WAR AS A SYSTEM
- A LUHMANNIAN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF WAR RECURRENCE

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Alexander Akbik
March 3, 2016
ABSTRACT

This project engages with the question why some wars recur and others do not. It departs from the observation made prominent by Collier and Sambanis in 2002 that a considerable amount of wars is recurrent and consequently some countries are caught in a ‘conflict trap’ from which they seem unable to escape. Existing studies typically provide context-based explanations for the recurrence of war, linking the outcome with specific conditions created during the war and the opportunities present after conflict resolution. Often relying on statistical indicators to measure underlying causes of war recurrence, such studies fail to unpack the interrelations between war and society and thus cannot offer a comprehensive theorization that treats war as a social process rather than as a (series of) conflict(s) to be resolved.

To address the gap, this project advances a modern systems theoretical framework for the study of war based on the work of Niklas Luhmann. The starting point is the conceptualization of war as a (dys-)functional or parasitical system whose operations can be studied along the communicative distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. Taking into account that the war system operates alongside functional systems (such as the political, the economic or the legal system), it is argued that war recurrence is more likely when the functioning of other functional systems becomes dependent on the operations of the war system. In the Luhmannian terminology, this is captured by the concept of structural coupling of a system with its environment. Operations inside the war system are also taken into consideration, with the expectation that the fragmentation of war actors and the dispersion of violence is likely to foster war recurrence.

The theoretical argument is illustrated on four empirical examples—the Kosovo War (1999), the Second Russo-Chechen War (1999-2009), the Second Liberian War (1999-2003), and the Second Congolese War (1998-2003). Based on newspaper articles collected from the LexisNexis database, a qualitative content analysis was conducted to investigate the operations of the war systems. The analysis revealed two distinct types of war system. In the case of the Kosovo War and the Liberian War, the parasitical impact of the war systems resulted in the destruction of all functional systems. Moreover, both wars witnessed the isolation of a major war grouping and a simultaneous linear progression of hostilities towards a decisive outcome on the battlefield. Consequently, the war systems were terminated in such a way that recurrence became unlikely. In the case of Chechnya and Congo, structural couplings of the war systems could be observed and accordingly also the recurrence of war. In both cases, the operations of functional systems became dependent on the continuation of the war(s). Additionally, in these
two cases, isolation of war parties was circumvented and violence became dispersed—which rendered any decisive outcome impossible. The findings underline new avenues of research for the study of war recurrence and social order as well as offer recommendations for policymakers on the prevention of war recurrence.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are too many people to thank and acknowledge in a few lines that I will not even try to do them justice; a couple of sentences must suffice to point out that this project, for better or worse, is really not just mine alone. Actually, when I read the paragraphs, arguments, and ideas that make up this project into a coherent whole, I picture hours of discussion among friends and colleagues; struggles of our small and courageous group of PhD students; encouraging words from my supervisor, other professors, and conference participants I encountered over the years; ideas in ruins and helpful suggestions to build them up again; long debates on theories and projects that had actually very little to do with our theories and projects; and above all—laughter, love, and friendship. Truth be told, the fabric of this project is made of all the great people I met along the way without whom I would not have been able to be where I am today.

I came to Budapest with a suitcase, a project on democracy in Russia, and a lot of textbook knowledge on what makes a theory, what a concept does, and how to put it all together. Maybe it was Sashi making fun of me that I realized that possibly only the suitcase has proven itself useful in the end. A textbook cannot explain the necessity of the warmth, support, and motivation the great people I have met in Budapest. Particularly Anatoly, Andreea (thank you for the pineapple), Aron, Bastian, Bruno, Emrah, Jelena, Martin, and Sashi, cannot be thanked enough (particularly when I gave some of you 90 pages to read within a week). It is because of you and the lunch tribe that I survived the last years in one piece.

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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliances of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Content Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CoW</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
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<td>CWS</td>
<td>Critical War Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community Observer Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAWS</td>
<td>Lethal Autonomous Weapons System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Woman Peace Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Modern Systems Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NYT</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
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<td>OAF</td>
<td>Operation Allied Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Content Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION: WHY DO WARS RECUR?

“Longstanding disputes promote a web of conflictual characteristics and hostile perceptions that tend to reignite every so often and generate much of the violence we see around us”—DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008, 56)

Why do some wars recur? In 2002, Collier and Sambanis made the famous observation that societies with a history of civil war are more likely to experience another war than societies without prior experience thereof.¹ Since more wars occur than the number of countries affected by it, it can be concluded that some societies are caught in a “conflict trap” (Collier and Sambanis 2002, 5) out of which they seem unable to escape. For Collier and colleagues, reappearing wars are common, as they identify a “44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years” (Collier et al. 2003, 83; see also Albin and Druckman 2012a). In the aftermath of their 2002 publication, the figure of recurrence was continuously scrutinized and corrected to “23 percent within the first five years” (Dobbins et al. 2013, 24), making “single civil wars […] more the norm” (Walter 2004, 371). An initial glance at data from the Correlates of War (CoW) project on war occurrence in the post-Cold War era shows that out of 60 wars that had (officially) been terminated, only 9 were concluded in a way that did not lead back to systemic violence²; and in the majority of cases, violence between armed groups often resumed, but below the threshold of war—which is conventionally considered to lie at 1,000 battle-related deaths per calendar year (Reid and Wayman 2010, 698).³

¹ For an extensive discussion on this observation, see Keen (2012) and Suhrke and Samset (2007).
³ The question of how to define and operationalize war is unresolvable (Levy and Thompson 2010; Kuchler 2013, 14), as the panoply of indicators to measure and understand war show. However, a preliminary understanding of war for the purpose of this study is necessary. In short, war is understood as a system; any system that encompasses communication along the friend/enemy distinction—an ‘other’ that needs to be eliminated or subordinated with violence—is considered to be a distinct war system. This definition encompasses both civil and international wars, without subscribing to a particular number of battle-related deaths. Moreover, it negates ‘methodological nationalism’, which treats society and the nation-state as equal and renders war an occurrence either within or between states (U. Beck 2003, 453; Zangl and Zürn 2003).
This observation is amplified if we include other databases. The International Conflict Management data (with their respective data range from 1945-1995), the International Crisis Behavior (1918-2007), the Ceasefires (1964-1994), and the SHERFAC database (1937-1985), display not only ‘successful’ peace agreements—which are assigned ex post in the CoW database (Gartner and Melin 2009, 570; Nathan and Toft 2011)—but also failed ones. These databases show that many wars run through a series of ceasefire and peace agreements until finally arriving at a resolution; and out of those, many revert to a state of war. For instance, the Liberian War of 1989-1996 “involved at least 11 peace agreements between 1990 and 1996” (C. T. Call 2010, 350) and 20 ceasefires, but broke out again three years later. The picture becomes even bleaker if we consider that some peace agreements have had the opposite effect of actually escalating hostilities in a conflict (Massoud 1996). For example, few would doubt that the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 to end the fighting between the former Republic of Yugoslavia (after Serbia), the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia did not influence the break-out in violence between the Kosovar and the Serbian governments only several hundred kilometers south. With the goal of resolving conflicts, some peace agreements actually contributed to the outbreak of new hostilities.

The findings by Collier and others have reignited the debate over how war ends and what factors contribute to the recurrence of war. Both questions have not been ignored by social sciences, but received considerably more attention since their publication in 2002. Specifically, while there is a rich pool of theorization on the causes of war, particularly international war, the question regarding the termination of war and recurrence thereof has been comparatively

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4 The way in which one counts is indeed an important issue. In a response to Collier’s article, Suhrke and Samset note that “When the same team, working from the same basic data set but using different statistical methods, arrive at three different sets of conclusions, this suggests a fundamental fragility in the findings that needs to be acknowledged, examined and explained” (2007, 201). Consequently, there is no ‘statistical truth’ on how many wars recur; it can only be assessed that the return to violence is a common phenomenon.

5 As I argue in chapter 4, the Dayton Peace Agreement led to the redirection of Serbian nationalists’ focus on maintaining political control over Kosovo, whilst at the same time, convincing Kosovar separatists of the need to use violence in order to gain international attention and advance their causes.
sidelined. But how do wars end? How can “groups of people, who have been killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and success, come together to form a common government” (Licklider 1995a, 4)? And how can this peace be stable? To answer these questions, four modes of war termination have been identified, namely the (I) cessation of hostilities, (II) conquest or subjugation and annexation, (III) conclusion by peace treaty, and (IV) unilateral declaration by one side (Carroll 1969; Wright 1970; C. King 1997, 22). Crucially, there is widespread consensus that the form of war termination shapes the likelihood of war recurrence (Toft 2010, 35; Mason et al. 2011). Albin and Druckman observe that “today more wars are stopped by negotiated settlements than by military victory” (2012a, 15), yet Licklider’s argument that negotiated settlements are more likely to revert to war within the first five years after conclusion still stands (1995b, 698). Of course, there is a growing body of literature addressing “the long-term consequences of mediated agreements on the duration of peace, and how important these are in comparison with other characteristics of the country that might change over time” (Gurses, Rost, and McLeod 2008, 134); accordingly, the impact of war termination and the recurrence of war are discussed, but not resolved.

Taking all this into consideration, the central research puzzle of this project revolves around the recurrence of war. In a nutshell, the question is, why do some wars recur and others do not? Or to paraphrase, despite the cessation of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement, why do some countries experience a reappearance of war? Two important clarifications are necessary here. First of all, for a variety of reasons that are explicated below, of concern for this project is only the post-Cold War era. Of course, in subsequent research, the applicability of the theoretical framework outside of this horizon can be investigated (see chapter 7). However, within the confines of this project, the aim is not the articulation of a

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6 Indeed, as Reiter remarks, “we know relatively little about how wars end, in contrast to the mountain ranges of ideas and scholarships we have about how wars start” (2009, 1).

7 This research question assumes that stable peace is possible. In fact, Boulding coined the term “stable peace” (1978)—a peace so established that even the idea of war between two former conflicting parties is unthinkable.
universal theory of war recurrence. Secondly, in Collier and Sambanis`s initial article, the
timeframe for the reappearance of conflict was unimportant; if a country experienced a
successive war 30 years later on, it was still considered to be a recurrent war. In short, they
were concerned with the frailty of a country (Suhrke and Samset 2007), whether a country had
the conditions for subsequent wars or not. But it is debatable whether one can consider a war
`recurrent` if in the same territory other actors are now fighting for different goals. This equally
applies to cases in which the subsequent war is far in the future. One possible way to avoid
these ambiguities is to follow conventional wisdom, meaning a five-year period after the
cessation of hostilities (Swain, Amer, and Öjendal 2008, 88). However, in contrast to this
position, I argue that it is more fruitful to consider a war recurrent if the conditions that were
created during the former war (for instance, the creation of various conflicting parties) are
present in the subsequent one. For example, the First Congo War ended in 1996 with the
installment of the Kabila regime by Ugandan and Rwandan forces; the same actors who went
to war against each other two years later on.8

This research question is not placed in a research lacuna. At least since 2002, a vibrant
debate has emerged over competing factors leading to the recurrence of war, their relative
importance, and the placement of causality thereof. Acknowledging the previous research, I
proceed in this chapter in five steps. Firstly, I give an overview of the state of the art in this
field. Specifically, I argue that despite the valuable theoretical and empirical insights generated
by existent research, war itself is mostly treated as a `black-box`, with the consequence of
having an under-theorized and under-estimated impact on future wars. Rather than negating the
debate on the individual factors on war occurrence, I develop an alternative theoretical
framework to approach the issue of war recurrence. Accordingly, in the second section, I
advance the main argument of this project. In short, I argue in favor of the theorization of war

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8 While the theoretical framework is articulated in detail in chapter 2, the empirical case of the Congo wars is the
subject of chapter 6.
as a (dys-)functional system in the theoretical tradition of Modern Systems Theory (MST) and, moreover, that this war system creates the conditions for its reappearance. War is a distinct system with its own logic, actors and events, which become difficult, if not impossible, to direct from the outside. Theorizing war as a (dys-)functional system allows us to study the operations within and the relations between systems. Consequently, it enables us to examine the impact of war on society while war occurs. The third section elaborates on the research design of this project, particularly on the universe of cases (i.e. the post-Cold War era) and case selection (i.e. whether war recurred or not). Here, I explain the need to study the Kosovo War (1999), the Second Russo-Chechen War (1999-2009), the Second Liberian War (1999-2003), and the Second Congolese War (1998-2003). Whilst the Kosovo and Chechen wars are studied in-depth, I conduct a comparative case study on the Liberian and Congolese wars in order to demonstrate the applicability of the framework outside the Eurocentric focus of the project. In the fourth section, the contributions of this research are highlighted. I claim that it is not only politically relevant—as it provides new insights into the means of terminating wars and preventing their reappearance—but also theoretically necessary, allowing us to study the processes of wars and the relationship between war and society without falling into the trap of methodological nationalism. I conclude this chapter by providing the outline of the project.

1.1 Existing Explanations for the Recurrence of War

As mentioned above, Collier and colleagues did not only reignite interest in the study of recurrent (civil) wars, but also provided the starting point for subsequent discussions and theorizing. In this section, I give an overview of the most prevalent positions found in the literature and group them according to how they identify the underlying causes of war recurrence. These cases include (ethnic) identities, types of war termination and duration, socio-economic and political conditions, the role of international intervention, and the pacifying effect of civil society actors. While many studies rely on statistical analysis, others conduct case
studies and consequently provide detailed information and many insightful positions. However, despite (or possibly because of) various different methods and data used, the robustness of the interpretation of the data is debatable. Both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view, the findings are contradictory and inconclusive. To put it in another way, studying war remains inherently complicated and ‘messy’, resulting in fragile data\(^9\) and competing (causal) claims. Indeed, for each factor identified as contributing to the creation of a stable peace, enough counter-examples can be equally found. One reason for this problem is that war as a social force is not (sufficiently) problematized.\(^{10}\) Some authors would argue that studying war as a social force is impossible in the first place because the ‘operations’ of war are hardly quantifiable and war is anyhow too complex for any serious theorization. However, as shown below, scholars working in the field of Critical War Studies and those focusing on the experiences of war, have shown—albeit with their own set of weaknesses—that the ‘black-box’ of war is capable of being be opened.

Possibly influenced by Huntington’s famous *Clash of Civilizations* (1996), scholars have problematized the presence of religious and ethnic divisions within conflicts for the duration and recurrence of war. For Huntington, who partially equated religion with culture, the future of conflict was beyond Great Power struggle—as during the Cold War—and inter-state war, but rather structured around cultural cleavages. Indeed, the wars following the break-up of

\(^{9}\) One example concerns the identification of wars as such. Since most data-sets rely on the conventional definition of 1,000 battle-related casualties per calendar year as the demarcation threshold for war, in the most basic form the analyst needs to ‘count’ the deaths. Despite improvements in data availability and the reliance on best-, under-, and over-estimations, this remains a guessing game for mainly two reasons. Firstly, by their very nature, wars are secretive, as the killing of others (particularly civilians) fuel anti-war movements. It remains unknown at this time in how many countries with how many casualties US drones currently operate. Secondly, wars are always also about establishing a regime of truth and advancing one’s cause. Reports of genocides or killing of civilians obviously undermine this effort substantially. In the Congo War, for instance, the Kabila regime refused independent observers to establish the number of casualties. Indeed, whole areas of Congo remained inaccessible. It thus remains a mystery how a number of battle-related deaths can be ‘guessed’.

\(^{10}\) The focus of this project is not to engage in-depth with the positivist literature on testing various indicators, but rather to develop a theoretical framework from a different perspective that provides an original and promising point of engagement. Indeed, I broadly position myself within the framework of the Lakatonian Scientific Research Program, by which I mean that I consider this theory to be able to produce novel facts for future research (Lakatos 1968, 163; Lakatos 1976, 182). The purpose of this review is to demonstrate knowledge over the debates on this research question and outline limitations thereof.
Yugoslavia, the attacks of al-Qaida, and the genocides in Africa have contributed to the twofold perception that ethnic and religiously motivated wars are more violent and will prolong the conflict when present (Bestor et al. 2014). Walter, DeRouen, and Sobek argue that ethnic wars last longer than other types of intra-state conflict as the competing identities inhibit cooperation and reconciliation among the groups (Walter 1997; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Similarly, Toft contends that religious identities can be manipulated by political elites in order to escalate the conflict (2007). In contrast, Hironaka remarks that “While participants in many civil wars are ethnic groups, their participation does not straightforwardly explain the length, or even the original causes, of the conflict” (2005, 9). Moreover, Weibul, Cox, and Fearon find little statistical evidence to support these claims and negate the effect (2004). Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom take a middle position, arguing for a non-linear relationship between the number of ethnic groups and war duration. On average, wars centering on two or three ethnic groups tend to last longest (2004). Finally, Byman and others question the stability of ethnic identities and point out to the processes of overcoming ethnic fragmentation (2000, 150). However, this in itself does not explain why the war in Liberia produced a stable peace, whilst Congo did not, although in both cases ethnic fragmentation was rampant and atrocities during the war were daily occurrences (see chapter 6).

This discussion is important for two reasons. First, it connects the causes of war to the likelihood of a recurrent war. Consequently, as Gurr (2015) and Fortna (2004) hypothesize, if there are two or more competing identity groups present in a conflict that have not been able to sufficiently address their issues, the likelihood for recurrent warfare is higher. In other words, as Walter also points out, the causes for the reappearance of war remain the same as those for the initial war (2004, 372).\textsuperscript{11} Evidently, the question then remaining is: what is considered to count as ‘sufficiently resolve’? This is a contested issue which points to the greater stability of

\textsuperscript{11} This is an extremely problematic assumption, as the initial causes and actors for and in a war can change over time. In the Second Russo-Chechen War (see chapter 5), the position of Chechen nationalists became co-opted by the Russian state and supplanted by militant Jihadists.
military victories over negotiated settlements. As mentioned before, Licklider early on recognized the issues at stake. While negotiated settlements are more unstable in their first years, military victory often results in genocide against the losers in war. Moreover, if the victors are willing to address the grievances of the rebel groups, they have a higher chance of stable peace (C. Hartzell 1999; C. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; C. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Equally, decisive military victories can also claim to deliver peace (Zartman 2001; Zartman 1986; Mitchell, Diehl, and Morrow 2012). However, the connection between war conclusion and war recurrence remains unclear, as it only insufficiently explains the processes linking the two events.

Second, the discussion on identity conflict connects the question of duration to the likelihood of recurrent war. This is another field in which diverging positions can be identified. For Smith and Stam (2004), Fearon (2004), and Walter (2004; 2009), a longer war equals a more stable peace for the simple reason that with duration, more information regarding the relative strengths of the war participants is revealed (see also Slantchev 2004, 815; Reiter 2009, 2). The underlying idea is the conceptualization of war as a bargaining game, meaning that the outbreak of war (e.g. something costly) only makes sense if the participants have incomplete or false information regarding the relative strength of the other. Through violent clashes, their actual strength is gradually revealed and a negotiated settlement can be achieved that takes this (strength) into account. Crucially, if a war is too short to reveal the true strengths, war can resume to amend for this perceived imbalance. Additionally, from a dissimilar direction, it is argued that after a certain time, war weariness sets in while the resources for launching a new war become less (Rosen 1972). Put differently, it is not that people become aware of the others’ capabilities and decide there is a reasonable point in stopping fighting, but that they have had enough, and just want it to stop. Whilst maybe at first glance convincing, this line of argument gives only insufficient explanation as to why neighbors, who had at one point tried to kill each other, should suddenly be content again with living together. Indeed, many scholars point out
that with the duration of war, the death rate rises, which in turn destabilizes the resulting peace (Kalyvas 2006; Dubey 2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). Again, the wars in Liberia and Congo demonstrate the problems with these explanations that focus only on war duration. Both wars lasted approximately for the same duration, but resulted in completely different outcomes. The Kosovo War, which lasted only 11 weeks, produced a (somewhat) stable peace, whereas the First Yemeni Cleric war between the state of Yemen and Zaidi Muslims from 2004 to 2005 recurred in 2007.

Next to the question of (ethnic) identity to the recurrence of war, a central debate has formed around the importance of socio-economic and political factors, centering on the question of the (relative) role of greed and grievance (C. T. Call 2010; Keen 2012; Vinci 2006; Allen 2014; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Berdal and Malone 2000; De Soysa 2001; Nelles 2007; Stewart 2008). In short, as Collier and Hoeffler summarize, either “rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently so acute that people want to engage in violent protest, [or] rebellion as an industry that generates profits from looting” (2004, 564). In other words, people are motivated either by greed to amass personal profit or they use the rebellion as a means to address their grievances and right their wrongs. Yet, while this question has sparked a fierce academic debate, “the conceptual distinction between greed and grievance is not in fact terribly useful, neither is it in explaining the motivation or persistence of civil wars” (Berdal 2005, 689). Depending on how greed and grievances are measured, what proxies are used, and who is looked at, the results differ substantially. Moreover, it presupposes an either/or logic, which simply cannot be assumed, since greed and grievances interact with each other in complex ways (Keen 2012, 757). The crucial point here, however, is not who is right, but the question of consequence. If the greed argument is followed, international intervention should be aimed at closing access to the global market and the sanctioning of rebel forces, and possibly intervening to help the host state in ridding itself of the insurgency. The grievance argument shifts the blame much more towards the government, who has created policies which are perceived to be unjust.
Evidently, the difference is substantial. If the greed argument is followed, resource-rich countries should be more prone to recurrent wars than resource-poor countries, as the presence of mineral riches is lasting. However, the comparison between Congo and Liberia, both resource rich countries, shows the limitation of this argument, as Congo slipped back into war, while Liberia has remained stable since 2003.

Indeed, this discussion points to the need for including foreign forces as well, the positive impact of whom are often highlighted. For instance, some point to the role of interventions in guaranteeing compliance to settlement terms in the long run (Walter 1999; Bailey 1982; Bloomfield 1997). Doyle and Sambanis highlight the particularly important role of multinational peacekeepers in the stability of the peace agreement (2006). Albin and Druckman emphasize the procedural justice in negotiations, provided by outside forces, for strengthening the durability of peace agreements (2012b, 15), while Collier and colleagues argue that power-sharing agreements—distributional justice—have a positive impact on durability (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008). Finally, others find that the importance of outside forces lies in their functioning as mediators in the conflict to overcome information barriers, and in that of providing exit options, proposing solutions, overcoming the prisoners’ dilemma, and providing leverage for a conflict party (Gurses, Rost, and McLeod 2008, 132; Zartman 2009, 324–25; Böhmelt 2011, 15). In particular, peacekeeping forces are supposed to help overcome commitment problems (Fortna 2004) and help advance the democratization process of a country, which in turn has a pacifying effect (Joshi 2013). In contrast, Dubey finds no significant effect of peacekeepers on the durability of peace (2002), while Hartzell and Hoddie attest only to negligible effects (2007). In fact, not only are they insignificant (Greig and Diehl 2005), but sometimes they achieved precisely the opposite, as in Liberia when Nigerian peacekeepers participated in looting in Monrovia (Howe 1997).

To make matters even more complicated, the role of civil society actors on the durability of peace remains unclear. Whilst some case and statistical studies indicate the higher likelihood
of a stable peace if civil society actors are included in the peace negotiation and further implementation of the peace agreement (Belloni 2001; Nilsson 2012; Issaka and Bushoki 2005; Paffenholz 2010), others find that the increase in potential veto players inhibiting peace stability and war termination (John and Kew 2008). It appears, however, quite clear that a larger inclusion of civil society increases the legitimacy of the final peace agreement. As Call argues, “civil society organizations offer the possibility of advancing broad participation and shunting exclusion” (2012, 269), which in turn lead to a more stable peace. In contrast to the positive effect, some point out that “bad civil societies” (Chambers and Kopstein 2001, 838; Paris 2004, 160) might actually spread prejudice and extremism, and function as a barrier to peace stability. Put differently, case studies reach the same conclusion as statistical analysis in that claiming the mere presence of civil society is insufficient in explaining the variation of war recurrence. Indeed, whether and how these types of actors matter for a stable peace remains understudied.

This last point expresses the actual dilemma of peace stability. It depends. The discussions above highlight that research agrees only to the extent that it disagrees on the relative importance of individual factors, such as ethnicity, war duration, war termination, greed, grievances, peacekeepers, and civil society. Indeed, the search for the implications of individual factors that account for the recurrence of war is misguided. Neither of these can provide an answer beyond ‘context matters’. However, they do point to the connection between war termination and subsequent war recurrence (or lack thereof). Indeed, the hypothesis that a recurrent war is unrelated to the previous one is generally rejected. Consequently, it appears that in one way or another, conditions are created during and at the end of a war that induce individuals to take up arms again. As Walter, Mason, and colleagues argue, it is the underlying political and economic conditions created by war and sustained after peace that make it desirable and feasible for individuals to enlist in a rebel organization (Walter 2009; Mason et al. 2011). While this might be the case, it remains unclear how war affects these conditions, or, more generally, how war produces the conditions that lead to its recurrence at a later date. The
conceptualization of war as a negotiation game neither takes the effects of war on socio-economic structures seriously, nor the society itself that is affected by war. Certainly, non-military aspects of war are underplayed. Crucial questions such as the institutional structure in which the new peace agreement is embedded, the subjects that are created by war, or the multidirectional influence of war and society on each other are basically ignored. Moreover, while (usually) ex post war terminations are explained, the actual processes unleashed by war are mostly sidelined and only a snapshot of such a complex phenomenon is taken. It is at this point that I argue the advancement of an alternative theoretical framework can increase our understanding of these processes during war and their impact on the likelihood of war recurrence.

The merits of such an approach are demonstrated by the literature on war as an experience. Sylvester remarked that the “Starting point [of the literature] is how ordinary people observe and suffer physically and emotionally, depending on their location” (2012, 483; McSorley 2013). Likewise, Scarry observes that “Reciprocal injuring is the obsessive content of war and not an unfortunate or preventable consequence of war” (emphasis in original, 1985, 67). Accordingly, these authors move away from addressing states as actors in warfare or creating topologies of war and towards the impact of war on the lives of ordinary people (Gill 2010). This refocus in scholarly attention goes hand in hand with a methodological reorientation from large-N statistical analysis to case studies, relying primarily on ethnographic research and discourse analysis. Particularly the use of ethnographic research is deemed useful, because as Nordstrom summarizes, this kind of research “must be able to capture not only the site, but also the smell, feel, taste, and motion of a locale, of a people that share a common space and intertwined lives” (2004, 13). Such people are not only interviewed during and after conflicts, but can also be observed by embedded scholars. Furthermore, narratives can be constructed based on a variety of data sources, such as newspaper articles (Zarkov 2001), drawings of children (Aradau and Hill 2013) or films (Shapiro 2011). The goal of the research is,
consequently, not to construct generalizable patterns of behavior across space/time which encompass a variety of wars, but to show in what kind of social relationship and social actions human life is placed in the moment during and after war.

A different direction is taken by Critical War Studies (CWS). Here, a threefold challenge has been articulated against the existent literature: the starting point is the contention that war has become and is subsumed under the broad umbrella of (Critical) Security Studies (Sylvester 2013, 619), and that war is (falsely) believed to be strategically controllable once it breaks out having no independent force of its own and finally, that war has been captured in databases such as the CoW project within a positivist reductionism, thus neglecting the historicity of war in favor of observable indicators (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 710). In short, within the main body of IR literature, war has been ‘reduced’ to something analytically measurable, captured in methodological terms, and become theoretically approachable under the guise of security. In contrast to this, the great strength of the project of CWS is that here, war as a societal force is being foregrounded. In short, the idea is that there is an ontology of war which shows that “While destructive, war is a generative force like no other” (Barkawi 2011, 126), reconfiguring social and political orders, and creating own claims of truth too (Barkawi 2012, 125). This ontology of war centers on the Clausewitzian understanding of fighting as being the unifying property of particular wars with the general notion of war (Nordin and Öberg 2014, 2).

In the context of this project, the limitation of the two approaches mentioned above is the lack of interest in the research question. Both bodies of literature do not address the question of war recurrence. Moreover, only the CWS seem to be interested in the relationship between war and society, but remain content at pointing to the need to study it without providing the tools to do so. How the ontology of war relates to the termination and the recurrence of war remains unclear. Additionally, the war as experience literature does not concern itself with the connection between the individual and the societal total, although it offers at least insights into
those bodies, through traumatic experiences, that never manage to leave the state of war. At the same time, they do not consider the possibility of opening up the ‘black-box’ of war in order to problematize it. In order to allude to the argument articulated in this project, there are several advantages of understanding war as a (dys-)functional system over previous literature. First of all, it allows us to study the operations within war instead of understanding war as chaos, and second, conceptualizing war as a system permits the study of the relationship between war and society. In the next section, I provide a theoretical framework based on MST on the study of war and offer a novel explanation for its recurrence.

1.2 Argument of the Project

The argument of this project builds up on the considerations above and is embedded in an adapted version of the theoretical framework developed by Niklas Luhmann, namely Modern Systems Theory. Based on this theory, war is conceptualized as a parasitical or (dys-)functional system, which alters and undermines the workings of other systems. Accordingly, once war has established itself as a fully parasitical system—making all other systems such as the economy, politics, media, and law reliant upon itself—war termination imposed or created will be highly unstable and ultimately will revert into full-scale violence. Put differently, war systems that manage to structurally couple themselves with their environment—the operations of other functional systems—will be more likely to reappear after their termination than wars that are only temporarily coupled. That is because these wars are more likely to revert back to identity conflicts rather than remain in the realm of solvable issue conflicts. For the purpose of such a

Post-traumatic symptoms emerge after the experience of traumatic events, such as combat exposure, sexual or physical abuse or terrorist attacks. Some people who suffer from this disease are “always alert and on the lookout for danger […] They may have trouble concentrating. […] They may feel like […] going through the event again” (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2015).

The subject of structural coupling is addressed in chapter 2. At this point, it suffices to understand coupling as binding points between two systems that influence their continuing operations.

The terminology of issue and identity conflict, structural and temporal couplings, and of system are shortly explained below and expanded upon in chapter 2. However, it should be noted that the idea of an identity conflict is different from the usual use of the term (see above). As I explain in chapter 2, identity conflicts are those in which stable identities have formed, which are not in a violent interaction with each other.
study, moreover, it needs to be pointed out that the use of this theoretical framework provides methodological tools that help us empirically investigate the workings of war on a systemic level, to open up the ‘black-box’ of war, and trace the interaction between war and its environment.\textsuperscript{15} In the following, I shortly expand on this argument.

The starting point in Luhmann’s thinking is his theorizing of the modern world society, which consists of a multitude of functionally differentiated systems—that are not, very importantly, hierarchically ordered. In so doing, he potentially allows for a broader theoretical approach to the relationship between war and society, both in its conceptions and in its impact. However, advancing a possible Luhmannian understanding of war does not come naturally for at least two reasons: firstly, Luhmann did not write on war specifically, and secondly, his understanding of conflict is very limited and holds only a residual space in his theory. It is true that in this regard, he was a student of the liberal-modernization project, as he mostly omitted conflict from his writings. In this theory, conflict is either considered as the residue of political and economic evolution (Matuszek 2007, 108) or a social pathology (Spreen 2010, 55)—prompting Kim to even go as far as to identify the normative foundations of his theory in the endorsement of further differentiation for guaranteeing social integration (2014, 13). In contrast, I argue that wars can actually be integrated into the MST framework and offer analytically valuable new insights. However, in order to present this argument, a basic understanding of the theory must be established.

The modern world society is a society of the multitude of functional systems. Every functional system operates according to its own media code (Luhmann 1995b, 368); the economic system distinguishes between profitable and non-profitable, the political one between government and opposition, and so on. The war system is not different and also works according to an internal binary code. This binary code, which consists of communication, takes

\textsuperscript{15} To be clear, this framework engages with war recurrence on a different playing field than much of the positivist literature, as it focuses on the conditions created by war during war for the likelihood of war recurrence in contrast to a causal analysis of the impact thereof.
ontological priority over action and actors; meaning that in principle, actors are constituted through communication depending on which system is observing them. Evidently, these communications do not have to observe any specific set of actors, only those relevant for the specific operations. Therefore, actors in the war system can be states, ethnic or religious groups, societies or regional and ideological blocks confronting each other. Religious, ethnic, international or other kinds of war all have in common that the functional code within them is the distinction between friend and enemy (see below). War does not need adjectives, it is war, a phenomenon with clear boundaries that exists throughout time, albeit in different configurations, structurally or temporally coupled to other functional systems. In short, I propose that the media code of the war system is friend/enemy—and every observation of the environment is made upon this distinction.16

In order to identify the communicative code of the war system, it is necessary to address its formation. According to Luhmann, communications can be either accepted or rejected: in the modern world society, there is a higher frequency of communication, because a panoply of functional systems exist alongside each other; accordingly, in a very simple form, the increase in communication leads to a higher possibility of rejecting it, thereby causing variations, selections, and re-stabilizations as the threefold process that Luhmann calls evolution. The process of rejection can cause irritations or conflicts, which can lead to war in its ultimate form. The function of some conflicts is for society to develop and to auto-correct itself, as conflicts can modify older and ineffective expectations—in this sense, they are part of society’s ‘immune system’ (Luhmann 1995b, 369). Simultaneously, not every conflict can be contained; some take the form of war (Messmer 2003b, 99; Matuszek 2007, 118; Schlichte 2007, 33). Consequently, since some rejections lead to ‘positive conflicts’ and others to ‘negative conflicts’, this

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16 As elaborated in chapter 2, the distinction of friend and enemy comes from the works on the political by Carl Schmitt. Despite many similarities, I argue to take this distinction outside of the political system, since I position war not as a subtype of politics, but as a distinct system (which can have strong structural couplings with the political system).
understanding of conflict necessitates the differentiation between communicative ‘noes’. To put it differently, the preconditions for the systematic reproduction of a war system need to be identified.

Building on the work of Messmer, Albert and colleagues, one can identify four stages of conflict escalation, which stabilize the communicated ‘no’. These are (I) conflict episodes, (II) issue conflicts, (III) identity conflicts, and finally (IV) subordination conflicts. In the language of MST, this means that the four stages represent the potential differentiation of a conflict towards a system on its own. In short, conflict episodes are almost random rejections of communication, which happen all the time, everywhere. If they cluster around specific themes, issue conflicts are identified. Such are for instance educational reforms or socio-economic policies. In the third stage of the conflict, the rejection of the communication does not concern the information anymore, but rather the utterer thereof. Something is rejected, because of who said it, not because of the content. Finally, only if the rejection takes the form of violence—convincing the other by means of violence—is a subordination conflict (i.e. war) reached. The implications of this understanding are twofold. Firstly, conflict is not understood in terms of disruption of communication, but actually in the continuation of conflictive communication. Secondly, the process from one stage to the other is not deterministic or inevitable, but in the tradition of evolutionary theory; it can be reversed again. Accordingly, a conflict can move between these stages back and forth; consequently, a conflict that moves ‘down’ from subordination conflict to issue conflict is less likely to revert back again, because it is more distant from war than one that remained at the stage of identity conflict.

I use the term war system and subordination conflict interchangeably in this project (see chapter 7).

These conflict stages are understood as Weberian ideal types. The purpose of these conflict stages is to guide empirical research without being present in its pure form empirically (Jackson 2004, 284).

The relationship between violence and war is evidently a highly complex one. I argue that the identification of an act as violent depends on the observer and is therefore a social and political category (T. K. Beck 2011). Moreover, not every violent action is an act or war, nor is every action in war that of violence.
Furthermore, the war system is distinct from other systems like the political or economic ones—it is neither subsystem nor a functional system, but a parasitical system that forms and disappears again. Consequently, once a war system has been established, one would expect that war participants, like local clans, will emancipate from their local, cultural, social, and economic setting (Matuszek, 2007: 27). To be freed from their traditions means that these actors are not bound by social rules and laws of warfare; on the contrary, war takes a total character, as the enemy becomes the total enemy—whose traditions, religious sites, and harmful members of their society need to be completely annihilated. Since the economic (and other) system differentiates alongside the war system, war actors can become financed by external capital, making the warring parties independent from the local legitimization of their actions as well as creating overlapping structures (which can be replaced). This in turn explains the motivation of ‘war actors’ to prolong conflicts, as it ensures their position in the new order. Many locals, “Faced with the choice between flight, death or active participation in the events of war, […] learn techniques of violence, the tricks of getting by and unscrupulousness” (Genschel and Schlichte, 1998: 112). For these actors, war becomes—contrary to Schmitt—the normal state of affairs and not an exceptional case. In this perverted logic, the routinization of war leads to a reversal of the rules of war and peace, as peace becomes the exception and, as Orwell would say, ‘war is peace’.

Just like functional systems, however, the war system observes its environment based on the distinction of its media code and differentiates internally by iterating this observation. Nevertheless, war is different from other functional systems, as it supposedly reduces the complexity of society and leads it back to a state of nature (Luhmann, 1995: 390–91). In other words, war undermines stable expectations. ‘Today’s friend can become tomorrow’s enemy’—as any realist would be quick to point out—is the reality of war as a (dys-)functional system. It physically destroys cultural artefacts, expectations, common bounds between and within people, reducing once prosperous societies to mere dust. For this reason, Luhmann defines the
conflict system as a parasitical one. As he states, “If one would perceive conflicts as social systems, which develop simultaneously with other systems in a parasitical manner, these are a case of over-integrated systems, which exhibit the tendency of concentrating all resources for the victory or (avoidance of) defeat of the conflict itself” (translated by the author, 2000a, 133).

Not only are wars then conceived as interruptions of communication, they also escape from any form of control from the social system from which they originated (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 2011, 97).

The observation of the war system is not only limited to whether something or someone is considered friend or enemy, but how the operations of the war system influence the operations of functional systems. The economy distinguishes not anymore between profit and loss, but whether it helps specific war parties and how a war economy is created—for instance in the form of Private Military Companies or drug trafficking to finance operations (Basile 2004; Rubin 2000). Laws try to regulate the conduct of war not only in terms of what the legitimate categories of combatants and civilians are, but also what can be done to them. On the illusory debate with Schmitt, the enemy is the other; nevertheless, he can also be the unlawful one, the ugly, the infidel, the destroyer of economic prosperity. And the relationship does not necessarily have to be a straightforward one. For instance, a stronger regulation by international law can actually lead to an increase in the conflict—contrary to much of the liberal literature (Koskenniemi and Leino 2002). But, crucially, this means that the destructive impact of war is not uniformly distributed and ultimately degenerative, but that there will always be profiteers and losers in war, and that certain structures (because this is an empirical not a theoretical question at this point) can be produced by war.

To conclude, there are at least four manifestations of the war system that follow from the interpretation of war from a systems theoretical perspective. They, however, stand in a particular relationship to one another and provide unique expectations on the likelihood of war recurrence. In principle, societies experiencing war will be likely to socially disintegrate and
resemble a dangerous and unstable Hobbesian nightmare of all against all in which stable expectations are undermined. This can take many forms, but in general, atrocities—such as mass killings, particularly of women, the elderly, and children, systematic rape, and torture—are a common expression thereof. Secondly, wars waged will quickly move outside of political control and juridical regulation. In this regard, Kruse distinguishes between the ‘steering’ and the ‘eigenlogic’ of systems: once a system forms, it is outside the steering capabilities of other systems (2010). Indeed, a conflict will draw on every resource available and impose its own logic on other systems. This can take the form of an apparent loss of control, or war dictating the terms of other systems as for example controlling the economy or politics for its own purpose. Another possibility is the occurrence of unintended effects, such as when the attempts to resolve a conflict (like an international tribunal convicting a dictator) actually worsen it. Crucially, these couplings can be either temporal or structural; meaning that the likelihood for recurrence is greater if the coupling between war and its environment has become more stable. This implies, furthermore, that a temporally coupled war system is more likely to climb down the ladder of conflict stages to issue conflict, while a structurally coupled war system is not.

Contributing to the stability of coupling are two additional factors. Firstly, once a war system has formed, due to continuing processes of (internal) differentiation, the number of enemies (and friends) should increase over time. This can happen in the sense that different (social) groups are targeted by military action or that more actors are encompassed in the alliance. Concurrently, existent alliances will experience fragmentation over time, as discontent over the lack of success, different opinions regarding the strategies employed, increased costs in the prolongation of war, as well as other sources of discontent, like domestic constituencies.

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20 These sort of acts are not chaotic in the sense that they are random events that just happen. On the contrary, particularly rape has been identified as a weapon during wars and acting out a certain role perception (Baaz and Stern 2009, 514). However, the act of systematic rape as a weapon becomes only possible after the outbreak of war and the breakdown of the existing order.

21 This is actually not the exception, as Willke points out. Political steering, for instance, has been remarkable in creating unsatisfactory results (2014, 4).
will increase. Indeed, possibly, new alliances will form or old allies will shift their position to become new enemies. Secondly, wars will intensify over time. This intensification can take three different forms. Either more weapons and vehicles are used to pressure the opponent into submission, or more fighters are sent in to engage in the hostilities, or the amount of targets increases, both by widening the territory affected and by releasing new targets. Wars that move towards a decisive battle and the isolation of singular war participants (individuals and groups) have a higher likelihood of resulting in a permanent peace.

To illustrate this line of argument, it is necessary to address the empirical evidence regarding the recurrence of war. Methodologically, studying wars from a MST perspective requires adopting a specific research design, whose details are discussed next.

### 1.3 Scope Conditions and Case Justification

Since one should always avoid ‘shooting at moving targets’, a viable strategy is the use of ‘postdictions’ in order to make future predictions. Here, the interest is in how the theory fits to previous cases in view of drawing inferences concerning ongoing and future wars. With this goal in mind, I propose four illustrative case studies, namely the War in Kosovo (1999), the Second Russo-Chechen War (1999-2009), the Second Liberian War (1999-2003) and the Second Congolese (Civil) War (1998-2003). The main data sources are newspaper articles, which were collected using the LexisNexis database and coded with the NVivo software (see chapter 3 for the discussion on research methods). From a methodological standpoint, this means employing a case study research design, which takes the limited amount of cases into account and allows for a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop [...] explanations that may be generalized to other events” (George and Bennett 2005, 5; Gerring 2007). Moreover, in the case of Kosovo and Chechnya, I provide in-depth case studies to illustrate in more detail the workings and interrelations of the war systems. In the two African cases, I test the theoretical framework on two wars that differ in the presence (absence) of war
The aim of this design is not to create a generalizable theory of war recurrence, but rather to show the application of the theoretical framework on two cases outside of Europe.

Regarding the scope conditions, I limit the study to the post-Cold War era. Basically, with the end of the Cold War, the last obstacle for the establishment of a modern world society—in which all systems are functionally differentiated—was removed (Stichweh 2007). From the theoretical viewpoint of MST, this marked the beginning of a qualitatively different stage. From the perspectives of classical IR, moreover, the post-Cold War era marks the end of the bipolar system, meaning that the number of Great Powers has declined to encompass only the US (Krauthammer 1990; Mastanduno 1997; Layne 2006; S. Smith 2002; Monteiro 2011; Layne 2012). For Waltz, it was earlier on clear to him that while specific wars can be explained with reference to the characteristics of particular leaders and/or the regime type of the countries involved, general war-patterns can only be understood with regard to the international system (1959). If the system changes, the patterns of war occurrence change as well. The literature on new wars equally acknowledges the transformation in the occurrence of war in the post-Cold War period. Kaldor, for instance, contends that wars are no longer fought between two ideological blocks, but rather between ethnic groups and for certain identities (1999)—an argument built on the prominent ideas of Fukuyama and Huntington. Fukuyama argued that we have reached the end of history, in which one ideology—liberal democracy—has proven itself superior to its socialist counterpart (1992). Huntington, similar to others, did

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22 The ‘strategy’ that I am employing can be described as ‘analyticisim’, that is I postulate “an ideal-typical account of a process or setting and then utilizing that ideal-type to organize empirical observations into systematic facts” (Jackson 2011, 151), while subscribing to the notion that the object under investigation is dependent on the researcher.

23 This point is addressed in more detail in chapter 2. In short, the idea that the current state can be correctly described of as modern world society is highly contested, because it is both Eurocentric and negates regional differences. To put it differently, a world in which Westphalian states co-exist with failed states and post-national states, seemingly runs counter to the notion of a one world society. As argued in chapter 2, the Luhmannian world society is one which is marked by heterogeneity not homogeneity and, therefore, actually fosters these differences.

24 The point is not whether we live in an era of unipolarity or not, nor whether this will last, but rather that with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, a transformation of the global political system occurred in which the East-West distinction—at the very least, temporally—ceased to be of prime importance. As I show in chapters 4 to 6, the origins of the investigated wars can be traced over centuries. The outbreak of these, however, occurred after the end of the Cold War.
not see this as the heralding in of a peaceful era, but rather as the beginning of inter-cultural conflicts (1992). From a more practical perspective, Hironaka reminds us that Great Powers have supported local wars through the provision of resources, arms, and ideology (2005, 23). With the downfall of the Soviet Union, the ideological competition has (some would argue) ceased to exist. As a closer look at individual conflicts in the post-Cold War era reveals, many wars would not have occurred had it not been for this systemic shift. For instance, both in Liberia as well as Congo the regimes received, despite domestic opposition, support from the US, while Chechnya and Kosovo were conflicts that resulted directly from the break-up of the Soviet Union and its client states.

In short, only post-Cold War wars are considered in the present study. It is important to stress here that this project does not claim to generate new insights into the pre-1990 period; to understand this phenomenon, a different research strategy is needed (see chapter 7).

Proponents of the MST argue that since the demise of the Soviet Union, worldwide barriers of communication have slowly collapsed—marking the commencement of a modern world society. All conflicts that have occurred after this incident fall principally within the scope of my argument. As noted above, the CoW database provides an overview of these conflicts from 1992, with the Algerian Islamic Front War of 1992 until 2007. This overview has been expanded with the help of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset to encompass the period up to 2014. Accordingly, the list contains 69 conflicts, a number that is too small to reasonably conduct large-N studies. However, it provides enough empirical material for a comparative case study. Case-study research is a powerful tool to build arguments, particularly when the criteria for case selection have been made transparent in order to avoid biases in the selection of cases (Hancké 2009, 62). While there are many approaches for the selection of cases, I adopt the most

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25 Two studies come to mind here. Kruse investigates the impact of the Great Power war during the 20th Century, particularly the Second World War. Kuchler aims at uncovering the change of warfare from a segmentary to a stratificatory, and finally, a functional society (Kruse 2010; Kuchler 2013).
**similar systems** design (Hancké 2009, 61; Simons 2014, 465; Levy 2009, 75)\(^\text{26}\); that is, I select two wars in which wars recurred and two in which they did not, despite having similar conditions on a range of dimensions.

**Table 1.1: Overview of Case Selection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of war</strong></td>
<td>Intra-State War</td>
<td>Inter-State and Intra-State War</td>
<td>Intra-State war</td>
<td>Inter-State and Intra State war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of peace agreement</strong></td>
<td>Negotiated Settlement, Military Victory for Russia</td>
<td>Negotiated Settlement, Military Victory for NATO</td>
<td>Negotiated Settlement, Military Victory for LRD, MODEL</td>
<td>Negotiated Settlement No military victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>10 Years</td>
<td>11 Weeks</td>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of conflict parties</strong></td>
<td>At least 3: Russia, Chechnya, Islamic Militants</td>
<td>At least 3: Serbia, Kosovo, NATO</td>
<td>At least 3: Liberia, LURD, MODEL</td>
<td>At least 3: Kabila, Rwanda/Uganda, Zimbabwe/Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic development</strong></td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition fragmentation</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but limited</td>
<td>Yes, but limited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity conflict</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign intervention</strong></td>
<td>Yes (Global Islamist Networks)</td>
<td>Yes (NATO)</td>
<td>Yes (UN)</td>
<td>Yes (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recurrent?</strong></td>
<td>Yes (weak)</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (strong)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of cases are intra-state wars, meaning that the dominant conflict parties are present within the state. Of course, each war is unique and comparing wars is only possible at the abstract level. The four wars that have been selected are similar in a wide variety of conditions (see table 1.1) that were central for previous studies (see section 1.1): they are

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\(^\text{26}\) This method of case selection builds up on John Stuart Mill’s famous method of agreement, but takes into account that the criteria of case selection for Mill are too strict to be met in the social world (Anckar 2008). The crucial advancement in this approach was made by Przeworski and Tuene (1970).
analogous types of war—ina-state wars with an internationalized component; they were terminated by a negotiated settlement in which one party obtained a military victory; there were a similar number of dominant conflict parties present; moreover, these countries can be considered underdeveloped economically; in addition, there was some extent of fragmentation in the opposition, a religious/ethnic component was present in each conflict as well as a degree of foreign intervention. The war in Kosovo and Chechnya followed the break-up of a type of federalized state (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), whilst Congo and Liberia are ethnically heterogeneous, resource rich, post-colonial states. However, regarding the stability of the peace agreement, we can find substantial variation. The state of Congo has experienced basically continuous violence, while the conflict in Chechnya is one that has continuously flared up again, with violence and atrocities committed across the conflict parties, just below the level that would make it count as a war in the CoW database. Moreover, Russian soldiers and civilians suffer from a post-traumatic stress syndrome, commonly referred to as the Chechen Syndrome. In Kosovo, a somewhat stable peace has been reached that excluded the shrinking Kosovo-Serbian minority, which is both subject to structural violence and of the greatest groups of inter-European migration. In contrast, it appears that Liberia has come out of the war with a stale peace agreement in which violence has been largely, and surprisingly, mostly absent.

At a more abstract level, there are further aspects of these wars which make them worthwhile to study in-depth. The war in Kosovo and (to a lesser extent) the Chechen war have been cases that served as blue-prints for the development of the new war theory—established by Kaldor and others. Likewise, Ignatieff developed his influential work on ‘virtual wars’ on the Kosovo war (2001), mirroring by experiences in Chechnya: whereas in the First Russo-Chechen War the nascent independent Russian media played the role of political opposition by transporting images from the battlefront to its domestic audience, and in the Second Russo-Chechen War, it became firmly controlled and instrumentalized by the Russian state and the Putin regime. Furthermore, whereas Moore calls the Kosovo War (and the Russo-Chechen War)
a post-modern one (2011), the general on the ground Wesley Clark dubbed it the first modern war (2001). Additionally, the Second Russo-Chechen War has been described as the prime example of a “hybrid war” (Bravin 2014; Münkler 2006), as the new dominant form of wars in the 21st Century. Moreover, all four selected wars challenge the notion of wars being spatially contained (as the name civil and intra-state war suggest), but demonstrate conversely the regional and global dimension of the conflicts (and the war systems). Indeed, taking the Second Liberia War and the Second Congolese War as further case studies serves the purpose of avoiding a possible Eurocentric bias of the study. Finally, two cases have been selected in which a stable peace after the cessation of violence can be observed, and two, in which this is not the case. To sum it all up, if the theory of war as a (dys-)functional system is supposed to be convincing, its expectations need to be empirically illustrated in all of these cases.

1.4 Contribution

By pursuing this line of inquiry, I contribute to existing research on war recurrence in several ways. I formulate a theoretical framework and provide unique empirical insights into the workings of wars, their termination, and the durability of peace resulting from the war cessation. Indeed, and in direct response to the research question, my theoretical framework seeks to explain why some war terminations are stable and others are not. By including the war/society nexus and understanding the impact war has on society (and vice versa), the theory addresses the stability and durability of any kind of war termination. As such, it moves beyond purely strategic and rational calculations of the actors involved to account for a more encompassing societal total in which peace is created and maintained (Sullivan 2012). In other words, by understanding the societal processes within war, we gain a better understanding of the prospects of durable peace after war. As mentioned already, the theory of war as a (dys-)functional system

27 This design corresponds to what Seawright and Gerring refer to as “diverse case method” (2008, 300). I have selected two cases for in-depth study (Kosovo and Chechnya) in order to build hypotheses, while the comparative case study is used to test the findings.
serves to include conflict/war within the panoply of societal processes, in contrast to viewing it as an outside, external, catastrophic event or process. Therefore, the proposed changes in the conceptualization of war have the goal of establishing stronger foundations for a durable peace afterwards.

Moreover, at the theoretical level, I offer a conceptualization of the mechanisms of war and how they impact on society and vice-versa. As I have outlined above, much of the literature either conceives of war as a contingent event that cannot be problematized in systems theoretical terms because war is considered to be an exceptional state. My framework thematically unpacks the inter-related processes between war and society into different levels and multiple dimensions. In other words, the irritating and structural/temporal couplings between war and politics, economy, law, and media are studied, without assigning a causal or pre-determined relationship amongst these systems. This allows me to place war within and not outside of society and establish the conditions for a peaceful resolution of conflict. One might expect that as crime is part of a domestic society, so is war part of the modern world society and needs to be engaged with not as the failure of politics, but rather as a social dynamic of its own. Put differently, it is a theory that does not “exclude from the notion of society social facts which cannot be subsumed under its integrative umbrella” (Albert 2004, 16).

Thirdly, adopting this approach de-emphasizes the primacy of territory in the writings about war (Helmig and Kessler 2007, 241). As stated above, in the conception of MST, the world is not separated primarily into different nation-states, but rather functionally differentiated systems, meaning—as Kessler remarks—that “functional differentiation highlights the co-existence of different functional systems” (2012, 79). Accordingly, as the space between politics and war is theorized to become separated, we would expect to find an increase of other modes of warfare vis-à-vis inter- and intra-state warfare. As each functional system creates both its own social facts and temporalities, this approach underlines the limited steering capabilities of one system (e.g. politics, morality) over another (e.g. economy, war).
This is reinforced by the lack of a single normative bias in the MST set-up (Diez 2004, 3), meaning that on the one hand, it lacks a political program, and on the other, it does not rely on a normative umbrella—common values and norms—to hold society together. From this perspective, we see war no longer as a contained event happening in a localized setting, but as a phenomenon with global implications.

