CHANGES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Abstract

The groundbreaking events in Crimea have recently shaken up the international political arena. Having challenged the status quo, they placed an even greater pressure on the highly contested changing geopolitical landscape of the Post-Soviet area. More than a theoretical underpinning for the newly crystallized backbone of Russian foreign policy – the Putin Doctrine, this research offers an investigation of its implications for Central Asian and European Union foreign policy vis-à-vis the region. Upon examination of recent developments, the research sees a steady consolidation of Russian presence and influence in the region that signifies the increased importance and need for rethinking of EU strategy. Through the analysis of key interests and instruments utilized by both actors: Russia and the EU, this thesis highlights the disadvantageous position of the EU and a lack of substantial leverages in the region. Based on the main findings, subsequent policy recommendations are offered.
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BOMCA - Border Management Program in Central Asia
BTC - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
CA - Central Asia
CADAP - Central Asia Drug Action Program
CASEP - Central Asia Sustainable Energy Program
CICA - Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
CNPC - China National Petroleum Corp
CORF – Collective Operational Reaction Force
CPC - Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CRDF - Collective Rapid Deployment Forces
CSDP - Common Security and Defense Policy
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization
CU – Customs Union
DAMOS - Drug Epidemiology Data Base Collection and Development
DCI – Development Co-operation Instrument
EC – European Commission
EEU - Eurasian Economic Union
EIB - European Investment Bank
EIHRD - European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ES – energy security
ESSAP2 - Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan
EU - European Union
FSP - Food Security Program
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
IEA – International Energy Agency
IfS - Instrument for Stability
IFSA – Investment Facility for Central Asia
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INOGATE - INterstate Oil and GAs Transportation to Europe
IR - International Relations
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas
MEDISSA - Media and Dissemination Strategies
MS – member-states
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA-LA - Non-State Actors and Local Authorities
OCAN – Overall Coordination and Networking
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSA - Production Sharing Agreement
RATS - Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
RF - Russian Federation
SC - Southern Corridor Strategy
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SES – Single Economic Space
TACIS - Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States,
TAP – Trans-Adriatic Pipeline
TAPI – Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline)
TCP – Trans-Caspian Pipeline
TRASECA - Transport Corridor Europa – Europa Caucasus and Asia
TREAT - Treatment Methodologies
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
US – United States
WS - Westphalian sovereignty
WTO – World Trade Organization
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Introduction

In the wake of “Crimean annexation” by Russia, the world has caught its breath observing “the slow death of global order.”¹ Recent events in Ukraine, the West's inability to adequately react to the ongoing crisis, and the expansion of sanctions on Russia, have cumulatively produced considerable repercussions in relations not only between Russia and the rest of the globe, but also among all international actors. This has awoken multiple and somewhat contradictory anxieties in the minds of political leaders and people in general. Bringing about troubling new dimensions and fueling the escalation of the conflict, the Ukrainian situation shook up the international political arena, placing a greater pressure on the highly contested changing geopolitical landscape of Post-Soviet space. The Crimean-Ukrainian crisis has begun a transition period in the global system of international relations, and may lay the foundation for a new era, the hallmark of which is the recognition of the real multipolarity of the modern world.²

Experts are convinced that this crisis may be projected on the rest of post-Soviet Space, Central Asia (CA) in particular.³ The region has undergone tremendous political, socio-economic and cultural transformation since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in

1991. Nevertheless, it has not lost its geopolitical, geo-economic and eco-strategic values.\(^4\) Surrounded by China, Russia, Afghanistan, Iran and the Caucasus, and being an essential linkage between Europe and Asia, CA has always been strategically significant in the global arena of international relations. This geographical proximity to major great powers, historical and cultural affinities, considerable endowment in energy and raw material resources, and potential threats of radical Islamic movements from Afghanistan\(^5\) have helped to shape its geopolitical significance. Yet, being a landlocked region, it simultaneously remains much more exposed to the influence of external powers.

As the Ukrainian crisis intensifies, CA has started to represent a critical area not only in Russian foreign policy, but also in foreign policy courses of other key players in the region, such as the European Union (EU). The crisis is generating a new wave of geopolitical shifts,\(^6\) in May of 2014 Russia after 8 years of negotiation signed a 30-year gas deal with China and an agreement to establish the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with Belarus and Kazakhstan,\(^7\) in the meantime, the EU started to express more concerns about the “neighbor of Europe” – CA in the European Energy Security Strategy (EESS) issued on May 28\(^\text{th}\) 2014


by the European Commission (EC) are given a greater attention.⁸ CA leaders, for their part, are cautiously observing the developments in Ukraine, and fearing the predicted destabilization of the region. For the purposes of safeguarding future stability, Kazakhstan in May, 2014 already confirmed its readiness to actively participate in integration initiatives with Russia, declaring the importance of such as a key to the “well-being of the nation”.⁹

Russian regional integration aspirations, such as the establishment of a Customs Union (CU) and EEU have become central to Eurasian discourse since 1996¹⁰ with the EU’s assertive expansion into former-communist Europe, and as its efforts to influence the political agenda and socio-economic developments in the area of the Kremlin’s “privileged interests”¹¹ grew exponentially.¹² Thus, in light of recent events, it is evident that while securitization of the post-Soviet realm (particularly CA) and Russia’s regional dominance will only grow, the EU, with its concern for maintaining stability on the Eurasian continent and creating energy diversification routes may seek a reorientation of its normative focus on its foreign policy and practices of diplomacy to a new realism-based strategy.

With the emergence of the Putin Doctrine in the first decades of 2000 and its recent reformulation in 2014,¹³ the future of other post-Soviet republics is relevant in mapping out

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¹⁰ The moment Evgenyi Primakov embarked on its post of foreign minister of Russia and became more explicit during Putin’s presidency.


the future of the “new world order”. The proposed main principles of the doctrine have served as the basis for Russian contemporary “sovereign democracy” in its “near abroad” for the past few decades. New designated foreign policy directions, along with pursued goals and objectives have become more explicit and assertive. Thus, it is clear that the stated doctrine may have a significant impact on the choice and range of policy instruments and implementation methods of other actors in the region. This work aims to investigate the changes in Russian foreign policy, their implications for CA and the foreign policy of the EU in the region, as well as the extent the latter takes into consideration the existing and newly emerged realities of the political climate.

This research is based on content analysis of high data (mostly official documents, speeches, statements and interviews), the case study of CA and statistical analysis. However, the latter faces significant constraints in the form of unreliable sources, abundance of outdated materials and existing distortions between official statistics and real life situation in the region. Additionally, the given research faces great spatial, temporal and scope-wise constraints. Geographically, focusing on the CA region, I bring in the strategic interests and instruments of two major players: Russia and the EU. Time-wise, two periods that mostly concern me are 2007-2013 (the EU’s Strategy for A New Partnership) and 2013 till present (the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and crystallization of the Putin Doctrine). The last few months of 2014 are of a grave concern as they mainly depict the shifts in geopolitical landscape of CA and, thus, possible implications for the EU foreign policy.

The Ukrainian crisis unraveled the implicit mechanisms of Russian realism-based strategy on the Post-Soviet space and made the EU’s normative power in the region more
relevant. Yet, any fundamental foreign policy course is based on realistic objectives, not on normative goals and aspirations, which are deemed to be secondary. Therefore, any successful foreign policy, first, pursues its material interests and consolidates its power, only then does it strive to utilize the obtained leverages to exert influence and promote its normative values and principles. This work examining the interests and the instruments of the EU intends to demonstrate a lack of leverage at EU’s disposal to exert a certain influence in CA and that its foreign policy objectives are shifted towards norms-oriented strategy such as human rights and democracy promotion. Instead, it sees an incorporation of both: realist and normative interests into a single coherent region-targeted realist-based strategy as a more efficient tool in boosting its presence and influence in the region, especially in the light of recent events.

The first chapter analyzes a newly-emerged hegemonic discourse - the Putin Doctrine through the prism of Krasner’s realistic premises and identifies its main tenets that assist in detecting the main changes in Russian foreign policy. Facilitating my empirical investigation the doctrine informs my research within a very recent time framework. Two main parts: Russian security and energy interests in CA and the means of pursuing them discussed in the second chapter, and, in analogy, EU’s security and energy interests along with the instruments are scrutinized in the third chapter. The doctrine guides the research unraveling how and to what extent the Putin Doctrine upgrades the key strategic interests and the leverages of two major players. Finally, the conclusion offers the analysis of the implications for the EU in CA and provides some policy recommendations in order to increase efficiency, viability and sustainability of EU’s foreign policy in the region, considering the emerging political climate.
1. Theoretical Framework: A hegemonic discourse of the Putin doctrine

The sovereignty of the nation-states and its decline come to the fore of contemporary International Relations (IR), particularly, during the post-Cold war period when dissolution of former federal states, globalization and humanitarianism’s principles and forces along with the birth of regionalism started to pace their way around the world. These processes drastically reconfigured the notion of sovereignty and the somewhat permeable boundaries of the past. Originally, a fundamental pillar of what is known as an international system of states, its viability has been significantly put into question, in light of recent events on the Crimean peninsula. A highly debated concept of sovereignty (statehood and self-determination) became central to contemporary discussion of theoretical and empirical role of such and reinvigorated a number of arguments among IR scholars. Some scholars contend it to be an obsolete or even utopian mode that has never existed in reality. Most of them are proponents of globalization that see the world as a borderless reality that is guided by neoliberal economic aspirations; others call it “organized hypocrisy” and/or “self-defense mechanisms”.14 The rest consider it a temporary phenomenon and are looking for future alternatives e.g. in the form of “global civil society”.15

Due to some contradictive and arbitrary definitions of the concept and its limitations,16 the lines with another group of scholars who sees the sovereignty as a basic tenet and a

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http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/23/is-sovereignty-organised-hypocrisy/
necessary basis of contemporary international system of states that underpins modern democracies

and provides a certain “code of conduct” for nation-states in international political arena still remain blurred. For the sake of this research, this work mainly focuses on realistic standpoint on this issue that approximates empirical reality. To be able to address and analyze the message of the recent events for the global order, this paper seek to employ one of the prominent scholar-realists and former Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State – Stephen Krasner’s definition of sovereignty, and his arguments that, as reality demonstrates, seem to be fully valid.

According to theories of realism states constantly act out of self-interest or in terms of power.

