Assembling Fragmented Citizenship
Bulgarian Muslim Migrants at the Margins of Two States

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Statement

I hereby state that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The thesis contains no material previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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Abstract

This dissertation addresses everyday citizenship practices and imaginings of the state/s of Bulgarian Muslim migrants in Spain. By doing this it seeks to understand how migrants re-position themselves as citizens in the context of multiple citizenship and migration regimes between two states within the European Union. It examines the multiple ways of being, becoming, and conceiving oneself as a citizen by engaging with or circumventing the state in its different faces through simultaneous normative and institutional incorporation in more than one polity and social context. Drawing on a year-long ethnographic multi-sited research of a migrant community spreading between a village in Bulgaria and a small town in Spain, it aims at unpacking the everyday struggles and negotiations of individuals embedded as semi-insiders/semi-outsiders at the margins of two states. As part of a process of ‘citizenship disaggregation and re-articulation’ migrants claim rights and membership by positioning themselves simultaneously within these multiple institutional contexts, making up for what they lack in one site by seeking it elsewhere. By working on the vertical and the horizontal relations that citizenship entails in these two contexts the migrants described here manage to assemble the different elements of their fragmented citizenship. However, I argue that the case of the Bulgarian Muslim migrants reveals not only the agentic process of assembling citizenship elements, but also the hidden inequalities contained in the concept of European citizenship in a pan-European space where free movement is linked to labour migration and demands participation in the accumulation of capital. In this context those who fall outside the category of regular workers - workers who shift between statuses of regularity and irregularity, and women and ageing relatives, who are engaged in reproductive labour sustaining the migrant family - are trapped in precarious positions and lose citizenship rights both at home and in migration. Although the EU space allows an overall economic improvement of migrant families’ wellbeing, the empowering potential of the process of assembling citizenship fragments is only enacted by the limited group of male regular workers, while new insecurities and dependencies emerge for the rest of the migrants in a highly gendered and age-dependent way. This dissertation has sought to tease out this particular heterogeneity and unevenness of intra-EU migration by focusing on the micro-dynamics inherent in the processes of citizenship disaggregation.
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Introduction

Setting the Scene

Every August a group of Bulgarian Muslim migrants come back to their home village in the Rhodopi Mountain in the South of Bulgaria in what has become a ritual of return and performance of success and wealth. They arrive with their new, expensive cars with Spanish registration numbers, and park them along their unusually large, colourful, Spanish-style houses. At the end of the month, they go back to a small town in Spain, where they work in construction (men) and domestic aid (women). Two thirds of the 2500 inhabitants of the village of Brushlyan, have been living and working in Spain over the last ten years. The larger part of them is clustered in the small town of Tafalla, Navarra, where they attempt to reproduce social relations of the village community. A constant flow of people and goods connect the two localities. Building techniques and materials are imported from Spain for migrants’ new houses. On the way back food, blankets and carpets are transported to Spain, along with grandparents who care of migrant children. Weddings take place in Bulgaria, while wedding videos allow to extend the wedding ritual in Spain. While migration has become the main source of income like in many other Bulgarian Muslim villages in the region, migrants say they “belong” to the village and envisage their future there. Migrants’ lives are spread between two places. What they lack in one place, they make up for in the other. Work, financial wellbeing, and social security are what they seek to get in Spain. Community and ritual are what they find in Bulgaria, through their connections to the village.
Stitching together the different parts of their lives only makes sense when both localities and both contexts are thought of as part of one transnational space.

The subject of this study is Bulgarian Muslims’ migration to Spain in the early period of Bulgaria’s accession into the European Union (2007/2008). In this period their migration is already both transnational and intra-EU. This means they are simultaneously embedded in the two political, institutional and cultural contexts of Bulgaria and Spain, and at the same in the common institutional and legal space of the European Union. As Bulgarian Muslims in Bulgaria they have been exposed to different types and levels of exclusion – cultural discrimination and limited rights of self-identification until 1989, economic and social rights discrimination in the present, a certain level of political disenfranchisement, and media, political and everyday marginalization from the majority and the state expressed in emblematic acts of violence and anti-Muslim public discourses. As Bulgarian migrants to Spain, they have been excluded in different ways by virtue of being partial members, denizens, irregular workers, while at the same time they have enjoyed access to social and economic rights that they have lacked in practice in Bulgaria. While they do not have full citizenship rights in Spain, they do hold EU citizenship, which opens for them economic and institutional opportunities that third-country nationals do not have access to.

The practical aspect of EU citizenship which grants certain rights by virtue of the new status is combined with the symbolic value of the new status of EU citizens and the symbolic transformation of the space of belonging which now encompasses both the place of origin and the place of settlement. Becoming EU citizens Bulgarian Muslims migrants move from a position of exteriority (that of the third-country nationals) to position of being internal to the European Union space. I show how this change of status is conceived, enacted and negotiated and what are the implications for the claims that Bulgarian Muslims start having both towards the state where they hold a migrant
status and the state where they hold a citizen status. The transformation of the symbolic belonging to the common European space, however, is only relevant for Bulgarian Muslims in their capacity as Bulgarian citizens, but masks their cultural and religious difference of Muslims. Thus being a Muslim remains an uneasy question in terms of belonging to the political body of Europe and in terms of everyday encounters of discrimination. While the civil aspect of being an EU citizen is emphasized and mobilized through various claims and change of practices, the religious and cultural difference of being a Muslim is voluntarily suppressed in migration and encapsulated in the private sphere.

Beyond the usual aspects of a transnational life, stretching over two localities/two states, entangled in various institutions and actors spanning over a transnational social field, and holding different status positions in the two social milieus, Bulgarian Muslims are trapped in a semi-insider/semi-outsider position both in Bulgaria and in Spain. In Bulgaria they have developed a long ambivalent relationship with the Bulgarian nation state, which is transformed in yet another ambiguous position in their place of settlement, where they are simultaneously labour migrants, Muslims and citizens of the European Union. With this dissertation I explore the interactions and crossing points between official state-proposed, imposed, and institutionalized categorizations and the everyday enactments, appropriations, re-interpretations and circumventions of such categorizations by Bulgarian Muslims in migration context. I seek to understand their experience on the margins of two states, and within the supra-state framework of the European Union.

Using the case of Bulgarian Muslim migrants in Spain I interrogate the spaces of empowerment and disempowerment created by migration and describe the disharmonies, contradictions and misfits which occur in the transnational existence of a marginalized social group. I approach this issue through examining the ambivalent position of Bulgarian Muslim migrants vis-à-vis the
Bulgarian and the Spanish state, analytically approaching the state simultaneously as a system which produces regulatory regimes that affect people’s lives through various statuses and institutions, and as an idea that citizens engage with, imagine and re-invent. By doing this, I seek to understand how Bulgarian Muslim migrants experience and negotiate their position on the margins of two states and consequently what are the spaces of empowerment and disempowerment that migration opens for them.

**The Brushlyani migrants**

Most Bulgarian Muslims live in the Rhodope Mountains, near the border with Greece. Their number is estimated at roughly 200,000, which is approximately 3 per cent of the Bulgarian population (Konstantinov 1997). Their group identity has been highly contested, fitting neither in the nation-state project, nor into a legal minority category. Most broadly they can be defined as Bulgarian-speaking Muslims. But there is a spectrum of different local and international group names that circulate internally and externally – Bulgarian Mohamedans, Pomaks, Ahryans, Bulgarian Muslims, just Muslims. Over the last century the Bulgarian state has repeatedly approached Bulgarian Muslims as a problem for the nation-state project and has devised various assimilation campaigns. Thus their group identity did not get channelled into a fixed affirmative category, but is instead depending on external definitions by the other ethnic groups based on double negations: Bulgarians, but not Christians; Muslims, but not Turks. This has resulted in a complex ethnic identity which is shifting and relational (Karagiannis 1997). Based on my fieldwork I have chosen to call them Bulgarian Muslims, the rationale for which is explained in details in the historical Chapter 3.
In the period after 1989 official state repressions against the ethnic and cultural identity of Bulgarian Muslims were terminated. Nevertheless, Bulgarian Muslims do not have the status of an official minority group in Bulgaria (like Bulgarian Turks) and are defined both by lack of affirmative state categorizations and by the definitions of the two other major ethnic groups (Bulgarians and Turks) through double negation of being “ethnically” Bulgarian, but not Christians, and of being Muslims, but not Turks. This turns the Bulgarian Muslims in a social group defined by its existence on the margins of other groups. For that reason they have always been almost part of the Bulgarian nation, without having the option of another kin nation, thus having been left on the margins, never completely inside, nor outside. This has resulted in a complexly constructed social identity generated as an interplay between self-identifications and social and state categorizations (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Jenkins 1996), which is relational, often situationally dependent and creates great divergences in terms of self-identifications and self-representations among the Bulgarian Muslims in different settings. The non-affirmative categorizations are accompanied by the long history of state-imposed assimilation politics over the last century, which tossed them between perceptions as the “self” of the nation, which needs to be assimilated back (and christianized/bulgarianized), and the “other” of the nation which has to be excluded and differentiated (tukisized) (Brunnbauer 2001). All these developments have turned the Bulgarian Muslims into a social group defined by its existence on the margins of other groups through their “ethnic marginality” with no internal coherence or a clearly expressed sense of belonging together. In this sense, their groupness (Brubaker 2004) is historically contingent and politically contestable.

The change, however, was accompanied with post-socialist neoliberal economic and structural transformations which affected the region of the Rhodope Mountain gravely. Most factories and
mines were closed down, agricultural cooperatives fell apart, leaving land uncultivated, and unemployment grew exponentially. Economic liberalization and ‘uneven development’ (Harvey 1996) have led to the withdrawal of state support from certain regions, which affected the rural mountain region of the Rhodopi Mountain particularly seriously. The impoverishment and underdevelopment of the Rhodopi mountain region, caused by the post-socialist neoliberal economic transformations, further contributed not only to the Bulgarian Muslims social marginalization, but also to their economically disadvantaged position and decreased the opportunity structures (Tomova 2000). Economic marginalization is further complemented by the lack of political representation and hence decreased political participation and group claim-making both during state socialism and after its demise in 1989, even though this has been the period of intensified identity politics. The economic and political marginal experience has a spatial expression as well, with many of the Bulgarian Muslims being concentrated near the border with Greece in a rural mountain region, which does not invite for strong agricultural or industrial development.

Negative public discourses, wide spread anti-Muslim and racist attitudes, especially the post 9/11 anti-terrorism global discourse, and occasional overt discrimination in combination with the low-skilled labour that Bulgarian Muslim rural population provides are the main factors that condition the low volume of internal migration. While there was some internal migration to the nearby ski resort of Bansko during the construction boom before 2008, perceived discrimination and internal discourses on the desertedness by the state have urged Bulgarian Muslims to undertake mass international migration mostly towards Greece, Italy and Spain. In this sense, mass transnational migration is not only an attempt to overcome economic hardship, but it is also a strategy to escape
from social marginalization and disenfranchisement. In this sense migration of Bulgarian Muslims is both class and ethnicity triggered.

Spain offers Bulgarian Muslims the chance to reposition themselves as European citizens, thus avoiding structural and identity-based discrimination. This is expressed in the concrete practice of multiple naming which allows them to reinvent themselves not through their belonging of an ethnic and religious minority but through their status of Bulgarian, hence EU, citizens (Chapter 2). In addition, Spain offers migrants the opportunity for realising substantive economic and social rights by virtue of having a regularized employment and thus becoming part of the welfare system. At the same time it privileges only regular workers, expelling the rest of the migrants (irregularly working, or not working) from access to such rights, and thus drawing lines of distinction of who can enact rights and who cannot. But even those who enjoy better economic conditions and wider social rights, lack full political rights and in this way cannot fully become part of the political process in Spain. Thus, in migrancy Bulgarian Muslims are yet again in a marginal and ambivalent position. They are conceived as the stranger in Simmel’s definition, “who comes today and stays tomorrow” (1950:402) which positions them simultaneously as different compared to the insiders and as immanent elements of the social space, thus making them significant for its construction (Isin 2002:30).

Their ambivalent position is also related to their Muslimness. With Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007 roughly 1 million Muslims (Turks, Bulgarian Muslims, and Roma) became European Muslims by virtue of being Bulgarian citizens. On paper, they moved into a status of Muslims of Europe, rather than simply in Europe. Nevertheless, the European Union has not tackled the presence of these ‘autochthonous’ Muslims in any inclusive way, choosing instead to bracket and ignore this. Their presence on the internal side of the Union should have opened the floor for
debating the basis and core of the European identity professed by the EU, but is it has not. Muslims continue to be considered as external to the European space, regardless of whether they are second or third generation immigrants or ‘local’ EU citizens. Thus, the Muslimness of the Bulgarian Muslims is not recognized as a European quality, but instead emphasizes their difference. It continues to place them in a problematic position vis-à-vis other groups. Being EU citizens, immigrants and Muslims at the same time, differentiates Bulgarian Muslims from other categories of population in Spain in different ways: from other Bulgarian immigrants (for being Muslim), from Latin American immigrants (for being EU citizens and Muslim), from North African immigrants (for being European Muslims), and from all local Spanish population (for being both immigrants and Muslim). However, all these differentiations are potential and can be enacted, utilized or downplayed in different degrees, in different institutional context and vis-à-vis different actors. The extent to which Bulgarian Muslims enact those different aspects of their potential social identity is one aspect that is explored empirically in this dissertation.

Bulgarian Muslims started migrating to Spain on a massive scale after 2001 when Schengen visa restrictions were lifted for Bulgarian citizens. Spain and Greece have since been the most popular destinations. EU accession in 2007 relaxed mobility rules even more and intensified shorter-term non-labour migration. Typically, Bulgarian Muslims migrate to Spain in village clusters, connecting localities through network-based chain migration. Most people from the Western Rhodope village of Brushlyan settled in the small town of Tafalla, arriving in several waves and mobilizing their social networks. Thus, most migrants relied on close kin members (father, brother, or cousin) for settling in Spain, including providing initial accommodation, small loans, finding employment, and other practical and administrative advice. The bigger the migrant community in Tafalla grew, the more this encapsulation within the kin extended to other spheres of social support.
and interaction. Networks of social support were reproduced, as were patterns of going out, paying visits, and holiday celebrations. But while social relations may seem the same in Tafalla, as in Brushlyan, the generational dynamic is not reproduced. The majority of migrants are still young families, with elderly people starting to migrate only recently, which triggered reformulations of social relations and social control.

At first most men worked irregularly in the sphere of construction and trespassed the officially allowed three months of visa-less sojourn. Gradually, through several regularization campaigns and later on relaxed EU regulations for migrant labour, most of the men managed to get employed regularly. By 2008 the majority of them already had work permits and were employed under different types of temporary contracts which involved tax and social benefits contributions, but also allowed them access to social rights. While male migrants’ jobs were precarious and insecure, most men rarely remained without a job, and economic mobility was rather fast. With the support of an extensive kinship and village network, by 2008 every new migrant was first accommodated and oriented in the administrative procedures. Employment was usually found through migrants networks and most men went through a progression of temporary jobs to find a more secure and regular jobs. Within six months to a year the average male migrant got a stable job and enough money to rent a flat and invite his family to join him.

Migration gives male migrants access to economic and social citizenship that they lack at home. In Bulgaria men work as irregular workers – without contracts, without any social security, and without any workers’ rights guaranteed. This hampers both their economic and their social citizenship in practice, even though formally they have rights to it. In Spain they make up for these absences. Their employment is a mixture of flexible moves between different positions of regularity and irregularity (from a non-contract, through different types of temporary contracts,
through unemployment, and into self-employment or longer-term contracts). Moving between different employment positions also defines the way of relating to the state through taxes and social security contributions. Working regularly with a contract turns migrants into tax payers, which connects them with the Spanish state in a way they have never been connected with the Bulgarian state (Chapter 4). Through work male migrants enter into a contract not just with their employers as workers, but with the state as citizens. Taxes and social contributions in turn allow access to social benefits and are the basis for developing social citizenship which they lack in Bulgaria. How migrants enact and interpret their social rights is the topic of Chapter 5.

However, migration as a strategy for achieving economic and social citizenship does not affect all Bulgarian Muslim migrants in the same way. Women and elderly people are highly dependent on male migrants, both in terms of economic and social terms, and enter in an essentially different relations with the Spanish (and with the Bulgarian) state. Young women migrate to Spain in their capacity as mothers and wives joining their husbands. The majority of them have precarious part-time employment mostly in domestic service and in catering. Not only are these jobs more poorly paid, but they are also irregular, with no contracts or social benefits. In this sense, migration turned around the social citizenship positions of men and women. While men’s main employment in Brushlyan is stone-tiling, which is seasonal, non-contractual and with no social benefits, women largely work in the village sewing workshops with permanent contracts. The decision to migrate deprives women of their secure, albeit poorly paid, employment by emphasizing their role in reproducing the family. Moreover, while women do not work full time, their working hours and shifts often extend beyond nursery and school opening hours, which makes it impossible to actually work and have young children without any additional help. Thus, the intergenerational imbalance causes various informal difficulties, especially with regard to care.
Therefore, young migrants started inviting their parents, the young-old, to Spain for limited periods of time in order to help with child-rearing and household activities. This second wave of migration of ageing carers aimed at restoring the kin support network, which allows the reproduction of the family in migrancy. The ageing care takers migrate for shorter periods and without a plan to settle and depend exclusively on their children for financial, but also social security support. In the meantime, their livelihood in Bulgaria is changing dramatically – elderly women often quit their jobs to be able to travel, and then eventually do not manage to fulfil the lengths of service required for pension. They step out of the healthcare system and of all types of other social services. They also quit all side activities like tobacco cultivation and cows herding, which takes away the additional income and security they used to have. This means both their economic situation and their social security is disrupted by migration. Thus, they become dependent on their children not only for the present, but also for their future security. In addition, family relations undergo transformations in Spain, causing new relations of reciprocity and kin dependency. Care-triggered migration then has very different outcomes for the ageing carers as compared to the younger migrants.

**Assembling the fragments**

I approach the relationship with the state through the lens of citizenship from two perspectives: 1. as categorization and regulations that states, the EU and global market regimes impose on Bulgarian Muslims both as citizens in Bulgaria and as immigrants in Spain, and 2. as the everyday practices and interactions with the state/s and the conceptualizations of the state by Bulgarian Muslim migrants. The relationship with the state is the interface, created through the intersection of categorisations/regulations, practices/interactions and imaginings/discourses. In this sense I insist on exploring the state simultaneously from above as a mechanism and system for imposing
certain regulations on people’s lives and actions, and from below as the experiences and practices of citizens in their interactions with and interpretations of the state. For that reason, I have combined analysis of institutional regulations and global transformations of the nation-state and citizenship with ethnographic analysis of everyday practices and conceptualizations.

This study is placed in the context of nation-state transformations and the process of citizenship fragmentation, which implies a changed way in which citizens relate to the state. Approaching these processes through the experience of migrants who interact with and act within more than one state, allows me to trace the acts of circumvention, the claim-making acts of partial membership, and the comparative interpretations that migrants develop by living their lives incorporated in two polities. Migrants are simultaneously positioned as full citizens and as partial members in different polities. This opens up the opportunity for simultaneous incorporation in more than one place and at the same time triggers critical engagements with the different states – both at the level of conceptualizations and at the level of practices. Grounding this in the context of the European Union introduces an additional level of governance, but also a symbolic context of identifying and claim making.

My argument is that Bulgarian Muslim migrants have developed a relationship of detachment and circumvention of the Bulgarian state which has been conditioned by a long history of ambivalent relations with the state, as well as by the current economic and social conditions (chapter 3). As migrants, however, they have attached themselves to the Spanish state and claim rights and participation that they do not claim at home through regular employment, taxation, and social security. Thus a disenfranchised, disempowered group like the Bulgarian Muslims finds self-empowerment through migration and through making claims in a new institutional and political context. Through migration then, Bulgarian Muslims re-position themselves as citizens in a new
context in which they can only have a partial position. This, however, has implications for changing concepts of the ‘good state’ and the ‘good citizen’ that are formulated along the way. Since these notions are crafted from a position of partiality, they take the idea of rights as entitlements only by virtue of initial contribution. Thus, it is the worker who pays taxes and social contributions and only then has the rights of the other citizens to social services, and security. This model is based on a contractual and marketized understanding of citizenship which excludes part of the migrants, like women and the ageing, and thus disrupts their claim to various citizenship rights.

The lives of the Brushlyani migrants evolve within a process of citizenship fragmentation which implies disarticulation of different citizenship elements and allows enactment of certain citizenship rights without formal status and vice versa, deprives formal citizens from practical rights. In this context, migration can be read as an attempt to find the missing citizenship elements in a different polity and context. Thus, male migrants lack social citizenship in the sense of access to social benefits at home even though as citizens they are entitled to such rights. This is partly because they have never worked regularly and thus have never paid taxes or become part of the social security system by social contributions based on employment contract. In this aspect then they have been disconnected from the Bulgarian state. Becoming regularized in Spain means that they get inserted in a new type of relations with the Spanish state through contracts, taxes and social benefits. As migrants in Spain they are more closely related to the Spanish state, than as citizens in Bulgaria. At the same time, in Spain migrants have limited political rights, not being allowed to vote or run for office on national elections. Thus, they cannot participate in the process of governing, but they also do not establish horizontal ties with other citizens in the political body. What is more, their relation to the Spanish state through their position of workers, i.e. through taxes and social benefits, remains curiously interpreted as strictly vertical and reciprocal, and used in a quid-pro-quo way,
rather than viewed as participation in a wider community of citizens. Adding to this the social encapsulation within the migrant village community, prompts the argument that migrants’ citizenship in Spain is actualized along vertical ties with the state through employment. Horizontal ties are sustained in Bulgaria, where migrants sustain their membership in the village community through rituals like weddings, but also through keeping in touch with local political fights, business affairs, and, ultimately, gossip. In this way, I argue, migrants manage to assemble the different elements of their citizenship through their spread lives between two localities and within two polities.

Along the way, male migrants develop a discourse of the good state as a caring state on the basis of contract and direct reciprocity based on regularized employment. Their discourse is framed within a logic of contractualization and marketization of citizenship, which conceives citizens as discreet individuals who contribute to the labour market their skills and labour, and can claim social rights and social participation only based on their contribution. The EU free labour mobility regulations reinforces this understanding of citizenship by promoting inclusion in local welfare systems through work, while leaving non-working migrants outside the sphere of social security, ultimately hampering their social citizenship rights. This conceptualization of citizenship as contained in the labour migrant only and as rooted in marketized and contractualized relations between the state and the individual is further taken by migrants at the level of conceptualizations and understanding of what does it mean to be a good citizen. This neatly fits into an understanding of the neoliberal subject as self-managing and self-entrepreneurial.

But this conceptualization excludes irregular workers and all the other actors in the migration project who make possible the reproduction of the family. Thus, both the state regulation and the policy development of the EU, and the male migrants’ conceptualizations exclude the rest of the
migrants and create new dependencies and inequalities within the migration community of Brushlyani villagers. Assembling the different fragments of citizenship, I suggest, is an uneven process in which different agents play different roles, but also experience it in different ways. While working men benefit from this process by acquiring all different fragments of citizenship, women and ageing people on the contrary, by following the male migrants and enabling the reproduction of the family life, position themselves outside various spheres of rights. Nevertheless, even if based on the experience of the male migrants, the process of assembling creates one overarching discourses of what is a good state and good citizenship which is relevant for the whole community.

**Spain as an immigration country**

Spain is a main actor in the European debate on immigration because of its liberal policies and because of having the role of the Europe’s South “gate keeper” or “fortress”. The country has witnessed significant changes in its migration tendencies in the last two decades, transforming from a country of emigration into a country of immigration in the mid 1980’s, attracting labour migrants mainly from South America and North Africa. According to King and Rybaczuk (1993) among the main factors for this change are the complex processes of post 1970’s economic restructuring and the impact these processes have had on the international division of labour, which lead to the emergence of new forms of labour market organization in southern Europe, in particular the segmentation of labour demand and the consequent need for cheap, flexible immigrant labour. Since the early 1990’s the number of immigrants has increased in an unexpected and unplanned way in the context of rapid economic growth, which resulted in a construction boom and in opening of a great number of low-skilled jobs both in the formal and in the informal economy. The number
of aliens rose from 277,000 in 1990 to 5,220,000 in 2008, predominantly due to labour migration (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010).