Fourthly, more generally, by advancing this theory, the body of knowledge that is summarized under the MST label is brought closer to the workings of IR (Albert 1999). One common criticism leveled against MST is that it is too abstract to actually provide any kind of methodological guidance for empirical study. By providing a theory on war recurrence, I demonstrate its applicability on the topic, which lies arguably at the core of IR. In order to achieve this, a research method is articulated (see chapter 3) to make the theoretical framework usable for empirical research. Despite some recent advancement in this direction, empirical applications of MST remain rare and lack a systematized approach. Scholars admit that they are walking on “thin ice” (Andersen 2003, 88) and frequently wonder about the usefulness of the theory in general (M. King 2006). I improve the theory by articulating a research method based on critical content analysis that aims at identifying the observations of other systems during war. In short, this constitutes not only a significant advancement of MST, but also helps to bring these two disciplines, sociology and IR closer together and advance inter-disciplinary research.

Finally, by looking at four cases, the stability of post-war peace is investigated with the help of secondary literature and a vast amount of primary data. Again, this project contributes to the broader knowledge on the processes of war, how it is created, and how it is terminated on the basis of the cases studies. However, this contribution is not only theoretical, but provides primary data, coded from newspaper articles that trace the developments during four critical wars. By understanding these wars better, policy recommendations can be provided which aim at creating durable peace in conflict-laden areas of the world. Again, as these are prototypes of
the new forms of warfare, it is more likely that they are more relevant to current conflicts, particularly those that appear to have become permanent.

1.5 Roadmap of the Project

The argument of my project is presented in six further chapters. In the following chapter, I put forth a theory of war recurrence. Here, I proceed in a twofold manner. Firstly, in order to understand war recurrence from a Luhmannian perspective, war needs to be conceptualized as a system. Therefore, I identify the building blocks of MST and elaborate on the core concepts of this theory, namely the theory of functional differentiation, communication, and social evolution. Moreover, within this framework, I develop the concept of war as a special kind of system and elaborate on the expected relationship between war and society. Secondly, I position the war system in relation to functional systems. Specifically, I show how a functionally differentiated world is theorized to operate and specify how a conflict forms in this context. While conflicts form within different systems, they actually become their own system. Consequently, it is necessary to elaborate on the relationship between the war system and other systems. Alongside this positioning, I address the question of steering from the outside and the problem of war termination by other systems. Connected to this, I demonstrate that a war system that is structurally coupled to its environment is more likely to recur than one that is only temporally so.

Chapter 3 provides the methodological framework of the project. Here I elaborate on the method of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) to study the four characteristics of a war system as outlined above. Moreover, I address the issue of how the political, economic, media, and juridical systems can be observed and what data sources are used to trace their observations. Based on Luhmann’s work, I justify the recourse to newspaper articles and QCA to draw inferences about the workings of the war system. Here I also articulate the main limitations of the choice of method (e.g. newspapers reproduce power structures and, consequently, reaffirm
existing power structures as well as a Western bias) and why these concerns can be dealt with (e.g. the cases are chosen as illustrations of the theoretical argument). The manifestations of the war system have been mentioned above already; however, how other systems are present empirically can only be understood with recourse to Luhmann’s work. Thus, different manifestations of couplings are described and discussed. Consequently, part of the objective is to present the theory of the war system from a different angle that makes it better understandable.

Chapter 4 deals with the war in Kosovo, as in this case war did not recur. Based on secondary literature, I reconstruct the conflict stages, from one of issue conflicts centering on access to education, political representation, demographical change to identity and, finally, subordination conflict. The Kosovo War broke out on March 24 and lasted until June 10, 1999. Using QCA on a selected range of newspaper articles, the destructive impact on society of war is observed. Moreover, the war proved to be parasitical without permanently coupling with functional systems. Furthermore, events observed by the war system demonstrate the necessity of including its operations into the analysis. Indeed, the war system terminated, because one group of actors, the Milošević regime, was domestically, regionally, and internationally isolated and confronted with escalating violence towards a decisive battle. In short, the war ended because the Milošević regime (and himself as president) was subordinated. As the functional systems had to be rebuilt again, it also implied that they did not rely on the continuation of war to carry on their own operations.

In contrast to this, in chapter 5, I use the Second Russo-Chechen War to illustrate the recurrence of war and its unsuccessful termination. Two important aspects are demonstrated in the first part of this chapter. Firstly, based on secondary literature, the formation of the war system can be illustrated and explain the formation of friend/enemy distinction in the conflict, which culminated in Russia’s declaration of war on August 26, 1999. Secondly, however, the war that is studied is itself a recurrent one, as the First Russo-Chechen War was concluded in
1996/1997. Because the first subordination conflict was only limited to an identity conflict, its recurrence was more likely—supporting the claim that these conflicts are more likely to result in wars than issue conflicts. In the second part of the chapter, the operations of the war system are analyzed. Crucially, next to a parasitical impact, structural couplings and the formation of different war systems can be observed. Consequently, any declaration of peace by the political system proved spurious as the war became autonomous. Finally, the events during war within the conflict system supported this development. Next to the dispersion of violence—another form of intensification—the fragmentation of actors circumvented isolation of one particular group. To put it differently, the war system never terminated as the composite enemy group never became subordinated or eliminated.

I contrast the findings of the Kosovo and Chechen wars to the wars in Liberia and Congo. Of particular importance here is the application of the theoretical framework to cases outside a Eurocentric perspective. Like in Chechnya, both wars are already recurrent ones, either as a response to the establishment of the Taylor regime (Liberia) or the installment of Kabila (Congo). The analysis on the four dimensions of the war system serves to demonstrate that the theoretical framework is applicable and that the findings hold. In Liberia, the war system was mostly destructive for other functional systems; in Congo, the war formed structural couplings. In Congo, moreover, the war was never truly terminated in the first place as violence dispersed beyond the classical battle-lines and enacted by ever smaller fragmented war groups. In contrast to this, a unified front against the Taylor regime formed that managed to push for a decisive outcome.

In the concluding chapter of this project, I summarize and discuss my findings. Particularly three fields for future research are highlighted that challenge the limitations of this project. Firstly, based on the example of Daesh, the applicability of the framework to an additional post-Cold War case is probed. As the conflict is still ongoing, the exercise is to see what insights the application of this framework generates from a current war. Here, I argue that
based on the theoretical framework of this project, the war with Daesh is likely to continue and any termination thereof to be only short-lived. Secondly, the temporal limitation of this project is challenged. In other words, the question becomes how a research strategy would look like that tries to encompass war recurrence during the Cold War. As I argue, the changes are fundamental and presupposed by a completely different hierarchy of functional systems. Finally, the role of agents in MST and the study of war is discussed. Whilst this project is based on the observation of the media system, a supplementary study could focus on observing participants during war and how they perceive the enemy. I conclude this project with policy advice based on the theoretical framework. Significantly, the termination of a conflict can only occur, if one war party and the violence within this war becomes isolated. Furthermore, the dominant theme of this project is to advise from a position of modesty when planning to find ways to permanently terminate a war.
2 ON THE RECURRENCE OF THE WAR SYSTEM

“The golem, the monster of war, does not know the friend-enemy distinction. War brings death to all equally. That is the monstrosity of war”—Hardt and Negri (2004, 11).

Why do some wars recur? So far, this project has addressed the central research puzzle in a negative way, arguing that the existing body of literature has failed to capture the social processes during war, and, consequently, offers only an incomplete understanding of its recurrence. How has this failure contributed to the understudy of the peace resulting from war termination? One possible way to understand the limitations and opportunities of the existing literature in the introduction is to view them as criteria for a good theory on war. For scholars in the field of IR, the question of what constitutes a good theory dates back to at least Kenneth Waltz, who concentrated on the tradeoff between explanatory power and parsimonious construction of the theory (1979). Whilst parsimony is hardly an option when it comes to Modern Systems Theory (MST)—on which this chapter is built—it is possible to identify certain pointers for the formulation of a war theory which can be followed up here. In short, if any kind of statement is to be made concerning the recurrence of war, its formation cannot be seen as a failure of some sort of internal structures (the grievances of a substantive part of the population are not addressed) or as an exceptional moment. Moreover, the recurrence of the war system cannot be understood if its origin (the causes and events leading to war) is excluded. Finally, the termination of the conflict and the peace (durability) resulting from it can only be explained if the causes and processes of the war system are included in the analysis of the societal structures emerging from the conflict, which in turn provides impetus for the formation of future wars.

This chapter puts forth the first part of the positive case this project makes by presenting a MST answer to the research question. In this chapter I argue that next to the complete destruction of the enemy, the possibilities for permanently terminating conflicts are either internal shocks in the system or a broadly laid-out creation of expectations for ‘social roles’
outside the war system. In contrast to this, any other form of war termination, like a one-sided declaration of cessation of hostilities, can only lead to unstable peace and war recurrence. One reason why this (stable) termination is difficult is because of the types and numbers of coupling that are established between war systems and their respective environments. Briefly, throughout this chapter, I reason that once couplings become more stabilized, the recurrence of war can be expected. Additionally, the propensity to influence war from other systems is dependent on the amount of coupling the war system manages to maintain. In short, if more systems are coupled with the war system, war becomes more autonomous and more difficult to be terminated. Moreover, as systems create social roles, the high number of (structural) couplings influence the possibility of creating ‘social roles’ outside the friend/enemy dimension—if systems produce roles outside of enemy and friend groupings, war recurrence is less likely. This finally implies that wars are less likely to recur if they move to the stage of issue conflict(s) rather than revert to identity conflicts, as I demonstrate below on the basis of a four stage conflict intensification model. The exercise of the present chapter is in introducing the theoretical tools to engage with the research question. Subsequently, in chapter 3 I provide the operationalization of the theoretical expectations.

The following chapter is divided into two parts. In the first section, I conceptualize war as a system. Basically, I explicate what it means and implies if we understand war—in Luhmannian terms—as a system. Moving along the three foundations of MST, the theory of differentiation, communication, and (social) evolution, the inner side of the war system is exposed at the systemic level. The focus is on what kind of operations are conducted in the war system and what structures are established by it. Here, I make the case that the war system is (dys-)functional in the specific way that it undermines expectations from the range of possible actions that are created by different functional systems. However, the war system does not exist in nothingness so to speak. Consequently, in the second part, the environment of war is addressed. Firstly, I position the formation of the war system within modern world society with
the help of a four stage conflict intensification model—showing that when war is created, it cannot be formed outside of society; and then secondly, to the introduction of the mechanism of war formation can be seen the placement of the war system in relation to its environment and other systems (even though other functional systems are part of the environment of the war system). Here, I argue that the war system is not a subsystem of a functional system, but, after its formation, exists alongside these. I then conclude by investigating the relations between these systems. War recurrence is likely not only because the termination of a war system from outside (e.g. other functional systems) is impossible, but also due to the ability of the war system to create structural couplings with its environment.

2.1 Introducing the War System

In order to understand the recurrence of the war system, it is necessary to conceptualize war as a system in the first place. Consequently, some foundational notions of MST have to be put forth. In brief, the main focus of MST rests on modern societies, which are modern because they are functionally differentiated into subsystems, like the legal, the political or the educational system\(^\text{28}\) (Mattheis 2012, 628). These systems are functionally, stratificatory or segmentary differentiated into subsequent subsystems. Each system operates according to a communicative code, which is a binary distinction that enables the system to observe its environment (Luhmann 1997a, 254). The main ‘function’ of the observation of the environment along binary codes is to reduce complexity, create stable expectations, and enable further differentiation along these binary distinctions. For instance, once something is communicated as lawful, a set of expectations arise on how to behave in certain circumstances (e.g. I am allowed to buy something from a shop but not steal it) (Luhmann 1997a, 219). Society is in turn the totality of all the systems and their respective environments. This renders society as “an

\(^{28}\) There is no exhaustive list of functional systems and Luhmann is clear that they must be assessed inductively (1995b, 4), even though he identifies about ten of these in his writings (Kuchler 2013, 6).
exceptional case. It is the encompassing social system which includes all communication, reproduces all communication and constitutes meaningful horizons for further communications” (Luhmann 1982, 131). One can add to this that “If communication constitutes society and if there is no communication outside of society, then there is no society, in fact, no social system at all exists outside world society” (Albert 1999, 254). In other words, society in MST is the world society.29

2.1.1 The War System: Functional Differentiation Reversed

The ‘first’ pillar of modern systems theory—the theory of differentiation—is probably most accessible to IR researchers. Luhmann distinguished societies according to their dominant mode of differentiation, which can either be segmentary, stratificatory, or functional30 (Luhmann 1976; Luhmann 1982; Luhmann 1997c). The most basic form, present in archaic societies, is segmentary. Here the whole—meaning usually society—is partitioned into equal parts. This is the case in realism, but also in international law when it comes to the recognition of formal sovereignty of territorial states or concerning human nature, in that all men are evil. The second type of societies are the advanced ones, which are characterized by stratificatory differentiation:

29 This conception of world society is evidently not a new one for the theoretical landscape of IR. Two examples should suffice to demonstrate the presence of world society within the discipline. In the writings of the English School, we find at least three different relations between world society and international society/system: depending on different philosophical traditions, the ideal types of international system, international society, and world society can either be the basis from which one can philosophize about ‘reality’ (Wight 1991), the relationship between international and world society can be antagonistic or the relationship between them is seen as deeply complex, contrasting, and (simply) under-theorized (Buzan 2004, 2; Pella 2013, 67). The theory of world society as articulated by Meyer argues for the coexistence of international and world society, which explains the similar institutional design of states. Furthermore, for the purpose of this project, the above-mentioned definition of world society is sufficient. However, the concept of modern world society has been revised and adjusted by other scholars, building up on Luhmann’s work (Petze 2012). Particularly the idea of a super-code inclusion/exclusion was expanded to include places of inclusion within zones of exclusion, and zones which lack the differentiation of the political and judicial system (Japp 1996; Neves 2006).

30 The usage of the label ‘functional’ is highly problematic, because it implies a normative conception of function like in neo-functionalist literature (Risse 2005; Schmitter 2005). Equally, it can be seen as apologetic of extant structures, a criticism that Luhmann was charged with by Habermas (Bausch 1997; Kjaer 2006). Moreover, the notion of ‘function’ also indicates questions such as ‘function for whom and for what’. Paraphrasing Cox, should not functions be always for someone and for some purpose? There is much ambiguity on this subject, yet in this project, I argue against this instrumentalist understanding of function, because people simply cannot control and create functional systems. At the same time, whether a system is preferable for some or not depends on the observation of psychic systems (individuals or groups) themselves (Andersen 2003).
a hierarchical order being established between the single elements, such as in the class or caste system. Again, IR theory has numerous examples of this: Wallerstein distinguishes between core and periphery to highlight economic and political disparities (1979), Lake talks about hierarchies under the condition of anarchy (1996), and theories of hegemonic stability emphasize the special roles Great Power play in the system (Graaff and Apeldoorn 2011; Ikenberry 2004). Finally, modern societies are identified by the primacy of functional differentiation. One can think of the literature on globalization and the demise of statehood, which discusses how different policy fields internationalize and work in favor of or against each other. Here, the units themselves are disintegrated into different functional systems. A typical example is how the globalization of the economic sphere is undermining the political capacities of the state to monopolize the use of violence (Adler-Nissen 2013; Baker 2000; Carter 2011; Tilly 1995).

For Luhmann, functional differentiation is the dominant mode of differentiation of modern societies, because it allows for higher levels of connectivity within each. By observing the environment, each system reduces the complexity of reality for itself by assigning one side of the binary code to an event. Indeed, “Functional systems differentiate society according to the function they fulfill for it, which they do by binary recoding communication according to a specific symbolically generalized communication medium” (Roth 2014, 5). Accordingly, every system is regulated by a binary ‘media code’ such as profitable/non-profitable or just/unjust. These media codes create expectations and facilitate communications for the members of each functional sub-system (Schwanitz 1995, 145). Again, this allows for higher levels of connectivity at the cost of the reduction of complexity within a society, which means that not every part is connected and that some options of action are excluded, while others are made

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31 Complexity can be defined as the abundance of possibilities for experiencing and taking action in a given situation (Schneider 2002, 251). By the establishment of a communicative code and the bifurcation of observation according to different systemic points of view, complexity is reduced and action is shaped along the lines of expectancy; that is, expectations on the range of possible actions.
possible by this very exclusion. The differentiation of a system must always be seen in light of
the choice between alternatives, where the particular decision cannot be established *a priori*
theoretically, but empirically. Moreover, in a modern society, there is no primacy of one system
over the others (Albert and Buzan 2013, 131). To be absolutely clear, “Whether and to what
extent one system comes to dominate another […] depends not least on the extent to which both
the systems and the system of their relations depend on the respective environment”, but “no
system can completely determine the system/environment relations of another system, save by
destroying them” (Luhmann 1995b, 17–18). This is a crucial point to understand, since it
implies that in a modern society, the steering capabilities of politics and law are very limited
(Willke 2007; Willke 2014; Mattheis 2012).

What role can be ascribed to war for the working of the modern world society? Without
turning to the question of its (internal) operation, Luhmann provides two possible functions
which shed light on the issue. While Luhmann does not directly talk about war, he dedicates
considerable space to the relationship between society and conflict. In short, he suggests that
conflicts result from the rejection of communication. Since the rejection of communication are
frequent phenomena, conflicts serve as society’s immune system (Luhmann 1995b, 369). They
help society to learn, similar to an actual immune system, on how to react to deviations of the
norms, which deviations to integrate, to reject, and to create the possibilities for useful change
within itself. For a moment, “the system’s total pretention of being an ordered, reduced
complexity” (Luhmann 1995b, 373) is destroyed, everything seems possible, while at the same
time, the autopoiesis of the system (a term that will be explained below) continues to operate
uninterrupted. Conflict enables the correction of social order. War—as a more extreme case of
conflict—has a far less positive function in Luhmann’s view. As he argues, “Conflicts are social
systems, indeed, social systems formed out of occasions that are given in other systems but that
do not assume the status of sub-systems and instead exist parasitically” (1995b, 389). Moreover,
“As social systems, conflicts are autopoietic, self-reproducing units. Once they are established,
one can expect them to continue rather than to end” (Luhmann 1995b, 394). While these two references point to the hierarchical relationship between conflict and other functional systems, as well as the origin of conflict, two aspects which I consider below, they demonstrate that conflicts and wars are parasitical. A conflict system not only draws on the resources of other systems, but functions by undermining the workings of these systems. In short, it brings complexity back in, destroys prospects of connecting operations, and subsumes everything under itself. If fully established, wars structurally couple with other systems and establish themselves as the dominant ones, limiting other systems’ scope of autopoietic reproduction.

This line of thought can be illustrated in terms of ‘double contingency’ and the creation of expectations in a state of nature. Originally, systems do not have expectations regarding other systems, which means that conflicts are as likely as cooperation. Accordingly, each system can initially choose between cooperation and conflict. For Luhmann, in the long run, cooperation prevails over conflict, as it enables higher levels of connection and the ability of the social system to engage with higher complex settings. Through evolutionary accomplishments, certain possibilities are relinquished in order to enable new possibilities. For example, the establishment of a stable currency made it more difficult to trade in agricultural products, but overall enabled and facilitated trade. The construction of a road assisted transport by forbidding driving around randomly. For the media system, the establishment of a printing press, television stations, and the worldwide spread enabled a broader reach of news, more accurate and timely reporting, while at the same time diminishing the role of the clergy and nobility in spreading information (Luhmann 2000b, 85). The list can easily be expanded. Contrary to this, war is undermining the level of connectivity of a society by destabilizing stable expectations. It is a version of negative double contingency, “I will not do what you want if you do not do what I

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32 This notion is clearly also represented in the work of Kruse, who argues that wars are de-differentiating, resulting in a more hierarchical and centralized state (Kruse 2015, 11). However, this understanding of war under-emphasizes the destructive impact of it on other systems (psychic and social). At least wars in the modern world society appear to be more (dys-)functional than de-differentiating.
want” (Luhmann 1995b, 389). This also indicates why wars escape control of the social system from which they originated (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 2011, 97) and possess their own intrinsic logic; reasons which make their termination from the outside more difficult and their recurrence more likely. All of this, however, does not tell us anything about the operations within the war system. In order to address the issue, the ‘second’ pillar of MST, the theory of communication, needs to be introduced.

2.1.2 The Inner Workings of the War System: The Theory of Communication

Systems “have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate these relations from relations with their environment” (Luhmann 1995b, 13). They manage this by observing their environment, which thus allows them to create meaning. Following this line of thought, social systems are first and foremost systems of meaning. The actual operations of functional systems are captured by the theory of communication. Luhmann introduces this theory by contrasting it to action theory and particularly the notion of social action by reversing the causality. As he remarks, “Sociality is not a special case of action; instead, action is constituted in social systems by means of communication and attribution as a reduction of complexity, as an indispensable self-simplification of the system” (1995: 137). One can think of it in this way: the process of observing the environment can be understood in terms of communication, while the observed events are interpreted as actions. Observation is drawing distinctions, which constitutes meaning in the first place, because it presupposes selecting something out of a range of possibilities. Moreover, as Arnoldi summarizes, “that the distinction appears twice: as a distinction between ‘this’ and the ‘rest’ (meaning or sense) and as the distinction between the observer, that is, the system, and its environment” (2001, 5).

The label communication, however, might be misleading, since one would suspect in line with Speech Act Theory (Austin 1975) that at least two people are involved, namely the
speaker and the recipient. However, there is no place for people as such, since they are conceptualized as psychic systems that are only partially present in each functional system. Moreover, “fundamentally speaking, people cannot communicate at all, not even in their capacity of psychic systems. Communication alone is able to communicate” (Andersen 2003, 75). Communication is a process of coordinated selection of the drawing of boundaries in order to create meaning (Luhmann 1995c, 51). Communication then consists of three interrelated processes that all have to occur in order to be conceived of as communication: it is a selection of information regarding the content of what is being communicated. Here the focus is on what the information reveals about the observed world. Secondly, selection is formed on the basis of the form of communication, as this exposes information about the speaker. Finally, selection is about how the initial message has been understood or should be understood by the addressee of the communication (Andersen 2003, 75; Schwanitz 1995, 150). Whether the communication is understood correctly is not the issue, only, if it allows for further communication and points of connection.

Furthermore, communication is twofold. It is self descriptive in the sense that it attributes responsibility to the sender for an act of communication that is observed as action. Additionally, it is the basis of the self-constitution of the system as we have seen above; it establishes the distinction between system and its environment. This highlights the fluidity of systems, since communication constitutes not only action but also reaction as the continuous flow of events dissolve and are reinterpreted by the system itself. Communication, consequently, constitutes not only Ego but also Alter and encompasses acceptance or rejection of the communication (which then again Ego may also do). It is here that we have to refer back to the idea of ‘double contingency’ (Luhmann 1995b, 103). As systems (psychic or social) are

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33 This is of course central for the Copenhagen School or more specifically, the theory of securitization in which speech features prominently (cf. Buzan and Wæver 1997; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; Stritzel 2007).
34 Individuals are not directly part of the society in MST, since the building blocks of society are neither humans, action, nor their interaction, but communication. People are conceptualized as structurally coupled psychic and living systems that are part of the (social) systems’ environment, not the system itself (Albert 1999, 241).
‘black-boxes’ to each other they have no way of knowing how the other system will behave once they interact; in the words of MST, how the understanding of the communication is observed internally. As no common expectations between the systems exist, that is, they are not already socially preconditioned to behave in a certain way, cooperation is principally as likely as conflict. Yet, similar to an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the process of ‘double contingency’ feeds on itself in a dual sense: firstly, it creates expectations for further interactions as common expectations are generated.\footnote{At this point, some clarification is needed. Although conflict is as likely as cooperation, systems are to a certain extent pre-disposed to accept communication and create stable expectations (Messmer 2003b, 100), due to their character of continuous differentiation. This is not a normative assumption, because differentiation itself is not a good thing but can only be ascribed by an observer to be one. Nor is this a teleological assumption, because stable expectations can also be rejected, leading to an increase in the exposure to complexity of the society.} As Luhmann remarks, “Through their mere assuming they create a certainty about reality, because this assuming leads to assuming the alter-ego’s assuming” (emphasis in original, 1995b, 106). Secondly, it highlights the fact that in order to survive, systems are in need of these problems and so create them themselves. The implication is that the set of actors that matter depends on the observation of the functional system. More specifically, the actors of the political system can and are usually different than the ones of the economic or religious system.

This does not imply that these functional systems are completely detached from one another; on the contrary, they can become \textit{coupled} (Mattheis 2012, 631)—“a temporary interlocking of independent units” (Luhmann 1995b, 222). One system cannot regulate the other, but with its decisions it can either cause irritation in the other that will lead it to malfunction or provide a basis for further differentiation. One can distinguish between \textit{temporal} and \textit{structural} couplings. Temporal couplings are operations connected with a particular event that have to be created continually, like the payment of taxes, while structural ones are more permanent, like the creation of a taxation system (the structural coupling of the economic and political system). These exist only if “a system permanently presupposes certain characteristics of its environment and relies structurally on the very same” characteristics (Luhmann 1995a,
374). In a nutshell, couplings create binding points between two systems, which enable them to influence each other, not by interfering in the internal operations of a system, but by providing new points of departure, and closing some possibilities while opening up new ones, potentially to facilitate higher connectivity—again at the expense of complexity.

While this might sound very abstract at first glance, two examples help to illustrate the concept: the establishment of a constitution is the structural coupling of the political and the legal system (Mattheis 2012, 631). Based on the constitution, the functioning of the legal system is severely constrained in the sense that it can only formulate verdicts that are in accordance with the constitution and cannot rule, for instance as in the case of Germany, for capital punishment. At the same time, the constitution allows for higher complexities within the legal system, serving as a fixed point of reference in relation to which the system can establish a judicial code that can deal with the problems of a modern society (e.g. internal differentiation of the legal system). A modern democratic constitution also eliminates certain alternatives of coming to power in a state (e.g. military coup, anointed by God), whilst enabling the creation of a complex electoral system. The passing of a law on minimal wage is another example. The political system makes the collectively binding decision (e.g. law) to establish a minimal salary. The judicial system can observe acts in the economic system based on this law as either lawful or not. The religious system might consider it morally just or not. Yet, in the economic system, the measure can cause actual irritations, infringing upon its capacity to regulate itself and thus potentially causing unemployment or inflation. One can think about it in this way: whilst systems cannot regulate each other, they can aim at irritating each other to behave in a certain way, with the outcome being far from certain. This is what is meant by describing systems as operationally closed, but open to exchange with their environment.

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36 As I explain in chapter 3, every functional system has ‘programs’ which enable the continuation of its operations. These programs are only temporally fixed and are open to change. Within the democratic system, the program of elections allows for the distinction between government/opposition and rulers/rulled by allowing for designation over legitimate power. Among the dimensions that enable decision-making within the political systems, hence, reference to the program of elections is central.
As mentioned before, war recurrence is deemed more likely if structural couplings between the war system and other functional systems are established. In this case, by structural couplings, I mean that the continuation of the operations of a functional system becomes dependent on the continuation of the war system itself. For instance, it has often been argued that one of the defining features of the so-called new wars is the economic aspect of war (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2004). Whether for example through resource extraction smuggling, illegal weapons trade or ransom money, certain networks of actors during war find it profitable to actually prolong the war (Duffield 1998). More so, termination of the war is against their (economic) interests, as it would take away their source of income. These kind of configurations, which can exist between the war system and all other functional systems (see chapters 4-6) are considered to be supportive for the recurrence of war as (successful) structural couplings between the war system and its environment.

Up to this point I have explained the process of how systems operate and observe different actors (and actor categories). These observations are conducted by (sub-) systems based on their binary media code, which allows them to draw distinctions and, subsequently, create meaning. Moreover, this distinction is not dependent on a sovereign—one system making binding decisions for other systems—but is a communicative operation of (and for) the system itself. Each system can be structurally coupled (both in the short and long terms) with other functional systems and produce different variants; nevertheless, communications take place only within each system; despite coupling with others, systems remain operationally closed. They determine their own borders—indeed, “boundary determination is the most important requirement of system differentiation” (Luhmann 1995b, 29)—with which the systems regulate their contacts with their environments.37 The next step is to identify the communicative code of the war system that fulfills the functions outlined above.

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37 One could compare a system to a house, in which the doors and windows regulate the possible entries and exits to the neighborhood. Each household is able to open/close doors and windows depending on its preferences, time, etc.
I propose that the media code of the war system is friend/enemy—and every observation of the environment is made upon this distinction. In other words, every event, action and actor, is observed according to this code. Since every functional system observes its environment according to its own media code, the war system operates in the same way. Actors are constituted through communication alone and, as I mentioned before, do not have to be any specific set of actors. Therefore, the warring parties can be states, different identity groups, societies, towns, empires, or regional and ideological blocks confronting each other. The media code of friend/enemy fulfills all criteria of a code with a preferential hierarchy. Simply put, one is rather surrounded by friends than by enemies. Only friends are capable of fighting together to secure their own survival. The role of the enemy is to organize opposition, mount attacks, and threaten the very survival or the friend groups. The positive value of ‘friend’ is the designation value of the war system, the negative value of ‘enemy’ is the reflection value. Also, one value conditions the other. As in any functional system, only in distinction is meaning created. As always in distinction, which is based on observations, both sides of the code are simultaneously relevant, even if only one is used and named. The friend group has to, with everything that it does in the war, always consider which possibilities result by its actions for

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38 The distinction friend/enemy only considers how the war system operates, not necessarily its function. Much of the above-mentioned literature points to the role of wars in maintaining and changing order, however defined. For now it should be mentioned that from a MST perspective, this cannot be the case. As there is no hierarchy among functional systems, there cannot be a super-system that can organize the other ones. Indeed, speaking of order only makes sense within a functional system, which allows for multiple orders to be present simultaneously. Because of this, a second factor comes into play. One premise for the functional differentiation is that outside of a functional system, no functional equivalent can exist (Luhmann 2000a, 83). Below, I explain the difference to other usages of the friend/enemy distinction, particularly as conceptualized by Carl Schmitt.

39 There have been several attempts to identify the war system. Harste assigns the media code war/peace (2013), Matuszek establishes next to the war system a war resolution system (2007), and Dammann advances the code as “the organizational destroying of the organized destroy capacity or not doing so” (2012, 297). The problem with Dammann’s suggestion is that it includes the idea of struggle in warfare, but cannot account for ‘arbitrary’ killings of civilians (as he himself acknowledges). His argument against the friend/enemy distinction regards the fact that third-party military operations do not refer to this code and that some ‘enemies’ survive war. Whilst the second point will be addressed in the latter part of this chapter, I find his rejection unconvincing. Even if third-party interventions do not consider the enemy to be evil, they nevertheless participate in the war and form a conflict party on their own. Moreover, also the code of victory/loss for the war system is unsatisfying. Primarily, this code is part of the sports system (Bette 1999). But more crucially, it is in the logic of the war system that it actually does not find any conclusion (Hardt and Negri 2004).

40 The media codes of every functional systems have an underlying preferential hierarchy, it is better to be powerful than powerless, profit is preferred over loss, good over bad, beautiful over ugly, love over hate, etc. (Luhmann 2000a, 89).
the enemy group, which counteractions and strategies are enabled, and how the propensity for victory and success is altered by it. The enemy is indeed dependent on the friend. But from the reflection perspective of the enemy, also, and possibly primarily, what matters are *omissions* by the friend: everything that *could* happen if another strategy had been chosen, another action preferred, another target selected, and different weapons used. Because of this reflection potential of the enemy, the enemy group is never one to be fixed, and allows for multiple manifestations thereof. Crucially, any observation of friend and enemy forms the basis of further communication about friend and enemy (e.g. was the strategy successful? Did an attack occur?), guaranteeing the autopoiesis of the war system.

It should be noted that prevalent literature supports the designation of the friend/enemy distinction as the media code of the war system. For instance, along the lines of the bellicose sociological tradition, von Treitschke argued that the occurrence of war was central in the creation of an identity and the formation of the modern state. In his words, “without war there would be no state at all” (1914: 21), as a state’s foundations lie in the conquest of one smaller tribe after another. This is echoed by Gumplowitz, who linked advancements of human civilization to warfare in a social Darwinist manner: progress is the subjugation of one group over others. In order to secure this rule, laws are created and police force established to maintain the privileged position of the previous victors over the others. For Simmel, it is evident that war serves the function of friend/enemy creation, even though his account does not necessitate the creation of states (Matuszek 2007, 81). Ward goes one step further than the previous thinkers. It is not only that states were created by war, but that violence and war are the engines of human development in the sense that this is the source of all creation, as “The new state, the new people, the new nation, are on a higher plane, and a long step is taken toward civilization” (emphasis in original, 1905: 600).

This does not mean that the enemy is a group ‘out there’ that only waits to be activated and sought. For Schmitt, this would be the case and the justification for politics in the first
place. This is the ideal for him, and exemplified in the proclaimed enmity by Cromwell towards
the Spaniards, voiced in 1656, in which he declared that “your great Enemy is the Spaniard. He
is a natural enemy [...] his enmity is put into him by God” (1996, 68). The role of the sovereign is
then, consequently, only to decide correctly on the friend/enemy distinction. However, other
than in the writings of Schmitt, the self and the enemy are constituted through struggle in the
first place. This understanding lies at the core of the writings of Clausewitz, who ascribed the
constitutive function of war, in the formation of the self against an exterior threat (Kochi 2009,
23). Without one existential threat of another—conceived of as the enemy—the self and the
friend cannot form in the first place. And without the hostile pairings of two or more groups,
conflict as such would be entirely impossible (Gladstone 1959, 132). This does not imply that
the enemy identity emerges outside certain previously established structures, but rather that it
is reshaped and reformed by the conflict itself (Matuszek 2007, 34). After all, the autopoiesis
of the war system relies on continuous communication, which can be equally rejected or
accepted—just as in every other system.

In relation to this, the opening quote of this chapter is instructive on the workings of the
war system. It describes the golem, a monster of old Jewish folklore created to defend the
Jewish community in Prague from its prosecutors (Hardt and Negri 2004, 10–12). In the story,
the golem loses control and starts to kill indiscriminately between friend and foe. The current
counterpart to the golem are autonomous robotics—usually unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e.
drones) or “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (i.e. LAWS or killer robots)—that distinguish
between targets and non-targets based on some complex algorithm (Cartwright 2010; Finn
2011; Knapton 2015). While in popular movies such as Matrix, Terminator or television series
like Person of Interest and Battlestar Galactica, the narrative of the creation turning against its
creators is often employed, in real life the binary distinction between friend and enemy lies
precisely at the core of automated robots. As United Kingdom Air Vice-Marshall Green discusses, “such a system will be able to decide on an appropriate action to bring about a desired state without depending on human oversight and control, although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not be” (emphasis added, Cole 2013).

At this point, the dynamic nature of war is already alluded to. As mentioned before, by observing the environment through the drawing of boundaries between marked and unmarked space according to a binary code, systems create meaning. But what is this meaning? Cryptically, Luhmann refers to meaning as “the simultaneous presentation […] of actuality and possibility” (1995c, 42). Everything that is actual—that is, observed by a system—already points to the future as the possibilities of new actualities (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 2011, 170). Communication—the ascription of meaning—is only then meaningful, if it allows for the connection of new communications. Even meaningless things are meaningful, if they allow for the continuation of communication. Crucially, the realization of meaning can be actualized along three dimensions, namely “factuality (realitas), temporality, and sociality” (emphasis in original, Luhmann 1995b, 72). While the factual dimension simply refers to the fact that something is something and not something else (for instance, a horse is a horse and not a cow), and the social dimension denotes the understanding of reality being socially constructed, it is the temporal dimension which concerns us here.

For the purpose of this project, the understanding of temporality is twofold. Firstly, it encompasses the horizon from the past and future. Every system observes its own history, expressed in particular stories and narratives, as well as the movement towards a particularly, system-specifically defined future. Secondly, every actuality of meaning is a temporal event

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41 One interesting question which will not be addressed here is the relationship between war, violence, and robotics. If LAWS are able to identify targets, which are other LAWS, the idea of battle-related deaths in order to characterize wars disappears, as only equipment is destroyed and the emotional connection towards the friend/enemy is absent from the participants of warfare.
that is replaced by a new observation of a system, a new temporal event. In other words, every system observes time differently and produces its own dynamics and history. The temporal dimension, according to its own code and programs, highlights the distance between functional systems and the practical impossibility of control of one over the other. For example, not only are the crucial actors in the economic and political systems different (possibly national governments and international organizations versus multinational corporations and financial institutions), but the speed of making the observation in each system distinct. The time it takes to create and pass legislation, react to pressures from the public sphere and policy stakeholders is longer than regulations of the market (in terms of prices), the advancements of new technology or financial transactions. In short, systems create both space and time; in this sense, each system creates its own universe.

For the functioning of the war system and the processes within it, the implications are straightforward. By observing the environment, the war system ‘creates’ not only events, actors, and action within it, but also its own history, narrative, and stories. In the present, it projects itself into the future, likely in the form of a final goal, the victory and defeat of the enemy. Moreover, because each system observes a different environment and creates meaning which can only be internally observed by each system, but not understood both socially nor temporally, the consequence is an even greater loss of control of the functional systems over the war system. The only exception is the war system itself, which due to its parasitical nature, draws from the resources of the others (as explained above) and, consequently, takes a dominant position vis-à-vis the other systems. Finally, because each war system creates its own historicity, the paradoxical situation arises that once a war system becomes established, it has no beginning; for the participants of war, the fight becomes deeply rooted into their group identity as an almost inevitable struggle that can find its logical conclusion in war. At the same time, there is no end in sight, as understood in the war termination literature (see chapter 1). The wound as another constitutive feature of war is psychically and psychologically present for
the systems (both social and psychical) that were observed by the war system. Crucially, this temporal dimension contributes to the impossibility of steering the war system from the outside; the war system operates at a different speed than for instance the political system. Because of this ‘distance’, controlling and terminating the war system (also in such a way that war does not recur) becomes even more difficult.

2.1.3 Change of and within War: A Theory of Evolution

As it is, the characterization above describes the internal and external operations of the war system, yet it remains incomplete, necessitating the ‘third’ pillar of MST, the theory of (social) evolution. The theory of evolution is needed as each system continuously faces acceptance and rejection of their communications, which is again communicated. Different than for instance historical institutionalism (Fioretos 2011; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004), in MST the idea of process and sequence is replaced with the notion of evolution. In principle, the theory of evolution is not a coherent one, as it encompasses different strands, which can be primarily distinguished by their understanding of direction. In the Darwinian account, as the one Luhmann himself is following, evolution is non-directional as well as non-deterministic. Systems change, but it is neither clear in what direction nor if the emerging form is (normatively) superior to the previous one. As evolitional change is not teleological, development can also revert again to an earlier stage of lesser complexity. In itself, “evolution presupposes self-reproduction and observation. It comes about by deviant self-reproduction” (Luhmann 1995b, 360) and is, therefore, an illogical process in the narrow sense.

The theory of evolution serves as Luhmann’s theory of change and views evolution as undirected—meaning that there is no agency nor causality behind it, since both are produced by communication alone and observed by other functional systems (Viskovatoff 1999, 511). Evolution increases the complexity within a society, by foreclosing a set of alternatives and at the same time allowing for new possibilities for connection. Evolution is a complex mechanism,
which encompasses three parts, namely variation, selection, and restabilization (Albert 1999, 250; Albert 2010, 52; Luhmann 1995b, 355). Variations are almost random in appearance within the system’s mechanisms of observing its environment. As some variations increase, they form a new structure; or in other words, deviant communications are captured as new structures. As such, the criteria for their selection is not the intention behind their creation, but whether they enable new and additional possibilities for connection with the environment (Matuszek 2007, 92). Luhmann remarks, “Expectations are formed by the intervening selection of a narrower repertoire of possibilities, by whose light one can orient oneself better with and, above all, more quickly” (1995b, 96). To come back to an earlier point, the establishment of new codes of communication increases the level of connectivity precisely because it simplifies and, consequently, speeds up processes within the system. However, the newly selected structures must be adjusted to the pre-existing ones; a process that is described as restabilization. In this sense, functional systems are constantly confronted with the need to restabilize, since variation and selection are equally constant processes. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of MST.

Figure 2.1: Overview of three foundational theories of MST

While this already points to the fact that the origin of conflict lies in the rejection of communication and the need to create further concretizations of the conditions under which rejections occur, I want to firstly turn to the internal differentiations of the war system. For
instance, from a strategic point of view, evolution—understood in this context as learning—is the primary means to success in war; after all every tactical choice, advancement in technology, and more effective recruitment measure helps one side to win over the other. Strategy and understanding the opponent play a critical role in translating power into military success (or vice versa). This is the story of classical warfare and, currently, of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations (Kilcullen 2010). Also this is surely one aspect of internal differentiation which happens in the war system. Observing the enemy, movement of troops, weaponry, terrain, or the weather are crucial aspects that are needed to be included in the calculation over one’s own strategy. Additionally, this allows for the forming of subsystems within the war system, in which (possibly hierarchically structured) groups operate, form organizations (i.e. war parties), and interact with one another. This is not the main aspect which I wish to address in this section, even though it is evidently an important one in the internal workings of war. What is more crucial in the context of the war system and its internal differentiation is the establishment of stable structures of expectancy, or the lack thereof.

The allocation of the friend/enemy distinction is crucial to the operation of the war system in order to limit the complexity of reality and the realization of strategic behavior in the first place. Any kind of coordinated action can only be possible against the background of some sort of baseline notion that the troops will follow orders, that they will be financed, that there will be no defections, etc. Accordingly, the war system needs the resources of other systems in order to survive: money for the maintenance and expansion of troops, law and morality for the regulation of behavior during warfare, modern mass media for communication within and outside war, and so forth. However, in war, precisely the stability of these expectations becomes questionable: alliances shift, power-struggles with groups create new parties in the conflict, a conflict expands to encompass more territory, and in turn, more interest groups become included into it. Indeed, as the literature on war termination (but also the experiences of war and CWS) has demonstrated, the fragmentation of conflict parties is not only a frequent
occurrence in war, but can also be part of the strategic calculations of warring sides (Foran and Goodwin 1993). In short, the undermining of stable expectations means that group cohesion can only be achieved at considerable costs, fragmentation becomes the norm, mistrust on the actions and intentions of others grow, while the ever-present danger of betrayal forces one towards treachery. Under these circumstances, any kind of social contract dissolves and reality comes to resemble the Hobbesian state of nature.

To conclude, at this point, war as a system in the tradition of MST has been conceptualized. I have discussed the function of war in relation to other systems, on what basis it observes reality, and what kind of structures are created by it. In the second section of this chapter, the focus shifts now to the environment of the war system; or in other words, in what kind of setting the war system is embedded, from where and how it originates, and finally, how it interacts with functional systems. Put differently, the discussion shifts from conceptualizing the war system to explicating the ways in which this system shapes its environment to make war recurrence more likely.

2.2 The Position of War

To be more specific, in this section I address three issues. Firstly, I introduce a four-step model of the formation of war within the modern world society. Here, I offer an additional justification for the allocation of the friend/enemy distinction as the communicative code of the war system. This model is of particular importance, as it is multi-directional. A conflict can move between different stages and as I shall demonstrate, the distance between an issue or identity conflict towards subordination conflict are different and impact on the likelihood of war recurrence. Secondly, I examine the position between the designed war system and other functional systems. I conclude by emphasizing the difficulty of (permanently) terminating the processes of the war system externally in such a way that a recurrent war is avoided. Indeed, because wars are not subsystems of other systems, they are outside steering capabilities by other systems.
Rather, wars can form structural couplings, which render the operations of particular functional systems conditional on the continuation of warfare.

### 2.2.1 The Consequence of Rejection

Again, society in MST is the sum of all communications. This implies two interrelated aspects, namely that according to this framework, society is not held together by common norms, values or identity. Indeed, predominantly, it is assumed that in modern societies, violence is typically absent as it is assumed to negate the norm structure that holds society together (Elias 1978; Schlichte 2007, 55). MST scholars criticize that this conception “systematically exclude[s] from the notion of society social facts which cannot be subsumed under its integrative umbrella” (Albert 2004, 16).42 Secondly, due to the lack of common norms, the presence of world society does not serve as the basis for isomorphism (i.e. states becoming increasingly similar), but conversely implies the rejection of dominant forms of communication in favor of variations. The modern world society is not homogeneous but highly heterogeneous, allowing for diverging and overlapping manifestations of functional systems.43 Keeping in mind Luhmann’s argument that the rejection of communication can lead to war, I concentrate in this section on illustrating its mechanisms in modern world society.

We know already that communication can be accepted or rejected and that in a modern world society, due to the magnitude of functional systems, communication has increased in frequency. The increase in communication leads to a higher possibility of rejecting it, thereby causing variations, selection, and restabilizations in the first place. This process creates irritations and conflicts which can ultimately result in war. However, conflict is nothing bad in itself and can actually be the mechanism through which a system auto-corrections itself, as it can

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42 One illustrating example regards the treatment of rogue states in the international system, which must be ‘contained’ and ‘shielded away’ from the society of states. They are a ‘danger’ to the international environment and, like a disease, can infect adjoining states.

43 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner show for instance that the presence of a (global) law system leads rather to overlapping and conflict manifestations thereof rather than to a unified law system (2007).
modify old and ineffective expectations—accordingly, is part of its ‘immune system’ (Luhmann 1995b, 369). Still, rejection can lead to conflict, which in turn can result in war. Matuszek remarks that “the world society includes the possibility of its negation, which can lead to conflict” (2007, 118, translated by the author). Stetter too finds that “communication, by definition, always includes the possibility of rejection, contradictions or opposition, thereby pointing to the ubiquitous possibility of social conflict arising in world society” (2007, 33).

Messmer finds that the “pure rejection of meaning-ascription [e.g. communication] explains empirically sufficiently a social conflict” (2003b, 99). Indeed, “conflicts not only point to the constant possibility of a ‘no’ inherent in all communication, but through their specific discursive framework they facilitate the actual, repeated communication of the ‘no’” (Albert, Diez, and Stetter 2008, 16). But does every rejection of communication directly lead to war? Are there different kinds of rejections? And is there a mechanism we can find that would allow us to identify which rejections become actual, repeated communications of the ‘no’ that results in the formation of war? In other words, what are the preconditions for the systematic reproduction of a conflict?

For Luhmann, the possibility of rejection and the occurrence of conflict is such a regular occurrence in society that the question is not ‘why do conflicts arise’, but ‘why do some conflicts actually not disappear again’. In his own words, “Conflicts form daily. They emerge everywhere and are trivializes quickly resolved” (1995b, 391). Rejections of communication happen all the time, in all systems, and are in themselves insufficient to cause the outbreak of a war. Some rejections, however, manage to be perpetuated, deepen, transcend system

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44 One possible way of re-thinking this is the idea of the increase in complexity. As mentioned earlier, the establishment of systems in MST is a method to decrease complexity in terms of the amount of realizable options by creating common expectations (what is good, what is profitable, etc.). Conflicts are a way of questioning these expectations, and thus, a way of increasing the range of possibilities; hence, increasing the complexity. However, creating common expectations opens up possibilities for the opportunities of linking and creating more advanced complex–systems, whereas the rejection of these undermine them. This topic is again raised and explained in chapter 3.

45 To give an everyday example, just because two friends cannot agree on where to have lunch together and eat in different places is not sufficient enough to break up their friendship or to result in an antagonistic relationship.
boundaries, and form a system of their own. Building up on the work of Messmer, Albert, and colleagues, I propose a mechanism of stepwise conflict intensification which accounts for the creation of wars. There are four steps a conflict needs to take in order to form a war. These are (I) conflict episodes, (II) issue conflicts, (III) identity conflicts, and (IV) subordination conflicts (Albert, Diez, and Stetter 2008; Albert, Kessler, and Stetter 2008; Hayward and Wiener 2008; Messmer 2003a, 87). In the language of MST, these four stages represent the potential differentiation of a conflict. The implications of this understanding are threefold. Firstly, conflict is not understood in terms of disruption of communication, but actually in the continuing of conflict communication (Albert, Kessler, and Stetter 2008, 56–57). Secondly, the process from one stage to the other is not deterministic or inevitable, but in the tradition of evolutionary theory, it can be reversed again (see figure 2.2). Finally, a subordination conflict reverting to the stage of issue conflicts is less likely to recur than one reverting to the stage of identity conflict for the simple reason that it has a bigger distance to cover. Significantly, conflicts can disappear again. Basically, it is always possible to reject the rejection. Every stage shall now be shortly introduced.

(I) Conflict Episodes: Conflict episodes are the most basic form of rejection and contain events when one party articulates disagreement over a specific issue. This is the most elementary form of conflict and happens regularly in every setting. They are in line with

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46 The idea that conflicts escalate and run through stages is not a new one in IR. Recently, Senese and Vasquez have developed a model of 'steps-to-war' in which they identify paths to war between states that are roughly equally powerful (2005; 2008). Other studies focus on the dynamic interaction between the conflict parties in order to demonstrate the escalation of these into wars (Sartori 2002). Finally, in the tradition of the Copenhagen School (see above), securitization is equally thought of as a step-by-step intensification of a security discourse, which ultimately takes it out of the public sphere of control.

47 One classical example is the security dilemma, which is the result in the inability of states to communicate their true intentions. The tragedy of the SD and of classical realism by extension is that even if all affected parties do not want conflict, they have to act as if they do, since they can never be sure whether the defensive capabilities of the other have potentially offensive capabilities (Roe 1999). The idea of IOs and international regimes—actually the inherent assumption of political liberalism—is that these create the possibilities of communication to overcome misunderstandings and limit the pitfalls that can lead to wars again.

48 The use of the arrow in this figure is misleading, as it indicates only one direction the conflict can take. The argument in this project is more nuanced. While these are the stages a conflict has to run through in order to become a war system, there is no ‘determinism’. Rather, conflicts can move through these four stages in every direction.
Luhmann’s strict criteria that a single rejection of communication can be conceived of as conflict. There is no repetition of rejection necessary, nor will any follow-up action be conducted. Thus, for the addressees the “mere voicing of disaccord” is sufficient (Albert, Diez, and Stetter 2008, 17).

(II) Issue Conflicts: If the communication of disagreement is constantly repeated, a situation arises in which one side tries to convince the other side of their respective views on the issue. To give an example in order to clarify the difference between these two forms of conflict, it makes sense to use the illustration of the PISA studies. In a conflict episode, one affected party would raise concerns regarding the implementation of those best practices in secondary education policy set up by the OECD. An issue conflict arises, when the concerned party sticks by its ‘no’ and forms a valid opposition. Consequently, the opposition represents a more structurally-solid form of the rejection of communication in this issue area. Conflict parties are formed, which by their very existence again facilitate communication, due to the establishment of stable expectations. The establishment of issue conflicts are in principle positive occurrences within society, as they allow for the correction of established structures and the formation of conflict mediation procedures within the society.

(III) Identity conflicts: At the third stage of conflict, the disagreement becomes somewhat ‘personalized’ (Albert, Diez, and Stetter 2008, 18). At this point, it is not anymore the issue over which disagreement is articulated, but the disagreement is a reaction to the sender of the communication. In the example above, simply for being policy advice from the OECD, the communication is considered potentially hostile and will be rejected due not to its content, but simply because it is coming from the ‘other’. While prior to this stage, conflict could have been the result of misunderstandings (the communication of a code is misunderstood by the recipient), it is now a form of principal non-acceptance. In other words, the conflict has moved from non-understanding to non-acceptance (Messmer 2003b, 100). In established identity
conflicts, the creation of parallel societies is expected, as the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ strive to become separated and minimalize contact between each other.

**IV. Subordination Conflicts**: The last stage of conflict becomes the acting-upon the establishment of hostile others. At this point of the conflict, an aggressive solution is sought, as it becomes an either/or situation. Thus, the communication moves from distinguishing oneself from the other (e.g. he is a liberal, a Muslim, a Kosovar, etc.) to the subordination/elimination of the other (e.g. they must be put in jail, constrained in their possibility to endanger us, removed like a cancer from the face of the earth, etc.). The use of organized violence like ethnic cleansing, religious or inter-state wars becomes the preferred way of ‘convincing’ the other side (Albert, Diez, and Stetter 2008, 19). Thus, the communication code changes from considering the other as ‘other’ and the self as ‘self’ towards perceiving the other as ‘enemy’ and everyone who supports oneself as the ‘friend’. In other words, a subordination conflict forms a differentiated system of conflict. In this war system, the formation of subsystems is made possible, with the formation of social organizations and interaction systems that follow their own operations. While subsystems establish potentials for higher connectivity within the war system, their operations can create a ‘surplus’ that brings the entire communication structure in the war system to a stop. This point will be revisited in the last part of the chapter.

![Figure 2.2: Overview of Conflict Stages](image)

For now, it suffices to point out how classical definitions of war and the conception of subordination conflicts differ. Levy and Thompson, for instance, define war as “*sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations*” (emphasis in original, 2010, 5). Contrary
to the common definitions of war, the enemy does not have to be a combatant, and, consequently, struggling with and fighting against the other are not the core of war. It is about destroying (or at least subordinating) the enemy, not about whether the enemy actually fights back. Additionally, it should be noted that subordination conflicts are in no way limited to inter-state wars. Conversely, they are very broad as they include all conflicts in which the opposing parties rely on this mode of communication. Moreover, these conflicts are formed within the environment of the modern world society; they are, consequently, observed by the various systems within this society. To a certain extent, a spatial demarcation of conflict with regard to where it is formed and who participates (i.e. states, intra-state groups, international organizations) is only of limited value. The crucial question is, how the war system conditions and irritates its surrounding systems and vice versa. At this point, the stages only describe how conflicts can reach the stage of being traditionally considered war, therefore, from disagreement to elimination. Bearing this in mind, the discussion moves towards understanding the relationship between the war system and other functional systems, as well as how the war system can actually be conditioned in order to be terminated in such a way that recurrence is unlikely.

2.2.2 War and its Relationship to Functional Systems

`Fixed` or `stable` communications demarcate social systems from other potential systems. Herein, the process of border drawing is central, as it signals the attempt of the war system to close down operationally as well as delineate itself from its environment. A war system is nothing but “a distinct social system which is constituted and sustained by communication between Alter [enemy] and Ego [friend] and which therefore ought to be studied as a social order in its own right” (Albert, Kessler, and Stetter 2008, 62). This means that within the war system, communication in terms of friend/enemy is preferred to other forms of communication (profit/non-profit, right/wrong, etc.)—a configuration which is not necessarily stable in the
longer run. However, war systems assume a dominance over other forms of communication, drawing on their resources similarly to parasites—an allusion that will be engaged with in the next chapter. Yet, drawing borders is vital for all systems, including the war system. Only if it manages “to reproduce and maintain the boundary between itself and its environment can it start to build internal complexity” (Helmig and Kessler 2007, 243). Border-drawing is not a primarily spatial matter as these system borders do not necessarily have to correspond to psychical space. If even in the political system, “borders between different regions in world society cannot be regarded as static distinctions with ontological status” (Stetter 2007, 38), then conflict systems equally cannot claim to be stable.

