Beyond Copenhagen: Realpolitik in EU Accession Conditionality

By

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Abstract

This thesis is a comparative case study of the accession of the Republic of Cyprus with Moldova’s current path towards EU integration. It makes the case that a favorable international political context and EU political climate are unwritten political conditions that go beyond the explicit conditionality outlined by the Copenhagen Criteria. It shows how Turkey and Russia have worked as obstructing third party states in these cases, while Greece and Romania have worked as facilitating EU member states. It also discusses the effect of EU enlargement fatigue on European integration efforts today. All of these examples show realpolitik affecting EU enlargement, a staple of Brussels’ foreign policy.

This raises a question: to what degree does the EU function as a unified political entity? The degree to which Brussels’ foreign policy agenda is subject to pressures from national interests supports the integovernmentalist theories of Stephen Hoffman, who suggested that national politics stand in opposition to the realization of true regionalism in a political sense. This raises questions about the validity of neofunctionalist predictions that economic integration will spill over into close political integration over time.
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List of Abbreviations

AA – Association Agreement
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
EaP – Eastern Partnership
ENP – European Neighborhood Policy
EEU – Eurasian Economic Union
EU – European Union
EUCU – European Union Customs Union
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE – Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe
PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
RoC – Republic of Cyprus
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TRNC – Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN – United Nations
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Introduction

European expansion is an essential part of Brussels’ foreign policy in which the EU endeavors to expand its normative framework over neighboring regions. Through accession conditionality, the EU attempts to integrate candidate states both economically and politically in order to promote unity and cohesion throughout the region. Future EU expansion is an essential component of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) that forms the backbone of Brussels’ official foreign policy for the region. The effectiveness and future of EU integration remains a subject of scholarly debate.

The political component of EU conditionality has arguably been a practical part of the accession process since the original enlargements to the Community, but it was first specifically outlined at the 1993 European Council of Copenhagen. The resulting “Copenhagen Criteria” center around the stability of institutions, quality of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities in candidate states. In addition to these written criteria, there appear to be a number of unofficial elements to EU political conditionality.

The success of an accession bid seems tied to the political context in which it takes place, both in terms of international political considerations and the EU’s political climate. International political context is here defined as the environment created by individual political interests of various nations that affects the outcome of an accession bid. The EU’s political climate is here defined as the quality of unity, stability, and political will within the EU that is either conducive or hindering to enlargement.

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These realpolitik considerations, born of competing national interests, seem to deeply affect the EU’s actions; they drive Brussels to move in ways that could be considered contrary to its proposed policy agenda. The degree to which national politics shape EU policy as a whole calls into question the ability of the latter to act as a unified political entity.

Hoffmann’s Intergovernmentalism

Two theories, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, have historically dominated academic debates surrounding EU integration. Each differently conceptualizes the trajectory and potential of the EU. Neofunctionalism, developed by Ernst Bernard Haas, predicted that the importance of national identity would see a decline in favor of increased regionalism. The neofunctionalist framework envisions the EU as an increasingly unified political actor, suggesting that economic and social considerations drive individual states to operate as a single entity. Says Haas,

The advent of supranationality symbolizes the victory of economics over politics, over that familiar ethnocentric nationalism which used to subordinate butter to guns, reason to passion, statistical bargaining to excited demands.

However successful the EU has been as an economic union, this degree of political unity is yet to be seen. Intergovernmentalism, created by Stanley Hoffmann, posits the opposite and suggests that state interests drive international competition that works against regional integration. The enormous influence that individual states continue to have on EU policy, as shown in this research, supports Hoffmann’s claims.

To better understand the ability of the EU to function as a unified political body, this thesis will analyze unwritten EU conditionality and the implications of political

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5 Ibid; 71
6 Hoffmann, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe.” The MIT Press (1966). 862-915.
influences on accession by conducting a comparative case study of Cyprus and Moldova. The experience of Cyprus from the time of its Association Agreement (AA) with the European Community in 1973 until its accession in 2004 and the experience of Moldova from the establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009 to present both highlight the importance of political context in determining the progress of EU enlargement.

There are important implications to the vulnerability of EU integration to realpolitik. In some cases, national pressures seem to drive EU foreign policy in directions that run contrary to Brussels’ official international relations agenda. The fact that national interests can derail EU policy suggests that the viability of the EU as a unified political entity may be suspect. Though the EU has certainly become a political organization with a certain degree of legal personality, particularly in the wake of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the depth of political integration it can achieve remains to be seen.

*Introducing the Cases: Cyprus and Moldova*

In 2004, the EU admitted the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) despite having unresolved border issues surrounding the generally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with which it shares the island. This set an important precedent for potential future EU candidates, particularly post-Soviet countries containing quasi-states within their borders, such as the Republic of Moldova.

There are a number of unwritten political conditions affecting Moldova’s path to accession that were also present during Cypriot accession negotiations. First, in both cases, an obstructing third party state complicates the integration process. Here, obstructing third party is defined as “a third-party state that has a vested interest in preventing the accession of another state to the EU.” For the RoC, this state is Turkey
and for Moldova, it is Russia. A major difference between the cases of Moldova and the RoC is that Russia’s involvement in this capacity complicates Moldova’s relationship with Europe far more than did Turkey in a similar context with regard to Cyprus.

Second, both cases also involve facilitating EU member states. Here, facilitating EU member is defined as “a full EU member state that has a vested interest in helping to facilitate the accession of another state to the EU.” In the case of the RoC this is Greece, and for Moldova it is Romania. Importantly, Greece was better able to advocate on Nicosia’s behalf than Romania is on Chisinau’s.

A third item is the presence or absence of enlargement fatigue. Here, enlargement fatigue is defined as “a climate of reluctance, and possibly inability, to welcome the accession of new member states.” Because the RoC applied for accession before the 2004 enlargement, it dealt with a very different EU than Moldova encounters now. The current EU, with twenty-eight member states that are less fully integrated than were the twelve at the time of Cypriot accession, is not as likely to embark upon new enlargement initiatives.

The capacity of an obstructing third party state to stymie EU negotiations, the ability of a facilitating EU member state to aid integration, and the presence or absence of enlargement fatigue differ between the two cases in this research. These differences show that Moldova may be facing a steeper climb towards accession than did Cyprus. The Copenhagen Criteria address none of these variables; they are, rather, unwritten political criteria that exist outside the official framework.

These cases are enormously valuable to conducting an analysis of EU enlargement policy. The presence of an unresolved border dispute within both territories, the similar relationships they share with external powers both within and outside the EU highlight unofficial political conditions that can affect an accession bid. The fact that Cypriot accession took place as part of the big 2004 enlargement and
Moldovan integration has begun in earnest years later, during a period of so-called “enlargement fatigue,” shows how the political situation within the EU itself shapes Brussels’ foreign policy.

_Contextualizing Moldovan Integration_

Though this research highlights the political roadblocks confronting Moldova, it makes no claims that these are insurmountable or that the country will never attain full membership. While the attainment of Cypriot membership in the EU can be seen as the culmination of a “successful” accession bid, Moldova’s status outside the Union cannot considered a “failure” or treated as an opposite outcome.

