Imagining the Ukrainian Body: Everyday Nationalism and Body Politics in Contemporary Ukraine

By Dariia Rachok

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Supervisor: Professor Hadley Z. Renkin
Second Reader: Professor Elissa Helms

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Abstract

This thesis examines the place of gendered and sexualized bodies in the discourse of everyday Ukrainian nationalism: what bodies are thought of as im/proper and why. I argue that due to Ukraine's distinctive geographical position at the crossroads between “Western Europe” and Russia, its national identity is being shaped with regard to the gazes of several Others: its post-Soviet past, complex relationship with “the West” and Russia, and its newly built national narrative.

My analysis of the narratives of 22 respondents shows that even though young people do not identify as nationalists, they internalize and reproduce nationalistic ideas when speaking about the issues of health, sport, beauty, and sexuality. I illustrate that in their narratives, my respondents unsuccessfully attempt to reconcile sexist, heteronormative, homophobic and xenophobic utterances with the ideas of inclusiveness and tolerance.

I conclude that the nation is reproduced daily by performing internalized, mechanical and not reflected upon bodily practices. I show that despite different political affiliations of young people, their views on the im/proper body and their bodily practices are nevertheless constructed in relation to the disciplinary agenda of Ukrainian nationalism, which is highly exclusionary.
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# Table of Contents

## Introduction: “Ukrainianness” must be defended? ................................................................. 1
  Research design.......................................................................................................................... 4
  Limitations................................................................................................................................. 7
  Thesis structure.......................................................................................................................... 8

### 1. Mapping the nation/alism ................................................................................................. 10
  1. 1 Nation and nationalism in theory and practice ................................................................. 10
  1.1.1 What is a nation?............................................................................................................... 12
  1.1.2 Everyday nationalism....................................................................................................... 14
  1.2 Gender and sexuality of the nation/alism............................................................................ 19

### 2. “Eastern Europe” between “the West” and “national traditions” ................................. 29
  2.1 Nationalism in “Eastern Europe”: returned of the repressed? ........................................ 30
  2.2. From zadruga-state to nation as a family ........................................................................... 33
  2.3 Ukrainian national narrative and collective memory: away from the USSR – back to
      Europe? ................................................................................................................................. 40

### 3. Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism from the Far-Right Perspective: Defending
    Proper Bodies ......................................................................................................................... 47
  3.1 Metamorphoses of Svoboda .............................................................................................. 47
  3.2. Negotiating national identity ............................................................................................ 48
  3.2.1 Selectively “European” values ......................................................................................... 49
  3.2.2 Invented Traditions ........................................................................................................ 50
  3.2.3 Gendering “national traditions” ....................................................................................... 52
  3.3 Healthy body – healthy mind: im/proper bodies and internal enemies............................. 54
  3.3.1 Christian values ............................................................................................................... 54
  3.3.2 Health: mens sana in corpore sano ............................................................................... 56
3.3.3 Immigration: visible minorities as a menace ................................................................. 59
3.3.4 (Inventing) Traditional values....................................................................................... 60

4. Guarding gender binaries, policing sexualities for the sake of the nation.......................64
  4.1 “It seems that before we had men and women, separately, and now we have a kind of
     middle gender...” (Alina).................................................................................................. 66
  4.2 “It is really difficult for me to imagine a healthy family that consists of people with non-
     traditional sexual orientation” (Vitaliy)........................................................................... 76

5. Defining the im/proper ....................................................................................................... 85
  5.1. Sport, beauty, nationalism .............................................................................................. 85
  5.2 Bad habits and health (of the nation).............................................................................. 93
  5.3 Dirty bodies — crazy minds............................................................................................ 96

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 103
Appendix I ........................................................................................................................... 106
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 109
Introduction: “Ukrainianness” must be defended?

In December 2013, when commenting on the negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on the topic of the Association Agreement in one of the major political TV shows, one Ukrainian deputy said that signing it will result into “a bunch of European homosexuals putting Ukraine into a doggy-style position”\(^1\). Interestingly, this deputy was not even representing far right party but the Communist Party of Ukraine. Thus, his remark might be seen as a particular sign of homophobic and nationalist consensus existing in Ukrainian society. In this thesis I argue that despite young people do not see themselves as Ukrainian nationalist, they still reproduce certain nationalistic assumptions about what it means to be a proper Ukrainian.

I address the idea of Ukrainianness by inquiring about people's ideas on bodies. Elaborating on Michael Billig’s idea of banal nationalism (1995), I explore what kind of the body is constructed in the discourse of Ukrainian banal nationalism. I argue that the discourse of nationalism in hegemonic in Ukraine; hegemonic in the sense that it is a kind of common sense that is reproduced on the levels of ideas, institutions and social relations (Gramsci 1957). I claim that national belonging is embodied and that it is first and foremost one's physical body that matters. I show how certain assumptions about the body shape and appearance that are inspired by Ukrainian nationalism are internalized and unconsciously reproduced by young people, shaping their everyday bodily practices. As well as their overall views on what is the im/proper body and why. Thus, I demonstrate that national belonging implies disciplining and policing of one’s body and the bodies of other people.

\(^1\)http://3s.tv/programs/shuster-live-08112013/ (accessed 15.12.2013)
Though until recently Ukraine was seen as an exceptional and paradoxical case of the post state socialist space because there were no powerful nationalistic forces and visible far right actors (Shekhovtsov 2011, Umland and Shekhovtsov 2010), since the second half of 2000s the popularity of nationalistic ideas in Ukraine has been increasing and now nationalistic discourse is hegemonic. The Euromaidan protests that unfolded in November 2013 revealed the ubiquity of nationalism. The protests were triggered by the refusal of the President to pursue the process of signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Initially, the protests were marked by people's desire to prove that Ukraine belongs to “Europe” and Ukrainians are “European”. Overall, the mood of the protests could be described as breaking away from the state socialist past and alliances with Russia by asserting Ukraine's belonging to “European” community. However, the mood of breaking away from the USSR and Russia, as well as the perceived dichotomy “Europe” vs. Russia, contributed to the strengthening of nationalist ideas and moods.

Having much in common with nationalisms of other post state socialist countries, Ukrainian nationalism is yet somehow different. Like other post state socialist countries, Ukraine oscillates between contradictory cultural identities: firstly, it claims belonging to “the West”; secondly, it emphasizes its uniqueness by appealing to its national traditions and heroic history (that are still in the process of construction); thirdly, it tries to distance itself from the state socialist past. However, as recent protests have shown, there is fourth dimension of Ukrainian cultural identity. Not surprisingly, it is connected with Ukraine's state socialist past and present day efforts of asserting its “Europeanness” - Ukraine negotiates its identity with the reference to Russia, positioning it as another Other to fear and escape from. Consequently, Ukrainian national
identity frequently implies a dose of cultural “anti-Russianism”, anti-state socialism and selective “Europeanness”. As I demonstrate in chapter 4 and 5, these tensions sometimes result into peculiar utterances pronounced by my respondents: utterances that aim to reconcile xenophobia/heterosexism/homophobia with the rhetoric of tolerance and inclusiveness.

In this work I contextualize Ukraine within the space of “Eastern Europe” - an imagined space that began to crystallize somewhere around 17th century (Wolff 1994). Larry Wolff notes that the “iron curtain” of the 20th century descended exactly where the Enlightenment mapped the boundary between “Western” and “Eastern Europe” (1994). The process of nation-state-building also owes much to the legacy of Enlightenment. “Western Europe” was the first to experience nation-state-building and to map itself out, it created “Eastern Europe” – this uncivilized consequence of the “Western” gaze, located somewhere in between Europe and Asia (Wolff 1994). Building on the body of texts on ambiguities of “East European” belonging (Graff 2006; Helms 2008; Kulpa 2010; Partridge 2012; Renkin 2007; Renkin 2009; Verdery 1999), I explore how Ukrainian national belonging is gendered and sexualized in relation to “the West” and its state socialist past.

However, imagining is real in its consequences. In the 21 century the conceptual divide between “Eastern” and “Western Europe” preserves some of its topicality. To contextualize my analysis on the space of “Eastern Europe” without naturalizing this geographical region, I will use the concept of “Eastern Europe” but put it in inverted commas. Given that certain features (e.g. its heterosexism, homophobia, alliance with religion and distancing from the state socialist past) of Ukrainian nationalism are common for its “East European” counterparts as described by Graff (2009), Rivkin-Fish (2006), Verdery (1996; 1999) and others, I refer to Ukraine as a part of
“Eastern Europe”. However, the whole picture of Ukrainian national belonging is more complex. In this thesis I show how it is embodied, gendered and sexualized. I illustrate that the proper Ukrainian body constitutes a kind of patchwork, shaped by several others.

**Research design**

Billig claims that language “is a prime determinant of nationalist identity” (1995:29), so the study of a national identity “should begin with the search for the common-sense assumptions and ways of talking about nationhood” (1995:61). As references to nationhood are always contextual (Skey 2011), one should begin analyzing national identity from looking at the everyday discourse – to understand how it is reproduced and evoked through references to certain symbols, rituals, practices, objects, etc. Clearly, national identity is also reproduced through everyday bodily practices.

Being interested in the everyday nationalism and its influence on the ideas about bodies, in April and June-July 2013 I conducted open-ended semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 22 respondents. My respondents were university students, doing their Bachelors and Masters in two most prestigious universities in Kyiv: Taras Shevchenko National University and National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”. Admission to a prestigious university is a means for some people to advance their class and status position. As the majority of students either already belong to middle-class or aspire to be included in it, I consider this social group to be important to investigate as it is usually middle-class that is associated with nationalist claims to respectability (Mosse 1988:9). Moreover, young people are very important for nationalism as
they are often seen as the key group that has to be disciplined and inculcated in proper values. Many nationalist movements thus attempted to organize and control youth movements. Given that the schools my respondents study in are considered to be among most prestigious in Ukraine, they are frequently referred to as ‘the future of the nation’ or ‘the elite of the nation’ and face quite intense disciplining of bodies.

An important part of my research methods was participant observation, which allowed me to observe students’ routine: their everyday conversations and rituals. Spending time in student restaurants and university courtyards, I had a chance to observe how students spend their breaks, understand what they talk about and engage into informal conversations with them. It also allowed me to study students' appearance. As my topic of interest is the body and bodily practices, students' everyday appearance was of much interest to me. Thus, my data for the analysis is taken from my field notes and interviews.

I reached 22 respondents: doing 15 individual interviews and 2 mini focus groups. Mostly the interviews were conducted in the cafe or in the park near to the respondent’s university. The interviews were conducted in both Ukrainian and Russian – depending on the respondent's preference. Taking into consideration my affiliation with the Gender Studies department and the ambiguity of perception of gender studies in Ukraine, I was not disclosing my departmental affiliation in order to minimize respondent's expectations of what I want to hear from them. Disclosing my affiliation might have resulted into my respondents self-censoring their answers. The questions I asked were quite broad, so the respondents were able to develop their narratives the way they wanted to.

In order to target respondents, I sent call for the participation to students' group e-mails
and some people e-mailed me back, saying that they were interested and wanted to be my respondents. To invite more people to participate in the research, I was also sending invitations to the interviews via social networks (Facebook and Vkontakte) to people from the universities I was interested in. Though mainly people were ignoring the invitations, some still replied and told that they were interested. Targeting people through social networks proved to be more effective than through group e-mails, as before consenting for the interviews people had the ability to scroll my profile and get some information about me.

Among my respondents there were 11 males and 11 females from different parts of the country: 10 of them claimed Kyiv to be their home city, 4 people were from “Western” Ukraine (Rivne, Lutsk, Uzhgorod and Ivano-Frankivsk regions), 7 – from “Central” Ukraine (Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia and Zaporizhzhia regions) and one person from the Crimean peninsula (Simferopol). All respondents identified themselves as coming from financially well-off families (more or less middle-class). 11 people identified themselves as believers (Orthodox or Catholic versions of Christianity), 5 as agnostics, 4 as non-believers, 1 claimed to believe in “Supernatural” without identifying with any Church, and 1 identified as neopagan Asatru (version of Germanic neopaganism). Speaking of political identification, nobody identified as nationalist: 10 people claimed to be apolitical, 7 – to be liberals, 1 person identified as neoliberal, 1 as social democrat, 1 as socialist, 1 as leftist and 1 wrote in the questionnaire that his political affiliation is “no freedom to enemies”. Unfortunately, he did not leave any additional comments that could possibly help to identify his political position more precisely. The respondents were aged from 19 to 24 years old. Given the fact of the same age group, it was quite easy for me to establish friendly atmosphere during the interviews, as I was
not perceived as other.

Marjorie DeVault in the description of her experience of interviewing women about housework emphasized that the “difficulties of expression” (e.g. when a respondent cannot find appropriate words) can signal “the realm of not-quite-articulated experience, where standard vocabulary is inadequate” (1999:69). Thus, I also paid attention to the “difficulties of expression”, structure of the narrative, references that were made, and terminology that was used by respondents. When analyzing the interviews, I paid particular attention both to content and form of the speech. With the help of Norman Fairclough’s method of critical discourse analysis (2003) I paid particular attention to the assumptions my respondents made about certain phenomena and to the justifications of these assumptions.

Limitations

Unfortunately, among my respondents there were no people from the “Eastern” region of Ukraine, which is often thought as being more pro-Russian. Still, given the fact of similarities between Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms on the questions of bodies and sexualities (that I explore more in Chapter 2), it is possible to hypothesize that their narratives would not be of too much difference but their sources might be. Like other post state socialism nationalisms, Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms are marked with distancing from state socialism and building new national narratives (Verdery 1996). Both nationalisms had also made alliances with religion, so their discourses are pretty much permeated with references to Christianity. Thus, though there might have been different sources and different accents, the overall picture would
Thesis structure

My thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the importance of everyday nationalism and lays out the gender and sexuality aspects of it. In chapter 2 I move to the space of “Eastern Europe” and discuss the peculiarities of post state socialist nationalisms and their body politics, showing how Ukrainian memory politics and identity negotiations fit in the mentioned above theories. I continue to explore Ukrainian national narrative in chapter 3, where I primarily focus on the most visible political actor that openly self-identifies as nationalist – All Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (further referred to as Svoboda), who for a while mainly monopolized nationalistic discourse in the country. I chose Svoboda's version of nationalism not only because they are most visible and easily to reach ones, but also because Svoboda presents the most “purified” discourse of the nation and national belonging, so it is relatively easy to demonstrate national (and sexual) anxieties and Others, in contrast to whom national identity is being built. It is also insightful to see the shared assumptions between the far right version of nationalism² and the everyday nationalism of my respondents.

Chapters 4 and 5 are based on my ethnographic data and are dedicated to the discussion of students’ narratives – I show how the assumptions reproduced by students fit into

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² I classify Svoboda as far right following Sarah Harrison and Michael Bruter's “conceptual map of the extreme right ideological world, based on two dimensions: (1) a negative identity dimension that can take two predominant forms of expression, which we respectively define as xenophobic and populist, and (2) an authoritarian dimension, of which the two founding modes are respectively reactionary and repressive.”(2011:195).
the nationalistic discourse exemplified by Svoboda. Thus, I show how the ubiquity of nationalist discourse affects my respondents' perception of bodies. I argue that though my respondents do not openly identify as nationalists but have different political affiliations, their ideas about what constitutes the proper body and whose body can be granted national belonging are heavily affected by the discourse of nationalism. This way I show that it is indeed one's body, one's physical appearance that is the condition of exclusion and inclusion. Given that the demands for the proper body type are very strict, I show that Ukrainian national community stays quite exclusive – despite its claims to openness.
1. Mapping the nation/alism

Nationalism is often thought about as a set of ideas about solidarity, loyalty, morality, respectability, and will. Still, in such a view on it what is left out is the fact that nationalism is also a set of ideas about im/proper behavior as a ground for inclusion to or exclusion from the community. Assigning “everyone his place in life, man and woman, normal and abnormal, native and foreigner” (Mosse 1988:16) and rooting its premises in the realm of nature, nationalism is “a discursive formation that gives shape to the modern world” (Calhoun 2007:27). These premises are often related to the issues of gender, sexuality and the body.

In this chapter I lay out the theories of nation and nationalism, locating main debates about their origins, significance and the reasons nationalism is so widespread. Building upon the existing literature, I discuss the exclusionary character of nationalism, the roles of gender and sexuality in projects of nationalism, showing that it is a project with highly disciplinary agenda. In order to discuss at length the specificities of Ukrainian nationalism and its body politics (chapters 3-5), in this chapter I map out key points in nationalism's intersections with gendered and sexualized bodies.

1.1 Nation and nationalism in theory and practice

There is hardly any exhaustive definition either of nation or of nationalism, or all-encompassing theory. Widely conceived, nationalism is an ideology and a social movement (inspired by Enlightenment and enabled by the emergence of industrial society) claiming that
state borders should coincide with ethnic borders (Gellner 1983). According to different interpretations, a nation might be broadly defined as a social group of shared cultural background (Gellner 1983) that possesses its own laws of collective behavior (Smith 1991) and group consciousness (Gellner 1983). Still, even these broad definitions could raise objections and questions.

Despite the lack of consensus among scholars, it is possible to find similar patterns, premises and conclusions in their views. For instance, they agree to regard a nation as a phenomenon engendered by modernity (Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1992, Kasianov 1999) and a consequence of nationalism (Gellner 1983). Similarly, they agree on the main factors that contributed to the emergence and growth of nationalism: industrialization (Gellner 1983, Smith 1991), extensive growth of the bureaucratic apparatus (Hobsbawm 1992, Bourdieu 1994), standardization of a state language and educational system (Kedourie 1960, Gellner 1983, Smith 1991, Hobsbawm 1992, Bourdieu 1994) and book-printing (Anderson 1983). I root my perspective on nationalism in this social constructivist and modernist approach that objects to primordialism by arguing that nation is not primordial and perennial but modern phenomenon, and that national community is not a natural or God-given entity but an outcome of particular social processes (e.g. industrialization and state-building). I start from outlining some theoretical interpretations of the emergence of nationalism and further link them to the theories of reproduction of nationalism, moving from the macro to the micro level.
1.1.1 What is a nation?

Karl Deutsch humorously defined a nation as a group of people united by common mistake about their past and common hate toward their neighbors (Deutsch in Kasianov 1999). This ironic definition skilfully captures the exclusionary and boundary-drawn character of nationalism by pointing to the question of borders – as the existence of one's neighbors presupposes territorial divides. The question of borders – be it administrative borders (of the state), linguistic and other symbolic borders – is crucial for the scholars of nation/alism.

One of the key debates on nation/alism is the issue of the state. Though today we are accustomed to think in terms of nation-states, there is a question of stateless nations and a debate whether state is the sine qua non of a nation. There are also debates whether nationalisms of nation-states and stateless nations could be described in the same terms or whether these are different kinds of nationalisms, and therefore it is necessary to come up with distinct terminology for these phenomena (Zaytsev 2013). However, there seems to be consensus that the process of state-building greatly contributed to the process of imagining the nation and subsequently facilitated and enabled the emergence of nationalist movements (Anderson 1983, Bourdieu 1994, Hobsbawm 1992, Gellner 1983). For instance, Pierre Bourdieu argues that it was precisely the emergence and stabilization of the state that enabled the idea of the nation to emerge.

