THE MOTIVATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA’S ODA TO AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Along with the rapid expansion of the Southern partners in the international development cooperation, the world of foreign aid is observing a number of countries raising its aid volumes and level of engagement with the African countries. Seeking to play a vital role in the international community, South Korea is also rapidly increasing its Official Development Assistance (ODA) volume with the particular focus on Africa. In fact, the volume of South Korean ODA to Africa increased tenfold in a dozen of years. In this context, the thesis aims to understand the main motivations of the recent rapid increase in South Korean ODA allocation to Africa. The critical reflections on the contents of the South Korean government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be presented. This will help to better understand what drives the country to increase its engagement level with Africa from the donor’s perspective.
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List of Abbreviations

AU – African Union
DAC - Development Assistance Committee
DI - Donor’s Interests
EDCF – Economic Development Cooperation Fund
FOCAC – Forum of China-Africa Cooperation
KAF – Korea-Africa Forum
KIAD - Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development
KOAFEC – Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation
KOICA – Korea International Cooperation Agency
KSP – Knowledge Sharing Program
LDCs - Least Developed Countries
MDGs - Millennium Development Goals
MICs - Middle Income Countries
MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOSF – Ministry of Strategy and Finance
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding
NAM - Non-Aligned Movement
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RN - Recipient’s Needs
SDGs - Sustainable Development Goals
UN – United Nations
UNDP - United Nations of Development Program
Introduction

In December 2015, under the theme of “China-Africa progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development,” The Johannesburg Summit and the sixth Ministerial Conference of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) took place. The Heads of State, government and delegations of China and 50 African countries and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AU) attended the Summits.\(^1\) During the summits, the President of China, Xi Jinping announced that China would provide 60 billion dollars of financial support for development of Africa.\(^2\) The FOCAC is a tri-annual ministerial dialogue platform between China and Africa, which was launched in October 2000.\(^3\) Going through six forums for the past years, the partnership between China and Africa has been expanding rapidly, mainly in the sector of economy. In fact, China became Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009. Overall, there has been a rapid increase in bilateral trade between the two sides.\(^4\)

The FOCAC is a good example showing an expanding presence of the Southern donors of “South-South Cooperation” in the international development community, as it shows how the economic and diplomatic relations between China and Africa have been developing through the summits. The Southern donors, also called as emerging donors, such as China, India, and Brazil are announcing pledges of a large scale of financial aid and infrastructure reforms. As Moctar Aboubacar defines, the emerging donor countries are “countries which have seen significant economic progress over the past decades and which

\(^4\) Ibid.
have developed sizeable foreign aid programs,” which have been developing their own strategies of engaging with developing countries. In this context, international development assistance in the continent of Africa is getting more and more competitive every day. For example, China has notably engaging with the African countries with its approaches, emphasizing win-win cooperation and non-interference. This appears to be new and different from the ones of the traditional donors to the African countries. This active engagement of China is gradually leading the international aid society towards a competition between the traditional Western donors and the Southern donors.

In this context, among others, the concern of neo-colonialism of Africa by China has long been raised in the international community and academia as the trade dependency of some African countries on China became significantly high in the recent years. In this regard, Maswana presents an example, in which ten countries in Africa “locked” into its intense trade dependency on China based on the relative trade index he created. In fact, the trade dependency of the countries indicated higher level of dependency than the one on the former colonizers in 1995. However, the economic capacity of these African countries are absurdly lacking in comparison with the one of China. Despite the concern, African countries seem to welcome the interests of the Southern donors, considering them as an alternative option from the Western donors. When looking at the patterns of engagement, while the traditional donors attempt to focus on the collective norms, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), promoting good governance and democracy, the Southern donors are mainly focused on economic development and

7 Ibid., 107.
commercial partnerships based on non-interference policy, which does not require the African governments to reform their institutions and governance. ⁹

In line with the global concern of China’s neo-colonialism, there has been a lot of research on the donors’ motivations. As demonstrated by the existing literature, motivations of donors tend to carry more donor’s national interests rather than the needs of recipient countries.

While there has been a considerable international attention to Southern donors in the context of rapidly increasing trade intensity and patterns between these emerging Southern partners and Africa, South Korea has been surprisingly under-researched despite its relevance. In fact, its trade volume with Africa has also known a significant rise. When China over took the United States and became Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009,¹⁰ South Korea was the third largest emerging trading partner.¹¹ Along with this increase in trade volume, South Korea has also been rapidly increasing its aid allocation towards Africa. South Korea’s former President Roh Moo-hyun made an official presidential visit to Africa¹² in 2006 and launched the Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development (KIAD). This initiative included tripling its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa and strengthening the relations with Africa through high-level forums and workshops for socio-economic development. Since then, South Korea is gradually putting Africa on its ODA agenda.

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¹² President Chun Doo-Hwan’s visit to Africa in 1982 was the first South Korean Presidential visit. Soyeun Kim, “Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle?,” LSE IDEAS AIAP Strategic Report: Africa and Emerging Actors, 2013.
Most recently, South Korea’s current president, Park Geun-hye promised to increase the aid by more than 11 million dollars in 2015. In fact, between 2002 and 2014, the ODA to Africa rapidly increased from 2.7 percent to 23.8 percent of the entire figure of South Korean ODA. This recent increase in development aid to Africa demands attention from the international community, particularly when contrasted to the average 53 percent of total bilateral ODA budget allocated to Asian countries in the last decade. Unfortunately, such a comparison is beyond the scope of this research.

In this context, this thesis analyzes the motivations of the recent rapid increase in South Korean ODA allocation to Africa. Even though South Korea’s ODA is relatively small in size and weak in comparison to other donors, its increasing development aid flow to Africa is worth observing for several reasons. First of all, South Korea is an interesting case since it has gone through an impressive transition from a hopeless recipient to an active donor in the world of development aid in the past decades. Along with its formidable economic development, South Korea officially joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2010. As Heo and Roehrig argue, this impressive development has brought changes in the relations with other countries. Once a developing country with historical focus on its ties with Northeast Asia, its recent engagement with African countries implies a broadening of its interests and influence in the region.

In addition, South Korea’s engagement with Africa is not totally new. The history of the relations between South Korea and Africa dates back to the mid-20th century, after the

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Korean War. After the accession to the United Nations, South Korea’s government visibly stopped its engagement with Africa, closing eleven embassies in four years after the accession. Moreover, some argue that President Roh’s visit to Africa in the mid-2000s had its main motivation at Ban Ki-moon’s UN secretary General campaign.\(^{17}\) South Korea’s engagement has been thereby often criticized for being shortsighted.\(^{18}\) Expanding on this point, the research paper of Chatham House analyzes the motivations behind South Korea’s (re-) engagement with Africa since the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. The authors conclude that there were three major factors behind this strategical change: food and energy security, need for a new market and recognition in international community.\(^{19}\) Therefore, even though South Korea’s ODA volume is not comparable when it comes to major donor countries, considering the short period of experience and significant increase, it is worth observing the case of South Korean aid.

Furthermore, one of the foreign aid strategies used by the South Korean government consists of promoting the Saemaul Undong, the New Community Movement that is a rural development movement implemented by Park Chung-hee in the 1970s. Through utilizing this movement as a crucial factor for South Korea’s economic development, the South Korean government has been actively attempting to promote its model of development. As such, its unusual success story of economic development and its history give South Korea an advantage in approaching the African countries. In regard to this, the nation has been attempting to build an emotional connection with the African countries with the story of its experience of colonization and development.

