Extending Sovereign Reach into Diaspora: Croatia and Eritrea in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

Recently, the flows of people across borders have increased in volume and in the individual's ability to cultivate and maintain connections in multiple localities simultaneously. Diaspora is a term that has been used to describe a particular subset of people residing outside of their country of origin, but who still remain oriented in some way towards the origin state. This thesis examines one part of the origin state-diaspora-country of residence nexus, namely the relations between diaspora and the country of origin. I am interested in why some states successfully form and dominate linkages with their populations abroad while others either fail in the attempt or do not attempt to form such linkages at all. Through a comparative case study of Croatia and Eritrea, I test the interaction of four factors - historical legacy, dominant national project, regime type, and the position of the origin state in the international system. The analysis of these two cases revealed a necessary additional factor, the level of integration into the society of residence. Based on these findings, I argue that while each of the factors tested can be said to play a role in shaping diaspora engagement, historical legacy, degree of integration to country of residence, and the regime type of the origin state taken together present the clearest prediction for when a state will be able to successfully engage a diaspora.
Introduction

On February 24, 1990, a number of Croatian émigrés from around the world arrived to much fanfare in Zagreb for the Croatian Democratic Union's (HDZ) party congress.¹ These members of the Croatian diaspora, some of whom had never before set foot in Croatia, were instrumental in HDZ's electoral success and were in the process of directly contributing to the wars that accompanied the breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia. Barely three years later and on an entirely different continent, the dispersed people of the tiny African state Eritrea declared their independence through an internationally monitored referendum after 30 years of war with Ethiopia. In a unique move, the new state extended citizenship and voting rights to Eritreans living abroad and even incorporated them into the drafting process of the constitution. Both of these anecdotes serve as examples of what has been broadly termed globalization, or the increasing interconnectedness of populations across physical space. Such connections raise pertinent questions about the previous dominance of the territorially bound state sovereignty paradigm and about the various processes that accompany such trans-border activities.

Today, people and goods move throughout the world more often and at a faster pace than ever before. Globalization, as many now call it, while not a new phenomenon, has succeeded to place stress on the current world system and especially on states and governance with its unprecedented volume and new patterns of interaction. With the end of the Cold War and the turbulent last decade of the 20th century, came a recognition that global processes, while not new, were having an increasingly pronounced affect on the world system. Such recognition inspired particular interest in a number of social science disciplines to be placed on processes and relations which, by their very nature, were not confined to the geopolitical borders of states.

¹ Paul Hockenos. Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Cornell University Press, 2003), 51
In particular, the transnational practices of diasporas and the web of relations in which they are embedded have received particular focus with some hailing them as "long-distance nationalists","^2^ others as key partners in development^3^, and still others focus on their roles in conflict and peace building.^4^

In this thesis, I take interest in what might be problematically termed the diaspora-homeland nexus. Though later to the game, political science and international relations scholars have begun to interrogate the ways in which dispersed populations of various types relate to and affect domestic and international politics. Much attention has been given to the immigration aspect of international migration and especially to questions of integration and assimilation in the migrants new country of residence.^5^ Less attention has been paid to the politics and policies, both domestic and foreign, of so-called sending states or countries of emigration. What attention there has been, has remained relatively geographically and even conceptually limited with the majority of case-studies focused on economic policies especially in Latin America. This thesis aims to

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^5^ In the literature, authors often use the terms "host country/society" or "receiving country." These terms are problematic because they immediately convey the idea of temporary stay and/or of not belonging. Migrants and immigrants have long existed and have played integral roles in the economies and societies of countries the world over, not least in traditional immigrant receiving state like the U.S. Moreover, a growing number of migrants are taking second and even third citizenships making such terms even more problematic. Thus, I opt for the more neutral though still imperfect term "country or state of residence" which lacks such connotations.
contribute to our understanding of the ways in which the state of origin relates to its populations abroad. Specifically, I will undertake a comparative analysis of the attempts to engage populations residing abroad in two case studies - Croatia and Eritrea. I will explain how and why Eritrea has been more interested in and more successful at engaging and even extending some degree of control over its diaspora than Croatia. I argue that a combination of four factors account for this difference - historical legacy, dominant national program, the position of the country of origin internationally, and regime type. While two cases are not enough to make any broad generalizations, I suggest that these factors provide a useful starting point for the analysis of additional cases.

I hypothesize that a state with significant historical experience in relating to its non-resident population will be more likely and better able to influence and control those residing abroad. This ability remains further dependent on the integration of the country of origin within the economic and political world system - i.e. a less integrated state with a large diaspora is likely to place greater importance on relations with them and on the various ways they might contribute to the state. Furthermore, when it comes to the methods of engagement, a more democratic government has comparatively less space and tools for exerting control over its dispersed population than does a more authoritarian state. For the most part, these assertions so far are unsurprising and only unique insofar as the manner in which I am suggesting they function together. The final factor, the dominant national project, represents somewhat more of an innovation especially with regards to its function in the engagement of diaspora(s) by a state and any efforts at control within what is largely a more standard international relations perspective on a diaspora's transnational relations with the origin state. While not sufficient to explain effective control of a diaspora by an origin state, I argue a national project oriented in
some way towards a dispersed population is necessary for such a state to effectively undertake diaspora engagement and can shape the particular form and content of engagement policies.

Croatia and Eritrea make for an interesting and productive comparison for a number of reasons, not least because they are actually more similar than they appear at first glance. Both are relatively small countries with small populations (Croatia - 4.5 million and Eritrea - 6.4 million\(^6\)) and large numbers of people identifying with the state resident abroad. Independence for both was achieved through the use of violence within the territory of the state and came at nearly the same time within the context of the end of the Cold War, a period which both experienced in a position between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Moreover, each was influenced by Communist thought albeit in very different ways, with Croatia existing within the framework of a Socialist regime for almost 50 years, and the independence movements in Eritrea drawing inspiration from various strains of Marxist thought. Post-independence, neither Croatia nor Eritrea can be said to occupy a key position in global economic or political processes, though Croatia, with its position in Europe and more open orientation, has experienced greater economic growth than Eritrea and has now also entered the European Union.

However, there are also important differences between the two countries. With regards to regime type, Croatia is characterized as a free country by Freedom House and has a score of 8.5 on Bertelsman's Transformation Index while Eritrea is characterized as not free and ranks near the bottom of Bertelsman's democracy rankings. Furthermore, Eritrea has been involved in multiple conflicts since independence including a devastating border war with Ethiopia from 1998-2000 after which the state became increasingly closed and antagonistic towards the international community. It is my assertion that Croatia and Eritrea are similar enough to allow

\(^6\) CIA World Factbook 2014 estimates.
for a fruitful comparison while at the same time offering the opportunity to interrogate dynamics not fully explored elsewhere. Eritrea and its diaspora has received significant attention in specialist academic literature though not as much as Croatia and rarely, if ever, appears in any sort of comparative studies. This thesis contributes a combined contextual and processual approach to analyzing and understanding the relative success of diaspora engagement policies from the perspective of the state.

While Croatia is generally accepted within the literature as having a diaspora in the sociological sense of the term, Eritrea is much less often mentioned. However, Eritrea's dispersed population can in several instances be defined as a diaspora. This is especially true of those residing in the United States, the main focus of this study. As will be detailed below, more recent definitions and typologies of diasporas take into account more diverse reasons for leaving the country of origin. Thus, although many Eritreans fled as refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants, the communities they subsequently set up in many states throughout the world will be shown to meet the necessary analytical requirements laid out in the next section, namely that many conceive of themselves as an enclosed community, are clearly dispersed throughout the world, and place great emphasis on their ties to Eritrea, which in many respects go beyond what has been observed for other highly recognizable dispersed communities.
Diaspora, Transnationalism, and the State-Diaspora Nexus

Diaspora

While the term has been in use for centuries, only recently have scholars begun fully engaging with the concept of diaspora. Like the related concept of transnationalism discussed below, diasporas began receiving greater attention in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the shifting of scholarly paradigms which allowed, in some cases, the recognition of new phenomena and in others produced new approaches to understanding already existing practices and phenomena. Accompanying the recent growth of interest in diasporas and in transnational practices has been the expansion of the meaning and usage of the term diaspora prompting one scholar to speak of the "'diaspora' diaspora." In one of the earliest usages of the term, diaspora appears in Greek translations of the Bible in reference to the dispersion of the Jewish people and means "to sow widely." Many of the most prominent definitions of the term in social science usage take such classical diasporas - the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek diasporas - as the paradigmatic cases and use their characteristics to formulate the concept. For example, William Safran suggests six defining characteristics (though of course no diaspora will meet all six of them): 1) dispersal from a single center to at least two foreign lands, 2) maintenance of a collective memory of the original homeland, 3) belief that full integration into the new country of residence is never possible and thus feel a sense of alienation from it, 4) idea of return either for themselves or their ancestors, 5) belief that they should contribute to the maintenance or restoration of the homeland, and 6) "ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity" are defined in

8 Cohen, Robin. “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72, no. 3 (July 1996), 507.
relation to the imagined homeland. As the focus has shifted from the classic diasporas to more recent ones, some scholars such as Robin Cohen have modified Safran's definition to better suit the range of factors in modern migration - by adding in additional reasons for dispersal such as in pursuit of greater economic security - though the general idea and homeland orientation remain. Such definitions have since been criticized as essentializing and thus of obscuring the range of practices and experiences contained within a diaspora. As James Clifford rightly points out, "Whatever the working list of diasporic features, no society can be expected to qualify on all counts, throughout its history. And the discourse of diaspora will necessarily be modified as it is translated and adopted." In addition to definitions, some scholars approach diasporas by categorizing them based off of their function in the society of residence, reasons for their migration, or by the types and dynamics of the connections made by a given diaspora.

With this in mind, in this thesis I will make use of what Rogers Brubaker has identified as the three main, consensus characteristics of diaspora - dispersion in space, orientation to a homeland, and boundary maintenance. This definition provides the broad criteria I will use to determine whether or not we can speak at all of an Eritrean or Croatian diaspora and in what instances this may apply. Moreover, my approach to such concepts as diaspora is informed by Brubaker's work on nationalism in which he cogently argues for treating such terms and concepts

12 Esman, Milton J. Diasporas in the Contemporary World (Polity, 2009); Armstrong, John A. “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.” The American Political Science Review 70, no. 2 (June 1976): 393–408.
15 Brubaker, "The ‘diaspora’ Diaspora," 5-6
not as real, existing things, but rather as "categories of practice" or collections of competing political stances. Such an approach necessitates taking into account the various competing political projects and fields of relations in the analysis of the various events and policies which follow. Although I accept a broader definition of diaspora, my focus throughout this thesis will mainly, though not exclusively, be on a more limited subset of the diaspora population that corresponds to what Lyons et. al\(^\text{17}\) and Lyons and Mandaville\(^\text{18}\) define as diaspora - those mobilized to participate in the political processes of the origin state.

**Transnationalism**

Transnationalism has been the umbrella term developed within the social sciences to refer to any number of practices carried out by people across geopolitical borders. The word itself is a combination of the prefix "trans" meaning across, beyond, or through, and the word "nation". Nation is more problematic to define as it comes from the Latin root natio, from nat-, meaning to be born. The Oxford online dictionary defines the term as "[a] large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory."\(^\text{19}\) Together, the two parts convey a sense of moving somehow beyond the nation whether that be physically as with people, goods, and so on, or more metaphorically suggesting, for instance, the de-coupling of nation and territory. Earlier definitions arose out of the migration studies literature. Basch *et al.* define transnationalism as "processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and

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\(^{19}\) Oxford English Dictionary Online
settlement." This broad definition leaves room for a variety of linkages formed by "transmigrants" - immigrants who form these cross-border familial, economic, social, organizational and political connections. Another definition, limits transnationalism by the actors involved, namely to "sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders." Proliferation of usage has led to efforts to provide greater limits to the concept with some requiring trans-border ties to be regular and sustained and others to focus their efforts on a particular realm of transnational activity such as social fields, transnational social formations, and the specific institutions of transnationalism. Another approach has been to characterize types of transnational engagement such as the "narrow" and "broad" practices of Itzigsohn et al., transnationalism from above or from below, or by particular variables such as mobility and locality. Vertovec usefully categorizes the various modes of thought on transnationalism into six groups: social morphology, type of consciousness, mode of cultural reproduction, avenue of capital, site of political engagement, and the reconstruction of place or locality. For my purposes here, I will operate within a more thematic

20 Basch, Linda Green, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nationstates (Breach, 1994), 8
21 Ibid, 8
22 Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (Routledge, 2009), 3
29 Dahinden, “The Dynamics of Migrants’ Transnational Formations: Between Mobility and Locality.”
30 Vertovec, Transnationalism, 4
The primary focus of this thesis will be on instances of diaspora engagement at first by groups seeking independence and later by the states these groups set up. My analysis is primarily focused on engagement policies once statehood has been achieved though it is my assertion that practices of engagement prior to the gaining of statehood profoundly affect the shape and success of later relations between the state and diaspora communities. Placing the focus on the relations between state and diaspora and how these (re)imagine and (re)make the nation and state will allow me to avoid falling into the trap of "methodological nationalism" identified by Wimmer et al. While disinterest was previously argued to be the default position of states in relation to populations residing outside of their territorial borders, subsequent research has shown that this is not the case. The state-diaspora nexus is a highly researched area in some respects. Much research has focused on the role of diasporas in conflicts in their countries of origin, in democratization, in development, claims made by diasporas on their states of origin, and political transnationalism specifically conceiving of the term as a site of political engagement.