Moldova has strongly indicated its intention to work towards full integration with the EU; its ruling political party is called the Pro-European Coalition, the government of which is the successor to that of the Alliance for European Integration. Former Prime Minister Iurie Leanca has explicitly called for Moldovan accession by 2019. But in spite of a wealth of evidence indicating intention, Moldova has yet to officially apply for membership and only signed an Association Agreement (AA) as recently as 2014.

Cyprus submitted its application to the EU in 1990, twenty-three years after signing its AA with the European Community and a full fourteen years before securing admission to the Union. There is no standard timeline for accession; for example, the integration process for those who acceded as part of the 2004 big enlargement enjoyed an expedited timetable compared with the experiences of Greece or Austria. By any measure, however, Moldova is still at an early place on its path to integration. Though it

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8 “Moldova wants to join EU in 2019.” Regional Today (April 30, 2014): 4-5
remains a non-member and many obstacles still stand in the way of its full integration with the EU, Moldova has made enormous strides even in the last five years towards eventual accession. Gabrielle Bulgari states,

The AA negotiations between the European Commission and the Republic of Moldova, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), started back in 2009 and was finally signed on 27 June 2014. By replacing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the AA has moved the political dialogue and economic integration between the EU and Moldova to a new stage. In the aftermath, Moldova has proven remarkable results in implementing all the EU reforms and so far is the most promising of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) partners.  

Therefore, conclusions drawn hereafter from the comparison of Cyprus and Moldova are meant only in the context of studying EU enlargement and the union itself, and this research makes no comment on the likelihood of the eventual admission of Moldova.

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Chapter 1 – EU Accession Conditionality

Although an increasingly politically oriented organization, historically the EU has been first and foremost an economic body and it only explicitly outlined political conditions for accession in the early 1990s. As Tanja Cerruti observes,

In view of the fifth enlargement – more specifically on the occasion of the European Council of Copenhagen in 1993 – the European Union enunciated for the very first time the criteria for accession, determining that ‘the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union’, provided that they complied with conditions of a political and economic and legal nature. Political criteria were identified with stability of institutions in guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.\(^{12}\)

These criteria refer to the domestic political situation of an applicant country. Official conditionality provides a framework according to which an EU hopeful may reform its government and economy to conform with EU norms and values. Through this mechanism, the EU acts as a normative power that exerts regional influence through the very processes of enlargement and integration. In theory, an applicant state has the ability to reform its domestic situation and therefore is able to meet these criteria over time as it works towards the goal of EU accession.

1.1 Unwritten EU Accession Conditionality

In addition to the written political conditions, there seem to be a series of unwritten criteria over which applicant countries often have little to no control. For example, the EU seems to have a strong preference for only accepting immediately geographically adjacent neighbors, for taking on groups of states rather than individual countries, and for maintaining periods of non-enlargement for roughly a decade proceeding any enlargement.\(^ {13}\) Therefore, while a country can diligently make efforts to

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\(^{13}\) Balázs, Péter. Enlargement conditionality of the European Union and future prospects. In: Van Elsuwege et al. (eds.): Liber Amicorum for M. Maresceau, University of Ghent, 2013. 533
adopt EU political norms in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria, it may still have to wait for a favorable set of circumstances that find it appropriately geographically and temporally positioned for EU integration. There are exceptions to these unofficial conditions; Croatia’s accession broke the convention of having a ten-year gap between enlargements and violated the preference for group accessions. Still, these conditions help form an unofficial framework that goes beyond the Copenhagen Criteria.

In addition to the aforementioned unwritten conditions, international political considerations and the political climate of the EU itself have enormous impact on the success of an accession bid. These variables are more complicated and even harder for an applicant to influence. EU integration may be fast-tracked, delayed or even derailed by the EU’s relationship with external powers, by internal dynamics within the Union itself, by political relationships involving the applicant, or by the failure of member states to act as a single political unit. This final consideration is perhaps the most problematic. The EU is a community based on the principles of consent and unanimity and national divergences between EU member states prove ruinous to its attempts to operate as a single political identity, thereby obstructing the process of political integration and hindering the spread of Europeanization.14

There are numerous instances in which the realpolitik side of EU conditionality has affected an applicant’s membership prospects. For example, Tanja Cerruti suggests that the Copenhagen Criteria were applied more rigorously to Croatia than to any previous applicant partially because “Croatia had started negotiations together with Turkey, towards which EU Member States have always shown a more cautious stance than towards other Candidate Countries.”15 Meanwhile, Kosovo will face far more obstacles in pursuing EU integration than will its neighbors Serbia or Bosnia and

14 Jovanovic, Miodrag A. "Eu and the Recognition of Kosovo - A Brief Look through the Legitimacy Lenses." Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade 3 (2008): 72
Herzegovina due to its relationship with individual EU members, only some of whom officially recognize its sovereignty.\textsuperscript{16} And, of course, the importance of political context is evident in the cases of Cyprus and Moldova.

1.2 Value of the Cases: Observing Aspects of Unwritten Political Conditionality

As part of the criteria of EU accession, it is generally understood that an applicant country must not be engaged in any ongoing border disputes. The 1999 meeting of the European Council in resolved that,

\begin{quote}
…the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

In spite of Cyprus failing to solve the long standing border dispute between the two halves of its territory, it was accepted as a full EU member even as the UN brokered for reconciliation process, the Annan Plan, fell apart.\textsuperscript{18} However reluctant the EU may have been in 1999 to accept a new member state with internal border issues as severe as those in Cyprus, in which nearly roughly a quarter of the island’s population still resides in a largely unrecognized pseudo-state, Nicosia’s successful admission in 2004 set a precedent that the conditions outlined in Helsinki are more guidelines than hard rules.\textsuperscript{19}

This precedent is important in studying the integration paths of potential future EU hopefuls like Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, all of which currently struggle with internal border disputes that negatively influence prospects of their successful accession.\textsuperscript{20} In the case of Moldova, this dispute is over the autonomous,

\textsuperscript{16} Jovanovic, Miodrag A. "Eu and the Recognition of Kosovo - A Brief Look through the Legitimacy Lenses." \textit{Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade} 3 (2008): 79


\textsuperscript{19} Brewin, Christopher. \textit{The European Union and Cyprus}. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000, 176

\textsuperscript{20} Balázs, Péter \textit{Enlargement conditionality of the European Union and future prospects}. In: Van Elsuwege et al. (eds.): Liber Amicorum for M. Maresceau, University of Ghent, 2013. pp. 534
yet unrecognized, territory of Transnistria (also called Trans-Dniestr or Pridnestrovie.) Verdun and Chira have labeled the Transnistria conflict as the “ultimate challenge to Moldovan membership aspirations.” Yet the case of Cyprus shows that such a conflict is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle to EU accession, provided there is a favorable political context. From this starting point, this research looks beyond where many scholars focus, the Transnistria conflict, to other important political considerations surrounding Moldova’s path to EU integration: international political context and EU political climate.

The influence of international political context is clearly seen in these cases, both of which involve an obstructing third party state and a facilitating EU member. Furthermore, it incorporates data from both before and after the 2004 enlargement. Enlargement fatigue is generally understood to be a phenomenon observed after, and perhaps as a result of, the 2004 enlargement. By using a case from before and after, this research observes the effect of EU political climate on states’ paths to membership.