Despite this significant increase of South Korea’s ODA provision to Africa, the current literature on foreign aid is heavily dominated by the cases of the Western donors and

\(^{18}\) Kim, “Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle?”
the emerging Southern donors. In this context, South Korea’s case is often neglected, which makes it worth being explored. In addition, given the fact that existing stand of the literature on the motivations of South Korean ODA is mainly focusing on quantitative analysis of the data and statistics, more qualitative research on the government contents is desirable in order to understand the motivations of aid allocation at the national level.

In line with these points, this thesis aims at assessing the main determinations behind South Korea’s rapidly increasing aid provision to Africa. This will be examined by critically reflecting the statements of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the way the increasing ODA to Africa is addressed from the donor’s perspective. Drawing attention to the South Korean government’s viewpoint towards Africa, it will examine the implications behind the recent increase. I argue that, South Korea’s increasing ODA flow to Africa and foreign aid policy changes entail its own political and economic interests rather than humanitarian needs. Among others, geopolitical objective for better recognition in the international community seems to be the primary motivation. South Korea has been using its aid provision mainly as a mechanism of achieving an influential presence in international politics and playing an important role by utilizing its own development model in the international development cooperation community. In addition, by strengthening the partnership between the two sides, South Korea seeks to expand its economic interests in the continent.

The outline of the paper is as follows. First, it presents the current dynamics of foreign aid with the emergence of South-South Cooperation. Scholarly debates on the motivations of aid allocation that is divided into donor’s perspective and recipient’s needs will be presented. Then, I will closely examine the history of South Korea as a donor within international development community. The following chapter will include the analytical research on Seoul’s foreign policy strategies and patterns. This will help assessing the current
pattern of South Korean ODA and its primary motivations in the context of rapidly increasing aid flow towards Africa. Lastly, I will conclude with the findings and implications on future research on South Korean ODA towards Africa.
Chapter 1 – Literature Review

This chapter presents a theoretical analysis on development aid and its contemporary phase of becoming a ground for competition between donors, as the “emerging” donors such as China and India have been actively engaging in foreign aid. Taking a closer look at the debate among scholars on foreign aid and aid allocation in relation to South-South Cooperation, the chapter aims to examine possible patterns and motivations of South Korean aid towards Africa.

The existing body of literature on foreign aid is absolutely massive and broad, therefore this chapter will narrow it down to certain aspects that are necessary for answering the research question: What were the main motivations behind South Korea’s rapidly increasing ODA? Firstly, it presents the history of foreign aid and the contemporary phase of the foreign aid society in relation to the emergence of South-South Cooperation. This will show the current pattern of aid flow and increasing donors’ competition in the international aid community. Secondly, the debate among studies on the determinants of aid allocation will be followed. This covers the complexity of what drives countries to give aid and how nation’s foreign policy agenda affects nation’s foreign aid allocation.

1.1 Foreign Aid and the Rise of South-South Cooperation

First of all, it is necessary to define the terms of aid and development. Regarding the definition of aid, I use the definition by the Development Assistant Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as the organization represents the major donors in the world. This definition (see Figure 1) was firmed and agreed by the members in 1972 and is valid to this date. But what we also have to note here is what it meant by the term of development. The definition of development has long been a source of
discussion but yet does not have one clear definition. Furthermore, in the foreign aid community, the definition of development has been changing over time.

**Definition of Official Development Assistance**

ODA consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following test: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).

![The Definition of Official Development Aid](source)

Lancaster examines transitions of aid and development throughout history.\(^\text{20}\) She found that, in the 1960s, foreign aid was used to finance infrastructure and industry reforms. Moving to the 1970s and 1980s, the aid society started to emphasize development in aid allocation, as Lancaster calls the age of “aid for development.”\(^\text{21}\) Development, however, did not always mean the same over time and there was no consensus on the discourse of aid for development among the donors. In fact, in 1970s the general agreement for development was ensuring basic human needs. So, the aid giving was aimed at helping the poorest countries. However in the 1980s, “structural adjustment” appeared, which focused on economic reforms such as adjusting currency and trade liberalization. In this context, the discourse of development is “the name of the game” in which donors use the term flexibly in their foreign aid policy.\(^\text{22}\) The 1990s mark a change in the purposes of aid. As the Cold War ended, the size of foreign aid decreased after it had been used as a powerful diplomatic mechanism.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 44.
during decades. As a result, Lancaster argues that there four new purposes appeared in the world of foreign aid: “promoting economic and political transitions, addressing global problems, furthering democracy, and managing conflict.”

Regarding differences in defining development, Hajoon Chang also conceives a change in the discourse of development during the last quarter of a century from the perspective of an economist. Development, in the past, used to mean economic development such as production capabilities and transition of industries, which has to be “earned.” Therefore, the world refers to the nations with advanced technologies and productivity in industries as “developed countries.” However, he observes that the concept of development today is more about improvement in living conditions and poverty reduction when looking at the international initiatives as the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As such, the transition of the development at the high-level forums foreign aid that is from enhancing economic development to the state of welfare has been happening. This leads a number of countries to put their foreign aid policy focus on improving living conditions and poverty reduction in the developing countries.

This shows that the discourse of development has changed over time, therefore, giving aid also has shown different patterns. This leaves us with questions: What does development means today? How is the world of development aid working today? In order to grasp the contemporary phase of development aid, the foreign aid overview will be followed.

The volume and flow of foreign aid in the world have been showing fluctuations throughout history according to a variety of global trends. Riddell notes that there has been an “aid revival” in today’s global development aid world. Aid revival refers to the upturn following years of low development aid at the end of the Cold War. What he means by aid

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23 Lancaster, Foreign Aid.
revival is that, in the history of foreign aid, there existed a time when the level of foreign aid was experiencing a downturn going through the end of the Cold War. Because during the Cold War, aid was used as a mechanism for promoting democracy within foreign policy and with the end of the War this showed a sharp decline. However, today, the world is observing a significant increase in foreign aid level (see Figure 2) and size by a number of nations. In explaining this, Riddell asserts that this expansion in providing aid is mainly driven by international initiatives such as the G8 summit and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that calls for increase in the volume of aid.26

Veen also notes the impact of global initiatives in the increase of aid provision. The appearance of the MDGs in 2000 resulted in the total increase of 10% in the ODA. And in 2006 the total DAC ODA reached $104.4 billion.27 However, Veen argues that this is mainly because of debt relief, and thus this is expected to decline in the following years.

![Figure 2 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 1950-2010](image)

*Figure 2 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 1950-2010*

Source: Riddell, 2007. p.22

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26 Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*

In this context, it is worth examining the global initiatives of foreign aid in order to look at the current universal commitment of development. Comparing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it attempts to analyze the dynamics and transitions of foreign aid construction.

