, as it reformulated the design of various projects including the metro. Not to mention the fierce rejection of other initiatives such as the construction of housing solutions for IDPs in central and Northern areas and his decision to de-privatize the garbage collection service. According to Petro’s administration, most of these measures were framed within the goals of fighting against socio-spatial segregation and securing the city’s environmental sustainability, which were included in its development plan (Lewin 2013; Achtenberg 2014). But as these strategies entailed deep transformations of the current city model and implied a major role of the government in the management of various urban issues, Petro was depicted in local media as promoting a revanchist and Chavista politics and pejoratively labeled as populist. By ‘pejoratively’ I mean that populism was used in order to ethically condemn and denigrate Petro’s policies, rather than in the sense formulated by Laclau and Mouffe which I embrace. So it is worth noting that populism is not an ideology but, as Mouffe suggests, a necessary dimension of democracy which emerges in order to subvert what Laclau calls “more mature” ideologies” and a “post-political consensus” that work to prompt anti-partisan forms of politics and the rule of technocracy (Laclau 2007: 18; Mouffe 2014a, 2014b, 2002c).
Hence, by recalling Molière, ex-Mayor Castro (1992-1994) asserted that the project of building housing for displaced persons in rich areas of the city served Petro’s purpose to “épater le bourgeois,” which he roughly translated as shocking and frightening the bourgeois.\textsuperscript{55} In doing so, according to Castro (2013), Petro was bringing into the city an “anachronistic conflict of classes” that was polarizing Bogotá’s inhabitants. Such a dismissal of Petro’s initiatives, and a merciless campaign deployed in local media which portrayed the measures he adopted as pure improvisation overshadowing his technical arguments, paved the way for Peñalosa’s return in the mayoral race that took place in 2015. Not surprisingly, Peñalosa succeeded by gathering his constituencies under the flag of taking back Bogotá and through an anti-partisan campaign that recycled his own slogan stating “let’s make together the Bogotá we want.”\textsuperscript{56}

Indeed, the terms of the mayoral debate mirrored the arguments raised by Petro’s adversaries and the mass media in 2014 when they dismissed his claim, that I mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter, according to which “the majority of Bogotanos are happy in their city.”\textsuperscript{57} At that time, the media argued that although the Citizens’ Happiness and Satisfaction survey showed that 77% of the citizens were satisfied with the life they lead in Bogotá, it was also true that 77% of the informants asserted that they do not feel safe (El Tiempo 2014), 71% were unsatisfied with the work of the police, and 80% were unsatisfied with the state of public transport and city’s roads (Semana 2014a). Interestingly, as is the norm in happiness surveys (e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002), all of these findings were the result of people’s perception but they did not necessarily match actual statistics. For instance, between 2010 and 2014, Bogotá’s homicide rate fell from 24 to 17 per 100,000 inhabitants (Ávila 2015).


\textsuperscript{57} Statement made by Mayor Petro during the presentation of the results of the Citizens’ Happiness and Satisfaction survey. E.g., “La Mayoría de los Habitantes de Bogotá Están Satisfechos de Vivir en Esta Ciudad,” Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, October 15, 2014, accessed November 18, 2015, http://Bogotá.gov.co/content/la-mayor%C3%ADa-de-los-habitantes-de-bogot%C3%A1-est%C3%A1-satisfechos-de-vivir-en-esta-ciudad.
On the other hand, social achievements were totally ignored by the media throughout this mayoral race, such as the reduction of adolescent pregnancy rates which dropped from 21,000 cases in 2011 to 16,000 in 2014 and the reduction of poverty rate from 11.9% in 2011 to 5.9% in 2014. The model of support to the IDP population through which Bogotá provided assistance to 291,065 victims of the armed conflict between 2012 and 2015 was not mentioned either. Such assistance involved access to education, health services, housing, and legal support for accessing rights and benefits included in the transitional justice framework. Curiously, controversial measures adopted by this administration through which it lowered the cost of public transport, guaranteed the provision of a free basic amount of water for the poorest population (mínimo vital de agua), amended Bogotá’s public TV channel to allow the participation of LGBT people, civil rights activists, feminist voices, critical journalists and scholars, among others, were also left aside (Crooks. 2013). And the same goes with the implementation of a waste recycling system and the inclusion of the marginalized population of garbage recyclers in this model. It did not matter that during Petro’s administration these initiatives were highly controversial and turned into arguments used against Petro in order to label him as populist (see Duzán 2012). But perhaps, bringing those subjects into the debate would have meant putting technocratic candidates against the wall. That is, it would compel them to publicly state whether they will dismantle such measures which, despite the critics of mass media, have become social entitlements from the perspective of a large part of the population (e.g., garbage recyclers, LGBT and displaced people, ecologists).

Hence, concerns put on the table by Petro’s administration prompted by the ideals of securing the city’s environmental sustainability and overcoming socio-spatial segregation with a special

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focus on serving the displaced population have lagged behind and are now totally excluded from the city’s agenda of urban renewal. Throughout the mayoral race, leftist candidate Clara López managed to portray the solutions to problems of security and public transport as related to social and economic exclusion and to the lack of opportunities for those left behind by the city’s urban transformation. From her perspective, the problems of the city should not entail sacrificing citizens’ rights and people’s opportunities for an excessive repression. For his part, Peñalosa recalled his Broken Windows approach, insisting that “where there is disorder, there is delinquency. It is a fertile ground for delinquency.”

But whatever the crux of the debate was, the media’s focus on security, mobility, public transport and city’s competitiveness suggests the dubious conclusion that environmental sustainability, socio-spatial inclusion—and especially of the displaced population—may not have been actual and pressing issues, or simply that they might not concern Bogotá’s hegemonic population, i.e., those who have placed their expectations, needs, and values in the vision of the happy city. Hence, Peñalosa regained the Bogotá Mayor’s office by drawing on the idea of the dreamed city on which he capitalized, and that he pictured as being endangered by the lack of management and laxity on the part of the left. That dreamed city, according to León, is the one that “Peñalosa has been thinking about for more than 20 years” and such “obsession,” as she adds, “has allowed him to have a clear vision of the city he wants and that he will attempt to achieve” (2015, 2011).

For the “mayor of happiness,” as the writer on urban planning Montgomery (2013a, 2013b, 2008) has labeled Peñalosa, “parks are an important step towards a more convivial, constructive and civilized urban future” (Peñalosa, quoted in León 2011). In accordance with this narrative, Peñalosa re-centered the transformation of the city on the scope of security, public space, and

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mobility (Contreras 2015; Vélez and Anzola 2015).\textsuperscript{60} Even during a debate aimed at addressing the position of Bogotá in the face of the challenges that the post-conflict would bring about, Peñalosa brought the debate into the frame of security, the building of more public spaces as a means to achieve social equality, and the compliance with the norms as a requirement for peace.\textsuperscript{61}

On this note, I will explore in the following sections two key elements that participate in sustaining the hegemony of this model of city. Drawing on the perspective of the IDP population, and on the urban experiences of other groups of population related to them, I will approach the program Bogotá Mission and the uses of monumentality in Bogotá’s public space. While unpacking the material transformations and the kind of subjectivities that those mechanisms participate in bringing about, I will disentangle the role they play in promulgating and in keeping alive the interest of the city’s population in the ongoing urban rejuvenation.

5.3 Bogotá Mission: Bearing the Vision of the City That We Dream of

“For me, the transformation of the city, and particularly in terms of transport, has not been traumatic because I feel like I have been part of it” Maritza Buitrago says while describing the time when she worked as ‘civic guide’ for the so-called program Bogotá Mission (Misión Bogotá).\textsuperscript{62}

Maritza is an internally displaced woman who arrived in Bogotá in 2004 when she was about 20 years old. During two months in 2005, Maritza worked as an agent of Bogotá Mission, a program created by Peñalosa in 1998 and originally grounded on the Broken Windows theory (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 461). By 2014, Bogotá Mission had recruited almost 20,000 people with diverse backgrounds, targeting especially people who belong to what the city calls vulnerable populations. They include homeless people, people working as waste pickers, people working in prostitution,

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\textsuperscript{60} E.g., “Debate de los Candidatos a la Alcaldía de Bogotá en La FM”; “Conversatorio Aspirantes a la Alcaldía de Bogotá,” YouTube video, 2:03:40, posted by ANDI Colombia, June 5, 2015, accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G6piNa1LoaY.

\textsuperscript{61} “PACIFISTA Presenta: Debate ‘Bogotá de Cara a la Paz.’” YouTube video, posted by PACIFISTA COLOMBIA, August 13, 2015, accessed August 20, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRj6x_i5-LY.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview with Maritza Buitrago, Bogotá, October 19, 2012.
displaced people, and during Petro’s administration, it also included LGBT people (Valenzuela 2013).

Before referring to the tasks performed by these civic agents, it is important to note that from the beginning, the program has been laden with a symbolic and moral approach, as their training emphasized their condition as “moral subjects” able to take responsibilities (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 461). But in addition, it could be asserted that Bogotá Mission takes advantage of the conditions of vulnerability—or social exclusion—in which most of the participants of the project have found themselves, and capitalizes their life’s experiences turning them into an asset for the city’s transformation. Agents’ stories of exclusion are related to socioeconomic circumstances, personal life experiences, or to a combination of both, but also due to political reasons. This for instance is the story of Maritza, as her forced displacement was triggered by the murder of his father, a human right activist assassinated in 2004 by an illegal armed group in the Santander region at the northeast of Colombia.

Despite the diversity of agents’ backgrounds, by 2004 Bogotá Mission depicted these people in general terms as being “agents of insecurity and generators of fear” in the view of other citizens, and accordingly, the program claimed to give them the opportunity to overcome this stigmatization and to “reorient their capabilities” so that they could become “better citizens” (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 455–460). While undertaking this approach, Bogotá Mission exemplifies the making of “docile bodies” described by Foucault (1979: 136). And this is so, not just because this program seeks to transform, use, and improve the capabilities of these individuals, but also because the work of those agents is evaluated by the way in which they behave and act after being trained, rather than by the results they achieve (Ibid.: 137). Hence, according to the rationale of the program, what is expected from these civic agents is that they become people “who through their example, and by voluntarily following the norms, promote [citizens’] self-regulation and collective regulation” (Martin and Ceballos 2004: 459).
The tasks developed by those civic agents have changed over time according to the perspective of the ruling city administration. However, the modifications of the program also reflect the way in which the urban restructuring and citizens’ normalization process have evolved throughout these years. These include a shift from an emphasis on civility and citizens’ formation which was fostered by Mockus and Peñalosa, towards an emphasis on human rights and diversity which has been the approach promoted—albeit unevenly applied—by left-wing administrations in power between 2005 and 2015.

In the beginning, Bogotá Mission’s agents were involved in community policing programs and in creating so-called “spaces of order” in those urban areas first subjected to gentrification (Ibid.: 461), the most telling example being El Cartucho area which was turned into the Third Millennium Park (see preceding chapter). Other targets were zones in which a certain aloofness prevailed between the city authorities—or institutions—and the dwellers (Ibid.: 455). During the Mockus administrations, the civic agents played a key role in the so-called Citizen Culture program, specifically by promoting people’s involvement in security campaigns and in the urban parks recovery program.

By 2006, Bogotá Mission had 1,700 agents, 60% of whom were women, many of them heads of households (Badel 2006). This coincided with the issue of the Equal Opportunities Plan for Gender Equality 2004–2016, launched by then Mayor Garzón (2004-2007), whose goals included the promotion of women’s access to work and income (DABS 2005: 35). Worth mentioning, the Equal Opportunities Plan was followed by other strategies such as the creation of the so-called Houses for Equal Opportunity and the Subsecretariat for Women, Gender and Sexual Diversity in 2007. Those achievements were brought about by a group of women referred to as the Women of Wednesdays. Defined as a space of dialogue, the Women of Wednesdays was not merely a group led by supporters of the left-wing party Polo Democrático, but also by members of labor unions, feminist scholars and activists who advocated for the effective mainstreaming of gender in
Bogotá’s public policies (Fuentes 2009). As Fuentes suggests, the scope and success of the group’s advocacy are not limited to the areas addressed by the Plan for Gender Equality; that is, gender violence, women’s political participation and representation, women’s economic rights, access to health services and education and the building of a culture free of sexism (Guerrero 2013: 24–25). Beyond that, the Women of Wednesdays set the path for positioning issues of diversity regarding race, sexuality, and sexual orientation in Bogotá’s public policies.

Worth mentioning, the advocacy of women activists and feminist movements before the Constitutional Court has been crucial to prompt and enforce the city to design and implement programs for the assistance of the displaced population (Samper and Candamil 2011); the allocation of a specific budget for housing programs for IDPs introduced in 2008 being a telling example (Ibid.: 88). However, the enforcement of the rulings issued by the Court has not been an easy task. Indeed, under the argument that any affirmative action policy would make the city attractive for other forced immigrants, the city did not implement until 2004 any differentiated policy regarding the IDP population (Hernández and Gutiérrez 2008: 162; Samper and Candamil 2011: 68). But in addition, the lack of awareness of the armed conflict among the traditional urban population made it possible that the plight of forced displacement remained a hidden reality rendered invisible by mass media and through political and bureaucratic strategies (e.g., CNMH 2015b; Romero 2014).

But coming back to the analysis of Bogotá Mission, the mainstreaming of gender in Bogotá’s politics did not imply that Garzón’s administration abandoned the “docility-utility” approach that characterizes and ensures the functioning of this program (Foucault 1979: 137). Garzón also involved a great number of street vendors who were particularly charged with the task of keeping parks, streets and sidewalks near public schools safe (Galindo 2007). The words of its then director Calle illustrate how Bogotá Mission reshapes the capabilities of its agents so that they

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become productive assets in the endeavor of propagating the desire for ordered spaces and security in Bogotá:

Bogotá Mission is an opportunity for these people to give back to the city the ‘expertise’ they have about public space and to work at making routes to school safer. Those who were involved in street selling have developed a ‘sixth sense,’ which allows them to identify situations or people that put children’s security at risk on their way to school: the ‘lunch box thief,’ the drug dealer or the exhibitionist, to cite a few examples. (2008)

Such tasks strikingly demonstrate the docility-utility approach of this program, that is, how the life experience of these civic agents—in some cases in borderline situations—has been used by the state in order to stretch out its spatial governance (e.g., Sáenz-Obregón 2006: 17).

During Petro’s administration, civic agents were called “multipliers of a culture for life,” somehow echoing the city’s biopolitical approach introduced by Mockus through his leitmotiv Life is Sacred (2015). However, the focus of Petro’s administration should not be considered as a mere repetition of the same strategy. Rather, it reflects some of the ways in which discourses of gender equality, diversity, and human rights struggle to permeate Bogotá’s public space politics and the notion of citizen culture. In fact, among the new Bogotá Mission’s agents, the Mayor’s office decided to hire LGBT people and sex workers whose role, among others, was to promote a program aimed at helping sex workers get out of prostitution (El Espectador. 2013). Nonetheless, the participation of LGBT people in this program was not wholly welcome, as Christians politicians took this fact as an evidence of the “disproportionate privilege” and “power of LGBT people in the city administration” (El Espectador 2012a; Malaver 2012).

The inclusion of LGBT people in Bogotá Mission and other similar strategies fall within the category of affirmative actions that the city has enacted for various populations in conditions of vulnerability, which include women heads of households, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous peoples,

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and IDPs, among others (OPP-LGBT 2013; Mosquera 2011; Mosquera and León 2009: xi). Moreover, although the jobs provided by Bogotá Mission open opportunities for social inclusion and meet the standards of formal employment, they could still be considered as precarious (i.e., short-term employments with minimum salary). However in their hetero-normative crusade, those conservative sectors do not hesitate in bringing LGBT Bogotá Mission’s agents to the fore in order to prove that, according to them, “with Petro the city is heading towards a dictatorship of sexual diversity” (Malaver 2012) and, furthermore, to keep the citizen culture that those agents are meant to embody within a heterosexual frame.

In general, the current role of Bogotá Mission’s agents involves binding the city’s residents to the Mayor’s office programs by providing information about the city’s campaigns and new services; to monitor citizens’ rightful behavior in public spaces, during public spectacles and citizens’ demonstrations; to administer surveys of various observatories run by the Mayor’s office; and to regulate people’s circulation in TransMilenio stations. Indeed, the main task of Maritza during the time she worked as civic agent in 2005 consisted in providing information about the use of the TransMilenio system (bus, routes, maps), tasks that she performed at the moment when this system was being introduced.

Wearing uniforms whose yellow or green color recalls Bogotá’s flag and other symbols of the city, those agents embody the sense of continuous modernization and civility that Bogotá strives to maintain. But insofar as Bogotá Mission’s agents are distributed in most localities of the city, they have become a key element in the state’s endeavor to stretch out its spatial power over the population (see Cerwonka 2004: 155). Hence, to a great extent, this network of agents contributes to stretch out the city’s spatial governance.

There is a sense of spatial appropriation of the city’s urban space and a notion of pride which, despite having left this job years ago, persists in the narratives of these people. This is probably an outcome of the promise of overcoming social stigmatization under which the agents are
recruited, and of achieving social integration into a city defined by Bogotá Mission as “the scenario of their own project of life.” So, Maritza takes pride in the fact of having worked for the city and having participated in its transformation, and recalls some of the experiences she had while working in crowded stations; for example, helping people to find their way in the TransMilenio lines and learning by heart its complex maps, but also correcting users’ behaviors when, as Maritza says, they “do not show respect for others.”

Hence, this network of civic agents accomplishes the double function of bearing throughout the urban space the disciplinary gaze of the government and, on the other hand, of propagating the desire for the city that all Bogotanos should want. However, while for some that city could be a means for achieving social and spatial order, security, economic prosperity and modernity, for others it could be a place for enhancing diversity and tolerance. Therefore, whatever desires and wants they have in mind, it is clear that Bogotá’s public space has become a means for achieving them. But insofar as their interests and values come into conflict, the hegemonic vision of the city also turns into an object of contestation, one that some want to defend while others reclaim their right to shape it.

When I interviewed Maritza in 2012, she had become a leader among IDP women. When Maritza tries to define the reasons of her political engagement, the immediate reason that comes to her mind is “I’m rebellious by nature.” So in her narrative, her father’s political involvement and the influence of the feminist NGO Women’s House, with which she is connected, seem to be pushed to the background. But no matter what is the source that inspires her the most, Maritza’s political work shows a strong awareness and critical position regarding the governmental policies vis-à-vis IDPs, a feminist perspective about the armed conflict and a deep knowledge about the city in terms of its physical features and its administrative functioning which Maritza says she acquired through her experience as Bogotá Mission’s agent.

64 “Misión Bogotá Humana – IPES.”
In fact, with the slogan ‘The government holds the key of my house…Until when?’ Maritza and her colleagues of the so-called District Group for the Advocacy and Monitoring of Auto 092 gathered hundreds of women in a public hearing held in the Colombian congress in November 2, 2012 (see Appendix 2). The protagonists of this hearing were IDP women whose main aim was to demand access to housing for displaced women in Bogotá. Such a demand is on the one hand grounded on the above mentioned ruling Auto 092 of 2008, which compels the Colombian government to set programs aimed at ensuring the non-revictimization of IDP women and that includes securing their right to housing (Bustamante-Peña 2012). On the other hand, their demand for the right to housing is also based on the Victims’ Law—according to which access to housing is one of the forms of reparation that the government should make available for the displaced population (Ibid.). The above mentioned norms of transitional justice have been described as involving a gender sensitive approach as they have been seen as a point of entry through which to bring about changes in discriminatory gender patterns (Meertens 2012). IDPs’ right to housing has mostly been mobilized through the advocacy of feminist pacifist groups and it can be asserted that they have achieved to position this claim as a women’s need; in other words—following Moser (1993: 38)—as a means through which strategic gender interests as well as practical gender needs of IDP women are satisfied. Indeed, insofar as these measures tackle historical practices that have prevented many displaced women from exercising formal house ownership, they fall into the category of strategic needs. On the other hand, these norms take into account that, as a result of circumstances surrounding forced displacement, as many as half of IDP households are headed by a woman. From this perspective, access to housing constitutes a practical need as it alleviates new economic and social responsibilities IDP women have (Meertens 2012; Meertens and Zambrano 2010).

But regardless of the fact that IDPs’ right to housing has been advocated by feminist groups and thereby positioned as a women’s need, it does not mean that IDP women alone have engaged or are involved in those political acts. As Prada—a displaced male leader—told me when referring to the public hearing on IDP women’s access to housing, “We sent several women of our group to this meeting.” The statement of Prada, who leads a grassroots organization of forcibly displaced people from the Santander region, gives a sense of how, by positioning their claims in terms of IDP women’s experiences, IDP people have achieved a certain degree of leverage. It allows them to voice IDPs’ rights and interests among the city’s public opinion and to push their right to decent housing forward onto the city’s political agenda. Besides this, Prada’s words also exemplify some of the networking actions that displaced women, as Maritza, have undertaken. These actions entail building links between grassroots organizations of peripheral areas and NGOs whose main headquarters are located in the city center (see Appendix 4, Map 1). That is why Maritza’s knowledge about the city’s spatial order and its political organizations has been strategic in her role as IDP leader.

As I have explained in chapter 2, since entering in office in 2012, Petro’s administration—and especially his Housing Secretary Maldonado—demonstrated their engagement to fulfill IDPs’ right to decent housing. Their efforts were reflected in the reform of the POT submitted by Petro’s administration; however, such reform was rejected by the city’s council and unfortunately will never see the light of the day.

For Maritza, as for most IDP people in Bogotá, access to decent housing continues to be a pressing need that shapes their experience of urban segregation. However, Maritza does not seem to relate the lack of housing solutions for IDPs to the city’s regeneration process or to Bogotá’s current urban model. Hence, Maritza speaks spontaneously and accurately about the “amazing” changes that the city has undergone and refers positively about her work in Bogotá Mission as she

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66 Interview with Gonzalo Prada, Bogotá, December 11, 2012.
asserts: “I am proud of having worked for the district because it was what helped me the most to know Bogotá.” Thus, when observed through the experience of Maritza, in general terms *Bogotá Mission* seems to have achieved its goals, those not only of transforming the citizens’ culture but also of binding newcomers to the city’s urban renewal project and making of the current vision of the city a happy means.

5.4 Deploying Monumentality: Between Urban Homogeneity and Peripheral Subnormalcy

In an article published by Saldías in 2009, this economist and urban scholar asserted “There is also a need to stop thinking that the city is made of center and periphery. Everyone must live in a good city and a good city does not have a periphery or, if it exists, it is of excellent quality” (2009: 88).

The claim of Saldías, who also acted as Finance Secretary of and as director of urban planning during Mockus’s administrations, illustrates the rationale which allegedly guided the design of Bogotá’s POT, which was approved in 2000 and reformed in 2003 (Salazar-Ferro 2007: 209). According to this ideal vision of city—promoted through the slogan *For the Bogotá We Want*—the implementation of the POT would turn Bogotá into a ‘homogeneous city.’ Such a process, as the Orjuela pointed out, should mean “to take the good city [that characterizes the center and the north] into the peripheries [of the south and the west], in such a way that everywhere there will be a good city.”

In practical terms for Bogotá, the building of this spatial urban homogeneity has meant engaging in strategies aimed at transforming its urban space from a structure with only one center and heterogenous peripheral areas into a polycentric organization (e.g., Saldías 2009: 88). The starting point of this process, which I explain in chapter 2, took place by the end of the 1990s with the identification of various places which had pre-existing conditions of urban centrality, for instance

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67 Carmenza Orjuela, November 2012.
a certain level of mixture of uses. In parallel to these 21 centralities (González 2014: 40; see appendix 4, Map 2), the polycentric model implied that the traditional center—which includes the so-called international center and the historical center—was meant to attract and to serve international flows, and therefore would be the locus of a renewal and gentrification process (Salazar-Ferro 2011: 330; Beuf 2011b).

