From Segmentation to Dissolution: The Segmental Institutions Thesis and the Case of Yugoslavia

By

Nikola Burazer

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Supervisors: Anton Pelinka and Matthijs Bogaards

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Abstract

The break-up of Yugoslavia presents one of the most well-known and tragic examples of failure of ethnofederal states. In this Thesis, Philip Roeder’s Segmental Institutions Thesis, a theory offering an institutional explanation of nationalism, nation-state crises and the creation of new nation-states, is tested on the example of Yugoslavia. After a brief introduction into the history of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav idea and the presentation of the Segmental Institutions Thesis, process tracing is used to test its validity in the case of Yugoslavia. Analysis shows the confirmation of the Segmental Institutions Thesis in the arenas of politics at the periphery and politics between the periphery and the center, but with a less clear explanatory power in the case of the break-up of the state itself. Overall, the Segmental Institutions Thesis offers a convincing explanation of both the destruction of Yugoslavia as a state and of Yugoslavs as a nation.
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1. Introduction

When Yugoslavia disintegrated and when its former republics became battlefields and graveyards for tens of thousands of civilian victims of war, many were in shock and disbelief. More than a hundred thousand people lost their lives and millions became refugees in several wars that swept through the region. Millions and millions of people, including those who were not even born at the time, have suffered and are still suffering from political and economic consequences of the bloody Yugoslav break-up. It is fair to say that there is no burning political issue in the Western Balkans which is not in some way connected with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars that resulted from it.

The answers to the question why such a thing happened are numerous and stem from fatalistic to scientific and from the ones focusing on ancient hatreds to those focusing on purely political motivations and interests. The more one goes close to the region where the horrors of the Yugoslav wars have been felt, the closer he is to believe in the former. Many scholars have written about “ancient hatreds”, “Balkan ghosts” and other orientalist assumptions about Southeastern Europe. Many more have focused on accusing certain political actors and personalities, both Yugoslav and international, for destroying what was a prosperous and a lovely federal state.

However, there is no reason to believe Yugoslavia is a sui generis case. At about the same time, two other socialist federations, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, have also fallen apart, even though with lot less political drama and casualties. One would expect to find common causes in the break-up of these three socialist federations, especially since their constitutional design was so similar and following the same ideological pattern. Moreover, there is a
significant social science literature about ethnofederalism that examines very critically this form of ethnic accommodation and warns about its dangers.

One of the scholars promoting such a stance on ethnofederalism is Philip Roeder. His Segmental Institutions Thesis represents an institutional explanation of nationalism, nation-state crises and the creation of new nation-states. Based on the example of the Soviet Union, Roeder’s theory aims to explain the processes that lead ethnofederal states, or in his own terms, “segmented states” to nation-state crises and dissolution. By examining the effects of ethnofederal or segmental institutions on both politics at the periphery – in the constituent units of an ethnofederation – and politics between the center and the periphery – between those units and the federal government, Roeder created a theory that aims to explain how those segmental institutions lead to nation-state crises and the creation of new nation-states.¹

In this Thesis, I will aim to test Roeder’s segmental institution thesis on the case of Yugoslavia in order to confirm its validity, but also to offer a purely institutional explanation of the Yugoslav break-up. Through the method of process tracing, I will attempt to define the observable implications² of his theory and to analyze whether those are to be found in the case of Yugoslavia.

After offering a brief introduction into Yugoslav history, I will present the literature review on the issues of Yugoslav break-up and ethnofederalism, which will be followed by a detailed presentation of the segmental institutions thesis. Finally, I will test the segmental institutions thesis on the case of the post-1974 Yugoslavia in order to test its validity.

2. Yugoslavia between a Nation-State and an Ethnofederation

Here I will briefly present the emergence, development and downfall of both the Yugoslav nation and the Yugoslav state during the twentieth century. Understanding the break-up of the socialist Yugoslavia as a state is impossible without attention being paid to its turbulent history, both before and after the creation of the ethnofederal Yugoslavia which is under analysis in this work. This is especially important since many explanations of the Yugoslav break-up are non-institutional, focusing on historical “hatreds” and fatalistic conclusions about the possibility of a unified South Slavic nation and state, and also because institutions which are going to be analyzed here were not born in a “political vacuum”. They were created as a response to certain challenges, conflicts and controversies, aiming to resolve both the political and ethnonational conflicts that plagued the Yugoslav state since its creation and reform the very concept of the Yugoslav nation-state. To test Roeder’s segmental institutions thesis on Yugoslavia requires us to examine its foundations and the very notions of a Yugoslav state and nation.

Authors differ on their periodization of the development of the Yugoslav national idea or the “constitutive concept” Yugoslavia was based on. Andrew Wachtel recognizes three different stages of development of the Yugoslav national idea\(^3\), while Dejan Jović presents us with four distinct “constitutive concepts” that laid at the foundation of Yugoslavia as a state.\(^4\) Taking into account their periodization, but with a desire to simplify these processes as much as possible in this chapter, I will differentiate between two historical periods in Yugoslav

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history with two significantly different concepts of Yugoslavism – the first being the unitary Yugoslavia (1918-1941) and the second the federal Yugoslavia (1945-1991).

2.1. Unitary Yugoslavia: A Yugoslav Nation-State

The first Yugoslav state under the name Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed on 1 December 1918 as a result of unification of previously Habsburg South Slavic lands and the Kingdom of Montenegro with the Kingdom of Serbia, which participated on the Entente side in the First World War. The new state, despite implying its multiethnic nature by recognizing Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as separate entities within its name, was in fact imagined as a nation-state of a single, but a “three-named” people.\(^5\) The unitary Yugoslav nation-state idea on which this state was based on was created during the 19th century and competed with other existing nation-state projects such as Serbian or Croatian throughout several decades that preceded the First World War.\(^6\) Especially strong in the period before the war in Habsburg lands of Croatia and Bosnia, Yugoslav national idea was also the ideological background of Bosnian revolutionaries who triggered the First World War by assassinating the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Habsburg during his visit to Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. The creation of the first Yugoslav state was, therefore, not simply an act of political opportunism of those political actors who saw in it a chance for the fulfilment of their particular interests, but an establishment of a nation-state project which had a strong background and support of the elites in most areas of what is to become the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.\(^7\)

The very creation of the state, however, was not without controversies. The geopolitical situation and the position of Serbia as a state whose army was crucial in establishing the new state and protecting the Habsburg South Slavic lands from Italian aspirations placed Serbian

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\(^7\) Ibid., 53.
political elites in a dominant position at the very beginning. The state was named “Kingdom” before the government formed was even agreed upon, placing the Serbian Karadžorđević dynasty at the helm of the state, and when the first constitution was introduced in 1921, it was achieved with the opposition of major Croatian and Slovenian parties. The 1921 constitution made Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes a highly centralized unitary state, a nation-state of a “three-named “people under the leadership of the Karadžorđević dynasty.\(^8\)

Despite the proclaimed national unity of the new state, it was severely shaken by inter-ethnic disputes, mostly between the Serb and Croat political elites. Croat elites, previously enjoying autonomy within Austria-Hungary, did not readily accept the unitary nature of the Kingdom, nor the rule of the Serbian royal dynasty. The culmination of this conflict was the assassination of Stjepan Radić and several other Croatian politicians by a Serb-Montenegrin parliament member Puniša Račić during the parliament session in 1928.\(^9\) As a result of this incident, King Alexander Karadžorđević suspended the 1921 constitution, banned all political parties, imposed a Royal Dictatorship and renamed the state Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The dictatorship was partially weakened after the introduction of the 1931 Yugoslav constitution, but Alexander’s goals remained the same: national unification within a single Yugoslav nation and the preservation of the Yugoslav nation-state.\(^10\)

King Alexander Karadžorđević was assassinated in 1934 by a member of the Internal Macedonian Organization (VMRO), which aimed to secede Macedonia from Yugoslavia, with the assistance of the Croatian ultra-nationalist and fascist organization Ustaše, which aimed for Croatian independence. Since his oldest son Peter was still a minor, his cousin Prince Paul Karadžorđević assumed the position of regent.\(^11\) The unitary Yugoslav state as originally

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\(^8\) Calic, *Istoriija Jugoslavije u 20. veku*, 106.
\(^9\) Ibid., 111.
\(^10\) Ibid., 145.
\(^11\) Ibid., 162.
imagined existed for four more years. In 1939, days prior to the beginning of the Second World War in Europe, in the famous Cvetković-Maček Agreement Croats in Yugoslavia were given their own autonomous unit, or in Roeder’s terms, a segment-state. Yugoslavia remained a unitary state, but with an ethnofederal component in the form of the Croatian Banovina, created by merging several non-ethnic units to create a Croatian homeland within the common-state. Further federalization of the state, however, did not occur, since Germany attacked Yugoslavia in April 1941 after an officer-led coup d’état removed Prince Paul and proclaimed Alexander’s son Peter, still a minor, as King Peter II of Yugoslavia. The militarily weak and internally divided Kingdom was quickly overrun by German troops and their allies, after which it was divided among several states. While certain regions were annexed by Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, Croatia was created as a new state to be governed by the fascist Ustaše movement within today’s Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The First Yugoslav state has disappeared from the map and in its placed emerged a battlefield in which several formal or non-formal armies, domestic and foreign alike, committed mass atrocities against the civilian population.

2.2. Federal Yugoslavia: A Segmented Yugoslav Common-State

Claiming to fight both for the liberation of the state from the occupiers and the achievement of a social revolution, the Yugoslav communist party and its military force led by Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav Partisans emerged victorious from the four-year long civil war that plagued Yugoslavia and resulted in 1.7 million casualties. The reasons for the Partisan victory are numerous, from geopolitical, through ideological, to purely military, but the legitimacy of the Partisan movement and the Communist party in the post-war Yugoslavia was beyond any doubt.

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12 Ibid., 163.
13 Ibid., 166.
14 Ibid., 171.
15 Ibid., 209.
Their wartime platform was based not so much on communist ideology as on their proposed solution to the “national question” in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{16} Even before the Second World War, Yugoslav communists proposed federalization of the country and recognition of several nations instead of a unified Yugoslav one, even arguing that Yugoslavia itself is an imperialist project of the Serbian bourgeoisie that should be fought against. During the war itself, however, Partisans were the only truly pan-Yugoslav movement which fought both against the occupying forces and the movements which represented nationalisms of separate Yugoslav nations, including the Croatian Ustaše and the Serbian Chetniks. Promoting brotherhood and unity of separate Yugoslav nations within a socialist federation reminiscent of the Soviet Union led to a new phase in Yugoslav history, one widely known as “Second Yugoslavia”, “Communist Yugoslavia”, or in Dejan Jović’s terms, “Brotherhood and Unity Yugoslavism”.\textsuperscript{17}

Yugoslavia was organized as a federation of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, along with two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which were at the same time parts of the Republic of Serbia, but also constituent elements of the Federation. The concept of a Yugoslav nation disappeared, being replaced with the idea of brotherhood and unity between five separate Yugoslav nations: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Each of these nations was granted a homeland in a shape of a republic, with Bosnia and Herzegovina being the only exception as a republic whose both constitutive nations – Serbs and Croats, already enjoyed a homeland of their own. Later on, during the 1960s, Muslims will be recognized as a separate nation, raising the number of Bosnian constitutive nations to three and making Bosnia and Herzegovina a homeland for the Muslim nation, a relative majority in the republic.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 57.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{18} Calic, \textit{Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku}, 224.
The socialist solution to the “national problem” in Yugoslavia was not without controversies. First, two new nations were established, Montenegrins and Macedonians, out of which Montenegrins were previously considered to be ethnically Serbs\(^\text{19}\) (even during the time of Montenegro’s existence as a separate state), and Macedonia was a territory historically contested between Serbia and Bulgaria and rival Serbian, Macedonian and Bulgarian nationalisms, being a part of Serbia before the First World War. Second, attempts were made to contain nationalisms of the two largest Yugoslav nations, Serbs and Croats, which resulted in the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate republic and also the affirmation of Montenegrin and Macedonian nationalities. Also, its two autonomous provinces, created to provide autonomy for some of the non-Yugoslav nations in Yugoslavia – officially labelled “nationalities” (narodnosti), Albanians in Kosovo and Hungarians in Vojvodina, reduced Serb control within their own republic. These Serb and Croat nationalist frustrations would account for a significant amount of internal political conflict within Socialist Yugoslavia.\(^\text{20}\) The socialist resolution of the “national question” was seen primarily as a containment of Serbian nationalism and the prevention of the Serbian dominance within the state, as was the case in interwar Yugoslavia. “Centralism” or “unitarism” would therefore be considered as the biggest dangers in internal politics and attempts to prevent both would mark the next several decades of Yugoslav history. As potential Serbian dominance was considered to be hidden behind centralist and unitarist ideas, decentralization and national emancipation of different Yugoslav nations would represent a cornerstone of the Yugoslav official narrative. The Second Yugoslavia, therefore, became a clear example of a fully ethnofederal or a “segmented state”.