Chapter 2 – Obstructing Third Party States

EU enlargement does not occur in a vacuum, and naturally the spreading of European norms and influence is of great interest to a great many parties not directly involved in the process itself. Powerful states can influence accession proceedings and ill will from an interested third party can tie up the process; the EU can be stymied in the face of opposition from a large external force. While certainly not a part of written EU conditionality and little talked about in official dialogues, the role of third party states is hard to miss in practice. This variable is clearly visible in the cases of Cyprus and Moldova.

2.1 Roots of Turkish Interest in Cyprus

Since the Turkish invasion in 1974, the island nation of Cyprus has been divided into the predominantly ethnically Greek southern RoC represented by a government in Nicosia and the TRNC governed by a second administration seated in North Nicosia. Discussions of Cyprus as an EU member state implicitly refer to the RoC. Though it is independent from its southern neighbor in almost every way, the TRNC remains a largely unrecognized state and the government in North Nicosia does not participate in the administrative machinery of the EU in any capacity beyond observer. There have been numerous strategies for reunification, including the establishment of a federal system over the entire island suggested as early as the 1970s and attempted in the UN brokered Annan Plan rejected by referendum in the southern republic in 2004. However, the two territories remain partitioned today.

Turkey, understandably, maintains a healthy interest in the affairs of Cyprus. The TRNC, as indicated in its name, has been affiliated with mainland Turks in various linguistic, historical and cultural ways and is a product of the Turkish intervention in 1974; Ankara maintains a military presence on the northern part of the island today.\textsuperscript{25} In many ways, Turkey sees itself as responsible for prominent Turkish minorities outside its borders, particularly in Cyprus where it has such direct and recent historical ties.

The accession of the RoC to the EU broadened Greek Cypriots’ practical leadership of the island as a whole, decreasing the legitimacy of the TRNC and diminishing the bargaining power of North Nicosia in reunification negotiations. Furthermore, it made a tidy resolution to the conflict far less likely. The declarations at Helsinki inspired a renewed thrust towards resolution in the early 2000s by reaffirming that a solution was a precondition to Cypriot membership.\textsuperscript{26} The 2004 accession, therefore, drastically reduced incentives for Nicosia to normalize relations with the TRNC, an outcome Turkey sincerely wished to avoid. Brewin explains,

\begin{quote}
…the EU willingness to negotiate accession while leaving a settlement to the parties under the auspices of the UN was itself making a settlement less likely. The accession negotiations strengthened the hand of the Greek Cypriot nationalists who were prepared to risk deepening the division of the island rather than compromise on their view that Cyprus is a Hellenic island which should be ruled democratically by the majority, with protection for the rights as individuals of the Turkish Cypriot minority.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

The accession similarly strengthened the position of hardliners in the TRNC who were equally unwilling to compromise their own vision for the island.

Cyprus is even more central to Turkish foreign policy because of how it complicates Turkey’s own EU accession path, and relations between Ankara and Brussels in general. First, Cypriot accession required Turkey to extend the free trade

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Anastasiou, Harry. “Cyprus as the EU Anomaly.” \textit{Global Society} vol. 23 no. 2 (2009): 135}
\footnote{Brewin, Christopher. \textit{The European Union and Cyprus}. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000, 120}
\end{footnotes}
policies established under the Ankara Protocol to the RoC, a government Turkey does not recognize (an action Ankara has been unwilling to take.)\textsuperscript{28}

Furthermore, accession drastically increased the legitimacy and political influence of the RoC and ensured that Cypriot policy at the EU level is that of Greek Cypriots and generally hostile to Ankara.\textsuperscript{29} Since obtaining membership, as described by Anastasiou, [Nicosia] subsequently pursued a policy of halting Turkey's accession process. As a result, the European Union, compelled to act on its laws and regulations, decided to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey on 8 of the 35 chapters of the harmonization process that had a bearing on trade with Cyprus.\textsuperscript{30}

Even if Turkish accession proceedings eventually advance to the point of calling a vote among current EU member states, the government of Nicosia would then have the power to veto Turkish membership. Nicosia’s influence on Turkish accession proceedings is, therefore, infinitely greater now than it was before 2004. For all of these reasons, Turkey clearly had a vested interest in blocking Cypriot accession.

\textit{2.2 Turkey as an Obstructing Third Party State}

Turkey's primary method of fighting Cypriot accession was to take steps to integrate with the TRNC in a kind of “proportional integration” parallel to the incorporation of the RoC to the EU.\textsuperscript{31} Following the EU’s March 1995 decision to accept the initiation of Nicosia’s accession negotiations, Turkey and the TRNC publically declared their intention to begin integrating by the end of that year.\textsuperscript{32} In 1997, as a reaction to the formal start of EU accession negotiations with Nicosia, Ankara unveiled a program designed to integrate the TRNC with mainland Turkey in a number of ways; the policies included establishing a “special relationship” in the sphere of foreign policy,

\textsuperscript{28} Anastasiou, Harry. “Cyprus as the EU Anomaly.” \textit{Global Society} vol. 23 no. 2 (2009): 137
\textsuperscript{29} Tocci, Nathalie. “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?” \textit{Turkish Studies}. Vol. 3 No. 2 (2002):117
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid; 137
\textsuperscript{31} Brewin, Christopher. \textit{The European Union and Cyprus}. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000, 183
\textsuperscript{32} Tocci, Nathalie. “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?” \textit{Turkish Studies}. Vol. 3 No. 2 (2002):112
the formation of an “Association Council,” the inclusion of the TRNC in Turkish economic plans, the provision of water resources to North Nicosia, and generally that “every structural co-operation between the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus and the EU [would] be similarly implemented between the TRNC and Turkey.”

By 2000, almost half of the TRNC budget derived from Turkish aid in some form or another, and Ankara was increasingly pressuring North Nicosia to fully integrate with the mainland.

Turkey was forced to abandon this strategy in exchange for advocating the Annan Plan, and of course in the end the RoC acceded to the EU in spite of Turkish objections. Part of Ankara’s inability to challenge the EU on Cypriot accession came from Turkey’s dependency on trade with the Union. The EU has been Turkey’s key trading partner for decades. Not only was its export market dominated by the EU, it maintained a serious trade deficit as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.

![Figure 1: Turkey's exports by region as share of total exports (in percent)](image)

34 Ibid; 184
36 Ibid; 9
Comparatively, the EU was far less reliant on Turkish markets that made up less than two percent of its imports and exports of both merchandise and services throughout the 1990s. This trade imbalance severely limited Turkey’s influence over the EU throughout Cypriot accession talks.

Turkey was, and continues to be, deeply involved with the EU in ways that further tied Ankara’s hands regarding Cyprus. As early as 1963 Turkey signed a broad free trade agreement known as the Ankara Agreement, and it has been party to the EUCU since 1995. Even had it logistically been in a position to pressure the EU economically, major actions would have jeopardized numerous long-standing contractual agreements. As a NATO member alongside numerous EU member states, an overly

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aggressive stance from Ankara towards the EU could easily have soured Turkish international relations even outside Europe.