The economic growth since the mid 1990s lasting until the financial crisis in 2008 created many new jobs for the domestic population and allowed absorption of the foreign labour force both into the formal and the informal economy. In this period eight million new jobs were created thus raising the number of people in employing to 20 million (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010). Like in many other place, the jobs that immigrants took were jobs that the Spanish workers were reluctant to take. These were the unskilled or low-skilled jobs which involved precariousness and hard conditions like long working hours, low wages, hard physical conditions, and often insecure informal agreements or unfavourable contracts. By sector male migrants worked predominantly in construction and agriculture, while women worked in services like domestic and care work, catering and hotels (Calavita 2005).

In the late 1980’s Spain’s position as a receiver of immigrants was reinforced because of the closing of borders of other EU countries and Spain’s admission into the European community, the economic and historical connections between Spain, Northern Africa and South America, and the growing underground economy that increasingly relied on immigrant labour (Levinson 2005). At the same time the relaxation of the travel and visa-regimes for Eastern European countries on their track to EU accession brought an additional wave of labour migrants, who worked mostly irregularly. In addition, there were also a number of bilateral agreements with these countries mostly for importing seasonal agricultural workers on the basis of quotas (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010). Bulgarians in Spain make up the largest diaspora with about 150,878 registered migrants in
2011, which makes them the tenth largest emigrant community in Spain and the second largest among Eastern European communities.¹

While early legislation such as the first law on immigration in 1985 (Ley de Extranjería) looked at migration as a temporary phenomenon, successive immigration laws have recognized immigration as an ongoing issue and have sought to encourage the integration of foreigners into Spanish society. The frequent changes in Spain’s immigration law are due mainly to the tendency to link legislation to current immigration flows (Zapata-Barrero 2003). Nevertheless, it is difficult to find debates on immigration in Spain that view immigration - especially from non-EU countries - as a positive phenomenon, with the exception of employers in sectors that rely on immigrant labour. Public opinion polls on immigration show that immigration is the most important concern for Spanish citizens, more than half of the Spanish population consider that there are too many immigrants, and that the majority support restrictive policies towards immigrants (Zapata-Barrero 2009). Thus, there is a clear link between a lack of governance and the attitudes of Spanish citizens towards immigrants (Zapata Barrero 2007). In addition, a simultaneous securitization of migration throughout the Western striates and the accompanying anti-terrorist, anti-Muslim political discourse further influenced negatively public attitudes towards immigrants.

Before the financial crisis of 2008 Spain, as compared to other EU countries, had a liberal regime of accepting migrants, but the largest part of non-EU migration to Spain has remained irregular. This has been a result of a lack of comprehensive migration management policies, multiple post-factum special amnesty campaigns for irregular workers already on the territory of Spain, and

compliance with the requirements of the free market for cheap labour. While irregularity puts migrants in the trap of informal labour, exploitation and hampered negotiating rights, Spain has been offering a relatively safe ground for irregular migrants in comparison to other EU countries. The irregularity of migrants in Spain has been of a special type. An amendment to the immigration law from 2000 recognized political and social rights for illegal immigrants. Irregular migrants without residency or work permits have enjoyed partial social rights (like access to basic healthcare and free education for children), and high prospects for obtaining a legal status and regular access to the labour market through one of the recurring regularization campaigns. The institutional tolerance towards irregular migrants until 2008 has been further explained with the “dominant political culture of permissiveness towards illegality” and “a relatively positive social attitude towards immigrants” (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2009:140, Encarcarion 2004).

The main venue for regularization of irregular migrants in Spain since the mid 1980s were the regularization (or amnesty) campaigns, including the possibility of receiving a long-term resident permit after two years of working in the country. Since 1985 there were seven regularization waves in Spain, the last one in 2005 (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010). According to the Spanish government, each has been an attempt to simultaneously control the informal economy (which accounts for an estimated 20 percent of the country’s GDP), to gather information on and to reduce the numbers of unauthorized immigrants in the country, and to correct for shortcomings of previous regularisation programmes (Levinson 2005). Regularization campaigns substituted a consistent labour migration policy which would assess the needs of the labour market and provide systematic tracks for entering the labour market as a migrant, thus creating pockets of large numbers of irregular migrants living and working in highly precarious conditions. At the same time the existence of regularization campaigns in this period was also assessed as providing a trigger for
irregular migrants and the motivation to ‘patiently’ remain in irregularity until the next campaign (Markova 2006, Markova and Sarris 2001).

A distinct feature of Spain, as compared to countries like France, the Netherlands, Italy or Greece, is the lack of a right-wing anti-immigrant party to channel citizens’ increasing anxiety about immigration (Encarnacion 2004). Moreover, existing political institutions in Spain (especially those on the Right) have not adopted the harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies found in other European countries. Among the main reasons for this are the specific immigration patterns and the fact that immigrants have not yet been perceived as a threat for the labour market; the public culture – after Franco era of democratization, modernization, multiculturalism, and the far Right being discredited and weak; as well as the state decentralization and the pluralisation of regional parties, identities and symbols (Encarnacion 2004).

Spain, thus, has become a popular destination for Bulgarian Muslim labour migrants not just through chain-migration based on networks. Additional explanations can be traced in the relatively liberal immigration regime, in the large informal labour market niches open for low-skilled irregular migrants, the social policies favouring both regular and irregular migrants, the possibility of regularization through the recurring regularization campaigns, and the lack of anti-immigrant right-wing party to foster stronger xenophobic discourses and more restrictive policies.

**Studies of Bulgarian migrations**

Studies of Bulgarian outmigration have started proliferating since the early 1990s with the first more massive migration waves after the demise of state socialism in 1989. Due to the liberalized border visa regimes, political instability, economic transformations leading to high unemployment
and inflation the number of Bulgarian emigrants by 2007 reached according to different sources between 600,000 and one million or up to 12 percent of the population\textsuperscript{2}. While there is no consensus on the periodization of the different migration waves, scholars have roughly divided it in 4 periods, which reflect policy changes in the migration regimes of destinations countries vis-à-vis Bulgarian citizens, rather than just the political and economic conditions in the country: 1. 1989 and the early 1990s – early political emigration, 2. mid 1990s until 2001 – economic crisis triggered migration in the context of tight control and visa regimes of Western European countries, 3. 2001 – 2007 – pre-EU accession period and restriction regimes liberalization; 4. post-2007 EU membership. (Jileva 2002, Mancheva 2011, Markova 2010)

The first period, which started in 1989 and stretched into the early 1990s, witnessed high migration rates for political reasons and the first massive attempts for labour triggered emmigration. It started with the exodus of Bulgarian Turks who were expelled by the Bulgarian state with nearly 300,000 ethnic Turks forcibly migrating to Turkey. In the first years of the 1990s members of the majority and other ethnic groups also migrated applying for political asylum but their destination was Western Europe and North America (Soulbanova 2006). The massive outflow in these first years prompted the interest of sociologist in trying to establish migration trends through large scale quantitative surveys measuring potential migration rather than existing flows. This resulted in predominantly quantitative studies attempting to measure migration through surveys of attitudes and motivations, constructing a demographic and economic profile of the potential migrants and identifying countries of preference\textsuperscript{3} (Kalchev 2001, 2002, Minchev et al. 2004, Galev and

\textsuperscript{2} The numbers vary according to sources and methodologies of estimation. The World Bank (2008) gives the highest estimates of 1 million, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides values between 600,000 and 800,000 (MFA 2007:9), and the National Statistical Institute which bases the values on change of permanent address registration estimates it at about 600,000 (NSI 2011).

\textsuperscript{3} Studies like Migration Potential of Bulgaria and National Migration Potential Surveys were conducted annually in the first years of the 1990s, also in 2001 and 2003, quoted in Kalchev 2001)
Tchalakov 2006). However, as Mila Mancheva (2011) has noted, this prognostic research has little relevance for analysis of actual migration trends and for the social and economic impact of migration. This type of quantitative studies of attitudes has continued in the recent years by also including groups of migrants, often circular, thus attempting to map some existing trends of actual migration (Pamporov 2012).

The massive migration of Bulgarian Turks into Turkey in 1989, dubbed as the ‘Big excursion’, was an outcome of the state organized violent assimilation campaigns against Muslims in Bulgaria taking place since the 1960s, with a peak against the Turkish minority in 1984. While some of these migrants to Turkey returned after 1990, this first wave created large communities of Bulgarian Turks in Turkey who established transnational connections which have developed over time and triggered subsequent smaller scale migration to Turkey. The migration of the Bulgarian Turks into Turkey has become a research interest for a number of migration scholars. They have focused on the volume and changing patterns (Georgieva 1998), on processes of integration and adaptation (Dimitrova 1998, Elchinova 2005, 2012, Zhelyazkova 1998), and on questions of identity negotiations, dual allegiances and belonging (Parla 2007, 2009; Maeva 2004, 2007b). Ayse Parla discusses the role of the Turkish nationalistic discourse for placing Bulgarian Turks at the margins of the ‘Turkish national body’ national body (Parla 2006, 2007), while Mila Maeva demonstrates the effects on a flexible, multiple and situated self-presentation (Maeva 2006). Scholars continue to study the transborder movements of the second generation Bulgarian Turks between Turkey and Bulgaria and the way they make sense of their economic, symbolic and cultural capital in these movements (Zlatkova and Penkova 2012).

The second period encompasses the mid-1990s to 2001 with a peak in 1996-1997 when Bulgaria experienced a heavy economic crisis that prompted an increased economic outmigration.
Characteristic for this period is the irregular and often temporary and seasonal labour migration to Western European states like Germany and the Netherlands, as well as the transformation of Southern European states like Spain, Italy and Greece into popular labour migration destinations. The strict visa regulations and mobility regimes are identified as the main reason for the temporary character of migration in this period (Guentcheva et al. 2003). Another migration pattern identified by researchers is the more long-term migration to the US, mostly through the green-card system, through student visas and high skilled work visas (Karamihova 2003, 2004, Stoilkova 2003).

The third period started with the placement of Bulgaria on the so called Schengen white list in 2001 when it became a pre-accession country, which resulted in a liberalized mobility regime within the EU. Visa regimes relaxation and EU accession intensified migration waves significantly. Analysing visa and labour migration policies of the European Union Elena Jileva concludes that Bulgaria was subjected to uneven mobility policies explaining that the EU has treated Central and Eastern European countries as members in regard to obligations and as third-country nationals in regard to labour migration mobility and benefits in the pre-accession periods (Jileva 2002, 2003, 2004). Another research thread is the economic analysis of access to and incorporation in the labour market and the role of remittances. Using quantitative micro-surveys Evgenia Markova has been studying micro-level factors like length of stay, status, and family structure to determine of remittance practices migrants in Spain (Markova and Reilly 2007; Markova, 2004, 2010). Markova has studied the effect of regularization campaigns on Bulgarian irregular migrants in Greece and their labour market ‘accommodation’ and their economic situation (Markova and Sarris, 1997, 2001, Markova, 2001, 2004), as well as the experience of Bulgarian migrants on the UK labour market (Markova and Black 2008).
The larger part of migration research in this period, however, is ethnographic with a focus on concrete migrant communities. The main questions addressed are the cultural practices of adaptation, migrant networks and family relations, and dynamics of identity negotiation in migration especially among ethnic minorities (Lazarov 2006, Mancheva 2008, Slavkova 2008, Tsaneva 2005). Besides the interest in identification strategies a few anthropologists have paid attention to aspects like the effect on children who are left behind (Guentcheva 2010), the role of networks and the reconstruction of the family model of the first generation of migrants in the US (Karamihova 2003, 2004), the feminization of migration, focusing on care work and domestic services in Greece (Angelidolu 2010, Grigorov 2003), the predominantly male labour migration to Spain and Portugal (Troeva and Grigorov 2003), and the strategies for representation and political participation of Bulgarian migrants through cultural associations which also points to the ethnic and spatial segregation of Bulgarian migrants in Spain (Ibanez-Angulo 2012). What is missing from this range of studies on this period are the cases of family-based temporary seasonal agricultural migration from the Southern Bulgarian mountain regions to the North of Greece, and the case of middle-aged migrant women working in domestic services and care work in Spain.

The fourth period starts with Bulgaria’s accession into the European Union in 2007. While some of the studies above encompass both the earlier period and the period after 2007, few make an analytical point of the changes that might have affected migrants with the change in status. My study is rooted in the context of this prior research, but attempts to go beyond it and think of Bulgarian migration within the EU from the perspective of citizenship. What is more, it aims to go beyond discussions of cultural practices of ethnically specific minorities and refers to wider questions of class and labour relations with the state which do not negate but extend and complement questions of ethnicity. Citizenship and relation with the state have only been
marginally approached on a macro level through the analysis of policy regimes (Jileva 2002, 2003), and through an economic perspective of the role of regularization (Markova 2004, Markova and Sarris 2001). However, the role of the changing position of Bulgaria and the way migrants negotiate their own positions as citizens out of Bulgaria has remained unexamined.

While the body of research of Bulgarian outmigration has been growing the picture is still scattered. There is no reliable quantitative data due to methodological difficulties with measuring flows and categorizing migrants into short-term and permanent. Many of the studies have been done in Bulgaria, researching the effects of out migration or drawing conclusions based on stories of migrants’ lives rather than on research of migrants’ everyday lives. The few exceptions of research conducted in Spain, Greece, Germany, and the US focus on identity questions and cultural practices, and on the role of networks for sustaining migrants communities. Overall, ethnographic studies of Bulgarian migration remain mapping initial migration movements and destination and focus on the immediate experience of migrants without relating it to wider economic and social developments and structural conditions. My research seeks to build on these studies by widening the scope of questions and connecting policy and state regulations with the everyday practices of migrants. Studying citizenship and relations with the state in the context of migration from an ethnographic perspective provides the lens for putting together these different levels in the same framework of analysis. While I do this by looking at a particular village community of Bulgarian Muslim migrants in Spain, I aim to relate their experience to the institutional, political and economic frameworks that they are embedded in.
Methodology

The ethnographic material for this study is based on a year long multi-sited fieldwork in 2007-2008 and subsequent shorter visits between 2008 and 2010. I have approached a translocal vibrant and constantly changing migrant community through a translocal method, sharing my time over the course of twelve months between Brushlyan, a village in the Western Rodopi mountain in Bulgaria and the small town of Tafalla in the northern Spanish province of Navarra. I have returned both to Spain and to Bulgaria for shorter periods of time several times since then. My main focus is the micro level of migration and citizenship regimes. I looked at the daily manifestations of claim making acts and practices, of interactions with the state, of circumventing or being trapped in regulations and state categorizations. I also explored the way people talked and made sense of their acts through the concepts of state and citizenship the way they understand and employ them. In this sense, my research is mostly a study of ‘transnationalism from below’ (Baldassar 2007). As Wilding (2007) suggests, the ethnographic focus is particularly insightful for documenting the many ways in which migration transforms the everyday life of people. Combining research of discourses and practices my methods included life stories, extended semi-structured interviews, and informal conversations during multiple visits, walks, and chats in public spaces. In addition, I have participated in social and family events and feasts, but also in everyday activities like accompanying women to pick up grandchildren from school, doing weekly shopping with them, having Sunday morning coffee with at the central square, or being in the park with the children and their attendants. Thus, through participant observation I had the opportunity to witness both exceptional moments of tension or crisis, and practices which are mundane and routine.
I have been going to the region of the Western Rhodopi Mountain for research since 2001. I have visited a number of villages of different ethnic and religious composition and have conducted migration related research in three of them, before arriving to Brushlyan in 2006. I first went there on the recommendation of the deputy-mayor of the nearby municipality centre who told me: “The whole village moved to one place in Spain. People say that on the city sign of Tafalla someone has written Brushlyan with smaller letters. There is not a single house without a migrant in Tafalla. Tafalla has turned into the second Brushlyan.” As it turned out most villages in the region had the same joke and followed the same chain-migration pattern of sending a compact community to one particular village or town abroad – typically to Spain or to Portugal. This pattern of connecting localities through migration proved to be easily approachable through multi-sited ethnographic research.

In both localities I lived with a family – in Spain with a young migrant couple with two small children, in Bulgaria with an elderly couple whose three grown up children were in Spain. The two families were from different kin, which allowed me to enter the field through two different kin networks (as it turned out, the two most influential ones in the village). Over different periods of time members of the extended family have joined the people I lived with. In Spain, we shared the flat in different periods with the younger brother of the wife and with her father. In Bulgaria the two sons and their families returned home for the summer vacation and we all shared the house. In addition, I have spent time and talked to many other migrants and their relatives both in Bulgaria and in Spain. In this way I have tried to construct a multi-sited ‘extended field site’ (Olwig 2002) by dividing my research in geographic space and following closely two kin networks, comprising of both horizontal and vertical links of cousins, siblings and their spouses, and parents, in-laws, aunts etc.
Yavor was the first migrant I met in Brushlyan a year before my actual fieldwork started. He immediately invited me to stay with his family in Spain. A year later I found myself in Tafalla in Yavor’s flat where he lived with his wife, Rumi, their two young sons, and a younger brother and a cousin of Rumi. When the cousin moved out, Rumi’s father arrived for a month. Next time when I returned, yet another cousin was staying there. Like most established migrants’ flats, Yavor and Rumi’s home was a place for short-term stays of newly arrived co-villagers who needed a settling period before they can find employment and a flat of their own. Sharing a flat with Yavor, the established migrant, and the newly arriving relatives allowed me to glimpse into the mechanisms of settling, finding employment, and further emersion in life of migrancy.

Upon my arrival in Spain Rumi took charge of me. I was now part of the women and I was exploring Tafalla and the migrant community through her eyes. ‘Being a woman’ meant that I will perform everyday activities like shopping, picking up children from school, staying with the other women in the park, and paying many visits to other migrant women for afternoon coffee. Sundays were for morning coffee at the main square, and afternoon family visits (for the women), and cards in the pensioners’ club (for the men). I often accompanied Rumi in her visits to her different relatives. My interaction with men was either on especially scheduled interviews (usually in a café) or during group events – house visits, feasts, rituals. Sometimes, a man with whom I had an interview would take me to the Pensioner’s club, where men played cards on Sundays, or to a café where only men went. Thus, I also had access to male only sites. Overall, I was considered part of the household and the two families I stayed in Bulgaria and in Spain treated me as a ‘foster family’. This included me in all their activities and inserted me in their kinship networks. Therefore my most extensive understanding of different practices and discourses in migrancy and in the village was highly determined by my insertion in these two kinship networks, which was complemented
with interviews and casual meetings with the rest of the people in the migrant and in the village community.\(^4\)

There were three types of interactions with people which provided me with ethnographic material. Formal interviews, informal visits and group discussions, and participation in concrete practices and events. Interviews were structured around the migration trajectory of the person: life before migration, motivation for migration, recourses and mechanisms for initiating the migration process, settling down in Spain, tactics for finding employment and accommodation, work trajectories etc. Over time my network of friends and ‘foster kin’ extended and I would visit their houses informally on a regular basis discussing a wide range of topics and learning the past and present most pressing issues for the community. Moreover, during these visits I often witnessed impromptu situations of crisis which needed immediate solving. The third aspect was taking part in everyday activities and in special events like weddings, celebrations of Bayram etc. Besides assisting my landlady with shopping and picking up the children from school, I accompanied several people in different sites where they interacted with institutions: the hospital, the municipality, the trade union which provided legal advice and integration assistance. I also went to the work place of several women who cleaned houses, to make interviews, but also to discuss and observe work practices. In addition to the mundane activities, I also had the chance to participate in special events and rituals like weddings and ritual ‘wedding videos watching’.

The themes of the state and citizenship often emerged spontaneously. I did not instigate direct questions on opinions of the state and on the meanings of citizenship. I asked people specific

\(^4\) The practice of gaining more intensive knowledge from a limited number of people, in this case two extended families, has been justified in other anthropological writings like Janet Carsten’s ethnography on a Malay village (Carsten 1997)
questions on their understanding of the regulations, on their concrete interactions with institutions and norms, and on their views of limitations and opportunities opened by the different states. However discussions of what does it mean to be a citizens, and comparisons or the Bulgarian and the Spanish state, were prevalent. They often crystallized into concepts of the ideal state and the good citizen. Thus the main theme of this dissertation – the way people make sense of their citizenship and conceptualize the state – has emerged from below. The recent entry into the EU triggered this topic even more intensely. Watching Bulgarian television, especially the news, was a common activity, which provided many comments in relation to the state of the Bulgarian government (e.g. “There is mafia in all states, but only in Bulgaria the mafia is the state”) and subsequent comparisons with Spain. Watching wedding videos together also provided an occasion of wider discussions of migration, the situation in the village, which further spilled into questions of rights and obligation, hence of citizenship and comparisons between the states.

In addition to ethnographic participant observation and in-depth interviews with migrants and villagers, I have also mapped the main policy developments both in Bulgaria and in Spain, and the main legislative and normative changes that took place in the different stages of Bulgaria’s pre-accession and post-accession periods. I have also included a historical perspective of the different logics in which Bulgarian Muslims engaged with and were treated by the Bulgarian state over the last century. The historical chapter is based on a combination of secondary sources. Analysis of statistical data on migration trends, unemployment numbers, and patterns of migration flows. I also obtained materials from the two municipalities – in Spain and in Bulgaria and local statistics. Interviews were conducted with an employee in a trade union (Union General de Trabajadores), which deals with migrant rights and has an office in Tafalla, with a representative of the local council. In Bulgaria, interviews were conducted with the mayor of the village, and the deputy
mayor of the nearby municipality centre. In addition, I also talked to other employees in the municipality responsible for social services, employment, work contracts and migration.

Finally, what plays an important role in the way I could enter the field and the different themes, is my positionality as a researcher. In a highly gendered and conservative community with a religious and cultural minority profile, my position of a young, unmarried woman coming from the ethnic and religious majority of the country, and from the capital city, limited my access to some questions, positioning me simultaneously at a distance and in a proximity. As a woman I had a different access to men and women, as a co-citizen I had a deeper understanding of the country specifics and the cultural codes. At the same time, as a member of the ethnic and religious majority, I was positioned as the Other. These three aspects – gender, ethnicity and religion – provided parallel openings and closures for my research.

As a woman, I had more limited access to the male working environment and to some aspects of men’s social life. I usually had scheduled interviews with men in cafes, and informal conversations during in mixed companies at fiests and informal gatherings. I was not able to accompany them to strictly male environments like the work place or certain bars. I could not witness and participate in their working relations, the way I would have been able to if I could take up a male’s job in construction, as many male researchers of migrant labour have done. However, men in this community are the active, and leading figures, taking decisions, they had strong opinions, and they were not shy to share them with me as a researcher. Moreover, I was perceived differently than the local women because of my exteriority and my researcher position, which allowed a different type of interaction with men. I entered into discussions and topics in which they approached me as a researcher, rather than one of ‘their women’. At the same time, my gender allowed me a much better access to women, through which I could approach the domestic sphere. What is more,
participating in various practices that are exclusively for women, allowed me to spend more time and get a deeper insight into women’s views and opinions that would not emerge in immediate interviews.

My position of a Bulgarian from the majority defined the way Bulgarian Muslims presented themselves to me in terms of their group identity. My specific position of an outsider to the community, but insider to the nation-state space, teased out discussions of the tensions of self-presentation and the dynamics of group identification that are discussed in Chapter Two. My difference allowed me to see better how the B Ugarian Muslims present themselves to strangers and what are the complexities of moving between different circles of closeness. Finally, my position as religiously different, as Christian, exemplified by the cross hanging on my neck, allowed me an entry point into the sphere of religious ritual and endless discussions of Muslimness, which would have been masked had I circumscribed my being a Christian. Thus, while my knowledge is perspective and defined by my particular positionality, it allowed me specific entry points into the field.

The Chapters

The structure of the dissertation is divided in three main ethnographic and historical parts, which are preceded by a conceptual chapter. Chapter One delineates the main theoretical debates in which I position this study and the main approaches to citizenship, the state and transnational migration that have guided me in the subsequent ethnographic analysis. The ethnographic body of the thesis contains of three parts. The first part is focused on diverging state categorizations
imposed and internalized or circumvented by Bulgarian Muslims, and individual self-identifications which evolve in the context of migration. The second part deals in more details with how migrants construct themselves as citizens through work and unemployment, and by this develop expectations from the different states. The last part is devoted to the private sphere of kin relations and ritual constructions of the village community. The three parts deal with three levels of citizenship and relationship with the state: interactions through categories, contractual relations through work, and mechanisms of family reproduction, sociality and belonging.