After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia positioned itself between the two opposing blocs and Yugoslav leaders attempted to create a model of state and the society that would be opposed to both Western capitalism and Soviet-style social-realism. The ideology of workers’ self-management, promoted by the leading Yugoslav communist ideologue and Tito’s closes associate Edvard Kardelj, would become the cornerstone of the Yugoslav socialist federation. Instead of a centralized economy in the hands of the state, Yugoslav economy was supposed to be based on worker-controlled enterprises which would participate in a market system. This ideology was based on Marx’s ideas on “free producers” and was considered to be true to the spirit of original Marxism and opposed to Soviet “state capitalism”. From 1950s onward, Kardelj’s ideas on self-management would gradually be advanced within the state, with Yugoslav Communist Party changing its name into Yugoslav League of Communists in 1952 to better suit its new imagined role within the society.²¹ Along with reforms in the economic sphere, Kardelj’s concept envisioned further political decentralization and the establishment of Yugoslavia as a highly decentralized federation of sovereign Yugoslav republics. The reform process culminated in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, through which Yugoslavia became a federation with significant confederal elements. The narrative of Yugoslavism has also changed. Instead of being based on cultural links between various Yugoslav nations in the “brotherhood and unity” model, it was now based on the socialist character of the state and international communism. This Kardeljist concept of a federation of sovereign nations which would not be kept together through insistence on cultural links, but through socialist ideology, would therefore link the notion of Yugoslavia to socialism instead of a nation-state or a multi-nation state project.²²

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²¹ Jovic, Yugoslavia, 77.
²² Ibid., 62.
After Tito’s death in 1980 and as a result of economic hardship and political conflicts between the Federal government and the republican governments, as well as between the republican government themselves, Yugoslavia entered a time of political struggle and economic stagnation. The constitutional design prevented any centralization or the emergence of a “new Tito”, since at the head of the state there was a rotating Presidency in which the President of the Presidency was rotating on a yearly basis from one republic to the other. Economic reform processes required centralization of the state, which was fiercely opposed by the republican leaders. Conflict also arose regarding Serbian control over its own province of Kosovo, who was on par with republics in everything but the name within the 1974 Constitution. It was the rise of the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, who attempted to centralize Yugoslavia while at the same time relying in a large part on Serbian nationalism, which triggered the nation-state crisis which will eventually result in the break-up of the state. Milošević’s attempt to control and reform the federation led him into a conflict with leaders of other republics, as well as the federal government of Ante Marković who has undertaken a series of successful economic reforms in a last attempt to save Yugoslavia. After the dissolution of the Yugoslav League of Communists and the organization of the first post-war multiparty elections on the level of the republics, but not on the level of the federation, the stage was set for the dissolution of the state.\textsuperscript{23} Despite the initial reluctance to recognize the secession of Slovenia in Croatia in the first half of 1991, the internal community eventually considered that Yugoslavia in the process of dissolution by the decision of the Badinter Commission and subsequently recognize the independence of those republics who fulfilled certain standards. The Yugoslav federation ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} Jovic, Yugoslavia.
In the last stage of this nation-state crisis, it was not the preservation of Yugoslavia at the center of the conflict, but ownership of its former territories. The result was a series of wars that caused around 140,000 deaths and almost four million refugees. Former Yugoslav Republics have all become separate nation-states, with the region remaining unstable, economically underdeveloped and suffering from recurrent ethnic tensions and disputes.

3. Literature Review

3.1. The Break-up of Yugoslavia

Much has been written about the break-up of Yugoslavia. The nature of this event and the resulting bloody warfare has captured much attention of both the academia and the wider public. Naturally, this topic has remained a hotly contested political issue within the Yugoslav successor states, where debates about the causes of the Yugoslav break-up and the ensuing political, economic and demographic catastrophe still garner significant attention of the public. This should not come as a surprise since many of the current political processes such as the Serbia – Kosovo dispute, ICTY trials and the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political turmoil are directly related to the issue of Yugoslav disintegration and the resulting violent conflicts. However, it is for these same reasons that Yugoslavia came to be important for the worldwide academic community, which has produced numerous works dealing with the break-up of the country. Scholars, journalists, diplomats and politicians from all sides of the world came to publish books and articles about what they either studied or saw for themselves in the war-torn region of former Yugoslavia. Many of these authors, Yugoslav and foreign alike, offered their explanation of the processes that led both to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing bloodshed. Some authors aimed to explain both of these events as having the same cause and logic, while others dealt with the break-up of the state separately from the wars that it led to.

One of the classic explanations for the break-up of Yugoslavia is what Dejan Jović labelled as the “ancient hatreds argument”\textsuperscript{26} and Rogers Brubaker as the “return of the

\textsuperscript{26} Jovic, Yugoslavia, 18.
repressed” view\textsuperscript{27}. According to scholars and practitioners who share this line of thought, the demise of the communist repressive regime led to the awakening of old hatreds between the Yugoslav nations, who continued where they left off before the communist rule “froze” their ethnic hatreds and conflicts. A classic example of this approach is offered by Robert D. Kaplan in his book “Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History”, where he presents a dark image of the Balkans as an area of fierce ethnic rivalries and a troubled history.\textsuperscript{28} Even though not all authors who have taken this view have explicitly tried to explain the break-up itself with this argument, it has nevertheless been widely used by practitioners to justify their course of action. As US President Bill Clinton would frame it in his defense of the decision to militarily intervene in the Kosovo conflict: “Under communist rules, such nations projected a picture of stability, but it was a false stability imposed by rulers whose answer to ethnic tensions was to suppress and deny them. When communist repression lifted, the tensions rose to the surface…”\textsuperscript{29} This type of explanation is faced with two problems. First, as Rogers Brubaker points out, even though communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were antinationalist, they were not antinational.\textsuperscript{30} Far from suppressing nationhood, these regimes institutionalized it by categorizing people based on their ethnicity and nationhood. In Yugoslavia, citizens were members of one of the constitutive nations or nationalities, with the membership in the Yugoslav nation, expressed by many on the official censuses, being deprived of any political meaning.\textsuperscript{31} The other problem with this line of thought is that it is not backed by data: according to the research on prejudice and interethnic distance done in Yugoslavia during the 1980s, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Rogers Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism,” in The State of the Nation (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (London : Macmillan, 1993, n.d.).
  \item \textsuperscript{29} The Sunday Times, 18 April 1999.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism,” 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Laslo Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration (Social Science Monographs, 1993), 11.
\end{itemize}
level of interethnic animosity between members of different Yugoslav nations were reasonably low and comparable with the results from Western countries at the time.\(^\text{32}\)

Another very popular explanation of the break-up of Yugoslavia is the influence of international actors and the overall geopolitical situation at the time of collapse of communism. According to one version of this argument, accepted by many scholars and practitioners including Croatian president Franjo Tudman, Yugoslavia was created by the great powers to serve their interests and its downfall can be explained by the change in their geopolitical preferences.\(^\text{33}\) Susan Woodward and Warren Zimmerman consider the failure of the West in supporting Yugoslav economic reforms as crucial in this regard. According to Woodward, “Critical to its breakdown was change from the outside, in the foreign economic and strategic environment on which the country’s stability had come to depend”\(^\text{34}\). Similarly, Bülent Gökay and Vassilis Fouskas consider that “in the final instance, the external rather than internal environment was responsible for the collapse of the country”\(^\text{35}\). There are also authors like Michael Parenti who insist on deliberate actions by the Western governments in order to break-up Yugoslavia.\(^\text{36}\) The main problem of this approach is not the attempt to better explain the events of 1990-1991 with international factors, but the neglect of internal political dynamics, institutional framework and actions of domestic political elites which led to the crisis in which international influence could be decisive.

Many authors emphasize the crucial role of certain personalities for the break-up of Yugoslavia, mainly focusing on the communist Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito (deceased in


\(^{34}\) Susan L. Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War} (Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 22.

\(^{35}\) Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, \textit{The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Terror and Blood for Oil} (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), 166.

\(^{36}\) Michael Parenti, \textit{To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia} (Verso, 2002).
1980) and the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. According to the interpretation of those focusing on Tito, he was the undisputed leader of the country who concentrated all power in his hands, remained a supra-constitutional political force and after the decentralization of 1974 remained the only bond holding various Yugoslav states and nations together.\footnote{Jovic, Yugoslavia, 28.} After his death, the country weakened and collapsed. However, the person most frequently perceived as having a crucial role of the break-up of Yugoslavia is undoubtedly Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. According to Reneo Lukić and Allen Lynch, “Had Slobodan Milošević not emerged as Duce in Serbia, Yugoslavia might have evolved gradually after the end of the East-West geopolitical division of Europe into an asymmetric federation or confederation.”\footnote{Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford University Press, 1996), 114.} Considering the Yugoslav federal structure as adequately resolving the “national question”, Christopher Bennett considers Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power in Serbia as “critical to Yugoslavia’s disintegration”, since he “changed the face of both Serbian and Yugoslav society.”\footnote{Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (Hurst & Co., 1995), 10.} A problem with these “intentionalist” explanations is that they fail to take into account structural deficiencies both in the time of Tito and on the eve of Yugoslav disintegration during Milošević’s rise to power, putting too much accent on individual actors and their motivations and actions.

What the aforementioned explanations have in common is their intentionalist, fatalist or external understanding of the cause of the Yugoslav break-up and their neglect of the structural deficiencies of the Yugoslav state and society. Those explanations who are based on the latter can be classified in three groups: the ones using the nationalism argument, economic and institutional.
The nationalism argument is perhaps the most widely used and *prima facie* the most accurate explanation of events that led to the Yugoslav break-up. According to this argument, it was the rise of nationalism in the Yugoslav republics, most importantly in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia, that led first to the crisis, then to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the resulting bloodshed. This argument comes in many forms. One classical explanation of the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia is offered by Milovan Đilas, who argues that nationalism was stronger than liberalism, which is why it was the main alternative for a dominant ideology after the fall of communism.\(^{40}\)

Much more complex explanation of this process is offered by Laslo Sekelj in his book “Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration”, published at the eve of the Yugoslav break-up. According to Sekelj, the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia can be explained by the modernization process and the attempt of Yugoslav political elites (or oligarchies) to legitimize their power. He argued that Yugoslavia was a system with a “built-in disintegration” where decentralization without democratization within a one-party system perpetuated the crisis and led to the rise of nationalism, which replaced Yugoslavism and communism as a legitimization basis.\(^{41}\) The Yugoslav self-management system was the based on the idea of equality among the “working people”, perceived as constituting a conflict-free society. Since Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics and of six different nations, with Yugoslav identity being “deprived of any political meaning”, the only legitimate identities were national ones. This “levelling” process within the republics and the decentralization between the republics led to what Sekelj refers to as the “only intentional re-feudalization of a European state in this century”.\(^{42}\) This legitimacy of nationalism vis-à-vis liberalism is why the modernization crises communism was faced with did not result in liberal democracy, but in nationalist conservatism. According to

\(^{40}\) Jovic, *Yugoslavia*, 19.  
\(^{41}\) Sekelj, *Yugoslavia*, 6.  
\(^{42}\) Ibid., 11.
Sekelj, another factor to contribute to this outcome was the politically-motivated economic decentralization, where every republic possessed a *de facto* separate economic system, while a Yugoslav national economy and a Yugoslav labor market practically disappeared. As a consequence, inter-republican differences in economic development grew and provided a basis for nationalism which the republican elites later used for legitimization purposes.\(^43\)

An interesting outlook on the Yugoslav disintegration is offered by Andrew Baruch Wachtel in his book “Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia”. Wachtel explicitly claims that Yugoslav disintegration did not represent a failure of Yugoslavia as a state, but a failure of the Yugoslav nation.\(^44\) According to him, Yugoslav communist federation would have survived in some other political form if the nation that this state represented still existed. He argues, however, that the real cause of the Yugoslav break-up is the death of the Yugoslav national project, which occurred in the cultural sphere before it became evident in the political sphere. Defining a nation as a subjective concept, with several national projects co-existing at the same time within the same society, Wachtel offers a view on the creation and the modification of the Yugoslav national idea since its inception. According to him, there were three phases in the evolution of Yugoslav national identity. In the first phase, the model of the Yugoslav nation was promoted on the model of a modified Serbian culture. In the second, multicultural phase, Yugoslav national identity was imagined as a synthesis of different cultural and literary traditions from different regions of Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavs were still imagined as a single nation which ought to have a nation state. In the third phase, promoted at the time of communism, Yugoslavism was imagined as a supranational identity, with different Yugoslav peoples seen as constituting separate nations.\(^45\) Linked with communism and embodied in the phrase “brotherhood and unity”, this concept of Yugoslav

\(^{43}\) Ibid.  
\(^{44}\) Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 4.  
\(^{45}\) Ibid., 9.
identity waned as different national identities were promoted within different Yugoslav republics and communism gradually lost legitimacy. Ultimately, it was decided that political and economic forces were perceived as being sufficient to hold the state together, with no further attempts to unify cultures.46 Forming his argument on an analysis of linguistic policies, literary and artistic canons, educational policy, and the production of new literary and artistic works, Wachtel argues that the idea of a Yugoslav nation was all but destroyed during the 1980s, which paved the way for the collapse of the state. Speculating, he tried to explain why destruction of the Yugoslav nation almost inevitably led to the destruction of the state and did not result in a multinational Yugoslavia. Invoking Leah Greenfeld distinction between collectivist and individualist nationalisms, Wachtel argues that collectivist nationalisms do not allow for multinational states, since nations are seen as collectives for which it is necessary to have their own states. This is why multinational states with individualist nationalism succeed, while those with collectivist nationalisms fail.47

Although Wachtel explicitly claims that the changes in the cultural sphere brought changes in the political sphere, and not vice versa, he seems to be overlooking the importance of the institutional design of Yugoslav federalism for this outcome. Moreover, he connects the changes in literary canons and educational policy with changes in understanding of Yugoslav identity, and these are significantly influenced by the federal structure. This is why Wachtel’s argument, even though it gives a non-political explanation of the final break-up of the Yugoslav state, does not diverge much from explanations focusing on the Yugoslav federal structure.