Diaspora Engagement and the State-Diaspora Nexus


See for example: Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands and Koinova, “Diasporas and Democratization in the Post-Communist World.”


their impact as lobbyists. However, less attention has been focused on how and when states succeed in controlling the activities of their diaspora(s). What follows is a review of the work to date on the relationship between states and diasporas with particular focus on the logic of diaspora engagement policies.

The government of the origin state is generally thought of as having three main interests vis-à-vis a diaspora: 1) ensuring the continuous inflow of economic resources, 2) mobilizing political support and reducing or eliminating dissent, and 3) to promote the status and upward mobility of their nationals abroad. Each of these three interests relates directly to concerns common to the traditional notion of the nation-state. The first two are specifically domestic political necessities which can increasingly be pursued through the use of transnational strategies, while the third may point towards particular foreign policy concerns and especially towards a desire to use the diaspora as a lobbying tool. Each of the three interests are clearly interrelated feeding one into the other. For example, a government that promotes the status and rights of its diaspora can hope for greater investments and remittances and even greater support from abroad in favor of the ruling party at the time. However, none of these results are certain and detailed knowledge and/or statistics on people living abroad and their preferences are difficult to obtain making diaspora engagement policies a fairly risky venture from the standpoint of many political parties.

A number of factors that impact diaspora engagement policies, both what type of policies and whether any are implemented at all, have been put forth in the literature. The characteristics of diaspora engagement in the country of origin and vice versa may be determined in part by the


38 Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies, and Transnational Relations* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4
type of state the people have migrated from. Ostergaard-Nielsen identifies three types of sending states - labor exporting states, countries gaining independence after a large out migration of nationals, and sending countries in conflict - all of which have considerable overlap between them rendering such a conceptualization not particularly useful.\(^{39}\) Alan Gamlen proposes a three part typology of states with diaspora engagement policies. His three categories include "exploitative states, which extract obligations without extending rights; generous states, which extend rights without extracting obligations, and engaged states, which both extract obligations and extend rights."\(^{40}\) Such a typology enables the comparison of states based on the specific packages of engagement they implement, though it does nothing to help understand when and why a particular state acts in an exploitative manner nor why some states have greater involvement with their diaspora than do others.

States that foster relations with their population abroad have made use of a number of institutional approaches. Sives, citing a large sample study conducted by Agunias, notes the prevalence of different types and levels of state institutions. Agunias' analysis of 30 developing countries yielded fifteen examples of ministry-level diaspora institutions, ten subministry-level diaspora institutions, seven national-level committees, four local-level institutions, and five with quasi-government institutions.\(^{41}\) A quick counting of the examples considered by Agunias shows that numerous states in his sample made use of institutions at multiple levels in their relation to their diaspora. Furthermore, these findings demonstrate that multiple levels of government are involved in cultivating relations with diaspora members including those operating only at a very local level. Agunias' analyses focuses mainly on the first of the three main types of institutional approaches.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?," 21

actors that participate in the diaspora-homeland nexus. The administration of the country of origin, the political parties of the origin state (especially when citizenship and voting rights have been de-territorialized) which may act either on behalf of the government or as a source of counter-mobilization, and immigrant or community organizations set up in the country of residence. Thus in addition to specific state institutions, other organizations including political parties and non-governmental organizations conduct their own relations with compatriots residing outside of the territorial state.

Migrants participate in their countries of origin in a number of ways. These include through participation in diaspora politics, absentee voting, buying into regimes, playing a role in enabling or preventing war and peace, mass protest and the raising of awareness/consciousness, and overseas support for insurgency or terrorism. Origin states, through the various institutions mentioned previously, make use of a variety of policies to control their diasporas and to extract cooperation from them. These policies fall into five main categories: consular reforms, specific investment policies aimed at channeling or extracting remittances, the extension of political rights, the extension of particular state services (especially incentives such as social security benefits) to citizens living abroad, and through symbolic actions designed to maintain a particular sense of identity and reinforce feelings of belonging. In order to account for the possibility of additional policies not included above, origin state policies of engagement may be divided into three types: capacity building in which the state itself builds institutions in the country of residence aiming to create a "state centric transnational society", policies for the

42 Smith, Robert C., “Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics.”
43 Itzigsohn, “Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants’ Political Transnationalism.”
44 Vertovec, Transnationalism, 94-95
extension of rights and thus assuming the role of the legitimate sovereign, and policies aimed at extracting obligations which presumes that emigrants owe allegiance and loyalty to the sovereign.\textsuperscript{46} Some scholars further reduce the array of possible policies to two types of mechanisms: "diaspora building' mechanisms, which cultivate or formally recognize non-residents as members of a diasporic community, and 'diaspora integration' mechanisms, which project various membership privileges and responsibilities onto various extra-territorial groups. Through these mechanisms, sending states influence the identities and activities of different groups of emigrants and their descendants, constituting them as members of a 'diaspora.'"\textsuperscript{47} Gamlen has further argued that states proceed with diaspora engagement policies in three distinct steps. States first

> aim to produce a relationship of communication at the transnational scale, based around the idea of the nation – a system of symbols and signs within which states can immerse the exercise of power. Secondly, states aim to create objective capacities for the realization of power relations by building diaspora institutions. Thirdly, the “finalized activities”, or “specific effects” of this transnational exercise of home-state power consist of “transnationalized citizenship”...\textsuperscript{48}

Gamlen suggests that the third stage functions as a way for the state to bring nationals abroad into the sovereign web of rights and obligations in the absence of the full coercive power it can exercise within its borders.\textsuperscript{49} However, this does not mean that states are powerless with regards to their population abroad. In particular, states maintain the power to distribute resources beyond their borders (pension plans, health insurance, etc.) and can choose which diaspora organizations

\textsuperscript{46} Gamlen, “Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?,” 5-6
\textsuperscript{47} Alan Gamlen. “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination.” Political Geography 27, no. 8 (November 2008), 851
\textsuperscript{48} Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?," 5
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
to recognize as legitimate and to extend support to allowing them some leverage over diaspora populations and their organizational activities.\footnote{Smith, “Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics,” 329}

Various pressures and considerations have been posited as the impetus for state decisions to engage their diaspora(s). Some earlier works connected diaspora engagement policies with abstract causes like globalization or the problems of integration into the global capitalist system. Smith cogently argues for the rejection, or at least, the complication of simplified explanations of diaspora engagement policies as being due to processes of "globalization" or "global capital."\footnote{Ibid, 326} His work and the work of other scholars using focused case studies supports this assertion. Not only are the contextual causes more complex and less abstract, but also engagement policies themselves do not function within a single, established framework. As Gamlen argues, "diaspora engagement policies should not necessarily be seen as part of a unitary, coordinated state strategy. Rather, they form a constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programs that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different timescales at different levels within home-states."\footnote{Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?,” 4} Thus diaspora engagement policies are part of a dynamic process involving multiple actors and influences that change and develop over time. In his analysis of the Mexican government's shift towards greater engagement with diaspora communities in the United States, Smith demonstrates the inter-relation of three levels of pressure - bilateral relations with the U.S., participation in the global system, and domestic politics - that led the Mexican government to pursue further engagement with its diaspora.\footnote{Smith, "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics,” 325} Sives concurs with the factors mentioned so far and adds in to her analysis the degree to which a
state recognizes a need to forge links with diaspora communities.54 Gamlen adds that the origin state's capacity to implement diaspora engagement policies depends on the imagined and/or discursive existence of a cohesive transnational community with an identity centered on a national state and the existence of the necessary state apparatuses to put a program of engagement into action.55 While individual engagement policies focus on particular desired outcomes such as increased investment, return, or increased political participation, the overall package of engagement, especially when it includes the extension of political rights and participation, serves as an attempt to extend the locus of state control outside of its borders. According to Gamlen, diaspora engagement policies aim mainly at (re)producing the citizen-sovereign relationship with expatriates and in so doing govermentality is transnationalized.56

55 Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?," 6
56 Ibid, 4-5
The Croatian Diaspora

History

In order to understand the complex and dynamic relations between the Croatian state and its diaspora in North America, it is important to understand the history of emigration from Croatia and the relations between émigrés abroad and the homeland. Francesco Ragazzi identifies three waves of emigration from Croatia: the "old emigration" (stare iseljeništvo) of largely religious, working class people between 1880 and 1914 (600,000-1 million), the post World War II emigration of mainly skilled, upper class people of whom many were sympathetic to the Ustaša regime (50-100,000), and the generation of gastarbeiters (radnici na privremenom vremenu u inozemstvu / gastarbajteri) which left beginning in the 1960s.\(^{57}\) As noted by Mesarić-Žabčić, it is important to add a fourth wave of emigration, that generated by the conflict in Croatia and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, many of whom left as refugees.\(^{58}\)

Relations between the regime and the émigrés differed greatly across the three waves and depended largely on the demographics and political orientation of both regime and migrant as well as on the degree of control desired by the state. The old emigration occurred during a period in which the overriding concern of the state was with population. Austro-Hungarian authorities of the period were unconcerned about the depopulation of Croatia and Slavonia despite the grave concern voiced by the Croatian political and intellectual elite because they likely viewed the

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\(^{58}\) Rebeka Mesarić Žabčić; Institute for Migrations and Ethnic Studies, Zagreb; rebeka.mesaric@imin.hr. 2013. The importance of the Croatian Diaspora for the development of the Republic of Croatia: Examples from Australia and the USA. Croatian Studies Review; bskvorc@ffst.hr. http://hrcak.srce.hr/102751, 135-136.
exodus as a partial solution to the nationalities problem facing the empire.⁵⁹ Such an attitude also corresponds to the prevailing view of the relationship or lack thereof between emigrants and their "homeland". The predominantly territorial understanding of sovereignty and state authority essentially made emigrants lost to the state once they left.

In the interwar period, this strong territorial conception shifted towards membership based on kinship, ethnicity, and "Croat-ness" (hrvatstvo) leading to greater state involvement in preserving the national identity of emigrants and ensuring their economic success abroad.⁶⁰ Following the end of World War II, the relationship between the state and the diaspora shifted once more. The government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia now forbade emigration and distinguished between two groups of emigrants already abroad - the old emigration which retained positive connotations and received support from the government for cultural organizations and the "fascist and extremist emigration" seen as the sworn enemies of Yugoslavia and the socialist project.⁶¹ This characterization was taken quite literally as Yugoslav security services and extremist elements of the post-World War II emigration battled one another throughout the world resulting in assassinations of diaspora activists as well as with radical diaspora groups carrying out terrorist attacks and even small scale guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia.⁶²

Beginning with the opening of the border in 1964, the Yugoslav state shifted tactics again as a new wave of economic emigrants left the country to work throughout Western Europe and

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⁶⁰ Ibid., 149-150
⁶¹ Ibid., 151
especially in Germany. The focus here was again on managing citizens abroad through socio-economic policies including fear of unemployment, the loss of personal resources still in the country, and forced exit from the system of social and health insurance.63 This historical generation of the Croatian diaspora and its relations with the government in the homeland can also be seen in the various fissures within diaspora communities abroad and their organizations.