Part One focuses on the way Bulgarian Muslims position themselves collectively and individually vis-à-vis two states through mobilizing or suppressing different identification regimes. Chapter Two, *The Order of Plural Names: Naming, Re-naming, and Self-naming Practices in Crafting Simultaneous Social Lives*, introduces the social context and everyday routines of the community of migrants. The emphasis is on the way they use different names (Bulgarian or Muslim, nicknames, or kin positions) in different contexts and thus create different orders of identification and livelihood. I explore how migration changes or reinforces certain ideas of positionings vis-à-vis institutions and the other significant social others. Then I move to the question of group identity and the kind of community that migrants form – a village one, a regional one, an ethnic or religious one, a national one etc. I argue that they have established a strong village community which has clear boundaries not only vis-à-vis the Spanish and the Bulgarians, but also vis-à-vis Bulgarian Muslims from other villages. I end with a discussion of the choice of the group name – Bulgarian Muslims, which is also a transition to the next historical chapter.

In Chapter Three, *The History of a Group in Flux*, I present a critical historical overview of the debates of who are the Bulgarian Muslims as a politically crafted category and as a category of academic analysis, which are tightly intertwined. It discusses the nature of Bulgarian nationalism
and the waves of assimilation policies against the Bulgarian Muslims, concluding with the present political situation in Bulgaria and the role which Bulgarian Muslims have in it. The chapter is built on secondary historical and ethnographic sources.

Part Two deals with institutional participation and citizenship practices. The main goal of Chapter Four, *Re-positioning the Worker-Citizen: Regimes of Regularity and Irregularity and the ‘Successful Migrant’*, is to deconstruct the category of migrant work by shaking the dichotomy of irregularity versus regularity and then re-construct it through exploring how people manoeuvre between different positions and statuses. There is a continuum of possible positions visible in the multiplicity of contracts that workers (regular or irregular) are being offered and in the actual practices that accompany working with or without a contract. The dichotomy is complicated even more by the flexible moves from one position to another and back (from a non-contract, into temporary contract, into unemployment, into self-employment etc.) and the way people manipulate or are being trapped within this flexibility. At the same time, I look at how work is invested with meaning by the migrants. The different acts related to employment affect the symbolic interpretations of the possibilities of work in migration and the way this is translated into concepts of precariousness or security. This, in turn, feeds into the way migrants address questions of inequality and marginalization vis-à-vis the Spanish. The issue of (in)equality is more broadly linked with discourses on citizenship and the various meanings people invest it with. Thus, the two aspects I seek to explore throughout the chapter are: 1. what are the actual everyday acts of participation and claims to rights that are reflected in the practices of work and 2. how do people relate implicitly or explicitly their work positions to their position as members of a community and as citizens. Ultimately, by contrasting the Spanish and the Bulgarian labour contexts with their
opportunities and traps, I suggest that migrants enjoy a certain type of practical citizenship in Spain, which they lack in their formal citizenship in Bulgaria.

In Chapter Five, *Unemployment: Security through Insecurity and the Discourse of the Deserving State*, I discuss uses and interpretations of unemployment. I show the different ways of approaching and acting upon unemployment in Bulgaria and in Spain as a social status signifying lack of employment and as a practical status allowing access to social benefits. I look into the ways people interpret the meaning of unemployment and how it can be used as a critique towards the state. At the same time, I explore the ways in which it can be used as a resource and a security strategy. Unemployment benefits are closely linked with the theme of taxes and social contributions. I look at the connections between regular employment, tax-paying, and the subsequent unemployment benefits and the way migrants interpret these connections in a framework of rights, responsibilities and deservedness. I argue that in Spain migrants develop a rhetoric of ‘the good citizens’ who have deserved their rights through fulfilling certain obligations, which is based on an understanding of the relationship with the state as directly reciprocal, contractual, individual, and exclusive.

Part Three deals with kin and community transformations. The focus of Chapter Six: *Caring Satellites: the Role of Wives, Mothers and Grandparents in the Transnational Family Project*, are the young migrant women and the “transnational ageing carers”, a group of elderly migrants who are in constant movement between social contexts, families, and states. While the previous part is mainly focused on the male migrant and his experience as a worker and citizen, in this chapter I move the lens to the other actors in the migration family project. I look into the ruptures in the structure of care arrangements, kin expectations and family relations, which migration triggers. I distinguish between two types of care migration – the young women as wives and mothers who follow their husbands in order to reproduce the family, and the second stage of ageing carers who
are needed for additional support. I suggest that transnational care motivated mobility disrupts women’s and elderly people’s social and economic citizenship, albeit in different degrees and ways, and creates new inequalities and dependencies. Moreover, I show how migration affects the ageing carers’ sensibilities of home and belonging and I argue that these transformations lead to reformulation of the fabric and meaning of the family and kin relations. I argue that these two lines of transformations, of kinship and citizenship, result in new forms of gender and intergenerational inequalities. Furthermore, their intersection leads to a move from welfare to wellbeing, which affects not only the present arrangements between migrants, but also defines future insecurities.

In Chapter Seven, *Phantasmic Devices: Wedding Videos and a Virtual Community in the Making*, I analyse the uses of wedding videos to explore one of the avenues for being an active member of a community in more than one place and time. I argue that through an extension of the wedding ritual through the device of the wedding video migrants create a common social space between Bulgaria and Spain, rather than two oppositional points in space. I explore the circulation and uses of wedding videos as a tool for building a new type of imagined community between the migrants and those who stay behind. Moreover, I look at the particular mechanisms for creating temporal and spatial bridges between home and abroad, respectively between the past of home and the present of migrancy. On the other hand, I discuss the transformations in the meaning and the essence of the ritual as a result of its postponed re-enactment and re-consumption. The emphasis in the analysis is on the visual medium as a tool for creating a new type of community dual participation. I focus on the relevance of knowledge and familiarity, achieved through the wedding video devices, which allows for further participatory claims.
Chapter 1: Theorizing Migration, Citizenship and the State

The ethnographic material of this thesis evolves in several conceptual fields which address the state, citizenship and transnational migration from different perspectives. In this chapter I map the main fields and concepts that have guided me in reading my material and building my argument. The broad question that I have aimed to answer is how do transnational migrants navigate between two states and multiple scales of incorporation, how do they make sense of their relations with both states. I use citizenship as the exploratory lens to the relationship with the state. I look simultaneously at the statuses and institutional categorizations in which my informants are entangled, at the practices and everyday acts through which they navigate and negotiate their positions and interact with the state, and at the conceptualizations and imaginaries through which they make sense of their acts. The chapter is divided in two parts. The first outlines a normative conceptualization of citizenship that the thesis build on, then continues with a discussion of tracing recent transformations of the nation-state and the implications for citizenship, and concludes with a discussion of the process of marketization of citizenship and the emergence of the neoliberal subject. The second part examines the shifting epistemological lenses of studying state and citizenship in a context of transnational migration.

I approach citizenship in the framework developed by Hannah Arendt ([1951] 1975)] as the ‘right to have rights’, i.e. to be a full member in a polity which guarantees treatment as a moral equal along with the other citizens. A condition for full membership is the ensemble of political-cum-social inclusion (Marshall [1950]1998, Somers 2008). Historically the right to have rights has been guaranteed by the nation-state which has laid the boundaries of membership and inclusion. Persons
stripped of citizenship rights become ‘stateless’ people in Arendt’s conceptual framework, which equals to turning them into ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). Transformations of the nation-state have intensified and multiplied the shades of the binary opposition between citizens with full right and stateless persons with no rights. The re-configuration of the role of the nation-state has placed citizens in a new position vis-à-vis the state, and lead to a process of ‘de-hyphenation’ of the nation-state (Friedman 2003, Turner 2003). The changing role of the nation-state in globalization context resulted in transformations of citizenship, and lead scholars to discuss emergence of postnational forms of membership and claim making based on human rights, rather than nation-state allegiances (Soysal 1004). This process also results in an ever growing discrepancy between formal and substantive citizenship, which is coded as a process of ‘disaggregation of citizenship’ (Benhabib 2004, 2007) in which the different elements of the citizenship ensemble (political, social, civil, cultural and other rights territorially linked to membership in one nation-state) are being fragmented and disentangled from each other. The implications of these transformations are two-fold. On the one hand, strangers and outsiders like migrants can enjoy partial rights (like access to social rights, but exclusion from political rights) without having formal status. On the other hand, full formal status does not guarantee actual substantive rights to all members thus depriving citizens with a formal status from effective rights like access to welfare, while still enjoying formal access to governance through political rights like voting and running for office. The latter aspect of citizenship transformation unfolds in the context of individualization and contractualization of the relationship between the citizens and the state, ultimately turning it into a market based relation (Somers 2008).

These are the parallel empowering and disempowering structural conditions in which the lives of the migrants in this thesis evolve. But migrants also act upon these structural conditions by
navigating and negotiating different partial positions, through what Engin Isin (2008) has conceptualized as ‘acts of citizenship’. By claiming social inclusion in the host country through everyday acts of citizenship, while keeping access to political participation (even if not actualized) as citizens in their home country, migrants re-construct a patched picture of the idea of what full citizenship should be. I see these acts as acts of assembling fragmented elements of citizenship. But in this process migrants also form images and ideas of themselves as citizens, of the ‘good’ state, and of their relationship with the state. I argue that their conceptualizations are framed in the language of the neoliberal subject as ‘homo economicus’ (Foucault 2008) who has to be a discrete autonomous self-managing, self-reliant and entrepreneurial subject (Rose 1996, Ong 2006b). In this framework, the relationship with the state is imagined as an individualized bilateral and reciprocal contract in which there is no space for solidarity and redistribution in the wider community of citizens. This view is highly exclusive and only refers to the male regular worker, leaving the other actors in the migration project (spouses and other kin members, and the village community) who are not incorporated in the state through taxes and social contributions out of this relationship. The discourse of the neoliberal subject is juxtaposed to the practices that make the migration project possible which place a heavy emphasis on the use of ‘social capital’ in the sense of kin and community social support network, which places the main burden of security and care on social capital, rather than on the state (Rose 1996, Somers 2005, 2008).

The second part of the chapter explores the epistemological foundations for studying citizenship and the state in the context of migration using ethnographic methods. Migration literature has developed the concepts of a transnational social field and simultaneous incorporation to explain how migrants fragment and reassemble their lives between states, institutions, and communities. Transnational social field is an analytical tool with which I approach questions of simultaneous
entanglement and responses to the constraints and demands of two or more states and includes various actors and institutions in a web of power relations in the place of both origin and of settlement of migrants. With regard to studying the state anthropologists have argued for adopting an approach that allows treating it not as a monolithic entity, but as a process and a relation, as a set of practices, and as an imaginary (Abrams [1977] 1988, Gupta and Sharma 2006, Hansen and Stepputat 2001). This framework enables me to approach the state as a multifold concept comprising of: 1. the different state crafted norms and categorization framing migrants’ lives in two polities; 2. the interactions and practices that migrants are engaged in with state institutions and through regulations of their positions as different types of members; and 3. migrants’ imaginings of the state and of their relation to it. Thus, the ethnographic approach makes it possible to think the relationship with the state as a processual interface which reconciles a top-down analysis of state policies and structures and the view “from below” of how people enact, react to or circumvent such structures. In this framework, the ethnographic approach to citizenship entails a similar multi-fold conceptualization as a status, as a series of practices and acts, and as notions and discourses.

1.1. Transformations of citizenship and the state

1.1.1. Citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’

An initial definition of what citizenship is and what turns an individual into a citizen, What are the rights and claims of citizens have and who is to guarantee these rights - these are the necessary questions for laying the foundations of the further investigation of citizenship transformations. In a minimalistic definition citizenship describes the relationship between the individual and the polity. This is a legal relationship that involves a spectrum of rights and obligations of an individual
as a member of an organized political community. Citizenship rights are guaranteed by virtue of membership. In this sense, Hannah Arendt defined citizenship as *the right to have rights*, the right to membership which guarantees being treated as a moral equal among other human beings. (Arendt [1951]1975) The phrase *the right to have rights* contains two types of rights. The first right is of an ontological order. It denotes the meta-right of membership as a moral claim of the individual to be treated as a moral equal, as a person “belonging to some human group and entitled to the protection of the same” (Benhabib 2004:56). This is the right to belong to an organized political and legal community that gives the individual the right to have substantive rights. The second type of rights in the phrase is contingent on recognition of the first right to membership. They are part of a *juridico-civil* order, and include legal and civil freedoms, access to justice, participatory rights in the political governance, and social inclusionary rights.

But what does it mean to be a member in a polity? According to Margaret Somers (2008) the initial right to membership should not be limited to political inclusion. She insists, in line with Karl Polanyi ([1944]1957) and T.H. Marshall ([1950]1998) that “the right to political membership must equally include the *de facto* right to social inclusion in civil society” (2008:6). This conception requires both political and social membership as ontological foundations for the existence of the other juridico-civic rights, like economic, cultural, intimate etc. This is clearly contained in T.H. Marshall’s well known definition of social citizenship, which is ‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.’ (Marshall [1950]1998:94). And while Marshall enlists social rights as one of the three historically developed components of citizenship along with civil and political rights, Somers emphasizes the meaning of social inclusion as a foundational right. In this sense, the political and social
membership is the *conditio sine qua non* for recognition, i.e. for acknowledging the others as moral equals.

The polity which guarantees these rights can and has assumed many forms, but over the last century and a half the nation-state has been the dominant form of political organization granting membership to individuals and thus granting them the rights of full members. The sovereign nation-state has the right to restrict membership and hence to exclude anyone from citizenship or entry. Revoking citizenship takes away recognition of belonging to a certain state and thus makes a person stateless. With no other actual political institution to effectively provide access to membership a stateless person is a rightless person. The first right, the right to citizenship, is rendered fragile in a state-centric international order in which the main political unit is the territorially bound nation-state. Refugees, stateless people, and minorities are created through the exclusionary measures of the nation-state. A person becomes stateless when the state withdraws its protection, a group becomes a minority when the majority (political, religious, ethnic) in the polity refutes the equality of the people and divides them into more and less advantaged units, one becomes a refugee when one is driven away from one’s state. The *right* to have rights becomes discernable when it is lost by means of exclusion from the political community one belonged to.

Drawing on the historical example of the Holocaust and the fate of the German Jews, Arendt writes: “We became aware of a right to have rights … and a right to belong to some kind of organized political community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation”(Arendt [1951]1975:297).

While international conventions on human rights should guarantee individuals’ rights beyond and outside their citizenship, the political bodies that sign and ultimately conform to the conventions are the nation-states. “The Rights of Man”, Arendt says in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, were
“defined as ‘inalienable’ because they were supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.” (Arendt [1951]1975:291) Nation-state citizenship is based on exclusivity and thus, although the liberal state claims to protect the rights of the humans by virtue of belonging to humanity, in fact it only protects the rights of its citizen-members. Taking this argument further, this means that stateless people (whose right to citizenship has been revoked) lose their right to have rights and thus, their rights as human beings. Along similar lines Giorgio Agamben (1998) argues that “bare life” makes humans “nothing but human”. Without the additional citizenship rights, human rights can easily become void of meaning and power. In this view, inclusion in a polity is the ontological precondition for recognition as an equal human being. Consequently, a number of scholars have developed Arendt’s concerns and have argued that the radical difference between human rights and citizenship rights needs to be blurred or at least re-visited (e.g. Agamben 1998, Benhabib 2002, 2004 , Somers 2008, Somers and Roberts 2008, Morris 2012).

Citizenship defined as membership in a political community and as social inclusion is a normative ideal and an aspiration. As an aspiration it provides a basis for a development of further political philosophy deliberations on the development of a global regime of justice and universal citizenship projects. As a normative ideal citizenship’s actualization is always less than complete (Lockwood 1996:536). As Saskia Sassen puts it, citizenship is “an incompletely theorized contract between the subject and the state,” and this is what makes it possible for such a highly formalized institution to constantly accommodate change keeping its formal status (Sassen 2006:277). In this sense, this normative definition of citizenship can be used as a yardstick against which to measure the actual variations and transformations (Morris 2012). Transnational migration, neoliberal forms of
capitalism and minority discrimination and mistreatment are among the main factors that act as a challenge to citizenship both as a formal institution and as the practice it enacts. My ethnographic analysis is framed within these transformations, the emergences of new political subjectivities, new spatial frames for politics and new citizenship assemblages.

The right to have rights, as it is briefly drafted above, is the normative definition of citizenship I subscribe to as the basis of my inquiry. Drawing on the particular case of Bulgarian Muslim migrants I trace the divergences from this basis or ideal of citizenship. Bulgarian Muslim migrants have been excluded from being treated as moral equals in a political community in different time frames and political spaces and thus have been deprived of the right to have rights in different aspects and degrees. Historically they have been a group in an ambivalent position within the nation-state and more recently as citizens of post-socialist state undergoing neoliberal reforms. They have been internally excluded while having formal citizenship. As migrants they have been in a yet another ambivalent position of non-citizens with some substantive rights, thus enjoying partial membership and facing partial exclusion in a different context. In both cases, however, one of the two crucial elements of the right to have rights – political and social inclusion – is disrupted. By analysing how migrants cope with these disruptions, I trace the different steps of individuals’ attempts to construct a membership status which is closer to the normative definition and further away from ambivalence and partiality.

1.1.2. Transformations of the nation-state

Over the past decades economic and political globalization has led to the integration and subordination of national economies to the global market. The rise of transnational actors and international institutions, a heightened movement of people across borders, and the new
communication and transportation technologies have been interpreted by some scholars as a sign of erosion or withering of the sovereign nation state (e.g. Appardurai 1996) the rising of “politics of postnationalism” (Beck 2002), and “post-national constellations” (Habermas 2001). Announcing the decline of the nation-state, however, might have been premature. Looking at the forms and roles of the state at more levels and in different spheres of influence shows we are not witnessing the emergence of a stateless world just yet. Nonetheless, the nation-state system as such is experiencing major transformation. States are losing much of their autonomy as political units regulating their own economies and formulating policies, but at the same time they are acquiring new roles in supporting policies that stabilize and protect the global market economy (Sassen 2006, Turner 2003). This affects states’ sovereignty, the state space and territoriality, the relations with citizens, and the ideological basis of the nation.

Analysing the Western capitalist state, Bob Jessop (2002) formulates three transformational trends. First, the “internalization of policy regimes”, by which the channels and mechanisms of formulating internal state policies have been changing to incorporate international concerns within domestic policy paradigms, with the key players expanding to include international agents and institutions like the IMF, WTO and NATO. Second, “destatization of the political system”, which describes the entrance of non-governmental and private actors into the domain of governance in a process of reallocation of tasks and rearticulation of relationships between institutions and organizations across the public-private spectrum. The increased reliance of states on non-state actors, especially in delivering welfare and healthcare, blurs the public-private divide and problematizes democratic popular control over matters of governance. Third, the “denationalization of the state” which involves the territorial and functional reorganization of some state capacities which are increasingly defined and pursued at several levels, rather than being
primarily shaped by the national state, to include supranational, national, and subnational (regional and local) actors which are organised in both vertical and horizontal networks. While Jessop’s analysis is focused on the western state, the postsocialist European states are undergoing similar transformation, both in terms of economic neoliberalization of their policies and in terms of aligning them to supranational actors such as the European Union, among others. Moreover, the EU is currently the most advanced forms of multi-level and multi-centric governance (Jessop 2002).

The restructuring of territorially demarcated forms of state power has urged critical geographers and political economist to question the conventional assumptions of the structural congruence of the national state, territory, economy and society which are taken as a natural entity. They argue against this ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994), which treats states as fixed, self-enclosed geographical containers of social, economic, political and cultural relations (Brenner 2004, Brenner et al. 2003a, Jessop 1999). The national is being redefined in relation to other scales of institutional organization (local, regional, national, or global), in a process in which state institutions and policies are reoriented towards supra and sub-national scales of governance. With the destabilization of the welfare state since the early 1980s’ and the collapse of the European socialist states, there has been a neoliberal move away from the redistributive spatial state strategies towards a ‘competitive-oriented forms of locational policy’ (Brenner 2004), which created uneven development of regions and localities across the national space. State support does not aim any more at equalizing the development of regions within its territory, but is offered on a competitive basis to cities or regions, thus making localities responsible for their own success or failure (Brenner and Theodore 2002). The result is thriving of some regions and impoverishment and decreased opportunity structures of the others.
What these scholars fail to address is the ways rescaling of the state re-articulates the relationship of the citizens with the state and with each other. The structural shift from centralized political processes, policymaking, economic regulation at the scale of the nation state to a differentiated process of multi-level governance, that Jessop (2002) calls ‘the relativization of scale’ involves a shift in the way citizens are being governed by the state. The uneven development and the competitiveness between regions and localities within the state further place the population of these localities in a different position vis-à-vis the state. Rescaling then is one of the factors shattering the basis of a shared citizenry identity as part of the nation-state. Moreover, underdeveloped and impoverished regions which are not competitive and are fallen out of state’s support and development have little opportunities for providing its inhabitants means for survival. With declining welfare and shrinking job opportunities, migration often remains the only feasible survival option for those whom the state has effectively deserted. Linking transnational migration analysis with discussions of transformations of the contemporary state with an emphasis on neoliberal rescaling processes allows an insight in the uneven effects of globalization. The structural changes which transform the scalar positioning of migrants’ localities of departure and settlement are particularly important for the processes of incorporation and development of particular transnational practices, as Ayse Caglar (2006) shows.

The trends transforming the modern nation state involve a change in the ideological basis of citizenship as entrenched in the nation state. While the state continues to be an actor in supporting the global market and regulating domestic policies accordingly, the focality of the state in identity formation is fading away. This creates what Terence Turner has eloquently formulated as the “de-

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5 While some scholars address the reshaping of political spaces through the lens of popular mobilization, social movements and organized contestation (e.g. Brenner et al. 2003 b, part III), the everyday relations of citizens with the state, which are not based on organized and active political action, remain unaddressed.
hyphenation of the nation-state” (Turner 2003). The state is gradually losing its unifying force to provide a sense of national community as a common identification to all (or at least most of) its citizens. As Jonathan Friedman has summed this up:

If the modern nation-state is based on the identification of a subject population with a national project that defines its members, in principle, in terms of equality and political representativity, and which is future oriented and developmentalistic, when this project loses its power of attraction, its subjects must look elsewhere (Friedman 2003:7)

There is a process of simultaneous horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the nation-state identification, Friedman (2003) continues, which he calls “double polarization”. Horizontal fragmentation denotes the decline in unification mechanisms across classes and social divides and the appearance of a range of cultural identifications that fragments the former political units. Migration plays a role in this process by introducing compact migrant communities which develop diasporic transnational identities rather than try to incorporate as citizens in the new countries. Their presence is then used for further horizontal polarization and exclusion. At the same time class stratification has deepened creating vertical polarization between a small very wealthy mobile elite engaged in transnational politics and global business, and the growingly impoverished and insecure middle and working classes (Friedman 2003, Turner 2003). Deindustrialization and flexible labour regimes have created a large pool of working poor and a “crisis of wage labour” (McMichael 1999), while the middle class economic security and relative income levels have eroded. The process of double polarization pulls the elites upwards and detaches them from the nation-state, while it pushes the rest of the population into a horizontal competition for resources in the context of cultural fragmentation. This in turn translates into a changed relationship between citizens and the
state by way of which large segments of the population have started feeling unrepresented and detached from the state.

