THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY ON PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

- a comparative analysis of Hungary and Poland

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ABSTRACT

What explains variation in human rights foreign policy between countries? This thesis argues that the perception of historical grievances heavily influences collective memory, which foreign policy making as well as public opinion reflects. Drawing on the cases of Hungary and Poland to argue that collective memory explains this variation, this unorthodox approach suggests a causal factor linking them both, something that has eluded foreign policy scholars to date. A comparative case study approach is complemented by public opinion data and key informant interviews in the context of post-2004 human rights foreign policies of Hungary and Poland, with an emphasis on the promotion of civil and political rights. Empirical evidence suggests that the wars and mass atrocities of the 20th century still heavily influence the collective mindset in these countries, resulting in the composition of a more open-minded nation and more human rights and democratization-oriented foreign policy in Poland, while it suggests a more withdrawn society and a less civil and political rights-concerned foreign policy agenda in Hungary.
Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him.

~Dwight D. Eisenhower

History is the most dangerous product which the chemistry of the mind has concocted. Its properties are well known. It produces dreams and drunkenness. It fills people with false memories, exaggerates their reactions, exacerbates old grievances, torments them in their repose, and encourages either a delirium of grandeur or a delusion of persecution. It makes whole nations bitter, arrogant, insufferable and vainglorious.

~Paul Valéry, Regards sur le Monde Actuel
~ To my beloved Mother and Sister, who never let me fall apart,

~ To my Father, who made me love history and who looks down on me from above.
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ACRONYMS

CEE – Central Eastern Europe
EaP – Eastern Partnership
EU – European Union
EVS – European Values Study
V4 – Visegrád 4 countries (Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland)
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

“To assess the aftermath of the EU accession of Central Eastern European states, one has to look into the collective memory of these societies, since collective memory and identity shape the attitude to Europe and Europeanness.”

János Áder, the President of Hungary apologized in 2013 in the Serbian Parliament for the mass murder of approximately 3800 civilian Serbs and Jews, committed by Hungarian soldiers in Novi Sad, Serbia in 1941, when that part of Serbia (Bačka) was re-attached to Hungary 21 years after the Trianon treaty. In exchange, the Serbian Parliament apologized for the mass murder of 5000 civilian Hungarians, committed by Serbian soldiers in the same region in 1944, as a revenge for the mass murder of Serbs 3 years before. This act is a positive example of how two nations who share similar historical grievances and caused pain for one another in the past are capable of acknowledging their crime, asking for each other’s apology, and laying new grounds for their bilateral foreign affairs. This thesis explores the power of historical grievances over people’s mindset, and demonstrates through the level of political engagement and the making of human rights foreign policies how these grievances form both the individual and the collective mindset on social and on political levels.

The hypothesis and case selection

The hypothesis of this research states that collective memory is one of the underlying causes of the prevailing public opinion and the priorities of human rights foreign policies in countries. The perception of painful historical events and whether or not a society has managed to discuss and

reconcile with their respective past is reflected in the values of the society and the attitude of its people to politics and decision-making. Simultaneously, human rights foreign policies at least partially reflect the mindset of the people of whom they represent. It is an especially viable assumption in the countries of Central Eastern Europe, as seen in the Spohn quote above. I am aware that some scholars argue that historical grievances only have a limited effect on public opinion and foreign policy making, and that the political elite might manipulate the society with (mis)interpretations of history.\(^4\) Therefore, I focus on the interpretation of and reconciliation with those historical events that the academic literature regards as most influential ones over public opinion and political culture.

The study explores why Poland has managed to reconcile much better with its past compared to Hungary, where historical grievances are still untold and unresolved.\(^5\) I chose to contrast Hungary with Poland for the reason that both countries have similar historical backgrounds, both of them are members of the Visegrád 4 cooperation, and they are famous of their centuries-long, nostalgic friendship.\(^6\) The similarities are sufficient enough to comparatively analyze the prevailing public opinion and the human rights foreign policies of these countries. I illustrate the different coping mechanisms of Poles and Hungarians with their history through two examples. First, through the comparison of the level of political engagement in the society (public opinion), and second, through human rights foreign policies formulated after the 2004 EU accession. Since scholarly literature usually divides the foreign policy making tendencies of these two countries into the periods of before and after the 2004 EU accession, I do the same for methodological purposes. Dealing with the

\(^4\) I elaborate on the contested issue of the effect of public opinion on policy making in Chapter 2.


foreign policies of Hungary and Poland before the EU accession would overrun the scope of the research. Anyway, their priorities until the accession were very similar, as they both aimed at NATO and EU accession. It does not make much sense to re-tell two very similar foreign policy evolutions.

If one takes into account the similar historical backgrounds of Poland and Hungary, it is clear that both countries have lost a large chunk of their territories, both were invaded by foreign forces several times throughout the history, and both have to cope with the legacies of WWII and the Communist dictatorship. One might assume that Hungary would just as much aspire to share its experiences of twenty-five years of transition to democracy from dictatorship as Poland does in its Eastern European, and broader Caucasian neighborhood. Since scholarly literature falls short on the analysis of the underlying causes of the differences between the foreign policies of these two countries, this research attempts to fill in this gap. I acknowledge that it is difficult to measure the extent to which historical events shape public opinion and foreign policy; therefore, this research serves as an experiment to see how viable this assumption is in the context of Hungary and Poland.

As subsequent sections will show, Poland has a more robust human rights foreign policy than Hungary, and it is a greater supporter of civil and political rights abroad than other countries within the Central Eastern European (CEE) region. Numerous events of the recent past strengthen this claim. For instance, the fact that Poland pushed for the integration of the Eastern Partnership (2009) into the Eastern Neighborhood Policy (2004) of the European Union is a clear sign of the

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8 Zsinka, “Similarities and Differences in Polish and Hungarian History.”
commitment of Poland to the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad.\textsuperscript{11} Also, according to a recent Freedom House report on the level of commitment to democracy promotion in different countries in the world, Poland is in second place as a “strong” supporter, right after Sweden.\textsuperscript{12} One cannot find similar level of engagement with civil and political rights issues in the case of Hungary, since the country’s human rights foreign policy mostly exhausts in the promotion of minority rights of ethnic Hungarians abroad, as subsequent sections will demonstrate. The different ratio and scope of dealing with human rights issues are the basic differences between the human rights foreign policies of the two countries which I explain by the level of reconciliation with the past.

I do not analyze how different governments interpreted history and engaged in the promotion of civil and political rights in Hungary and Poland after 1989. Instead, I examine overall tendencies with a special focus on the post-EU accession political culture. It is beyond the scope of my research to analyze the attitude and effect of left or right-wing governments to the issues explored here. Neither do I analyze the role of geography, country size nor security issues in the making of human rights foreign policies. I am aware that the proximity of Russia and Ukraine to Poland and Hungary, and the security implications of this geopolitical setting can be influential in their foreign policies. On the other hand, I believe that security priorities only partially explain the directions of foreign policies, and this is why I analyze the role of societal factors, such as collective memory and public opinion in policy making. The society might not entirely agree with security interests-driven political decisions and would prefer value-based policies instead, as it happened in the case of Poland, where several

\textsuperscript{11} Michael J. Baun and Dan Marek, \textit{The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign Policy and Europeanization} (New York: Routledge, 2013), 83.

protests took place in 2003 against the country’s participation in the Iraqi intervention,\textsuperscript{13} as I will later present this case.

The second illustration of historical grievances presented in this research is focused on prevailing public opinion in the two countries. The feeling of injustice stemming from past atrocities and unfair treatment might actually be the reason public opinion is such as it is. As we see in subsequent chapters, many Hungarians still perceive the Trianon treaty signed at the end of the WWI as one of the most painful events of their history.\textsuperscript{14} The horrors of WWII and the oppression suffered during the Communist dictatorship all add up to this feeling of injustice, which the Hungarian society has been unable to reconcile with to date. In contrast, the Poles have experienced all the dreadful events of the 20th century and the invasion of their territories just as much as Hungarians did, but they managed to overcome and reconcile with at least part of their past, which made them able to actively engage in regional or even global politics. I demonstrate these differences through the analysis of the 2008 European Values Study conducted simultaneously in Poland and in Hungary.

The research focuses only on the promotion of civil and political rights within the area of universal human rights. These include the freedom of association, religion and thought, and the prohibition to subject anyone to torture, unlawful judicial procedure and arbitrary detention, just to mention a few, based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\textsuperscript{15} The notion of freedom during the transition in 1989 meant the full emergence of these rights for people in the Communist bloc. These rights possess a symbolic meaning for the people living in Central Eastern Europe, and policy

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makers in the region usually think about the promotion of civil liberties when they consider sharing their experiences with other countries currently undergoing democratization processes. This is why the research is focused specifically on the patterns of civil and political rights promotion.

The structure of the thesis

The second chapter engages scholarship on collective memory, public opinion and foreign policy making in order to reveal the gap between the two areas, and identify how the research on the effect of public opinion on foreign policy making fits into this picture. The third chapter presents the most painful 20th century historical events of Poland and Hungary, and explores how they shaped collective memory over time. Chapter 4 presents the methodology, which combines quantitative public opinion data with qualitative research on Polish and Hungarian human rights foreign policy literature. In addition, eight interviews conducted with former and current Polish and Hungarian foreign policy makers and academics serve as secondary reference points to interpret the findings. Chapter 5 presents and compares the findings of public opinion data in Poland and Hungary. Chapter 6 discusses and compares the prevailing human rights foreign policy tendencies in the two countries. Finally, Chapter 7 closes the thesis with a short conclusion and projects prospective research in the area.