The new identified centralities were thus areas located around the main center and in the peripheries, which were targeted to be transformed so as to fulfill the needs of the local population.\(^{68}\) In so doing, it was expected that the number of trips people have to make to the city’s traditional center to obtain goods and services as well as to work would be significantly reduced (Salazar-Ferro 2011). In order to achieve this spatial homogeneity and to bring about what Orjuela describes as “a city well served in all the centralities,”\(^{69}\) Bogotá’s administrations have built new architectural structures in public spaces, allegedly maintaining similar quality standards. Drawing on Berney (2010, 2011), the most important developments of this process could be analyzed through the categories of hybrid hubs and Bogotá’s transportation networks aimed at enhancing urban mobility and connectivity.

Distributed in each centrality, hybrid hubs gather a considerable number of public buildings, such as libraries, hospitals, schools, cultural centers, Citizen Service Centers—so-called CADEs—and other civic buildings. Simultaneously, the new centralities have been progressively connected through the system of mobility. This system includes bicycle lanes, pedestrian walkways, and more specifically a Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system called TransMilenio, whose main stations are clustered also within the structures gathered in the hybrid hubs (Berney 2010, 2011). The tacit and explicit intentions driving the construction of architectural megaprojects and infrastructure in these peripheral areas are to expand and to decentralize the offer of public services (e.g., education, health, cultural and civil services) as well as to encourage

\(^{68}\) Ibid.  
\(^{69}\) Ibid.
the growth of investments, and thereby of the market economy. Given those functions as well as their visibility and aesthetic features, it is no coincidence that these monumental structures have been turned into representational devices of the government’s concern for peripheral communities; all the more as they are places aimed at being platforms for activities seen as improving people’s well-being, including social programs and activities linked to the city’s cultural agenda.

Endowed with all these intentions and because of their architectural features, buildings clustered in the hybrid hubs illustrate the political dimension of architecture. In Kingwell’s perspective, architecture is an applied form of beauty in which “beauty is always political because it always addresses, in some manner, how to live” (2008: 81). But more specifically, Aureli identifies the political character of architecture as he sheds light on its agonist condition, that is, the extent to which architecture functions as an “instrument of separation, and thus of political action” (2008: 119). Following Aureli, architectural agonism is, for instance, manifested in the way in which, through urbanization, architecture serves the purpose of setting and shaping “the borders that define the possibility of the city” (Ibid.). But within the limits of the city, this agonism operates through opposition insofar as architecture governs the confrontation of elements contained within the urban, shaping—among other things—public spaces for citizen coexistence (Ibid.)

In light of this perspective, the analysis of the politics of architecture underlying Bogotá’s development of public spaces in the centralities entails a complex approach that allows one to disentangle not merely how and the extent to which these architectural structures would enable Bogotá to achieve spatial homogeneity, but also how those developments work to keep people oriented towards the project of the city’s modernization. Borrowing Ahmed, I will frame my analysis as an attempt to understand how Bogotá’s public space developments participate in making people feel the city’s rejuvenation as a good object that will enable them proximity to a
happy life (2010a: 46). Having this in mind, it is useful to take as a starting point what Foucault defines as the “problem of the human site or living space.” As he argues:

[This problem] is not simply that of knowing whether there will be enough space for men in the world – a problem that is certainly quite important – but also that of knowing what relations of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation, marking, and classification of human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites. (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986: 23)

Foucault underlines major concerns related to the management of space by pointing towards various complexities pertaining to urban planning. As he suggests, the creation of living spaces is not a matter of a random deployment of human settlements, but, rather, of how this deployment is organized across space in such a manner that it contributes to achieving the government’s objectives. Countries, as discussed earlier in this chapter, are caught in a state of permanent competition, which drives them to strengthen their strategic advantages (Foucault 1988). Thus, Bogotá’s governing authorities have identified the building and modernization of its public spaces as a crucial requirement for increasing its competitiveness. Hence, monumental buildings created in Bogotá’s public spaces since the 2000s which, as mentioned above are often clustered in hybrid hubs and transport networks, became notorious as soon as they were built because of their architectural design, the increasing flow of people moving through on a daily basis, and because they have also turned into unavoidable points of transit and encounter for local residents.

Consider, for example, the reflections of Maria de Jesús Cárdenas, a member of the feminist grassroots organization CPC-FASOL, when I asked her about the public buildings constructed since the 2000s in Kennedy, an area in the Southwest of Bogotá where this organization is located. The first building that comes to her mind is in fact the CADE, to which Cárdenas refers by mentioning a branch office of an agency included in this public center, namely the Urban
Development Institute (IDU). By citing this agency, Cárdenas underlines the ways in which the CADE has brought about institutional decentralization and how it has transformed the way she relates to the city’s traditional center.

The SuperCADE clusters all the institutions of the district, so for instance you don’t have to go to the main office of the IDU there [in the center], because there is an IDU office here; there are public servants who deal with all the questions regarding the IDU. All institutional issues are included within the CADE, you don’t need to go to a main office.

Other services available in at least 24 CADEs set up throughout the city include citizens’ affiliation to the public health system, and procedural formalities related to access to public services. Besides the CADE, Cárdenas highlights the building of modern commercial areas around the hybrid hubs and asserts that these developments, combined with the increasing pedestrian flow in the TransMilenio stations, have made that those who carry out income-generating activities—including small business and street vendors—look for a place to delocalize their activities near these new developments. Marlene, another woman of CPC-FASOL whom I met on different occasions including a peace demonstration taking place in Bogotá’s traditional center, shares the same perspective. As Marlene asserts, nowadays she finds in Kennedy most of the things she needs, so she does not come frequently to the city center.

Maria de Jesús and Marlene spend most of their time leading CPC-FASOL, a grassroots organization born in the area of Kennedy in the mid-1970s. Their experiences testify to the emergence of neighborhoods such as Patio Bonito, El Amparo and Britalia located in Kennedy, and which emerged as a result of informal urbanization. In Colombia, the definition of informality involves a wide range of practices which do not fit within the procedures and formal frame set by the government. Included in this category, informal urbanization refers to processes of self-

70 The Urban Development Institute (IDU) is concerned with the management of urban space developments as for instance the pavement of internal roads and the collection of taxes related to such urban infrastructures
71 Interview with Maria de Jesús Cárdenas, leader of CPC-FASOL, Bogotá, July 3, 2012.
72 For more about services available in the CADEs, see for instance http://guiatramitesyervicios.Bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/03.16.html (accessed November 12, 2015).
73 Conversation with Marlene during a peace demonstration, Bogotá, June 13, 2012.
help construction in which people engage in order to build their dwellings on illegally subdivided land, neither following legal formalities nor city regulations, and in most cases, before having secured access to public service networks (Hataya 2007; Gilbert 2004a: 35). Although informal urbanization involves a large range of actors (e.g., illegal land subdividers, clientelist politicians), in general, this spatial practice has been carried out by lower-income population who cannot afford to pay for a room in the inner slums of the city—commonly known as *inquilinatos*—and/or who need more space to house their families than the available space in those kind of rooms (Hataya 2007: 126).

This practice of renting rooms has been carried out through the construction of additional floors or the subdivision of illegal lots in low-income neighborhoods, and nowadays represents one of the main mechanisms of Bogotá’s densification (Maldonado 2007: 329). Nevertheless, historically, the growth of informal developments has been one of the forces that participated in extending Bogotá’s urban perimeter (Beuf 2013). And this is so, because most of these settlements have been developed in rural areas located at the edge of the city and, in some cases, in land with difficult topographical conditions for construction and for the provision of public services (Hataya 2007: 181; Maldonado 2008).

The initiation of informal urbanization in *Kennedy* could be traced back to the 1970s, but as the stories of CPC-FASOL’s women illustrate, those processes were still taking place through the 1990s (SDP 2009: 10). Worth mentioning, these informal settlements have developed at the same pace as the strategies aimed at legalizing or regularizing them implemented by the city’s governing authorities. In Colombia, the terms ‘legalization’ or ‘regularization’ of neighborhoods denote processes by which the city’s authorities recognize the existence of an informal urban
settlement (SH 2011: 15). Such recognition opens the path to the process of land titling, access to public infrastructure and services, as well as the provision of social services (Ibid.).

In spite of the changes in infrastructure and living conditions carried out in these neighborhoods of Kennedy after their regularization, they continue to be subject to negative portrayals linked to insecurity and poverty. As Beuf has put it, this stigmatization is sometimes based on actual facts, but also on imaginaries (2011a: 153). Indeed, some women related to CPC-FASOL echo these portrayals when—as I will analyze later—they refer to their own neighborhoods as ‘subnormal’ (CPC-FASOL 2012). As the Mayor’s office pointed out in 2011, the percentage of Kennedy’s households living in poverty reached 29.76% (SH 2011: 10). Although Kennedy’s population represented about 13.7% of Bogotá’s total population—an estimated 1,019,949 inhabitants—(Ibid.: 2), Kennedy was ranked in 2015 as the part of the city with the third largest number of displaced people, hosting 12.7% of them (50,230 IDPs) (ACDVPR 2014; see Appendix 4, Map 3).

Monumental buildings—mentioned above by Cárdenas, such as the CADEs and TransMilenio stations—built after the issue of the POT were followed by other public developments such as schools, health centers, and parks. But simultaneously, as the stories of CPC-FASOL’s women suggest, the increasing number of public services and bureaucratic procedures available in the public buildings spurred the growth of commercial activities and the offer of goods and commercial services. Hence, since the mid-2000s, the number of trips to the center that Kennedy’s residents have to make in order to meet their needs for goods and services or to accomplish bureaucratic procedures has decreased. To this must be added that the construction of the TransMilenio stations significantly improved the connectivity of Kennedy with the center of the city, bringing about the building of new housing units around these hybrid hubs. In general, new

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74 While the first informal settlements emerged in Kennedy in the 1970s, according to the Mayor’s office, between 1972 and 2011, the city has legalized in this area 53,219 houses which were inhabited by about 284,000 people (SH 2011: 15).
neighborhoods—such as *El Tintal*—show better architectural standards and urban planning conditions than the ones usually found in *Kennedy*, and especially in neighborhoods that emerged through informal processes (see Appendix 4, Map 4). Most of the new developments have been built in the form of enclosed housing units known as *conjuntos cerrados*; which have attracted lower middle-class people who used to live in other places of the city (Beuf 2011a: 153). Depicting a spiral of reurbanization, the construction of new housing units and public infrastructure in *Kennedy* was followed by private investments and, specifically, by commercial centers which mirror the same standards as those of the North of the city, including even multinational brands. They, in turn, have increased the value of the zones surrounding the public buildings.

From the perspective of Beuf, as a result of these transformations, peripheral areas of Bogotá such as *Kennedy* have experienced a process of social diversification, by which she means people from different social conditions increasingly sharing the same spaces (2011a: 153). However, the sharing of a space, like the sharing of a happy object, does not imply that a space signifies the same thing to all its users. As Marlene suggests in her narrative, the offer of services and commodities has expanded, which has meant that women of CPC-FASOL have fewer and fewer reasons to go to the city center as nowadays they can make their everyday purchases in *Kennedy*. However, it is interesting to note that while newcomers of upper low-income classes are the main costumers of the new commercial centers of *Kennedy* (Beuf 2011a: 167), for most women related to CPC-FASOL—and specifically for Teresa, a displaced woman who has lived in Bogotá since 2002—these commercial areas are not actual spaces of consumption. Although Teresa links those commercial spaces with the notion of modernity, they are places she rarely visited, or just because her daughter has taken her there to have an ice cream on the weekend. For Teresa, as well as for Marlene and María de Jesús, neighborhood stores and informal commerce continue to be the places where they make most of their purchases.

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75 Interview with Teresa, Bogotá, July 3, 2012.
76 Ibid.
Nevertheless, regardless of the use people make of the new commercial spaces, most flows of infrastructure, cultural trends and consumption patterns and services, attracted by the building of public structures and gathered in those commercial areas, are generally welcome by long-established Kennedy’s residents, as demonstrated by surveys conducted by the women of FASOL (CPC-FASOL 2012). However, parallel to these transfers, there are other flows coming into peripheral neighborhoods, which can be described as remnants of Bogotá’s center expelled through processes of gentrification and which, therefore, make up the other side of the coin. Besides identifying the kind of elements transferred through these flows, it is worth asking: What are the forces at play determining such displacements from the center towards Bogotá’s periphery? Does monumentality play a role in fostering such flows?

Among these displacements, there is a flow of newcomers mostly constituted by low-income classes who have moved from downtown because of gentrification when their dwellings were bulldozed to give way to the construction of roads, transport facilities and other public spaces (González 2015; Rico 2013). The razing of El Cartuco’s area between 1998 and 2003 and the building of the Third Millennium Park discussed in chapter 4, which involved the destruction of 602 properties and the eviction of 10,000 people including dwellers and informal vendors, is a telling example of such processes (Till 2012; Berney 2011: 26; Beuf 2011b: 203). But the development of other projects that followed it, as for instance the construction of the Comuneros Avenue also decided by Peñalosa’s administration, repeated a similar history of socio-spatial injustice. The testimonies collected by Alice Beuf with officials and among some of the 3,000 people who, between 2003 and 2006, were evicted from the area and particularly from the neighborhood of Las Cruces, are telling of the failures in the social management of the project and even of the lack of transparency (González 2015; Rico 2013; IEU 2011a). I will take the liberty of quoting an extract of Beuf’s interviews which, as this geographer suggests, leaves the impression of a project whose construction is imposed regardless of the cost.
The construction of the Comuneros Avenue is a premeditated disaster. They had to expel a lot of people. Sometimes there were several families in the same place, up to 6 or 7 families who rented in the same house. With 3 million pesos (1000 euros) they have given on average - of premium for tenants - people thought they could buy a house. Our neighbors went looking to buy in Bosa (poor district in the southern periphery) ... Poverty is now even worse than before. When you go looking for a home in another neighborhood, you feel stigmatized because you are from Las Cruces. We are 'high-risk individuals' (2011b: 234).

This testimony brings us to the process of urban decline that preceded the eviction of the residents. As with most gentrification cases, in the Comuneros Avenue this decline allowed the government to buy the dwellings at low prices (see Smith 2005, 2008). However, as this amount of money was insufficient to buy a house, the eviction of the residents worsened their pauperization and left them with no option but to find a place on the fringes of the city.

Besides these evictions, where gentrification was mainly linked to the building of public spaces, other flows of people has been displaced because private universities have expanded their facilities or because cultural centers have been developed through the purchase of houses in the so-called historical center (Beuf 2011b; Vargas 2015: 59; IEU 2011a, 2011b). However, in the cases described above (i.e., the Comuneros and Third Millennium projects), gentrification was mobilized through a discourse that articulated the securitization of public space and the production of disposable lives through a gendered civilizatory regime, which I depicted in chapter 4 as rational, moral protectors – backward, uncivil aliens – feminized figures to be protected. In contrast, urban renewal taking place in the so-called historical center has been facilitated by claiming the preservation of architectural and cultural heritage. But given the differential treatment implemented in these processes, it is pertinent to enquire what circumstances or criteria allow some neighborhoods of colonial architecture to be preserved while contiguous neighborhoods representing the same style are bulldozed.

On the one hand, the origin of this differentiation could be traced back to working-class struggles and riots taking place in the mid-1900s, which resulted in the stigmatization of the
neighborhood of Las Cruces, at the time mostly inhabited by working-class people. This background, in addition to the spiral of abandonment and disinvestment triggered by these events, participated in the dismissal of Las Cruces’ historical memory and in the denial of its legitimacy to represent collective memory (Vargas 2015: 49, Beuf 2011b: 200). Instead, such status has been reserved to La Candelaria, which in 1975 was declared a historical center and a National Monument. Following this recognition, considerable efforts and investments have been increasingly dedicated to La Candelaria at least since the 1980s, aiming at its preservation and at the reconstruction of the historical memory that this neighborhood used, or is expected, to represent. According to Beuf,

“[The recovery of La Candelaria] has been based on the promotion of an accurate picture of the historical center: a center with a rehabilitated colonial heritage, touristic and cultural, in line with the standards of the international cultural industry” (2011b: 200).

In the achievement of this ambition, the notion of monumentality became crucial. But unlike the way in which this notion operates in Bogotá’s peripheries, in La Candelaria, monumentality has worked on the basis of the recovery of a narrowed historical memory that, while putting aside class struggles and labor union history, privileges narratives concerning Spanish colonial heritage and the independence and post-independence period. Insofar as their background is recognized as fitting within this specific vision, architectural pieces such as monuments, buildings, parks and plazas have been turned into a sort of fetishized objects of cultural consumption.

Concomitant with this process, traditional dwellers of La Candelaria have been steadily replaced by others of higher socioeconomic status. Such change reflects an “emptiness of population” (Vargas 2015: 23; see Appendix 4, Map 5), which has been accompanied by a transformation in the use of space from housing to uses related to commerce activities, tourist industry and culture. For this reason, this emptiness has implied also the rupture of the socioeconomic fabric that used to be anchored in this historical center. This despite the fact that some renovations have been intended for housing purposes; however, even in those cases, the process of renewal has
raised property values in such a manner that it renders impossible for the usual residents to remain there (Maldonado, quoted in IEU 2011b: 15). Hence, the idea of recovering historical memory in Bogotá’s historical center has been more about physical urban heritage conservation rather than the preservation of symbolic meanings it had for its habitual residents or of spatial practices through which they shaped their neighborhoods.

Besides monumentality, there is still another factor at play which has determined the razing of entire neighborhoods in Bogotá’s center while others nearby are preserved. Following Beuf, one of the criteria behind the construction of the Comuneros Avenue and Third Millennium Park—each of which involved the demolition of a neighborhood (Las Cruces and El Cartucho)—was to create a “buffer zone” between the historical center and surrounding neighborhoods of the South and of the West (Beuf 2011b: 207). By creating this zone, these projects materialize Bogotá’s socio-spatial segregation between the South and the North and reinforce a rupture between “neighborhoods included in the city and others excluded” (Ibid.: 209). They separate a historical center subjected to architectural preservation and in which political power is concentrated and exercised against other areas which have suffered from stigma and negative representations. Included among them are neighborhoods such as La Estanzuela, Los Martires and Santa Barbara whose physical decline starting from the mid-1900s was followed by the pauperization of their dwellers and by the presence of criminal activities that have taken root there (Ibid.: 207).

At first sight, the Comuneros Avenue and the Third Millennium station function as a tunnel that facilitates the mobility from the North towards the center in “total safety,” but, as Beuf claims, in so doing they represent a “will to control the urban territory from the part of the authorities” (Ibid.: 208). Concomitant with this function, these architectural structures work as devices that disrupt the social and economic fabric of the surrounding areas and trigger a centrifugal effect
through which the center expels remaining elements that do not fit within the dynamics of the global neoliberal economy.

Local scholars have not remained indifferent to the effects brought about by the migration of such flows. In the view of security expert Ariel Ávila, the growth of begging and some forms of criminality in Bogotá’s peripheral neighborhoods is highly associated with the process of renewal of the city center. As Ávila claims, those activities have been pushed into peripheries such as Kennedy and Bosa as a result of the rehabilitation of city-center slums (2010a: 13; León 2011). For example, according to Ávila, soon after El Cartucho was demolished, the drug trafficking taking place there was fragmented into five primary stewpots and other multiples stewpots of minor scale distributed in various neighborhoods, which are fostered by the “stewpot matrix” (2011: 50). Given the weak territorial control exerted by the authorities in Kennedy, the decentralization of local drug trafficking has found a favorable ground there (Ibid.). In addition, this decentralization was fueled after the North American drug market was taken over by Mexican cartels, which drove Colombian traffickers to turn their activities towards internal markets (Ávila 2010b: 22; Bonello 2016). This is compounded by the fact that Bogotá’s biggest agricultural whole-sale distributor so-called Corabastos is located within Kennedy, a place which, besides being the main entry point of agricultural products into Bogotá, has become a site for the storage and trafficking of arms, contraband, and drugs under the control of neo-paramilitary groups (CPC-FASOL 2012: 21; Ávila and Nuñez 2010: 53). In short, Corabastos could be depicted as a liminal space where the flows of agricultural legal products overlap with the smuggling of illegal products via the same trade channels.

To be sure, spatial transformations taking place in low-income peripheries of the West and South of Bogotá such as Kennedy have brought about increasing densification, the growth of commercial activities, a diversity of cultural trends, new consumption patterns, institutional decentralization, as well as the upgrading of infrastructure of these communities, all of these
values being contained in the notion of Bogotá as a happy object. But in the meantime, through the gentrification of Bogotá’s center, the city has steadily expelled many of its poorest inhabitants and has dispersed towards its periphery nodes of poverty and some forms of criminality that were rooted in its main center. Some flows expelled from the center have found a favorable terrain in places like Kennedy because of its condition of poverty and spatial informality. Other less desirable remnants have found a fertile ground there because of the illegal activities that have historically mingled with legal ones (Ávila 2012).

Despite experiencing this double dynamic, when it comes to the physical transformations, public spaces and infrastructure, Kennedy’s residents have a favorable opinion about them. The survey conducted by the women of CPC-FASOL with 115 women related to this grassroots organization showed that in response to the open question “What changes have you observed in this area during the time you have lived here?,” 40% of them pointed out changes in urban infrastructure (CPC-FASOL 2012: 62). Specifically, among the changes implemented in Kennedy since the 2000s, 95% of women claim that the most important changes are related to the improvement of water supply and the sewage system, since—as they recall—“before they had to collect water from pipes” (Ibid.: 68). Others underline the construction of hospitals, schools, bicycle lanes and the CADE asserting that those changes “have improved residents’ coexistence.” The same is true with the creation of nursery schools which, in their view, has facilitated the lives of women as heads of family. Besides that, women see the new housing units as an improvement that benefits the whole area; this despite the fact that they do not directly enjoy the better urban planning and architectural standards that those units have. These upper low-class developments, along with commercial centers and, especially, the introduction of TransMilenio, are colloquially depicted by women as “advancements” that have in so few words “upgraded the status of the neighborhood” (Ibid.). However, it is important to note that while main roads have been improved through the process of urban renewal—and particularly those
roads used by TransMilenio services—internal roads within the neighborhood remain unpaved. However, Bogotá’s urban renewal seems to work as a happy object, as it tells people of these peripheral areas towards which values they should be inclined (modernity, spatial order, consumption trends), even if they cannot afford an immediately access to them.

On the other hand, in the same survey, 67% of women point to the increase of delinquency, begging, drug abuse and drug trafficking as the main social concerns affecting their neighborhoods. However, they do not relate the intensification of such problems to the rejuvenation of the center, or specifically, to the gentrification processes taking place in central areas of the city. The growth of these problems, in their perspective, is explained as stemming from the “status of poverty” of their neighborhoods and from the lack of police officers (CPC-FASOL 2012: 62–65). To a lesser extent (i.e., 12%), other circumstances identified as problems by the women interviewed were the presence of displaced people and the emergence of neo-paramilitaries, so-called BACRIM. Although seen by them as effects of the armed conflict, women explain the arrival of these newcomers as correlated to the status of poverty and ‘subnormalcy’ of their neighborhoods (Ibid.: 63).