The idea of the war system dominating other systems is both embedded and contradicted in Luhmann’s writings. How can a system become dominant over other systems in a functionally non-hierarchical world? It appears that by definition, once a war system (e.g. subordination conflict) forms, it draws on the resources of other systems in order to survive and function. At the same time, as long as the conflict system remains below the war system, it serves much more as a corrective to the workings of particular systems than as destruction—it serves as the immune system. The analogy with an injection should not be taken too far, but one could draw a parallel with how the introduction of a weak virus into the human body helps it build up resistance, while a stronger one leads to sickness. In other words, once a conflict moves beyond a certain threshold, it actually aims at establishing dominance over other systems while simultaneously undermining their functions. This suggests that the war system starts as a kind of subsystem of other systems (see above), but actually manages to not only form (that is, differentiate from its host system) but also assume dominance through (permanently) structurally coupling with the systems of its environment.

At this point, one aspect to the mechanism of structural coupling has to be added. In a nutshell, the concept of structural coupling has been introduced to encompass the duality of autonomous systems—autopoietic systems that operate according to their intrinsic logics—
with the possibility of being irritated (not steered) by other systems. Manifestations of structural couplings like the constitution (between the political and the judicial system), political consulting (between education and political system), and property (between economic and judicial system) are, in other words, expressways of (mutual) irritation (Luhmann 1997b, 781). To iterate my argument in this project: the more permanent these couplings are with the war system, the more likely its reappearance becomes. Crucially, what matters for the permanent termination of the war system is not only the stability of the structural coupling, but the amount (Schneider 2002, 355). Like with any functional system, the greater amount of systems that the war system is coupled to, the smaller is the possibility of becoming reliant on one specific system. Consequently, the autonomy of a system increases if it is coupled with more systems, as it becomes less dependent on a particular one. Accordingly, if the war system manages to structurally couple with more systems, it actually becomes more independent and more difficult to successfully resolve.

One final point is necessary. For a variety of reasons, one can question whether war is a distinct system or a subsystem of the political (or economic) system. Particularly, since Schmitt’s *The Concept of the Political*, the friend/enemy distinction has been considered to be the primary distinction of the political system, indicating that war is only a—albeit important—subset of politics (Bendersky 1983; Schmitt 1996; Mehring 2011). In this project, war is considered to be a parasitical system, it can form and influence the operations of every functional system—meaning that it is neither a sub-system of political, economic or any other functional system, nor an equally functional system. As such, it can disappear again, a feature that is practically unthinkable for a functional system (Viskovatoff 1999, 487). Moreover, without going too much into detail at this point (see chapter 3), it should be noted that within the framework of MST, politics as a functional system has been clearly defined and described by Luhmann. For him, the function of politics is to create “collectively binding decisions” (Luhmann 2000a, 86), which in terms are observed by other functional systems. The central
distinction within the political system is not between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, but between ‘government’ and ‘opposition’—and subsequently between the ‘powerful’ and ‘powerless’ (Kim 2014; Luhmann 1990a, 165–175; Thornhill 2007). For Luhmann, particularly important for the political system’s self-observation is public opinion, as it structures attention and selects issues (Luhmann 1990b, 206). In short, Luhmann does account for politics as an autopoietic system, which hence does not have an exceptional standing—as in the Schmittian case. This, however, points to the final question of this chapter: If other systems take the ‘backseat’ in a conflict and are unable to steer a war, how can a conflict be (permanently) terminated?

2.2.3 Termination of the War Systems

In light of the above considerations regarding both the ‘function’ of the war system and its position vis-à-vis other functional systems, the question on the termination of these kinds of systems, it becomes even more urgent to understand war recurrence. Unfortunately, Luhmann did not direct much attention to the termination of conflicts in his writings and his ideas are underdeveloped in this regard. However, he provided a fruitful starting point, when he remarked that “From the perspective of systems theory, we ask, not for ‘solutions’ or even a ‘good ending’ to conflict, but rather to what degree conflict can be conditioned” (emphasis in original, 1995b, 393). He continued by providing two such mechanisms for conditioning the conflict system, namely the restriction of means of warfare and by increasing insecurity within the conflict system. The idea of prohibiting the use of physical force during warfare rests on the assumption that it is superiors within conflict groups who have the ability to reject or accept communication, such as peace agreements. Accordingly, when the respective leaders agree on some sort of war termination, they end the conflict. Secondly, by including more parties in the conflict system (for instance, foreign interventions), the system is creating the opportunity for new structures to emerge, providing conflicting sides with the option to exit the conflict (by saving face,
forcing the conflict’s parties to the negotiating table, or altering the balance of power) (Luhmann 1995b, 394–97).

While the idea that conflicts can be conditioned is helpful, the two mechanisms proposed by Luhmann seem to be insufficient in my opinion. First of all, it is the logic of war to undermine stable expectations (see above) and create structures which enable the continuation of the war system in several regards. Not only does the war system create the structures for certain participants to actually desire the continuation of war (for subjective goals such as social prestige, economic benefit or fear of judicial prosecution), but it also undermines obedience to a leader’s acceptance of an agreement in the first place. Secondly, as I have shown in the previous chapter, foreign interventions have proven themselves to lead to contradictory results, often times actually prolonging the conflict, particularly if at least two foreign powers are intervening. It is the fundamental premise in MST that systems create their own elements internally while observing their environment externally; the environment—including other systems—cannot create the elements of the system under question. It is, therefore, a logical impossibility for one (or more) system to create the conditions for the termination of a war system.

There is one evident prospect, however unlikely and unfavorable, which provides the means for war termination. In order to explicate this mechanism, the ideas of operative closure and autopoietic operations need to be shortly revisited. The notion of operative closure implies that the environment cannot produce the operations (thoughts or communications) within the system; these can only be perceived as perturbations (e.g. irritations) but not as commands or causes (Luhmann 1997b, 220). In contrast, systems are autopoietic, meaning that the elements of a system are reproduced by the elements of the system themselves. This suggests that in order to ‘survive’, each autopoietic system needs to constantly produce elements in itself. Because such elements are extremely short-lived—without duration and vanish as soon as they come into being (Luhmann 1995b, 450)—a system disappears the moment its autopoiesis stops.
In other words, the moment events (actions and actors) observable to the war system cease to exist, the autopoiesis of the system is disrupted. This is in principle the main way through which a system stops operating, as other systems can only trigger processes, but does not change those already in place. Within the war system, this seems to be the case only when one side has achieved total domination or at least military victory over the other. Basically, wars end when there is no one left to shoot at anymore. The subordination conflict has achieved its goal, as the enemy was subjugated/eliminated through force. The normative undesirability of such an outcome is evident as it goes hand in hand with the physical destruction of the enemy.

Nevertheless, there is a second prospect for autopoietic processes to stop in a system, namely when the structures generated by the communication within the system produce their own decay. In other words, “It [a functional system] can continue to live, to produce conscious states or to communicate, or it can choose the only alternative: to come to an end” (Luhmann 1986b, 184). If each system creates the condition of its own demise, the war system should not be different. In other words, only war participants can decide when the enemy is not the enemy anymore and fighting should be ceased. Because of the unique operations of the war system, this does not mean that a war ends when the initial grievances (issues leading to the construction of enemy identities) have been addressed, as they are subject to change during the course of war. Moreover, this does not necessarily have to be some kind of inner awakening or peaceful movement within one group, but can come in the form of internal shock49, when one subsystem creates a surplus value by committing an act which forces the other conflicting parties to reconsider the entirety of the war. A ‘good’ example is the dropping of two atom bombs on Japan at the end of the Second World War, which caused the immediate surrender of the Imperial Japanese army and the termination of the war system. In general, widely captured atrocities, like the 1995 massacre of (mainly) Bosniaks in the city of Srebrenica, Bosnia, forced

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49 The third option would be the external shock. Possibly natural disasters or events perceived as catastrophes produced outside the war system can have the same effect, but will not be addressed subsequently. This is because they might be theoretically relevant, but cannot produce any political recommendations.
the conflicting parties through external pressure to the negotiation table and ultimately led to the termination of the war. Again, the idea of providing ends of war by committing atrocities is, for second-order observers, far from desirable. Moreover, while the convincing of the other by force might have stopped the conflict, it does not address the underlying ‘identity conflict’, as the other remains the other.

There are two additional prospects for war termination. As second-order observers, the goal for other systems is to irritate the war system to such an extent that the termination of hostilities is actually a feasible option; meaning that other functional systems offer the production of ‘social roles’ (see below) which makes it more preferable for individuals to leave the war system and ‘join’ other systems. At the same time, functional systems need to find a way of ‘stopping’ the support of their resources (e.g. political legitimacy, information, economic, moral, and legal support). This, however, is only conceivable in cases where the coupling between other functional systems and the war system has only been temporal and not become structural (Luhmann 1997b, 45). As Schneider remarks, the autopoiesis of a system “depends on its environment, which enables the system’s continuation and has to permanently require certain environmental conditions for the possibility of its operations. If these conditions are infringed upon, the autopoiesis of the concerning system will be limited” (2002, 354). Because of the dominant position ascribed above, the war system, once it is fully established, has the power to irritate the operations of other systems to such an extent that they become supportive of its own operations. If this dominant position has not been established yet, these systems, however, have the ability to constrain the war system.

There are two consequences following from this line of argument: firstly, the need to prevent the establishment of a dominant war system by facilitating the stopping mechanisms of other systems, and secondly, the idea of destroying the structures (i.e. communications) that create expectations on the construction of the ‘enemy’. The idea of stopping mechanisms within other systems is both straightforward and limited. In principle, each system hosts processes that
aim to prevent the establishment of a war system; all part of the society’s immune system. Particularly the judicial system comes to mind, which settles disputes in ways that are non-threatening to the system and the physical survival of individuals (Luhmann 1995b, 384). In the political system, both public opinion and political opposition can be vocal against a military campaign. Voices within industry, church, and media might also hinder the formation of the war system. In many ways, international law has served to delegitimize war and outlaw at least offensive wars, while morality has served to find (and limit) the conditions for just wars. However, the likelihood of success is limited and depending on an almost coordinated effort by functional systems to prevent the extraction of their resources. Laws and constitutional orders can be ignored, and industries can be established that offer the possibility of enriching themselves during the war. The war system can undermine the functioning of the media system by forcing it to select the transmission of information and catapult fractions into political power that have more to gain from the prolongation of war than its peaceful resolution.

As I have mentioned earlier, individuals feature only as psychic systems in Luhmann’s theory. This is not the whole truth and has been the reason for a bulk of criticism directed against his work (Greshoff 2008). For Luhmann, individuals are structurally (one might say even permanently) coupled complexes of a living system (reproduction of cells) and a psychical system, which operate on the basis of thoughts. These are two autopoietic systems, which constitute a person. Additionally, this person is the “social identification of a complex of expectations directed toward an individual human being” (Luhmann 1995b, 210). The social and the psychic systems are structurally adapted to each other, allowing for mutual irritations (a process called interpenetration). But more importantly, social systems would not be possible without psychic systems (and possibly the other way around as well). The social roles created by the war system are not only friends and enemies, but subsequently also combatants, civilians,

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50 Generally speaking, a person is unable to alter his or her reproduction of cells on the basis of thought, while cells are not able to alter the establishment of thoughts depending on their own operations. However, these two can cause irritations between each other.
victims, perpetrators, warlords and so on. In consequence, if the role of the enemy is not anymore created by the war system, the war system itself collapses.

Of course, as we know from social theory, an individual navigates concurrently between multiple social roles (Goffman 1997, 17; Mingers 2002, 233). For instance, for the political system, one can be a voter, a politician or the member of a social movement. For the science system, one is a scholar, a student, a teacher. The point is, that these roles are united in the individual at the same time and solemnly ascribe specific inhibitions on behavior (Luhmann 1991, 171). This is precisely the idea of the double contingency explored above. At the most fundamental level, it is the communication between persons that create roles and allow for the establishment of complex situations. If the problem of the conflict system is the reversal of the double contingency in the form of a negative, in which by communication common expectations are dissolved, then it is all the more important that other systems create structures which reverse the reversals of double contingency, and not enforce it. The enemy must become neither evil, nor part of the illegitimate opposition, nor a disrupter of information, nor unlawful, and so on. Strictly speaking, functional systems have to create the conditions for people wanting to communicate with other people and establish stable expectations again. Evidently, this implies the transgression from a subordination conflict to an identity conflict and issue conflict. We can understand this as the reversal of the conflict stage model, as communication centers again on issues not on identity (nor on enemy groupings). While the difficulty of such an approach is evident, it provides however the most favorable policy option for a conflict to become terminated and a stable peace to follow.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an explanation on war recurrence in the tradition of MST which supplements the theories introduced before (see chapter 1) in that it opens up the ‘black-box’ of war and highlights both the conflict stage model and the role of structural coupling between
the war system and its environment. Moreover, the theory accepts many fundamental premises and constructions of MST, while advancing the idea of conflict/war. The next chapter provides the methodological means of studying war recurrence. There, the question is how a war system actually looks like, and based on what data one can study it in line with the ontological and epistemological premises of Luhmannian systems theory. In contrast, this chapter has formulated a theory of war, which is able to capture the formation, processes, and termination of war on both social and temporal dimensions. The inclusion of the social and society has served to highlight the limited extent of influencing a war from the outside, the risks of unpredicted and undesirable consequences, and the need for an unassuming approach to conflict resolution. From a theoretical point of view, it has explained how difficult it is for wars to end and why it is easy for wars to recur. The remainder of this project is dedicated to illustrating these claims. Before this step, three concluding remarks in this section need to be made.

I have argued that MST provides the tools for addressing the workings of the war system and the recurrence thereof. Whilst the aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the above, it should be emphasized that Luhmann did not write about it specifically; in consequence, this is one possibility of introducing war into the workings of Luhmann. While I believe this to be the most convincing approach, it came about by basically questioning three premises of MST, namely the separation between modern societies and war, the hierarchy of functional systems, and also specific mechanisms of the conditioning conflicts. Once war has formed, it appears to structurally couple with other functional systems, in order to draw on their resources, alternate (if not undermine) their structures, and consequently, establish itself as the dominant system. However, in this conception, wars form out of rejections which are processes happening within specific functional systems and are, mostly, positive, frequent occurrences. Because of this duality between the destructiveness and the productive powers of war, finding the right balance to regulate them is an extremely difficult endeavor and prone to misjudgment and unexpected consequences.
Moreover, the overview covering the processes of war termination indicate the difficulty of actually finding (permanently) peaceful resolutions to a conflict. If one does not desire the end of a conflict to result in the destruction of the enemy—and one should keep in mind that it is necessary for some actors in the war system to localize a new enemy—nor in the use of even more appalling atrocities to stop their occurrence thereof, then the answer can only lie in a quasi-coordinated effort by other functional systems to stop the inflow of resources as well as provide viable alternatives for actors. Whilst the existent literature on war termination assumes the possibility for a political apparatus to engage with a war system and find solutions to facilitate its termination, this Luhmannian-inspired approach would point to the impossibility of such an understanding. After all, it is impossible to cause a change in the autopoietic processes by one system on the other. It is only thinkable to irritate the other system, but how this system will actually observe this irritation is completely unpredictable.

Finally, the considerations above lead to a refinement on the relationship between war and society, as the former is part of the latter, not external to it. A society in which a subjugation conflict has formed is prone to be structurally coupled to war, which supports the prolongation of the conflict while simultaneously hosting political declarations on the war’s end, without having the structural conditions for the cessation of hostilities. Because in this understanding of war the aspect of physical confrontation, struggle, and organized violence is actually absent, the continuation of war is possible without the continuous presence of fighting. In short, the necessary element that determines whether war has ended lies in the war system itself and the characteristics it exposes. Preventing the formation of this system is by all means more desirable and achievable than its termination.
3 STUDYING THE WAR SYSTEM

“Different systems construct their environment differently in the way they observe it. This means saying goodbye to the way the world ‘really’ is—instead we have different distinctions constructing the world, each in their own way and with no common denominator”—Knudsen (2011, 136)

In this project, I started with a research puzzle and argued for the lack of systematic research addressing the questions related to it. The previous chapter served as the theoretical framework that provided the lens to study the systematic processes of war—captured in the conceptualization of war as an autopoietic, (dys-)functional system. Internally operating according to the friend/enemy distinction, war couples temporarily and structurally with other systems in order to draw on their resources and limit their operations. The parasitical nature of war destabilizes expectations (i.e. the communicative structures of other systems) and consequently, decreases the complexity of societies. Furthermore, once wars—in the form of subordination conflicts—have established themselves, their peaceful resolution is severely limited and very costly. Systems evade regulation attempts from other systems, which is one of the reasons why political, religious or moral initiatives regularly fail in controlling conflict. Consequently, just because a political system (or even a scientific system51) proclaims the end of a war, it does not imply that this is reflected in the operations of the war system. To drive the point home, systems can only irritate each other, not steer and cause specific operations. Moreover, from the position of a second-order observer who is opposed to the formation and effects of war, it appears that the greatest room for influence is present before the war system has actually managed to form itself.

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51 Some examples thereof are the different scientific databases introduced in chapter 1 of this dissertation. The scientific system observes war recurrence from a distinct position rather than, for instance, the media system.
How does the war system effectively look like and when do wars recur? Based on chapter 2, we can reiterate the argument of this project (see figure 3.1): A subordination conflict that descends into an identity conflict is more likely to recur than a conflict that diminishes into an issue conflict. The extent and likelihood of this development is dependent on the type and amount of coupling, which in turn relies on the dynamics of the war system itself. Consequently, there are at least four manifestations that follow from this argument and conceptualization of the war system. First of all, the undermining of common expectations will be widespread: societies targeted by war are more likely to socially disintegrate and resemble a dangerous and unstable Hobbesian nightmare of all against all. This can take many forms, but in general, atrocities, such as mass killings, particularly of women, the elderly, and children, systematic rape, and torture are manifestations thereof. Secondly, the actual war waged will be outside of political control, social observation, and juridical regulation. In principle, a conflict draws on every resource available to it and tries to impose its own logic on other systems. This ‘imposing’ is understood in terms of stabilizing the couplings. The more stable and the greater the number of couplings, the more likely it will be that the conflict will recur and not descend from a subordination conflict to an issue conflict. For instance, it can take the form of an apparent loss of control or war which increasingly dictates the terms of other systems. A classic example of this process is the establishment of an economic system which relies on the continuation of war to continue its operations or the creation of a lawless space which is ruled by military tribunals. Even a political system that relies on the continuation of war is a case of this structural coupling.
Another expression is the occurrence of unintended effects, in which the attempt to resolve a conflict (like an international tribunal convicting a dictator) actually worsens it.

The establishment of the war system and the success of structural coupling are closely linked to two additional factors. Firstly, the number of enemies (and friends) should increase over time. This can happen in the sense that different (social) groups are targeted by military action or that more actors are encompassed in the alliance. At the same time, existent alliances experience fragmentation over time, as discontent over lack of success, different opinions regarding the strategies employed, increased costs of prolongation of the war, and other sources of discontent, like domestic constituencies, will increase. Indeed, possibly, new alliances will form or old allies will shift their position to become new enemies. Finally, for some war participants it can be more profitable to defy peace agreements negotiated by their commander and subsequently defect, effectively prolonging the confrontation. Evidently, a war which always produces new war parties is more difficult to terminate and has a higher propensity to return than one, in which a war party can be isolated by a coherent and lasting coalition of war actors. Secondly, wars intensify over time. This intensification can take various forms. On the one hand, more weapons and vehicles can be used to pressure the opponent into submission or more fighters sent in to engage in the hostilities; on the other hand, the range of targets can

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52 There is no mathematical equation here regarding how much time is enough. Rather, it indicates a general trend. The longer a war lasts the more likely is it that it will differentiate into several sub-systems.
increase, both by widening the territory affected and by allowing for the bombing of more people and buildings in the affected territory. However, intensification can take a linear (e.g. it intensifies proportionately over time) or nonlinear form (e.g. violence disperses). The latter form includes wars, in which the classical battlefront disappears and attacks can potentially happen everywhere at any time. This is accompanied usually with the widening of affected territory. For instance, the Chechen campaign by Russia resulted in a form of guerilla warfare, in which the attacks (against particularly the civilian population) were carried on inside Russia proper. By the ability to hide in the mountainous terrain and attack unexpectedly, it became all the more difficult for Russia to militarily defeat its enemies.

Table 3.1: Overview of Expectations of the War System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifestation</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) War sites revert to state of nature</td>
<td>Atrocities, human rights abuses, systematic killing of civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Parasitical impact of war system</td>
<td>Coupling of war from other systems, loss of control over war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Fragmentation of actors</td>
<td>More people affected by war. Weakening of alliance structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Intensification of war</td>
<td>Increase in use of weapons. Number of fighters increases. Expansion of territory affected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This account leads to a new set of questions centered on the possibility of actually studying wars (see table 3.1 for an overview). Can these manifestations be observed, and if so, how? What data can be used, particularly considering the radical constructivist ontologically of MST? And if we are able to obtain data, what methods are most useful for the purposes of the study? These questions are the other side to the answer of the research questions raised in this project. If so far I have concentrated on the theoretical engagement, I turn in this chapter to the methodological and empirical part of it. In short, I argue for the use of newspaper articles to illuminate the processes of the war systems. The method chosen for the study of these articles is a variation of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). Using the Nvivo software, I coded articles
published by selected newspaper sources on the four wars which I selected in the introduction, during their unfolding. In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on this approach.

### 3.1 Data on Wars

In order to conduct the case studies, I rely on newspaper articles published during the conflicts studied. From the perspective of MST, one can only observe how a system observes, that is, how it draws distinctions. Since these wars are past events, one can only observe how the observations of the war systems have been observed by other systems. At this point, we are at the level of third-order observations and the distance to the original phenomena becomes quite apparent. Accordingly, there are two ways to remain close to the war system, either by interviewing (or observing) war participants during war itself\(^53\) or by analyzing written statements and newspaper articles published during the war.\(^54\) With regard to conducting field research in war zones during actual hostilities, among others, the problems are “the threat of physical harm to the researcher, his or her team […]; variable (and unpredictable) access to field sites due to changing battlefield conditions; the twin dangers of social desirability bias and faulty memories that may creep into interview and survey responses” (Lyall 2015, 204).\(^55\) Additionally, it is practically impossible to observe the dynamics of a conflict based solemnly on interviews for the fundamental reason that the researcher would have to be in the war zone from the beginning until the end of it. Except for the actual participants, this is not possible for a scholar, as (s)he is still outside the system. In short, since I am interested in entire conflict

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\(^{53}\) This includes interviewing both combatants and non-combatants, conducting surveys (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Mironova, Mrie, and Whitt 2014), focus group research, ethnographic research, and even field experiments (Voors et al. 2012).

\(^{54}\) The goal is to understand how the media system observes the war while it occurs, not how it is reported on after it happened. As such, the articles serve as textual manifestations of these observations.

\(^{55}\) Even if I was able to immerse myself in a conflict and conduct interviews, I would only have access to those participants that allow me to attach myself to them. As a result, the kind of information I could access would be sectorial and not holistic.
The use of ethnographic data for war research should not be confused with a methodological negation thereof, but rather that for the purpose of MST this is not the most convincing source of information. Despite this, from a more pluralistic point of view, any kind of data that illuminates the phenomenon of war is, of course, useful in order to appropriate the object under scrutiny.

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It is possible to include additional media, like blog entries, into the analysis. However, newspapers in principle receive a wider readership and therefore contribute to a stronger extent to the creation of ‘reality’.
The idea is that basically every news outlet serves also a political purpose of twisting and changing the truth in favor of some sort of hidden power (Herman 1988; D’Alessio and Allen 2000; Watts et al. 1999; Iyengar and Hahn 2009). However, this line of criticism articulated usually from a neo-Marxist perspective can be turned on its head. If multiple realities do exist, observing the one expressed by these supposedly powerful is the best way to proceed as this is the one that is usually acted upon. In other words, it is the powerful who need to understand the world most closely in order to remain powerful (Kennard 2013). At the same time, including more newspaper sources will equally distort the object of study: increasing the range of newspaper sources will not get one closer to reality, as reality does not exist, and will only amplify the selection bias of the researcher. Selecting the NYT as the source of primary data collection gives the particular position of this media outlet but serves as a convincing database on which the workings of the war system can be illustrated. It should be also taken into consideration that newspapers do not preset one uniform position, but different opinions, expert statements, interpretations, etc.58 Portraying this complexity is already a demanding undertaking; comparing them with other mass media sources and analyzing the relationship thereof is both too complex and simply beside the point (Chari 2010).

However, the limitation in the selection of data sources becomes apparent for the two African wars in Liberia and Congo, as Western media outlets were noticeably silent on these wars (Okosun and Kibiswa 2013). Against the above formulated position, relying only on newspaper articles of the NYT proved insufficient as both wars were covered with a total of under 300 articles. In order to amend this lack of data, the pool of newspaper articles was expanded to cover the entire database of LexisNexis. This move implies a greater distance to the war itself and a greater influence of the researcher.59 In a second step, articles with a high

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58 This is not to deny that, of course, newspapers as a whole can be politically positioned and follow an editorial line.
59 To put it differently, due to the necessity of widening the data sources, the role of the researcher in interpreting the data becomes even more important. Because this is both undesirable and unavoidable for these case studies, the pool of data sources has been widened.
and moderate similarity were automatically removed, as they were considered duplicates. Because arguably newspapers do copy from each other or simply report the same article, these were a considerable number. In the third step, first automatically and then by hand, unrelated articles (false positives) were removed from the sample, so that only relevant articles could later be coded. This still produced a considerable number of newspaper articles that were later coded. The focus was, however, only on the information regarding the processes of the war system and not to problematize underlying framing or power issues, as is the case in a classical media analysis.\(^{60}\)

In the previous chapter I highlighted the paradoxical nature of time on the war system, namely that once a war system is established, it has already always been there. The reason for this seemingly illogical feature is that every system creates its own temporal reality next to the social one; consequently, every system has its own history, narratives, stories, poems and so on. In order to account for this dimension, a certain interplay of primary and secondary sources is necessary. Based on the available secondary sources on each conflict, I reconstruct the four conflict stages identified in the theoretical framework and test whether and to what extent these steps were present in the formation of the war system for the selected cases. Indeed, this choice separates the case studies into two blocks: on the one side the formation of the war system, which is based on secondary data, and on the other side the functioning of the system, for which primary sources are consulted. This means that the starting point of each conflict is simultaneously the date when primary sources are used. Moreover, as I have argued above, it should be noted that the inclusion of the conflict stages is vital in order to understand the processes during war, as wars do not form or operate in nothingness.

The second limitation of a methodological approach based on Luhmann’s writing refers to his rejection of causality. Accordingly, if we want to analyze change over time within specific

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\(^{60}\) The point of the empirical studies in this project is to illustrate the application of the theoretical framework, not to evaluate the reporting of war.
war systems, any type of process tracing cannot be used. Process tracing, in one way or the other, is a mechanism that reveals, tests, compares, and traces micro-causalities over a long duration of time (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Hall 2013; Mahoney 2012; Lyall 2015). The aim of process tracing is to shed light into the procedure of causality in order to see how processes have evolved and condition each subsequent event. As causality is here rejected due to the over-determined nature of reality, the only thing that can be aimed at is a sequencing of events and the subscription of causality by second-order observers. This presupposes the possibility of identifying certain events, actions, and actors over time and ordering them according to their occurrence—in order words, a temporal order. As all four manifestations emphasize the dynamic nature of war (indicated by words such as ‘increase’, ‘rise’, ‘decrease’, ‘diminish’, etc.), this approach is the only feasible option to study the workings of the war system without subscribing to a limited understanding of causality. To stress the point made above, this does not imply that second-order observers negate the causality assumptions, but rather that within the scope of third-order observation, only the causality assumption of others can be observed; it is possible to observe how systems assign blame and responsibility, but that does not mean that this allocation has to correspond to reality.

3.2 Method to Study the War System

The choice and limitations of data sources still leaves open the question of how this data is used to study the war system. With the help of the software NVivo, the newspaper articles which have been collected from the database LexisNexis are coded with a method called Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). As Mayring reminds us, “The goal of content analysis is the systematic examination of communicative material” (2004, 266). This does not imply, as in content analysis, that only the occurrence of specific words are counted and inferences are

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61 The newspaper articles are selected by the use of certain key words. These keywords are dependent on each specific case and are introduced in each respective chapter.
drawn based on this, but that based on clear criteria the material is coded in order to reduce its breadth while maintaining the information contained in it. Based on such a strict understanding of content analysis (Cavanagh 1997), different strands are included, namely conventional, directed, and summative (Hsieh 2005). For the purpose of this study, directed content analysis is applied, meaning that the newspapers are coded in relation to the manifestations of the war system outlined above.

3.2.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

On the range of textual analytical tools, this variant of content analysis lies between classical content analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA). Classical content analysis regards the presence of certain indicators in texts and rests on the assumption that the frequency of certain words used tells us something about the object we study. Summarized by Stemler, “Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (2001, 137). The great advantage is that it enables a reduction of information through techniques which are both replicable and reliable, if constructed correctly. This form of CA is often computer-assisted and allows for the fast analysis of huge amounts of data. Not only can it show how frequent certain actors or actions are present in the text being studied, but it is also a viable method of identifying these actors/actions in the first place. Bearing in mind that only the reality constructed by the media system is of interest in this project, attention will be paid only to actors that are present in the media system (i.e. are written about).

However, the problem with counting words is that it can only take us so far. Proponents of CA understand this very well and advocate the combined use of their technique with others.

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62 In the conventional content analysis the coding categories are directly based on the coded text and derived from it. In the directed variant, the coding scheme is oriented on an already elaborated theory. Finally, the summative content analysis consists of the comparison and counting of certain keywords together with an interpretation thereof.
(G. Shapiro and Markoff 1997). If one takes the example of actors in the war system, it becomes quite evident that while their identification might be straightforward, their relationship is much more difficult to trace. For the purposes of this study, the relationship between actors can be positive, negative or neutral. But what does it mean for a relationship to be positive? How can we identify a positive relationship? Clearly, in order to extrapolate this from the text, the context has to be included in a manner that informs but does not limit our understanding. At the same time, we need to move away from looking at text as an object independent from us to be studied, and start seeing it as a source to be interpreted by the researcher and only understood through the researchers’ perception; in the Luhmannian terminology, text should be treated as a second-order observation of the operations of another system (which itself observes as a second-order observer the operations of another system). Whereas the ascription to the relationship status between actors can still be rather straightforward, the relationship between the war system and other functional systems is less so. What manifestations belong to the political, economic, judicial or media system, on which levels do they operate, and how are they affected by the war system? In order to address these questions, the methodology of CA needs to be opened up for interpretation.

The ‘first’ choice of method that is capable of doing so is discourse analysis (DA). It is true that in many ways, DA lacks the systemic procedure, which so much underlies content analysis (Fairclough 2003; Li 2009; Schwab-Trapp 2002). It allows us, nevertheless, to answer some vital questions in the present research. Indeed, there are different kinds of discourse analysis, and delimiting them proves already to be a complicated task. It is among the core assumptions that “facts are never neutral and are always embedded in contexts” (Rogers et al. 2005, 368). These contexts are embedded in history, represent power structures which construct some kind of domination of ideas and are reinforced by discourse. It is therefore the role of the

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63 To be very brief, positive relationships are when actors support each other or fight together. Negative relationships are those in which this is reversed. The neutral relationship lies between indifference and a not clearly observable/definable relationship.
analyst to deconstruct these ideas by placing discourses, or in this case newspaper articles, into the context of societal practices. This method allows us to answer questions regarding actors, how they are portrayed and how they interact. Moreover, it allows us to interpret texts or other sources based on what is being said as well as what is not being said, the silenced part of the discourse. One possibility to understand it lies in the comparison to content analysis: while CA deals with reducing the amount of information by assigning text to categories, DA increases complexity, by adding context to text. This method, however, does not fit the purpose of this study. To reiterate, the goal of this project is not to deconstruct power relations within mass media representations, but to demonstrate the functioning of the war system based on media information. Consequently, for the empirical investigation of this project, both CA and DA are inappropriate.

In contrast to these two approaches, QCA is situated in-between both methods, as it acknowledges the need to contextualize the text and create categories that are open to interpretation (Schreier 2012). The attribute of qualitative highlights the move away from word frequency studies that are more closely related to quantitative methods and establishes this method firmly at the intersection of both (Prior 2014, 370). Accordingly, the emphasis of the study moves beyond interpreting word frequency, while at the same time not adding information that is not observable. A clear, convincing, and transparent definition of the core concepts are necessary in order to provide a study that is replicable and provides a solid basis for future discussions (Elo and Kyngäs 2008). Like in any kind of operationalization, it is necessary to identify the core concepts of the theory and address how they relate to each other, and consequently make the process of interpretation as transparent as possible (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 26). Before I establish the representations of the political, media, judicial, and economic system, it should be noted that the units of analysis are not words or grammatical structures, but sentences (either single or multiple) and dependent on the content
of whether they are coded or not. This limitation is necessary for this project; other uses of this method have focused not only on statements, but even videos and images.

In order to minimize my possible biases, I have coded the material at two different time periods and selectively checked the coding with a second researcher. Different levels of codes have been used. First of all, whenever an article mentioned that a war party has increased its use of bombs, directed more troops to fight, broadened its range of targets to include both more facilities as well as a wide geographical area, new actors have been included, or likewise, the coding noted as an *intensification of war*. For example, in the case of the Kosovo war, the intensification of war has been identified in sentences like: “Although there were no detailed accounts of target destruction in the latest bombing run, the Pentagon said that the list of targets was broadened today but that air and missile strikes continued to focus on air-defense systems” (Clines 1999). Another instance concerns the deregulation of how combatants engage in the war in order to increase the destruction they can cause: “NATO planes also are no longer restricted to operating at 15,000 feet. Some pilots have the flexibility to fly considerably lower, particularly to identify targets” (Gordon 1999). Consequently, it is not only important that the numbers of fighters, targets, and area bombarded increases, but also how the conduct of the forces is restrained (or not) and what actions they are capable of carrying out. In this dimension, it is expected that the recurrent wars (e.g. Chechnya and Congo) experience ebbs and flows of warfare, which escape decisive military outcomes.

Moreover, actors have been identified and their relations coded. These relationships can take different forms, namely whether they criticize, support, fight against each other or emphasize the need to work together. Friends and enemies are, of course, composite groups, meaning that they interact both with other composite groups, as well as have contending voices within each. Based on this coding, the *relationships between and within actors* are captured over the duration of each war. This is particularly important as it is assumed in line with the tenets of the theoretical framework that actors have a tendency to fragment into smaller units.
Therefore, studying the friend/enemy groupings can only make sense if the temporal dimension is included in the study and analysis of the data. This inclusion is achieved by comparing different time periods (which are themselves presented as amalgamated units). These units are established based on the frequency of articles over time, as well as their general position in the conflict; in other words, at least three time points are established to indicate the beginning, middle, and ending of the war and trace the relationship of actors in each conflict. Similar to the first expected manifestation of the war system, it is assumed that the level of fragmentation of these actors will only increase; meaning that not only the initial conflict groups will separate into various dyads, but also that composite groups will be continuously replaced by smaller units. At the same time, it is expected that wars that had a more stable peace (e.g. Liberia and Kosovo) have an observable isolation of a war group.

### 3.2.2 Concept Operationalization

While it is a relatively straightforward task to identify textual representations of the third and fourth manifestations of the war system, the first two manifestations are much more difficult to trace. The second manifestation regards the *relationship between the war system and functional systems*, particularly the media, economic, judicial, and political one. As was mentioned earlier, Luhmann does not provide a list of all functional systems that are present in the society. Accordingly, the limitation to only four functional systems comes at the expense of the exclusion of others, such as moral, health, love, and religion—all of which would also be interesting subjects for future study. What follows now is a short introduction of the four systems that were chosen, why they are important, as well as examples on their manifestation in newspaper articles. This overview serves only as an illustration, since the complexity of each

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64 This does not mean that the cleavages within groups were not present before, but rather that the costs for maintaining group cohesion had become unbearable.
system lies outside the scope of this project. Together with the empirical case studies in the succeeding chapters, the method should become fully comprehensible.

As was mentioned, the media system holds a particular important position in Luhmann’s writings, as it establishes the fundamental basis with the help of which other systems observe their reality. In short, the media system is a functionally differentiated subsystem of the modern world society. The code on the basis of which the media system differentiates is the distinction between information/non-information. Therefore, the system is capable of ascribing what is interesting and deserves further reporting and what is not—which does not mean that things which are considered non-information cannot be interesting as well (Luhmann 2000b, 22). This requires media systems to have programs which help it decide what is considered to be informative and what is not. Consequently, the media system creates structures that enable it to perceive its own success or lack thereof, pre-determine what and how something is reported, and in what form this information is generated. Subsequently, it is in need to produce new information as soon as it creates information (because the moment something becomes information, repeating it turns it into non-information). While Luhmann dedicates his efforts to identifying the subsystem-specific programs of the media system, like for news, advertising, and entertainment (Luhmann 2000b, 29), the question for this project is rather how the war system undermines the operation of the media system and how the couplings between the systems look like.

The parasitical impact of the war system can be either structural coupling in the form of establishing the media system as a new frontier of warfare or the destruction and production of the means to communicate. These two aspects are closely interrelated as is apparent when presenting the forms their interactions can take. By limiting the access of (foreign) journalists to war zones, destroying television towers, closing down, and raiding newspaper offices—which report particularly and critically on the war itself—, embedding journalists with combat troops or blocking access to internet sites, not only is the dissemination of information disturbed
but the program with which the media system operates becomes dominated by the war system. For instance, the NYT noted that “An eyewitness in Grozny, the Chechen capital, said two evening waves of air strikes by two jets had destroyed a television tower” (*The New York Times* 1999); but also that “Since the bombing began last week, Russian television stations have shown film of burning factories and damage at Grozny airport, but no pictures of the civilian casualties reported by Chechen authorities” (Bohlen 1999). Indeed, if the media system becomes dominated by the war system, its operations prolong the conflict and enable the persistence of war; basically reversing the code from information/non-information to knowledge (i.e. the enemy is evil, it must be destroyed) that only supports the continuation of war.

The economic system is of particular importance in MST, as its reference problem concerns the scarcity of goods—i.e. goods are present only to a limited extent (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 2011, 209). It is the system-specific paradox that by accessing goods in order to dispose of the scarcity of those goods, the scarcity of the goods is created in the first place. In other words, if Ego has access to a scarce good, Alter does not. At the level of society, by reducing scarcity, scarcity is produced. However, by observing the environment according to the code of have/have not, the possibility of trade and circulation of goods is created. Through the introduction of the evolutionary accomplishment of the medium of money, the operation of the economic system has become revolutionized, as trade is facilitated manifold (Luhmann 1984, 308). Independently of actual physical objects, money itself becomes a commodity that can be traded. Operations become facilitated and the central concern is only about whether something or something else will present itself as profitable or not. The main regulatory measure of the economic system becomes decoupled from other systems (notably the political one) and manifests itself in the market or—more concretely—the price. Within the realm of the market, the economic system observes its environment on the basis of the monetary value of an event (product/action/actor). By the establishment of a price, it becomes possible to adjust the
product to a highly dynamic environment and guarantee the continuation of production processes—every payment of a service allows the future payment of a subsequent service.

The structural coupling of war with the economy allows for the redirection of the economic system towards what is commonly called a war economy. First and foremost, wars cost money and both states as well as insurgency and rebel movements have to finance their activities. This can come about through the rerouting of the economy to produce war material, the investment of money to buy weapons and troops, the use of diaspora funds to fund group activities, the establishment of a shadow economy which relies on the trade of valuable raw material, the kidnapping of individuals, the narcotic trade or human trafficking. For instance, wars lead to the physical destruction of private businesses, as one article recalls: “Nearby a long, low building that had housed private businesses—a car repair shop and a plastics production laboratory—smoldered” (Gall 1999). At the same time, “A good deal of the money that came to the rebel army was from the Albanian diaspora, mostly in Europe, as well as fundraisers from London to New York” (Bonner 1999). The war system impacts the economic system in a way that certain possibilities should be denied in favor of economic businesses that profit from the war.

The judicial system is also vital, as it serves the function of regulating conflicts within the world society in a non-violent way and provides means to profit from contradictory communication. Based on the primary code of lawful/unlawful, it observes its environment and helps to resolve conflict once it is established (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2007, 54). As such, it operates much more on the temporal dimension, as it creates stable expectations on future behavior; as it limits the scope of what can be anticipated in the future. The program on which the law system operates encompasses procedures that help it decide how to rule in specific cases and whether a particular instance is something new and requires an alteration to the body of law, or a recurrent theme that can be delegated to an already established body. Simultaneously, the paradox of this system rests on the fact that the basis of its decision rests
in positive law, not on some natural one (M. King and Thornhill 2003, 39). In other words, the central question herein refers to the rights according to which the judicial system is able to establish who is right and who is not. However, this paradox allows the system to remain adaptable and flexible to its environment and fulfill its function of ‘normalizing’ behavior (Luhmann 1995a). Because what is ruled as right is not necessarily something perceived as justice, every decision creates the basis for advancing the cannon of law (i.e. based on these rulings, further procedures are established) or changing it (i.e. revising a certain decision).

It is well-known that the regulation of war by the legal system does not stop once a war is established. In fact, the whole cannon of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* documents attempts by the legal system to regulate the workings of war and order the extent of violence (Osiel 1998; Kolb 1997). To put it differently, the war system creates the expectations for future behavior: if you know that certain acts will not be committed by the enemy, you are more likely not to commit them either. This is basically a re-statement of the mechanism of double contingency (see chapter 2). The operation of the law system is, subsequently, a prime example of the presence of stopping mechanisms of one system over the establishment of the war system. At the same time, it creates the basis for certain actions of the conflict itself. By establishing who the enemy is (‘bandits’, ‘criminals’, ‘rebels’), how it operates in an atmosphere of ‘lawlessness’ and violates human rights, whether the enemy ignores weapons conventions or undermines international regulations and orders, defies international criminal courts or violates the UN charter, central categories of the law system are being questioned and undermined. At the same time, the establishment of a new constitution and the institutionalization of a new judicial system in the respective territory helps to document the manifestation of a war-created law system.

Finally, the political system needs to be shortly addressed. As was mentioned in chapter 2, the function of the political system is the production of collectively-binding decisions, which can be enforced via the medium of power (Luhmann 2000a, 85; Albert 2002; Guzzini 2005;
Willke 2007). Accordingly, the distinction of power (powerful/not-powerful) and of the politics (inferior/superior) develop simultaneously and condition each other. The realization of power and superiority manifests itself in the development of governmental offices and is expressed in the distinction between government and opposition. This distinction constitutes the democratic form of government; the lack of opposition equals the lack of democracy and limits the operation of the political system. For Luhmann, the political system is much more regulatory, as it cannot determine the operations within other autopoietic systems. However, “The political system’s application of power is likely to have the effect of maintaining the conditions of systemic differentiation and of preserving the integrity of distinct systems” (M. King and Thornhill 2003, 71). It should be noted that the political is not equated to the state, even though there is considerable overlap there. The state can more correctly be understood as an organization that operates within the political and which enables the realization of a specific form of democracy (Stichweh 2007). Via the program of votes, it serves as the basis of legitimizing power, on whose behalf decisions are made (and thus resolving the paradox of the political, in which people have to be both ruler and ruled (Esmark 2004, 132). This implies, however, that there are other organizations within the political, like non-governmental organizations, IOs, or social movements, that do not directly produce collectively-binding decisions (Thomas 2004, 74).

The political system is differentiated into politics, administration, and the public, which stand in a circular and interdependent relationship to each other. It is in the form of public opinion (substituting the masses) that politics is observed and observes itself (Moeller 2006, 76). To understand the impact of the war system on the political, several aspects have to be taken into consideration. How does the war affect the functioning of political organizations and the programs with which political power is legitimated? Do political decisions, which also include the establishment of international bodies, become stabilized or not in the presence of war? How do political units change their relation towards each other due to the war? But also,
how does the war become observed by the public and which pressures unfold on the political system due to that? This becomes all the more important if we consider that the political system has the ability to exert influence through political pressures and power over stopping the formation of war (allocation of political power); simultaneously, it is the political system that usually calls for the peaceful resolution of a conflict (regardless of whether war participants are either aware of or in agreement with it).

What should be evident by now is that functional systems do not operate at a specific level (domestic, regional, international), but are principally global and manifest themselves to concrete settings. There is one political system that is present in different forms on multiple levels while simultaneously other systems do not have to mirror this internal differentiation. Consequently, the impact of the war system is analyzed in terms of its impact on the political, judicial, media, and economic system, and not on the local variant of it. Evidently, the economic system in Liberia is affected by a war happening there; but this does not mean that the war does not impact globally as well. The same applies to the other systems, marking this approach as both multi-level, multi-dimensional and highly dynamic.

Finally, the first manifestation of the war system needs to be addressed. What is designated as the dissolution of the social fabric is the phenomena of the process of negative double contingency. Stable expectations and conditionings of future behavior are dissolved, and actions that would otherwise become unthinkable become the normal state of affairs. In Luhmann´s theoretical complex, society is a special case of a social system, as it encompasses all communication, and serves the principle function of reducing complexity. Through the process of differentiation (e.g. segmentary, stratificatory, functionally), the range of selection is limited, which is the precondition for establishing connections and enabling action in the first place. Conversely, wars increase complexity, dissolve stable expectations, and almost literally make everything possible. Indeed, “If everything possible should be expected all the time, it would be difficult to do anything” (Knudsen 2011, 129). Society needs physical systems that
communicate within it. Equally, if people are subject to almost arbitrary violence, any kind of interaction becomes almost impossible. In other words, the structures created in other systems count little, if the threat of death looms and becomes increasingly possible.

In the newspaper articles, I have coded instances of mass killings, torture, rape, and other atrocities as such indicators for the dissolution of the social fabric. The reasoning is threefold. First of all, as indicated above, stable expectations are only possible if physical survival can be guaranteed. There is simply no time or reason for somebody to orient the behavior on laws in a violent environment. In a nutshell, if events such as mass killings occur, one can safely assume that the social relationship of this community has dissolved. Secondly, it is possible to argue that the recourse to violence occurs in such settings in which other means of resolving conflicts are not available anymore. The failure of other systems to provide stable expectations on the behavior of individuals comes at the price that both cooperation and conflict become equally likely; meaning that a situation like the security dilemma arises: because there is insecurity how the other will react, one preempts the worst outcome by behaving aggressively. This is expressed in violence against the other, the enemy, which includes everyone who is not the friend. Finally, one can argue that the subjugation conflict is about destroying the enemy and consequently eliminating its ability to communicate itself or—more basically—silencing the enemy (Dammann 2003, 304). In this sense, the use of these kinds of violence is the most basic form of restructuring society that the war system has to offer.

3.3 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to complement the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 by providing methodical guidelines for conducting case studies based on the conceptualization of war as a system. In the considerations above, I have argued that war systems manifest themselves in a specific form throughout four dimensions, which are (I) the impact on society as such, (II) the relationship between war and other functional systems, (III)
the relationship between war actors, and finally (IV) the contraction/expansion of the war system in terms of violence. Through the recourse to newspaper articles as primary data and QCA as method, these manifestations are investigated in four specific cases. It should be noted that it is hypothesized that the war system can develop in two different directions, towards structural or temporal couplings, which in turn impacts on the likelihood of it reverting back to an identity or issue conflict. In short, whilst in any case it is destructive upon the subjected society and internal differentiation and couplings occur, the form can be different. This is expressed in the last two manifestations, the intensification of war and fragmentation of actors. However, these are empirical observations and not theoretical determinations. What is needed, in other words, is the empirical illustration of the theoretical arguments made above.

Finally, Luhmann himself offers little guidance on how to actually use his highly complex theory to guide empirical research⁶⁵ (Luhmann 1997a; Besio and Pronzini 2008; Leydesdorff 2010; Nassehi and Saake 2002). His interest was in articulating a universal theory on society, and not the devices for studying causal relationship within clearly articulated hypotheses. There have been very rare attempts to articulate a methodology based on Luhmann’s writings, such as the functional method (Knudsen 2011), a variety of discursive analytical strategies (Andersen 2003), or even the ‘functional’ iconographical analysis of currency (Roth 2014). These approaches either concentrate on the functional analysis of systems (i.e. to what problems do these systems offer solutions? What problems are created by the offered solutions?) or assist in deconstructing societal structures; for this reason, they are discarded in favor of an approach that highlights higher order observations. The route taken here concentrates on unmasking the dynamics of war by trying to make visible how other systems observe the war system, while taking into consideration that the researcher is also part of the societal system. The central concept, consequently, employed in this method is that of

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⁶⁵ He conducted what can be called macro-level historical case studies on the establishment of specific systems (Luhmann 1986a, 17), which centered on the formation of a system and not so much on the actual operations thereof.
observation within a functional system (Ahlemeyer 1997); in other words, how a system of meaning creates meaning.

Through the means elaborated above (QCA), and based on primary data composed of newspaper articles, the manifestations and developments of the war system are traced in the next chapters on four war systems: the Kosovo war (1999), the Second Russo-Chechen War (1999-2009), the Liberian War (1999-2003) and the Second Congolese War (1998-2003). The goal is, however, not to primarily produce new empirical data, but rather to illustrate the applicability of the theoretical framework that has been articulated in chapter 2. As I expand upon in the final chapter of this project, the need for more empirical testing is a task for future research.
4 The Kosovo Conflict (1999)

"Concerns that many had about the first month of independence […] have proven unfounded. Nor has there been widespread destabilizing violence" – International Crisis Group (2008)

War did not recur in Kosovo. Since the end of the Kosovo War on June 11, 1999, systematic violence has been absent in the now sovereign republic (Kosovo adopted the Declaration of Independence on February 17, 2008). Although domestic violence against women and harm against minorities, particularly in the north, is still rampant (Human Rights Watch 2004; The Economist 2013; UNDP 2015), the return to warlike conditions has been averted so far. This is surprising, considering that “The unemployment rate, one of the highest in the world, and other economic problems contribute to the collapse of state structures. Social issues are also in disastrous shape” (Hebda 2014, 215). Accordingly, not only are the socio-economic conditions conducive for the return of war, there is widespread consensus that the project of state-building in Kosovo has been a failure (Papadimitriou, Petrov, and Greicëvci 2007; Borgh 2012; P. D. Miller 2013; Capussela 2015); and no monopoly of violence in the newly formed state has been established. This lack of statehood is expressed in conflicts “from direct inter-ethnic intimidation and assaults to more indirect forms of intimidation and pressure, such as property-related crime, vandalism and theft” (CDA Collaborative 2006, 3). The most pervasive explanation for the absence of a new war is in the presence of international peacekeepers—United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)—and the success of particular strategies in collaboration with non-governmental, international, and supranational organizations (Simonsen 2004; Choedon 2010). Whilst this explanation highlights the external factors in the post-war environment, it underplays the significance of the impact the war itself had on Kosovo’s society—nor can it in itself account for other cases (see chapter 6) in which peacekeepers were present but war returned.

In this chapter, I supplement the existing explanation with a systems theoretical account of war recurrence. As I demonstrate, the dynamics of the war system contributed at least
threefold to the stable peace to follow. In short, coupling between the systems did not manage to become structural, but led to the termination of operations of functional systems. To put it differently, the operations of functional systems did not become dependent on the continuation of war (see chapter 5 for the reverse); as all functional systems broke down, the autonomy of the war system was undermined and its termination became possible. Two manifestations of the war system aided this development. First of all, the fragmentation of war groups resulted in the isolation of the Milošević regime, with the prerequisite to remove him from power in order to conclude the war; and second, the war intensified in a linear way. From all sides, the war moved towards a decisive battle—even if it was ultimately concluded at the negotiation table. The result was the establishment of new functional systems, whose operations and legitimacy depended on the absence of war. Finally, because of these developments, the subordination conflict scaled down to issue conflicts, as the operations of each functional system replaced the war system.

Furthermore, in the Kosovo war, the progression of the conflict stages as outlined in chapter 2 can be detected: one can identify the stage of issue conflicts (from 1966 till mid-1989), identity conflict (from February 1989 till 1997), and then the following subordination conflict (starting in 1997 and ending with the conclusion of Operation Allied Force (OAF) in June 1999). Naturally, in order to understand how the conflict distinguished itself, it is important to take the historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts into account; otherwise the danger of overly-simplistic accounts and explanations of the subsequent events can lead to misleading policy implications. For instance, one can easily lay the blame for the war on the ultra-nationalist policies of Slobodan Milošević, compare him to Hitler and evoke Munich as the historical example why outside military intervention was needed. Equally, one can blame the operations of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as provoking a military response from the Serbian government and thus escalating the crisis into a full-fledged war. Similarly, the motives of the US facilitating—under an American presidency facing
impeachment—a military campaign supposedly waged to protect the civilian population in Kosovo, can be reasonably questioned. These examples only demonstrate the difficulties of untangling the historical events without playing the blame game. Moreover, they show that the actors in this conflict are not constrained to the domestic level but include international ones like the US, NATO, Russia, and even Albania.

4.1 The Historical Roots of the Conflict: A Pendulum of Domination

Serbians and Albanians have clung to their past to justify their claims to Kosovo. Indeed, Guzina observes that “At the heart of these disputes is the question of identity” (2003, 30), while Judah notes that “For as long as anyone can remember, the history of Kosovo has been a battlefield pitting Serbs against Albanians” (2008, 30). Therefore, the Serbian and Albanian perspective of the conflict needs to be included into the analysis of the war, which has been described as “cycles of revenge” (Judah 1999, 6) or as a “pendulum of domination” (Nikolic 2003, 55). Kosovo has been marked by the succession of Serbian and Albanian rule over each other, legitimized by their respective interpretations of their pasts. Consequently, it is necessary to look beyond facts and to analyze how these have let to myths, narratives, and stories of and for each group (Mertus 1999, 3; Moore 2011, 15).