Chapter 2 - Theoretical Background

Introduction

I group the relevant literature of this thesis into three categories. The first category consists of literature on how historical events shape collective memory and collective identity. The second part entails the results of research on how public opinion does or does not affect public policies. Finally, the third section elaborates on foreign policy making in general, and how the promotion of human rights as a specific issue area becomes part of the foreign policies of states. These sources provide a firm theoretical background for the analysis of the collective memory, the prevailing public opinion and the tendencies of foreign policy in Hungary and Poland, later on.

2.1 The formation of collective memory and identity in light of historical grievances

Maurice Halbwachs defines collective memory as the accumulation of individual memories within the structures and institutions of a society.\(^\text{17}\) Hunt and Benford defines collective identities (and thus collective memory) as the “products of […] interaction and sociocultural structures”.\(^\text{18}\) The definitions of collective memory and identity suggest that the two concepts are intertwined, and build on each other in a way that it would be difficult to imagine collective identity without the existence of collective memory. I regard Halbwach’s and Hunt and Benford’s definitions of collective memory and identity as the basis to discuss the present-day Polish and Hungarian collective memories.

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I draw on two explanations for how historical grievances shape collective memory. The first method of interpretation, devised by Ruth Wodak, suggests four different ways societies can possibly cope with and interpret historical events. The ways of dealing with the past are: 1) dialogic forgetting, which means that the parties involved in a violent conflict mutually agree to forget what happened and regard mass atrocities as taboos about which the society shall not speak, in order to maintain peace; 2) remembering in order to never forget means that the experiences of the individuals of a mass atrocity are discussed not only with other victims, but with the perpetrators as well, thus creating a shared understanding of what happened and keep the notion of “never again” alive; 3) remembering in order to forget goes beyond constantly reminding groups of people of what happened, because it is aimed at healing the “wounds” and “letting it go”; 4) finally, dialogic remembering is a well-structured and mutually agreed way for two or more countries to face the harm that they caused to one another in the past, and provides a platform for the parties to come to terms with their painful memories and to eventually forgive to one another. The mutual apology of the Serbian Parliament and the Hungarian President for the massacre of each other’s people during WWII is a perfect example of dialogic remembering.

The second way I use to examine how history shapes collective memory comes from Assmann and Shortt, who put the characteristics of “memory” into the centre, and show how these characteristics contribute to or limit the interpretation of history, thus collective memory on individual and on

20 Ibid., 33.
21 Ibid., 36.
22 Ibid., 37.
23 Ibid., 40., 43.
societal levels. The first characteristic of individual and collective memory is that it is dynamic in a sense that remembering something inevitably involves forgetting another thing. The second quality of memory derives from the first one in a way that the interpretation of history rests upon collective memory and derives from it, but at the same time the interpretation can also contribute to forgetting, and to how people remember certain events. The third characteristic is that multiple, “heterogeneous memories” exist not only on societal, but on individual level as well, which might not necessarily coincide with the “official”, national-level interpretation of history. Finally, Assmann and Shortt come to a conclusion that the ambiguous nature of remembrance and forgetting leads to the clash of different interpretations of history, which transforms memory into an “agent of change”. In sum, they argue that collective memory is capable of both changing and blocking the change of political regimes and the value-orientation of societies, if it possesses social and political institutions to make that change happen.

The four ways of dealing with the past described by Wodak will help to explain how the Polish and Hungarian societies, as well as their governments, have or have not dealt with the painful events of the 20th century, while the theory of Assmann and Shortt on memory as a change-maker serves as the main reference point to see how the different interpretations of history, and especially 20th century historical grievances have or have not contributed to societal and political change in the two countries. I find both theories relevant to my research, therefore, I make use of them simultaneously during the analysis.

25 Ibid., 3.
26 Ibid., 3-4.
27 Ibid., 4.
28 Ibid., 4-5.
2.2 The impact of public opinion on policy making

Since this thesis tries to grasp the effect of historical grievances on public opinion and foreign policy making, assessing the existing literature on the relation between policy making and public opinion is essential to understand the prevailing public perceptions on human rights and foreign policy-related issues in Hungary and Poland later on. Burstein examines in depth the impact of public opinion on public policies. He argues that public opinion does have an effect on public policy, and the effect depends on the issue’s salience. The more salient an issue is for the public, the more likely it is that citizens engage in active discussion of the topic. Since the impact of foreign affairs is less direct on citizens compared to domestic policies, public opinion is much less concerned about foreign policies than other policy areas.

As Taras argues, only a small amount of research has been done so far in the topic of how public opinion affects foreign policy making – if it has any effect at all. Miller et. al. generally acknowledges that public opinion can indeed play a restricting effect on foreign policy making, based on their research on threat perceptions of the citizens of post-Soviet countries. Taras says that measuring the effect of public opinion on foreign policy is difficult, because the public usually evaluates policies after implementation and rarely engages in active discussion about a concrete policy topic in advance. Lewis provides a compelling explanation of the public’s usual negligence towards foreign affairs. He discusses extensively the effects of mass media and political rhetoric on public opinion.

30 Ibid., 31.
33 Taras, Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy., 35-36.
and finds that people simply have no alternative sources from where they could retrieve information and compare with the news transmitted by the media.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, it is easier for the public to accept the often simplistic views of their governments that the foreign actors and stakeholders are either friends or foes of their countries, as if the picture of international relations would be black and white. Doeser’s case study (to which I briefly referred in Chapter 1) about the Polish government’s decision to contribute to the Iraqi invasion with troops in 2003 despite the Polish public opinion’s explicit disagreement clearly supports Burstein’s idea of how issue salience affects public opinion. The Polish government made the decision about the Iraqi intervention at the time when a referendum was held in Poland about the EU accession.\textsuperscript{35} Since the question whether or not the Poles wanted to join the European Union was of much higher importance than the Iraqi invasion, the public could not be mobilized by opposition groups to organize widespread demonstrations against the government’s decision. Doeser supported his argument with opinion survey results.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{2.3 Theories of foreign policy making and how the promotion of human rights becomes a foreign policy priority}

This set of sources on foreign policy-making discusses the specific topic of how the promotion of human rights becomes part of the broader foreign policy agendas of countries, since the present thesis examines the tendencies of human rights foreign policy making in Hungary and Poland as an example of how historical grievances affect policy making.

\textsuperscript{34} Justin Lewis, \textit{Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They like and Why We Seem to Go along with It} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 132.


\textsuperscript{36} Fredrik Doeser, “When Governments Ignore Public Opinion in Foreign Policy,: 420-422.
2.3.1 General theories on foreign policy making

The processes of contemporary foreign policy making have received considerable attention from political scientists and international relations scholars. Some, such as Mark Webber and Michael Smith, argue that foreign policy making in the 21st century is the product of multiple stakeholders with clashing interests in a highly diversified international and domestic context.37 Glenn Palmer and Morgan T. Clifton explain foreign policy making tendencies through their own theory, the “two good theory”, which says that states pursue two types of foreign policies by which they either attempt to change the status quo, or maintain the current state of affairs.38 As a third approach, Raymond Taras argues that cultural and historical fears are the powerful forces which shape states’ foreign policies.39 Webber and Smith and Palmer and Clifton have similar arguments in the sense that they both exclude the moral judgment of foreign policies when applying their theories on case studies. In addition, they ignore the societal factors of foreign policy making stemming from the society’s emotions and pursued ideologies.40 For instance, Webber and Smith list three factors, or “images”, by which foreign policy makers are influenced when they define the goals of their respective states’ foreign policies, and none of them includes societal aspects or the public opinion as foreign policy-shaping factors. The rational images (objective constraints and capabilities, geopolitical characteristics)41, the political images (results of bargaining among the ruling political elite)42, and the

39 Raymond Taras, *Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy: Europe and Beyond* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015)., 28. It is important to mention here that the author himself handed over the manuscript of his work to me in November 2014, well before the book’s March 2015 publication. Given the short period of time designated for the research process, his help made it possible to get a full picture of contemporary FPM on time, for which I wish to express my gratitude at this point.
41 Webber and Smith, *Foreign Policy in a Transformed World*, 52.
*psychological images* (the leader’s and the political elite’s subjective perceptions of foreign policy goals)\textsuperscript{43} are the three factors which Webber and Smith define as key determinants of foreign policy agendas. Palmer and Clifton support the idea of public opinion-free foreign policy making by stating what matters at the end is how policy makers scale up the costs and benefits, and the trade-offs of an applicable foreign policy in light of the two possible measures (keeping up the status quo or pursue change).\textsuperscript{44} They define the amount of available state resources as the main determinant of deciding over which policy the governments wish to pursue - maybe even both strategies simultaneously in different segments of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{45}

These theories leave out the societal factors from the process of foreign policy analysis, which does not necessarily mean that they do not play an important role in the making of foreign policy. In contrast, Taras argues that political leaders select and apply deeply embedded fears within their rhetoric, then turn them to their own advantage, thus constructing policies upon these “threat perceptions”.\textsuperscript{46} Societal fears stem from cultural or religious values, beliefs and historical grievances, just to mention a few components. These fears discussed by Taras can be viewed as parts of the overall public opinion within societies. I regard the work of Taras as the main reference point for the theoretical setting of the thesis, since it acknowledges the policy-shaping effect of societal factors, such as the collective interpretation of history within foreign affairs.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{44} Palmer, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{46} Taras, *Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy*, 42.
2.3.2 The promotion of human rights within foreign policies

Gropas argues that liberal democratic states see the promotion of human rights as a means to stabilize peace and security both at home and abroad.\(^{47}\) It might be true in the relation of EU member states and post-Communist Central Eastern European states after the transition as she illustrates it, but another argument from Bieńczyk-Missala questions this assumption. She argues that it is often difficult to tell what lies behind the motivations of the countries to promote human rights abroad.\(^{48}\) Human rights are sometimes integrated into development policies or humanitarian intervention strategies, thus constitute the basis of broader policy goals, and do not stand alone. Therefore, it is not immediately obvious which interests lie behind the human rights foreign policies of countries.