**Diaspora Involvement in the "Homeland War"

Croatians around the world contributed in a myriad of ways to the war effort in Croatia. According to Sean Carter, there were three main areas of diaspora involvement in the war - fundraising, political protests, and public relations efforts.64 Fundraising, particularly for humanitarian causes, was by far the most prevalent form of participation that included a wide range of individuals and groups including everything from the large organizations mentioned above to individual Catholic parishes serving large numbers of Croatians. The Croatian Humanitarian Aid Fund, for example, had received $850,000 in donations by the end of June 1993.65 Contributions were also funneled directly to the state through multiple bank accounts including one based in Switzerland referred to as the "Croatian National Fund". The money that found its way into these accounts enabled Croatian officials to both enrich themselves and purchase weapons,66 but also led to the diaspora being referred to by some as the "third pillar of the Croatian national economy."67 Political protests were held in cities with significant diaspora populations around the world and had two major functions: to bring the Croatian community

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63 Ragazzi, "The Croatian Diaspora Politics of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?," 152-154
66 Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*, 83-87
together in a show of unity and to demonstrate their electoral strength to key policy makers. For example, an early demonstration in Toronto on January 26, 1991 brought out 15,000 people to protest the disarmament of Croatian police forces.\(^6\) Such actions also played into the public relations efforts carried out by active members of the diaspora. Public relations within the diaspora included formal lobbying efforts through specific Croatian organizations and the public relations firm Rudder Finn, letter writing campaigns, cultural events, and the writing of opinion pieces in local papers countering negative portrayals of Croatia. Analyzing the effectiveness of such efforts is inherently a subjective process. In general, the literature refers to Croatian diaspora efforts at influencing host country governments as relatively successful.\(^6\) However, despite such apparent successes as the passing of the Direct Aid for Democracies Act and the Nickels Amendment in the U.S. context, the U.S. government's interests already coincided with Croatia's in many respects making claims of significant influence by such a small minority dubious.

**Tudman, HDZ, and the Diaspora**

Many scholars have noted the success of Tuđman and HDZ at mobilizing key segments of the diaspora in support of the party and its goals. HDZ, while not the only party to reach out to the diaspora, was by far the most committed and most successful in this endeavor. This commitment to making use of the diaspora comes as a result of two related factors. Within Socialist Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia itself, Tuđman was politically isolated\(^7\) and at the same time had an awareness of the political situation among segments of the diaspora from

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\(^7\) Ragazzi, "The Croatian Diaspora Politics of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?," 157
previous travels and the significant luck of being one of the few dissident politicians allowed to travel in the 1980s.\(^{71}\) At the same time, reaching out to the diaspora had been a personal goal of Tuđman's since 1987, and can be readily seen in the focus HDZ gave to generating support abroad as evidenced by its 16 party branches North American alone by November 1989.\(^{72}\) This strategy proved to be widely successful and further evidence supports the assertion that the diaspora essentially bankrolled HDZ's first election campaign in 1990 with an estimated 1.5-2 million U.S. dollars contributed by the diaspora worldwide.\(^{73}\) As Hockenos puts it, “The HDZ, less than a year old, mounted a global campaign for office in little Croatia, one republic of six in federal Yugoslavia, with a population of just 4.7 million”.\(^{74}\) At his inaugural speech in the Sabor on May 30, 1990, Tuđman stated,

Among the other successes of the HDZ that have contributed significantly to the hard-won democratic transformation, one must add the unquestioned creation of a spiritual unity between the homeland and exiled Croatia. The new Croatian government, at all levels, should undertake effective steps in order to facilitate the return of the largest possible number of Croat men and women from around the world to the homeland as soon as possible.\(^{75}\)

Already in the 1990 elections, some segments of the diaspora were able to vote, but only those with permanent residence in Croatia and the ability to be physically present for the elections.\(^{76}\) Despite HDZ's success in gaining political support from important segments of the diaspora, actual engagement of Croats abroad during the war was relatively haphazard, unsuccessful, and limited. This is not to say the diaspora was not involved in war and humanitarian efforts

\(^{71}\) Sarah Garding, *Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism*, Thesis (PhD), University of California, Berkeley, Department of Political Science, Spring 2013, 43.
\(^{72}\) Ibid, 51
\(^{73}\) Ragazzi, "The Croatian Diaspora Politics of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?," 158
\(^{74}\) Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*, 53
\(^{75}\) As quoted in Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*, 49.
throughout the first half of the 1990s nor that the Croatian government was completely unable to extract necessary resources from the diaspora. The war itself and the national program put forth by Tuđman and HDZ have been credited with mobilizing the diaspora and providing a common purpose to the actions of disparate diaspora organizations. Bank accounts based in Austria and Switzerland by the Croatian government and operated under the name "Croatian National Fund" succeeded in channeling $25-30 million donated from the U.S. alone directly to the Croatian government. However and despite the success in procuring funds from the diaspora, the efforts of North American diaspora organizations remained uncoordinated and disorganized. HDZ and the Croatian government made some attempts to coordinate and assert dominance over the actions of Croatian diaspora organizations, but as will be shown below, these efforts were resisted and ultimately thwarted by the organizations themselves. Tuđman and HDZ successfully mobilized the diaspora in support of their bid for power within Croatia and continued to benefit rhetorically and materially from diaspora participation in the war effort. However, relations with the diaspora were never effectively institutionalized despite the extension of extensive citizenship and voting rights in 1991. Engagement with the diaspora never progressed much beyond the extraction of resources and the rhetorical usage of the "diaspora" in support of domestic political aims.

Interestingly, Ragazzi notes a paradox in the engagement of the Croatian diaspora with the homeland. He notes that while remittances, return visits, and state policies on emigration were at their lowest levels in quite some time and possibly ever at the beginning of the 1990s, the diaspora began to receive the most attention it ever had within the media and political discourse.

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77 Wattman, Dangerous diasporas: émigré nationalism and ethnic violence, 119
78 Ibid, 120
of Croatia. This observation is further confirmed by the progressive dismantling of the links between the state and the diaspora after the end of the war despite continued rhetoric of the importance of the diaspora, prompting Ragazzi to argue that Tudman and HDZ instrumentalized diaspora discourse in order to expand the electorate in a favorable way and to assert the influence of the Croatian state in Western Herzegovina. Ragazzi argues that this paradox, embodied in the extension of citizenship and voting rights beyond Croatian territory, amounts to a "deterritorialized annexation" of Western Herzegovina cloaked in the internationally accepted language of transnational practices. With the exception of the diaspora's commitment to Croatia during and immediately following the war and the largely informal remittances that undoubtedly still flow within family networks, the general pattern identified by Ragazzi appears to be accurate. Moreover, the Croatian state, unlike many other homeland governments, never made much effort to assert control over the diaspora once their role in the war effort ended further supporting Ragazzi's argument. Thus, with the exception of during the war, the Croatian diaspora largely functioned as a rhetorical device in the construction of HDZ's nationalism and political gain domestically.

**Postwar Inclusion and Exclusion: Deterritorialized Citizenship and External Voting**

On October 8, 1991, the Republic of Croatia passed a new citizenship law to go along with its newly declared statehood. The conception of citizenship in this law is part of a unique but growing trend towards deterritorialized notions of citizenship. Citizenship in this law is based on two principles: continuity with citizenship in the Socialist Republic of Croatia

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79 Ragazzi, "The Croatian Diaspora Politics of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?,” 144-145
80 Ibid.
81 Ragazzi, “The Invention of the Croatian Diaspora: Unpacking the Politics of ‘diaspora’ during the War in Yugoslavia,” 7
Republican citizenship) and Croatian ethnicity. Such a formulation is problematic in the context of Croatia because of the specific relationship between republican and federal citizenship in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the law set strict requirements for the naturalization of those who did not qualify under either of the above mentioned categories. To naturalize, one must have five years of registered residence on the territory of Croatia, renounce current citizenship or demonstrate that it will be lost automatically upon naturalization, be proficient in the Croatian language and with using the Latin alphabet, that the individual's conduct has demonstrated an attachment to and acceptance for the legal system and customs of Croatia, and demonstrate the acceptance of Croatian culture. Acquisition of citizenship for Croats residing abroad is much easier and is governed by Article 16 of the citizenship law in conjunction with Article 8.1.5. Article 16 reads, "A member of the Croatian people who does not have a place of residence in the Republic of Croatia can acquire Croatian citizenship if he or she meets the prerequisites from Article 8, paragraph I, point 5 of this Law and if he or she issues a written statement that he or she considers himself or herself to be a Croatian citizen. The specific section of Article 8 mentioned above requires only a decision regarding the applicant's conduct and his or her acceptance of the legal systems, customs, and culture of the Republic of Croatia. Clearly, this naturalization policy was designed in such a way as to make excluding Croatian Serbs from citizenship as expedient and legal as possible as many did not possess the requisite republican


83 Ragazzi and Štiks, "Country Report: Croatia," 6
85 Ibid.
citizenship and then could be disqualified on the basis of denying the legitimacy of the state.\textsuperscript{86} It was also designed to include as many ethnic Croats as easily as possible even to the point of bringing sections of the law into partial contradiction on the question of dual citizenship.\textsuperscript{87} De-territorialized citizenship and external voting rights were also conceived of as a means of reintegrating emigrants into Croatia and of compensating the diaspora for their participation in the struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{88}

External voting rights play a particularly interesting role in the Croatian context. In the rhetoric of the Croatian state and especially of specifically HDZ, these voting rights are extended to the diaspora broadly defined as all of "expatriate Croatia" which includes the significant number of Croats residing in western Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{89} This enfranchised many people living in Bosnia as over 800,000 applicants from Bosnia had received Croatian citizenship by 2012.\textsuperscript{90} From 1995, the first elections in which external voting was allowed, until 2011 a special constituency just for the diaspora existed sparking significant domestic political debate. This specific constituency for the diaspora has had a disproportionate impact on domestic politics despite the notoriously low turnout among the diaspora.\textsuperscript{91} HDZ consistently won 80-90\% of the diaspora vote and thus always held every seat within the diaspora constituency.

\textsuperscript{86}Interestingly, Croatia considered Serbian rebels to be citizens until 1995 when after Operations Flash and Storm exclusionary legislation was passed by the Sabor. By the end of the 1990s, these restrictions had been lifted though by that time most Serbs had fled with little to no intention of returning (Koska, “Framing the Citizenship Regime within the Complex Triadic Nexuses: The Case Study of Croatia,” 401).
\textsuperscript{87} Article 2 specifically allows dual citizenship even if it is not recognized by the Republic of Croatia while article 8 on naturalization specifically forbids foreign nationals who want to naturalize from retaining their previous citizenship. In practice however, dual citizenship is accepted by the state and especially with regards to the diaspora in North America, Australia, etc (Ragazzi and Štiks, "Country Report: Croatia," 7).
\textsuperscript{88} Kasapović, “Voting rights, electoral systems, and political representation of diaspora in Croatia,” 781-782
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 779
\textsuperscript{90} Koska, “Framing the Citizenship Regime within the Complex Triadic Nexuses: The Case Study of Croatia,” 403
\textsuperscript{91} In the 1995 elections when one might assume that diaspora interest would be at its highest, the turnout was only 27.4\%, but gave all 12 diaspora seats to HDZ (Ragazzi and Balalovska, "Diaspora Politics and Post-Territorial Citizenship in Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia," 9)
Controversy over this special constituency peaked during the 2007 elections when the seats won by HDZ in the diaspora constituency provided the party with enough seats to form a government, something they would have otherwise been unable to do.\(^{92}\) Moreover, the vast majority of "diaspora" voters actually reside in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, in the 2007 Parliamentary elections, there were 284,023 registered voters in Bosnia of which 82,226 or 29% turned out to vote while there were 120,927 registered voters in the rest of the world of which 8,246 or 3.5% actually voted.\(^{93}\) This situation when viewed with HDZ's dominance amongst diaspora voters has led some to argue that Croatia's deterritorialized citizenship and voting policies amount to a "non-territorial annexation" of Herzegovina in an attempt to make up for the failed physical annexation during the wars of the 1990s.\(^{94}\)

**Dominant National Program**

Croatia is a country with strong internal divisions including significant regional identities produced in part by the divergent histories of rule in past empires. Thus a unified national narrative must create or point to a larger continuity unrelated to the particularities of any specific region. Therefore the dominant national claim has been based on a narrative of historical statehood. Alex J. Bellamy usefully traces the development of this narrative and analyzes how it fits into and deals with actual historical events. The historic Croatian state begins with King Tomislav in 924 and extends through union with Hungary in 1102, incorporation into the Habsburg Empire after the Ottoman defeat of the Hungarians in 1526, the 1918 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (which then became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929), the fascist