Both sides claim to be the first occupants of Kosovo. From the Serbian perspective, the starting point is the arrival of the Slavs in Europe, dating back to the fourth century A.D. Of the three Slavic groups, one settled in the Balkans, in the area of Kosovo. As Vickers puts it, “The Serbs are convinced that, prior to their arrival in the region during the sixth and seventh centuries, Kosovo was virtually uninhabited, and that the Albanians only arrived in the region in the fifteenth century together with the conquering Turks” (2000, 97). However, it was not until the twelfth century that Kosovo was incorporated into the Serbian medieval empire as the spiritual nucleus of all Serbs, becoming plastered with Orthodox churches and monasteries in an effort to develop a national identity (Judah 1999, 6). With the Ottoman expansion, Serbia
was fragmented, with much of its territory falling under Turkish domination. An important date is June 28, 1389, and the Battle of Polje, in which the armies of the Ottoman Empire and the Serbian state clashed. Under the leadership of Lazar Hrebeljanović, Serbia united to fight against the Ottoman Empire. According to legend, the Serbs fought bravely, but lost against an overwhelming force, contributing to the folklore of Kosovo ‘lost’. While this interpretation had nothing to do with the actual historical facts, it implanted an indispensable factor in the Serbian national identity (Moore 2011, 36).

Serbia fell and came under Ottoman rule for about 500 years. The imposed system favored the Muslim population, leading to an exodus of ethnic Serbs, while contributing to an influx of Albanians. Under Ottoman rule, only Muslims were allowed to rise to higher positions, which explains the systematic favoring of the predominantly Muslim Albanian community (Judah 2000, 11). With the Balkan Wars starting in 1912, a new Serbia was formed, which dispelled the Ottoman powers from the region and established Serbian domination. Kosovo was a significant area in this struggle for independence and the legend of Lazar was often invoked (Emmert 1990, 133). The incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia resulted in the expulsion of Albanians, who had fought with the Turkish occupants of the country. Since the Balkan Wars, the possession of Kosovo changed hands in quick succession. In 1915, the Serbian army was pushed out of Kosovo as punishment for the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. At the end of the First World War, Serbia emerged to retake the land, only to be driven out by Italian-ruled Greater Albania from 1941 onwards. Indeed, Greater Albania tried to cleanse Kosovo of its Serbian inhabitants, in its effort to “exterminate the Slavs” (Judah 1999, 8). After two World Wars, each favoring the Kosovo Albanian majority, Kosovo was integrated in the newly formed Yugoslavia under the rule of Marshal Tito.

Albanians stressed their ethnic and cultural ties to the early Illyrians and the establishment of a medieval Albania before the creation of Serbia in the twelfth century (Juka 1984; Rogel 2003, 169). They lived in a peaceful state before being subjugated by Serbian rule
The Ottoman Empire was felt as relief, allowing Albanians relative peacefulness, protection by the Turkish authorities, and the possibility to reclaim the land which had been wrongly taken from them. This did not mean that the Serbian aspirations for Kosovo were stilled. Indeed, “according to Albanian historians, Serbian plans for an expansionist policy toward Albanian lands were outlined in the manifesto programme of Ilija Garašanin, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia and one of the most outstanding Serbian officials in the nineteenth century, known by the name ‘Načertanija’” (Daskalovski 2003, 16). Serbia aimed at occupying other’s territories and to denationalize, assimilate, and expatriate other people, particularly Kosovars. The Balkan Wars brought with it the possibility of realizing the policies coming out of Načertanija’, as Serbian forces occupied Kosovo and promoted the Serbianization of the region.

In Tito’s Yugoslavia, the situation for the Albanians did not improve. Albanians were terrorized by Serbs, forcing many of them to flee the country. Kosovo was not allowed to join Albania, despite the wishes of the majority of people living there. “The first two decades of Communist rule were particularly harsh, and the dominance of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Party and State apparatus meant that Albanians there still had very much a second-class position” (Malcolm 1999, 314). Instead, Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, signed an agreement for the expatriation of Kosovo Albanians—Kosovars—to Turkey, which lead to an exodus of more than 400,000 Albanians. During the period of 1953-1966, Ranković was head of the secret police. Under his brutal reign, Kosovars were harassed on a daily basis as acts of violence and terror were carried out by his secret police. In 1966, Ranković and his associates were removed due to “inter-party squaring of accounts” (Vickers 1998, 163), allowing Tito to push for the further de-centralization of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1999, 324).
4.2 Stages of the Kosovo Conflict

Both sides declared themselves firstcomers and victims. Feeding their narratives with a mystified version of the past, both sides conducted atrocities in the name of protection—protecting their identity, their bodies, and their land. Historical events became exploited or instrumentalized in order to legitimize future policies, like the Battle of Kosovo, in which the Albanian population fought together (and against) the Serbs.

4.2.1 The Issue Conflict(s): Education, Politics, Demography of Kosovo

The period of issue conflicts lasted from 1966 to 1981. In 1963, Kosovo’s status had already changed from a region to an autonomous province (Arhsien and Howells 1981, 423). It is important to understand the basic set-up of Tito’s Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics and two autonomous regions. Kosovo was not given the right to become a republic in the Yugoslav constitution since republics had the right to secede. Although this right was a formality and not envisioned to be invoked, in the Kosovo case, the Albanians constituted the largest minority in the region, who had previously resisted being incorporated into Yugoslavia in 1912, 1918, and 1944 and had stated the goal of being united with Albania (Judah 1999, 8). Kosovo was projected as a ‘bridge-builder’ between Yugoslavia and Albania. In 1971 constitutional amendments were passed, which gave Kosovo greater autonomy. In 1974, the expansion of autonomy was followed by the establishment of a constitution, which gave the region economic, cultural, social, and political independence. In 1980, even in the legal sphere, independence from the Serbian system was achieved. However, all of these efforts stopped short of giving Kosovo the status of a republic, the stated goal of many Kosovars. These events were accompanied by widespread protests from the Albanians towards greater autonomy and the forming of an Albanian republic within Yugoslavia, as well as there being sporadic outbreaks of violence. In contrast to this, Serbian nationalists felt threatened in their position in Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to their access to Kosovo (Vickers 1998, 170).
In this period, political debate and resistance centered on concrete issues that helped solidify the two different identities for later conflict. The first issue regarded education. Protests in the 1960s gave Kosovars the right to have independent research facilities in the Albanian language (Judah 2000, 37–38). In 1969, the University of Pristina was created, which emancipated itself from the University in Belgrade. Courses were offered in Albanian and Turkish, allowing and facilitating the development of free expression, cultural ties, and Albanian literature. After an agreement was made with the University of Tirana, about 200 teachers came from Albania and taught with the help of textbooks printed in Albania (Malcolm 1999, 326). The numbers of students increased to about 30,000 during this time. This period saw a remarkable flourishing of Albanian literature and culture (Vickers 1998, 132).

Another issue was the distribution of key policy positions. In order to cater to the Kosovar interests, many managerial positions, which were formerly taken up by Serbs, were given to the Albanians; federal posts were filled with Kosovar politicians; and Hoxha, a leading Kosovar politician, became vice-president of the Yugoslav Presidency (Guzina 2003, 31). It seemed that on the political level, the Kosovars and the Yugoslav authorities were able to actually accommodate both parties. In 1971, Serbs and Montenegrins made up roughly 21 percent of the population, whilst holding the majority of offices, particularly in the security and police sector. Yet, even though Albanians occupied office here, one cannot speak of an Albanization of the security apparatus; as the repressions never approached the levels of Ranković’s secret police (Malcolm 1999, 327).

Demographic development was another issue. Serbs and Montenegrins made only about one fifth of Kosovo’s population, whilst the majority of the inhabitants were Albanian. In a census, which shocked Serbia, 76.5 percent of the population where Albanians, with only 13 percent being Serbian. This was a huge issue, as Serbs became afraid of losing Kosovo. Whilst some blamed Albanians for discriminating against Serbs and threatening/using violence, there were mainly two factors which contributed to this trend. Firstly, the deterioration of
economic conditions in Kosovo allowed many to migrate towards Serbia proper. Secondly, the enhancement of the medical health care service together with the traditionally high birth-rate in Albanians led to a natural shift in demographics. Accordingly, the departure of Serbs did not reflect some plan by the Kosovars, neither did the increase in the birth-rate, although both were speculated upon by the Serbs (Guzina 2003, 32).

Table 4.1: Share of Serb Population in Total Population of Kosovo (Blagojević 1998:261)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Serb Population</th>
<th>Share Of Serb Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>728,436</td>
<td>171,911</td>
<td>23.6 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>966,026</td>
<td>227,016</td>
<td>23.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,247,344</td>
<td>228,264</td>
<td>18.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,585,333</td>
<td>209,498</td>
<td>13.2 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,961,515</td>
<td>194,190</td>
<td>9.9 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most importantly, with Tito’s death on May 4, 1980, the situation in Kosovo further deteriorated. Tito was in many ways the person holding Yugoslavia together and his passing led to the manifestation of Albanian nationalism. Assaults were reported, as were instances of rape and the destruction of property. Whether this was actually the case (to the same extent that the Serbs felt it) is another matter (Rogel 2003, 168); yet, this fueled the student demonstrations of 1981 in Pristina. The students of the University of Pristina originally protested against poor conditions at the university—particularly of its canteen—but widened their agenda to address a whole range of socio-economic and political hardships that Kosovars faced. The police resorted to extreme brutality, beating the protestors down as well as imprisoning them (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, 36). As one professor described it, “From the moment the state of emergency was declared and military police forces committed to it, violence assumed an organized state character against the Albanians, bringing about greater political riots in Kosovo” (Nushi 1996, 147). Many of those imprisoned declared themselves part of various Marxists-Leninist groups and would later become prominent figures in the KLA. Serb nationalism rose alongside Kosovar voices for independence, culminating to the election of Slobodan Milošević on December 9, 1990.
4.2.2 The Identity Conflict: Of Serbs and Albanians

The conflict between Albanians and Serbs intensified from the mid-1960s onward. Precisely due to this, identifying Milošević and his role in the conflict as the sole culprit is misleading; yet, negating his presence is equally wrong. Indeed, one can debate his role in the conflict. At the onset, as he rose to power, he insisted on the centrality of Kosovo for Serbian people. In one political rally, which was attended by more than 350,000 people in Belgrade in 1987, he called out that “Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo” (Malcolm 1999, 343). Indeed, Milošević aimed at establishing a certain Serbian identity in which Kosovo occupied a central part.

His vision of a Greater Serbia was felt throughout Yugoslavia and was not limited to Kosovo. In Kosovo, however, the measures employed to reach this goal were particularly harsh: he removed the status of autonomous region from Kosovo in 1989, forced many Kosovars from their jobs, disrupted the education system by limiting the number of Albanian children allowed to attend schools, and enacted discriminatory laws, like the outlawing of property transfers from Serbs to Albanians (O’Neill 2002, 21). In July 1990, the Law on the Termination of the Work of the assembly and the Executive Council of Kosovo was passed, which amounted to the commencement of Serbian administrative rule of the province. Many of the most important Kosovar cultural institutions were closed down, like the Kosovo Academy of Science and Arts, the Kosovo Institute for History, and the Kosovo Bureau for Textbooks (Guzina 2003, 36). Indeed, “In the period between June 26, 1990 and August 8, 1992, the Serbian parliament passed an average of eighteen laws a month that ended Kosovo’s autonomy in all spheres of life” (Kostovicova 2000, 146). To make matters worse for the Kosovars, on November 27, 1992, the Declaration on Human Rights of Members of National Minorities was passed. This law aimed against the Kosovar numerical majority, allegedly to protect and preserve Kosovo Serbian communities. All these efforts reflected the Serbian nationalists’ desire to alter the ethnic
balance in Kosovo. Discrimination against Albanians took place on a daily basis, in the form of exclusion, by being the target of (threats of) violence or insult.

The Albanian side reacted to this mounting violence by advocating for territorial sovereignty. In July 1990, Kosovars declared Kosovo as independent, although this carried little weight. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovars united in non-violent, peaceful resistance. This choice reflected at least three strategic considerations. Firstly, Rugova explained that the choice of passive resistance was not due to his conviction, but because he knew that the Kosovars would not be able to successfully fight against the Serbs. Secondly, in the election between ultra-nationalist Milošević and Panic, a candidate who strived for reconciliation between the Serbs and Albanians, it served the interests of Kosovar independence to have an antagonist in Belgrade. Indeed, “Unless Serbia continued to be labelled as profoundly evil […] they were unlikely to achieve their goals. It would have been a disaster for them if a peace-monger like Panic had restored human rights, since this would have left them with nothing but a bare political agenda to change borders” (Vickers 1998, 263). Finally, taking the wars in Yugoslavia into account, a passive, non-aggressive Kosovar regime could be better sold to Western audiences.

However, Rugova’s pacifist policies were not uniformly supported by Kosovars; by 1994 serious differences emerged. This split between hardliners and moderates was reflected in the creation of the KLA. It appears that the group developed out of the student protests of 1981. On January 17, 1982, three Kosovar activists were assassinated in Stuttgart, Germany, a clear sign that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians had moved beyond the borders of Kosovo (Judah 2008, 77). Many of the KLA’s activists were young and mobile, since they were moving between Switzerland, Germany, and Kosovo. However, for the most part of its existence, the KLA was regarded as a fringe group, which should have remained marginal due to the fear of bringing disaster to the Kosovars. Officially, the group was founded in December 1993, but remained marginal until 1995.
From the 1990s onward, Kosovo became two “separate worlds” (Maliqi 1998) or “parallel societies” (Kostovicova 2000). The Serbian society in Kosovo was dominated by a strong security and police apparatus. Access to public positions, favoring conditions on the labor market, and guaranteed school education according to Serbian curricula as well as Serbian textbooks dominated the ‘visible’ society. Simultaneously, a Kosovar shadow government was established, including a presidential office. “Disenfranchised and forced into marginal spaces, Albanians focused their energies on building a shadow government and society in Kosovo” (Kostovicova 2000, 146). Financed by Albanian diaspora groups, education and basic social services were offered to the Albanian population. At the same time, the excluded work-force sought their own employment in Kosovo’s thriving grey economy. Despite the occasional eruption of violence between both groups, both Albanians and Serbs lived in an identity conflict. While the majority of actors and actions were viewed under the umbrella of ‘us’ or ‘them’, this did not lead automatically to a relationship of enmity. On the contrary, people were able to stroll the streets, mostly not harassed by the other group in their everyday lives. Indeed, “Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo […] walked on different sides of the street in Pristina, the capital, and in other towns and cities” (Naimark 2001, 177), while at the same time the “two communities in Kosovo went about their daily lives in utter ignorance of the other community” (Kostovicova 2000, 147).

Two events, taking place outside of Kosovo and Serbia, transformed this conflict into one of enmity. The first was the Dayton Peace Accord of 1997, which ended the Bosnian war (Freedman 1994, 57). This treaty ignored the Kosovo situation. Indeed, this signaled that on the one hand the best Kosovars could hope for was the elevation of their region to a constitutive part of Yugoslavia. It indicated to the Kosovar population that peaceful resistance had failed. Unintentionally, the international community had dealt a decisive blow against the Rugova regime and strengthened the resolve of militant hardliners (Vickers 2000, 99). The younger members of the KLA particularly favored radical steps and became impatient with Rugova’s
gradualist approach (O’Neill 2002, 22). The problem for the militant wing was the lack of weapons and the overwhelming Serb forces. The Dayton Peace Accord limited Milošević’s ability to take Yugoslav territory from Bosnia whilst giving him free reign in Kosovo.

4.2.3 Subordination Conflict: Towards NATO’s Involvement

The events from spring 1997 until March 24, 1999 comprise the advancement from an identity conflict to a subordination conflict, in which the enemy was to be destroyed, moved out of the country/region; if peace was ever to be possible then it would only occur by separation. Whilst within this period violence mounted and moved from spontaneous to systematized outbreaks, the entry of NATO forces—Operation Allied Force (OAF)—brought the conflict to a qualitatively different stage. More specifically, from that moment on Serb forces under the leadership of Milošević aimed to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of Albanians, while Kosovars aimed at expanding the conflict in order to draw NATO forces in on their side. The goal for both Albanians and Serbs was the establishment of a new reality in which the other was either removed or subordinated.

The second major event was the collapse of Albania in 1997. Due to a faulty economic pyramid scheme, the Albanian economy, and with it the political and security system collapsed. Albanian military barracks became unguarded and robbed of all their inventory. In short, a viable black market emerged which met the demands of the KLA for weapons. As these became readily available, a credible Kosovar military force appeared that was able to challenge the Serbian security apparatus on a much larger scale (I. King and Mason 2006, 42). In an attempt to restore law and order in Kosovo, the security forces overacted again. What can only be called a tit-for-tat strategy, KLA and Serbian forces pulled Kosovo down on a spiral of violence. Kosovars broke with Rugova’s principles of non-violent resistance. In many villages, people took up arms and actually started calling themselves KLA, without actually being part of the KLA structure. The change of strategic environment allowed KLA operatives to orchestrate a
series of guerilla attacks with the aim of destabilizing the region. At this point, the peaceful paralleled existence of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo was destroyed and atrocities committed on both sides. One particularly fateful event took place on January 22, 1998, when Serbian police failed to arrest Adem Jashari (Judah 2008, 81). A month later, police mounted a second attempt and after intense fighting in Prekaz, Jashari and his extended family of 50 were killed. Effectively, this event created a martyr under which Albanians could rally and sparked the explosion, as it served to convince the rest of the Kosovo Albanian population of the futileness of non-violent resistance.

While the KLA and the Serb forces clashed, it was the Kosovars that initially overreached and started to take territory as well as an important coal mine (Judah 2008, 82). Yet, with the Serbian counter-offensive to take back the Trepcća mine, Kosovar forces were pushed into a massive retreat. Despite thousands of Albanian weapons, the KLA was outmatched in terms of military strength, leading to a massive displacement of Kosovars at that time. The mounting conflict was observed internationally, culminating in the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission—superseded by the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)—which monitored the compliance to an agreement by US chief diplomat in the region Holbrooke and Milošević to reduce Serbian forces in the region. Indeed, it was the “American diplomat [who] persuaded Slobodan Milošević to comply with the demands made by Security Council Resolution 1199” (Bellamy 2002, 95), otherwise they would react by bombing Milošević to end his military campaign (I. King and Mason 2006, 44).

The KVM was in many ways a failure, yet it provided NATO forces the legal framework to deploy ground forces in neighboring Macedonia. At the same time, NATO was flying aerial reconnaissance missions—Operation Eagle Eye—that enabled allied forces to prepare for an intervention. Starting in November 1998, there was a fast unraveling of peace between the Serbs and Albanians, as attacks against each side mounted and the number of displaced people increased (Bellamy 2002, 111). In early 1999, as the killings resumed there was an incident at
the village of Racak, which proved to be the tipping point to escalate the conflict. Serbian forces attacked a village, killing 4 people. According to Walker, the head of the KVM, the killing of civilians was an act of ethnic cleansing (2000, 141–42). This attack reminded many in the West of the genocide in Srebrenica, which pushed them to seek a diplomatic, and if needed, military solution to the conflict. Calls were made out to both Serbs and Albanians, to meet at Rambouillet, France, in a last-ditch effort to work out a peace proposal. Important to note here is that at this point, it was next to Rugova, the KLA which officially represented the Kosovars, whilst important figures were notably absent from the Serbian delegation. The talks lasted from February 6 to February 23 and resulted in the rejection of the proposal by the Serbian delegation (Herring 2001). Shortly after, NATO conducted a military campaign to end the ethnic cleansing and function as a neutral party in the conflict (Arkin 2002; Clark 2001). The campaign, which was fought from the air, started on March 24, 1999 and lasted eleven weeks.

There is a fierce debate over the motivation of NATO states to go to war in Kosovo. Some voices point at the official narrative, according to which the experience of the Bosnian War rendered humanitarian need for intervention indispensable (Bellamy 2002, 157; Wheeler 2001, 146). According to the then-NATO general secretary Javier Solana, NATO “acted to stop the humanitarian tragedy” (2000, 228). For US President Clinton, “Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative” (Clines 1999a). Some have pointed to the possibility of regional instability arising from the conflict (Daalder 2001, 27), others invoked historical comparisons between Kosovo and Munich (Bellamy 2002, 158), while some saw it as imperative to unite NATO states and commit members to the transatlantic alliance (Davidson 2011). What matters much more in this study is the effect that the intervention had on the conflict. Although many warned about this happening, OAF worsened the conditions of Kosovars. While there is some doubt

66 Chomsky (2002) and Todorov (2000) question the reasoning of NATO’s entry into the conflict. If, so the argument goes, the intervention was conducted in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, why then was the immediate consequence a worsening of the conditions of the civilian population? A second line of criticism emerged from the lack of a UN Security Council mandate for the mission (Wheeler 2001, 147–52).
over the truthfulness of this account, Milošević reacted to the air campaign by unleashing an even harsher attack on the civilian population, with the goal of ethnically cleansing Kosovo. At the same time, KLA fighters sought the intensification of the conflict. Only with the entry of NATO in the Kosovo conflict, can we speak of a subordination conflict; it is at this point that war as a system had formed. Some commentators refer to the beginning of NATO airstrikes as a second, parallel war that had virtually left untouched the conflict between Serbs and Albanians (Bellamy 2002, 160). Contrary to this, I argue that ‘both’ wars are connected in the sense that the onset of OAF attacks prompted Milošević to significantly intensify his campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovars. Indeed, it appears that his strategy to counter the NATO offense was to create ‘facts on the ground’ as soon as possible and wait the attack out; while at the same time hoping for fractures within the alliance to spread and ultimately to break NATO (Clark 2001; Daalder 2001).

4.3 Observing the War System

The remainder of the chapter traces the development of the war system in the Kosovo case. To briefly restate, a non-recurrent war is assumed to exhibit only temporally coupled system relations, which is expressed by the undermining of system operations. The break-down of the war system is aided by two additional developments, namely the isolation of a conflict group and the linear progression of battle towards a decisive outcome. This analysis is based on the entire collection of New York Times articles that were published during this period, a total of 461, this empirical record overwhelmingly confirming the assessment on the almost fully established war system. The four manifestations of the war system (see chapter 3) are now considered in turn.

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67 The search string was ‘(kosovo liberation army OR KLA OR operation allied force OR (Kosovo AND war))’. The results were filtered manually for duplicates and non-relevant articles.
4.3.1 The Disintegration of Kosovo’s Social Order

First of all, the weakening of the social fabric within Kosovo can be observed. We can distinguish between three different manifestations of this dissolution, namely the physical removal of large parts of the population, the increase of physical violence in the forms commonly labeled as war crimes, and psychological warfare against the civil population. Crucially, as atrocities have been committed by both major groups inside Kosovo, it is by no means only the Serbian side that has become detached from its social environment, but rather what happened was the total evaporation of society as such. For instance, the KLA has not only become increasingly financed from the outside, but also filled its ranks with people coming from abroad. Evidently, this freed them from any kind of social constraints people have in inflicting pain on their neighbor or members of their villages. In the remainder of this section, a short overview of the corresponding evidence is provided.

Serbian forces, particularly paramilitary ones, committed atrocities against the Kosovar population. Already at the onset of the war, “reports of atrocities in Kosovo, including mass executions, deportations and forced marches” (Broder 1999) compelled the West to intervene in the first place. As the war prolonged, these reports became more frequent. Although the “accounts [of mass killings] cannot be independently verified […] they are being given credence here because of their striking similarity, the specific details provided by the refugees, and the past behavior of Serbian forces during the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia” (Kifner 1999a). Moreover, Serbia “rejected accusations of mass killings as well as the existence of an organized policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’” (Erlanger 1999k) and attributed the occurrence of such atrocities either to the actions by the KLA or that of NATO. Moreover, daily streams of refugees continued to tell the story of forceful mass expulsion (Rohde 1999g). While some men had been directly executed by Serbian forces (sometimes in front of their family members) (Perlez 1999c), others had been purposely stopped on their way to the border in order to be questioned and interrogated. At some time during the campaign, it was assumed that those people have...
been internally displaced, as it was believed that “more than 200,000 people have been forced to seek shelter in the rubble of their ruined villages or in the fields and hills of the countryside” (Whitney 1999a). Of those that managed to flee the country, their passports were taken away and their property stolen.

Next to the accusation against the Milošević regime of organizing genocide (Lewis 1999b), the specifics of the crimes included systematic rape. For instance, “Serbian paramilitaries reportedly rampaged through two ethnic Albanian villages in central Kosovo last Sunday, killing as many as 40 people, including four or five young women who were raped and then executed, refugees arriving here said today” (Rohde 1999e). In another instance, in a story entitled, “An Albanian Tells How Serbs Chose Her, 'the Most Beautiful,' for Rape” (Rohde 1999f), glimpses into the everyday life of sexual violence are revealed. Men mostly feared torture. For instance, one refugee “and 60 other men were separated out from the main group and forced to kneel down, with their faces against the concrete floor and their fingers laced behind their necks. He said they stayed in that position for four hours, which human rights groups say is an extremely painful form of torture” (Fisher 1999a; Gordon 1999e). Others tell the story of the killings of children and women (Perlez 1999d), like in the northern Drenica region, where the bodies of 150, including women and children, were found (Gall 1999d).

The everyday life of those who stayed behind was no less troubling. At the early days of the campaign, “Yugoslav Army tanks have been patrolling the streets of Pristina for the last several days in an attempt to intimidate the urban population” (Perlez 1999d). Describing the situation in Pristina, one inhabitant remarked that “There have been many killings in Pristina and people are in great fear […]. The streets were virtually deserted […].” (Perlez 1999d). It is worthwhile to quote one representative account describing the situation at length:

“To amplify the effect of the killings in Kosovo, Serbs gunned down Albanians in the streets and in their homes, sometimes at random, sometimes from target lists. Bodies have been mutilated, with ears cut off, eyes gouged out or a cross, a Serbian symbol, carved into foreheads or chests. In many places the Serbs compounded the fear with humiliation. Older men were beaten for wearing the white conical hats of
the Albanian mountains or forced to make the Serbian Orthodox three-fingered sign. One refugee convoy passed row on row of white conical hats set atop fence posts. [...] As in many places, the Serbs were guided to the most affluent and influential families, the people who helped give the Albanian community its cohesion. It is not known whether this was on instruction, or perhaps motivated by the greed, or grudges, of individual attackers, but one effect may be to damage Albanian prospects for rebuilding their communities. ‘In this block, they burned a lot of houses,’ Ardina said. ‘They were the best houses in town, the rich people,’ she said. ‘There was a Serb from the city guiding them. He told them: 'Burn this house. Kill this one.' Everyone in Djakovica knows him. They killed a large number of intellectuals, especially doctors’ (Kifner 1999c).

While the Kosovars lived in constant fear and prepared themselves for early-response evacuations in case the Serbian forces should attack, life in Belgrade and other cities in Serbia proper became equally affected by the war. Firstly, it was the KLA that carried out attacks against the Serbian civil population (Gall 1999a). Moreover, they “conducted paramilitary tribunals [and were] believed to be responsible for the abduction and execution of civilians and police officers […] there were more than 40 bodies that Serb authorities said were Serb civilians who had been kidnapped and killed by the K.L.A. soldiers” (Olson 1999). Secondly, NATO attacks impacted on social life as well, as daily rock concerts held to indicate support for Milošević ceased to be organized as people stayed more inside in order to avoid being accidentally hit by NATO missiles.

4.3.2 Kosovo War’s Impact upon other Systems

In the case of Kosovo, the relationship between the systems is not particularly straightforward: they influence each other multi-directionally and singling out specific connections is not an easy task. Crucially, what can be observed is the subjugation of functional systems to war. In short, the war in Kosovo led to a collapse of the political, economic, judicial, and media system in Kosovo, while simultaneously undermining the operations of these systems globally. Because of this development, no permanent couplings could manifest themselves, which explains why Kosovo was eventually able to leave the state of war.
War and politics: The impact of the war system on the political one is very apparent in the newspaper analysis conducted and operates at different levels. For the sake of clarity, one can distinguish between three different levels of analysis here, namely how national political systems observed the war, how war was observed by NATO as a case of political alliance, and finally, how the war was observed beyond NATO and how it impacted on the diplomatic ties within the international system. Despite the often observed rally-round-the-flag effects in Serbia, the US or Russia, in many ways domestic, regional, and international political systems have been undermined by the war. This has expressed itself in the form of domestic protests, strengthening of parliamentary and para-parliamentary opposition against the war and specific regimes, fracturing within the NATO alliance, undermining the system of the UN, and negatively impacting on the relationship between the political West, Russia, and China. The operations of the political system became dependent on the termination of the conflict, not its continuation.

Perhaps one of the most interesting observations is how the Serbian political system initially reacted to OAF. Starting from the early days of the campaign, “the Serbian public has [...] rallied to Mr. Milošević” (The New York Times 1999b), as it fed into “Serbian mythologies” (Erlanger 1999c) and expressed itself in popular culture demonstrations (Erlanger 1999d). Next to daily rock concerts ‘of solidarity’ held in downtown Belgrade to express support for the resistance of the Milošević regime (Erlanger 1999g; Erlanger 1999m), instances of public violence against institutions of allied powers, such as the Goethe Institute or the French Cultural Center (Myers and Schmitt 1999b) could be witnessed. Particularly at the beginning of OAF, support for the Milošević regime came from the Serbian opposition, who were highly critical of the West’s response. As one Serbian musician remarked, “It sometimes looks like America and Europe are doing all things to support the survival of Milošević” (Harden 1999a), while an opposition leader, Mr. Obradovic commented “that the West miscalculated the difficulty of any Serb accepting foreign troops and a loss of control over
Kosovo” (Erlanger 1999a). Only as the campaign persisted did the sentiment in the population shift, from initial neutrality to disapproval, like demonstrations in different Serbian cities, organized by Serbian mothers of Serbian troops (Gall 1999f). At the end of the campaign, did opposition leaders like Obradovic call for the resignation of Milošević and his allies, with the backing of the majority of the population (Erlanger 1999o; Harden 1999c; Erlanger 1999q).

In the US, the decision to intervene in Kosovo was supported by the majority of the population and political elites, regardless of political affiliation (Clines 1999a). Whilst humanitarian intervention was deemed more important than good diplomatic relationships with Russia (Perlez 1999b), the option of sending ground troops into Kosovo was generally strongly opposed (The New York Times 1999b; Wilgoren 1999). With Serbian demonstrators comparing Clinton to Hitler, protesters in the US equally likened Milošević to Hitler, chanting “Stop the Genocide!” and expressing support for the KLA (Wilgoren 1999). Nevertheless, the longer the war lasted, as reports of unintended casualties mounted, and the ending of the war became unforeseeable (Depalma 1999a), public support dropped from 62 percent at the beginning of the campaign to 53 percent nine weeks later. Despite being initially against the option of sending soldiers into Kosovo, voices grew louder to do just that as success of the war continued to be absent. For instance, Senator McCain became “a forceful advocate of all-out intervention in the Balkans [and] steadily make the case from which President Clinton shies away—that America can no longer afford to rule out the use of ground troops in Kosovo” (A. Mitchell 1999).

The persistence of the conflict had a similar effect on NATO, as member countries became increasingly critical of the entire campaign. From the onset of the campaign, NATO was concerned about projecting a unified front against Milošević and countered “suggestions that NATO was divided over the raids” (Clines 1999b) while not withholding to “reaffirm their determination to continue the air campaign with undiminished intensity” (Whitney 1999a). In many respects, the campaign was as much about stopping the atrocities by the Milošević regime
as it was about defending the continued existence and utility of NATO. As Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, noted, “Our message is that the NATO of the future is as good as the NATO of the past” (Weiner 1999a). In fact, this was precisely the message that was reinforced at the alliance’s 50th anniversary, as dissatisfaction with NATO’s performance, and as domestic and international criticism of the engagement mounted. Particularly Italy and Greece (Harden 1999c), but also France and Germany remained skeptical due to the lack of a UN mandate (Myers 1999d), while the British and General Wesley Clark advocated early on the use of ground troops, very much against the wishes of Washington and the Clinton administration (Gordon 1999i). Yet, despite all of these diverging voices, NATO managed to maintain unity throughout the war, which in the end contributed significantly to its success.

On the third level of analysis, it is apparent how the relationship between NATO countries and other Great Powers, Russia in particular, had deteriorated due to the conflict. Ultimately, it was the ability of NATO to work together with Russia that proved in many ways decisive to the alliance’s coherence in the final outcome of the war. However, at the onset of the conflict, this coherence was far from guaranteed. Moreover, despite the common front that these powers managed to create against the Serbian regime, diplomatically speaking the campaign was a fiasco, as the relationship between all powers had become tainted by it. Russia was vocal in its criticism of NATO and of the US in particular. A point in case occurred in the first week of the campaign, as “three prominent liberal politicians from Moscow warned that NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia had severely damaged Russia’s relationship with the United States” (Harden 1999b) since “Russians believe that the United States is hypocritical: it has demonized Serbia for conducting ethnic cleansing but has acquiesced in the same atrocities by Croatian forces armed by the United States” (Lieven 1999). However, NATO and Washington engaged in extensive courtship, for instance when “President Clinton called President Boris N. Yeltsin […] to press for Russian participation in a political resolution in Kosovo” (Perlez
Indeed, Russia’s support for the final agreement in Kosovo proved to be vital for the end of the war (Friedman 1999; Schmemann 1999; The New York Times 1999m).

The political system was, nonetheless, not the only one heavily affected by the conflict, as the economy also suffered a lot as a result of the war—a relationship which is illustrated in the next pages.

**War and the economy:** With regard to the relationship between the economic and the war system, the matter is slightly less straightforward than might be expected. Wars destroy infrastructure, factories, perturb the daily workings of the economy, with people unable to buy food, go to work, while at the same time, opportunities for ‘shadow’, ‘illegal’, and war economies arise. The data analysis has revealed at least five points of interest, namely how the conflict affected the economy of the Serbian state, the economic possibilities of the Kosovo Albanian civilians, how the KLA managed to financially support itself, how it impacted on the economies of those states waging war as well as, finally, on those being in one way or another affected by it. The findings indicate that no stable war economy formed that presented an alternative. Like the political system, developments in the economic system rather point towards a break after the ending of the war, and not a continuation; which in turn contributed to the explanation of why the war did not recur.

The strongest impact of the war system on the economic system can be observed in Serbia proper, due to trade embargoes on oil, gasoline, and general goods, the destruction of infrastructure like roads and railways as well as factories, the costs of waging war on the Serbian state, the flight of international investors out of Serbia, and finally the increase in prices for imports. From the early days of the war, “The NATO air strikes […] have severely crippled the nation's industrial infrastructure” (The New York Times 1999g). Moreover, these attacks were “destroying its [Yugoslavia’s] indigenous oil production and shattering its transportation network, as NATO cruise missiles and aircraft pick off highway and railroad bridges from one end of the country to the other” (Myers and Schmitt 1999a). Indeed, “Yugoslavia’s economy
has been blasted by NATO’s war against bridges, highways, factories and refineries. […] They expected Yugoslavia to continue to have to pay well over market price for the goods it was able to import or smuggle past the sanction monitors” (Erlanger 1999p). But next to the physical destruction of the Serbian economy, NATO’s imposed trade embargos, contributed to the collapse of the economic system. For instance, while initially trying to “compensate for the allied attack by importing refined oil by sea” (Gordon 1999d), NATO “was succeeding in cutting off the supply of fuel for Yugoslav troops” (Becker 1999a).

During much of NATO’s air campaign, Kosovo was as much part of the target as Serbia proper was. Early on, Pristina’s “main commercial and military airport had been hit” (Clines 1999a). However, not only had the infrastructure and factories in Kosovo been damaged, but the entire daily life of economic activity had been disrupted by the war. For example, one observer describes the daily life in Pristina, in which “The streets were virtually deserted […] Only three of four bakeries were operating” (Perlez 1999d). Albanian-owned businesses had either been looted or set on fire, while at the same time, Kosovars were forcefully removed from the country. Many refugees fleeing Kosovo took with them their tractors, as this vehicle served to guarantee their livelihood. However, with crossing the border, often times, they were forced to either leave their tractors behind or sell them for food, shelter or transport (Depalma 1999b).

What one can witness is the creation of a new economy in which some people prosper from the sufferings of others. The case of the KLA is most instructive in this regard. Fighting in wars costs money, as weapons, supplies, and the like must somehow be provided. It was mentioned earlier that the Kosovar diaspora had sent considerable funds to Kosovo in order to finance a shadow government under Rugova, providing both education and health support as well as ensuring financial assistance for Kosovars to buy simple goods. However, as the conflict prolonged, an increasing amount of money to finance the KLA activities came “from contributions sent by more than 100,000 Kosovo Albanians living abroad” (Depalma 1999c);
in other words, the money was directed from the economic system into the war system. Moreover, the KLA was allegedly earning some income from drug trafficking. As both American and European officials agreed, “it was undoubtedly true that some supporters of the Kosovo Liberation Army were drug traffickers” (Bonner 1999, see also Gall 1999e) and possibly involved in other illegal activities, like money laundering (Depalma 1999c).

Neither Serbia nor the KLA were the only parties of the conflict bearing the costs of war. Among others, the economy of Bulgaria, Albania, and Montenegro were impacted upon, as well as the entire Balkan region as tourists started avoiding this area (Erlanger 1999b). Moreover, NATO members themselves were forced to invest considerable funds in it. For instance, “the Pentagon is running up bills that approach $1 billion, and Congress is preparing to approve the Administration's request for $6 billion to finance the war through September, if needed […] The Pentagon says this war is costing about $37 million a day, and that's not counting the relief operation for refugees” (E. Schmitt 1999f). The US “agreed on $11.7 billion” to finance the war (Weiner 1999c), while at the same time passing “legislation that would help small businesses employing reservists who are called up by providing loan deferments and low-interest loan assistance from the Small Business Administration” (Becker 1999b). In addition, these sums do not include any of the economic costs of actually rebuilding the Serbian, Kosovar, and Balkan economies. At the end of the conflict it was “Prodi, the new President of the 15-nation European Union's executive Commission, [who] has estimated the costs of reconstructing and supporting the two million people of Kosovo at about $6 billion a year for at least five years” (Whitney 1999c).

Also in addition to these huge direct costs shaking the economic systems of the parties involved in the conflict, there were important legal consequences at both domestic and international levels—which are discussed in detail below.

**War and law:** Unsurprisingly, the legal system was strongly affected in its capacity to function by the war system. We can identify broadly three dimensions that emerged in the legal
system at the intersection between international law and the Kosovo War, namely whether either Serbia or NATO has infringed upon international law; as well as the relationship between humanitarian intervention and the legal concept of sovereignty. The Kosovo War has come to question legal categories such as combatant, war criminal, and sovereignty; however, this type of coupling remained temporal, as the collapse of the judicial system created the need to establish a new one and the international legal system delegitimized the domestic one.

In Serbia proper, the category of criminal has been altered to encompass domestic political opposition, allowing for legal and paralegal prosecution of these individuals. For instance, “Mr. Milošević has targeted for kidnapping and assassination the top Albanian editors, lawyers, doctors and educators. The idea is to decapitate the leadership—exactly what his killers set out to do in Bosnia seven years ago” (Lewis 1999a). Equally, “The Yugoslav Army issued a warrant today for the arrest of Montenegro's Deputy Prime Minister, Novak Kilibarda […], who has been critical of President Slobodan Milošević of Yugoslavia, [with] ‘the crime of undermining national military and defense ability’” (The New York Times 1999j). Consequently, in this case, war has undermined the ‘normal functioning’ of the legal system, as prosecution was not based anymore on whether someone or something was legal/illegal, but rather whether it belonged to the friend/enemy group. Additionally, the international legal system observed the Milošević regime and Serbian paramilitary forces on the question of whether their actions were in accordance with international law. Already on March 27, 1999, it was reported that “The [International Criminal] tribunal has opened an investigation focusing on Mr. Milošević’s role in the atrocity-ridden Balkan wars” (Clines and Myers 1999) and started to “collect evidence of any war crimes, like summary executions” (Perlez 1999c). Indeed, prosecutors were initially much occupied in collecting information regarding Milošević’s war crimes against civilians, such as mass killings, systematic rape, torture, and the use of chemical weapons (J. Miller 1999b; M. Simons 1999; Gall 1999d; Erlanger 1999f; Clymer 1999; Broder 1999). While in a remarkable portion of the newspaper articles, a
conviction of Milošević and his agents due to war crimes committed against the Kosovo Albanian population was openly advocated for\(^{68}\), if this conviction later on in the conflict was perceived to impact negatively on the efforts of actually ending the war.

On March 28, 1999, the “international tribunal at The Hague indicted Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and four other senior officials on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes” (The New York Times 1999l). Although naturally the Serbian government rejected the jurisdiction of The Hague as well as the indictment itself, saying that “the tribunal had no standing to indict the officials because his country was not engaged in war, but in an internal police action” (Erlanger 1999n), it was the allies reaction which is telling. Here it is worth quoting the NYT at length:

“Publicly, the Clinton Administration has applauded the indictment of Slobodan Milošević, a move that appears to change the Yugoslav President's status from potential deal maker to pariah. But in private, administration officials say the indictment is likely to cripple their efforts to find a diplomatic solution on the current tracks—through the Russian envoy, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, and the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari. The indictment has much diminished the hopes of using Mr. Ahtisaari as a go-between who could win Mr. Milošević's acquiescence in a settlement. Viewed in recent weeks as the most likely candidate to succeed in final negotiations, Mr. Ahtisaari would be very reluctant to go to Belgrade to deal with an indicted war criminal, one colleague said. […] officials acknowledged the awkwardness of negotiating with a man who has been indicted on war crimes charges” (Perlez 1999g).

Conversely, the actions of NATO were also not considered to be in accord with international law, human rights conventions, and the UN Charter. Indeed, it was early on and an often-repeated mantra by Milošević and his regime to describe “NATO's attack on Yugoslavia as criminal” (Erlanger 1999b), to advocate that “NATO officials be tried for war crimes” (Gordon 1999a), arguing that “NATO's criminal activities are aimed against all those who strive for a joint life, peace, unity, and understanding” (Erlanger 1999j). In this position, Serbia was supported by Russia and China (Safire 1999a), as well as critical voices from at

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\(^{68}\) As a second war crime, it is mentioned that Yugoslav forces had illegally abducted American soldiers that were patrolling the Macedonian border. As the US formally declared, “that the three captured soldiers might be put on trial […] would be in violation of international law (Myers and Becker 1999a; Myers 1999a).
home and allies (Gordon 1999d). As Serbia was criminalized due to atrocities committed against the civilian population, NATO violates international law as well. Firstly, it was argued that NATO, not the Serbian regime or paramilitary groups, were responsible for civil suffering. Secondly, it was pointed out that NATO operated without the authorization of the UN Security Council (Lavrov, quoted in J. Miller 1999a) using unauthorized force “against a member nation” (The New York Times 1999d). Thirdly, NATO’s intervention constituted a clear violation of the international legal norm of sovereignty.

However, it was in the UN that the great debate regarding humanitarian intervention and the infrangibility of sovereignty were discussed. For instance, it was “At the century's last session of the Commission on Human Rights, [that] Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations unveiled a doctrine with profound implications for international relations in the new millennium. The air strikes against Yugoslavia, he said on April 7, showed that the world would no longer permit nations intent on committing genocide to ‘hide’ behind the United Nations charter, which has traditionally safeguarded national sovereignty” (J. Miller 1999c).

Kofi Annan was especially vocal in his support for the NATO air strikes, despite lacking authorization from the Security Council, due to “shocking violations of human rights” (The New York Times 1999e). In other words, the “cornerstone of the international system” (J. Miller 1999c) of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty has been vaguely opened up to allow for international intervention based on humanitarian grounds, even if, crucially, a mandate from the Security Council is missing.

**War and the media:** Regarding the impact of the war system on the media system, multidimensional impairment is observable. We can identify at least six different dimensions, which themselves also exhibit different aspects on a very general level: the subversion of the Serbian media to appease and influence domestic and international audiences, the removal of information from the Serbian opposition, the subversion of Western media for political purposes, the physical destruction of media outlets by war forces, the blocking and crackdown
on foreign and domestic journalists, both in and out of Serbia, and the general lack of reliable information due to the war. In other words, as anticipated by the theory of war as a dysfunctional system, the Kosovo conflict undermined the functioning of the media, away from reporting what is happening on the ground to using misinformation for war purposes. The Kosovo War was as much a war for physical dominance as dominance over information.

The Serbian case has been most noticeable in its subversion of the media system to the war, as the media functioned to calm the domestic population, by cracking down on foreign and Serbian journalists alike, feeding it wrong information or regulating its program. Already in the first days of the NATO campaign, the Yugoslav Information Minister, Vucic, had instructed local newspapers and magazine editors with “the requirement to call NATO ‘criminal,’ and injunctions not to demoralize the population with detailed descriptions of ‘targets’” (Erlanger 1999a). On a different instance, the deliverance of several newspapers was delayed so that “reports on [China’s] President Jiang Zermin’s condemnation of the NATO attack” (Eckholm 1999) could be included. A different strategy was the altering of Serbian TV program, to play ‘patriotic themes’, show international support for the Serbian cause by highlighting “protests against them in Greece and Russia”, and screening the film ‘‘Wag the Dog’ many times today” (Erlanger 1999b). Moreover, Serbian media became dominated by themes of war victories, reports of anti-American protests, support for their cause by Kosovars, and the Greek Orthodox Church as well as the general critics of NATO. To give some examples, “President Milošević was shown on state television meeting with Ibrahim Rugova, a prominent leader of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. The two men signed a document calling for a peaceful end to the Kosovo crisis through ‘political means’” (The New York Times 1999c; Erlanger 1999f; Erlanger 1999h; Erlanger 1999i); or showing Milošević meeting the representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church (Erlanger 1999f). Furthermore, the report of “protesters [that] were allowed to assemble near the embassy and their anti-American signs and catcalls” (Gordon 1999a) conveyed the image of a criminal attack by NATO on an unjustly prosecuted Serbia. An additional method
to stir up support for the Serbian cause was the display of Serbian war victories against NATO, which occurred essentially in two instances. Firstly, that an “F-117 was brought down late today [March 28, 1999] near Budjenovci, 35 miles northwest of Belgrade” (Broder 1999; E. Schmitt 1999c; Clymer 1999), together with images of the wreckage of the warplane. Secondly, the capturing of three U.S. soldiers that were patrolling within Macedonia, resulted in them being “paraded on Serbian television” (Erlanger 1999f).

Critical voices from Serbian journalists were silenced. For example, on March 28, 1999, “a prominent Serbian journalist, Dragoslav Rancic, a senior contributing editor of the weekly magazine Nin, was arrested today for an article about Mr. Milošević and his negotiating style that was considered to have broken censorship rules” (Erlanger 1999b). On another occasion, “Radio 021, the only independent media outlet in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, was also shut down” (Erlanger 1999e). Moreover, the strategy of silencing Serbian journalists was reinforced by controlling the inflow of information from abroad. This concerned particularly information found on the internet, as a story on April 1, 1999 highlights: “In an electronic assault on NATO’s presence in cyberspace, computer users in Serbia managed to temporarily disable the alliance’s site on the World Wide Web last weekend and cause intermittent outages over the last few days, NATO officials said Wednesday” (Harmon 1999).

Additionally, the Milošević regime was highly concerned about gaining and securing information superiority vis-à-vis NATO and the US (Erlanger 1999h). One such strategy was closing down the access to information by physically threatening and expelling foreign journalists from Serbia. From the first day onwards, “Serbian military authorities have begun to crack down on foreign journalists who were reporting news of the NATO air strikes from Yugoslavia” (Mifflin 1999a). On the second day, “the order came that foreign journalists from NATO countries should leave Serbia, and about 20 men, who appeared typical of the hard-core paramilitary Serb forces who became notorious in Bosnia for the atrocities of “ethnic cleansing,” began to harass journalists. They forced them to leave, smashing equipment and
setting fire to an armored vehicle used by CNN” (Gall 1999b). Other journalists “were taken to a police station and questioned separately [for] about 11 hours” (Mifflin 1999b) before being expelled from the country. At the same time, the Serbian government engaged in feeding foreign journalists their specific interpretation of the actions on the ground. For instance, the “Yugoslav Government organized a junket for some 70 foreign journalists” (Erlanger 1999d) and spread the information that “Kosovar Albanians are fleeing NATO's intensifying bombing campaign […] or that the damage is done by the bombs, or by the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army, or even by the Albanians themselves” (Erlanger 1999l). War crimes by NATO, like the killing of a 3-year-old child by NATO bombs (Whitney 1999b) were contrasted to Milošević seeking a peaceful resolution (The New York Times 1999k).

The media system in the West was subdued as well, since it was equally aimed at steering up support domestically while countering Serbian propaganda internationally. The US engaged in a “public campaign to maintain popular support in the United States for the NATO air strikes [and] talked on television today on Mr. Milošević’s stepped-up efforts to clear the ethnic Albanians from Kosovo” (Perlez 1999e). President Clinton himself used media to sway public opinion, arguing that “Mr. Milošević’s forces burn and loot homes and murder innocent people [while] our forces deliver food and shelter and hope to the displaced” (Weiner 1999b). Next to portraying Milošević as absolute evil, the media has been used to describe Kosovars as victims. Consequently, “without the ability to show pictures of the atrocities being committed inside Kosovo, the news media would tire of repetitious footage of fleeing refugees, and that reduced exposure to such scenes could then weaken public support for the war effort” (Seelye 1999). It was not the case that Western media had not been regulated. As a senior military spokesman points out, “There are some European allies who don't like this portrayed as too much of an American show, and there are other allies who don't want information about their role put out at all”, while “senior Administration officials are following a tightly choreographed script as they seek to manage information and perceptions of the air campaign” (E. Schmitt
1999b). In short, the problem with reporting in this war was that “What journalists see of the air war is what the NATO allies want them to see” (The New York Times 1999a), a circumstance of which both sides were aware and tried to exploit willingly.

The ultimate undermining of the media system is the physical destruction of television stations and newspaper factories. Not only were Serbian, Kosovar, and foreign journalists expelled from Serbia, the content of information strictly regulated and altered to fit each specific need, but also the possibilities to communicate information were removed. Particularly interesting is the fact that NATO targeted news stations in order to ‘silence Serbian propaganda’. From the third week of NATO’s air campaign onwards, the media was targeted. NATO “hit in the bombing campaign […] Pristina’s airport and a television transmitter” (The New York Times 1999f) and three days later destroyed using several missiles “the television and radio transmitter atop Mount Goles, near Pristina […] leaving people in Kosovo’s capital unable to watch Belgrade television channels” (Erlanger 1999k). If anything, as the conflict prolonged, media installations have moved increasingly into target. At the end of April, for instance, “American F-117 fighters leveled the headquarters of Serbian television in Belgrade” (Perlez 1999a) and it was a cat and mouse game between destroying the television network and quickly rebuilding it by Serbian forces (Myers and Becker 1999b; Weiner 1999b; Myers 1999b).

4.3.3 The Fragmentation of Actors in the Kosovo War

The fragmentation of actors has two dimensions that need to be considered. First of all, the war system simply observes more actors as they become involved in the conflict. New groups with their own demands and goals form which stand either in opposition or in support of old groups in the conflict. Secondly, these old groups fragment due to, for example, discontent or political opportunity and break the solid blocks that have formed between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. The empirical record shows that both developments happened, even though NATO remained in a
state of fragile coherence until the end of the conflict. While critical voices became louder, it was due to the efforts of political and military leaders in the West that the alliance not only remained intact, but was able to turn Russia, from an outspoken critic of the war, to a supporter of the NATO peace plan. *Time* played a crucial role in this equation. In order to account for this, I have selected three time periods, the first week, weeks five and six, and weeks ten and eleven, as they constitute the beginning, middle, and end of the war system. They confirm a broad trend and provide sufficient empirical material for this study.

In the entire time period, a total of 48 actors could be identified, which stood in 127 constellations towards each other. The most prominent relationship was NATO fighting against the Serbian forces and regime, the Serbian forces fighting against Kosovar civilians and KLA respectively, and Russia openly criticizing NATO and the KLA attacking Serbian forces too. This finding can already be observed in the first week of the campaign, in which 56 actor constellations were coded (see appendix 4.1). On first glance at the data, the centrality of NATO, the KLA, as well as the Serbian forces under the regime of Milošević, becomes apparent. From the onset of the conflict, we find that Serbian forces attacked and violently expelled Kosovars from Kosovo, which was coupled with their ‘police operations’ against the KLA. At the same time, it was NATO that moved in to support the civilians, KLA and Kosovar civilians, whilst fighting against Serbian troops and emphasizing a campaign against the person of Milošević. Outside of these actors, the harshest critic of NATO action came from Russia, which features very strongly in the first week of the campaign.

While domestically the Serbian regime was first and foremost supported by the Serbian people and regime officials, internationally it was Russia that was most loyal. As has been captured by the NYT, “Dishearteningly, the Serbian public has initially rallied to Mr. Milošević, as have traditional allies like Russia” (Niebuhr 1999). Additionally, Montenegro offered support for the Serbian regime, and paramilitary groups, such as the infamous Tigers that helped Serbia in their campaign against Kosovo civilians and ‘freedom fighters’, as also against
international critique. As a matter of fact, critique was aplenty. Firstly, a weak but visible Serbian opposition continued to exist. Secondly, it was pressure from NATO and its organs, as well as member states, particularly the US that continued to be exerted on the Serbian regime. Moreover, on a personal level, between Wesley Clark and Milošević, President Clinton and Milošević, and on a more neutral level, between UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Milošević an antagonistic relationship could be observed. Next to critical voices from Russia, discontent against the OAF was voiced from China, the UN, and from NATO member states (particularly the US itself and Greece). To sum it all up, in the first week of the campaign, we find principally two dominant camps, around which the other actors cluster. First, we have NATO and the Kosovars and second, the Serbian regime and Russia.