The most important issue was Turkey’s own accession bid. As a candidate for membership itself, Turkey’s options in 2004 were limited. A continuation of its historically secessionist policies regarding the TRNC may have proved a greater hindrance to Cypriot accession to the EU, but this would have had severe implications for Ankara’s own ambitions by driving a wedge between Ankara and Brussels. Instead, Turkey pinned its hopes on the success of the Annan Plan. By the time it became clear that reunification was unlikely, there was little Turkey could do to foil the integration of Greek Cyprus. Thus, Turkey’s deep ties with the EU again diminished its power as an obstructing third-party state.

2.3 Roots of Russian Interest in Moldova

Moldova attained independence upon the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. Since that time, fierce debates surrounding Moldova’s future have abounded. Competing trajectories for the nation include unification with Romania, accession to the EU, and continued independence from both; since 2009 when the Communist Party in Chisinau left power, Moldova has instead increased efforts to move towards integration with the EU. Moscow takes great interest in Moldovan affairs. Devyatkov describes,

Relations with the newly independent [post-Soviet] states remain a high priority on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy agenda. These relations are like a litmus test for the normalization of

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41 Anastasiou, Harry. “Cyprus as the EU Anomaly.” *Global Society* vol. 23 no. 2 (2009): 130
post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy identity, the core feature measuring the political transition of the country. 

Moldova is well within Moscow’s historic sphere of influence, an area Russia tends to be quite protective of. Putin’s goal of re-establishing Russia as a great power and a regional hegemon is at odds with Chisinau’s chosen path towards EU integration.

Moldova is part of what Europe considers to be the Eastern Partnership and Russia considers to be the “near abroad,” an area that the latter hopes to shield from European integration. The Kremlin often views with hostility any attempts by outside powers to influence this territory, particularly by the EU and NATO. The accession of the Baltic states to the EU and the expansion of NATO to include six previously Warsaw Pact countries in the early 2000s was far from celebrated in the Kremlin; Russia has seen further attempts by the EU at integration, the establishment Eastern Partnership and signing of AAs with Ukraine and Moldova, as Western expansionism within its region. Chirila explains,

Russia sees the ENP and EaP as geopolitical instruments designed to challenge Moscow’s so-called “legitimate interests” in the post-soviet area/near neighborhood. Therefore, Russia staunchly opposes Moldova’s political association and economic integration with the EU by applying political pressure, trade blockades, energy threats, and media propaganda. Putin’s Russia seems to view the EaP as a “zero-sum game” in which any European integration with the region is a threat to its own designs.

Moscow is further determined to ensure that the so-called Color Revolutions seen across the post-Soviet region throughout the 2000s never becomes a widespread phenomenon on the scale of the Arab Spring. Afraid of events similar to Ukraine’s

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44 Ibid; 187
45 R. Lyne: Russia’s Changed Outlook on the West: From Convergence to Confrontation, In: The Russian Challenge, Chatham House, 2015, 4
Orange Revolution taking place in Moldova, Russia long supported the communist regime of ex-president Vladimir Voronin in Chisinau in opposition to more pro-Western elements in the country.  

Finally, the territory of Transnistria on Moldova’s eastern edge further cements the Kremlin’s interest. A de-facto state, home to roughly 500,000 ethnic Ukrainians, Moldovans, Russians and Jews among other minority groups, Transnistria is recognized by no UN member states. In a relationship not unlike the one shared by Turkey and the TRNC, Russia supports Transnistria both politically and economically, most importantly by supplying the territory with free natural gas; the government in the administrative center of Tiraspol almost certainly could not exist without Moscow’s aid. In a further parallel with the TRNC, ethnic Russians within Transnistria support reunification with Russia and the Kremlin feels a degree of responsibility for this population. The territory is also important to the Kremlin because it links Moscow to infrastructure networks running from Kaliningrad, where sits Russia’s prized Port of Baltiysk on the Baltic Sea.

2.4 Russia as an Obstructing Third Party State

One way in which Russia acts as an obstacle in the way of Moldovan integration with the EU is merely a consequence of its very existence. As a powerful neighbor with a great degree of regional influence and its own established economic and security

50 Ibid; 190
structures, Russia offers a viable alternative framework to that of the EU and OSCE. The formation of such international bodies as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has created networks of security and economic relations that exist outside Western systems. This phenomenon, called “regiopolarization,” creates competition between geographic hubs over the patronage of unaffiliated states like Moldova. By offering an alternative trajectory for regional integration, Russia complicates the arithmetic for Chisinau. At various times in the last decade, certain factions within Moldova have advocated pursuing integration with the Russia-Belarus customs union, the predecessor to the EEU, and have lobbied Moscow for support.

Trade relations between the two countries give Russia further influence over Moldova’s path to integration. Once Chisinau’s primary trading partner, strained political relations in the wake of Moldova’s signing the AA and DCFTA in 2014 led Russia to levy a number of sanctions against the country. Even after a drop in economic activity between Chisinau and Moscow, Russia still accounts for 12% of Moldovan trade. Although the EU is now Moldova’s primary trading partner, receiving a full 62% of its exports in 2015, Popa explains that,

…after the establishment of DCTA between Moldova and the EU the export of some categories of products to the EU has increased… [but] for most groups of exported goods there was not enough counterbalance from EU and other countries to cover the decrease of exports to Russia…

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58 Ibid
Certain sectors of the Moldovan economy were particularly dependent on Russian markets, as highlighted by the data shown in Table 1. Clearly, Moldovan dependence on Russian trade leaves Chisinau vulnerable to punitive measures taken by Moscow in retribution for pursuing EU integration.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>8411</td>
<td>Turbo-jets, turbo-propellers and other gas turbines</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0201</td>
<td>Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6402</td>
<td>Other footwear with outer soles and uppers of rubber or plastics</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0808</td>
<td>Apples, pears and quinces, fresh</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Tomatoes prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0405</td>
<td>Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk; dairy spreads</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8413</td>
<td>Pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with a measuring device; liquid elevators</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Other vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen, other than products of heading No. 20.06.</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0204</td>
<td>Meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or frozen</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8309</td>
<td>Stoppers, caps and lids (including crown corks, screw caps and pouring stoppers), capsules for bottles, threaded bungs, bung covers, seals and other packing accessories, of base metal.</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Exports to Russia as percent share of total exports by product

Furthermore, although Moldovan energy dependence on Russia may be decreasing due to its incorporation into the Europe’s Energy Community and will likely decrease further upon the completion of the proposed gas pipeline from Romania projected to be complete by May 2018, Moscow currently maintains a great degree of influence over Chisinau through its role as energy provider. Transnistria remains entirely dependent on Russian gas imports, the still-accruing debt for which will likely have serious implications for Tiraspol, and maybe Chisinau as well, in the future.

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Russia seems far more able to act as an obstructing third party state in the case of Moldova than was Turkey for Cyprus. While Ankara was rendered largely impotent during Cypriot accession negotiations by its own relationship with Brussels, Moscow has far greater soft power to bring to bear against both the EU and Moldova itself.

Power asymmetries seen between Brussels and Ankara are not present in the case of Russia. While Moscow, like Ankara, depends to some extent on trade with the EU, the former has more bargaining power because Brussels is far more dependent on Russian markets than Turkish ones. Russia is the third largest trading partner of the EU after the United States and China. Also, as of 2012, the EU received fully 50% of its gas and 30% of its oil from Russia. Moscow, therefore, has a great deal more influence over the EU from soft power than does Ankara.