While scholars like Friedman and Turner analyze these processes of polarization and fragmentation through their effects on burgeoning social movements and mobilized popular response, they do not explore the effects it has on the changing meaning of citizenship as expressed in ordinary citizens’ everyday ways of interacting with or circumventing the transforming nation-state. Through the case of the Bulgarian Muslims that are a particular class of impoverished and migrating citizens, I have studied what are the effects of horizontal polarization on the individual-state relations and how are they imagined and envisioned. Thus, I show how these processes have permeated everyday practices in relation to and conceptualizations of the state through the lens of migration. I see migration in this analytical context, as the answer to de-industrialization, impoverishment, shrinking welfare, and uneven development of the post-socialist state, in which the Bulgarian Muslims are the class of the deprived peasants and workers who have no means to support themselves, live in an underdeveloped region and are culturally and ethnically different than the majority which further complicates their relation to the nation state. I argue that migration is an active step of confronting the changed relation between the state and the citizen caused by the transformations of the state. Through migration my respondents detach themselves partially from the Bulgarian state while not attaching themselves fully to another state. And while this act could have many layers and meanings, I focus here on the way it brings to the fore a changed relation to the state and a new way of being a citizen. By looking into the acts of citizenship and the way people make sense of their relationship to the state through these acts, I attempt to understand the ground processes, the everyday implications of state transformations for citizenship as a category and as practice.
1.1.3. Fragmentation of citizenship

Current transformations of the nation state have challenged the conception of citizenship as strictly tied to the terrain and imagination of the nation state. The “citizenship-versus-statelessness model” outlined by Hannah Arendt has been shattered by various “mutations of citizenship” (Ong 2006a) which are breaking the once bound together ensemble of different rights, entitlements and obligations, depending on a legal status and a territorial bond. Citizenship theorists have emphasized repeatedly the distinction between formal citizenship (legal status) and substantive citizenship (practices and enactments of rights and obligations). This distinction unfolds in a more particular analysis of the processes of unbundling of political, social, civic and other citizenship rights (see Benhabib 2004, 2007, Isin and Nielsen 2008, Lister and Pia 2008, Soysal 1994). ‘Disarticulation of citizenship’, ‘citizenship reconfiguration’, ‘disaggregation of citizenship’, ‘unbundling of citizenship rights’ – these are the most prevalent concepts used to describe the process of fragmentation of citizenship into independent components not necessarily tied to a political entity or to a territory. Political membership is increasingly dissociated from social and civil rights, and from a shared national identity. While in theory rights depend on membership in the nation-state, in practice new entitlements are being mobilized and claimed without participation in the governance through political representation, and vice versa political membership per se does not guarantee full social rights in practice. Finally, shared (national) identity is not a condition sine qua non for participation in a common political project, or for access to rights, and it can potentially be replaced by residence (Benhabib 2002). Thus, citizenship elements are being disarticulated from each other and from the connection with the nation state, while being re-articulated in a context of universal moral regimes like human rights or globalizing market regimes like neoliberalism.
The process of fragmentation works simultaneously in two directions. On the one hand, it enables access to separate citizenship components without full membership, both in terms of rights and entitlements and in terms of claim making. In the context of migration this means that migrants can have access to economic and social rights and make membership claims without having full citizenship status in the host country, while at the same time they have limited formal political rights for voting or running for office. On the other hand, disaggregation also results in disabling certain individuals with formal status from enjoying full citizenship rights. In this way formal citizens can be excluded from access to social rights for example, and become what Margaret Somers calls the ‘internally stateless’ (Somers 2008). The intensified discrepancy between formal and substantive citizenship then has simultaneously an empowering and a disempowering effect. While most scholars tend to focus exclusively on one of the two effects, I argue that the analysis of citizenship fragmentation in the context of migration requires taking into consideration both aspects of the process as people navigate between partial membership positions in different political and institutional sites. In this sense, understanding the experience of Bulgarian Muslim migrants means exploring how they negotiate and manoeuvre between their position of citizens with partial rights and their position of migrants with access to citizenship rights.

**Fragmentation of citizenship 1: Migration and the EU**

Transnational migration teases out the tensions inherent in the processes of state transformation and reconfiguration of citizenship. There are two major streams that have formed in approaching these tensions: one focuses on the implications for the formal and institutional aspects of citizenship as tied to the nation-state, and the other on the modes of incorporation and claim-making that allow non-citizens to acquire some form of membership in a state other than their own. The former
approach operates with the concept of citizenship as delineating rights and obligations. Scholars within this framework explore differences in migrants’ incorporation based on different principles and models of citizenship (Brubaker 1994, Joppke 1999, 2010), discuss the implications of dual citizenship for the nation-state allegiances and affinities (Joppke 2007, Faist 2007), and explore different policies and legal frameworks that allow multi-tiered citizenship like the European Union citizenship (Faist 2001, Wiener 1997). The latter approach focuses on the disjunction between formal and substantive citizenship and seeks to explore citizenship as practice rather than status and to show the differences between formal principles of citizenship and different modes of incorporation. Concepts like multiple or multi-layered citizenship (Fox 2005), ‘postnational citizenship’ (Bosniak 2006, Sassen 1998, 2001, 2006, Soysal 1994), ‘transnational citizenship’ (Balibar 2004, Bauböck 1994, Smith 2005), ‘global citizenship’ (Bellamy et al. 2006, O’Byrne 2003), ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Linklater 1998) have been introduced to capture systems of rights, emergences of political communities, and cross-border inclusions that are above and below the separate nation-states.

The intersection between social citizenship and transnational migrations offers a lens to explore fragmentation of citizenship both through formal policies that define entitlements and contributions to social welfare and through substantive claim making and citizenship practices. Large numbers of migrants and their descendants have become permanent denizens with social rights but no access to full citizenship (Bauböck 1991, 1994, Bauböck et al. 1998, Joppke 1998, Soysal 1994). Social rights have been extended to migrants by virtue of residency rather than based on a shared cultural identity. There has been a wide debate on the different modes of incorporation that are based on transnational citizenship claim-making and multiple membership (Aleinkoff and Kusmeyer 2000, Bauböck 1994, Caglar 2004, Glick Schiller 2005, Glick Schiller and Caglar 2008, Faist 2000,
Some migrants claim rights and act within the institutional setting of their state of origin even if they do not reside in it or they have given up altogether on their formal citizenship status, with long-distance nationalism and home-town associations being a case in point. (Basch et al. 1994, Benda-Beckmann 2001, Caglar 2006, Glick Schiller 1999, Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, Kearney 1991). Transborder citizenship rights can be claimed not only on the basis of membership, even if partial, in a territorial nation-state, but can also be anchored in global human rights regime like the case of asylum seekers, or, the much less researched claims made in the name of global religions (Glick-Schiller and Caglar 2008, Levitt 2003, Richman 2005, Van Dijk 2004, Vasquez and Marquard 2003) Some see in these transformations the possibility for emergence of cosmopolitan norms detached from nationality (e.g. Benhabib 2002).

Different categories of migrants enjoy different clusters of social (and sometimes partial political) rights. Partial membership varies along a continuum of different positions: asylum seekers, refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection, high-skilled migrants, irregular workers, intra EU migrants and third-country nationals, and other in between categories. There is a tendency to argue there is a qualitative distinction between internal and external migrants (e.g. Benhabib 2004, Caglar 2009, Caglar and Mehling 2013). EU citizenship has introduced a divide between the political and the social community by excluding third country nationals who reside in the EU from political rights, while allowing social and economic incorporation. This is seen as one of the major deficiencies of EU citizenship (Bauböck 2006). While there are undoubtedly major differences, I would emphasize that EU citizenship is a heterogeneous category itself, in which different subcategories of internal migrants enjoy different types of rights and hence experience and practice their status as EU citizens in diverse ways. In addition, different European countries apply different types of restrictions for intra-EU migrants, especially for the new member states.
Even in the case of my informants who are mostly low-skilled labour migrants living in the same EU state there are several distinct subcategories: regular and irregular workers, caretakers, spouses. They all experience the rights that EU citizenship grants them in different ways, facing various levels of exclusion and inclusion, and different modes of incorporation. Thus, for example, a regular male worker and his wife, which might be non-working, engaged in care work, or employed irregularly, are not only put in different migrants’ categories (a worker and a worker’s spouse), but consequently experience their intra-EU migration in very different ways.

European Union citizenship is a multi-fold and derivative citizenship (Balibar 2004, Bauböck 2000, Caglar and Mehling 2013, Delanty 2007, Faist 2007, Wiener 1997). It is contingent on nationality of a member state, rather than on residency and thus is accessible only by citizens of the member states (which effectively excludes all third country nationals, refugees and asylum seekers). European citizenship does not replace national citizenship, but it is conceptualized as complementary. European citizenship rights are complementary rights, “a thin layer of additional rights placed on top of a thicker national citizenship” (Bauböck 2000:310). In this sense, EU citizenship is multi-layered in terms of rights, and it allows for multiple identities – national and a common European one – but it does not function as a post-national citizenship. Rather, EU citizenship is supranational, leaving the frame of the nation basically intact.

The main types of rights that EU citizens enjoy are freedom of movement, free labour mobility (with restriction for new member states), conditional social rights, and limited political rights. EU migrants’ political rights (voting and running for office) are limited to local and supra-national EU-level. Migrants are excluded from voting or running for office on national elections. This restricts their potential participation in governance and in a shared political community in the nation-state they currently reside. The practical implications are that EU migrants have no influence on
decisions taken by national governments, which might affect their everyday lives and futures. Citizenship, however, does not only constitute of a vertical relationship with the state, but also of a series of institutionalized and symbolic horizontal ties between fellow citizens (Offe 1999, Caglar 2004, 2013, Faist 2001). Being deprived of participating in the state-level political process EU migrants, then, remain outside the political community of local citizens also at the level of horizontal ties, which has further implications for building trust, diffuse solidarity and understanding of generalized distribution (Faist 2001, Habermas 1998). At the same time, European identity and participation in a common EU community is still rather abstract and has little practical or symbolic power for the ordinary citizen (Delanty 2007). Hence, I would suggest that while EU migrants enjoy more political rights than third country nationals, they are in the similar position when it comes to participation in the state governance and in establishment of ties with the local citizens. In this sense, EU migrants are mobile workers with partial citizenship rights rather than mobile citizens and mainly enter in vertical relations with employers and state institutions. Sheyla Benhabib’s concern that the focus on social rights of migrants reveals a potential risk of falling into a state of ‘permanent alienage’ becomes pertinent also in regard to the internal EU migrants, in the sense that they have access to social, economic and property rights, but are continually, albeit partially, excluded from participation in the political process and governance (Benhabib 2002:455).

With regard to social citizenship EU citizens are also not a homogenous category. EU citizenship was conceived above all as enabling free labour mobility and circulation of workers. The EU citizen is a worker-citizen (Hancock 1999). Social rights for EU migrants under EU citizenship provisions are not universal, but conditional. First, social rights for EU citizens vary between the different member states. Second, they privilege those in paid and regular employment (Ackers 2004). In this
sense, full social rights are contractual, contingent on a narrow meaning of ‘work’, which has implications in terms of age and gender. This aspect again blurs the clear distinctions between internal EU migrants and third country nationals. Zooming in the case of Bulgarian citizens in Spain, access to social entitlements both before and after Bulgaria’s EU accession was not based on their citizenship status, but rather on their status as workers. The difference in this respect was in the restrictions for access to regular employment which were significantly relaxed after EU accession, albeit not completely lifted.

Conditional social rights for migrants, i.e. linking access to welfare entitlements with regular full-time employment, affects those people who move as part of a ‘male breadwinner’ family model or are in irregular or part-time jobs. (Ackers 1998, McGlynn 2000, 2001, Stychin 2000). This also places in a vulnerable position the people whose migration decisions are motivated by the need to provide unpaid care for family members (Ackers and Dwyer 2003, Ackers 2004). Indeed, dependent spouses and in some cases ascendant kin members, enjoy access to limited social rights, on the basis of their relation to the worker. Thus, in the case of Spain, wives of male migrant workers, who are engaged in care work, work part-time, or are in irregular employment, can have access to healthcare and some maternity benefits, but they are excluded from pension and unemployment entitlements. Ascendant relatives who join their children are in a similar position. This conception of EU citizenship based on a narrow definition of work renders social citizenship of women and ageing relatives indirect, derivative and relational and places them in a position of dependent individuals, rather than autonomous citizens (Hancock 1999).

The two main issues with EU social citizenship then are the focus on the citizen-worker and the narrow conceptualization of work as paid employment, not recognizing care work as an avenue for citizenship. The underlying assumptions here are on one hand the individualistic view of the citizen
as an autonomous agent and worker. This view does not acknowledge different family roles and the need for reproductive work. In this way, denying full citizenship rights to mobile family members, may lead to reinforcement of patriarchal power relations, to new insecurities, and to stronger dependency on one family member. This is particularly relevant for the case under scrutiny here, in which migration is a family project and the reproduction of the family depends equally on the ‘breadwinner’ and on the unpaid care work by women and ageing relatives, whom I have called the ‘caring satellites’. Insecurity and dependency here is two-fold. On one hand, women lose their independence as citizens and are only acknowledged as such through their role of wives and mothers. On the other hand, the working male migrant becomes responsible for a number of family members which makes their access to limited rights contingent on his secure employment. How do the ‘caring satellites’ experience these constraints and how they negotiate their new insecurities and dependencies is discussed at length in Chapter 4.

The way EU citizenship affects intra-EU migrants as discussed above reveals two parallel developments. Citizenship can be enacted in its different fragments which individual citizens can assemble through migration, which EU citizenship enables through the encouragement of free labour mobility. At the same time, the emphasis on the worker-citizen within the EU context stimulates the conceptualization of the citizen as an individual agent entering in vertical relations with the state, without necessarily establishing horizontal ties with other citizens. This way of understanding citizenship and the relations with the state evolves both at the level of practice and at the level of discourses. Through being regular workers and tax payers migrants create institutionalized ties with the local citizens (the Spanish citizens in this case), which are mediated through the state. But this only refers to a fraction of all migrants and excludes the other agents in the migration process. At the same time, in the migrants’ understanding, as I show in Chapters 4.
and 5, this is not about diffuse solidarity and redistribution between them and other members of this polity, but it is about direct vertical reciprocity between them and the state as an abstract actor. In this way, their relationship with the state as citizens is conceptualized as a contract. This is framed in a general discussion of the process of marketization and contractualization of citizenship that I discuss next.

**Fragmentation of citizenship 2: marketization, contractualization and the neoliberal subject**

Citizenship is a mechanism both for inclusion and for exclusion by allowing or prohibiting membership in political entities. This makes it a ‘two-sited’ research field (Somers 2008:21). Migration scholars typically focus on the exclusionary lines of demarcation and on the possibilities for partial inclusion for outsiders, as I have sketched above. The other site of citizenship analysis is grounded in the interior meaning of citizenship for those who already have it. More recently, however, some scholars have started to transgress this division by analyzing how the borders and boundaries once used as external demarcation to exclude strangers from the body of the nation state are now moving inwards to the centre of the polity, creating new interior borders of social and political exclusion (Balibar 2004, Bosniak 2006, Somers 2008). One aspect of citizenship disaggregation is the way in which full status-bearing citizens are stripped of their full rights as moral equals and are turned in Margaret Somers’s words into ‘internally stateless and rightless individuals’ (Somers 2008). This is part of a process of erosion of rights for certain categories of citizens and a transformation of the meaning of citizenship itself.

The erosion of rights, particularly social rights, is happening in the framework of what Somers (2001, 2006, 2008) calls ‘contractualization and marketization’ of citizenship, i.e. the
reorganization of the relationship between the citizens and the state, which shifts from universal non-contractual rights and obligations to a market exchange following the principle and practice of *quid pro quo*. According to Somers the logic of market fundamentalism (or neoliberalism) displaces society’s ethics of inclusion, solidarity and membership and replaces it with a market logic based on contractual relations. In this way, the right to social inclusion becomes conditional on being party in an exchange of equivalent values, instead of participating in non-contractual reciprocities. There is a basic ontological distinction, however, between citizenship and contract, Somers insists. Citizenship entails reciprocal but *non-equivalent* rights and obligations between legally *equal* citizens, *while contracts entail* market exchange of *equivalent* goods between *unequal* market actors (Somers 2008:69-70).

“Contractualizing citizenship distorts the meaning of citizenship form that of shared fate among equals to that of conditional privilege. The growing moral authority of both market and contract makes social inclusion and moral worth no longer inherent rights but rather earned privileges that are wholly conditional upon the ability to exchange something of equal value.” (Somers 2008:3)

Marketization of citizenship entails moving the responsibility for social problems from structural conditions to alleged defects of individual moral character, which characterizes much of the ‘culture of poverty’ and the ‘undeserving poor’ framework (see Katz [1989] 1990, Katz ed. 1993, Mead 1986, Moynihan *et al* 1967). The effect of this shift is turning the structurally unemployed or those without marketable skills, who are not able to engage in contractual relations with the state, into ‘contractual malfeasants’ and ‘morally unworthy’ citizens (Somers 2008:3). In this way citizenship becomes an individualized contractual relationship with the state based on personal ‘marketable’ skills and qualities. Citizens’ “worth, value, and inclusion, are accordingly determined by contractual success or failures in relationship to utility” (Somers 2008:41). This type
of reassigning responsibility from structural conditions to individuals and to personal moral failures is one of the neoliberal understanding of the relationship between citizens and the state and has been dubbed by Somers and Block (2005) as a ‘conversion narrative’.

While Somers focuses exclusive on the tendencies in the United States, Aihwa Ong (1999, 2006b) analyses the transformations of welfare provision in the wider context of the changing way the neoliberal states are functioning. By doing this Ong (2006) brings together two concepts – neoliberalism and exception. She shows how components which used to be tied to citizenship (rights, entitlements, and territoriality) are now becoming disarticulated and then rearticulated anew following an economic logic which postulates protecting only certain categories of subjects. This neoliberal exception means that the state operates through calculative practices which work against universal rights, but instead filter and prefer certain citizens over other. Meanwhile other segments of subjects are exempted from the citizenry. This process leads to a blurring between local and foreign population, while at the same time deepens inequalities. People who are defined as lacking in “neoliberal potential” are categorized and might be treated as less worthy citizens, Ong (2006) argues. This is especially true for low-skilled workers, whether from the local population or migrants. They become an exception to neoliberal mechanisms and are framed as excludable population in transit, in between zones of economic growth.

Eastern European states, and Bulgaria in particular, have been on a route towards neoliberalization of citizenship in the last decades after the fall of state socialism with privatization of public services, contraction of welfare, uneven development of regions etc. And while the Western European states have been less affected by neoliberal contractions of welfare, they are quickly picking up the pace,
especially after the recent economic crisis.\textsuperscript{6} In terms of migration, however, the concept of the contractual relationship with the state is rather relevant, even in the case of the EU internal migrants, who benefit citizenship inclusion through their EU status only when they are also in the positions of workers., as discussed in the previous section. The case of Bulgarian Muslim migrants evolves against this backdrop by both being citizens of Bulgaria and by being migrants. They are affected on one hand by the transformations of the Bulgarian state, by their specific relationship with the state as a ‘group in flux’, and by the local developments of the region – all of which in different ways hampered their social citizenship, as I discuss in Chapter 3. The relationship with the state in migrancy has developed along contractual terms to an even greater extent, which only includes the male regular worker, excluding from access to actual full citizenship women, the elderly and generally those who are not in paid labour, i.e. do not have a ‘market value’ in crude terms. Moreover, the language in which my informants formulate their own position vis-à-vis the state as citizens, migrants, and workers is the language of marketization and contractualization. Conceptualizations of the good state and the good citizen are framed within the discourse of the neoliberal subject, as I explore in Chapter 4 and 5 through the issue of work and social security.

The neoliberal subject as drawn by Michel Foucault (2008) is that of \textit{homo-economicus} who is governed by market principles of competition and has displaced the \textit{homo juridicus}, who is the legal subject of the state. ‘Homo economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself,” Foucault argues (2008:226). The neoliberal subject is therefore not a citizen with claims on the state, but a self-enterprising citizen-subject who is obligated to become an entrepreneur of himself or herself (Gordon 1991:43-44). In this context Nikolas Rose (1999) has called neoliberalism a

\textsuperscript{6} For example the UK is on a route of shrinking all types of public services and adopting an individualistic and morally blaming view on poverty.
mode of “governing through freedom”. The citizen has turned into ‘human capital’ and needs to constantly invests in his/her own skills and abilities, while communities and kinship networks have become assets of ‘social capital’ and function as a support network instead of the state (Rose 1996). Migration, as a strategy for finding better economic opportunities, is interpreted as an investment in human capital. Thus, the neoliberal subject is described as autonomous, not relying on the state, self-governing, and self-enterprising, and hence highly flexible and adaptable. (Mitchell 2003, 2006, Ong 2006, Rose 1996)

The idea of the neoliberal citizen as an independent individual entering in contractual relations with the state is an ideological one. It develops parallel with the rise of the idea of social capital as a necessary asset of the neoliberal citizen. With transformations of welfare systems towards marketization and contractualization of the relations between citizens and the state, there is a new emphasis on shifting the responsibilities for providing care and future security to different types of overlapping communities and networks - the family, the neighbourhood, the religious congregation, volunteering associations (Rose 1996). In a critique of social capital as a political project of neoliberal states, Margaret Somers (2005, 2008) argues that it provides an anti-statist political language to justify the shifting of state responsibility for social risks to personal responsibility of individual families and communities.7 In this framework, concepts like ‘ethical citizenship’ describe the transformations of social citizenship under neoliberal condition, by imagining citizens as bound together by moral and affective rather than social and political ties, through obligations rather than rights (Muehlebach 2012). The community as the site of social

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7 This has been most recently exemplified by the announcement of the ‘end of the welfare state’ by the Dutch King and the emergence of the new ‘participation society’ in which responsibilities are shifted from the state to communities, families, neighbourhoods etc. [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-king-willemalexander-declares-the-end-of-the-welfare-state-8822421.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-king-willemalexander-declares-the-end-of-the-welfare-state-8822421.html)
capital is ‘morally obligated to compensate for loss of public services and social rights’ (Somers 2008:243).

In this regard, the apparent tension between the image of the self-managing migrant and the practice of migration as a family project get a new meaning. The male migrant enjoys his access to citizenship rights by virtue of participating in the labour market as a tax payer. Along with this he develops a highly individualistic self-enterprising view of himself as a worker-citizen, and a contractual understanding of the relation with the state. But the migration project the male migrant worker is only one of the participating agents. He is entangled in a network of kin and community support for reproduction of the family. At the same time, he provides immediate security for those family members who are excluded from access to social rights. Thus, the contractual view of citizenship and the image of the citizen as a self-managing individual exclude from access to citizenship (both symbolic and practical) certain agents in the migration project. While fragmentation of citizenship rights opens up certain spaces for participation and empowerment for some migrants through giving them access to economic and social rights, it also results in disempowerment and new dependencies of the rest of the migrants whose lives evolve in the framework of citizenship’s contractualization. How people negotiate their different positions in this context is at the core of this study.

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1.2. Shifting the epistemological lens on state and citizenship in migration context

In this second part of the chapter I lay the epistemological foundations of my study of citizenship and the state in the context of migration. Both citizenship and the state are concepts used cross-disciplinary, especially within the context of migration. Different disciplines engage with these concepts through different lenses. I have tried to understand the way people engage with the state through everyday practices and acts, how they experience and negotiate their positions in relation to two states, and how they formulate notions and images of the state and of themselves as citizens and migrants. By adopting an ethnographic approach, I have chosen to explore the state and citizenship from the point of view of the actors embedded in particular structures. Thus, I have approached citizenship simultaneously as a status defined by the state, which is at once inclusive and exclusive; as a series of practices or acts through which people become citizens; and as a notion and an image which people craft and which further guide their acts. Similarly, I approach the state in my analysis at several levels. First, as an entity as and as a system that is crafting official categories and statuses and is governing citizens and migrants through legislation and policies. Second, I have looked at the state through the relations and everyday interactions in which citizens get engaged and experience the regulations and the categories of the state. Third, I explore the state as an image and as a notion that people develop to explain their position as migrants and citizens, in relation to their encounters with the state in action. In the context of migration this approach of studying the state and citizenship requires adopting an ongoing comparative perspective. Migrants are engaged in relations and interactions with more than one state, they take on different statuses as full citizens and partial members, have access to different rights and practices, and form
competing images of the state and of themselves as citizens based on a constant comparison and assessment. In this context I think of migrants’ lives as evolving in a transnational social field.

### 1.2.1. Simultaneity and the transnational social field

The transnational lens on migration allows for a conceptualization of the links and networks established between the place of origin and the place of settlement of migrants. The classic by now definition of transnational migration is “the process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders” (Basch et al. 1994:6). The further refinement of the concept of ‘transnational social field’ as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relations highlights the inclusion of those individuals that have never moved or crossed borders themselves but who are linked to the migrants through a complicated web of interdependencies and influences. These networks are hierarchical sets of social relations that link migrants to various institutions grounded in states of differential power as well as to non-migrant transnational financial, non-governmental, and religious institutions that work through and across states. Thus the transnational social field, as a network of networks includes multiple actors and institutions with different kinds of power and locations of power that interact across borders (Glick Schiller 2005).