The use of the notion ‘subnormal’ in their narrative could mean, for instance, that conditions of poverty, the informal origin of their neighborhoods and the close proximity to the above mentioned Corabastos make their area a fertile ground for delinquency and make rental dwellings almost affordable for displaced people. This does not necessarily mean that neo-paramilitaries and displaced people are placed in the same category. While women associate the former with trafficking activities and social cleansing, displaced people are depicted as unharmed:

“Displaced people do not harm but some of them take advantage of their condition and bring about conflict with people different from them.” (CPC-FASOL 2012: 63)

The above assertion is even more striking if we consider that among CPC-FASOL’s women many of them are themselves displaced. In addition, as I witnessed first-hand, this grassroots
organization invests most of its time in raising awareness among women about the armed conflict, and many of its members have demonstrated their engagement with feminist pacifist movements (e.g., Pacific Route of Women; see Appendix 3, Photo 6). This is, however, not surprising in light of the fact that displaced people enter in direct competition with long-term residents over scarce resources, specifically over access to social services.

While for long-term residents those new arrivals (i.e., IDPs and neo-paramilitaries) are seen with a certain, but different, degree of mistrust—as for them they are factors that might bring back the subnormalcy of their neighborhoods (Ibid.: 68)—for IDP women, the term subnormal, seemingly, involve different meanings. Consider for instance the perspective of Claudia, a displaced woman linked to CPC-FASOL, who explains the reason why she and her family arrived in El Amparo (Kennedy) in 2007 after their displacement, and the reason why she left this neighborhood after two years of inhabiting there:

We arrived first in El Amparo because we found a house there … Because you can arrive there, build a shanty in a vacant lot and they will allow you to stay there for a while. But since El Amparo became so rough, we had to go to Soacha. El Amparo is Kennedy’s red zone, don’t you know? 77

Claudia’s story allows one to see two sides involved in the condition of subnormalcy which differ from the notion reflected in the narratives of Kennedy’s long-term residents. By this I refer to a certain spatial anarchy prevailing in these neighborhoods which allows displaced people as Claudia and her family an opportunity to find a place in there. On the other hand, there is simultaneously a sense of latent danger and insecurity which is originated in the presence of neo-paramilitaries who, given their rightist discourse, represent a particular menace for displaced people.

Confronted on a daily basis with increasing begging and delinquency, women do not seem to relate these concerns to the physical transformations being implemented elsewhere in the city.

77 Interview with Claudia, Bogotá, September 1, 2012.
For most CPC-FASOL’s women, unfavorable changes and situations they identify as social problems are seen as inherent to, or as attracted by, historical conditions of poverty and informality; or, in other words, as correlated to those conditions that make their neighborhoods a “subnormal area” (Ibid.: 65). This despite that fact that the arrival of some unlikeable, or less favorable, newcomers as well as the deepening of social problems are direct consequences of the cleaning up of central areas and the gentrification process being carried out in Bogotá’s main center.

In general, most of the women interviewed in CPC-FASOL’s survey see the physical transformations brought about by the urban restructuring as changes that improve their living conditions, enhance modernity as well as new cultural patterns, and upgrade the status of their neighborhoods. The perspectives of these women give an interesting example of the values and achievements that have made possible people’s attachment to the process of urban renewal. Whereas this process is presented as a means to homogenize their neighborhoods vis-à-vis other areas of the city, it represents for local inhabitants a possibility to perhaps overcome urban subnormalcy and to leave behind the stigma attached to their neighborhoods. Insofar as this representation persists, the vision of the city that the process of urban restructuring entails remains intact as an object of happiness, containing various expectations that the women of Kennedy have for a better life.

Given such balance, it is timely to recall the feminist curiosity encouraged by Enloe (2004), and to use it as a starting point in order to call into question the re-shaping and the perpetuation of the peripheral condition of Kennedy’s neighborhoods—such as El Amparo, Patio Bonito and Britalia—where CPC-FASOL’s women inhabit. According to Enloe,

“No individual or social group finds itself on the ‘margins’ of any web of relationships … without some other individual or group having accumulated enough power to create the ‘center’ somewhere else” (2004: 19–20).
Drawing on this feminist tool, it is possible to assert that the re-shaping of Bogotá’s peripheral centralities cannot be understood without considering its relations with the gentrification and renewal of the city center, and the role that each area—center and periphery—is expected to play in Bogotá’s race for global competitiveness. Hence, taking this into consideration, I will elaborate some conclusions about this peripheral/center dynamic by outlining some points about the role played by monumental public buildings in re-shaping Bogotá’s peripheral centralities and, at the same time, in enhancing both the center’s gentrification and the positioning of the city to come as an object of happiness.

Monumental public developments gathered in hybrid hubs have become both architectural icons and inevitable axes in the life of Bogotá’s peripheral areas. Insofar as they are places related to the access to social services, they have become representational devices of the government’s concern for those communities and equalizers of social differences. Besides these functions, monumental buildings play a paramount role because they are tools through which the city implements its vision of urban planning (Kingwell 2009). Specifically, they function as organizational devices, mediating processes such as the building and deployment of materials, the organization of uses of land as well as a considerable range of human practices.

Some conclusions may be drawn from this perspective. First, monumental buildings developed in Bogotá since the 2000s participate in introducing and/or enforcing the public-private spatial binary in peripheral areas. They mediate the segregation of what are considered to be reproductive activities from others depicted as productive and, simultaneously, they serve the purpose of enhancing the preponderance of market economy over informal practices. Indeed in Kennedy, buildings located in hybrid hubs have reinforced the commercial character of areas surrounding them, and in doing so, they have induced the delocalization of informal businesses formerly located within the neighborhoods, or the commodification of some activities that used to be carried out within households.
Second, these monumental buildings have worked to articulate two forces of urban centrality which are necessary for enhancing the ‘city’s competitiveness.’ By this I mean they have boosted a centripetal dynamic aimed at attracting diverse kind of flows from the center of the city, which include not merely capital, institutional knowledge and logistics, people, cultural trends and consumption patterns, but also flows made of the remnants of poverty and crime that the city’s main center is not willing to host. By the same centripetal dynamic, those buildings have brought about a certain form of cohesion as well as a cultural and spatial homogeneity around them and among the elements contained in each periphery.

Hence, public buildings of monumental scale constitute a corner stone through which Bogotá strives to deploy the vision of the City We Want. According to this ideal, the city’s traditional center would be a cluster of middle-upper- and upper-class inhabitants and a platform of advanced producer services. While this segmentation is aimed at triggering a centripetal force through which Bogotá’s center would attract and serve international flows, peripheral centralities would allegedly achieve the homogeneity of the ‘good city’ that have prevailed in the North and the center. This would be achieved through improving peripheries’ infrastructure, their institutional capacity and boosting local market economy, which are seen as means to overcome poverty and informality, but also as values of a happy urban life. However, despite its good intentions, the City We Want has turned out to be the vision of a partial observer, which, mirroring Robinson’s urban analysis, modernizes the center of the city through the prism of the global city, while reserving to the periphery a developmentalist approach (Robinson 2006: 135).

But Bogotá’s periphery and its inhabitants will not catch up with the city’s urban homogeneity, if the rejuvenation of the center is carried out through such an elitist segmentation; all the more as this vision is implemented through a power dynamic that expels and directs towards the periphery all those elements and lives that the dreamed city renders disposable. Insofar as the politics of urban space eludes taking a “city-wide” perspective (Ibid.), the possibility of enjoying
the benefits of social mixing is denied to those inhabiting the peripheries. Their neighborhoods are likely to remain *subnormal*, being the receptor of displaced people who join the belts of poverty, and of other flows of local and global nature that the rest of the city overlooks or is not willing to host.

### 5.5 In Lieu of Conclusion: The Bogotá We Want, the Bogotá We Have?

The deployment of monumentality throughout Bogotá’s public space and *Bogotá Mission* exemplify some of the mechanisms through which the vision of the *Bogotá We Want* has been turned into an object of happiness in the perspective of the city’s residents, as well as in the perspective of stakeholders and hegemonic politicians. Mirroring the inescapable tautology that, according to Ahmed (2010a: 203), characterizes the pursuit of happiness, this hegemonic vision of the city becomes both what Bogotanos want their city to be and a means to achieve the expectations, values, and desires that they have attached to this vision.

The functioning of these mechanisms reveals the role they play in maintaining the engagement of Bogotá’s inhabitants in the rejuvenation of the city, and, simultaneously, in sustaining the promise according to which the proximity to and the accomplishment of this vision of city will bring a better life to all residents and will participate in enhancing Bogotá’s competitiveness. In this chapter, we have been able to grasp some notions clustered in this container of wants. Spatial order, modernity, security, efficiency, institutional decentralization, patterns of consumptions channeled through the market economy along with prescribed uses of public space have been advanced as standards of urban homogeneity and have become the signifiers of what a happy urban life should be.

The dominant acceptance of those criteria as standards of a good city have been promoted through a strategy that fuses the achievements of the city’s economic goals with the pursuit of people’s happiness, and that positions politicians’ contribution to these ends as the test against which their political action is judged. But with such rationality that has become common sense, it
is the building of a homogeneous and allegedly universal public space—rather than access to social justice and the right to the city—that constitutes the means to promote people’s happiness. The hegemony of both this rationality and the urban order it entails is to a great extent due to the rationalist character endowed in the process of urban renewal, which implies a denial of the agonistic dimension of architecture and urban planning. Despite claiming to “govern without politics” (Riveros 2015), Bogotá’s defenders of anti-partisan politics carry out an urban transformation that involves what Mouffe calls “inescapable moment[s] of decision” (2008a: 8, 2012b). Whether they take place through the distribution of infrastructure, segregation of human activities, prescription of public space uses, or by means of segmentation of a large range of flows between Bogotá’s center and its peripheries, these moments unveil the political character of Bogotá’s urban politics and the limits of its supposed pure rationale.

As documented in this chapter, scholarly works concerning the ways in which the implementation of this model has participated in deepening spatial segregation, or have brought about modalities of social exclusion, are not an exception (e.g., Maldonado 2010; Ávila 2012; Berney 2011; Till 2012; Robledo and Rodríguez 2008). However, current attempts to counteract these adverse effects or to overcome the ineffectiveness of Bogotá’s urban politics in addressing spatial inequality have been neutralized by casting them as populist, as opposed to technocracy, and as aimed at generating an ‘anachronistic’ conflict of classes (Castro 2013). Insofar as the urban rejuvenation is able to drop some benefits towards Western and Southern peripheries that are aligned with the criteria of people’s happiness, the flow of displaced people into peripheral neighborhoods—rather than into other areas of the city—is naturalized by the periphery’s inhabitants. And a similar understanding is applied to the emergence and mutation of forms of delinquency. Both of them are seen as attracted by, or as derived from, circumstances linked to what peripheral residents call the subnormal condition of their neighborhoods.
But as with any order, there is an “ever-present possibility of antagonism” to this spatial order (Mouffe 2008a: 8, 2012b), which has the potential to emerge and to challenge it once the feelings and desires placed in this container of wants enter into conflict. We learn from the women of CPC-FASOL, from the difficulties of LGBT people to legitimately represent Bogotá’s citizen culture, and from the narratives of displaced people about other wants, values, and expectations. Through their everyday spatial practices, these populations negotiate their multiple values with the hegemonic spatial order in their struggle to reinvent the place they inhabit. In the recent mayoral race that took place in 2015, the revanchist crusade to take back the city and to continue the building of the Bogotá We Want demonstrated the hegemony of the spatial order they defend. However, the experiences brought into this chapter, and the narratives of displaced people on which the next chapter is focused, allow us to see some fissures left through the implementation of this model and demystify its status as incontestable object of happiness.
CHAPTER 6 – TAMING EXCLUSIONARY HAPPINESS

6.1 Introduction

“I did not want to leave, I did not want to come here, but a woman said to me: this and this happens, and if you do not leave, you may have the same fate as your husband. … I left on Tuesday and by the following Friday, they already came to my house looking for me.”

These were the words of Fanny as she explained how the murder of her husband was a turning point in her life which sparked a series of events that triggered her forced displacement. In 2009, one year after her husband’s assassination, Fanny fled from her home in a small village near Tumaco on the Pacific coast to Bogotá, where she arrived with her three children, two boys and a girl. At the time of this interview, in 2012, Fanny knew almost nothing about the assassination, but that her husband was murdered because of a rumor. As she told me, a neighbor spread the rumor that her husband had helped somebody, who happened to be related to an armed group, and this is apparently why he was murdered. By asserting “I did not want to come here,” Fanny emphasizes the involuntary character of her displacement, but her words seemed also to reflect a willingness to provide a legitimate explanation of the reasons why she had left her village. I would even suggest that they attest of Fanny’s initial intention to remain in this home despite the threats.

Stories like Fanny’s are reflected in a song written by Colombian and feminist pop-rock singer Andrea Echeverri, which echoes some of the most disruptive experiences endured by Colombian displaced people:

“I left ‘cause I had to, but I left my heart there. … I left my little house, my terroir, my hoe. I changed fruit trees for begging on the streets.”

78 Interview with Fanny, Bogotá, September 5, 2012.
Echeverri’s song points out the rural background of most IDP people, but also the fact that their displacement was not voluntary but forced and that it was triggered by means of violence. Echeverri’s song, as Fanny’s story, also tells us of how the same violence that compelled displaced people to flee and that caused the loss of their loved ones suddenly forced them to live in conditions of urban poverty, whether because they were despoiled of their means of livelihood or/and because they have lost some of their relatives upon whom their economic survival depended.

Released in 2008, Echeverri’s song was intended to sensitize urban dwellers and to raise awareness about the difficulties experienced by displaced people.\textsuperscript{80} It is not my intention to belittle the powerful meaning that the song bears and the courage of Echeverri and her band, the Aterciopelados, in engaging in this cause. However, I would like to critically consider its title, “Wandering Diamond,” in two senses.

The first sense refers to having the potential to help us understand the grief that displaced people experience while being displaced. Frequently this mourning process mirrors the figuration of “nomadic activism” in the sense suggested by Braidotti (2006). In other words, displaced people become subjects who follow a path to learn the truth and to seek justice and reparation, oftentimes “bearing witness, receiving and containing the pain of others” (2006: 88). Through this “nomadic activism,” they develop an “ability to self-represent and narrate [their] relationship to the variables that structure [their] location in [time and] space” (2006: 94). These might include race, ethnicity, origin, gender, urban or non-urban condition, class, condition of victimization, and even their subject position as survivors.

The second sense is, in contrast, quite problematic. It refers to the links that can be traced between the song’s title “wandering diamond” and one of the counterproductive imaginaries about the experience of displaced people. Echoing Liisa Malkki (1992: 29), I argue that referring

\textsuperscript{80} See https://aterciopeladosenglishblog.blogspot.hu/2008/12/rolling-stone.html.
to the displaced condition as wandering could take us to see the displaced person as a problematic errant detached from the soil to which, many people believe, she/he is naturally tied. This occurs because, unlike other ethical figures as for instance the urban flâneur or the tourist to whom postmodern time has granted mobility across boundaries (Braidotti 2006: 88), there are political reasons that constrain the mobility of forcibly displaced people (Tuitt 2004a). As Malkki suggests, the very notion of displaced, along with its description as uprooted and the use of other metaphoric practices that “link people to place” (1992: 27), has the consequence of spatially incarcerating them, of picturing displaced people as natives symbolically confined to the places from where they were forced to leave. In material terms, it takes societies to believe that the best solution would be their return, even in cases of protracted conflicts where peace and war overlap.

In Bogotá, as I illustrate in this chapter, such territorialized imaginary of the displaced person as a spatially confined native has served to implicitly deny them the right of mobility that their fellow citizens enjoy, thereby turning them into illegitimate urban inhabitants. It is therefore not surprising that Fanny, as I suggest above, feels compelled to justify having left her village. Because of this imaginary, displaced people are frequently disenfranchised from the right to make a home in the city where they arrive.

In this chapter, I explore displaced women’s urban experiences taking as a starting point the two senses discussed above, that is, the nomadic activist and the illegitimate urban dweller. When looked through displaced women’s own standpoints, these two senses are not necessarily antithetical. Their narratives show how, during the time they have inhabited in Bogotá, displaced women might have occupied one of these locations or transited from one to the other.

In the first part of the chapter, I approach these itineraries separately. My choice is mainly methodological, since it allows me to demonstrate how Bogotá’s center/periphery spatial model participates in shaping each of those locations, namely nomadic activism and disenfranchised
dwelling. For instance, I will analyze how, by displaying a distributive spatial justice, the city aims to encourage a less political subjectivity among those displaced people inhabiting the periphery. Conversely, I will illustrate how, by permeating time-space fissures left by the city’s spatial order in the center, displaced people carry out strategies of survival or engage in networking forms of resistance through which they strive to influence decision-making political processes.

In so doing, this chapter begins to unravel the idea of Bogotá as a happy city. Particularly, displaced women’s urban experiences testify of a continuum of violence through which the violence of war materializes in urban space and becomes imbricated with other systems of oppression: sexual, gendered, economic, ethnic or racial. I show how such violence and oppression feed into Bogotá’s spatial segmentation (south–poor, north–rich) and how, inasmuch as the continuum of violence is embedded in the city’s spatial order, displaced women are likely to be revictimized or denied access to transformative mechanisms of justice.

I devote the second part of the chapter to exploring displaced people’s forms of resistance, and in particular “acts of citizenship” (Isin 2008), through which this population challenges their depoliticization and vindicates their access to transformative justice. By turning themselves into active actors and by reclaiming a right to the city that allows them the right to truth, memory, and reparation, I argue, displaced people become the killjoys of the happy city, since in doing so they put the finger on the wounds of exclusion and oppression that the city’s urban renewal has deliberately overlooked.

### 6.2 A Cartography of Bogotá’s Spatial Order through the Nomadic Path from Mourning to Survival

When I met Blanca Nubia Díaz in 2012, she was about 60 years old and referred to herself as belonging to the Wayuu community, an Indigenous group based mainly in La Guajira, a northern region located along the borders with Venezuela. In *La Guajira*, Blanca Nubia (hereinafter Blanquita, as her friends call her) used to live in a *rancho*. This is the name given by the Wayuu
to a group of houses inhabited by people belonging to the same family, according to maternal lines. While living in her rancheria, Blanquita used to practice botanical medicine among her community and she takes pride in talking about how Wayuu people trusted her medical practice. In *La Guajira*, Blanquita was also an activist leader linked to the National Association of Peasant, Black and Indigenous Women of Colombia (ANMUCIC).

But in Bogotá, Blanquita did not only define herself as a Wayuu and activist woman, but also as a forcibly displaced woman and recalled that her story of displacement started when paramilitaries murdered both her husband in 2000 and her 15-year-old daughter almost one year later. Her daughter, Irina del Carmen Villero Díaz, took part in the communist Youth House and, according to Blanquita, it may have been because of this militancy that the paramilitaries took her life. After these crimes were committed, and despite having received threats, Blanquita tried to stay in *La Guajira*. Her major worry was however, as she narrates, that “other people were trying to persuade my adolescent sons to take revenge for these crimes. They wanted to involve them (my sons) in trouble.”

Blanquita did not want revenge but justice. She wanted to know the truth about the murder of her daughter and, as she says, “to make people know about her.” Thus, Blanquita refused that the armed conflict turns the life of her daughter into another disposable one. She did not trust the Guajira’s judicial system, which according to her has been infiltrated by paramilitary groups.

So, Blanquita left *La Guajira* and arrived in Bogotá in 2001. When speaking about the reasons why she moved to Bogotá rather than to another city, and about the first days she spent living there, her thoughts reflect Bogotanos’ mixed feelings, swinging from hospitality and alterity to mistrust with regard to forcibly displaced people:

I met people from Bogotá before. They had been in La Guajira visiting the Indigenous communities. Some of them gave me their telephone number and invited me. They told me to visit them if I ever come to Bogotá, but I never believed that I would have to come to live here because of the killing of my daughter. I thought that I will perhaps visit Bogotá during a journey. It is because of the murder of my daughter that I looked for
these people. They provided me with accommodation and helped me. But you know, when you arrive in this city, people are afraid to hear me saying that I am displaced, and that my daughter was killed. People here, they are coward, they are afraid. For this reason, I did not say anything. I remained silent and suffered my pain alone.81

Blanquita, as Fanny, had never considered leaving the place they used to call home before. It was the violence of the conflict that drove them out and led them to seek for safety and justice in Bogotá. However, the lack of awareness and, perhaps, avoidance of knowing about the conflict of urban inhabitants ensure that displaced people bear their wounds and pain alone.

In 2012, Blanquita was living in Marco Fidel Suárez, a working-class neighborhood in the South of Bogotá. But over the last twelve years, she has moved throughout the city at least six times and always to working-class areas located in peripheral neighborhoods. Sometimes she has moved because of economic reasons and oftentimes because of the threats she has received. Therefore, her spatial wandering is not a result of will but rather of force. Feminist researcher Ramírez referred to this form of mobility, which is common in displaced people’s urban experiences, as “itineraries of displacement.”82

Ramírez’s concept calls attention to an important issue. It points towards the experience of urban displacement that displaced people often face even after reaching an apparently safe place. Nevertheless, taking a step forward from the material spatiality of this itinerary and considering the trajectories overlapping in Blanquita’s political subjectivity (i.e., Wayuu woman, mother, community woman leader, forcibly displaced person), it seems fair to say that Blanquita embodies the figure of a nomadic activist. The first traces of Blanquita’s nomadism could be traced back to her activism as a leader among Indigenous women and they unfolded over time, triggered by her experiences of loss and displacement.

Blanquita initiated the process to be recognized as IDP in 2003, but it was only in 2008, and thanks to the juridical support she received from the NGO Lawyers’ Collective (CCAJAR), that

81 Interview with Blanca Nubia Díaz, Bogotá, July 11, 2012.
82 María Eugenia Ramírez, July 2012.
Blanquita was granted official IDP recognition. Nowadays, she is an active participant of the Movement of Victims of State-Sponsored Crimes (MOVICE) and has become a member of the Tribunal on Women’s ESCR. It was in this latter group where I first met her in 2012.

After that, oftentimes I met Blanquita during peace demonstrations and at the headquarters of various human rights organizations. More often than not, these events (e.g., demonstrations, meetings, rallies) took place in Bogotá’s main center. But it is not only the public space of Bogotá’s center which has become familiar for Blanquita but also NGOs’ offices, as in fact she has notoriously won the trust of NGO employees. Somehow, Blanquita has tamed those material and social spaces for herself. This is partly due to her political activism, but also to the fact that in those places Blanquita sells Wayuu handicrafts among NGO workers. “This is my livelihood with which to pay my rent and utilities,” Blanquita claims. As she told me, in twelve years of displacement, she has just received two monetary humanitarian aids from the state. So selling Indigenous handicrafts is the way she has learnt to make a living. Hence, Blanquita spends a significant part of her time in the city center, and likes this area. In her narrative, Bogotá’s main center appears to be a place of resistance, contestation, freedom, and work (see Appendix 3, Photos 4, 5).

Blanquita’s nomadic wandering offers a starting point from which to draw a cartography of Bogotá’s urban model of development. The path traced by her nomadic wandering evidences the functioning of the polycentric model—explained in the previous chapter—that the *Bogotá We Want* aims at developing. Turned by this model into an area increasingly gentrified, Bogotá’s center is less and less made of homes and households. As discussed in previous chapters, the center’s urban renewal has implied that impoverished neighborhoods are being steadily demolished, leaving room to new public spaces. Dilapidated housing is being replaced by governmental buildings, houses that used to host middle-class families are becoming headquarters of NGOs, being bought by universities or transformed into cultural centers, and
buildings of colonial architecture are transformed into hotels and restaurants. It means that the center is either lowering its population density or replacing its traditional dwellers by others with upper economic status (see Appendix 4, Map 5). In both cases, Bogotá’s urban renewal is transforming the center’s social tissue by suppressing class mixing, thereby leaving the poorest inhabitants with no other option but to find a place in poor peripheries.