“A fundamental premise of realist foreign policy analysis is that countries try to maximize their security by dominating weaker neighboring states insofar as they can, given their resources, and insofar as they must, given the dangers perceived from their neighborhood”

Krasner in his book: “Sovereignty – organized hypocrisy” presents his realistic vision of this contested notion and offers a rational explanation to states’ behavior. He vehemently argues that states frequently are not willing to follow the rhetoric of normative principles in their actions e.g. imperviousness of boundaries, territorial integrity, simply because conventional principles of sovereignty can be inconsistent or incompatible with certain interests of a state.

In other words, normative principles are oftentimes violated for the sake of upholding those principles.  According to Krasner, sovereignty encapsulates autonomy and independence of


states from each other, holding a right to choose their own form of governmental organization within their borders, being able to control cross-border movements of capital, goods and people, sovereigns also possess an international legal personality that is recognized by other states, entailing universal principles of non-interference.

In his monograph, Krasner reasonably dissociates the concept into the following four sub-concepts: international legal sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty (WS). The first illustrates the international recognition of an independent territorial entity, to be more precise, whether a state enjoys such or not. Thus, it enables a state to legally express and act upon its will and is directly linked to the way we determine its sovereignty. The second, interdependence sovereignty refers to state’s inability to control its intra-borders movements, mainly, due to some external influences such as globalization, trade, environment, transport and so on. The third points out the ability of a state to take control over its domestic affairs and how effective those so-called domestic authority structures are. Finally, the core of the concept, this work will mainly focus on is WS – a right of a state to choose and establish its own domestic authority structures to be able to resist external forces to intervene. The corollary of such subtype’s definition lies in the non-intervention principles that was originally coined by Emmerich de Vattel, but lately mysteriously dignified as “Westphalian”. In effect, not all four constituents of sovereignty need to be present. In most cases, it is sufficient to exhibit some of them.19 Overall, all four

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19 The EU is an example of “pooled sovereignty” where member states voluntarily agreed to compromise their WS by establishing a supranational authority, simultaneously maintaining their international legal sovereignty. Hong Kong is another example of existing international legal sovereign with somewhat perplexed domestic sovereignty complicated by the absence of WS. Krasner, Stephen D. “Think Again: Sovereignty.” Foreign Policy, January 1, 2001. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/01/01/think_again_sovereignty.
subtypes altogether create discrepancies between contemporary normative and descriptive
dimensions of the notion. This work admits the contested nature of the concept, and will not
engage into the debates about what the concept in reality is and how it should be like. Nay, it
sees the geographical proximity, economic interdependence, regional and global integration
processes, and humanitarian assistance and so on as the main intervening forces that prevent
any state of being fully independent and sovereign.

The main rationale behind the postulation of sovereignty as an organized hypocrisy is a
dilemma of norms’ violation based on preference of “logic of consequences” to “logic of
appropriateness” by state’s actors. Nevertheless, it should not be understood that normative
principles of sovereignty do not matter at all, but that the latter are extremely amenable to the
core material interests in a volatile global setup. This line of thoughts goes hand in hand with
realistic premises, significantly questioning and challenging constructivists’ principles of
constitutive power of norms. Despite of this, the logic of consequences unveils certain
political tools that justify illegal acts and allow a certain degree of manipulation of
international legal norms.

History illustrates a handful of precedents that witness erosion of the concept (from now
on I will refer to WS only), when some countries intervened into domestic affair of others.\textsuperscript{20}
With the only exception of new perceptions about legitimacy of eroding processes, nothing
has essentially changed in the way a state’s sovereignty is challenged.\textsuperscript{21} The new forms of the

\textsuperscript{20} Amitai Etzioni (2006) “From Right to Responsibility, the Definition of Sovereignty is Changing”,
Cambridge University Press.

\textsuperscript{21} Stephen Krasner (1999)
violations of this fundamental principle enshrined in UN Charter (1945) and customary international law\textsuperscript{22} have been continually spawning: human rights rhetoric, minority rights protection,\textsuperscript{23} religious toleration, multilateral institutions (UN, WTO, IMF), international stability and peacekeeping missions, spread of Internet, onslaught of NGOs and etc.\textsuperscript{24} Currently, the Crimean events are introducing a new form of challenges to the normative principles of sovereignty giving a rise to the Putin doctrine.

For decades, Russian conservative discourse was scrutinized through the prism of spatial self-definition of its practitioners.\textsuperscript{25} It gave somewhat confusing interpretations of the main tenets of Russian present hegemonic discourse. The emerged dualism of so-called “left” and “liberal” ceased to exist with the formation and popularization of a new Putin Doctrine. The ongoing Ukrainian crisis has given an essential impetus to the formation and slightly restated the old conceptual framework of Russian imperial power in the Post-Soviet space, known as pragmatic realism. A drastic turn in Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine spurred the minds of all political leaders, in particular, those of Soviet origin. The emergence of a single coherent, to some extent, ideological doctrine that manifests a more assertive stance of Russian leaders on international affairs, undoubtedly, begets considerable changes in Eurasian order and largely undermines the current global order.\textsuperscript{26}


In order to examine the changes in Russian foreign policy and its further implications for EU foreign policy in CA, this work first seeks to scrutinize the main pillars of a newly crystallized doctrine. Then, through examining its realistic objectives and means of achieving those objectives, how they are currently changing or solidifying it will lay out a vision on a new post-Ukrainian crisis geopolitical discursive field and engage in the heated polemic over the future of the CA region and EU’s role in it. It is worth mentioning, however, that the new doctrine that is still in progress in its formation and far from widespread public recognition should be read as a series of interpretations of Russian leaders’ official statements, speeches and actual actions by different scholars and experts.

The first tenet of The Putin Doctrine marked by Ryzhkov is that “Russia no longer considers itself part of European or even more Euro-Atlantic civilization.” Indeed, historically speaking, “tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia” has always envisaged the West as the Other and never perceived Russia as an essential part of it. The statement assumes the existence of so-called natural civilization community (Russian-speaking people regardless of their ethnicity and place of origin scattered in the post-Soviet space and who identify themselves, to a certain degree, with Russian Byzantine and hold on to similar traditions and values) with the leading role given to Russia. Russian unity is represented by “three part Russian” in a multitude of Putin’s interviews and speeches where he speaks of very special

http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/ryzhkov/1292700-echo/. Ekho Moskvy blogpost

27 Ibid
28 See Tsygankov A. “Russia and the West...” (2012)
ties given to Ukraine, and Belarus that share “a common church, a common spiritual source, and a common destiny.”31 When addressing these particular historically and culturally bound nations, Putin chooses to use the term “narod” (nation or people), which in most of his connotations has political underpinnings. “Russkiy mir” or the Russian World, therefore, stands as a basis for protracted integration projects in the post-Soviet area (Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Union) with the ultimate aim of creating a common civilizational, political, economic Unity. Hence, based on the discourse of “Russkiy Mir”, Putin intentionally distances Russia and post-Soviet countries from the rest of the world. However, it is not a unidirectional process, as it also has reciprocal effects based on impositions of sanctions by the West and the attempt to isolate Russia.

Second, from Putin’s official address to State Duma deputies regarding Crimea,32 it is clear that the Kremlin sees the West as external threat that undermined its trust suing the “old policy of containment”.33 The doctrine, clearly, portrays the West as an encroaching foreign danger not only with regard to the post-Soviet realm, where Russian security predicaments mostly concentrate, but also to its domestic context. In 2004, current deputy minister – Vladislav Surkov – brought up a triad of themes representing Russia as a besieged fortress. There are Western efforts to undermine Russian statehood and its great power status, to fuel anti-Putin’s sentiments and facilitate the plotting against current government, and,

33 Ibid, Putin : “In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today.”
eventually, referring to Russian president’s will as to the will of Russian nation.\textsuperscript{34} Russia
numerously stated the role of the West in the current conflict as an instigator, and instigator
not only against Russia or Ukraine, but also against Eurasian integration projects. This
particular perception of the West as a common threat and danger to its domestic and foreign
policy and security-wise strategic interests as well as instigator of regional conflicts
significantly bolsters the legitimacy of the present government in the eyes of its population
and solidifies its position.

The third component of the new doctrine presupposes a modification of the
post-Westphalian world, a reconceptualization of its main postulates such as inviolability of
state sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to it, international law is no longer going
to be a set of universal rules or coordinates that is equally applicable to all sovereigns; it is “a
menu from which every strong country can choose what is useful to itself.”\textsuperscript{35} With all the
implications, the words of Vladimir Putin: “Crimea is our common historical legacy and a
very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a
strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian”\textsuperscript{36}, delivers a clear message to
the world that Russia believes it is time to revisit the rules of the game, where strong countries
have a larger responsibility over the future of weak countries, if such can lead to a regional
destabilization and/or threaten security domain or national interests of a strong state.

\textsuperscript{34} Vladislav Surkov’s interview with Spiegel, Germany (2005)
http://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/vladislav_surkov_zapad_ne_obyazan_nas_ljubit__germaniya.htm Accessed April 30, 2014

\textsuperscript{35} See Ryzhkov V. “Fights without rules…” (2014)

\textsuperscript{36} Putin addresses State Duma in the Kremlin with regard to Crimean events http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 Accessed May
1 2014
In accordance with this new doctrine, “every strong country has its own system of values and its own model”. Provided by official statements and speeches, some key aspects of potential future foreign and security policy’s courses can be raised: defense of rights of Russian people [Russkikh lyudei] and Russian-speaking people, “good neighborly relations” in exchange for independence and territorial integrity recognition, and the possibility along with the necessity to use extralegal actions if prescribed by the will of the nation, its interests, truth and justice.

The first principle of being a guarantor of rights for Russian and Russian speaking population can be invoked in any part of the world, but, of particular relevance to post-Soviet states, where an enormous amount of Russian and Russian speakers are still residing. Taking into consideration all the discriminative actions taken by the new authorities in Ukraine: the issuance of a draft law related to language policy revision and aiming at infringement of ethnic minorities’ rights, toppling down historical monuments and literally depriving Russians of their historical collective memory were clearly regarded as intentions to seriously harm the existence and security of Russian or Russian speaking inhabitants, be they Russian compatriots or militant servicemen stationed abroad. A serious threat to life of Russians accompanied with a request for help by the majority of Crimean people who found


38 The term 'compatriot' (sootechestvennik) should be interpreted broadly as Russian citizens who are abroad, former citizens, or descendants of citizens, of the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic and the Russian Empire. according to the Law of 24 May 1999 on the state policy of the Russian Federation towards compatriots abroad

themselves in distress, eventually, legitimized Russian involvement in the Ukrainian domestic conflict.