Moscow also has greater access to alternative markets and stronger economic relationships outside the EU than does Ankara. Russia has been pursuing a “go east” strategy for some time, increasing its economic ties with China and increasingly building relationships within the framework of the SCO. This means that the EU has relatively far less soft power over Russia than it does over Turkey, and Moscow is therefore far more able to obstruct an EU accession bid.

Also, Russia is less integrated with the EU than Turkey. As discussed, Ankara’s own accession goals, economic agreements, and NATO membership inhibited its ability to confront Brussels in any meaningful way. Moscow, on the other hand, routinely stands quite publicly in opposition to the EU; while at one time Russia pursued a policy of cooperation and integration with the West, the Kremlin has since spectacularly departed from this path; obstructing EU expansion can do little to sour its already icy

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64 Romaniuk, Scott Nicholas and Marlin, Marguerite. Divided States: Strategic Divisions in EU-Russia Relations. Hamburg: disserta Verlag, 2012, 267
65 Ibid; 267
relations with Brussels.\textsuperscript{66} Russia has no EU accession ambitions, no NATO membership, and increasingly little stake in cooperating with Europe in general. All these factors combine to make it far more successful in its capacity as an obstructing third party state because Moscow has less at stake and is already vocally opposed to unrestrained Europeanization.

\textbf{2.5 Implications}

Turkey’s inability to obstruct the accession of the RoC contrasts with Russia’s comparatively successful inhibition of Moldovan integration, and clearly demonstrates that obstructing third party states have the potential to shape EU expansion efforts. This shows that a favorable international context goes a long way in catalyzing an accession bid, and that outside influences affect the success of European integration.

Stanley Hoffmann describes regionalism in the EU as like a large house, saying,

\ldots those nations that coexist in the same\ldots "home" of a geographical region find themselves both exposed to the smells and noises that come from outside through all their windows and doors, and looking at the outlying houses from which the interference issues. Coming from diverse pasts, moved by diverse tempers, living in different parts of the house, inescapably yet differently subjected and attracted to the outside world, those cohabitants react unevenly to their exposure and calculate conflictingly how they could either reduce the disturbance or affect in turn all those who live elsewhere.\textsuperscript{67}

In this way, national competition works against regional integration. In this case, working within his metaphor, the actions of Turkey and Russia are “smells and noises” from the outside. As Hoffmann predicts, there is rarely a unified response of any great conviction from Brussels to influences from outside the “home” of the EU. The success or failure of an obstructing third party state in preventing EU enlargement seems more intimately tied to the individual situation of the third party than to the EU’s response. The case of the RoC was decided largely by the decisions of Ankara, Nicosia, North Nicosia and

\textsuperscript{66} R. Lyne: \textit{Russia’s Changed Outlook on the West: From Convergence to Confrontation}, In: The Russian Challenge, Chatham House, 2015, 6-8

\textsuperscript{67} Hoffmann, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe.” \textit{The MIT Press} (1966): 865.
Athens, not by Brussels. The case of Moldova is likely to be decided by the actions of Chisinau and Moscow, with the EU taking only cautious steps to expand the EaP.

In this way, Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism seems to explain modern accession dynamics better than Haas’ neofunctionalism; national interests trump regional interests, and Brussels’ foreign policy often remains beholden to the agendas and influences of individual states. At least part of EU conditionality, therefore, has nothing to do with the processes outlined by the union itself as a unified political body, but instead is a product of *realpolitik.*
Chapter 3 – Facilitating EU Member States

Not only states outside the EU affect the accession process of applicants. While a highly integrated organization in many ways, the EU remains a collection of individual states with different, and sometimes conflicting, political agendas. This adds a new dimension to accession negotiations in cases where an applicant state has a special relationship with one or more EU member states. Both Cyprus and Moldova have deep historical ties to an EU member, and this has been an important factor in their paths to integration.

3.1 Roots of Greek Interest in Cyprus

At one time, Cyprus was considered a part of Greece. Though the Ottoman Empire seized Cyprus in 1571, holding it for over three centuries until 1878 when the island became a British protectorate, ethnically Greek Cypriots are still the majority group on the island.\(^68\)\(^69\) Since the 1950s, reunification with Greece, or \textit{Enosis}, has been sought by certain elements within Cyprus.\(^70\) Rising tensions between the pro-unification southerners and the ethnically Turkish northerners prompted Turkey to invade in 1974, after which the island was partitioned.\(^71\) In a situation quite similar to that of Ankara’s relationship with the TRNC, Athens’s interest in the RoC is driven largely by a feeling of historical connection to and responsibility for its predominantly ethnically Greek population and by broader international political concerns involving Turkey and the EU.


\(^{69}\) Brewin, Christopher. \textit{The European Union and Cyprus}. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000, 176


\(^{71}\) Tocci, Nathalie. “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?” \textit{Turkish Studies}. Vol. 3 No. 2 (2002): 105
Historic and ethnic ties link the island of Cyprus to Greece just as much as to Turkey, and Athens often advocates on behalf of Nicosia in opposition to Turkish Cypriot interests supported by Ankara; while Turkey opposed the accession of the RoC on the basis that it would increase the legitimacy and power of the Nicosia government over the island, Greece supported it for the same reason. Furthermore, since the 1990s Athens viewed Nicosia’s integration with the EU as the best way to work towards resolving the conflict on the island by “internationalizing” the problem.\textsuperscript{72}

On a larger scale, Cyprus has often been at the center of a complicated triangle of tense EU-Greek-Turkish relations. Greece and Turkey have long had a tense relationship marked by territorial disputes not just in Cyprus, but also in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{73} They also have ongoing disagreements over the treatment of their respective national minorities.\textsuperscript{74} In this context, EU influence in Cyprus has been seen variously by Greece as a force for positive change that can foster regional stability, or as a mechanism through which to pressure Ankara.\textsuperscript{75}

### 3.2 Greece as a Facilitating EU Member State

Athens was quite active in its role as a facilitating member state aiding the accession of the RoC. Greece was consistently able to pressure the EU on the Cyprus issue with a great degree of success. Cypriot accession owes a great debt to Greek support. The initiation of negotiations in 1995, the removal of key conditionality for the RoC, and the eventual accession itself were all made possible by Greece facilitation. Natalie Tocci explains,

> The March 1995 decision allowing for the initiation of accession negotiations with the RoC was linked (although not explicitly) to Greece’s removal of its veto on the Turkey-EU customs union.

\textsuperscript{72} Brewin, Christopher. *The European Union and Cyprus*. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000, 162
\textsuperscript{73} Ker-Lindsay, James. "The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkey's EU Accession." *Turkish Studies* 8 Vol. 71 No. 1 (2007): 72
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid; 72
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid; 71
The opposition of some member states to begin accession negotiations with a divided Cyprus was eliminated by Greece’s explicit threat to veto the entire enlargement unless this also included the RoC. The decision to explicitly remove conditionality on the RoC was linked to Greece’s acceptance of Turkey as an EU candidate. In short, Greece’s role in the EU has been arguably one of the most pivotal factors affecting the Union’s stance towards the island.76

Greece, as an established EU member with its own veto power over enlargement initiatives and major economic agreements, enjoyed a great deal of influence over the RoC’s negotiations. By threatening to obstruct Turkish integration, Greece ensured the first steps towards Cypriot accession would be taken. By standing in the way of the 2004 enlargement, Athens quite effectively catalyzed Cypriot integration process.