This landscape of social segregation does not reflect the promises of the happy city that the Bogotá We Want pledged to bring about. Quite the contrary, goals such as the redistribution of political power towards the periphery have rather been neglected or have fallen into oblivion. Because of that, displaced people like Blanquita, whose political consciousness became reinforced after displacement, spend much of their time in, and are strongly related to, the city center even if they cannot afford to live there.

Maritza Buitrago’s urban experience—whose story I described in chapter 5—echoes a similar cartography of Bogotá’s space, despite the fact that her story draws a distinct path of nomadic activism:

I arrived in Bogotá with my daughter, she was 4 and I was 20 years old. At that time, I came as I was: a single-mother head of household. Since then, we have lived in Bogotá as displaced people. … Now I take part in various political spaces, all of them related to public policies and displaced people. 83

Maritza has become a leader of various IDP women’s groups. In 2012, Maritza was living in a working-class neighborhood located at the beginning of the Southern area of San Cristóbal. As she claims, she has avoided living in what she calls ‘marginalized neighborhoods.’ Thus Maritza underlines the centrality of her neighborhood as well as the fact that—in her words—it is “well equipped with alarms and system of security.” Maritza seems to see these features (i.e., centrality and surveillance) as signifiers of her neighborhood’s quality of life, which is not surprising given the general acceptance of Bogotá’s spiral of spatial securitization. However she recognizes that

83 Maritza Buitrago, October 2012.
not all displaced people are surrounded by the same spatial conditions: “I just live with my daughter and my partner, so we do not need much space.” Maritza’s partner is not himself a displaced person and it seems to mean for Maritza a certain symbolic support that facilitates her urban integration.

Because of her role as an IDP woman leader, Maritza is constantly involved in activities developed in NGOs, particularly the Women’s House, as well as in political events taking place in the city center and governmental institutions. Her relatedness to the governmental or administrative institutions located near her home or in peripheral areas is linked to specific activities of leadership. Thus, Maritza asserts that she visits Dignify Centers (center for the support of IDPs, see chapter 2) when she needs to invite women to participate in political activities, as for instance peace rallies taking place in the city center or workshops related to raising awareness about displaced women’s rights.

Maritza’s appropriation of Bogotá’s urban space is telling of the networking organization through which NGOs have been able to build linkages with IDP grassroots organizations and mobilize displaced women living in peripheral areas (see Appendix 4, Map 1). But it too gives an account of the extent to which Bogotá’s spatial decentralization has not really brought about a significant decentralization of political power. In other words, the center of the city is more and more the very place where most important political decisions are made. Therefore, in order to exert political pressure, social activists and NGOs need to build linkages that bind displaced people living in the periphery to the city center.

The Auto 092, a gender-sensitive ruling issued in 2008 which I described in chapters 2 and 5, is itself a result of the linkages built between feminist NGOs and displaced women. It compelled the government to design programs aimed at protecting women from, during, and after forced displacement, and its dissemination as well as its follow-up is one of the main activities Maritza has undertaken. The Auto 092 makes explicit the links between forced displacement and sexual
violence, and establishes the reasons why forced displacement has had a disproportionate effect on the lives of women.

A closer look at the process engaged by a coalition of displaced women, feminist movements, and NGOs in their endeavor to accomplish the issue and dissemination of the *Auto 092* evidences how forced displacement and sexual violence are embedded in a continuum of violence. It starts from the violence that forced women’s displacement and flows through other forms of violence they might experience when trying to rebuild their lives in cities.

Reflecting precisely on the standpoint of Colombian feminist movement *La Ruta Pacifica*, Cynthia Cockburn brings to light the notion of the continuum of violence. “Wars are only phases in a sequence of conditions linked together as a continuum” asserts Cockburn (2010: 147–148), thereby it is impossible to define the conditions that keep the wheel of violence turning just from one perspective (e.g., economic, ethnic, gender). Cockburn’s analysis sheds light on the links between violence in wartime and gender violence in peacetime, foregrounding that the violence produced through military acts “spills back into everyday life and increases the quotient of violence in it” (2012). Building on her analysis, I argue that the violence of the Colombian conflict in the rural context is not at odds with the violence operating upon displaced people and, in particular, on displaced women during displacement. Economic, ethnic, gender and class regimes are spatially readjusted, allowing an actual spatial transfer of violence from rural areas of conflict to urban spaces, even though it is still asserted that in Bogotá ‘the war does not exist.’

### 6.2.1 The Continuum of Sexual Violence: From Rural Landscapes of War to Urban Landscapes Where the ‘War Does Not Exist’

The recognition of the disproportionate effects of forced displacement on the lives of women was the framework wielded in a strong advocacy campaign that preceded the issue of the ruling *Auto 092*. The campaign aimed at gaining the attention and support of the Constitutional Court was conducted by the joint effort of displaced women, their grassroots organizations and
feminist NGOs. Feminist social researcher Osana Medina, from the Women’s House, recalls during an interview some of the arguments they presented before the Court in 2008, at the time when the public hearings took place:

We documented to the Court that cultural pre-existing patterns of discrimination against women are exacerbated amidst armed conflict … and the reasons why we, the women, are the main victims of the war because of being a woman. We therefore referred to activities of care and reproduction, as well as to sexual violence. Because of women’s culturally assigned roles, they are recruited to develop care and reproductive activities in troops. Thus, they are not taken as combatants, like men, but they are recruited to take care of the troops and to be the women of the commanders. They are forced to render sexual services or to engage in sexual relations with the troops’ commanders, they are forced into pregnancy or abortion … Women are forced into prostitution too, there are villages where armed actors set up centers of prostitution, where troops used women as sexual objects.84

What Medina describes took place in various war zones of Colombia, however, the history of El Placer—a Southern village located in Putumayo near the Amazon area—is particularly telling about the cruelty of armed actors against women. El Placer was first occupied by the guerrilla FARC, who in the absence of the government assumed authority. But it was the role of this area as an epicenter of coca production what motivated the guerrilla to control El Placer and to impose its rule over the population, and so too it was this economy which turned this zone into a disputed area between the FARC and the paramilitaries.

The paramilitaries occupied El Placer between 1999 and 2006 (CNMH 2012c: 130), a time during which they confined and isolated the entire population. Like the FARC, the paramilitaries took over the control of the coca trade and imposed their own code of conduct upon the civilian population. As the stories collected by the National Center of Memory reflect, the paramilitaries imposed a regime of terror and a system of sexual exploitation, including setting up houses of prostitution, which perhaps could be comparable only with the so-called “comfort women’ system” established by the Japanese army during the 1940s (Enloe 2000: 83).

84 Interview with Osana Medina, Bogotá, October 6, 2012.
The paramilitary rule was supported by a specific gender regime through which members of this group differentiated between decent and indecent women, and divided the population between allies and enemies (CNMH 2012c: 19). For instance, men’s body postures, ways of walking, marks on the body, hair styles or ways of dressing were not only ways of disciplining masculinity, but also markers used to identify whether a man belonged to the guerrilla or whether he was a civilian. According to their judgments, the paramilitaries sentenced peasants to forced displacement, torture, disappearance or assassination.

In parallel, because of having blood ties or having had affective relations with guerrilla members, women were accused of being their informants. But besides that, women showing character or physical strength, agile body or walking briskly were likely to be labeled as guerrilla members or sympathizers (Ibid.: 146). Such gender regime worked as a weapon to enforce women’s submission, but on the other hand it functioned as a trial in which any sign of women’s empowerment or misconduct constituted sufficient proof of being a guerrilla woman, and thereby to be punished with sexual violence, sexual torture or rape (Ibid.: 173, 166).

The use of conflict-related sexual violence against women have been depicted by Colombian feminist groups as a “multi-functional weapon of war” (MTMCA 2010: 11), and a “systematic military strategy in connection with forced displacement” (MNSA 092&009 2016: 25). In both depictions, feminists point out that sexual violence in the Colombian conflict is not an isolated but a “premeditated, systematic and generalized” practice. As they assert:

“In Colombia, armed groups use sexual violence as an instrument of social control, ‘they seek to discipline women’s behavior: their right to freely decide on their emotions and relationships, their body and their sexuality, and thereby reinforce traditional gender roles, deepening unequal power relations between men and women.’” (MTMCA 2010: 11)

This perspective depicts sexual violence as a weapon which is used by armed actors in order to prevent women from, or punish them for, undertaking roles other than reproductive ones and, especially, for being involved in political activities. Touching upon this aspect, Medina underlines
the vulnerability of displaced women leaders, as sexual violence is also used as a means of retaliation against them, even when they have resumed their lives in urban areas:

“All displaced women suffer persecution, but it is exacerbated when they play a leadership role. Many of them have been victims of displacement because of their leadership. Here [in Bogotá], they keep doing the same role. That’s why persecution, threats and violence against them are exacerbated.”

The vulnerability of displaced women leaders in urban areas Medina refers to is also intersected by power relations of race, ethnicity, and place of origin. According to the 2015 report of the Working Group on Women and Armed Conflict, the use of sexual violence against Afro-Colombian women leaders has increased inasmuch as the victims’ movements which they represent “have become feminized” (MTMCA 2015: 72). By this, the Working Group means that Afro-Colombian women have increasingly become visible actors in movements of resistance aimed, for instance, at protecting their territories from mining operations or at vindicating the restitution of lands. Thus, just as sexual violence is used by armed groups to prevent women from keeping or regaining control over their lands, so too is it used as a form of discipline, because their leadership is interpreted as a transgression against both traditional gender regimes and patterns of racial subordination.

The experience of Yovana Sáenz, an Afro-Colombian woman who has been forcibly displaced on numerous occasions, is revealing of the way in which conflict-related sexual violence is used as weapon for disciplining women’s political role. When I met Yovana, she was living in Bogotá and has become a member of AFRODES. However, Yovana recalls that her political involvement began after her first forced displacement from the Tolima region towards Tumaco, which took place in 1999. In this village of the Pacific, and motivated by both her experience of forced displacement and her Afro-Colombian ethnicity, Yovana became a leader among a group of the so-called Proceso de Comunidades Negras – PCN. The PCN is a Black communities’

85 Ibid.
movement that gathers about 120 grassroots organizations (Paschel 2013), and which promotes an ethno-cultural agenda focused mainly on the defense of the ethnic, cultural, and territorial rights of Afro-Colombian communities (Escobar 2008).

The PCN was born in the context of the issue of the 1991 Colombian Constitution and the Law 70 of 1993, as the latter seeks to allow the recognition of Afro-Colombian communities and their ownership over the riverine lands they have long occupied in the pacific coast (Wade 2009). The PCN’s most crucial struggle is the building of a model of development based on local Black practices, guided by the principles of sustainable uses of land and resources, the respect for their rituals, and collective ownership of their lands (Ibid: 219–223; Grueso et al. 2003: 433). Defending these principles has made PCN’s activists targets of illegal armed groups, as its implementation hinders the interests of illegal armies. Whether they are driven by the interest in controlling coca crops and trafficking routes, or whether they defend the interest of oil palm investors or gold mining companies, from the perspective of those armies, the claim of Afro-Colombian autonomy over these territories is seen as inconvenient (Yagoub 2016).

It is amidst this climate of resistance of the PCN that Yovana was forcibly displaced again in 1999 from Tumaco and came to live in Bogotá. Yovana joined AFRODES in 2007 and among her activities she participated in the hearings and in the dissemination of the Auto 092. Yovana stresses the fact that to disseminate the Auto among displaced women was, supposedly, an obligation of the Colombian government. However, as the state did not comply with this task, it was undertaken by the displaced women themselves with the support of feminist NGOs such as Sisma Mujer and the Women’s House. Yovana says:

In 2009, it was an achievement of the women’s struggle—not of the [governmental] institutions—to make public the Auto 092. … We, the women, disseminated the Auto 092 without a penny, because we wanted the rest of the women to know it. We took over what was the responsibility of the government.86

86 Interview with Yovana Sáenz, Bogotá, October 12, 2012.
Undertaking this task, however, implied the visibilization of displaced women leaders, among whom were Yovana and Angélica Bello (Duzán 2013a). Both of them became targets of death threats sent through leaflets signed by paramilitary groups which, as Yovana tells, did not take long to materialize into sexual violence.

It was in November 2009 when sexual violence began to be used in Bogotá against those women leaders who were promoting the Auto 092. First was Angélica Bello and then it was me. They made me clear that what they were doing to me was because I was speaking about the Auto, and that if I will not shut up, they will do the same to my children.87

After these events, Angélica Bello reinforced her work as spokeswoman of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, but in 2013 she was found dead under circumstances that are not yet clear (Duzán 2013a). When I met Yovana in 2012, her case of sexual violence had been dismissed on the grounds of lack of evidence; however she continued working as activist leader.

Angélica’s and Yovana’s experiences must not only be added to at least 12,740 victims of conflict-related sexual violence registered in Colombia until 2016, but also to the rates of impunity that, in those cases, reaches 98% (El Tiempo 2016a). Thus, one of the notable things that appear in Angélica’s story and in Yovana’s interview is the accuracy of their memories about these events of sexual violence, and specifically concerning details such as time, date, place, objects. While it is also the case in most stories of forcibly displaced people I could collect, the accuracy of Yovana’s memories is explained by the difficulties displaced women face in order to probe having been victims of conflict-related sexual violence. Such difficulty increases in urban contexts such as Bogotá, since it is asserted that neither war nor paramilitaries exist. I will return to this point later, but for now it is important to stress how Yovana’s and Angélica’s experiences are telling examples of the ways in which, even in urban areas where displaced people have arrived seeking for safety, sexual violence is used as a multifunctional weapon of war. On the one hand, it serves as a means of enforcing women’s submission and preventing them from playing

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87 Ibid.
political roles. On the other, their stories, as with the gender regime of *El Placer’s* coca-based economy, illustrate how conflict-related sexual violence has been instrumental to maintain territorial dominance and to control the trade of raw materials used in both legal and illegal economies.

Thus, in a broader perspective, it seems accurate to assert that the maintenance of illegal economies and the development of new legal ones appear to depend on the persistence of structural unequal power relations of gender. As Sara Meger suggests, such relations are both produced and productive, as they are a cog in a broader struggle over the control of productive resources embedded in international global trade (2015: 418). Hence, to point to the exacerbation of cultural patterns of domination in the analysis of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Colombia’s internal war is certainly accurate. However, there is a failure in analyzing the use of this violence in isolation from the dynamics of international political and economic drivers of the internal conflict itself (Ibid.). Yet, not all armed actors use deliberately SGBV as a strategy to achieve material goals (Meger 2015: 419). Such crimes could be related either to individual motivations or to a collective interest in counterbalancing local hierarchies or in shaping social structures. In Colombia, these dynamics have become even more relevant inasmuch as the feminization of leadership is understood as a menace to traditional masculinities. However, it is exactly because of the potential of women’s leadership to disrupt gender hierarchies, and thereby to hinder the functioning of extractive and illegal economies, that displaced women leaders are being revictimized. Therefore, embracing Meger’s framework, it is worth claiming that the aggregate of SGBV is also productive as it allows the control of raw materials, whose trade—even if it is illegal or informal—reaches its final consumer through the “global assembly line” of international economy (Ibid.: 418).

Another common place in Yovana’s and Angélica’s storytelling has to do with the process following the event of sexual violence and, specifically, with their experience in dealing with the
trauma left by this violence. The sense of guilt and the feeling of shame or fear of stigma prevented both Yovana and Angélica from immediately lodging a complaint with the authorities. Fortunately, both of them found special support in Pilar Rueda, feminist human rights Ombudsman, who encouraged them both to make their cases public (Duzán 2013a, 2013b). The process of healing the trauma was however undermined by the procedures undertaken by, and the lack of support of, the authorities. Angélica was asked to provide documents in order to probe that she was effectively a human rights activist (Duzán 2013b), which, I suggest, means that otherwise her case would have been dismissed as if it were not conflict-related sexual violence. Yovana’s case was dismissed by the prosecutor’s office on the grounds of lack of evidence; however, it did not prevent these authorities from communicating with her male colleagues of AFRODES, and with her ex-husband. According to Yovana, no women but her male colleagues were asked by the prosecutor if they were aware of the rape claim made by Yovana.

They did not have to know that. It seems to me the height. The father of my children did not have to learn about it because I had not been living with him for years. … That day I carried a purse with 60,000 pesos [20 US dollars] and a camera, but they did not take any of these things. It was neither a burglary nor a robbery.88

The level of detail of Yovana’s narrative gives a sense of the difficulties—including disbelief or skepticism—she has faced through these years while trying to probe her condition of victim of sexual violence. As with Angélica’s story, the process that Yovana faced before the prosecutors is symptomatic of reflexive relations of “causality, influence or flowing” which, as Cockburn highlights (2012), operate between war violence and everyday violence in urban context, and which prompts urban societies to consider violence as normal. However, racism, sexism, poverty and other forms of violence are intertwined and play also a role in the process through which conflict-related sexual violence occurring in urban spaces become to be seen as normal. Thus, it is not by chance that Yovana links the hardship she has endured with her condition of being a

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88 Yovana Sáenz, October 2012.
woman, as she asserts “being a woman makes us an easy target for this crime” (Duzán 2013a), but she also intersects the risk with her condition of ethnicity. However, while doing so, she seems to conflate her ethnic condition with a vulnerability: “The risk is higher when it comes to Afro-Colombian women,” Yovana explains by evoking words that, she believes, belong to Sisma Mujer’s director:

> There is a phrase of Claudia Mejía … according to which the greater the vulnerability, the greater the risk of being assaulted. … Afro-Colombian women are seen in this country as a sexual object, and that makes them more vulnerable. The risk is higher for a Black woman than for a mestiza, but we are all at risk. All the women who engage in activism are at risk.\(^89\)

Yovana’s story suggests that, willing or not, the procedure followed by the prosecutor’s office feeds exactly into the purposes of her aggressors, by which I mean that it seems to work in order to discourage women leaders from further political activism. But Yovana also points to the fact that when it comes to sexual violence perpetrated against Black women leaders, the possibility of being revictimized seems to increase. And this is so because hypersexualized stereotypes of Afro-Colombian women might be used to dismiss their cases as not being conflict-related, not being serious, or having been consensual. Yet, there is another common denominator in Angélica’s and Yovana’s memories: a sense of hope and struggle. In Angélica’s story, that strength helped her to encourage other women to speak up (Duzán 2013a, 2013b). In Yovana’s narrative, it is tangible when she asserts that despite the threats, “I did not remain silent.”\(^90\) By adopting this standpoint, Yovana appears to narrate and represent herself as a survivor, and in so doing she brings another modulation into her nomadic activism.

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\(^{89}\) Ibid.  
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
6.2.2 Becoming a Survivor: An Advantageous Position in the Struggle to Tame Bogotá’s Urban Space

Yovana’s words ―I did not remain silent‖ echo the campaign It’s Not Time to Be Silent initiated by Jineth Bedoya, a Colombian journalist who was kidnapped in 2000 and sexually tortured by paramilitaries in retaliation for her work covering the armed conflict. Unlike Yovana’s story, Bedoya’s activist role started some years after having been sexually assaulted, and her strategy focuses primarily on encouraging women victims of sexual violence to make their stories public. The It’s Not Time to Be Silent campaign she leads is aimed at raising awareness among public opinion and to compel the Colombian government to improve guarantees so that victims can seek justice. But, beyond that, both Jineth Bedoya and Yovana Sáenz have joined long-term advocacy of women’s movements, particularly those focused on the continuum between violence against women and armed conflict. Among the accomplishments of these efforts are the harmonization of the Colombian legislation to international treaties including the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (Bouvier 2013; Pineda-García 2015), and more recently women’s participation in the peace talks with the FARC, as a result of which the final peace agreement included a gender focus. The agreements foresee the creation of a Subcommission of Gender, which during the post-conflict is aimed at securing—among other issues—that sexual violence will not remain unpunished and that the rights of women as well as non-heterosexual people will be respected, especially in rural areas (Bouvier 2016).

Yovana’s ongoing political engagements are centered on both her work with AFRODES and with the District Group for the Advocacy and Monitoring of Auto 092. This is why places such as the Women’s House, Sisma Mujer, and AFRODES offices—all of them located in the center—are spatial references in Yovana’s experience of the city. In contrast, the place she has called home has been pretty variable as she has moved at least 20 times between 2000 and 2012. The

main reasons for moving from one place to another stem from the fact of having received threats or having perceived signs of safety risks. Thus, during the interview, Yovana listed a long number of neighborhoods in which she has lived, all of them in the South of Bogotá. However, as with the majority of displaced people, Yovana cannot afford to live anywhere but in Southern neighborhoods, although this might imply better safety conditions.

In 2012, she was living in Ciudad Bolívar, the poorest locality of the city, which today hosts most of the displaced people living in Bogotá, the majority of them being Afro-Colombians. Yovana describes her neighborhood as an “Afro-Colombian community council” and in doing so, she reflects on how Afro-Colombians have transferred into Ciudad Bolívar’s neighborhoods many of the spatial practices they used to have while they were living in the Pacific region.

This place is absolutely a community council. There are community councils which have moved from their territories and have settled there. … You arrive there because you meet people you knew and because you find people’s support. Something that has to be said about Bogotá is that it is very cold, and I am not referring so much here to the weather but to the people. People here are very skeptical. Instead in Black communities, everybody helps everybody. If I go to work and leave my kids home, I don’t even have to tell you. You just know that they are alone and that they have no food, so you come and give them something to eat. Black communities are a single family. But not here… Here, it is everyone for themselves.92

In light of Yovana’s perspective, the extent to which neighborhoods of Ciudad Bolívar look like an Afro-Colombian community of the Pacific plays an important role in the decision of incoming displaced Afro-Colombians to look for a place in this area of Bogotá. Yovana’s narrative also gives an account of the practices through which Afro-Colombian displaced people have shaped Bogotá’s urban space, which is an important signal of the extent to which displaced people exercise their right to the city. Nevertheless, Yovana draws attention towards the process of mestizaje as a force that operates in urban spaces, and which counteracts Afro-Colombians’ attempts to keep their traditions. Therefore, mestizaje in her narrative appears as a phenomenon that hinders Afro-Colombians’ right to the city. Mestizaje, in Yovana’s depiction, permeates

92 Yovana Sáenz, October 2012.
Afro-Colombian people’s lives, and she insists by reiterating “it is not the city which fits into our lives, we fit into the city.”

Yovana underlines a straightforward differentiation between the Mestizo population and Afro-Colombian people, which, in a certain sense, seems to combine both cultural and phenotypical aspects. In her view, such a difference has direct implications in the process of integration of those populations in Bogotá. When considering this, it is important to have in mind that, as Paschel points out, mestizaje in Colombia—at least until 1990—was an ideological process that included cultural hybridity as well as biological mixture. However, it predominantly involved Spanish descendants and Indigenous populations, while rendering the Black population invisible, either by marginalizing or by culturally absorbing them (Paschel 2010: 730–736, 2016). Nevertheless, Yovana’s perspective regarding mestizaje, I argue, should also be read through the lens of the “ethnic difference frame” that foregrounds the project of cultural and territorial autonomy that the PCN attempts to enact (Ibid.: 731), and as a reaction to the disruption of this attempt which occurs once these Black communities are forced to leave their lands.

Interestingly, in the examples she provided regarding Afro-Colombian urban mestizaje, Yovana draws attention towards everyday mechanisms through which long-term inhabitants exert their power over Afro-Colombian displaced people and steadily lead them to homologate their spatial practices and to adopt implicit norms of coexistence.

We are losing a lot of our culture here. You live in a house with five families and you cook fish, and if someone is bothered by the smell, (s)he will say: “this one bothering with her seafood, they spend their time eating fish.” So, one is losing one’s own culture, education, medicinal herbs. One is setting aside all that is traditional in order to accommodate to the city.