In the middle of the campaign, we find essentially the same picture with certain alterations. Primarily, the main configuration of actors remained unchanged. NATO’s efforts to bomb the Serbian forces, as well as Serbian efforts to expel the Kosovars continue to be the most visible relationships. Moreover, if anything, a united front of Milošević and Russia, being critical of NATO had formed, which became the third and fourth most prominent relationships (see appendix 4.2). Russia remained “strongly opposed [to] the raids on Yugoslavia” (Myers
and Becker 1999b), with “Russian official rhetoric [being] white-hot against the bombings” (Lieven 1999), “warning that the military campaign might even spark a third world war” (Gordon 1999f). While the Serbian regime and military forces continued to have the Serbian population and Russia on its side, next to Ukraine it is Greece, a NATO member state since 1952, which voiced support for the Serbian cause. Simultaneously, the enemy camp for the Serbian side expanded to include more domestic actors, specifically the Roma population and the state of Albania, which became a target of attacks from both Serbian military and paramilitary forces. NATO was criticized by Serbia and Russia, but also from within NATO itself. Simultaneously, NATO was all the more vocal in emphasizing the unity of its alliance. What became increasingly apparent were efforts to incorporate Russia into the NATO camp and the need to work together, which was the fifth most visible relationship coded. Moreover, the KLA moved away from NATO, as it became supported by two actors, which have been the most prominent in the last decades in their opposition to the political West: Iran and the Taliban.

At the end of the campaign further movements can be observed. Chiefly, the NATO campaign against the Serbian regime had become the all-dominating one, pushing the relationship between Serbs and Kosovars to the background. Concurrently, the collaboration between NATO and Russia to build a united front against Milošević has been completed and has manifested itself. This does not mean that the relationship between Russia and NATO have become easy and outright friendly, but remained critical until the very end. Alongside this, the antagonistic relationship between the Serbs and Kosovars, more against the civil population than the militarized one, persisted. Yet, whilst Russia moved closer into the camp of NATO, the KLA moved away and often became a target of NATO members. As might be expected, support for the Serbian cause had eroded by the end of the campaign, as only Russia and the Serbian government were still voicing it. NATO, the KLA, and Serbian opposition forces build a war on three fronts, both internationally in the forms of continued NATO air strikes, but also as domestic opposition within Serbia proper and Kosovo. Moreover, the pressure against the
person of Milošević further increased, to which Russia joined. However, the unity against Milošević should not be over-exaggerated and was frail. Critical voices against NATO increased from member states, particularly Greece and Germany, and from outside, China. Equally the KLA and NATO split. The KLA, whilst emphasizing the need to work together with NATO, did little to hide their discontent with how NATO was supporting them. Whereas initially both Kosovars and NATO were in harmony, at the end of the campaign it was particularly the US, NATO, but surprisingly also Kosovo Albanian civilians who distanced themselves from, and out rightly criticized the liberation army.

To sum it all up (see figure 4.1), at the end of the campaign, we find the fragmentation of the ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ groups. While ultimately Russia moved away from Serbia towards NATO, the KLA equally moved away from NATO and Kosovo Albanian civilians, essentially opening up a third camp. Moreover, within NATO, the discontent had reached new heights and one is left to wonder, whether the alliance would have been able to maintain its unity for much longer. Crucially, the fragmentation of actors took the form of isolating the Milošević regime, which was vital for the termination of the conflict.

4.3.4 The Intensification of War Efforts by Kosovo War Participants

The final manifestation of the war system suggests that the tendency of observed actors and actions within the war system is to intensify their efforts in order to reach their goals. In the case of Kosovo, we can distinguish between four dimensions of the intensification of war, namely intensification of the OAF, growth of the Yugoslav army in expelling Kosovar civilians, spiraling of the conflict between KLA and Yugoslav forces, in addition to the war affecting a wider geographical area in terms of other states. Specifically, the intensification of war developed linear—the stepwise increase over the use of force from practically all participants in the conflict. Next to the fragmentation of actors, this development also contributed to the (permanent) termination of the war system.
The intensification of the NATO air campaign is the clearest example of this development. From the onset of the campaign, President Clinton was strictly opposed to deploying ground troops and risking the lives of soldiers. In the first week, “administration officials insisted that they were not planning to use American or NATO ground troops to halt any killings and punish Mr. Milošević’s forces” and US Vice-President Gore emphasized that "There is no consideration by NATO or any of the allies for the introduction of ground troops" (Broder 1999). The reasoning behind this was straightforward: firstly, it was believed that a short, limited campaign as the one in Bosnia would be sufficient to induce Milošević’s troops to lay down their arms. Secondly, the US supposed that superior air power would be sufficient to compel Milošević. Finally, the NATO campaign was already unpopular enough for member states so much so that they would be unwilling anyhow to send in troops and risk their lives. Clark, however, “made little secret of his belief in the need for an invasion force” (Perlez 1999i) and on several occasions “urged the Pentagon and NATO to at least begin planning for ground invasion because of a timetable that would require deployment in the summer if such a huge force is to return the refugees before winter sets in” (Becker 1999c). At least three circumstances were responsible for the decision to use more force. First of all, Milošević evidently did not back down and sign a peace agreement. Secondly, the Serbian forces intensified their campaign against the KLA as well as Kosovar civilians and thirdly, bad weather conditions hampered NATO’s air campaign.

The result was that almost on a daily basis from the very beginning of the campaign, the NYT reported decisions of NATO officials to intensify their efforts. So it goes that “the Pentagon said that the list of targets was broadened today” (Clines 1999b), “that the United States and NATO were broadening the goals of the four-day-old military operation in Yugoslavia” (Broder 1999), and that “The alliance’s decision last week to broaden its target list has already had an effect” (Gordon 1999b), only to later allow “Clark, NATO’s top military commander, to expand the campaign to a 24-hour operation and to broaden the range of targets
NATO forces can attack in Kosovo and the rest of Serbia" (Becker 1999b), by “attacking Yugoslavia’s electrical system” (Gordon 1999g) and “a variety of political and economic targets” (E. Schmitt 1999g). In other words, NATO flew more sorties over a wider territory, targeting more goals, from purely military to also economic and infrastructural ones. One strategy to increase military capacity was to increase the overall number of aircraft; another one was to use the existing ones and improve their effect by letting them fly at a lower altitude.

Indeed, as OAF was a humanitarian intervention, the explicit goal was to minimize the damage and loss of life of the civil population from NATO attacks. The first mechanism to ensure this was the modus of target selection, which happened within NATO headquarters and required unanimous approval from all member states. Additionally, this mechanism aimed at maintaining alliance coherence over time. The second was that air pilots had to visually identify the target and confirm it with headquarters before attacking it. However, “flying at 15,000 feet, a precaution established by NATO planners to avoid anti-aircraft fire and surface-to-air missiles” (Gordon 1999c), also permitted the unintended killings of civilians and civilian installations. For instance, one “NATO pilot mistakenly bombed a convoy of Kosovo refugees headed towards the Albanian border, killing 72 of them” (The New York Times 1999i), another “mistakenly bombed a hospital complex and marketplace in Nis”, and others “struck and badly damaged the Chinese Embassy” (Myers 1999c). Again, poor intelligence, bad weather, and, most importantly, unwillingness to risk the lives of NATO soldiers in order to save those of civilians severely undermined the goals of humanitarian intervention.

Consequently, the intensification of NATO’s military campaign was enabled due to at least three factors. Firstly, “Bad weather is one important hindrance to the NATO pilots. Cloud cover prevents them from identifying targets and using laser-guided bombs to hit them” (E. Schmitt 1999d). Yet, as OAF moved through the early months of 1999, the weather improved significantly (Gordon 1999i; Myers 1999e; E. Schmitt 1999g; Perlez 1999h; Whitney 1999d). Secondly, despite clever strategic maneuvering by Serb forces, allied forces succeeded in time
to rigorously weaken Serbian air defense, allowing NATO planes to fly at lower altitudes. It was already expressed hopefully at the onset of the campaign that “once the air defense systems had been destroyed and supply sites and radar attacked” (Perlez 1999a; E. Schmitt 1999a), NATO air planes would be able to move freely throughout Serbia. Despite limited success with this strategy, starting on the sixth week of the campaign, NATO planes were allowed to operate under 15,000 feet (Gordon 1999h; Gordon 1999g). The reason behind this was more political than anything else. Following the idea of ‘the more the better’, Western leaders allowed a growth in the size of the fleet in order to increase the political and military pressure on Milošević (E. Schmitt 1999e). Along with this was the ever-discussed option of using ground forces, an option that was, nonetheless, only threatened, but never realized (Rohde 1999b; The New York Times 1999h; Gordon 1999e; Lewis 1999c).

Milošević, the Yugoslav army, and Serb paramilitary groups defied the expectations of NATO: rather than backing down, they intensified their efforts against the Kosovo civilian population and the KLA. In the famous “Operation Horseshoe” (OH)69 or “Potkova” (Whitney 1999a), ethnic Kosovars and other ethnic minorities like Roma from Kosovo were forcefully expelled. These actions were termed as police action and aimed to restore the internal order of Serbia against the attacks of the KLA. As the NYT reports, “In Kosovo itself, […] the Yugoslav military has driven thousands of ethnic Albanians out of their homes during its pursuit of the Kosovo Liberation Army” (Erlanger 1999a). Therefore, intensification on the Yugoslav side meant that an increased number of Kosovars were expelled from the country, more military men (and equipment) were used in the fight against the KLA, and a wider geographic area was affected by the fighting. The main reason behind this intensification was the strategy of Milošević and his regime of changing the facts on the ground, permanently altering the ethnic balance in Kosovo in favor of the Serbian population, as well as using the time available as

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69 Although it has become contested whether OH actually existed, the reality observed by the NYT is one in which it did.
efficiently as possible. Consequently, Serb forces aimed at creating “such widespread destruction that it would be difficult for the refugees ever to rebuild their lives in Kosovo” (Kifner 1999b). They were “hunting down ethnic Albanians hiding in woods and villages in southeastern Kosovo and herding them into Urosevac” (Rohde 1999a), “burned down villages” (Rohde 1999b), and “have systematically expelled tens of thousands of Albanians from the swath of southeastern Kosovo” (Rohde 1999c). As observers noted, with the prolonged duration of the conflict, Serb forces were “stepping up a campaign of expelling ethnic Albanians” (Rohde 1999d) resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kosovars. In many ways, the Serbian campaign was an initial success, as it managed to almost completely destroy the capabilities of the KLA during the first weeks of fighting (Erlanger 1999j).

The KLA were not destroyed by the Serb forces and managed to stage a comeback to the conflict. It is here that another type of intensification occurred, namely the recruitment of Kosovars as fighters for the KLA. The KLA survived the first wave of Serbian attacks due to three reasons: first, the NATO campaign helped the KLA by slowing down the Serb forces and provided cover for retreat (Gall 1999c). Second, retreating beyond the Albanian border enabled the remaining forces of the KLA to avoid full destruction and third, a pool of Kosovo Albanian civilians, which first-handedly experienced the Serbian violence joined the liberation army (Hedges 1999). However, while for instance one Kosovo Albanian refugee exclaimed that “I just want three or four days to rest […] Then I’m joining the KLA.” (Fisher 1999a), others reported “overly aggressive recruitment” (Fisher 1999c) and being exposed to ‘harassing’ in order to join (Fisher 1999b). Thus, during the war, more civilians changed their status to combatants, as on the Serbian side more reserves were called up to fight in the war, while NATO flew an increasing amount of sorties over the territory that makes up Kosovo.
4.4 Conclusion

Following the findings of the newspaper analysis presented in this chapter, several manifestations of the war system were observed (see table 4.2). The two auxiliary expectations accounted for the termination of the war system, as one enemy group was singled out, contained, and ‘defeated’. The Milošević regime gradually lost support from their own population and the diplomatic backing of Moscow and Beijing. Simultaneously, the alliance around NATO remained stable, despite critical voices being raised throughout the campaign. Crucially, there was no strong side of the conflict which had anything to gain from the continuation of violence—even though the KLA did distance itself more from NATO. Violence did not disperse or become omnipresent, but was continuously increased from all sides towards a decisive outcome. From the form of coupling, important inferences can be drawn as well. As demonstrated above, the Kosovo War undermined the functioning of the political, economic, judicial, and media system. In short, it led to the following: removal of a political system, collapse of the economy, creation of a lawless environment, and destruction of the media system. Counterintuitively, by this ‘success’, conditions were created for the (permanent) termination of the conflict.

Table 4.2: Overview of Hypotheses for Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Observation</th>
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| Disintegration of social structures | • Displacement of entire social groups  
• Increase in atrocities  
• Psychological warfare |
| Coupling of the war system with functional systems | • Parasitical impact upon functional systems  
• Disruption of operations of functional systems |
| Fragmentation of actors | • Increase of affected actors over time  
• Relatively stable alliance structure  
• Isolation of Milošević regime |
| Intensification of war | • Intensification of Operation Allied Force  
• Growth of Yugoslav army in order to expel Kosovo Albanian population and combat KLA  
• Spiraling of conflict between KLA and Yugoslav forces  
• Affecting wider geographical area inside and outside Kosovo |
This brings me to the final note of this chapter. The focus of this project lies in war recurrence, not on the functioning of the resulting systems. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the state resulting from the war in Kosovo, despite its declaration of independence and sovereignty, cannot be considered to be a functioning one. The implication is that the recurrence of war and the building of statehood are two separate issues, even though they are evidently connected. The analysis above has only demonstrated that the impact of war on functional systems took the form of undermining their operations; not in subverting them in order to continue its operations. To put it in another way, the systems that emerged after the termination of the conflict did not need the continuation or recurrence of war in order to function. In the next chapter though, this was not the case.
5 THE SECOND RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR (1999-2009)

“It’s like a blood feud,’ says Adam Osmaev, one of the key Chechen commanders participating in the war. ’Politics can’t stop it.’”—Cited in TIME (2015)

The war in Chechnya never fully stopped. Even in 2012, “Armed conflict in the North Caucasus is the most violent in Europe today” (International Crisis Group 2012), despite sustained and strong efforts by the Russian state to quell the insurgency. Notwithstanding recent gains towards state stability, economic growth, and higher autonomy, the “peace is fragile” (International Crisis Group 2015). Chechnya suffers many human rights abuses like torture or extrajudicial executions (Human Rights Watch 2009), whilst Russia remains subject to occasional terrorist attacks by Chechen separatists (The Guardian 2011; Rosenberg 2011). This is surprising. Not only has Chechnya been confronted with overwhelming military force, which was used freely to quell the insurgency, but also large-scale concessions to the Russian republic have been made, like greater autonomy to the extent of almost forming a separate justice system, high economic subsidies, and a media campaign to create the ideological support for the status quo (International Crisis Group 2015). However, never having been granted the right of independence, “war never stopped in this part of the world” (Özel 2011).

In this chapter, I argue that structural coupling can account for this situation. In short, I maintain that the war undermined the operations of functional system, which instead of activating stopping mechanisms for the war system became dependent on it. Despite various proclamations on the cessation of the conflict, the continuation of operations by functional systems became dependent on the survival of the conflict; other than in Kosovo, a political, judicial, economic, and media-war system formed which inhibited the termination of the conflict. This formation was aided by developments in the war system itself, namely the fragmentation of actors without the isolation of particular conflict parties, and the

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70 For instance, explosions in a Russian subway system killing 40 people in 2010 or a suicide attack on a police station in Nazran in 2009.
intensification of war, which took the form of dispersion of violence. Instead of aggravation towards a decisive battle, violence became possible practically everywhere.

The Chechen case allows for a second empirical insight, namely on the movement along the conflict stages. As indicated in chapter 2, a subordination conflict which only changes to an identity conflict is more likely to revert than one that moves towards issue conflicts. In Chechnya, these movements can be observed in the period between the First and Second Russo-Chechen War. Accordingly, I proceed in this chapter by illustrating the formation of the war system along various stages: issue conflicts (1957–1985/86), identity conflict (1986–1994), subordination conflict (1994-1996), before moving back to identity conflict (1996-1999), and once again subordination conflict (1999-2009). As in the case of Kosovo, the historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts are included in the mapping of the systemic differentiation. The aim is to give a nuanced account and explanation of subsequent events to avoid the assignment of blame and the formulation of counterproductive policy implications. The second part of this chapter provides the analyses based on considerable amounts of newspaper sources and substantiates the claims made above.

5.1 The Historical Roots of the Russo-Chechen Conflict: A Circle of Violence?

This section covers the period from 1722 to 1957, the contact between the Russian Empire (later Soviet Union) and Chechnya. The Russian empire perceived its expansion to Chechnya as a mission of civilization (Russell 2007, 51). Unmentioned were geopolitical considerations, such as expansion of territory, extraction of resources or access to the sea. Under Peter the Great, both geopolitics and the desire for modernization found their expression in an aggressive expansion of the Russian Empire, the modernization and enlargement of its army, together with the desire of westernizing its state structures. Russia was starting its territorial expansion into the North Caucasus already in the mid-1550s (Moore 2011, 40). Thus, even before recurrent and systematic clashes between Russian and Chechens occurred, the first noteworthy military
defeat under Peter the Great happened in 1722 near the village of Enderi. German remarks that “Following Peter the Great’s death in 1725, Russia’s imperial expansion was suspended for almost 50 years until Catherine the Great renewed the drive to the south, as rivalry with the Persian and Ottoman empires for influence in the region intensified” (2003, 3). The Chechens had been portrayed as Caucasian highlanders, freedom loving, fierce fighters, but also as bandits, hostage-takers, and slave traders. Therefore, the conflict, which really started in 1722 and lasted nominally until 1864, was accompanied by racial sentiments and demonization one of the other.

The clashes between the Russian forces and the Chechen inhabitants intensified after 1780. Of particular importance is the year 1785, when the first gazavat—a type of holy war within Islam (Henze 1995, 5)—against the Russians was proclaimed by Sheikh Mansur (Gammer 2006, 17). This event is highly significant for three reasons. Firstly, it exposed the importance of the interplay between the order of the Chechen society and the territorial expansion of the Russian state. Although Chechen society is often referred to as being anarchic, it can more accurately be described as lacking a central hierarchy. Within Chechen society, we find a coherent structure clustered around different teips—Chechen villages. Faced with an external threat, inter-Chechen rivalries were temporarily discarded to fight the greater foe. Secondly, although the early Chechen society cannot be called Islamic, the proclamation of gazavat demonstrated the extent of Islamization that had been reached by 1785 (Lieven 1998, 305). Thirdly, the Chechens did not present a unified front against the Russians.

After 1785, hostilities between the Russians and Chechens increased. One important date is 1805 when the Georgians called on the Russians to overwhelm Chechen forces, as Georgian farms were continuously subjected to raids. This left a permanent mark on the Georgian-Chechen relationship. It took another 12 years until the Great Caucasian war started, which lasted for 47 years and was marked by harsh brutality and military strategies by Russian and Chechen forces alike that would repeat until today. For instance, on September 27, 1819,
Russian General Sysoev was responsible for the massacre of the Chechen village of Dadi Yurt, where Russian troops killed people regardless of gender or age (Bullough 2010, 261). Prior to this village, the troops of General Sysoev had destroyed six other communities, always offering peace deals, being rejected, and then continuing by exterminating the whole village. Additionally, fueled by both the hatred produced by wars and the visible cultural differences that became apparent when these two people came into contact, the mutual demonization of the other enabled an even greater extent to the violence and acts of brutality. Finally, strategically, the Chechens mobilized the entire village in their fight against the Russians (Seely 2001, 37).

Although the Chechen resistance was crushed in 1864, the peace was spurious. This was the result of the particularities of Chechen society and the military strategy employed during the conflict. Firstly, the problems emerging from the imposition of a hierarchical order on an anarchical society such as the Chechen one guaranteed a level of substantial freedom for Chechen villages, particularly those in the mountainous regions. Secondly, military strategy also shaped the later situation. Primarily, because of the superior strength of Russian forces, Chechen resistance fighters adapted by using guerilla warfare strategies, namely the avoidance of large-scale battles in favor of ambushes and hiding out in the mountains. The Russians responded to this strategy by building a line of forts to defend their positions. As Schaefer notes, “The Russians could not best the Chechens in the forests […]. But in the forts, the Russian cannons provided the superior technological advantage which prevented the Chechens from driving the Russians out” (2010, 58). Despite the incorporation of Chechnya into Russia, conflict remained defining characteristics of the Russo-Chechen relationship.

One immediate result of the Caucasian War (1817-1864) was the expulsion of Chechen people from Chechnya and their migration to the Ottoman Empire, whilst European settlers flocked to the new capital of Groznyy as oil workers (German 2003, 3). This contributed to the even starker divide between capital and land. The mixture of forts and expulsion of Chechens led to a relative peaceful period in the Russo-Chechen relationship. On November 30, 1922, the
Chechen Autonomous oblast was created and integrated within the structures of the Soviet Union. As a result of the Soviet ‘divide-and-rule’ policy, in 1934, the Chechen Autonomous oblast and the Ingush Autonomous oblast were merged (Arbatov 1997, 33). Yet, despite attempts to delude the Chechen population and stir antagonism in the periphery, by 1944, Chechens became the largest ethnic group within the new territory. What followed was one of the most traumatic events in the history of Chechen society, as Stalin accused the Chechens of collaborating with the enemy. Consequently, he ordered the deportation of approximately 500,000 Chechens and Ingush to northern Kazakhstan (Tishkov 2004, 15). Under Khrushchev’s leadership, in his efforts of de-Stalinization, Chechens were allowed to return. This did not mark the event of a peaceful coexistence between the Chechens and Soviets, but the advent of a new circle of violence. This is the topic of the next section.

5.2 Stages of the Russo-Chechen Conflict

At this point, it becomes evident that in the long history between Russia and Chechnya, both sides have repeatedly committed violent acts against each other. While the largest difference, in contrast, to the case in Kosovo is that the claim of ‘first ownership’ is uncontested—the Chechens were there first—the territory of Chechnya was early on recognized as an integral part of the Russian Empire. Because of these two irreconcilable positions, conflict appeared inevitable. Moreover, the nature of the military strategies employed by both Chechens and Russians, guerilla warfare on the one hand and sweeping through villages on the other, led to a prolonged conflict and to mutual demonization of the other. The culmination of the confrontation with the mass deportations of Chechens under Stalin resulted, and furthermore, in a collective trauma that merged the narrative of the Chechen fighter with the victim of Russian aggression. In contrast to this, the Russians perceived themselves much more as a civilizing power and a force of progress. Ultimately, the conflict originated from the Chechens’ rejection of Russian hierarchical order and political domination of their society.
5.2.1 The Issue Conflict(s): Sovietization, Demography, and the Economy

The period from 1957 to 1988—with Gorbachev’s reforms of glasnost and perestroika—is identifiable as an era of issue conflicts. This period was marked by little (open) Chechen discontent with the Soviet Union as well as the process of Sovietization71 (Zürcher 2007, 73). The reasons for this are twofold: first of all, the loyalty of most Chechens lay with their own teip more than with the construct of a Chechen state. During the years of exile, it was because of the connection with their respective teips that Chechens managed to maintain their cultural identity as well as their language, folklore, and songs. The second reason for the relative low level of discontent with the central state were the problems the returnees faced upon arrival to their home country. There was a clash between the returnees and the new settlers, which led as often as not to violent confrontations. Additionally, the attempts of Sovietization led to a partial integration of Chechens into the emerging society, albeit at much lower participation rates than Russians. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a range of areas of contestation around which the discontenting voices have clustered. These refer primarily to the socio-economic situation of Chechens in the Soviet Union, higher birthrates, and the environment.

Demographic dynamics played an important role. Indeed, a significant shift occurred within the Chechen-Ingush oblast in favor of the indigenous population: between 1979 and 1989, the Chechen-Ingush population grew by 9.9 percent (Henze 1991, 156). At the same time, the Russian population increased only by 7 percent. However, if we look at the percentage of Russians in the oblast itself and the change thereof, we find even stronger indicators of the change in the population. During the same years, the percentage of Russians decreased by 12.6 points, which constitutes a significant change in the demographic setup of Chechen society (German 2003, 22). The reason for this change was mainly the higher birthrate in Chechens. This was not only due to a different socio-economic situation amongst the Chechen population,

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71 The Sovietization encompassed mainly the change in school curriculum and a shift from Arabic to Cyrillic letters, the change of street names, the fusion of Chechnya with Ingushetia, and the general expulsion of everything that countered the Soviet ideology by showing ethnic, cultural or religious differences.
but the clan structure that laid higher emphasis on children and the desire to repopulate Chechnya. However, the dire economic situation in Chechnya, which was relatively worse than in other territories of the Soviet Union, encouraged many Russians and Chechens to migrate to other areas—which proved easier for Russians than Chechens (Sakwa 2005a, 24).

The list of economic problems was long and included poor standards of living, high rates of unemployment, and lack of a functioning infrastructure. This situation was surprising, as Chechnya was one of the main sources of oil in the Soviet Union. However, from 1971 to 1980, oil extraction had declined from 21 to 4 million tons. Additionally, “In the late 1980s, the largest petrochemical firms in Chechnya employed some 50,000 workers and engineers, of which only a few hundred were Chechen or Ingush” (Evangelista 2011, 148). The lack of available jobs was compensated by seeking work in the shadow economy or migrating abroad as ‘guest workers’. “Many Chechens turned to the nascent ‘grey’ and ‘black’ economies that were to thrive in the USSR under Brezhnev. This produced considerable profits for the Chechens and resentment from the Russians, who felt that they were being ripped off” (Russell 2005, 104). Particularly Chechens in villages were affected by the dire economic situation (German 2003, 20). The dangerous combination of a growing population together with a thriving shadow economy and dissatisfaction with the ruling apparatus, partially because of injuries suffered from the past, and partially to blame for the current situation, turned Chechnya into a powder keg that was waiting to explode.

In Chechnya, voicing dissatisfaction became possible with glasnost and perestroika. Protests first appeared regarding the environment: In 1988, the construction of a biochemical plant in Gudermes, the second largest city in the Chechnya-Ingush oblast, was objected against (Hughes 2007, 18). The demonstrators in Groznyy quickly expanded their list of grievances to include the protection of the Chechen language, the right to openly practice their religion, and to defend their national culture. These protests consolidated national identity around later independence movement forms (Lieven 1998, 56–57).
5.2.2 The Identity Conflict: Creation of the Independence Movement

In recent studies, the aspect of religion is often singled out as the main culprit in agitating the Chechen population into open resistance (Gammer 2006; Hegghammer 2010); however, at the onset of the demonstrations, it was the Popular Front—aimed at alleviating concrete problems—who was behind the popular movement (Hughes 2007). The Popular Front was the forerunner of the National Front, the movement which would later call for the independence of Chechnya and the creation of a new state. The events started to accelerate with the 1988 demonstrations in Groznyy. Firstly, the nascent independent press started to make use of its new freedoms, as several newspapers and journals opened. Secondly, in 1989 the National Front played an active role in the elections of the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies. While this was another step towards independence, it was a typical occurrence for the dismantling Soviet Union and went practically unnoticed, as Moscow became consumed by the power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev (Erlanger 1992). This might be all the more surprising, considering that the “congress began adopting openly separatist resolutions” (Azrael and Payin 1996, 12). From November 23 to 25, 1990, the first National Congress of the Chechen People was held, during which General Dzhokhar Dudayev started his ascension to power. Dudayev “maintained that the Communist government had lost the trust of the people and that it needed to be dissolved” (Toft 2003, 71). He further advocated independence for Chechnya, the freedom to practice religion, and compensations for crimes that were committed under communist leadership. Three dimensions of the conflict became apparent: the struggle for leadership in Moscow between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, the demand for independence of former Soviet republics, and the struggle for power within the Chechen elite between Dudayev and the communists, represented by Zavgayev.

Dudayev moved quickly to take control over Chechnya. His followers stormed the local KGB offices and demanded from Russia to recognize Dudayev’s position (Toft 2003, 72). Regardless of Yeltsin’s threats of taking measures to “stabilize the situation” (Sakwa 2005a,
27), the apparatus around Dudayev organized on October 27, 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections. Dudayev won. In an election which was considered to be mostly fair, Chechens voted against the threats of Moscow. The struggle for independence found support from Russians and Ingushetians living in Chechnya. As a consequence, on November 1, 1991, Dudayev proclaimed the sovereignty of the Chechen republic (German 2003, 39). One did not have to wait long for Moscow’s response and its desire to make good on its promise. Yeltsin, who had factually gained power against Gorbachev and considered himself ruler of both Moscow and Groznyy, commanded Russian troops to ‘restore order’ in the Chechen republic (Toft 2003, 74). The Chechen parliament reacted with the assignment of emergency powers to Dudayev, the declaration of martial law, and mobilization of Chechen troops. As Russian troops were ill-prepared, they were defeated quickly and humiliated by the Chechen forces (Schaefer 2010, 117).

5.2.3 Subordination Conflict I: Restoring Constitutional Order

The period between 1992 and the first Russo-Chechen War of 1994 was an uneasy peace or ‘stalemate’ (Toft 2003, 75), since both sides were unsatisfied with the current situation, but no forceful move had been made to change it. Several factors contributed to the shift towards a subordination conflict. Among these was the rise of religious zeal in Chechnya, the large-scale presence and availability of weapons from the former Soviet army, the worsening of the economic situation bundled together with the rise of crime and mafia structures in the new republic, the drive of Russian Great Power, the relationship between Dudayev and Yeltsin, and both Yeltsin’s and Dudayev’s use of rhetoric to generate public support at the expense of the other.

The desire for stronger Islamic influence on the republic has played a vital role in the motivation towards greater autonomy. This was reflected in the new constitution drafted under Dudayev’s regime and ratified in March 1992. Not only was independence reaffirmed in the
document (German 2003, 59), but also the Islamic nature of the new state (Cornell 2005, 41). Yet, while it is true that religion did have a stronger appeal on the young and unemployed population and, consequently, acted as a driving force to greater autonomy, in itself it did not call out for violent resistance; indeed, few would assign responsibility to Islam for the emergence of the First Russo-Chechen War. “The growing trend towards Islamization in Chechnya widened the political and cultural gap between Grozny and the federal center, thus reducing the chances of reaching a mutually acceptable compromise concerning the country’s final political status” (Hunter, Thomas, and Melikishvili 2004, 152). But Islam as a radical ideology used by insurgency fighters only surfaced during and after the First Russo-Chechen war (Hughes 2007, 105).

A second enabling factor to the conflict was the sudden availability of weapons to the newly formed Chechen forces. Compared to earlier bids for independence, “Things were dramatically different in 1994, […] because the Chechens were able to get the heavy weapons, vehicles, sanctuary, and time to actually conduct large-scale operations against the Russians” (Schaefer 2010, 66). In fact, “Dudayev and his armed forces were equipped with weapons ‘left’ by the withdrawing Soviet Army in 1992” (German 2003, 135). Although General Shaposhnikov of the Russian army ordered all weapons and military equipment out from military facilities throughout Chechnya to be shipped to Russia, Dudayev’s forces were able to seize and steal as much as 80 percent of the entire stockpile. Additionally, the retreating Russian forces, often sold their weapons for cigarettes or alcohol. It is true that the military equipment of Dudayev’s troops helped solidify the will of (violent) resistance against later Russian intervention, but its concrete effect became visible later on in the conduct of war (and its outcome) rather than actually causing it in the first place.

Under the new regime, the situation of the average Chechen worsened, particularly in terms of economic well-being. Many Chechens before 1991 had the possibility to migrate to other areas in the Soviet Union to work for a season or so. This option, under the new republic,
was not possible anymore, forcing many to migrate into the shadow economy, working as smugglers or for mafia-like organizations. This gave rise to clientelism, meaning in this case the favoring of individuals based on their teip connection and corruption. As a consequence, crime and lawlessness soared in the new republic, often times spilling over the borders into Russia, which contributed to the perception of Chechnya by Russians as a “lawless enclave” (Politkovskaia 2003, 82) and as the home of bandits. Here, we find one of the official reasons for the later intervention by the Russian state into Chechnya: “to restore law and order in the Chechen Republic” (Ushakov 2000, 1161). At the same time, dissatisfaction with the economic situation and the soaring of crime was concentrated in the growing opposition against Dudayev within Chechen society.

Dudayev played an important role in the formation of the conflict, as he felt the need to compensate for his lacking of a Chechen background. Although born in Chechnya in 1944, he spend (after deportations under Stalin) his first thirteen years in Kazakhstan before starting a military career in the Tambov Military Academy, later moving on to Siberia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Estonia (Tishkov 2004, 59). He advanced in the Soviet military and became the only Chechen general in the history of the Soviet army. When “Dudayev faced mounting opposition at home as some constituents blamed him for the misfortunes of the Chechen economy” (Toft 2003, 76), he was quick to blame this on the Russians as part of a conspiracy (Seely 2001, 118). Dudayev wanted both to secure his regime domestically against other opposition and to especially gain international recognition of Chechnya as a state, with himself as the legitimate leader of this state. His strategy failed at home and abroad. Domestic opposition mounted to such a degree that it seemed only a miracle could and would save Dudayev. Internationally, across the board, countries refused to recognize the sovereignty of Chechnya. Most crucial in this regard was the relationship between Yeltsin and Dudayev, in which the latter continuously strove for a personal meeting with the new Russian president. Besides the personal contempt that Yeltsin harbored for the Chechen leader, Russians feared
that a meeting between the two would be conceived as a *de facto* recognition of Chechen statehood. As a consequence, many officials on both sides met almost on a regular basis, but ultimately the two heads of state never personally encountered each other. Some believe that war could have been avoided had these two protagonists actually met (German 2003, 97).

However, Yeltsin was the president of a state which was falling apart in many regards. Confronted with the lack of working institutional structures, independence movements in its periphery, and a deeply problematic economic situation, Yeltsin had to hold together a state traditionally fueled by its aspirations to be a Great Power (Russell 2007, 131). Next to the opposition from old communist elites which manifested itself in the 1993 coup attempt, the Russian population was equally deeply frustrated with the new situation they found themselves in. On the one hand, they felt to be on the losing side of the Cold War, with the dismantlement of the Soviet Union and the loss of international prestige; if not power. On the other, similarly to Chechnya, rapid economic liberalization created more losers than winners. Finally, after the defeat of Russian forces in Chechnya in 1991, Yeltsin was under immense pressure to make no further mistakes in his policy toward Chechnya in order not to appear weak or lose more territory. This, in turn, sheds light on the decision never to meet with Dudayev in person and to maintain a hard line against the Chechen separatists.

The situation further deteriorated from mid-1994 onwards.\textsuperscript{72} Clashes between the two forces in Chechnya intensified, often spilling over into Russian territory, while domestic pressure on both Yeltsin and Dudayev contributed to the hardening of their political stances. Although Chechnya was on the brink of civil war itself by October 1994, it was the full-scale military invasion by Russian forces that shaped its development for the next decades. The decision to invade was made after Russian authorities became increasingly worried that a Chechen civil war could spill over into neighboring republics (German 2003, 116).

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\textsuperscript{72} Between December 1994 and August 1996, Russia launched a campaign to restore “constitutional order in Chechnya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia” (Karagiannis 2002, 61).
5.2.4 Subordination Conflict II: Chechnya’s Unstable Peace

The Khasavyurt Peace Accord of August 31, 1996 and the subsequent peace treaty of 1997, which ended the First Russo-Chechen War, provided only a short-term stabilization of the conflict. Of most crucial importance was the unresolved question of Chechen secession, but also the conduct of the Russian military, the success of the Chechen resistance, the role the Russian media played, and the unrelenting economic situation, which further enabled the emergence of an environment of lawlessness and the resort to kidnapping and extortion of ransom money. Certainly, the relations between Russia and Chechnya remained at the level of identity conflict.

After two years of fighting, on April 21, 1996 Dudayev was killed by two laser-guided missiles from Russia. He was supplanted by Maskhadov, who managed to reach a negotiated settlement with Moscow; the hostilities were stopped and the crucial question of independence was adjourned for five years, until 2001. One year later, Yeltsin and Maskhadov met in Moscow to sign the final version of the treaty. By then approximately 50,000 civilians and 10,000 Russian soldiers had lost their lives, notwithstanding the economic costs (which for the Russian state amounted to about 3 trillion rubles every day) and the political costs of a declining support rate for the Yeltsin regime (Gall 1997). The hope of this treaty was to establish stable structures upon which a peaceful transition could be realized. Demonstrating the gap between intention and actual outcome, “Tragically, this was not to be, and the three years of Chechen quasi-independence saw the republic plunge into an orgy of lawlessness that threatened not only its own citizens, but also its neighboring regions and ultimately Russia itself” (Sakwa 2005b, 10).

The conduct of the Russian military during the war contributed to the deteriorating relationship between Russians and Chechens. The Russian soldiers were badly prepared and not trained for the kind of warfare that they would encounter in Chechnya. The majority of soldiers were young, underpaid, inexperienced, and completely unable, to restore “constitutional law and order” (German 2003, 129). This was reinforced by the rejection from
Chechen forces of the classical decisive battlefield in favor of urban (and later mountain) warfare. Lack of success on the military front, fear, as well as institutionalized abuse during military training, the so-called dedovshchina (Bender 2014), led to both alcoholism and a propensity towards the overuse of violence. The consequence was the near-complete devastation of Groznyy—as insurgency fighters hid in the urban buildings from Russian fighters, who in turn adopted a strategy of slow demolition. After the destruction of the Chechen capital, fighters on both fronts moved to the mountainous terrain to continue the war there. The situation remained in many respects the same: Russian superior numbers were countered by guerilla strategies, often with the Chechen fighters obtaining the victory. This military situation greatly supported the separatist movements. As Lieven reminds us, “During the war, out of anger with the Russian invasion and atrocities by Russian troops, many of them [Chechen fighters] rallied to the separatists” (1998, 59).

The Russian media played a crucial role. The Russian authorities were not used to having a free press and did not quite understand how to treat it. Moreover, “It is necessary to mention that Russian society was overwhelmingly opposed to the first war, not to a small degree because Russian journalists in their last moment of professional glory exposed, with great passion, the war’s senselessness and ghastly reality” (Politkovskaia 2003, 20). Images of children being killed or injured, soldiers fleeing for their lives, and Russian troops shooting Russian civilians inside Groznyy evidently increased the pressure on the Yeltsin regime to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Of crucial importance were the terrorist attacks by Shamil Basayev, who in mid-1995 brought 150 volunteers across the border into Russian territory to the town of Budennovsk (Schaefer 2010, 131–32). There, he took 1,500 prisoners and fortified his position inside the local hospital. Under the focus of Russian media cameras, Russian Special Forces eventually stormed the building, killing many hostages in the process. Under heavy public pressure, Russian officials were forced to negotiate with the Chechen fighters—an attempt which almost did lead to a peace deal. Similar events continued to cement anti-war
sentiment in the Russian population and exert pressure on Yeltsin, particularly in the election year of 1996, which of course was one of the prime motivations for the eventual peace deal. The consequence, however, was that the Russian authorities learned the importance of the media and that a successful military campaign needed to be ‘communicated’ to the domestic audience.

After the signing of the peace deal, the economic situation did not improve visibly. On the contrary, Chechnya descended further into chaos and lawlessness, which was not only reinforced by mafia/clan-like entities profiting from the absence of law and state order, but also by the rise of systematic kidnappings of foreigners then working and living in Chechnya. “Most of the blame was placed on criminal gangs that were able to operate freely in the lawless region. Russian Interior Ministry statistics showed that up to 1,300 people were kidnapped in Chechnya between 1996 and 1999” (Global Security 2015). The Russian authorities considered this both as a violation of the peace accord and as something which was tolerated by the Maskhadov government. Identifying Basayev as the main culprit behind these attacks, Russian troops again engaged with Chechen insurgents.

Consequently, the conclusion of the first war did not lead to enthusiasm on the Chechen side, but rather to a fracturing of the Chechen state back along old cleavages; “the victors began to violently persecute other Chechens, particularly those who did not cooperate with them” (Tishkov 2004, 106). Radical Islamists, under the leadership of Basayev, gained popularity. The dismal economic situation, together with the already fueled hatred against the Russians and the inflow of foreign fighters with radical Islamic backgrounds (Hegghammer 2010, 83), led to an increase of Islamism in Chechnya. In this respect, it has been argued that “Maskhadov allowed the Salafists to build their own alternative hierarchy within Chechnya that would eventually contend with him for power and precipitate a second war with Russia” (Schaefer 2010, 173). What happened was the ill-conceived incursion of Islamists into neighboring Dagestan in 1999 in order to establish a North Caucasian Imamate. With the help of Russian
air and artillery forces, the occupied Dagestanian villages managed to drive out the Islamists. In retaliation, Chechen separatists allegedly planted bombs at several residential buildings in Moscow, which prompted a reaction from the Putin administration in the form of a declaration of war on August 26, 1999. Russian troops then entered into Chechnya in a war that would, by most accounts, last for 10 years until April 15, 2009 (Steele 2008; M. Schwirtz 2009b).

5.3 Observing the War System

Having established the initial parameters of the Russo-Chechen conflict, the remainder of this chapter contrasts the development of this war system with the manifestations outlined in chapters 2 and 3. Based on the analysis of a stratified sample of the entire collection of NYT articles that were published during the period of war, a total number of 1,678 (sample size was above 800), I demonstrate that the empirical record overwhelmingly confirms the expectations of a recurrent war system. In short, the war was more than parasitical on the societal total and on individual functional systems, as it formed structural couplings with functional systems. Regarding the latter, the continuation of the operations of functional systems became much more dependent on the continuation of the war than was the case in Kosovo. Operations within the war system reinforced this development, as the fragmentation of actors circumvented the isolation of one actor group, and the intensification denied a decisive (military) outcome. Consequently, the war in Chechnya was never fully terminated. I consider each manifestation now in turn.

5.3.1 The Disintegration of Chechnya’s Social Order

In the Chechen case, we can distinguish between multiple manifestations of the dissolution of the social fabric, namely the removal of large parts of the population along with the physical representation of Chechen culture, the increase of violence directed at Chechen and Russian populations, both inside and outside of Chechnya, in the forms of sexual harassment, the
widespread use of torture and kidnappings, and a kind of psychological trauma experienced by both the civil population and the fighting forces. The aim of this chapter is not to assign blame to Russia and make it responsible for the events that occurred in Chechnya, because the reality is far too complex than that. One example is the presence of foreign Jihadist fighters in the ranks of some Chechen rebels, who tried to impose a religiously zealous social order on a population against its will. In the remainder of this section, I provide a short overview of the corresponding evidence.

As was mentioned earlier, the Russian incursion into Chechnya involved the destruction of whole villages (Bohlen 1999a) and leveling Groznyy to the ground. This strategy continued to affect the civil population well into the later years of the campaign (Kramer 2008). Moreover, that civilians, both ethnically Chechen and Russian living in Chechnya, would be physically affected was basically ignored by the Russian military (The New York Times 1999s). The killing of civilians by Russians was a common occurrence during this war. Moreover, this happened during all phases of the war. Particularly at the onset of the campaign, civilians would often voice the mistreatment at the hands of Russian officers (Bohlen 1999f; Gall 1999g; Tyler 2001c, 4). It was rather bad preparation of a counterinsurgency campaign than malcontent which often drew Russian forces into several ambushes (Gordon 1999t; M. Schwirtz and Philips 2006). Equally, Russian civilians were targeted by Chechen groups, like a terrorist attack on a Moscow apartment complex (Wines 1999b), a raid at a Moscow theater (Myers 2003b) or the Beslan school massacre (Reuters 2004). Indeed, it appears that if anything, violence had been increasing over time with the aim of raising the costs of warfare for the Russian regime, while the Russian violence remained constant (if not even in decline). In Chechnya, this led to the expulsion of civilians from the territory and the destruction of historical, cultural, and religious artifacts. In many ways, one can claim that the destruction of cultural treasures like landmarks and museums (Kishkovsky 2002b) was part of the larger campaign of ridding Chechnya from the Chechens (if not people then history, culture, and, more broadly, identity) and impart on the
ability to communicate being Chechen. Indirectly, the steady flow of refugees outside of Chechnya (Gall 1999h), early on already 150,000 refugees (Broad 2002), with little chance of returning (Wines 2002d), subjected to random violence (Wines 2003a), contributed to the forming of a new social order in refugee camps outside of Chechnya (Chivers 2004a), and the disintegration of the old one within Chechnya.

Additionally, we see that the people subjected to war experienced more violence, like living in food scarcity, being exposed to torture, rape, general harassment, and kidnappings. There was a different kind of social disintegration within (and outside of) Chechnya, in which war combatants and civilians increased their willingness to harm others. While the problem of food scarcity resulted in “lines over two miles long” (The New York Times 1999p), the everyday life of the people became affected by the closing down of schools and hospitals and the constant threat of harassment on the street. It was experienced, for instance, by “two desperate women, who said Russian soldiers had ripped their ear-rings from their ears and stolen their food” (Gordon 1999t). Others joined, with “tales of looting and summary executions of residents who objected to the plunder [of a village]” (Gordon 1999t), stories of civilians being kicked and beaten by Russian soldiers (Wines 2000b), and in general accounts of atrocities wide-spread (Wines 2000d). Abducted rebels lived to tell the story of torture, like having a needle pushed under the fingernail or being ‘warmed up’ by having electronic current sent through the finger (Tyler 2001a). Reports noted the high amount of abductions, people who went missing, as well as ‘fragments of bodies’ discovered (Wines 2003b; Chivers 2004c).

An atmosphere of fear and mistrust was the consequence. This was a fright charged directly first and foremost against the presence and conduct of Russian soldiers in Chechnya. In Russia, this fear expressed itself in “negative attitudes toward minorities, in particular Caucasians” (Tavernise 2002). However, this suspicion went further than that in a sort of fear over everyone. After years of war, some Chechens “cannot go out after dark, when the streets pop with gunfire between guerrillas and Russian troops” (Wines 2003a). In the republic, as one
commentator noted, the “years of fighting have spawned a cycle of revenge and where much of
the capital, Groznyy, is in ruins and most of the population is poor and unemployed” (Mydans
2003). Indeed, in the later years of the campaign it was impossible to find Chechens who were
not in one way or the other traumatized by the warfare, had lost a relative or witnessed the death
of somebody close by. Indeed, a “medical commission in Moscow blamed emotional stress for
the mysterious illness that struck 85 people in six towns in Chechnya over the last week”
(Thorner 2005). And it was not that the Russian soldiers coped any better, as the Chechen war
gave birth to something called the ‘Chechen syndrome’, which is similar to the Vietnam
syndrome experienced by US soldiers after the war in Vietnam. This was not only the case of
the horrors soldiers experienced during the war, but also how they were treated by the Russian
army itself (Myers 2005a).

5.3.2 Structural Coupling of the Subordination Conflict

In line with the theoretical framework elaborated in chapters 2 and 3, the structural couplings
of the war system with its environment were observed. This coupling took the form of making
functional systems (politics, economy, law, media) reliant on the continuation of the conflict.
Consequently, as I demonstrate below, specific war systems formed during the war.

War and politics: The empirical analysis revealed (at least) four dimensions in the
relationship between war and the political system: the domestic (Russia and Chechnya), the
regional (Commonwealth of Independent States), the international, and the transnational. The
rally-round-the-flag effect, which can be observed during the Kosovo War (in the case of the
US) would suggest that the impact of regime support is only a short lived one. However, in this
case, this effect managed to increase, creating little pressure on the Putin regime to actually
change course. As demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the high degree of coupling
between the war and the political system can best account for this situation.
From the beginning, we can see that “the operation in Dagestan […] had broad support in Russia, even in Dagestan” (Bohlen 1999a). Putin understood that initial popular support for a military campaign needed to be nourished. Consequently, the opening strategy was a cautious one, in which “The Russian military has bombed bases in Chechnya, but has been reluctant to invade the disputed province” (Gordon 1999j, 30), as such a move would jeopardize the illusion of a quick military victory. As such, the war helped propel Putin to the presidency (Bohlen 1999f; The New York Times 1999r; Wines 1999d) and created continuously high support ratings for his regime (Myers 2007c; C. J. Levy 2007). However, this political system was one in which the domestic opposition became silenced and the institutional structure geared towards a centralized state around Moscow. We can see this, both in the decrease of criticism of the regime, which called “the Yeltsin Government […] ‘completely unprepared’ to deal with terrorism” (Gordon 1999k, 95), leading to a “consensus […] that stretches across society and across the political spectrum—Mr. Yeltsin’s time has run out” (Bohlen 1999b), and the breaking of ranks to “end the campaign” (Bohlen 1999c). In later phases of the war, its rejection became equated with being a traitor to the Russian state (Wines 2002a), silence preferred over voice (Kishkovsky 2002c), protest on the street disappearing (Wines 2003c), and critical media channels closing (Arvedlund 2003), allowing only for sporadic criticism, like the conduct of the Special Forces during the Beslan crisis or the investigation of the killing of the Kremlin-critic Ana Politkovskaya (Chivers 2007a).

The Russian state successfully framed the conflict in terms of restoring order within and outside of Russia. With regard to Dagestan and Chechnya, the war was portrayed as a mission to regain administrative control in the rebel-held regions, as “all villages seized by the rebels were liberated and handed over to local administrations” in order to “restore stability and prosperity to a region that has been torn apart” (Bohlen 1999a), “undermine Mr. Maskhadov” (The New York Times 1999o) and create a “version that allowed less autonomy than in other independent republics in Russia” (Tavernise 2003), in which a “Kremlin-backed Constitution”
(The New York Times 2003) with a “Kremlin-backed Chechen president [Akhmad Kadyrov]” (Chivers 2005c) would reign. In fact, restoring order in Russia, meant first of all, establishing rule over Chechnya, and secondly, disrupting the possibility of dissent within other regions of Russia proper. This took the form of making the legitimacy over the use of force visible and enforcing a constitutional order in Chechnya (The New York Times 2000b; Hill 2004), whilst at the same time, altering it within Russia proper, with “sweeping proposal[s] to overhaul Russia's political system—replacing, for instance, the election of governors, presidents and other regional leaders with presidential appointments” (Myers 2004c). Moreover, the war was perceived not only as a chance to alter the Russian political system in favor of the Kremlin, but to “reassert Russian control over the entire Caucasus” (Bohlen 1999e; Tyler 2000c; Cowell 2006).

The war also coupled with the Chechen political system. Firstly, different Chechen warlords, like Basayev, elected representatives, like Maskhadov, Islamic militants generating and drawing on popular support, and Russian backed representatives, the Kadyrovs, can be identified. The positions within this Chechen political system oscillated between working together with the Russian authorities, participating in Chechen elections under a Russian-backed constitution on the one hand, and establishing an alternative to Moscow as well as rejecting its claim of rule on the other. As there were various power sources competing for the trajectory of the Chechen state, the steering capacities of each of these groups was far more limited than the Russian counterpart. Furthermore, it seemed that a peace was only reachable, once the Kremlin managed to successfully find local support for its claim of rule.73 Considering the competition between local forces, “Some experts say Mr. Basayev, seen at home as a hero

73 It is particularly interesting how the Russian and Chechen political systems became intertwined. After the first Russian-backed leader in Chechnya, Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov—appointed in June 2000 (Gordon 2000i)—was assassinated (Arvedlund 2004), Putin supported the son, Ramzan Kadyrov, who took over power in February 2007 (Myers 2007a). This was not only a mutually beneficial relationship, in which Kadyrov and Putin supported each other, but rather the manifestation of two political systems (Russia and Chechnya) which drew their legitimacy from the war (see above, and Kadyrov, who was in principle a product of the war itself (Chivers 2005c)), but crucially from the continuation of the war itself (C. B. M. Schwirtz and Philips 2006b).
of the earlier war, may have intervened in Dagestan to raise his profile and re-establish his
credentials as a fearless warrior against Moscow” (Bohlen 1999a). Similarly, support for the
Chechen president Maskhadov was “rallied at a tent city across Chechnya's border in
Ingushetia” (Tyler 2002a). At the same time, discontent in the form of protest and violence
against Russia continuously shackled the nation (Tyler 2000a), either against the presence of
Russian troops as such, or against Kremlin-backed Chechen politicians, like Mr. Kadyrov
(Gordon 2000j; The New York Times 2000c; Myers 2003d; Stanley 2006; M. Schwirtz 2009b)—least of all due to the parallel construction of a separate Moscow-backed government.
However, some Chechens supported Russia, which was expressed in the act of voting for a
Russian-backed candidate (Myers 2004b), allowing for the turnout of an election in favor of
(Putin’s party) “United Russia [of] 99.4 percent of the vote in Chechnya [with a] turnout of 99.5
percent” (C. J. Levy 2007). The quagmire was completed once the rebel forces were included,
which became willing to negotiate and work with Moscow (Myers 2007b; C. J. Levy 2009).

In respect to transnational actors, what can be mentioned are particularly those relating
to political Islam, which acted both as engine (Bohlen 1999a; C. S. Smith 2002a; Erofeyev
2004) and brake to the conflict (Tyler 2001b), in conjunction with the regional political systems.
In contrast, the international political system played a more important role in the conflict. Both
Russia and Chechnya appealed to the international community to make their claims and justify
their cause. Chechen leaders at times criticized the use of terrorism of some rebels (Chivers and
Myers 2004; Chivers 2006a), while at others openly asked for international help (Gordon 1999m; Mydans 2004c). Similarly, Russia operated by criticizing and condemning the Chechen
rebels, criticizing the political West, as well as generally defending itself, by claiming it was
acting in self-defense (Perlez 2000a; Weisman 2004; C. S. Smith 2005). The international arena
remained critical of Russia, pressured it to alter its strategies, if not suspend its campaign
altogether, with the exception of the period following September 11, 2001 (Erofeyev 2003;
Chivers 2005a; M. Schwirtz 2009a). In the political arena, the international dimension served
as an audience to legitimize different power claims, with little direct influence (except in terms of worsening relations between Russia and the political West) in terms of international peace plans (Tyler 2002b; Mydans 2003). The results have been, in conclusion, that international criticism only fueled Putin’s popularity as the leader who was willing and able to stand up to the West, without having to fear large-scale repercussions.

**War and the economy:** The relationship between war and economy is multifaceted and exhibits at least three traits. First of all, the fragile economic system was destroyed in Chechnya, the costs on the Russian state inhibited investments in structural reforms to modernize its economic system, and the international economic system strained. Secondly, a new war economy emerged, in which people profited from the raging corruption, illegal cash trade, and the creation of a private security industry. Simultaneously, the profiteers of violence also fought over and potentially gained new access to natural resources, which Chechnya had plenty of. In relation to the emergence of the new war economy, the third trait refers to the economic system as facilitating and maintaining the conflict. Indeed, it appears that in many ways, the prolonging of conflict was made possible by the absence of a functioning economic state to begin with. In the following paragraphs, I substantiate this claim.