As shown on Figure 3, if the poverty reduction in the developing countries was a main priority in the MDGs, the new agenda seems to deal with broader worldwide issues in terms of sustainability. The MDGs were the call for the developed countries to act in eradicating extreme poverty, whereas the SDGs are applicable to all nations. The new set of goals act for development in three major aspects: economic development, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion.28 This implies that there is “a new developmentalism”29 that urges the whole world to commit to sustainable development and responsible actions in providing aid to developing countries. As demonstrated, the global understanding towards development has changed and this gives a glimpse at what the world of development aid is following and working in terms of development.

In regards to this, Whitfield and Fraser noted the situation that the aid architecture of today is in chaos.30 The authors point out that the aid business in fact is very chaotic with a number of actors and their strategies. The donors are competing with their strategies and the focus and priority are actually not the recipients but rather “donors hungry” for information, plans, reports, and success stories. In addition to this increasing aid volume, the attention towards the “emerging donors,” also known as the southern partners from South-South Cooperation, such as China, India and Brazil took a part in shaping the current global foreign aid world into a competition.

As Emma Mawdsley, Laura Savage and Sung-Mi Kim point out, transitions in the dynamics of foreign aid construction have been happening and could be observed in the context of the high-level international aid forums and the patterns of the southern donors. In the past, the western-led high-level forums organized by the OECD represented the donor community and suggested paradigms for development aid. However, the emergence of the Southern donors and their emphasis on economic engagement with developing countries is now confusing the world of development aid as they are rapidly increasing their visibility. Therefore, the donor community is divided into two main actors: the traditional Western partners and the new Southern partners.

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When looking at the patterns of the southern donors, especially in Africa, it became evident that they have been promoting their “different” strategies. For example, China has been promoting “non-interference” and “win-win cooperation” principles from the “Five Principles of Peace Coexistence” and focusing on economic development and reforms in Africa. The “Five Principles of Peace Coexistence” are a set of principles that include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. This was initially introduced in 1954 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in order to address the tension on the border between the two countries, which was officially affirmed in the Bandung Conference a year later. At first, it was to allow China to reach the countries with no communist background. To date, China has been devising these principles in its foreign policy in order to represent itself as different from traditional Northern approaches, challenging the traditional donors.

While the Western donors tend to impose their governance and institution models through conditionality based on vertical and multilateral relations, China rhetorically claims that they pursue bilateral relations upon its foreign policies of “non-interference” and “win-win cooperation.” This has attracted a lot of countries in Africa as it is seen as an alternative option for them.

In sum, the general aid volume is rapidly increasing and the dynamics in the world of development aid have been evolving with the appearance of Southern donors and their strategies in attracting developing countries. Not only the appearance of the Southern donors

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35 Li et al., “Difference or Indifference.”
36 Clapham, “Fitting China In.”
has created a divergence between them and the traditional Western donors, but it also has
turned the world of development aid a place of competition of strategies and influences.
Furthermore, China’s influence in Africa raised a notion of “neo-colonialism” among
scholars as some countries such as Sudan and Equatorial Guinea show a high level of
economic dependency that is higher than the one on the former colonizers in 1995. This
emphasizes the need of investigating the motivations of aid allocation of donor countries.
Thus the literature review on the motivations of aid allocation will be followed.

1.2 Aid Allocation and Motivations

The notion that foreign aid conveys a variety of interests and purposes of donors
became a general assumption in the development aid community. When examining bilateral
foreign aid allocation and determinants, McKinlay and Little’s work in explaining the case of
the United States’ aid allocation has been widely used in the existing literature. The
framework is intended to explain a donor’s aid allocation from two separate perspectives:
donor’s interests (DI) and recipient’s needs (RN). The former is the view that focuses on
donor’s political interests and national security, which is a realist perspective. This
perspective includes national interests of politics, economics, security or culture in which
donors attempt to pursue their own interests in recipient countries. The other is rather an
idealist view that focuses on recipient’s needs. This perspective is related to the recipient
country’s income level, and in which the donor country provides development aid to poorer
countries. Based on these two distinguished perspectives suggested by McKinlay and Little, a
number of work on conceivable motivations and intentions of foreign aid allocation have

37 Maswana, “Colonial Patterns in the Growing Africa and China Interaction.”
38 R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, “A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocation,” World Politics 30,
39 Eric Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance
(Routledge, 2005).
been examined. The main debate question in this is that, between self-interests and humanitarian considerations, which factor determines donors’ aid allocation more.

Some argue that donors’ interests are main factors rather than recipients’ needs in aid allocation. McKinley and Little assessed the determinants of aid allocation of Britain and the U.S. during the 1960s by running regression models. The authors found that mostly it was donors’ interests that dominated the aid flows of those countries. The U.S. showed tendency to allocate foreign aid by its national security and military purposes. And Britain provided aid to its former colonies where they had already established economic ties. In line with the argument, Boone finds that donors’ political, strategic, and welfare interests considerably reflect aid flows, measuring cross-country determinants of aid. With this finding, Boone concludes that there is no relationship between foreign aid and economic development of a large sample of developing countries.

Schraeder, Hook and Taylor also finds cases that donors’ aid shows significant impact on foreign aid flows. Emphasizing the complexity of scholarly understanding of the motivations of aid allocation, the authors present a comparative analyze of empirical cases of American, Japanese, French and Swedish foreign aid towards 36 African countries in the 1980s, the Cold War era, from the donor’s perspective. With the six variables of humanitarian need, strategic importance, economic potential, cultural similarity, ideological stance, and region, the research is intended to examine the primary determinants of the donors’ aid provision. The finding is that they reject the altruistic view of foreign aid and aid provisions of those countries were significantly driven by strategic and ideological concerns.

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41 Ibid.
during the 1980s. Especially, the authors challenges the general assumption of the Swedish aid which is viewed to pursue humanitarian needs as their research shows the lack of a relationship between aid levels and humanitarian needs.\textsuperscript{43} This challenges the argument of Lumsdaine, who asserts that humanitarian concerns are the fundamental driver of aid provision.\textsuperscript{44} While agreeing that there could be political and interest interests involved, he emphasizes that the main motives are humanitarian and egalitarian principles. However, Lumsdaine’s thesis is quite not convincing and received critiques because his argument dramatically lacked support and credibility.\textsuperscript{45}

Moving onto the recent research on the motives of foreign aid to see if, after the Cold War, political interest are still driving aid flows, Alesina and Dollar examine the determinants of aid allocation of “big three donors:” the U.S., Japan and France.\textsuperscript{46} They find that their foreign aid patterns reflect national strategic interests. For example, France provides a significant amount of aid to its former colonies and Japan provides aids according to UN voting patterns. They conclude that “bilateral aid has only a weak association with poverty, democracy, and good policy.”\textsuperscript{47} In regards to this, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland established positive relation between the number of projects of the World Bank and membership in the UN Security Council. The authors find that the level of foreign aid increases when the countries are among the members of the UNSC and go further by stating that “temporary

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 320.
\textsuperscript{44} David Halloran Lumsdaine, \textit{Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989} (Princeton University Press, 1993), 32.
\textsuperscript{46} Alesina and Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 55.
members can trade their Security Council votes for case.”48 This shows that donor’s political interests have been and still are the key factors in aid allocation.