\(^{92}\) Ragazzi and Balalovska, "Diaspora Politics and Post-Territorial Citizenship in Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia," 10; Koska, "Framing the Citizenship Regime within the Complex Triadic Nexus: The Case Study of Croatia," 403

\(^{93}\) Kasapović, "Voting rights, electoral systems, and political representation of diaspora in Croatia," 781

\(^{94}\) Ragazzi, "The Invention of the Croatian Diaspora: Unpacking the Politics of ‘diaspora’ during the War in Yugoslavia."
Independent State of Croatia (NDH) led by Ante Pavelić, and then shifts to emphasize national opposition to Socialist Yugoslavia followed by the realization of an independent Croatian state in the Republic of Croatia in the 1990s. Franjo Tudman and the HDZ made use of the historical statehood narrative in the formation of a Croatian national ideology beginning in the 1980s and extending into the first decade of independence. For Tudman, a shared history was the basis of the nation, and relatedly, possession of a state was the only guarantee for the survival of the nation. At the same time, any successful national ideology needed to bridge the significant political differences found within the Croatian national body, namely between Communists and Fascists. Hence, what Bellamy refers to as "Franjoism" focuses on national unity and national reconciliation. Franjoism functioned as the link between fascists and communists, united both the good and the bad of Croatian history, and included both Croats in Croatia and those abroad in pursuit of a single goal - independence. National reconciliation was facilitated by Franjoism in that "All Croats could rally behind Franjoism, the argument went, because it encompassed every strand of Croatian political thought." To further this project of reconciliation and unity, Franjoism also focused on positioning Serbs as the Other. Thus Croats were also united in not being Serb (in being distinct culturally, historically, and even geographically in a Huntingtonian sense of civilization), Balkan, or uncivilized. As a product of these general concepts, three additional themes of Franjoism as national ideology are important and include: the primacy of Croatian sovereignty and independence, an exclusivist approach to citizenship, and the promotion of conservative clericalism in order to further differentiate Croatian-ness from other

98 Ibid, 68.
99 Ibid.
ethnic and political positions. Emphasizing historic statehood as the basis of the nation leads, in the case of Croatia, to citizenship and voting policies becoming intertwined with national ideology and being used to further goals such as national unification for, as numerous authors have pointed out, much of historic Croatia has been (re)incorporated into the modern Croatian state without formally controlling all of what nationalists claim is historic Croatian territory.

Within this national ideology, the diaspora plays a key role and represents an integral field within which the politics of national reconciliation are developed and play out. In the case of Croatia, the diaspora featured prominently in the early nation building practices of the state (which occurred in earnest despite Croatia's existence as a constituent republic within Yugoslavia) and was even referred to specifically by the eminent nationalism theorist Benedict Anderson as an example of what he refers to as long-distance nationalists. Franjo Tuđman, the first President of Croatia, formulated an ideology of a national body made up of two inalienable parts: Isiljena Hrvatska (Emigrant or Expatriate Croatia) and Domovinska Hrvatska (Homeland Croatia). In the early iterations of his conception of national history, which he developed in part during the 1980s during his first forays into the diaspora to gain their favor and support, Tuđman's nation building strategy or ideology was based on three pillars: national reconciliation, anti-Serb sentiment, and the return of the diaspora. National reconciliation refers to remaking Croats into a cohesive community by overcoming the traditional (and considerable) right-left, Ustaša vs. Communist divide that existed prominently in the diaspora. Serbs were largely positioned as the defining other for Croats and in the nationalist imagining of history were to

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{100}}\text{Ibid, 71 and 74}
\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{101}}\text{Anderson, "Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics."}
\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{102}}\text{Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, 48 and Ragazzi, “The Invention of the Croatian Diaspora: Unpacking the Politics of ‘diaspora’ during the War in Yugoslavia,” 4}
\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{103}}\text{Ragazzi and Štiks, "Country Report: Croatia,” 188}
blame for most, if not all calamities especially the wars of the 1990s. This belief in a turbulent national history was used to explain the "catastrophic circumstances" that lead to the departure of the diaspora which now could be reunited into a single Croatian nation aiming for statehood.\textsuperscript{104} Importantly, especially for developments occurring during the 1990s, the diaspora itself was divided in this national imaginary into Croats in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina\textsuperscript{105} and those living further away "in exile".

\textbf{Regime Type and Geopolitical Position}

Today, Croatia is a democracy characterized as free by Freedom House and the newest member of the European Union. At the time of independence however, the state was much less democratic despite holding elections and having political pluralism on paper. HDZ emerged from the 1990 elections with a comfortable majority of seats in the Sabor and Franjo Tuđman received affirmation for his ideology of national unity. As in other former Yugoslav and post-Socialist states, the first government of independent Croatia demonstrated authoritarian tendencies and the ruling HDZ moved to consolidate its position vis-a-vis other political parties and the media.

At the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Croatia already enjoyed a positive relationship with other European countries and power brokers including Germany and the Vatican. Furthermore, the proximity of the European Community and then the European Union provided further encouragement and opportunities for democratization, capitalist development, and regional integration. As one of the wealthiest of Yugoslavia's six republics, Croatia also showed great potential for a successful transition from Socialism. Croatia's position in Europe and

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 189
\textsuperscript{105} Croats in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina are not a diaspora by most academic definitions including the one used in this essay. Such a situation of transborder co-ethnics is more properly covered in the literature on kin-state politics and especially in Rogers Brubaker's \textit{Nationalism Reframed}. 

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nationalist rhetoric of Croatia as a European rather than a Balkan country and as a bulwark of European civilization placed the country in a position in which cooperation with international and regional organizations was seen as productive. Due to the availability of international assistance and the willingness of the government to participate, Croatia was and is not dependent on diaspora resources\textsuperscript{106} and remittances though such funding sources remain significant and likely played a considerable role in the ability of individual citizens and families’ ability to make it through the war and the early years of the transition. In 2013, Croatia entered the European Union completing its integration into the region and placing it within the financial structures of Europe and the international system. It remains to be seen how EU accession will affect Croatia - does it go the way of Hungary which has sought to again bring its diaspora into the fold mainly due to domestic political calculations, or does it continue its current policies of encouraging investment but without real engagement.

\textit{Control}

I characterize the government of Croatia as having exerted relatively little formal control over its diaspora in North America. Most of its efforts were focused on exploiting diaspora members for their financial resources and its interest in Croats residing outside of the surrounding region quickly waned following the end of the war. The Croatian diaspora already had long-standing institutions through which support for an independent Croatia could be channeled. These organizations like the Croatian Fraternal Union had a history of autonomy from any government and successfully resisted the efforts of HDZ to bring them into the fold of an umbrella organization controlled by the state. In 1993, moderate emigrants established the Croatian World Congress (CWC) as a forum for coordinating all Croatian diaspora organizations

\textsuperscript{106} Garding, \textit{Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism}, 122
throughout the world. Its effectiveness was soon undermined, however, as HDZ quickly moved
to take over control leading many Croatian organizations, especially Croatian-American
organizations, to recognize the Congress as an attempt to bring them all under the control of
HDZ, though it must be noted that CWC still was the first Croatian NGO granted observer
status by the United Nations in 1999. Continued ideological and political differences also
produced cleavages between diaspora organizations and their support for the war effort
especially as the focus turned towards Bosnia. More right wing organizations like the Croatian
American Association (CAA) continued to support Tuđman and his designs in Western
Herzegovina while other groups such as the Croatian Fraternal Union and the National
Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA) spoke out against the government's actions in the
name of democratic principles. Croatian diaspora organizations in North America tended to
safeguard their autonomy including with regards to aid and support during the war.

One of the main focuses of the literature on state-diaspora relations is deterritorialized
citizenship and voting rights. These two related issues are generally seen as the basis of pressure
placed on the government by the diaspora or as a pragmatic strategy used by the government to
entice additional remittances from the diaspora. Such issues form the basis of most contention
between government and diaspora in cases as diverse as Mexico, Haiti, and Morocco.

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108 Maja Povrzanović Frykm. "Homeland lost and gained: Croatian diaspora and refugees in Sweden." in Al-Ali,
Nadje Sadig, and Khalid Koser. New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the
Transformation of Home (Routledge, 2002), 119
109 Ragazzi, “The Invention of the Croatian Diaspora: Unpacking the Politics of ‘diaspora’ during the War in
Yugoslavia,” 5.
110 Smith, “Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics.”
111 Basch, Schiller, and Blanc. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and
Deterritorialized Nationstates.
However, as Smith notes,\textsuperscript{113} decisive in most of these cases are a combination of factors affecting the domestic political environment and the leverage held by the diaspora over the government. In this vein, Garding argues explicitly using Serbia and Croatia as case studies that the single most important factor in diaspora political incorporation is domestic political party competition.\textsuperscript{114} The provision of deterritorialized citizenship and voting rights was focused primarily on people living in Western Herzegovina and functioned as a means to extend state authority over additional territory and to ensure the electoral success of HDZ rather than as a method of diaspora inclusion in order to produce the necessary state knowledge to exert state hegemony outside of Croatia's borders. As Ragazzi notes though, passports in the case of Croatia function both as a method of identifying and controlling the nation and "a symbolic document signifying belonging to the nation, and abolishing the previous distinction between political exiles, third generation migrants and workers temporarily abroad."\textsuperscript{115}

In the early 1990s, Croatia established its first ministries for the diaspora which set the tone for official state dealings with the Croatian population abroad. The main focus of these ministries was on the return of Croatians to Croatia in order to further economic development and to re-populate the country, especially rural areas vacated by Serbs who fled during the war.\textsuperscript{116} First came the short lived Ministry for Emigration (Ministarstvo za Iseljeništvo) in Fall 1991 led by the now well known diaspora supporter of HDZ Gojko Šušak until he became Minister of Defense. This was then followed by the Ministry for Return and Immigration


\textsuperscript{113} Smith, “Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics,” 325

\textsuperscript{114} Garding, \textit{Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism}

\textsuperscript{115} Ragazzi, "The Croatian Diaspora Politics of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?,” 162

\textsuperscript{116} Ragazzi, \textit{When Governments say Diaspora: Transnational Practices of Citizenship, Nationalism and Sovereignty in Croatia and Former Yugoslavia}, Thesis (PhD). Northwestern University, Dept. of Political Science, 236
(Ministarstvo Povratka i Useljeništva) in November 1996 and existed until it was transformed into the Ministry for Development, Immigration, and Reconstruction (Ministarstvo razvitka, useljeništva i obnove) which functioned from May 1999 until January 2000. This date is significant in that 2000 marks the first election lost by HDZ and begins a gradual shift in policy towards the diaspora. After 2000, there is no longer a ministry level office aimed at the diaspora. The capacities of the former ministry were absorbed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration becoming simply the Office for Croatian Minorities, Emigration, and Immigration. In this move, the Croatian government literally subordinated relations with the diaspora to their European Union aspirations, something jeopardized by the pre-2000 diaspora inclusion policies. Of course, the Croatian government still has an interest in maintaining contact with the diaspora and in facilitating their investment in the country. However, the end of the Tudman era also spelled the end of diaspora engagement policies aimed explicitly at enabling their participation in the state and ensuring that participation benefitted HDZ. As discussed above, these moves away from a specific Ministry for the diaspora also corresponded with domestic political efforts to reduce the size and influence of the diaspora constituency in Croatian elections. Thus, domestic political competition along with the overriding concern of joining the European Union, a goal at odds with the effects of previous diaspora policy, determined, in large part, the tone of Croatia's efforts to engage and control its diaspora.