The second principle of “good neighborly relations” as a prerequisite for respect of sovereignty takes us back to Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty”. According to The Putin doctrine, stability and territorial integrity of a state fully depends on the good-neighborliness of that state towards Russia and Russian speaking residents. Putting the historical legality of Crimean incorporation into the Ukraine and Ukraine’s sovereignty as such into question,\(^{40}\) Putin asserts that Russia pledges to support Ukraine as long as it maintains brotherly relations with Moscow. That, in turn, incorporates a number of controversial issues, such as its non-participation or request for permission to join any sort of political, economic and/or military integration processes or negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements that go against Russian security and national interests e.g. military presence of NATO near Russian borders\(^{41}\) and, instead, choose a path of closer Eurasian reintegration and, preferably, enhance bilateral cooperation with its big neighbor. Another issue at stake is full respect of Russian or Russian-speaking inhabitants’ rights, infringement of which can be followed by subsequent protective actions and measures. These preconditions strictly constrain the scope of sovereignty and redefine the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity in alignment with Russian security concerns and justifies extralegal (at least violating universal norms and rules) remedies, as it is stated that national interest, truth and justice of “Russian nation” (Russkogo naroda) overrule international customary law.


The fourth component of the Putin doctrine speaks about the Russian historical legacy in post-Soviet realm and its strategic and security concerns over the area. Emphasis is put on a shared history of the countries, specifically, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and their cultural and civilizational unity.\textsuperscript{42} Russia has never regarded any of these countries as foreign. Moreover, Vladimir Putin sees oneness among these three nations: “we are not simply close neighbors but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.”\textsuperscript{43} This brings a new dimension for their international status as sovereigns in the eyes of Russia, which due to shared past and nostalgic sentiments towards the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{44} projects its geopolitical ambitions and sees them as an inevitable part of its strategy for national security. Consequently, henceforth, the sovereignty of those post-Soviet countries may be the subject to a sharp conditionality approach set by Russian increasing presence and growing interests in the region.

The fifth component of the Putin Doctrine can be extracted from the following statement: “Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected”\textsuperscript{45} and implies a diminished role of international organizations, for instance the UN, the OSCE, and so on. The whole idea of non-cooperation or suspended participation of a member (especially a strong

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{42} The Khersones, for instance, where “spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy by [Prince Vladimir] predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.”
\textsuperscript{http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889} Accessed April 28 2014
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid “Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart.”; “However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice.”
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid
\end{flushleft}
one as it can successfully act in an independent fashion) whose interests stayed neglected considerably undermines the role and the weight of international organizations in the global arena.

And the last but not the least point, it seems plausible enough that the newly crystallized doctrine calls for a shift in the existing balance of forces. It foresees a decline of Western hegemony, and a continual growth and consolidation of non-Western blocs such as Latin American, Asian and African countries. These countries may take advantage of the situation and form an alliance with Russia to counterbalance the world’s great powers in the face of the US and European countries. Such aspirations of strategic parity were formerly mentioned by Tsygankov in his book “Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations” (2012), but, in the light of recent events seem to be realized.

To summarize, it seems some propositions are not novel, but have been clearly reformulated by the current government. At the same time, a few key points were stated that made this world realize the importance and gravity of the new foreign policy turn by Moscow and also its incompatibility with the existing international norms. The evolution of this doctrine into a solid foreign policy course and most likely a new ideology can significantly challenge not only post-Soviet realities, but also global Western dominance, giving rise to a new global order. The empirical part of this work traces the pace and the course of such evolution, detecting what substantial changes it can bring for the post-Soviet world, namely CA, and following most likely shifts in EU’s strategic maneuvers in that area.
2. Factors of Russian presence in Central Asia.

The main Russian interests in CA are predominantly of a geopolitical character. These strategic interests of the Russian Federation (RF) aim: first, to ensure and maintain stability in its immediate abroad and prevent and/or resolve emerging regional conflicts or instances of violence, second, to safeguard its external borders and territorial integrity. In addition, the rhetoric of the Russian government also encapsulates an intention to protect the Russian speaking diaspora, but, in reality, no specific tactics have been employed. The situation has been drastically changed since the post-Crimean events.46

It has become increasingly clear in the past few months that from now on, Russia is going to grant a high priority niche in its foreign policy agenda for Soviet ecumen - CA region. Russia, regarding this region as a “buffer whose presence could improve the impermeability of the Russian borders”47, in the light of recent events and according to the Putin doctrine, is about to maintain and even further enhance its influence in the region. The most imperative motives for strengthening its role and exerting a greater influence based on a few areas of strategic interest in the region such as geopolitical aspirations, “hard” and “soft” security issues and geo-economic interests are mainly reflected in energy and transport route monopolization.

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47 Wojciech Górecki , “Ever Further from Moscow. Russia’s Stance on Central Asia | OSW”, Number 48, Warsaw (2014) p. 18
2.1 Hard security factors.

It has been mentioned by a variety of scholars and experts that Russia is an exceptional actor in the region, as it has “the means to react to a crisis and a sense of responsibility to engage”. Indeed, it was assumed that Russia is the “reluctant soldier” that only gets involved in events if such directly challenge or impose a threat to its key strategic interests (such as territorial integrity). The Putin Doctrine argues that such interests are not limited spatially and can be found in the Russian “near abroad” sphere of influence, such as Russian speaking diaspora or stationed military complexes and strategic facilities and so on. Yet, in light of recent events in Ukraine and Russian inability to exert influence to resolve a conflict in its “prioritized” near abroad area, Russia may seek to upgrade its regional status of a security guarantor and a military superpower. This subchapter will mainly discuss fundamental security objectives pursued by Russia in CA and a range of available instruments it possesses vis-à-vis the region. Then it will look into recent developments in the Russia-CA security realm; analyze the explicit and implicit implications of the happening in the context of the Putin Doctrine to be able to determine security-related shifts and/or trends within the region.

A long list of security challenges that may have significant repercussions on the Kremlin, and Russia is mostly concerned about threats including internal, external and regional. Internal threats to regional security are mainly manifested in political instability

48 Ibid p. 9; also see: Sebastien Peyrouse, Jos Boonstra and Marlene Larulle (2012), “Security and development approaches to Central Asia: The EU compared to China and Russia”, working paper 11, EUCAM, p. 5
characterized by underdevelopment, inefficiency of political and civic institutions that can lead to a handful of other problems, the growing rate of migration, economic disruption, discrimination and oppression of minority groups (in our case of ethnic Russian and Russian-speakers), deterioration of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the country and so on. Likewise, CA also possesses a myriad of regional threats like transboundary water management disputes between upstream and downstream countries, territorial disputes and border delimitation problems, regional power rivalry between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, interethnic clashes, clan rivalry and so on. However, what constitutes the core security interests for Russia are external or so-called non-traditional threats, namely: drug trafficking from Afghanistan, infiltration of radical Islamists, possibility of spill-over of violence and terrorist attacks (again given the proximity to Afghanistan), implications of drawdown of NATO forces’ (ISAF) from Afghanistan, along with a loss of control over military complexes and strategic sites, hydrocarbon and hydropower sector networks. The non-conventional threats signal that the Russian leadership may strengthen its regional coordination and stimulate regional cohesiveness among CA countries to create a collective integrated system of security, which requires an establishment of a supranational authority what CA states perceive as a potential threat to their state sovereignty. Due to this fact and the apparent inefficiency of a soft power approach, Moscow seeks to use different mechanisms and structures in order to pull CA republics into its orbit.

Being a top priority for Russia, security issues in the heterogeneous region of CA are pursued both bilaterally or multilaterally. Nevertheless, Russo-CA security agenda seems to prevail more in bilateral cooperation, where two main elements, military collaboration and
economic assistance, remain highly intertwined. Moscow employs a broad range of instruments, such as the military presence of Russia on the territory of the member states (military bases and complexes), dependence of CA countries on military armament supplies and training, existence of Russian-led military/security alliance on the post Soviet area’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and to a lesser extent the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), constrains to presence and influence of extra-regional actors.

A year after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the first Russian-led political and defense alliance, further transformed into a full–fledged intergovernmental organization-prototype of NATO’s military alliance (2002), was created. Already in 2002, in light of the increasing possibility of regional destabilization coming from Afghanistan, the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) for CA has been proposed to set up. Nowadays, the CRDF headquarters are located in Bishkek, as well as the airbase Kant, where most of the military exercises take place. Since the moment of establishment, the number of members in the CSTO decreased from 9 to 6, with quite disproportional representation of CA states, with only 3 of them participating: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

The interaction and integration of national military structures of member-states (MS) has always been seen by Russia as a main objective that can facilitate creation of a coordinated

50 Especially in Moscow-Bishkek and Moscow-Dushanbe relations. See See Craig Oliphant (2013) “Main Interests in Central Asia”, Safeworld, p.9


52 Turkmenistan opted not to join. While Uzbekistan, an initial member, left the organization twice in 2006 and 2012.
security system with reaction forces. The CSTO, nowadays, can boast a certain “horizontal” integration of the MS: the System of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense, Collective Air Defense System, Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (to conduct anti-terrorist operations, combat organized crime and drug trafficking), Collective Peace Support Forces, and so on. All these mechanisms serve as the levers by means of which Moscow solidifies its position in the regional security architecture,\(^ {53}\) involves national MS military forces, attempts to create a common vision on security problems. The Kyrgyz political crises showed Russian passiveness and reluctance to intervene (though the CSTO Statute at that time did not proscribe a direct intervention in the case of internal crisis) into internal turbulences of CA countries. Shared fears of the possibility of other ethnic clashes or “Tulip” revolutions breaking out created another powerful instrument that Russia can utilize to interfere in the CSTO member state on a legal basis referring to the “Stance on the principle of emergency response from the member state of the CSTO”. The latter allows a direct interference into an internal crisis of one of the member-state as an emergency response to crisis and a necessity to maintain regional stability.