Emphasizing the importance of taxation for the creation of a unitary territory (that later would be perceived as a national territory) and for the consciousness that developed from tax obligation, Bourdieu argues that the fact that this practice was imposed on nearly everybody was unifying (1994:4). Along with taxation, the education system was unified as well: “the creation of national society goes hand in hand with universal educability: the fact that all individuals are
equal before the law gives the state the duty of turning them into citizens, endowed with the cultural means actively to exercise their civic rights.” (1994:8). Unification and centralization of the state and monopolization of education led further to homogenization of cultural matters. That in turn led to the establishment of a certain mode of thinking and classification (produced by the state), which were later successfully internalized and further reproduced, though already under the name of national identity. By

“universally imposing and inculcating (within the limits of its authority) a dominant culture thus constituted as legitimate national culture, the school system, through the teaching of history (and especially the history of literature), inculcates the foundations of a true "civic religion" and more precisely, the fundamental presuppositions of the national self-image.” (1994:7-8)

Hence, the reproduction of nationalism depends much on the state. However, nationalism is also reproduced daily: in the routine interactions that are mechanical and not reflected upon. This way, nationalism is also a principle that “organizes people's sense of belonging in the world and to particular states.” (Calhoun 2007:27)

It was thus the modern state with its internal integration, border-police, customs and tax systems that required a hitherto unseen level of cultural and linguistic homogeneity along with the standardized and unified system of domestic administration (Calhoun 1997:68). Briefly, “the technical requirements of the modern administrative state once again helped to foster the emergence of nationalism.” (Hobsbawm 1992:100) However, in order to create cultural and linguistic homogeneity it was necessary to re-shape already existing cultures and to perform some work on already existing languages.
1.1.2 Everyday nationalism

Answering the question why linguistic homogeneity was so important for state-building, Anderson argues that growing bureaucratic apparatus of the state demanded that there exist unitary and standardized process of documentation, that cadres need to communicate with each other, and that there is a need to educate new cadres, so therefore to reach different social groups the language had to be standardized and the education system had to become more open (1983). Consequently, argues Anderson, the language of the elite or state administration slowly becomes “an important element of proto-national cohesion” as the primary intercommunicating community becomes “a model for a larger intercommunicating community” (1983:59-62). With the help of print technology it was relatively easy to give the language fixity, to standardize it and to impose it upon all literates. And shared and standardized language gave “the means of imagining – and therefore creating – the nation.” (Anderson 1983:66).

The question of (national) language is interconnected with that of (national) culture. Scholars broadly agree that national culture developed on the basis of some ethnic core, ethnic origin and already existing beliefs and rituals that further were re-signified and reshaped. However, there are different views to what extent ethnic component is decisive in the formation of national culture. Smith (1991) argues against seeing ethnic identity as either primordial or simply instrumental and situational; he sees ethnic identity as a durable and stable though historical arrangement that may survive despite various changes. Anderson (1983) claims that national community is an imagined community – but stresses that “in fact, all communities larger
than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.” (1983:6) He warns that it would be erroneous to see national community merely as a fabrication and falsity. Likewise, Calhoun argues that though national culture is built upon invented traditions, but it is not tradition per se that matters but rather “the process by which tradition constitutes certain beliefs and understandings as unquestioned, immediate knowledge, as the basis for disputing or questioning other claims” (2007:61). He stresses the importance of reproduction of traditions in the form of “habitus” or orientation to social action” (2007:62). Seeing national culture as habitus enables us to move from official nationalism to the level of everyday, banal nationalism and to see what mechanisms enable national culture to be successfully inculcated and reproduced.

It would be thus a mistake to associate nationalism only with its extreme appearances and to forget that it is also a great source of social solidarity (Calhoun 2007), formative to collective identities, as well as to one's sense of self. It is necessary to note that national identities and the feeling of solidarity generated by national sentiments are mostly produced in the everyday settings – they are the outcomes of routine, daily repetitions of practices that further turn into habits. This type of routine is what Billig terms “banal nationalism”. He emphasizes that people reproduce their nations every day – in the form of certain practices, assumptions, sets of beliefs, representations, etc. – so called “ideological habits” (Billig 1995:6) – that they are accustomed to and socialized into. With the help of this toolkit people “reproduce established nations as nations” (Billig 1995:6). Moreover, Billig points out that in the modern world “society” is frequently associated with the population of a nation-state, hence socialization for the great part
means learning national habits. Certainly, it is the state that plays the grand role here as it is “the primary institutional apparatus for legitimizing national discourse, through systems of education, law, finance, territorial control and so on.” (Billig, 1995: 63). But, Michael Skey steps in, nationalism – a set of ideas related to culture, territory, way of living, etc. – is always contextual (2011:20); thus, instead of theorizing nations “as 'things' that exist in the world” it is necessary to understand “the ways in which manifold practices, symbols, texts, objects and utterances form part of a wider social discourse that (re)produces the world as a world of nations” (2011:10).

Without doubt, everyday reminders of one's national belonging are not perceived consciously. For instance, everyday use of national currencies (when each coin and banknote bear national symbols) becomes so routinized that passes unnoticed in daily financial encounters. Similarly, the mere sight of the national flag is not noticed in daily routines. Though a flag bears great symbolic role of representation of the nation, its use on a daily bases may not be conscious. Skey points out that people's everyday conversation has its solid ground in references to internal and external ‘others’ as well as in the constant use of deixis³ (Skey 2011:62). These discursive forms allow people to express bonding and group solidarity. However, if these everyday practices and use of certain symbols are not perceived consciously and not reflected upon, but are mechanical and internalized, this does not mean that they are unimportant. Billig argues that precisely because the habits and practices are internalized and routinized, the significance of the nation and national belonging enhances - as it becomes a part and parcel of the everyday life. Nationalism is thus reproduced in the form of “habitus” (2007:62).

³ Deixis is a word or a number of words that can't be understood without additional context, because their denotational meaning depends on the context (e.g. words like “us”, “there”, “here”, “them” etc.)
Because of nationalism's ability to anchor in the everyday life with the help of symbols and ceremonies and the ability to nurture with their help its sacred object – the nation – nationalism has been frequently compared to political religion. Firstly, like religion, nationalism sanctifies certain object (the nation), and proclaims it to be the ultimate source of collective behavior and ethics (Gentile in Zaytsev 2013). Another similarity between nationalism and religion is their attitude toward different ceremonies. Émile Durkheim noted that different symbols and ceremonies have the ability to bear collective emotions; that with the help of ceremonies, customs, and symbols each member of the society participates in the life of the whole society (Durkheim in Gellner 1983). From Gellner's point of view, national symbols and rituals are the most transparent and clear cut examples of this, as nationalism aims to erase all mediators between the deity and the person, positioning the nation itself as the deity (Gellner 1983).

An example of ritualization is provided by Katherine Verdery in her discussion of Ceausescu's Romania. She shows how different rituals were mobilized to set up a new “temporal punctuations that would alter the sense of personal identity” (Verdery 1996:54). In order to tie one's sense of self and one's temporality to the nation-state, new rituals (that marked the beginning and the end of certain periods) were established to replace the old one. One's “annual cycle was to be punctuated not by religious festivals but by secular ones—for example, New Year's, May Day, Women’s Day—and, increasingly, by national ones—Romanian independence day, the four hundredth anniversary of the enthronement of this or that prince, the birthday of this or that Romanian hero” (Verdery 1996:54). These means sought to seize the time and reorganize it. Consequently, people's sense of self was altered as “social senses of self are
intricately bound up with temporal investments in certain kinds of activity, incursions upon these activities have consequences for how the self is conceived and experienced” (Verdery 1996:41).

Certainly, these rituals and ceremonies are invented traditions. Invented – in the sense that they had not existed until the nation was created, and traditions in the sense that they are presented as something ancient. Hobsbawm and Ranger define invented tradition as

“a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past”. (1992:1).

Still, the fact that it is invented does not make it less important or meaningful. Tradition, because of its reference to the past and insistence on reiteration, has important ritual and symbolic functions, it organizes the life cycle and gives all members of the collectivity a sense of identity, providing them with a feeling of solidarity. For instance, Olympic Games and other sport competitions were born in the era of nation-state-building: teams or individuals came to represent nations and bond all members of the nation-state together in a fervent support of the national symbol.

Alternatively, invented tradition may serve a certain group as a means of separation from others. By insisting on their admiration of sport, as well as on the particular life style founded on “respectability”, middle classes managed to separate themselves from the lower classes. Hobsbawm and Ranger hypothesize that this separation was established via references to different national symbols (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Mosse 1988). Sport competitions
provide us with a very easily understandable example of everyday nationalism, as well as with
the example of a medium for instillation of national sentiments:

“what has made sport so uniquely effective a medium for inculcating national
feelings, at all events for males, is the ease with which even the least political or
public individuals can identify with the nation as symbolized by young persons
excelling at what practically every man wants, or at one time in life has wanted, to
be good at. The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of
eleven named people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a
symbol of his nation himself.” (Hobsbawm 1992:143).

Clearly, inculcating national feelings through sport means also educating and inculcating certain
ideas about body, health and beauty that I proceed to analyze in the next subchapter. To sum up,
by establishing under the guise of traditions new ceremonies and practices and by their
reiteration, nationalism manages to evoke the sense of collective belonging and to root in
people's everyday settings and also in their language (Billig 1995; Skey 2011).

1.2 Gender and sexuality of the nation/alism

Unfortunately, theorizations of nationalism has been mainly gender-blind (McClintock
1993). Still, starting from George Mosse's classical work (1985), quite a number of efforts to fill
this gap have been made. It is now a commonplace that in the national imagery men and women
are ascribed different but specific roles (Mayer 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997), that nationalism is
linked to sexuality, as it regulates sexualities and bodies with the mechanisms that aim to
distinguish between proper and improper types with a subsequent exclusion of the former
(Partridge 2012; Peterson 1990; Sekuler 2013). With the help of its regulative and disciplining mechanisms nationalism produces left-over bodies: bodies that are denied belonging on the basis of their lack of normalcy. It claims to be a “reassertion of “the natural” in terms of both its racial and gender articulations” (Partridge 2012:41) and on behalf of “the natural” prescribes appropriate practices and identifies proper bodies – making sure that one is performing gender/ethnicity/sexuality – appropriately.

Nationalism emerges around the same time as the separate sphere of sexuality does, along with the development of capitalism and Enlightenment, argues Robert Kulpa (2010:44). Since that time, claims Michel Foucault, there emerges a phenomenon of “policing of sex: that is, not the rigor of a taboo, but the necessity of regulating sex through useful and public discourses” (Foucault 1975:25). Henry Abelove argues that given the “dramatic rise in virtually all indices of production” (2007:220) of that time, heterosexual intercourse – seen as “productive” sexual behavior – became central discursive category of sexuality. All other types of sexual encounter were redefined as unproductive (Abelove 2007:220). Redefinition of sexual behavior was followed with the making of the culture of danger: “there are the campaigns around disease and hygiene; and then think too of what took place with regard to sexuality and the fear of degeneration: degeneration of the individual, the family, the race, and the human species. ” (Foucault 2008:66). Thus, the mechanisms of control, regulation and coercion have been employed. The regulation of bodies and sexualities (that are central to the notions of “hygiene” and “degeneration”) was performed by constructing abnormal sexual categories of hysterical woman, homosexual, masturbating child, and savage, Ann Stoler adds (1995). These were
frightening anti-examples in contrast to which good citizens were required to self-police their sexualities and bodies (Foucault 1975; Stoler 1995).

Similarly, Gayle Rubin (1984) claimed that in order “to draw and maintain an imaginary line between good and bad sex” (1984:282) societies produce sexual hierarchies. According to the hierarchy of Western middle-class society “promiscuity, homosexuality, sadomasochism, fetishism, transsexuality, and cross-generational encounters” are considered unacceptable and threatening (1984:283), so such sexual behavior is assumed to be a menace to “health and safety, women and children, national security, the family, or civilization itself” (1984:97). Consequently, in this sexual imagery all but reproductive heterosexual encounters are tabooed. Not surprisingly, the sexual hierarchy of Western middle-class society was an outcome of nationalism/morality alliance that offered its notion of respectability that was founded upon the idea of self-mastering, self-disciplining and self-restriction; on the idea of necessity of control over one's passions. The order of things proposed by nationalism is thus gendered and sexualized: “national identity has been an eroticized identity, and one that carried prohibitions of deviant sexualities as sharply as of deviant ethnicities. Nationalism has also been a distinctly gender-biased ideology in many settings, valuing the family as the source of the nation's continuity in time, nationalist ideologues have seen men as future martyrs, women as mothers.” (Calhoun 2007:71).

But nationalism has also been frequently constructed as not only heterosexual project, but also as a male project, as a brotherhood, “horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 2006) and/or patrilineage (Verdery 1996). Consequently, national imagery is always gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity specific. Indeed, one of the ways to limit the access to national membership is through the categories of gender and sexuality: “nationalism becomes the language through
which sexual control and repression (specifically, but not exclusively, of women and homosexuals) is justified, and masculine power is expressed and exercised.” (Mayer 2000).

For instance, nation is usually feminized because women's bodies are seen as symbolic borders of the national territory, violating women's bodies is thus violating the nation. However, women's role in the nation is not limited to symbolic representation. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias describe five ways in which women are related to the project of nationalism: as biological reproducers of the nation; as reproducers of the national boundaries; as active transmitters and producers of national culture; as symbolic signifiers of national difference; as active participants in national struggles (Yuval-Davis and Anthias in McClintock 1993:62-63).

Because of women's reproductive capacities, nationalism establishes a link between women and children. Survival and reproduction of national culture is secured through reproduction of population. Hence, women are seen as the reproducers of national culture and boundaries. Because of the importance of women's bodies for nationalistic imagery, nationalism is often preoccupied with the control of women's sexuality and reproduction. Yuval-Davis isolates three discourses that concern reproduction, population and its control: pronatalist discourse of “people as power”, eugenicist discourse (that is concerned less with the size of the nation but emphasizes nation's quality), and “Malthusian discourse” (1997:29). Despite general gendered and sexualized patterns of functioning, it is also important to take into account local peculiarities: i.e. though control over female body and reproduction is a general pattern of nationalism, in certain localities women are encouraged to reproduce, whereas in others they might be urged to limit their reproduction (see Dwyer 2000, Greenhalgh 1994).
Clearly, nationalism targets men too by promoting the “right” type of masculinity and policing it. Hegemonic masculinity goes hand in hand with hegemonic nationalism – “the modern form of Western masculinity emerged at about the same time and place as modern nationalism” (Nagel 1998). Masculinity is the heart of every nationalism, as nationalism “adopted the masculine stereotype as one means of its self-representation” (Mosse 1996:7) – so masculinity is constitutive to nationalist discourse as it exemplifies the set of behavior practices that are exemplified as being of the ultimate value.

Usually, positive values of masculinity are articulated in a binary way – in relation and contrast to femininity. For instance, in Meiji Japan two competing types of masculinity were perceived in gender-binary way: the “feminized” masculinity was thought of as linked to the West, being foreign and therefore being imitative and degenerate, whereas the “masculinized” one was regarded as the one that expresses “the spiritual domain of an essential national culture” (Karling 2002:77). Hegemonic masculinity is often linked to the military. This is done through a rhetorical move, claiming that it is the duty of every man to defend his country and to die for it, if necessary. Tamar Mayer shows how in Israel the image of the “New Jew” was intrinsically linked to military – men treated serving in the military as the only one true consecratory rite in their transition into manhood (2000). The military, homosocial institution par excellence, serves the purpose of male-bonding and establishing male (national) solidarity, as well as the purpose of reproduction of gendered meanings and codes of behavior upon which national culture is pillared (Massad 1995).

Sustaining proper masculinity/femininity division is the sine qua non of many nationalist projects. Consequently, one of the improper types of conduct implicated in the national
imaginary is the violation of the taboo on homosexuality. Nationalisms are excessively preoccupied with biological and symbolic reproduction because of the heterosexist assumption that they are based on.

“Heterosexism presupposes a binary coding of polarized and hierarchical male/masculine and female/feminine identities (ostensibly based on a dichotomy of bio-physical features) and denies all but heterosexual coupling as the basis of sexual intimacy, family life, and group reproduction. And heterosexism is key to nationalism because today’s state-centric nationalisms (the focus in this article) engage not only in sexist practices that are now well documented by feminists, but also take for granted heterosexist sex/gender identities and forms of group reproduction that underpin sexism” (Peterson 1999:39).

However, one has to be careful when speaking of nationalism's heterosexism, because, argues Todd Sekuler, nationalism is able to incorporate on its own terms gays, lesbians, transgenders – when it needs to create a new picture of itself. Certainly, this incorporation comes at the expense of exclusion of others – Sekuler's study of contemporary France suggests that sometimes it is more useful to talk about homonationalism to explain how national sexual imagery was reshaped by taking the “Western” body and sexuality as the norm in order to exclude immigrants and refugees from Arab countries on the grounds of possessing an Other type of sexuality. The headscarf was mobilized here as a particular indicator of the absence of Westernness and proper sexuality – as in order to be recognized as a proper body type, certain areas of one's body should be opened to the public but not covered with the headscarf (Sekuler 2013). It is important to note here that people at whose cost the discourse of the nation in France has been renewed and reinvented are visible minorities: it is far easier to construct the ‘us/them’ divide along the visible features, so skin color and headscarf are mobilized as the markers of difference. Likewise, Jasbir Puar shows how in the case of the USA national sexual identity has been redrawn with a new
reference to race (as first and foremost to the visibly other body of Muslim) – through “the perpetual fissuring of race from sexuality – the race of the (presumptively sexually repressed, perverse or both) terrorist and the sexuality of the national (presumptively white, gender normative) queer: the two dare not converge” (Puar 2005:126).

As nationalism is occupied with the control of bodies, it also matters what race and class the body belongs to. For instance, Andrea Smith (2002) in the piece on the USA body politics towards Native American women shows that not every woman is considered by the state to be of a proper type, that some social groups are viewed as 'dirty' and therefore threatening the health of the nation, so such groups are encouraged not to procreate. She provides an example of Native American women in the USA who underwent forced sterilizations. Smith explains that the state was driven by the interest to appropriate the lands belonged to native American people, so it did not disdain to publicly equate Native people with pollution of the nation and to use this rhetoric to justify mass sterilization campaigns against Native women (2002). Similarly, Partridge notes that the questions of belonging (and in particular, of national belonging) are simultaneously about one's culture inasmuch as about one's physical appearance, i.e. one's body. Partridge provides readers with the examples from Germany: of both state-sponsored racism and everyday exclusion black people routinely encounter (2012).