Risse-Kappen et. al. developed the “spiral model” which provides an explanation for how human rights norm-violating states become international norms-abiding countries.\(^{49}\) They argue that the fundamental prerequisite for change is the existence of a strong opposition within the norm-violating state. Only upon the persistent resistance of the opposition can the international community condemn a state for failing to comply with international human rights norms.\(^{50}\) What Risse-Kappen et. al. hypothesizes on the basis of the spiral of change is that the change in norms leads to the change in identities (of people living under oppression) with the help of the international community


which then eventually results in the change of norm-violating states’ interests.\textsuperscript{51} Therefore, the opinion of the public actually matters. However, while Risse-Kappen et. al. say that the regime of international legal norms change the attitude of societies, and countries thereof to human rights violations, I argue that it is the experience of painful historical events and mass atrocities which generate solidarity within a society towards the citizens of other, oppressive states, and this is how human rights promotion appears in the foreign policy agenda, rather than through the adoption of international human rights norms.

Interestingly, Kardos provides an explanation similar to Risse-Kappen et. al.’s argument when he analyzes citizen attitudes to politics in Visegrád 4 states. He says that unless the notion of universal human rights and democracy has deeply rooted in a society, the promotion of civil and political rights will not be a priority on the foreign policy agendas of the Visegrád 4 states.\textsuperscript{52} Despite the causal differences, this argument is of great importance for my research, since it is connected to the question about the extent to which collective memory influences human rights foreign policy making and public opinion in a way that the more people have reconciled with their past, the more engaged they become with civil and political rights issues at a later stage.

\textit{Conclusion}

The diverse views on what shapes foreign policies and especially human rights foreign policies do not elaborate on the possible effects of collective memory or collective identity on foreign policy making. Taras is the only one who discusses this factor when he analyzes the role of societal fears in decision making. However, the feeling of “fear” as such is somewhat different from the complex

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{52} Kardos, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Central Europe: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.”, 5.
emotion of “historical grievance”, which is caused by a set of unresolved issues and by the inability to understand what happened and why. Also, most of the scholars (Lewis, Burstein, Taras) use the projections of mass media as the primary or secondary influencer of public opinion, while I suggest looking into how the society perceives historical events in different historical moments, how those events are (mis)interpreted by a government, and how it shapes societies’ mindset. The goal of my research is to show the power of collective memory at those times when mass media have not even existed, and then how this memory evolved during the past couple of decades alongside the changing political landscape of Europe.

Overall, I found little academic research on my topic, suggesting there is a gap in the research on the effect of collective memory on public policy-making. The scholarly literature falls short on examining the relation between collective memory, public opinion and foreign policy making. This thesis then contributes to a better understanding of the underlying causes and eventual effects of contemporary human rights foreign policy making.
CHAPTER 3 – THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

This chapter presents the most characteristic and most painful historical events in Poland and in Hungary in the 20th century, and assesses their impact on collective memory and identity. The events and their interpretation discussed in this section serve as a basis to explain the variance between public opinion and between the human rights foreign policies of the two countries in subsequent chapters.

3.1 Poland

There are four or five intertwined historical events of 20th century Poland that shaped and are still shaping the Polish collective memory and collective identity in the 21st century. These are the occupation of Poland by the Nazis in 1939; the massacre of the Jewish population by Polish inhabitants in Jedwabne in 1941; the Holocaust in 1939-1945; the Polish-Ukrainian civil war in 1943-1947 which partially caused the border changes of Poland; and the Communist dictatorship from 1945 to 1989. One could go back centuries to find more collective identity-shaping events in the past, but the scope of the present research limits itself to the mass atrocities of the 20th century.

The Polish-Ukrainian civil war took place in the North-Western region of present-day Ukraine, where approximately 40,000 Poles were killed by Ukrainians between 1943 and 1945. Later, some 260,000 Ukrainians were expelled by the Poles from the region, and additional 4,000 were deported to Western Poland where dozens of them died between 1946 and 1947. Later, Communist Poland and the Soviet Union decided not to talk about these incidents, after it turned out that some of the

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54 Ibid., 44-46.
Ukrainian perpetrators were collaborating with the Nazis in the mass murder, and some Poles were collaborating with the Soviets to carry out the deportations.\textsuperscript{55} Realizing that there were fascists in the Soviet-allied Ukraine, and that some Poles were already Communists before the arrival of the Red Army in 1945 in occupied Poland, it was an ideologically complicated situation which the Soviet Union and Poland preferred to avoid. After the transition in 1989 the Polish elite decided not to bring the incident to light, and instead built a friendly relationship with Ukraine.\textsuperscript{56} They also accepted Poland’s post-1945 border: ceding territories in the East to Ukraine and Belarus, and absorbing new ones in the West, formerly belonging to Germany. Despite attempts by the Communist regime to erase the civil war from the collective memory, the victims and their descendants remembered the incident very well, and preserved it in their historical narrative. They acknowledged their involvement and led small-scale discussions, which eventually resulted in mutual forgiveness on both sides, without the initiative or interference of either Polish or Ukrainian authorities in the process.\textsuperscript{57} This event is an example of \textit{remembering in order to forget},\textsuperscript{58} described in the section on collective memory in Chapter 2.

The reason Poland decided not to bring those atrocities of the Polish-Ukrainian civil war into the spotlight could be partially attributed to the fact that they finally possessed a large, independent state from 1989 after centuries of struggle and war,\textsuperscript{59} and that they did not want to risk this status. They restrained from opening up the issue of ethnic cleansing for the sake of freshly acquired stability, peace, and independence in the region. This attitude could also serve as an explanation for why

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 51-52.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 56-57.
\textsuperscript{58} Borea and Wodak, \textit{Justice and Memory - Confronting Traumatic Pasts.}, 37.
Poland does not put a special emphasis on the promotion of minority rights of 132,000 ethnic Poles living in Ukraine and 300,000 ethnic Poles in Belarus, for that matter.

Numerous scholarly works suggest that the role of the Poles in the Holocaust is one of the heaviest topics in the historical discourse of contemporary Poland (Lim 2010, Molden 2010, Stobiecki 2008, Judt 2002, Wodak 2009, Ash 2009). As Lim points out, the core issue of facing their role in the Shoah (the Holocaust) is that the Poles themselves were victims in the WWII, as Poland was the first country that Germany occupied from the West, and then the Soviet Union from the East. The end of the war brought along the implementation of Communist dictatorship in Poland, where the Holocaust was neglected, and these crimes were attributed solely to the fascist, German forces. As a result, the whole topic was subjected to collective amnesia for the next 50 years.

In 1987 this discourse changed completely. In that year, Jan Błonski published an essay, entitled “Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto”. In this essay, published in Tygodnik Powszechny, a Roman Catholic newspaper in Poland, he recounts what the Poles did not do to prevent the mass annihilation of Polish Jewry during the war. Four years later Poles had a second opportunity to reconfigure their collective memory around the Shoah. The occasion was the publication of a book entitled “Neighbors:

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66 Lim, “National Mourning and Global Accountability.”, 150.
The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland” in 2001, in which historian Jan T. Gross describes how the Poles massacred a thousand Jews in the town of Jedwabne in 1941 with the approval of the occupying Nazi forces. Poles were the perpetrators, since they took the initiative not the Germans. The book spurred massive debates in Poland, since it changed the whole “victim narrative” of Poland. Suddenly, Poles have become perpetrators themselves too, besides being victims of Nazi Germany. Opinion polls conducted in 2001 showed that the majority of Poles still denied that they bore any responsibility in the Jedwabne massacre. Despite the denial, a debate in the society has started, which still persists in the present, dividing people into those who give credit to the idea, and those, who refuse the accusation outright. Therefore, 21st century Poland is characterized by open discussions around history, in which not only historians, but the rest of the society also participates. As I will argue during the analysis of the survey data in Chapter 5, the slightly higher level of political engagement and feeling of empathy towards mankind in Poland compared to Hungary can be explained with the changing attitude of Poles to reconcile with their past, maybe partially due to the publication of Neighbors. The “only victim” narrative have changed since 2001, which the 2008 European Values Study could possibly demonstrate.