Garding, Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism.
Eritrea

The "Struggle for Independence"

Eritrea, a young country with a turbulent history, gained independence in 1993 at about the same time as the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. The name Eritrea was first used for the present day territory in 1889 by Italian colonial administrators. Eritrea had two colonial rulers, Italy from 1890-1914 and the British Military Administration (BMA) from 1941-1952, followed by a weak autonomy within the Ethio-Eritrean Federation from 1952 until the Ethiopian regime of Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea in 1961. The annexation is regarded as what ultimately sparked the fight for independence which lasted from 1961 until the ultimate defeat of the Derg (sometimes also spelled Dergue) regime in Ethiopia in 1991 by an alliance of Eritrean and Ethiopian rebel groups. In between, Eritrea saw heavy fighting throughout much of its territory including a civil war between rebel groups lasting from approximately 1970 until the ultimate triumph of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1981. Immediately following independence, Eritrea was heralded as a possible leader in the development of Africa, though such positive prognoses were short lived as the government turned increasingly authoritarian, isolating itself from the international community, and fighting with its neighbors. These conflicts included a particularly devastating Border War with Ethiopia from 1998-2000. Throughout all of this, many people and organizations within Eritrea's growing diaspora remained involved in the affairs of the homeland and maintained direct connections with the state.

119 Within particular discourses, especially those surrounding the Eritrean independence movement, the period of Ethiopian rule is also referred to as colonial in order to further claims for self-determination based on the African decolonization model. A full discussion of this issue is out of the scope of this essay.
120 Tricia Redeker Hepner. Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora (Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 17
It is estimated that one quarter to one third of all Eritreans reside outside of Eritrea either as refugees or as part of the global diaspora. The Eritrean diaspora remains spread throughout the world with large contingents in the Gulf States, Western Europe and the United States. While "cycles of departure and return" began prior to the formation of a distinct Eritrean identity as well as helped craft one, the important era for more politically conscious diasporic activity began in the 1950s. Soon after the end of British Military Administration (BMA) period in 1952 and the founding of the short lived Ethio-Eritrean Federation, Eritrean liberation movements began to form among exile groups of mainly Muslim students and workers particularly in Sudan. The most successful of these first organizations was the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which had leadership in exile as central feature of its organizational structure from the beginning. Founded in 1960, the ELF remained the main fighting force until the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front grew into a position of dominance in the mid to late 1970s, though the ELF remained active until finally loosing the intermittent civil war with the EPLF after which it was forced into exile in 1981. At this same time, the Immigration Act of 1965 enabled the first Eritrean students and workers to come to the United States. By 1970, the first Eritrean nationalist organization, Eritreans for Liberation in North America, was founded and quickly became linked directly to the EPLF. This linkage or subordination to the EPLF was part of a constant strategy and effort made by the EPLF to extend its reach into the diaspora and unite Eritreans in the struggle for independence. The EPLF was so successful that by the end of the 1970s all Eritrean

123 Hepner, *Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora*, 19
124 The EPLF was founded in 1970 out of a coalition of two splinter groups from the ELF and a number of other competing factions.
125 Hepner, *Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora*, Chs. 1 and 2
associations in the U.S. were associated with the Front.\textsuperscript{126} Reaching out to and incorporating the diaspora was a strategy inspired by both the EPLF's national project and necessity. In 1975, the chief fundraiser of the EPLF broke ties with the organization leaving them in desperate need of new sources of funding.\textsuperscript{127} This combined with the EPLF's strategy of self-reliance - a key pillar of the Front's overall nationalism based on both a distrust of the outside founded on a particular reading of Eritrean history and a strong sense of community fostered by the struggle itself\textsuperscript{128} - served as the main impetus for the intimate involvement of the diaspora in the fight for independence.

Complications brought on by influxes of new immigrants and refugees within diaspora communities especially following the Refugee Act of 1980 began to occur as the majority of new arrivals were directly linked to the ELF and its forced exile into Sudan. These Eritrean exiles were given preference for admission (along with Ethiopian refugees) by the U.S. in order to silence domestic voices critical of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa and as a political gesture to Sudan, an ally which viewed the refugees as a source of instability.\textsuperscript{129} The experience of the civil war and the difficulties of integrating these new refugees into the largely pro-EPLF diaspora in the U.S. complicated the definition and organization of Eritrean diaspora communities.\textsuperscript{130} While this may seem like a recipe for diversifying and reorienting the organizations and institutions of the diaspora, the opposite has largely taken place. The Eritrean state, or rather the EPLF and its later political iteration, the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), proved quite successful in maintaining its control over formal organizations in the diaspora. This control

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, 108
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 49
\textsuperscript{130} Hepner, \textit{Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora}, 104
remains relatively continuous from during the independence struggle, through the early years of independence and the devastating Border War with Ethiopia, and into the present day. Despite early optimism from many observers about the future of Eritrea, the PFDJ transformed the country into an authoritarian party-state allowing little space for dissent within its borders and even to an impressive degree within the diaspora.

**Relations Between State and Diaspora**

Eritrea and its diaspora appear to represent a sort of anomaly within the established diaspora and transnational studies literature. Throughout the struggle for independence and into the present day, state and diaspora remain strongly interlinked. Like Croatia, the newly independent Eritrean state defined citizenship broadly in order to incorporate and included them in the drafting of the new Constitution which also then granted the diaspora full voting rights. However, the only vote to date that has occurred in Eritrea was that regarding independence in which Eritreans from around the world enthusiastically participated. The logic behind the political incorporation of transborder Eritreans is tellingly different than in the Croatian case. As essentially a single-party state that never held elections, diaspora inclusion cannot be seen as a product of domestic political party competition nor can Eritrea's widespread, diverse diaspora be seen as offering full support to the ruling PFDJ as can be suggested of Herzegovinian Croats.\(^{131}\) The Eritrean diaspora, in a way that is unique or that has at least persisted in way different from most other cases, continues to not only be seen or rhetorically constructed as a part of the population, but also to a large degree acts as such. As will be explored in greater detail below, during the fight for independence, the EPLF developed a national program based on self-reliance.

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\(^{131}\) Such a statement is not meant to essentialize Herzegovinian Croats or to suggest that all are full, unconditional supporters of HDZ. My intention is simply to point out that when it comes to political support as demonstrated by voting, this segment of the Croatian population abroad was the most consistent supporter of HDZ.
to make up for the lack of international support. The form and content of this national project was made possible in part due to heavy contributions from the Eritrean diaspora. While this is relatively common for diasporas whose homelands are in conflict and especially of diasporas seeking a homeland, this approach to development and independence has persisted much longer than in other cases. The state continues to maintain an ideology of self-reliance which translates practically into a rejection of organizations and aid that refuse to submit to the terms and control of the Eritrean government. For example, the government insists that donor funds go to the relevant Ministries rather than separate organizations or directly to people, it restricts the activities of NGOs, and actively resists any sort of loan conditionality.\textsuperscript{132} This functions in large part through the 2\% tax levied on all adult Eritreans regardless of residence. In times of crisis such as during the border war with Ethiopia, the government further augments the revenue generated by the tax through calls for additional contributions from the diaspora. Payment of the tax as well as additional contributions occur at a relatively high rate keeping in mind the more limited ability of the state to enforce such a tax beyond its borders. However, as will be expanded on below, the state does make use of both more coercive means and consent to encourage contributions organized through embassies, consulates, and local PFDJ offices. It is here that the logic of diaspora incorporation can be seen. By providing citizenship easily to all Eritreans and by using the extensive network of diaspora organizations associated with the PFDJ, the Eritrean state can come to "know" much about its population abroad and make use of every measure at its disposal to relate to them almost as though they lived within Eritrea.

Historical Legacy

The Eritrean fight for independence was, from the beginning, partly waged from outside its territorial borders. As the struggle continued, more and more Eritreans fled the country increasing the size of an already present and active diaspora. The ELF was founded in exile in Sudan, and the EPLF cultivated strong links with the diaspora by essentially acting as the central impetus for organization and mobilization.\textsuperscript{133} Virtually all Eritrean diaspora organizations in North America were politically active and directly connected to the EPLF. The EPLF and members of the diaspora themselves resisted the formation of any organization that threatened the unity of Eritreans, and demonstrated their willingness to sabotage attempts to form unaffiliated organizations through the use of rumors, accusations of working for "the enemy", etc.\textsuperscript{134}

Just prior to the triumphant defeat of Ethiopian forces in 1991, the leadership of the EPLF, recognizing the possibility of victory, dissolved all of the mass organizations and advocated the construction of community associations known as maHber koms along guidelines provided by the Front.\textsuperscript{135} MaHber koms were billed as non-political organizations and, despite negative reactions from many long term supporters in the diaspora, had an important two pronged rationale: 1) to encourage the most active supporters to return to Eritrea and physically contribute and 2) to consolidate national unity by creating "non-political" associations more amenable to former supporters of the ELF.\textsuperscript{136} Such a strategy proved to be largely successful as it accomplished both the subversion of attempts by non-EPLF members of the diaspora to construct autonomous organizations and the construction of a new space for the propagation of

\textsuperscript{133} Hepner, \textit{Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora}  
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, Ch. 5  
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid, 115  
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, 116
EPLF's nationalist program. Furthermore, since independence the PFDJ has made use of all international functions of the state to maintain its position within the diaspora. Through the use of embassies and consulates as well as branches of the PFDJ and diaspora organizations linked to the party (just as during the war), the state continues to have an impressive presence within the diaspora.

**National Ideology**

Diaspora organizations' historical linkages with the state helped shape, in part, the EPLF's ideology and enabled the state to control and spread its nationalist orientation within the diaspora. As noted above, debates over the boundaries of the nation played a key role in during the independence struggle. The EPLF and its "synthetic nationalism" came out of the debate as dominant. Hepner takes the example of Medina and analyzes the competing nationalisms of the ELF and EPLF according to a typology of nationalist projects as hegemonic, synthetic, and pluralist. According to her analysis, the ELF represent a pluralist national project which "affirm[s] and strengthen differences defined and marked by multiple racial and ethnic categories...mak[ing] difference highly visible." However, many disagreed with this project, believing that it served to reify and exacerbate the complex cleavages present in Eritrean society, thus the EPLF embarked on a radically different nationalist project. Hepner describes the Front's version as an example of a synthetic national project in which the aim is "to create a shared national culture by mixing and combining practices and values associated with constituent ethnic

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137 Ibid.  
138 Hepner, *Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora*  
140 Hepner, *Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora*, 42  
141 Medina, "Defining Difference, Forging Unity: The Con-construction of Race, Ethnicity and Nation in Belize," 761  
142 Hepner, *Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora*, 47
cultures to produce a new, synthetic national culture and identity.143 Hence, national unity and especially unity in the face of threat and adversity remains a significant theme within Eritrean national discourse. Unity in this way can be deployed to close ranks and provide support in times of crisis, but also to mobilize against dissent by portraying it as unpatriotic and, more importantly, as actually working in a way that helps the nation's enemies. All nationalist projects make use of some form of this rhetoric through the use of terms such as traitor and betrayal, though the Eritrean case demonstrates the power such constructions can have even in the diaspora when teamed up with significant institutional reach and a particular historical legacy.

A second pillar of the EPLF's national project is the concept of self-reliance. As noted briefly above, self-reliance arose originally out of the necessity to make up for a sudden absence of external support. The EPLF turned to its sizeable and committed diaspora networks to provide the monetary and material support it needed to continue the struggle towards independence. At home, self-reliance produced a generation of industrious fighters and laborers who became highly frugal and accomplished improvisers. Abroad, this meant that prior to independence and the shift in the international community towards viewing diasporas as "development partners",144 the EPLF cultivated a particular relationship with the diaspora which did its part for the independence struggle by providing the necessary funding. This arrangement carried over into independence as the Eritrean state managed to quickly alienate and/or kick out virtually all international organizations and NGOs.145 Informed by the broader African experience of post-colonialism and neoliberal globalization, the state aimed to maintain its independence and safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity (a point of significant insecurity and paranoia).