Though nationalism usually resists women's movements (Calhoun 2007:71), as well as other movements of the oppressed, it can sometimes cooperate with movements of such kind and to reconcile, for instance, claims for women's rights and gender and/or sexual equality with nationalism. However, this reconciliation is only temporary: as soon as the “common enemy” is dealt with, nationalism tends to pressure its former allies and to eradicate them. The stories of
such unhappily coupling of nationalism and women's movement in the case of Eritrean People's Liberation Front and Afrikaner nationalism are documented by Victoria Bernal (2001) and Anne McClintock (1993) respectively. Moreover, nationalism tends to reconstruct retrospectively gendered histories of “the nation”. These histories are usually rather biased and are characterized by high selectiveness of elements of the story and by peculiar interpretation of the re-invented stories. However, national myths have their function: they bond people together, legitimize nation's existence and uniqueness, and either celebrate nation's victory in the struggle against others or call for such kind of struggle (for instance, in case of stateless nations).

Last but not least, nationalism is quite often connected with the notion of health. Firstly, it is necessarily to mention that health, like sexuality, is not a neutral concept (Klein 2010, Adams 2010), but a political category. Though it is usually assumed that health means something definitely good, the details of what kind of good it is are usually lost (Klein 2010). Health may quite easily become a kind of floating signifier that may be mobilized to stand for morality. This way certain practices that are labeled as healthy are also regarded as moral; moreover, this notion of health as morality tends to be naturalized and further internalized by people. In nationalism's imaginary 'health' is frequently equated with 'beauty' – this link is made possible through the reference to the categories of nature and normalcy. Mosse notes that in the case of German nationalism “only the healthy and the normal could be beautiful; they alone could live in harmony with nature” (1988:139). Such kinds of arguments are frequently used by nationalisms to legitimize outlawing or persecution of nonprocreative sex, assuming that it is a menace to health (of the nation) (Rubin 1984). Jonathan Metzl argues that labeling certain daily practices healthy is a moral judgment.
“Health is a desired state, but it is also a prescribed state and an ideological position. We realize this dichotomy every time we see someone smoking a cigarette and reflexively say, “smoking is bad for your health,” when what we really mean is, “you are a bad person because you smoke”. Or when we encounter someone whose body size we deem excessive and reflexively say, “obesity is bad for your health,” when what we mean is not that this person might have some medical problem, but that they are lazy or weak of will” (Metzl 2010:2).

For sure, neither nationalism nor sexuality is a stable construct, nor is the relationship between them (Kulpa 2010:44). Therefore, it is important not to forget Gellner's warning that the rise of nationalism as a social process is a tendency but the emergence of particular nationalisms is occasional (1983). With the help of the outlined above scheme, in further chapters of this work I proceed to analyzing and describing Ukrainian official nationalism (having my focus on the way it talks about bodies) and to showing how it is related to the everyday nationalism – what utterances from the official discourse are supported in the banal nationalism and what utterances are reshaped.

Nationalism is thus an ideology and a social movement that emerges as an outcome of a new societal organization that is pillared upon unified cultural standards that come into existence because of educational and linguistic standardization, that in their turn are necessitated by state formation with its processes of the development of taxation and grow of bureaucracy. This unified proto-national culture was a reshaped combination of already existing cultural patterns and historical memory. Similarly, unified proto-national identity was built upon already existing cultural and ethnic identities though reshaped for its own purposes. One of the purposes is bonding, and indeed national identity is a great source of social solidarity, whereas nationalism is a powerful rhetoric that structures our sentiments and loyalties (Calhoun 2007). Still, it is also a
set of disciplinary ideas about bodies and practices of bodily regulation. It is very exclusionary, preoccupied with drawing boundaries in respect to its others and with solidifying the community against the others who allegedly menace it. These others are often embodied and the threat they carry frequently relates to the gender and sexual order of society.
2. “Eastern Europe” between “the West” and “national traditions”

Post-state-socialist space provides an example of nation-state-building in allegedly post-nation-building era, with its discussions on globalization and cultural homogenization. Stuart Hall warns that “whilst globalization may be the prevailing force of our times, this does not mean that localism is without significance” (1992:622), that “instead of thinking of the global replacing the local, it would be more accurate to think of a new articulation between “the global” and “the local” (1992:623). Re-articulation and re-organization of the global/the local could be traced in the strategies of the return to roots and/or to traditional values that have been used by many new nation-states as a means of resistance to globalization and cultural homogenization. For instance, “East European” homophobia is sometimes seen as a response to “Western” paradigm of acceptance of LGBT people and gay marriages (Graff 2006). Once “Western Europe” needed “Eastern Europe” as the Other in order to constitute itself (Wolff 1994). Now one can witness how “the West” is being Othered by the new nation-states of “Eastern Europe”, in contrast to which “Eastern Europe” is building its own identity – an identity of selective “Europeanness”.

In the previous chapter I mapped some debates on the issue of nation/alism and its intersections with gender/sexuality in order to show the centrality of bodies and their regulation for nationalist projects. In this chapter I bring these debates to the space of “Eastern Europe” in order to discuss the revival of nationalism after the fall of state socialism (with a focus on Ukraine), see how it is gendered, the place of women and LGBT people in it, its body politics
and to demonstrate its articulations in relation to gender/sexuality aspects of the global.

2.1 Nationalism in “Eastern Europe”: returned of the repressed?

Social scientists agree that the process of nation-state-building as the process of consolidation of people on the basis of one all-encompassing national identity on the space of “Eastern Europe” is of the later date, comparing to “Western Europe”. Walker Connor (2005) and Kulpa (2010) speak of different temporalities of nation-state-building in “Western” and “Eastern Europe”, they claim that certain processes (for instance, nation-state-building) “occurred geografically unequally” (Kulpa 2010:45) because of different historical settings (Calhoun 1994; Hobsbawm 1992). Ukraine is another example of a nation-state that ardently started to reconstruct its national narrative after the collapse of state socialism.

Nationalism’s appearance on the scene in the 1990s as the main discourse of the newly appeared states was not out of the blue – the scene had been prepared by state socialism's national politics and pre-state socialist nationalist movements. For instance, in the case of Ukraine there existed Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) that are constantly referred to in the discourse of official nationalism of post state socialist period. Under state-socialism, nationalism was frequently used as a means of resistance, it was mobilized as an “expression to the anti-imperial feelings of many East-Europeans […] against Soviet or Russian domination” (Verdery 1996:85). One of the reasons for this was the fact that despite assumed equal treatment of all nationalities, one's belonging to certain nationality could affect one's life chances, as in the one case a person could benefit from the
affirmative action, when in the other person's chances could be affected in a negative way (for instance, if one was Jewish). In the USSR, when nearly all other common denominators for political organization were destroyed, “national sentiment emerged to overwhelm federal politics.” (Verdery 1996:86). Speaking about the presence of national feelings under state socialism as an opposition to the latter, Alain Touraine notes their importance for Hungarian events of 1956 and for Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s (Touraine 1983). He explains that national feelings were frequently mobilized by social movements as a source of resistance to state socialism, even if fighting for the independence was not the most important issue for the movement. Touraine brings the example of Solidarity who played on the national feelings but “did not speak of a worker's state, rarely of 'true socialism', and even less of the total independence of Poland. They wanted to drive the Party away from their lives.” (1983:56).

Under state socialism and after its collapse, national identity was the main source of bonding and solidarity. Rogers Brubacker (2009) and Verdery (1996) argue that under state socialism, two definitions of a nation – ethnic understanding of a nation (that manifested itself in the concept of nationality) and political and territorial understanding of a nation (national republic) – were not congruent as nationalities did not live only within their own national republic. They see it as one of the potential sources of mobilization of national/ist feelings. Another source of national/ist feelings can be identified in cultural politics of state socialism. “Nations were to be seen but not heard; culture (and, one might add, politics and administration as well) was to be "national in form but socialist in content."” (Brubacker 2009:36). Given this, it is no surprise that after the collapse of state socialism, nationalism was the most available means of imagining a new community.
Quite often the main fuel for national identities was their positioning as “anti-communist” (Verdery 1996:92). After the fall of state socialism, nationalism tried its best to position state socialism as its Other – as the enemy who tried to destroy the nation. Nationalists started claiming to represent the nation as their socialist predecessors did, but they transformed the meaning and the history of the nation. “All across the region, local historiographies represented the nation as an innocent victim, victimized nearly always by other nations” (Verdery 1996:96) and by the Party. “Those who defended “nation” imagined it as a pure value and object of loyalty that the Communists had betrayed, hence moral superiority would lie in restoring it to its rightful place at the center of politics” (Verdery 1996:107). Thus, “East European” nationalisms backed up their claims for national authenticity by referring to the allegedly heroic pre-state socialist past and opposed the old regime and the neighboring nations on the grounds of their own moral superiority and respectability.

The narrative of breaking-free from state socialist past and restoring traditions that were nearly destroyed by the Communist party can be illustrated by tearing down the monuments erected during state socialism and changing toponymes that alluded to the state socialist past. Exploring the politics of commemoration in Hungary, Emilia Palonen notes that from 1989 to 2001 Hungary underwent the processes of symbolic reorganization of public space, stressing the importance of national freedom, independence and of “the return to the past, which was driven equally by the need to express national sovereignty” (2008:227). In addition to “nationalizing” the history and the discourse of cities, Hungary also faced the return of pre-1945 religious statues (Palonen 2008). All these gestures of refurnishing and renaming of public spaces constitute “an attempt to construct and represent imagined communities” (Palonen 2008:220). Observing this
tendency of breaking-away from state socialism, Verdery noted that throughout “Eastern Europe”
different social and political groups strove for legitimacy by appealing to different “dead bodies”
and surrounding these dead with different ritual practices, that for nationalists “finding the
skeletons of those whom communist partisans had killed, for instance, was instrumental in
building the anticommunist sentiments” (1999:101). She argues that dead bodies were
“animating postsocialist politics, as people struggle to come to terms with the profound changes
in their environments and their universes of meaning” (1999:22) ensued after the fall of state
socialism. Of course, not only dead bodies matter for the post state socialist politics. Thus, in the
next subchapter I focus on the importance of living bodies for the post state socialist space.

2.2. From zadruga-state to nation as a family

In the previous chapter I showed that nationalisms always possess their own peculiar
gender regimes and therefore their own peculiar approaches to determining proper and improper
bodies. Post state socialist nationalisms of “Eastern Europe” are no exception. Pointing to a
relatively understudied field of nationalism and sexuality/gender on the space of “Eastern
Europe”, Greta N. Slobin claims that “problems of nationalism and sexuality in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe are radically different, for example, from the issues explored in current
postcolonial theory mainly focused on the first and third world, with little to say about the
second” (1992:246). Certainly, this space has its own gender and sexuality specificities; still,
more general and universal processes can be grasped as well. As Slobin succinctly summarized
gender/sexuality regime of USSR: “post-Revolutionary freedom was succeeded by a Soviet-style
puritanism that conformed more to the nineteenth-century Europe model of “respectability” than to any new socialist understanding of sexual relations.” (1992:249).

Discussing the similarities between gender regimes of state socialism and nationalism, Verdery (1996) and Michel Rivkin-Fish (2006) point out that there had been indeed less difference than it is usually claimed by nationalists. For instance, state socialist discourse on reproduction was appropriated by nationalists with very few modifications, as both regimes tend to control women's bodies – the only difference is the justification. Moreover, both regimes even imagine themselves in a similar vein. Scholars like Verdery (1996) argue that state socialism frequently presented itself as “zadruga-state” – an extended family with Party as a father on the top and subjects as grateful children (1996:63). Likewise, nationalism often presents itself as a big family (Hill Collins 1998, Rivkin-Fish 2006, Yuval-Davis 1997).

However, post-state-socialist nationalisms object to these profound similarities. Attempting to break free from the state socialist past, nationalists often tend to make use of the narrative of alleged women emancipation under state socialism by pointing to the detrimental effects it had for the nation. But if to consider gender roles under state socialism, it becomes clear that the picture presented by nationalists is at least exaggerated. Verdery notes the ambiguity of messages that were conveyed by the state: on the one hand, the state regarded women as equal to men because they did the same job, on the other, it emphasized women's role as mothers (1996:67). The first type of messages she sees as a consequence of industrialization and labor-intensive programs that led to the inclusion of women into labor force. Susan Zimmerman highlights that “women were a key focus of policies aimed at speeding up the inclusion of new groups of the population into formal employment” (Zimmerman 2010:2).
However, as both Zimmerman and Verdery point, industry and agrarian sectors were highly gendered: heavy industry was dominated by males, while women were overrepresented in agriculture and light industries (Verdery 1996:67, Zimmerman 2010:3-4). Thus, proclaimed women's emancipation is mere fiction.

Viewed from this perspective, it becomes easy to see main patterns of both state socialism and post-state-socialism gender regimes. Both systems tend to control women bodies and to see them as property of a greater socialist/nationalist community. The horrors of illegal abortions during Ceausescu's rule are well studied (Kligman 1995; Verdery 1996). Analyzing changes in the abortion legislation in Hungary, Susan Gal noted that since 1973-74 a restrictive abortion policy had been in place. The introduction of this policy was celebrated by a media campaign that “reasserted the rationale of national over individual interests and attacked the “unhealthy” spirit of individualism (leading to birth control) as unacceptable in socialist society” (Gal 2000:264). Though since 1955 abortion was legally approved in the USSR, simultaneously there had been a “state-sanctioned anti-abortion campaign” (Randall 2011) that aimed to intimidate women and to push them to the “right” choice of motherhood.

After the end of state socialism this anti-abortion discourse was picked up and fostered by nationalists. Looking at the reproduction discourses in Russia, Rivkin-Fish argues that in contemporary Russia, women's bodies are frequently regarded as (ethno)national property, and though abortion continuous to be legal de jure, it is condemned by nationalists who blame it for the supposed “death of a nation” (2006). Unfortunately, as Rivkin-Fish mentions, it is not only nationalists who pursue pronatalist agenda. She cites community leaders from the mainstream business newspapers who also made “explicit links between national continuity, reproduction,
and the need to preserve the Russian “gene pool” (2006:160). Analyzing reproduction policies in Poland, Agnieszka Graff notes that they are known to be among the most conservative in “Europe”. She emphasizes that “the object of interest of Poland’s antichoice campaign are not “the unborn,” but the nation: Poland as a heroic mother, trying to shelter her (unborn) children from the onslaught of murderous outsiders, as well as their treacherous agents at home.” (Graff 2009:137).

Thus, “East European” nation-states rigidly police the bodies of their citizens and try to control women's bodies, just like their predecessor. However, they also pay a lot of attention to the issue of sexuality. Interpreting “Europe” (the EU) as immoral because of its acceptance of LGBT people, “East European” nationalisms oppose it on the grounds of moral superiority and respectability. However, the relationship between “East European” nationalisms and “Europe” is more complex. Regarding “Europe”, many “East European” countries have been oscillating between two main discourses: one was the discourse of catching up, in this frame “Europe” was shorthand for the standard to be reached in any given area – social, economical, technological, political – and was often accompanied by references to modernity, civilization, and prosperity” (Helms 2008:98); whereas within the other, “Europe” came to stand for the world “that was morally bankrupt, lacking in spirituality and essence, and doomed to self-destruction” (Helms 2008:98). Still, from time to time these discourses seemed to converge in a schizophrenic mixture of seemingly both “Eastern” and “Western” attributes.

In the process of refining Polish national identity, “Europe” was mobilized as a signifier of aggression and pervasion – Polish nationalists tried to present an image of “Europe” “aiming to infiltrate the boundaries of that which is innocent and childlike” (Graff 2009:138). It was done
in order to push homosexuality to the margins as something foreign and non-masculine and to define proper Polish masculinity through heterosexuality and in contrast to femininity (that was equated with motherhood and childbearing). By doing so, nationalists aimed to position heterosexuality as something innocent, childlike, natural and therefore to make homosexual bodies foreign and perverted.

Thus, under the guise of morality and naturalness that nationalism talks about, real bodies are at stake. For instance, if one's body is seen as too sensual or too sexy, it might be interpreted as a signal of one's abnormality. Analyzing lesbian representations in post-soviet Russia, Brian Baer stresses that the lesbian “is typically imagined as closely connected to the body and deeply sexual, qualities that distinguish her from the average Soviet and post-Soviet woman, whose sexual life is marked by 'estrangement' from the body and restrictions against bodily pleasure” (Baer 2011:284). Contrasting the image of lesbian as powerful and even narcissistic woman who “pursues sexual satisfaction” (2011:284) with an image of an average asexual, respectable and obedient heterosexual woman, Baer accentuates the foreignness and estrangement of homosexuality and of public taboo on the bodily pleasure.

In some cases, marginalization and attempts to exclude LGBT people from national community inspire them to seek inclusion to the nation by showing their presence in the national history and therefore altering the basis of national belonging. Hadley Z. Renkin describes tactics employed by Hungarian LGBT groups - by commemorating Karoly Kertbeny, writer, translator, researcher of homosexuality and sexual rights activist, they aim to root queer belonging in the national history (2007; 2009). For instance, the local LGBT organization took care about organizing a new gravestone (after his grave was discovered) and about holding a memorial
service every summer. By these acts the local LGBT community struggles to assert its place within Hungarian history (Renkin 2009:29). This provides a nice illustration of dead bodies politics described above, as it stresses the centrality of bodies for national belonging.

Unfortunately, even with the increasing presence of LGBT in the public space and national history, “Eastern Europe” remains quite homophobic space. These moods are frequently nurtured by religion, which is often seen as the heart of a national culture. Ann Szemere argues that “Eastern Europe” underwent a striking revival of religiosity, which she connects with the instability of social environments after the end of state socialism (2000). Religion also enables local nationalisms to back up their claims to morality and respectability. Rivkin-Fish notes the important role of Orthodox Church in promoting pronatalism and anti-abortion moods in Russia (2006). Similarly, Ewa Hauser, Barbara Haynes and Jane Mansbridge stress the role of Catholic Church in Poland in pursuing misogynistic agenda (1993). Graff mentions the importance of Catholic Church for nourishing Polish homophobia and marginalizing feminism. Allying with nationalism, religion helps it to nourish Cartesian dichotomy of body and soul, simultaneously highlighting the value of the latter over the former and making claims about which bodies are seen as clean and proper.

Forming an alliance with religion, “East European” nationalisms try to distinguish themselves from both secular and morally bankrupt “West” and secular and vicious state socialism. Proclaiming the return to traditions eradicated by state socialism, “East European” nationalisms aim to wipe out alleged gender equality and women's emancipation by asserting motherhood and family as the main values and assigning women the role of reproducers of the nation. Consequently, “East European” nationalisms are very heterosexist and heteronormative.
They position heterosexuality as the only normal and healthy sexuality, essentializing the masculine/feminine binary and dismissing homosexuality as a foreign and perverted. Hence, all bodies that perform gender and sexuality inappropriately (for instance, homosexuals) are pushed to the margins as foreign (that belong to the “West”) and potentially dangerous. Like state socialism, “East European” nationalisms police and control bodies of their citizens. Though unlike state socialism, they openly do it in the name of the nation.
2.3 Ukrainian national narrative and collective memory: away from the USSR – back to Europe?