After 1989, the traumas stemming from the Communist dictatorship and the events of WWII, including the Holocaust have started to be in competition with each other in a sense that “whose
pain is the gravest”. As Judt puts it, “there is too much memory in Central Eastern Europe”, which means that a lack of reconciliation with the horrors of WWII and then with the Communism impose a double burden on the society. The biggest challenge in this regard is to hold the former, Communist elite of Poland accountable for their role in maintaining the state machinery, with a special focus on their activities as secret agents, if applicable. Such a widespread and thorough screening has not happened in most of the post-Communist Central Eastern European countries (except the Czech Republic). Instead, the former elite have always pointed at the former Soviet Union as the primarily liable entity for all trauma caused by state Socialism.

### 3.2 Hungary

Similarly to Poland, there are four 20th century historical events that heavily influence collective memory, and therefore public opinion, in present-day Hungary. These are the Trianon treaty of 1920; the role of Hungary in the Second World War; the Holocaust; the revolution of 1956; and the Communist dictatorship, later transformed into a much less dictatorial, Socialist-type of regime. One could obviously go back centuries in order to get a fuller picture of what events have shaped the Hungarian collective mindset, but this research focuses specifically on the 20th century.

The Trianon treaty, signed in 1920, is one of the most painful historical events for many Hungarians within Hungary, and in the neighboring countries as well. Spohn argues in his analysis of post-

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Communist Hungary that the underlying cause of nationalism which emerged after 1989 is the Trianon treaty itself and the feeling of injustice stemming from (unjustly) dispatching territories from Hungary. The interwar period after signing the treaty and before entering WWII was characterized by irredentism and revisionism. As András Kovács argues in his assessment of the interwar era, the only goal of the Hungarian people and foreign policy makers at this time was to re-attach Hungary’s lost territories. In order to achieve this, Hungary allied with Germany shortly before the war, and managed to re-gain its former Northern (now Slovakian) and Southern (now Serbian) regions in 1938 and 1941, respectively. In return, Hungary introduced anti-Jewish legislation which impeded those with Jewish origin from taking jobs in the public service or studying at universities, in order to comply with Nazi ideology. I would like to note at this point – based on the collective memory literature referred to in this chapter – that the re-attachment of territories to Hungary upon the society’s demand is the perfect example of how much public opinion is capable of shaping foreign policy decisions due to historical grievances, without any political or strategic caution.

The far-right favors the argument which explains all the events that happened to Hungary after the Trianon treaty as an “evil” conspiracy by foreign empires over the head of the Hungarian nation to victimize Hungary. The result is that nobody asks Hungarians to take responsibility for the Holocaust, for example. In this context, the collective memory of Hungarians, and especially of the survivors of WWII, have to deal with a double burden: not only did Hungary suffer from losing

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77 Spohn, “Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe.”, 9.
79 Ibid., 281.
ethnic Jews and Roma during the Holocaust, but the country allied with Hitler from the very beginning, unlike Poland, who was a neutral, non-aligned state in the pre-war period. This “historical twist” is probably the most painful fact, and society is still reluctant to face up to. The establishment of the Communist regime twisted once more the already complicated situation of collective memory and identity. Similarly to Poland, the competition of “who suffered the most” took place between those suffering from the destruction of “Great Hungary” in 1920 and of the Communist dictatorship from 1945, and those, who were persecuted shortly before and during the WWII.\textsuperscript{82}

A very interesting political situation took place during the systemic change in Hungary in 1989. Besides the fact that the vetting and lustration of the old, Communist elite did not take place,\textsuperscript{83} the different political sides tried to invent new ideologies with the combination of introducing new elements into their rhetoric, while removing uncomfortable events caused by their ideological predecessors in the past, and re-explaining historical facts in their own favor.\textsuperscript{84} First, all parties denied the legitimacy of the Communist dictatorship in Hungary, and regarded it as an illegitimate intermezzo in the history of Hungary.\textsuperscript{85} Second, the new left did not condemn Communism and state Socialism as a morally evil ideology, but simply treated it as a failed economic reform attempt, “the failure of the Communist experiment” as one can often hear it even today.\textsuperscript{86} They treated Communism as if it was only an effort to reform the economic and social situation in Hungary, and


\textsuperscript{83} Ash, “Treating a Difficult Past in Post-Communist Europe.”, 277.

\textsuperscript{84} Judt, “The Past Is Another Country.”, 158., 160., 163., and my summary of the following paragraphs on this phenomenon.


\textsuperscript{86} Laczó, “The Many Moralists and the Few Communists.”, 151.
not as a well-built, ideology-driven, coerced machinery to re-shape society through the manipulation of collective memory in the form of an oppressive dictatorship. Tackling the Communist-Socialist era in Hungary in this way during the transition did not help society to reconcile with human rights abuses which took place at that time.\textsuperscript{87} And third, the new right wing wanted to root its legitimacy in the “Christian-conservative-national” political environment of prewar Hungary.\textsuperscript{88} In order to fully embrace the ideology of that period, the post-1989 conservatives had to tackle the issue of Hungary’s role in the WWII and to deal with its alliance with Hitler’s Germany. Therefore, they put all blame for the Shoah on the Nazis, stating that the deportation of Jews started strictly after the occupation of Hungary by German forces in 1944. The re-interpretation of this historical event and the clear demarcation between war-torn Hungary and Nazi Germany seemed to be the most useful method to distance themselves from all the anti-Semitic elements of that regime.\textsuperscript{89}

The use of history as a political tool re-occurred in October 2006, when the Hungarian far-right organized violent protests on occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1956 revolution, and demanded the resignation of Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány.\textsuperscript{90} In order to legitimize and connect their ideology to a noble and heroic event of the past, the far-right re-interpreted the aims of the 1956 revolution as an attempt to restore the prewar, Christian-conservative state of Hungary.\textsuperscript{91} This is a clear distortion of the legacy of the revolution, since the aim of the revolt was to expel Russian

\textsuperscript{88} Kovács, “The Case of Hungary.,” 279.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 280.
troops from Hungary and introduce a social democratic type of regime. Archive records and memoirs of dissident freedom fighters prove that they did not aim at restoring the prewar regime, since there were many reform Communists in their ranks, who did not want to return to the 1920-30s situation. This type of history distortion blocks the objective interpretation of the events and delays the reconciliation of victims and their descendants with the past. It also produces a foreign policy narrowly focused on the past, and only a narrow version of the past.

**Conclusion**

This explanation of collective memory and identity suggests that Poles are becoming more concerned about their role played in the Shoah as agents and victims. Hungarians make no efforts in this regard. This is probably the biggest difference in how the two countries tackle one critical historical moment. Regarding the legacy of the Communist regime, both countries fall short on dealing with this era. Withholding the records and files of the secret service is probably the biggest problem, since it prevents society from getting to know who did what during the dictatorship. Germany is basically the only half post-Communist country to open up secret service files after 1989. Neither Hungary nor Poland brought to light the files of the Communist elite at such a scale. Opening up the files is important in order to re-gain the society’s trust in the political elite, and to build up a democratic system after decades of dictatorship. Despite this shortcoming with regard to the Communism in both countries, Poland is at least open about its role in the Holocaust, while Hungary still owes sincere discussion to the survivors of the genocide and their descendants.

94 Ibid., 175.
95 Ash, “Treating a Difficult Past in Post-Communist Europe.”, 278.
CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY

I apply two different methods in this research: a quantitative explanation of public opinion, and a qualitative assessment of the scholarly literature on human rights foreign policy in Poland and Hungary. These are complemented by eight semi-structured expert and elite interviews conducted with current and former Polish and Hungarian foreign policy makers, scholars, diplomats and former foreign ministers. The polling data is best explained in the context of collective memory, as I argue it in the next chapter. The interviews serve as secondary reference points to better understand public opinion and foreign policy making in the two countries. Because of the small number and the subjective character of the interviews, I only use them to supplement the interpretation of public opinion and foreign policy literature results.

4.1 The public opinion data

There are numerous international, regional and national surveys measuring citizen attitudes towards political issues. The most comprehensive databases on public opinion in Europe is the *European Values Study* (EVS).96 It is an extensive database on the value orientation of the citizens of each European country from the past two decades, including Poland and Hungary. I draw on the latest wave of EVS survey conducted in 2008 with a sample size of around 1300-1500 people aged 18 to 80 and 400 questions. Since I did not find any cross-country survey asking people about specific historical events, I had to rely on this survey, since it provides a picture of political engagement, national identity and interest in human rights issues. Based on the collective memory literature, to my

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understanding, collective memory and identity shape the individual’s identity and values. This is why I look into this value survey and to these survey questions, specifically.