In this literature review, the debate of whether donor’s interests or recipient’s needs are the main motives for aid allocation has been addressed. In sum, numerous studies on traditional Western donors find that development aid is used as a tool for promoting national political and economic interests rather than addressing humanitarian concerns. However, there is not much research that has been done on the South Korean aid. In fact, Kim and Oh examines the KOICA’s policy agenda and the pattern of South Korean aid in general and find that South Korean aid shows a “dual-track” structure, which tends to pursue its own economic interests in the groups of the richest and the poorest group but focuses on recipient’s need in the lower-middle group.49 In this context, this thesis aims to examine the determinants of foreign aid in particular focus on the South Korean aid provision to Africa, whether it reflects its political and economic interests or humanitarian needs or it correlates with the “dual track” structure suggested by Kim and Oh. By analyzing South Korea’s contemporary official foreign policy for Africa, the thesis examines the possible determinants of its increasing ODA to Africa.


Chapter 2 – South Korea’s Official Development Assistance

Before examining the cases of South Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa, this chapter provides a general overview of South Korea’s ODA and its history in order to show why South Korea poses an interesting case to analyze. Even though South Korea’s ODA volume has been very small compared that of other donors (see Figure 4 over page), it has been steadily increasing over the past decades (see Figure 5 over page). This increasing South Korea’s ODA volume is especially interesting when looking at history. Traditionally, South Korea has allocated more than a half of its total ODA to the region of Asia (see Figure 6 over page).

South Korea was once a large recipient of foreign aid receiving $12.69 billion of financial assistance between 1945 and the early 1990s. However, with the impressive economic growth of the past decades, it is now an official development aid donor and the first country to join the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with a recipient background. Along with this impressive transition, South Korea has been actively expanding its economic and political presence in the international development community. Furthermore, as a so-called “middle power,” South Korea has a unique status in international relations, in which it bridges the developed and developing countries. This unique standing in international relations is interesting to look at as this gives South Korea a narrative in promoting its own development model to the developing countries. In this context, based on its experience of


economic development, South Korea has been attempting to shape its own development model through the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and promoting Saemaeul Undong\textsuperscript{52}.

By analyzing all of these points mentioned, this chapter presents a thorough overview of South Korea’s foreign aid. Thus, this chapter will eventually help us to understand how economic development experience of South Korea has shaped its foreign policies and ambition of playing a significant role in the international community by promoting its own development model. It will be continued in the next chapter with the particular focus on Africa with a critical analysis of the South Korean government’s contents in order to understand the motivations of recently increasing South Korea’s ODA to Africa.

\textbf{Figure 4 Net ODA Total, \% of Gross National Income}
Source: OECD, 2015

\textsuperscript{52} Saemaeul Undong (the New Community Movement) is a rural development project of South Korea during the 1970s. For further information, see page 25.
Figure 5 Net ODA of South Korea, 1998-2014
Source: OECD

Figure 6 Regional Aid Share of Bilateral Net ODA, 2008-2014
Source: ODA Korea
In terms of history, as mentioned earlier, going through the Korean War, the land was viewed as hopeless and received a large amount of political and financial assistance through various international channels. South Korea was a large recipient in a critical situation until it was officially excluded from the recipient list of the DAC in 2000. With the help of international aid assistance and its effort in economic development, South Korea is now one of the leading economic powers, ranking eleventh in 2015. This led South Korea to become a member of the donors’ group, the DAC of the OECD, representing the sixteenth largest donor by volume.

Figure 7 Theoretical Framework
Source: Heo and Roehrig, 2014, p.11

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In order to examine the transition and its active participation in the world of foreign aid in a theoretical way, I use Heo and Roehrig’s framework. The authors developed a theory that explains the causal path between economic development and its impact on foreign policies. Figure 7 displays four of the main economic development outcomes relevant to South Korea. The factors include namely, a transition to democracy, increase in trade and foreign investment, a stronger military, and finally an enhancement in national pride and public expectation. The authors argue that economic development of a nation causes changes in domestic politics towards democracy and expectation of good performance of the nation among the public rises. Therefore, in order to enhance national economic and political growth and meet the expectations, the elites seek to secure national interests in various ways, such as focusing on foreign policy and changing diplomatic relations with other states. In sum, a country facilitates further economic growth by changing foreign policy and international relations.

In terms of the relations with the developing countries, economic development and interests are the main motivations. South Korea’s economic development steered the nation to look for ways to strengthen its economic and political position in international relations. Considering South Korea is highly lacking natural resources and markets that will boost its economic performance, the fact that the country has been actively engaging with the developing world in terms of trade, investment, and foreign aid could be understood by its attempt of securing energy and raw materials in the regions. This means that South Korea’s economic development for the past decades has had considerable impact on its current increasing engagement within the foreign aid world. In line with this notion, some are

56 Heo and Roehrig, South Korea’s Rise.
57 Ibid., 10.
58 Ibid., 19.
concerned that the recent pattern of South Korea’s increasing ODA to Africa is dedicated to promoting its own economic interests in the continent. 59

This unique history leads us to the next point, namely South Korea’s bridging role in international relations. The economic development brought South Korea to become a “bridge” or “middle-power nation” that is situated between developed and developing countries.60 Jordaan defines middle power as a concept referring to “states that are neither great nor small in international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system.”61 However, in the modern world, Cox notes that the concept of middle power has become related to the development in international organization, and middle power’s role is to support this international process.62 In this context, South Korean elites position the nation as a middle power and have been pursuing “Middle Power Diplomacy”, reinforcing its position as such. The pursuit of middle power diplomacy of South Korea begins with the Lee Myung-bak administration under the slogan of “global Korea.”63 Through organizing high-level international summits and increasing its development assistance to the developing world,64 South Korea has been actively strengthening its position in the international community.

In this sense, South Korea is often seen as a model of development and modernization among the developing countries.65 In response to this, South Korea has been putting in

64 Scott Snyder et al., Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2015).
65 Ibid.
increasing amounts of effort into shaping its own aid model and strategies to promote to the
developing countries. The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), launched by the Ministry of
Strategy and Finance in 2004 is a perfect example. As a government-organized program,
its goal is to promote South Korea’s development model with a three-part strategy: policy consultation, joint consultation with International Organization, and Modularization of Korea’s development experience.

For instance, South Korea has been shaping and promoting the Saemaul Undong (새마을 운동) among the developing world. Samaul Undong, also known as the New Community Movement, is a rural development movement led by the Park Chung Hee government in the early 1970s. It was to encourage the people in rural areas to participate actively in building their communities in order to eradicate rural poverty and increase farmers’ income. The government provided support based on the community’s performance, in which successful villages received preferential support. This was initially intended to bridge the gap between the rural and urban areas. The movement contributed significantly to the economic development of the rural areas, as the income level increased by 8.7 times from 1970 to 1979. The link between the movement and rural poverty as a common global concern is clear. The fact that a plethora number of developing countries suffer from rural poverty and that Saemaul Undong is focused on this aspect makes it easier for South Korea to approach the developing world.

Through these knowledge-sharing projects, the South Korean government has been placing considerable efforts into becoming influential development model among the world of development aid. This ambition is well emphasized by Kim:

68 Ibid., 87.
69 Kim, “Executive Summary Series1.”
… The government’s efforts to make a distinctive contribution to global thinking on aid and development and further the nation’s ‘intellectual leadership’ as a ‘knowledge champion’ based on its highly admired development experience (interviews with government officials and experts)\textsuperscript{70}

This illustrates how the South Korean officials attempt to improve South Korea’s global standing through promoting its development model. On the other hand, some are concerned about this expansion of South Korean development model since this development was achieved under the strong dictatorship and had sacrificed human rights in favor of the country’s collective good.\textsuperscript{71} Therefore, a critical examination of the model on the recipient’s side should be taken account while applying the model.