Another type of explanation is based on economic parameters. According to the authors supporting this view, it was the economic crisis within the state, combined with large differences in economic development between the republics, which presented republican

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 236.
leaders with the incentives to push for secession. According to the aforementioned Susan Woodward, it was the economic crisis that triggered the constitutional conflict which ended in the destruction of the state.\textsuperscript{48} This argument is not without its critics. As Dijana Pleština claims, Yugoslavia dissolved at the time of economic successes under the Prime Minister Ante Marković, whose economic reforms seemed to signal a way out of the crisis and not towards the breakdown of the state.\textsuperscript{49} Also, according to Dejan Jović, constitutional crisis of the 1960s and 1970s were not the product of economic failures, but of economic successes.\textsuperscript{50}

Some authors offer purely institutional explanations of the Yugoslav break-up, many of them focusing on the 1974 constitution, which they consider to be dysfunctional, unworkable and inevitably leading towards the failure of the state.\textsuperscript{51} Robert M. Hayden considered that the 1974 constitution, avoiding a majoritarian rule, “rendered the polity inefficient economically and politically”.\textsuperscript{52} Another type of institutional explanation is offered by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, who argue that the decision to hold the first democratic elections in 1990 on the level of the republics and not on the level of the federation was crucial for the resulting break-up.\textsuperscript{53} A legitimate objection to these claims is made by Dejan Jović, who argues that even though the 1974 Constitution and the republican instead of federal elections in 1990 did contribute to the break-up, we must explain why were decided on in the first place. According to Jović, instead of treating institutional arrangements as a cause of disintegration, we should treat it as a consequence of the “climate produced by the political elite”\textsuperscript{54}.

\textsuperscript{48} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}.
\textsuperscript{50} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 17.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{53} Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia,” \textit{Daedalus} 121, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 132.
\textsuperscript{54} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 33.
Jović’s own explanation of the Yugoslav break-up is a combination of external (objective) factors and the “perception of these elements by political actors themselves and their resultant actions”\textsuperscript{55}. He argues that Yugoslavia failed as a state because of the failure of the “constitutive concept” of self-management socialism. This form of socialist ideology, based on the ideas of the Slovenian communist Eduard Kardelj, was the integrative factor and the source of unity of various Yugoslav nations, taking primacy over nationalist or cultural sources of unity. This concept was based on the Marxist idea of “withering away” of the state and was opposed to both liberalism and the Soviet interpretation of communism. It became the only foundation of both the Yugoslav state and Yugoslavism, which is why both have failed after this elite consensus on ideological issues was lost. As a result, anti-communist forces were anti-Yugoslav, but both ultra-statist and ultra-nationalist. In Jović’s view, in the Yugoslav case communism and nationalism existed separately, but “constructed themselves by reacting to one another”\textsuperscript{56}.

Many of the explanations presented here are in one way or the other connected with major issues present in the debate on ethnofederalism. Before I present Philip Roeder’s Segmental Institutions Thesis, I will first provide a brief overview of some of the major works on ethnofederalism and its variations.

3.2. Ethnofederalism

Federalism has been long discussed within political science literature within the past few centuries, with its advantages in promoting democracy and pluralism both argued and tested on the example of United States, whose institutional design was copied by many states, many of whom have maintained their federal structure until the present times. The United States, along with states like Argentina, Brazil and Germany, are frequently labelled as “classical”\textsuperscript{55, 56}.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 5.
federations, whose federal structure is the consequence of their size and/or the desire of constitutional designers to promote democracy, pluralism and quality of governance. Another type of federalism, one that is frequently labelled as “ethnofederalism” or “multination federalism”, is much more controversial. Unlike “classical” federations, the federal structure of “ethnofederations” is the consequence of the desire to accommodate ethnic or national minorities within a state by granting them autonomy and self-government within their own autonomous entity, hereby labelled as an “ethnic homeland”.

Differentiating between “integration” and “accommodation” as two general patterns in dealing with national, ethnic and communal diversity, McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon place “territorial pluralism” at the very end of the integration/accommodation continuous scale, one step short of full secession.57 Labelling mononational federations (previously mentioned as classical federations) as “national federations” and ethnofederations as “pluralist federations”, the authors also present the concept of “federacies”, units of self-government that enjoy a distinctive relationship with the state despite its non-federal constitutional design.58

Will Kymlicka, one of most well-known proponents of ethnofederalism, differentiates between “administrative-territorial” federations and “multination” federations, based on whether the division of power occurs among a single national group or is an instrument of accommodating minority self-government.59 Kymlicka, however, does not consider all multination federations to be federations in the technical sense, but all states which “embody a model of the state in which national minorities are federated to the state through some form of territorial autonomy… to ensure that each national group is able to maintain itself as a distinct

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58 Ibid., 62.
and self-governing societal culture.”\(^{60}\) This definition, therefore, encompasses both “pluralist federations” and “federacies” as defined by McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon.

Philip Roeder uses similar concepts, but with a somewhat different terminology. According to him, states are faced with demands for both communal and territorial autonomy. Nation-state projects, however, present demands for both. In Roeder’s terminology, states that “divide their territory and population further among separate jurisdictions and give the population that purportedly is indigenous to each jurisdiction a distinct political status”\(^{61}\) are considered to be “segmented states”. These autonomous units are henceforth labelled as “segment-states”, while the segmented state they belong is labelled as a “common-state”. Roeder reserves the use of the term “ethnofederalism” for federal states, but considers it to be closer to non-federal segmented states than classical federal ones.\(^{62}\) Therefore, same as Kymlicka, Roeder does not differentiate between federations and asymmetrical unitary states. What matters is territorial autonomy granted to populations which are recognized as having an ethnic homeland in their designated autonomous territories. This is what differentiates segmented states from federal states and segment-states from classic federal units.

But even though the concept of ethnofederalism, no matter how named, seems to be clear, there is a heated debate among scholars about its merits. They are divided on two issues: first, the question of functionality of ethnofederations and dangers of secession, and second, about the desirability of ethnofederal arrangements.

In his book “Multicultural Citizenship”, Will Kymlicka lays down the basics of his theory of liberal multiculturalism. Differentiating between national minorities and immigrants, he defines the former as territorially concentrated ethnocultural groups with distinct societal

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 212.
\(^{61}\) Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From, 12.
cultures, “as intergenerational communities, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a
given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history”.
Kymlicka then argues
that liberal democratic states should establish territorial autonomy for these national minorities
as a means of protecting their culture and achieving liberal justice in multinational states.
Expanding on his liberal multiculturalism theory in his later works by increasing the number of
categories of ethnocultural groups and attempting to justify it the Central and Eastern European
context, Kymlicka further elaborates on his ideas about accommodation of national minorities.
He argues that since the “ethnocultural neutrality” of liberal democratic states is a myth and
national majorities are employing a process of nation-building on whole state, national
minorities should be given the same opportunities on the territories where they enjoy autonomy.
Therefore, they should have the rights and possibilities for nation-building and their self-
definition as nations in order to defend their culture against the majority’s nation-building.
Apart from promoting ethnofederalism for normative reasons, Kymlicka also claims that there
are virtually no alternatives to ethnofederal arrangements in regards to accommodating
territorially concentrated national minorities, and if had not they been ethnofederations, states
such as Canada, Belgium and Spain might not even exist today.

Arend Lijphart also supports ethnofederalism as a means of accommodating
ethnonational groups. Within his consociation theory, ethnonational groups, or segments,
should enjoy “segmental autonomy” either in a territorial or non-territorial form. Lijphart
considers federations “particularly suitable for divided societies with territorially concentrated
segments”, but does consider its possible drawbacks, admitting that it is never a perfect answer

63 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 1996).
64 Ibid.
to the demands of segmental autonomy since it can never fully divide the groups from each other.\footnote{Ibid., 285.}

A radically different position is held by Philip Roeder, who is considered to be one of the most vocal critics of ethnofederalism.\footnote{Anderson, “Ethnofederalism,” 201.} Unlike Kymlicka, Roeder is mostly concerned with empirical evidence about the successes of different institutional arrangements in accommodating minorities and avoiding nation-state crises and break-ups. Within many of his works, Roeder has offered a very negative position on ethnofederalism and other forms of power sharing, claiming they foster nation-state crisis escalation, with ethnofederalism in particular having the most profound negative effect.\footnote{Philip G. Roeder, “The Robustness of Institutions in Ethnically Plural Societies,” in \textit{Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC August}, 2000, 32.} The most developed Roeder’s critique of ethnofederalism comes in the form of his “Segmental Institutions Thesis”, introduced in his 2007 book “Where Nation-States Come From”. This theory, aiming to offer not only a critique on ethnofederalism, but also the institutional explanation of nationalism and the creation of new nation-states, will be presented in the following chapter.
4. Philip Roeder’s Segmental Institutions Thesis

Within his book “Where do Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism”, Philip Roeder aims to answer the question of why some nation-state projects succeed in achieving sovereign independence, while others fail. While many explanations of this process are based on the questions of national identities, grievances, greed, mobilization of resources, political opportunities and international recognition, Roeder offers an institutional explanation. Even though he recognizes the importance of these elements in nation-state creation, even claiming that a misalignment of only one of them could represent an “insurmountable obstacle to success”, Roeder argues that it is the political institutions, specifically the presence of segment-states, which enable all of these elements to align favorably.

Roeder defines nation-state projects as “claims that a specific population should be self-governing within a sovereign state of its own”, which are therefore both territorial and communal. During the past few centuries, there were hundreds or thousands of nation-state projects, out of which only a handful managed to lead to the creation of a nation-state. What determined this outcome? From 1815, there were 191 new or reconstituted states, out of which 118, representing 62 percent, were created through decolonization, while 62, representing 32 percent, through secession or dissolution of metropolitan states. More dramatically, from 1901 to 2000, 153 out of 177, roughly around 86 percent of new nation-states, were previously segment-states. Therefore, a vast majority of newly-created states were previously segment-

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71 Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From, 9.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 12.
74 Ibid., 3.
75 Ibid., 8.
76 Ibid., 10.
states within larger states. In Roeder’s words, “almost every successful nation-state project has been associated with an existing institution that I refer to as a ‘segment-state’. Independence represented the administrative upgrade of this existing jurisdiction”.77 In even stronger words, he argues that during the past century it would be possible to bet on the rule of thumb “no segment-state, no nation-state”.78 The argument about importance of segmental institutions for the creation of new nation-states is what Roeder calls the “segmental institutions thesis”.