I analyze the EVS data by observing the answers given to the questions related to political activism, the perception of democracy, national identity, the feeling of empathy towards different groups of people and the perception of human rights-related issues. I put the tables which indicate the results into the Appendix section of the thesis. I present the answers in an aggregated way, by showing the cumulative percentages of similar answers, in order to better understand the answers of the respondents and to capture a clearer picture of the prevailing public opinion in the two countries. I analyze the public opinion data in the cases of Poland and Hungary in Chapter 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question types</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political activism</td>
<td>How often discuss politics with friends?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How important is politics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How interested are you in politics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How often do you follow politics in the media?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would you sign a petition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would you attend a lawful demonstration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would you vote at a general election tomorrow?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The perception of democracy</td>
<td>Are you satisfied with democracy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is democracy the best political system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>How proud are you to be a Hungarian/Polish citizen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How much do you fear of losing your national identity/culture in the European Union?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How important is it to have been born in Poland for being truly Polish?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy and the promotion of human rights</td>
<td>Do you belong to third world-development or human rights groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which are the most important and the second most important aims for this country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are you concerned with fellow countrymen / Europeans / humankind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you justify death penalty?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: The list of questions examined in the public opinion survey*
4.2 Literature on human rights foreign policy making

The findings on the foreign policy priorities of Poland and Hungary draw mostly on journal articles and a few books on the topic. Generally, there is not much literature specifically on how and why human rights foreign policies are made in these countries. Most of the articles assess the foreign policy priorities of the two countries by dividing them into pre- and post-EU accession periods (Baun 2013, Gropas 2006, Kardos 2000, Park 2014, Longhurst 2013, Jonavičius 2008). I also assessed the available, official documents of Polish and Hungarian governments on their foreign policy priorities after 2004. Surprisingly, the information in this regard is very scarce, as only one or two relevant documents are made available for the public in both cases.

4.3 Expert and elite interviews

I conducted eight semi-structured interviews with three former foreign ministers of Hungary, two former and current ambassadors of Poland, two Polish scholars and one former foreign minister of Poland between January and February, 2015. Some of them are professors at Central European University, which made it easy to reach out to them, and later they helped contacting the rest of the interviewees. I applied the “leapfrog method” to reach these individuals, meaning one individual helped me reach out to the next one, and so on. The Appendix details the full profile of these people, including their expert areas, their tenure as diplomats and ministers, and their research areas as academics.

4.4 Limitations of the method

One of the pitfalls of my method is the difficulty to determine causality between the prevailing collective memory and its effect on public opinion and foreign policy making. Since scholarship is limited on the topic of how collective memory shapes policy making, it is difficult to detect how the historical events I am looking at influence policies. Assessing how people perceive historical events and how it builds up collective memory is the second issue. It is hard to find literature on it, relevant to the special case of Hungary and Poland, since it is a relatively young discipline, at least in the 25-year old, post-Communist history of the two countries. It probably stems from the fact that Poland has only recently initiated the reconciliation process with its past, while Hungary has not even started in a similar scale yet. The third problem is that the public opinion data is relatively old, as it was collected in 2008. This is the latest cross-national survey about values in Europe. I have attempted to solve the methodological problems listed here with expert and elite interviews. Clearly, nine interviews are not robust enough to draw a conclusion about how collective memory shapes foreign policy making, but they helped formulating my comparative historical argument. Integrating the opinion of current and former policy makers into the research is an attempt to check the validity of the collective memory argument. Though the interviews are insufficient in number, they are valuable and helpful in the interpretation of foreign policy tendencies, the prevailing public opinion and collective memory.

Conclusion

The overall aim of this method is to see if historical grievances (collective memory) can be traced in the prevailing attitude to politics and civil and political rights issues, and in the human rights foreign policies of the two countries. I emphasize that this research is an attempt to see if the theory about
the effect of historical grievances on public opinion and on foreign policy making is a viable assumption, at all, and if it is worth dealing with in the future for public policy purposes.
This chapter examines the results of the European Values Study (EVS) conducted in Poland and in Hungary in 2008, and supplements the results with the expert and elite interviews, where applicable. It focuses on questions related to political activism, national identity and the importance of civil and political rights, because I find that these questions relate the most to collective memory and identity.

Table 2: The results of the 2008 European Values Study data (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How often do you discuss politics with friends?</td>
<td>frequently</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>occasionally</td>
<td>56.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>never</td>
<td>36.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How important is politics?</td>
<td>important/often</td>
<td>23.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not important/not often</td>
<td>76.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How interested are you in politics?</td>
<td>important/often</td>
<td>38.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not important/not often</td>
<td>61.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How often do you follow politics in the media?</td>
<td>important/often</td>
<td>64.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not important/not often</td>
<td>35.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Would you sign a petition?</td>
<td>have done /might do</td>
<td>46.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>would never do</td>
<td>53.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Would you attend a lawful demonstration?</td>
<td>have done /might do</td>
<td>74.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>would never do</td>
<td>25.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Are you satisfied with democracy?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>20.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>79.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Is democracy the best political system?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>81.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>18.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Would you vote at a general election tomorrow?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Do you belong to third world-development or human rights groups?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>99.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Which is the most important aim for this country?</td>
<td>maintain order</td>
<td>46.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more say in decisions</td>
<td>30.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fighting rising prices</td>
<td>18.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protect freedom of speech</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>much</td>
<td>16.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Are you concerned with fellow countrymen?</td>
<td>to a certain extent</td>
<td>52.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not much</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Are you concerned with Europeans?</td>
<td>to a certain extent</td>
<td>41.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not much</td>
<td>51.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to a certain extent</td>
<td>35.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not much</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>much</td>
<td>6.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Do you think your voice counts in your country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>to a certain extent</th>
<th>not much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>it counts</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td>54.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it doesn't count</td>
<td>47.75</td>
<td>47.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>36.03</td>
<td>9.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proud</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>95.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not proud</td>
<td>54.79</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. How proud are you to be a Hungarian/Polish citizen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rather afraid</th>
<th>rather not afraid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>proud</td>
<td>62.17</td>
<td>37.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not proud</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. How much do you fear of losing your national identity/culture in the EU?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rather yes</th>
<th>rather no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rather yes</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>30.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rather no</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>69.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Do you justify death penalty?

5.1 Poland – public opinion

5.1.1 Political activism

The overall interest of respondents in political life is the starting point for understanding how much one gets involved in political activities. When asked about the importance of politics in one’s life or about one’s interest in political matters in general, approximately two-third do not regard politics important neither in general, nor in their own lives in Poland. This result seems somewhat ambiguous when looking at the rate of political news consumption, where the majority follows politics either on a daily basis, or several times a week. The explanation of this ambiguity might be that people count the daily evening news in the television and in the radio as a means of political news consumption regardless of the actual content of news reported in these programs.\(^{100}\)

The perception of democracy and its institutions, and the engagement in decision-making is the second aspect of measuring political activism. At least half of the Polish respondents would attend a lawful demonstration, almost two-third of them would sign a petition, and around 65% would vote at elections tomorrow. More than half of the Poles are satisfied with democracy, and 90% of them believe that it is the best political system. These findings suggest that the vast majority of Poles

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\(^{100}\) This is my own assumption, and I do not wish to discuss it in detail here, as it is beyond the scope of the research.
would rather take advantage of the tools offered by democracy and would exercise their civil and political rights, despite the generally low level of interest in politics as such. As subsequent sections will show, the figures on political activism in Hungary show a completely different picture.

5.1.2 Empathy and the importance of civil and political rights

These questions tell about the commitment of Poles to human rights and how empathetic they are to other human beings. The ratio of belonging to any kind of human rights organization is extremely low in Poland with only 5 positive answers out of 1490. The vast majority of respondents prioritized the ‘protection of freedom of speech’ as the least important aim of Poland as a country. Fighting rising prices and maintaining the order are of higher importance in this regard. Despite the fact that Poles exercise their civil liberties relatively actively, as the survey data suggests above, they do not find the protection of civil and political rights even as a secondarily or tertiary important aim to be pursued or to be maintained by the authorities.

When the respondents had to tell how much they care about their fellow countrymen, Europeans or humankind as a whole, Poles score relatively low in all the three categories. However, it is important to note that the majority of Poles preferred the mid-range “to a certain extent” answer in each case, with an increasing ratio towards the “not much” answer as the questions widened the community of people asked about. It implies that Poles probably care the most about people living in their immediate environment, and much less about people living in their broader region.

The support of the death penalty also tells about one’s attitude to human rights, as the abolition of capital punishment is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, and is also a
precondition to access the EU. More than one-fourth, the majority replied that they would never justify death penalty on a 10-point scale, while the second most frequent answer was “5” that we can interpret either as a “don’t know” answer or a strong “it depends”. Usually, the pros and cons of death penalty split the public opinion very much, and it is not any different in the case of Poland. Although the majority refuses capital punishment outright, around 60% percent represent a more diverse range of answers, which perfectly illustrates the divisive nature of the issue.

5.1.3 National pride and national identity

The majority, 95% of Poles are either very proud or quite proud of their nationality. Approximately 85% said that having been born in the country is either a very important or a quite important factor to declare oneself Polish. When asked about how much one fears of losing their national identity as being a member state of the European Union on a 10-point scale, 20% replied that they do not fear of it at all, while 13% answered either “don’t know” or “it depends”, similarly to the question about humankind. However, if the answers are split into two groups, where “rather afraid” ranges from 1 to 5 and “rather not afraid” ranges from 6 to 10, then it turns out that 40.1% are rather afraid, while 59.9% are rather unafraid, thus the slight majority of Poles are not afraid of losing their national identity within the European Union. Aggregating the data in this way makes the interpretation much clearer and better comparable to the same data on Hungary.