Like many “East European” states, post-1991 Ukraine faced a need to reconstruct a national narrative and to revisit Soviet vision of history. In post-Soviet Ukraine two main paradigms of reading Ukrainian history compete, first one portrays Ukrainian history as a part and parcel of Russian history, whilst the second one “emphasizes the distinctiveness and independence of the Ukrainian historical process and presents Ukraine as the victim of injustices committed by Russia” (Hrytsak 1998:270). Thus, after the breakup of the USSR, the second paradigm, which emphasizes the uniqueness and heroic struggle of Ukrainian nation, has been promoted. But along with highlighting the vicious nature of the USSR and Russia, this new paradigm also stresses Ukraine's belonging to “Europe”.

Looking for new unifying symbols and events that would contrast with Soviet ones, Ukrainian politicians turned to topics that were not voiced in the USSR. Presumably, building a new national narrative aimed at connecting Ukrainian history to the history of “Europe”, implying that being Ukrainian meant being “European” (Phillips 2008). Ukraine's attempt to assert its cultural belonging to “Europe” can be illustrated on the example of Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) held in Kyiv in 2005, shortly after the Orange revolution of the end of 2004. It is telling that after the winner of ESC-2005 was announced, the new President of Ukraine came onto the stage in order to congratulate the winner “with a ‘special prize’ from the host country: ‘a special pictorial to the song that unites the whole Europe’” (Bolin 2006:195). Eurovision is a
space where transnational and national tensions are resolved in constructing an identity of a nation-state (Baker 2008). With this in mind, it is interesting to look at Ukraine's oscillation between asserting its belonging to a greater cultural community (of Europe) and stressing its uniqueness and commitment to traditions – as the Eurovision where the unification of Europe was celebrated was brought to Kyiv by Ruslana (winner of ESC-2004), whose representational strategy involved playing with ethnic elements that led some scholars to regard her performance as an example of essentialization of tradition (Baker 2008).4

Along with the process of Europeanization one can spot the process of re-traditionalization of Ukrainian society. Researching women's activism in post-Soviet Ukraine, Phillips highlights great value that is given to motherhood as a defining core of woman's subjectivity - “the centrality of motherhood, nurturing, and care giving for women’s subjectivities is taken as a given by many activists and their constituencies, who believe that women can best serve society and their families by executing their “natural-given” duties as wives and mothers” (2008:75). She emphasizes that the discourse of motherhood and family is very much fueled by nationalist agenda that “emphasizes women’s roles and responsibilities as mothers, nurturers, and culture bearers” (2008:75).

Re-traditionalization is coupled with distancing from the state socialist past, which can further be illustrated by Ukrainian memory politics. Firstly, it is useful to consider the commemoration of the famine of 1923-1933 in Ukraine – Holodomor (verbatim translation from

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4 Participating in Eurovision in 2004, Ruslana and her team were dressed in allegedly ethnic garments and used “traditional” music instruments in the song. Some ethnic musical elements were inserted into otherwise “Western”-style pop song. The song and the whole number alluded to the nature – by asserting the "wildness" of their music and dances (the title of the song was “Wild Dances”). This representational strategy made some cultural studies scholars argue that Ruslana was naturalizing the ethnic elements.
Ukrainian is extermination by hunger). In 2006 President Viktor Yushchenko furthered the bill that recognized Holodomor as planned by the USSR authorities extermination of Ukrainians by hunger. Though there are debates to what extent it was intentional and to what extent natural factors contributed to it, in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism Holodomor is presented as a deliberate decision made by Soviet, and it is argued that it should be recognized as an act of genocide. Since 2006 Holodomor has been commemorated each year. In 2008 a memorial dedicated to its victims was opened in Kyiv. Recognizing it as a planned murder and commemorating it – these acts are illustrations of victimization of Ukrainian nation in the new national narrative. It is portrayed as an innocent victim of vicious state socialism intents.

Along with new commemoration dates new national heroes emerged. Their function was to further distance Ukraine from state socialist past and facilitate the construction of “a heroic narrative around the struggle of Ukrainian nationalists” (Petrenko 2012:246). It is not unexpected that the figures chosen to be national heroes were more or less young males, who were connected to the military, fought against the USSR, and were members of very radical organizations (that somehow associated themselves with integral nationalism). This is another illustration for Verdery's claim that nation is frequently imagined as patrilineage (1996).

In 2007, President Viktor Yushchenko posthumously awarded the title of the Hero of Ukraine to Roman Shukhevych, the head of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); in 2010 the same title was awarded to Stepan Bandera, the chair of one of the branches of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The President attempted several times to grant legal veteran status to living members of the OUN and UPA, but each time his endeavors were blocked by the Parliament. Still, under Yushchenko several institutes of memory management were organized.
Surely, in the national narrative the cooperation of the OUN-UPA with German forces during WWII is downplayed. Though the title of the Hero of Ukraine was taken away from Shukhevych and Bandera by Victor Yanukovych, they are still commemorated by different nationalist organizations.

Building the new national narrative is a process of selection. Interestingly, among many different Ukrainian national organizations existed in the beginning of 20th century, it was OUN and UPA who were allocated the main place in the national narrative. OUN was founded in Vienna in 1929 by people from armed clandestine organizations and youth, inspired by the ideas of integral nationalism (Zaytsev 2013). OUN's ideology and concept of the nation was heavily borrowed from Dmytro Dontsov – it was elitist, voluntarist and antidemocratic approach to the nation; nation was seen as a natural community consisting of a small stratum of elite that would rule the majority. Moreover, Dontsov saw Ukraine fulfilling its special historical role – protecting “European civilization from “barbaric Asian”, whose avant garde is Russia” (Zaytsev 2013:207). OUN was influenced by the ideas of fascism and national socialism, though it might be debatable to what extent this was dominant tendency – for instance, national socialism was taken with a caution because of its theory of racial inferiority of Slavs (Zaytsev 2013:262).

Still, OUN considered the Ukrainian nation as the ultimate value, regarding the nation as an “organic whole” (Zaytsev 2013:264) and the ultimate aim of its own existence was Ukrainian independent state, founded by the means of “national revolution” (Zaytsev 2013:262). By the end of 1930s, members of OUN were referring to their version of nationalism as “totalitarian and authoritarian” (Zaytsev 2013:268). It is not surprising that these ideas led to quite hostile politics toward ethnic minorities on the territory of Ukraine and neighboring nations (Poland, Russia).
Following this politics, by the end of 1930s OUN started to engage in ethnic cleansing. Zaytsev claims that Bandera and his wing of OUN (in 1940 OUN split in two wings – OUN(b) chaired by Stepan Bandera and OUN(m) headed by Andrii Melnyk (Katchanovski 2010, Zaytsev 2013)) were very interested in German politics toward Jews and even considered implementing it in Ukraine (2013:319). John-Paul Himka argues about the decisive role of OUN in Jewish pogroms in Lviv in 1941 (2011). In 1942 OUN(b) initiated the establishment of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) headed by Roman Shukhevych. A significant number of people participated both in OUN(b) and UPA; UPA is seen as a military unit of OUN(b). Both organizations acted on the territory of Ukraine up to 1954, when nearly all Ukrainian nationalistic underground was cleaned up (Petrenko 2012).

Not surprisingly, OUN-UPA behavior code was very influenced with masculine military virtues. They valued the cult of war and heroes, seeing this moral toolkit as a necessary feature of struggle for freedom (Zaytsev 2013:272). Consequently, this code of behavior established the scenarios of “right life” and “right death” (Zaytsev 2013:291). So, both organizations were predominantly male. It is also important to mention that OUN-UPA prioritized “national interests over the interests of gender with conscious sacrifice for the political goals” (Petrenko 2012:254). Still, it would be wrong to say that these organizations were 100% male. There were women but their roles were confined to “female” spheres, like medical care or communications. However, when in 1944-45 the conditions of OUN-UPA existence worsened, they started to recruit more women. The more dangerous were the conditions and the more men were killed or caught by Soviets, the more women were recruited and the wider range of activities women were allowed to participate in: “after the arrival of the Red Army in the western regions of Ukraine (...),
women could be spotted even in such male-dominated roles as the security service” (Petrenko 2012:256); this happened because women were believed to attract less attention.

Certainly, taking into consideration OUN-UPA’s cult of heroism, there were demands for women how to behave. It was expected that women would be “self-sacrificing, brave, but also a devoted wife and mother at the same time” (Petrenko 2012:249). OUN and UPA were very heterosexist and heteronormative in their views, highlighting women’s reproductive capacities and seeing “normal sexuality” as resulting in reproduction. But above the loyalty to men, women were supposed to be loyal to national goals and to the activity of OUN-UPA. To make sure there were no Soviet spies among them, OUN decided to take the right of sentencing people who did not fit certain behavior rules in their hands; for instance, this applied “women who lived legally in the villages and allowed the soldiers of Red Army to stay in their houses” (Petrenko 2012:257). OUN urged women to avoid relationships with Russians (“moskali”) and to think of their imprisoned or dead sons and husbands, contrasting the heroism of “deported Ukrainians (…) with the morally slack behavior of village women” (Petrenko 2012:258). Though the question of women participation in OUN-UPA as well as the question of their views on gender are severely understudied, it is possible to make preliminary conclusions about patriarchal and heterosexist nature of these organizations. As well as about the consequences of their inclusion into national mythology. However, the rehabilitation of dead bodies is important to nationalism, as it allows to demonstrate its alleged uniqueness and authenticity.

The organizations that are rehabilitated shared authoritarian, discriminating, masculinist and heterosexist views. They were criticized for these views both then and now. For instance, in the end of 1920s – beginning of 1930s OUN-UPA were criticized by Milena Rudnyts’ka from
“Soyuz Ukrajinok” (Union of Ukrainian Women) - nationalist women organization. She opposed gender politics that was admired by male-dominated nationalistic underground, asserting that different Ukrainian nationalistic organizations fight with each other, but strikingly agree on the “understanding of women's role”, that “they all would like to reduce Ukrainian woman to the role confined for a woman by totalitarian countries with dictatorships” (Rudnyts'ka in Zaytsev 2013:414). Instead, she proposed another agenda – legislative equation of children born out of wedlock with those born within the marriage; protection of women labour and motherhood; women's education, etc. (Diadiuk 2011). Certainly, this critique did not find the place in the new national narrative, as well as there is nearly no place for other organizations except OUN-UPA.

Thus, from 1991 on a new national narrative is being built in Ukraine. Like many other “Eastern European” states, in its national narrative Ukraine struggles to stress its belonging to “European” cultural community and simultaneously assert its uniqueness by appealing to imagined traditions, including imaginings of traditional national gender and sexual order. The case with OUN-UPA inclusion into the national history provides a clear example of the selective and creative process of invention of traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). A great part of its national narrative is dedicated to breaking away from the state socialist past and seeing the USSR and Russia as its Other. Certainly, claiming one's “Europeanness” goes in Ukraine hand-in-hand with re-traditionalization of society – emphasizing motherhood as the core of femininity, valuing heterosexuality above all other sexualities and bodies that perform gender-appropriately.
3. Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism from the Far-Right Perspective: Defending Proper Bodies

In this chapter I provide an overview of Svoboda party version of nationalism with the focus on bodies and sexualities. Chapter 1 showed that national belonging is first and foremost about bodies. In this chapter I illustrate it on the example of Svoboda’s rhetoric. Given that Svoboda has been the main far right actor since the end of 2000s and the main voice of Ukrainian nationalism, I consider it important to inquire about Svoboda's version of nationalism because it presents the exemplified version of it, which is quite easy to use to determine national anxieties. In chapter 2 I discussed Ukrainian position as neither “European” nor “pro-Russian”, showing how its identity is re-shaped in relation to a number of variables: the USSR, Russia, “the West” (exemplified by the EU) and “national traditions”. My choice for Svoboda is also conditioned by the fact that they seem to have more or less stable national narrative. In Svoboda's discourse about the bodies and sexualities four main themes could be isolated: the topic of Christianity, immigration, health and traditional values (this topic is situated at the crossroads between all others). The themes I identified from the statements are not properly separated one from another and overlap in many ways, but this artificial separation proves useful for the analytical purposes. But before proceeding to the place of gendered and sexualized bodies in Svoboda’s narrative, I will briefly discuss its history and its attempts of remaking of the national history in order to provide the reader with the broader context of the party’s rhetoric.

3.1 Metamorphoses of Svoboda

Founded in 1991 as Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, in 2004 it re-branded itself. It
changed the name to a more moderate All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” and traded the wolf-hook for the stylized version of trident. The wolf-hook is a symbol used during WWII by the German SS Panzer Division “Das Reich” and the Dutch Volunteer SS Division “Landstorm Nederland”. After 1945 this symbol was used by various European neo-Nazi organizations (Umland and Shekhovtsov 2010). The changes were made exactly at the time of President Viktor Yushchenko who ardently engaged into creating the new national heroes (OUN-UPA) and changing memory politics (commemorating Holodomor) as I briefly discussed in the previous chapter.

Svoboda's new symbol - three yellow fingers raised together on the blue background - alludes to Ukrainian national flag (yellow and blue horizontal stripes) and to the national symbol, the trident. Through this change it became possible to think of Svoboda not as of another marginalized half-subcultural group but as a serious nationalistic organization. It also allowed the party to symbolically distance itself from its neo-Nazi past and to provide the image of becoming more moderate and open for the new people while preserving its old supporters. The mere naming as "All-Ukrainian union" already alluded to its alleged openness. Given the nationalistic moods kindled by President Yushchenko politics, this change proved to be useful – since the second half of 2000s Svoboda has been gaining popularity with its peak in 2012 when it entered Ukrainian Parliament with around 12% of the vote.

3.2. Negotiating national identity

As shown in chapter 2, many “East European” nationalisms frame themselves in relation to “Western Europe” as its Other. In addition to that, Ukrainian nationalism also sees Russia as another Other to escape from. Moreover, as any other nationalism, Ukrainian nationalism also
needs a bunch of internal others who can be seen as polluters – in contrast to whom good citizens are encouraged to discipline their bodies. It is not surprising then that Svoboda’s carefully claims Ukraine belonging to the “Europe”, tries to distance Ukrainian identity from Russia and the USSR and actively reshapes history.

3.2.1 Selectively “European” values

Like many European far right parties, for a while Svoboda had a steady anti-EU position. In 2009 party’s leader Oleh Tiahnybok blamed the EU in the “unemployment of European indigenous people, destruction of national industries, mass influx of color migrants, destruction of traditional European family, antinational media censorship”\(^5\). Svoboda was faithful to this position until the end of 2012 – the beginning of 2013, when Ukraine was offered to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. In December 2013, feeling popular support in favor of the Association Agreement, Svoboda used this popular mood to stress that being closer to the EU means being further away from Russia. The party leader claimed that “we [Svoboda party] will not allow a Moscow Colony to form in Ukraine! We are a European nation...”\(^6\) Joining the pro-European side enabled Svoboda to emphasize its anti-Russia position.

Despite Svoboda’s change of mind toward the EU, it still argues that one should be careful with Europe and its values, accepting only those that agree with Christian mores and traditional values of Ukrainian nation. Its political program is subtitled “The Program of the Defense of Ukrainians”, so the existence of a threat to Ukrainians is already assumed. According to the program, the threat comes from Russia (as the colonizer); Europe (in its acceptance of


LGBT and immigrants), and internal enemies. As discussed earlier, positing some bodies as an internal menace is a widespread nationalistic strategy (Karlin 2002).

3.2.2 Invented Traditions

In the Preamble to Svoboda's project of constitution\(^7\) it's stated that

“Ukrainian nation faced difficult times, as it was captured by a colonial yoke for more than three hundred years; that it has survived a horrible genocide in the years of Holodomor, which has nearly killed its gene pool; that during hundreds of years its language and culture were being destroyed; that Communist repressions were held against Ukrainians.”\(^8\)

It is quite obvious from the quote that under the colonial yoke Russia is implied. To back up this position, Svoboda frequently turns to the history of Ukraine, emphasizing different episodes of alleged nation-building and stressing the role of different historical figures in the process of continuous attempts to break free from Russia. Such rewriting of history, when figures and events from the past are re-interpreted with regard to the existing order of things and the demands of imagined national community, is not peculiar to Svoboda. Bourdieu (1994), Calhoun (2007), Anderson (1983) and many other scholars note that modern nationalisms eagerly engage in reinterpretations of history in order to establish a solid, grounded national self-image and legitimize their claims.

To root itself in history, Svoboda frequently references to Cossacks, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). For example, when congratulating the “people of Ukraine” with Christmas, Svoboda claimed that celebrating

\(^7\) Svoboda has its own version of Constitution since 2007, which they promise to put into vote
Christmas on the streets (Orthodox Christmas is usually celebrated January, 6. In 2014 the protests were still going on when Christmas came) is a continuation of the tradition of “our ancestors – Cossacks, UPA militants”9. Moreover, UPA is claimed to be a unique historical phenomenon that should be taken as an example to follow by contemporary youth, as UPA militants are “the heroes who struggled for the independence of Ukraine and its will”10. The birthday of Stepan Bandera (January, 1), one of the key figures of OUN, is celebrated by Svoboda with a torchlight march since 2007. After the march on January, 1 2014, Iryna Farion from Svoboda, decided to remind people that “torchlight marches have been known since the Middle Ages, when people with the help of torchlights fought plague and other devilry”11. This way, Farion signified present enemies under the term “devilry”, essentializing them. It is a clear example of invented tradition: establishing a reference to the past, it aims to organize people around an event, endowing this event with symbolic importance (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

3.2.3 Gendering “national traditions”

Nationalism usually resists women's movements (Calhoun 2007), though sometimes tries to incorporate and to “domesticate” them. In this vein, Svoboda tries to historize the concept of gender equality in order to show that it has always been present in Ukraine's history but now. For instance, Svoboda deputy claimed that Ukrainian women are “severely affected in their rights”. He continued that “it is not about not having equal opportunities but about women not being able to realize their human and citizen rights”. The deputy claimed that “since Kyiv Rus both men and women had very important roles in state-building. So, they are partners and constitute 'the one' in this sphere.” He finished by expressing the need to “come back to traditional values”. However, he did not clarify whether he was talking about equality in opportunities, equality in outcomes or about mere provision of everything necessary for women to take up their traditional role. Still, this piece of speech may be a very interesting example of Svoboda's attempts to accommodate and reshape the concept of gender equality: as this rhetorical move allows to nest it under the signifier of traditional values and by these means it is resignified – as it is implied that in order to achieve gender equality and women's emancipation, it is necessary to look backwards, in the historical past.

Another example of Svoboda’s attempt to pursue the topic of women’s emancipation is more recent. As from the beginning of the protests in Ukraine in November 2013 people started to organize platoons to protect themselves from the police and internal military forces, at the end of January 2014 one of Svoboda’s supporters from Ternopil decided to organize a platoon

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13 Ibid.
consisting only of women, because all the others consisted only of men and many men were not eager to allow women to the barricades. The organizer claimed that “the current government is afraid of women that are able to defend themselves and do not wish to be hurt.”