143 Medina, “Defining Difference, Forging Unity: The Co-construction of Race, Ethnicity and Nation in Belize,” 760
Thus, a culture of participation in the country of origin was cultivated through the contribution of funds and remains imbedded in a diaspora that continues to give more and more\textsuperscript{146} despite growing discontent due to the extra contributions solicited during the Border War with Ethiopia (1998-2000) and the poor performance, broken promises, and illiberal nature of the PFDJ party-state. The World Bank estimated that, in 2002, remittances accounted for almost one third of Eritrea's GDP.\textsuperscript{147} To further illustrate the significance of the diaspora in this regard, Poole cites statistics demonstrating that $10 in remittances came in for every $1 of foreign direct investment, and $40 per each dollar earned from exports. In a somewhat bitterly toned introduction to a recent special issue of the journal \textit{Africa Today}, Tekle M. Woldemikael suggests that despite some recent scholarship documenting growing dissent and discontentment within segments of the diaspora\textsuperscript{148} there exists a sort of symbiotic relationship or at least a tacit understanding between the regime and the diaspora where the diaspora contributes taxes and supports war efforts, and in return, the government gives them preferential treatment such as the granting of land (a scarce resource) on which to build houses - a state of affairs recognized by those within Eritrea and contributing to the perpetuation of a "refugee-diaspora" nexus in which Eritreans aspire to leave the country and by doing so become part of the global diaspora with its attendant privileges in Eritrea.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{146}Poole, “Ransoms, Remittances, and Refugees: The Gatekeeper State in Eritrea,” 75
\textsuperscript{147}Ibid, 74
\textsuperscript{149}Woldemikael, “Introduction: Postliberation Eritrea,” xiv-xvi.
Post-Independence Regime Type

Government type plays an important role in determining when engagement policies are pursued and their content once the desire for engagement is present. It is highly unlikely that the Eritrean state would have been able to maintain such a high degree of control over the diaspora without the use of particular legal and extralegal measures. Unlike other cases in which the diaspora had to work in order to receive de-territorialized citizenship and voting rights, the Eritrean state extended such rights broadly upon gaining independence (though the only example of voting has been in the internationally monitored referendum on independence) and also took pains to ensure diaspora participation in the writing of the constitution, which, though ratified in 1997, has never been implemented. Citizenship rights play a particularly important role. Not only does the extension of transnational citizenship rights maintain continuity with the official national program, but they also provide the government with additional legal mechanisms of control. As citizens, adult Eritreans must pay the 2% tax, thus broader rights means more revenues. More importantly, particular perks such as the ability to own land or obtain building permits are only open to citizens, and may be restricted by the state for not paying taxes, not contributing enough during the Border War, or for engaging in subversive activities (monitored by the vast networks of diaspora individuals and organizations connected to the state). For example, Hepner recounts the story of a young woman from her fieldwork who was not allowed to adopt her deceased sister's children specifically because she was considered to have not

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contributed enough during the border war.\textsuperscript{153} Following independence, the state moved to consolidate its presence abroad. This took the form of a (re)institutionalization through the transitioning of EPLF chapters into representatives of the PDFJ and especially the special Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose job it was to link “Eritrean embassies and consulates abroad, local community associations in exile (ideally organized and managed by PFDJ chapters) and the state”.\textsuperscript{154} The Eritrean state takes this one step further by working to actively undermine any attempts to create autonomous space within Eritrean communities abroad. In 2005, for example, representatives of the state along with members of the local community succeeded in undermining the functioning of an autonomous organization connecting Muslim and Christian Eritreans in Southern California through the use of a variety of tactics including overt intimidation as well as more covert means such as the spreading of rumors.\textsuperscript{155}

\textbf{Control}

Eritrea and its diaspora relations represent a clear example of successful diaspora incorporation and control. The later development of Eritrean's residing abroad into a diaspora and the general lack from the beginning of autonomous diaspora institutions produced the necessary context for the successful extension of state power abroad. EPLF and later PFDJ affiliated institutions function as the main and, in many cases, the only locus for community based activities for Eritreans in North America as well as the primary vehicle for remotely participating in Eritrea proper. These organizations work actively to undermine the formation and functioning of any diaspora institutions which attempt to maintain any autonomy from the

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, 483
\textsuperscript{155} Poole, “Ransoms, Remittances, and Refugees: The Gatekeeper State in Eritrea,” 74
existing structures.\textsuperscript{156} The story of the short lived Eritrean Student Relief Organization (ESRO) represents a prime example of this. ESRO was founded in 1992 as an attempt to bridge the divide between Muslim and Christian Eritreans living in Southern California. These two groups often had different refugee experiences, mainly with regards to countries travelled through, and Muslim Eritreans, whether practicing or secular, were more likely to have supported the ELF while Christians had come more strongly behind the EPLF and still held most positions of importance in official organizations both in Eritrea and the diaspora. ESRO attempted to surmount this divide by taking an explicitly non-political stance and attempted to act as an independent NGO delivering mainly medical aid directly to people in Eritrea, something the government asserts nearly complete control over.\textsuperscript{157} Such a focus meant ESRO aimed at autonomy both within the diaspora community in Southern California and from the Eritrean government in the delivering of aid within the country. This quickly earned it attention from PFDJ affiliated organizations in the area which "saw it as their duty to conduct surveillance and intimidation of ESRO members in order to undermine the initiatives taken by ESRO, an organization outside of their control."\textsuperscript{158} Through the use of rumors and the labeling of ESRO as an opposition organization, the ruling party and its allies in the diaspora succeeded in undermining the organization by 1997.\textsuperscript{159}

However, this example is not meant to suggest that the Eritrean government is able to extend its full authoritarian repertoire into the diaspora. Significant political debate is able to occur in the diaspora and over the internet unlike within the territory of Eritrea. An early example of this is the internet site Dehai founded by Eritreans living in the U.S. in 1992, which

\textsuperscript{156} Tekle M. Woldemikael, "Bridging the Divide: Muslim and Christian Eritreans in Orange County, California." \textit{Eritrean Studies Review} 4, no. 2 (2005), 143-164.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, 151 and 153
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid, 154
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid, 155
has even been credited with changing official government policy due to public criticism posted there.\textsuperscript{160} However, Dehai itself is actually a largely pro-government website that even the official Government of Eritrea webpage links to.\textsuperscript{161} In the late 1990s, two additional websites were founded by Eritreans residing in the U.S., Asmarino and Awate, which take an explicitly autonomous and critical stance towards the Eritrean government. The three websites compete for page views and struggle over the "boundaries of national authority and public discourse," thus taking on the role of civil society beyond Eritrea's borders.\textsuperscript{162} While Bernal presents a relatively positive verging on emancipatory view of these websites as emerging public spheres bringing all parts of the nation together and enabling communication both between segments of Eritrean society which are usually distant from one another, but also between citizens and the government who is alleged to follow these online forums, the actual effects of online forums are notoriously difficult to measure and the responsiveness of the government to pressure from these websites has almost certainly decreased as it has increased in authoritarianism. Because the government has so successfully monopolized most organizational sectors both inside and outside Eritrea, online spaces remain among the only open for autonomous organization and speech, though even in these spaces individual identity must be protected.


\textsuperscript{161} Bernal, “Civil Society and Cyberspace: Reflections on Dehai, Asmarino, and Awate,” 29.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, 30.
Discussion and Analysis

As discussed in depth in the first section, scholars have examined many aspects of the origin state - diaspora - country of residence nexus though only more recently has attention turned towards the diaspora - country of origin dyad. This thesis aims at contributing to this direction of research through a comparative case study of origin state efforts to engage and influence the activities of its diaspora especially with regards to flows of people, remittances, and information. This section will proceed in two parts. The first provides an empirical look at the engagement policies of Croatia and Eritrea and the second offers a comparative analysis of the two cases based on the four variables I identified previously.

Empirical Analysis

In order to provide a more clear comparison of the engagement efforts of Croatia and Eritrea, this section takes an empirical look at the engagement policies of the two states. The following are a series of tables comparing the specific diaspora engagement efforts of both Croatia and Eritrea. Each of the tables are based on Gamlen’s research on diaspora engagement and use his categories while also supplementing his data on Croatia and Eritrea with my own research. Table one presents a broader comparison of diaspora building and diaspora integration mechanisms. Across the top are the broad categories with accompanying examples developed by Gamlen. As can readily be seen, Eritrea engages both in diaspora building and diaspora integration at a much higher level than Croatia does. The only point at which the action of the two countries corresponds is in the second column of extending rights as neither state encourages emigration nor works extensively to improve the lives of emigrants in their new countries of residence. Table two contains details of the symbolic nation-building efforts of the two states. As the above discussion has shown, both Croatia and Eritrea featured the diaspora in their respective
national programs, though in the case of Croatia this has been downplayed over time corresponding with waning domestic political interest. Based on my research, I cannot claim that either Croatia or Eritrea implements any significant policies of cultural promotion in the diaspora. The Croatian government, through the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports, maintains a number of language and literature programs abroad that do somewhat correspond to locations with heavy concentrations of Croatian expats, but there is no specific diaspora focus to these programs. The Eritrean government does not have any explicit programs for promoting Eritrean culture in the diaspora, though it could be said to do so through local diaspora organizations which are affiliated with the ruling party and/or are under its direct control, though my lack of evidence of any specific policy leads me to tentatively state that none exists. Both states tend to present a positive image of the diaspora in domestic media. Most of the scholarship I have examined has examples of prominent, positive messages about the diaspora during the Tuđman era in Croatia as evidenced by the excerpt from a speech of his quoted in the section on Croatia. In comparison, Eritrea clearly promotes an overtly positive image of the diaspora in state media and national discourse, a practice that forms part of Woldemikael’s argument that Eritrea has a hierarchical form of citizenship with Eritreans living in the state possessing fewer rights than those living abroad. Table three compares the diaspora institutions at use in both cases. Prior to 2000, Croatia had a ministerial level agency for the diaspora, but after 2000 the only institution focused on the diaspora is an office with accompanying bureaucracy within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration. In stark contrast, Eritrea engages in all of the institution building policy steps with the exception of having a ministry level agency. As discussed extensively throughout this thesis, the extent of state involvement in the institutionalization of the diaspora is heavily correlated with more successful diaspora

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163 Woldemikael, “Introduction: Postliberation Eritrea,” xi
engagement. Croatia and Eritrea are nearly polar opposites in this regard explaining in large part the differences in successful engagement attempts.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultivating a diaspora: Celebrating national holidays; honoring expatriates with awards; convening diaspora congresses; proclaiming affinity with and responsibility for diaspora; issuing special IDs/visas; national language and history education; extended media coverage</th>
<th>Recognizing the diaspora Expanded consular units; commissioning studies or reports; improving statistics; maintaining a diaspora program, bureaucratic unit, or dedicated ministry</th>
<th>Extending Rights (1) Permitting dual nationality, dual citizenship or external voting rights; special Legislative representation; consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies</th>
<th>Extending Rights (2) Providing pre-departure services; extensive bilateral agreements; intervening in labor relations; supplementing health; welfare and education services support; upholding property rights</th>
<th>Extracting Obligations Taxing expatriates, customs/import incentives, special economic zones, investment services, tax incentives, matching fund programs, diaspora bonds &amp; financial products, facilitating remittances, fellowships, skilled expatriate networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Little*</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Extensive*</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Extensive*</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Symbolic nation-building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusive rhetoric and symbols</th>
<th>Cultural Promotion and Induction</th>
<th>Shaping Media and PR</th>
<th>Conferences and Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Limited*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes:

164 Adapted from Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination,” 845.
165 An asterisk appearing next to an entry in the table, indicates a point at which I altered the data provided by Gamlen based on my own research. His table covers a significant number of states and thus his research into each could not be as extensive as my own with regards to the two case studies examined here in this thesis. Furthermore, diaspora engagement policies are dynamic and change over time hence these tables should be seen as an imperfect snapshot of diaspora engagement policies.
166 Tables 2-6 have been adapted from Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use them?,” 9 and 19.
167 A single asterisk indicates a point of difference between the information in my adapted table and Gamlen's original. Double asterisks indicate insufficient evidence.
Table 3 Institution building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ministerial Level Agency</th>
<th>Dedicated Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Monitoring Efforts</th>
<th>Building Transnational Networks</th>
<th>Consular and Consultative Bodies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>No¹⁶⁸</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From table four on, the focus shifts to the extension of rights and the extraction of obligations from the diaspora. With regards to political incorporation, Croatia and Eritrea are quite similar as has been well established throughout this thesis. Both states quickly extended citizenship and voting rights to people living abroad. However, in the case of Croatia, such a move was not responded to enthusiastically by most living abroad and ended up being focused mainly on incorporating Croatians living in Bosnia into Croatian politics. Eritrea has never held elections so its political incorporation of the diaspora has thus far been mainly symbolic except with regards to formal citizenship. Special ID cards are issued by embassies and consulates to Eritreans living outside of the country. By claiming Eritrean citizenship and obtaining the necessary ID card, Eritreans abroad are then required to pay the 2% tax. Compliance is monitored carefully by consular and embassy staff with non-compliance often resulting in the refusal to issue travel documents or to assist with other necessary services.¹⁶⁹ The Eritrean state also engages in additional practices aimed at securing revenue from remittances. For example, the state has made it illegal to hold or use any foreign currency thus forcing those receiving remittances to exchange their foreign currency at government run banks or exchange offices which operate on the exchange rate set by the government enabling it to profit further from

¹⁶⁸ Croatia did have a ministerial level agency for the diaspora between 1991 and 2000, though after 2000 this agency was reduced to simply an office within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration. See the chapter on Croatia for an in-depth discussion.
¹⁶⁹ See for example: Redeker Hepner, “Transnational Governance and the Centralization of State Power in Eritrea and Exile,” 486-487; Poole, “Ransoms, Remittances, and Refugees: The Gatekeeper State in Eritrea,” 75
money sent back into the country by the diaspora.\textsuperscript{170} However, for those who comply with the state’s regulations and who contribute when necessary, the Eritrean government incentivizes trips to the country and diaspora investment through special tourism services and by granting diaspora members the right to own land.\textsuperscript{171} Thus, the Eritrean state has instituted a much wider range of diaspora engagement policies than Croatia which is evident not only in the institutions involved and symbolic efforts, but also in the success of the policies themselves.