103 Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania, “European Values Study 2008: Poland (EVS 2008)” (GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, 2008), doi:10.4232/1.10164., The exact formulation of the question is as follows: “Some people say the following things are important for being truly Polish. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?” Question V276: “important to have been born in a country”. 34
The analysis of Polish public opinion suggests that democracy and civil and political rights are important values for the Polish society, but they show low levels of empathy. I discuss the possible reasons of this result after the next section, which presents the Hungarian survey results.

5.2 Hungary

5.2.1 Political activism

Similarly to the Polish case, approximately two-thirds of the Hungarian respondents do not regard politics as important in their lives. In contrast, around 65% of the respondents follow politics in the media rather often. This ambiguity can be explained with the same assumption as in the case of Poland, namely that people might count the everyday news programs in the television and the radio as sources of political news, regardless of the real content of these programs.

The questions covering the perception of democracy and its institutions show that the Hungarian population has very little confidence in democracy and its tools. For instance, more than half of the respondents would never sign a petition, and around two-third of them would never attend a lawful demonstration. Moreover, almost 80% of the respondents are not much or not at all satisfied with democracy compared to Poland, where more than half of the respondents think the complete opposite. In contrast, some 72% of the Hungarians would vote at a general election tomorrow, which probably somewhat outweighs the prevailing negative responses to the other questions in this category. These findings suggest that Hungarians are not so much likely to make use of their civil and political rights, on average.

5.2.2 Empathy and the importance of civil and political rights

The first question in this category asks whether one belongs to any kind of human rights organizations. Only one positive response is given out of the 1511 answers. When asked about the
most important and second most important aims of Hungary as a country, only 4% indicates the protection of freedom of speech at the first and 11% at the second place.

When the respondents had to tell how much they care about their fellow countrymen, Europeans and humankind as a whole, most of them chose “to a certain extent” in each case, with an increasing ratio towards the “not much” answer as the questions widened the range of people asked about. Only 7% care “much” about Europeans and 6% about humankind as such. The majority of the respondents do not report caring about these categories of people at all. These results imply that Hungarians probably care the most about the people living in their immediate environment, and the least about people living on the other side of the borders of the country. The results are almost identical to those found in the case of Poland within this set of questions.

The figures on the support of the death penalty show that the majority of the respondents, almost 25%, would always support capital punishment, while 22% would never justify it. Having a look at the cumulative percentage of the data, we can see that the majority would rather approve the death penalty, with a 51.7% turnout, thus constituting a simple majority in this matter. Comparing this figure with the results of the other Visegrád 4 countries, it turns out that Hungary is the most supportive nation of death penalty on average, slightly ahead of the Czech Republic, where 50.24% supports capital punishment to some extent.104 This turnout is interesting for the reason that the abolition of death penalty is a precondition to join the European Union. Obviously, this EU policy does not mean that citizens necessarily embrace it; however, one might think that such an essential EU policy should not be that divisive in the society within and among member states.

5.2.3 National pride and national identity

The majority of the respondents are proud of being Hungarian, and find it rather important to have been born in a country to count as a “real” Hungarian. When asked if one is afraid of losing their national identity within the European Union, some 62% responded that they are rather afraid of it. Observing this figure within the Visegrád 4 context again, we can see that the Hungarians are the most afraid of losing their national identity as a member of the EU).

Comparative discussion

When compared to Poles, Hungarians are more disinterested in their fellow countrymen, Europeans and humankind as such (questions 12, 13, 14). They are also more fearful of losing their national identity as member state of the European Union (question 17), but less proud of their nationality (question 16). They are more interested in politics (questions 1, 2, 3, 4), but at the same time they are much less likely to actively take part in shaping politics (questions 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). Hungarians score lower in the majority of the questions which imply that they are politically less active and engaged in public discourse than Poles, and trust democracy and its institutions much less than Poles. Finally, while half of the Hungarian population justifies capital punishment, only one-fourth of Poles would ever justify death penalty (question 18). I argue that the differences in the two nations stem from existing historical grievances.

In the case of Hungary, the active remembrance, the interpretation and the intergenerational transmission of the events of the 20th century history create a narrative which might provide an explanation of the low levels of satisfaction with democracy, political engagement and the high level of national pride. The inability to look beyond the issues of ethnic Hungarians in terms of human rights stem from the feeling of injustice caused by the Trianon treaty. The rhetoric of the emerging
The refusal to admit Hungary’s responsibility in the deportation of Hungarian Jewry is another blockage in coming to terms with collective memory. The lack of screening of the former Communist elite and the non-existence of open discussions about the role of the opposition and state officials in the 1956 revolution, among other events, largely contribute to the society’s distrust in politics. In my view, the unresolved historical grievances in collective memory – such as the distrust in the post-Communist political elite – are explanatory factors of political inactivity and disillusioned attitude to democracy. A reasonable interpretation of the data presented here suggests people are still living in the past and tend to take several misinterpretations of history for granted. This prevents them from soundly evaluating historical events from a present-day, post-Cold War perspective. The merit of my argument provides a testable hypothesis for future research in form of a cross-national, representative survey that asks Poles and Hungarians about the perception of historical events of their respective nations.

Drawing on the collective memory literature discussed in Chapter 3 in the case of Hungary, “historical grievances” are emphatic elements of the currently prevailing public opinion. To support this argument, I recall the argument of János Martonyi, former foreign minister of Hungary, who discusses the issues around the Trianon treaty in the “interview book” entitled Our Place in the World – The Paths of Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. He argues that Hungarian public opinion is heavily influenced by historical grievances stemming from the feeling of injustice caused by the peace treaties of WWI. One of the greatest problems is that the most painful historical events of

Hungary, such as the “Trianon trauma”, the horrors of WWII and the crimes of the communist dictatorship have not been talked over in the society. This idea resonates with the observations of Kinga Göncz, who confirmed in light of her experiences as a psychologist and as the former foreign minister of Hungary, that this sharp division of “historical grievances” still exists in Hungary, and heavily influences people’s mindset in their view of foreign affairs.¹⁰⁷

Though only a small portion of the Polish society cares about fellow countrymen, Europeans and humankind as such, the turnout of the question “How much do you care about fellow countrymen/Europeans/mankind?” is higher compared to Hungary. It is possible that the Poles have realized that dealing with the legacy of the Holocaust requires focusing on the whole European Jewry, not only on its Polish proportion. One manifestation of this is that Poland regularly hosts conferences on Holocaust and Jewish studies, and served as the meeting point for European rabbis four years ago in Warsaw.¹⁰⁸ It shows the picture of an open-minded and mature society, which is ready to take part in discussions about the most painful and most dreadful historical events committed on its own soil a couple of decades ago which affected not only fellow Poles but the whole European Jewry during WWII. It seems that Poles have realized that they bear huge responsibility in discussing the events of the war in an open way with other European nations for the sake of reconciliation. In my view, the higher turnout in political activism and in questions related to human rights promotion can probably explained by this attitude of the society.

¹⁰⁷ Kinga Göncz, Interview, January 14, 2015.
Not only is Hungarian society hesitant to initiate discussions on the same issues, but historical research falls short on conducting objective investigation in this matter.\footnote{Judt, “The Past Is Another Country.”, 180.} Poland is in a slightly better position in this regard, since the publication of “Neighbors” in 2002 triggered a still ongoing discussion about the responsibility of Poles in the Shoah, while no such volume has been published in Hungary on this very topic. The low levels of “caring” about fellow countrymen, Europeans and humankind as such, and the high scores on nationalism in Hungary further support this argument, because it shows the picture of a rather withdrawn and closed society, compared to the Poles. In my interpretation, while Hungarians care more about their own victimhood within different historical settings and events, the Poles are discussing their role in making other people victims, e.g. the Jewry during WWII.

The evolution of collective memory in Poland suggests that the Polish society is slowly, but steadily opening up to a nation-wide discussion on their (and their antecedents’) role in the WWII and in the Communist regime. Their strong support of democracy and the high turnout of making the most out of their civil and political rights show that they recognize the possibility of facing their past through democratic measures, for instance through the freedom of academic research. Poles are gradually leaving behind the “only victims” attitude regarding their role in WWII (as the literature on collective memory has shown in Chapter 3), while Hungarians are still reluctant to admit that the revisionist, post-Trianon attitude of their antecedents played a huge role in joining the war on the side of Germany. The attitude of Poles results in a more open and more democratic mindset, as the public opinion data show. The opposite results in the case of Hungary show the picture of a less confident and more withdrawn society.
CHAPTER 6 – ASSESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS FOREIGN POLICIES OF HUNGARY AND POLAND

This chapter sketches the foreign policy trajectories of Hungary and Poland after 2004. The ultimate aim of this section is to explore whether the promotion of civil and political rights has ever been a foreign policy priority in Poland and Hungary after their accession to the European Union. Expert and elite interview data serve as a secondary reference point to better understand why certain foreign policy decisions have been made. Finally, I explain variation between these foreign policy tendencies in light of the collective memory literature and public opinion data in the two countries.

6.1 Polish foreign policy after 2004

The literature about Poland’s foreign policy priorities identifies two key foreign policy goals: first, to free itself from Russia for security reasons; and second, to help build democracies in the Eastern Partnership countries for political reasons. The two goals go hand in hand, because Poland wants the EaP states to take sides with the European Union in order to reduce the possibility that they might side with Russia, which would constitute a threat on Poland. As Taras puts it, it is an embedded fear to a certain extent within the Polish society that Russia represents a constant threat on the sovereignty of the country.