And Yovana immediately adds:

93 Ibid.
94 For more about mestizaje in Colombia, see Paschel 2016, 2010.
“In Tumaco, it is common to smoke tobacco inside the houses but not here. Here people smoke cigarettes. So, if the tobacco smell spreads, they say: ‘this woman is a witch.’ Thus, you are steadily giving up your culture in order to fit.’

Despite these observations, Yovana does not seem to have experienced any serious inconvenience in this regard that would have driven her to move into another neighborhood. As I mentioned earlier, the reasons that have led her to move are explicitly connected with her political activism. However, as I will show later, other displaced people’s stories testify of another experience. The anxiety of spatial homogeneity among locals and their interest in defending norms of coexistence have also come into conflict with some forms of cultural resistance engaged by Afro-Colombian people, and have materialized in violent events.

As Yovana told me, she avoids sharing aspects of her work of political activism with her neighbors, and her relatedness with administrative or governmental institutions located in her neighborhood seems to be minimal. Add to this that Ciudad Bolívar is one of the localities with the lowest number of public amenities, so that despite having inhabited peripheral neighborhoods—as it happens with Maritza—the center of the city rather than the peripheries seems to be more relevant in Yovana’s experience of Bogotá. Most of the displaced people’s urban narratives I have brought here suggest a clear role distinction between the center and the city’s periphery in shaping their lives, and specifically the lives of those women engaged in political activism. It evidences that displaced women’s political subject positions are strongly shaped by the way these women relate to the city center and, in particular, are imbricated with those spatial sceneries where political decision-making takes place.

Whether it is about Indigenous, White-mestizo or Afro-Colombian women, these displaced women seem to have enacted a nomadic activism. In most cases, it is drawn from the subject positions they occupied prior to their experience of forced displacement, transformed through their journeys of mourning and sometimes disciplined by their encounters of violence through which they are re-victimized. But above all, displaced women’s nomadic activism is also a spatial
process of “becoming” (Braidotti 2006: 169), which would not take place in isolation. It is carved by the network of solidarities they have woven as they heal collectively the wounds of violence, and it is also spatial since it might not have occurred if these women and the feminist organizations they have joined would not have tamed Bogotá’s center/periphery spatial form. It could be asserted that the extent to which these women have overcome the urban segregation produced by this center/periphery arrangement is accomplished by the building of a network that involves grassroots organizations, feminist NGOs and women’s movements, and which mimics this order. But in so doing, this network redistributes the political power that Bogotá’s urban design strives to keep concentrated at its very center.

6.3 Decision Making at the Center, Distributive Justice at the Periphery

I just can speak for myself, and in my case, I ask them (the government) to give me housing and micro-business support. In other words, I ask them to provide me with victim’s reparation. That is all, and I will not bother anymore. Because one day, we have to get out of this position as displaced; we have to be conscious that we will not remain in this position for a lifetime.\textsuperscript{95}

In the previous part, I reflected on some stories of displaced women, particularly on those who have occupied a location of leadership. In so doing, I traced the path of nomadic activism they have drawn and shed light on the ways in which this path has found its condition of possibility in the feminist networks built between IDP grassroots organizations and feminist NGOs. Such spatial organization has enabled displaced women to tame the center/periphery urban design of Bogotá and, to a certain extent, to influence processes of decision making regarding forced displacement.

In this section, I direct my focus on the experience of displaced women who might not have been involved in the political decision-making taking place in the city center. I by no means intend to suggest a straightforward division between the urban experience of IDP leaders or activists and that of less politically involved—or less visible—displaced women. I do not want

\textsuperscript{95}Interview with Gladys, Bogotá, 11 September 2012.
either to deny the nomadic paths that displaced women of different conditions might enact. What interest me here is to explore the role played by peripheral spaces of Bogotá in shaping IDPs’ subjectivities and the strategies carried out by less politically visible displaced women in their struggles to exert their right to the city.

Do the peripheries of Bogotá prompt a particular subject position on the lives of displaced women? If so, to what extent is this subject position related to the values attached to the ideal of the ‘happy city’? And what spatial layers overlapping in Bogotá’s spatial order other than the binary center/periphery participate in shaping displaced people’s urban experiences?

Let me first tell something about Gladys, whose words I quoted at the beginning of this section. Her narrative offers a suitable path in order to explore Bogotá’s socio-spatial cartography from another angle of vision. Gladys refers to herself as a mother head of household. She lives with her adolescent son and her elderly father, all of whom became forcibly displaced in 2006. As I reflect later, Gladys tells this story with an unfair sense of guilt. Before she was forcibly displaced, Gladys lived in a farm that belonged to her family in the Tolima region. When she fell in love with a member of the Colombian army, she became a target of the guerrilla who assaulted her physically and ordered her to leave her own family’s farm. The guerrilla gave them only fifteen minutes to leave; therefore Gladys, her father and her son had to flee with nothing but what they were wearing. They lost their farm and all their belongings, and that is why Gladys frequently refers to her experience as to “start all over again.”

Throughout these years in Bogotá, Gladys has tried very hard to be an economically self-sufficient person again. For instance, she has sold hot dogs in the street, and also household linen. But in doing so, she has experienced the difficulties faced by most informal street vendors in Bogotá, especially insecurity and the harassment of the police for occupying public space. By the time I interviewed her, she was working a few days a week as an informal domestic worker. Despite these difficulties, she seemed to be an optimistic person. Sometimes she defines herself
as a victim of the conflict but, in her narrative, this condition as well as her IDP status do not seem to have an evident political meaning. In fact, Gladys asserts that her condition of a displaced person will end once she gets reparation, which she specifically defines in terms of access to housing and income opportunities. As quoted in the introductory sentence, Gladys claims:

I ask them (the government) to give me housing and micro-business support. In other words, I ask them to provide me with victim’s reparation. That is all, and I will not bother anymore. Because one day, we have to get out of this position as displaced; we have to be conscious that we will not remain in this position for a lifetime.  

Her perspective, I believe, is not generalized among displaced people, since for many of them access to justice and truth are perhaps more essential measures to satisfactorily overcome the condition of displacement. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Gladys’s words resonate with the legal framework and imaginary prevailing in the 2000s, when the recognition of forced displacement and the enforcement of the state to effectively protect the victims were just a struggle of some activist groups and NGOs. At that time, the reluctant position of the government in office was supported by a public imaginary, in which displaced people were seen as guilty of their own displacement. Backed by this belief, the government maintained that the condition of forced displacement would end once the victims achieve socio-economic stabilization (CCJ 2005: 41).

On the contrary, the current framework of transitional justice—which is illustrated in the 2011 Victims’ Law—is bound to a notion of transformative approach, and that is, in part, due to the cross-cutting gender perspective that has influenced it. According to this approach, the Colombian state should bring about transformative reparations aimed at overcoming social inequalities or conditions of vulnerability that allow forced displacement to occur. Thus, when observed through this lens, for Gladys to obtain reparation will not only involve her economic

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96 Ibid.
stabilization or the restitution of the economic means she lost, but also measures of satisfaction such as, for instance, to know the truth, public apologies or declarations restoring her dignity as victim, access to justice, and guarantees of non-repetition. In that light, Saffon and Uprimny underline the need to make available mechanisms of empowerment which would help victims to rebuild their identity “as moral and political subjects,” and for decision-making processes that allow them to voice their needs (2010: 375).

Unlike this framework, which is often imbricated in the displaced women’s narratives I brought in the previous section, aspects other than housing and economic survival do not seem to be a concern from Gladys’s perspective. These concerns, which are absolutely legitimate, go in parallel with a certain sense of guiltiness since Gladys seems to think about herself as the responsible of her own displacement, and that because of the relationship Gladys was having with an armed actor:

“I was the guilty one. I had to face the situation and I couldn’t leave my father and my son. They (the guerilla) do not have qualms about killing, no matter who.”

The first time I met Gladys, she was attending an event taking place in Suba, a peripheral neighborhood in the North of Bogotá. The event, designed by the then-new city administration, served as an introduction of the so-called Dignify Centers and was therefore mainly presented as an opportunity for all displaced people to know the social services offer that the city was providing to them. But importantly, for the Mayor’s office, it was also an opportunity to conduct a census of the displaced population. At that time, Gladys was not living in Suba but in Usme, at the other end of the city; however, she attended this event in Suba despite entailing a two-hour bus trip. As she told me, she wanted to know the status of her application to a housing program, but yet, attending this event does not mean that Gladys has only resorted to institutional means.

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97 Ibid.
Indeed, some days prior to this event, Gladys with at least one hundred displaced people attempted to occupy a public property in Suba; however, the demonstration was immediately dissolved by the police and the ESMAD (Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron). In her description, the goals of this attempt are coextensive with her understanding of what would bring about the end of her condition of displacement:

We just wanted to be seen, to call public attention. We want them to give us our housing, and reparation. After that we will not bother anymore. ... We have to take action by force majeure. We displaced people need to unite around each and everyone’s situation to have our voices heard and to put pressure on them.98

Thus, neither Suba and the displaced people living there nor the social services offered in this area are unfamiliar for Gladys. Since her arrival in Bogotá in 2006, Gladys has always inhabited in peripheral neighborhoods, whereas her relation with the city center and with feminist IDPs or with more political IDP movements are scarce. Upon her arrival in Bogotá, Gladys found a room in Suba, but nevertheless she and her family had to move several times within the area:

We had to move once because they sold the house and another time because... you have to stick to the rules set by the homeowners. Then, you cannot come late, you cannot have a friend. For instance, I was working with the hot dog cart until late in the night, and the landlord of the house complained because I arrived late and because of the noise I made with the cart. So you know, when you live in a rented home, you are here today and there tomorrow.

Later on, her son had some troubles in school and, as Gladys told me, he was discriminated against on the basis of his condition of displacement. So, although Gladys asserts that she likes Suba, she and her family moved in 2012 from the Northern periphery of Bogotá to live in Usme, at the other end of the city. However, Gladys often goes to Suba because, on the one hand, she feels more familiar with the officials of the local Dignify Center, and, on the other, because while living there she joined the so-called Women Savers in Action project, a self-entrepreneurial program mainly addressed to displaced women. She takes pride showing the diplomas she has obtained by attending this program, and she carefully keeps the books and notes of the courses she has taken.

98 Interview with Gladys, Bogotá, 27 July 2012.
Among other activities, Women Savers in Action includes the design of a project for setting a self-entrepreneurial initiative and Gladys properly speaks about the shop she would like to set if she receives some financial support (see Appendix 3, Photo 8). But yet, as the majority of displaced people, Gladys is aware that by following this program and other antipoverty strategies managed by the national government—such as the antipoverty program Red Unidos (United Network) and the conditional cash transfer program Families in Action—her eligibility to accessing welfare services and specifically social housing programs increases (Camacho et al. 2014).

One of the most publicized initiatives of social housing recently initiated is the so-called Free Housing program, launched by President Santos in 2012. With the promise of providing 100,000 houses at the national level (Gilbert 2014: 253), the Free Housing program is aimed first and foremost at targeting participants of Red Unidos, including those displaced people who have joined this network. It was presented both as a social program but also as one of the strategies to boost the building industry, which is one of the five locomotives of Santos’s economic policy (see chapter 2). Such a purpose is not in itself new, as since the 1970s massive investment in housing programs was defined as a mechanism for creating jobs and thereby boosting economy. At this time, however, such mechanisms were not able to provide housing for the poorest sectors and this, among other factors, fostered the proliferation of informal housing (Gilbert 2004b; Maldonado 2010).

Traditionally, Colombia has focused on encouraging homeownership and has ignored other possibilities as rental housing (Gilbert 2004b). In the 1990s, in the frame of the neoliberal policies introduced with the Washington Consensus, President Gaviria initiated a strategy so-called ABC (Ahorro, Bono, Crédito)—meaning Saving, Subsidy, Loan—according to which the role of the government would be to allocate subsidies to families so that they would be able to buy houses produced by private investors (Ibid.). However, private builders failed to meet the expectations of building affordable housing for the poorest sectors and, as Maldonado points out

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displaced people have not been able to use their subsidies as their lack of income has made them ineligible to access a bank loan.

As a result of Santos’s Free Housing program, it was expected that at least 8,000 units would be developed in Bogotá by 2014 (Maldonado 2012). However, the core of the debate generated around the houses, in which displaced people were caught as scapegoats, was not so much about numbers, but about the location. As an official of the district housing secretariat asserted during an interview: “the issue is that the city has little available land, it is already dense, already well populated” (see also SDH 2015: 28).

The scarcity of land to be urbanized unveiled the political differences between the then Housing Minister and now Santos’s Vice President, Germán Vargas, and the then Mayor Petro. According to the above-mentioned official, they represented two opposing perspectives:

The city administration wants to focus on small projects that can be easily integrated in the city, and hopefully to give them possibilities to participate in small building enterprises which involve social researchers. Instead, for the national government, housing is mostly a real estate product, which should be made rapidly and effectively. However, this effectiveness entails that the builder will reproduce the same model throughout the country. This is the policy rationale because if you see the tender terms, whether it is in La Guajira or in El Chocó, they bear the same stamp.

The city official interviewed did not sidestep the difficulties faced by Petro’s administration in its endeavor to provide a balanced response to tackle both axes of the problem: first, to attend Bogotá’s quantitative housing deficit for the poorest inhabitants which in 2014 was estimated at 66,108 units (SDH 2015: 18); and second, to build sustainable social housing which will not deepen the existing level of socio-spatial segregation, which in her view was highly dependent on the location of the projects.

Consider, for instance, how wealthier populations are generally located where more economic resources, cultural offer, and means of connectivity are available—in other words, in city centers. Therefore the proximity of social housing to the center would allow disadvantaged populations
the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of mixed use of land and social mixing, and would thus facilitate displaced people’s urban integration and improve their quality of life. The story of Gladys, for instance, gives an account of how location is a critical factor for women heads of household who have to care for elderly people and live in peripheral neighborhoods, as they are left with no other options but to resort to low-remunerated informal jobs near the place where they live. As it was demonstrated during the last mayoral debate, the entry into force of free trade agreements has led Bogotá to endure a process of deindustrialization and to heavily depend on the service sector (González 2014: 51). The same debate showed that formal or quality employment is mainly concentrated in the center of the city, as the implementation of the model of centralities and the centripetal forces explained in chapter 5 have not been able to decentralize job opportunities from the city’s core to the peripheries (Ibid.: 45). Such concentration of employment in the center goes in tandem with a low offer of social and health services in the periphery, and both aspects particularly affect population groups in disadvantaged positions, as, for them, to meet these needs entails additional expenses in transport, services and housing (Maldonado 2012). According to the Mayor’s office, in 2012, the poor population spent on average more than two hours a day commuting (Ibid.). Add to this the social stigma associated with areas exclusively designated to house poor populations (Maldonado 2014). Such stigma is a great concern in Colombian society, given both the gap of social inequality and the historical spatial segregation which have rendered chances of social encounters between people belonging to different social classes scarce (Ibid.).

The POT proposed by Maldonado in 2012 tackled some of these challenges, as she flagged the need to incorporate mixed uses of land and social mixing as main criteria of Bogotá’s fight against socio-spatial segregation. Seeking to implement those criteria, Maldonado’s POT focused on the revitalization of the center, which she defended as a way of providing available space for social housing while avoiding further extension of Bogotá’s urban margin. In spatial and
technical terms, to dismiss this strategy turned out to be difficult for its opponents since it was undeniable that Bogotá’s density was uneven (i.e., high population density in peripheral neighborhoods, particularly in poor areas of informal origin, decreasing density in the center expelling its inhabitants) (Lewin 2013; see Appendix 4, Map 5). In addition, it would provide the opportunity to partially bridge the city’s gap of social housing.

However, this strategy sparked a political clash between the Mayor’s office and the national Housing Minister, through which economic terms and class biases achieved the status of common sense. Indeed, Maldonado’s plan for the center’s re-densification would have made a dent in the process of gentrification, as it would reverse the dynamic through which the city center has been consolidated as a middle- and upper-class area, and the Southern and Southwestern skirts of the city as the areas left for the poor. But indeed, the center’s re-densification would also have implied to build social housing in expensive lands, and to oblige owners of vacant plots to sell their lots to the city (El Espectador 2012b). Her POT, and particularly her idea of developing social housing in the center for displaced people, was fiercely criticized by the Housing Minister, as they collided with his intention to develop large-scale social housing projects extending the limits of the city’s urban perimeter.

One of these projects was a free housing program that the Housing Minister sought to build in what is known as Campo Verde, a development which would contribute to urban sprawl into the South. Plans to urbanize these lands located in Bosa, at the South of Kennedy, existed at least since 2004. However, in 2014, a court injunction prohibited further urbanization following technical studies that asserted that 57% of the area was at high risk of flooding (Pava 2016; El Espectador 2014). Those studies were conducted in 2013 after another social housing development so-called El Recreo—also located in Bosa—promoted by Peñalosa’s first administration suffered severe flooding in 2011 (Ibid; Pinzón 2016; Maldonado 2016; Valbuena 2011).
Therefore, as many voices claimed, developing Campo Verde in Bosa would mean to allocate thousands of displaced families and other disenfranchised groups in lands classified with high flood risk. Despite the evidence and dismissing the judicial decision, in June 2016—that is, six months after the entering into office of Peñalosa’s second administration—the vice-President Vargas and Peñalosa’s Housing Secretary announced that “housing has come back in Bogotá” and resumed the construction of social housing in Campo Verde (Maldonado 2016). It is expected that 6,129 housing units will be built by 2017, 50% of which will be assigned to displaced families as a means of reparation (El Tiempo 2016b).

But the extent to which access to housing in peripheral neighborhoods such as El Recreo will actually enfranchise IDPs’ right to the city and therefore the possibility to overcome their victimization is still an open question. In what follows I revisit this spatial location, striving to identify some clues about IDPs’ concerns regarding access to housing there. Although real, the risk of flooding and of spatial confinement resulting from inhabiting spatially segregated areas might pale vis-à-vis IDPs’ uncertainty of having a place of their own.

6.4 Peripheral Survivors, Depoliticized Inhabitants, and Illegitimate Dwellers

In 2012, I had the chance to visit El Recreo when I interviewed Janet who had recently moved from Suba to one of the houses affected by floods. Janet was born in Cauca, and her forced displacement was triggered in 1985 after the murder of her father, a local government official who died at the hands of an illegal armed group. Two years after, the same armed actors who committed this murder sought to force Janet to join their group, and that is why she was obliged to flee. Before coming to Bogotá, Janet and her family tried to resettle in various small towns, but she repeatedly received threats. Although Janet has not achieved economic stability despite many years of trying, it is in Bogotá that she found the anonymity she could not find in any other place, as this was where the threats stopped.

99 Interview with Janet, Bogotá, December 3, 2012.
Janet and her family have also lived in numerous neighborhoods of Bogotá, and two months before I interviewed her, they were evicted from *Suba* for nonpayment of rent. Their eviction was issued by a judge, and as they had a newborn baby, they were advised by state officials that they would risk losing custody of their sons, their baby, and an adolescent unless they were able to provide housing for them. Janet received legal support from the *Dignify Center of Suba*, but the center’s officials could neither provide her with economic support nor could they stop her eviction. However, she refers to them with gratitude and, despite not living in *Suba* anymore, she remains in contact with these officials. Yet, she regrets that those centers do not count with material or economic means to help displaced families to meet their basic needs. Fortunately, after the eviction, Janet’s friend offered her and her family a room in her house in *El Reque*, and that is how they moved from *Suba* in the very North to *Bosa* in the very South of Bogotá.

While living in *Suba*, Janet took part in the same public demonstration that Gladys did. But she regrets that, at the moment when she was evicted, none of the leaders or colleagues of this demonstration were there to give her support. IDPs’ demonstrations are important in order to pressure the government regarding housing solutions, Janet asserts, but still she does not totally trust the leaders of these actions. In her view, they use the displaced population in order to advance their own interests and, specifically, to gain political positions. She especially regrets that while these leaders collect signatures and data from displaced people, and thus claim to represent them, they do not give any feedback about the meetings they might have had with local or central authorities.

Like Gladys, Janet also participates in the *Red Unidos* program, and some days before the interview, she also registered her sons to the cash transfer program *Families in Action*. Besides the economic support that her family might receive, Janet expects that their belonging to these programs will allow her adolescent son to be exempted from compulsory military service, a dispensation granted to the sons of displaced families. In order to obtain any governmental
support, Janet has had to spend quite some time on bureaucratic procedures, and now that she is living in *El Recreo*, she has to spend more time and money in commuting. However, the decentralization of administrative procedures and the opening of new *Dignify Centers* by the Mayor’s office throughout the city will hopefully help her to make these procedures in *Bosa*. Although her husband does not have a permanent job, according to Janet, he occasionally has the opportunity to work on an informal basis, and therefore she is the one who is in charge of dealing with bureaucratic procedures.

More than being an exception, it is increasingly common that displaced women as Janet play a visible role in the public sphere. On the one hand, by a small margin, women represent the majority of the displaced population, but in addition, they are the majority among IDP adults and they are overrepresented as heads of households (Meertens 2012: 6). Reflecting on the stories of displaced women she has witnessed, social researcher and feminist activist Ramírez speaks about the reasons why, once living in urban areas, women turn towards new roles in the public sphere:

> Many women flee from war without having had a prior community organization experience. They just flee because their partner has been murdered or forcibly disappeared. They do not understand why it did happen, asking themselves “Why me?” So, from the displacement, they get to know what their partners used to do, for instance, that they were community leaders. Forced displacement is a drama, a tragedy, and behind these histories there are harsh realities, the anguish of having lost everything and come to live in the poorest neighborhoods. But perhaps, they suddenly realize that they did not know about their partners’ public life. … Women might not have taken part in any civil organization, and they might have been homemakers. But somehow, it is the circumstances of displacement that force them to meet with other women, and to move forward in awareness-raising processes. These women are survivors. They do not let their children starve to death, they do whatever it takes.100

Ramírez’s narrative encompasses a large range of strategies women adopt in cities in order to meet the needs of their families and their own. She refers to the work that women such as Gladys carry out as domestic workers, the leadership roles played by some displaced women, and

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100 Maria Eugenia Ramírez, July 2012.
to the ways in which—in their attempt to access welfare services—many displaced women become a bridge between their families and governmental agencies. A broader scope that takes into consideration various strategies of survival taken up by displaced women in public sphere opens a window to understand the reason why women have become the entry point for policies and programs addressed to the displaced population (Meertens 2012: 6). However, this focus of the state and NGOs on IDP women has not always existed and does not constitute an advantage per se.

More often than not, as Ramírez underlines, these programs are designed with a family-oriented approach that reinforces women’s subordination and does not consider women’s needs. Specifically, those programs have been conflated with antipoverty policies, thereby disregarding particular needs and conditions of the displaced population. Common starting points of such family-oriented approach is, first, that women’s natural role concerns care and reproductive activities and, second, to presume that the heterosexual nuclear family is the basic unit of society. As a result, such programs place most of the responsibilities associated with childrearing on women without questioning how these responsibilities are actually distributed within households. This is the case of Families in Action and Red Unidos, whose functioning depends on women’s maternal roles, as for instance on their ability to secure children’s school attendance and regular medical check-ups. Speaking from her experience giving support to women’s grassroots organizations, Ramírez adds that for NGOs and the government, it has taken time to recognize that, in many cases, women were the ones who were playing leadership roles in IDPs’ organizations, as they assumed that the natural leaders were all male. As Ramirez recalls, it took a while to make NGOs understand that female leaders needed financial support too.