Probably, feeling popular moods and the growing reluctance of many women to confine themselves to the passive role in the protests, Svoboda decided to make use of this. But the emancipatory potential of such projects on behalf of far right is usually suspicious. As shown in chapter 1, the history of gendered nationalisms has already known the attempts to (unhappily and un成功fully) reconcile claims for women’s rights and gender and sexual equality with nationalism – because as soon as the common enemy vanishes, nationalism tries to subjugate its ally movements and to not fulfill its promises of gender or sexual equality (Bernal 2001; DeGrazia 1992; McClintock 1993; Sekuler 2013).

Not surprisingly, Svoboda has a negative attitude toward feminism. Andriy Illienko, one of the best known members of Svoboda, mentioned in his article that feminism and other leftist ideas (somehow, Ilienko reduced feminism to one of the many ideas of leftist agenda) are detrimental to the healthy society. He blamed leftists for seeing the revolutionary potential in “mad people, homosexuals, feminists, drug-addicts and other social groups, whose way of life is absolutely unacceptable for healthy society.”

Given that Svoboda advocates “traditional values” that imply big heterosexual families, is very homophobic and pro-life, their attitude toward feminism is not unexpected.

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3.3 Healthy body – healthy mind: im/proper bodies and internal enemies

Nationalism’s desire to control the citizen’s bodies is well documented (Mosse 1988; Partridge 2012). One of the ways it regulates them is through the category of health, which is used as a substitute for morality. In this section I demonstrate how Svoboda makes use of the narrative of health and what bodies according to it are im/proper.

3.3.1 Christian values

As shown in chapter 2, after the fall of state socialisms “Eastern Europe” underwent a revival of religiosity (Szemere 2000) and local nationalisms made alliances with local Churches in their stance against homosexuality and women’s emancipation. I mentioned that nationalism benefits from Christian ideas about the sinfulness of all sex but heterosexual penetration within marriage. Consequently, these ideas lead to seeing LGBT and people who practice other types of sexual encounter as inherently sinful and therefore as possessing improper, dirty bodies. Hence, the body politics of “East European” nationalisms is very much influenced by religious ideas.

The references to God and Christian values are commonplace in Svoboda's language, though what is understood under “Christian values” is never explained. Moreover, it is not voiced what type of Christianity Svoboda appeals to. For instance, during the big demonstration organized by Svoboda in October 2013, Iryna Farion was quite open in her speech with the
appeal “to love both God and Ukraine”\textsuperscript{16}. Even though she did not appeal to the specific church, from the rest of Svoboda’s rhetoric it is clear that she was talking about Christianity.

Though in Ukraine there exist plenty of different churches, Svoboda mostly befriends Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) (popular mostly in the Western part of Ukraine). Svoboda is united with these two not only in their conservative world view, but also in their hate toward Russia and Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. Around Orthodox Christmas (January 2014), some of Svoboda members participated in the reception provided by the Patriarch of UOC-KP; in the party’s official press-release about the event it was particularly emphasized that the Patriarch is providing care for Ukrainians and Ukraine in the country’s hard time\textsuperscript{17}. About a week before, on the party’s web-site an interview appeared with a UGCC priest. In the beginning of the interview, the interviewer stated that priests provide Ukrainian people with “spiritual example”\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{17}www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/046280/ (accessed 25.02.2013)
\textsuperscript{18}www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/dopysy/046009/ (accessed 25.02.2013)
3.3.2 Health: mens sana in corpore sano

Nationalism frequently appeals to nature and claims that following a certain set of practices means living in harmony with it, whereas refusing to do so leads to degeneration and death (Mosse 1988:13). Clearly, the practices that are regarded to be in harmony with nature are labeled healthy. Following these practices means thus contributing to one’s health and to that of the nation. Moreover, health is connected to sexuality, as nationalisms label as unhealthy sexual encounters that do not result in procreation. For example, homosexuality and masturbation were usually treated as perversions and manifestations of a person’s sickness (Mosse 1988). Sometimes, in order to protect a nation, the existing of a foreign sexual threat is postulated by nationalism. It is claimed that certain foreigners with unhealthy bodies pollute the body of a nation and spread their disease or unhealthy way of life (Mosse 1988). In order to secure the nation, good citizens have thus not to have any contacts with foreigners and to fear them.

In Ukraine the concept of health is very much permeated with constant references to Christianity and traditional values, especially in order to oppose LGBT claims in terms of their behavior being unhealthy and detrimental to the health of the nation. From Svoboda’s point of view, health is related to sexuality and proper sexual and bodily behavior. First and foremost, it is related to heterosexuality. Svoboda is known for its homophobic statements – for instance, one of its members when advocating for traditional values and conservatism also took a stance against “homosexuality, that logically leads to the degeneration of people.”19 Svoboda members openly claimed that their “political force supports the Declaration of All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations on the “Negative attitude towards the phenomenon of

homosexuality and attempts to legalize so-called same-sex marriages”\(^{20}\). Secondly, health is connected to sobriety and lack of “bad habits”. It is implied that only clean bodies that abstain from alcohol, smoking and drugs can be healthy. In one of the long pieces on the issue of alcohol, published on Svoboda's web-site, the advertising of alcohol and tobacco was equated with the advertising of “licitious behavior” and “sexual perversions”\(^{21}\). Obviously, the former stand as the signifiers of the latter. So, the body spoiled with improper substances is also regarded as being of improper morality.

The issue of alcohol is linked by Svoboda to the problem of demographic crisis: “family values face the danger of being forgotten because of the contradictory values that are imposed on Ukrainians but are historically, culturally and even genetically foreign to them”\(^{22}\). By this rhetorical move the body of a smoker/drinker is framed as improper because these habits are the signifiers of improper behavior (sexual perversions) and/or lack of respectability (licitious behavior and foreignness). Not surprisingly, one the most widespread slogans of the youth events organized by Svoboda is “Sport, health, nationalism!” and Svoboda's youth camps claim “to educate an average Ukrainian [...] into morally and physically healthy person in order to educate a nationalist”\(^{23}\). Physical health comes to stand quite often for physical strength, as in these youth camps the sports that train first and foremost strength are cultivated (e.g. martial arts). “Healthy body possesses healthy spirit,” - claimed one of Svoboda's deputies commenting on the “March of Healthy Youth”, organized by Svoboda. He continued by saying that those who

participated in the event “are the vanguard of Ukrainian youth and the example that shows that instead of sitting at home, drinking beer and taking drugs, students should do sports and be interested in their country's future.” It logically follows from this statement that only those bodies that are fit (and therefore healthy) are able to care about the future of the nation. Smokers, drinkers, drug-addicts or those who are just not sporty enough are denied membership in the nation.

In an interview, Yevhen Karas', one the leaders of C14 (a paramilitary organization affiliated with Svoboda party), claimed that not only drug-addicts, but also thieves should be excluded. He said that he was totally fine with using physical violence to punish such people: “I think there is nothing bad in kicking a thief's ass and breaking his hands. [...] I am not a supporter of all this liberal shit…” Violent behavior toward drunks, drug-addicts, thieves from the far-rights was noted quite often during the protests of 2013-2014. One student that participated in the protests, Borys, recalled that he and his friend once saw about ten thugs kicking a drunken who was lying on the ground. The thugs took off man's pants and started beating him. When Borys' friend tried to protect the man and asked them to stop the violence, one of the offenders asked her whether she “was drunk or injected something”. Refusing to self-discipline and self-restraint according the standards of nationalism is thus accountable on both physical and symbolical levels – if one refuses to follow the standards, s/he will be either forced to do so or excluded (both physically and symbolically) from the community.

24Ibid.
3.3.3 Immigration: visible minorities as a menace

Sexuality is always political and it has been always prescribed which kinds of it are more acceptable and which are punishable (Rubin 1984). Being a political concept, it has been used by nationalists to position certain people as having the improper kind of sexuality and to exclude them on these grounds (Partridge 2012). Given the relationship of nationalism and colonialism, it is no surprise that the non-white bodies are often stereotyped as either hypersexual or homosexual (Stoler 1995) or as polluters of the nation (Smith 2002). It is not surprising that Svoboda sees non-white migrants as a reproductive and cultural menace.

Svoboda incessantly points out the dangers already brought by immigrants and the threats that will be brought, if Ukraine follows the example of Europe and does not adopt nationalism as its main ideology. The path of adopting nationalism is a cure against the “consequences of migration” as it “offers a simple formula: either you adopt our values or you go away”26. Love me or leave me – no compromises whatsoever. Svoboda is especially preoccupied with the capital city, it claims that “because of the absence of natural growth of the population, the region of Kyiv can easily turn into the land of migrants”27. So, to avoid this, it is proposed to “introduce more severe anti-immigrant laws”28 because Ukrainians cannot simply deal with people from China or Middle East29 or people of “Caucasian nationality”30.

It is interesting that people who are mentioned are visibly different. The number of people

30www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/hovyny/041957/ (accessed 8.12.2013). The term “Caucasian nationality” is a linguistic marker that has many negative connotations because of it being very offensive and racist. Moreover, it homogenizes all people from the Caucasus region under the same label. This term is a heritage of Soviet period.
from Caucasus region, Middle East and China in Ukraine is extremely low and there is no reason to expect it to augment. Though it is not stated openly, Svoboda implies that such bodies – the visible non-white bodies of immigrants – are “pollution of the nation” (Smith 2002) and have to be eliminated, so that proper bodies take their place.

3.3.4 (Inventing) Traditional values

Discourses that proclaimed homosexuality pervert and unnatural can be traced back to the 19th century (Foucault 1975; Mosse 1988), as the category of homosexual and homosexuality as identity are the outcomes of the sexual regime that emerged along the rise of nationalism, which attacks non-procreative sexual practices as unhealthy and unnatural (Mosse 1988). Svoboda’s rhetoric towards LGBT falls in line with Foucault’s and Mosse’s expectations. For instance, in May 2013 when Ukrainian (mainly Kiev-based) LGBT community was finally allowed by city administration to organize a pride march, Svoboda announced that they would protest against the event. After the event, when several dozens of Svoboda's members and supporters gathered to protest against the pride and tried to hinder it, Svoboda published an official press-release where the pride was labeled as “the coven of perverts”\(^\text{31}\). The pervert as the Other has been for long time the necessary condition of the norm (Foucault 1975; Mosse 1988).

Svoboda’s views on Christianity, health, Europe, and immigration reach its peak in the articulation of “traditional values”, when all these topics are connected and mobilized. Svoboda's member Ihor Miroshnychenko stated that “we, Ukrainian men, love our women very much and

we will do anything in order to preserve heterosexual family as the ultimate value and the only norm in our country. This is an openly heterosexist statement, proclaiming that only heterosexual bodies are normal and valuable. As discussed in chapter 1, Rubin (1984) and Mosse (1988) reminded that in the discourse of nationalism all non-heterosexual and non-reproductive behavior is frequently tabooed as abnormal and is assumed to menace “health and safety, women and children, national security, the family, or civilization itself” (Rubin 1984:297). Nationalism is preoccupied with both reproducing and legitimizing itself through the references to "nature" and the norms derived from the nature, hence its obsession with the reproduction of population, its regulation and policing. Hence, it is frequently others homosexuals and rigidly polices men's and women's bodies, claiming that the normal masculinity is heterosexual masculinity and that women are responsible for biological reproduction of a nation. Female homosexuality thus endangers its reproduction.

In Svoboda's heterosexist discourse, women are seen as first and foremost biological reproducers of the nation, their symbolic functions are secondary. Svoboda speaks of demographic crisis and the need to stimulate births. Third part of its party program is focused on the issues of reproduction and family. For example, it is stated that it is necessary to implement the program “Reproductive Health of the Nation”33. In the section with such title Svoboda proposes to criminalize abortion by equating it with the “attempted murder”. Svoboda implies that prohibition of abortion is connected to the reproductive health of the nation. April 2013 Svoboda deputy Oleksandr Sych registered in the Parliament a bill criminalizing abortion. Citing

Poland and Ireland as examples, he claimed that “a woman has the right to not become pregnant. So, don’t become pregnant.” Stressing that this bill is in line with Christian values, the deputy also advised women to have “an ordered way of life” and to “behave properly”. The link between “proper behavior” that implies modesty (and potentially abstinence before marriage) and respectability is obvious. Unlike a woman who had an abortion, pregnant body is normal body. In his public blog, Ihor Miroshnychenko stated that women’s ability to bear children is “given by God”. Heterosexual bodies that procreate are normal because of being natural and praised by God. Normalcy is of divine origin. So, it should be praised and the normal have to be rewarded for being proper bodies and citizens: for example, by granting them material benefits everybody else is denied.

The category of body is always-already political. Thus, when speaking of nationalism it is difficult to distill the discourse of body from it – though the preoccupation with body is not pronounced openly. Through the categories of health, sexuality and morality nationalism aims to regulate and discipline the citizens’ bodies, so the gendered and sexualized national order persists. In case of Ukrainian nationalism, as exemplified by Svoboda, it is clear that through the mobilization of themes of Christianity, traditional values, immigration and health, the normal Ukrainian body is seen as white, heterosexual, able to procreate and healthy (not drinking/smoking and sporty). Therefore, all other bodies are excluded through the category of “sexual perversion” (LGBT), visible difference of skin color (migrants), refusal/inability to procreate (childless people and women who aborted their fetuses and again LGBT) or refusal (or inability) to have a healthy lifestyle (smokers, drinkers, drug-addicts or just not sporty people or

35www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/038372/ (accessed 27.02.2014)
people with special needs). Once again, there is assumed to be the correlation between right body type and proper behavior and vice versa.

Svoboda has been the main political force that openly voices very exclusive version of nationalism. After having the picture of its view on the bodies and sexualities, I turn to everyday nationalism of my respondents and show how certain nationalistic ideas voiced by far right Svoboda find their place in the heads of people that don't even identify as nationalists.
4. Guarding gender binaries, policing sexualities for the sake of the nation

I am in the student restaurant in one of the buildings of Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. The room is quite big with a lot of light. All the tables are covered with clean tablecloths, which, along with carpets on the floor make the room look simultaneously expensive and funny, as one does not usually expect to see student restaurant decorated in such a way. Lunch break has already finished, so it is not crowded at all, there are just few people. The majority of them are girls. It is not surprising, given the fact that in this building mainly language departments are situated, and as on the post socialist space in particular, education is heavily gendered: humanities and social sciences are occupied predominantly by women. What is very noticeable is their being very well-groomed. Generally, they wear long hair (that is brushed and clean) and some make up; their clothing accentuates their slender figures. As I show in this chapter, the beautiful body is frequently equated with the healthy body and therefore with sanity and morality, so looking after one's body becomes of primary importance. The beautiful body is seen as capable of moderation and self-restraint – the key elements of the proper national body.

Attention to one's appearance and to one's body is precisely the topic I am interested in – the disciplining practices that aim to shape one's body in relation to a certain ideal can tell a lot about people's attitude to such topics as morality, health and finally the nation. Internalized and not reflected upon, these practices of the body are also rituals of everyday nationalism. Talking to the respondents about their attitudes to bodies and appearance in general, about their bodies and their appearance, I revealed that many of them (both male and female) highlighted the
importance of make-up, different cosmetic procedures and bodily techniques (such as sport). In this chapter I will focus on their perspectives body practices, showing how they are gendered, sexualized and used to sustain gender binarism, which is further used to naturalize heterosexuality and the nation. In order to focus on reproduction and the importance of heterosexuality for my respondents, I start with an outline of why gender binarism and gender-appropriate behavior are valued by my respondents – as heterosexuality is founded on the premise that there exist two genders that are attracted to one another.

It is important for many nationalist projects to sustain proper masculinity/femininity division – as coding gender identities in the binary way allows nationalism to institutionalize sexism and take heterosexuality for granted as the only normal and healthy sexuality and therefore sexuality by default (Peterson 1999). Mosse stressed that lesbian and gay people sometimes sought inclusion into the nation by “emphasizing their masculinity or femininity and deemphasizing their passion” (1988:109) – thus, they also adhered to the masculine/feminine gender binaries. A binary coding of gender and tough rules of gender-appropriate behavior become an inherent feature of nationalistic ideologies as they make possible to establish heterosexuality as the norm – its importance is the outcome of nationalism's preoccupation with procreation and reproduction. Thus, nationalism sets its standards of proper masculinity/femininity and gender-appropriate behavior – coding masculinity as the opposite of femininity (Karlin 2002; Nagel 1998) and seeing the core of femininity in both biological and symbolical reproduction of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997). This way, the bodies are policed according to the standards of gender-appropriate behavior set by nationalism, hence, the bodies that transgress gender binarism are regarded as inappropriate and dangerous. I start this chapter
by showing the importance of gender binarism and gender-appropriate body practices mentioned by the respondents and further move to the discussion of homosexuality, heterosexuality and the importance of reproduction, finishing by showing the links between the topic of reproduction and national belonging.

4.1 “It seems that before we had men and women, separately, and now we have a kind of middle gender...” (Alina)

During my interviews with university students conducted in spring and summer 2013, it became clear that one of the most popular practice associated with femininity was that of make-up. The idea of make-up was evoked as the main signifier of femininity. Men who wear make-up were thus discredited as feminine and possibly homosexuals. “Make-up should be used in order to emphasize certain features of one’s appearance... Though... it depends on person's needs. Women's nature of men-hunting led to this, that women use make-up and paint nails; it is a kind of a desire to differ,” - says Anna. She is 21, studies philosophy and identifies as apolitical. Our talk takes place in the park, so sometimes other people pass nearby but Anna does not seem to care about it. She is quite categorical and emotional in her judgments. Anna uses make-up every day in order to correct certain features of her appearance. She seems to be quite attentive to her appearance and to pay a lot of attention to her body – pursuing the internalized ideal of feminine appearance: big eyes with expressive eyelashes (she uses mascara to make her eyelashes more pronounced). During the interview she wears make-up that emphasizes her eyelashes; she wears a mini skirt, emphasizing her long slender legs, and has long dyed hair. Her overall appearance
might be well classified as the one that goes in line with post-Soviet norms of female beauty: long unfettered hair, make-up and clothes that emphasize one's bodily advantages (Azhgikhina and Gosciło 1996). It is important to note how Anna naturalizes in her speech (by referring to “women's nature of men-hunting”) certain practices used by women as if these practices have some background in nature/biology.