According to Roeder, it is not nationalisms that lead to creation of nation-states – it is the nation states or segment-states that created widespread nationalism. While different nation-state project might be prominent within intellectual circles, it is the control of state or segment-state institutions that grant the opportunity to ethnonational elites to promote their nation-state project and have leverage over competing ones. In Roeder’s words, “the state coordinates identities by serving as a unique focal point, but it reinforces this natural psychological tendency by rewarding supporters, suppressing proponents of alternative nation-state projects, and propagating the official project through public education, public ceremonies, and the many other tools a state uses to celebrate itself”.79 According to the segmental institutions thesis, the same principle goes for segment-states, which account for a majority of non-state nationalisms.80

As previously mentioned, Philip Roeder’s segmental institutions thesis aims at an institutional explanation of nationalism, nation-state crises and the creation of new nation-states. Roeder creates his theory on the example of Eurasia - the Soviet Union and Russia during different time periods in the twentieth century. Describing the dynamics and processes in the region makes the majority of his book, with the rest being used to test the hypotheses against

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 27.
80 Ibid.
the large number of cases to test for its global validity. Here I will present the basics of his segmental institutions thesis, followed by the research design and results of his statistical analysis.

4.1. Segment-States and Common-States

First, Roeder’s terminology has to be clarified. As previously mentioned, Roeder considers “segmented states” those states which “divide their territory and population further among separate jurisdictions and give the population that purportedly is indigenous to each jurisdiction a distinct political status”81, consisting of both “segment-states” and the “common-state”, which is encompassing the entire community and territory of the segmented state. What differentiates segmentation from federalism is that “segmentation simultaneously divides the population into separate communities or peoples and allocates members of these communities different decision rights”.82 Therefore, citizens of segment-states are members of separate communities, on which their rights in the common-state depend. Moving from one segment-state to the other changes an individual’s political status. To use the more common terminology on ethnofederalism, “segmented states” are ethnofederal states in which separate communities constitute federal units, “segment-states” are those federal units defined as homelands of separate communities, and “common-state” represent the federal level of an ethnofederation. It is important to note, however, that “segment-states” can be present in states which are not strictly federations, being possible even in otherwise unitary states.

Roeder differentiates between several types of segmented states based on the employed concept of sovereignty. While some segmented states employ the principle of “common-state sovereignty”, where the state as a whole is the only one to constitute a sovereign community, and “metropolitan sovereignty” reserves sovereignty for only one part of the population (for

81 Ibid., 12.
82 Ibid., 46.
example, citizens of colonial empires), there are other forms of shared sovereignty in segmented states. Under the principle of “pooled sovereignty”, both the segment-states and the common-state constitute sovereign communities which freely agree on the competences given to each other, “partitioned sovereignty” exists where the common-state and the segment-states enjoy separate and inviolable decision rights, while “segmented sovereignty” exists where segment-states enjoy the rights to constitute states of their own and supreme sovereignty, only delegating those powers to the common-state which they have the right to rescind without approval from the common state.⁸³

Roeder’s institutional explanation of nationalism and the creation of new nation-states is, despite being the central argument of his book, only the foundation of the segmental institutions thesis. Much more important than claiming how contemporary states are the successors of previous segment-states, the segmental institution thesis aims to explain how and why the existence of segment-states lead to common-state break-ups and their independence. There are two questions it aims to answer: first, the mechanisms behind the creation of nation-state crises, and second, behind secession and creation of new nation-states. Roeder aims to explain both of these phenomena by examining how segmental institutions influence the behavior of political actors and lead both towards nation-state crises and secession. According to the segmental institutions thesis, these are two arenas through which segmental institutions lead to these outcomes, one concerning politics at the periphery and the other one politics between the periphery and the center. Causal logic the segmental institutions thesis is influenced by relies on formal theories of bargaining first formed within the field of economics. Bargaining, both within the segment-states and between the segment-states and the common-state, is therefore the methodological foundation of the segmental institutions thesis.⁸⁴

⁸³ Ibid., 69.
⁸⁴ Ibid., 37.
4.2. Politics at the Periphery

The first arena concerns politics at the periphery. According to Roeder, segment-states might empower proponents of nation-state projects to establish what he calls a “political-identity hegemony”, which refers to “both to the relative predominance of a national identity within ‘the people’ and to the relative empowerment of a cohort of politicians associated with that project within ‘the homeland’.”

Identity hegemony represents “institutionalization of a dominant symbolic framework”, while political hegemony represents “predominance of a cohort of politicians associated with this framework”. In other words, institutions of a segment-state may allow proponents of a nation-state project to establish both a political domination within the segment-state and promote their own nation-state project. Having access to these institutions, they may impose their concepts of nationhood on others and defeat rival nation-state projects, including the one that calls for unity of the common-state. It is not necessary for segment-state elites to impose their nation-state project onto a wider population or foster a deep sense of nationalism, but they need to make sure that no other nation-state projects are able to match their own within their segment-state, especially not the nation-state project of the common state. Roeder considers political and identity hegemony to have the same foundation: resources necessary for privileging a nation-state project are those necessary for political hegemony.

Roeder recognizes several conditions for the emergence of political-identity hegemony:

1. The existence of the segment-state. Without segment-states, proponents of nation-state projects are unlikely to establish political-identity hegemonies.

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85 Ibid., 82.
86 Ibid., 82.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 83.
89 Ibid., 85.
2. Type of regime. While autocratic common-state governments may foster political-identity hegemonies, these are more likely to be limited and unable to threaten the common-state unity. Democratic common-state governments lead to a variety of consequences for political identity-hegemonies. While they may be harder to establish in democratic common-states, they are also more likely to endanger the common-state.  

3. Disunity in the common-state government enables segment-state leaders to more easily establish political-identity hegemonies, whether in autocratic or democratic common-states. 

4. The share of decision rights given to segment-state leaders influences their possibilities of establishing political-identity hegemonies. 

5. Even if a titular community within a segment-state is only a minority, extensive autonomy can nevertheless enable segment-state leaders to establish a political-identity hegemony. 

6. The possibility to establish political-identity hegemony does not depend on the size of the “lootable resources” within the segment-state as much as on the monopolization of these resources by the segment-state leaders. 

As previously mentioned, Roeder understands widespread nationalism as a consequence of the existence of a state, rather than the other way around. He argues that segment-states help create identity hegemonies before independence by successfully solving two problems of national identity creation. The first problem regards identifying a “winner” among competing

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90 Ibid., 86.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 87.
94 Ibid.
nation state projects, while the other regards ensuring payoffs to the supporters of a successful nation-state project. According to the segmental institutions thesis, “segment-states solve the paradox of nation formation before independence by providing a focal point, the incentives to coordinate identities, and the coercive resources to suppress public expressions of alternative national identities”. For Roeder, this suppression of alternative identities is of crucial importance for segment-states. The segment-state leaders need to establish themselves in “switchman” roles, being arbitraries in a conflict between dual identities – the one of the segment-state and the one of the common-state.

Roeder presents the conditions necessary for nation-state projects to emerge hegemonic within politics at the periphery. As previously mentioned, segmental institutions thesis stresses out the importance of the existence of a segment state for establishing a political-identity hegemony. The other conditions are related to political institutions at both the segment-state and the common-state level.

The first regards the autonomy and intervention from the center. According to Roeder, “the more the common-state leaders have the capacity to intervene against segment-state leaders, removing them or countermanding their decisions, the less likely it is that segment-state leaders will establish political-identity hegemonies – or at least hegemonies that can challenge the common-state”.

The second condition regards the autonomy to design institutions. Roeder claims that “the greater their control over the design of political institutions within their respective

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95 Ibid., 109.
96 Ibid., 112.
97 Ibid., 137.
segment-states, the greater are the opportunities for segment-state leaders to construct political-identity hegemonies”.  

The third regards the autonomy to fill political offices. “The more extensive is the control of segment-state leaders over elections within the homeland, the more likely it is that they will build political-identity hegemony”.  

The fourth condition regards the autonomy to foster a national culture. According to Roeder, “the opportunities to establish political-identity hegemony grow the more the decision rights of segment states empower segment-state leaders to cultivate a cadre of national-cultural leaders who elaborate the segment-state’s nation-state project, to mobilize resources in the campaign that propagated this project, and to deny alternative elites access to these resources”.  

Roeder claims that it is the political institutions that enable or prevent the creation of political-identity hegemonies. Other types of constraints, such as demographic or economic, are secondary to institutional constraints. According to the segmental institutions thesis, they do influence the ability of segment-state leaders to establish political-identity hegemony, but they are on the other hand themselves shaped by segmental institutions. Significant autonomy can enable the creation of political-identity hegemonies even when titular communities within segment-states are a minority. Also, more important than the amount of available resources within a segment-state is the question whether it is controlled by the segment-state leaders or not.

98 Ibid., 139.
99 Ibid., 146.
100 Ibid., 149.
101 Ibid., 152.
4.3. Politics between the Periphery and the Center

The second arena concerns politics between the periphery and center. According to the segmental institutions thesis, the existence of segmental institutions enhances the chances of bargaining between the segment-states and the common state escalating to a nation-state crisis and the break-up of the common-state.\(^{102}\) Roeder defines nation-state crises as critical junctures where there is a possibility of a “significant change in the configuration of nation states”, which may end both in centralization or the break-up of the common-state.\(^{103}\) As previously mentioned, segmental institutions enhance the chances for both the occurrence of nation-state crises and those nation-state crises resulting in a break-up of the common-state. Roeder notes six consequences of segmental institutions relevant for the creation of new nation states:

1. “Segmental institutions typically lead to a narrowing of the circle of participants in center-periphery bargaining to just the leaders of the common-state and segment-state governments.”\(^{104}\)

2. “Segmental institutions typically lead the agenda of center-periphery bargaining to focus on a zero-sum conflict over the division of decision rights between common-state and segment-state governments.”\(^{105}\)

3. “Segmental institutions create incentives for segment-state leaders to escalate the stakes in bargaining by pressing sovereignty claims against the common-state.”\(^{106}\)

4. “Segmental institutions lead to constriction in the bargaining range as more solutions that might keep segment-states within a common-state become unacceptable to one or the other party. Segmental institutions permit growing

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 164.
\(^{103}\) Ibid., 163.
\(^{104}\) Ibid., 165.
\(^{105}\) Ibid.
\(^{106}\) Ibid.
divergence among the cultural, economic, and political institutions of the segment states and between those of the segment-states and the common-state.”

5. “Segmental institutions typically empower the leaders of the segment-states with means to make it more costly for the leaders of the common-state to try to hold on to the segment-state.”

6. “Segmental institutions can weaken the common-state government itself. Where segment-state leaders are empowered within the decision-making processes of the common-state government, they can paralyze the common-state.”

These six consequences can be grouped in three main points. First, segmental institutions put the segment-state and the common state government in conflict with one another and create a zero-sum game over decision and resource allocation. Second, they empower segment-states against the common-state, and third, they lead to segment-states and the common-state (as well as different segment-states among themselves) take different development paths, which may make governance of the state very hard.

According to Roeder, nation-state crises can be caused by either the common-state or the segment state government, either in the form of escalation of stakes or escalation of means. Escalation of stakes occurs when politicians ask for more decision rights, while escalation of means occur when politicians increase the cost on the opponent in the case it does not concede these rights. Following the logic of bargaining, political actors escalate nation-state crises when they expect positive pay-offs.
According to the segmental institutions thesis, the likelihood that nation-state crises will result in common-state break-ups increases if the following conditions are met:

1. “As segment state leaders consolidate political-identity hegemony”\textsuperscript{112}
2. “As segment state develop in divergent directions”\textsuperscript{113}
3. “As there is growth in the capacity of segment-state leaders to back their demands for a greater share of decision rights with actions that inflict higher losses on the common-state leaders”\textsuperscript{114}
4. “As the common-state leaders find the commitments they must make to appease the segment-state leaders too costly”\textsuperscript{115}

In other words, consolidation of political-identity hegemony, divisions among the leaders of the common-state and larger the decision rights given to common-state governments, the greater the chance of a nation-state crises that will lead to a common-state break-up.\textsuperscript{116}

Roeder argues that there is an “inherent instability in segmental institutions”.\textsuperscript{117} Segmental institutions privilege the balance between segment-state and common-state leaders above all other balances. According to the bargaining model, stability requires a balance between the two sides in the bargaining, who need to believe that the other side can successfully retaliate. Weakening of one of the sides in the bargaining process advantages the other side. In other words, while weakening of the segment-state governments can lead to a peaceful centralization, weakening of the common-state government can lead to a peaceful devolution.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 170.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
Power parity of a perceived power parity can, however, lead to a conflict because of imperfect information available to the actors involved in the bargaining process.118

4.4. Escalation of Stakes and Escalation of Means

As previously mentioned, Roeder claims that “segmental institutions focus the agenda and often lead to the conflation of many, potentially cross-cutting issues onto a single, zero-sum dimension of allocating decision rights between the segment-state and common state governments”.119 The existence of such cumulative policy divisions increase the chances for the emergence of a nation-state crisis. Furthermore, with the emergence and intensification of a nation-state crises, mutually acceptable compromises to preserve the unity of the common-state might disappear.120