In line with this, there are several challenges that South Korea is facing in taking a bigger role in the field of international development cooperation. In terms of administration, South Korea’s bilateral ODA is administrated by two government bodies: Grants by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and concessional loans by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF).\textsuperscript{72} It is noted that this division causes fragmentations in the policy making process, as the two stakeholders have different perception towards what aid is and has to be. The MOFAT-KOICA perceives aid as an instrument that is to serve diplomatic and humanitarian purposes, whereas MOSF-EDCF opposes believing it should be more effective in synergizing economic cooperation, trade, and investment.\textsuperscript{73} These different understandings of foreign aid often result in difficulties in a


coherent decision-making, which eventually leads to the ineffectiveness of foreign aid. Therefore, a better coordination between the agencies is highly desirable.

![Figure 8 Bilateral ODA by Income Group, 2008-2014](source: ODA Korea)

Furthermore, South Korea has an “ambiguous”74 standing in the development aid community. It belongs to both categories of the major donors considering its membership of the DAC and emerging southern donors. In this context, South Korea has to follow the norms and responsibilities as a member of the OECD DAC on the one hand, but shows similarities with other East Asian actors on the other.75 This shows the confusion of South Korea in identifying itself in the architecture of development cooperation. In fact, within the DAC, South Korea was criticized for its aid allocation pattern based on recipients’ income level, in which it provides relatively small amount of aid towards the least developed countries (LDCs), but provides almost half amount of the total to the middle-income countries (MICs). This shows that South Korean aid allocation had a slight different pattern than the internationally agreed aid policies, such as poverty reduction and following international

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75 Kim, “The Domestic Politics of International Development in South Korea,” 81.
development agendas. However, with its continuous effort into contributing to poverty reduction and the MDGs, the pattern seems to be improving (see Figure 8). In this regard, South Korea needs to identify itself between the two groups so it can shape its own concrete aid architecture and pursue a more sound international reputation that will allow for continued cooperation with other states.

To sum up, South Korea has achieved formidable economic development during the past decades, subsequently transforming the country from a large recipient to an active donor in the international aid community. In other words, South Korea’s pursuit of active engagement in the field of development cooperation is primarily driven by its economic development. This is explained by the theory of Heo and Roehrig, in which they demonstrate how economic development affects a nation’s policy changes in foreign policies and relations with other nations. Moreover, South Korea considers, and is considered itself, as a middle power nation. And it attempts to act as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds by promoting its own development model and enlarging its ODA volume towards the developing countries on the one hand, and actively organizing high-level forums with the developed countries on the other. From this perspective, South Korea’s increasing ODA provision level might be explained as its ambition to play a role of middle power. In the same vein, Hwang argues that the South Korean government aims to utilize aid as a tool for soft power to become a middle power. Thus, scholars assume that South Korea’s effort to become an influential actor in the international aid community is an instrument to pursue better reputation in international politics. This, in fact, raises concerns that South Korea might be seeking to become more than just a middle power in the politics of international

76 Lee, “Aid by Korea: Progress And Challenges.”
78 Kyu-Deug Hwang, “Korea’s Soft Power as an Alternative Approach to Africa in Development Cooperation.”
development cooperation. Based on this understanding, the next chapter assesses the motivations of South Korea’s contemporary ODA policy towards Africa.

Chapter 3 – South Korea in Africa

In order to investigate the possible motivations of South Korea’s rapid increase ODA provision to Africa, this chapter provides an analysis of South Korea’s plan and strategies for Africa. This analysis is based on the press releases, official statements, and documents of the South Korean government and the agencies responsible for the making of foreign aid policy.

The history of South Korea-Africa diplomatic relations could be divided before and after the mid-2000s. Thus, the first section overviews the early years of the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Africa, which begins from the 1960s. This former engagement is examined in the context of the competition for recognition in the international community between the two Koreas.80

It then moves on towards the “re-engagement” phase and addresses the contemporary relations after the mid-2000s. From this section, this chapter is organized thematically. The pattern of South Korea’s engagement with Africa in this re-engagement phase shows more diverse national interests. To date, South Korea has been continuously expressing its interests in Africa, by increasing the volume of foreign aid to Africa with the launch of the Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development (KIAD), hosting several high-level forums of development cooperation such as the Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) and the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC) and so on. In this context, this chapter attempts to understand the dynamics of South Korea’s increasing interest in Africa in the landscape of the international development community in the recent years.

80 Kim, “Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle?”
81 Darracq and Neville, “South Korea’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
3.1 The First Engagement

The history of the relations between South Korea and Africa traces back to the 1960s, after the Korean War. As addressed in a number of existing literature, the primary motivation back then was to be recognized for the name of Korea in the international community. As Kim observes, there was a competition in the realm of foreign policy between the two Koreas especially with regard to African countries. The two Koreas were actively attempting to tie diplomatic relations with the newly independent African nations after the period of colonization had ended. Quite surprisingly, during that time, South Korea was a peripheral player as North Korea had an advantage for promoting anti-Western propaganda and also had strong relations in terms of military cooperation.82 In fact, North Korea had more embassies in the continent than South Korea did in the 1970s.83 Thus, the continent of Africa acted as a “chessboard”84 for the intense diplomatic competition between the two Koreas.

During this time, the tension within the Korean peninsula had led South Korea to practice its own “Hallstein Doctrine” which refuses to establish relations with the countries that recognize North Korea.85 This is very similar to today’s “One China” Policy in practice.86 However, in 1972, under the lead of President Park Chung-hee, South Korea abolished this policy and attempted to establish and normalize diplomatic ties for several reasons. Moon and Yoon argue that it was an inevitable policy decision, mainly because the African countries had a huge impact on the UN General Assembly and the UN membership related to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Despite this effort of the South, North Korea stayed superior in terms of the status in the international community. With the entry to the NAM in 1976 and

82 Yoon and Moon, “Korean Bilateral Official Development Assistance to Africa Under Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development.”
83 While North Korea had 23 embassies, South Korea had 10 embassies in the 1970s. Kim, “Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle?,” 53.
84 Darracq and Neville, “South Korea’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
86 One-China Policy is a view that there is only one China (People’s Republic of China), considering Taiwan (Republic of China) as a part of China. Yoon and Moon, “Korean Bilateral Official Development Assistance to Africa Under Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development.”
taking the leadership of the organization, North Korea was in an advanced status in getting into the UN. North Korea, during that time, provided millions of dollars of aid to the Third World, especially to the countries in Africa, which accounted three quarters of the total aid provision. Therefore, the influence of North Korea in the continent of Africa was superior to the one of South Korea during the time.

Situated in this peripheral situation, South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan made the first South Korea’s official presidential visit to African countries such as Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal and Kenya in 1982. This visit illustrates the nation’s effort in strengthening ties with the African countries and marks the first step of formal diplomatic relations between South Korea and the countries in Africa. Through continuous efforts and struggles and with the support of African countries, South Korea finally achieved the accession to UN membership with North Korea in 1991.