Another inductive leverage Russia possesses is the sale of its military equipment and technologies at a reasonably low price (equals to domestic market price) to CA states to allow rearmament of the region with Russian-provided weaponry. For example, when Russia needed to extend its military base stationing in Tajikistan, Putin headed to Dushanbe to discuss the details of the deal. He offered Emomalii Rahmon modernization of the Tajik army and the training of military personnel at Russian military academia. The agreement was signed in late

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2013 and the base was extended till 2042.\textsuperscript{54}

Restored military cooperation between Russian and CA military-industrial complexes allowed a multitude of joint regular military exercises such as “Rubezh” (dealing with terrorist attacks) and “Kanal” (anti-drug operations).\textsuperscript{55} Regular summits and meetings of the Councils of Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers provide Moscow with a powerful instrument for influencing foreign policy of the other CSTO members. This happened when Moscow introduced a new Protocol on Military facilities deployment in CSTO states on December 20, 2011 and that was recently – January 16, 2014 - ratified by Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{56} The agreement tightens the rules to host a new (non-CSTO members) foreign military bases requiring a full consent of other members and, thus, empowering the latter to veto any base deployment plans.\textsuperscript{57} However, this decision to limit a number of extra-regional military bases does not apply to already present facilities, i.e. the U.S. transit centre in Kyrgyzstan, a German air transit facility in Uzbekistan and French military aircraft based in Tajikistan. In the meantime, this move gains gravity in the context of the Pentagon’s reported plans to redeploy a part of the withdrawn from Afghanistan forces to CA and essentially aims to counteract the influence of other actors in the region.

In addition, a close collaboration of the CSTO military experts with Russian Armed


\textsuperscript{55} Sebastien Peyrouse, Jos Boonstra and Marlene Larulle (2012), “Security and development approaches to Central Asia: The EU compared to China and Russia”, working paper 11, EUCAM, p. 8


Forces exists. This, in turn, implies that all the CSTO MS draw upon Moscow’s information sources, though the existing international practice with regard to the EU and NATO demonstrates a similar dependence on the US navigation system and satellite information. Russia regained a number of research and military facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (See Figure 2.1) For instance, till 2052 Russia is entitled to supervise the Okno space surveillance site where an essential part of its Space Defense Troops are stationed. One should not forget the biggest orbital complex in the world is operated on the territory of Kazakhstan – Baikonur, or other present strategic military sites Moscow uses for military purposes such as firing ranges: Radar node of the 3rd Missile-Space Defense Army of the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces, The 929th Chkalov State Flight-Test Centre of the Russian Ministry of Defense, The 10th State Testing Range of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Although, it seems that Russian presence in the region is eminent, bilateral security cooperation demonstrates a slightly different tendency. At a bilateral level, two countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, reflect a lack of Russian military presence and influence. No military facilities exist or agreements have been signed. Even when Uzbekistan was a member of the CSTO it did not participate in the CORF military exercises. Turkmenistan, in turn, since it declared its neutrality in 1995, forced Moscow to withdraw its border guards. On the other hand, the other three countries seem to maintain close bilateral military bonds with Moscow. Tajikistan extended Moscow’s rights to Ayni air base (more than 7000 troops) till 2042 and Kyrgyzstan to Kant air base till 2058 (with a possibility to extend for another 25 years!). Four major military units: Kant air base, radio seismic laboratory, the naval testing
site and naval communications are planned to form a single united base from 2017.\textsuperscript{58} These developments and the long-standing presence of Russian border guards in Tajikistan (to a lesser extent) and Kyrgyzstan significantly reconfigure the regional security environment and the Russian role in it.

Figure 2.1 Russian military bases in the CIS region.

SCO is not the most powerful instrument in the Russian arsenal, and rather plays a secondary role in exerting influence on CA countries. The Chinese leading role in the organization and its different stances on some international issues (China did not officially recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the presence of other non-CA states as observers (Pakistan, Mongolia) curtails Russian ambitions to impose its influence. However, due to

\textsuperscript{58} Craig Oliphant (2013) “Main Interests in Central Asia”, Safeworld, p.9
some more flexible arrangements, such as The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure SCO RATS (existence of common database, joint anti-terrorist and anti-extremist military exercises), “Peacekeeping Mission” exercises; Russia manages to pursue its security interests in the CA region.59 Recent news – the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) - highlights new security developments on the Eurasian continent. Being members of CICA, Russia and CA expressed concern regarding security issues in their countries and pledged to enhance cooperation among each other and the other 18 members. Another security-oriented framework provided the Tajik leader a chance to call for a greater strengthening of the Tajik-Afghan border, promised within CSTO framework, but this was delayed due to Ukrainian events.60

Some of the CSTO initiatives either are not fully implemented due to the differences in national legal systems and further difficulties in ratification of required legislative processes or discourage other members from participation in the organization that can potentially curtail their sovereignty rights (Uzbekistan’s 2006 and 2012 withdrawals). Recent developments in both regional security structures, the CSTO and SCO, show that Ukrainian events changed the Russian defensive and reactive security approach and introduced a more assertive stance and security-oriented reading of the region. Recent summits of the CSTO emphasize a series of implications for the CA security realm with Moscow planning to enhance cooperation with SCO, China in particular, towards joint work on common threats and challenges strengthening cooperation with Iran to combat drug trafficking and establishing the Center to combat cyber

threats and to counter information attacks.\textsuperscript{61} “There is a decision to establish the Centre to combat cyber incidents within the CSTO. Today we are working on the creation of a normative base,” - said the Secretary General of the CSTO at a press conference. Rapprochement sentiments were also voiced by president Lukashenko: “CSTO countries must be prepared to stand together to defend the sovereignty and independence, “[…] we must be prepared to stand back to back […]”\textsuperscript{62} Thus, in the near future, acceleration of consistent implementation of the Putin doctrine in the region is expected. Particularly, it is relevant in the context of the emerged new instruments in the sphere of economic cooperation – the signed EEU agreement – that also seeks to promote Moscow’s security interests in the region. Using new tools may enable to attract even more CA countries to EEU and significantly improve the efficiency of Russian security policy in the region.

\subsection*{2.2 Soft security factors}

Russian soft-security interests in the CA region are mainly based on the first tenet of the Putin doctrine, namely, ideological and cultural affinities among post-Soviet nations or so-called civilizational unity. This “ethnocultural closeness”\textsuperscript{63} to Slavic or, generally, Russian-speaking people of Soviet origin and perception of the hostile West (second principle

\hypertarget{footnote61}{\textsuperscript{61}} The original speech can be viewed at: \url{http://www.odkb-csto.org/presscenter/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3397}. Accessed May 22, 2014.


\hypertarget{footnote63}{\textsuperscript{63}} Sergei Stankevich - former foreign policy advisor (1992), “Rossiya uzhe sdelala antiimperskii vybor”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 Novermber, p.2
of the Putin doctrine) constructs a vision of multipolarity. By doing so, the discourse of Russian identity and its stress on Slavic roots of the identity presupposes not only limited engagement with the West, but also subsequent limited dependence on it, moreover it emphasizes an activation of the Russian role in the CA realm. Serving as a core of Russian foreign policy course, soft security factors that aim to maintain its civilizational location and uniqueness\textsuperscript{64} are of a high significance. This section, thus, examines soft security concerns towards the region and the arsenal of “soft” instruments as well as mechanisms Moscow uses to exert influence on the region. Once regarded as secondary to hard security concerns, I argue that with emergence of the Putin Doctrine, they appeared to be equally powerful and effective in Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the region. The implications of rising soft security concerns should be, undoubtedly, taken into consideration by the EU, if it is willing to maintain or consolidate its posture in CA.

A Pan-Slavic rhetoric\textsuperscript{65} can be seen as an effective tool for achieving Russian objectives. Most of the time, it is employed to reach the ruling elite or public circles in a target state. Once it facilitated the Russian government to approach the Balkans and justify their mission in the region.\textsuperscript{66} Now, it was clearly reformulated in the Putin Doctrine and applied to Crimea. By the same token, civilizational unity principle may also carry a message of a duty, not only to preserve these ideational values, but also to actively protect the rights of the Russian

\textsuperscript{64} See: Konstantin Eggert and Bobo Lo (2000), “The Yeltin Era and Russia’s Search for a Post-Soviet Identity”, working paper, the 6th World Congress of the International Council of Central and East European Studies, Tampere, Finland, p.2

\textsuperscript{65} Boris Yeltsin. (1995) “Bosniyskiy krizis ne imeet silovogo resheniya”, interview to Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai in Rossiskie Vesti, 10 August, p.1

\textsuperscript{66} Ekaterina A. Stepanova (1999), “Explaining Russia's Dissention on Kosovo Explaining Russia's Dissention on Kosovo”, PONARS Policy Memo, 57 Carnegie Moscow Center, 
diaspora and millions of Russian speakers scattered all across the post-Soviet space. This principle of protecting rights and ensuring non-infringement of those rights by post-Soviet state is clearly asserted in the Putin Doctrine and bears grave implications for the CA region.

To assess soft security interests and the instruments Russia utilizes in order to achieve its strategic objectives in the region; some statistical methods have been employed. The following table illustrates soft security interests in figures,\textsuperscript{67} measuring ethnic Russian population, percentage of Orthodox Christians and Russian speaking inhabitants to give an insight into the existing Russophone situation. It is clear from the table that the five countries inherited Soviet legacy to varying extents. Despite of the lack of statistical data in some countries (predominantly Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan), or distortions between official data and real life situation, along with considerably outdated sources, it is still evident that there is a great differentiation of leverages that can be used by Russia in CA. For example, Kazakhstan seems to be the largest country with the largest share of Russian minority population, around 24% of the total population (that is around 4.3 mln people), whereas Turkmenistan’s Russian-speaking group has significantly shrunk since 1989 from 9.5% of the total population to somewhere around 3.3 at present. (See Table 2.2.a) Nevertheless, a common trend can be observed, that is a gradual phasing out of Russian language from the territory of the region followed by a number of laws and regulations restricting and limiting its use. Thus, it created an outflow of migrants to neighboring countries, predominantly Russia.

\textsuperscript{67} Sources include The World Factbook CIA, www.nationsonline.org and UNDP in Central Asia.
Russia’s comprehensive presence in the region is highly interlinked with its arsenal of soft power instruments available and utilized. There is no a single coherent strategy towards this region, instead it pursues a diversified approach to each and every country, taking into account all the existing specificities and constraints. Constraints are fairly clear if we look at the official status of Russian language proscribed by the constitutions. Only in two countries, where the largest Russian diaspora are located – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is Russian an official language. The other countries constitutionally designated no special status to Russian (equals to a foreign language), with the exception of Tajikistan where Russian is a language for inter-ethnic communication.

The Russian presence and influence is mainly represented by a number of cultural and educational institutions, e.g. Rossotrudnichestvo agency, the Russkiy Mir Foundation that runs Russian Culture Centers in the region, branches of Russian universities and institutions, Russian theaters and so on. Again, it is highly noticeable on the Kazakh and Kyrgyz territory, as their operation there does not meet the constraints from national political elites. Other countries enjoy somewhat limited scope of operation and a rather passive presence of Russia.