**Table 4 Political incorporation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Special Membership Concessions</th>
<th>Dual Nationality (no vote)</th>
<th>Must Return to Vote</th>
<th>Embassy Voting</th>
<th>Postal Voting</th>
<th>Indefinite, Unconditional Voting</th>
<th>Parliamentary Representation</th>
<th>Can Run for Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes\textsuperscript{172}</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes\textsuperscript{172}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5 Civil and social rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tourism Services</th>
<th>Welfare Protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Yes\textsuperscript{*}</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6 Investment policies and lobby promotion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mandatory Payments</th>
<th>Special Economic Zones</th>
<th>Remittance and FDI Capture</th>
<th>Knowledge Transfer Programs</th>
<th>Promoting Expat Lobby</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variable Analysis**

At the beginning of this project, I hypothesized that four factors in particular would effect and together explain the relative effectiveness of states' efforts to engage and control the

\textsuperscript{170} Poole, “Ransoms, Remittances, and Refugees: The Gatekeeper State in Eritrea,” 75-76

\textsuperscript{171} Woldemikael, “Introduction: Postliberation Eritrea,” xii-xiv.

\textsuperscript{172} This remains a yes, though the special diaspora constituency has been steadily reduced between independence and the time of writing. See the chapter on Croatia for an in-depth discussion.
activities of their population resident abroad - historical legacy, national ideology, the position of the country of origin internationally, and regime type. This comparative case study has shown that each of these factors certainly plays a role in such efforts, however some must be considered more second order factors rather than more fully explanatory ones.

The form and content of particular nationalist projects appears often able to explain particularities in state efforts and the degree to which a national program resonates with the population in question and is accepted as hegemonic can contribute to the effectiveness of diaspora engagement. In the case of Eritrea, self-reliance formed an important pillar of the EPLF’s nationalist program and was widely accepted and implemented both domestically and throughout the diaspora. Such a strategy assumes a more centralized control structure able to efficiently use scarce resources. Hence, dissent outside of the Maoist inspired critique of self and of one's comrades could not be tolerated during the independence struggle, a practice that continued into independent statehood with its related problems of development and near constant border conflicts. Wide acceptance of self-reliance resulted in an eagerness to contribute in whatever way possible to the independence struggle as well as to the development of the new Eritrean state, though it fails to explain the persistence of this support in the face of dissatisfaction with the ruling PFDJ and state efforts to engage the diaspora and extort both money and support from it. In this way, the national project of the EPLF functions to partially explain some of the logic behind engagement efforts and perhaps also some aspects of the authoritarian turn of the PFDJ, but does not explain fully how and why Eritrea has been relatively successful at exerting its influence within the diaspora.

Croatia, on the other hand, demonstrates the effects of a less successful national project. Tuđman and HDZ's ideology of national unity and reconciliation was most successful early on
when the goal of an independent Croatian state was able to focus all factions on the war effort. By placing the focus on historical Croatian statehood, Tuđman and others hoped to remove the focus from internal identity cleavages present in Croatia as well as in the diaspora. However, focusing only on reconciling the political divide at the expense of regional differences, resulted in increasing opposition to HDZ and Tuđman himself as they promoted agendas, such as the attempt to take control of Western Herzegovina, that went against the interests and desires of other segments of the population, especially those residing in and around Zagreb and in Istria who did not see the incorporation of parts of Bosnia as essential components of an independent Croatian state and thus also resisted the cost in people, material, and money such a venture required. Furthermore, Tuđman's everything for everyone ideology was inevitably haphazard and full of contradictions that remained conspicuously visible resulting in much less than full acceptance of it within the diaspora. This is evidenced by the ways in which diaspora organizations such as the CFU resisted subordination to HDZ and later spoke out against Croatian crimes in Bosnia. In this way, segments of the North American diaspora at times conformed to Shain’s argument that diasporas living in the United States attempt to export liberal democratic values to their countries of origin. Once the dream of independent statehood was achieved, the national ideology lost its main unifying element. The clear failure to spark any significant return of Croatians living abroad, another important aspect of the national project, contributed to a decrease in attention towards the diaspora. Though, as Ragazzi convincingly argues and was detailed earlier in this thesis, the Croatian state appropriated diaspora discourse not to further engage with a diaspora, but to place a cloak of legitimacy on its blatantly

173 Uzelak, "Franjo Tudjman's Nationalist Ideology," 461  
174 Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Ideology: A centuries old dream, 72; Winland, We Are Now a Nation: Croats between “Home” and “Homeland”, 43  
175 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands
irredentist policies towards Croats living in Western Herzegovina. The diaspora organizations that remained active after the war largely returned to their pre-war focus on the preservation of community and identity in their local, diaspora context. Here, Croatia acts as a sharp contrast with Eritrea. The failure of Tuđman's national project to be widely accepted resulted in considerable internal fracturing even during the war. Its eventual collapse in the first decade of independence certainly contributed to the lack of interest in the diaspora, though it cannot be seen as a main factor in the lack of state efforts to engage and control the diaspora after the war. Taken together, these two case studies demonstrate that while national ideology can impact the particular strategies chosen and the decision to incorporate the diaspora, it cannot fully explain the relative success or failure of engagement attempts.

I use the term historical legacy to mean an established history of origin state-diaspora relations and can be thought of in a simple two factor matrix with one axis being time (short or long term) and the other being either a positive or an antagonistic relationship. Clearly, relations between origin state and diaspora can fluctuate between being positive and antagonistic so this matrix requires a rough averaging of relations over time. I have categorized Eritrea as an example of a long term positive state-diaspora relationship. While it is arguable at exactly what point an Eritrean diaspora project began in the sociological sense of the term, it is clear that there is an established history of close relations between the EPLF and Eritrean groups around the world and especially in North America with these communities and their actions taking on more

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176 See Chapter 4 of Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Ideology*, for a detailed account of the fractures within the Croatian body politic which were exasperated by Tuđman's narrow political view of national reconciliation. For an account of how these cleavages played out in a particular diaspora context, see Winland, *We Are Now a Nation*.

177 For consistency I call this state-diaspora relations, though as one of my own case studies (Eritrea) demonstrates, in this case state should also be seen to include an eventual victorious party/movement/front in an independence struggle especially when that armed group transitions into a position of governance.
specifically diaspora characteristics in the 1960s and 1970s. The EPLF's success in institutionalizing the Eritrean diaspora is unmatched by any other group or government that I am aware of. Earlier Eritrean liberation movements forged links with Eritreans around the world, but the EPLF, as it became the dominant force, managed to institutionalize its presence in the diaspora through the formation of mass organizations wherever Eritreans were present. These mass organizations became the main organizational point for the Eritrean community abroad. The PFDJ reworked the system of mass organizations and has maintained its presence in Eritrean diaspora communities through embassies, consulates, local PFDJ chapters, and other diaspora organizations linked to the party. The success of the Eritrean state to exert control outside its borders is largely attributable to its widespread, early institutionalization of its diaspora.

In contrast with the Eritrean diaspora, the Croatian diaspora is older and had more problematic relations with the state until Tudman and HDZ in the late 1980s and 1990s. Croatia experienced multiple earlier waves of emigration that differed in political allegiance and regional identity. The Croatian diaspora, especially in North America, institutionalized itself early on forming a number of organizations to suit the needs of the population. These organizations had virtually no links with any of the states Croatia was a part of, and some even had an overtly hostile relationship with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Used to autonomy, Croatian diaspora organizations appear to have remained wary of any attempts by HDZ to co-opt or bring them under its control. Most if not all came out in support of an independent Croatia, but only those whose politics coincided with HDZ's political and military project sought further

179 See Chapter 4 “Eritrea in Exile: Refugees and Community Building in the United States” of Hepner, Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora, for a more detailed discussion of the development of community organizations than the one provided in this thesis.
180 Wattman, Dangerous diasporas: émigré nationalism and ethnic violence, 114
linkages with the Croatian government or the ruling party itself. Multiple political parties had offices in countries around the world, but HDZ dominated the diaspora vote to such an extent that many parties saw a continued presence abroad as unproductive and unnecessary and promoting significant domestic political opposition to particular engagement policies especially the special diaspora constituency in the Sabor. The evidence from these two case studies suggests that a historically rooted, positive relationship between a diaspora and its country of origin is the best single indicator for the ability of a state to extend its reach outside of its territorial borders.

The position of Eritrea and Croatia within the international system appears on paper to be the factor of greatest difference. With the exception of a few, admittedly key, differences, the two cases are actually fairly similar. Both occupied a subordinate position in the capitalist world system with Eritrea as essentially a delayed decolonization and Croatia facing the quadruple transition of a post-Socialist state. Both also experienced warfare within the eventual borders of the state though the extent of damage and loss of life was far greater in Eritrea than in Croatia. Moreover, both faced hostile neighbors with irredentist aims and had to work to gain international support in the early post-Cold War period of disengagement. Here, however, is where the differences in international context become significant. One significant difference is the domestic situation at the time of independence. In Eritrea, the EPLF was virtually the sole legitimate mass organization as all others had been delegitimized and/or defeated, the governing apparatus put in place by Ethiopia was completely destroyed and there was no civil society to

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speak of giving the EPLF/PFDJ free reign to set up a society and government as they wished. Unlike in Eritrea, HDZ came into independence as the dominant political party, but did face legitimate domestic opposition to its program. HDZ capitalized on the popularity of Tuđman as a figure and emphasized their key role in re-forging a Croatian state. However, they were constrained by European conditionality and domestic opposition to the national project they had put into place resulting in resounding electoral defeat for HDZ within a decade of independence.

Eritrea is a small country on the Horn of Africa that had an antagonistic relationship with most world powers due to their support of Ethiopia and Eritrea’s turn towards both Middle Eastern and Communist countries such as China and Cuba. Throughout the push for independence, Eritreans and the EPLF were forced to rely on their own resources and those of the diaspora. The involvement of the diaspora throughout the 30 year war against Ethiopia was significant and carried over into independence picking up the slack again during the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia. Thanks to diaspora involvement and the special 2% tax, Eritrea has been able to haggle over terms with international organizations and maintain control over most aid and development projects in the country. This is not to say that development has been particularly successful in Eritrea or that the diaspora has actually been able to make the country self-reliant. On the contrary, Eritrea is an extremely poor country faced with little international support and a volatile regional environment. As a result of its problematic relations with international organizations and major power brokers, Eritrea has a distinct incentive to ensure support from its diaspora. In contrast, Croatia is in Europe, was one of Yugoslavia’s wealthiest republics, and had relatively close ties with some European Community member states. Already oriented towards the European political and economic project, Croatia could count on economic and political

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support as long as it accepted the conditions of that aid. In this way, Croatia was not dependent on diaspora support for development leaving domestic political competition as the main subject of discourse surrounding relations with the diaspora.\textsuperscript{184}

The final factor I examined in these two cases is regime type. This is where we can see the starkest differences between the two cases. Eritrea is in practice if not in name a single-party state which has never held elections. In spite of considerable initial optimism on the part of both Eritreans themselves and international observers brought on by the successful handling of the independence referendum and the participatory nature of the constitution drafting process, Eritrea soon descended into authoritarian rule under President Isaias Afwerki and the PFDJ. The "transitional government" never transitioned and the constitution was never brought into force. Eritrea can be seen as prime example of a state functioning in what Giorgio Agamben describes as the perpetual state of exception characteristic of many modern societies.\textsuperscript{185} This observation is not unique to me. Woldemikael relies heavily on Agamben in his analysis of the post-independence Eritrean government, noting that the country was never demilitarized and that the "state of emergency", as it is called in Eritrea was even expanded indefinitely to all of society following the border war with Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{186} Since independence, Eritrea has had conflicts with all of its neighbors and has been sanctioned by the United Nations for supporting terrorist groups.