Besides building on the academic literature which analyzes the foreign policy of Poland, it is worth having a look at the Polish Foreign Ministry’s foreign policy priorities between 2012 and 2016. Reading through the document it is obvious that Poland places its security interests at first place. It is

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111 Taras, Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy., 123.
committed to the expansion of NATO in the Eastern hemisphere of Europe, and clearly takes sides with the United States in the fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{112} Cooperation with the Visegrád 4 states in the Central Eastern European region comes is a third or fourth priority, while the promotion of human rights is not mentioned as a priority in itself at all.\textsuperscript{113}

Generally, the strengthening of relations with NATO and the US has characterized the Polish security policy in the past decade. Longhurst analyzes in great detail Poland’s security priorities after EU accession, and notes that Poland has become the most powerful state in the Central Eastern European region not only due to its size, population or the fact that it is the sixth largest economy of the EU, but also because Poland spends the most on military and defense per year.\textsuperscript{114} Also, Poland is the most committed Atlanticist and the greatest supporter of the US from among the V4 countries.\textsuperscript{115} However, the alliance with the United States does not merely derive from the value-orientation of Poland. As Doeser points out in his study about Poland’s involvement in the 2003 Iraqi invasion, the United States is a crucial military and political ally for the simple reason that Poland needs the support of the US in order to defend itself from Russia.\textsuperscript{116} In return, Poland has proved to be a reliable ally for the US in two instances: first, when Poland contributed with Polish troops to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 even amidst the firm disagreement of the Polish society;\textsuperscript{117} and second, when Poland remained silent about the torture of high-level detainees in CIA camps on

\textsuperscript{112} Ministry of Foreign Affairs Poland, “Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016.”, 15.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 365.
\textsuperscript{116} Doeser, “When Governments Ignore Public Opinion in Foreign Policy.”, 424.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.Ibid., 413.
Polish territory between 2003 and 2005.\textsuperscript{118} Although there is no evidence that the Polish government knew about the abuses, it is likely that they rather did.

The operation and development of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is one of the key priorities of the Polish foreign policy agenda, in general. Klatt attributes the successful integration of the Eastern Partnership into the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy to the smart maneuver of the Poles by convincing the Swedes to join the Polish government in formulating the EaP.\textsuperscript{119} It is a well-known fact in Europe that Sweden is one of the most credible supporters of human rights and democracy both in financial and political terms; therefore, winning over Sweden for their cause made it possible to come up with a comprehensive EaP strategy. The European Council approved the plan in June 2008.\textsuperscript{120} As a result, as Szczerbiak points out among others, Poland has become the leading promoter of the realization of EaP strategies in the European Union.\textsuperscript{121}

Despite the clear-cut goals of the Eastern Partnership as of today, the execution of EaP policies used to be approached differently under the regime of previous Polish governments. Szczepanik points out that Poland’s highest priority within the EaP is to establish democracy in Belarus and Ukraine, because in these two states only the democratization processes can ensure the security of Poland vis-à-vis Russia.\textsuperscript{122} He also mentions that the Polish political elite tends to approach the support of democracy from a romantic and paternalistic viewpoint deriving from the history of Poland, which


\textsuperscript{119} Klatt, “Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours.”

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{121} Aleks Szczerbiak, Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner Or New Heart of Europe? (Routledge, 2012), 101-102.

makes Polish decision makers feel that it is their heroic mission to help their unfortunate neighbors to establish democracy in their respective countries. It is an outdated and idealistic legacy of the governing era of the Kaczinsky brothers in Poland between 2004 and 2007. Klatt argues that the Polish foreign policy under the direction of foreign minister Radosław Sikorski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk has put an end to this romantic approach, and introduced the notion of “political minimalism” in 2007 as a much more viable and realistic approach to the promotion of democracy in EaP states.

The literature on the promotion of civil and political rights in Poland is scarce. For instance, Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala starts the evaluation of the engagement of Poland in human rights issues by first enumerating Poland’s membership in countless specialized bodies of the United Nations, and mentioning the dates when Poland signed the most important, as well as the less well-known human rights treaties. In terms of geographical focus, she analyzes Polish human rights-related foreign policies in the context of Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, where a large number of populations with Polish ethnic origin live. Therefore, she narrows her focus to the observation of the attitude of Poland to the promotion of minority rights in neighboring countries. Unfortunately, she does not provide any additional information on Poland’s attitude to the promotion of civil and political rights outside Europe. In addition, since the book was published in 2006, and no other comprehensive work on Poland’s human rights foreign policy has been produced since then, much information is missing about the subject to date.

123 Ibid., 52., 55-57.
124 Klatt, “Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours.”, 4-5.
125 Bieńczyk-Missala, Human Rights in Polish Foreign Policy., 184.
As Mr. Rosati, former foreign minister of Poland and Mr. Gniazdowski, member of the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw put it, Poland has multiple purposes with the promotion of human rights in neighboring countries, particularly in Ukraine and in Belarus. The aim is to establish democracy and stabilize the situation in these countries, because it is in the security interest of Poland. As CEU professor Osiatynski pointed out through the example of Polish minorities living in Belarus, focusing only on the situation of the Polish minority in Belarus and Ukraine would “have a backfire on ethnic Poles, which would probably lead to their harassment by the authorities, thus derogating their overall situation.” This aspect of Poland’s foreign policy has not changed since 1989.

6.2 Hungarian foreign policy after 2004

The key goals of Hungarian foreign policy after accession to the EU are different than the goals of Poland within the same period of time, as suggested by the scholarly literature on the topic. One cannot divide the areas of Hungarian foreign policy into three distinct categories as in the case of Poland, because all the available academic literature points in the single direction of the promotion of the rights of ethnic Hungarians, whether it is security policy or multilateral diplomacy. The previously cited book entitled “Our Place in the World” is probably the most relevant source in this respect and from the perspective of the research question, in which two former Hungarian foreign ministers discuss Hungary’s foreign policy priorities in the 21st century from different perspectives. Regarding human rights they focus almost exclusively on how different Hungarian governments

126 Dariusz Rosati, Interview, February 8, 2015.
128 Wiktor Osiatinski, Interview, November 25, 2014.
129 Ibid.
130 Csaba, Helyünk a Világban.
have treated the situation of ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries after the transition.\textsuperscript{131} They do not comment on the role of Hungary in the promotion of civil and political rights in other countries as a human rights issue area. Therefore, based on their comments and on the foreign policy areas that they highlighted, I assume that Hungary has never really taken part in the promotion of civil and political rights, since it focused mostly on the rights of ethnic Hungarians.

The focus on the promotion of minority rights equipped Hungarian foreign policy makers with a unique expertise which made it possible to widen the rights of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries. Törő (2013) recalls the 2011 EU accession negotiations with Serbia, where the FIDESZ-led government during the Hungarian EU presidency laid a condition for the Serbian government to amend its “laws on restitution and rehabilitation”, which discriminated against the Hungarian minorities.\textsuperscript{132} The Serbian government amended the law for the sake of signing the accession treaty with the European Union, thus fulfilling the Hungarian government’s condition. The assurance of the rights of ethnic minorities is one of the three Copenhagen criteria with which all member state candidates have to comply upon accession.\textsuperscript{133} The fact that the Serbian government made concessions in the question of ethnic minorities is an indisputable success of the Hungarian foreign policy makers in this regard.

I find it important to mention in all fairness as a side example that Kinga Gönčz, former foreign minister of Hungary pointed out Hungary’s active role in the promotion of democracy and human

\textsuperscript{131} Csaba Zahorán, “Foreign Policy Challenges,” Hungarian Quarterly 51, no. 198 (June 2010): 82–85.
rights through best practice exchange after the transition in 1989. For instance, the Budapest-based International Centre of Democratic Transition (ICDT) is a non-governmental organization supported by funds and the Hungarian government, which shares the experiences of transition of the Central Eastern European region with other countries currently undergoing democratic transition. However, since this is an NGO-led and not a government-initiated project, it is rather an exception which proves the rule that Hungary is less engaged in the overall promotion of human rights than Poland. Dr. Góncz also recalled that Hungarian diplomats and foreign policy-makers have always been called by decision makers in Moldova, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro in the past to give advice on how to comply with the fundamental democracy and human rights prerequisites of the European Union in case a country is aspiring to become a member of the EU. Therefore, Hungary is regarded as an “expert” on EU integration issues in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe. In my view, these achievements of the Hungarian foreign policy should be researched and assessed more thoroughly in the Hungarian scholarly literature, so that academics and the broader public would get a better picture of the activities of Hungarian foreign policy.