The concept of transnational social field is helpful to describe the kind of material and symbolic bridging of people, attachments and material constructions. At the same time, migration is a factor which influences all other spheres of life, like kin relations, everyday routines, but also imaginations and the way people position themselves vis-à-vis various entities, whether it is the state, welfare services, or different types of communities. Through the concept of ‘field’ I aim to
describe the inclusiveness of various levels and actors in people’s lives. Here, it is important to note that the field is not a static snapshot. On the contrary, it is dynamic and constantly changing including or excluding different institutions, norms, or actors as significant or irrelevant. For example, at the level of actors, those at home linked with the migrants can become migrants themselves at any given point. In this sense almost everyone is a potential migrant, rather than a passive position placed in the “home” realm only indirectly participating in the migration process.

Migration is about the temporal and spatial spreading of everyday life and social relations, but also about institutional and formal incorporation in more than one unity. Hence, conceptualizing migration as establishing a transnational social field draws the attention to the simultaneity of transmigrant connections to two or more states (Glick Schiller and Levitt 2004). It calls for an investigation of the ways in which transmigrants become the fabric of everyday life in their places of origin and of settlement, and the overlapping, though different, participatory claims and strategies which are deployed simultaneously in two institutional and social contexts. Thus, it opens up further venues for empirical ethnographic research of the different modes, degrees, and dimensions of incorporation and for examination of the conditions which favour certain modes over others. The concept of simultaneity allows me to analyse the interactions, ties, and belonging that migrants establish in two localities. Moreover, simultaneous incorporation of transmigrants can also happen in different dimensions, as is the case with my informants who establish vertical ties through claiming social citizenship rights in Spain and sustain horizontal ties of belonging in

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8 For an example of political participation and claim making of Kurds and Turks directed to Germany and to Turkey, see Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003b
9 For examples of different modes of incorporation see Glick Schiller et al. (2006) on non-ethnic incorporation in small-scale cities.
a village community in Bulgaria. Thus, the process of assembling fragmented elements of citizenship is a process of simultaneous incorporation in different localities and states.

Through moving away from the assimilationist perspective on migration (for a renewed interest in this see Alba and Nee 2003, Brubaker 2001), the transnational lens not only calls for a re-interpretation of the necessary uprootedness of migrants from their places of origin, but also provides an analytical strategy of transcending a compartmentalized view of society, rooted in what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) called “methodological nationalism”, which assumed that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world. The authors argue that the nation-state building processes have shaped the way immigration has been perceived and the way immigration policies have been developed. Moreover, the tendency of anthropology to study cultures as unitary and organically related to, and fixed within, territories, reproduced the image of the social world as divided into bounded, culturally specific units typical of nationalist thinking. Further on, the anthropology of ethnic groups within modernizing or industrial nation-states tended to describe them as culturally different from the “majority” population because of their different historical origin, including their history of migration, rather than see these differences as a consequence of the politicization of ethnicity in the context of nation-state building itself. In relation to the study of migration, the authors argue that the shift towards a study of transnationalism was more a consequence of an epistemic move away from methodological nationalism than of the appearance of new objects of observation.

1.2.2. The state as an actor in migration flows

In migration theories the state is often analysed as a monolithic homogenous whole and state territory as a homogenous entity vis-à-vis state policies (Caglar 2006). The “role of the state” is
looked at from a normative and policy perspective, in which the state is the main actor shaping and managing migration flows. This is relevant both for discussions of receiving countries’ immigration and social policies, and of sending countries acts for remittances encouragement, political participation and lobbying (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003, Massey 1999, Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Likewise, debates of citizenship issues, civic and political participation and “dual loyalties” of migrants spanning over two or more countries look at the state from a strictly normative perspective (Bauböck 2003).

Nevertheless, works on the role of the state draw the attention to the importance of analyzing not only the receiving states immigration policies and the opportunity structures they create, but also the role of the sending states. Instead of looking at sending states as “pawns rather than players” Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003a) suggests to shift the research focus to sending countries’ willingness and ability to formulate and implement policies towards their citizens abroad. In addition, this view further points to the different pathways though which sending states influence directly or indirectly migrants’ activism and political participation, by re-inventing themselves and adapting their strategies and policies to the new migration conditions (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001, Levitt 2001, Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Moreover, as Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003b) demonstrates with her analysis of Kurdish and Turkish guest-workers and the factors influencing their political mobilization, it is crucial to take into consideration the interplay between institutional contexts and events in the sending and the receiving state, thus including in the concept of transnational social field not only individual or informal interactions and networks, but also state practices.

Besides a few notable exceptions (e.g. Caglar 2006, Glick-Schiller and Caglar 2011), the state remains static in migration theory. What lacks here is the dynamic relations established between
the different states and the migrants. This means first to include the interplay between sending and receiving states as constituting a network of power relations in a transnational social field. Second, it means to consider the conceptualizing the state beyond its normative legal entity and turn to exploring the relations with the state through state practices, through images of the state, and through citizenship practices and acts. If we think of citizenship as a relationship with the state, then studying the state from this perspective means in fact studying citizenship.

1.2.3. The state as a practice, as an interaction, and as an image

A research which attempts to address citizenship in a non-normative way, but on the level of the actual state policies and the people's responses to them necessitates a different approach towards the state then the one which takes is as an actor, producing policy and legislation. Philip Abrams ([1977] 1988) explains the difficulty of studying the state by challenging the idea of one realm of the state consisting of different facets or levels. He distinguishes between the state-system, which is a nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government; and the state-idea, which is projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different times. However, Abrams argues there is no third unifying realm, no unified political subject or structure over and above the state-system and the state-idea. There is a need to deconstruct the idea of entity and homogeneity for analytical purposes in order to grasp the relationship with the state, i.e. the everyday interactions and practices, and the conceptualizations and discourses of states by the people. In his call for rethinking the state Abrams is joined by other prominent scholars who have approached the state in a new way: as a bureaucratic field (Bourdieu 1994), as an effect (Mitchell 1991, 1999), as culture (Steinmetz 1999), as having multiple faces (Navaro-Yashin 2002). These
new approaches to the state provided an opening for the anthropological conceptualizations and studies of the state. Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues for a research strategy which goes beyond “governmental or national institutions to focus on the multiple sites in which states processes and practices are recognizable through their effects” (Trouillot 2001:126). State effects – isolation effect, identification effect, legibility effect – are appearing in new sites away from the national to the infra-, supra-, or transnational ones. The state thus appears to be an open field with multiple boundaries and no institutional fixity (Trouillot 2001:132).

Gupta and Sharma further argue that we should deconstruct “the illusion of cohesion and unitariness created by states” and instead think of the state as always contested and fragile, rather analysing the cultural processes through which “the state” is instantiated and experienced (Gupta and Sharma 2006:11). Therefore they propose to study the state as a “multilayered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices, and people in a globalized context” (Gupta and Sharma 2006:6). This could be done through examining how the micro-politics of state works, how state authority and government operate in people’s daily lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and re-imagined by the population. In an earlier article Gupta insists on the “analysis of the everyday practices of local bureaucracies as well as the discursive construction of the state in public culture” (Gupta 1995: 375). These two interdependent aspects of the study of the state reveal how the state is enacted and what meaning is invested in everyday practices of bureaucrats, and at the same time how the state is constructed as representations and imagined. Analyses of encounters in welfare offices and the ways this shapes systems of social support and integration of migrants are framed in the same approach (Dubois 2011, Olwig 2011). This approach is further developed by Alberto Arce and Norman Long in the concept of ‘interface’ between the
lifeworlds of peasant, bureaucrats, and experts, as a way to study state practices (Arce and Long 2001).

The anthropological approach to the state is one way of “denaturalizing” the state through studying stateness as historical and contingent construction. According to Hansen and Stepputat (2001) ethnography is best equipped to bring into view the gap between discourses of state power (such as discourses of territorial integrity, rights, entitlements, citizenship) and social states such as exclusion, marginalization, resistance and separatism. It further raises the question of the limits of government: where does the state begin and where does it end? Veena Das and Deborah Pool (2004) further deconstruct the notion of the state by insisting on studying state exceptions rather than state norm, similarly to Agamben (2005) and Ong (2006). By doing this, they look at how practices and politics at territorial and social margins shape the practices that constitute the “state”. The margins are not inert, but rather creative, both economically and politically, legally and illegally, and the state is continually being redefined in response to the imaginaries nourished in the margins and projected onto the state. Moreover, although the margins are defined by state efforts to control populations, the manipulations that people make of state institutions may at times “reconfigure the state as a margin to the citizen body”. In this way the study of the margins of the states allows an entry into complex local ideas of justice, of the ‘good state’, and of ‘proper citizenship’.

1.2.4. Acts of citizenship

The ethnographic approach to citizenship as a relationship between the individual and the state is framed in this broader understanding of the state as a series of practices, representations and images. My point of departure is that citizenship can be understood as a set of practices that
constitute encounters with the state at various levels. One constellation constitutes of practices associated with formal political rights like voting and being elected, as viewed by political theorists (Lister 1997, Turner 1993, Yuval-Davis 1997). But there are a variety of other constellations of citizenship practices that may constitute the relationship with the state in a particular context. For example, individual citizenship can be mediated through membership in collective entities like trade unions (Lazar 2008). Citizenship can be questioned and reinvented by subversive acts and new assemblages by irregular migrant workers for example (Lee 2008, Newman and Clarke 2009) or by public services users (Barnes and Prior 2009). All these studies focus on citizenship as a series of everyday acts and as an enactment at different levels, as act of fragmentation and of assembling of citizenship elements. Citizenship has also been explored through the process of subject making and self-making in a Foucauldian sense, where cultural politics and schooling is a particularly salient example of becoming a citizen (Hall 2002, Lazar 2010, Ong 1996). At the same time, citizenship can be approached as a notion and as a discourse by asking how do people imagine themselves as citizens. More often it is about formulating a relationship with the state through claiming political, social or civil rights. But citizenship can also be interpreted as ‘civil sociality’, i.e. as a way of ‘being in society’ beyond the state (Stack 2012).

However, exploring citizenship as a status and as a practice reveals only partially the ways of relating to and interacting with the state and of being a citizen. In his critical analysis of citizenship beyond status and practice, Engin Isin (2008) turns to migration as inserting individuals in ‘overflowing webs of rights and obligations’. He talks of citizens who have become increasingly mobile, ‘carrying these webs of rights and obligations with them and further entangling them with other webs of rights and obligations’ (Isin 2008:15). The question then is, how do these subjects of new overflowing rights and obligations enact themselves as citizens. Isin insists that we need to
focus on the concept of the act itself. The various effects of globalization have triggered the production of new sorts of subjects, new subjectivities and scales of identification, new areas of action and struggle. This required a move from thinking of citizenship solely as a status of membership (in a state) to thinking of it in terms of practices of becoming, of claim-making within different sites and scales (not just within one nation-state). Such differentiation between formal (status) and substantive (practice) citizenship is crucial, Isin agrees. Yet, practices imply a habitus – routines, norms, rituals, and everyday habits through which subjects become citizens. Acts, on the other hand, create ruptures in the habitus, they trigger transformations in terms of both practices and status.

Subjects can enact themselves as claimants of rights, rather than simply exercise or be deprived of such rights. Enacting oneself as a citizen involves transforming oneself from a subject into a claimant of rights, which means breaking the habitus (Farnell 2000). Moreover, acts do not just create a rupture of the order, but allow the actor to remain at the scene which is created. Claims of migrants are acts of constant struggle which have the potentiality of constituting them as citizens. In this way, citizenship is not thought of in its narrow and static sense of a status, but in an active, constantly manifesting itself activity which opens up certain spaces of empowerment, while closing others. In this sense, citizenship is the (recurring) act of becoming a member and a participant in a polity/community through different paths, which in turn offers certain rights and entitlements, and the further possibility of making claims.

This means, that different migrants’ membership might possibly be reconfigured in every act that they take vis-à-vis the state. Whether it is by changing their passport name, or by changing their worker status, or by supplementing the welfare support with drawing family members into a care network, or by the constant circumventing of the other nation-state of which they are full citizens.
de jure, the migrants constantly re-enact their position as members, socially, economically, politically etc. Rather than talking of the different attributes of their citizenship which are constantly in flux, I focus on the separate acts which allow or limit their access to rights and entitlements. In this way the static conceptualization (through various attributes) of citizenship as something given and fixed in a certain moment of time is replaced with a processual one, which looks at each and every separate act derived from and constructing a certain type of citizenship, as manifested in everyday people’s lives. This approach opens up a way to take into consideration the temporality and the changing nature of citizenship which migrants face in their flexibilized lives.

The epistemological considerations I have outlined here have critically informed the methodological approach to citizenship and the state that is used in this thesis. Based on understanding of the state both as a system and as a practice I used ethnography to examine the effects of state regulations and categorizations as contained in different statuses that states impose on individuals (like citizen or migrant, regular or irregular, worker or carer, Bulgarian or Bulgarian Muslim) and the way these individuals negotiate their positions within this system and find ways to challenge it. To this end I look at the interplay between legal norms, statuses and regulations contained in them, and the way people enact, manipulate and make sense of them. I study the acts of citizenship to understand how people position and re-position themselves as citizens vis-à-vis different states, and how they conceptualize the state in and through these acts. Furthermore, in order to make sense of the transnational social field migrants are actors in I did a mutli-sited ethnographic research connecting two localities, different scales, and various actors entangled in multiple networks. In this way I was able to make sense of how institutional frameworks and actors from different places are connected in one common space. This has also made me include in my analysis the different agents in the migration process and explore their different positions and roles.
Therefore I have paid special attention on the transforming relation between the different participants in the migration project – the male migrant, the ‘caring satellites’, those who ‘stay behind’, the village community, and the ‘others’ – Bulgarians from the majority, or the Spanish.
PART I

Circumventing Categories, Inventing Identities. Between the State and the Self

In this chapter I discuss the everyday social lives of migrants, lives that spread between two places, two countries, and two social contexts. Using the lens of the specific question of plural naming practices I aim to outline the parallel and simultaneous social lives that migrants construct and inhabit. I suggest that splitting the self through multiple presentations which are situationally dependent is a manifestation of a deeper demarcation of the different spheres that migrants inhabit and switch in between. These different spheres are overlapping and at the same time are clearly demarcated. In this sense, the choice of a certain name or designation for a particular situation refers to a choice of a certain aspect or category of the self – worker, villager, relative, friend. Thus, discussing naming practices I look at the ways people present themselves to others depending on the context, but also the ways they position themselves vis-à-vis institutions through a particular choice of name. In this sense I look at the name simultaneously as a social and legal identity, which creates the link with others and with the state. The official name is the face of the person to the state. In the context of legal freedom of naming practices, the choice of name reflects how a person wants to be perceived in legal terms and has further implications for the conceptualization of oneself as a citizen. To demonstrate the practice of multiple naming, I will start with my own personal confusion in the early days of my fieldwork.
I arrived to Tafalla after a short stay in Bulgaria where I gathered some contacts from migrants’ relatives. In the first days in Spain I was mostly walking around with Rumi, my 30-year-old landlady. I was accompanying her in her daily routines – picking up the children from school, shopping, spending the afternoon in the little park, hanging out with other migrants at the central square on a Sunday morning, visiting relatives, and receiving guests. When walking on the cobbled small streets of Tafalla, we were constantly being greeted by acquaintances. Sometimes we would stop for a short conversation, but more often we would just wave and continue. Rumi was presenting me to everyone, hesitating a bit before pronouncing the name of the person – always a Bulgarian name. Then she would go on to explain who the person is and what is their relation to the others that I already knew. Soon after I started going to the central square to meet and hang out with the people I was introduced to earlier. I was overwhelmed with the many names and faces I was so suddenly exposed to. Most of the names sounded Bulgarian, but not very typical for my ears. I would later realise, that most of the Bulgarian names were specifically chosen as to avoid any Christian connotations and thus were not the most widespread and commonly known names.

One day I had coffee at the main square with a middle aged man that Rumi had introduced me to the previous day. He told me his name was Nikolay. When I tried to explain later whom I met, Rumi was puzzled and it took some time until she understood me. Then she said: “I keep forgetting his other name is Nikolay. Cause according to “our” names, he is actually Ibrahim.” The next day I met him again and he asked me to deliver a message to Rumi. When I told her what Ibrahim asked me to, she looked at me confused. “Who’s Ibrahim? How does he look like?” I explained it is Nikolay form the previous day. And she said: “Oh, of course, I didn’t understand at first. He’s my uncle, I call him uncle. Well, in fact I call him mizho, which is our way of saying uncle.” Fine, I thought, so this is mizho Ibrahim. Next time we talked and I mentioned mizho Ibrahim, Rumi did
not understand whom I meant yet again. It turned out, no one really called him Ibrahim, but people used the diminutive Brinda instead. And Rumi, who was his niece, referred to him as mizho Brinda. I was in the end encouraged to also call him that way, by extension of my living arrangements and friendship with Rumi.

Mizho Brinda had at least four ways of presenting himself and being addressed. He was Nikolay for the outsiders of the community, like the Spanish people and me initially. Nikolay was also the name that was written on his passport. His Muslim name was Ibrahim. The way people from the village would call him was Brinda or by his nickname, the Rod, referring to his boy figure. For Rumi and her family, he was mizho Brinda (brother of her father). But of course, for other kin members he was referred to with the local versions of kin statuses: father, grandfather, another type of uncle (brother of the mother), etc. This plurality of ways of presentation and designation was not exceptional, but rather the rule among most Bulgarian Muslim migrants. Most people had a Bulgarian name, a Muslim name, a nickname or a diminutive from the Muslim name, a regional Muslim kin status, depending on the relation, and a Bulgarian kin status, as a clarification for the outsiders, like me.

People use one name or another depending on the social context and on the other actors present. All names and designations are activated on a daily basis in different situations. In this sense, the naming practices are situational and the identities towards which they refer are multiple and shifting. In the next section I first discuss the way people use alternatively their Bulgarian and their Muslim names. I will look at the situations in which they activate one or the other and at the interpretations that they themselves give to this practice. Next, I explore the circles of intimacy that become apparent through the different names or kin names that people use. The multiplicity of naming options has a complex structure which demonstrates the compartmentalization of the self
in different spheres of social life. I would like to suggest that this apparent fragmentation is in fact a coping strategy for reconstructing a coherent life in migrancy. This fragmentation is reflected in the everyday moves and socializing practices of migrants in Tafalla. I argue that the naming practices construct social boundaries and delineate spheres of interaction for migrants which encode different circles of intimacy – from the family, to the kin, to the village community, to the outsiders like other Bulgarians or Spanish. I link the practice of “double naming” with the wider context of Bulgarian Muslims as a minority and point to the historical roots which are discussed at length in the next chapter. In conclusion, I motivate my choice of a collective name and identify the difficulty in pinpointing one single group name for a group which is in constant flux.

2. 1. The two personal names in Bulgaria: shifting between Bulgarian and Muslim identity

This section is devoted to the duality between the two kinds of personal names most people have - a Bulgarian and a Muslim. What Rumi called ‘our’ name is the Muslims name, that everyone in the village community (and I dare argue in the wider Bulgarian Muslim community) receives by birth with a religious ritual. The other name is a Bulgarian name that is employed for outsiders like me, the other Bulgarians, the Spanish, and to the different institutions. Most migrants activate both names on a daily basis depending on the social context and the situation. In this section I explore these different contexts of name uses and the meanings and interpretations that people have developed in order to explain the duality of their naming. I suggest that the uses of the names depend on the context and might change in the context of migration. I also explore how choosing one name over the other in a certain situation alludes not only to deeper self-identification
statements, but also to complex positioning within religious, ethnic, village communities on the one hand, and as citizen and members of different political communities (like states or the EU) on the other. I will first discuss the nature of the Muslim and the Bulgarian name before I proceed to an analysis of the shifting usage.

Similar cases of contextual dual name use can be observed in different examples of minorities who either experience state repression and are forced to adopt non-ethnically specific names approved by the state (like the case with controversies over Kurdish surnames in Turkey (Aslan 2009), or choose themselves to self-impose a name that will blur their difference from the majority to avoid discrimination. Examples of the second type are particularly interesting in migration context, when migrants change their names to adjust to the receiving society (Coutin 2003 on Salvadorians in the US, Pratsinakis (2005) and Hatziprokopiou (2006) on Albanians in Greece). What makes the case of Bulgarian Muslims use of two names is not simply the constant shifting and mobilization of both names at the same time, but it is the particular choice of the public name. Bulgarian Muslims choose to use their alternative Bulgarian names now, as opposed to the period before 1989 when they were violently forced to. However, they only use these Bulgarian names in migration, where these names do not blend them with the locals, they blend them with the wider Bulgarian migrant community, thus drawing a different type of distinction. How is this motivated and conceived is what I seek to understand in this section.

2.1.1. Muslim names, private lives

The Muslim name is received by birth with a religious ritual. Everyone has a Muslim name, even if they choose to never use it in public. Therefore, even those who have chosen to use only their Bulgarian names in all social situations, still have a given Muslim name, including the children
born in the recent years in Spain. People from Brushlyan call these names “our” names or “Turkish” names. Some names are indeed Turkish, other have an Arabic origin. But for the local imagination the Turkish language accommodates these names which sound different than the common Bulgarian names. When asked why they call it Turkish and not Muslim or even Pomak, people would usually say that this is how their parents and grandparents referred to these names and this is how they are used to. Categorizing the Muslim names as Turkish then should not be interpreted necessarily as identification with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. It is more of a descriptive and apparently traditional historical way of opposing Christian to Muslim with the ethnic shortcuts – Bulgarian and Turkish, rather than an ethnic or cultural approximation. In practice, there is a differentiation between the commonly used Muslim names among Bulgarian Muslims and among Bulgarian Turks, even if there is some overlap. In the meantime, there are already some of the younger people who would avoid the Turkish reference altogether, and talk of their names as Muslim, or Arabic due to the Islamic influences coming from the middle East (Ghodsee 2009), but also in some cases due to the attempts to differentiate themselves from the Turkish minority.

I chose to call these names Muslim, rather than use the emic notion of my respondents, for analytical purposes and for more clarity. At one level, the Muslim name refers to the link of the person to Islam and to all related religious rituals. Even the people who do not activate their Muslim names in public, and restrain from them even within the family, still have one given to them at birth, which they use for participation in the basic religious rituals. A person goes through a naming ceremony after birth, through circumcision (if male), gets married (signs a nikah), participates in prayers and gets buried with a Muslim name. A person cannot call himself Muslim, unless he/she has a proper Muslim name. This opens the question of religiousness and the meaning of being a Muslim for the Brushlyani people which will be discussed at a later point in this chapter. For now,
I will just say that Muslimness is part of people’s self-identification and differentiation from others, and the Muslim name is a prerequisite for that.

There are two levels of using a name – in social interactions and in official documents. At the level of social interaction the choice of name is reflected in a series of smaller or wider circles of intimacy. Some people choose to use heir Muslim name in every situation. At the other end of the spectrum are the people who never use their Muslim name or have only their parents or spouse refer to them with it. In between are the nuclear family, the wider kin, the village community, the ethnic and religious community (confined within the region), the circle of friends which might be outside the minority community, the wider horizon of Bulgarian citizens, and finally, the Spanish citizens (or any other foreigner). Thinking of these widening circles of intimacy, I would suggest that the Muslim name starts in the core being an expression of the private self and it is used in more intimate circles like the family and the village community. The Bulgarian name, on the contrary functions in the wider circles of strangers and as an official designation for institutions. In this sense, it is denominator for the public self. This scheme varies in individual cases, depending on whether people have migrated, on their age and status, and on the intensity of their religious practices.

Before 1989, after a series of violent assimilation campaigns, no one was allowed to register officially with a non-Bulgarian name. The most massive re-naming campaign against Bulgarian Muslims happened in 1972-1974. Since then, everybody in Brushlyan adopted an official Bulgarian name and all the children born after were officially registered with a Bulgarian name. At the same time, most people continued using the Muslim names in their daily interactions. And when communicating with official institutions or travelling outside the village and going into a Bulgarian context, people would present themselves with their Bulgarian names. This
inconvenience affected only some of the people, because many villagers, especially the elderly did
not travel outside the village too often, or ever. Thus, before 1989 there was a split between the
official, documented identity, and the personal one, reflected in the two names. The wider context
of these developments is discussed in more details in the next chapter. After 1989 this practice
changed to a certain extent, but did not disappear completely. While most people reverted to their
Muslim names as a gesture of independence from the coercive acts of the communist state, others,
especially younger ones, decided to keep their Bulgarian names in their documents, while still
using their Muslim names in social interactions.