Among the casualties of war, the national infrastructure ranks high (Gordon 2000c; Mydans 2004b; Chivers 2005b). “The latest war has shut down the railroad. The pipeline also traverses Chechnya, where much of its contents have been siphoned off by thieves” (Wines 1999c). Moreover, “Russian planes have struck a broad swath of targets, including oil refineries, telecommunications centers, a television station and the Grozny airport” (Bohlen 1999c); shutting down both lines of communication and of transportation. This was, of course, only a part of the general trend of the destruction of the Chechen economy as “the campaign would be limited to bombing intended to destroy the Chechen economy” (Odom 1999). However, this still meant that the campaign took many shapes. We find the destruction of marketplaces (The New York Times 1999r), oil refineries (Wines 1999d), which in turn only
created a critical mass of underpaid and unemployed people (Gordon 2000c). Factory buildings had been destroyed by Russian troops in their search for Chechen rebels (Kishkovsky 2002a), vineyards burnt to the ground (Myers 2002c), which were, one of the biggest strands of industry of the Chechen state. The Russian state recognized the damaging effect of their campaign by allocating “more than $60 million for Chechnya this year [2001], with $16 million for housing reconstruction in Groznyy during the first quarter” (Tyler 2001a).

The expenses on the Russian state were bigger; and in parallel with the higher costs, the lacking potentials for investment rose. As the NYT remarks, “the economic implications for Russia are devastating. A war of even a few months would cost more money than Russia will get in loans from the International Monetary Fund this year” (Odom 1999). Indeed, part of the international response was sanctioning via the IMF of Russia, resulting in the withholding of needed funds (Gordon 1999n). At the same time, wars are expensive. For instance, in order to “keep up morale amongst the troops, the Russian government has promised to pay soldiers in Chechnya a hefty bonus that could bring their monthly pay to as high as $1,000, a substantial sum in Russia's depressed economy” (Gordon 1999o). But next to soldiers, building up an administrative apparatus, sending police forces, or bolstering up of the law enforcement capacities were costly for Russia (Mydans 2004a). But despite these high costs, the payoff was minimal. As the NYT summarized, “After a decade that has seen two wars between the Russian government and Chechen Islamists and separatists, Chechnya is a land of horrors, a tiny corner of Russia that lies in ruin, plagued by battles in its southern mountains and ambushes and terrorist attacks on its urban streets” (Chivers 2004b).

Crucially, new structures emerged which profited from the war and had a strong interest in maintaining the conflict. Various Chechen groups received grants and financial support from outside, where outside can mean anything from Western governments, the global Islamic
movement to the Russian state itself aiming at co-opting some Chechen fighters.\textsuperscript{74} For instance, “Money and explosives are transferred across the middle of the great Eurasian land mass in ways that Islamist terrorists see as a riposte to the medieval Crusades” (The New York Times 2004a), and often, Mosques and other religious establishments misused to channel financial support to Chechen fighters (Myers 2004a; Lichtblau 2002). Some fighters, additionally, profited from the war by extracting ransom money from kidnappings (Bohlen 1999h; Gordon 2000a; Chivers 2004a; Chivers 2005b). Not only did these actors receive money from their kidnapping efforts, but it proved an effective strategy in keeping other actors out. To give one example, the “wave of kidnappings that has alienated local people seized for ransom and driven foreign investment, international aid organizations and all but the most intrepid outsiders from Chechnya” (Gall 1999i).

It, hence, becomes apparent that the war economy managed to supplant the traditional economy that was in place in Chechnya, as well as weighing down on the growth and development of the Russian economy due to a variety of reasons. Moreover, it is evident that not everybody had to lose from the prolongation of war and that to a certain extent this war served the material self-interest of some individuals and groups. Consequently, this made the political steering of the conflict even more difficult, as the war was not only a political phenomenon, but also created a momentum which needed the facilitation of the conflict much more than any stopping mechanism. However, it stands to reason that at the onset of the conflict the already devastated economic situation in Chechnya enabled the creation of the new war economy in the first place. Accordingly, only a viable economic alternative to the war economy could have served as a stopping mechanism of war; or in other words, what was needed was the destruction of the new war economy whilst simultaneously re-building the existing one. This, however, evidently, lies outside the scope of the economic system.

\textsuperscript{74} Another aspect is that not only some Chechen rebels profited from the war financially, but some Russian actors did so as well (Tyler 2000b).
War and law: One might expect the judicial system to have greater regulatory capacities on the war system than the economic one; after all, certain actions and actors can be criminalized herein with the specific purpose of changing behavior and ending conflicts. At the same time, these regulatory capacities are undermined by war, because the legality surrounding war and the conduct of war are in constant change and, consequently, influenced by the war itself. In the Second Russo-Chechen War, we see an evolution in the categories of lawful and unlawful with regards to criminalization of the opponent, the category of rebel, and the actions of the Russian soldier. Moreover, on the global level, the war has come to challenge the notion of sovereignty, raised the specter of intervention in other states to protect one’s own citizens, as well as to question the use of chemical weapons. Finally, the war has enabled the emergence of competing systems of law along with the reform of the justice system in Russia and the establishment of independent Sharia courts in the territory of Chechnya (and beyond). Consequently, the judicial system has turned out to be much more regulatory in terms of shaping the war than actually being able to impose stopping-mechanisms.

From the beginning of the conflict, “Russia's bombing of Chechnya has been advertised by Defense Minister Sergeyev as a plan to ‘eliminate the bandits’ terrorizing Russian apartment dwellers and to create a zone of Russian security around Chechnya” (The New York Times 1999q). Also, in another instance, “Mr. Putin said the war would be over with ‘the total liquidation of the groups of bandits,’ the deployment of a permanent security contingent in place of federal forces and the start of a ‘democratic process’ in Chechnya” (Gordon 2000e). Yet, equally to portraying the mission as one of restoring order in a region of lawlessness (Gordon 1999p; Chivers 2006d), run over by Chechen bandits, the imagery of the Chechen terrorist emerged, which accordingly needed to be eradicated through anti-terror operations. Thus, the “brutish war in Chechnya is alternately portrayed as Russian troops’ trying to put down ‘terrorists’, or freedom-loving Islamic rebels' seeking to throw off Russian domination” (Gordon 1999q). This narrative particularly emerged after the apartment bombings in Moscow,
the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, as well as strikes in Russia, namely at the Moscow theater siege (C. S. Smith 2002b) and the Beslan massacre (Hoge 2004).

At the same time, the question regarding the legality of Russia’s actions was continuously raised and fueled by the conduct of the Russian military and paramilitary troops in the Caucasus. Whether the Russian reaction to the Dagestan intervention was appropriate or not, there was a widespread consensus that the conduct during this reaction violated basic human rights and international law respectively. In order to combat this situation, a wide range of judicial cases emerged where the lawful actions of soldiers was enforced. Already in 1999, the Russian military announced for the first time the “punishment [of Russian soldiers] for their treatment of civilians” (Wines 1999e), a task that was repeated in order to convince “a skeptical West that Russia is serious about ending human rights abuses in Chechnya” (Gordon 2000h). Throughout the campaign, “questions about Russia’s conduct and counterinsurgency” (Chivers 2006c) remained. In other words, the parasitical impact of war on the judicial system took the form of violating human rights on such a large scale that they took the appearance of normality (Kishkovsky 2005).

This development was also connected to the broader global question of the right to interfere in another country, the legality of sovereignty, and international arms conventions. The legality of intervention on the side of the Russian regime predated the question on how the war was later conducted. Concurrently, the justification for infringing on the territorial rights of another political entity created both a challenge to a global norm and influenced how the operation was carried out. In that sense, Russia did not recognize the sovereignty of Chechnya, but considered it to be an integral part of its own statehood (Putin 1999). To put it differently, the campaign was justified in terms of internal policing matters (Wines 1999g), despite the acknowledgment of the de facto autonomy of the region (Gordon 2000b; Perlez 2000b). Moreover, as an integral part of Russia, the question of Chechen statehood was never peripheral to the conflict, but at its very core. As the Putin regime was adamant to recognize Chechnya as
a separate entity, it could equally not accept Maskhadov’s rule and consequently never actually negotiated between these two conflict-parties for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This was expressed on the one hand by Moscow’s refusal to negotiate with Maskhadov and on the other by the rejection to install a constitution—i.e. a wide-ranging legal reform—that would place Chechnya under the power orbit of Putin (Perlez 2000c). The extent of international criticism to Russia’s actions express outrage as much over the disregard of Chechen political and legal rights as over the negation of international war treaties, like the outlawing of chemical weapons, which Russia used during the conflict (Chyba 2002).

The wider implications and effects were the undermining and removal of existing international legal norms as well as the replacement of the domestic legal framework in favor of a new rule of law; justifying the actions of Russia and placing Chechnya firmly under Moscow’s control. In a region where “everything that happens proves that there is no justice there” (Myers 2003a), Russia aimed at building a law system according to its preferences (Gordon 2000l). The removal of previous constitutional and legal constraints enabled the placement of a new legislative framework (Chivers 2004d) in both Chechnya and Russia. Both the constitution of Russia after 1993 and the Chechen one were dismantled in favor of this new kind of rule (Myers 2005b). The alternative to the Russian charter did not emerge in the Chechen national resistance, but came from the religious system in form of Sharia law (Gordon 2000g; Wines 2001). To a certain extent, it can be concluded that the logic of the judicial system became subject to the logic of war, which explains the limited and contradictory impact of the judicial system in stopping the war. While the war system should have been contained by the legal one by outlawing certain actions, possibly the reverse has proved to be the case. As Maskhadov was not recognized legally as the leader of Chechnya, his power was limited in terms of influencing Chechen rebels as well as negotiating with Russia. Of course, after his death, the situation did not improve, as the newly installed leaders in Chechnya were never accepted by the majority of the population. Moreover, the condemnation of Russian soldiers
was paradoxically used to justify the military presence of the Russian state in Chechnya. But more generally, the war itself destroyed any idea of a stable judicial framework exerting its own influence on the conflict. The fragile institutional framework of both Russia and Chechnya never allowed for the emergence of effective stopping-mechanisms of the judicial system on the war system but exactly the reverse, the continuation of the specific legal system became dependent on the continuation of war.

**War and the media:** Additionally, it can be shown that the war system served as a mechanism to subvert the existing media system to its own logic. At the same time, the media system is a battleground over different meanings and information on the war, a circumstance that resulted in an ‘information war’, i.e.: journalists were threatened, harassed, and killed, media infrastructure built and destroyed, and new channels of information sought and controlled. In this environment, the war system undermined the media system to the extent that the latter becomes an extension of the former. Everything that the media system observed has become overtaken by the logic of war.

At the beginning of the war, the Russian media gave voice to supporters of the campaign, the Russian regime in general, and raised little criticism of either. The major news channels showed pictures of “collapsed walls, twisted metal and debris beside a 10-foot-deep bomb crater” (Gordon 1999j, 30) after the Moscow apartment complex bombings in 1999, together with “undated film clips […] depicting torture and execution by Chechen militants” (Wines 1999a). At the same time, these channels presented “film of burning factories and damage at Grozny airport, but no pictures of the civilian casualties reported by Chechen authorities” (Bohlen 1999c), disregarding images of “200,000 pitiful Chechen refugees or Russian body bags” (Safire 1999b), or simply not reporting on the war if events did not fit the general narrative (Bohlen 1999i; Chivers 2006b; Chivers 2004a). But next to the indirect control over the information flow, some members of the Putin regime used the media apparatus directly as a mouthpiece (Sestanovich 2002; C. S. Smith 2002b). Thus, the media became...
misappropriated in order to convey political messages as well as address the domestic and international audiences directly.

Additionally, next to control over the narratives of war, those that were not supportive to a specific narrative became blocked. This found its expression in a decrease in criticism voiced on Russian media outlets over time. Initially, newspapers disapproved of the conduct and inefficiencies of the Russian military apparatus (and by extension the political one as well) in handling the Chechen insurgency and providing security to the Russian citizens (Gordon 1999k, 95; Wines 1999a). As Moscow started to limit and control media outlets, this line of criticism gave way to the effort to defend the possibility of reporting on the war at all, and to disapprove of the Russian regime (Bohlen 2000b). Accordingly, critical TV channels and newspapers were harassed, closed down, and its founders arrested and silenced (Safire 2001; Daley 2001b). The campaign to block unfavorable information, moreover, took the form of blocking signals from radio stations (Myers 2002d) and preventing independent journalists from entering the war zone (Gordon 2000f). This whole development amounted to a situation that by 2007, most critical voices in the Russian media all but disappeared (Chivers 2007a). The one exception to this trend was the rise of channels on the internet to provide a free and unconstrained outflow of information, although even here the “war in Chechnya […] was fought not only on the ground and in the air, but also in cyberspace” (Varoli 2000).

Entering Chechnya itself and receiving information from the battleground proved to be a difficult undertaking. This was the case due to the physical destruction of media broadcast outlets, such as television towers and newspaper factories. Targeted actions, such as when a “bomb had been stuffed with metal fragments and apparently contained about half a pound of TNT” and had been planted at the independent NTV television network (Wines 2000f) or a “television tower had been put out of action” (The New York Times 1999p) destroyed the media infrastructure. Additionally, journalists wanting to report from the war risked their lives in order to do so. As the NYT sums up, “the story became more and more dangerous to cover—first of
all because the Chechen rebels started taking journalists hostage, and then because Russian authorities put heavy pressure on the press to stop publishing or broadcasting anything except official reports. Journalists who dared to cover the Chechen side of the conflict were at times threatened and detained by Russian troops. All national television channels and the overwhelming majority of newspapers and magazines have obeyed” (Gessen 2002). Indeed, the Russian side complicated matters further by forcing journalists to report only from a controlled area, while the Chechen side was impacted by kidnapping and also ‘supervising’ the reporting (Gall 1999h).

As such, not only a war on information was waged (Bohlen 1999c), but actually an information war (Bohlen 1999g). The sides were not only different forces in Russia, but also different Chechen ones, as well as the international media apparatus, which were often “denounced as agents for foreign powers who dispense Chechen disinformation” (Gordon 1999r). Indeed, Russia often complained about the way Western media observed the war (Perlez 2000a; The New York Times 2002), which claimed to be reporting impartially. The way the war was reported in the Russian media, justified Russian actions, criminalized the Chechen fighters, delegitimized global opinion, and, ultimately, served to support the power base of the Putin regime. Equally, the Chechen media, often limited to online portals (Wines 2002b), was not used to creating some sort of ‘objective’ information on the war, but to justify Chechen opposition, condemn Russian actions, and draw in international support. As I have described above, this was only made more problematic, as independent journalists faced various and multiple threats for reporting from the war zone. To sum it all up, we can say that the war did have a parasitical impact on the media system in the sense that it destroyed the possibility of objective reporting, but also gave rise to the new war media system, if one can call it that. Furthermore, the stopping-mechanisms of the media system failed because they were unable to reach a wide audience over a long enough duration of time that would have provided options between the narrow constraints of political control.
In conclusion, it has become evident how the different sopping-mechanisms of the war in Chechnya failed, while certain options in every system had been open to end the war earlier. However, in every case, the war system proved itself dominant (as long as a physical enemy remained) and gave rise to a new political system both in Russia and Chechnya, a new war economy, the abuse of a judicial system, as also the dismantling of a free press in the classical sense of being in favor of an entity which can be described as a misinformation apparatus. In the next two sections, two dynamics of the war system that supported this development are investigated.

5.3.3 Fragmentation of Actors during the Second Russo-Chechen War

To begin this subsection, it is important to reiterate the main tenets of this manifestation. In short, it is expected that there are more and smaller groups of war participants the longer the conflict lasts, for the simple reason that both the costs of maintaining alliances is high and more people will be exposed to war, particularly if the war is expansive. The empirical record of the Second Russo-Chechen War shows that this was the case; in contrast to Kosovo, however, without the isolation of one conflict group. I have selected four time periods which were reflected in the publication of newspaper articles (see figure 5.1). It goes without saying that they confirm a broad trend and give sufficient empirical material for this study. In fact, giving a detailed account of all the information coded here would exceed the limitation of space (detailed tables of all four periods can be found in the appendix).

In the entire period, a total of 59 actors are identified, which stand in 114 constellations towards each other. In contrast to the previous case study, it is not possible to identify one specific relationship that remains dominant over time, but rather certain actors which remain central in the configuration. The most central actor is Russia, which either fought Chechen Warlords, Islamic militants operating in Chechnya, or the whole of Chechnya itself. At the same time, the international arena is represented by the political West generally, and by the US
specifically. However, this international audience oscillated in the type of relationship it displayed towards other actors from being almost unanimously critical to being supportive or at least expressing some sort of support for the Russian campaign in Chechnya. Next to the international level, the biggest criticism of Russia’s actions came from individuals in Chechnya and Russia itself, even though the Russian opposition diminished over time. At the same time, the biggest support for the Islamic militants in Chechnya came from the global Islamic movement, in which Osama bin Laden personally and the al-Qaida network played a central role.

![Figure 5.1: Overview of Articles of Second Chechen-Russo War](image)

From the onset, the Russian campaign was framed in terms of punishing Islamist terrorists for their incursion into Dagestan. For instance, “Russia's bombing of Chechnya has been promoted by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev as a plan to ‘eliminate the bandits’ terrorizing Russian apartment dwellers, and to create a zone of Russian security around Chechnya” (The New York Times 1999q) and that “Chechen reports say that 384 people have been killed and more than 1000 wounded in the punitive raids, and in which tens of thousands of Chechens have fled their mountainous province in panic” (Bohlen 1999c). This Russian campaign was not perceived on the Chechen side as one aimed against the radical Islamist elements within Chechen society responsible for the incursion into Dagestan, but against the whole of Chechnya. As the Chechen official representative Vachagayev remarked, “It means
war […]. Until now, we thought there would be some way to agree with Moscow. But now it is clear there is not” (Bohlen 1999d). He referred to the movement of a considerable amount of Russian troops into Chechnya, planning to advance slowly from Dagestan, through villages, into Grozny in order to take over the capital of the country. The unfortunate result for the Russian troops was that this strategy caused killings of both guilty and innocent civilians (Gall 1999i).

![Diagram of Actors over Time in Chechnya](image)

**Figure 5.2: Configuration of Actors over Time in Chechnya**

The high degree of violence was criticized globally by the West and the UN. In fact, “The Germans made their points that Manilov’s army [Russian military commander] was
abusing human rights” (Lloyd 2000), “Mr. Blair said there was ‘real concern’ over what is happening in Chechnya” (The New York Times 2000a), and “France […] was so vocal in denouncing Russia’s war in Chechnya” (Mcneil Jr 2000) that it was sidelined by Putin diplomatically. Other forms of protests were articulated by the actual civilian populations inside Russia and Chechnya themselves. Some “protesters, which included members of the well-known The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee circulated a petition calling on Acting President Vladimir V. Putin to settle the conflict peacefully” (Wines 2000c), but they soon became sidelined, too. During this time, Russia deflected criticism from the West as a form of hypocrisy; especially after the events in Kosovo (Wines 2000e). Additionally, “Mr. Yeltsin accused President Clinton yesterday of forgetting that ‘Russia is a great power that possesses a full nuclear arsenal’” (The New York Times 1999t).

The terrorist attack in New York on September 11, 2001 changed the war dynamics. First of all, the global Islamic movement became more central in supporting the Islamic militants. This was the result of a popularity of radical Islamist ideas which found traction in Chechen society whilst being cleverly framed by the Putin regime. Accordingly, if in the first period of the war Moscow portrayed itself as fighting interchangeably between terrorists and bandits, the narrative of the Islamic terrorist attracted much broader support the moment the US found itself target to precisely such an attack. Secondly, the political West repositioned itself towards Russia. Putin, quickly condoning the terrorist attacks in New York, and Bush, seeking allies for a punitive campaign against al-Qaida, found themselves aligned both at a personal level as well as the political one. The shift was not one of uncritical support towards Russia’s conduct of warfare, but rather a form of understanding of Russia’s situation in light of terrorist threat and the necessity to combat this problem globally together (Erlanger 2001). This expressed itself in criticism towards Chechnya and created a situation where “the United States and Germany lined up behind a Kremlin demand that rebels in Chechnya lay down their arms, notably omitting criticism of human rights abuses there by Russians” (Daley 2001a). The third
shift happened within the Chechen camp, where their civil population, and warlords, as well as Islamic militants became more antagonistic towards each other. In short, the Chechen fraction, if one can call it that, became fragmented as conflicting strategic goals, war aims, and political agendas came to surface. One problem was the Chechens who sided with the Russians. For instance, “The Russian Army sweeps followed several months of violence by Chechen rebels, who killed people thought to be cooperating with the Russians, and bombed Russian government installations and buildings. But the harsh Russian response, the report says, ‘further eroded what little trust Chechen civilians retained in Russian troops’” (Crossette 2002). However, it was in the third period, that this manifested itself in another shift of the relative power positions.

On October 23, 2002, Islamist militants, under Barayev, seized the Dubrovka Theater and took over 850 hostages (Wines 2002c). With this, targets in Russia proper became viable for Chechen fighters. This development highlighted the extent of the role of the global Islamist movement and its support of Islamic militants in Chechnya, both within Chechnya and outside of Chechnya (Frantz and Butler 2002). Moreover, during this period, the amount of international terrorist elements in the Chechen insurrection (Sciolino 2002) became undeniable to many observers (Myers 2003e). Ultimately, the three central actors in the conflict became the global Islamist movement, the Islamic militants, and Russia. Whilst the latter was continuing its campaign against Chechnya, it was mostly fighting within and between Chechens that intensified. Here, the conflict line was drawn between Chechen warlords and Chechen collaborators (Tavernise 2003). In response to these intra-Chechen struggles, the newly-installed Chechen leader, Kadyrov, began a stronger campaign to win support for “reuniting in the patchwork of militias, special police forces and military units operating” on Chechen soil (Wines 2003b). Internationally, the winds began to change yet again. While the Moscow Theater siege evoked international condolence for the victims of the attack, it soon became apparent that the conduct of Russian forces during the siege, as well as their behavior within
Chechnya, could not be ignored for too long (Myers 2003c). Although international attention to the Russo-Chechen conflict faded rather quickly, we can still perceive this block as the fourth actor group in the conflict during period three—an actor constellation which was repeated in period four.

Whilst the Beslan crisis on September 1, 2004 received a lot of media attention, it did not necessarily alter the dynamics of war. An attack against a school, of course, ignites fury on the side of victims. Thus, the idea that Russia is defending itself against Islamic militants that do not shy away from using any kind of violence was again reinforced. At the same time, the idea that Russia needs to work together and negotiate earnestly with Chechen separatists also found traction and can be considered one of the reasons why the war found its uneasy conclusion on April 17, 2009. A response after Beslan was the growing willingness of Russians to negotiate with a Chechen side that actually represented more the interests of the Chechen people than the puppet government installed by the Putin regime (Hill 2004). Consequently, in small steps and negotiations (C. B. M. Schwirtz and Philips 2006a), Russia managed to install as Chechen leader a certain leader of the militias, Ramzan Kadyrov, who seemed to be better equipped in handling the situation favorably for Russia (Kramer 2008). Indeed, the son of Akhmed Kadyrov, who was killed in May 2004, played a pivotal role in working together with Putin and against separatist and radical Islamist forces (Chivers 2006e; Chivers 2007b; The New York Times 2006; M. Schwirtz 2008).

However, one of the reasons why the peace called for in 2009 remains fragile can be seen in the final actor constellations, in which the friend/enemy relationships have remained intact. Any deal negotiated with Chechen warlords has had only a limited impact for two reasons. Firstly, these warlords neither represent a unified group nor have the possibility of enforcing the agreement on all Chechens. Secondly, as long as a sizeable group of global Islamists support the Islamist militants in Chechnya, they will have the means to continue fighting. This means that other than in the case of Kosovo, it was never possible to construct a
global opposition to any enemy group. Moreover, the danger of fragmentation could never be fully addressed and, thus, contributed to the atmosphere of antagonism in Chechnya. The expansion of the war system is the subject of the next subsection.

5.3.4 The Ebbs and Flows of War

The final manifestation of the war system regards its intensification over time. This intensification is expressed in the increasing number of countries and territories, subjected to a growing quantity of weapons, an increasing amount of displaced people, and the widespread use of torture, harassment, and kidnappings. However, this intensification is not a linear process as in the Kosovo case, but rather experienced as ebbs and flows. Because of this development, any decisive outcome was avoided—contributing to the recurrence of war.

This war originated from a religiously-motivated attack on Dagestan in which fighters “estimated to number from several hundred to over a thousand […] streamed across the border from Chechnya” (Gordon 1999j, 30). While the fight was to ‘free Dagestan from Russian rule’ (Bohlen 1999a), it found its expression in local confrontations and in the facilitation of terrorist attacks on Russian soil. Particularly the Moscow apartment bombings (Gordon 1999k, 95) had been “attributed to Islamic guerrilla leaders whose operations in Dagestan have made a mockery of the Kremlin’s earlier claim of victory [i.e. First Chechen War]” (Bohlen 1999b). Regardless of whether Basayev’s troops were responsible for the bombings in Russia, their incursion into Dagestan as a form of rejection of Russian rule facilitated a response by Moscow which vaulted the war into a whole new sphere and marked the initial phase in the intensification of the conflict.

The spurious borders between Chechnya and Dagestan allowed Basayev´s to take refuge within the Chechen territory, making clandestine movements and surprise attacks possible in the first place. Accordingly, despite the perception that “the fighting in Dagestan […] appeared to be over today as federal troops raised the Russian flag over mountain villages seized […] by
Islamic militants” (Bohlen 1999a), the movement of Russian troops into Chechnya was the only logical conclusion of the military operations. It was clearly communicated that the “Kremlin vowed to crush Islamic militants in the region” (The New York Times 1999o) in order to “root out Islamic militants they say are hiding there” (The New York Times 1999p) but also to punish “the province that humiliated Moscow’s troops only a few years ago” (Odom 1999). While the territory affected increased, the Russian troops responded to the insurgency by the use of overwhelming force, from the initial bombing of oil and communication targets to industrial and infrastructural ones, to finally the deployment of “an estimated 50,000 Federal troops” (Bohlen 1999d) for “large-scale ground operations” (Gordon 1999l) that would move slowly from village to village in order to reach the Chechen capital.

The Russian invasion into Chechnya was welcomed by the Chechen population, as the horrors of the previous war were still fresh. Only, “After two months of steady advances into Chechnya’s heartland, the Russian military said today that it is beginning to encounter serious resistance from Islamic militants, and that fighting is likely to intensify in the next few weeks” (Gordon 1999o). Indeed, whilst Russian forces advanced from multiple directions into Chechen territory and caused heavy losses for the rebels (Wines 1999f), resistance against these equally grew. Here, the combination of historical legacy and the memories of the First Chechen War (Gordon 1999q) contributed as much as the actual conduct of the campaign to the cause of the rebels. It is the destruction of Grozny that has come to represent the early phase of the war (Huntington 1999). Whilst Russian troops engaged in urban warfare for which they were ill-prepared (Gordon 1999s; Wines 1999h), the Chechen rebels knew what they were getting into. This explains the confidence with which the Chechen fighters engaged with their Russian counterparts, “yelling out from their hiding places that ‘Ivan’ and other ‘Russian fools’ have come to Grozny to die” (Wines 2000a). The result was the even greater bombardment of the city, the suffering of heavy losses on both sides, and high numbers of civilian deaths who had been caught and trapped in a city that resembled more and more a coffin (Gordon 2000a).
Moreover, being unprepared for this kind of warfare meant that any kind of prompt victory envisioned by the leaders in Moscow remained impossible, which in turn only increased the pressure on Russian troops to use even more force to meet their objectives (Gordon 2000d).

Nevertheless, it was only a matter of time until the Russian forces militarily triumphed and captured the capital. However, some rebels managed to slip out of Groznyy (Gordon 2000g). The war, consequently, took a different turn in the strategies and personnel employed in it. This was indicated by the continuation of rebel attacks against Russian troops moving within Chechnya by other means (Bohlen 2000a; Tyler 2000a). The war turned from a classically defensive war, in which one side awaits the attack of another, to one of ambush, surprise, and suicide attacks. For instance, on July 3, 2000, “Chechen suicide bombers have set off a series of devastating blasts throughout the breakaway Russian republic, killing at least 37 soldiers and wounding 74” (Gordon 2000k). The strategy aimed at exposing the limitations of the Russian leadership claim by challenging not only the legitimacy of the use of physical force, but also its efficiency thereof. This was expressed in the death rates of an estimated 10,000 Russian servicemen (vis-à-vis 11,000 rebel fighters) (The New York Times 2001) after well over a year into the campaign (Daly 2001).

The shift in warfare strategies was expressed by the movement across borders, particularly Georgia—ultimately expanding the war into yet another territory and exposing a neighboring state to the conflict. Starting in 2002, Putin stressed the presence of ‘Chechen terrorists’ operating within the borders of Georgia (Tyler 2002b), which ultimately made this war spill “into the steep green gorges and snow-flecked mountains across its border with Georgia, worsening already tense relations between the two countries. Russian fighter jets and helicopters have repeatedly crossed into Georgian territory in recent weeks, evidently in pursuit of Chechen fighters” (Myers 2002a). Due to Russia’s confidence in its right to self-defense (Myers 2002b), another entity became exposed and affected by the Russo-Chechen War. Similar clashes broke out also in the region of Ingushetia (Myers 2004a). Ingushetia, a region
in which ‘history, culture and language’ is closely linked to the Chechen nation’s, was moreover affected by hosting large numbers of refugees—amongst whom also Chechen fighters allegedly were hiding. By the fifth year, the conflict showed every sign of spreading further to other regions like Tajikistan (Kishkovsky 2004).

Consequently, the main feature of the Chechen war was not a continuous expansion of weapons and troops used, but rather an enlargement that led to the dissolution of classical battlefronts towards the potentially omnipresent possibility of attack. The intensification that we can observe here was an increase in the space in which war-participants fight and act, without presenting solid obstacles. Thus, the mountainous regions of Chechnya continued to be hazardous for the Russian forces. Chechens who collaborated with these forces increasingly became legitimate targets of the insurgency. Finally, and possibly most often presented in the media were attacks by the rebels within Russia and the taking of hostages (J. Miller and Broad 2002). Most shocking for the international and Russian public was the Beslan massacre. In southern Russia, Chechen fighters under the leadership of Basayev on September 1, 2004 occupied a school which later was stormed by Russian Special Forces and resulted in the deaths of over 350 people (Mydans 2004c; The New York Times 2004b). Often, these kinds of attacks resulted in a process where “grief begins to mutate into anger two weeks after the mass killings in Beslan” (Mydans 2004d), which in turn led to a further spread of violence.

5.4 Conclusion

Following the findings of the newspaper analysis presented in this chapter, it is argued that the case of the Second Russo-Chechen War confirms the overall expectations of the theoretical framework (see table 5.1). Evidently, the parasitical impact on the societal total and on different functional systems was observable. Moreover, regarding the latter, it became apparent that structural couplings formed which made the termination of the war all the more difficult. To come back to an earlier point made in chapter 2, not only one functional system was structurally
coupling with the war system observed. Rather, all four functional systems under investigation coupled with the war, which resulted in greater autonomy of the war system. To put it differently, war became less dependent on particular ones, which in term explains why termination efforts, be the political system (e.g. proclamations of peace) were unsuccessful. Moreover, while the fragmentation of actors actually revealed how the main war participants became partially replaced (from nationalists to Islamists), there was no isolation of one group vis-à-vis a coherent other group. In contrast to this, the Islamic militants managed to maintain and increase their outside support. Finally, because of the strategy used by the insurgents, like hiding in the mountainous terrain or using terrorist attacks, any decisive military outcome was avoided. In a nutshell, it has proven impossible to kill the enemy as a means of war termination.

Table 5.1: Overview of Hypotheses for Chechnya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration of social structures</td>
<td>● Displacement of whole social groups&lt;br&gt;● Increase in atrocities&lt;br&gt;● Psychological warfare (e.g. Chechen syndrome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupling of war with functional systems</td>
<td>● Coupling with political, economic, judicial, and the media system&lt;br&gt;● Parasitical impact upon functional systems&lt;br&gt;● Domination of other functional systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation of actors</td>
<td>● Increase of affected actors over time&lt;br&gt;● Relatively stable alliance structure&lt;br&gt;● No isolation of war party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification of war</td>
<td>● Intensification of Russian counterinsurgency campaign&lt;br&gt;● Dispersion of violence&lt;br&gt;● Disappearance of the battle front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter has focused on the origin and workings of the war system in this specific case. There are several points that need to be stressed in order to conclude this chapter. First of all, in accordance with the theoretical expectations, the war system was capable of having a parasitical effect on other (functional) systems by drawing on their resources and effectively creating war subsystems. Additionally, the stopping-mechanisms of these other systems quickly
became disabled, as there were little functioning systems to begin with. In other words, in the absence of stable systems, the war system has both easier access to these resources, and also a longer lasting impact as the systems created by war become stable. In the end, due to increased violence, the Putin regime was forced to the negotiation table, but the result, by default, was a peace agreement that rested on a pillar of systems which were geared towards future war. In other words, one would expect that the peace that resulted from the Second Russo-Chechen War to be anything but stable and the empirical record has so far only confirmed this expectation. Secondly, in accordance with the theoretical expectations outlined above, the fragmentation of actors together with a considerable support from outside Chechnya in the form of a global Islamist movement, has left a considerable quantity of war participants out of the negotiated settlement. There were no changes made that resulted in the greater preference of war termination for these actors. Finally, I demonstrated in this chapter the presence of the various stages of conflict, rooted in interest, identity, and history, at the same time I shed light on the workings of the war system and their impact (and vice versa) on other systems arriving at a peace agreement.
6 THE WARS IN LIBERIA AND CONGO

“Always war, war, war. We are tired”—Micheline Nzala Mbuki, a 33-year-old shopkeeper—quoted in Telegraph Herald (2001a)

In this chapter, I test the application of the theoretical framework on two cases that lie outside of the arguably Eurocentric gaze of this project, namely the Second Liberian War (1999-2003) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003). The object of this analysis is twofold. Firstly, I investigate whether or not the framework articulated in chapters 2 and 3 and tested on the two cases of Kosovo and Chechnya still holds in a different region. Secondly, I illustrate why Liberia did not experience a resurgence in violence whilst Congo principally remained in a state of war. My argument is straightforward, namely that despite regional and local characteristics, the model still holds. Both wars run through the stages of conflict and have recognizable issue and identity conflicts, resulting in war. Thus, contrary to what some claim, these wars cannot be explained in terms of “ethnic hatred” (DeRouen and Hŏ 2007, 77), but actually show how political, economic, educational, and social issues had become rejected, leading to the ‘rejection’ of the other (e.g. Taylor or Kabila regime), and finally to the need to convince the other by violence (e.g. the use of force). Moreover, while both wars had a dysfunctional impact on their environments, only the war in Congo managed to structurally couple with the Congolese political, judicial, economic, and media system, whereas the Liberian one did not. The consequence is that despite finding a (political) solution to the conflict in Congo, war returned, while Liberia managed to experience mostly the absence of large-scale violence.75

In order to advance my argument, this chapter is structured into two parts. In the first two sections, the creation of the war systems in Liberia (1999-2003) and Congo (1998-2003) are described. In both cases, the starting point is the colonization of the respective territories in the 19th century. The goal is not simply to demonstrate knowledge, but to contextualize the

75 For instance, both the Correlates of War dataset and the Uppsala Conflict Encyclopedia do not observe any large-scale violence in Liberia and label it as peaceful.
conflicts, test the applicability of the model, and link the past to actual conduct during the wars. It is evidently acknowledged that the history of Liberia and Congo is too complex and multifarious to be summarized in a couple of pages; rather, the most important developments are introduced. In the third section, the main analysis is situated. Based on about 1,500 newspaper articles collected from the LexisNexis database (see below), the events or workings of both wars are described and their impact towards the recurrence of war punctuated. This analysis is not chronological, but rather, each dimension of the war systems is juxtaposed against the other. To recapitulate the dimensions, the four expectations are the destructive impact on the societal total, the dysfunctional impact of the war system, the fragmentation of participants, and the intensification of war over time. Finally, in the conclusion of this chapter, I point to two further aspects for this study, namely the role of Eurocentrism in the study of war and the relevance of neo-patrimonial political systems for the operations of war systems. With this chapter, I conclude the empirical study of this project.

6.1 Missing Attention Leading to the War in Liberia

The historical roots of the Liberian war can be found in the neo-patrimonial ruling system and ethnic identity, as others have argued (Strachan and Scheipers 2011, 215). Moreover, whilst the political apparatus was founded in the early 1820s, there were particular events which fueled and sparked the outbreak in violence of the later wars. In the case of the Liberian wars, ethnicity was only later socially and politically constructed by the adversarial ruling class, predominantly individual warlords that profited by the prolongation of war. Accordingly, the Liberian case is an inherently paradoxical one. While the civil population clustered around certain topics of conflict, such as the prices of nutrition, civil rights, and access to education, the warlords never offered competitive socio-political alternatives to the prevalent system; there was initially no other reason than hatred toward the status quo which persuaded individuals to support the rebels. Furthermore, the continuation of violence resulted from private, economic interest,
whether for economic benefits, protecting oneself and family members, gaining social recognition or political power. The lack of any impartial international intervention until the end of the war is one of the main reasons for the continuation of the conflict and the outbreak of the second Liberian war in 1999.

**Historical Roots:** The history of the modern state of Liberia began in 1822, when it was settled as a colony for freed and freeborn American blacks as well as African women and men liberated from slave boats (Gbowee and Mithers 2011, 7). These people established Liberia as a settlement in 1847, marking it as the oldest state in West Africa (Duyvesteyn 2005, 36). However, these people—later referred to as ‘Americo-Liberians’—did not move into an unoccupied territory derived of history, but supplemented the existing social and political structures of the 15 officially recognized ethnic groups76 (Moran 2006, 53). Consequently, the issue of property rights arose early and would come back to haunt Liberia (Gbowee and Mithers 2011, 7). These ethnic identities were only marginally fixed since intra-ethnic marriages were the norm and religious affiliation spurious; both Christian and Muslim beliefs were mixed with local religions, secret societies, and witchcraft (Bøås 2001, 704). The 1847 Liberian constitution was based on the US American one and was one of many indicators of the ideological and political heritage of the Americo-Liberians, who came to subjugate the country according to the logic of the social and political system they had inherited from the US (Chaudhary 2012, 249). The small group of elites, which were only 2 percent of the total Liberian population, dominated political life, held access and rights over natural resources, particularly rubber, iron, and diamonds, and controlled the police apparatus. Additionally, local elites were integrated into a highly personalized and hierarchical network, in which the ruling apparatus came to rely on its continuation upon the support of tribal participants and vice versa (Moran 2006, 55; Persson 2012, 116). From very early on in the Liberian state, the idea of an ‘us’ and ‘them’

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76 Together with the ‘Americo-Liberians’, these are Bassa, Dei, Gbandi, Gio, Glebo, Gola, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kuwaa, Loma, Mano, Mandingo, Mende, and Vai (Duyvesteyn 2005, 36).
became established, in which the urban, civilized group stood against the tribal and uncivilized land tribes (Dillon 2007, 22). This system, which was described in Weberian terms as neo-patrimonial (Bøås 2001, 699), was instrumentalized as a means to secure the dominance of the minority elite—and subsequently in many ways lay the foundation for the conflicts to come.

**Issue Conflict(s):** In 1870, the True Whig Party was founded, which dominated and ruled Liberia until 1980. During this time, the subjugated masses revolted on several occasions—which was usually countered with excesses of violence (Bøås 2001, 704; Dillon 2007, 22). This induced Liberian President Tubman to open up the political system with the clear aim of integrating indigenous people in the political apparatus, to address their grievances, but more importantly to secure his own political power against a civil population that was becoming increasingly able and more willing to articulate their demands and grievances (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2008, 70). When he died and his vice-president, William Tolbert took over power on July 23, 1971, a governmental apparatus was left behind that secured the hold on power for a small circle of the business elite, Americo-Liberian families, and local tribal leaders (Bøås 2005, 79). There were several additional factors which contributed to the increasing tension inside Liberia. Firstly, due to both the Cold War and the historic ties between Americo-Liberians and the US, Liberia enjoyed economic support which led to the flourishing of the economic and acquisition of prosperity (Duyvesteyn 2005, 39). The distribution of economic gains matched actual power relations and was by no means fair or equal. Consequently, ethnicity and class became identities which were felt more strongly than ever before. This was reinforced by a crisis of underdevelopment in basically every aspect of Liberian life; culturally, economically, politically, in security, and socially (Kieh 2009, 17). One instance was the so-called ‘Rice Riots’ of 1979. At that time, the Tolbert regime decided to increase the subsidized price of rice by four US dollars; arguably to increase profit for the Tolbert friends and family who were rice farmers. The planned demonstrations against the new
price quickly turned to an outbreak of large-scale violence in the capital of Liberia, Monrovia (Harris 1999, 432). In order to counter this, the Tolbert regime ordered troops to control the demonstrators and jailed the leaders and other political opponents as a severe punishment.

Another issue was access to education as a means of social mobility. As a UNESCO report notes, “27 percent of all professional posts were occupied by expatriates, whereas the proportion for administrative occupations was as high as 49 percent” (1970, 8). Originally, Liberia´s education system was established as a further means of distinguishing between Americo-Liberians and the local population and of securing the hierarchical structure of Liberia (Dillon 2007, 23; Nelson 1984, 3). However, after several reforms, the post-World War II era marked the beginning of the expansion of Liberia´s educational system to encompass its indigenous population. Of course, it is a question of causal directionality, whether with wider availability of education, the opposition was enabled to articulate and express its views or whether the educational sector continued to grow precisely because of political opposition. Nevertheless, it appears to me unquestionable that this greater access to educational institutions as a means of bridging the social hierarchy in Liberia, and enabling social mobility, only came to highlight the existing inequalities within its system.

**Identity Conflict:** The oligarchy of the Americo-Liberians ended with a violent coup d’état. In 1980, Samuel Doe from the Krahn ethnic group led a multi-ethnic revolt which would carry him to power (Duyvesteyn 2005, 39; Moran 2006, 7). Contrary to the hopes of the majority of Liberians, the category of ethnicity increased in importance and lost the fluidity which had marked life in Liberia. Specifically, the change of power did not usher in an era of greater equality, but simply replaced the figures on top. It was a result of poor political management and the desire to preserve access to power that made Doe base his leadership increasingly on fellow clansmen, who also made up only about 5 percent of the total population, as well as the Mandingo group, who as traders assisted in financing the regime. The ethnic
fracture was further assisted by Doe’s decision to staff the military of Liberia, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), with his fellow tribesmen from the Krahn. Accordingly, the Krahn came to dominant political and military life in Liberia (Mwalimu 2010, 886). The significance of the Krahn dominance in the AFL should not be underestimated as the “Military force constituted one important element of the construction of Americo-Liberian hegemony” (Bøås 2005, 78). For Liberians, only the leaders changed (Bøås and Utas 2014, 52).

Two events contributed to the identity conflict in Liberia. Firstly, under pressure from the US and vocal demands from the civilian population, a constitutional reform was brought forth, which claimed to eliminate ethnic tensions. The main issue was the problem of recognition of Liberian citizenship (Moran 2006, 115). However, while the constitutional reform broadened the category of citizenship to include “only persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent shall qualify by birth or by naturalization to be citizens of Liberia”, it was constraining to ethnic groups that did not fit into this profile. Furthermore, Doe’s interpretation of the constitution did not lead to a separation of executive, judicial, and legislative powers; in short, it further strengthened the person-based ruling system centered on President Doe. Secondly, the elections in 1985 marked the beginning of the end of Doe’s era (Bøås 2005, 80). Coming increasingly under pressure from the US for his style of governance, which was considered to be “incompetent, repressive, corrupt, and ethnically divisive” (Gompert 2007, 35), Doe decided to cement his legitimacy by holding nation-wide elections. Whilst Doe was declared the winner, “many observers believe Doe stole the elections. Widespread fraud and rigging were also reported. Many other political figures in the country were also prevented from participation” (Mwalimu 2010, 898). Officially, Doe won with 51 percent. Responding to the election, Thomas Quiwonkpa and Jackson Doe rose in rebellion against Doe in 1985. They belonged to the Gio and Mano ethnic group respectively (Chaudhary 2012, 250; Bøås 2001, 711). Yet, not only did the AFL crush the rebellion brutally, but reprisals against real and
suspected opponents and their home communities began the reality of post-1985 Liberia (Bøås and Utas 2014, 52).

**From Subordination Conflict I to the Second Liberian War**: Amongst the people feeling the reprisals from Doe was Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian. He would, ultimately, come back and become the leading figure in the Liberian wars. As Bøås and Utas retell, “On Christmas Eve, 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a small rebel army led by Charles Taylor, crossed the border into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire” (2014, 52). For this project, the processes of this war, which came to be known as the First Liberian War and lasted until 1996, are not essential and have been retold elsewhere (Kieh 2008; Huband 2005; Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh 2009; Bøås 2005; Sanoe 2010). However, several characteristics of this war were of vital importance in understanding conflict in the Liberian setting. This was the high level of violence employed in the conflict, the utilization of child soldiers, the fracturing of war regiments into ever small units, the failure of international conflict mediation, the spuriousness of regional borders, and the frequent failure and collapse of several peace agreements.

One striking feature of the war in Liberia was the panoply of interests that were present on virtually every level. For instance, Taylor invaded through Nimba county—a region in Liberia which was most heavily violated by Doe—gaining there popular support for his movement (Adebajo 2002, 601). Taylor was supported by Félix Houphoët-Boigny, the leader of the Ivory Coast, who never forgave Doe for executing Tolbert, the husband of his beloved daughter (Ngaima 2014, 63). Additionally, Taylor received military training from Libya and political support from Burkina Faso (Duyvesteyn 2005, 40). The importance of this only becomes apparent once the international dimension is also included in the analysis. With the end of the Cold War, Liberia lost its geo-strategic significance for the US, which shifted its gaze towards Iraq and the establishment of a post-Cold War order.77 Thus, it was the regional

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77 Additionally, next to the low strategic interest, Doe’s poor human rights records and flawed election, led the US to withdraw its support to the Liberian regime (Kieh 2008, 152).
powers in the form of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which established the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to help resolve the conflict in Liberia. Yet, having members which followed interests on their own that had little to do with what is traditionally understood as peacekeeping—maintaining a peace already agreed to—they functioned more as an additional side in the conflict than an impartial one. As Boas remarks, “specifically, the Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, was alarmed by the spectre [sic] of a civilian uprising overthrowing a military government. To the ECOWAS leaders gathered at the summit, he warned: ‘Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any of you!’” (2005, 82).

Of course there were more than ample reasons to intervene from a rather neutral perspective. Indeed, some of the hallmarks of the Liberian war were the high levels of violence, particularly directed against civilians. As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission remarked, “Children suffered some of the most horrific crimes committed during the Liberian Civil War and LURD and MODEL insurrections. They were forced to kill friends and family members including their parents, rape and be raped, serve as sexual slaves and prostitutes, labor, take drugs, engage in cannibalism, torture and pillage communities” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2008, 62). Taylor’s advancements towards Monrovia led to the violence of his Gio and Mano populated NPFL forces against the Krahn population as a retribution for previous attacks under President Doe (Howe 1997, 149). However, regional intervention was fueled by the fear of instability caused by the Liberian war and private interests. Nigeria initially provided 80 percent of ECOMOG’s troops, 90 percent of its funding, and led the negotiations, whilst having at the same time its generals and soldiers profit from the ongoing war and their participation in looting (Adebajo 2002, 604). Against the expectations that regional peacekeepers have a higher incentive to intervene in order to quickly and profoundly end a conflict, the track record of the ECOMOG intervention in its early years only served to prolong the conflict and worsen the situation of civilians in Liberia (Howe 1997).
Accordingly, the divisions within ECOMOG and the lack of interest globally, contributed to the continuation of the war. Inside Liberia, the warring sides became hopelessly fragmented, by some accounts having at least eight major factions, out of which none of the warlords openly expressed the goal of reordering the political, social, and economic structures of Liberian society (Adebajo 2002, 601; Howe 1997, 156). Rather by gaining control over resource rich territory, warlords created the incentives to not end war; soldiers, particularly child soldiers, came to understand the civil war as a means of finding a place in the Liberian war society; and woman maneuvered between victimhood and active participants of the war (Utas 2005). In such an environment, each warring party feared reprisals from other groups once they would lay down arms and forfeit their defenses (D. E. Cunningham 2006; K. G. Cunningham 2013). In consequence, all the peace agreements that were negotiated during the war collapsed. Every time war parties managed to come to an agreement, soldiers who had an interest in continued warfare would split off and form a new insurgency group (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999, 117).

That in this environment any kind of peace was possible was due to a number of factors. Taylor’s NPFL was the dominant force in the Liberian war and once his strength actually started to erode, the option of a peace agreement as a means of securing power made sense; particularly with ECOMOG alteration of its approach by offering concessions to Taylor and other warlords for their signature under and the compliance to a peace treaty. Before this change of power,

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78 To give one example, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) split off from the NPFL and was led by Prince Yormie Johnson (Howe 1997, 149). It was this group that captured, tortured, and executed Doe in 1990.

79 As Atkinson notes, “The factionalisation of the government has led to the integration of the illegal economy with state functions. Most of the foreign companies are run by individuals with prior links with Liberia which greatly facilitate their ability to do business in such a risky environment, with a few newly arrived opportunists” (1997, 6). The best example is probably ‘Taylorland’, which functioned as a rival capital to Monrovia, had its own currency, media outlets, police, and hospital; while holding at the same time access to the most valuable resources in Liberia (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999, 116).
Taylor as the leader of one of the three main groups\textsuperscript{80}, was fundamentally opposed to ECOMOG’s engagement in Liberia (Howe 1997, 154). Additionally, the high level of violence of this war finally caught the attention of the US and Europe, which induced these to assist ECOMOG (Adebajo 2002, 600). Regionally, Nigeria became willing to include Taylor in the negotiations (Bøås 2014, 66). Lastly, war exhaustion and a humanitarian catastrophe at the local level, with the civilian population on the brink of collapse, over 200,000 deaths and huge numbers of refugees, created an increasingly hostile environment towards the warlords (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999, 119). Consequently, in 1996, Liberia held an election which Taylor won by a wide margin (Gbowee and Mithers 2011, 70). His victory was not the product of election fraud as one would expect, but rather a conglomeration of factors, such as an incompetent/divided opposition, stronger financing of his election campaign, and a wide-spread fear in the Liberian population that a loss at the election booths would only result in the resumption of fighting. The sentiment in the civil population was captured by the slogan “He [Taylor] killed my father but I’ll vote for him. He started all this and he’s going to fix it” (quoted in Rotberg 2004, 296).

That the war broke out again two year later can be attributed to Taylor’s failure on two fronts. Firstly, Taylor’s government failed to tackle human rights abuses (actually, continued to commit them), to alleviate social and economic grievances, but instead sustained the Liberian tradition of ethnic division (Scott 2005, 40). Moreover, his government did not engage in structural reforms in Liberia, particularly two reforms which are considered pivotal in transitional phases of peace-building, namely, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) (Kieh 2009, 7). As the name suggests, DDR is a process of engaging with former combatants in a way that they do not pose a threat to the

\textsuperscript{80} The three main groups were Taylor’s NPFL, Johnson’s INPFL, and the AFL. Another force that would follow the AFL was the United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ULIMO), which would split into the Krahn dominated ULIMO-J and the Mandigo dominated ULIMO-K.
monopoly of violence of the central state; evidently vital once a state has failed experienced multiple power centers. However, neither Taylor’s soldiers, who were ready to take up the fight again at any time nor those of others, obliged to seriously engage in DDR. For instance, “Alhaji Kromah, the leader of ULIMO-K, and Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO-J, […] needed to retain their ‘hardened fighters’ as their respective ‘insurance policies’ against possible attacks from Charles Taylor” (Kieh 2009, 12). Finally, even for those who actually expressed a desire to leave the warlords, no programs for re-integration existed. Particularly for wounded ex-combatants and children suffering from the horrors they experienced, the lack of any rehabilitation program was felt hard (Lord and Stein 2015, 284; Gbowee and Mithers 2011).

One additional point is important to be emphasized. In the Abuja II Peace Accord (1995) that ended the first civil war, the provision was put in place that called for the disarmament of all factions and the training of a national army under the direction of ECOMOG (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999). After the electoral victory of Taylor, this provision was firmly rejected by the newly formed government. Rather, Taylor established the Executive Mansion Special Unit, the Anti-Terrorist Unit, the Special Operations Department in the police force, in order to cast a net of security checkpoints all over Liberia. Part of the reason for the establishment was directly linked to the policy of ethnic scapegoating, blaming particularly the ethnic groups Krahn and Mandigo for the war, creating by this targeted violence the resentment that would lead to the Second Liberian war. Thus, as a consequence to Taylor’s policies, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) emerged (Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh 2009, 608), a Mandigo dominated group. Not much later, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) split off, and formed a second flank against Taylor (Bøås 2014, 72). They began their attacks on April 21, 1999 marking the foundation of the Second Liberian War and the starting point of the in-depth analysis (Scott 2005, 16).
6.2 Diverging Pathways to the War in Congo

As in the case of Liberia, the role of ethnic identity in the formation of the war system in Congo is a politically and socially constructed one that served as later rationalization of the war. This might come as a surprise not only due to the emphasis of ethnicity in the literature seen below, but because of the far greater presence of different ethnic groups within the territory of Congo. While in Congo the fluidity of ethnicities can also be observed, the lasting impact of colonial heritage, the constraints of Cold War logic (as well as the vacuum created by the post-Cold War years), the conglomeration of private and public interest, both politically and economically, and the importance of state borders in the Sub-Saharan context are most important factors in the formation of the war system. Additionally, the Congo case exposes the limitation of distinguishing between inter- and intra-state wars as done by other institutions (Turner 2007, 21–22); rather, the Congo war was both. In short, the creation of ‘Africa’s World War’ (Prunier 2009) resulted from regional securitization, lack of international attention, and socio-economic tensions within Congo. Moreover, the continuation of violence after the first military intervention by a regional coalition and the installation of the Kabila regime can be understood by the inability of Kabila to govern, his reliance on ethnic groups, and the fall-out between him and Rwanda/Uganda. In the following paragraphs, these claims are substantiated.