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68 See Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan.
For instance, in Turkmenistan, in the whole country there is only one school with Russian language of instruction – Turkmen-Russian Pushkin School. The received diploma from that School is well recognized among Russian higher education schools, however, according to the media news, in order to be accepted into those schools Turkmen parents are forced to bribe local authorities.\textsuperscript{69} The lack of leverage in Turkmenistan created a favorable ground for the linguistic vacuum that has been swiftly replaced by Turkish schools.\textsuperscript{70} Subsequently, it is hard to call the latest Russian soft security quest towards the region unambiguously successful. It appeared to be successful in some countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but to a certain extent (principally Kazakhstan). Nevertheless, a high susceptibility of CA information space to Russian media that distantly keeps shaping civilizational unity among the countries with Russia is obvious. (See Table 2.2.b)


Table 2.2.b. Main source: Wojciech Górecki “Ever Further from Moscow…” (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cultural/educational institutions, government agencies and other associations</th>
<th>Mass Media (both local and Russian)</th>
<th>Status of Russian language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Two Russian government agencies: Rosotrudnichestvo agency and The Russkiy Mir Foundation (Russian Culture centers) – scope of operation is limited</td>
<td>Quite restricted access to some Russian TV channels, Internet censorship with regard to some news portals; “Pravda Vostoka”, “Novosti Uzbekistana” newspapers</td>
<td>No special status, de-russification process, introduction of Latin script</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Limited operation of Rosotrudnichestvo</td>
<td>No Russian radio, highly limited access of Russian press to the Turkmen market; highly restrictive policies of censorship “Neytraniy Turkmenistan” newspaper</td>
<td>No official status, equal to a foreign language; introduction of Latin script</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Amultitude of Russian organizations at least 38 (Cossack communities; Slavonic movements); Rosotrudnichestvo, The Russkiy Mir Foundation and so on.</td>
<td>Both local media and Russian is present and Russian press is easily accessible</td>
<td>Official declared to switch to Latin script by 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Rosotrudnichestvo agency, Russian coordination Council in Kyrgyzstan with many Russian national minority organizations; the Russkiy Mir Foundation (Russian centers) Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University (has center of Slavonic Studies), Slavonic Culture Center.</td>
<td>Russian News Internet portals (News-Asia), local press “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”, “Dla Vas” and the “Vecherniy Bishkek” newspapers, branches of Russian press, Russian TV broadcast</td>
<td>Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Dozens of schools, relatively passive operation of Rosotrudnichestvo agency, the Tajik Association for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, The Russkiy Mir Foundation, Russian Tajik Slavonic University, a branch of the Moscow State University</td>
<td>Limited Russian TV broadcast, “Digest Press” and “Vecherniy Dushanbe” newspapers, Tajik Internet News portals</td>
<td>Language for inter-ethnic communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CA immigrants on the territory of Russia are another soft power instrument at Russian
disposal. The recent statistics of the World Bank\textsuperscript{71} demonstrated that in 2013 Tajikistan reached a critical, for a country, threshold of remittance-dependency from Tajik migrants in Russia, that constituted around $4 billion or 52\% of the country’s GDP, meanwhile the amount of remittances of its neighbors – Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan\textsuperscript{72} constituted 31\% and 16 \% of their GDP respectively. This striking tendency accentuates the vulnerability of CA economies to the Russian market and migration policies of the Russian government. One of the examples how Russia tends to pursue its interests using soft power (to be precise migrants’ mass) can be found at times of relations’ deterioration between Russia and Tajikistan, which was caused by the reluctance of the Tajik government to renegotiate a Russian military base.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, the remittances-dependant CA, at the moment, sees not many alternatives to Russia-led CU, SES, CIS, or co-controlled by Russia SCO. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have no significant leverage to bargain against constraining the migration policies of Russia.

All in all, despite the differences in political leadership, socio-economic development and external influence of five countries, soft power interests drive Russian leadership to utilize the Russian speaking diaspora as instruments to pursue a series of objectives. Particularly, it is used to reassert itself as a great power on the international arena, to demonstrate its civilizational and historical commitments to its compatriots and preferably pacify its internal oppositional forces that carry patriotic sentiments. Similar realistic rhetoric seems to


transcend time and space and appear to be one of the key principles of the Putin Doctrine – the current backbone of Russian foreign policy.

2.3 Energy factors

This particular section discusses the Russian energy security aspirations in the region and the means to realize them. It also brings in the EU dimension and competing interests in the region showing that in light of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian assertive posture is leading to intensification of Russian-CA energy cooperation, leaving the EU vulnerable to potential cut-offs.

According to the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the country owns almost 33% of global natural gas resources, 20% of global coal reserves and 10% of global oil reserves. Thus, it is reasonably to ask why energy security is of strategic interest. Obviously, Russia is not in desperate need of fossil fuels and its key interest in the CA energy sector has more implicit underpinnings. First of all, Russia is not only a consumer of energy resources; it also produces and transits such to the West. Russia became a main transit zone for CA gas deliveries to Western markets. So, in most cases, it endeavors to control fossil fuel prices, production processes and schemes of transportation. Second, by using its competitive advantages Moscow aims not only to maintain its regional economic preeminence, but also to secure its national income (reselling at mark-up prices). Oil and gas imported in its raw form from CA substantially benefit the Russian economy, thus having a stabilizing effect on

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74 Creating “transit trap”, see: (Bertil Nygren “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS region” Problems of Post-communism, (2008) vol.55, no.4, pp.3-15)
domestic politics and strengthening internal ruling forces.\textsuperscript{76} As can be seen from the figures 2.3.a and 2.3.b, oil and gas are the main traded commodities between Russia and CA countries; hence, this subchapter will mainly focus on these two primary sources of fossil fuels.

Figure 2.3.a Share of CA countries in Russian imports of individual commodity groups (%)

![Bar chart showing the share of CA countries in Russian imports of individual commodity groups from 1995 to 2010.]

Figure 2.3.b Commodity structure of Russian imports from individual CA countries, 2010 (%)

![Pie chart showing the commodity structure of Russian imports from individual CA countries in 2010.]

Since 1991 the landlocked region has been left with old Soviet-model infrastructure, an integrated energy reallocation system (at the border of Northern Kazakhstan and Russia) and outdated equipment. Isolation and uneven distribution of natural resources exposed the region to economic backwardness, which reflected a lack of new transport networks and the predisposition to Russian economic grip. Nowadays, a vast majority of the exploration and mining technology, transportation logistics and, in some cases, oil refineries and gas processing centers have been running since Soviet times. For example, the Central Asia-Center pipeline was built almost 50 years ago and runs natural gas deliveries from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. See Figure 2.3.c

Figure 2.3.c Gas network of CA, source: IEA (International Energy Agency) (2010)

Unfortunately, modernization of the inherited infrastructure is a highly costly process, and CA republics’ domestic capacities have not reached the required level to replace the already outmoded technologies and equipments. This, in turn, necessitates huge investments
from outside, and with the Russian tight grip over the hydrocarbon sector of the region, CA appears to be highly dependant and susceptible to the Russian market and its transit functions, unless CA countries seek a greater diversification of trade partners or, presumably, restructure their hydrocarbon industrial outputs, e.g. refine crude oil in-house and export petroleum, as in the case of Turkmenistan.  

The future of the hydrocarbon market seems to be indeed promising for CA if they choose to export petroleum products. As the geographical position of the region is problematic for crude oil transportation across the Caspian Sea to the Western consumers (there are only two possible ways: either to circumvent the Caspian Sea area – that presupposes lengthening of the route, or even a more costly alternative – to locate the pipeline under water), petroleum would ease transportation of fuel (as petroleum can be shipped or railed) and help CA to boost their economies. However, some countries like Uzbekistan chose oil production and prioritized domestic demand over foreign consumption needs.

Table 2.3.d Production and Proved Reserves of CA countries, source: CIA World Factbook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Crude oil</th>
<th>Natural gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Production (bbl/day)---world ranking</td>
<td>proved reserves (bbl)---world ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>244.100 --- 36</td>
<td>600 mln --- 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


78 The latter sounds quite unlikely, taken into consideration that the Caspian seabed is a subject to lingering debates among five littoral states that stay unresolved.

79. See CIS Executive Committee (2013) “Overview and prospects of main pipeline transport networks in the states - participants of the CIS”, Moscow
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>102.600</td>
<td>549 mln</td>
<td>62.9 bln</td>
<td>1.841 trln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>40 mln</td>
<td>10 mln</td>
<td>5.663 bln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>12 mln</td>
<td>3.928 mln</td>
<td>5.663 bln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (CA)</td>
<td>1.607 mln</td>
<td>31.201 bln</td>
<td>147.514 bln</td>
<td>21.759 trln</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above Table 3.2.d clearly demonstrates that in terms of hydrocarbon potential CA countries vary to a great extent, as do Russian energy politics in the region. It differentiates between two blocs of countries: rich export-oriented CA countries – Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and poor import-oriented – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan. It tends to exert influence over both creating two types of dependencies.\(^{80}\)

Russia approaches the first bloc of countries for the purposes of purchasing and transiting raw materials to other parts of the world. Therefore, its main concern is to isolate the countries from other actors and to prevent development of alternative routes of exporting hydrocarbons to the West, so it can preserve its dominant role in energy transportation. To maintain its monopoly it tends to dominate the energy sector of the region by purchasing more assets, constructing new pipelines or running hydrocarbon projects. Moreover, a number of alternative projects were suspended due to Russian interference in the process, as in the case of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP),\(^{81}\) which again seems to be on the table of strategic reconsideration of opening a Southern Gas Corridor for the EU.\(^{82}\) Another major project

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\(^{80}\) Bertil Nygren (2012), Russian Resource Policies towards the CIS Countries, Palgrave Macmillan

\(^{81}\) The pipeline was proposed in 1996, and could have linked Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, if Moscow would not try to reassert its ownership rights of the Caspian seafloor. The projects being significantly hampered by Russian involvement was restarted its operation in 2005.

aiming at bypassing Russian monopoly grip has been recently put on hold. The “Nabucco” project (Caspian Sea underwater pipeline) initially designed to link the coast of the Caspian Sea with Turkey and further with the rest of the European continent was put aside by Shah Deniz consortium decision\(^83\) that preferred the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)\(^84\) instead. Prior to Shah Deniz’s II decision to switch to another project; Russia undertook many efforts to discourage CA countries, in particular, Turkmenistan to cooperate on the transport routes that bypass Russia. In 2009 it proposed a new gas pipeline agreement to Turkmenistan that was later on joined by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. Altogether, they snuggle up to Russian-led project leaving the agreement related to the Nabucco pipeline unsigned.