Some people, like Yassen, a 37 year old driver, did this because they did not want to get involved
with the complicated administrative procedures. Yassen had a professional driving license, and a
vocational school diploma, in addition to the passport. For him changing all the documents with a
new name seemed too complicated. He kept using his Muslim name in the village. But he presented
himself with the Bulgarian one every time he travelled. Others, like Rumi, my landlady, wanted to
study in University, in the regional centre, Blagoevgrad. Rumi did not want to be treated differently
because she is from a minority, so she insisted she keeps her Bulgarian name officially. She studied
as zadochno (as a distant student) for four years and got used to presenting herself as Rumi to her
classmates the few times throughout the year, when they met. In this period she already decided to
keep her Bulgarian name also for her Bruslyani social interactions. Her family accepted her
decision, so even her parents and brothers started referring to her with her Bulgarian name. The
only people who kept using her Muslim name were one of her aunts, and her grandparents.

Rumi’s husband, Yavor, was a similar case. He never reverted to his Muslim name. And he was
known in the village with his Bulgarian name. His mother and his wife (!) though stuck with the
Muslim name. Yavor’s grandfather was the village mayor in the period of the name changes and
he was responsible for the administrative change of name of many men in the village. He tried to keep the peace and avoid violent clashes by personally assigning alternative names and signing the documents for many of the men, who had escaped in the mountains as a protest. The grandfather believed in assimilation and acted from his local position of power, and most men never forgave him for taking this decision for them. Yavor, however, felt he should follow his grandfather’s example and should avoid demonstrating his Muslimness through his name. The Muslim name is not a secret or regarded as shameful by any of the people who decided to stick to their Bulgarian names even in village social interactions. They did not hide their name, neither did they mind that certain close people used it in public. Rumi or Yavor’s mother would call him or refer to him as Amet in public within the village community freely and everyone knew whom they meant. Still, he would never present himself as Amet to anyone. His Muslim name is confined within the very close kin circle and was treated as a kin name.

The other end of the spectrum is represented by Aynur who had a Bulgarian name ascribed when she was born, but since she changed it in 1991, she never used it again. She had her Muslim name on all her documents and she would always present herself as Aynur on all occasions. Aynur was a more rare case, but still there were people, both among the young ones and among the elderly, who would only use their Muslim names. Between these two ends of the spectrum, there is a multitude of people who shift between their Bulgarian and their Muslim name depending on the context and the circle of intimacy.

The elderly people, irrespective of their migration status, prefer to use their Muslim name in most settings. They have experienced the change of a name, which has replaced their given name, imposed by the state with force. The Bulgarian name for them is distant, foreign and does not signify anything related to them. And still, some of them would use the Bulgarian name when
presenting themselves to an outsider. I often experienced this being in the position of someone coming from the majority and from the capital city. Elderly people used their Bulgarian name on the first meeting as a more formal and official way of presenting themselves, but would switch later to their Muslim name. An indicative example is my first meeting with Yassen’s mother. I already knew Yassen from Spain. We met with his mother on the street in front of their house in Brushlyan. She was waiting for us at the front door, watching us while we were climbing the steep street. When I reached her, she pulled her hand and said in a hesitating tone: “I’m … Albena.” But Yassen interrupted her: “It’s all right, you can use your real name. Neda’s one of ours already.” Then his mother sighed with relief saying her Muslim name, Zaira, smiling and giving me a hug.

Later on, in their kitchen, she told me in great details about the different assimilating campaigns that happened in the village since she was a child in the 1950’s. “I suffered from this name change. The clothes change was also not good, but taking my name away, erasing it from the passport, this I suffered the most for. I never learned to like this Albena name. It doesn’t sound bad, but… it just means nothing to me. It wasn’t given to me by my parents, it doesn’t connect me to Allah. What’s the use of it. So now, after the change [1989] I only have Zaira.” Still, she was willing to present herself to me with this non-meaningful Bulgarian name. She explained this with uncertainty, and desire to protect herself: “Before someone could rat on you to the police if you didn’t use your Bulgarian name officially. It’s a habit, when I see a stranger.” Later on, she added: “People are mean sometimes when I go to Gotse Delchev, to the hospital. I have the feeling they give me this nasty looks, because they know I’m Muslim. So, whenever I can, I use the Bulgarian name. Not always, because my real name is on my ID, but whenever I can and I feel I should.”

Avoiding the Muslim name in fear of discrimination or harm is a common reason given by people. In a way, for most villagers it has become a rule of thumb to use the Bulgarian name, when meeting
someone for the first time or in an official situation. The name then, can serve as an identity disclosure or as a veil over the difference perceived as harmful. While the state has terminated the official assimilation attempts after 1989, some of the media and the public discourses coming from the majority have been openly hostile against Muslims in general, and Bulgarian Muslims in particular. Some media reports and attacks are directed against alleged radical Islam ‘enemies’ in the face of certain local political leaders and imams. Others echo extreme right and nationalistic appeals for a pure and Christian nation and call for violent solutions. Other less threatening public opinions, especially among people who do not live in a region populated by Bulgarian Muslims, are limited to discussions of “backwardness, low hygiene, and lack of education”. Such and similar negative stereotypes contribute to fears of discrimination from the majority and reinforce the desire for cultural and ethnic anonymity and blending. In this sense, the use of the Bulgarian name is caused on one hand by the historical memory and by the present perceived discrimination and existing negative stereotypes in the wider Bulgarian society.

The fine balance between using a Muslim and a Bulgarian name reflects not just a personal strategy for avoiding harmful and marginalizing attitude from the majority. It is related to the more general question of group identification and group constitution. Through the personal name people confirm or avoid belonging or difference. The constant shifting between one name and the other is framed by the broader questions of who are the Bulgarian Muslims as a group, as a minority, as an ethnicity, what are the meanings the people inscribe in group markers and how do they translate them in their everyday lives. I will go back to this in the last section of this chapter.
2.1.2. Bulgarian names, legal identities

The name that people choose to put on their documents is the identity that they choose to demonstrate to the state. Having a Bulgarian or a Muslim name on the documents is a statement in citizenship terms and a positioning vis-à-vis the state. Being officially registered with a Muslim name is a statement of distinction – ethnic, religious, cultural, or simply a minority qualification. It is a solid statement of difference, beyond everyday situations of presentation. Conversely, choosing to have a Bulgarian name on the documents can be interpreted as a sign of an attempt to blend with the majority, or, which is in fact more often the case, a more intense fear of perceived discrimination. Most of the Brushlyani people, who chose to have a Bulgarian name on their documents, justify it with the desire to be treated “indiscriminatively” in administrative terms, to be unnoticeable for the institutions. They want to have the right to choose when to disclose their difference and when to conform to a common denominator like Bulgarian citizenship. The Bulgarian name on the documents then is not necessarily a move towards Bulgarianness in ethnic terms, but a move towards the civil meaning of belonging as a citizen, which guarantees equal treatment.

Unlike the Muslim name, the Bulgarian name has a more public and distant status. For the elderly people it was a violently imposed name during the several assimilation waves. Younger people, born after 1972, were given a Bulgarian name along with the Muslim one upon birth, and until 1989 they were registered officially with the Bulgarian name. After 1989 the people who got their names changed were allowed to revert back to their names through an administrative procedure, or register with the names that they chose (for the younger ones). While most people did this formally, some still kept presenting themselves with their Bulgarian names outside the village to strangers.
(where official ID was not required). Official discrimination on the basis of the Muslim name was still lively kept in the collective memory. And at present using the Muslim name in the context of the majority would still often evoke differential sometimes even violent treatment, compelling some people to use their Bulgarian name when outside the village. Thus, the interplay between the Bulgarian and the Muslim name remained very dynamic, even after people were allowed to register with the name they choose.

Historically, after the mass renaming campaign in 1972, the Bulgarian name was the code which people used to present themselves to the state and to the institutions. Through the Bulgarian name they were categorized as citizens. They were refused civil rights unless they conformed to the Bulgarian name. They were refused to be served in administrative and legal context, but also in restaurants and shops.\textsuperscript{10} Even though this situation has been changed post-1989, having a Bulgarian name continued to be conceived as a marker for citizenship and as an official identity. While the Muslim name is regarded as a condition for access to religious inclusion, the Bulgarian name was and still is to a certain extent a condition for civil inclusion within the institutional realm of the state. Through the Bulgarian name people split at one more level their public and private persona. This way of employing the Bulgarian name constructed an anonymous, indistinctive public self, which evolves at the level of citizenship and rights, distinct from the private self, identified by the Muslim name, and is only expressed in everyday personal situations.

The opposition between the Bulgarian-Muslim name is also an opposition of secular versus religious position. The Bulgarian name as a connection to the citizen status signifies a vertical position within the state structure. The Muslim name, on the other hand, connects people with the

\textsuperscript{10} This refers more to the dress than to the name, because people did not to present themselves by name on entering.
community and also places them in the framework of religious life and thus connects them to the transcendental. One provides institutional security through state laws, rights and obligations. The other provides ontological placement in the world and vis-à-vis God. Ultimately, the Bulgarian name provides incorporation in a community of citizens, while the Muslim name symbolises an ethnic and cultural community.

At the same time, there is a link between the duality of the name as a strategy to avoid discrimination and the decision to migrate abroad. While transnational migration is extremely massive in the whole region, internal migration is very low. When people do migrate internally, it is usually short term, only for work, not settling, and it is male only. There are isolated cases of families who have relocated internally after 1989. When asked of why they prefer to migrate to a foreign country, the most popular explanation people give is related to their Muslimness and the negative attitude that they are exposed to by the majority in the other parts of the country and by the media.

Hasan, a migrant in Spain for ten years already, had previous experience as an internal migrant. He went to Sofia for a while, as a construction worker in the late 1990’s. He went with another five workers from the village. They stayed and worked in Sofia for 20 days there in a row, with no free days, and came back for ten days each month.

“We lived together in a sort of a dormitory in Sofia and it was somewhat isolated. We would go on Friday afternoon to the mosque and meet other people, other Muslims, from the region, there. But at work, with the other workers, the Bulgarians, we used our Bulgarian names. Even though the boss knew we’re from the Rhodope mountain and we’re Muslims. And everywhere I went, I presented myself with the Bulgarian name. I felt that otherwise people will give me bad looks,
and will treat me differently, in a nasty way, if they knew that I’m Muslim. So I was hiding it all the time…. I didn’t like it. I want to be what I am in my own country and not hide as a criminal. Being a Muslim is not a crime…. So, in the end, I gave up on this. I couldn’t live apart from my wife anymore, and taking her there and both of us hiding where we’re from, this just didn’t feel right.”

For Hasan migrating to Sofia more permanently and with his family meant making a compromise with him being a Muslim. He did not want to give up his Muslimness, so he chose to leave Bulgaria, instead of moving to another bigger city. Whether this is the major reason for migrating abroad is irrelevant. What is important is the feeling of imposed (and self-imposed) identity suppression that is embodied in the choice of name used for everyday interactions. Such statements not only express the views of many other Brushlyani people I talked to, but also confirm conclusions based on earlier research of mine among Bulgarian Muslim village in the region (Deneva 2005).

The duality of the personal name prior to transnational migration then is seen as partly imposed from outside. While the state is not regulating personal names anymore, people still feel the urge to switch between Bulgarian and Muslim names in situations in which they feel their Muslimness might be a reason for discrimination. The fine balance between the contexts in which people use one name or the other varies individually. There are very few cases of people who use exclusively only one of the two names. The very old people in the village who do not leave it and do not meet strangers stick to their Muslim names on all occasion. The other extreme are the very few families that migrated internally in Bulgaria, to Sofia for example, and chose to use exclusively their Bulgarian names. They still keep their Muslim names though, mostly used by their parents and more distant relatives, on visits back to the village. This situation gets different shades with the introduction of transnational migration. This is what the next section is devoted to.
2.2. Bulgarians for the Spanish, Muslim for the Bulgarians

The public-private divide between the Bulgarian and the Muslim name becomes more enhanced in Spain, where the migrant community is mixed within the same space (urban and working) with other communities – ethnic, religious, cultural etc. The majority of the migrants shift between their different names on a daily basis, depending on the immediate social context in which they operate. The Muslim name is confined within the community of co-villagers and thus is also expressed by a linguistic marker. Switching to Spanish means for most people also using the other, Bulgarian, name. In this way, sometimes even within the same temporal and geographic site, people might operate with two different names.

A telling example is the space of the little park, where many of the migrant women take their children after school. Sometimes they might exchange a few words with another mother, or a colleague who is also there with a child. While talking to each other with the other Brushlyani women they use their Muslim names, but when they turn to a Spanish (or any other) colleague or a neighbour, they will engage in the conversation with their Bulgarian name. Similar thing could be observed on a Sunday morning when everybody goes to the central square to have coffee. Typically, both Brushlyani and local Taffalans would gather there around 10 a.m. and stay until 12.30 p.m. They do not mix with each other and are separated even spatially by standing in the two corners of the square and sitting in different cafes. Again, if a Brushlyani man sees a colleague there, they would engage in a short conversation in Spanish, and the man will be addressed with his Bulgarian name. Turning around and switching to Bulgarian, he would be already in his Muslim-name-self for his co-villagers.
The linguistic divide is particularly sensitive for children. My landlords’ 5-year-old son was presented to me as Christian by his father before I arrived. When we first met, I asked him what’s his name. His mum answered for him – Christian. But he himself said at the same time, Ismetko. She smiled, and said: “That’s our name, but you can call him as you wish.” Then I asked him how he would like me to call him, and he answered: “Well, Ismetko, obviously, since you speak Bulgarian.” Another case happened in the Bulgarian language classes, that children have once a week. The teacher asked children to first write their names in Latin letters and then in Cyrillic letters. One boy wrote his Bulgarian name in Latin letters, and his Muslim name in Cyrillic letters. When the teacher asked him what is the reason for this discrepancy, he explained: “Well, in Spanish, I’m Andrey, but in Bulgarian I’m Mehmed, right?” Children are rigorously taught to present themselves in public (kindergarten or school) with their Bulgarian names, while they are allowed to use the other name at home. The linguistic explanation was apparently the easiest way to settle clear rules of the situations corresponding to one name or the other. In order to make it easier for children some more younger parents chose to give only one name to their children, which sounds more universal and can pass for Spanish too, like Martin, Daniel, or Andres. These children still received a Muslim name upon birth, but it was a very private name, which only the parents knew and no one really used. Whether this will remain a tendency by which more and more people will stop using their Muslim names, remains to be seen.

The linguistic and social divide as symbolized by the name switching also has an administrative expression. It is a rather widespread practice for pre-migrants to change administratively their names back to their Bulgarian version prior to the first migration trip. Name change is a complicated and difficult procedure which requires going to the local court with witnesses, and paying a substantial fee. And yet, a big majority of the migrants had gone through this and reverted
to their Bulgarian names from before 1989. Names, which were thought of as imposed and impersonal at that time. Suddenly, these public and distant names became a matter of personal choice and started being used as an instrument. But an instrument for what? When I asked them why bother going through such a complicated, lengthy and expensive administrative procedure, the usual explanation was that they wanted to avoid discrimination of the type they felt in Bulgaria when interacting with people from the majority.

Goran, a 34-year-old migrant, who had changed his name from Alil in 2003, just before he embarked on his first trip to Spain, told me: “I want to be treated like the rest of the Bulgarians, I don’t want people to know that I’m Muslim, judging from my name, unless I decide to tell them myself. Some of my colleagues know I’m Muslim, but the people in the bank, or in the UGT [the labour union] do not, and I don’t see why they should.” He further told me that when he worked shortly on a construction site in Blagoevgrad, even if he presented himself as Goran, people would still know he is a Pomak because of the region and the particular village he was coming from. As a result, he felt they treated him as a second class person, backward and stupid. “Here, they don’t know anything about Bulgaria, so, when I tell them a Bulgarian name, they don’t ask questions. But think about it! If I present myself as Alil, they will immediately raise an eyebrow. They have enough problems with other Muslims here, with the Africans too. I’ve heard about this from my cousin who came here before me, so I decided to change my name officially.” Other people have followed suite, and now this is almost a sine qua non for the very decision to migrate among young people.

The re-introduction of the Bulgarian name into the legal identities of Bulgarian Muslims should not be misinterpreted as an act of identification with the Bulgarian majority. Instead, I suggest to treat it as an act of instrumentalization of a legal name by dividing the legal and the personal name
in two realms. The fact that people choose to change their names by their own will is a step towards removing the traumatic aspect of the Bulgarian name. Thus, the Bulgarian name is interpreted not as an act of state violence onto the person, but as an individual act of choosing how to be seen by the public, and by the state itself. In this case the public consists of the Spanish citizens (and by extension the other non-Bulgarian migrants in Spain). The instrumentalization of the name then liberates it from the painful connotations of discrimination and forcible assimilation. It does serve, in fact, as an anti-discrimination purpose, a self-regulated protection from envisaged discrimination and stigmatization in Spain, which makes it powerful in a positive way. Moreover, while in Bulgaria simply changing the name might not be enough to conceal the difference as it was pointed above, in Spain there is no cultural referent to the particular geographic area, where the migrants come from, hence the name is enough for a re-invention of a new identity - the identity of a Bulgarian citizen. The Bulgarian name then provides migrants with anonymity and sameness with the rest of the Bulgarians.

Reinvention through an act of homogenization with the majority and through concealment of cultural difference is thought of as empowering and liberating. But when this same act is performed in a Bulgarian context, it is thought of as “giving up on what we are”, as another man told me. As I mentioned before, this was given as the main reason of why Brushlyani (and other Bulgarian Muslims from the region) do not migrate internally, and prefer transnational migration. Leaving the confines of the Bulgarian state then contributes to perceiving the act of anonimization as agentic and empowering, rather than as discriminating and victimizing. It is this act of choice which is not imposed from outside, that act of personal self re-naming that migrants see as empowering and dignifying. And in this sense their shifting between different variations of identity is not thought of as problematic or traumatic, but as instrumental for their wellbeing.
The naming reinvention is also accompanied by concealing from the Spanish all other signs of Muslimness, such as traditional clothes, celebration of holidays etc. While for men and for younger women clothes are not a differentiating factor anymore, for elderly people they certainly are. When older women who normally wear their traditional Muslim clothes in Bulgaria come to Spain, they change their traditional colourful *shalvari* and remove their headscarves. “When I decided to go to Spain to help my son with his children, I applied for a new passport with the Bulgarian name, and I bought a pair of trousers,” a 60-year-old woman told me. Hence Bulgarian Muslims in Spain are not recognizable as different from the majority of the Bulgarian citizens. The celebrations of the Muslim holidays is also concealed and kept within the circle of the kin. While in Bulgaria Bulgarian Muslims would traditionally share their celebrations with their Christian neighbours, here in Spain, the festivity is kept low key for the outside gaze. Nevertheless, holidays and fasting periods are kept strictly. A few of the men even go to the mosque in the nearby Pamplona on big holidays and when a child is sick, people go for prayers to the imam.11

### 2.3. European citizenship as a claim

What Bulgarian Muslims in Tafalla say *en passant* when talking about their situation in Spain is usually related to the rights they have as Bulgarian *and* EU citizens. They like to juxtapose themselves vis-à-vis other migrants from Latin America or Northern Africa, and point out their own privileged position. At the same time, when referring to their position in Bulgaria, the following quote is more than representative of the general attitude: “In Bulgaria the other Bulgarians know we are Pomaks, they know we are Muslims and they don’t treat us as equals.

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11 Another interesting detail is that there is an imam from the village who is also a labour migrant in Tafalla, working in a bakery. Even though he is not a full-time Imam at present, he is performing an intermediary service between the imam in Pamplona and the Bulgarian Muslims, and also serves for all kinds of smaller spiritual needs of the migrants in Tafalla.
Here we are like everyone else. Here, there is no difference between you and me. We are simply Bulgarian citizens,” one of the young men explained to me once, when talking of his experience in Spain. In this sense, it is the importance of equality and of shared European citizenship status that makes their life in Spain more dignified than the one in Bulgaria. Formal citizenship accompanied with the cultural knowledge which is followed by perceived discrimination provides less equality than semi-membership status that they have in Spain.

The official position which Bulgarian Muslim migrants have been assigned by the Spanish state at present is of EU citizens with fewer rights than citizens of older EU countries. In this sense, they are still immigrants who do not have full citizenship rights and need to go through certain procedures for obtaining a work permit, could be discriminated in the labour market on the bases of lack of working documents and risk immediate dismissal if caught working without documents. However, both Spanish institutions and Spanish citizens do not have the knowledge of the specifics of Bulgarian Muslims and in this sense they treat them indiscriminatory like the rest of the Bulgarian citizens. Bulgarian Muslims are not seen as different either administratively or socially. In this way, they are granted a kind of “sameness” which they cannot fully enjoy in Bulgaria. Through the anonimizing name (an oxymoron), then, migrants insert themselves in a position of full-fledged Bulgarian citizens. By changing their name, they also change their “legal position vis-à-vis the state” (Scott et al. 2002) claiming same treatment as everyone else.

Even though the Spanish state places them in the marginal position of immigrants with no full rights, it allows them anonymity and an opportunity for re-invention. At the same time, the Bulgarian state categorizes them as citizens with equal rights, but the social context and the economic conditions marginalize and condemn them to a status of difference they do not necessarily yearn for. Consequently, while sustaining and reproducing the village community
migrants more and more differentiate themselves from the group of other Bulgarian Muslims through this duality. What is more, being a Muslim is thus becoming less a cultural and ethnic signifier for belonging, as it is recognized by them in Bulgaria, but instead is further reinforced as a matter of the private sphere.

Bulgarian Muslims use the Bulgarian name not simply to anonimize themselves against possible stigmatization of Islam. They use this name as a claim to their status as citizens – Bulgarian citizens, and by extension European citizens. While in Bulgaria their citizenship status is not recognized as instable, and hence in need of claiming of confirmation, in Spain it is vital to be perceived precisely as Bulgarian citizens, rather as Muslims, who might be non-EU third country nationals. Here it is a matter of re-confirming their interiority to the European space through a citizenship status. In this sense, the Bulgarian name serves as a signifier for their right to belonging to a community of citizens and in the common European space. Therefore, I would suggest that mobilizing a double naming strategy can be read as an act of claim-making for belonging to a wider community by virtue of the status of citizenship. Moreover, this is an act of rupturing the existing categorizations through shifting the emphasis from culturally and religiously recognizable distinction (pointing to being a Muslim) to a civil sameness (pointing to being a citizen) and in this sense it is an act of re-positioning as a citizen. This makes the act of using a double name an act of citizenship.

2.4. The kin position and the nickname: on circles of intimacy

Both the Bulgarian and the Muslim names are distant. They are used for different categories of strangers and institutions. Shifting between different names is shifting between different registers of external to the community actors. The unit of the community here is the village and the extended kin outside the village. Inside the village and respectively within the migrant village community,
other designations and names are activated. Slowly, following the early example of mizho Brinda’s multiple designations, I started to unravel a complex system of different ways of addressing and designating people according to different orders of relatedness, kin relations within the village community, and finally, seniority. The personal name was only one way of addressing a person. The more I participated in communal events, random encounters, joint Sunday mornings at the square and numerous house visits, rather than just tête-à-têtes, the more it became clear that the alternative ways to address or refer to someone are in fact prevalent within the community. While for me people would use the personal name to clarify whom they are talking about, among each other they would very rarely use it. This often resulted in funny misunderstandings, when it turned out that the person talking to me in fact does not know someone’s Bulgarian name for example. Moreover, while the Bulgarian name was a name used by the Spanish (and by extension, it was also acceptable for me to use), people would never use it to refer to each other, with only rare exceptions. So when someone did utter it in order to explain to me who is who, they would always do it in a lower voice and with an air of embarrassment and discomfort.