I ask Anna about make-up for men, as maybe they also want to correct some of their features. She answers that it is quite okay for men to use after-shave lotions or powder to hide an irritation of skin, but it is not acceptable for men to use more make-up: “if a guy starts to pencil his eyes or to use mascara... o my gosh... this is really horrible.” She does not say why and what is particularly wrong with men who wear make-up. Given the fact of “East European” homophobia and constant emphasis on proper masculinity as heterosexual masculinity (Graff 2009), it is possible to hypothesize that men with make-up are seen as improper men: they are probably gays or transvestites if they wear it in public. Certainly, in this framework being gay or being a transvestite is not being a man; because the very idea of manliness is constructed against the idea of femininity, so manliness is the relational category that can only exist “in front of and for other men and against femininity” (Bourdieu 2001:53). Moreover, “feminized” version of masculinity can be regarded as degenerative to the nation (Karlin 2002).

In this framework, men are allowed to use make-up only if they are performing on stage, their masculinity is not doubted on stage. Still, they are denied to be “proper man” if they use make-up (or other signifiers of femininity) in everyday settings. During one of the interviews, when asked about make up for men, Ilia (21, studies social work, identifies as liberal) told me a story how he and his friend when sitting in a bar, met a man who was wearing make-up, female
shoes and asked people to refer to him/her with a feminine pronoun and name. The interview also took place in the public space – we were sitting on a bench in the park – but Ilia also didn't seem to be restricted by this. He told me that he found the situation in the bar strange and improper, adding that “probably, I have a negative attitude towards things like that” and “this is too much, it is not healthy... this setting does not fit my worldview”. It is interesting that Ilia described the situation in terms of health, implying that lack of masculinity (that is achieved through wearing clothes associated with femininity and the practice of make-up) is unhealthy. If we recall that health is often evoked to stand for “something good” (Klein 2010) and for morality, it becomes possible to argue that labeling someone's appearance as unhealthy is the same as calling it immoral. Ilia's aversion to this man and seeing him “unhealthy” can be explained by the internalized notions of correlation between beauty, health and morality; in the framework that has been established since the 19th century the beautiful body is the healthy body, argue Gilman (1995) and Mosse (1988). So, the beautiful male body should avoid any signs of femininity (Mosse 1996).

Masculinity is seen by the respondents as the natural feature – one is a man, one performs masculinity. In this framework gender is naturalized and is seen as derivative from sex, so gender is also essentialized and interpreted through the framework of heterosexuality. Hence, displaying feminine features (like make-up) questions one's masculinity. When I ask Olga (22, studies folklore, identifies as apolitical) about men and make-up, she answers that “generally, if a person plays in the theater – why not? If he needs it for the profession – then yes. But if it is in the everyday life – it is not acceptable. It is really strange and uaugh.” As an example of her own discomfort Olga recalls the example of her male group mates, some of whom are very
“effeminate” because they are painting nails – Olga cannot reconcile feminine practice of painting nails with the otherwise masculine appearance of her male group mates. Therefore, this practice makes them effeminate for her.

Effeminate men – men engaging into the bodily practices that are ascribed to females – make many of my respondents uncomfortable. Masculinity, on the contrary, is quite often cited as a necessary feature of a man. Clearly, man's appearance is very important for many respondents, as it is precisely the appearance (including the body) that has to signal about masculinity. Alina (19, studies philosophy and identifies as apolitical) told me that

“Man – first of all, he has to be manly, masculine, and his appearance has to talk about it. He has to be a bit beefy... (...) I am very irritated by this trend among men to wear small bags and shoes – I am really irritated. It seems that before we had men and women, separately, and now we have a kind of middle gender... Briefly, a man has to be manly. I know it is tautology, but it is all that I want to say.”

It is not quite clear to me what she means under the word “before”, what shift she alludes to. Presumably, Alina refers either to the spreading of metrosexuality that has been in fashion for the last couple of years or to the unnoticed idealized version of the past, that nationalism likes to recall.

Similar to Alina’s description of the male body are Inna's (21, studies sociology, identifies as liberal) thoughts on how the man has to look like: “broad shoulders, strong hands... and the absence of the ugly beer belly. Also, I like tall men.” Mosse claims that guarding the standards of manliness usually serves the purpose of guarding the existing order of things and that “manliness symbolized the nation's spiritual and material vitality” (1988:23). He also argues that gay people are frequently not seen as belonging to proper masculinity/femininity division and on these
grounds they are refused inclusion to national the community. Taking into consideration Alina's strong anti-gay position (she said that Catholicism that she identifies with is against homosexuality and she supports this position), I assume that first and foremost gay men (and only then metrosexuals) were denoted under the word “middle gender”. So, stepping out of the things appropriate to one's gender is seen unnatural and not moral.

Similarly, in the national imaginary there are also rather strict definitions of what is appropriate for a woman; not surprisingly, appropriate appearance and behavior are very connected to the idea of femininity. When talking about women bodies, respondents often told me that the woman's body has to have a “feminine figure”, to be of “feminine shape”. Femininity is frequently defined through reproduction and the ability to please the male gaze – so the ideal feminine shape is the hourglass figure, which Susan Bordo interprets as “the most literal symbolic form of maternal femininity” (1993:104). Still, the appearance is also important as “femininity is imposed for the most part through an unremitting discipline that concerns every part of the body and is continuously recalled through the constraints of clothing and hairstyle.” (Bourdieu 2001:27). Thus, in order to perform the right type of femininity it is necessary to demonstrate the proper shape (highlighting one's reproductive capacities), as well as the proper look — make-up, hairstyle, and clothing.

Nearly all respondents denounced overweight women, highlighting that a woman should be well-groomed and look after her body: diet and do sports in order to keep it in the proper shape. Interestingly, many respondents also denounced “too slim” bodies, labeling them as anorexic and therefore unhealthy. Bordo (1993) argues that anorexia and obesity constitute the extreme points of contemporary culture: obesity comes to signify excessive consumption and
therefore the lack of ability to restrain and master oneself, which is so important for modern ideology of the body. On the other side, anorexia is the negation of consumption. What is especially telling is that the ideal body shape of contemporary world, this slender, neither obese nor anorexic, female body is an outcome of the modern “tyranny of slenderness” that was born in the 19th century. This “tyranny of slenderness” was the result of a tacit equation of one's bodily shape with one's inner qualities and capabilities, it has functioned as a social norm along with the imperative to self-management, creating bodies that were not only constantly self-disciplined, but this disciplining process was internalized, so the aspired bodily shape was also constantly (re)naturalized. But as the nature has to be managed by people, the body also does not have to be in excess: “as the body itself is dominantly imagined within the West as belonging to the “nature” side of a nature/culture duality, the more body one has had, the more uncultured and uncivilized one has been expected to be” (Bordo 1993:195). These standards of self-discipline that form alongside with nationalism are of extreme importance to women, as women are imagined as guardians of both public and private order and traditional values (Mosse 1988). Moreover, women's bodies are important as a site of biological and symbolic reproduction of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997). Women are to signify and reproduce it.

The body – that comes to stand as a signifier of moral qualities – is central to nationalism, because of the assumption of correlation between beauty, health and morality. Consequently, different bodily practices, such as sport, dieting and using make-up become endowed with the special meaning; they stand to signify self-disciplining and self-mastering. With the help of these practices individuals police and master their bodies; the more routine and habitual the practices become, the more important they are – as they start to constitute everyday routine that is
reproduced without reflection. Taking into consideration the centrality of the body to nationalism, it is important to count on the different bodily practices and techniques with the help of which a nation is manifested and reproduced on everyday basis – through policing one's gestures, clothing, and body shape so they are in line with the interests of the nation.

“Our [Ukrainian] girls are really very beautiful, it is... both because of their behavior and genes. Yes, genes – we [Ukrainians] really have extremely beautiful girls”. - Nadia (20, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical) seemed to be sure in this. It is quite telling, how “Ukrainian” as beautiful is naturalized in her answer by the reference to genes, as if there were “Ukrainian” genes responsible for beauty. It is also important to note Nadia's use of deixis “we” to signify Ukrainians. According to Skey (2011), such unconscious discursive moves allow people to produce group solidarity and express bonding. Though they seem to be quite innocent, with the help of such discursive constructions, because they are so routinized, the nation and the division of the world into different nations (us/them divide) becomes naturalized. Moreover, with the help of such routinized actions, argues Billig (1995), the nation and national belonging are enhanced – because they become installed in the daily practices.

Disdaining overweight people and blaming them for the lack of control and will is an example of body policing one routinely encounters. In her appraisal of slenderness, Nadia told me that slenderness means “that these people do not eat too much, and I like it, I consider overeating as gluttony; moreover it says they are active in their life, and this, once again, is what I like”. Anna blamed a well-known female TV-host for having too much fat on her arms; Anna wondered why she can't “do something” about that, for example “hiring a coach who'd help her to work out”. Anna summed up her view of the ideal woman's body this way: “for me, the
female figure is a well-groomed figure; it should be well-groomed; woman has to look after herself”. Vitaliy (23, studies economics, identifies as liberal) said that ideal female body means “weight control, shape control”. Slenderness and the absence of fat are considered as the outcomes of one's attempts to control and shape one's body. These attempts are highly praised as they are interpreted as the signs of one's active way of life and the desire to self-master. The images of slender feminine figures that my respondents evoked and described as exemplary of ideal women's bodies fall in the framework described by Bordo and Mosse. This positioning of well-groomed and well-mastered women's bodies as ideals is partially an outcome of the internalized images derived from nationalistic images of the body that has been at work since the 19th century.

Another interesting reference that popped up in the speech of many respondents was the reference to “nature”. Interestingly, “nature” was mentioned predominantly in the discussion of female bodies and was hardly evoked as a necessary feature of the male body. Zhenia (20, studies sociology, identifies as a leftist) described the ideal female body as the one that “lacks artificiality”. She labeled “artificial” “too many earrings, for instance, piercing, I don't like it. And also make-up and dyed hair”. Anita (19, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical) also disapproved dyed hair, saying it is not natural and it is better to stick to your natural hair color. Overall, I quite often heard the magic saying that “what is natural cannot be ugly”. These utterances remind us of Mosse's claims that seeing beauty in the “naturalness” as opposed to “artificiality” is a successful trick of nationalism, when “naturalness” comes to be the only possible criteria for classifying something as beauty (1988). Equating beauty (especially female beauty) with the nature often leads to putting additional value on reproductive capacities – seeing
a reproduction as natural and desired process and the pregnant body as natural and beautiful. Consequently, it frequently means seeing heterosexuality as natural and therefore the only normal sexuality – the one that results in procreation.

Considering the topic of “naturalness”, it is important to mention the rhetoric my respondents used to describe a pregnant female body. Taking into account what I mentioned above, it is not surprising that a pregnant body was seen as natural and therefore beautiful. Some people even argued that it is not sensual beauty that makes it beautiful, but the very fact of “new life” inside this body. For instance, Ihor (23, studies political science, identifies as liberal) said that a pregnant body “is very beautiful, but not because of physical appearance of the woman, but because she carries a baby. This is beauty for me. This is beautiful because it is a new life”. The link between reproduction, pregnancy (viewed as a natural feature of women) and beauty is quite obvious in his speech. Likewise, Zhenia described her attitude towards a pregnant body: “Naturalness is the feature of beauty as well. [...] Yes, pregnant body is beautiful. Even if a woman is not dressed super nicely, if she has some strange clothes on her, it is not pushing you away. Yes, it is beautiful, undoubtedly”. Similarly to Ihor, Zhenia downplayed the sensual part of pregnant body's beauty and highlighted the fact of pregnancy as a sign of procreation and possibly fertility. Seeing pregnant body as beautiful because of the pregnancy recalls racial medical discourses of the fin de siécle, when both health of a woman and her beauty were associated with positive reproductive capacities (Gilman 1995:58). It also recalls the discourse of nationalism – as it often grants women the roles of “patron saints and mothers of the family and the nation” (Mosse 1988:105) – so motherhood becomes to be the bodily expression of proper femininity.
Speaking about pregnancy and beauty, it was also quite common for respondents to mention that female beauty during pregnancy depends much on the presence of the father. Alina said that

“When pregnant, a woman should feel that a man is nearby; she should know that the father of her child is near. And then she will be happy, she will be beautiful, her eyes will shine... She will be even sexy. Obviously, if a woman is alone during pregnancy, then it is an ugly and pitiful creature.”

Heterosexual coupling and female dependence on the male is taken for granted in her response. Male respondents were also eager to say that the presence of a man is necessary for a woman to be beautiful. For instance, Ostap (19, studies philosophy, identifies as liberal) claimed that “if a woman is pregnant from a man that loves her, then it is a pleasure to see it; because soon a woman will give birth and there is high probability that a child will be beautiful as well”. Ostap emphasized the necessity of father's presence not only as the sine qua non of woman's beauty but also as a condition of a child's beauty. Again, heterosexuality and man's leading role are highlighted as necessary conditions that make a woman beautiful. Interestingly, the aspect of sensuousness is downplayed here. A pregnant body is perceived as beautiful not as a body but more as a signifier of heterosexuality and procreation. Arguing about the image of beauty that nationalism upholds, Mosse stresses that this image quite often transcends sensuousness, redirecting people's passions “to a higher purpose” (1988:11). Possibly, in the aforementioned cases it is the purpose of a big heterosexual family.

It is not surprising then that feminism was perceived by the respondents as something strange because of its claims of gender equality. Rostyslav (22, studies history, identifies as a social democrat) said that “true feminism is feminism in the mines”. He meant that if feminists
want gender equality, they have to go to the mines and to do male work, implying that there are some natural differences between men and women that one can’t overcome - thus, demanding equal roles for them is strange. He was supported by Ostap, who claimed that “women are physically less strong than men”. Further, Rostyslav noted that

“feminists exaggerate, equal rights – this is wonderful, nobody is against that, but when feminists try to perform men's role – then they do not have to be surprised that men are trying to perform women's roles, that men became weak and so on – to each its own. That is the first point. Secondly, there are indeed some...not limitations but differences. Somehow... 50% of students are female but among professors there are many times fewer women. I am not saying that women are dull, God forbid. But a man is a strategist, a woman is a tactician. Something like this.”

Naturalizing in his answer the social phenomenon of the glass ceiling, Rostyslav aimed to prove how naturally different men and women are – both in terms of bodies and in terms of social roles, highlighting that one's mental abilities (strategist or tactician) result from the body one has. His anxiety is understandable – as undermining the male-female role division is undermining the foundation of gender-appropriate behavior and consequently of gender binarism and the normalcy of heterosexuality. Masculinity/femininity distinction has been the imperative of modernity and nationalism (Mosse 1988) and questioning it means jeopardizing the existing order of things.

4.2 “It is really difficult for me to imagine a healthy family that consists of people with non-traditional sexual orientation” (Vitaliy)

Guarding gender binaries is very important for naturalizing heterosexuality and viewing
homosexuality as one of the possible manifestations of transgressed gender norms. Given the overall importance of gender binarism, quite a lot respondents said that they have a negative attitude towards homosexuality and homosexual people. It seemed that respondents were quite polite and tried to be as correct as they could when framing their attitude towards homosexuality. They frequently made pauses in their speech to look for the appropriate word. Presumably, internalized standards of political correctness shaping their language and keeping them away from straightforwardly labeling homosexual people as perverts are the result of the identity tensions Ukraine faces. On the one hand, in the public discourse homosexuality is widely denounced (I have mentioned homophobic statements of far right Svoboda party in chapter 3 and briefly mentioned the omnipresence of homophobia in public discourse in Introduction). On the other hand, Ukraine aspires to assert its “European” identity, which means also adopting anti-discriminating legislation and pursuing LGBTQ rights.

Caught on this crossroads, the respondents seemed to police their speech on the issue. Still, even in the very self-censored answers a little homophobia could be traced. For instance, Vitaliy claimed that

“I can't say I have a really bad attitude towards it [homosexuality] or I am homophobic... But generally, I think that it is bad; I think it is not good for society. It is really difficult for me to imagine a healthy family that consists of people with non-traditional sexual orientation and it is difficult for me to imagine how these people will raise their kids.”

Further, he concluded that he did not find it necessary to prohibit homosexuality, but rather to “softly limit it, for example by contrasting with more orthodox relationships, as more healthy and natural”. Homosexuality is not seen by Vitaliy as healthy and as a variation of the “norm”. Homosexuality is more about deviance. Obviously, heterosexuality is naturalized in his answer –
it is seen as the only normal sexuality.

Vitaliy is not the only one who would like to regulate sexualities. For instance, Alina said she would support legislation that would criminalize homosexuality and/or its “propaganda”: “women-women and man-man – it is not natural; they can't have children. There, abroad, where this practice [same-sex marriages] is legalized... think how it harms child's psyche when they are adopted to such kind of a family. It is abnormal. It is unnatural. Man was not created for this.” Alina alluded to two similar homophobic bills that were registered in Ukrainian Parliament during 2011-2012 – bill #8711 titled “Amending some legislative acts (considering children right to safe media space)” and bill #10290 titled “Criminalizing propaganda of homosexuality aimed at children”. Both bills were copied from similar Russian legislation that was adopted in several regions of the country. Though Ukrainian politics is marked by the attempts to break away from Russia, Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms are very similar in some aspects. For instance, in their homophobia, heteronormativity and heterosexism.

More softly, Ihor claimed that he would also support criminalization of “propaganda of homosexuality”. When asked to define what propaganda would mean, he said that he would treat a billboard with two men kissing or LGBT pride as such. To support his claims in favor of criminalizing “propaganda of homosexuality”, Ihor argued that “a healthy family – a man and a woman – they don’t go to the streets and shout that they have each other. So why would someone shout that he has a boyfriend”. As Graff notes, in the case of homosexual people, the issues of representation and visibility are often regarded as an imposition and a request for domination, which makes homophobic rhetoric similar to racism – it is thought that “they” want to impose themselves on “us” (2006).
The need to regulate sexuality is quite apparent in the above mentioned answers. The majority of respondents seem to be okay with marginalizing homosexuals by stressing the normalcy of heterosexuality. Seen as natural and tied to the issue of reproduction, “compulsory heterosexuality” (Rich 1980) is the main condition of being normal, so homosexuality is pushed to the margins as unhealthy, as a disease. Rubin (1984) in one of her well-known articles on sexuality shows how the discourses about sexualities become medicalized and frequently used as an example of deviations:

“low status sex practices are vilified as mental diseases or symptoms of defective personality integration. In addition, psychological terms conflate difficulties of psycho-dynamic functioning with modes of erotic conduct. [...] These terminological muddles have become powerful stereotypes that are indiscriminately applied to individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation” (1984:280).

This way homophobia works to enhance people's sense of belonging into the community of normals. Certainly, these claims for belonging are quite often reinforced by nationalistic rhetoric.

Hand-in-hand with the issue of heterosexuality goes the issue of reproduction – as homosexual people are often blamed for not being able to procreate (as well as jeopardizing the existing order by transgressing the boundaries of gender appropriate behavior). The need to procreate is not doubted and questioned; having children is seen as an obligation. Interestingly, all respondents but one expressed their willingness to have children; among those who wanted to have them only one person wanted to adopt a child. Heterosexuality, heterosexual families with children were seen by my respondents as healthy and normal. “A healthy family is when they can have children,” - summed up Ihor. Another respondent, Valentin (20, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical), said he would not like to live near homosexuals, because they cannot procreate and
because they can affect negatively his own children. When asked whether procreation is important, Valentin answered that yes, it is and that his own personal ideal is having two children – a boy and a girl, because a family consists of two parents of two genders, thus it is necessary to have balance, that is why he would like to have two children of different genders. Again, the importance of gender binarism as a necessary condition for heterosexuality and reproduction is highlighted.