Russian energy interests primarily focused on Kazakhstan - a major oil producer and, to a lesser extent, natural gas producer in the region. The hydrocarbon sector of Kazakhstan accounts for 1/4 of the country’s GDP and plays an essential role in the country’s economy as it trades almost 90% of the total extracted amount of oil. Moreover, the country acts as a main transit point of CA fossil fuels to Russia and further to the West, or from the Caspian Sea region directly to Europe bypassing Russia.(see further BTC pipeline). The main oil reserves – five onshore oil fields (Mangistau, Karachaganak, Tengiz, Aktobe, Uzen)\(^85\) are situated in the western part and other offshore fields (Kurmangazy and Kashagan). Russian firms and companies such as LUKoil, Gazprom, Transneft, to a varying degree are all present in

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\(^84\) TAP aims to deliver natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe (Italy). It will be also connected with the Trans Anatolian Pipeline.
\(^85\) Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields constituted 40% of Kazakhstan’s total liquids production in 2013.
Kazakh’s energy production and transportation projects and complexes.\textsuperscript{86} The scale of LUKoil presence is reflected in the amount of assets it possesses that constitutes almost 90% of total foreign assets in the country. At the same time oil and natural gas produced in Kazakhstan accounts for 90% and 40% of the whole of LUKoil’s output overseas respectively.\textsuperscript{87} It is also a stockholder in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that runs from a huge Tengiz field to Novorossiysk. Although in April of 2014 it announced optimization of its assets in the Caspian Investment Resources Ltd and the selling of a 50% share to China’s Sinopec, LUKoil reasserted its presence in Kazakh hydrocarbon market with a further turn to investing in more promising geological exploration projects.\textsuperscript{88}

In addition, in order to gain access to explore and mine offshore oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea (such as the Kashagan field!), Almaty signed an agreement with Moscow and in exchange for these rights, voluntarily offered Moscow full jurisdiction over the Khvalynskoe and Tsentralnoe oil and gas fields. This illustrates significant constraints to energy sovereignty and essential dependency on Moscow’s benevolence. In light of its curtailed energy sovereignty, Almaty actively seeks to diversify their trade partners and transport routes, proclaiming its multi-vector foreign policy course, e.g. a recent firm decision of the Kazakh government to transfer 4.5 million tons from Tengiz field to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline\textsuperscript{89} (See Figure 2.3.e).

\textsuperscript{86} Moscow is involved in 7 oil and gas onshore projects and 3 offshore projects on the Caspian shelf. See Craig Oliphant (2013) “Main Interests in Central Asia”, Safeworld, p.6.


\textsuperscript{89} The ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Azerbaijan stated that Kazakhstan signed a new agreement, pledging to continue transferring oil through BTC pipeline that relaunched its operation back in October 2013. See: “Tengiz Oil Is in
The situation in Uzbekistan looks a little more different, as Uzbekistan’s energy production is dominated by natural gas accounting for 88.6%, while oil constitutes only 7.7% out of total energy production output. The two biggest companies, LUKoil and Gazpom, are not only actively purchasing and transporting gas, but also building their production capacities. They are involved in 3 main projects: The Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with Uzbekneftegaz (till 2039), The South West Gisar Project (includes 7 main fields, till 2043) and The Aral Project 26.7 % with China and Korea. Gazprom Germany and Gazprom Zarubejneftegaz, both holding 50%, are engaged in the project under PSA - Gas Project Development GPD that along with natural gas extracts and produces crude oil and condensates for domestic purposes.

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The neutral foreign policy of Turkmenistan, the third biggest energy-rich country, predisposed Ashgabat to more enthusiastically engage with extra-regional actors, such as Iran (2 pipelines) and China. This happened particularly when the financial crisis hit Russian pockets (until 2009 87% of Turkmen gas exports were transported to Russia) and Russia found itself unable to pay for Turkmen gas. As half of Turkmen budget revenue is dependent on its energy exports, Ashgabat decided to sell its gas to Iran and China. Thus, in 2009, the launch of Central Asia-China pipeline via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan put an end to a Russian monopoly on gas exports from the region. In order to bypass Russian-dominated infrastructure in Kazakhstan and further limit Russian influence, Ashgabat plans to build another pipeline to China via Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Ashgabat also significantly limits Russian engagement to the natural gas sector only, compounded by restrictions to offshore gas field operations for foreign investors. Additionally, Turkmenistan plans to expand the geography of its gas exports to Europe via Azerbaijan and South Asia via TAPI pipeline projects (See Figure 2.3.b).

The other two upstream resource-scarce countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are targeted by Russian large-scale investments (primarily by Gazprom) in construction of hydropower stations. Both countries are extremely well-endowed with water resources. Both economies are highly reliant on Russian railed petroleum products. Ironically, Gazprom also indirectly holds a monopoly on oil production in both countries. Sangtuda-1 hydropower plant is run

92 E.g., hydro energy amounts to almost 90% of total energy production in Tajikistan.
93 Gazprom has a operational license till 2028 Sargazon and Rengan, the Sarikamysh ans Western Shokhambary oil and gas fields.
by the Russian government and Russian companies (Inter RAO UES and Rosatom) that possess 3/4 of shares and invest 5 times more ($680mln) into the project than the Tajik government.\(^9^4\) At the same time, Russia seems to be more proactive in Kyrgyzstan where it has already pushed for construction of Kambarata II hydro power station (investing more than $2bln) and another 4 stations within the next 2 years.\(^9^4\) According to Eurasia Insight (16 February 2010) there was a precedent when Russian government lend $2billion dollars to Bishkek to proceed construction of Kambarata I project. However, unwillingness of Kyrgyz government to close Manas airbase pushed Moscow, to withhold the payment of the rest of the loan referring to unaccountability of local authorities. This gesture exerted influence over the country’s political climate and could be interpreted as a direct support of an alternative political leader. On top of this, a considerable strengthening of the Russian position allowing it to gain a greater leverage over the country’s energy sector took place in 2013. Bishkek decided to transfer all its assets to Russian Gazprom in exchange for writing off the enormous debts of Kyrgyzgaz Company.

The summit in Shanghai on May 22\(^\text{nd}\) of 2014 clinched a historic landmark on Eurasian continent that highlighted the possible implications and reconfiguration of energy politics and energy space in CA region. After 8 years of negotiation Beijing and Moscow, represented by Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) signed a 30 year gas agreement.\(^9^5\) According to this deal, in 2018 Russia will start gas deliveries to its newly found alternative energy market in China with an estimated volume of deliveries reaching $38 billion (cu m). I


is clear that in light of these developments, the demand for energy purchased by Russia in CA will only grow. Thus, it is reasonable to expect activization and intensification of Russian efforts in the regional energy trade sector. The second trend that may play out in the near future is that Russia may more assertively constrain Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and seek to limit their energy deliveries to their western partners by either providing some economic incentives, as it did in the case of the Nabucco, or use rather coercive instruments available at its disposal to exert pressure on CA countries.
3. The EU – “hesitant vicar” in Central Asia: interests and instruments.


Acknowledging the changes in Russian foreign policy and ongoing political and socio-economic transformations in the region, it is interesting to see how EU’s role is currently changing and what the nature of these changes is. To be able to assess the current and possible shifts in EU’s approach and/or strategy, this chapter will primarily focus on the main interests the EU pursues in the region, what instruments it uses to attain the appointed objectives, and how both interests and instruments are different from those of Russia. Two main spheres of interests were singled out: security (development, values promotion) and energy (including transport routes) spheres.

The many sides of EU’s face inevitably resonate in its actorness in the CA region, particularly in its security policy. The EU’s representation is in itself a question of high scrutiny. For the purposes of this research, the focus is on the several heads the EU consists of, namely: the Commission, Parliament and Council. This paper will not look into security approaches undertaken by the MS themselves, non-state actors (such as civil society and, private sector), European non-member states (Norway and Switzerland), or transatlantic institutions such as NATO or OSCE, that are, security-wise, obviously, more active than the EU. However, it will take into consideration all the assistance programs and projects conducted and implemented with the assistance of UNDP, such as the Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA).
In addition, unraveling the interests, instruments, and potential readjustment of the strategy for the period (2007-2013) in security matters in the region, this chapter will mainly focus on the primary strategic documents produced by the EU during the long seven years of the strategy such as “The European Union and Central Asia: The New Partnership in Action” ⁹⁶, “Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013”, ⁹⁷ as well as numerous reports and working papers produced by EU-Central Asia Monitoring ⁹⁸, annual EU-CA Ministerial Meetings and Conferences and two high-level dialogues and security forums (held in 2008 and 2009), assessing the security policy vis-à-vis the region.

The security issues come to the fore of EU-CA dialogue, and now are placed on the top of EU’s hierarchy of interests. This can be seen in the 2012 “Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia”, when intentionally or not, the political dialogue that signals increasing concern towards security matters was prioritized and put before well-known norms and values promotion, or even energy diversification plans. The same document, simultaneously, pledged that the EU will “continue its efforts to encourage closer cooperation among CA states since problems such as border management pose a threat to regional security and need urgent solution”. However, in reality, a myriad of challenges exist to the effective implementation of EU’s security objectives in the region. Most of them

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related to the conflicting perceptions of the security and divergences in its practices, absence of substantial security narrative, limited presence and leverages (assistance programs and projects are limited in number and scale), double standards related to relaxation of human rights and democratic values promotion if energy interests are at stake and the prevalence of institutional actors with overlapping security agenda.

First of all, unlike Russia, the EU does not emphasize “hard security objectives” in its security agenda towards the region. (EU members rather choose NATO or OSCE structures to pursue their hard security objectives). It does not set a goal to pursue an establishment of EU-led regional security structures, in order to compete with the CSTO or SCO. Until the 2010 Joint EU Council and Commission Implementation Report of the Strategy for Central Asia, the EU exclusively focused on a rather narrow definition of security, namely human security. The report stressed: “Poverty remains a major challenge in the region, in some parts increasingly so in the light of the recent economic and financial crisis (via remittances), particularly in rural areas, and needs to be addressed with renewed vigor, also as a means to combat the dangers of radicalization.” Hence, it is clear that the EU understood security in its own way, underlining “the need to explain and promote the EU concept of security and stability” that is different from that of CA states (preservation of the state’s regime.) and is grounded in respect of “basic rights and opportunities that result from the absence of

democracy and the rule of law can lead to situations of insecurity”. Such an approach helped the EU to incorporate its normative goals in good governance and rule of law promotion, helping countries to meet international development standards. However, being too focused on the values/development/security nexus, Brussels overlooked the danger of external problems, such as the potential of the violence spill-over as an aftermath of the 2014 withdrawal of NATO security troops from Afghanistan. The unpreparedness of CA governments to face this problem and the high permeability of the Tajik-Afghan borders may eventually have serious repercussions on the EU. This realization of the gravity of the security notion and the necessity to widen the scope of the challenges that exist pushed the EU to reconsider its security policy. Concluding remarks of the Implementation Report highlight the upcoming changes in the EU security agenda in the region: “It will be necessary to expand the concept of security to include major international and regional challenges such as human security, the combating of drug trafficking in human beings, […] border management, […] and the combating of terrorism and prevention of radicalization and extremism, including via a continued emphasis on poverty alleviation”.