The two orders of personal names, then, are complemented by other systems of reference: the kin position, the nickname, and the generic respectful terms used for the elderly. Nicknames are a substitute for the personal name among people of the same cohort (i.e. seniority status). The nicknames are usually given in puberty or shortly after by friends, classmates, but elderly relatives. In this sense, the nickname expresses a trait of the character outside the realm of the kin, which is one aspect of someone’s personality. (cf. Lave 1979, Scheper-Hughes 1992, Watson 1986). Another way of referring to someone is by a mixture between a nickname and a genitive of the kin or paternal name pointing which kin this person belongs to. Among relatives, the most common way of reference is a relational kin position. This leads to simultaneous uses in the same
conversation of different kin positions referring to the same person, depending on the link this person has with the speaker. Somebody’s aunt, can be another one’s sister-in-law etc. The kin position is not something static, but exclusively relational. Finally, there is a generic way of addressing elderly people, abba and ago (for old lady and grandmother, and for old man and grandfather, respectively). Addressing (or referring to) someone elderly (i.e. from the generation of grandparents, which means above 40-45) by name is highly inappropriate, even rude. 12 This move is typical for more conservative peasant communities where using the kin name is a matter of respect and the personal name is reserved only for childhood and youth (see Humphrey 2006).

Here, I do not aim to analyse all the possible ways people refer to each other and all the meanings of these references, but rather to underline the reality of these different orders of naming which co-exist along with the personal name. Thus, the personal name remains only one of the ways to address someone and it is one among many other ways. Ultimately, within the community, as opposed to the outside world of strangers, it is mainly parents who address their children by name, and spouses to address each other. The rest of the relations are either coloured by a kin relation, by a kin descriptive term (whose child or spouse) or by a nickname. Whether this is a result of the violent re-naming and works as an escaping strategy, or the re-naming campaigns never really managed to transform people’s identity because of these multiple orders of naming, remains to be further researched. For now, I will only suggest that there might be a connection between the two.

Kin names are used to position people in a web of kin dependencies and to re-confirm the hierarchical relations between different members. Nicknames, on the other hand, help with

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12 As a stranger, I was allowed all sorts of transgressions. So, I would at first call my landlady in Brushlyan Fatma when explaining where I live to other people. One of my younger friends when telling me a story of her, called her: ‘the woman that you call Fatma”. Even though she told me it is acceptable for me to call her that way, the young girl herself could not utter the elderly lady’s name bluntly, but had to specify. Abba Alilovica (by her husband name), or just abba is the appropriate way to refer to her, I was told.
recognizing non-kin members in the sea of the very few popular names. Still, I heard from interviews on multiple occasion that nick-names became popular after the forcible state campaigns for name changing as way to avoid using the Bulgarian name in public. In this sense, the strategy of avoiding the name altogether (Bulgarian or Muslim) by using kin positions might have also been a mechanism of “name displacement” (Keane 1997), a way to ‘trick’ the imposing state.

Bringing this into the present, the dual naming strategy and the constant shifting between names becomes more intelligible. People address each other with multiple designations. The closer the circle of intimacy, the more the kin relation substitutes the personal name. The name, then, might be as well instrumental, without destroying the whole self. (cf. Bodenhorn and vom Bruck 2006). For the Spanish state people have a Bulgarian sounding name. This is a guarantee for their legal identity as Bulgarian citizens. The Muslim name is a token for their religious belonging and guarantees them a transcendental spiritual connection. The nickname is closer to the particular village community, the circle of friends and acquaintances. The nickname has a strictly local meaning. Finally, the kin relation expresses a private relation. There is a move from public to private, which can be traced through these different ways of reference. They all co-exist in the same person, and allow alternating between different self-presentations.

2.5. Why Bulgarian Muslims? Segmented identification or the non-politics of identity

The plurality of personal names mirrors in a way the complexity of the group names. How are we supposed to call Bulgarian Muslims in their plurality – are they a minority, a separate ethnicity, a culturally distinct group, a religious community? Can we group them at all and talk of boundaries between them and the rest of the citizens in the country? Are they the same as the Greek Pomaks,
the Bosniaks, the Macedonian Muslims? All these questions have no explicit or final answer neither in the Bulgarian political context, not in the academic community. On the contrary, the more one tries to pinpoint an explicit definition, the more elusive it becomes. Part of the difficulty is related to the long and complicated history this ‘group’ has had over the last century within the Bulgarian state, that I discuss at length in the next chapter. At present, Bulgarian Muslims are not a recognized minority and are not defined as an official ethnic group. While there are sporadic attempts to go forth with establishing them as a recognized minority, the majority of people are not engaged in such identity politics. In addition, Bulgaria is one of the few European countries that does not allow formations of ethnic parties. Thus, the Movement for Rights and Freedom, which is informally known as the “Turkish party”, stands as a representative of all Muslims in Bulgaria, and thus blurs attempts to create alternative political forces. Here I will only discuss groups naming, leaving the lack of organized identity politics for the next chapter.

There are many widespread names that refer to the Bulgarian speaking Muslims who live in the Rhodope Mountain and partly in the region of Teteven: Bulgarian-Mohamedans, Bulgarian Muslims, simply Muslims, Ahryani, Pomaks, even Turks. According to Evgenia Ivanova (2011) who analyses a recent sociological qualitative and quantitative study, the difficulty with coming up with a common label and group them is becoming more and more severe. She suggests, instead, talking of segments, which are geographically concentrated and divided. My own micro study fits in this aspect of her analysis. People in my village answered to the blunt question: What are you? Inevitably with “We’re Muslims”. This goes along with Ivanova’s analysis of the data. In her dataset people who live to the West, near Gotse Delchev typically call themselves Pomaks, the region around Satovcha, where the village of Brushlyan is situated, use simply Muslims, next to the East there are many examples of Turkish self-identification, and finally, those who live in the
Eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains where the majority of the population is Turkish, refer to themselves as Bulgarians. (Ivanova 2011)

Pomaks is the most well known in the English and German academic literature. Nevertheless, I have decided against it, even though it would have made me part of an academic discourse community. The main reason is that my respondents never called themselves Pomaks in my presence. Only rarely they would use Pomak as a derogative term. Not being entrepreneurial for example, allowing others to cheat you, or being backward all together would be called a “pomaska rabota” (“Pomak business”). At the same time, the idea of other, external people calling them Pomaks was regarded as offensive. I could assume that it makes a difference whether the researcher going into a minority group comes from the majority of the same state, or comes as a more neutral outsider. This might explain why foreign researchers use Pomaks as the self-designation group name, while Bulgarian researchers diverge greatly on this issue and often shy away from this denomination. Another explanation might be that each village differs from the rest, including in the use of common group denominators. Whatever the reason for my respondents to avoid using Pomak when talking of themselves (even when we were discussing the issue of the group name), it is clear that it is not an emic term. For that reason, I have decided against using it.

Nevertheless, while Ivanova’s conclusion that in the region of Brushlyan people predominantly identify themselves as “just” Muslims, I have decided against calling them that way either. Even if this is the emic answer, it might have opens way too many possibilities for misunderstandings or misconceptions. Muslim is a generic religious label, which applies to several categories in Bulgaria: the Turks, the Muslim Roma, the tiny group of Tatars, and finally, my respondents. Calling them just Muslims would masque their difference from the other groups – perceived both from the outside and from the inside. The option of calling them Bulgarian-speaking Muslims to
distinguish them from the Turkish minority is also too generic and puts the emphasis exclusively on language difference, but masks the element of citizenship status.

Bulgarian, on the other hand, is generic enough to include different aspects. In my use of Bulgarian Muslim, the adjective Bulgarian does not refer to an ethnic category, but defines the citizenship status and the spoken language. The language differentiates them from the Turkish minority. At the same time, Bulgarian as a citizenship reference is used also when talking of the Bulgarian Turks, to distinguish them from the citizens of Turkey. Moreover, the citizenship status is evoked by my respondents on various occasions and is part of their identity claims, as it was discussed above. Being a Bulgarian citizen is the key for being a European citizen as well, which is fundamental in their claim-making.

To conclude, I have chosen to use the designation Bulgarian Muslim because it reveals the heterogeneity that has been covered up until 1989 through the homogeneity logic of nationalism. It represents a critical discussion of both aspects of identity and (self-) determination – being Muslim, but not Turkish, and being Bulgarian, but not Christian. Second, it does not contain the possible pejorative or insulting overtones, which the other concepts like ‘Pomaks’ have for some people. Third, it points to the officially recognized categories with which they are being labelled by Bulgarian state institutions, census etc, and which they themselves evoke in interaction with state institutions in Spain. In this sense the category Bulgarian Muslims is wide and unspecific enough not to impose a group label, while at the same time, if thought of as pointing to a citizenship status, rather than to ethnic belonging, it can be a critique of ethnicity as a necessary category of identification and categorization. The category is particularly useful for describing the group of migrants who indeed activate and enact their Bulgarian citizenship status as a main identification strategy, while keeping their religious difference of being Muslims part of their private sphere.
Furthermore, the migratory experience of Bulgarian Muslims transforms their relationship with other Bulgarian Muslims at home and the very idea of what it is to be a Bulgarian Muslim. Due to migration into a different social context where they are not recognizable and socially labelled in the same way as at home, many Bulgarian Muslims start to downplay their cultural specificity and their Muslim identities in order to stress their Europeanness. However, this contributes to the broader process of fracture and fragmentation of their “community” in Bulgaria. Being categorized in different ways by the receiving state and the social milieu there creates a potentially different relational setting for their self-identification. At the same time this also developed the feeling of independence and empowerment from the home state (both at the level of practice and of identification).

The plurality of naming practices expresses the complex lives extending between different geographic and social spaces. Juggling with different self-references allows people to fit in their new social and institutional environments while keeping connections to what they call ‘home’ – the village community and the cultural and religious difference. What might seem as fragmentation of the self into different segments, is in fact a complex system of plural situational orders of designation, which is kept together by the community. The name as a social and legal identity functions according to a system of meanings and usages, based on circles of intimacy that expand from the smallest circle of the family through the wider kin, through the village community, to other Bulgarians and Spanish citizens as private individuals, and finally to the institutional and legal level of the state. The complex structure of multiple naming and situational identification reflects a compartmentalization of the self in different spheres of social and legal life. The different names and designations construct social boundaries and delineate spheres of interaction. The Bulgarian name is the migration name, the Muslim name and the kin and nickname designations
are the names of home. Alternating between the names keeps the different spheres apart. The phenomenon of using a Bulgarian name in more formal situations outside the community can be read as an act of reinvention and re-positioning vis-à-vis the new anonymous social context and the new state. It signifies a decision to merge with the other Bulgarian migrants putting to the fore the shared citizenship, rather than the ethnic or religious differences. In this way, religion and ethnicity remain in the private domain. Citizenship status, on the other hand, is used as the public face and as a foundation for making claims, for example for having equal rights with other EU citizens, as I explore in the following chapters.
Chapter 3: The History of a Group in Flux

The overall theme of this chapter is the process of grouping and de-grouping of the Bulgarian Muslims over the last century, as a result of the intertwining and shifting efforts of different state regimes, local elites, and the Bulgarian Muslims themselves. There is hardly any other Balkan Muslim population with more contested and constantly problematized identity, torn between imposed categories and self-identification projects. In fact, even grouping them into one narrative might be misleading, according to Mary Neuburger (2000:181). And indeed, at present the Bulgarian Muslims (also often referred to as Pomaks) would be characterized most precisely as a cluster of people with flexible group boundaries and shifting situational self-identification. At the same time, their groupness is actual to the extent that they have been subjected to various external state-crafted categorizations and policies. In addition, both the public discourse and the academic community have continuously grouped them into one category, albeit with uneasiness and with no consensus of how to name them. This conceptual and practical conundrum shapes to a great extent the ambiguous position that Bulgarian Muslims hold vis-à-vis the state and the other social and cultural groups today. For that reason, I will trace the dense, winding and often contradictory roots of the process of non-ethnification and non-politisization of their identity.

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13 Even identifying their number poses conceptual difficulties for the statisticians and the calculations are made on the basis of expert estimates. Since in the census there is no official category of Pomak or Bulgarian Muslim an estimate is being made on the basis of comparing categories of religion and ethnic identity (cross tabulating the number of Muslims with the number of Turks and Roma) in order to obtain the residual category of neither Turks, nor Christians (or others). This census operation is quite telling for the interplay of categorization and self-identification of Bulgarian Muslims.
The main part of the Bulgarian Muslims lives in the Rhodope mountain, near the border with Greece. Their number is estimated roughly to about 200 000, which is approximately 3% of the Bulgarian population (Koinova 1999; Konstantinov 1997; Tomova 2000). There are few uncontested facts about their history. It is clear however, that they are indigenous population which was Islamized during the Ottoman rule on the Balkans. They have never had the status of an official minority. This is a result of the ‘uncomfortable’ position they have occupied in the Bulgarian nation-state project. The modern Bulgarian nation-state was established in 1878 as a project of a “pure nation” without minorities (ethnic, religious, or language), which is in line with the kind of romantic nationalism based on shared language, Bulgarian, and shared religion, Orthodox Christianity. (Konstantinov 1997) The Bulgarian Muslims did not fit in this project and were instead tossed between perceptions as the “self” of the nation, who needs to be assimilated back (and christianized/bulgarianized), and the “other” of the nation, who has to be excluded and differentiated (tukisized) (Brunnbauer 2001). As a result, they have been located in a position of “ethnic marginality”, continuously being excluded both by the Bulgarian majority, for not being Christian, and by the Turkish minority, for not speaking Turkish (Karagiannis 1997, 2009). Thus the Bulgarian Muslims have been defined through double negation, but have not adopted a positive affirmative self-identification category for themselves. This has lead to a relational self-identification, which is flexible and situational, activated in interaction with other ethnic and religious categories and often aiming at blending, rather than emphasizing distinctiveness.

14 Outside Bulgaria population similar to the Bulgarian Muslims, i.e. Slavic speaking Muslims in Greece, Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey. Their status and name varies from country to country, and depends on the different nation-state politics towards minorities. (Brunnbauer 1998; Georgieva 2001).

15 Karagiannis develops the concept of ethnic marginality as “a lack of clarity of ethnic affiliation, i.e., an uncertainty and indistinctiveness of assignment between the familiar and ethnically foreign. (1999:8)
Drawing on ethnographic and historical sources I aim to construct a multi-sided picture of the way Bulgarian Muslims came to be what they are today. For that reason, I trace the different policies and discourses that the state has introduced and implemented in different periods, by analyzing on one hand the domestic political institutions and the effect of ethnic hierarchies, and on the other hand, the role of the foreign geopolitical and economic influence. At the same time, I sketch out the way Bulgarian Muslims responded to and re-worked the state intentions. First, I look at the early Bulgarian nationalism and the Christianization campaign of 1912-1913. Then I discuss the internal Bulgarian Muslim elite’s movement Rodina, which had assimilation and Bulgarization aims. The next four sections are devoted to the socialist period, drawing different aspects into the picture – the ambiguities of the early socialist regime, the efforts for transforming the everyday life, the violent re-naming campaign and the forms of resistance, and finally, the role of the socialist drive to modernization. Finally, I conclude with the post-1989 period, a time of recognition of human rights and a move towards neoliberalization of the economy and the state.

My main argument is that the state’s conception of and respective policies towards the Bulgarian Muslims have followed two distinct and parallel logics, which have intersected at the level of people’s lives. This, in its turn, has resulted in two tendencies. First, the ethnic and cultural identity of Bulgarian Muslims remained non-politicized and non-codified. In this sense, their ethnicity is still in the process of making and unmaking, which has deep historical reasons. Second, not only was their marginalized position reinforced throughout all periods, but they have also developed a position of mistrust and detachment from the state. This process continues to this date in the context of the neoliberal idea of the “self-enterprising citizen-subject” (Ong 2006:14) and has further implications for the way Bulgarian Muslims act vis-a-vis the state under conditions of migration. I borrow the notion of ‘internal orientalism’ from Louisa Schein (2000) to explain the processes of
exclusion and minoritization of Bulgarian Muslims, which are based on the presupposed and actively confirmed othering coming from the dominant majority and the state. Moreover, the economic and political disempowerment of Bulgarian Muslims can be traced also through a spatial marginalization which reflects the construction of the geography of the national identity (Jansson 2003). The tendency of internal orientalism in the pre-1989 period develops simultaneously with socialist modernization and claims of even development, which reflects a parallel state logic which applies indiscriminatively to the whole population. These two logics intersect at the level of people’s lives and create contradictions in their position vis-à-vis the state. It is these contradictions that I aim to trace in what follows.

3.1. Christianization campaigns of 1912-1913: new territories and political inabilities to conceptualize the nation

The existence of large clusters of Muslims on the Balkans is an outcome of the five centuries Ottoman rule in the region, which not only brought along Islam, but also abolished all state frontiers and enhanced population movement and interpenetration of various groups within a vast territory. Historiography has not reached agreement on whether the presence of Muslim population can be explained through colonization or conversion. The large body of literature that traces the gradual process of Islamization of the local Balkan Christian population in the Ottoman tax registers from the sixteenth century on is the most convincing in academic terms. (see Kiel 1998, Radushev 2005, Zhelyazkova 1990). However, a parallel discourse built on pseudo-historical mystifications and ideological fiction and film works insists on the rapid violent mass conversion of the population in the late seventeenth century. The outcome of the argument would have been of little significance
for the present study were it not for the fact that the position of the state vis-à-vis the Bulgarian Muslims has been predominantly legitimized on the basis of this historical interpretation.

Both explanations, albeit conflicting, concur on one point: the converts were part of the already consolidated Bulgarian ethnic group and by virtue of their conversion their ‘Bulgarianness’ was weakened or lost (Todorova 1998). In the realm of the Ottoman Empire, however, ethnicity had little importance as opposed to religion. The millet administrative division was not ethnic or territorial but primarily based on confession, which had both economic (tax relief) and military (conscription) consequences. In that way, the system dissolved ethnicity into confession (Zhelyazkova 1997:32-33) and created very clear power distinctions based on religious difference. Turk and Muslim were interchangeably used as synonyms, just as Bulgarian and Christian Signified the same for the local population (Mutafchieva 1994:19). This had repercussions in the everyday culture, generating the stereotypical negative image of the Muslim as the threatening Other who is ‘backward and uncivilized, fanatic, hostile and aggressive’ (Elchinova 2001:54).

The consolidation of the Bulgarian nation state in 1878 caused massive population exchange and migration which continued until the first decades of the twentieth century with constant remapping of the territory and of the population within it. The position of the Bulgarian Muslims in this first period was further problematized by the fact that the Bulgarian nation-state treated them as indistinguishable from the larger Muslim group and lumped them together with the group of the Turks in all censuses in the late nineteenth century – in 1880, 1885, 1888 (Todorova 1998:476).

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16 The primacy of the religious belonging is not necessarily specific for the Pax Ottomana. In Western Europe almost until mid nineteenth century the language and ethnic criteria remained politically irrelevant as opposed to the religious belonging and the social status (e.g. Anderson 1991; Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992)

17 The negative stereotypes concerning the Bulgarian Muslims were further solidified in this period by the presumed role they had in the bloody suppression of the April uprising in 1876. Additional note on the historical debate of the role that Bulgarian Muslims played in this event.
This move was one of the ways the state would handle the conceptual dissonance that the Bulgarian Muslims caused for the established language-based nationalism.\footnote{Maria Todorova argues that in this early period of nation-building in the Balkans the Christian populations began speaking among themselves the language of nationalism, whereas their attitudes toward the Muslims remained in the realm of the undifferentiated religious communities millet discourse. This is what she calls “a case of overlapping and conflicting institutional legacies.” (Todorova 1998:478)} The Turkification impulse soon came to an end with the First Balkan War in 1912-1913 and with the new geo-political issues at stake in which the Bulgarian Muslims were to play a significant, albeit passive, role.

In 1912 Bulgarian troops marched deep into Ottoman Thrace and parts of Macedonia and Greece thus including for the first time into the territory of the Bulgarian state the compact Bulgarian Muslim population of the Rhodope mountain. The newly annexed Muslim population numbered between 100 000 and 200 000 people according to different estimations (Büchsenschütz 2000; Neuburger 2000; Velinov 2001), a fact that called for immediate state attention. The state saw as its main task not only to tame the new borderlands, but also to solve the serious conceptual problem that the new population created for the nation-state. While until then the smaller number of Bulgarian Muslims in the country were shoved towards blending with the Turkish minority (identification that was to a great extent their own choice too), the stake suddenly rose significantly. Proving that this population is purely Bulgarian was a question of proving that the territory is also purely Bulgarian.

Based on the logic of the religious-language nationalism, the first step towards incorporation of the new citizens was a mass forced Christianization campaign, the so called Krastilka. It was carried out by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in collaboration with the army and local police. The initiative was supported by the head of the state – Tsar Ferdingnad and by the government. People were forcefully baptized en masse at the central squares of villages and towns and given a new
Christian name (Radushev 2005). In addition to the new religion and the new Christian name, Bulgarian Muslims had to replace certain items of their attire – the fez, the turban and the “veil” – with Bulgarian hats and scarves (Neuburger 2004). Merging together belief, name and the external semiotic codes of identification would be the main state strategy for incorporation and assimilation for the next almost 80 years. For several months in 1912 and 1913 more than 150 000 Bulgarian Muslims in the Rhodope mountain were Christianized and renamed. The public did not hear much of this, while the archives of the Orthodox Church and the official report to the government present a “voluntary and cheerful”, even “desired” conversion back to the Bulgarian roots and to the lost Christian faith (Georgiev and Trifonov 1995).

As a result of the Second Balkan War in 1913 Bulgaria lost much of the newly occupied territory, although it did manage to expand considerably.¹⁹ This however, put an end to the Christianization campaign. Already in July 1913 the new government of Vasil Radoslavov restored the minority status of the Bulgarian Muslims and allowed them to revert to Islam and to their Turco-Arabic names. The reasons behind the government decision were two-fold. Domestically, the liberal coalition of Radoslavov managed to win the election owing to the votes of the Bulgarian Muslims based on the promise of restoring their freedom of religion and their old names. Internationally, Bulgaria was pressed to guarantee the rights of freedom of religion and cultural autonomy of its Muslims. According to Velinov (2001:86-87) in this period the Bulgarian Muslims were instrumentalized as a token for international territorial and peace negotiations with Greece and Turkey, while at the same time were regarded as a risk factor for the unity of the state. In this sense,

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¹⁹ Note on the protests against land division into two states which would lead to irrevocable changes in the livelihood of the population of the region, which is relying on the “Greek” pastures in the winter and on the “Bulgarian” mountains in the summer. The delegations were insisting the border should pass either near Maritsa (Central Bulgaria), or include Aegean Thrace (Northern Greece). The result is that the interruption of the landscape had indeed changed the means of living turning them from stock breeders into land cultivators.
in this first period the battle over who and whose the Bulgarian Muslims are is a geopolitical battle for territories more than anything else.

Left unbothered for a while by the church and the state, the Bulgarian Muslims continued being a burning question for the academics, who posited their Buglarianness drawing on pre-war ethnographic and historical evidence. Meanwhile, an almost unnoticed campaign, supported by the academia, lead to a great number of geographic name changes, replacing the “foreign” place names with “original” Bulgarian ones (Neuburger 2000). The Bulgarization of the exteriors of Bulgarian Muslims’ life was soon followed by a group name transformation. While in the census of 1905 the category Pomak appeared for the first time (as an alternative to Turk for the Bulgarian Muslims), in the 1930’s the ethnographer Stoyu Shishkov (1936) was already advocating and replacing it with the term “Bulgarian-Mohammedans”. Shishkov’s attempts to prove the essential Bulgarianness in rites and language of the Bulgarian Muslims crystallized in the next assimilation, which this time started as a grassroots movement.

3.2. Assimilation inside-out. The organization “Rodina” and the grassroots movement for Bulgarization

The change of the government in 1934 lead to new structural transformations in the political system of the state, which had implications for the policies regarding the Bulgarian Muslims. The strong centralized state power established control over its citizens with the support of the army, the unified

20 Shishkov portrayed the Bulgarian Muslims as speaking the ‘most pure dialect of old-Slavic’. He also insisted that all aspects of Bulgarian Muslims’ culture that concide with those of the Bulgarian Christians are real and organic proof for their nativeness, while everything else is foreign imposed under the Ottoman rule.
administration, and the educational reforms. In this phase of state nationalism, as described by Hobsbawm (1992), the main task of the government was to transform the population into a nation, based on shared language. In this context, Bulgarian Muslims became a demographic resource for the development of the nation. Their ‘nationalization’ was a question of marking the symbolic geography of the national space.