**Historical roots:** Like in Liberia, with the colonization of Congo by Belgian forces under King Leopold II in the 1870s, a rupture in its historical and societal systems occurred. The presence of foreign troops established dominance over the various Congolese tribes due to the “material superiority of the intruders, the new relations of production based on colonial capitalism, and the ideology of white supremacy” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 13). Congo was

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81 Just to give an idea, the CIA World Factbook lists over 200 African ethnic groups that are separated into different tribes, like the Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and the Mangbetu-Azande (Central Intelligence Agency 2015).

82 One example of this fluidity concerns the violence in North Kivo (eastern Congo). As Reyntjens retells, “those who became the victims of a wave of violence waged by ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups, such as the Hunde, Nande and Nyanga, supported by their respective militias (the Mai-Mai and the Banglima), were the Banyarwanda, Hutu and Tutsi alike. Only two years later, the Hutu and Tutsi confronted each other in ‘ethnic strife’” (2009, 14)
colonized by Leopold’s troops for both his personal ambition and to gain access to Congo’s resources; although at the time, the latter was basically unknown (Hochschild 1998). Leopold did not have access to public resources to subjugate Congo and had to rely on resource extraction; put differently, Congo actually had to pay for its own colonization (Turner 2007, 40). In order to achieve this, a system was established in which the Belgian authorities forced villagers to collect rubber or ivory for them. As these resources were scarce and failing to meet quotas resulted in harsh punishment for the natives, conflict between different tribes often resulted. In short, an economic system was established in which the resources flowed out of the country, while the profits went into the pockets of few, usually outside powers (Montague 2002, 109). But not only was an economic system established which logic would survive well into contemporary times, but also a social structure was imposed that continued to influence life and conflict in the Congo. Belgium took the cue from Germany, and constructed a ruling apparatus in which it relied on local chieftains to govern and ‘schools for sons of chiefs’ to educate them with the necessary administrative knowledge (Aden and Hanson 2014, 51). The Belgians divided Congo along ethnic lines; however, this division must not only be understood spatially, but more socially, as a social hierarchy was established based on ethnic affiliation. Economic tasks and positions were assigned based on ethnicity; “on the basis of colonial stereotypes” where people moved around to develop mineral resources, specifically copper and gold (Turner 2007, 41).

At the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-1885), Congo was recognized by the European powers as a Belgian colony. At this conference, “New borders were drawn not so much in violation of pre-existing ones but according to a different logic” (Prunier 2009, xxix). And while the colonial powers established different orders within these new borders, natives

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83 Particularly the ethnic group of the Tutsi were considered by European colonizers to be particularly ‘worthy’ of rule, and came to resemble state power for many other ethnicities in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 218).
formed resistance (Koponen 1993, 130). European powers acknowledged the human dimension on paper, as it was agreed that the signatories were to “help in suppressing slavery and especially slave trade” and to “watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for their moral and material well-being” (Ewans 2002: 98). However, it is little surprising that with the separation of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and other groupings and the simultaneous imposition of economic, judicial, political, and military rule, local resistance to the colonizers formed. As Haskin remarks, “Their every waking, breathing moment was devoted to extraction” (Haskin 2005, 10). What followed was a struggle for liberation by Congolese, which was brutally put down by the Belgian forces84—who at the same time expanded their territorial reach into the east. However, as Leopold II was facing domestic and international pressure for his Congo policies—particularly the violence conducted against the native population—the Belgian state decided to annex Congo in 1908 (Vanthemsche 2012, 41). At this point, Leopold II had already not only instituted a program of enriching himself personally but also the Belgian state, to finance urban planning and construct monumental structures.

From 1908 until 1958 Belgian Congo existed; this had both a profound impact on Belgium and on the administrative, political, and economic structures of the Congo (Vanthemsche 2012). For the civilian population of Congo, the difference between Belgium’s and Leopold’s rule was marginal (Haskin 2005, 11). Particularly noteworthy was the lack of education the Congolese received, “for fear that he [the Congolese] will then demand a growing share of responsibility” (Merriam 1961, 65). Ironically, shortly after the Belgian Professor Antoine van Bilsen set-up a 30 year plan for creating more independence and self-reliance to the Congolese—one of several programs to establish independence of the Congo—Belgium started to lose control over Congo in the late 1950s (Béchard 2015, 277). It is necessary to

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84 Indeed, the level of civilian casualties and violence experiences was higher than many post-Cold War conflicts, undermining the claim of new war theorists on the new (higher) levels of violence of war on non-combatants (Newman 2004, 182).
remark that the independence movement brought forth Lumumba, Kasavubu, (to a lesser extent) Kabila, and Tshombe as well as that with the increased struggle for independence, the political climate became more militant. The consequence was that the independence movement articulated the demand to distance itself geopolitically from Belgium and by extension the political West and to become non-aligned globally.

**Issue Conflict(s):** In June 1960, Congo became officially independent, with Patrice Lumumba sharing the government as prime minister with Joseph Kasavubu as acting president. The main issue of contestation was political. Shortly after independence, the Congolese army mutinied, which led to Belgium sending in its troops to “protect its nationals” (Turner 2007: 45). Tshombe, known to be close to Belgium, had organized the secession of the Katanga province, which resulted in the entry of the Belgium army, who wanted to retain some form of control over Congo. Domestically, it was a struggle for power between Lumumba and Kasavubu, which the latter won by first dismissing Lumumba as prime minister, later arresting him, and finally having him murdered (van den Braembussche 2002, 44; Gerard and Kuklick 2015). Internationally, however, it was a struggle for Belgian influence in Africa and Cold War rivalry (Jullien 2013). For the Belgian government, furthermore, business met politics, meaning that access to Congo, particularly the Katanga region was lucrative. At the same time, the US accepted the groundless Belgian characterization of Lumumba as a communist (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2011). Consequently, Washington aimed at establishing an anti-Lumumba regime—leading to a weak central government and insurgencies over much of the country.

Shortly after Lumumba’s murder, UN troops began disarming the secessionist forces. They were called in by the Congolese government to protect the national territory against outside aggression (United Nations 2001). Under the guidance (and pressure) of the UN and the US, the Katanga Assembly voted to end the secession; which was realized with the entry of the UN forces in Kolwezi on January 21, 1963 (Dorn and Bell 1995, 24). However, this meant
only that the trouble for Congo moved to the west, as a new insurgency swept over from Congo Brazzaville. Tshombe, who by that time had been named new prime minister, took over to quell the unrest in Stanleyville. Unconvinced with the results of Tshombe, Kasavubu dismissed his prime minister, creating a political vacuum which enabled the rise of Mobutu. By then, the UN forces had already left the country, as their mission was limited to restoring territorial integrity in the east of Congo. Moreover, the US was instrumental in providing support for Mobutu, who, dissatisfied with the election results in 1965, decided to seize power through military means (Haskin 2005, 40). These entire struggles left the civilian population highly dissatisfied. However, the result was not one of action, but the adoption of “a passive political culture” (Weiss 2000, 21) and resignation. This explains the lack of resistance of the Mobutu years.

Identity conflict: Joseph-Desiré Mobutu, who renamed himself Mobutu Sese Soku Kuku Ngbendu waza Banga and Congo into Zaire, ruled from 1965 until 1997. Placing this time period as one of rising identity conflicts is problematic, as still many issues, mostly economic, social, and political remained. Moreover, Mobutu underwent tremendous effort for constructing a Congolese state identity with its own official languages, making much effort at exactly not relying on ethnic structures (Renton, Seddon, and Zeilig 2007, 111). However, as opposition to his rule increased, his base of power relied strongly on ethnical support; put differently, it is impossible to understand the resulting Congo wars without accounting for the ethnic dimension, which in turn as mostly constructed by the Mobutu regime to stay in power in the first place. Also, the ethnic dimension is necessary to encompass in the analysis because it is in this specific context transnational. Both wars in Congo were partially interventions from outside of Congo; therefore, understanding the conflict solemnly in domestic terms misses this point. These outside interventions targeted ethnic groups and must be considered for the later subjugation conflicts that emerged.
While Mobutu was extremely unpopular in his last years of rule, initially, most of his reforms were welcomed by civilians and elites alike (Schatzberg 1988, 3). Supported by the stabilization of order within Congo and the rise of copper prices internationally, the Congolese economy began to recover. His policies of nationalization, though ill-fated in the long run, contributed to an initial success by stripping Belgian companies of their profits and redirecting these into Congo (Shillington 2005, 532). Politically, he moved against the old cast of politicians, dismissing them all as liars. As a consequence of this discourse, his constitutional reform to centralize political power around himself was met with little resistance. In the educational sphere, he nationalized the universities, which gave him support from professors and students alike. Finally, coming from the army himself and understanding the finer workings of it, he was popular in the military sector (Turner 2007, 47–49).

The success of his policies, however, quickly turned on themselves. Economically, his policies were disastrous and only served to enrich himself and his supporters. For instance, he not only placed the Ministry of Finance under his direct control, but also “began forcing the state-owner copper conglomerate Gécamines to hand over part of its revenues from mineral exports” (Wedeman 1997, 462). Moreover, he directly enriched himself by taking money from the Central Bank and moving it to his private accounts in Switzerland. Finally, many senior government officials profited of the exports by channeling them outside state control, thus, paying no taxes (Askin and Collins 1993). In a story that resembles colonial Congo under Leopold II, the profits of its vast mineral wealth went into the pockets of few, whilst the majority of the population had to carry the brunt of the work. Indeed, while under Leopold´s and Belgium´s policies, some of the extraction went back to reinvesting industry, Congo, then Zaire, experienced a crumpling of its industry in comparison to international competition (International Business Publications 2009, 52). Trying to fix the damages, Mobutu decided to invite foreign investors and companies back into Congo, without much success. What started
in the 1970s erupted as a full-scale economic crisis on into the late 1980s; which manifested itself in Congo’s default on Belgian credits.

Next to the economic centralization for the enrichment of Mobutu and his supporters, by 1970, Mobutu had already dissolved the parliament and structured the entire political system of Zaire around his person (Haskin 2005, 43). As dissatisfaction with his policies grew, so did the calls for more democratic participation and the forming of political opposition; mostly from the Catholic Church, but also from the urban and rural poor as well as students, who always were among the strongest opposition groups (Renton, Seddon, and Zeilig 2007, 140). Only by 1990, with the hardships of economic crisis and the principal dissolution of the Congolese state, did Mobutu lift the ban of multiparty elections. A transitional government was appointed, in which he managed to secure most of his powers. Following the riot of unpaid soldiers in Kinshasa, Mobutu agreed to open up the political system further. In this regard, the end of the Cold War did not play out in his favor. While during the Cold War years, Mobutu marketed himself to Washington as a supporter in the region and a base for covert operations in the neighboring countries, because a wave of democratization swept through Africa, as in Liberia, backing for him disappeared (French 1997).

As his popularity decreased both domestically and internationally, the regional developments in neighboring Rwanda (and Uganda) became essential. The basic collapse of the economy, political, and military pressures resulted in the genocide of nearly one million Tutsi and moderate Hutus, while the international community remained absent (Turner 2007, 50; International Crisis Group 1998, 16). Among the fleeing refugees were not only victims but many perpetrators of the genocide, so-called Interahamwe, who hid among the victims on their flight to Congo. Once there, these fighters continued to carry out lethal attacks against insecure and unstable Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda (Prunier 2009, 46; Reyntjens 2009). But not only did this lead to a security rational for the Rwandan government to intervene in Congo, it also altered
the racial composition of regions in eastern Congo. Ethnicity was important in the Congo, because Mobutu installed a system in which violence based on ethnicity was considered a legitimate means to bring about change (Vlassenroot and Romkema 2002, 3). In Congo, citizenship and landowner rights went hand in hand (Lemarchand 2009, 213; International Crisis Group 1999, 4). Thus, the boundaries between ethnicities, always an instrumentalized resource, became much more pronounced and led to diverging conflicts in eastern Congo.

**Subjugation Conflict I to the Second Congolese War:** By 1996, it was made clear by the new Rwandan (and Ugandan) governments that they would not continue to tolerate the incursions from Congo into its territory (Caplan 2013, 464; Reyntjens 2009); indeed, in the larger picture, this genocide would come to serve as a “trigger for the collapse of the Mobutu regime” (Adelman 2003). The Mobutu regime and his supporters—individuals who represented various ethnic tribes—proved unwilling to stop and possibly actively hosted the perpetuators of the Rwandan genocide. Hence, they were confronted with an alliance of domestic and regional forces. In short, it was acknowledged by both Congolese civilians and Rwandan (including Ugandan) politicians that only the forceful removal of Mobutu was an acceptable goal. Surprisingly for many, the Mobutu regime of over 30 years unraveled within a couple of months. The two most striking features of the conflict were the quick resolution thereof and the broad support Kabila enjoyed both domestically, regionally, and internationally, when he moved into office.

In this context, several aspects need to be highlighted. Firstly, while the main motivation for intervention by Rwanda and Uganda concerned their security, they quickly grasped the economic potential of occupying parts of Congo. As icing on the cake, they realized that the control over resource extraction economies would finance the war effort and potentially serve as a source of personal enrichment. Secondly, Kabila had no administrative experience; important when considering the monumental task of governing a state that had proved to be
ungovernable in the past. His previous experience was mainly in drug and human trafficking and a short-lived alliance with Ernesto Guevara. Because of this lack of experience, Kabila quickly learned to rely on ethnic politics to mask his failures and draw up domestic support. These two aspects resulted in the further economic exploitation of Congo and an even worse situation for the civil population (Turner 2007, 53).

By the time of the invasion, Mobutu was already seriously ill, prompting many Congolese to consider the war unnecessary in the first place. Rwanda and Uganda recruited Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a small time drug trafficker to install a puppet regime mostly by happenstance. He led the Alliances of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which consisted mostly of Rwandan, Ugandan, and Angolan forces as well as the Congolese Tutsi (the Banyamulenge) and the Katanga Gendarmes fighting against Interahamwe, UNITA, Serb, and Ex-FAR mercenaries (International Crisis Group 1999, 3). Still, regardless of the critical stance of much of the local population and the fact that Kabila fought with and was sponsored by outside powers, “he was welcomed” (Marriage 2013: 49). And indeed, he was heralded as a much needed change in Africa’s largest country, as part of a ‘new generation’ of African leaders (Human Rights Watch 1997). Particularly the US was warm in its embrace of Kabila, praising his commitment to “open markets, honest government and the rule of law” (French 1997).

Like Mobutu before, some of Kabila’s policies were welcomed and initially successful. Particularly his efforts to stabilize the currency and attract foreign aid were originally fruitful. But that was it. Kabila was under constant suspicion to be only a puppet installed by the Tutsi regimes of Uganda and Rwanda; and thus, eyed suspiciously by the Hutu majority (International Crisis Group 1999, 8). Particularly the Banyamulenge, ethnic Tutsis who were perceived to be loyal to Rwanda, but in fact were much more distant to both sides of the conflict, became critical
of the Kabila regime. His inexperience in leading a country together with structural weaknesses and the lack of institutional structures made Kabila substitute statesmanship with playing out ethnicity. Moreover, he got rid of his weaknesses by employing many elements of Mobutu’s hated security apparatus as well as co-opting opposition leaders. Finally, in order to secure his hold domestically, he further frustrated his allies by expelling the Rwandan and Ugandan advisers from Kinshasa. Indeed, at first “many top aides in Mr. Kabila’s government were Rwandan Tutsi, but he dismissed them as his popularity plummeted” (Onishi 1998c).

Practically, the decision to place Kabila on the seat of power laid the foundations for the second war. Possibly, had a more competent successor of Mobutu been chosen, had Rwanda and Uganda not assumed that they could install a puppet regime, had the international audience out of shame over inaction in the genocide not victimized every refugee coming out of Rwanda, and had the economy recovered, the war could have been avoided. The fact is that it was precisely these elements, created in the First Congo War, which triggered the Second Congolese War, which would come to be known as Africa’s World War and encompass a multitude of state and non-state actors. The war officially broke out on August 2, 1998, immediately after Rwandan and Ugandan advisers were dismissed from Kabila’s cabinet.

6.3 Understanding the War Systems

Before presenting the analysis, I find it necessary to recap the main points regarding the origins of both wars in order to emphasize the similarities and differences. The key difference between these two war systems is the recurrence of war (or the lack thereof). In short, while Liberia eventually ended its war and constructed a remarkably stable peace, Congo has suffered various returns to violence since the official end of the conflict. The preceding sections served multiple

85 As the Times commented, “In 1996 the Banyamulenge rebelled when the old regime stripped them of citizenship and ordered them to leave Zaire. Still labeled as ‘foreigners’, they see Mr. Kabila’s recent order that all “foreign” troops leave Congo as revisiting dangerous ground. The region’s Tutsis […] have loyalties that transcend borders” (1998a).
purposes. Indeed, in both cases, the neo-patrimonial system signaled the importance of private interests like acquiring social recognition, political power, and material wealth in comparison with ethnic identities. Additionally, these wars would not have been possible had the Cold War persisted; at least in this form. In both cases, the incumbent regimes enjoyed the support of the US, which itself was operating according to Cold War, bipolar logic. With the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization, and the dissolution of bipolarity, the raison d’État for (almost unconditional) support for the US disappeared, making the absolutist regime open for fracturing. Thirdly, while the grievances resulted from poverty, inequality, lack of access to the political system and representation, and others, the conflicts did not attempt to actually address these grievances. Neither the rebel movement against Taylor nor against Mobutu really took the trouble of articulating a socio-economic or political program other than the establishment of a new ruling coalition that would make everything better.

A fourth similarity is the amount of media attention the resulting wars received. In short, the Second Liberian War lasted from April 21, 1999 until August 12, 200386 and the Second Congolese (Civil) War from August 2, 1998 until the installment of a transitory government on July 18, 200387. Despite rather broad search strings, only few articles could be identified, which occasioned the broadening of the data sources to encompass the widest variety of (English-speaking) newspapers the LexisNexis database allows.88 The lack of reporting on the African wars is not a new finding as such; it rather means that for the perspective of MST and the general occurrence of war, there was simply less war in Africa. For the invented average reader of the NYT, the wars were both less important as well as less there than the wars in Kosovo,

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86 The search string for the Liberian war is “(Liberia AND War) OR Liberian War OR Charles Taylor OR Movement for Democracy in Liberia OR Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy OR Monrovia”.

87 The search string for the Congo war is “(Kabila OR Katangan Tigers OR Alliance of Democratic Liberation OR Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces OR Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie OR E.W.D. Wamba OR RCD OR J.P. Ondekane OR J.P. Bemba OR Movement for the Liberation of the Congo OR Forces for Renewal OR Union of Congolese Patriots OR Forces Armées Congolaises OR Congolese Armed Forces OR Défense civile et populaire)”. The search strings for both cases were created with the help of secondary literature.

88 The search results were first automatically, then manually, filtered to exclude identical articles and unrelated articulated.
Chechnya, and later Afghanistan and Iraq (all occurring at a similar time). Since the goal is on understanding the workings of war and the recurrence thereof, for this chapter, it was necessary to widen the net. This does not imply that this empirical illustration is less value-laden than in the previous comparison or closer to the truth. As was mentioned earlier, the purpose is only to illustrate the theoretical argument.

In this regard, the periodization of the war is important. In figure 6.1 and 6.2, the publications of articles regarding each war are listed. We can see a very different distribution of articles in both cases. For the Liberian War, the first period ends at September 2000 (the end of the third quarter of 2000) and the second terminates on December 2002. Each ending point signals the potential for a transformative event, as the surge in articles suggest that something new has had happened at these points. For the Congo war, this new development rather signals the beginning of a time period (third quarter 1999 and fourth quarter 2000). Evidently, most articles were either published at the beginning of the war and after the death of Kabila. At the end of the conflict, there was a slight increase in articles, which resulted in separating the Congo war equally into three different time periods.

The Second Liberian War began with the invasion of Liberia from various rebel groups (first mentioned in 1999), which quickly consolidated under the banner of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Supported by Guinea and forming its ranks with former ULIMO fighters, the rebels quickly moved towards the capital of Monrovia to encircle
Taylor and his forces. Coming under increasing international, regional, and domestic pressure for the level of violence, abuses of human rights, use of child soldiers, systematic rape of women, and destruction, the war ended at the negotiation table. Particularly important was the step-down of Taylor, who was considered to be a major obstacle to peace. Motivated by the military inferiority against LURD and later forces of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MODEL) and the desire to escape international prosecution, Taylor eventually agreed to step down and give way to a peaceful transition. Finally, the role of the civil society, particularly of the women’s movement was important in pressuring the conflict parties in finding a political solution and ensuring a highly inclusive transitional government.

In Congo, things went differently. As Rwandan, Ugandan, and eastern Congolese forces started in 1998 their march towards Kinshasa, the capital of Congo, Kabila formed a counter alliance consisting primarily of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia. The result was the de facto partition of Congo into different blocks, between the east and west, and into smaller territories under the control of the various war participants. Of particular importance was the murder of Kabila, who was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila early in 2001. He negotiated ultimately a political solution with the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, as well as with various rebel movements. However, more than in the Liberian case, the alliances fractured and created smaller units, which were ultimately excluded from the peace process. Additionally, within the war, smaller ethnically motivated wars broke out, which continued without interruption after the peace agreement. More than in the Liberian case, the Congolese resources and economic interests played a role for war participants to continue the fighting and not allow for a permanent peace. In the following sections, the two war systems will now be compared along the four manifestations outlined at the introduction of this chapter.
6.3.1 Social System: Destruction of the Social Systems

In both cases, the destructive impact of the war system on the societal total was evident and can be demonstrated in at least two dimensions. Before going into detail, the two manifestations are (I) the unraveling or destruction of the social fabric, creating an ‘order’ of all against all, and (II) the wide-spread occurrence of crimes against humanity. The latter category is explained below, but has been chosen as a designator for acts which in their nature actually lie outside comprehension or classification. Both cases demonstrate in this dimension that war creates unstable expectations in the sense that violence, even unspeakable acts, become possible, basically from everywhere and at every point. They show that war ‘functions’ as a defunctionalization force on societies, regardless of whether they can be understood in the traditional sense of advanced, or not. As this analysis shows below, the operations of functional systems become imparted the moment uncertainty reigns. However, despite the widespread occurrence of violence, which draws in everyone affected by the war, new social structures do emerge in which the stable expectation is precisely non-stability. In other words, order in disorder. This is demonstrated below.

Early in the Liberian war, reports of a “campaign of terror of mutilating civilians” (The Perspective 1999) were heard, while other reports cited the traumatization of children (Star Radio 1999), or the “widespread rape of woman and girls, some as young as twelve” (Human Rights Watch 2002). Abuses by Taylors gangs “included summary executions, indiscriminate killing of civilians, intentional targeting of civilian areas, widespread rape and other kinds of sexual violence including sexual slavery, abductions of adults and minors, illegal detention, torture, forced recruitment or conscription into the army and forced labor” (Human Rights Watch 2003a). Looting was also a wide-spread phenomenon, with rebel and government fighters targeting abandoned and inhabited houses, stealing food, mobile phones, and cars from civilians (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003h; UN Integrated Regional
Information Networks 2003k). At other times, violence against civilians did not serve as a means to establish some sort of dominance, but rather was just an expression of random brutality. As the following report indicates, “Eyewitnesses said pro-Taylor combatants had on several occasions fired over the heads of residents, accusing them of being rebel sympathizers. They had also stolen personal items from people stopped for identity checks, including their shoes, watches and mobile phones and any money they could find” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003l). If not directly affected by violence, civilians suffered, as they were “short of food, clean water and basic health services” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003o).

In this regard, Congo was in no way second-rate. On the contrary, despite many “heart-rending” appeals from the civil population (Courier Mail 1998a), massacres on civilians regularly occurred (The Irish Times 2000b). As one article reports on a battle, “Entire neighborhoods were reduced to rubble as the combatants set up artillery positions in back gardens and fought hand-to-hand in the humid streets. Families crouching under mattresses were blown apart by stray shells. When it was over, 619 civilians and an estimated 300 soldiers lay dead” (The Independent 2000). Indeed, slaughtering became a wide-spread occurrence (Vick 2001a), as “heads were cut off and circulated around town in vehicles” (Walsh 2001), and stories of cannibalism spread (Belfast News Letter 2003; The Vancouver Sun 2003). Moreover, systematic rape as a weapon of war (The Independent 2002; The Independent 2003) of people between five and eighty occurred throughout the war. There were other instances of the detainment and torture of civilians (Duke 1998b; Duke 1998a) and the expulsion of foreign aid workers that tried to alleviate the suffering of the civil population (The Gloucester Citizen 1998; McGreal 2001b). One final expression thereof should be mentioned, namely the destruction of food supply. During the course of the war, a nutritional crisis became apparent, claiming many more lives than the actual warfare (Butcher 2002). Hunger motivated warriors,
for instance, “the Mayi-Mayi repeatedly attacked Lemba in search of food, women and whatever they could loot” (McGreal 2001b). This was also signaled by the fact that the food could only reach a small number of people who needed it (Fisher 2001).

As a consequence, in both cases violence contributed to the creation of a new social order. First of all, particularly in the case of Liberia, huge migration, both inside and outside of the country, was observed. At the end of the war, international aid agencies estimated that “roughly three million people have been chased from their homes by war, at one time or another” (Ita and Abubakar 2003), while 450,000 people have been expelled from the capital alone (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003q). Not only did the huge occurrence force the creation of new structures, health system, and food supply (Daily Trust 2003b), but also to the formation of private advocacy groups (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003p) and particular social structures in the refugee camps; with forced recruitments (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003b), the opening up of schools (United Nations News Service Section 2003), and orphanages (Frushone 2003). This development was mirrored with the destruction of infrastructure in order to prevent the return to normal life (United States Committee for Refugees 2003). For instance, “the fighting in Monrovia has resulted into a growing humanitarian disaster, leaving thousands of people, mainly women and children as well as the elderly without food, medication and other essentials. A massive brain drain coupled with a significant loss of possessions, plus the massive dislocation of people are scars of the fighting” (Zangar 2003). As a matter of fact, contamination of drinking water (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003i) was another means to harm the civilian population and prevent any return to normality.

In Congo we can also observe the descent into anarchy, with “atrocious scenes of lynchings, burnings and beatings” (Sunday Mail 1998) and the massacre against and between civilians (Walsh 2001). However, a new social order emerged, “without electricity, radio,
television or newspapers” (The Age 1998), a rule of the powerful (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1998c), the normality of child soldiers (Onishi 1998b), and the avoidance of public appearances (Courier Mail 1998c). While we can detect reconciliation efforts in the Liberian case (Star Radio 1999), these attempts were noticeably absent in Congo. Indeed, one newspaper summarizes the new order effectively, “Kinshasa is a city of eight million people that is visibly falling apart. The roads, the government buildings, the Grand Hotel are in disrepair, and this is made all the more obvious by the huge scale of the chandeliers, the towering height of the monuments, the sonorous names of the boulevards. The Grand Hotel is awash with camouflage” (Treneman 2002). Yet, despite the small dissimilarities on the abstract, both cases show a comparable development of the societal total. However, in the other three dimensions crucial differences exist, which help to explain the diverging trend of the recurrent war system(s). These are now considered in turn.

6.3.2 System Relationships: Between Destruction and Coupling

The most important difference between both wars plays out at the systemic level. In a nutshell, the difference is not of degree but of kind; whereas the war system in Liberia led to a collapse in the operations of other systems, drawing off of their resources and practically leaving behind a malformed society, in Congo a different construction emerged. What we can observe is the structurally coupling of the political, economic, judicial, and media system with the war system, meaning that the continuation of their operations depended on prolonging the war system. The conclusion of such an assessment is straightforward and can explain why we witnessed a recurrent war in Congo, but not in Liberia. As in the case of the Second Russo-Chechen War, if the war system manages to structurally couple with its adjoining systems, the recurrence of war is more likely and the termination only seemingly. If this is not the case, as in Liberia, the result is much more the destruction of the economy, judicial, political, and media system, which
in turn needs to be rebuilt from scratch. What follows in the next paragraphs is a discussion of the systemic relationships.

**War and Politics**: The developments in the political systems reflect the argument made above well. What we find in Liberia is first the establishment of a political system centered on the regime and person of Charles Taylor, who used the war as a means to centralize power both domestically as well as regionally. As I discuss below, political opposition against him formed from multiple directions, as international and regional isolation was coupled with a resurgence of domestic opposition. The point is not, however, simply that political opposition formed and Taylor was isolated, but rather that the entire political system became submerged under the logic of war and basically collapsed. Once peace was created, a new political system was established that replaced the existing one. This replacement was personified with the removal of Taylor, who became increasingly considered to be the main hindrance to the peace process and his removal pivotal for the deployment of peacekeeping troops (Olaniyonu 2003). In contrast to this, the Kabila regime managed to remain in power. Moreover, the war enabled both the regime and the rebels to establish political systems regionally and domestically. This is not to say that war did not have a dysfunctional impact on the political system, as alliances and international organizations fractures and the political system managed only domestically to survive on the basis of ethnic hatred, not administrative or other functions. Again, the personal dimension reflects this very well. Even after the death of Kabila, his son took over power without substantially altering the functioning of the political system.

In the case of Liberia, throughout the war, the extent of political system-building by Taylor is very noticeable. This system-building took different forms. First, Taylor aimed at constructing and maintaining popular support, by ceremoniously decorating force commanders (Panafrican News Agency 1999), using the media to fuel dissemination, a framing of the conflict (The Perspective 2000d), or by lobbying on behalf of the government (The Perspective
These ‘soft’ approaches were coupled with a show of force, like the display of security and military personnel in public (Star Radio 1999; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2000a), stacking the military with “largely […] pro-Taylor civil war fighters” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2000a) as well as “threatening to crackdown on his [Taylor’s] opponents and impose a state of emergency that gives him [Taylor] sweeping powers” (The Perspective 2000f). One particular quote is illustrative of the Taylor system:

“So it should come as no surprise to anyone that even as the country lays in complete ruin and decay, Charles Taylor continues to consolidate and arrogate political and economic power to himself by any means necessary. His security apparatus, staffed with mercenary soldiers from the Ukraine, Burkina Faso, Gambia, South Africa and other countries, brutally kills his enemies (actual and perceived) and intimidates those he has not yet succeeded in eliminating or sending into exile. […] To him, absolute power is the ultimate goal and any means used to achieve that goal are justified by the end result” (The Perspective 2001a).

Moreover, this system was not limited to the national boundaries of the Liberian state, but extended well beyond, as Taylor attempted to create a regional system in his favor. For instance, in May 1999, “At a meeting in Tripoli, Charles Taylor, Bin Laden [sic] and Colonel Gadhafi agreed to uproot American influence from West Africa [and] to eliminate ‘harmful’ opposition elements” (The Perspective 1999; see also UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003m). The same can be observed in Liberia’s relationship with Sierra Leone, which was aimed at building a regional alliance and highlight the importance of Taylor internationally (T. Kamara 2000a; Royce 2002). One such instance in which Taylor signaled to an international audience his importance was his role in the negotiated release of 500 UN peacekeepers, which had been held captures by Sierra Leone’s rebels (Josiah 2000).

Simultaneously, as rebel groups achieved increasing military victory, the establishment of political control by those forces was cemented. LURD signaled its control over various parts of Liberia (UN Integrated Regional Information Network 2002), forcing Taylor to acknowledge that “he no longer has control over the whole country” (Weekly Trust 2002). To a certain extent
this shift actually impeded the peaceful resolution of the conflict, as it convinced the rebel
groups that it would not have the need to “discuss peace so long as Taylor remains head of
state” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003h) and continued fighting when it
appears to actually hinder a negotiated settlement (The Day 2003; This Day 2003a). Indeed,
“LURD has mounted two fresh attacks on Monrovia, Taylor has remained in power, the Accra
peace talks have failed to thrash out a blueprint for leading Liberia into a new era of peace and
democracy within the time-span allotted” (UN Integrated Regional Information Network 2003).

It is here that we find the final resolution of the conflict. Critical voices regarding the
conduct of both Taylor and the rebel groups gained traction, as frustration over the conduct and
delayed peace process grew. Internationally, the US not only criticized Taylor but urged him to
step down in order to facilitate the peace process and conditioned its support to ECOWAS on
this (allAfrica 2003d; allAfrica 2003f); albeit, while warning the rebel groups as well (allAfrica
2003e; Vanguard 2003c). Pressure was built up regionally for Taylor to accept a peace deal
(Dalieh 2003a; Jarkloh 2003) and the rebel groups to participate in the talks (Haddad 2002). In
fact, by providing logistical, economic, military support, hosting peace conferences, and
applying political pressure, the regional and international dimension played a vital role in the
peace process. Perhaps more crucial were the protests and campaigns by Liberians and civil
society groups, both against Taylor’s regime and the rebel groups. As people demonstrated
on the streets (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003d), civil society groups,
particularly women, youth, and interfaith groups participated in the peace talks (allAfrica
2003c). It is crucial to point out that the protests were not centered on Taylor, but on all war
participants (allAfrica 2003b; allAfrica 2003c). The peace that was negotiated and concluded
with Taylor’s step-down of power in August 11, 2003 brought in a wide coalition of domestic
and regional, political, and civil society actors that aimed to build up a functional state from
scratch (Ita and Abubakar 2003; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003q).
It is not that in the case of Congo the destructive impact of the war system is unobservable. However, it appears that structural couplings formed during the war. What is usually described as state failure is in the case of Congo actually the loss of control of Kabila’s regime of eastern Congo and the establishment of various political systems on this geographical area by various rebels groups, Rwanda, and Uganda. From the point of view of Kabila, securing the hold of political power seemed to be the main objective, which he pursued by massive troop presence inside his sphere of influence (Birmingham Post 1998), postponing elections (French 1998a), instituting a firm hold on the military (The Financial Post 1998), or surrounding himself with family and tribal members for the occupation of key positions inside the government (A. D. Smith 1998a). At the same time, he managed to distract from his own unpopularity by igniting racial hatred particularly against Rwanda, the Tutsi ethnic group, and the West. In other words, he aimed at creating an outside enemy, by denouncing “the uprising [in the east] as a thinly-veiled Rwandan invasion” (French 1998e), with the goal of creating a “Tutsi empire” (Tucker 1998c), and steered from the unknown by the “white man” (Edmonton Journal 2001). In short, despite his own unpopularity domestically, Kabila aimed at presenting the conflict as the violation of state sovereignty by outside forces and not as a domestic (violent) opposition to his regime. This was also expressed by his repeated rejection of peace negotiations with the rebel groups, as he considered these only ‘instruments’ of Uganda and Rwanda (Meldrum 1998; St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1998d). One can argue that with the succession by Joseph Kabila the democratic constitution of the country was further disbanded (T. Sullivan 2001) and only a redirection but not a replacement of an already dysfunctional political system took place—from the hard-liners to the soft-liners (Vick 2001b).

It goes without saying that the evident narrative of Rwanda and Uganda was not one of establishing political control over the territory of another country, but rather that it was aimed to protect themselves from security threats. As the Rwandan president remarked, “For us to be
or not to be in the Congo is because we have a security problem that has its base in the Congo” (Boustany 2001). While this narrative had been accepted much more internationally, particularly by the US, it did not necessarily contribute to popular support for the rebel movements, who themselves aimed at changing the political system and establishing political control over the parts that they occupied. In short, the rebels came to realize that they were not only opposed by most of the civilian population, but were “arguably the world’s most unpopular rebellion” (The Irish Times 2001). This became painfully evident as the rebel groups started to fraction and split between Uganda and Rwandan dominated groups. One such expression was the offer to negotiate a peace and cessation of hostilities with Kabila on the requirement that the “government acknowledged this conflict was a domestic problem” (The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 1998).

Additionally, regional and international alliance structures emerged. Important in this discussion is only that the conflict functioned as a destabilizing force for other states’ political systems, particularly Zimbabwe (A. D. Smith 1999a; Ndlovu 2001), Namibia (O’Loughlin 1998) and Angola (The Globe and Mail 1999), which resulted in international criticism of Rwanda and Uganda (McGreal 2001a; Vick 2001d), as well as imparted on the regional stability of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly between South Africa and Zimbabwe (Courier Mail 1998b; A. D. Smith 1999b). In short, the war in Congo created tremendous political costs for every state involved, undermined the working of the political system and its subsystems, and created the conditions in which a negotiated agreement was not only unlikely, but the stability thereof, limited. Even as a multitude of participant came to an agreement, it was practically impossible to include all. Particularly, many of the rebel groups had an incentive not to have peace as it directly infringed upon their political control. Moreover, other groups could and can only operate in the first place, as long as the political control of the state was only partial.
**War and the Economy:** As I show below in more detail, in both cases an economic incentive for war can be found. Different resource extraction economies formed and personal financial reasons for joining the rebel or state troops explain the prolongation of the conflict. Moreover, these economies were designed mostly to personally enrich oneself, meaning that little money was invested in the maintenance and technological advancements of these industries. Indeed, for the establishment of a working economy, these resource extraction industries were completely destructive. The crucial difference between the two cases can be explained in the size and amount of resources of Congo in comparison to Liberia. This meant, that the economic interests were much stronger in Congo and could not be penetrated from the outside, while in Liberia, the economic interest for peace outweighed the one for war.

Liberia’s economy was already in shambles even before the conflict started, as it was war-torn, had a crushing national debt (Kahler 2000a) and relied on the promises of Charles Taylor to rebuild the economy (The Perspective 1999). Not that war made this environment much better. On the contrary, the absence of an “environment necessary for private investment”, the sporadic closure of shops and markets due to the war (Vanguard 2003b), the destruction of infrastructure (Osamgbi 2003) led to a “culture of crime” (T. Kamara 2000a). Civilians under Taylor suffered economically (Haddad 2001), not only due to the breakdown of the economy and lack of foreign investment, but also due to the withdrawal of foreign aid (The Perspective 2000a) and impositions of sanctions. But, “as sanctions hang over Liberia, there are those who contribute to insist that the sanctions will hurt the ordinary, the poor” (Haddad 2001). The Taylor regime and rebels alike, in contrast to this, were able to enrich themselves personally by looting neighboring Sierra Leone or selling timber. For instance, “diamonds […] mined by children abducted by the RUF and driven across the rebel-controlled border into Liberia along rutted dirt tracks” (T. Kamara 2000a) went straight into the pockets of the respective warlord. These diamonds have equally “paid for the weapons that mutilated the children of Sierra Leone
[and] are fueling the refugee crisis in [Liberia]” (Momodu 2000). Moreover, despite claims by the authorities to the contrary, the income of international trade led to underfunded schools and non-working hospitals (Haddad 2001). Rather, reports amassed on the link between exports of resources and the import of weaponry (Kposowa 2001; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003f).

The point here is not to give a detailed description on these economies of violence, but rather that these economies existed and perpetuated an environment in which other business could not function, foreign investment and aid was cut off, individuals enriched themselves at the expense of the masses, and weaponry could be flown in to continue this war. It is, therefore, actually no coincidence that the effective ban of timber products originating from Liberia (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003n) and the restriction of financial flows (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003j) coincided with the final phase of the war. In other words, despite the destructive structure of the war economy, the concentration on a few resources in the hands of a few groups made effective restriction much more possible and hindered the perpetuation of the war economy. Thus, although the economy in Liberia was basically destroyed, the war economy equally came to a stop. This was, however, not the case in Congo.

Indeed, an already-destroyed national economy broke down even further. The war made people too afraid to go to work (Birmingham Post 1998) or to open their shops (Mutond 1998). Shop-owners from the wrong ethnic tribe were robbed and killed (Blair 1998), villages and markets looted by governmental and rebel troops alike (I. Stewart 1998b), infrastructure destroyed (Phythian 1998), and farmland devastated (Brittain and McGreal, Chris 2001). Consequently, many people had a financial incentive to join the army, as it was the last place that could provide a (increasingly less) safe salary. For instance, at the onset of the war “hundreds of unemployed men and women turned out at a Kinshasa military base to enlist in
the army” (I. Stewart 1998c). Later, one could see many children joining the army for work (Onishi 1998b; Astill 2001). Closely connected to this is the fact that the Kabila regimes understood that it could use its resources to buy its support in the form of hiring mercenaries (The New York Times 1998b; Phythian and Smith 1998) or reward other countries within access to mineral reserves (Chiahemen 1998). Particularly his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia used the war to enrich themselves. Specifically, Zimbabwe joined the war out of fear that any successor of Kabila would default on Congo’s debt to Zimbabwe (I. Stewart 1998f; Taylor 1998; The Times 1998b) as well the possibility for business, state, and army to financially profit from access to Congolese resources (Vick and Trueheart 1998; Butcher 2001).

It was not one particular faction in the war that established a war economy, but all sides. Rebels and the supporting states equally fought with the Kabila regime and among themselves over access to Congo’s resources. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the rebel movements consolidated its rule often at particularly economically important areas (Duke, Lynne 1998; P. Smith 1998) and established an apparatus of tax revenue collection (Vick 2001c), nor that Rwandan and Ugandan troops establish their own industries in rebel controlled territory (Duke 1998c; Onishi and Fisher 2001b). As one commentator remarks, “And along the way, Rwanda's motivation for prosecuting the war has been sullied by its ruthless exploitation of Congolese natural wealth. Diamonds, gold and coltan […] have all been shipped from Congo to the Rwandan capital Kigali in large quantities” (The Irish Times 2001). And it should be noted that this system could not have survived for long, had it not had international support and connection to the global market (Brittain 1999) and private companies providing supply lines (The Irish Times 2000c; The Press 2001). In short, despite the imposition of international sanctions (O’Reilly 2002a), from private to public participants, too many profited from the continuation of war and the access to resources as to allow for the lasting conclusion of the war. Thus, even

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as the main war ended, older conflicts again enflamed on the “competition for the region’s resources” (Maharaj and Masciarelli 2003).

**War and Law:** In the judicial system, a similar development as described above can be observed. By ignoring international law, human rights, looking the other way at crimes and corruption, ordering a certain verdict and instituting military tribunals, the essential function of the law system was undermined, away from finding a peaceful resolution in a conflict to an instrument of a conflict. At the same time, more and more ‘lawless regions’ formed, in which civilians were subjected to random maltreatment by soldiers and combatants, regardless over the cause these people were fighting for. One expression of this was the spread of instances of war crimes, but also the treatment of prisoners of war, and the challenges to international law that got communicated during the conflict. But even in this dimension, it appears that the difference in these wars was the type of coupling. While in Congo the coupling between these two systems became structural, in Liberia it remained a temporal one, as the international isolation and incitement of Taylor by the International Criminal Court created the foundations for a new judicial system operating in Liberia. At the very least, the judicial elements of Taylor’s rule had been removed.

From the beginning of the war, Liberia was described as the “‘epicenter of crimes’ that could turn West Africa into a Mafia fiefdom” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2000b), with an “entrenched criminalization of the country” (The Perspective 2000a). Instead, “The ancient practice of trial by ordeal, […] with torture as its cardinal element of forcing confessions from the accused, has replaced courts […]. Added to this, many lawyers have rejected state appointments outside Monrovia due to incessant attacks on state officials by rebel security men” (T. Kamara 2000a). Accordingly, we find the discounting of law from both rebels and state powers; albeit while constructing their own variants thereof (Media Foundation for West Africa 2002; The News 2002a; Bardue 2003). It is therefore almost corollary that the
accusation of war crimes and violation of human rights were most frequently observed by the (international) judicial system. Such acts as the use of child soldiers (The News 2002b), the killings of civilians (The Perspective 2002b), hiding known war criminals (allAfrica 2003a), rape, extermination and slavery (Human Rights Watch 2003b) had become corollary in the Liberian war.

The mechanisms for ending the war of the judicial system were the indictments of war criminals; most importantly, of Taylor himself. However, as was the case in Kosovo, “when news of the indictment reached Monrovia, the capital city ‘went amok,’ [and] people ran home from fear of violence” (Church World Service 2003). So, while the indictment “against Taylor sends a strong message that no one is above the law when it comes to the accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law” (Human Rights Watch 2003b), Taylor himself left the peace conference in Accra “following the indictment by the UN war tribunal” (Oni and Oghifo 2003). While this harmed the peace process in the short run, it actually gave greater illegitimacy to the Taylor-style law system and contributed to its later replacement.

Equally, we can detect the breakdown of the judicial system in Congo. This failure took several forms. Firstly, the enemy of the Kabila regime also became the criminal. For instance, “Congolese soldiers battled rebels who had slipped into the capital and hunted down suspected insurgents throughout Kinshasa on Thursday, taking more than 1,000 prisoners” (Calgary Herald 1998b, 000). It is not so much remarkable that the war created its own prisoners of war, but rather that the tools of the judicial system were used to combat the perceived enemy. Opposition and human rights activists got jailed (I. Stewart 1998e) as much as civilians, who were subject to “house-to-house arrests” (French 1998c). These people were not only detained, but also starved, tortured, and killed (Duke 1998b; Duke 1998a). Secondly, the creation of a lawless space followed suit; as one newspaper put it, “Lawlessness rules. The country is a mass
of warlord fiefdoms” (The Australian 2001), in which “gangs are rampant” (The Press 2001) who enriched themselves of Congo’s resources (Boustany 2001). Rebel groups conducted their own tribunals, which more often than not resulted in “summary executions” (Hobart Mercury 2002). Thirdly, decisions by the judicial systems were not effectively implemented. One example concerns the use of child soldiers, a practice criminalized by Joseph Kabila and in turn ignored by the generals (The Globe and Mail 2001). Finally, a victor’s justice system was established, which can be exemplified on the show trial regarding the murder of Laurent Kabila and conducted under the watchful eye of Kabila Jr. In a trial described as “Kafkaesque” (Onishi 2002), 104 suspects accused of the murder on Laurent Kabila were held first in solitary confinement, receiving food only “every other day” (A. D. Smith 2001), without having a date set for their trial (Telegraph Herald 2001b), before being sentenced to death or jail terms between six months to life (San Gabriel Valley Tribune 2003)—and deprived of the right to appeal.

Other than in the Liberian case, discontinuations in the operation of the judicial system could not be observed. It is true that there were attempts to delegitimize and supersede the Congolese judicial system, particularly from the international level (Erlanger 1998; A. D. Smith 1998a; A. D. Smith 1998b) and advocate for the implementation of and adherence to human rights (Mufson 2001; St. Louis Post-Dispatch 2001; The Independent 2001). However, these remained attempts with little indication of actually changing anything. In this regard, it should be noted that under Joseph Kabila the operations of the judicial system continued with human rights still being ignored, giving arbitrary detention and torturing political prisoners (Astill 2002). The International Criminal Court did not manage to condemn any major participant at any point during the war.

**War and the Media:** The last comparison on the system relationships concerns the media system. The media system had been instrumentalized during the war by various war
parties, while being simultaneously hindered and damaged in its ability to function; be it due to restricting the access of journalist to war sites or by destroying the infrastructure necessary to operate. Thus, from rebels, Jihadists, the Catholic Church to Taylor and Kabila, each war fraction fought over the establishment of truth of the conflict. One example, which has already been mentioned above, concerns the war in Congo, of whether it was a defensive war by Rwanda and Uganda to protect themselves from incursions of Interahamwe fighters who hid in the Congolese jungle or the breach of Congolese national sovereignty. The framing of the conflict evidently influenced the type and extent of domestic and international support for the players on the ground. The crucial difference again is one of (dis-)continuity. While the breakdown of the conflict in Liberia occurred with (not due to) the resurgence of independent media, this cannot be observed in the Congo case. If anything, only the Catholic Church aimed at filling the vacuum of ‘objective’ reporting.

The instrumentalization of the media system by rebels and Taylor alike is observable during the Liberian war. First of all, Taylor started a campaign of exploiting the media to communicate his framing of the conflict (Concord Times 1999): he sent warnings to enemy groups (Kahler 1999a), denounced ethnic groups (Hanciles 2000), addressed (and tried to calm) the civilian population (Kahler 2000b; The Perspective 2000c), defend himself (Adams 2002a), as well as “making the media circuits trying to deceive the world community” (Kansteiner 2002). This strategy was reverberated by the rebel groups, making it “look so much like a theatrical production, with both sides saying exactly the same thing as in an echo chamber” (Dukule 2002). Even the Islamic Jihad Movement felt the need to circulate their own interpretation of the events on the ground (Kollie 2002). Secondly, the operations of independent media outlets were continuously undermined. Early on, the “government […] intensified its clamp-down on the independent media closing two radio stations and deploying security troops at the station offices” (Haddad 2000), placing a “news embargo” (The
Perspective 2000e), intimidating and harassing journalists (Friends of Liberia 2002), but also physically destroying media infrastructure (Star Radio 1999). Equally, rebel groups, particularly from LURD, also tried to undermine the legitimacy and workings of (international) news outlets (The Perspective 2000h). In total, a dysfunctional media system formed that did not operate under the truth/untruth distinction, but placed this distinction under the friend/enemy logic.

At the end of the conflict, however, independent media representatives managed to resume their operations. Even shortly before the end of the conflict, the situation of the independent media system was bad; as “The situation for journalists in and around the city has become increasingly dangerous […] Currently no independent newspapers are publishing and all independent radio stations in Monrovia have ceased broadcasting” (IFJ 2003). However, with the end of the conflict, newspapers were allowed to resume publishing. Indeed, “The four-year armed rebellion by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) that deposed Liberian president Charles Taylor from State Power into exile has had an adverse effect on almost all institutions in the Country including the struggling newspaper industry” (Dalieh 2003b). To put it in another way, with the end of the war, the structures were created that allowed the resumption of a media system not subject to the logic of war.

Precisely this was not the case in Congo. Here, we can also observe the subjection of the media system to the logic of war in multiple forms. For instance, the Kabila regime used the media to denounce the ‘enemy’ (French 1998a), report on the war (French 1998d; Onishi 1998a), calling for domestic support (I. Stewart 1998d), ‘use’ foreign journalists (Dufka 1998) or threaten other states, particularly Rwanda and Uganda (French 1998c; I. Stewart 1998a). At the same time, the war allowed for the establishment of a certain media system for the Kabila regime, by clamping down on press freedom (The Irish Times 2000a), arresting journalists (The Irish Times 2000b) or beating and robbing independent reporters (I. Stewart 1998e; Este 2001).
Similarly, the rebels made use of the media as well. Thus, they claimed victories (French 1998b; St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1998f), denounced Kabila (Courier Mail 1998a), and defended their position in the war (Vick 1998). Statements such as “We want to remove President Kabila from power for the interest of the people because he failed to rule them” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1998b) were often heard, both to gain public support and to indicate independence from Rwanda and Uganda (Jeter 1999). Other states also tried to channel the information flow of the war (Herbert 1998; The Gazette 1998b). In short, while independent media was destroyed by the war, a war-media system emerged that distinguished its observation based on whether it was good/bad for the friend/enemy.

Possibly one reason why this newly formed system got structurally coupled was due to the lack of independent news sources and outlets, particularly international ones. Commenting on the lack of media attention the war in Congo received in comparison to the eruption of a volcano in Goma (part of Congo), one report laments that “vivid shots of the burning lava streaming down from the mountain and the mounds of lava on the street have been on the world’s television screens for days now. But during all those years of carnage and death, nothing or almost nothing. Natural disasters are more televisual” (Browne 2002). At other times, the war in Congo was described as “the world’s biggest and least reported modern war in which an estimated two million people have died.” (Fridgland 2001). While the international media system concentrated on singular aspects of the war, whether natural catastrophes or the supply lines and industries of resource extraction (Phythian and Smith 1998), very little actually happened in terms of rebuilding the media system. In short, there was no indicator that the war-media system ever came to a halt.
6.3.3 Fragmentation of War Participants: Between Isolation and Support

The two auxiliary hypotheses shed additional light into the operations of both war systems. The third dimension of the war system concerns the fragmentation of war participants. In short, with duration, it is expected that more and smaller acting groups participate in the war. In Liberia we can observe how with time, Taylor became increasingly isolated as more participants positioned themselves in opposition to his regime. Crucially, this rejection of the Taylor regime did not only originate from the rebel movements LURD and (later) MODEL, but also from the civil population and internationally from the US, the UN, and ECOWAG states. In Congo, we also witness an increase in actors, particularly as the war managed to draw in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, and a multitude of non-state players. However, these coalitions remained mostly intact throughout the period, with the civil population increasingly supporting the Kabila regime(s). This should not cover the fact that the civil population was mostly against the war in general, but only highlight that the rebel movements in its various facets, did not enjoy popular support. Moreover, it appears that if anything, Kabila Jr. managed in the later phase of the war to gather international support, while Rwanda and Uganda was criticized to a great extent by the UN and the US. Finally, in the last period of the conflict, we see the complete breakdown of coherence in the rebel movement, particularly with the increasing importance of Mai-Mai\textsuperscript{89} and Interahamwe fighters; while at the same time, a conflict between the Hema and Lendu rose to prominence, which formed a recognized ‘war within a war’. With the isolation of Taylor and the suppression of new actors of violence, the Liberian war could be contained. As I described above, this was not the case in Congo, which means that even if some fighters agreed to a ceasefire or peace, others always had an incentive to re-engage and continue the fighting.