As shown above, South Korea’s engagement with Africa in the early years has mainly been driven by its search for political recognition in the international community. This has often been criticized in the literature of development aid for being not sustainable as South Korea’s government notably stopped the engagement after the accession to the UN, closing 11 embassies in Africa by 1994. This shows how South Korea’s engagement in the early years was very limited and clearly driven by the national political interests.

3.2 The (Re-) Engagement after the Mid 2000s

With the Korea’s Initiative for African Development (KIAD) in March 2006, Africa started to get a considerable amount of attention in the South Korea’s foreign policy agenda. The KIAD was launched by the Roh Moo-hyun government. The project with the vision of

87 John Feffer, North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (Seven Stories Press, 2003), 38.
88 Kim, “Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle?”
“world peace and common prosperity of the 21st century” is about increasing support for Africa’s development and poverty reduction, and, thus, for South Korea to play a role in the international development community in order to contribute to the global agenda of the UN Millennium Development Goals. The notable points in the initiative are that South Korea would triple the overall amount of development assistance to Africa by 2008, and the materialization of the nation’s plan to share its own development experience through workshops. The launch of the KIAD remarks South Korea’s “reengagement” with Africa. Given the fact that South Korea indicated one of the objectives of the KIAD as to help boosting its presence in the international community, such initiative of South Korea’s commitment to Africa’s development implies its geopolitical interest.

In line with this, starting from the mid-2000s, South Korea has been notably increasing its ODA volume to the African continent. In November 2007, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) announced in the first Korea-Africa Forum that South Korea will increase its ODA to Africa up to twenty percent of the total aid budget by 2009 as a part of carrying through on the KIAD. In addition, the president of KOICA emphasized the fact that Africa could usefully adapt South Korea’s development experience. He promised that KOICA will work for capacity building and poverty reduction of Africa through humanitarian assistance, workshops on development and volunteer work. In fact, South Korea’s ODA to Africa has been rapidly increasing since the early 2000s. The amount of ODA to Africa in the total budget rose from 2.7 percent in 2002 to 23.8 percent in 2014 (see Figure 9), increasing tenfold in a dozen of years, while the ODA to the Asian countries

90 “Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development” (KOICA, March 2006).
91 Darracq and Neville, “South Korea’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
decreased. For an actual amount of ODA, as shown in the Figure 10, the amount had steadily doubled from 47 million to 104 million in three years from 2006 to 2008. Even though net disbursements slightly decreased in 2009 by nearly ten million, it was counteracted by a rapid increase in the next year to close to 45 million, and has continued to grow in the years thereafter. These figures clearly illustrate South Korea’s firm commitment to Africa, showing a steady and rapid increase in the volume of foreign aid.

![Figure 9 Bilateral ODA by Region, 2000-2014](source: ODA Korea)
Along with the rapid increase in its aid allocation to Africa, South Korea also has been organizing various platforms for both Africa and the public in South Korea. As a follow-up project based on the KIAD, the first Korea-Africa Forum was held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006.\textsuperscript{94} The forum consists of three sessions: developing economic cooperation between Korea and Africa, economic development of Korea: sharing experiences with Africa, and Plans to Develop a partnership between Korea and Africa. During the forum, the president of the KOICA, comparing the amount of South Korean ODA to Africa to the

other donors’ ODA emphasized that the country is facing limitations of developing the relations with Africa and contributing to the global initiatives such as the MDGs. The interesting point here is that, in the document the KOICA presented, it addressed the global ODA trend and the competitive roles of Japan and China in increasing their ODA and plans for Africa. This gives an impression that South Korea’s initiative for Africa is not driven by the humanitarian motives, but rather by the will to join the competition realizing the global trend in the African continent. The same year, the Ministry of Strategy and finance hosted the first Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation conference (KOAFEC) at the ministerial level jointly with the African Development Bank. As of today, three Korea-Africa forums and five KOAFEC have been held.

In line with these ministerial-level forums, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also launched several platforms for the domestic public. In 2011, the MOFA founded the Africa Cooperation Center to provide information on politics, economy and culture of the countries in Africa at the government level, as the information was extremely limited. As a part of the effort, the center had held an educational seminar that aims to raise awareness about the countries in Africa among the public, which were organized by the officials of the Foreign Ministry, scholars and professional travelers. However, this seminar took place only one time without follow-up sessions. Besides, the website of the Africa Cooperation Center is unjustifiably no longer available.

In fact, 4 years after the official launch of the Africa Cooperation Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened a similar kind of agency, the Korea-Africa Future Strategy
Center\textsuperscript{100} in January 2015. The center was established to “perform strategic research and build a professional network to contribute in diplomatic, economic, and commercial affairs of Korean organizations and business that are interested in Africa.”\textsuperscript{101} This agency also has held an educational seminar on Africa called the BeFA (Be Familiar with Africa), and recently the 13\textsuperscript{th} seminar took place in April 2016. Despite the fact that both were founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have their goals at establishing integrated African information and helping increase awareness about Africa, the difference between the former and later agencies is not clear at the first glance.

\textbf{3.2.1 Economic Interests}

During this time, in terms of trade, the volume itself has rapidly increased. However, it shows that the trend is in favor of South Korea. Based on the Africa Economic Brief published by the African Development Bank, while South Korea’s export rate had been increasing rapidly the import from Africa shows a gradual decrease (see figure 11). In addition, when looking at the exports by country, South Korea’s exports to Africa are very limited to a few countries such as Liberia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and South Africa. Moreover, the products exported are mainly machinery, transport equipment, and manufacturing goods. However, primary commodities such as crude oil and mineral fuels mainly dominate Africa’s imports to South Korea. The trend of trade between South Korea and Africa, therefore, explains that with the various events of ministerial forums and economic cooperation conferences clearly helped increasing the trade volume between the two sides. But, when

\textsuperscript{100} The initial English name and current Korean name of the agency is the “Korea-Africa Future Strategy Center”, however the current English name of the agency is the Korea-Africa Center. “Korea-Africa Center,” accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.africacenter.kr/eng/main/index.do.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
looking at the details, the general trade patterns seem to favor South Korea more than Africa.\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11.png}
\caption{Africa’s Share in Total Korean Exports and Imports in Percentage}
\label{fig:figure11}
\end{figure}

Source: IMF Direction of Trade (2010).

South Korea’s economic interests in Africa is obvious according to the Director of the Africa Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Park Soo-deok. In his essay, he states:

“It is true that Korea has economic interests in Africa, which is not only a treasure trove of natural resources but also a potential export market. With newly emerging economies such as India and Brazil, not to mention China, reviving up their entry into Africa in competition, it is also true that Korea is on tenterhooks fearing that it will fall behind. However, if we approach Africa with this anxious mind and obsession about economic gains, Korea won’t be able to free itself from the errors and mistakes that many other countries have made in Africa.”\textsuperscript{103}

Therefore, South Korea’s active engagement with Africa could be understood in the context of the competition for economic resources and markets with the emerging partners of Africa. The reason why this is related to the motivation behind South Korea’s increasing ODA to


\textsuperscript{103} Emphasis added. Soo-deok Park, “:: KOREA FOCUS ::,” KOREA FOCUS 19, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 112.
Africa is also clear according to Mr. Park’s recent statement. At the Korean business conference held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2013 that attracted 160 South Korean businessmen, Park Soo-deok,104 the councilor of South Korean embassy at the moment stated “The best way to gain trust from Africans is through ODA. Therefore, if we expand the ODA policy to Africa, we can build trust, and then we can develop our relations towards win-win cooperation.”105 This statement of Mr. Park implies that South Korea is using its ODA policy in order to develop commercial ties with Africa, given the fact that he used to be the director of Africa department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, an increasing number of Korean private companies have been attempting to expand their business in Africa, calling it as the “continent of opportunity”.