Eventually, the issues of terrorism, radicalization, extremism and anti-drug trafficking were put on EU’s security agenda. However, the long-term security objectives have still remained closely related to poverty alleviation and social well-being and only indirectly touch upon the security matters such as through good governance promotion programs. By doing so,


the EU aims to facilitate cohesion and cooperation among the countries themselves, and foster their resilience to internal, regional and external security threats. Therefore, their development assistance is directed to pursue 3 missions: ensure stability, reduce poverty and enhance regional cooperation. This can be seen from the changes in EU-CA cooperation dynamics from the period of 2007-2010 to 2011-2013 (See Tables 3.1.a. and 3.1.b). Interestingly, prior energy interests disappeared from the list of prioritized interests in the region (it became a matter of bilateral negotiation), and border management lost its significance; nevertheless a new sector gained gravity – regional sustainable development, that nowadays includes a more broader understanding of security, and amounts to almost half budget spent within EU-CA Regional Cooperation 2011-2013 framework.

Table 3.1.a.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Amount in million €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1.b.

Furthermore, the EU also chose to advance bilateral relations with CA countries and most of its “carrots” concentrate on differentiated approaches of the country-specific strategy. The EU identified security-wise more unstable and vulnerable countries that require the rather special treatment. (See Table 3.1.c) These are low-income resource-scarce upstream countries like Tajikistan, that experienced devastating civil war and Kyrgyzstan that drew special attention after ethnic clashes in 2010. Both are extremely poor, with 38.3% of people below the poverty line in 2013 (it was 72% in 2003) and with 40% of poor people in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan. Bilateral cooperation takes 2/3 of the budget in the form of development aid, loans, and grants, (for example, macro-financial assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2013)\textsuperscript{105} and predominantly aims at lowering poverty levels and improving standards of life.

\textsuperscript{105} 15 mln euro in the form of loans and the rest 15 mln euro in the form of grants. See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1327956&t=f&l=en Accessed May, 14 2014
In order to achieve its human security objectives the EU utilizes three types of aid channels: technical assistance, which includes projects, action plans and a variety of programs, sector budget support (which according to EU data is given primarily to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan only) and the civil society channel (again having a pretty limited use in CA). Technical assistance can be found in numerous instruments for its reallocation: 2 regional programs, Border Management in Central Asia Program (BOMCA) and Central Asia Drug Action Program (CADAP), “Heroine route” project, 2 Action plans (the EU-Central Asia Action Plan on Drugs and the Joint Plan of Action for Central Asia under the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy), a number of geographic and thematic instruments such as Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), The Instrument for Stability (IfS), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Food Security Program (FSP) and Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) program. (See Figure 3.1.d)  

Figure 3.1.d Geographic and Thematic Instruments of the EU development aid in CA.
The EU has a fundamentally different mode of operation than Russia. It does not form an organization, it has no significant military presence in the region like Russia, nor does it station border guard troops; it rather co-finances or cooperates with already existing organizations. For example, BOMCA – assistance project running by EC since 2002 and implemented by the UNDP. Generally pursuing securitization of borders, it stresses the importance of institutional reforms, introducing Integrated Border Management (IBM) approach and strengthening overall capacities of border posts by providing training, necessary infrastructure and equipment. Currently, BOMCA Phase 8 (2011-2013) is more specifically pursuing enhancement of counter-drug capacities at border cross points with subsequent improvement of the working conditions, continuing pedagogical training and institutional...
reforms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In reality, it seems that even those objectives are ambitious, as in the latest news report the main achievements were provision of computers, furniture and equipment for border posts, study tour-workshops to Latvia, and intensive trainings and meetings. As was mentioned by Jos Boonstra in his working paper, it is hard to assess the sustainability of this program if it is not systematically monitored and evaluated. Another major project, CADAP, is more a drug-centered project with a budget of 4.9 mln euro (2010-2013). Its four technical projects: Drug Epidemiology Data Base Collection and Development (DAMOS,) Treatment Methodologies (TREAT), Media and Dissemination Strategies (MEDISSA) coordinated by a general component OCAN have rather more specific goals, such as drug addiction prevention, its treatment, monitoring and data collection. Nonetheless, their mission also carries some normative elements such as exposure to and possible implementation of “internationally recognized best practices of anti-drug policies”.

Recent developments illustrate a hardening of EU’s security and increasing concern about the aftermath of NATO troop’s withdrawal from Afghanistan along with the overwhelming number of foreign fighters flowing into Syria. The Council of the European Union reports about a recent visit of European External Action Service officials headed by EU

110 However, it is a rather a consortium of member states supported and joined by the EU
112 Ibid.
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator – Gilles Kerchove to Almaty regarding further strengthening security dialogue plans.\textsuperscript{113}

No doubt, such intentions to a lesser extent were always present, but significantly hampered by internal crises in the EU and the existing dissenting opinions among MS on the necessity to go even that far beyond its eastern members or neighbors, when such experience a greater need of EU’s involvement. The limited visibility of the EU can be partially explained by the Ukrainian analogy as another post-Soviet but a more contiguous country that was significantly prioritized by the EU government than the entire “troubled region”.\textsuperscript{114} The amount of the macro-finance assistance reallocated to Ukraine since 2010 approximates 2 billion euro,\textsuperscript{115} meanwhile the total amount of money provided to the five CA countries for the period of 2007-2013 in several areas of cooperation constituted only 750 mln euro. Being sandwiched between internal constraints and external challenges, the Common Security and Defense Policy’s (CSDP) hard security objective is a subject to heated debates among MS. The vagueness and inclusiveness of EU’s security approach, accompanied by the absence of a substantial security narrative (both hard and soft) shared by all its members, lack of political and security leverages (predominance of development aid carrots) significantly hinders the positioning of the EU in the region as a full security partner or a security guarantor.

\textsuperscript{113} See “EU Deepens Dialogue on Counter Terrorism with Five Central Asian Countries (Council of the European Union)” (27\textsuperscript{th}-28\textsuperscript{th} April, 2014) Accessed May 25, 2014.  

\textsuperscript{114} Although it should be mentioned that geographical proximity matters and Ukraine is seen more as the “European neighborhood”.

3.2 Energy interests and instruments.

“Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.”

Winston Churchill.

The recent changes in Russian foreign policy, undoubtedly, brought the European hydrocarbon quest in CA region back into spotlight. As the repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis became more and more tangible, the possibility of experiencing energy cut-offs became imminent. The urgency and gravity of the situation call for drastic reconfiguration of the EU’s energy policy in CA prompting a more proactive approach in energy transport route diversification. Therefore, this part of the chapter aims to investigate the EU-CA energy security (ES) ties, the EU energy security interests in the region and a set of the instruments it employs to reach its ES objectives. The latter informs my research of the increasing assertiveness of the new doctrine and to what extent it is upgrading CA energy profile on the global arena.

The continuity of energy supplies is a source of stability and a lifeline for every nation-state. The two concepts – security and energy are intrinsically intertwined. Taking into consideration the anticipated growth of gas import demand by 25% within the next decade and the volatile nature of supply channels accompanied by regular disruptions (1/3 of the

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117 In response to imposed sanctions and attempts to isolate Russia, the latter actively uses energy as an leverage, for example, rising prices and openly expressing a threat of suspending deliveries due to Ukrainian delay in payments (approximating $2 billion of gas debt) See: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7002, Accessed May 21, 2014.

118 Although the demand for gas imports decreased due to economic recession, an outward tendency is expected. See José Manuel Barroso, Energy Priorities for Europe, Presentation given at the EU Summit of 22 May 2013,
EU’s total gas imports are supplied by Gazprom, while 50% of it crosses Ukrainian territory). EU’s ES policy gains even greater significance. Therefore, the main objectives of the policy are ingrained into energy diversification, dependency minimization on Russian fossil energy supplies and creating additional routes.

With these aspirations the EU turned to CA – an energy-endowed region. The EU has been engaging in ES policy area since the early 1990’s through a variety of frameworks and initiatives: TACIS, INterstate Oil and GAs Transportation to Europe (later known as INOGATE), BAKU Initiative, Transport Corridor Europa – Europa Caucasus and Asia (TRASECA), and the Broader Southern Corridor Strategy (SC). However, only in 2007 did Brussels manage to formulate its first CA-oriented ES strategy. In order to achieve all the asserted ambitious plans of the strategy, the EU as Russia chose to operate at both regional and bilateral levels.

Regionally, the strategy involves regular high-level energy dialogues with CA leaders in the framework of the 2nd Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (ESSAP2), Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFSA), INOGATE and TRASECA. INOGATE is one of the main energy cooperation frameworks between the EU and CA. Currently, all five countries-members to INOGATE are involved in three projects with other countries-partners related to renewable energy and energy efficiency. The first two projects primarily aim to decrease the dependency on hydrocarbons, ensure the ES supplies and mitigate the effects of

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121 Only 4 CA countries are parties to this program, with an exception in case of Turkmenistan
climate change. Both set a broad range of goals with modest budgets (2mln and 16mln euro respectively) and are directed towards 11 countries (not specifically targeting CA region) for a 5 year duration. Only the third project – Central Asia Sustainable Energy Program (CASEP) encompasses exclusively the five CA countries and introduces a perspective of joint initiative on development of renewable energy and energy efficiency programs. Since the moment it was launched in 2013, CASEP has not organized or conducted any kind of activities or designated specific projects or future plans within the given framework and only 6mln euro budget.

TRASECA is another key regional framework that involves CA partners in a greater integration project that sets the goal to promote regional dialogue on Euro-Asian transport links, while stimulating regional economic growth. As the latest developments demonstrate, TRASECA countries actively negotiate multimodal transportation infrastructure and are preparing to launch the “Silk Wind” Project - China-Kazakhstan-Caspian-Caucasus-Turkey-Europe container train, initiated by Kazakhstan and calling for enhanced commercial ties between East and West. In addition, the EU engaging CA countries facilitates investment activities in their domestic projects, such as electrification of Aktogay-Dostyk Railway in Kazakhstan ($546.4 mln), Osh-Batken-Isfana Road in Kyrgyzstan (130 million euro) financed by countries themselves.