Segment-state leaders are motivated by two concerns: first, how to expand their decision rights against the common-state, and second, how to expand their decision rights against other political forces within their own segment-states. Regarding the relation between the segment-state and the common-state, segment-state leaders are interested in two arenas: first, they demand greater decision rights in the common-state government and second, they demand more autonomy for their own segment states.121

According to Roeder, “segmental institutions create incentives for segment-state leaders to monopolize the agenda of center-periphery bargaining and to escalate their claims on behalf of their segment-states into more realms until these claims become demands for the sovereign independence of a nation-state”.122 There are five incentives for segment-state leaders to escalate the stakes of the conflict:

118 Ibid., 173.
119 Ibid., 203.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 209.
122 Ibid., 219.
1. Preservation of political-identity hegemony. Segment-state leaders attempt to create or preserve their political-identity hegemonies which they perceive to be threatened by the common-state.\textsuperscript{123}

2. Externalization of costs of ethnic outbidding. Segment-state leaders see benefits for their segment-states with the increase of their demands against the common-state.\textsuperscript{124}

3. Abstention of the moderates and the prevalence of radicals. As moderates usually abstain from politics during a nation-state crises, radicals take center stage.\textsuperscript{125}

4. Divergent development between the segment-states. The differences in economic or political development make achieving compromises harder, if not impossible.\textsuperscript{126}

5. Spread of radicalism and mimicry among segment-states. As some segment-state escalate the means of the conflict, others have incentives to follow suit.\textsuperscript{127}

Regarding the escalation of means, Roeder argues that “proponents of nation-state projects are more likely to achieve sovereign independence when they possess the means to induce common-state leaders to listen and accede and when they are relatively secure against retaliation.”\textsuperscript{126} He recognizes three main factors to influence whether segment-state leaders are capable of achieving this goal:

1. The extent of decision rights by the segment-states. Especially important for the relevance of this factor is weakness or division among the common-state leadership.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 220.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 222.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 224.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 225.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 227.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 229.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 231.
2. The influence of segment-state leaders in common-state decision-making. This factor is especially relevant if segment-state leaders are empowered with “real or potential” vetoes.\textsuperscript{130}

3. The existence of a political-identity hegemony. A stable political-identity hegemony can be a crucial factor in strengthening the position of segment-state leader even if the common-state leadership is not weakened or divided.\textsuperscript{131} Political-identity hegemony is important because of the following reasons: first, it enables segment-state leaders to inflict greater losses on the common-state than the common-state is against them.\textsuperscript{132} Second, they can more easily absorb losses related with bargaining.\textsuperscript{133} Third, segment-state leaders with political-identity hegemony can convince the other side that “no better offers will come from (their) side of the table”.\textsuperscript{134} Fourth, political-identity hegemony gives segment-state leaders better control of information.\textsuperscript{135}

Furthermore, Roeder argues that segmental institutions may lead to cascading defections that could significantly weaken the common-state. In his version of the “free rider” argument, segmental institutions encourage segment-state leaders to use the benefits of cooperation of others, but raise their own demands and refuse to contribute their shares to the common-state. This may, in Roeder’s words, make the state “wither away”.\textsuperscript{136}

4.5. Testing the Segmental Institutions Thesis

After presenting his segmental institutions thesis and its propositions, Roeder goes on to formulate a set of hypothesis to be tested against both the Eurasian example and a global set

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 236.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 242.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 246.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 249.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 250.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 251.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 254.
of cases. First he aims to discover the causes of nation-state crises and show which nation-state projects have succeeded in becoming a focus of a nation-state crisis and reached the bargaining table with the state. For this he analyzed 658 ethnic groups in 153 states from 1995 and 1999 by testing several factors or hypothesis such as the presence of a segment-state, previous independence of the state nation-state project aims to create, the existence of a distant kin state, weakness of the common-state, presence of autocratic government, cultural differences, demographic pressure, etc.137 The results show that ethnic groups with segment-states have a twice larger chance to provoke a nation-state crisis when compared to those without a segment-state, this being by far the best predictor of nation-state crises.138 The population size of the ethnic group also proved to be of significance, but segmental institutions and population size turned out to be independent factors – while the presence of segment-state did not increase the chances of nation-state crises caused by large groups, but was a substitution for size when it comes to smaller ethnic groups. Cultural divisions also showed an effect, but it was significantly increased with the existence of the segment-state.139

The other question Roeder aims to answer with a statistical analysis is the connection of segmental institutions with the creation of new nation-states. The main hypothesis he wishes to test is whether segmental institutions give greater incentives for segment-state leaders to push for independence and the common-state leaders to accept it.140 The other two main hypotheses in this research are whether political-identity hegemony within the segment-state and the decline of unity and security of the common-state leadership lead to the same consequences.141 Furthermore, he tests the higher empowerment of segment-state populations within their segment-states than within the common-state (inclusion at the periphery, exclusion

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137 Ibid., 261.  
138 Ibid., 283.  
139 Ibid., 288.  
140 Ibid., 291.  
141 Ibid., 292.
at the center). To this he adds further auxiliary hypotheses such as the negative effect of autocracy, modest positive effect of fully inclusive democracy and the strong positive effect of anocracy - the level of democratization between autocracy and inclusive democracy. Roeder believes that anocracies, “weakly institutionalized, imperfectly competitive, and less than fully inclusive polities between autocracy and democracy”\textsuperscript{142} are especially providing incentives and means for segment-states to seek independence and for the common-states to grant it.\textsuperscript{143} To test these hypotheses, 336 segmental dyads were analyzed for each year between 1901 and 2000, creating a total of 13,664 observations to be analyzed with a Cox proportional hazard analysis.\textsuperscript{144} The results have again shown the importance of segment-states for independence, especially if in combination with transitional or anocratic common-state regimes. Common-states that would give a separate political status to their segment-state populations and excluded them from politics at the center faced a 17 times greater chance of secession than fully inclusive democracies, while anocratic regimes in the combination with self-government in the segment-states increased this chance 39 times.\textsuperscript{145}

Roeder’s conclusions are clear – “the essential precondition for a successful nation-state project is a segment-state”.\textsuperscript{146} Therefore, Roeder considers segmental institutions to be a very poor mechanism for holding divided societies together. They exclude cross-cutting interests, promote political-identity hegemony within segment-states and put zero-sum conflict at the center of politics.\textsuperscript{147} Considering his findings, Roeder finds the propagation of ethnofederalism as a solution to ethnic conflicts “remarkable”.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 297.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 298.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 324.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 329.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 329.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 341.
\textsuperscript{148} Anderson, “Ethnofederalism,” 166.
4.6. Critique of Roeder’s Segmental Institutions Thesis

Roeder’s segmental institutions thesis and his overall negative assessment of ethnofederalism have attracted a fair share of criticism. While recognizing his analysis of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many authors question Roeder’s causal link between segmental institutions and nation-state crises and common-state break-ups.

In a series of articles by Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, Andreas Mehler and Bethany Lacina in *Ethnopolitics* journal from January 2014, different case-studies that seem to contradict his conclusions are analyzed. These case-studies aimed to challenge Roeder’s segmental institutions thesis by pointing out at different mechanisms and alternative explanation of nation-state crises (or the lack of them). Two of the cases were democratic, India and Nicaragua, while two were autocratic, China and Cameroon. All of them were outside the region Roeder’s theory was based on.

In his analysis of the case-study of Tibet within China, Matthew Hoddie argued how the lack of a segment state in Tibet since 1959 (the autonomy of Tibet was negligible) did not prevent nation-state crises and ethnically based violence in the region. While Roeder’s theory can explain the outbreak of violence of 1959, which led to the revoking of Tibet’s autonomy, it cannot manage to explain the nation-state crises after this moment. Instead, Hoddie argues for the importance of international actors.\(^{149}\)

Caroline Hartzell reaches similar conclusions in her study of Nicaragua, where international actors also had a role in the break-out of conflict between the state and its minorities. Also, the case of Nicaragua, where nation-state crises actually resulted in segmental

institutions, and not vice versa, leads to the conclusion that segment-state can be endogenous to nation-state crises.\textsuperscript{150}

In the case of Cameroon, Andreas Mehler argues that is wasn’t the creation of a segment-state that led to a nation-state crisis, but that its dissolution did. Therefore, the case of Cameroon could be in direct contradiction with the segmental institutions thesis.\textsuperscript{151}

Finally, Bethany Lacina analyzed the region of Darjeeling within the state of West Bengal in India, arguing that it was the creation of the segment-state, along with the establishment of the political-identity hegemony, which prevented secession claims. Furthermore, she argues that Indian segment states have actually stabilized the state, and that Roeder’s very definition of segment-states could be flawed, being endogenous to nation-state crises, and not their cause.\textsuperscript{152}

Another type of criticism of Roeder’s work came in the article “Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement?” by Liam Anderson. Unlike previously mentioned authors, who used case-studies to question Roeder’s main hypotheses, Anderson challenged his statistical analysis, and even more importantly, his overall stance towards ethnofederalism. Anderson argues that the problems with contemporary literature on ethnofederalism are that it is based primarily on the examples of failed post-communist federations, and secondly, that it recently became more prescriptive. However, when the number of cases is expanded and an alternative answers are demanded from the critics of ethnofederalism, the evidence against it becomes a lot less convincing. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, Anderson claims that “ethnofederalism may be the worst form of institutional arrangement, except for all the others


\textsuperscript{152} Bethany Lacina, “India’s Stabilizing Segment States,” \textit{Ethnopolitics} 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 13–27.
that have been tried”. According to him, the only two alternatives to ethnofederalism are unitarism and non-ethnic federalism, but the problem is that ethnofederalism was most frequently introduced precisely because of the failure of these two models of accommodation.\textsuperscript{154}

Anderson differentiates between full ethnofederations, partial ethnofederations and ethnic federacies as different types of what is widely defined as “ethnofederation”. While in full ethnofederations all ethnic groups enjoy a distinct homeland, in partial ethnofederations only same units of the federation are defined as segments states, with ethnic federacies being unitary states with segment-states. Divided like this, the three subtypes show significantly different success rates. While 9 out of 12 full ethnofederations have failed (66 percent), that was true for only 4 per cent of ethnic federacies and zero percent for partial ethnofederations.\textsuperscript{155} Therefore, it is the full ethnofederations that fail miserably, but these are very rare. Other types of ethnofederations, on the other hand, have a high success rate.

Another distinction that Anderson makes is between those states that were born ethnofederal and those where a different institutional arrangement previously existed. With those which were born ethnofederal, the only choice was between ethnofederations or no state at all, so they are not good indicators of success or failure. Regarding those that were previously unitary states, Anderson argues that those that failed therefore present failure of both unitary and ethnofederal institutions, which is why no conclusion against ethnofederalism can be reached from them. Only those states which were previously unitary states, but now ethnofederal, enable us to analyze and compare different arrangements. Therefore, Anderson

\textsuperscript{153} Anderson, “Ethnofederalism,” 166.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 174.
claims that ethnofederalism has outperformed unitarism in nearly two thirds of the cases in his study.\textsuperscript{156}

Furthermore, Anderson argues that ethnofederalism is rarely introduced as a first choice institutional design, frequently being the only possible option besides partition or continuation of warfare. Looked at this way, it seems like a better alternative.\textsuperscript{157}

The aforementioned critique of Roeder’s segmental institutions thesis does not manage to challenge Roeder’s fundamental claim, that segment-states give birth to nation-states, and even more importantly for this research – do not question the validity of Roeder’s theory for the post-communist societies such as Yugoslavia. Liam Anderson goes as far to claim that communist federations undergoing a transition process are exactly those in which Roeder theory works, but that its validity does not extend far beyond them.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 203.
5. Testing the Segmental Institutions Thesis on Yugoslavia

5.1. Overview

In this chapter I will test Roeder’s Segmental Institutions Theory by noting the observable implications of his theory and analyzing the case of Yugoslavia to examine whether the propositions of his theory are confirmed or rejected on this particular case. This will include the analysis of politics at the periphery, politics between the periphery and the center, and the explanation of the nation-state crisis that led to the break-up of the state. Due to restricted volume of this analysis, the main focus will be on the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, which brought full segmentation of the federation and was in effect until the break-up of the state.