Some suggest that when the Annan Plan failed, the EU should have suspended the Cypriot accession process; however, partly as a result of previous pressure from Greece, the EU had already signed a Treaty of Accession with Cyprus the year before and suspending the negotiations would have halted the ten-country eastern expansion already in motion.77

Former EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, who held office at the time of Cypriot accession, made statements made public by a Wiki Leaks release. The leaked cable reveals Patten’s sentiments that,

…some of the [2004] accession countries were foisted on the EU as part of a larger bargain. Cyprus, for instance, probably should not have been admitted…but the Greeks insisted on Cypriot admission as the price of agreeing to some of the northern European candidates.78

Specifically, Athens threatened to veto Polish accession should Nicosian membership be denied; Greek influence over the EU was clearly essential in facilitating the accession of the RoC.

Having itself acceded in 1981, Greece was well established within the EU by the time Cypriot accession negotiations started. This allowed Athens to use EU mechanisms to its advantage in ways its opponent, Ankara, could not. Furthermore, Greece’s success

77 Pope, Hugh et. all. “What if the EU…?: An Exercise in Counterfactual Thinking to Address Current Dilemmas.” *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* 19 (2014): 27
in the case of the RoC was in large part due to favorable circumstances. The 2004 enlargement was the largest EU expansion in history; Athens’s ability to effectively halt the entire process gave it unprecedented leverage that it brought to bear on the Cyprus issue. Had Greece not inextricably linked the issue of Cypriot accession to those of Turkish integration and eastern expansion, the RoC may well not have been able to accede without years of further work in meeting EU conditionality.

3.3 Roots of Romanian Interest in Moldova

In a relationship that will by now sound familiar, strong historical and cultural ties along with intersecting modern political interests tie Romania and Moldova. Just as Cyprus was once a part of Greece, up until relatively recently Moldova was part of Romania. A province of Romania until annexation by Imperial Russia in the 19th century, Moldova was again a part of Romanian territory from 1918 until the Second World War.79

The peoples of Romania and Moldova have remained incredibly close. Indeed, many consider Moldovan language to, in fact, be the same as Romanian and the Moldovan flag is almost identical to that of Romania.80 Bucharest’s view is that they are a single nation across two states, and in Romania most consider Moldovans to be fellow Romanians.8182 Until the Romania’s accession to the EU in 2008, Moldovans enjoyed visa free travel to Romania.83 Bucharest has encouraged Moldovan citizens to “regain”

their Romanian citizenship, a process once totally free of a residency requirement. Bucharest’s encouragement of Moldovan integration with Romania has become more complicated since its own accession to the EU, however.

The high degree of fluidity at the Romanian-Moldovan border has been a cause of some consternation among certain other EU member states who see it as a corridor for trafficking and illegal immigration and are highly aware that around 25% of the EU’s eastern border is now controlled by Romania. Facing pressure from Brussels, Bucharest has been forced to try to rationalize its support for free movement between Moldova and Romania with a need to control its portion of the EU border and limit outside access to the Schengen Area.

From a desire both to aid its economically struggling neighbor with whom it feels a deep kinship and to improve border control on its eastern edge, Bucharest strongly supports Moldovan integration with the EU. Says Milevschi,

Romania became Moldova’s most committed advocate, a policy that has remained steady ever since... Romania started permanently backing Moldova’s bid for membership and positions in the major European, (sub-)regional and global organizations and policy projects, such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It subsequently advocated for Moldova’s interests in the World Trade Organization, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Danube Strategy. Moreover, Romania [was] a constant advocate of Moldova’s inclusion in the Western Balkans “package” for an Association Agreement with the EU.

EU membership for Moldova, either on its own terms or as an extension of Romanian membership in the event of the two countries’ unification, would greatly simplify Bucharest’s obligations both to Chisinau and to Brussels. Clearly, Moldova’s future is of great interest to Romania, and the latter will try to be directly involved in guiding the former’s trajectory.

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84 Ibid; 80
3.4 Romania as a Facilitating EU Member State

The most direct way for Moldova to join the EU would be through unification with Romania. In response to increasingly severe economic turmoil, Moldovan rallies in support of unification drew thousands in early 2016. Support in Moldova for unification is far from unanimous, however. While lauded as a shortcut to accession by some, Russian speakers in Moldova often cite the threat of unification as a pretense for maintaining close ties with Moscow; Transnistria’s violent split from Chisinau was, at least in part, inspired by similar fears. Indeed, Romania’s aggressively pro-Western policies regarding Moldova have caused periods of sour relations between the two powers in the past. To a large extent, the success of Bucharest’s attempts at greater integration is dependent on support in Chisinau. Moreover, Russia stands firmly opposed to Moldovan unification with Romania. Author Robert Kaplan says he cannot see how Moldova and Romania can unify, claiming it could be seen as cause for war in Putin’s Russia. Kaplan explains, Were Romania to annex Moldova or to unify with ethnic Romanian-speaking Moldova, that could lead Russia to formally annex Transdniester and that would create far greater regional tensions than we see now. Bucharest has a limited ability to stand against Moscow on the issue. Now, with the crisis in Ukraine creating increased tensions between Russia and the EU, seems a poor time to push the issue.

90 Ibid; 172
92 Ibid, 1
Romania also works to support Moldova’s path to independent EU accession by offering economic aid to Chisinau and promoting foreign direct investment. In the wake of a massive scandal in which around a billion dollars disappeared from the Moldovan banking system, nearly 12.5% of the country’s GDP, Bucharest has pledged 60 million euro in financial support to help. Pro-EU authorities have been in power in Chisinau for some time, and the public seems increasingly pessimistic about the countries integration prospects and distrustful of a government that many feel has a poor record of governance. Romania seems determined to keep Moldova on the path of EU integration and offers monetary assistance in part to keep dissatisfaction with the seemingly corrupt administration in Chisinau from bleeding over into growing dissent regarding the pro-EU movement in general.

However, Romania, as one of the poorest EU countries, has relatively little to offer Moldova economically compared to Russia. As previously noted, Russian sanctions have had enormous effect on Moldova and European trade has been unable to fill the void left by Moscow. While aid from Bucharest is more than welcome in Chisinau, it is unlikely to meaningfully diminish the hard times Moldova is facing. Perhaps as a consequence, public support for EU integration in Moldova has decreased from 63% in 2009 to 32% in 2015, while support for joining the EEU has reached 50%.
As far as taking concrete measures within the EU in support of Moldovan accession, Romanian influence is hindered by its own status as a new and only somewhat integrated member. While Greece was a long-standing member at the time of Cypriot accession, Romania acceded only in 2007. Furthermore, it simply lacks the power to influence Moldovan accession in the way Greece advocated on behalf of the RoC. There is no planned enlargement for Bucharest to threaten and no free trade agreement to oppose; the political context that allowed Athens to influence Brussels is lacking today. Romania is therefore limited in its capacity as a facilitating EU member state.