Looking at the ODA volume by countries in Africa, South Korea has eight priority partner countries among 26 countries in total priority countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Between the two years of being on the list, it shows that the priority partners received the higher amount of ODA compared to the other countries in Africa, except Nigeria ranking sixteenth (see figure 12). When looking at the sectors, it shows that it is focused on socio-economic infrastructure, human resource development, and rural development (see Figure 13). However, the criteria of these priority partners is not clear and, considering it is very recent, it is hard to identify clear motivations. However, it is noteworthy that three of the priority partners (DRC, Nigeria, and Cameroon) are in a group of five major crude oil exporters to South Korea.106

104 Mr. Park used to be the director of the Africa Division at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 2009 to 2011.
105 The original article is in Korean. The translation of the statement is my own work. In-seob Han, “'Win-win Cooperation for Success'... Korean companies looking for Opportunities,” YTN, December 8, 2013, http://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0104_201312080503386054.
106 MOFA, “Africa Status” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, n.d.).
### Figure 12 Top recipients in Africa, 2013-2014
Source: the Export-Import Bank Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient Country</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Tanzania</td>
<td>56.87</td>
<td>79.84</td>
<td>68.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mozambique</td>
<td>57.08</td>
<td>56.51</td>
<td>56.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ethiopia</td>
<td>27.34</td>
<td>42.91</td>
<td>35.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Senegal</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>19.86</td>
<td>18.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Rwanda</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>16.46</td>
<td>14.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ghana</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>12.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Uganda</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>12.16</td>
<td>11.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Cameroon</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>8.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 13 Main focus sectors of the Priority partners in Africa
Source: ODA Korea

The economic interests of South Korea was again expressed during President Park’s visit to three African Countries (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya) in 2016. The government published the press release with the title, “Presidential visit to Africa, Europe to boost economic cooperation.” In this release, the Presidential Senior Economic Advisor Ahn Jong-beom was included. He said:

The three African countries on this presidential itinerary have showed rapid economic growth, from 5 up to 10 percent last year, despite a worldwide economic slowdown. Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya are actively carrying out policies to foster new industries through long-term economic development plans. These offer many opportunities for business with Korea. As these three countries have been enacting policies to construct infrastructure, such as roads.
and ports, and building communication and power supply facilities, they are becoming new markets for Korean firms in the infrastructure sector.\textsuperscript{107}

This statement clearly shows South Korea’s commercial interests in the three countries that President Park has visited.

In this notion, we could find that South Korea highly values Africa as an economic partner. In order to foster a strong economic partnership with Africa, South Korea has been notably using its foreign aid policy as a tool to gain trust from the African countries. Thus, the recent increase in the foreign aid volume to Africa appears to be mainly driven by its economic interests. In addition, as South Korea is late to start the engagement with the African countries compared to the Southern Donors, namely China, the aid volume shows very rapid trend.

\textbf{3.2.2 Political and Strategic Interests through South Korean Development Model}

Throughout various forums and conferences with Africa, South Korean officials constantly emphasized shared experience of colonization, war and poverty. By stating that, they underline how South Korea’s development experience could be a model for the countries in Africa through intense cooperation between the two sides. As a result of the country’s constant effort, in 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United Nations of Development Program (UNDP) on promoting the Saemaul Undong as an effective development model for developing countries. According to the press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government stated that

\textsuperscript{107} Emphasis added. Cheong Wa Dae, “Presidential Visit to Africa, Europe to Boost Economic Cooperation,” \textit{The Republic of Korea, Cheong Wa Dae}, May 25, 2016, http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/headlines.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=22&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=deta il&srh%5Bseq%5D=15742&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=626.
signing the MoU was driven by a high demand among the developing countries, and that thereby it is expected to be globalized.\textsuperscript{108}

Among other agencies in Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been promoting the Korean model of development actively, which has been clearly shown in the various interviews of the former KOICA’s president, Kim Young-mok, who was a senior advisor for the current President Park Geun-hye on foreign affairs and security during her presidential campaign. Among others, while explaining the key efforts of the KOICA he stated:

First, we’d like to help recipient countries achieve the UN Millenium Development Goals. This involves medical education, human rights, sexual equality and governance. Second, we’d like to help them through Korea’s Saemaul (development project) because saemaul is a strategy aimed at both rural and social development. The third one is to help them in industrial capacity and infrastructure as the KOICA’s donations are small.\textsuperscript{109}

This implies that South Korea is attempting to contribute to the global development agenda, but through promoting its own economic development model. In the interview with Devex, to the question of the KOICA’s strength, Kim answered with the repeated emphasis on the Saemaul Undong in the context of South Korea’s economic success.

[South] Korea was very poor until the mid-1970s [when] we started this new village program, Saemaul Undong [New Village Movement] … It helped a lot to reduce the gap between rural and urban areas … and also wake up villagers who had no future at the time, so they can start to work hard and coordinate among themselves. Everyone in [South] Korea believes that Saemaul was [the] real base for starting Korea’s industrialization because this started from the village, but has extended to many cities. It has become one principle for everyone, for any organization to abide by. It stresses a lot the spiritual side, and cooperation.\textsuperscript{110}

As such, South Korea has committed to actively promote this development model and Saemaul Undong.


\textsuperscript{109} Emphasis added. KOICA, “Giving back to the Countries That Helped during the War,” \textit{KOICA}, July 31, 2013.

On the other hand, some are concerned that the Saemaul Undong might not be suitable for all the developing countries. In this context, the director of the Africa Division from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that the fact that Korea has achieved economic growth under dictatorship makes the South Korea’s development model more attractive among the African governments. However, he adds that Africa’s domestic politics and historical contexts should be taken into account when promoting the development model.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, Munyi argues that the Saemaul movement is “a long shot policy” and “ill-suited for Africa’s realities,” considering the lack of institutional capacity of the African governments and heavy agricultural subsidization.\textsuperscript{112}

In spite of the critiques, to this date, South Korean government is putting its effort in “sharing its development experiences.” Mostly recently, since May 25, 2016, President Park Geun-hye has visited three African countries (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya). These three African countries are the main countries to which South Korea has been recently promoting its new development cooperation project, “Korea Aid”, which is expected to be officially announced during the visit.\textsuperscript{113} The government stated that these summits would “strengthen the foundation of sharing and win-win cooperation with Korea’s African neighbors.” It also indicated that South Korea plans to boost the cooperative diplomatic ties with the African governments, stating:

The Korean government plans to deepen its cooperative relationships with African governments through a new form of official development assistance (ODA), dubbed “Korea Aid.” It is a combined assistance program that includes both development cooperation and cross-cultural promotional programs. Through the new ODA program, Korea aims to bolster its development cooperation and share its development experiences, such as the

New Community Movement, or Saemaul Undong, a series of rural and agricultural development policies from the 1970s and 1980s, with its African partners.\textsuperscript{114}

Given the fact that the government used the word “the new ODA” to refer to its own ODA policy, the initiative of “Korea Aid” reflects that South Korea attempts to brand its ODA policy as a different model than the traditional ones with an extra emphasis on its development experience that overcame the aftereffects of colonization and poverty.