\textsuperscript{184} Garding’s main argument is that diaspora engagement measures are a product of competition of domestic political party competition. A secondary part of her argument is that economic considerations cannot be seen as a determining factor for the extension of rights to populations living abroad and uses the example of Croatia which she characterizes as not being economically dependent on the diaspora. Garding, Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism, 122

\textsuperscript{185} Giorgio Agamben. State of exception (University of Chicago Press, 2005); Agamben expands on the concept of the exception first developed by Carl Schmitt arguing that today the state of the exception has become the norm. For more on the state of the exception see: Carl Schmitt. Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (MIT Press, 1985) and Carl Schmitt. The concept of the political (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

\textsuperscript{186} Woldemikael, “Introduction: Postliberation Eritrea,” x
such as Al Shabab which operates in Sudan.\textsuperscript{187} The authoritarian nature of the regime and the lack of the rule of law enables the Eritrean government to exert greater coercive pressure on its diaspora than a more democratic state would be able to. However, as the literature on power and hegemony would lead us to expect, the Eritrean state also makes use of significant incentives available only to Eritreans living abroad to entice their support and investment. These policies have lead Woldemikael to describe Eritrean citizenship as differentiated, hierarchical, and mirroring the two-tiered citizens and subjects structure of colonial societies observed by Mahmood Mamdani.\textsuperscript{188} As will be further demonstrated below, undemocratic states like Eritrea have greater freedom to engage the diaspora due to a lack of domestic political competition as well as a larger arsenal of both coercive and consensual measures.

Today, Croatia is a capitalist democracy and the newest member of the European Union. Despite some ongoing regional issues and continued problems of transition, Croatia is a liberal democratic state based on the European model. As such, it is more limited than Eritrea with regards to the range of coercive actions it can take towards its population living abroad, and, as discussed above, its diaspora engagement policies are largely dependent on domestic political party competition. Party competition is an essential aspect of democracy and it has been shown to play a significant role in determining how a given government relates to its population abroad.\textsuperscript{189} This particular aspect of the Croatian case goes a long way in explaining the changes and developments in Croatian policy towards Croats abroad since independence. At the beginning, Tuđman and HDZ were able to come into power because of their success in reaching...

\textsuperscript{187} Woldemikael, “Introduction: Postliberation Eritrea,” vii. Eritrea was sanctioned by the U.N. first in December 2009 for supporting Al Shabab, though support for the group is based more on regional power politics than on ideological grounds. Additional sanctions were passed in December 2011 leading to a profound economic and political crisis by 2013.

\textsuperscript{188} Woldemikael, “Introduction: Postliberation Eritrea,” xi

\textsuperscript{189} Garding, \textit{Courting the Nation Abroad: Diaspora Political Incorporation Policies After Communism}
out to the diaspora and in providing a national program that could unite Croats for the time being behind the goal of an independent Croatia. In this early period, Croatia cannot be characterized as a democracy and we can see the state of exception at work during the war with the ruling party’s control of the media and the silencing of dissent. Internal and external pressures for moving forward after the war led to gradual steps towards becoming a European style parliamentary democracy. The death of Tuđman and serious domestic dissatisfaction with HDZ and its political program led to the party's defeat in the 2000 elections. No other party had anywhere near the same amount of support as HDZ among Croats outside of Croatia and these other parties had opposed the degree of influence HDZ had succeeded in giving the external constituency in Croatian politics. Hence, immediate steps were taken to reduce the number of seats in the Sabor reserved for voters living abroad. Furthermore, the death of Tuđman and the serious electoral defeat in 2000 led HDZ to remake itself under Ivo Sanader into a more traditional center-right party. 190 Though HDZ managed to return to power for a significant period since 2000, particularly between 2003 and 2011, the size and influence of the external constituency was continuously reduced in a process described in detail above. The case of Croatia suggests that in the case of democracies political party competition and the ability of parties to make links outside of the country play an important role in determining government interest in the diaspora and the success of engagement policies.

Thus far, this comparative analysis has demonstrated the function and importance of the four factors I identified in explaining state interest in diaspora control and engagement and the relative success of some states as opposed to others. The comparison of Eritrea and Croatia also succeeded to bring to light an additional factor originally left out of my analysis, the level of

integration into the country of residence. This appears to be an additional useful explanatory variable. Eritreans living in North America are described in the literature as experiencing isolation, discrimination, and disenfranchisement in their countries of residence that has increased their sense of being Eritreans and has "provided an impetus to maintain links with fellow Eritreans across vast distances." This suggests that a lack of integration into the society of residence can encourage the strengthening of ties with the country of residence. "The focus of Eritreans' civic engagement and political participation is their 'homeland', and this focus has remained intense despite decades of residence abroad and no plans to resettle in Eritrea." Thus, the example of Eritrea corresponds to Dahinden's transnational mobile category in which the transnational formation is characterized by a low degree of local ties in the country of residence, significant ties to the country of origin, and frequent travel between the two places, though the generally low economic status of Eritreans means a lower level of transnational mobility than Dahinden's ideal type. Strong transnational ties coupled with low local integration increases the ability of the state to place pressure on its diaspora by, for example, linking particular privileges such as entry visas with cooperation and investment or, in more extreme cases, by threatening to disrupt communications with friends and family living in the origin state.

The experience and integration of the Croatian diaspora in North America illustrates nicely the effect that local integration can have on the transnational relations between a state and its diaspora. Croatian immigrants in North America were largely accepted into these white dominated societies and the general cultural and religious profile of these immigrants enabled a more smooth transition. While numerous organizations were developed to maintain a sense of

191 Bernal, “Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination: The Eritrean Diaspora Online,” 168
192 Ibid.
193 Dahinden, “The Dynamics of Migrants’ Transnational Formations: Between Mobility and Locality,” 58
identity, preserve Croatian culture, and to build a sense of community, Croatian immigrants tended to be well integrated even in places with large concentrations such as Toronto. Community organizations focused mainly on local issues such as education and the maintenance of culture in a new context. Return to the country of origin was possible though expensive and could also be difficult based on the antagonistic relationship between some segments of the diaspora and the government of Socialist Yugoslavia resulting in a lower degree of transnational mobility and reduced local ties in the country of origin. Thus, I characterize Croatians abroad as an example of what Dahinden calls a localized diasporic transnational formation. Prior to the 1980s and 1990s, collective action generally revolved around local boundary maintenance. With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Croatian diaspora in North America became increasingly tied to the events in Croatia and more significant movements back and forth occurred. Thus, the fight for independence brought about a shift from a localized diasporic to a localized mobile transnational formation a shift that remains true for some though certainly not all segments of Croatians living abroad. Because of integration into the societies of residence, the Croatian diaspora was not dependent on ties with Croatia to maintain their sense of identity and community. The threat of war and the desire for independence succeeded to mobilize Croatians abroad in support of the new state but was not enough to spur large-scale return migration or even to considerably increase the strength of relations in the long term as after the war the remaining active diaspora organizations tended to be those that were well-established prior to the 1990s and that focused primarily on local community and cultural concerns. The contrast between these two examples demonstrates the degree to which integration into the country of residence can insulate a diaspora from the extension of the origin state beyond its territorial borders.

194 Winland, We Are Now a Nation: Croats Between "Home" and "Homeland," 137
As this section has so far demonstrated, these five factors interact in particularly important ways to produce the conditions in which a state can or cannot insert itself into the diaspora. At the beginning of the analysis, I suggested that some of the variables I used in my analysis could no longer be considered as primary explanatory factors despite their usefulness when examining more fully a particular manifestation of state-diaspora relations. The comparison of these two cases suggests that three factors working in tandem have the greatest explanatory power - historical legacy, the level of integration in both the place of residence, and regime type. Historical legacy relates to how institutionalized a diaspora is as well as the focus of that institutionalization; whether it is well connected with the origin state, whether or not the origin state has played a particular role in the institutionalization of the diaspora, are diaspora institutions focused on life in the society of residence or more oriented towards involvement in the country of origin. Well established organizations and linkages are difficult to supplant with new ones especially when existing institutions actively resist or seek to undermine the establishment of new ones. Eritrea is a prime example in which most of the diaspora organizations in North America are under either the influence or direct control of the ruling party and, as the example from Southern California demonstrated\textsuperscript{195}, established institutions can make utilize the trust and influence they have built up within a particular community in order to prevent the establishment of any organization which they oppose. Related to historical legacy, the degree of integration into the place of residence can have an historical component given the general assumption that populations become more integrated with time and a contextual component based on the society of residence and their relative openness to particular classes of immigrants. A diaspora that is more highly integrated into the society of residence can be expected to place greater emphasis on local community concerns rather than on strengthening

\textsuperscript{195} Woldemikael, "Bridging the Divide: Muslim and Christian Eritreans in Orange County, California."
ties to the origin state thus resulting in fewer opportunities for the state to attempt to exert its influence. The Croatian diaspora in North America described in this thesis is a case in point. Their greater integration into American and Canadian society resulted in the establishment of inward looking community organizations which emphasized local issues and the maintenance of culture rather than the forging of ties with the country of origin. Conversely, less integrated diasporas can be expected to maintain more significant ties to the origin state providing greater opportunities for action and negotiation between the origin state and the diaspora, though the results of these stronger ties may vary between significant, successful state interference in the diaspora like in the case of Eritrea or more equal interactions including diasporas making claims on the government of their country of origin as in the case of Mexico.196

Conclusion

In the two case studies explored here, the primary interest of the state in engaging the diaspora was to guarantee a more constant inflow of economic resources and to mobilize the population for political support while also minimizing dissent. The main interest of this thesis was to explain when and how states successfully move through the three steps of diaspora engagement identified by Gamlen which are transnational communication aimed at constructing a shared idea of the nation, the building of diaspora institutions, and “finalized activities” such as the extension of citizenship to populations residing abroad. Previous scholarship had identified a number of factors as determining the outcome of diaspora engagement. Some such as Robert Smith point towards the interplay of political factors at multiple levels. These levels - foreign policy relations between the origin state and the state of residence, the integration of the origin state within the world system, and the domestic political scene - interact to produce the impetus for diaspora engagement while also determining the conditions under which this can occur. Thus, Smith emphasizes the interaction of Mexico’s new foreign policy goals with reference to the U.S., the developmental logic of those goals in the context of global capitalism, enhanced democratization domestically, and the political action of migrants based in the U.S.¹⁹⁷ None is considered sufficient to explain the changes in Mexico’s engagement with migrants living in the U.S., but together these factors provide a more full picture of the complexity inherent in diaspora engagement which often results in the lack of a unified, coordinated strategy of diaspora engagement identified by Gamlen. In this thesis, I have used a comparative case study to test the explanatory power of four more specific variables that nevertheless still correspond to the insights into diaspora engagement provided by both Gamlen and Smith.

¹⁹⁷ Smith, “Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics.”
more process focused variables of national program and historical legacy while Smith’s analysis presupposes the context oriented variables of the origin state's position in the international system and regime type.

My analysis combines context and process to provide a richer explanation of the development and success of diaspora engagement in the case of Eritrea and Croatia. While originally overlooked, the analysis of these two case studies reaffirmed the importance of the characteristics of the diaspora communities in question in any explanation of the outcomes of diaspora engagement policies leading me to add in the level of integration into the society of residence of the community under analysis. This analysis of Croatia and Eritrea has demonstrated that the most useful explanatory factors for the relative success of diaspora engagement are historical legacy, integration into country of residence, and the regime type of the origin state. The form and content of the dominant national project and the position of the origin state internationally have been shown to be secondary factors that can be brought in to explain internal variations in engagement policies or why particular types of engagement were used in one case and not in another as these factors relate more closely to the actual interests or needs of the origin state vis-a-vis its diaspora. Further research utilizing additional cases is needed to test the generalizability of my findings though the usefulness of the variables defined in this study for analyzing these two cases suggests their value for future research.
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