134 Góncz, Interview.

Observing Hungarian foreign policy in a more international context reveals significant achievements other than the promotion of the rights of ethnic minorities. Dr. István Lakatos, former diplomat responsible for human rights issues of Hungary, describes the priorities of the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union held in the first half of 2011, and during Hungary’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva from 2010 to 2012, with a focus on those human rights issues for which Hungary was advocating during these two tenures. He recounts the role of Hungary in the creation of mechanisms to prevent genocide, in the promotion of the rights of people with disabilities and in the process to shape the scope of application of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The priorities of Hungary within the UNHRC show that the country is committed to the promotion of human rights at times when it performs international or regional duties, such as holding the EU presidency or a seat in the UN. However, neither the article of Lakatos, nor other sources in the same topic mention whether Hungary has ever taken part in the advocacy for the emergence of civil and political rights on a global level, without performing any special duty as a member or chair of any committee or other international organization. (LAKATOS, István. “The Hungarian human rights diplomacy in the UN - successes and failures during the Hungarian EU presidency and in the UN Human Rights Council (A magyar emberi jogi diplomácia az ENSZ-ben, avagy sikerek és kudarcok a magyar EU-elnökség és az EJT-tagság alatt),” Külügö Szemle 12, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 46–73.)
Hungarian scholar Pál Pritz stresses that the promotion of the rights of ethnic Hungarians should be taken even more seriously within the foreign policy agenda, because only a nationalistic foreign policy approach can make a nation state successful.\(^\text{136}\) This call seems to be much favored by current Hungarian foreign policy makers, since human rights foreign policy only occasionally goes beyond the promotion of minority rights, as the scholarly literature shows. Both Péter Balázs and Kinga Göncz admitted that the efforts of the Hungarian human rights foreign policy are almost entirely allocated to the promotion of the rights of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries. This policy outcome might actually be the result of the ever-increasing support of the extreme right in Hungary,\(^\text{137}\) therefore, it is not surprising that their loud voices are heard on policy-making level.

**Comparative discussion**

As the findings demonstrated in this chapter, the most important goal of post-2004 Polish foreign policy is the development of security in its neighborhood and the promotion of human rights and democracy through the Eastern Partnership. Hungary’s main goal within the realm of human rights is the promotion of minority rights of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, as the limited number of scholarly literature shows. Poland has a broad, inclusive human rights policy which does not focus only on one or two aspects of rights, as Mr. Gniazdowski explained, while Hungary concentrates on the promotion of minority rights through its foreign policy. According to the argument developed here, the reason for this lies in the different perceptions of, and response to historical grievances.

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\(^{137}\) Saltman, “Radical Right Culture and the Youth.”
The fact that Polish foreign policy does not engage in any territorial and ethnic disputes with Ukraine and Belarus might stem from a Polish commitment of not focusing simplistically on only one or two major “historical grievances”. Drawing on the “two good theory” of Clifton and Palmer, Poland is satisfied with the current status quo, and decides not to revise its current borders with Belarus and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{138} The primary reference point for Polish foreign policy is the overall situation of democracy (or the lack of it) in Eastern European countries rather than the treatment of Poles within these countries. This demonstrates that Poles look beyond the interests of their fellow countrymen in order to pursue more inclusive policies that benefit the region.

It seems that Poland has a more clear-cut vision of its foreign affairs and is able to take its different interests apart from one another, thus providing an easy-to-follow and comprehensible way of conducting its foreign affairs. In contrast, based on the literature discussed in this chapter, Hungary places the promotion of the rights of ethnic minorities on top of all its human rights foreign policies. It constantly keeps an eye on its Hungarian kin in neighboring countries, and looks at human rights issues through the lenses of minority rights both on regional and international level.

I believe that Poles have started to realize, probably partially thanks to Neighbors that they are responsible for putting the events of the past in their place not only for their own reconciliation, but for the healing of all other Europeans, whom the war similarly affected. The inclusive human rights foreign policy and the organization of historical and Jewish studies conferences and meetings are good examples of this. The picture is different in Hungary. The erection of the monument commemorating the 1944 German occupation of Hungary in Budapest is the perfect illustration of

blame-avoidance and self-victimization of the Hungarian population.\textsuperscript{139} As Aleida Assmann points it out, no honest and courageous discussion will take place until governing political forces and society decides to open a platform for mutual reconciliation.\textsuperscript{140}


\textsuperscript{140} Assmann and Shortt, \textit{Memory and Political Change}. 
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored possible connections between collective memory, the prevailing attitude to political engagement and the promotion of civil and political rights through foreign policy. The hypothesis has rested upon the assumption that one of the determinants of foreign policy priorities and public opinion is how societies interpret and reconcile with their past, most precisely with their historical grievances. The thesis set the different attitude to historical grievances as the explanatory factor of why the Poles are more open to human rights issues, thus stronger promoters of human rights, while their Hungarian counterparts are much less engaged in political decision-making and in the promotion of human rights through foreign policy.

The theoretical background of the research has drawn on the literature of collective memory and identity formation, public opinion and foreign policy making. The collective memory literature served as the primary reference point in an exploration of the different public mindsets and human rights foreign policies in Hungary and Poland. The analysis of the literature on public opinion and its impact on policy making revealed that the specific area of foreign policy making and public opinion has not yet been researched thoroughly. The overview of the basic theory about foreign policy making served as a reference point during the analysis of the literature on the human rights foreign policies of Poland and Hungary. Knowing the measures along which academics usually assess foreign policies was helpful to spot what has not been researched yet about the foreign policy agendas of Hungary and Poland.

The presentation of the most characteristic and most painful historical events provided a point of reference to interpret the results of the opinion survey and to assess the human rights foreign policies of the two countries. The expert and elite interviews served as secondary reference points to
better understand the prevailing public opinion and the reasons of why certain human rights policies were chosen over others. Bearing in mind the subjective nature of the interviews it was not possible to refer to them as primary sources of data. The obvious geographical hindrance and the lack of connections impeded to interview more Polish and Hungarian former and current foreign policy makers and experts. However, since, the interviews only served as reference points to understand the literature and the currently prevailing tendencies of public opinion from a foreign policy making perspective. Another limitation of the method stems from the public opinion survey, because the latest European Values Study was conducted in 2008, right before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the appearance of Donald Tusk as prime minister and Radislaw Sikorski, former minister of foreign affairs from the Polish side, and prime minister Viktor Orbán from the Hungarian side. Common sense says that it is possible that if one conducted this survey now, in 2015, they would probably get slightly different results.

Despite the shortcomings of the mixed method, the findings suggest that Polish foreign policy is more universal human rights-focused than its Hungarian counterpart, and this difference might stem from the different levels of reconciling with historical events of the 20th century. Since this research was a preliminary attempt to see if historical grievances could serve as an explanation for the variance between political engagement and human rights policies, further investigation is necessary to fully explore the viability of this hypothesis. Creating a unique survey for the purpose of gathering data on how people perceive history is the first step for such research. Conducting interviews with more current and former policy makers at all levels is the second most important task for the next research phase. Alternatively, the research could integrate the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well, which would give a more diversified picture of the currently prevailing mindset and public opinion in
Central Eastern Europe. This way, it might contribute to the design of more inclusive human rights foreign policies in the region in the future.
APPENDIX

The location of Hungary and Poland

(source: http://wikimedia.org)

The profiles of the interviewees

Prof. Péter Balázs, and Dr. Kinga Göncz, professors at the Central European University and János Martonyi, are the three former ministers of foreign affairs of Hungary who agreed to have a conversation on my topic. Dr. Kinga Göncz served as foreign minister from 2006 to 2009 during the
tenure of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. The successor of Dr. Gőncz was Péter Balázs with one-year tenure from 2009 to 2010 in the cabinet of Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai. János Martonyi served as a foreign minister two times during his career in the cabinet of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán from 1998 to 2002 and from 2010 to 2014.

Prof. Wiktor Osiatynski teaches at CEU and played an important role in the Polish constitution-making process which took seven years from 1990 to 1997. He provided useful information about the Polish society in this era. The leapfrog method proved to be effective in securing the interviews with other Polish officials. Prof. Osiatynski provided the contact of Prof. Jerzy M. Nowak, a former Polish ambassador accredited to the NATO, and Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former minister of foreign affairs of Poland, who directed me to Dariusz Rosati, another former foreign minister between 1995 and 1997 and Member of the European Parliament since 2009. Prof. Nowak and Mr. Rosati who shared their insights about the Polish foreign policy directions, as well as their take on public opinion through Skype-interviews.

Prof. Balázs helped reaching out to the fourth interviewee, Mateusz Gniazdowski, head of the Central European Department at the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw (OSW). He agreed to answer my questions in written format. The Polish ambassador accredited to Hungary, Roman Kowalski, was the fifth person who agreed to be interviewed for the purpose of the research. He has served as a diplomat two times in Hungary in the 1990s, and was appointed as ambassador in 2010. Since he often takes part in discussions and public lectures at Central European University, it

was relatively easy to set up a meeting with him. All efforts have been made to secure interviews with more than one former Polish minister of foreign affairs for the sake of methodological consistency, but the insufficient connections and the geographical limitations hindered this attempt.

The structure of the interview questions reflected the line of argument of this thesis. They told at the beginning of the conversation that they were not experts on public opinion, which is a fortunate circumstance from the point of view of the research, since they were not biased or influenced by the results of any polling data. Their natural, first impressions and associations on the topic were exactly the type of data which are of key importance to supplement with and understand the polling data during the research process.
http://www.holokausztmagyarorszagon.hu/index.php?section=1&chapter=3_1_2&type=content.


http://people.ceu.hu/peter_balazs.


Göncz, Kinga. Interview, January 14, 2015.


Rosati, Dariusz. Interview, February 8, 2015.