Unlike the stories revisited in the first part of this chapter, the trajectories drawn by Janet and Gladys might not illustrate leadership experiences, but they reflect other strategies women

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101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
victims of forced displacement undertake in their path to become survivors. One of the most important means of reparation mentioned in the narrative of these women is access to housing, as for them and their families having a safe place to live is a pressing need. Other forms of reparation, such as participation in the construction of historical memory or in truth-telling processes are rather almost absent from their narratives. But as I could observe, it is a common feature of the perspective of those displaced people who are less politically involved.

The hope of Janet and her family is to find in Bosa the spatial and economic stability they could not find in Suba. As she told me, because of the improvement in transport infrastructure, public spaces, and the development of commercial centers in Suba, rental fees have disproportionately increased and that is one of the reasons why Janet’s family could no longer afford the rent. In order to have a better sense of Janet’s narrative, it is useful to recall that Suba’s was administratively annexed to Bogotá in 1954, as since the 1950s its rural landscape has undergone informal processes of urbanization. In the 1990s, some areas of Suba were declared zone of expansion for the building of social housing and in this frame, compensation funds—known in Colombia as cajas de compensación—developed two large-scale social housing projects. The location of these projects was an appealing factor, as the North of Bogotá is linked to an imaginary of better class status vis-à-vis the South. Add to this that many private schools are located in green spaces of the North. Therefore, attracted by those conditions, families with higher class status than Suba’s average came to live in what were aimed to be social housing projects (Beuf 2012: 482). Thus, nowadays Suba shows imbrications of low and low-middle class with middle- and upper-class neighborhoods. However, as the experience of Gladys reflects, recent architectural developments and increasing social class upgrading has made life more expensive in Suba, thereby making it more difficult for poor populations—and in particular for IDPs—to remain living in Suba.
Unlike Suba’s social mixing, Bosa’s physical transformation taking place since 2000 has not brought about changes in its social class status. Through these years, Bosa has basically been a place for the building of projects aimed at housing the poor. If we add to this long-established imaginaries and stigmatization of the South as a place for poor populations, we can understand why, rather than overturning those representations, Bogotá’s rationale of urban planning has worked to consolidate Bosa in particular—and the South in general—as low-class places. This is despite the physical urban conditions of new Southern neighborhoods which, when compared with the surrounding houses generated through informal process, show at first glance better standards of urban planning (Gilbert 2009: 432).

For instance, while those that emerged as informal neighborhoods have been urbanized through property-by-property development without leaving space for public amenities or green areas, new housing projects such as El Recreo have required the drawing up of an urban plan. This legal requirement is aimed at guaranteeing that those neighborhoods are better planned in terms of access roads, availability of green spaces and bicycle lanes, proximity to schools, medical facilities and various forms of public space. Add to this that these plans reflect a specific Cartesian map distinct from the unrulled design of informal neighborhoods (Gilbert 2009: 428; Campo 2012). But worth mentioning, the Cartesian distribution of space is not just a tool to achieve spatial density and order. Beyond aesthetic concerns, it also allows private developers to maximize their cost–benefit relationship (Kingwell 2008). Indeed, El Recreo includes 11,623 social housing units developed over 115.4 hectares and houses about 50,000 people (Campo 2012: 23–29). Emerging simultaneously with social amenities and new transport facilities, neighborhoods such as El Recreo are just a piece of a whole spiral of urbanization. This spiral, discussed in chapter 5, draws a centripetal dynamic which, impelled by the deployment of public spaces, has brought into Southern areas material and symbolic flows as well as population gentrified from the city center.
The governmental promise embedded in this urban rationale has been to foster a distributive form of social justice, and to improve people’s life standards. Indeed, it is commonly asserted by political elites that the renovation and creation of public spaces throughout the city have worked as a social equalizer. In other words, the widespread belief is that in Bogotá the greater the number of public spaces—such as transport and social facilities, parks and monumental buildings—the fairer the provision of social services, and the more efficient allocation of welfare benefits and opportunities.

This public space policy has been portrayed as a means to produce a homogeneous city by, allegedly, bringing into peripheral areas the good city that prevailed in the center and Northern areas. In such a way, public space in Bogotá has been turned into an object of happiness, into a container of the expectations and hopes that people in peripheral areas have for a better life. However, insofar as this distributive spatial policy is guided by economic criteria, it relegates social concerns to the background and, particularly, insofar as this urban rationale did not tackle deep-rooted socio-spatial hierarchies (i.e., class, race, location), the city perpetuates socio-spatial inequalities. In so doing, the city’s urban rationale is unable to bring about upward social mobility that does not consign displaced people to live in poverty nor increases their vulnerability.

Maldonado anticipated the shortcomings of Bogotá’s distributive socio-spatial justice as she calls into question the current national housing policy:

What matters here is [to build] large suburbs in peripheral areas. But to concentrate 5,000, 6,000, or 8,000 households in a peripheral area is very difficult; it is very complicated in terms of habitat and conditions of the people’s future coexistence. …. To build a project which only targets one type of household generates social homogeneity and this is not convenient. It is diversity what makes a city democratic, equitable, and based on solidarity (2014).

This approach to social housing has thus failed to take into account cultural and economic needs of the poorest sectors, including, the meanings that they attach to housing (Maldonado 2007: 329). For these populations, and particularly for women who risk being confined to reproductive
roles, home is a place where they frequently consider undertaking an income-generating activity. However, implicit in the model of housing promoted by the government is a clear division of the reproductive and productive spheres which does not match this reality. Instead, such model of housing entails the belief that the norm is the rational economic man, who is able to maximize their income by freely and rationally choosing in the consumption channels offered in the market economy, thereby leaving aside factors related to kinship, taste, culture, or individual and spatial constraints.

According to the ethnographic work developed by Liliana Campo (2012), the flood risk in El Recreo is one of the factors triggering social conflict. But just as problematic is the scarcity of local trade (i.e., convenience store, bakery, small grocery store, vegetable and fruit shop), because the design of the houses does not allow the dwellers to accommodate this kind of business or any other sort of family’s productive activity. Those activities are important not only for the families willing to develop self-employment initiatives, but also for almost all dwellers since—more often than not—many of them make their living in the informal economy and depend on the low incomes they earn on a daily basis. So, they cannot afford to buy in the nearest mall on a regular basis (Campo 2012: 48).

Nonetheless, faced with the prospect of receiving a house from the government’s free housing program, displaced people do not seem to be too concerned about these disadvantages or the perspective of living in a peripheral or flood risk area. An aggregate of the different answers they gave to the question “where would you prefer to live if you have the chance to receive a house from the government?” suggests that most of them do not have a preference about it. Fanny, for instance, whose story introduced this chapter, answers enthusiastically:
“If they give me a house, I don’t care where it is. If the government tells me that they provide me housing, wherever the place is, I don’t care. The only thing that matters to me is to access housing.”

Given the uncertainty of having a regular income sufficient to cover a month’s rent, for Fanny as for many displaced people, the program of free houses represents an enormous opportunity to overcome such an economic burden. In 2012, Fanny was 33 years old and—as mentioned above—following the murder of her husband, she was dispossessed of the land on which they had a ranch and worked together near Tumaco. At first glance, Fanny might share the same needs as those experienced by the poor or other marginalized populations in Bogotá. However, her condition of displacement, rural background, low educational level, the fact of being a head of household and of having an Afro-Colombian appearance entail for her further vulnerabilities.

For instance, Fanny inhabits an *inquilinato* (a house with several tenants) in which she and her sister rent two rooms, where both live with their three respective children. A significant portion of the income they earn by working informally in domestic jobs goes towards the rent of the rooms. However, they did not appear to have a secure tenancy as they must follow strict, and unfair, rules fixed by the homeowners.

“Where we live, we have to pay the utilities, especially water and energy, by head, as they say. So for instance, my sister and I, we each pay for four persons, and the owner for his own family… but they have hot water while instead we have to take pure cold-water showers”

Fanny tells this anecdote and others without any trace of resentment. Instead, she asserts that their landlords are patient and that she urges the children not to make noise. Her words resonate with those of Gladys, who—as previously mentioned—asserts that tenants “have to stick to the rules set by the homeowners” and meekly says, “When you live in a rented home, you are here today and there tomorrow.” Yet, Fanny’s and Gladys’s narratives reveal mixed feelings, swinging

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103 Fanny, September 2012.
104 Ibid.
between thankfulness towards their landlords and the fear of having to look for another place and move again. For instance, Fanny asserts:

Nowadays, if you want to rent a home, you have to be recommended. And if you have many children, they do not want to rent it to you. As with anything, what they ask first is, “how many are you?” And right away, the age of the children or if the kids are very young. Sometimes they put announcements saying, “For rent but without children.”

Curiously, Maritza, a displaced woman leader whose story I introduced before, also referred to the same announcement. However, unlike Fanny, Maritza adopts a certain defiant attitude toward such ads. To be sure, her leadership role as well as other conditions allows Maritza to speak from a less subordinated position. Thus Maritza asserts that she and her friends have turned the advertisement “For rent without children” into a mockery by ironically saying, “It is fine if they rent the house without children, we will bring ours!”

Thus, despite sharing the condition of being displaced persons and others such as age, rural background, sexual orientation, with regard to other subject positions Fanny and Maritza are not located at the same level. That shapes differently Fanny’s and Maritza’s urban experiences, and in Bogotá those conditions locate them in different positions of oppression.

Maritza was raising her daughter as a single mother and lost her father, a human rights activist, in the armed conflict. But later on in Bogotá, Maritza could undertake a job as ‘civic guide’ for the so-called program Bogotá Misión (see chapter 5). In addition, her affiliation to feminist organizations has given her the chance to experience feminist consciousness-raising and to share in collective spaces with other displaced women one another’s experiences. Furthermore, unlike Fanny, Maritza does not look like belonging to any racial or ethnic minority and some years ago she met her partner who is not himself a displaced person. In her path to carve an advantageous position, Maritza has drawn on the support she has found in other displaced women, in feminist organizations, and on what she describes as her rebellious nature. From this position and with

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105 Ibid.
the knowledge she gained as civic guide about the city’s spatial order, Maritza has been able to
tame Bogotá’s urban space.

Fanny, in contrast, has had another experience of Bogotá’s urban life. Fanny has been widowed
by the war, and after four years in this city, her kids frequently evoke the time when they were
living in the farm in Nariño. In their view, it is because of the murder of their father that they are
not living there anymore, and Fanny adds that she and her children still suffer from Bogotá’s
cold weather and spend most of their time indoors. So, with the exception of the Dignify Center,
references to public spaces such as parks, libraries or community centers are scarce in Fanny’s
narrative. Although she asserts that she has not been discriminated against because of her race,
her nephews have undergone this experience. However, Fanny does not define herself as an
Afro-Colombian person, nor does she refer to any ethnic or racial subject position. This
standpoint, however, seems to reflect a continuum of her life in Nariño, where she used to
devote her time to reproductive and productive activities but not to political or community ones.
So unlike Maritza, Fanny has not belonged to any particular IDP organization, and although
there are several IDP groups organized along ethnic and racial lines, Fanny has not had the
chance—nor perhaps the curiosity—to hang around with them.

Some of these experiences give us a clue as to why Fanny and Maritza might have appropriated
the city’s urban space so differently. Certainly many other relevant elements, perhaps related to
their inner subjectivity, are not possible to grasp or might not be visible through the
ethnographic approach I applied. Indeed, Fanny’s and Maritza’s experiences may be interpreted
as illustrating very opposite paths of urban displacement. However, I argue that their different
appropriation of the city is, to a great extent, shaped by the ways in which the city’s rationale of
urban planning has enabled them, or not, to develop a political subjectivity. Specifically, Fanny’s
and Maritza’s uneven urban experiences unveil some of the counterproductive effects resulting
from the practices through which the city uses its public space as an equalizer of class difference,
while leaving petrified spatial layers of inequality unquestioned (e.g., south-poor-mestizo, north-rich-white) or even consolidating them.

It is precisely in this sense that Young criticizes perspectives about justice that define it through a distributive paradigm. In her view—on which I build my analysis—when social justice is formulated exclusively in distributive terms, it “entails applying a logic of distribution to social goods which are not material things or measurable quantities” (1990: 24–25). When this happens, non-material things such as power, rights, self-respect, and opportunities are seen as static rather than as a “function of social relations and processes” (Ibid.: 16). Therefore, such distributive understating of justice fails to call into question the social relations of domination and oppression through which inequalities are produced. Embracing Young’s critique, I argue that the use of public space to mobilize a distributive paradigm of justice “colludes” to depoliticize the citizenry as it encourages people to see themselves as mere consumers and recipients, and leads them to evaluate the government’s performance according to the resources and services it is able to deliver in the peripheral centralities they inhabit (Ibid.: 71). Some of these goods and services are likely to match the wants that Bogotanos identify as bringing them happiness (i.e., health services, education, mobility, modernity). And, mirroring the tautological functioning of happiness (Ahmed 2010a), the public spaces though which those wants are delivered are seen as objects of happiness as they bear the promise of proximity to these wants. Needless to mention that, since most of these public services are provided through outsourcing agreements, the redistribution of those services in the periphery runs in parallel with neoliberal policies such as social services’ privatization and the growth of private contractors (see also Young 1990: 71). But especially, insofar as the city equates justice with distribution, it precludes efforts aimed at providing displaced people access to mechanisms of transformative justice. Such distributive dynamic brought about perverse consequences: namely, to depoliticize this population and to plunge them into a position of oppression joining the ranks of the poor population inhabiting
the peripheries, and second, to deny them the possibility of integrating Bogotá’s urban space with the same legitimacy as their fellow citizens.

6.5 Killing the Joy of a Happy City

“We don’t want Black people in this neighborhood,” stated a death threat addressed in 2012 to a group of Afro-Colombian families in situation of forced displacement who were at that time living in Soacha, a neighboring town of Bogotá. Among those who received the threat was Chela, a woman head of household with seven children, whose story of displacement began in 2010 after the paramilitaries forced her to flee her land near Tumaco in the Pacific Coast. According to Chela, the death threat they received in Soacha sparked after a relative was murdered there, and Chela’s family and friends celebrated his funeral in a community center, following their Afro-Colombian traditions, rather than in a funeral parlor. Following such threat, 20 Afro-Colombian families were forced to leave Soacha, and so too Chela was forced to move again and to find another place in Bogotá in which to live with her family.

The funeral traditions that sparked this episode of forced intra-urban displacement fall within the kind of practices through which Afro-Colombian people exert their right to the city (see Romero 2014; Rojas et al. 2014). Specifically, the performance of these funeral practices in Bogotá could be interpreted as a means through which displaced people appropriate the urban space and participate in shaping the places they come to inhabit. Unfortunately, since Bogotanos’ growing desire for civility and spatial homogeneity has given rise to the emergence of rigid identities (see chapter 4), some cultural practices, even though slightly different from the hegemonic ones, are somehow turned by the locals into ‘other.’ Especially, insofar as these traditions are carried out by minority or newcomer populations such as displaced Black people, they are interpreted as outsider practices that menace neighborhood homogeneity and coexistence.

106 Chela and her daughter, November 2012.
For Claudia Mosquera, professor of social sciences at the National University of Colombia, “the ways in which Black Colombian culture begins to seek its own place in the urban neighborhood space” could be described as “multiculturalism from below” (Garzón forthcoming). With this term, Mosquera distinguishes the cultural transmission carried out by Afro-Colombian people through their everyday practices from other cultural flows whose transfer into urban spaces are mediated by institutional channels (Ibid.). Mosquera adds another feature of “multiculturalism from below” which might shed light on the dynamics through which spatial practices undertaken by Afro-Colombian displaced people may lead to conflict in Bogotá’s neighborhoods:

Many Afro-Colombians who come to live in Bogotá as forcibly displaced persons are not willing to change something they see as their own cultural being: their ways of being, of speaking, the way they relate to others, the tone of their voice. They enter in the neighborhoods with this clear in their minds.

Mosquera’s perspective draws attention to the extent to which Afro-Colombians spatialize certain everyday practices as a way of counteracting the forces through which mestizaje permeates their lives in Bogotá’s urban space. Thus, mirroring the point I already made when I analyzed the experience of Yovana Sáenz, multiculturalism from below works as a form of resistance. It is enacted through attempts aimed at counteracting the homogenizing forces that, as Sáenz would say, push Afro-Colombian people to “fit in to the city.”

The cruelty of the intra-urban displacement experienced by Chela’s family, however, illustrates that the extent to which Afro-Colombian people are able to participate in transforming urban space might be at best ephemeral, and so are their possibilities to exert the right to the city. While living in the periphery, displaced people might undertake strategies in order to disrupt these dominant uses of public urban space, which they perceive as being oppressive or as seeking to foster their cultural homogenization. However, IDPs’ counter-strategies take place in the fissures of time left by the hegemonic population, that is, in a time-space that—borrowing de

107 Interview with Claudia Mosquera Rosero-Labbé, Bogotá, December 21, 2012.
108 Ibid.
109 Yovana Sáenz, October 2012.
Certeau’s term—belongs to the “proper” (1984: 29). Despite the attempts of Afro-Colombian displaced people to leave their fingerprint in Bogotá’s urban space, everyday uses of public space and the meanings attached to it are likely to be dominated by those who, even sharing IDPs’ class condition, are perceived as more legitimate. Because of their urban background or their White-mestizo appearance, and particularly because they do not bear the stigma of having been displaced by the war, long-term inhabitants are likely to exert their power over those who represent or perform some form of cultural dissonance.

Thus, inasmuch as displaced people’s spatial forms of resistance get consigned to the fissures of time-space occurring in peripheral spaces, their potential to bring about a change in the ethical-political relation with their fellow citizens, and especially with the ruling authorities, is likely to be suffocated. This, on the one hand, is a consequence of the model of centralities as it participates in reinforcing the concentration of the political power and decision making in the center, whereas it reserves for Bogotá’s periphery functions related to distributive justice. The main focus of this paradigm—as explained above—lies on the allocation and provision of services and resources, without calling into question spatial hierarchies, such as south-poor-mestizo vs. north-rich-white, through which spatial segregation and oppression are kept in place. In this landscape, for resistance practices the probabilities to make a substantial change in the uses and meanings of urban space which disrupt enrooted forms of oppression depend on their potential to find an echo in the very city center, as it continues to be the locus of Bogotá’s political power.

Indeed, if legal instruments related to the recognition and protection of displaced people such as the Victims’ Law or the Auto 092 have seen the light of the day, it is to a great extent because of the cross-network built between IDP grassroots and other victim organizations, NGOs, and activist groups which extends its action throughout the city’s urban space. Although the implementation of these legal instruments is an ongoing project, their approval demonstrates that not all IDPs’ resistance practices are ephemeral or doomed to disappear, as with the fissures
of time-space in which they were built. Quite the contrary, these acts have continuity inasmuch as they stretch out spatially, liking up organizations of the center with local ones in the periphery. They bring about changes over time in the habitual practices on which the relations between IDPs and their others rely. So in that sense, the multiculturalism from below and other resistance practices performed by displaced people inhabiting positions of oppression, and particularly IDP women, are not fated to be subsumed by the disciplinary yoke that the city’s spatial order brings about.

 Nonetheless, one of the major hurdles for displaced people to overcome is the risk of being caught in their own depoliticization, which operates through the spatial deployment in the peripheral centralities of a justice reduced to redistribution. Echoing Engin Isin’s as well as Young’s critique on distributive justice, in this paradigm of justice “actors … are already produced” and the same goes for the way in which they relate to others (Isin 2008: 37; Young 1990: 27). In Bogotá, due to the prevalence of this distributive paradigm of justice, displaced people are likely to be equated with the urban poor population and denied access to mechanisms of transformative justice. This is reflected in the eyes of officials as much as in the eyes of long-term Bogotanos, since in both perspectives, displaced people’s subjectivity is reduced to that of the poor. Hence the need for displaced people to disrupt habitual relations in order to be recognized as political actors with specific needs, rights, and claims.

 To envisage a scenery in which displaced people carry out spatial practices of resistance, through which they constitute themselves as political subjects and bring about transformations that would stand the test of time, suggests certain issues. For instance, how do displaced people become subjects of justice other than the distribution of resources and services? How do they achieve to differentiate their claims from those needs of the poor population and to become claimants of transformative means of justice? And what conditions do IDPs’ acts of resistance
require so as to bring about a rupture in the practices and habits that deny them political
subjectivity?

One way to approach this analysis would be to take as a starting point the narrative of Claudia,
whose story I introduced in chapter 5. I met Claudia during a workshop taking place in FASOL
in the Kennedy area. This was one among other meetings through which the women of FASOL
were reflecting on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and, specifically, on the ways in
which the armed conflict have affected their lives in their neighborhood. At that time, Claudia
and her mother had moved to Soacha, nevertheless, both of them continued attending FASOL
women’s meetings in Kennedy. Following that workshop, I interviewed Claudia at least twice, one
in the city center and another in Soacha.

During the interview I conducted in the center, Claudia drew my attention to a nearby church
recounting that she took part in an attempt to occupy this place. Shortly after, Claudia added that
she also participated in the occupation of the Third Millennium Park, which took place in 2009.
Before going any further, it must be said that FASOL by no means encourages or mediates any
public space occupations. As I will discuss later, FASOL and the organizations to which it is
related (e.g., Pacific Route of Women, Women’s House) prefer to stick to the law in all public
demonstrations they are involved.

Whereas the first public space occupation mentioned by Claudia was barely noticed by the public
opinion as it was rapidly dismantled by the authorities, with the occupation of the Third
Millennium Park, displaced people managed to attract media attention, as well as the attention of
politicians and their fellow citizens. There are several factors that explain why displaced people
achieved through the latter occupation to break into the everyday life of Bogotanos and to turn
themselves into the killjoys of a process of urban rejuvenation allegedly aimed at bringing about
citizens’ happiness.
First, since its development in the 2000s, the Third Millennium Park has become a landmark of Bogotá’s rejuvenation, as it marked the abrupt initiation of this process that implied the gentrification of about 10,000 dwellers. Second, the park is located just a few blocks from the Presidential Palace and other important buildings of political significance, and third, it constitutes a backbone of the functioning of the TransMilenio system. Thus, spatial features and meanings attached to the Third Millennium Park make this place a perfect platform for the displaced population to make their voices heard.

But besides that, along with the almost six months that this demonstration lasted, displaced people were able to gather about 1,000 IDP families camping in the park, making it one of the longest and most crowded public space occupations ever carried out in Bogotá’s center. According to Claudia, the majority of the participants who initiated the occupation were living in the periphery; therefore, they gathered in a place in the South and walked together towards the center until reaching the park and the Plaza Bolivar (Bogotá’s main political square in front of the Presidential Palace). The first day, they counted 1,350 displaced people but as the days went passing by, the number of demonstrators grew. Claudia underlines that they were spatially organized, divided in two groups: White-mestizo people on one side and on the other Black population, but she emphasizes their common interests by asserting “we were all asking the same: humanitarian aid, access to housing, and job opportunities.”

The sequence of events soon showed that when it comes to attention to displaced people, the denial of their rights and the delay of responses to meet their needs have become the norm rather than the exception. In accordance with President Uribe’s denial of the armed conflict, and consequently with his claim according to which forced displacement did not exist but a “generic process of immigration,” the then national government remained almost indifferent (CODHES 2012: 2; Idler and Paladini-Adell 2015). That despite the claims of the then leftist Bogotá’s

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110 Claudia, September 2012.
administration which urged the national government to intervene and asserted that this
demonstration was symptomatic of the humanitarian emergency situation endured by the
displaced population. Nevertheless, in the short term, both positions did not make any
difference, as the city government made clear that displaced people must pursue their claims
through the existing institutional channels and declared that it will not give in to de facto acts
(Maya 2009a). However, fearing that demonstrations like this would multiply throughout the city,
the Mayor’s office finally negotiated with the leaders of the movement in order to end the
occupation and obtain the dismantling of the encampment.