3.5 Implications

The fact that individual member states have such an effect on a crucial part of Brussels’ policy, EU enlargement, has enormous implications. Haas’ ideas of neofunctionalism posit that economic integration will one day unify the EU regionally in the realm of “high politics” as nations concede individual competencies and sovereignty to higher governmental bodies. 99 100 Meanwhile, Hoffmann’s theory of intergovernmentalism suggests that political unity beyond a certain threshold is unlikely, due to the inherent competition and nationalism of constituent member states.101

Greece was essential to the successful accession of the RoC; this is an example of an individual nation affecting overall EU policy. Romania has been unable to serve a similar role for Moldova, and this affects the latter’s path to full integration. If the EU were a becoming a fully unified political actor as Haas predicted, the individual agendas of its constituent states would be far less relevant.

101 Hoffmann, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe.” The MIT Press (1966): 882
Clearly in opposition, Hoffmann states,

The logic of integration is that of a blender which crunches the most diverse products, overcomes their different tastes and perfumes, and replaces them with one, presumably delicious juice. One lets each item be ground because one expects a finer synthesis that is, ambiguity helps rather than hinders because each “ingredient” can hope that its taste will prevail in the end. The logic of diversity is the opposite: it suggests that, in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender; ambiguity carries one only a part of the way.102

To apply his metaphor, the experience of Cyprus and Moldova with regard to facilitating EU member states seems to suggest that the “blender” of integration has been unable to unite national interests in the area of EU enlargement. Greece and Romania act on their own respective agendas, and their success is predicated on their individual political situation and the influence they exert on the region.

This research has shown that EU member states sometimes have the power to unilaterally affect EU enlargement, a phenomenon that highlights the importance of a favorable international political context to the success of an accession bid. This further evidence suggests that state agendas remain incredibly influential, and lends credibility to Hoffmann’s claims that national competition stands as an obstacle to full regional integration.103

102 Ibid; 882
103 Ibid; 908
Chapter 4 – EU Enlargement Fatigue

Perhaps the most widely studied aspect of European enlargement today is the enlargement fatigue that has been seen in the decade preceding the big bang enlargement. Various definitions and explanations for the phenomenon abound, but the consensus seems to be that it is a general reluctance within the union to grant membership to new applicants.\textsuperscript{104} Since the so-called “big bang” enlargement, only Croatia has successfully acceded to the union.

The RoC, whose accession was both a part and a product of the 2004 enlargement, dealt with a very different political climate than we see in the EU today. Economic troubles, dissent among member states, and numerous external pressures have diminished political will in the EU to pursue further enlargement initiatives at this time, and accession negotiations already in progress have seemed to stall. The political climate of the EU since the big enlargement is a factor that has greatly contributed to an unfavorable political context for accession bids.

4.1 Causes of Enlargement Fatigue

In 2014, at the start of his term as head of the European Commission, Jean Claude Junker promised,

\textit{There will be no new enlargement in the next five years… The EU needs to mark a pause in its enlargement process so that we can consolidate what has been done with 28.}\textsuperscript{105}

Importantly, while the severity of the current enlargement fatigue is perhaps unique, the phenomenon itself is not new.\textsuperscript{106} Debates between the so-called “wideners” who advocate for enlargement and the so-called “deepeners” who advocate for further

\textsuperscript{104} Szolucha, Anna. “The EU and ‘Enlargement fatigue’: Why has the european union not been able to counter ‘Enlargement fatigue’?” \textit{Journal of Contemporary European Research} Vol. 6 No. 1 (2010): 5


\textsuperscript{106} Szolucha, Anna. “The EU and ‘Enlargement fatigue’: Why has the european union not been able to counter ‘Enlargement fatigue’?” \textit{Journal of Contemporary European Research} Vol. 6 No. 1 (2010): 1
integration within the states already in the union always heat up in times immediately proceeding or preceding an enlargement.\textsuperscript{107} This cyclical period of enlargement fatigue has caused the EU to take decade long breaks between expansion initiatives, with enlargements historically happening in the middle years of each decade since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{108}

Yet now, twelve years since the big 2004 enlargement and approaching the latter years of the 2010s, enlargement fatigue remains strong. Although talks of Turkish integration have been revitalized by the refugee deal struck between Ankara and Brussels on March 18, 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina recently submitted a formal application, and members of the EaP have seen important steps towards integration in recent years, it remains to be seen if any of these EU hopefuls will actually accede any time soon. Says Balazs,

[The 2004 enlargement] embodied a threefold challenge to the already rather complex pattern of integration. First, it lowered the average economic development level of the Union. This had multiple consequences, such as increased demands of support from the common budget, new necessities and requests to the cohesion and agricultural policies. Second, it has imported systemic diversity into the Union with new members coming from a different political and economic world and being in the very critical phase of transformation. Third, [it] has added more new state actors to the internal decision making process of the EU than any other enlargement ever before.\textsuperscript{109}

This raises the question of if this period of fatigue is different than those that came before, and whether any end is in sight. This period of fatigue seems unique, and possibly symptomatic of a more lasting change within the EU rather than merely part of an ongoing cycle.

Citizens of the EU have shown a marked decline in support of enlargement initiatives. Surveys conducted by the European Union Democracy Observatory show that the strongest factors affecting personal support for or opposition to further enlargement include level of trust in the EU, views about the national economy, and the

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid; 5
\textsuperscript{108} Baláz, Péter Enlargement conditionality of the European Union and future prospects. In: Van Elsuwege et al. (eds.): Liber Amicorum for M. Maresceau, University of Ghent, 2013, 533
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid; 537
belief that EU membership gives a stronger say in world. The decline in support, therefore, is likely tied to decreasing trust in the EU, pessimism regarding national economies, and a perceived decrease in the EU’s global power.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what has caused the increasingly negative public opinion of the EU, but turbulent times almost certainly play a role. Since 2004, the EU has experienced the global financial meltdown of 2008, has had to bail out bankrupt Eurozone member states, has seen violence break out throughout the Arab World, has seen relations sour with Russia in response to the conflict in Ukraine, and now faces a migrant and refugee crisis unprecedented in its history. The Guardian recently suggested that the Eurozone is again heading for crisis. As a result of the refugee crisis, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia have begun closing their borders, calling into question the integrity of the Schengen Area. The looming “Brexit” referendum deciding whether the UK will leave the EU could mean the departure of one of the union’s most powerful members.

It is not difficult to see why EU citizens would be concerned about the union and leery of further expansion. The complicated and unstable situation in which the EU now finds itself may well fuel anti-enlargement sentiment and prove an obstacle to future accession bids for years to come. This period of tension perhaps highlights a decline in political unity and a resurgence of national interests and competing ideologies within the union; in spite of a clearly articulated regional foreign policy outlined by Brussels in the ENP, there is a distinct lack of unity at the level of the general public, among national governments, and even among officials within the EU government itself.

4.2 Implications and Application to the Cases

The very nature of the RoC’s accession in 2004, being part of the big bang enlargement and having submitted its formal application even before the other states in the expansion, made it easier for the bid to end in success. Countries on the path to integration today, like Moldova, face reluctance and apathy from within the EU. Current and future applicants are likely to be subject to far more stringent conditionality. While whole sections of conditionality were waived in the case of the RoC, Croatia was subject to unprecedented scrutiny throughout its integration process leading up to its accession in 2013.\textsuperscript{114} \textsuperscript{115} \textsuperscript{116} This trend towards strict application of the Copenhagen Criteria seems evident, and will likely make further EU expansions increasingly arduous.