The basic hypothesis of the segmental institutions thesis is that nation-states are created out of segment-states. This causal link is presented in Figure 1.

\[\text{Segment-States} \rightarrow \text{Nation-States}\]

*Figure 1 - Main Hypothesis of the Segmental Institutions Thesis*

According to the segmental institutions thesis, this occurs through the effect that the existence of segment-state has on politics at the periphery and politics between the center and periphery, which is itself influenced by politics on the periphery. This relationship is presented in the Figure 2.
First, I will analyze politics at the periphery. According to the segmental institutions thesis, segmental institutions are likely to lead to the establishment of a political-identity hegemony in segment-states if the following factors are present:\(^\text{158}\):

1. Autocratic government of the common-state (Common-state regime type)
2. Disunity in the common-state government and autonomy from intervention from the center (Common-state capacity to act)
3. Autonomy to design political institutions and to fill political offices (Political autonomy)
4. Autonomy to foster national cultures (Cultural autonomy)
5. Monopolization of resources by the segment-state (Economic autonomy)

Second, I will analyze politics between the center and the periphery. Segmental institutions thesis argues that segmental institutions will lead to the following consequences in this arena:\(^\text{159}\):

1. Narrowing of the circle in bargaining to leaders of the segment-states and the common-state

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\(^{159}\) Ibid., 164.
2. Zero-sum conflict over decision rights between segment-state and common-state leaders

3. Empowerment of the segment-state leaders against the common-state and the weakening of the common-state government

4. Growing political, economic and cultural divergence between the segment-states

Third, I will analyze the final Yugoslav nation-state crisis that led to the break-up of the state. Effects of the segmental institutions on politics on the periphery and politics between the periphery and the center are themselves not enough to explain the break-up of the segmented states or the creation of new nation-states. Segmental institutions thesis explains this process through bargaining between the common-state and segment-state governments which leads to a nation-state crisis. If the segmental institutions thesis is correct, we expect that the nation-state crisis in a segmented state to occur as either an escalation of stakes or escalation of means. While the escalation of stakes is related to motivation of political actors to induce a nation-state crisis, the escalation of means relates to possibilities of political actors to do so. Since the nation-crisis that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia represents both an escalation of stakes and escalation of means by political actors, I expect to find evidence of this logic in the Yugoslav nation-state crisis in the late 1980s.

Incentives for the segment-state leaders to escalate the stakes in the conflict are the following\(^\text{160}\):

1. Preservation of a political-identity hegemony
2. Externalization of costs of ethnic outbidding
3. Abstention of moderates and prevalence of radicals
4. Divergent development which makes compromises impossible
5. Spread of radicalism and mimicry among segment-states

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\(^{160}\) Ibid., 219.
Factors influencing the possibility of segment-state leaders to escalate the means of the conflict are the following:\[161\]:

1. Strength of decision-rights of segment-states vis-à-vis the common-state
2. Leverage of segment-state leaders in common-state policy making, especially in combination with real or potential vetoes
3. Strength of political-identity hegemony

5.2. Operationalization

Before starting with the analysis, I will briefly discuss the operationalization of terms used in the segmental institutions thesis in order for them to be tested on the case of Yugoslavia. This concerns the notions of the common-state, segment-state, common-state and segment-state government.

First, according to Roeder’s definition, Yugoslavia was a segmented state in which the federal Yugoslav government represented a common-state and Yugoslav republics segment-states. Also, even though the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were not republics, but belonged to the Republic of Serbia, they were constituent parts of the federation and enjoyed both wide autonomy and participation in the common-state government in virtually the same way as the republics. Therefore, they should also be regarded as first order segment-states.

Second, segment-state governments will be understood as governments of the republics and provinces. Also, as the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) was a key player in the political system and was characterized by a significant segmentation reminiscent of the segmentation of the state, officials of the republican branches of the party should be regarded as members of the segment-state governments. Described by Matthijs Bogaards as a “League Model”\[161\]'s cited, 231.
consociational party, the League of Communist itself represented an institution of ethnonational accommodation.\textsuperscript{162}

Third, the common-state government will be understood to comprise of the Federal Presidency and the Federal Executive Council. While the Federal Presidency was under the 1974 constitution a confederal body consisting of nine members – eight representatives from eight Yugoslav republics and provinces and the president of the Yugoslav League of Communists – which all had veto powers, the Federal Executive Council was the only truly federal executive institution.

These choices are not without controversies, both because of uncertainties within Roeder’s theory itself and the problematic nature of the case under observation. These will be discussed later on in the analysis.

5.3. Main Hypothesis of the Segmental Institutions Thesis

The main hypothesis of the segmental institutions thesis seems undisputedly confirmed in the Yugoslav case. New nation-states in the region: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, were all Yugoslav segment-states. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia gained their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991-1992, while Serbia and Montenegro became nation-states after the dissolution of their state union in 2006. Kosovo, whose status remains disputed between those states considering it a part of Serbia and those recognizing it a sovereign state, also enjoys a de facto independence since its Declaration of Independence in 2008. Therefore, in the Yugoslav case not only did all

the nation-states emerge out of segment-states, but all segment-states except one, Vojvodina, eventually became nation-states.\textsuperscript{163}

However, these facts themselves do not confirm Roeder’s theory. It is very unlikely that former Yugoslav republics would become nation-states in their present form and size if the Badinter Commission did not rule Yugoslavia to be a federation in the “process of dissolution” and called on the colonial principle of \textit{uti possidetis}\textsuperscript{164} to open to the door for international recognition of Yugoslav republics within their current borders. The case is even less clear with Kosovo, who achieved a de facto separation from Serbia only after a 3-month NATO bombing campaign in 1999 and a heavy involvement of international actors in determining its status from 1999 to 2008. The explanation of the Yugoslav break-up that focus on the international factors seem to explain the outcome equally well, if not even more convincingly, than the segmental institutions thesis.

Therefore, in testing Roeder’s theory, I will not include the events of 1991, when the Yugoslav federation has by all means and purposes already ceased to exist and when the Yugoslav and international actors attempted to find a solution to prevent war by either a creation of a “third Yugoslavia” or the recognition of its break-up. What is of interest for this research are the processes that led to a de facto dissolution of the federation before the international actors even decided to accept this dissolution as a fact and found highly controversial legal precedent to legitimate their decisions. The question the segmental institutions thesis should answer is – why did Yugoslavia come to a point where it could be saved either by war or international arbitration? According to the theory, it is through nation-state crisis enabled by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{163}] The existence of a nation-state in the light of Roeder’s theory is independent of international recognition of the state, which is why here I will treat Kosovo as a nation-state without prejudice on the legality and legitimacy of its independence from Serbia.
\item[\textsuperscript{164}] Radan and Badinter, “The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia,” 549.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
segmental institutions and their effects on the politics at the periphery and politics between the periphery and the center.

5.4. Politics at the Periphery

According to the segmental institutions thesis, segmental institutions shape politics at the periphery by enabling segment-state leaders to construct political-identity hegemony. Except the existence of a segment-state, favorable factors for the creation of political-identity hegemony are disunity in the common state government and autonomy of segment-states from intervention from the center, autocratic government of the common-state, autonomy of segment-state leaders to design political institutions, fill political offices, and foster national cultures, and the monopolization of resources by the segment-state. These factors therefore refer to common-state regime type, political, economic and cultural autonomy, as well as capacities of the common-state to use their decision rights.

5.4.1. Common-state Regime Type

Regarding the type of regime of the common-state government, segmental institutions thesis claims that autocratic common-state regimes will foster the establishment of political-identity hegemonies, but that these will not threaten the unity of the state, while democratic common-state governments will generally discourage political-identity hegemonies, but those could be a lot more dangerous for the common-state. There is no doubt that the political regime in Yugoslavia was autocratic, functioning within a dominance of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in all segments of the society. Therefore, its segment-states should be likely to contain political-identity hegemony of segmental political elites, but that it would become more threatening for the common-state only after the weakening of autocratic tendencies.
5.4.2. Capacity of the Common-State to Intervene

The Constitution of 1974 gave significant autonomy to the Yugoslav republics and created a very weak federal government with few competences. Josip Broz Tito, as the “founding” father of the state and a central figure of Yugoslav political life, held the position of President of Yugoslavia for life and has managed to successfully intervene several times in the internal affairs of the republics, most famously in 1970s, during the “Croatian Spring”, and when dealing with the “Serbian liberals”. However, the constitutional design made sure that there would be no “Tito after Tito”, since the position of the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia was rotating between members of the Presidency from all republics and autonomous provinces on a yearly basis. Without Tito, who died in May 1980, the central government became even weaker and less able to intervene in the internal affairs of the republics. Much of the 1980s was characterized by attempts of the Federal Executive Council, the Yugoslav government, to impose economic reforms which would save the state from a deep economic crisis it found itself in since the mid-1970s. The power was, however, in the hands of the republican and province leaders, which controlled members of the federal institutions and prevented significant state and economic reforms, staying true to the principles of “Kardeljism”. Therefore, there is ample evidence that in Yugoslavia after 1974, and especially after Tito’s death, there was autonomy of segment-states from intervention from the center caused by disunity within the common-state government.

5.4.3. Political Autonomy

As previously mentioned, political autonomy of Yugoslav republics was firmly established by the 1974 Constitution, where they were recognized as sovereign states. They were free to

166 Calic, Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku, 309.
167 Jovic, Yugoslavia, 147.
168 Ibid., 144.
elect their leadership, including the leadership of the republican branches of the League of Communists, and there were few competences designated to the Federal government. Segment-state leaders, therefore, enjoyed autonomy in filling political offices. Regarding their autonomy to design institutions, it was limited by the socialist and Kardeljist ideology of the state, but it was otherwise guaranteed by the Yugoslav federal structure.\textsuperscript{169}

5.4.4. Cultural Autonomy

Autonomy of segment-state leaders to foster national cultures was clearly established in the Yugoslav federation. First, the official narrative of the socialist Yugoslavia was based on multinational character of the federation and separate nationhood of all six constitutive Yugoslav nations. Unitary Yugoslavism – the idea that all Yugoslav constitute a single nation, was considered dangerous and threatening for the concept of a federal Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{170} Second, from 1948 there was no federal ministry of education, with republican ministries promulgating their own educational plans. As a consequence, there were significant differences in the curricula of different republics, especially regarding history, notably the troublesome history of the interwar unitary Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{171} Already during the late 1940s, Yugoslav authorities attempted to rectify the situation by agreeing on guidelines for republican education systems, establishing significant central control over education and language. Linguistic unity of Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins was preserved through the institutionalization of a single Serbo-Croatian language through the Novi Sad agreement in 1950, while Slovenian and Macedonian were recognized as separate languages with an official status in their republics.\textsuperscript{172}

As the decentralization process took place through 1960s and 1970s, it also resulted in the abandonment of the goal to create any kind of a unified Yugoslav culture. Instead of trying to


\textsuperscript{170} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 62.

\textsuperscript{171} Wachtel, \textit{Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation}, 136.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 140.
overcome national and cultural differences in one way or the other, they were embraced as a sign of strength of the Yugoslav socialist federation. This led to a significant increase in the difference in the fields of education, literature and language, setting the stage for the rise of political nationalism during the 1980s. The main argument of Andrew Wachtel is that it was the destruction of the concept of a Yugoslav nation and the strengthening of separate national and cultural identities is what preceded nationalism in politics and the break-up of the state itself. A significant cause of this processes, explicit in Wachtel’s otherwise non-institutionalist approach, is precisely the cultural autonomy enjoyed by segment-state leaders.

5.4.5. Economic Autonomy

Under the 1974 Constitution, each Yugoslav republic was designed to be economically self-sufficient and independent up to a point where it became economically irrational. Not only was the planning disintegrated along republican lines, but the market also disintegrated and the federal state lost any jurisdiction over foreign loans by various economic subjects. The republics had “full control over their economic plans”, which was justified by the political decentralization of the federal state. Therefore, Yugoslav segment-state leaders were firmly in control over their economies and resources.

5.4.6. The Presence of Political-Identity Hegemony

First of all, the concept of a political-identity hegemony needs to be clearly defined. According to Roeder, it refers “both to the relative predominance of a national identity within ‘the people’ and to the relative empowerment of a cohort of politicians associated with that project within ‘the homeland’. ” Identity hegemony represents “institutionalization of a dominant symbolic framework”, while political hegemony represents “predominance of a

173 Ibid., 174.
174 Ibid., 4.
175 Jovic, Yugoslavia, 148.
176 Ibid., 82.
cohort of politicians associated with this framework". Political-identity hegemony does not require deep or broad nationalism among the population of the segment-state. What is required is that alternative nation-state projects, especially the nation-state project, are not able to endanger the hegemony of the segment-state project. Empowered by political-identity hegemony, segment-state leaders are then able to play the “switchman” role between dual identities of the population – one belonging to the segment-state, one to the common-state.

But how can the presence of political-identity hegemony be observed? According to my interpretation of Roeder’s work, it is by examining whether titular nations of the segment-states did manage to prevail over alternative nation-state projects and whether the segment-state elites managed to confirm themselves as the legitimate representatives of these titular nations, having a strong position in both their own segment-states and within the common-state.