The question of whether and how certain forms and moments of resistance, such as the one
featured by Claudia, can transform habits, customs, or practices through which people relate
with others as ethical-political subjects has been explored by Engin Isin with the concept of acts
of citizenship. This term refers to “collective or individual deeds that rupture social patterns”
(Isin and Nielsen 2008: 2) and through which subjects enact themselves as claimants of justice,
rights, and responsibilities. One of the clues that make acts of citizenship different from other
forms of resistance is that they involve a certain amount of creativity—understood as an
“aspiration to chance” (White 2008: 45)—and of movement over time, opening a path toward
lasting sustainability (see chapter 3).

The first principle which makes a form of resistance constitutes an act of citizenship is that
people can, through this act, turn themselves into “activist citizens” (Isin 2008: 38). In other
words, through these acts, people become actors who, instead of following a pattern of behavior,
break such a pattern or call into question a law, thereby creating their own scene. Those acts
produce both actors who enact themselves as “claimants of rights, justice and responsibilities,”
and also actors who are “answerable to justice against injustice” (Ibid.: 18, 39). These principles
explain why acts of citizenship open a wider window than a distributive paradigm of justice in
disrupting oppressive orders. This holds on the one hand because, besides expanding the
universe of political subjects, acts of citizenship are oriented towards justice understood as a “correction of the asymmetry of proximity” between those close and those far off (Ibid.: 36). This understanding of justice which Isin advocates is not limited to redistribution, but instead brings about a rupture from ingrained hierarchies that sustain systems of oppression and segregation. Hence, acts of citizenship offer a window from which to analyze the possibilities for displaced people to carry out strategies of resistance through which they might be able to enact themselves as political subjects, disrupting an increasingly enrooted system of spatial segregation and bringing about sustainable changes in it.

In fact, the description made by the ruling authorities of the displaced people’s Third Millennium occupancy as a de facto act, along with the national government’s refusal to recognize forced displacement, gives an account of some ruptures produced through this act of citizenship. First, with such a massive gathering in the city’s very center, IDPs sent to the national government a clear reminder and provided to their incredulous fellow citizens direct evidence that they do exist. This ‘wake-up call’ occurred in the face of a growing representation in which their displacement was pictured as an economically motivated migration, rendering their needs interchangeable with those of the poor population. Thus, backed by the mayoral office’s affirmation regarding their humanitarian situation, this multitudinous act broke the hegemonic representational order that dismissed their tragedy and showed that forced displacement exceeded the proportions that the national government would have the citizenry believe.

The second order this act disrupted, which I discuss elsewhere (Garzón forthcoming), is not representational but spatial and legal, and it was brought to the fore by the city administration since it labeled this act as de facto. In other words, with this descriptor, the city administration hinted at the illegitimacy of the act. This emphasizes that the occupancy entailed the refusal of displaced people to seek response to their entitlements and needs in the peripheral centralities, and in accordance with the legal procedures and institutional channels available there. Yet, by
irrupting in the hearth of Bogotá’s political center, displaced people suspended this spatial and legal arrangement which, allegedly, is being set to build a homogeneous city. But in doing so, and insofar as they were able to voice their claims (e.g., job opportunities, access to housing, humanitarian aid), displaced people became more than protesters, they became the killjoys of Bogotá’s happiness. Borrowing, Ahmed (2010a, 2010b: 591), their protest and long presence in the very center was a form of dissent through which this population showed that they did not feel joy in inhabiting a city that is supposed to make everybody happy. Especially, their own claims about unemployment and lack of affordable housing testified of the failures of, and the wounds left by, the urban renewal. They revealed that this process have failed to bring to the peripheries the happy city whose quality of life standards, as are available in the center and in the North, were allegedly being deployed. But besides these failures, with this act IDPs became like a fly in the wound revealing the inability of the distributational spatial justice to dismantle the spatial segmentation south-mestizo-poor vs. north-white-rich.

In fact, it could be asserted that the media coverage illustrated the extent to which the gentrified center and the North of the city were foreign to the ethnic and racial backgrounds of displaced people, who were steadily being confined to the peripheries (Maya 2009b; Zeiderman 2013b). So generally speaking, the occupancy of the Third Millennium Park showed that the vision of justice prompted by the city’s rejuvenation had participated in concentrating the political decision-making in the center while specifically maintaining intact the power through which such socio-spatial hierarchy could be disrupted (Maya 2009b). However, insofar as the city’s ruling authorities were led to negotiate with the demonstrators, displaced people showed that the center of the city had never ceased to be the place where their voices, and those of other subjects occupying subjugated subject positions, have the chance to be heard and bring about change.

Yet, there is also a consensual order interrupted by this act of citizenship. I am referring here to the humanitarian practices through which the Colombian state was supposedly complying with
the legal framework for IDP protection. Despite the rulings issued by the Constitutional Court aimed at enforcing this framework, displaced people’s voices made clear that this system had become rather a consensual bureaucratic apparatus which had made into a habit the denial of the condition of IDP to victims, the delay of humanitarian aid, and had often prevented displaced people’s access to social services. As the then city administration called it, the Third Millennium Park’s occupation was a de facto act, since after all it stood outside the law, but despite that, it was also an act of citizenship (Isin 2008: 35). First, because by performing this act, displaced people turned themselves into political subjects who reacted in the face of injustice. They not only reclaimed the center of the city as a site of political struggle for themselves, but also re-created the political character of public space in general. Second, they disrupted a system of practices in which the dismissal of their needs and delay of social services that were due to them had become the norm (Garzón forthcoming). In so doing, this act created answerable subjects aimed at being responsible for correcting the asymmetry of justice between displaced people’s rights and the actual obligation of others.

As time passed by, the Mayor’s office steadily convinced displaced people to move into a temporary shelter. Claudia recalled having remained almost eight months in the occupation—most of them in the park itself—but her memories of this experience are fraught with a great amount of disappointment, and this explains her decision not to take part in any other occupation of public space. Looking back to the way in which she lived this experience, she asserts with heartbreaking simplicity:

“It is as if you hang up a mop and you wait for the cold to dry it, for the wind to dry it, and then for the sun too. Because we were there, exposed to the sun, rain and wind.”

Claudia seems to have had a close relationship with the leaders of the occupation, as during her storytelling she often named them. However, she adds that the city authorities negotiated with

111 Ibid.
the leaders, so that in the end “they [the leaders] obtained better benefits than the rest of us.”\footnote{Ibid.} Claudia’s assessment about public occupancies and her disappointment give a sense of both the power relations at play and the weak articulation among the organizations that produced this act. However, as mentioned before, Claudia has also participated in other kinds of manifestations, some of which are rather mobilized through feminist networks.

From the perspective of the latter, as the member of the Women’s House, Osana Medina, asserts, de facto acts and long-term occupations are not the kinds of strategies on which they draw.\footnote{Osana Medina, October 2012.} This does not imply that when it comes to make the victims’ voices heard feminist organizations have renounced to use public spaces as a political platform. Most NGOs and feminist grassroots organizations such as FASOL, MOVICE and the Pacific Route of Women prefer to stick to the law, and their events are specifically delimited in time and space. Because their public demonstrations involve performances full of symbolism, they achieve to disrupt other orders and, particularly, imaginaries about the conflict and cultural modernity. For instance, Blanquita referred during the interview to the so-called galerías de memoria through which the survivors of victims of state crime aim at recovering the memory of their loved ones.

These acts could be depicted as art interventions performed in public space, in which the victims’ survivors collect and exhibit personal belongings, pictures, printed narratives and other objects that speak about the victims’ lives. A small card printed with pictures of Blanquita’s daughter and a poem she wrote to her was one of the objects that Blanquita shared in the gallery of memory she performed in remembrance of her daughter (see Appendix 3). Besides this and other memorial objects, during the act Blanquita shared with the attendees a little bit of chirrinche, the traditional alcoholic beverage of the Wayuu Indigenous community. While for her this gesture seems to be a bearer of memory, as Blanquita recalls, it caused certain cultural dissonance among the attendees:
“I received some critiques, but I shared that because it is a Wayuu tradition. … This ritual was to remember what my daughter used to do, who she was… and she was a cheerful girl, who loved to dance, to share, to spend time with children and young people.”

Blanquita’s reflections take us back to the survivors’ refusal to let the lives of their loved ones be disposable. But through these acts, Blanquita aims to recover not only her daughter’s intimate subjectivity but also her political one:

For instance with the pictures of my daughter and other young people, we want people to know how they were assassinated, how they were taken away from us. We want to raise awareness among people about the violence of the conflict. We want people to know that there have been massacres, forced disappearance, and torture. And with that we are demanding justice, truth, and the end of impunity. This is what we do in MOVICE, and we want to show the country that victims do exist.

As acts of citizenship, these memorial performances turn not only the victims but also the survivors into political subjects, by which I mean into subjects entitled to transformative means of a justice which would allow them the right to memory, truth and, importantly, a time-space to restore the dignity of the victims. Even without intending it, the victims’ survivors become also killjoys, who reclaim the public space as a place to represent their knowledge of the armed conflict. In so doing, they reinstate the public space’s political function that the urban renewal process and the discourse of the happy city strive to deny.

There is indeed continuity between this range of acts, and this despite the fact that some of them, such as public space occupations, are dismissed for being de facto acts, whereas the kind of acts performed by organizations with a larger network support are less likely to be framed in this category. The participation of Claudia in both kinds of acts illustrates the extent to which less organized or local movements also build on the consciousness-raising undertaken by feminist NGOs and grassroots organizations. And the same happens the other way around. In fact, as Medina asserts, the work of feminist organizations has been crucial in order to make visible particular needs of women, which as she emphasizes are often overlooked in local

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114 Blanca Nubia Díaz, July 2012.
115 Ibid.
Hence, although the disappointment of Claudia gives an account of some of the power relations operating within these organizations, the debate concerning displaced women’s access to housing—discussed in chapter 5—is a good example of how feminist movements have achieved to position women’s strategic needs within the agendas of IDP local organizations.

Worth mentioning, acting within the law has not prevented women’s organizations network to undertake creative acts. Quite the contrary, acts led by organizations such as the Pacific Route of Women and the Women’s House have been able to disrupt cultural urban imaginaries, involving performances that draw on symbolic practices (see Appendix 1). In their acts, the focus on women’s bodies to resignify them as a political site and call attention to the disproportionate effects of the conflict on women’s lives has been reflected in rituals that involve naked body-painted women (Sánchez 2006: 71). In the words of the Pacific Route of Women: “The body is a text in which anyone and everyone, friends and strangers, can read the effects of war, marginalization, and exploitation” (RPM 2006: 133). Women wearing black in silent protests are also a symbol of the Pacific Route of Women. With this color, this movement has sought to signify its pacific resistance and its call upon the government to engage in a negotiated solution to the conflict (RPM 2003: 150). Since the creation of the movement in 1996, such claim has been bound up with their demands for women’s participation in peace negotiations and in peacebuilding processes (Sánchez 2006: 71) (see Appendix 5, Figure 2).

Another symbolic form on which the Pacific Route has drawn from the beginning is the so-called Cantaoras de Alabados. These are Afro-Colombian women from the Pacific zone, whose a cappella songs were originally performed in funeral rituals among their communities (Wabgou et al. 2012). Their participation in public demonstrations in Bogotá testifies to the women’s movements’ attempt to give room to traditional, but non-hegemonic, cultural expressions and to break up myths about the war and the role of women in it. At the time when their first

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116 Osana Medina, October 2012
appearances in Bogotá took place in the early 2000s, Cantaoras de Alabaos were barely known among the locals. But now, they have become a sort of marker of Colombian multiculturalism. Indeed, their participation in 2016 in official events related to the peace agreement can be interpreted as conveying the Colombian government’s recognition of the disproportionate number of victims of the war among Black communities. I cannot help thinking, however, that funeral songs performed by Cantaoras, which an increasing part of the political and cultural elites now celebrate, are the kind of Afro-Colombian rituals that sparked the violent episode of forced displacement of Chela and 20 Afro-Colombian families from Soacha.

This realization suggests at least a partial conclusion. From that time when the women’s movements mentioned here were like a tear in the ocean trying to expose the ravages of war before the eyes of until then incredulous fellow citizens, they have achieved to make more than a dent in such a negationist landscape. However, to ensure that these gains find an echo in poor peripheries still entails significant challenges. Multiculturalism from below alone is not capable of bringing about sustainable changes, but neither are acts carried out in the center if they do not involve displaced people living in the periphery and do not call into question the spatial distributive paradigm of justice, and therefore if they do not tackle power relations of class, race, sex, gender, class and ethnicity on which the city’s spatial segregation of the happy city relies.

6.6 Conclusion

Oftentimes, victims of forced displacement are victims of other war crimes that triggered their displacement, and they are often, too, victims’ survivors. Whereas most of them fled the war in rural areas, their plight of displacement does not end with their arrival in urban centers such as Bogotá. This despite the belief that in cities, the armed conflict “arrives only by hearsay” (Duzán 2015). By navigating through the stories of displaced women, this chapter gives a perspective of the paths they have covered through their experiences of mourning and survival. These experiences include ways of operating through which displaced women learn to make a living in
Bogotá’s informal economy while others recreate themselves as political subjects by turning into feminist activists or victims’ leaders. They build their nomadic path drawing on their sex, gender, spatial, class, racial and ethnic subject positions as well as on their experience of the conflict, but also on the solidarities they find through their experience of mourning. Nonetheless, the road they travel to become survivors is all but linear, especially since the continuum of violence, as manifest in conflict-related sexual violence, has proved that women’s subordination is an important cog in order to maintain the economic dynamic that fuels the armed conflict.

I argue that for displaced women, the possibilities to overcome this subordination and to become political subjects positioning their needs and rights is a spatial concern. As this chapter shows, the extent to which women break into what Rancière calls the “partition of the sensible” highly depends on their ability to elude the disciplinary yoke of Bogotá’s spatial order (Rancière 2004). Their confinement to peripheral areas does not bring about their urban integration, but on the contrary works to hide the plight of forced displacement, reduces displaced women to the role of welfare clients and condemns them and their families to become the new urban poor.

Taming Bogotá’s center/periphery spatial order has been paramount for women’s organizations’ networks in their effort to make women’s voices heard. Against a generalized climate of skepticism and the national government’s reluctance to engage in peace negotiations and to recognize the victims, women’s organizations have performed acts of citizenship in sceneries where women and victims have been denied their right to speak. In so doing, they have contributed enormously to displaced women’s endeavor to enact themselves as political subjects with specific needs and rights and to reclaim the public space of the center as political scenery.

But, willing or not, this achievement turns displaced people into the killjoys of the discourse of urban happiness since, by voicing their claims, they unveil the fallacy of public space as a social equalizer. Despite the claim on spatial decentralization mobilized through the discourse of the happy city, women’s movements in particular and civil society in general have made this clear:
the center of the city continues to be the site of power and political struggle, and for IDPs it is therefore the place for achieving visibility and a full citizenship from which to vindicate access to transformative mechanisms of justice.
CONCLUSIONS

After having related three experiences of forced displacement that her family has endured, Chela’s daughter concludes: “The only home you can be sure of is the cemetery.” The last of these experiences was an intra-urban displacement fraught with racist connotations which occurred in 2012. I referred to this event in chapter 6, yet I bring Chela’s daughter’s reflection here as it touches upon the research question guiding this dissertation: To what extent does the forcibly displaced population inhabiting Bogotá have the chance to exercise the right to the city in all its complexities? That is, the right to fully enjoy and to participate as political subjects in shaping urban life both in terms of its material forms and structures but also in terms of its symbolic means (Amin 2006; Fernandes 2007). Or is IDPs’ right to the city undermined by the disciplinary yoke of happiness, orderly spaces and citizen security mobilized by Bogotá’s hegemonic narrative of urban renewal?

To address this research question, this dissertation located the renewal of Bogotá and, therefore, the process of making Bogotá a neoliberal city at the core of Colombia’s path to catching up with the country’s normalcy. This starting point allowed me to excavate some tensions that, at Bogotá’s urban scale, underlie this process of normalization. Such tensions thereby stem from the endeavor of achieving spatial homogeneity and modernity, enhancing economic growth and developing institutional decentralization while making accessible transformative socio-spatial justice for the displaced population.

Spearheaded since the early 2000s by civil society actors, particularly by women’s movements, the concern for the displaced population found at least an echo in the national government in 2011, as it formally engaged in a process of transitional justice. Crystallized in the issue of Victims’ Law, this point of departure led the city to bring itself into line with this process. This despite the reluctance of Bogotá’s long-term inhabitants to consider the armed conflict as an

118 Chela and her daughter, November 2012.
urban concern, a denial which worked in tandem with the habitual apprehension of city administrations to implement strategies aimed at providing support for the displaced population. Despite the expectations generated by the political turn described above, this dissertation’s focus on the perspective of displaced people’s urban experiences casts doubts on whether the normalization of this population in Bogotá is actually facilitating their access to transformative justice. In other words, I have provided evidence that, in Bogotá, the entry into force of the transitional justice process is not leading to the dismantling of forms of oppression and inequality that enabled displacement to occur. Therefore, I suggest that the mechanisms implemented for displaced people’s normalization are rather drawn with a view to enabling the country to turn the page on its shameful human rights record, while simultaneously being too weak to counteract the range of oppressions through which the violence of the conflict has been able to flow. Hence, despite the supposed advent of the post-conflict, displaced people living in Bogotá are highly vulnerable and still exposed to re-victimization. Some forms of violence to which displaced people are exposed concern the ways in which the dynamic of the conflict has permeated, or mutated in, the urban space and through which the economy of war perpetuates itself. At first glance, this violence operates primarily on those displaced women whose nomadic struggle to become survivors is imbricated with subject positions through which they become political actors and strive to access mechanisms of transformative justice. Nonetheless, even the urban experiences of displaced women who have not intended to engage in political subject positions testify to the existing continuum of violence which operates in the urban space. Whether materialized in racial, class, gender, ethnic, sexual terms, or rather through mechanisms of violence in which these forms of oppression intersect, such a continuum of violence undermines the possibilities of the displaced population to reap the benefits of the ongoing transitional justice, and its promises of transforming the circumstances that allowed their victimization. It is precisely in its failure to address long-
entrenched layers of oppression on which Bogotá’s spatial segregation lies, where Bogotá has eluded its responsibility to allow displaced people the chance to overcome victimization.

Actions against the provision of housing to displaced people in central areas, which was defined as a means of reparation, and in a similar vein, the refusal to adopt urban planning mechanisms aimed at fostering mixture of classes and mix of uses with a view to counteracting Bogotá’s segregated spatial order north-rich-white vs. south-poor-mestizo are the icing on the cake of this failure. Willing or not, they illustrate the extent to which Bogotá is not in tune with the endeavor of implementing the changes needed in order to enable displaced people’s access to transformative mechanisms of justice. Specifically, they undermine the chances of making sustainable housing available for the displaced population, of dismantling existing forms of socio-economic exploitation and, consequently, of enabling them to enjoy the right to the city as legitimate urban dwellers.

Nevertheless, it is not just the urban experiences of newcomers, such as displaced people, which testifies to the inability of the process of urban renewal to dismantle Bogotá’s segregated spatial order and achieve the promise of rendering it homogeneous. The voices of long-term inhabitants brought into this analysis, such as the narratives of women living in the peripheral area of Kennedy or the experiences of pauperized dwellers of the center whose lives the gentrification process were made disposable, show that the city’s renewal—and especially its politics of public space—has participated in consolidating the geographical gap center/periphery.

Indeed, rather than rendering it homogeneous, the spatial centripetal/centrifugal dynamic enabled by the production of public space throughout the city has resulted in the segmented transfer into Southern and Southwestern peripheral areas of remnant flows of crime, poverty and informality which do not fit into the imaginary of Bogotá’s global center. Such flows reshape and allow a continuum through which gender-based violence, intra-urban forced displacement, socio-economic exploitation, and other forms of oppressions underlying displaced women’s itineraries
of displacement take place in Bogota's peripheries. In addition, it is through the same dynamic of redistribution of flows that the inhabitants of the periphery are treated through a developmentalist approach and that, in these areas, socio-spatial justice is reduced to the redistribution of welfare benefits. While in the meantime, the city center is consolidated as the locus of political power and reaps the harvest of innovation, modernity, and creativity.

Allow me to briefly emphasize the role of architectural forms and narratives in enhancing a differentiated re-distribution of flows between and within center and periphery. This relocation of flows, described here as a centripetal and centrifugal dynamic, is of particular significance to this research, given the spatial theory to which I have aimed at contributing. Starting from Lefebvre’s work, my analysis has prompted a gendered right to the city, bearing the hope of offering a suitable framework for the identification of forces which, besides neoliberal capitalism, shape contemporary urban space. But more importantly, I foresaw the potential of a gendered right to the city as a way to investigate the spatial-related concerns of displaced people that might hinder them from accessing mechanisms of transformative transitional justice and therefore have implications in deterring them from overcoming victimization and achieving socio-spatial inclusion. By suggesting this frame, I also aimed at dissecting gendered dimensions implied in discourses woven into, and spatial strategies implemented in, the endeavor of gaining people’s support and attachment to contemporary processes of urban renewal. Among the formers, two sets of narratives stand out as having been used in Bogotá’s politics of urban space.

The first one is the notion of quality of life, which in Bogotá has contributed enormously to erecting the ideals of spatial order and civicness as conditions for the protection of life in the city, and thereafter to amalgamate spatial order and public space’s securitization. Laying the seeds for what has become a pretended post-political governance, the defenders of Bogotá’s urban renewal process, through this local reorientation of narratives about the protection of life, confiscated the city’s politics of urban space, locked it up in the terrain of morality and
technocracy, and therefore as being above politics. But there is a gender regime underlying this
discourse, which is produced as well as productive, since it enables the whole gearing of spatial
order, citizens’ behavior and public space’s securitization. I am referring specifically to the binary
scheme ‘rational, moral protectors’ vs. ‘backward, uncivil or irrational aliens,’ which has been
recycled time and again since the inaugural steps of the renewal project took place in Bogotá’s
center.

Waved in the name of protecting life, the children or the city itself, these gender regimes have
been instrumental to turn into disposable the lives of a series of impoverished long-term
inhabitants and to literally spark a centrifugal dynamic that cleared the ground for the center’s
gentrification. In the peripheries, and as a reaction to the incoming flows that the center is
unwilling to host, the gender regime of rational-protector vs. backward-alien has generated a
centripetal movement around ethno-racial ideoscapes and security, which stirs among the locals a
desire for cultural and spatial homogeneity. Fueled by stereotypes regarding the victims of the
conflict (e.g., displaced criminals/displaced victims; see chapter 1), such a desire for homogeneity
has rendered displaced women particularly vulnerable. Indeed, the episode of intra-urban
displacement that provoked Chela’s daughter words, to which I referred at the beginning of this
conclusion, exemplifies dramatically how the desire for a homogeneous identity among the locals
of a working-class peripheral neighborhood turned a group of Afro-Colombian displaced people
into scapegoats for their fear of not attaining spatial and cultural harmony.

A second set of discourses at play in Bogotá’s urban renewal are built around the idea of the
happy city, a variation of the notion of quality of life, through which urban theorists around the
world and policy makers have turned the city into what Ahmed critically defines as a happy
object (2010a: 32). In the happy city, the production of public space is positioned as a means to
make society much happier, and happiness is mobilized as the standard against which to measure
what is desirable and worthwhile in urban life.
But as feminist thinkers have asserted, “it is not too clear just what the word happy really means and still less what true values it may mask” (Beauvoir 1949: 33), and so it is precisely because of such a vague amplitude that happiness could be turned into both a “container of wants” and a disciplinary device highly suited to dictating social norms and enacting the duty to support the building of the City We Want. Drawing on Ahmed, I have shown how the ineluctable tautology of happiness provides this urban rationale with such a disciplinary apparatus. One side of this tautology leads city dwellers to endorse a series of urban values around which a consensus has been generated, as it is asserted that they will make the happy city that people want become a real object. Put together, these values and wants became a regime of truth whose necessity nobody dares to question (e.g., modernity, civicness, citizen security, economic sustainability, competitiveness, connectivity, universality). On the other side of this tautology, it is the proximity to this dreamed city that is turned into the condition of possibility for securing the achievements of the very same values and wants that promise to render people’s lives worthwhile.