When asked about homosexual people and adoption, many respondents were hesitant. Lilia (23, does cultural studies, identifies as apolitical), who said that she is okay with homosexual people and does not support homophobic bills, was very careful when talking on this issue: “adoption by homosexuals... well, I am not saying it should be prohibited, but it should be approached more carefully. Well, because when a child grows up in a homosexual family, it might somehow affect the kid, the kid may develop a different understanding of relationships”. Given the context (Lilia said it in the discussion on homosexuality that took place in the mini focus group), it is possible to argue that under the word “different” she meant the possibility of non-heterosexual relationship. Possibly, she wanted to frame it carefully, in the correct manner. Vitaliy said he would rather support “severe limiting of adoption by homosexuals” because “children that grew up with homosexual parents are more inclined to deviations” and “have a less strong nervous system”. He concluded that “orthodox couples bring children up better”. Somehow, homosexual people are viewed as less capable of bringing children up. Presumably, this view is fueled by the belief that homosexuality is not natural: thus, if they cannot have children, they cannot be capable of bringing them up. As if the ability to procreate was connected to the ability to be a good parent. Graff (2006) mentions that
homosexuality (unlike heterosexuality) is perceived to be just about sex. Thus, homosexual people are seen as improper parents – because of the stereotype of their hypersexuality. Moreover, when heterosexuality is equated with nature, then homosexuality is pushed to margins and regarded as a perverted type of sexuality. This way, homosexual people are seen as sexual perverts and people who cannot be trusted children.

Discussing the topic of reproduction, it was difficult to omit the topic of abortion – what is respondent's attitude toward it, whether they think it should be legal or prohibited. Though the majority of respondents admitted that it is a difficult question for them to talk about and that it is a very tricky topic, still, they were able to formulate their standpoint. About half of the respondents (both males and females) were against abortion, though they also said that it should not be prohibited as sometimes people use it because of the medical conditions. Still, abortion was framed in the rhetoric of personal irresponsibility and referred to as murder. Anita said that her attitude towards abortion is “absolutely negative” because people “should think [before having sex]” and that “having sex when you're 16 is not okay and normal”. From her point of view it was necessary to wait until the marriage in order not to have unexpected consequences. Similarly, Nadia claimed that “when a pregnant woman decides to undergo abortion, she decides for someone else. Therefore, she limits someone's freedom and deprives another person the right to life”. Nadia said that she would never go for an abortion, even if her pregnancy was unplanned and her future husband was against it, still, she would keep the baby. Generally, respondents were framing the issue of abortion in the terms that one had to “think before”.

Nadia’s rhetoric that abortion means deciding for someone else is similar to nationalist anti-abortion rhetoric that was used for some time in state-socialist Hungary, when abortion was
positioned as “unhealthy individualism”, as not considering the interests of others (Gal 1994). Interestingly, the majority of respondents did not hesitate to treat a fetus as a person. “As for me, from the moment of conception it is already a human,” - said Denis (21, studies history, identifies as liberal), arguing against abortion and claiming it to be a murder. Nadia's, Anita's and Denis' attitudes recall Ukrainian nationalism's attitude to abortion exemplified in Svoboda's rhetoric discussed in chapter 3 – framing abortion as an “attempted murder” and seeing it as a cause of demographic crisis and as a question of national scale that can't be taken care of individually. My respondents' views on abortion also recall Svoboda's reminders that women should behave properly, have an “ordered way of life” and not get pregnant if they don't want to. Inspiring women “to have an ordered way of life” (for the benefit of the nation) sounds similar to claims to respectability and morality that have been going hand-in-hand with nationalism since 19th century (Mosse 1988).

Conversations about reproduction were frequently permeated with xenophobia and references to the nation. Anita and Valentin said they appreciate politics of restriction of reproduction in case of China, because if this politics was not introduced, “all Ukraine would be now populated by Chinese people”. Further, Valentin stressed that he would not like to have a Chinese wife, because “you can't get away from Chinese genes. Even blacks are better at this point... with Chinese, all your offspring will have narrow eyes and a flat face”. As in the case before, when Nadia naturalized the beauty of Ukrainian girls through the reference to genes, Valentin uncritically established a racist link, reducing being “Chinese” to genes responsible for “narrow eyes and a flat face”.

The topic of intermarriage helped to reveal xenophobia, stereotyping and the importance
of national belonging, as well as the perceived normalcy of Ukrainians in contrast to other nationalities. Olga said she would never marry a foreigner, because “it is impossible to be open with people of another mentality”, drawing an example of Americans who seem to her “produced on the production line, plastic, like hamburgers in McDonalds” and of Jews, among who “there are many weak people, because they were living in the closed groups and intermarried between themselves”. Lilia said she is “afraid of Muslim countries and Muslims”, claiming that she heard about incidents somewhere in England, when some girls were verbally abused for wearing short skirts and drinking beer in public. In these narratives, different nationalities are successfully othered and attributed some dangerous and/or unpleasant features which are naturalized as inherent to certain nationalities or ethnicities. The consequent outcome of othering different nationalities is an emphasis of one's own nationality and its importance for oneself and for one's future offspring as well. “My children... my inner feeling is that — yes, they should be Ukrainians,” - claimed Ihor. He did not say why and it is not surprising — in the context of continuous othering and stereotyping, it is important to secure one's sense of self and one's belonging to some collectivity; therefore, such uncritical remarks towards different nationalities and ethnicities might be seen as manifestations of “banal nationalism”.

Thus, my respondents seem to very anxious about the appearance or behavior that transgress gender binarism. Given the nationalist context of their narratives, such kind of appearance or behavior are seen as jeopardizing the existing gender and sexual order of things. Not surprisingly, many of my respondents valued heterosexuality and saw it as the only healthy and normal sexuality – because it results into procreation, which was very important for them. Thus, they seem to be fine with policing sexualities and both their own and other people’s
bodies. Some of them even said they would support legislation criminalizing homosexual behavior. Given the importance of procreation, my respondents generally had a negative attitude towards abortion, regarding it as a result of women's improper behavior – as inability to restrain themselves and to be moderate. Moreover, in general the respondents were against intermarriages as their narratives about other nationalities were frequently permeated with xenophobia and stereotyping, which can be seen as traces of their worldview of banal nationalism.
5. Defining the im/proper

When I ask to describe the ideal body he’d like to have, Vitaliy says:

“Well... speaking about ideal male body, I think it is this ancient Greek standard... Reasonable physical complexion, adequate muscularity, not being super beefy, when you can open beer cans with your muscles. I would say reasonable and healthy physiologically developed muscles, like this. If to look at the majority of well-known film stars who play heroes ... I can say I like the bodies of these people.”

He is not the only one to value muscularity and hero-type masculinity, responses of this kind were quite popular among both male and female respondents. Consequently, many of them in their discussions of the body emphasized the necessity of sport for beautiful body shape and healthy body.

In this chapter I explore the interconnections between the categories of sport, health, beauty, and morality in order to see how the ideal Ukrainian body is imagined in reference to them. I argue that the ideal body is constituted in contrast to the improper bodies of visible minorities, homosexuals or not sporty people. I show that the proper physical body is also endowed with moral virtues. I argue that inquiring about the category of health sheds light on the practices that are thought of as necessary for disciplining and policing one’s body. Finally, I illustrate how the health of the individual is connected to that of the nation.

5.1. Sport, beauty, nationalism

‘If you ask people why they practice sport, most people refer to in their answer to health as a primary value. Health is the fundamental condition to live, work, enjoy and to consume. Health is important for quality of life. [...] For centuries the health effect of bodily movements has also been propagated in moral-ethical terms. In the eighteenth century it was the pedagogue Salzmann who institutionalized gymnastics, hoping that as a consequence he could banish
sexual immoral behavior in youth. At the beginning of the 19th century Friedrich Ludwig Jahn laid the foundations for the German practice of gymnastics. Gymnastics made able-bodied men out of individuals, who were then able to fight for the health of a whole (German) nation.” (van Hilvoorde 2001:59).

I concluded from the interviews that for many respondents sport is the signifier of health, which is in turn frequently interpreted as a moral duty. In the discussions sport was frequently tied not only to the physical/physiological health, but also to the moral and spiritual well-being. A healthy person was imagined as not only physically healthy; the physical health was seen as a guarantee of internal, mental order. Mosse notes that nationalism requires that individuals master and police their bodies to keep themselves physically and morally healthy – so, individuals' desires do not come into conflict “with the demands of society, then family and state” (1988:11) because if they do, then “the foundations of the legal and moral order, would cease to exist.” (1988:11). Thus, individual's disciplining of the body is the prerequisite of the social order. Alina (19, studies philosophy and identifies as apolitical) told me:

“A healthy way of life... We can isolate two aspects here, one is spiritual and the other is bodily. If we speak about bodily aspect, it means to get rid of bad habits: drinking alcohol, smoking and so on. And, certainly, to do sport. And to walk a lot. ... And also the spiritual aspect. I think these two have to be together, the other way it will be extreme. For example, I believe in God, so I go to church, it is very important for me. So, I can't imagine not going there for a month, I need spiritual balance...”

In her response a healthy body is connected to “spirituality” – person's mental order. Adopting her framework of thinking, it would be problematic to imagine a person possessing just the healthy body, as being healthy implies also having healthy mind.

When I asked Anita to describe what it means to be healthy or to conduct a healthy way of living, she said that healthy way of living is a
“set of practices. It is a set of both physical and spiritual practices. One of the examples of such healthy way of life but that was developed not in our country is yoga. It is spiritual plus physical. But if to take the context of our everyday life, it is possible to say that physical side can be jogging, going to the gym or doing minimum of the morning exercises, and the spiritual is, for instance, philosophy and religion. Or even vice versa, first comes religion, then philosophy.”

It is quite easy to infer from her response that religion is for Anita an inherent part of being healthy, as healthy body comes only coupled with healthy (for instance, religious) mind. However, when talking about sport as a prerequisite for health, the respondents also mentioned that there is an upper boundary, that sometimes too much sport is not healthy, concentrating just on the body and not caring about one's internal order is not healthy. Olga said that it is not right when “a person who has been doing sports for all their life stops thinking whether something is beneficial or harmful... if there is an attitude like I want to achieve this result despite anything – then it has nothing to do with health.” Similarly, Anita mentioned that

“you have to love your body but you have to be moderate. To look after it – this is great. But what is important is not to fall in love with your body so you stop seeing everything else and stop caring about people’s relationships... But just looking after your body – yes, it is good, but as I have said, it should be done moderately.”

Thus, from the respondents' point of view, sport is very important for both physical and moral health – but sport is important when it is practiced moderately. Too little or too much of it is harmful for one's health. The ability to be moderate, to restrain oneself is key to the modern understanding of a proper body, argues Mosse (1988). In chapter 3 I demonstrated that in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism, the proper body is seen as a sporty body that lacks bad habits and that this body is thought of as a signifier of moral qualities in contrast to a non-sporty body or a body of a drinker/smoker that are associated with lack of moderation and licentious behavior.
When Anita finished talking about a healthy way of life from her perspective, Vita (21, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical) stepped in, saying that she totally agrees that “sport is very important for moral... for both moral and physical health”. Talking about sports, the respondents quite often mentioned its connection to body and health. For instance, Alina said that:

“If a body... for instance, if a man has muscular body, it means he is sporty, consequently, he is strong. These are my thoughts... Similarly, if a woman looks after her body, if she exercises, then she is... like a mainspring, she can dance or walk for a long time. And it is very important. Yes. Beautiful body, yes, if you can see that it is a sporty body – well, then yes, it is a sign of health.”

She openly stated that beauty is a sign of health. Her concept of beauty is inspired with the ideas of sport, muscularity and self-disciplining.

The existence of the link between beauty and health was not questioned by the respondents. Rostyslav (22, studies history, identifies as a social democrat) and Anna (21, studies philosophy, identifies as apolitical) both said that they can determine whether a person is healthy by looking at person's body. They claimed that if a person is beautiful and smiling, this person is undoubtedly healthy. Similarly, Nadia stressed that “if something is wrong with the person from inside – you can always see it on their body”. Thus, for many of the respondents “the size and shape of the body has come to operate as a marker of personal, internal order (or disorder) – as a symbol for the state of soul” (Bordo 1993:94). Not surprisingly, a healthy person was consequently regarded as a beautiful person and vice versa. The ideal body, the beautiful body was often interpreted as bearing all signs of health: both physical and mental. “Yes, undoubtedly, I think that everybody should do some sport. [...] Sport is useful for everything. Even if you are
just going to gym and pushing weight – it is good for your health. Overall, a sound mind in a healthy body,” Vitaliy told me.

The equation of healthy and beautiful and vice versa was treated by the respondents as evident. In chapter 4 I showed that the respondents frequently used the saying “what is natural cannot be ugly” in order to back up their claims that naturalness is the synonym for beauty. Given the equation of health and beauty, naturalness comes to play as the third part of this equation. Thus, being healthy means not only being beautiful but also living in harmony with nature. The dangers of this chain are described by Mosse, who shows how this view can be mobilized in order to exclude certain people from the nation on the grounds of being unhealthy and therefore sinful. “Vice and virtue became a matter of health and sickness. To remain healthy entailed a willingness to follow the dictates of nature, which supported the new respectability. Sickness was a consequence of crimes against nature, which if they could not be cured, must lead to decline and death.” (Mosse 1988:13).

My respondents are students and this category faces extremely strong disciplining of bodies. Nationalisms frequently represent themselves through the images of young, sporty and healthy bodies (Mosse 1988). Thus, they attempt to educate young people to self-discipline, to be moderate and restraint. They urge youth to engage into sport in order to have a healthy and slender body. They cultivate in men strength and muscularity, as every proper men has to be ready to become a hero and thus to represent the nation.

Interestingly enough, many respondents claimed that they try to stick to a healthy way of life and to do some sports when they have some free time. Many of them said that if they had more free time, they would practice sport even more. Certainly, the responses to the question
which kind(s) of sport they would like to engage into if they had time were very gendered: female respondents frequently mentioned gymnastics, aerobics, swimming and dance. Male respondents mentioned football, basketball and martial arts. Given the meaning attached to martial arts in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism, I would like to discuss this issue in more detail.

Social scientists agree that martial arts are tightly connected to the notions of masculinity and violence. Ian Wellard argues that “participation in violent sports, especially those with a potential for injury, reinforces and naturalizes notions of masculinity that value physical dominance” (2009:15). Similarly, Bourdieu stresses that “manliness, understood as sexual or social reproductive capacity, but also as the capacity to fight and to exercise violence (especially in acts of revenge), is first and foremost a duty.” (2001:51) that “leads to sometimes frantic investment in all the masculine games of violence, such as sports in modern societies, and most especially those which most tend to produce the visible signs of masculinity, and to manifest and also test what are called manly virtues, such as combat sports.” (Bourdieu 2001:51). Moreover, manliness is a “vital component of nationalism and respectability alike” (Mosse 1988:64) – the body of the proper man should be muscular (implying his strength, health, and beauty). In chapter 3 I noted Svoboda's preoccupation with educating healthy and sporty Ukrainian men and mentioned that one of the most cultivated sports in Svoboda's sport camps are martial arts. Svoboda insists that first and foremost physical strength has to be cultivated in Ukrainian men. Consequently, those who are sporty are thought of as the vanguard of the nation. Mosse argues that muscularity is seen as a sign of not only physical strength but also of willpower and self-
control. Because “this ideal of masculinity was ready-made for the kind of discipline the military needed.” (Mosse 1996:109).

Explaining his desire to go in for freestyle wrestling, Valentin (20, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical) said that this kind of sport “is not limited with old and unnecessary rules. Briefly, there are no limitations. I think it is the main reason”. Vitaliy said he is about to start learning boxing because it allows him to develop evenly all his body, it helps to develop reaction and he just “want[s] to try himself in the situation of combat”. Andrii (22, identifies as democrat) claimed that competitiveness was very important for him in sports and it was the competitive nature of martial arts that made him thinking about this kind of sport. Rostyslav said that he was thinking about something “punching”, so he decided to go in for martial arts. Further, he added that martial arts are also important as they teach to “stand up for oneself and keep oneself in proper form”. In all these responses competitiveness and the desire to combat were openly stated as important.

Given the connection between martial arts and masculinity, it would be an omission not to comment on the body image/body shape that are communicated through the figure of a person doing martial arts. Sports like martial arts strengthen the link between musculature and manliness and emphasize the connection “between powerful musculature and (potentially) violent masculinity” (Mansfield and McGinn 1996:50), thus the masculine body comes to be imagined as muscular and therefore strong. Given that nationalisms always seek to educate the right type of masculinity, that their ideal is physically strong and violent man that is simultaneously capable of self-control and self-sacrifice in the name of the nation, “it is therefore no surprise that the culture and ideology of hegemonic masculinity goes hand in hand with the culture and ideology
of hegemonic nationalism” (Nagel 1998:248-9). Recalling the promotion of health and sports (and especially of martial arts) by Ukrainian nationalists, it is possible to argue that for my respondents martial arts are the means of not only having a muscular and therefore healthy and masculine body, but also a means of performing the necessary masculinity-type: hegemonic muscular and potentially violent masculinity, distilled image of a proper male Ukrainian body. Given the exclusionary character of nationalism and its concern about protection of the nation from external and internal enemies, disciplined and strong bodies are a perfect resource to be used for the protection of the national community - “the line between normal and abnormal had to be tightly drawn if the nation was to be protected against its enemies” (Mosse 1988:33). The bodies that are strong and therefore beautiful, healthy and capable of moderation are praised as perfect bodies and therefore perfect citizens whose example is to be followed. This way the reproduction of the proper bodies and the idea of the nation is ensured.

Sport promotes “the ideal form of masculinity, not only for men to aspire to, but for women to find attractive” (Wellard 2009:21). It is also a site of various discourses and practices where different types of masculinities and femininities are shaped. One of the ingredients of hegemonic masculinity as it is imagined by Ukrainian nationalism is heterosexuality. Sport, interacting with different discourses of sexuality and being perceived as a site where men learn proper male value of competitiveness, greatly contributes “to the continued presence of a hegemonic masculinity informed by heterosexuality” (Wellard 2009:22). Caring about the reproduction and the quality of the nation, nationalism frequently proclaims heterosexuality to be a prerequisite of masculinity. Given the fact that hegemonic masculinity is tightly coupled with hegemonic nationalism (Mosse 1996), it is important for nationalism to connect itself to the
image of a strong muscular heterosexual man able to conquer other nations (represented either as women or homosexual men). Nagel shows that in the discourse of military nationalism, wars are often “cast as heterosexual rapes of women” and attacks on enemies are “phrased as homosexual rapes of men” (1998:258). Moreover, homosexual men are frequently stereotyped as feminine and weak - and therefore, unhealthy (Mosse 1988).