While arguments can be made for the benefits of increasingly stringent conditionality, the EU’s historically fluid application thereof suggests that conditionality itself is subject to change based on political pressures. This is clearly visible in the EU’s actions in the ENP era. Stefan Lehne comments,

\begin{quote}
From the beginning… the EU was selective and inconsistent in applying conditionality. Belarus, governed by a nasty authoritarian regime and with no major EU interests at stake, got the full dosage of conditionality, including sanctions and the denial of most of the benefits of the ENP. Yet, despite considerable human rights shortcomings, Azerbaijan, an important energy partner, was treated with considerable leniency. With regard to the Arab states in the post-9/11 geopolitical climate of the ENP’s early years, the EU assigned priority to maintaining stability and barely even paid lip service to the promotion of democratic values.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

In spite of having articulated an official unified foreign policy for the region in the ENP, Brussels does not always act in accordance with its own proposed agenda. The individual interests and situations of specific states, both within and outside the union, cause the EU to fluctuate in its adherence to its own political goals. Now, in this period of enlargement fatigue, the reluctance of the general public in the EU, of national

\textsuperscript{114} Tocci, Nathalie. “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?” \textit{Turkish Studies}. Vol. 3 No. 2 (2002): 116
\textsuperscript{115} Szolucha, Anna. “The EU and ‘Enlargement fatigue’: Why has the european union not been able to counter ‘Enlargement fatigue’?" \textit{Journal of Contemporary European Research} Vol. 6 No. 1 (2010): 7
governments, and even of EU level officials, threaten the unified political personality of the union. Dissent in the ranks calls into question the EU’s will to embark on any further enlargements, and threatens the backbone of the ENP and Brussels’ policy for the region as a whole.

Along with the influence of obstructing third-party states and facilitating EU members, the presence EU enlargement fatigue is a largely political factor affecting the success or failure of an accession bid, and a factor over which an applicant state has no power. In many ways a product of competing national interests and subject to international politics within the EU, this phenomenon also seems to fall in line with Hoffman’s theory of intergovernmentalism. Internal divisions are obstacles to the deepening of regionalism and are a threat to the establishment of a functional politically unified body; the effects of these tensions are seen in the stagnation of EU enlargement.
Conclusions

The cases of the RoC and Moldova, presented in this research, highlight the highly political nature of EU integration. As discussed, official aspects of EU accession conditionality were waived for Nicosia, seemingly in violation of the spirit of the Copenhagen Criteria and contradicting the terms outlined in the 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that this was a product of realpolitik, and that a favorable political context was perhaps the most important factor in the RoC’s expedited accession process. Moldova, in contrast, now faces an uphill struggle towards full membership. The factors that aligned to catalyze Cypriot accession – namely the inability of an obstructing third-party state to stand in the way, the enormous success of a facilitating EU member state, and the absence of EU enlargement fatigue – are completely reversed in Moldova’s case. While Moldova has yet to meet many official conditions of accession, Cypriot accession has shown that realpolitik can override the official position of the EU; it is possible that Chisinau could be having markedly different experience in a more favorable political context.

This research has shown how complicated relations with individual external powers, competing national interests of EU member states, and the quality of unity and stability within the union itself can be more influential in determining Brussels’ accession policy than its own established political agenda. Such a strong influence of national politics on something so crucial to Brussels’ overall international relations strategy as EU enlargement raises questions about the EU’s ability to function as a political entity. If national interests can so drastically affect the quality of European integration, what does this say about the depth of EU integration within the union itself?

The original architects of the European Communities generally placed their faith in the neofunctionalist model of European integration, predicting the eventual formation of a common political identity rising out of ever deepening logistical ties in economics.
and infrastructure. To a certain extent, a degree of political integration is certainly visible in the EU today; the political conditionality in the Copenhagen Criteria ensures some level of policy cohesion across national boundaries in the EU. Yet, although the EU has certainly achieved impressively deep economic integration, national interests still prove divisive and have prevented the formation of a European super-state in a political sense.

Indeed many EU members, notably the UK, stand expressly opposed to supranationalization. London has consistently objected to movement towards a unified security and defense policy, and demanded explicit recognition of its continued sovereignty as an individual nation in the deal drawn up between British Prime Minister David Cameron and European Council President Donald Tusk in February 2016. Ex London Mayor Boris Johnson has likened the EU’s progress towards a political superstate to the grand designs of Hitler and Napoleon, describing an “eternal problem” that “there is no underlying loyalty to the idea of Europe. There is no single authority that anybody respects or understands.” Meanwhile, the ambitious attempt of the Lisbon Treaty to create a legal personality capable of articulating EU foreign policy has had only limited success; diverging national interests undermine the coherence of Brussels’ international relations goals.

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EU leadership has noted increasing dissent within the union. Jean-Claude Juncker has criticized officials in the EU Parliament and European Council for prioritizing national interests of their own country over common policy-making and claimed, “if you are listening to your national opinion, you are not developing what should be a common European sense: a feeling for the need we have to put together our efforts.”¹²³ Donald Tusk, meanwhile, has suggested that the idea of a European super-state is “an illusion” and that there is little value in working towards an ideal “European nation.”¹²⁴ It is clearly visible that national interests are driving a wedge between member states at the federal level.

Clearly, then, the logic of neofunctionalism in which interdependence obliges individual states to transfer their sovereignty to a federal level and regionalism supplants nationalism, does not describe the situation in which the EU now finds itself. Intergovernmentalism, however, describes the phenomenon quite accurately. Hoffmann suggested that international competition and entrenched national identity would prevent the “spill-over” from economic integration to political unity described by Haas; while the former is possible, the latter is unlikely.¹²⁵ This is exactly what we see today: though the EU is a remarkable study in economic integration, realpolitik at a national level dilutes the authority of the EU’s overall political agenda in favor of state interests.

This research has been necessarily narrow in scope, and further study is required to uncover the real implications thereof. The progress of EU integration in the EaP states should be closely monitored, as developments in this region will be telling for the overall health and trajectory of the EU. Furthermore, the value of neofunctionalism and

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¹²⁵ Hoffmann, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe.” The MIT Press (1966): 882
intergovernmentalism as theories of regional integration outside the European context should be tested, and the logic of Haas and Hoffmann applied to other international systems like the African Union, the EEU and SCO.

In spite of its flaws, the EU remains a pioneering experiment in international cooperation and lessons learned from studying its development will certainly be beneficial to the construction of future regional systems. At a time when the problems arising from an international legal framework based on the idea of the nation-state have never been more visible, experiments in regionalism could prove essential in moving past the stumbling blocks of our current global system.

Finally, it would also be beneficial to study federated systems, such as the United States and India, as possible examples of small-scale implementations of regionalism. There are numerous instances throughout history of a central governing body uniting a number of otherwise independent territories in various successful and practical relationships. For example, one might turn to the Albany Plan of Union, a prototype for the United States proposed by Benjamin Franklin as early as 1754, as a template for which successful regional integration may be accomplished.126

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