By locating public space at both the starting and ending points of the urban-happiness tautology, the local authorities build a sole frame in which they are able to merge people’s well-being with the standards of the city’s competitiveness. In such promising puzzle, public space is as much a tool for social equality, which re-distributes the advantages and social services of the good city into the periphery, as it is a means to allow the city to meet the standards of the global competitiveness. Certainly, we should bear in mind the challenges raised by feminist economists, whose curiosity has allowed them to demonstrate the inadequacy of macro-economic indicators of the market economy to measure the well-being of the population. However, we cannot fool ourselves with the governmental endorsement of happiness as a means to fill this gap. At least when it comes to the adoption of this narrative in Bogotá’s urban politics, people’s happiness is not an aim in itself, but a governmental instrument to foster the market economy. The women’s
narratives that I have brought into this analysis are eloquent reminders of how the development of public spaces in the periphery has been sold as a means to make them happy, but is indeed an instrument of governance that participates in shaping their lives, without counterbalancing exiting mechanisms of violence and oppression.

New monumental architecture, for instance, has deepened the divide between the private and public sphere, as it has boosted the commodification of activities formerly undertaken within households by transforming them into services in an exchange economy. Even more, as the lens of feminist curiosity allows us to see (Enloe 2004: 19–20), the city’s public space politics has reinforced the concentration of political and economic power in the center, and far from being neutral, has simultaneously participated in undermining the chances of generating social mixing, thus reinforcing the socio-spatial marginalization of poor inhabitants in Southern areas.

Furthermore, I argue that the disciplinary force of urban happiness lies in its ability to leverage the commonsense idea of neoliberal urban renewal according to which “There is No Alternative” but to align itself in the race to become a global city (Massey 2013a). With such a disciplinary force, Bogotá’s urban-happiness narrative manages to convey and circulate the apolitical status and universality of public space and thus permits to maintain untouchable the taken-for-granted city’s spatial segregation north-rich-white vs. south-poor-mestizo.

When it comes to displaced people, this disciplinary force takes the form of what Ahmed calls the “happiness duty for migrants” (2010a: 158), which, she writes, is “a positive duty to speak of what is good but also … a negative duty not to speak of what is not good, not to speak from or out of unhappiness” (Ibid.). The urban narratives of displaced people brought into this analysis reflect the hurdles to overcoming victimization amidst such a segregated landscape. They shed light on the limits of governmental urban happiness discourse and of Bogotá’s spatial distributive justice to dislocate layers of race, gender, class, sex or ethnicity on which the city’s exclusionary order is built. As I argue, it is along these petrified layers of oppression that a continuum of
violence is able to flow in rural conflict zones, peripheral slums, and the global city center. But the entrenched idea that Bogotá’s life is sanitized of the violence of war, along with the reluctance of the city to seriously engage in a policy to protect this population, continues to deny the displaced population a chance to speak out about their unhappiness. Still today, the power of these beliefs turns against displaced people, becoming a tacit obstacle that hinders their right to make their claims for justice heard—and at times to name their victimizers—and denies the victims’ survivors a time-space to talk about their lost loved ones.

However, through their itineraries of displacement, their nomadic paths of survival and struggle to access mechanisms of transitional justice, some displaced people have achieved to tame the city’s public space and to penetrate the fissures of its center/periphery divide, thereby making a dent in the city’s geographies of power. A large part of this has been accomplished through the leverage that the displaced population has obtained with Colombian civil society, particularly with women’s movements. By making their voices heard, displaced women in particular have transgressed the disciplinary duty of happiness; one that, while seemingly apolitical, works to deny displaced people a political subjectivity and conducts them to assimilate their urban experience and their needs to those of the urban poor.

At national level, their political networking struggle has allowed displaced people to find some echo in mechanisms of transitional justice and has enabled most of them to obtain recognition of their victim status. Yet, they are not the expected newcomers that the global city is willing to host. Although the success of programs aimed at IDPs’ return has become, for the most part, publicly dubious, the idea that such programs are underway is taken for granted among public opinion and, as long as it remains so, it participates in hindering the right of this population to remain in Bogotá under legitimate conditions. Moreover, in contrast to the national level, displaced people’s impact on the city’s decision making remains fragile. After the issue of transitional justice laws, Bogotá advanced in the adoption of measures to ensure them a better
enjoyment of the right to the city (to be and inhabit); nevertheless, these measures did not survive the political turn adopted in 2016 by Peñalosa, the Mayor of happiness.

In any case, public demonstrations of displaced people, along with their acts of resistance, have not been in vain. Paralleling Rancière’s work, I assert that by performing these acts, displaced people have intruded into the city’s “partition of the sensible” (2004). They have spoken out about what is wrong in Bogotá, and put on the table the politics of security, housing, employment, access to public space and antipoverty programs. Even though in the eyes of many Bogotanos they do not have the entitlement to do so, displaced people have called into question the commitment of the city in the transitional justice process and in building a long lasting peace.

The experience of forcibly displaced people living in Bogotá exemplifies the struggle of oppressed groups who become urban by force rather than by choice, and whose urban life unfolded under conditions of socio-spatial exclusion. By speaking out, these groups become the killjoys of the urban happiness. As with the disturbance caused by a fly in a wound, their claims and everyday experiences reveal that, more often than not, processes of disposability, blindness to recognize the relation violence of the war – urban violence, or a neglect to address long-entrenched layers of exclusion are hidden below the surface of the global city, its politics of consensus and its disciplinary happiness. Certainly, numerous transformations implemented in the building of a global city follow a path shaped by the forces of capital, carried out somewhere else. However, by suggesting a gendered right to the city as an alternative way to explore these spatial formations, and by starting this analysis from the perspective of a population inhabiting the margins who has been forced to become urban, I have demonstrated that in the building of contemporary global cities there are other forces and actors playing a significant role. We have learned, for instance, how the struggles for accessing housing, even by means of informality, are also determinants in shaping the urban, and the same goes with ethno-cultural backgrounds that the displaced population bear, or forms of cultural hybridization they engaged with through their
path of urban survival. In that sense, feminist or race-based movements, among others, have played a key role in enabling time-spaces for consciousness-raising where political subject positions have been fostered.

In addition, this experience allows us to consider social activism and acts of resistance performed by the marginalized urban population as examples of political participation and thereby as an emergent venue for shaping the place we inhabit. This conclusion is all the more relevant as it opens the door for both: first, public demonstrations to defeat the ongoing idea of the neutrality of public space and, consequently, to actualize its agonistic character; second, for marginalized groups to defeat a notion of universal citizen that ends up tacitly denying them legitimacy to speak, as their perspective is considered as representing the particular.

**Concluding Remarks**

Let me conclude this dissertation by making reference to the main contributions that this research has provided. In essence, this research proposes a gendered right to the city as a methodological platform in the endeavor to move forward in building social-spatial justice in global South cities, with a special emphasis on those societies facing post-conflict situations.

Within this wide context, it narrows its focus to displaced people’s urban experiences and highlights the potential of the gendered right to the city as a methodology particularly well suited to meeting two interrelated purposes. First, to identify the challenges faced by this population in their attempts to overcome socio-spatial exclusion and therefore their condition of victim. Second, to bring about mechanisms of transformative transitional justice for forcibly displaced people, so that this population would be allowed the opportunity to be legitimate dwellers and to live in dignified conditions in the cities they have come to inhabit.

While focusing on displaced people, I maintain that the itineraries of displacement covered by this population offer an advantageous window from which to identify specific tensions that
might be common to societies of the global South emerging from internal armed conflicts. I argue that, oftentimes, these tensions lie at the intersection of the endeavor of providing redress for the victims, achieving social reconciliation and bringing about sustainable peace, while still enabling those societies to reap some benefits from the contemporary global urbanization.

Underlying this vision is the belief put forward from various feminist perspectives, according to which the city is a space where women’s possibilities of empowerment might increase and where patriarchal hierarchies could be counterbalanced (McIlwaine 2013; see also section 3.3.4). But yet, this research highlights the spatial dimensions of existing forms of exploitation and gender-based violence acting on the lives of displaced people. More often than not, these mechanisms play a role in deepening displaced people’s vulnerability and in hindering them from overcoming victimization and socio-spatial exclusion. In doing so, this research takes into account two interrelated concerns.

The first refers to the power of a male perspective dominating the design of cities which has thus resulted in the presumption of the rational economic man as the universal city dweller (see also Deutsche 1996). Implied in this patriarchal regime of the city is the prevalence of economic criteria at the expense of concerns aimed at the promotion of gender and racial equality, as the latter are seen as representing the interest of particular minorities or the private sphere and therefore as detrimental to the achievement of a universal general will. The second concern is the colonization of the city’s decision-making process by economic elites and by functionalist criteria. Although raised since the initial formulation of Lefebvre’s right to the city, this concern has been updated by feminist perspectives in order to redress the gender- and color-blindness contained in the initial Lefebvrian notion (see chapter 3).

That said, this research takes as a starting point the foundational tenet of the right to the city, that of giving back to the city’s inhabitants the right to participate in producing the space in which they dwell. But taking it forward, it impregnates this tenet with a gendered curiosity by offering a
platform from which to scrutinize the building of global South cities (including the discourses and architectural forms that enable it) and how women relate to this process. It means that the methodology this research proposes takes these narratives and material forms examining their gendered and race-based dimensions, while simultaneously looking at how they operate through particular axes of the right to the city. Those axes are related to the extent to which and the practices through which oppressed groups, and particularly women, appropriate and participate in shaping the urban space in which they live.

The axes on which this gendered right to the city focuses include women’s safety in public and private spaces, sustainable housing, availability of transport facilities, as well as proximity between housing, work places, and public facilities and places. In parallel, and giving the concerns for recognition and visibility raised by the displaced population I interviewed, this analysis emphasizes the need to pay attention to the right to participation in decision making and political representation. These civil and political rights become all the more relevant, as the success of struggles for recognition of oppressed groups in general, and of displaced people in particular, are highly dependent on the availability of public spaces and access to political settings in which to make their voices heard.

In fact, seeing from the perspective of the displaced population, the case of Bogotá represents a telling example of how the production and availability of public space plays a particular role in articulating other axes of the gendered right to the city. For instance, while the city has bet on the production of new public spaces as a means of bringing about urban homogeneity, it is through the very same means that it has pledged to make available sustainable housing for the poorest sectors. And moreover, it is through the provision of ordered public spaces that the city has endeavored to increase citizen security. However, contrary to the expectations raised by such politics of public space, it has not led the city to produce either class-mixed areas or mixed uses of land, conditions increasingly recognized as enablers for bringing about sustainable social
housing (see chapter 2). Worse still, the cleansing of public space in Bogotá’s center has not resulted in safe public spaces for the population inhabiting peripheral and poor areas. Instead, as the women of Kennedy I interviewed stated, public space development in the center has participated in increasing the “subnormalcy” of their neighborhoods (see chapter 6).

Although the case of Bogotá does not allow to draw a general statement about the politics of public space being implemented in other global South cities, it does allow, however, to rise concerns about the political dimension of public space in societies enduring post-conflict situations. This entails to highlight the fact that public space is neither gender- nor race-neutral. For instance, public spaces could act as a means for commoditization of formerly non-income generating activities, or for increasing the public and private divide. It might foreclose or be used as a means to enhance social mixing and, when privatized, public space might hinder the income opportunities of informal street vendors. Although not an example of decent work, informal street sales are perhaps the main income-generating activity the forcibly migrant population might engage with in global South cities.

Therefore, this research highlights the danger of gender- and race-blind politics of public space as it might conceal intersecting forms of oppression that shape and sustain existing hierarchical spatial orders. In societies facing democratic transitions related to post-conflict situations, intersecting oppressions of gender, sex, race, ethnicity, class, origin or political affiliation might allow to channel the flow of a continuum of violence from areas of conflict to urban areas. Although this violence might operate on the marginalized population in general, conditions such as their conflict-related background, lack of social network and relationships, lack of resources or urban-specific skills, language barriers, not to mention the very experience of loss and mourning, might lead displaced people to face overlapping vulnerabilities (see chapter 6).

“Intersecting axes of domination” as the above mentioned might become the means for mechanisms of socio-economic exploitation to emerge (Collins 2000), insofar as they are turned
by local population, or by others located in a better position, into vehicles through which to exert power over the incoming population. In this research, for instance, women’s itineraries of displacement tell us about how poor housing conditions offered by local landlords, and oftentimes without them being much aware, participate in denying the displaced population the chance to rebuild their lives. Overcrowding, limited access to basic services (water, gas, electricity, bathrooms), spaces that do not match their needs or their family size or structure, oppressive cohabitation rules and ghettoization, as well as social isolation and spatial exclusion are living conditions that participate in displaced people being re-victimized almost on a daily basis. In the long term, such living conditions reduce displaced people’s possibilities of breaking the poverty trap and exploitation in which they get immersed after having left everything behind.

Another axe of the gendered right to the city on which this research has shed light refers to the availability of public facilities and places. In fact, one of the promises of the polycentric model discussed here has been the provision of public facilities, including transport networks, with proximity to the places in which people live. Evidence brought into this research gives an account of the effectiveness of this politics in improving the lives of women inhabiting in the periphery. In particular, those places have become nodes for decentralizing and for improving the provision of welfare and social services. However, displaced women’s narratives also illustrate the extent to which the effectiveness of such politics turns pale if the deficit in the provision of affordable housing is not seriously addressed. Indeed, the shortage of social housing is inextricably linked to the persistent building of informal housing and to the emergence of informal settlements in peripheral areas, with no access to public service networks (sewage, water, electricity) and no transport facilities available. Those conditions become additional hurdles in the lives of displaced people, and in particular of displaced women, since the lack of social network and family support makes this population increasingly vulnerable to isolation and
sexual and gender-based violence, and deny them the possibilities of accessing social and legal assistance as well as job opportunities in decent conditions.

This research recognizes the potential of using public space as a means for decentralization, yet it is concerned with the implications that a focus that privileges the use of public space as a social equalizer has on leaving behind the political function of public space. It is through this politics, as I have explained, that social justice might become reduced to redistribution and that the needs of the displaced population end up being equated to those of the traditional urban poor. Fortunately, the networking of social movements, and in particular displaced women analyzed here, provides a good example of how the re-appropriation of public spaces and political platforms by social movements is crucial in order to show the connections between issues that, although appearing to be isolated, affect displaced people as a group. Specifically, their appropriation of public spaces and political sceneries has been instrumental to show that events of intra-urban displacement shaping women’s itineraries of displacement are not isolated episodes, but on the contrary these mechanisms of exploitation and violence are fuelled by other forms of oppression. The same goes with episodes of gender and sexual violence. In such cases, it is the displaced women’s links with women’s movements acting in the city center that has enabled them to show the relationship between the violence that triggers forced displacement and other forms of violence mutating through Bogotá’s spatial order.

While necessary, politics focused on redistribution are not enough to bring about socio-spatial justice and, in particular, to provide reparation to the victims of the conflict. In this research, we learnt from forcibly displaced women and their itineraries of displacement that in urban societies enduring post-conflict situations, a gendered right to the city might become a venue from which to enable this population access to transformative justice. By this I mean mechanisms of justice aimed at the dual goals of helping them to overcome the forms of exploitation that produce their re-victimization and tackling interlocked dynamics of violence
and historical gender-, class-, and race-based inequalities that allow their forced displacement to occur. For displaced people living in urban areas, reparation by means of access to sustainable housing, proximity to public facilities in which the social support available takes into account intersecting oppressions shaping their urban experiences, construction of memory in public spaces where their voices and the memory of their loved ones are fairly represented, access to truth-finding processes seeking to uncover the dynamics of power underlying the gender or sexual violence to which they have been subjected, public platforms in which to raise political awareness, and the right to engage in political leadership without the fear of being re-victimized are requirements to overcome social exclusion and to build transformative justice. Thus, mapping the links between the actual implementation of, or access to, mechanisms of transitional justice in global South cities and the gendered right to the city allows to unveil re-emerging forms of socio-economic exploitation, as well as a continuum of gendered violence flowing from areas of conflict to cities.

This research has shown that for urban societies, in order to successfully accomplish post-conflict processes and to build social reconciliation, addressing such forms of exploitation and violence, along with the gender-, class- and race-based inequalities that enable them to work is a pressing issue. It is, I claim, a condition of possibility for helping displaced people to transform their itineraries of displacement into paths of survival. If the above-mentioned links between the right to the city and post-conflict processes are not bridged by global South cities, displaced people might have played the role of “critical beings,” that is, following Tuitt (2004a), subjects whose experience and construction as victims was mostly instrumental for the enactment of formal requirements needed to turn the page of internal conflicts, but whose right to enjoy urban life in conditions of legitimacy is still delayed.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Demonstrations in Public Space

Demonstration “Mujeres por la Paz”
October 2012

1. “We are not invisible,
   We are invincible”

2. Women marching on the
   TransMilenio lane

3-4. Performance art in public space
Demonstration for disappeared women in front of the attorney general's office
August 2012
Appendix 2: Public Participation in Places of Political Power

Public hearing at the Colombian Parliament
November 2012

1. Meeting organized by displaced women of the District Group for the Advocacy and Monitoring of Auto 092

2. “The government holds the key of my house… Until when?”
Appendix 3: Nomadic Paths of Survival

Photo by Sonia Garzón and Carine Middelbos 2017

Photo by Sonia Garzón and Carine Middelbos 2017

Photo by Sonia Garzón and Carine Middelbos 2017
4. Blanquita’s path between survival
5. And activism
6. FASOL grassroots organization
7. Other grassroots organization:
   “Women building territories of life”
8. Gladys’s drawing of her dream home
Mija tus manos recogen la alegría que dejaste sembrada en tu casa y viven en mi memoria.

Cuando vi tu hermoso cabello no se que pensar en ese momento si agarrarlo y decirle muchas cosas que salían de mi alma con toda mi fuerza te quiero, te amo, y te extraño.

me naces falta, aunque tus rostros siguen en nuestro territorio, una esperanza que todo no quede en la impunidad.

Para mi corazón basta la memoria, para tu ausencia basta el recuerdo, mi soledad da vueltas como un naufragio perdido en las olas del mar.

Las historias que dejaste sembradas en los Chantos y Toropios siempre están en mi memoria un vacío que solamente una tumba nos espera para llenarla.

Mi bella Majayura Sigue viva en todos los corazones de ellos.

Te quiere TU MADRE.
Campaign “Not Even One more”
June 2012

“If they touch one of us
they touch us all”

“No aggression
without response”
Appendix 4: Maps

Map 1: Spatial Interactions between NGOs and Grassroots Organizations (sample)

NGOs:
1. Casa de la Mujer
2. ILSA
3. MOVICE
4. AFRODES

Grassroots organizations:
5. FASOL-CPC
6. ADESCOP
7. ASODESSANT (Association of Displaced People of Santander)
Map 2: Bogotá’s Network of Centralities

(Source: Beuf 2016)
Map 3: Spatial Distribution of Internally Displaced People in Bogotá by Locality

(Source: Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas 2014)
Map 4: Kennedy, Area Patio Bonito–Tintal: Urbanization Growth

(Source: Beuf 2011b)
Map 5: Bogotá’s Population Density Variation

(Source: Eltis 2012)
Appendix 5: Timelines and Figures of the Colombian Conflict

Figure 1: Timeline of the Colombian conflict by perpetrators (1964-2012), National administrations

![Timeline of the Colombian conflict by perpetrators (1964-2012)](image)

Source: GMH 2016, adapted by the author

Figure 2: Timeline of the Colombian conflict by methods of violence (1980-2012). Women’s political resistance, and mayoral administrations

![Timeline of the Colombian conflict by methods of violence (1980-2012)](image)

Source: GMH 2016, adapted by the author
Figure 3: Distribution of the number of massacres in the armed conflict by armed group (1980-2012)

Source: GMH 2016, Database of massacres in the armed conflict in Colombia (1980-2012)

Figure 4: Distribution of acts of abuse and torture in the armed conflict by armed group (1980-2012)

Source: GMH 2016, Database of abuses in the armed conflict (1980-2012)

Figure 5: Number of Internally Displaced People and annual growth (1985-2011)

Source: CODHES 2012
**Appendix 6: Interviews: Topics and List of Interviewees**

** Interviews with Displaced People: Topics**

| Main Topics                                      | Sub-Tops | Circumstances | Possible causes | Reasons to seek refuge in Bogotá | Access to IDP status, and humanitarian aid: Process, difficulties, time | Life in Bogotá, housing conditions, everyday life. | Itineraries of urban displacement: Places, neighborhoods in which they have lived | Reasons that have led them to move from one neighborhood to another | Social relations they have built in Bogotá, or organizations they are related to: | Personal | Political: Grassroots organizations, NGOs, social movements, other | Institutional: Social or welfare services | Participation in governmental programs: e.g., Families in Action, Women Savers in Action, self-entrepreneurial programs | Experiences of discrimination | Spatial relations: How space, distance and locations shape their relation to these institutions or organizations | Relation with political organizations, grassroots organizations | Notions of mechanisms of transitional justice: Reparation, justice, memory | Expectations regarding access to mechanisms of truth, reparation and construction of memory | Expectations of return |
|------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------|----------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Life before Displacement and Experience of Forced Displacement |          |               |                |                                  |                                                                         |                                                              |                                                                                                  |                                                                  |                                                                                |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                         |                                                                        |
| Experience during Displacement                   |          |               |                |                                  |                                                                         |                                                              |                                                                                                  |                                                                  |                                                                                |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                         |                                                                        |
| Political Participation and Transitional justice  |          |               |                |                                  |                                                                         |                                                              |                                                                                                  |                                                                  |                                                                                |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                            |                                                                         |                                                                        |
### List of Experts and Grassroots Organization Leaders Interviewed

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camila Medina</td>
<td>National Center of Historical Memory – Gender unit</td>
<td>Anthropologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camilo Andres Rodríguez</td>
<td>High Council for Victims’ Rights, Peace and Reconciliation</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camilo Buitrago</td>
<td>Victims’ Unit</td>
<td>Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmenza Orjuela</td>
<td>District Planning Secretariat</td>
<td>Adviser and urban architect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolina García</td>
<td>High Council for Victims’ Rights, Peace and Reconciliation</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Mosquera</td>
<td>National University of Colombia</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esperanza Ramírez</td>
<td>ADESCOP</td>
<td>Grassroots organization leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Jacome</td>
<td>ERU</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonzalo Prada</td>
<td>ASODESSANT</td>
<td>Grassroots organization leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier Torres</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Adviser and environmental architect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliana Cano</td>
<td>Victims’ Unit Gender Group</td>
<td>Gender adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarita Gil Olaya</td>
<td>High Council for Victims’ Rights, Peace and Reconciliation</td>
<td>Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria de Jesús Ramírez</td>
<td>CPC-FASOL</td>
<td>Grassroots organization leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Eugenia Ramírez</td>
<td>ILSA</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marino Córdoba</td>
<td>AFRODES</td>
<td>Grassroots organization leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>District Planning Secretariat Urban Studies Institute</td>
<td>Adviser and scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>District Housing Secretariat</td>
<td>Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osana Medina</td>
<td>Women’s House</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yolanda</td>
<td>MNSA 092</td>
<td>Grassroots organization leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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