Yet, CA is not an indispensible part of the ESSAP2, issued by the Commission. The

Accessed May 21, 2014

existing 5 broad action plans include CA gas and oil to a very insignificant extent and rather focus on improving energy efficiency within the EU, such as improving LNG distribution and gas storage facilities, as well as enhancing crisis response mechanisms.\textsuperscript{125} Playing a marginal role in past and present energy strategies of the EU at a regional level, CA still seems promising in the context of SG corridor expansion. In general, there were the Caspian littoral states, which hampered the process by not confirming contractually their decision to participate (due to the still-unresolved dispute of the seabed’s legal status). Meanwhile, the recent events and the concerns of losing their key export route to the Western market demonstrated that CA Caspian states became more lukewarm towards the project. Uzaqbai Qarabalin, oil and gas minister of Kazakhstan told the parliament on April 7, 2014, he fears the sanctions on Russia might hit Kazakhstan’s economy; therefore Astana plans to seek an additional energy route. Ashgabat also expressed their will to diversify their export routes and deepen ES ties with the EU.\textsuperscript{126}

The Investment Facilities for CA (IFCA) established under DCI was granted 45 mln euros from the EU budget and mainly works within the framework of Action Fiche for CA, focusing on energy, transport and development policy management. Again, as mentioned in preliminary remarks of the Action Fiche, the specificities of the region hinder the process of equal engagement with the countries. For example, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is absent in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the countries, that are not members of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as well; thus, complicating the procedures of project

\textsuperscript{125} The document can be viewed at: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.html}, Accessed May 24, 2014

investments. In the meantime Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are being more actively engaged in pipeline, hydropower and municipal waste projects.\textsuperscript{127}

The energy interests in the region are mainly manifested in bilateral cooperation. Bilateral ties pursue a conditionality approach, and vary from country to country, mostly depending on its human rights records, accountability and corruption rate, and subsequent unwillingness of CA leaders to cooperate, while being frequently targeted by sanctions. Not approving the authoritarian nature of the regime, and constant human rights violations, the EU blocked ratification of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Turkmen. Instead, in 2010 the EU substituted the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the Interim Agreement, which has similar provisions on trade. Realizing the significance of Brussels’ presence in Turkmenistan energy sector, the EU further signed a 2008 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership.\textsuperscript{128} These examples clearly demonstrate that the EU tries to keep the balance between its energy interests and the normative rhetoric. The latter faces significant constraints in the form of authoritarian nature of regimes that hamper the process of boosting EU’s presence and influence in the region.

Since the EU stated its main energy interests in CA focused on gas supplies,\textsuperscript{129} and as mentioned in chapter 2 the prospects of importing Kazakh and Uzbek gas are limited (domestic appetite and export quotas to Russia and China leave insignificant amounts of gas for the EU), Turkmenistan seems to be an optimal long term partner with a comparative

\textsuperscript{128} See \url{http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/doc/mou_turkmenistan.pdf}, Accessed May 24, 2014
\textsuperscript{129} “Gas deliveries from the region are of special importance to the EU”, “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for A New Partnership”, (2007), Brussels, p.19
advantage in gas resources. This prospect has been mentioned in European Energy Security Strategy (EESS) released by EC on May 28, 2014. Thus, it is obvious that in both short-term and especially long-term, the region will be given a priority in EESS and the EU may seek to bolster its presence in CA hydrocarbon sector.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{130} The strategy can be viewed at: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf} Accessed May, 29, 2014.
Conclusions - Changes in Russian Foreign Policy: Implications for the EU in Central Asia.

In summary, this research demonstrated that the Putin Doctrine – the new hegemonic discourse has preferred the logic of consequences (norms’ violation) to the logic of appropriateness with regard to Crimean events, and gave rise to a series of geopolitical shifts, one of which is multipolarity. Thus, crystallization of the doctrine bears a grave significance for other Post-soviet countries, particularly CA, where a huge Russian-speaking diaspora, strategic objects (the Baikonur Cosmodrome, military complexes and bases), major gas and oil fields are located. Since the moment of Crimean annexation, this research hypothesized a steady consolidation of Moscow’s presence and influence in CA region. Recent developments captured in this thesis clearly demonstrate such a tendency through a variety of frameworks CICA, SCO, SCTO, EEU and at bilateral level. In the meantime, Moscow’s assertive posture and increasing number of new leverages may significantly resonate on EU-CA relations.

In this final section, I outline some implications based on the aforementioned analysis, recent developments and policy recommendations on the EU’s foreign policy in the region. Energy-wise, Russian new pragmatic foreign policy may push the EU towards re-evaluation of CA energy profile for European markets and intensify negotiation over alternative energy routes, and even most likely renegotiation of PCA with Turkmenistan. New EESS released in May of 2014, on repeated occasions, emphasizes the importance of CA hydrocarbon potential for the MS. The implications may also include acceleration of the SGC launching with the active involvement of CA Caspian states (to a lesser extent Uzbekistan). Furthermore, there is
a potential of increasing energy supplies in light of recent discoveries of gas and oil fields in both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan along with a possibility to increase the share of investments in CA energy sector.

Security-wise, the implications are similarly substantial. Russia is not only a final destination of CA migrants but also a transit path to the EU. Control over the influx of migrants is a serious security issue for both the EU and Russia. Recently, Russia voiced the possibility of cancelling the visa regime with Schengen zone countries, while maintaining freedom of movement for CIS citizens. This, in turn, may lead to an increased number of illegal migrants on the territory of the EU and subsequent consolidation of efforts to boost its border management activities in the region.

Brussels has also started to realize that for the purposes of maintaining peace and stability on the Eurasian continent, as well as the status quo endangered by the Putin Doctrine, it may seek to reinforce its posture as a “security guard” in CA, supposedly, cooperating with OSCE or/and NATO and gaining more weight and leverage to secure the region. Additionally, the upcoming winding down of NATO troops from Afghanistan may signal that the EU should seek a more proactive role in regional security structures and tailor a region-specific security strategy. For instance, transboundary water security strategy may be extended to Afghanistan, which also suffers from mismanagement of CA water resources, thus, addressing water insecurities and poverty reduction problems in the region, which the EU sees as root causes for regional instability.

Regarding the policy recommendations a few points must be mentioned. The increasing of bilateral ties of CA countries with EU MS and not integrated cooperation is rather a negative
factor. Individual EU countries (such as Germany) pursue their economic goals creating their own instruments and leverages, while the EU-CA cooperation remains on the stage of establishing "Europa Houses". However, there is a possibility that a new EESS adopted recently will consolidate the efforts of the MS and ensure coherence in EU foreign policy. “In unity there is strength”.

Similarly, the EU policy division based on the principle “European neighbor” and “neighbor of Europe” in the context of globalization, has outlived itself and does not adequately reflect the realities. For example, not only key transport and energy routes and transit flow through distant “neighbor of Europe” – CA, but also possible destabilization of the region (no matter whether the violence spills over from Afghanistan or is ignited by internal/regional factors) may have a direct impact on the EU, in the form of the rise of drug trafficking, number of refugees, and environmental problems and may entrench cooperation in the sphere of trade on the Eurasian continent and in the world to name just a few.

Having conducted this research, it also became evident that political liberalization in relations with CA countries should not outpace economic liberalization, which aims to create the conditions for the formation of new social strata (primarily middle-class as a social basis for democratic political transformations). As mentioned in chapter 3, the EU endeavors to keep the balance between norms promotion and pursuit of its energy interests. As the analysis shows, CA countries on their part, express a genuine interest in the energy route diversification. Subsequently, a long-term and comprehensive energy strategy in the region may assist in eliminating imbalances between economic and political objectives and give economic cooperation an equal weight.
Hence, in order to assist in creating those new social strata in the region, educational programs should be expanded and increased in volume - as it would create a favorable climate for the introduction of EU normative values. Therefore, educational programs should not be limited to numerous trainings and seminars with CA experts, but should rather engage in the trainings of highly qualified professionals who have been already trained, lived in the EU and better understand and accept European democratic values. Currently, educational programs largely concentrate in Kazakhstan and in other countries to an insignificant extent. The disproportion should be subject to reconsideration.

The comparison of the range of instruments employed by RF and the EU in both energy and security domains indicated EU’s disadvantaged position and its lack of substantial leverages in the region. Therefore, the EU should act more promptly, more consciously and more strategically in support of deepening trade ties as a mechanism to improve energy security and a platform to promote EU normative values. Having established more robust economic ties with CA countries and gaining its market weight; the EU also creates new instruments and tools for norms dissemination and not the other way around.

Another aspect is based on globalization factor, namely, when the whole world is economically and security-wise highly interconnected, one cannot simply rely on successful promotion of its interests without cooperating with the global community, including Russia and China. As the region’s strategic value is deeply rooted in the regional security complex, there is a necessity to “consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia” for the sake of forming a more “cooperative trans-Eurasian security system”.

The EU should reconsider its resistance to cooperating with other major actors. The notion of “collective security”, especially in the context of globalization, lies exactly in the necessity to act in concert, keep constantly negotiating and seeking for compromises, sometimes conceding to each other, and not putting ultimatums, imposing sanctions and/or terminating cooperation if there are some problems in policy implementation (as in the case of Turkmenistan). Only continuous dialogue can become a constructive one, whereas noncooperation may create a political vacuum that can be easily filled by extremist forces in the case of CA.

Lack of political will to consolidate its position in the region, therefore, deprives EU security strategy from a long-term prospective. If the EU finds no real focus on a long-term policy in the region or fails to develop an international framework to integrate the interests of the present actors, it leaves other major actors with more chance to seamlessly pursue their interests in the region. Thus, it inevitably creates the risk that somewhat disinterested in democracy promotion, good governance and transparency, other actors may inevitably lead the region to a deplorable state. This, in turn, may negatively affect the EU as a whole. The security on the Eurasian continent largely depends on stability in this region. Therefore, the presence of EU’s normative power in the region is deemed of great importance. Finally, this research concludes that the EU also needs to broaden, deepen and enhance its arsenal of instruments and methods for the sake of achieving its desired goals and establishing, as was mentioned above, a more “realistic” leverage over the region.\(^{133}\)


\(^{133}\) This passage was taken from the author’s Research Methods and Design final paper based on the research for this thesis and was submitted to Central European University in 2014.
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