\textsuperscript{89} In order to avoid confusion, the Mai-Mai and the Mayi-Mayi are the same group, which go by different spellings.
In the first period of the Liberian war (see figure 6.3), we can observe the strongest adversarial relationship between the rebels and Taylor, in which LURD played the major role for the rebels. This played out mostly in the forms of military confrontations, particularly with the capture of several provincial and key towns in Lofa County by LURD. They justified their uprising with the objective to overthrow Taylor, due to his having “committed genocide against our [Liberian] people” (The Perspective 2000d). A more comprehensive list of socio-economic and political changes was not articulated by the rebels. The rebels claimed to be sponsored by “Liberian dissidents in the United States, to unseat the NPFL rebel leader, President Charles Taylor” (S. Kamara 2001a) and drew on the support from the civil population, particularly the Krahn, Gio, and Mandingo tribes (Vanguard 2003a). Moreover, they got military and political backing from Guinea and to a lesser extent from the US (International Crisis Group 2003). Reinforced by initial military victories, the rebels began their long march towards the Liberian
capital, Monrovia. At the same time, the rebel incursion gave Taylor the justification for imposing a state of emergence and rally forces to fight back (The Perspective 2000f). Taylor found himself surrounded by few friends. What can be observed, however, is that he worked together with the rebel force of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who were fighting in Sierra Leone (The Perspective 1999). Other than that, he already found himself opposed by the US, the EU, and several ECOWAG states, particularly Guinea (T. Kamara 2000b).

In the latter half of 2000, significant movements in the actor constellations can be detected, that started a trend which was concluded by the end of the war. While the conflict between LURD/rebels and Taylor only intensified (see below), international, regional, and domestic pressure on Taylor increased. Indeed, the actual fighting continued unabated. This led to the situation that the war had “come to be referred to as a ‘strange war’ [due to] the frequent trade in claims and counter-claims between dissidents and the government as to who is winning or prevailing in the war” (The Perspective 2001d). Particularly important, however, is the rise of civilian opposition to his regime. Indeed, opposition grew more vocal, for instance when “Opposition politician Ellen Sirleaf in an open letter to Taylor published by local dailies accused the Liberian leader of using the people’s resources for his nefarious misadventure in Sierra Leone” (Panafrican News Agency 2000). The establishment of civil society platforms and movements (The Perspective 2000i), like the Mano River Woman Peace Network (MARWOPNET) one of many women movements that aimed to stop the war (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2001), or Friends of Liberia (The Perspective 2002a), were a direct response to Taylor’s policies. Regionally, states like the Ivory Coast, “once a Taylor ally” (Haddad 2001) or Guinea (The Perspective 2001b; Akinterinwa 2002) either became more vocal in criticizing Taylor or were openly arming the rebel movements. It is in this context that discussion of whether “troops under the West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG) might intervene in Liberia” (This Day 2002b) gained traction.
Finally, at the end of the conflict, the isolation of the Taylor regime was complete. His main support consisted of ties with the RUF and Libyan leader Gadhafi (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003m). The rebel movement only increased in strength, as it encircled Monrovia, and opened up another front in the form of MODEL (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003g). Together with LURD, MODEL “had insisted that Taylor leaving before the end of his mandate in January was part of the initial ceasefire agreement” (Daily Trust 2003a). In other words, they managed to form a common front—albeit with occasional confrontations among themselves (UN Integrated Regional Information Network 2003)—against Taylor. However, while the main adversary relationship continued to be between rebels (now LURD and MODEL) and Taylor, the civilian population became even more vocal. In a nutshell, they wanted peace and the removal of the elements of Taylor’s regime. For instance, “women, dressed in white, which they said symbolized their desire for peace, read a statement that they planned to present to the government, and the country's two rebel factions: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003c). In their statement, an unconditional ceasefire was demanded and the establishment of peace. Indeed, “as the frontline edged towards the city, thousands of civilians, waving tree fronds and branches as symbols of peace, swarmed towards the battle lines in a spontaneous march demanding peace and chanting, ‘we want peace, we want peace.’ Many pleaded with the United States to ‘stop wasting time’ and come to their aid” (Quist-Arcton 2003). At the same time, ECOWAG intensified its operation to work together with Liberians, sending peacekeepers (Vanguard 2003d), to oversee the latter ceasefire and “stabilize the country and pave the way for democratic elections” (Olaniyonu 2003). In other words, as mentioned above, we find the isolation of Taylor’s regime, an only partial expansion of war actors, but not fragmentation into new battlefronts.
In the case of the Congo war (see figure 6.4), the situation was unfortunately very different. In the first period, the alliances quickly formed. We see the rebel movement, consisting of Banyamulenge, dissatisfied soldiers, and supported (at first covertly, then openly) by Rwanda and Uganda. Indeed, from the “eastern region of Kivu, the rebels have been pushing into the interior from the Rwandan border, capturing several key towns” (Duke 1998e). Undeniably, after Kabila removed the Rwandan influences, it seemed that Rwanda wanted to replace one leader with another (Calgary Herald 1998a; The New York Times 1998a). Uganda, mostly for security reasons also supported the rebel movement (A. D. Smith 1998a). But as one of the main motives (see below for more detail) for the intervention and support of the rebel groups was security, they were “perfectly content to sit in the eastern third of the country indefinitely” (Dyer 1998). In this context, the lack of any political program, except the removal of Kabila, can be explained. However, what appeared to be a quick victory was outmaneuvered by Kabila, who managed to secure support from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola (The Gazette 1998a). This not only made a quick military victory impossible, it also embroiled the whole region in the war. The rebel alliance with UNITA, a rebel organization operating in Angola, is one such instance where the borders of Africa became increasingly spurious (Braid 1998). Globally, despite instances of criticism, very little reaction was observable. If anything, it appeared that while the US was supporting Rwanda, France sided with Kabila (Whitney 1998). What is most remarkable is, additionally, the amount of players involved already from the very first days and weeks of the conflict.

The second period began with the death of Laurent Kabila and the succession by his son, Joseph. This particularly brought parts of the civil population against the regime, both due to the lack of political legitimization (as he was not elected into office), his mother being Tutsi, his lack of experience, and inability to speak French or the “language of the people” (Onishi and Fisher 2001a; Raghavan 2001b; Raghavan 2001a). However, in principle, Joseph Kabila
managed to increase his support. First of all, he maintained the backing of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, despite the domestic opposition the respective regimes faced. Secondly, even domestically, regardless of his unpopularity, the rebellion remained even less popular. Thirdly, he toured the capitals of the West in order to gain support from Germany, Britain, France, Belgium, and the US (Mufson 2001; The Washington Post 2001). Fourthly, his publicity campaign had the effect of distancing Rwanda and Uganda from US support. One result was that “America’s acting representative to the UN, James Cunningham, criticized Rwanda for the ‘alarming’ human rights situation in areas it occupies” (McGreal 2001a). Kabila’s position was further strengthened by the fall-out of the former allies Rwanda and Uganda and the fragmentation of the rebel groups into different units (The Weekend Australian 2001; O’Reilly 2002b). In other words, in the second period of the conflict we see the fragmentation of alliances, particularly of those forces opposing the Kabila regime.

Figure 6.4: Actor Constellation Congo
In the final period of the conflict, something remarkable took place. As we witness the lack of conflict between the initial conflicting parties—actually, the reverse, as Kabila started to cooperate with the rebels—new conflict configurations emerge. Particularly important are various conflicts in eastern Congo, between different strands of the RCD, the rebels in general and ethnic tribes—specifically the Hema and Lendu (Maharaj and Masciarelli 2003; The Age 2003). The point is not so much that these conflicts were anyhow present, but rather that with the major end of hostilities between rebels and governmental forces, the signing of different peace agreements with Uganda, Rwanda and Congo, other conflicts in Congo rose to prominence. Ultimately, as Mai-Mai and Interahamwe were excluded, respectively made objections to the negotiations, they maintained both an incentive and the freedom to continue their operations and ignite new rounds of violence.

6.3.4 The Expansion of the War Systems: Decisive Battle and Dispersion

The fourth dimension concerns the expansion and intensification of the war system. Here, a second difference of war development in Liberia and in Congo can be found. Whilst in principle, both war systems expanded, this enlargement took diverse paths, which can be best labeled as \textit{linear} in the case of Liberia and \textit{non-linear} in Congo. Evidently, each war expanded in terms of territory affected, number of war participants, conflicting parties, and use of weaponry and mercenaries. For instance, the war in Congo was famously described as “Africa’s First World War” (Prunier 2009; Raghavan 2014), because it drew in a dozen neighboring states and destabilized the entire region. Equally, the war in Liberia expanded into adjoining states like Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, giving rise to surrogate wars and offering the potential for the internationalization of the war. However, the crucial difference in these wars is not \textit{that} expansion occurred, but \textit{how} this happened. Without denying the complexity on the ground, we find that in Liberia the battlefront moved towards Monrovia, encircling the capital
and bringing it to a somewhat decisive outcome. This was not the case in Congo. The rebel insurgency, which originated in eastern Congo and supported by Rwanda and Uganda (see previous section), made initial territorial gains, which in turn gave fuel to the expectancy of a quick and conclusive victory. Yet, as Kabila managed to gain support from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola, a military stalemate emerged in which the entire Congolese state was carved up into different units. Next to the raging war behind the battle lines, the war became much more dispersed and uncontrollable. Consequently, it became practically impossible to actually conclude the war. From a theoretical point of view, these diverging developments contribute to a better understanding of why the war in Congo, but not in Liberia, recurred. Like the war in Chechnya (see chapter before) has shown, a non-linear war is more resilient in surviving as it avoids any definite outcome. The enemy is rarely defeated, but retreats or hides, only to attack again later on.

In the case of Liberia, we find a multi-faceted expansion of the war in Liberia into neighboring countries, with the overall threat of destabilizing the entire region. This was countered on three fronts. Firstly, the possibility (and later deployment) of an international intervention was specifically discussed as a means to prevent the ‘outbreak’ of the Liberian war. Secondly, the rise of a rebel opposition that gradually intensified its campaign to claim increasing amounts of Liberian territory and of Monrovia, ultimately leading to the direct confrontation with Taylor. Thirdly (and paradoxically), it was Taylor himself who contributed to his own end, by intensifying his efforts to destroy the rebels and kill all internal opposition to his rule. This ‘defensive act’ drove more people to the rebels and ultimately contributed to the end of the Taylor regime.

Particularly in the first months of the war in Liberia, the main aspects of the war were the destabilizing effects it had on the region, particularly due to incursions into Liberia (The Perspective 1999; The Perspective 2000a) and the "movement of arms [that] was a menace to
sub-regional security” (Star Radio 1999). However, the focus changed quickly towards the rise of a rebel movement inside and into northern Liberia (Kahler 1999b). Indeed, “the dissidents, under the umbrella of ‘Liberians United for Peace and Reconciliation,’ said they have taken the provincial city of Voinjama, and key towns, including Zorzor, Namah, Bellefani, Salayea, and Bakedu” (The Perspective 2000c). Afterwards, the rebel movements, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, and LURD made continuous progress towards the capital Monrovia (The News 2000; The Progress 2000). The response of Taylor was a likewise increase in his efforts to rid himself of domestic and foreign opposition. As such, he executed elements of the military that he perceived as threatening (The Perspective 2000b), expanded the military draft (T. Kamara 2000a), dismantled internal political opposition (The Perspective 2000f), started to use mercenaries (The Perspective 2000g), and in general deployed more and more troops (Panafrican News Agency 2000). Basically, as indicated above, both rebels and governmental forces continuously increased their efforts to gain a military victory (S. Kamara 2001b; The Perspective 2001c), with the rebels slowly taking the upper hand and moving their forces from Lofa county towards Monrovia, capturing strategic towns one after the other (Adams 2002b; Daily Trust 2002; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003a). As mentioned in the previous section, with the rise of an additional major rebel group, MODEL (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks 2003e), the dices had been cast. It should be noted that already the escalating conflict prompted the discussion of an international intervention in 2001 (Kposowa 2001); which only gained fuel with time moving one (This Day 2002a) with the intervention by ECOMOG (This Day 2003b).

The situation in Congo was different, although it initially seemed to be a quicker version of the Liberian war. What appeared to be a speedy victory by the rebel groups, moving in from the eastern province of Northern and Southern Kivu and from the coastal side on the West to the capital, came to an unexpected halt due to the entry of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia on
behalf of Kabila. While this led to a stalemate militarily, it resulted in an intensification of fighting in many regards. First of all, an increasing number of actors became involved (see previous section) from states to non-state ones. Secondly, frictions within the alliance structure lead to new conflicts, particularly between Rwanda and Uganda. Thirdly, a war within a war emerged in the Ituri region, between the so-called Hema and Lendu. Fourthly, the war intensified also in regard to the use of violence, as more troops, more money, and weapons were invested to ‘convince’ the other. All this led finally to a situation in which was in principle everywhere, and creating a condition that even after the signing of the concluding peace treaty, for the majority of the population, it was “arguably even worse now [April 2003] than it was before the agreements were signed” (The Japan Times 2003).

To be more specific, at the onset of the war, the fragile nature of the Congolese state became apparent, as the rebel movement was put together from “elements of its own [Kabila’s] military” (Vick 1998) together with “Banyamulenge bands” (Tunbridge 1998) and outside support (Tucker 1998b). They managed to sweep forward capturing a variety of strategically and economically important towns (Canberra Times 1998; St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1998a; St. Petersburg Times 1998) and brought the Kabila regime to the very brink of collapse. However, before this could happen, Angola and Zimbabwe particularly had already sent troops to bolster Kabila (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1998e; Sunday Tasmanian 1998; The Australian 1998a). Put differently, with the duration of the war, the intensification already took the dual form of involving more actors and more military means. Consequently, reports of intensification (Duke 1998d; The Australian 1998b), the “recruiting [of] children as young as 12 into the military” (Tucker 1998a), the armament of the civil population “for a long war, a drawn-out war, a people’s war” (French 1998c), and the (successful) attempt to buy weaponry and military equipment (O’Loughlin 1999b) accompanied the entire war. This also means that the term ‘military stalemate’ should not be understood as a halt to the fighting, but rather that the zones
of fighting moved back and forth with counter-offensives regularly mounting (Morning Star 2002).

Simultaneously, the fragmentation and expansion of war participants can be observed. Most importantly in this regard was the fallout between Uganda and Rwanda, respectively rival RCD fractions around August 20, 1999 (Jeter 1999; O’Loughlin 1999a), but also later instances in which hostile relations between former allies formed (The Independent 2002; St. Petersburg Times 2003). Equally, as mentioned in the previous section, we can observe how more and more actors were drawn into the conflict, from region, to sub-continental, to, finally, global, with the deployment of UN troops (Walsh 2000; Goodspeed 2002; The Independent 2002). Moreover, it was not only this fragmentation and intensification of the war that led to the omnipresence of war, but also developments in Ituri province. As was observed in 2001, “For more than a year in the eastern province of Ituri, perhaps several thousand people have been killed in-fighting between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups” (Fisher 2001). This resource rich area became host of fighting between both these two ethnicities and various splinter groups of the rebel movement (Daily Post 2003, 00). Here, a war within a war formed, as Lendu and Hema warriors killed apparently each other due to land ownership disputes (Fisher 2001). Thus, despite signing various peace agreements and cease fire declarations, the war never came to a halt.

### 6.4 Conclusion

The findings of the analysis can be found in table 6.1. While both wars had a destructive impact on the workings of society in terms of human suffering as well as on a systemic level, three crucial differences were identified. Firstly, in both wars fragmentations (and multiplications) of actors were witnessed, but only in Liberia did one party (e.g. Taylor) end up isolated. As emphasized above, throughout the war, the Kabila regimes managed to maintain the cohesion of their alliance. Secondly, while both wars intensification over time in various ways, the Liberian
case experienced a (somewhat) *linear* intensification thereof. The rebel armies of LURD (and later MODEL) encircled Monrovia, making it a matter of time before when the war (against Taylor) would be concluded. Evidently, the *non-linear* war in Congo did not allow for this logic, because intensification took the form of dispersion. Finally, how the war system was essentially dysfunctional (see chapter 2) was illustrated on the examples of the political, economic, judicial, and media system. However, whereas in Liberia this influence, the coupling was *temporal*, in Congo it proved to be *structural*. To put it in another way, in the Congolese case, the further existence of the (particular) political, economic, judicial, and media system depended on the continuation of the war system; this was not though the case in Liberia. As a consequence, the incentives for a return of war were much higher in the case of Congo.

**Table 6.1: Overview of empirical findings for Congo and Liberia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destruction of societal total</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dysfunctional Impact</strong></td>
<td>Yes, temporal coupling</td>
<td>Yes, structural coupling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fragmentation of actors</strong></td>
<td>Yes, with isolation of one conflicting party</td>
<td>Yes, without isolation of conflicting party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intensification of war</strong></td>
<td>Yes, linear</td>
<td>Yes, dispersion of violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one final thought, the comparison in this chapter has illustrated the applicability of the war-as-a-system framework outside of a Eurocentric focus. While this required broadening the number of data sources and including more newspapers, it provided certain key insights beyond the overall applicability of the approach. First of all, despite both states being ruled by what is commonly described to be a neo-patrimonial system, the steering capabilities of the political system during war proved to be minimal. While in both analyses, the coupling between the political and war system were the most observed phenomena (far surpassing any antagonistic relationship for instance), events on the ground more often than not evaded political control. This is as such remarkable, because it stands in opposition to the common
understanding of neo-patrimonialism, as a mode of hierarchy in which the power is centered on a core of elites (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Williams 2011). Secondly, the analysis has highlighted the importance of including domestic, regional, and international factors in the understanding of the causes and workings of war. Albeit being a counterfactual argument, both wars would not have happened (like this) had the Cold War still been ongoing, international attention not somewhere else, regional stability present, and domestic struggles for equality, prosperity, and political participation not suppressed for generations. Although this sounds like a trivial point, it is not. After all, how a war is categorized points to the perpetrators, the recognizable conflict parties (for instance when Kabila refused to negotiate with the rebels as he considered them only agents of Rwanda and Uganda), the set of solutions, and, politically most important, it assigns blame. The discussions above pointed to the impossibility of such an undertaking.
7 CONCLUSION: WHY WARS RECUR

“War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct”—Clausewitz (1953, 18)

Why do some wars recur? The aim of this project was to provide a novel explanation for the recurrence of war in the post-Cold War era. The central argument was that the type of coupling between systems determines whether war recurs or not. To be more precise, I showed that conceptualizing war as a (dys-)functional or parasitical system holds the advantage of allowing for the study of both the operations within war as well as its societal relations; originating both from society and impacting on society. In order to demonstrate this understanding of war, I have introduced a four-stage conflict intensification model. The advantage of this model was twofold. Firstly, it exposed the potentiality for war to form from any functional system. Secondly, it highlighted the non-deterministic nature of conflict evolution. Indeed, as conflicts can move ‘up and down the conflict ladder’, conflicts that revert to the stage of issue conflicts are less likely to recur than those that move down to identity conflicts. Furthermore, according to the framework of MST, systems can irritate but not steer or control each other. Only in the form of couplings can they form a relationship, in which the operations of one system rely on the operations of the other. Accordingly, my central claim was that if conflict systems form structural couplings with their surrounding functional systems, the operations of these become dependent on the continuation of the conflict itself—rendering war recurrence more likely. Additionally, the higher the number of functional systems that become coupled with the war system, the greater the autonomy of war and the lower the possibilities of stopping it. Thirdly, internal dynamics of the war system influence the likelihood of such an outcome. If one major war group can be isolated and destroyed, the war system ceases its operations.
In this chapter, these findings are presented and contrasted in more detail. Additionally, the limitations thereof and possibilities for future research are addressed. Three aspects are of particular importance, namely whether the theoretical framework is applicable to additional cases, whether the condition of modern world society can be expanded to encompass a larger temporal horizon, and whether the level of observation can be adjusted to study the actors of war utilizing the framework of MST. The aim of this section is to present the limitations of this project as promising new venues for future research by emphasizing diverging empirical and theoretical aspects. For instance, while the space limitations do not permit an additional case study, an empirical probe into the war with Daesh suggests the wider applicability of the theoretical framework. Similarly, a rudimentary articulation of several new research projects is not feasible within the limited space of this chapter; therefore, the emphasis lies on articulating several research questions that need to be addressed in subsequent research, and also on providing educated guesses to the direction these successive studies can take. Put differently, the goal is to present future debates resulting from this project and not answers thereof. These issues are theoretical, methodological, and empirical. Finally, tentative policy recommendations are brought forward regarding prevention of the recurrence of war. Each aspect is thus considered in turn.

7.1 **Insights on the Recurrence of War**

The empirical analysis in the previous chapters has revealed two diverging trajectories of the war system and its correspondence with war recurrence. In short, we can distinguish between operations *within* the war system (see table 7.1) and *outside* of it (see table 7.2). These two dimensions are interlinked. The cases of the Second Russo-Chechen War and the Second Congolese War have presented one variant thereof. Internally, both wars continued to differentiate into fragmented friend/enemy configurations, whilst simultaneously expanding beyond the territory they initially occupied, experiencing wider uses of force. To varying
degrees, the configurations of actors shifted in such a way that the isolation of (any) one primary war group was circumvented as these actors maintained vital outside support. Likewise, intensification occurred, yet this development became de-coupled from the battlefront: instead of an almost linear advance of the war towards a decisive outcome, the conflict oscillated between escalation and de-escalation, while simultaneously dispersing spatially. This was experienced in Russia through terrorist attacks on Russian territory or by massacres perpetrated upon different ethnic groups behind the battle-lines, as in the case of Congo. The consequence of these particular expansions was that these wars were never really terminated in the first place. It appears that as long as the social categories of friend/enemy groupings exist, the operations of the war system carry on.

In contrast to this type of war system, the wars in Kosovo and Liberia experienced different internal operations. First of all, fragmentation did occur, but took the form of singling out particular actors, thus isolating them as the primary enemy group. In Kosovo, it was the combined efforts of the KLA and NATO, both experiencing pressures on their respective coherence, against the Milošević regime, which furthermore lost diplomatic support internationally. Equally, in Liberia, the Taylor government faced increasing international, regional, and domestic pressures as LURD and MODEL rebels advanced on Monrovia; whilst the US, among others, actively called for the removal of Taylor. The isolation of a war party is, however, not the same as the (normative) ascription of guilt. Although it is a counterfactual argument, the theory suggests that if Milošević had aligned, for instance with the KLA, or NATO aligned with Milošević, the war would have equally ended. Secondly, the trajectory of the use of force followed a somewhat linear pattern. Whether by chance (e.g. weather) or design (e.g. strategy and will), the increase of force in both wars against an isolated primary group led to a decisive outcome. While both wars did eventually end at the negotiation table, it was the credible use of force which convinced one side of the superiority of the other. For Milošević and Taylor, continuing the war meant eventual suicide.
Table 7.1: Operations of War Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Kosovo and Liberia</th>
<th>Chechnya and Congo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation of actors</td>
<td>• Isolation of incumbent regime</td>
<td>• No isolation of war party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Forming of multi-level opposition</td>
<td>• Opening of new friend/enemy configurations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification of war</td>
<td>• Intensification of military campaign</td>
<td>• Dispersion of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Decisive outcome</td>
<td>• Disappearance of the battle front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the second level of analysis—the relationship between war and its environment—another set of crucial differences emerge. To be clear, the distinction here is not one of degree but of kind; both wars have been destructive on the societal total, by destabilizing expectations and threatening the physical survival of the respective members of these societies. This finding could be confirmed in all cases. However, when the attention shifts to the specific interrelations between war and functional system, distinct patterns emerge. Again, Kosovo and Liberia can be grouped together, as both can be characterized by the discontinuity of system operations as the conflict terminated. Crucially, in these two wars, the conflict system unfolded its full parasitical potential as it undermined the operations of the political, economic, judicial, and media system. The wars in Kosovo and Liberia left behind a landscape of systems that had to be rebuilt from scratch as the political system collapsed, the media system became destroyed, the law system distorted, and the economic system ruined. That the re-construction of functional systems does not result in a working state can be explained with the toolbox of MST, which highlights the limited steering capabilities of the political system and the occurrence of unintended consequences (Willke 2007).

If the wars in Kosovo and Liberia are defined by their discontinuity, correspondingly, the wars in Chechnya and Congo are characterized by the continuity of the system operations. In a nutshell, the argument is that if the continuation of operations within functional systems depends on the prolongation of the conflict, i.e. if they become structurally coupled, the termination of the conflict—usually a political act—is short-lived. The reason for this is that functional systems are beyond the already-mentioned limited steering capabilities of the
political system. Indeed, the more structural couplings the conflict system has with its environment, the more autonomous, and less reliant it becomes from the operations of a single system. Specifically, if the war was only coupled with the political system, the impact of the political system would be greater than if more systems were coupled. However, in the Second Russo-Chechen War and the Second Congolese War, the empirical evidence provided support to the notion that distinct war systems, like war economy, war media, war law, and war politics were formed. The most often observed example is evidently the formation of war economies; that is, economies that can only function as long as the war continues. The analysis has not only confirmed the presence thereof, but has shown the presence of additional systems next to the economic one.

Table 7.2: Overview of System Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Kosovo and Liberia</th>
<th>Chechnya and Congo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration of social structures</td>
<td>• Displacement of whole social groups</td>
<td>• Displacement of whole social groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase in atrocities</td>
<td>• Increase in atrocities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Psychological warfare</td>
<td>• Psychological warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupling of the war system with functional systems</td>
<td>• Parasitical impact upon functional systems</td>
<td>• Coupling with functional systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disruption of operations of functional systems</td>
<td>• Formation of war system (see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis revealed two additional aspects. First of all, time matters, but in a specific way. The dimensions under investigation were dynamic ones, by which I mean that evolution of the system over time was of crucial interest in the study. Indeed, the evolutionary impact (change of actors, increase/decrease in violence, and establishment of systemic relations) is definitely important in the study of war. What is of less importance appears to be the ‘factional’ duration of the war. The dynamics in the dimensions of interest that played out over eleven weeks in Kosovo were essentially the same that lasted over 3 years in Liberia. Similarly, 10 years of war in Chechnya exposed analogous events as did 5 years of war in Congo. This is possibly a minor point, but supports the notion that war creates its own reality in which the categories of friend/enemy are absolute, not relative. Secondly, particularly the wars analyzed
in Liberia, Chechnya, and Congo were already *recurrent* wars to begin with. Even the war in Kosovo followed a ‘pendulum of dominance’ as the historical overview made apparent. The overview of the various conflict stages emphasized the propensity of wars to be recurrent (only) if they move from subordination to identity conflict. This finding, evidently, points to the need for moving beyond the suppression of violence and towards addressing the underlying (socially constructed) identity-related issues.

Moreover, the empirical analysis and preceding theoretical discussions point to a crucial issue, namely the placement of the war system within the social realm. While in the antecedent chapters the terms subordination conflict and war system were used interchangeably, the empirical analysis has demonstrated the necessity to pull the conglomeration of concepts apart. Specifically, the operations of the war system can be observed both on a functional and the societal level. Consequently, I propose labeling the operations of the war system, and its parasitical impact, as a subordination conflict. This placement allows for the operation of the subordination conflict *without* the semantics of war (Ranger 1992, 703; Mégret 2002, 365). A war operates along the communicative distinction of friend/enemy, not when something is called a war. Evidently, the war on drugs is in many aspects less of a war than various humanitarian interventions. The categorization of ‘war system’ on the societal level allows for the differentiation of (national) societies that experience all the processes of war, as explicated above, from those that are not. It allows, therefore, to do away with the notion of political, economic, judicial, and media war system and place them under the umbrella of the war system (Kruse 2009, 199). A war system is a society in which temporally, the primacy of functional differentiation—as present in civil societies—is foreclosed in favor of (dys-)functional differentiation. This is radical for MST, as it suggests an additional layer of differentiation in the world system to operate *alongside* functional differentiation, namely between war and functional systems.
Before moving to the limitations of these findings and avenues of future research, one final aspect needs to be foregrounded, namely the relationship of this theory with the antecedent explanations for war recurrence articulated in the introductory chapter. Firstly, this project has served to demonstrate the possibility of studying war as a social force and of opening up the ‘black-box’ of war. Contrary to the war as experience literature and the Critical War Studies, the operations of the war system and its relationship towards society could be uncovered, without subscribing to any a priori structurally determined relationship thereof. With the help of the methodical tools developed in chapter 3, the processes during war were empirically illustrated. Moreover, the relationship of this theoretical framework to discussions on the recurrence of war should be seen not as mutually exclusive, but complementary. For instance, whether foreign intervention is successful in maintaining peace, or not, does not depend primarily on the size of the troops deployed, but whether these troops adjust to the realities created by war, as for example the changing actor configuration. Neither is the presence of valuable natural resources a theoretically determined reason for or against the reappearance of war, but what matters is whether a war system has developed that would profit from the continuation of war. Both these cases have been demonstrated by the comparison between Liberia and Congo. Moreover, the findings expand the argument of Walter and colleagues in the sense that it is not only the economic and political structures that matter for war’s recurrence, but rather societal ones more generally (Walter 2004, 385).

Finally, the theoretical framework presents a highly constructivist interpretation of the formation and operation of wars. This suggests that ethnical identities do play a role, but that these identities are constructed and not externally given. To put it differently, just because different groups are in a relationship towards each other is not sufficient enough for the outbreak and continuation of violence. Whereas the model of conflict stages has highlighted that enmity is avoidable, the operations of the subordination conflict demonstrate that friend/enemy groups change over time. Moreover, the model has shown that the distinction between greed and
grievance might be a political one (e.g. the ascription of guilt and responsibility), but holds little analytical value. Rather, the identification of conflictual issues, groups forming around them and finally, the use of violence to persuade the other group has proven to be a convincing model in studying the formation of wars without necessarily assigning blame to a particular group. The fact that both greed and grievances are present in the formation of (civil) wars is not denied; the point is that these are not analytically valuable categories.

### 7.2 Comments on the Limitations of the Project

If the findings of this study and the argument of the project are to be followed, a set of limitations needs to be addressed. This section does not simply states the drawbacks of the project, but rather offers ideas and probes for the amending of these. Three possible objections are as to whether the theoretical framework is applicable to other post-Cold War cases, whether it can say anything on war recurrence universally, and whether other methods and research strategies can be applied within this research tradition. Consequently, the following dimensions are presented as possible avenues for future research. Here, I concentrate on three aspects: (I) the prospects of generalizing the findings beyond the four case studies, (II) ways of expanding the temporal dimension to include wars before the end of the Cold War, and (III) the possibilities of widening the methods of both strengthening the empirical findings and investigating additional aspects on the functioning of subordination conflicts. These points are addressed now in turn.

#### 7.2.1 Beyond the Four Cases: Probing into the War with Daesh

As elaborated above, the expectations, that the trajectories of war systems that are recurrent are different from those that are conclusively terminated, were correct. Although there is no room for further case studies, I investigate here whether or not the theoretical framework can be used to illustrate the workings of other war systems on the recent international war against Daesh.
At the time of writing, this war is ongoing, a moving target so to speak. Therefore, the selection of this case moves from studying the processes of war after they have unfolded to making theoretically informed statements about how such a war will develop. Hence, I briefly discuss the developments of the international war against Daesh on the four dimensions outlined above. I argue that this war has been having comparable developments to Chechnya and Congo, which renders a recurrent war more likely. In the following paragraphs I substantiate this claim.

What is now called Daesh or Islamic State (IS) has its origins in early 2000s under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zargawi. Under the name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad, the Salafi—Sunni—militant organization operated in Iraq with the goal of rejecting American troops in Iraq and de-stabilizing the transition government (Hashim 2014, 70). After initial victories and the re-branding as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Zargawi was killed by an American airstrike, marking a decline of the organization. Indeed, from 2006 to 2011, it appeared that it was only a matter of time for AQI to disappear. Local resistance took the form of the Anbar Awakening, where Sunnis in Anbar Province cooperated with US forces to expel the radical group (Bruno 2008). This resistance grew out of the perceived foreignness of AQI and the rejection of violence by this group. Coalition forces carried out successful attacks that ultimately killed the leaders Abu Ayub al-Masri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Shanker 2010). However, aided by and because of the excluding policies of then-Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, who was part of the Shiite government, the withdrawal of coalition forces in December 2011, and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the group resurged. It received international attention in 2014 when it seized in a blitz-attack large territory in Syria and Iraq and captured key cities like Raqqa, Palmyra, Falluja, and Mosul (BBC News 2015). As the now declared Caliphate, it wages a war on many fronts against a coalition of more than 60 states and countless domestic insurgency groups (Laub and Masters 2015).

The level of social destruction caused by the presence of Daesh has been remarkable and often cited; these include the massacre of civilians (Westfall and Perry 2015), enforcement
of slavery (Tharoor 2015), beheading of prisoners (Cunningham 2015), systematic rape (Callimachi 2015), looting (Francis 2015), and the destruction of historic, religious, and cultural sites (Shaheen and agencies 2015). The use of terror attacks regionally and internationally have equally become observed (Gamio, Berkowitz, and Lu 2015). The violence unleashed by Daesh has caused many civilians to flee the affected area—although the related Syrian civil war has mainly contributed to this—causing the largest refugee crisis in the history of the European Union and the greatest social change in Germany’s post-World War 2 history (Amann et al. 2015). The latter points to the fact that the violence is not limited to only one side in the war, such as attacks on the Syrian civil population by the Assad regime or the West demonstrate (Osborne 2015; Ross 2015). At the same time, one should not underestimate that the project of Daesh is the establishment of an Islamic state, with its own social structures and orders (Kalyvas 2015; Ruthven 2015). This can be demonstrated by the unprecedented influx of foreign fighters from all over the world to join IS (Owen 2014).

Moreover, the latter observation points to the distinct formation of a war system, contrary to simply the presence of a parasitical conflict system. Indeed, it appears that new media, judicial, economic, and political systems have been created which necessitate the continuation of war. Although it can only be described as a Jihadi/proto state (Lia 2015), during the war with Daesh a distinct political system has formed, with its own currency, taxation system, and domestic representatives (al-Tamimi 2015). Moreover, arguably, at least the Syrian regime seems to be dependent on the continuation of this war for its own survival (Solomon 2015). Much has been written concerning the financial side of Daesh. For instance, through the extraction of natural resources, the sale of historical artifacts, the extortion of ransom money, and the financial support from outside, Daesh has established a viable economy (Hansen-Lewis and Shapiro 2015; Laub and Masters 2015). It is therefore also unsurprising that many international military raids have targeted precisely the trade in oil (Dagher 2015). Thirdly, the war has become prominent for being waged on the internet regarding the supremacy of
interpretation. Foremost, the access to the war zone for journalists has become severely restricted, making independent reporting basically impossible (Miller and Mekhennet 2015). Subsequently, with the use of Twitter and various publications like Dabiq from Daesh, a narrative of victory and superiority has been distributed to attract youths to join in the fighting (Hashim 2014; Gates and Podder 2015; Zelin 2015). Finally, the establishment of Sharia courts which have replaced the constitutional courts predominantly in Syria and Iraq, the infringement of internationally recognized borders, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war points to the erosion of the judicial system (Al Fares 2015; March and Revkin 2015). In sum, it appears that structural couplings between the subordination conflict and the functional systems have occurred, which led to the formation of a war system.

The operations within the subordination conflict support this assessment, as we find both the fragmentation of actors and dispersion of violence. Regarding the intensification of the war system, several indicators show that both the territory affected and the use of force has increased. However, this increase has not been neither linear nor progressive, but has moved through the different stages as alluded to already above. Firstly, while under Zargawi there was a growth in the number of attacks on Iraqi territory, after his death they noticeably diminished. It is only since its re-emergence in 2014 that it has affected a wider geographical area. Not only did IS manage to capture territory in Iraq and Syria, but it has also conducted a number of terrorist attacks outside this territory, whether in Beirut, Paris, against a Russian passenger jet or the US (BBC News 2015). At the same time, the territory it controls has again shrunk due to increasing airstrikes and the political and military support of counter factions (Laub and Masters 2015). In fact, the amount of air strikes has steadily increased, ever since the US decided to support the Yazidis, a Christian minority in Iraq, from the advances of radical Islamists in 2014 (Cooper and Shear 2014). As elaborated below, the pressure on IS has increased by attacks from the US, France, Britain, and Russia. Effectively, it appears that whilst the territory
controlled by Daesh is shrinking, the prospect of being targeted by Daesh-inspired and conducted terrorist attacks outside of this territory is radically growing. In this sense, it resembles the Second Russo-Chechen War, which might not be surprising considering the large amount of Chechens fighting in the ranks of Daesh (Dolgov 2015). Because of this trajectory, from the perspective of expansion, it appears that the termination of the conflict retreats into the distant future.

The final dimension concerns the fragmentation of actors; and the war on Daesh has surely made for strange bedfellows. At first glance, it would appear that Daesh is becoming isolated locally, regionally, and internationally. Most prominently, an international alliance has formed in which even rival powers such as the US, Russia, Turkey, and Iran cooperate in destroying Daesh (Drennan 2014; Hashim 2014). Transnationally, of equal prominence was the split between the insurgency group and al-Qaida, but also other Islamic militant groups, such as Jabhar Al-Nusra, under the umbrella organization of Islamic Front, which is operating in Syria (Hashim 2014; Spencer 2015). Regionally, opposition was formed by both the Assad regime and the Free Syrian Rebels, although relations are too diffuse to make for a clear picture (Friedland, al-Tamimi, and Landis 2014). In short, it would appear that Daesh has become isolated. However, two parallel developments contradict such an assessment. Firstly, globally, other Jihadi groups have pledged allegiance to Daesh, most conspicuously Boko Haram (Boffey 2015) and secondly, transnationally, the figure of the foreign fighter has risen to prominence, joining the fight of Daesh from all over the world, possibly returning to their home countries in order to carry out terrorist attacks (Hegghammer 2010; Owen 2014; European Parliamentary Research Service 2015). Through these dual developments, Daesh has managed to circumvent isolation and prevail. Again, in line with the expectations articulated in chapter 2 and the

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This appears only to be partially true, as the organization is currently establishing itself in Libya and south-east Asia (The Guardian 2015; Morello 2016). Indeed, this trajectory emphasized the partial de-coupling of war and territory.
empirical examples of chapter 4 and 5, the termination of this conflict in the near future seems unlikely.

Table 7.3: Overview of Daesh-War System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration of social structures</td>
<td>• Displacement of whole social groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase in atrocities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupling of war with functional systems</td>
<td>• Coupling with political, economic, judicial, and media system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Parasitical impact upon functional systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation of actors</td>
<td>• Increase of affected actors over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No isolation of war party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification of war</td>
<td>• Intensification of terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dispersion of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disappearance of the battle front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, the empirical probe has highlighted three aspects which need to be elaborated.

First of all, the theoretical framework can be applied to additional cases to provide insights into the conflict dynamics inside and outside the war. While the verdict over whether the assessment is correct can only be assessed in hindsight, the framework does appear to be plausible.

Secondly, as it stands, the termination of the conflict in the near future is deemed to be unlikely and the likelihood of war recurrence is expected to be high. Put differently, the danger of Daesh is expected to remain for a while. Finally, the formation of this war system has demonstrated the importance of avoiding methodological nationalism. The de-territorialization of the war, neither perceiving it solemnly as an inter- or intra-national war, appears to be necessary in order to capture vital dimensions of the war. Analyzing war as a system enables precisely this kind of research.

7.2.2 Expanding the Temporal Horizon of the World Society

Whereas the previous discussions centered on the findings of this project and the applicability of the theoretical apparatus to cases within the temporal horizon of the study (i.e. the end of the Cold War), the present and following section discuss theoretical and methodological aspects regarding the broadening of the research object. In this section, I shortly present a research
strategy for the study of recurrent wars during the Cold War. To reiterate, in chapter 1, I argued for the temporal restriction to post-Cold War cases for a number of reasons. Of particular relevance for systems theory was the question of distinction; I maintained that with the end of the Cold War, the distinction between East and West (stratificatory or segmentary) above functional differentiation was removed. Instead, political communication was able to span the globe to an extent which seemed impossible before. In other words, the functional political system reached a qualitatively different stage than before. At this point, however, one can ask about the implications for the study of recurrent wars during the Cold War (and possibly before as well). Indeed, at least four research questions emerge.

First of all, an empirical question is concerning whether we observe a different distinction of the global political system during the Cold War than after it. The concept of modern world society, that is, a functionally differentiated world society implies that the functional distinction is of higher importance than regional and national distinctions (Albert 1999, 257; Albert 2007, 15).\(^91\) Correspondingly, following the argument above, the Cold War period can be interpreted as one in which the world was primarily differentiated into two political blocks (i.e. East/West), with a variation on the periphery (i.e. non-aligned countries). Each system (East/West) differentiated into distinct subsystems and forms of rule (Brock 2007, 157; Albert 2007, 13; Menzel 2004). Accordingly, it can be reasonably claimed that while the Soviet landscape was characterized through the practice of direct rule and the establishment of imperial structures, the West was a space of indirect rule along with the establishment of international institutions and organizations. The point is, however, not about whether this one-sentence description correctly captures the Cold War period (it is an object for further study),

\(^{91}\) As this theoretical assumption does not correspond to empirical observations, scholars in the tradition of MST have come up with competing adjustments. Willke has argued, for instance, that we can only observe lateral world systems, meaning that the world systems are still in the process of forming (Willke 2007). Luhmann and others conceived of an additional meta-code, namely inclusion/exclusion into the modern world society (Stichweh 2005). A third, and in my opinion the most convincing approach, is to allow for regional, structural couplings of functional systems. In short, alongside (and not necessarily above) domestic functional systems, the world society operates, which creates shifting couplings with its regional and national counterparts.
but rather that the separation into these blocks had direct effects on the (re-)occurrence of war. One would suspect that the occurrence of war would correspond to these blocks, meaning that it would occur on the periphery as wars regarding block membership, as wars between the blocks or as civil war within the block.

Secondly, the question is whether political control over war was greater during the Cold War; after all, the theoretical expectation is that during the Cold War, the primacy of the political system was extended to the conflict system. The post-Cold War era highlighted the various structural couplings of the subordination conflict, which in turn implied a larger autonomy of the resulting war system. During the Cold War, however, structural couplings were more centered on (only) the political system. This implies at least two aspects: firstly, the recurrence rate of wars during the Cold War was lower than the recurrence rate after the Cold War, if it is assumed that the political system principally prefers the termination of wars. Moreover, the tools created for the prevention of war recurrence are unfit for the current era, as they do not account for the various structural couplings a war system can maintain. The latter point is vital, as it suggests the need for the system to learn (e.g. social evolution) and adjust its programs to operate in the new reality. Consequently, it would explain why the political system used inappropriate tools for the post-war period in the post-Cold War era, like the ill-conceived UN mission in Congo.

Thirdly, one can question the issue of social order and reconceptualize the notion of world society in Luhmannian writings. The definition in this project was that a modern world society is one in which the communication of each functional system is able to span the globe and no communication can exist outside of it. However, as Willke points out, this definition of world society only encompasses the dimension of the social, not the specifics of world society as a mode of ordering social relations (2006, 34). As the literature on global governance and transnational networks testifies, the analytical question that needs to be assessed is how the dimension of the global impacts regionally and locally both above these contexts and alongside
them. Theoretically speaking, the shift between the Cold War and the period after is significant. If the idea of functional systems observing their own reality, events, actors, and relations is accepted, the consequence is that currently, each functional system creates its own mode of order that exists alongside other modes of order, with limited possibilities of steering each other. Basically, while the global political system might be unipolar and inhabited primarily by states (Layne 2012), the economic order could be multipolar, with a complex relationship between states and non-state actors.

Finally, since the world is never temporally fixed, the changes of these relations need to be equally encompassed in the theoretical framework. As mentioned in chapter 2, Luhmann’s theory of change is one of social evolution. Through the threefold mechanism of variation, selection, and re-stabilization, systems transform, learn, and create something new, which in turn is subject to change. Simply put, at some point, something qualitatively new emerges. The twofold question is whether we can conceptualize these moments as long processes or transformative events and how we can actually empirically observe these. Regarding the first part, studies regarding the Peace of Westphalia suggest that the occurrence of specific events that changed the international structure are rather a myth than empirical reality (Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson 2011; Piirimäe 2011). Consequently, a research strategy to address this topic could look at the processes leading to these mythicized events in IR history. Luhmann´s framework emphasizes the presence of daily rejections, which in turn indicates the continuous presence of variations—the question being only why certain variations become ultimately stabilized and others do not. However, this directly leads to the second problem on the identification of transformative events, even if these events are rather conceptualized as processes than singular occurrences. It appears that the only methods of establishing whether something—like the end of the Cold War, the financial crisis or the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—were transformative, or not, is in hindsight.
In sum, at least four research fields emerge with regards to the presence, transformation, and functioning of world society. The purpose was not to offer answers to these questions, but rather emphasize their presence thereof and elaborate on possibilities of addressing these.

### 7.2.3 Changing the Level of Observation: Looking at the Actors of War

A final set of questions regards the subject of agency and the restriction over the use of methods. Specifically, in chapter 3 I argued for the observation of the war system (on the functional and societal level) through the lens of the media system for a variety of reasons. Crucially, it allowed for the study of the war during its occurrence, as media texts served as the manifestation of the closest higher-level observation available.\(^{92}\) This choice of methods was necessary to illustrate the workings of the war system. Yet, it only provided a macro-analysis of the actor relationship and not so much of an analysis of the interaction between and within friend/enemy groups. It seems, however, possible to study the latter with the toolbox of MST, which necessitates when a different research method is needed. These considerations merit both a theoretical and a methodological discussion.

Despite the common criticism leveled against MST of being anti-humanist, I maintained the importance of individuals in this theoretical framework. Crucially, functional systems create expectations for individuals on how to behave by creating social roles (see chapter 2). This does not mean that people have to accept these specific social roles, they can always reject, alter, and/or cause a change of the expected behavior (Stichweh 2000, 8). Moreover, as a study by Utas on the Liberian war has shown, social roles can be used to navigate through a war zone by using victimhood and combatant status situationally (2005). Indeed, this conceptualization of individuals allows the researcher to shift the focus on the particular structures that create the specific social role—therefore, treating it as the outcome that needs to be explained in

\(^{92}\) One evident additional avenue of research is to contrast these illustrative studies with studies based on further empirical material or to contrast the production of reality by the NYT, for instance with that of a different newspaper.
subsequent work and not the source (Fuchs 2001, 29). It remains an exciting and promising venue of research to understand the motivations and maneuvers of individuals in war zones, the development of friend/enemy categories within war systems, and the reaction to friend/enemy communication of addresses for future research. The war as experience literature introduced in chapter 1 provides particularly encouraging methodological tools for addressing these issues. One could think of participant observations or various interview techniques in order to understand how groups observe themselves and others, whilst acknowledging the positionality of the researcher her/himself. For instance, one could ask how former combatants of war describe themselves after the end of hostilities and what kind of societal positions/roles are available for these people now.

Another promising line of research is to use Luhmann´s concept of interaction system. In short, interaction systems are present if the perception of two or more participants and their reciprocal presence is existent. While they are very limited in both duration and what they can achieve—they can only process with one subject matter at a time and are terminated once the participants leave the interaction (Luhmann 1995, 125; Schneider 2002, 346; Stichweh 2011)—invoking the interaction system in the analysis of war dynamics offers several advantages. Firstly, it seems worthwhile to conceptualize a battle as an interaction system between participants of the war system. Through this move, the insights of CWS (See chapter 1) can be incorporated into a larger body of sociological thought. This would integrate the idea of struggle into the study of war, and through the lens of MST. Secondly, violence, as a communicative medium of these specific interaction systems, could be incorporated into the study of these hostilities. Finally, such an approach allows the researcher to move down a step on the level of observations to study how friend/enemy groupings observe each other, what actions are

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93 Consequently, the placement of actors is broader than for instance in the logic of practicality, which conceives of individuals acting out practices established in their field (Pouliot 2008). Indeed, this discussion alludes to the possibility of establishing a Luhmannian-inspired logic of action that supplements Bourdieusian social thought.

94 As Beck convincingly argues, whether something is considered as violent or not is (also) dependent on the social observation of the interaction (2011, 351).
legitimized in respective discursive frames, and how the enemy is presented to the outside audience. This allows for the evaluation and judgment of interaction, but crucially, also for the identification of marginal narratives that cannot be captured from the observation of newspaper articles alone.

Particularly for the latter, the methodological ramifications are straightforward. Instead of focusing on how the media system observes the war, the concentration rests on how war participants observe their respective enemy and the war system. The difference is one of self-description of the system and other-description thereof (Stichweh 2007, 29). Explicitly, other than in the empirical studies conducted in this project, the data sources would not be newspaper articles, but statements from the various fighting groups and the participants of war. For instance, in the war in Kosovo the data sources would cover press releases, official statements, and declarations from NATO and its member states, the Milošević regime, the Serbian opposition, Russia, China, the KLA and Kosovar civilians, as these were the most important actors identified within the conflict period. Additionally, publications by NGOs working in the conflict areas, Think Tanks, and human rights organizations could be considered as supplementary sources. Finally, conducting interviews in the war zones with war participants, whether perpetrators or victims, would generate new insights into the description of the friend/enemy groupings and the perception of the war system.

7.3 Concluding Remarks

Unfortunately, it is a difficult task to articulate implications for policymakers resulting from this project—most importantly due to the recognized limited steering capabilities of systems. However, for policymakers inside and outside of war societies, this project provides some practical conclusion with regard to limiting the recurrence of war, terminating subordination conflicts, and preventing the outbreak of war in the first place.
Predominantly, there are clear limitations of what the political system can archive in order to prevent the recurrence of war. Indeed, I have argued that due to the limited steering capabilities of functional systems and the structural couplings of the war system, even establishing the political will to stop war from breaking out again is in itself insufficient. Thus, the popular formula that wars break out again (or are not terminated in the first place) due to the lack of political will over-estimates the prospect of the political system of influencing events on the ground. In contrast to this, war as a societal phenomenon necessitates societal solutions. What does this mean? Of particular relevance, it appears, is the availability of social roles outside of the war system and the logic of friend/enemy. If it is more profitable to engage in the activities of the economic system rather than in the war economy, or the justice system is considered evenhanded rather than just the expression of the right of the strong—allowing a peaceful conflict resolution—individuals have a much stronger incentive not to pick up the fight again. But instead of being merely a political process, the role of other functional systems needs to be included. By this I mean that next to a political agreement over power-sharing and future elections, substantial economic aid in rebuilding the economy and infrastructure, judicial assistance for the establishment of a judicial system, disarmament, reconciliation, and re-integration programs, the presence of an independent media system is as much needed as impartial foreign military involvement to overcome commitment problems and facilitate the perception of procedural (and distributive) justice.

The second policy implication is related to this and concerns the operations of the war system itself. In short, if the goal is to terminate the war, and preferably in such a way that it does not recur, the conditions that arise during the war need to be remedied. This suggest that the operations of the war system have to be taken seriously. More specifically, as particularly the Kosovo case and the role of NATO intervention therein demonstrated, alliance cohesion of the intervening power is central and involves a considerable cost. After all, it was argued that the Serbian strategy of waiting for NATO to fraction and consequently withdraw from the
conflict was not ill-conceived. Because the configuration of friend/enemy groupings can change throughout a war, any intervention and peace agreement needs to take these shifts into account, as the case in Congo and Chechnya amply demonstrated. Any intervention that does not understand that the actors and their goals can change is destined to fail, as it addresses parties which are no longer the most relevant ones in the conflict. Additionally, if the goal of outside intervention is only to terminate a given conflict, it should not support the forces which are politically closer, but rather consider which war party is more likely to be isolated in the conflict. The Liberian War indicates that it was only after Taylor realized that he was domestically, regionally, and internationally isolated, he decided to stop the fighting.

Simultaneously, intensification of the war efforts ought to go hand in hand with containment of the hostilities. Particularly, the wars in Chechnya and Congo have shown the advantages of mountains and jungle for the hiding and regrouping of troops after military defeat. Because of the possibility to reassemble force, but also due to the option of targeting civilians outside of the war zones, like Russia proper, the possibility of subordinating a group was not given. Better analysis of the geographic environment of the war zones coupled with specific strategies that are aimed at combating insurgencies prior to and during the war could prevent the dispersion of violence, reduce the number of targets outside the war zones, and contribute to a successful termination of the conflict. Given how many people died by Chechen terrorist attacks in Russia proper or are currently targeted by Daesh, finding ways to restrict the movement of war participants seems to be imperative. Insurgencies rely on local support and cases, particularly the Chechen war, have shown how badly conducted military operations drive locals to support (and join) insurgencies.

The final implication is possibly the most far-reaching one. As was illustrated on the basis of the Kosovo and Liberian wars, the recurrence of war was avoided, because the war systems were successful in sprawling their parasitical nature and undermining the operations of other systems. Consequently, the war and peace period are characterized mostly by the
discontinuity of operations. After Milošević and Taylor, new systems (not only political systems) were established that aimed at preventing the outbreak of new hostilities. In contrast to this, Chechnya and Congo experienced the perpetuation of infected systems that allowed for the return of violence. This perpetuation was captured by the concept of structural coupling. Consequently, the policy implications of my findings can be summarized in one sentence: *One should not aim at salvaging compromised functional systems, but seek instead the creation of new functional systems, designed to prevent war recurrence.* Of course, it is well-known that both Kosovo and Liberia have had and still face multiple crises in governance and are rarely described as functioning states. Put differently, a whole new set of problems emerge, which any Luhmannian scholar is very much aware. They seem, however, preferable in comparison to a new outbreak of war.

In arguably one of the most influential studies on war, Clausewitz described war as a chameleon, as it changes its form with each occurrence. This project has argued that the character of the chameleon expands beyond war itself to encompass the society in which war forms and is affected by it in turn. As society changes, from the Cold War to the current state of modern world society, so does war change in its occurrence and relationship towards society. Be it as the formation of the war system vis-à-vis the operation of functional systems or in a different form, the study of war recurrence needs to include the dynamic nature of war and society. This project was part of the effort to understand this volatile nature of war, with the aim of finding tools to prevent its recurrence in the future.
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## 9 Appendix

### Appendix 4.1: Overview of Actor Relationship Kosovo War Coding of First Week

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Appendix 5.2: Overview of Actor Relationship Chechen War Coding at the Second Period of the War

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### Appendix 5.3: Overview of Actor Relationship Chechen War Coding at the Third Period of the War

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## Appendix 5.4: Overview of Actor Relationship Chechen War Coding at the Fourth Period of the War

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Appendix 6.1: Overview of Actor Relationship Liberian War Coding at the Beginning of the War

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### Appendix 6.2: Overview of Actor Relationship Liberian War Coding at the Middle of the War

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## Appendix 6.5: Overview of Actor Relationship Congo War Coding at the Middle of the War

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### Appendix 6.6: Overview of Actor Relationship Congo War Coding at the End of the War

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