Furthermore, the unification of the peninsula for “solid security and sustainable peace” has long been one of the four priorities of the Park administration.\textsuperscript{115} In this context, President Park urged for Africa’s cooperation against North Korea’s nuclear program during the speech at the African Union.\textsuperscript{116} This shows South Korea seeks to build allies with the African countries against North Korea. In addition, the Foreign Minister’s speech at the Korea-Africa Business Networking highlighted the strategic role of Africa in terms of support against North Korea.\textsuperscript{117} Overall, the recent South Korea’s presidential visit to Africa illustrates various political and strategic objectives based on the promise of strengthening cooperation for Africa’s development.

In sum, the engagement of South Korea with Africa since the mid-2000s reflects South Korea’s attempt of pursuing its economic and political interests, in order to secure its presence in the international community. As shown, South Korea has been increasing its ODA to Africa in order to foster better cooperation in terms of economy, diplomacy, and

\textsuperscript{114} Cheong Wa Dae, “President to Promote Overseas Aid, Cultural Cooperation,” \textit{The Republic of Korea, Cheong Wa Dae}, May 23, 2016, http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/headlines.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=22&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detailed&srh%5Bseq%5D=15727&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=625.


international politics. South Korea’s history of colonization and poverty enables the nation to approach the African countries through the development cooperation. With this regard, South Korean officials often mention how valuable its own development experience is for the development of the countries in Africa. Channeling and utilizing the narrative of the “Miracle of the Han River” through its ODA policy, the nation is forcefully attempting to expand its power in the African continent.
Conclusion

With the rapid expansion of the Southern partners in the international development cooperation, the world of foreign aid is observing a steady increase in aid volumes and level of engagement in the African region. As the emerging donors bring their own strategies and present them as different as the traditional ones, the international aid community for Africa is almost becoming a ground for competition of donors. In this context, South Korea, as a middle power country, also has been notably placing Africa on its foreign policy agenda in line with rapidly increasing level of ODA. Along with the considerable increase in its ODA volume towards Africa, the South Korean government has been actively pursuing its international presence based on its economic development and experience.

In this notion, this thesis has analyzed the motivations of South Korea’s increasing ODA to Africa by examining the official contents of the government and officials. Between the perspectives of donor’s interest and recipient’s needs in the context of recent increase in South Korea’s ODA volume to Africa, South Korea’s ODA policy at the moment shows the tendency of pursuing more of its own national interests. As shown in the analysis, South Korea seems to use its ODA policy towards Africa in order to build trust between the two sides, thereby to expand its own economic and political power in the continent.

The findings illustrate that, early years of the engagement was primarily driven by its political interests. The tension between the two Koreas brought the nations to Africa and compete for recognition in international relations. More clearly, for the accession to the UN, both nations attempted to build the ties with the African countries. During this time, South Korea was a peripheral player to North Korea as North Korea had been already established strong relations with the African countries for their common interest against the Western powers. And South Korea, who was allied with the United States, was seen as a part of the West.
After the membership of the UN, South Korea notably stopped engaging with Africa. Though, after a couple of decades, the nation restarted to engage with the continent actively, rapidly increasing its aid volume to Africa and organizing ministerial conferences for sound economic and development cooperation. In terms of the engagement after the mid-2000s, based on official government’s statements and documents, it implies that South Korea has various national interests in increasing its development assistance to Africa.

Firstly, South Korea is actively attempting to build economic partnership with Africa in the context of expanding Chinese power in the region. Looking at the statements of the South Korean government, it is observed that it is continuously seeking its own economic interests as a reaction to the rapidly increasing international presence of its neighbors (namely China and Japan). In this context, South Korean government shows the tendency to include its ODA policy within the context of business talks between the two sides. The visit of President Park in May 2016 also poses a good example. With the initiative of Korea Aid, the country ensured the commitment of both sides in terms of the practice of Saemaul Undong in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. The country also attempted to expand its business cooperation with the countries in terms of trade and infrastructure development along with the development cooperation. This could be explained by the fact that President Park was accompanied by a Korean business delegation of 169 businessmen on the trip. Thus, even though the government puts an emphasis on the visit (it was the first visit in the Park administration) as to show its support for the continent’s growth and development, it is continuously seeking to expand its commercial interests over the continent through a strong partnership. At the same time, the government also attempts to raise the awareness of Africa among the domestic people by organizing various platforms that the people can access and get information on the continent. Through this, the South Korean government attempts to encourage Korean companies’ investment in Africa.
Furthermore, the country strongly believes that its development experience could be a model of development to the developing countries. The unique history of South Korea gives the nation so much advantage in channeling and utilizing its own type of aid. In this notion, the South Korean government has continuously mentioned that the nation wants to share its experience with the developing world through its model of development such platforms of the Saemaul Undong and the Korea Aid initiative. A story of colonization and extreme poverty now acts as an instrument to approach the African countries as a friendly partner. Through promoting Saemaul Undong under the project of “Korea Aid,” South Korea now seeks to step up its global status as a model nation of development in the international community. In addition, as one of the main priorities of the Park administration, laying a foundation for peaceful unification with North Korea, South Korea seeks to build a strong cooperation with the countries in Africa. This clearly demonstrates its strategic interest in recently increasing level of engagement with Africa.

However, in order to be a feasible practice of development, critical examination and research on the South Korean aid is much needed on the way. Therefore, a much attention needs to be drawn to the case of South Korean ODA. Undoubtedly, South Korea is taking an active part in the global development cooperation, steadily raising its level of aid over the past decades. Yet, South Korea attempts to contribute to the development cooperation through developing its own model and strategies.

All in all, South Korea’s pursuit of a powerful nation of development includes several national interests. The South Korean government highly values Africa as an emerging economic partner and it attempts to build the sound cooperation through an active engagement for Africa’s development. This development cooperation is however through promoting its own development model, which shows its ambition to play a bigger role in the international development community. Moreover, through the close cooperation, it seeks for
support from African countries against North Korea. Thus, South Korea’s increasing ODA to Africa and active engagement contains various national interests.

However, as noted in the DAC peer review, the studies on South Korea’s ODA is still very limited to the civil society and research institutions. Therefore, a clear examination on the pattern and practice of South Korean aid is hard to be conducted, which makes it harder to evaluate and improve its aid architecture. What I have noticed during the research is that the fragmentation in the administration makes it hard for researchers to access needed information. As far as I am concerned, the nation has three major websites that contain its ODA policy information: KOICA, ODA Information Portal, and ODA Korea. Besides, in a lot of cases, English translations are very limited. Given the fact that it is forcefully putting effort in terms of foreign aid to Africa, it has a considerable potentiality playing an active role in the international development cooperation. Therefore, through reforming these areas and encouraging research, South Korea could benefit a lot in developing its strategies and becoming a competitive player in the international development cooperation community.


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