Regarding political hegemony of segment-state leaders, it seems to be firmly established after the introduction of the 1974 Constitution and Tito’s death, when their position was strengthened both against the republican opposition and the common-state leaders. Identity hegemony, however, is what represents the crucial part of the segmental institutions thesis regarding politics at the periphery.

In the Yugoslav case, it seems clear that Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, Montenegrin and Macedonian segment-state leaders managed to establish political-identity hegemony. In Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, which were recognized as nations even before the creation of the Yugoslav federation, those three nation-state projects managed to prevail over imaginable alternatives such as the Yugoslav nation-state project or potential regional nation-state projects. What is a lot more interesting in light of Roeder’s theory, however, is the prevalence of

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177 Ibid., 82.
178 Ibid., 112.
Macedonian and Montenegrin national identities in those two republics despite both of them being institutionalized only after the creation of the segmented state.

Montenegro may have enjoyed a long history of a strong regional identity and even nationhood for more than four decades prior to its incorporation in the first Yugoslav state, but at that time there were few Montenegrins which would consider their ethnic identity being separate from Serbian and they were historically divided between the Montenegrin nation-state and a Serbian nation-state project. In all Yugoslav censuses, however, a vast majority of Montenegrin citizens declared as being ethnically Montenegrin. This has changed after the break-up of Yugoslavia, after which Montenegrins again became strongly divided between those considering themselves ethnic Serbs and those considering themselves ethnic Montenegrins.

Macedonia represents a historically very complicated case of national identification and it remains so until the present day because of numerous debates about the historical background of Macedonian nationhood. What is beyond doubt, however, is that the Macedonian separate nationhood was institutionalized only in socialist Yugoslavia and that it trumped all alternative nation-state projects in the republic, such as the highly viable Bulgarian one. Along with Montenegrin, the Macedonian case offers a strong argument in favor of Roeder’s claim that segment-states create and coordinate national identities.

Much more complicated cases are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Vojvodina. First of all, none of those segment-states had a titular nation, each of them having more than one constitutive nation not referenced in the segment-state’s name. In Bosnia, frequently labelled “small Yugoslavia”, three national groups shared something I would consider a proto-consociational arrangement, with proportional representation and rotation at the head of the

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179 Pavlovic, Srbija - Istorija iza imena, 194.
180 Jovic, Yugoslavia, 172.
segment-state. Vojvodina, which was created primarily to satisfy Hungarian needs for autonomy, had a Serb majority and was in practice Serb-dominated. This, however, did not prevent Serb Vojvodinian leaders from being fiercely opposed to Serbian political initiatives from the 1980s.\textsuperscript{181} In Kosovo, members of the Albanian majority controlled both the League of Communists of Kosovo and the Kosovo government and established the hegemony of the Albanian national identity in the province.

Therefore, it could be argued that political-identity hegemony was established in all segment-states except in those in which there was no majority which did not already possess a segment-state. However, it could also be argued that these two segment-states also had a political-identity hegemony, but that it was not a hegemony of a particular national identity, but of a regional and republican identity. In my view, this offers an interesting outlook of Roeder’s theory.

Practically all favorable factors for establishing political-identity hegemony in Yugoslavia were present in the post-1974 period. Most importantly, autocratic Yugoslav government propagated the existence of separate nations which are to be ruled by their communist representatives, which in itself signifies the establishment of a political-identity hegemony. Other favorable factors like political, cultural and economic autonomy were also present, as well as the relative weakness of the common-state and its inability to intervene in segment-state affairs. These positive results should not be surprising, since the segmental institutions thesis was created on a case similar to Yugoslavia, thus making it a weak test for the theory regarding politics at the periphery.

With these reservations in mind, it could be concluded that in the case of Yugoslavia, segmental institutions with favorable factors regarding autonomy and common-state divisions

\textsuperscript{181} Mihailo Crnобрnja, \textit{The Yugoslav Drama} (I.B.Tauris, 1996), 95.
and weaknesses, did lead to the creation of political-identity hegemonies within the segment-states.

5.5. Politics between the Periphery and the Center

According to the segmental institutions thesis, the second arena influenced by segmental institutions concerns politics between the periphery and the center. The expected consequences of the segmental institutions in this arena that increase the likelihood of nation-state crises should be the narrowing of the circle of participants in bargaining on the common-state and segment-state leaders, the establishment of a zero-sum game over decision rights in that bargaining process, empowerment of the segment-state leaders against the common-state, weakness of the common-state government though real or potential vetoes of segment-state leaders and the growing political, economic and cultural divergence between the segment states.

5.5.1. Narrowing the Circle of Bargaining

According to the segmental institutions thesis, segmental institutions lead to the narrowing of the circle of participants in bargaining on only the segment-state and common-state governments, preventing cross-cutting interests from entering the bargaining table. There is ample evidence of this process in the post-1974 Yugoslavia. The 1974 Constitution has established a complicated negotiating process between the Yugoslav republics, in which practically all issues had a national charge. The federal structure institutionalized conflicts between republics and nations instead of different ideological and political concepts. Except the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), there were no Yugoslav institutions through which individuals could pursue their careers, being tied to republican institutions and national identities. As a consequence, this system encouraged “pillarization” of the state. According to Sekelj, this “decentralization without democratization” meant that the only legitimate

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identities were republican and national ones, preventing cross-cutting interests to be represented.\textsuperscript{183}

The two main political conflicts that shook Yugoslavia and the end of 1970s and 1980s were, first, about the policy of economic reforms to contain the serious economic crisis, and second, on the issue of Serbia’s competences over its own autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In both of these political conflicts, the narrowing of the circle of participants on the bargaining table was evident. Troubled by the economic crisis, growing inflation and inefficient republican investments, Yugoslavia was in dire need of economic and political reforms that could only be successfully implemented by the federal government and through centralization. The response to the economic crisis pitted the federal governments against the republican leaderships, regardless of nationality or republican boundaries. While members of the federal government called on centralization and reforms, republican leaders were opposing them. The conflict over economic reforms was, therefore, vertical, not horizontal.\textsuperscript{184}

The conflict over Serbia’s competences over Kosovo and Vojvodina, however, pitted republican governments against each other, mostly notably Serbian against Croatian and Slovenian. According to the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina were nominally part of Serbia, but they were outside the Serbian legal and judicial system, being practically republics in everything but the name. This weakened the position of Serbia, which tried to reform the Constitution in order to establish control over its provinces.\textsuperscript{185} By defending the 1974 Constitution from Serbian reform attempts, they were protecting their own position in the federation, considering centralism and Serbian nationalism the greatest dangers for the unity of the state.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} Sekelj, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 11.
\textsuperscript{184} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 164.
\textsuperscript{185} Crnобрњa, \textit{The Yugoslav Drama}, 94.
\textsuperscript{186} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 197.
5.5.2. Zero-Sum Conflict over Decision Rights

Both aforementioned political conflict were in fact zero-sum conflicts over decision rights. In the case of economic reforms, the main issue were the economic and political decision rights of the Yugoslav federation necessary for implementation of economic reforms. These centralization attempts were fiercely opposed by the republics, which acknowledge the need for reforms, but were unwilling to give up on their prerogatives established under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution.\(^{187}\)

In the political conflict over Serbian control over its provinces, Serbian leadership was involved in complicated negotiations with both provincial governments over decision rights in a clear example of a zero-sum conflict. The support of Croatian and Slovenian republican leaders to the provinces in this conflict is itself not an example of a zero-sum conflict, but it was nevertheless a consequence of their fear of Serbian hegemony in the federation, which would endanger their own autonomous and guarantees under the 1974 Constitution.\(^{188}\)

5.5.3. Empowerment of Segment-States and the Weakness of the Common-State

Roeder argues that segmental institutions empower segment-state leaders in way in which they can make it harder for the common-state leaders to keep the state together and also weaken the common-state government itself in the case of inclusion of segment-state leaders within common-state decision making with real or potential vetoes.\(^{189}\)

With the level of decentralization and the introduction of confederal elements in the 1974 Constitution, it is clear that Yugoslav republics could do both. With significant autonomy in the fields of economy, culture, and even military, with each republic possessing their own “territorial defense”, Yugoslav segment-states were significantly empowered by the

\(^{187}\) Ibid., 152.
\(^{188}\) Ibid., 213.
constitutional design, which was further aided by the establishment of political-identity hegemony in most of them. Since representatives of the segment-state also had veto powers in federal bodies, they could also weaken the common-state government itself.

5.5.4. Political, Economic and Cultural Divergence between Segment-States

According to the segmental institutions thesis, segmental institutions should result in a divergent political, cultural and economic development between the segment-states. This leads to inability to agree on common policies that would suit every segment states. Since political differences, understood as differences in potentials for democratization and transition were present, but not significant enough for any conclusive evidence to be found, I will examine cultural and economic differences between republics.

I have already elaborated on the growing divergence of cultural policies of the Yugoslav republics since the introduction of the Kardeljist concept and the end of any attempts to maintain a shared Yugoslav culture. This process has escalated especially in the 1980s, when the cultural sphere in the Yugoslav republic became increasingly nationalist and hostile to the Yugoslav narrative. As a consequence, at the time of the final Yugoslav nation-state crisis, there was barely any cultural unity in the state. However, at the same time, Yugoslav identity among the people has started to grow, with more and more Yugoslavs declaring as ethnic Yugoslavs on the population censuses. While this was attributed to mixed marriages in the previous decades, in the 1980s it was evident that the number of ethnic Yugoslavs has grown much more than the number of ethnically-mixed marriages. This does not counter the claims of the segmental institution thesis, however. This will be elaborated on in the next sub-chapter.

Regarding economic divergence, there is clear evidence that Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces have increased their differences in economic development since the

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190 Ibid., 165.
introduction of the segmental institutions after the Second World War, with a clear trend of increase in every decade. Taking the index of 100 for a Yugoslav average GDP per capita, the data on republics and autonomous provinces from 1952 to 1989 is the following:

Table 1 - GDP per capita in Republics and Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (total)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>+29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from this data that there were already large regional differences in economic development in 1952, and that despite equality of all nations and nationalities being one of the main goals of the socialist state, these differences became even larger over time. The biggest “winners” and “losers” of this process were the two Serbian autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, respectively. The largest differences in per capita income was between Kosovo and Slovenia, with Slovenia having a 3.87 times larger GDP per capita in 1952 and a staggering 7.54 times larger GDP per capita in 1989. Just for comparison, the largest GDP per capita difference in the EU in 2013 was between Luxembourg and Bulgaria, with 5.71 times in favor of Luxembourg, and if we would count tiny Luxembourg out of the comparison, the difference

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191 Jovic, Yugoslavia, 145.
between the second largest and smallest GPD per capita in the EU, Netherlands and Bulgaria, was only 2.9 times in favor of the former.\footnote{http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1} This data clearly shows the magnitude of economic differences within the Yugoslav federation.

5.5.5. Conclusion

It is clear that practically all effects of segmental institutions predicted by Roeder’s theory were present in Yugoslavia after the 1974 Constitution. According to Roeder, they all increase the likelihood of the emergence of a nation-state crisis and the break-up of the state. The establishment of political-identity hegemony in the republics, narrowing of the bargaining table on a zero-sum conflict over decision-making between republican and federal leaders, empowerment of republican leaders against the federation and a growing divergence between the republics and provinces, all make Yugoslavia a likely candidate for dissolution under the segmental institutions thesis.

5.6. Nation-State Crisis and the Break-up of Yugoslavia

The next and the final step in testing the segmental institutions thesis on Yugoslavia regards examining the applicability of Roeder’s arguments regarding nation-state crises on the actual nation-state crisis that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia. It is clear from the previous chapters that Yugoslavia confirms the hypotheses of the segmental institutions thesis and that according to the thesis, it represented a state with a high chance for dissolution. This could itself be enough to consider the theory tested and confirmed on the case of Yugoslavia. However, since Roeder devotes significant space to show how and why segmented states actually fall apart, this should also be included in this research.

The greatest obstacle, however, is how to determine where this crisis starts and where it ends, since Yugoslavia was in a constant political crisis for more than a decade before its
dissolution. But, since I have already elaborated on the political struggles over economic and constitutional reforms until the 1980s, I will focus on the period from Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power in 1987 to 1990. Unlike previous ones, political conflicts following the emergence of Milošević did actually lead to the break-up of the state.

5.6.1. Chain of Events

Here I will briefly present the chain of events that led to the end of Yugoslavia. As previously mentioned, two of the most significant political conflicts during the 1980s were the conflict over economic reforms and the conflict about Serbian control over its provinces. None of those was successfully resolved by the middle of the decade. Economic problems amassed because of weak and failed economic reforms, while the Serbian political elite remained highly dissatisfied with its inability to persuade other republican elites to change the Constitution and place the Republic of Serbia on par with other republics, none of which had autonomous provinces and therefore no obstacles for their full sovereignty. It is under these circumstances that Slobodan Milošević, who was introduced to the position of the President of the League of Communists of Serbia by the Serbian President Ivan Stambolić, entered the scene.