It is not thus unexpected that all the respondents that expressed the desire to go in for martial arts also denounced homosexuality (see chapter 4). Distancing themselves from homosexuality, whether more softly, like Rostyslav, saying that “not just I have strong aversion to it... I just see it as something foreign and unknown”, or more directly, like Valentin who called his acquaintance “latent faggot” and Vitaliy who also overtly claimed that homosexuality is unhealthy, might be seen as another move to position themselves within the category of proper masculine heterosexual (and therefore healthy) bodies.

5.2 Bad habits and health (of the nation)

Nationalist projects pay a great deal of attention to constructing the image of a “healthy citizen”, prescribing what one has to do in order to become healthy, but also enlisting activities one has to abstain from. For instance, emergent nationalisms of 19th century considered masturbation as the most serious vice and practice to abstain: “masturbation was the foundation upon which all sexual perversion was thought to rest” (Mosse 1988:34). Contemporary nationalisms seem to be less preoccupied with masturbation – they appear to concentrate on combating homosexuality, drinking, smoking and using drugs.
“The criminalization of innocuous behaviors such as homosexuality, prostitution, obscenity, or recreational drug use, is rationalized by portraying them as menaces to health and safety, women and children, national security, the family, or civilization itself.” (Rubin 1984:163).

In chapter 3 I argued that Ukrainian nationalists constantly warn about the negative consequences and dangerous outcomes of drinking and smoking. Activities connected to health are presented as the questions of immediate relevance because of the connections between individual health and that of the nation. Thus, it becomes possible to urge people to behave healthily for both their own and national good. It is not surprising that the necessity to practice certain things and abstain from others becomes internalized and reproduced as another practice of everyday nationalism.

Nearly all respondents mentioned the importance of a healthy way of life. Their definition of it presupposed the absence of bad habits. Anna said that “you invest so much money and time in bad habits; but instead of that you can sublimate it into sport activities. I am only for sport and a healthy way of life.” Before, she emphasized that unlike some of her friends she does not drink; from the way she was talking about it, I got an impression that not drinking is a special kind of virtue for her. Talking about healthy way of life, Vitaliy told me that it is very important and among other aspects it includes “not having bad habits like smoking. For example, I have never smoked. Also, you have to consume alcohol only on holidays and very-very moderately”. Similarly, Nadia (20, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical) said that she was living a healthy way of life, because she was not drinking and smoking “on principle” and she thought that these things were quite important victories for her. All the responses to the question why they do not drink and smoke can be summed up in Anita's (19, studies sociology, identifies as apolitical) eloquent response: “health of the nation”. Anita has also never smoked a cigarette and does not
drink at all. She stated that girls who did simply aggravated both their own health and that of the nation. I was greatly struck by such a straightforward answer of her.

Metzl (2010) suggests that labeling certain practices healthy and calling certain states of body as health is a technology of power and exclusion. Thus, the category of health is being used to make moral judgments, transfer the responsibility for people's bodily and mental states to the individuals themselves and to exclude improper and unhealthy people from the community. Health is ultimately defined by person's appearance, claims Metzl. In chapter 4 I discussed the importance of gender binarism and gender-appropriate behavior for my respondents. I also showed that transgressing gender binaries is seen as unhealthy and immoral; in this chapter I also mentioned about the proper masculinity appearance as described by my respondents and discussed its relation to sport and health. Given the above, I regard the concept of health (as it is used by my respondents) as inspired with rhetoric of religiosity and nationalism. In chapter 3 I highlighted that in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism, healthy body is constructed through the references to sport, women's reproductive capacities and men's strength and muscularity and in contrast to the bodies of homosexual people, migrants, drinkers, smokers or people who are just not sporty. Though Ukraine seems to adopt “Western” standards of beauty in terms of denouncing overweight and valuing slender, well-groomed and sleek bodies, these bodies are also endowed with meanings inspired by nationalism. Generally, “Western” body-standards are interpreted through and modified in relation to the peculiar Ukrainian framework. For instance, ideal feminine body has to bear signs of one's self-management, moderation and self-discipline (to be neither overweight nor anorexic but slender) and one's reproductive capacities (to signify heterosexuality). Whereas homosexuality and other improper sexualities are tied to unhealthy
bodies of drinkers/smokers – so these bodies become signifiers of improper deeds or views and are excluded on these grounds from the national community. Thus, along with homosexuality, drinking is positioned as something foreign, something imposed on Ukrainian people from outside. Presumably, rendering the bodies of drinkers improper and immoral is a way of distancing from USSR past and present-day Russia, as both states are known to have high rates of alcohol consumption (McKee 1999). Whilst seeing homosexuality as foreign helps to distance Ukraine from certain elements of “the West”. Thus, Ukrainian sexual and gender identity is an identity of selective “Europeanness” combined with the demands of nationalism and the desire to distance from Russia and state socialist past. However, sometimes distancing from “the West” means following certain examples from Russia – for instance, copying its homophobic legislation.

Being healthy is thus viewed from the perspective of necessary self-disciplining – a healthy (i.e. sporty heterosexual body without bad habits) is seen as beautiful and more importantly as a signifier of mental order and morality. "Modern forms of sin are indicated in terms of not being fit or slender. [...] The healthy and therefore sporty person is slender, fit and also socially productive." (van Hilvoorde 2001:59) I would like to add that this body is not just socially productive, but capable of reproduction.

5.3 Dirty bodies — crazy minds

“When I got into the university, just after school, I experienced two years of intense patriotic feelings. And I think it was my university that pushed me there. I was so disappointed
that I don’t have a vyshyvanka! [vyshyvanka is a piece of Ukrainian traditional clothing similar to a shirt but with elements of embroidery]” - Miroslava (23, studies history, identifies as liberal) told me. She thought that the university she had been studying in for 5 years had greatly contributed to her patriotic and nationalistic moods of first two years of studying as she was surrounded by nationalistic rhetoric and people with nationalistic worldview. Two academic years she referred to fell on the years 2007-2009 - a part of the period marked with President Yushchenko’s attempts to build a new national narrative discussed in chapter 2. Miroslava told me another interesting story from her 1st year in the university, this was a story of xenophobia within the walls of academia.

“It don’t really know how it is now but when I was on my first year and still hang out with my old company, I knew that they wanted to raise a question that a black girl was accepted to our university. I saw her just once, I don’t know how many black people study in the university now... But my old company, for example, was organizing a protest with banners that “no to niggers in the academy” and something like that”.

It is widely agreed that nationalism polices bodies producing “leftover bodies” (Partridge 2012), bodies that are stigmatized as polluters. This divide is often founded according to the visible difference of skin color. I mentioned that in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism it is non-white bodies of people from Caucasus region (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), Middle East or China that are seen as simultaneously cultural (they bring “foreign values”), health (“they” go for “our” women) and reproductive (they reproduce too fast) menace. Since Ukraine is a part of the former USSR that is situated relatively close to “Europe”, it frequently operates as a transit point for people from post-soviet “Asian” regions and “Middle East”. Those who were not lucky enough to reach “Europe”, stay in Ukraine.
“I think that only those people that could be useful for Ukraine should come here... If a person is going to Ukraine, he should have a definite aim and not... not... try to settle here,” - Denis (21, studies history, identifies as liberal), was very emotional when explaining me his views on immigration. Likewise, Ilia (21, studies social work, identifies as liberal) claimed that

“A person should enter Ukraine with a diploma, say, that he’s economist and this person should enter the country because of the invitation of some company that invited him to work... Or he comes here, gets a visa for work for three months and during this time he has to find a job according to his diploma, but not to sell shaverma [“middle eastern” fast food, selling which is associated with migrants] near the metro”.

Denis proposed “smart filtration of migrants. It is relatively cool to live here, if we compare it with the countries they come from, and I don’t want that people in Ukraine live like people from those countries.” Though neither Ilia nor Denis told the exact names of the countries or mentioned ethnicities they were talking about, this information can be inferred from their answers rather easily. Given that predominantly people from “Asian” post-Soviet countries are engaged into “selling shaverma near metro”, it is clear that people from “those” countries are mainly people from Middle East and Caucasus region. Not to mention the gender of migration in Denis' and Ilia's responses (as it is predominantly male migrant that is imagined as a menace).

Denis and Ilia were quite supportive of intensive policing of the borders and bodies that cross the borders.

Olga told that from time to time she had debates with her friends on the topic of migration to Ukraine and that many of her friends were against “all these Azerbaijanis who come here and open their kiosks and take our places, that where our people could work — they work”. She told that she did not share this opinion, because “it is their talent and they do it good. Still, our people, if to speak about mentality, are not successful in the business, as a rule. So, if they
are good in it, let them sell stuff”. I suggest that Olga’s reply is a prominent example of ‘unwilling racism’ — because of naturalization of certain abilities of people from other ethnicities as well as of “Ukrainians” (whom she denoted under deixis “our people”, assuming her belonging to this category). Though scholars argue that “in racism “culture” replaced “race” in public discourse and that rather than arguing for the hierarchy of biological groups, current racists argue about unresolvable cultural differences among people” (Fuglerud 2005:298), it is evident that in Ukrainian case, race is still an active concept used for othering. Despite the fact that Olga was not speaking directly about skin color or any other biological indicator of otherness, she rooted the difference of Azerbaijanis from Ukrainians in the realm of mentality – speaking of mentalities and talents as though they were produced by nature: her assumptions were rooted in the terrain of biological though covered with the categories of culture/mentality.

The respondents were aware of the importance of tolerance and inclusiveness, according to their words. Still, this awareness did not preclude them from pronouncing racist utterances. I argued in chapter 4 that my respondents seemed were of the standards of political correctness and that this affected their speech on the issue of homosexuality. They seemed to have a negative attitude towards it, but they tried to frame this attitude indirectly with the correct words. I also mentioned that this can be a possible outcome of Ukraine oscillating between “the West” and “national traditions” that imply essentializing and policing its ethnic identity and establishing an allegedly traditional homophobic and heteronormative order of things. This oscillation results into peculiar utterances like Anita’s: “tolerance is very up-to-date and important. I have normal attitude towards all nationalities but for khachi. Excuse me, but whatever tolerance there is, seriously, they are so much different...” Thus, it is a tolerance for all but some. Clearly, tolerance
is denied on the grounds that are frequently connected both to people's physical bodies and their cultural and ethnic identities.

After Anita said this phrase, she and Lilia imitated these people's accent in order to ridicule them and to express their nonacceptance of migrants' difference. Firstly, it is necessary to say that the very word “khach” is an extremely offensive ethnic slur to denote a person from Caucasian region. The word originated from Armenian first name Khachik. Later the word was used by Russian neo-Nazi groups to denote a person from Caucasus region. The term has been widely used by Russian far right groups (and later Ukrainian far rights who borrowed it) as an insult for migrants. For instance, on their demonstrations Russian nationalists use slogans like “Don't drink, don't booze, kill khachi!” or “Kill khach, save Russia!”37 Despite the attempts of Ukrainian nationalists to emphasize Ukraine's difference from Russia, there are many similarities in their rhetoric – moreover, Ukrainian nationalists borrow ideas from their Russian counterparts. Thus, the mere use of the word “khach” is a form of hate-speech. Secondly, it is important to highlight Anita's anxiety about these people's difference; it is very telling how she claimed to be tolerant towards all but some ethnicities, trying to justify her position with the words “they are so much different” — she is ready to be tolerant and to grant “others” incorporation if “others” stop being different, stop being “others”. The questions that arise here are “how little of difference is allowed for incorporation?” and “who is to decide who can be incorporated?” I suggest that in this context it is one's skin color and appearance that signal one's sameness or difference; it is one's physical body that is a ground of one's incorporation.

The fact that the physical body is important can be further illustrated by another example. It is first and foremost description of certain aspects of people's body and appearance that function as signifiers of these very people abnormality and are used to stigmatize them. For instance, Anna said that migrants can be different, as “there are adequate well-groomed migrants and there are some like dirty Gypsies. You look at them and you don't have any desire to talk to them, because they are this way... I think they are untidy and inadequate people”. In Anna's answer there is a strict correlation between the way one's physical body looks like and the qualities one's possesses: as being well-groomed and tidy equals being adequate (normal) for her and similarly, dirty body means dirty mind.

Some respondents mentioned not only migrants but also neighboring nations as abnormal. Anna said that “if you give a bottle of vodka to a Russian — then ok, you can communicate at any level”. She was not joking. Oleh said that last year when he was in Romania he was “pissed off by the dullness of Romanians. Really, something is wrong with them. Maybe they are developed in some other aspects but when you are talking to them — they are sooo lazy, so not normal...” Not surprisingly, these negative characteristics were expressed with references to some aspects of body: highlighting excessive drinking in relation to Russians and laziness in relation of Romanians. Taking into consideration a greater context of body-mind correlation, it is possible to conclude that these descriptions are used as signifiers of abnormality that is simultaneously seen as individual and national.

Thus, the ideal body (as seen by my respondents) is white, sporty, slender, well-groomed, and heterosexual body without any bad habits – as only such body is seen as capable of self-disciplining, moderation and therefore possessing mental order. Mosse (1988) argues that this is
precisely the features that nationalism demands from the bodies in order to be of the right type. Bordo (1993) demonstrates how we internalize the standards of slenderness set in the 19th century – the time of nationalism's alliance with morality and respectability. I showed that the ideal body is constructed in contrast to the improper one, displayed by the body of a visibly different migrant and the bodies of people who don’t practice enough sport or have bad habits.

Illustrating that the body is frequently interpreted as a signifier of person's moral qualities, I argued that the standards of the proper body and behavior are internalized and reproduced unconsciously. The standards for the ideal body are the result of Ukraine's cultural and geographical positioning. They are consequences of the gazes of Ukrainian others: the USSR and Russia (though the relationship with Russia is more complex but lack of space does not allow me to go in depth on the issue) and "the West", which is simultaneously welcomed and feared, so only certain elements of "Western" culture find their place in the culture of Ukraine. The situation is further complicated by the appeal to "national traditions" and the attempts to return "ancient" gender and sexual order, which is very homophobic and heteronormative. All these result into the strange narrative about the bodies that I heard from my respondents, when they try to reconcile their awareness of tolerance and inclusiveness with homophobia or racism. Despite these attempts, Ukrainian national community stays quite exclusionary – as the standards of inclusion haven't changed, unlike the way of speaking about the improper bodies.
Conclusion

This thesis is an ethnography about the interconnections between Ukrainian nationalism and gendered and sexualized bodies. Viewing nationalism as a discursive formation (Calhoun 2007) and a set of non-reflected upon routine practices and rituals (Billig 1995), allowed me to inquire about the place of bodies in it. Focusing on the level of everyday nationalism, I argued that students' views on such questions as what constitutes healthy and/or beautiful body are inspired by and inspire further nationalism, though the students did not identify themselves as nationalists. I argued that national belonging is carved upon people’s bodies, that everyday bodily practices my respondents engage into are simultaneously kindled by and constitutive to Ukrainian nationalism. I claimed that the nation is reproduced daily not only by using coins or flags, but by performing internalized, mechanical and not reflected upon bodily practices.

When I was writing the thesis, Euromaidan protests unfolded, proving the omnipresence of everyday nationalism in Ukraine and the desire of many Ukrainians for asserting their “European” identity and breaking away from Russia. Despite my interviews were conducted several months before the protests (in April and June-July 2013), the things said by the respondents are still relevant and important – as Euromaidan protests did not originate from nothing. The mixture of everyday nationalism with appeals to broader cultural community of “Europe” that partly marked the narratives of my respondents was partially the soil for Euromaidan protests to emerge. Though the protests are still waiting for their in length analysis, I see my research as contributing to the discussion on Ukraine's identity negotiations and on the implications of this process.

I argued that Ukraine's peculiar geographical position between “Eastern” and “Western
Europe” and its negotiations of cultural, sexual, and national identity result into quite peculiar views on bodies and sexualities. This view is shaped by Ukraine’s simultaneous attempts to assert its belonging to the cultural community of “Western Europe” and to distance itself from state socialist past and present-day Russia. The picture is further complicated by its efforts of proving one’s uniqueness by building the new national narratives with their selective and specific history of the Ukrainian nation. “Western” standards of beauty - slender, well-groomed bodies – are endowed with the meanings that arise from specifically Ukrainian context, which is marked with ubiquity of everyday nationalism.

Ukrainian nationalism proved to have a lot in common with its "Eastern European colleagues", homophobia and heterosexism (Graff 2006; Graff 2009), fear of "the West" and its sexual threats (Helms 2008) and pronatalist desire to control women’s bodies (Verdery 1996; Rivkin-Fish 2006) in particular. However, it also proved to be different – to creatively reshape "the Western" bodily standards, attribute them with new meanings and reconcile them with the "national traditions". Butler (1993) argues that the body is always the outcome of the gaze of the Other: “the very sense of the body is generated through this projection of ideality and integrity” (1993:75), that the body never exists in its totality before the projection of certain features of the Other. In the case of Ukraine, its ideal body is the outcome of a set of gazes of Others. Its body is white because non-white bodies of visible minorities are polluters of the nation (the gaze of a selective national narrative). It is heterosexual because homosexuality jeopardizes the very grounds of the national existing (the gaze of “the West”). It is healthy – unlike the bodies of drinkers/smokers (the gaze of the USSR and Russia). It is slender and thus is able to self-discipline and moderation (the gaze of “the West”). It is young, sporty, muscular and strong (the
gaze of a national narrative). Finally, it is able to procreate and to ensure the reproduction of the nation.

To provide the example of the rhetoric of Ukrainian nationalism, I analyzed the discourse of far right Svoboda party by isolating the main themes Svoboda evokes when talking about the bodies or sexualities. I used Svoboda as the example because recently it has been the most visible political actor that openly self-identified as nationalist and it has been actively working with youth. Further, I showed the similarities between the discourse of Svoboda and the discourse of my respondents. I claimed that by the routinized mechanical bodily practices my respondents reproduce the nation and the ideas about the im/proper bodies on an everyday basis.

I situated my perspective on nationalism in the theories of Benedict Anderson (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1982), Michael Billig (1995) and Michael Skey (2001) and my approach to the bodies and sexualities in the works of Michel Foucault (1975), George Mosse (1988) and Gayle Rubin (1984), showing the existence of Others shape the perception of one's body. I argued that in the discourse of Ukrainian nationalism, healthy body is constructed through the references to sport, women's reproductive capacities and men's strength and muscularity and in contrast to the unhealthy and therefore immoral bodies of homosexual people, migrants, and drinkers/smokers. I highlighted that in order to establish heterosexuality as the only normal sexuality, Ukrainian nationalism highly values gender binarism and gender-appropriate behavior, assuming that if one has male body, one has to perform masculinity. Transgressing the binary coded gender roles is regarded unhealthy – as it endangers the whole national sexual and gender order.
## Appendix I

Respondents’ Demographic Data

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