After a famous visit to Kosovo in April 1987, when he showed a hitherto unseen support for nationalist claims of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, Milošević began his ascent to power through his reformist rhetoric, political ability and populism that was on the borderline with Serbian nationalism. Fighting against the communist “bureaucrats” and advocating for constitutional reforms, Milošević aimed to resolve both political conflicts that plagued the state for almost a decade.193 After first managing to impose his rule within Serbia itself and removing Ivan Stambolić, Milošević successfully oversaw the overthrow of both the Vojvodina and Kosovo governments, taking control over their them and de facto cancelling their autonomy

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193 Jovic, Yugoslavia, 282.
The government of Montenegro was also overthrown by protesters, after which Momir Bulatović, loyal to Milošević, assumed the position of the party president within the republic. Milošević now had four votes out of nine in the federal presidency under his control.

Leaders of other Yugoslav republics were worried by Milošević’s aggressive take-over of the Serbian provinces and especially Montenegro, with Slovenia being the most vocal in protecting the 1974 Constitution, considering Milošević’s take-over of Kosovo as an act of aggression against Kosovo Albanians. Flying on the wings of Serbian nationalism, but using a pro-Yugoslav and pro-Titoist rhetoric, Milošević now attempted to take control of the whole federation with similar methods, trying to use the demonstrators to pressure the government of Slovenia to comply with his demands. In this, however, he was not successful. In his attempt to outvote the Slovenian party leadership at the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on January 1990 and take full control of the party, Milošević was instead faced with the disintegration of the party after the Slovenian and Croatian delegates all left the Congress mid-session. This represented the end of the Yugoslav one-party system and soon the first democratic elections in all Yugoslav republics were held.

At this point, Yugoslavia already began to disintegrate, with almost all elements of the Yugoslav federation disappearing. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was dissolved, elections in Slovenia and Croatia were won by secessionist parties, Kosovo Albanians declared their own republic, while Croatian Serbs organized a rebellion against Croatia in the summer. According to Jović, August 1990 could be seen as the effective end of the Yugoslav state. Milošević, who previously attempted to centralize Yugoslavia, refocused by that time to a “Greater Serbian” approach, attempting to at least keep the Serbs within a single state.

194 Ibid., 283.
195 Ibid., 311.
196 Ibid., 351.
197 Ibid., 360.
The subsequent conflict can hardly be seen to represent attempts to keep Yugoslavia. The Federal Executive Council led by Ante Marković implemented a highly successful program of economic reforms in 1990, but it was not welcomed by anyone, especially not Milošević, who saw Marković as a potential danger for his own position. As a result, Marković’s attempt to preserve Yugoslavia without the League of Communists failed. Nationalist leaders took center stage and the full-scale conflict was only a matter of time.

Therefore, the nation-state crisis that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia could be simplified in the following manner: it was one the segment-state leaders, Slobodan Milošević, who tried to centralize Yugoslavia and prevent its “withering away”, which in turn provided incentives for other segment-state leaders to escalate the stakes of the conflict and “play the sovereignty card”. In later stages of the crisis, segment-state leaders battled over the legacy of the common-state with no genuine attempts to find compromise that would keep the common-state whole. Now I will briefly analyze how this fits Roeder’s predictions.

5.6.2. Yugoslav Nation-State Crisis and the Segmental Institutions Thesis

As previously explained, Roeder recognizes several incentives for segment-state leaders to escalate the stakes of the conflict and create a nation-state crisis.

The first regards the preservation of political-identity hegemony. According to Roeder, segment-state leaders attempt to establish, expand or protect their political-identity hegemonies and thereby demand a greater share of decision rights. This logic is present in the final Yugoslav nation-state crisis. Milošević’s centralization attempts directly endangered republican autonomies and political-identity hegemonies.

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198 Ibid., 336.
199 Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From, 220.
The second regards nationalistic outbidding externalities. Playing the sovereignty card can “externalize the cost of a nation-state project” and bring more benefits to the segment-state in the long-term.\textsuperscript{200} This evidence regarding the presence of this logic in the Yugoslav nation-state crisis is inconclusive.

The third is about radical activism and abstention of the moderates. As moderate politicians are moved aside, radicals take center stage, forcing even those who are not radical themselves to push for more radical positions.\textsuperscript{201} This logic is evident in the case of Yugoslavia. Communists in all republics either abstained from politics or took more hardline positions because of nationalist opposition within their own republics.

The fourth regards divergent development. As segment-state develop in diverging directions, it becomes increasingly hard to find compromises over policies that would keep the common-state whole.\textsuperscript{202} Much has been said about the gravity of the situation regarding divergence in cultural and political development. The logic of this divergence being a motive for the escalations of stakes is perhaps not clear, but the difference over the position of Ante Marković’s reforms in 1990 clearly shows how compromises were at that point extremely hard to make.\textsuperscript{203}

Finally, the fifth incentive regards outbidding, mimicry and cascading defections. Segment-state leaders seek to outbid one another in demands for their decision-rights.\textsuperscript{204} Evidence for this logic is also inconclusive. It is true that there were cascading defections, such as like when Croatia followed Slovenia. However, it appears to be motivated by very different reasons, such as the preservation of its own position within the federation.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 223.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 224.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 225.
\textsuperscript{203} Jovic, \textit{Yugoslavia}, 355.
\textsuperscript{204} Roeder, \textit{Where Nation-States Come From}, 227.
Regarding the escalation of means, Roeder underscores three favorable conditions for segment-state leaders to be able to escalate the means of the conflict.

The first regards the balance of leverage. The greater the decision rights of the segment-states, the more opportunities for the segment-state leaders to escalate the conflict. As previously argued, Yugoslav republics enjoyed wide autonomy and a fair share of decision rights.

The second regards the presence of segment-states in common-state policy-making. The more segment-state leaders are able to influence the common-state policy making, especially in combination with real or potential vetoes, the larger their possibilities to escalate the means in a nation-state crises. Also, this empowerment of the republics is present in the Yugoslav case. Since they could block the decisions in the Federal Presidency, Yugoslav republics could much easier counter the threat of Slobodan Milošević.

The third regards the strength of political-identity hegemonies. The stronger the political-identity hegemonies in the segment-state, the more likely is it that segment-state leaders will induce a nation-state crisis. As previously established, most Yugoslav segment-states enjoyed strong political-identity hegemonies.

5.6.3. Conclusion

Roeder’s understanding of the causes and favorable factors for the escalation of nation-state crises seems mostly confirmed by the Yugoslav case. Regarding the escalation of stakes, there is evidence of the importance of preservation of political-identity hegemony, radicalization of the political arena and divergent development, while the other two incentives are inconclusive. This is presented in the Table 2.

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205 Ibid., 231.  
206 Ibid., 236.  
207 Ibid., 242.
Table 2 - Incentives for Escalation of Stakes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incentive</th>
<th>Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preservation of Political-Identity Hegemony</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Outbidding Externalities</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Activism and Abstention of the Moderates</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent Development</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outbidding, Mimicry and Cascading Defections</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the favorable factors for the escalation of means by the segment-states, all three were present in the Yugoslav state. This is also in accordance with previous findings on the effects of segmental institutions on the politics between the center and periphery. This is presented in Table 3.

Table 3 - Favorable Condition for the Escalation of Means by Segment-States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Decision Rights</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Segment-States in Common-State Policy-Making</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Political-Identity Hegemony</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking into account the presence of both the incentives for the escalation of stakes and the favorable condition for the escalation of means, the segmental institution thesis appears to have explanatory value in the case of Yugoslavia. However, there is one large difference in Roeder’s explanation of nation-state crises and the chain of events during the final nation-state crisis in Yugoslavia.
The segmental institutions thesis explicitly claims that both the escalation of stakes and the escalation means occur through the bargaining between segment-state and common-state leaders. However, in the Yugoslav example, it was the conflict between the segment-states that led to the break-up of the state, and is very debatable whether it could be even considered to represent “bargaining”. The leadership of one segment-state, Serbia, attempted to control the common-state through establishing control over other segment-states in order to effectively centralize the common-state despite the existence of segmental institutions. Milošević did not control the federal government of Marković and could not even control the Yugoslav army without securing the support of five out of nine members of the Yugoslav presidency. For these reasons, the aforementioned Yugoslav nation-state crisis does not correspond with the explanation given by the segmental institutions thesis.

However, I would like to argue that this does not mean that the segmental institutions thesis is not confirmed on the example of the Yugoslav nation-state crisis. The behavior of the segment-state elites in Yugoslavia corresponds to that which Roeder predicts in the common-state versus segment-state bargaining. The segment-state elites were not willing to allow centralization of the state and the possible loss of their hegemonies, autonomy and prerogatives and were capable of escalating the means of the conflict to prevent this outcome.

This difference is of high importance because of one other reason. As was presented before, many explanations of the Yugoslav break-up focus on the role of Serbian nationalism, Slobodan Milošević and his attempts to be the “new Tito”. According to those interpretations, Yugoslavia was, despite many problems it was faced with, a peaceful state in which the federal structure adequately accommodated all nations and nationalities before Milošević rode the beast of nationalism and destroyed the otherwise successful state.

According to my test of the segmental institutions thesis on the Yugoslav case, however, all the negative effects of the segmental federal structure were already present when Milošević
appeared on the political scene. The segmental institutions theory claims that practically all favorable factors for the dissolution of the state were present in Yugoslavia long before 1987 and that the state probably would not survive the democratization process. We do not know what would happen if there was no Milošević and whether, when and how Yugoslavia would disintegrate in that case. What the segmental institutions thesis claims, however, is that it would most probably happen in any case, and the examples of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia present good arguments for that claim. Milošević may have directly caused the crisis and the break-up of the state, but all the necessary conditions were already there.
6. Conclusion

I argue that Philip Roeder’s segmental institutions thesis is confirmed in the case of Yugoslavia. Just as it predicts, segmental institutions shaped politics at the periphery in ways that enabled the construction of political-identity hegemony and politics between the periphery and the center in ways that created a zero-sum conflict over decision rights between common-state and segment-state-leaders, as well as divergent cultural and economic development between the segment-states. Finally, Yugoslav segment-states, with the exception of Vojvodina, have all become nation-states and all national identities promulgated by the segmental institutions remain salient today. Regarding the nation-crisis that led to the break-up of the state, it does not conform strictly to the propositions of the segmental institution thesis, but it nevertheless follows the same logic and represents a consequence of segmental institutions of the Yugoslav federation.

Even though the segmental institutions thesis was based on the case of Soviet Union, also a highly decentralized socialist federation, its main purpose is not simply to explain how and why such states fail, but also how and why certain nation-state projects succeed, while others do not. Therefore, to finish the process of testing the segmental institutions thesis, I will briefly discuss the creation of national identities in Yugoslavia.

As previously mentioned, all national identities sanctioned by the Yugoslav segmented state managed to endure until the present day. While national identities of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were firmly established long before the second Yugoslavia, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims (today known as Bosniaks) were new nations which were institutionalized for the first time under Tito’s regime. This is not to say that the communists “invented” those nations or created them out of thin air. However, what they did was the institutionalization of these identities as national and therefore separate from other national identities. For example, it was
highly probable for a pre-war Montenegrin to be both a Serb and Montenegrin, not precisely defining what these terms mean, but this was not possible after the establishment of a Montenegrin national identity, since there was only one choice an individual could make. The same could be said about Macedonians which fostered some form of a Bulgarian identity or Muslims which felt that despite being religiously different, they belong to one of the other two Bosnian constitutive nations. It is very hard to say today what kind of national identities would prevail if there were no segmental institutions present or if these institutions promulgated different national identities.

There is one exception, however. Yugoslav national identity, created in the 19th century and fostered by the first Yugoslav state, without any doubt represents the largest “victim” of the communist Yugoslav segmental institutions. Strong among the political elites and the cultural sphere even during the darkest times of inter-ethnic political conflicts of the first Yugoslavia, this national identity was practically brutally repressed by the communist Yugoslav regime. Fearing centralist, unitarist and “Greater-Serbian” tendencies, communist political elites did their best to convince the Yugoslavs that they are members of separate nations and nationalities, with Yugoslavism being based on ideologies of socialism and self-management instead of deep cultural ties and language. How successful that policy was is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the majority of those few who are cherishing the memory of Yugoslavia today do it precisely on the grounds of its socialism, the figure of Tito and the principle of “Brotherhood and unity”. Yugoslav national identity died long before the death of the state itself. The “how” and “why” of this process is very well explained by the segmental institutions thesis.
7. Bibliography