While the first attempt to erase the Bulgarian Muslim difference and incorporate them into the Bulgarian nation was imposed from above, the next campaign started as an internal movement among the Bulgarian Muslim elite. In 1937 the organization Rodina (Motherland), a Bulgarian-Mohammedan cultural-educational and charitable association was founded in a small town in the Western Rhodope mountain by a group of educated Bulgarian Muslims with strongly manifested Bulgarian identification. The main goals of the organization were: ‘to work for the mutual cooperation and support between Bulgarian Mohammedans and Bulgarian Christians in the Rhodope Mountain’; ‘to facilitate the awakening and developing of a national (narodnostno) self-consciousness in the Bulgarian Mohammedans; ‘to cultivate love towards the motherland’, as well as ‘to protect them from any external propaganda and foreign influences’ (quoted in (Gruev 2003a:236). In other words, the organization wanted to foster Bulgarian ethnic consciousness and eradicate any Turkish leanings among the Bulgarian Muslims. The main motivation was de-marginalization of the group and hence upward group mobility which according to the Rodina activists was only possible through complete incorporation in the Bulgarian nation. (Todorova 1998:477)

Following the language-based concept of the nation-state already promoted in the public discourse, Rodina attempted to bridge the existing religious difference through language unity and to replace the previous predominantly religious identity with ethnic/national consciousness. After the
unsuccessful outcome of the 1912-1913 Christianization, the religious difference remained intact this time. The assimilation attempt was carried out on two levels: eliminating any linguistic Turkish or Arabic signs (i.e. worship language and names), and modifying the traditional costume from “foreign” (i.e. Ottoman/Turkish) to Bulgarian one. In the course of seven years the organization managed to introduce Bulgarian language worship in the mosques, to translate the Koran in Bulgarian, and to promote the creation of wider local elite by enrolling Bulgarian Muslims into secondary and higher education establishments. At the same time, already in 1938 actions for ‘de-fezzing’ of the men and in 1940 for ‘de-veiling’ of the women spread all around the Rhodope mountains. They were followed by a further step of interference in the private life – encouragement to cease the practice of circumcision. Moreover, in 1942 Rodina embarked on a new name-changing campaign offering lists of names which were considered Bulgarian, but not Christian.21

By September 1944, when the campaign was terminated by the new communist government, two thirds (around 60 000 of the Bulgarian Muslim population in the Central and Western Rhodope mountain had changed their names. (Konstantinov 1992a)

Even though Rodina’s efforts started off as peaceful voluntary inside-out assimilation attempts, it soon became clear the political regime had a very similar agenda and was willing to support any of the proposed activities. Some historians even argue that in fact Rodina was not consolidated as a spontaneous grassroots organization of the local elite, but was initiated and supported since the onset by certain political circles and the government apparatus (see Gruev 2003a; Velinov 2000). While the Rodina members changed their attire and their names publicly to make a statement for the rest of the population which was expected to follow suit, the general enthusiasm was very low.

21This move created a new type of name segregation between Bulgarian Christians and Bulgarian Muslims, which I will discuss at length in the next chapter on the meaning of the name.
The appeal to throw the fez and replace it with a hat failed completely, which prompted the initiation of a rather forceful campaign backed up by the police. A similar line of action was followed in the re-naming campaign, which was welcomed only by Rodina members. Backed by the government with a law for mandatory name change for the “Bulgarian Mohammedans” voted in 1942 the subsequent actions resembled very much the fast operation in 1912-1913. In the meantime, the regime made sure that all imams and local political representatives gradually become exclusively Rodina members (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). In addition to that, a plenitude of ethnographic and journalistic works proving the Bulgarianness of the Bulgarian Muslims, written by the organization members, were published and widely disseminated. At the same time, the regime used Rodina and its links to the local communities, however ambivalent, to support all key wartime legislation, such as the “Law for the purity of the nation” which prohibited mixed marriages between Bulgarians and foreigners, including those between Bulgarian Muslims and Turks, heretofore very common (Neuburger 2000:188)

Rodina’s claim of non-distinctiveness of the Bulgarian Muslims from the majority, a trope that kept reoccurring in all the later enforced or voluntary ‘identity reforms’, in fact prompted a plenitude of transformations in the Bulgarian Muslims livelihood. According to Neuburger (2000:189) the constellations of reforms ‘sought to reweave the fabric of Bulgarian Muslims life and hence reshape the geography of Bulgarian Muslims districts in the Bulgarian image. Rodina’s aspiration towards Bulgarianness as a way out of marginalization and poverty in fact created a symbolic dichotomy between the modernized and advanced Bulgarians and the backward Muslims. Everything that was ‘Bulgarian’ came to be a synonym of modern and developed, while everything

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22The importance of the hat – link with the communists’ campaign for changing the ‘bourgeois’ hat with a cap (casket)
that was ‘Muslim’ (or Turkish) was a signifier for the old Ottoman legacy. An outcome of this symbolic move was also the newly imposed group name *Bulgarian Mohammedans*, which replaced the previous *Pomaks* (suggesting distinct ethnic identity) and completely refuted the option *Turks* as self-identification. Finally, the internal elite aspirations for blending with the majority as a way for vertical mobility rather than attempting to politicize a distinct ethnic identity set the tone for the future role that they played in the complicated relations between the minority, the majority, and the state.

### 3.3 Early socialist ambiguities

The socialist period was marked by the apparent inconsistent approach of the state towards the Bulgarian Muslims. There were several waves of assimilation campaigns which targeted different aspects of the Bulgarian Muslims difference. These campaigns were as a whole ostensibly successful by the end of the socialist period, but at the same time were met with various forms of resistance. At the same time, the homogenization efforts and the often violent measures were accompanied by a general ‘modernization and progress’ set of policies. The interplay of two state logics, restriction and interference on one hand, and development and privileges on the other, that existed parallel to each other, intersected at the level of people’s lives and were experienced as confusing and inconsistent. This has repercussions in the way Bulgarian Muslims re-evaluate the past from today’s perspective. The socialist period is discussed through four complementary perspectives: the early period of ambiguous policies, the transformation of the everyday life, the violent massive assimilation actions and forms of resistance, and finally, the modernization and de-peasantization efforts of the state.
The coup from the 9th of September 1944 with which the communist party came to power set a new era in the state politics towards the Bulgarian Muslims, but with important continuities. The new affinity with the Soviet Union implied a certain harmonization with the practice on the ‘national question’. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) translated the Soviet model in relation to the Muslim minorities by trying to bring Bulgarian Muslims and Turks into the party structures and at the same time offer Turks resources for their own ‘national’ development. Bulgarian Muslims on the other hand were not considered a minority population, but an integral part of the nation, albeit with special needs because of its ‘backward’ state (Eminov 1990). As Neuburger points out, “in the course of the Communist period, it became increasingly clear that Bulgarian Communism was not about moving beyond nationalism… instead nationalism would become the tool with which Communism would pave Bulgaria’s new ‘road to modernization’. (Neuburger 2000:190) In other words, the attempts to build a homogenous nation composed of non-distinct population continued. However, the steps of the state in the period between 1944 and 1970 were faltering and often inconsistent.

In the early post-WW II years the Bulgarian Muslim population was again treated as a political resource. In order to win its support, the ruling BCP completely discarded the ‘integration’ course of the previous regime and quickly restored the withdrawn rights of free choice of name, traditional attire, and confessional language. In exchange, the Bulgarian Muslims did indeed vote in its majority (over 90 percent) for the Bulgarian Communist Party. The organization Rodina and its members were denounced as ‘Fascist’ by virtue of their association with the pre-war regime. Interestingly enough, the leaders of Rodina proved to be rather chameleon-like politically in their immediate conversion to a pro-Communist position. The party, however, did not allow them to
enter the power structures even in the 1970’s and 1980’s when ‘the spirit and form’ of *Rodina* campaigns would be resurrected. (Gruev and Kalionski 2008).

The external factors, especially the international position of Greece, played a great role in the early policies of the state. As in the period after the First World War, Greece sent a Pomak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in order to support its territorial pleas for Bulgaria. While the initial acts of the state aimed at proving to the international community that all human and minority rights are being observed, soon the border Bulgarian Muslims population started to be perceived as unreliable. The creation of numerous illegal groups of Bulgarian Muslims assisting the border crossing contributed immensely for this new perception of the Bulgarian Muslims as ‘unfaithful’ to the Bulgarian nation-state. The state responded by a twofold action. First, in 1948-1950 over 10,000 Bulgarian Muslims were relocated by force from the border lands to the interior territories, a practice rather similar to the Soviet model of dealing with ‘problematic population’ (see Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). In the meantime, the industrialization of the new socialist state included opening of a great number of (uranium) mines in the Rhodope region which triggered an opposite wave of immigration in the region of Bulgarian workers and experts. Thus, not only the economic, but also the demographic structure of the region was transformed. What is more, these restructuring of the economic and social landscape of the region were part of the larger process of transforming the Rhodope peasantry into a new working class and ‘builders of socialism’ (Konstantinov 1992a).

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23 The whole territory stretching from the Rhodopi mountain to the Aegean sea had a high economic significance for stock breeding which was seasonally dispersed in the mountain and in the valley. The new border disrupted this economic activity (Gruev 2003a:260-261)

24 The population relocations in fact created enclaves of Bulgarian Muslims in several areas in the Central and Northern Bulgaria, which kept their kin network with the community in the Rhodope mountain and remained relatively isolated from the rest of the Christian population in the region. (see more in (Konstantinov 1992a).
The second aspect of ‘taming’ the border population was the creation and special regulation of the borderzone. The socialist border with Greece, i.e. the border between the Socialist world and the West, was “an embodiment of the state and the nation politically, economically and symbolically” (Mihaylova 2003:49). A borderzone going 25 kilometres inside the country was created. After the relocation of ‘dangerous and suspicious families’, the rest of the population was geographically bound to the zone and immobilized, thus being isolated both from the outside and the inside of the state. Entering and leaving the border area was only possible with special one-time permission documents.25 This strategy caused further withdrawal into the immediate village community among the Bulgarian Muslims. Along with imposing restraint and control, however, the border population also received rewards and small privileges for remaining in the region and for being loyal to the state. In different periods until 1989, the border population received additional ‘border money’, exemption from taxes, sometimes bills for electricity and water, and higher salaries. In addition, in the massively produced propaganda literature on border theme, ordered by the regime, the frontier was described as the encompassing line of the motherhood flesh which had to be protected by its sons. (Mihaylova 2003:50) The “sons” were the border guards who were necessarily Bulgarians from the majority, but the Muslim population was forced to join special units ‘voluntarily’ as support, thus being kept on the margins, neither in, nor outside the nation-state. The border policies are an epitome of the experienced ‘politics of the stick and the carrot’. While the ‘politics of the stick’ constantly reminded Bulgarian Muslims of their partial belonging to the nation, the ‘politics of the carrot’ balanced this by binding them tightly to the state. (Creed 1998:273)

25The movement of the population was restricted not only to the interior territory, but also along the border line. Going from one border municipality to another was only possible through the internal land, with the special documents.
Another aspect of taming the minorities, while at the same time keeping the power divide, were the notorious Construction Corps in the army, which were created in 1920, but continued to function even after 1989, and thus link and demonstrate a continuity between the state policies in the different periods. After the First World War the government introduced labour duty for the whole population to help reconstruct the state’s losses during the war. This was institutionalized through creating the Construction Corps, which was an alternative for army conscription. There was a particular link with ethnicity, based on the conception that the ‘unreliable’ ethnic element of the country should not be allowed to participate in the guard of the national security. This was reflected in Law for General Military Service regulating who will be conscripted for the Construction Corps: 1. people with restricted abilities for military service; 2. persons with proven anti-social or anti-national activities (i.e. people who have received sentences for criminal or political offences); 3. representatives of ethnic minorities; 4. others. Under the fourth brief category would fall all those considered potentially unloyal to the Communist party. Thus, the Corps in fact had ethnically discriminatory and at the same time punitive character. (Konstantinov 1992b:93) Bulgarian Muslims were conscripted to the Construction Corps along with the Roma and Turks. This demonstrates the contradictions in the various acts of the state, that was alternating homogenization campaigns with such divisions which underlined the difference of the group. The policy not only had ethnic isolationist effect, but also distorted the composition of the police and army units, where it used to be almost impossible to find officers from a minority group. The message of the Construction Corps, as Konstantinov underlines, is that not only certain minorities are officially treated as unreliable and used for cheap labour, but also that merging together minorities with criminal and political offenders “de facto equalizes minority Islamic status with that of a criminal” (1992b:84). However, a side effect of the Construction Corps was the transformations in the employment and practical skills of the minority groups. They were
responsible for major construction works like building railway lines, roads, mines and water reservoirs. Most young men received professional qualification as construction workers, drivers, crane- and tractor-operators, engineers etc, which in many cases turned into the main source of income later on. In this sense, the Construction corpse were a professionalization unit as well. This counternarrative translates the discriminatory state as in fact caring and securing a means of living.

Parallel to these transformations was the continuing group categorization confusion. A curious moment in the inconsistent state vision was the census from 1946. The Bulgarian Workers Party advanced the Comintern thesis of the ‘Macedonian nation’ as an official state doctrine which turned the census in a political question\(^\text{26}\). The imposed from above required percentage for the category ‘Macedonian’ resulted in forcible enlisting of one third of the Western Rhodope mountain Bulgarian Muslim population as Macedonians. In the other regions they were allowed to register as Pomaks. The category ‘Macedonian’ contributed to the ‘terminological pluralism’ already confusing the population in the region and, as Gruev argues, was one more hindrance to the formation of a clear self-identification (Gruev 2003a:252). What is more, it demonstrates the arbitrariness in the categorization strategies of the state vis-à-vis the Bulgarian Muslims.

3.4. Transformation of the everyday: state interference in the intimate sphere

The first part of homogenization and modernization efforts of the state spread over the everyday practices of the Bulgarian Muslims. After a period of relative tolerance towards the external

\(^{26}\) The ‘Macedonian nation’ thesis.
distinctiveness of Bulgarian Muslims the state resorted back to the earlier assimilation campaigns strategies. The first re-dressing attempts of the communist regime have already started in 1958 for the celebrations of the 9th of September, the new communist national holiday, but were abandoned a few weeks after. According to Gruev (2003b) this has set the trend of the ambivalent state practice to alternate brutal mass assimilation campaigns with temporary partial retreats, which created a feeling of constant confusion and hope that each action is final. Moreover, each time the state pressure loosened the bans were ignored and the old practices were re-introduced. This only resulted in even more ruthless subsequent actions, which distanced the Bulgarian Muslims population from the state and at the same time instead of blending them with the majority, in fact lead to self-isolation and withdrawal into the community.

The re-dressing forceful reforms continued in the following years and were euphemistically called ‘cultural revolution’. They were framed as modernization efforts of the state, coming along with other assets like mass education and industrialization. In this context, the change of the attire was formulated as a ‘care’ act, rather than violation of the individual or group identity markers/everyday practices. The re-dressing policies of the early 1960’s, particularly in 1956 and then between 1960 and 1964, were implemented with unseen fervour and involved violent measures. This time the main goal was the women’s attire. Various bans on public spaces access were imposed on women who refused to remove their veils or change the traditional shalvari with skirts. Access to shops, inter-village public transport, administration and health institutions was only allowed to ‘modern’ dressed women. The campaign was implemented also by pressuring men through arresting them for not having bought dresses for their wives. There were also local committees formed to inspect the evening gatherings of women. Sudden check-ups would be made in people’s gardens and houses. In this sense, the invasion of the personal space was full. At the same time, for those who
conformed voluntarily and peacefully, there were small incentives – public celebrations, a village truck, money for building a school (see more in Gruev and Kalyonski 2008).

The meaning of the attire for the conservative rural Bulgarian Muslim population in this period was highly symbolic. Each element signified certain social position in terms of confession, social status, family status, and age. In this sense, transforming certain or all aspects of the attire was not only an act of homogenization with the majority, but also an act of breaking the symbolic fabric of the traditional small community and weaving it anew as a socialist unified nation, where each individual is equal and identical with the others. Nonetheless, the state project did not succeed as in so many other aspect of creating the ‘socialist individual’. In its efforts to eliminate the external semiotic codes of difference – the veil, the yashmak (headscarf), the shalvares, the local version of niqab (a traditional black or brown robe worn open over the other clothes), the state stimulated unconsciously a new form of unification apparel which differentiated the members of the group from the majority. Thus the niqab was replaced unanimously with a dark raincoat or a blue or brown working robe (usually worn by factory workers) and the shalvares were substituted by trousers or sweatpants, and instead of yashmak women started wearing white kerchiefs. Men replaced the fez and the turban with berets (cap). By the 1970’s this has become the new ‘uniform’ for the Muslim population reinforced by the lack of choice in the village shops. In their ‘new clothes’ the Bulgarian Muslims kept differing from the rest of the population and looking alike among themselves. Thus, as Gruev and Kalyonski (2008:34) formulate it, ‘a new socialist
widespread Muslim costume was created, which endured throughout the socialist period without much transformations.  

Transforming the material/physical culture as a step towards modernization was used as justification also for the abolishment of the circumcision practice. In 1959 the Ministry of Health issued an order prohibiting circumcision to be made outside the hospitals and by non-medical personnel. The ‘patients’ were supposed to also be hospitalized for 2-3 days after the ‘operation’. In this way the state turned the initiation ritual of circumcision into a purely physical and medical act, stripping all religious and social meaning from it. This was the first step towards the full criminalization of the practice. The last (already illegal) public and mass circumcision happened in 1964 with more than 50 000 people participating in it according to the State Security Service archives. A probably highly exaggerated number, which however demonstrates the transformation of the act into a common shared event for the whole Rhodope mountain region. In this sense, the threat of the collective identity once more resulted in a more tight consolidation of a community. This event was interrupted by the police forces and became a turning point in the position of the state towards the circumcision. From the mid 1960’s on the courts started to sentence not only the non-medical religious circumcisers, but also the parents of the circumcised children for slight or medium physical injury. What followed were kindergarten and school check-ups of boys whose fathers were fined or even fired from their jobs if the child was circumcised. The state literally entered the private/intimate life of the individual trying to make everyone conform to the same

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27 In fact, most of its components were kept even after 1989, when the bans on the dress code were lifted. The widespread costume (especially among the elderly) remained pretty much the same, with the exception of the reintroduction of shalvari instead of trousers.

28 In addition, the medical personnel were exclusively non-Muslim. As Gruev and Kalyonski have noted, this means complete elimination of the initiation act from the religious Muslims due to its transition into hands that are ‘clean’ from a medical point of view, but ‘unclean’ from a religious point of view (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:37).

29 State Security Service is the direct translation for the Secret Service during the Socialist regime.

30 The reason for the interruption was the claim that there was a Turkish flag waved at the ceremony.
socialist ideal even in the bodily practices. Moreover, as Neuburger (2004:113) argues, the circumcision as a creation of physical difference was also interpreted as a “disfigurement and infection of the ‘Bulgarian’ body – and by extension the Bulgarian nation – that was at stake”.

The anti-circumcision campaign was part of the general anti-Islam, and by extension anti-religious movement, which also included the closing down and even demolition of mosques in a later period, ban on public religious rituals like mevlut and Kurban celebrations. The state even managed to change everyday practices like the weekly market day, moving it from Friday to Saturday in order to prevent larger gatherings on the day for prayer. These anti-religious reforms started a decade after the massive attack against the Orthodox Christians. In other words, the policies regarding the Bulgarian Muslims were not always specifically developed just for them, but did come in particular periods of time, which indeed intensified the sense of separateness and difference. Nevertheless, the attempts to eradicate religious practices were not only framed as a move towards modernization, but also as a way to consolidate the nation in its unity and homogeneity.

3.5. Forms of violence, forms of resistance

By the 1960’s Bulgarian Muslim names, as markers of both personal and cultural identity, had again become the target of intense state-directed name-changing reforms. The campaign was at first rather unsystematic partly because of the differing voices in the ruling Communist party and partly because of the regime’s inability to implement it on the local level. The measures were introduced in different villages in different periods with varying degrees of force and resistance throughout the 1960’s. But the most large-scale and all-encompassing campaign took place only
in 1971-1974. The earlier campaigns were to a large extent theoretically ‘voluntary’ and were directed mostly at giving new-born babies strictly Bulgarian names and changing the names of the young students in school. Besides that, the emphasis was mainly on local party functionaries, agricultural cooperatives (TKZS) leaders, and teachers. Each renaming act was made public and celebrated and accompanied by enhancement of the system of small privileges. (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008). The elites’ choice to conform was a repetition of the earlier attempts of Rodina members to blend with the dominant majority through self-assimilation. However, this time the extent to which they were forced into conformity and brought into the work of the state was unprecedented. (Neuburger 2000:191) The elite members were not only the educated and administratively well positioned figures, they were also opinion leaders, whose actions did influence the formation of new public inclinations and set a certain trend in regard to the name-changing issue. (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:48-49)

A major turning point in the first large-scale re-naming campaign was the case of the village of Ribnovo in 1964. Already in 1962 the party took decision to expand the ‘persuasion methods’ by involving the army and the police, thus turning the so called voluntary renaming into an open act of coercion. Trucks of administrators, border guards and other military personnel were sent to the villages in the Western Rhodope region. Nevertheless, the abrupt and mass action met various degrees of resistance in a number of villages. Most dramatic was the case of Ribnovo, a big village, high in the mountain, stereotyped as a highly ‘conservative and religious to the extent of fanatism, and Turkophile’. (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:52). The whole population of the village had gathered at the square and attacked the task force with axes, stones and wooden clubs and managed to force them out of the village. A police officer and a soldier were wounded and kept hostage for a while. The Christian teachers and their families were forced out of the village. A Turkish flag was hung
on the mosque minaret. All connections with the rest of the country were cut and the bridge on the main road was blown. The culmination was the declaration of the “Independent Republic of Ribnovo”.

The news of the Ribnovo upheaval spread quickly and other villages joined the actions against the re-naming operation. A large group of women had thrown stones at the re-naming unit, after asked to turn over the old passport in order to be issues new ones with Bulgarian names. In addition to the local violent initiatives, a delegation of men managed to leave the region and go to Sofia with a protest note to the central authorities and the Turkish embassy. (Neuburger 2004) Thus, the resistance of the population of one village had become an organized movement of the whole Bulgarian Muslim population, thus once more enhancing the groupness of the Bulgarian Muslims who consolidated themselves as a community through solidarity and resistance. The upheaval wave was cut by a party decision to reverse the re-naming process for the time being. A party delegation was sent to Ribnovo. The villagers were assured that there will be no consequences and that they can keep their old names. The local committee methods were criticized and presented as a misunderstanding. ‘Renaming is a matter of own consciousness and good will,” and not a forced act, was the main message of the party representative. (ЦДАр ф. 1 Бр оп. 6, а.е. 5454, л.26-27 in Gruev and Kalyonski 2008:54). Thus, one event became the turning point and stopped the re-naming campaign of 1962-1964.

The next mass campaign was implemented only eight years later, in 1972. In 1970 BCP took a decision to continue “improving the social conditions, clearing the class and party consciousness, and developing patriotic education among the Bulgarian Muslims”, while at the same time embarking on another name-changing campaign. (Büchsenschütz 2000). This time the campaign was supported by media publications and mass propaganda actions. In addition, wide spread ‘soft
measures’ for persuasion of hesitating individuals were brought through the workplace where the failure to present a new passport resulted in loss of jobs and all the accompanying social benefits (Neuburger 2000). Nevertheless, the few cases of protests and upheaval were suppressed with harsher acts of violence, many arrests and even several death sentences. A protest procession to Sofia was brutally dispersed with 2 people killed and 50 injured.31 In the village of Madan, where for several days thousands of men and women gathered on the square. In Barutin the biggest part of the men, most of whom worked in the uranium mine, refused to be re-named, and were therefore collectively taken directly from the mine to the nearby town where they were severely beaten and forced to rename. Those who refused were sent to jail or interned. The protests in the village were bloodily dispersed with the support of tanks. Similar events happened in several other villages in the Western Rhodope, where there were attempts for active resistance. The culmination which also came to be the epilogue of the violent operations took place in the village of Kornitsa. Prepared better than in the earlier case of Ribnovo, the authorities developed a strategic deployment of forces to crash the expected organized resistance of the village. There were several people killed and many were arrested. With this incident the most violent and massive renaming campaign had come to an end in 1974.32

As these stories of protests and open confrontation demonstrate, there was a lot of active resistance as a response to the massive and violent campaign. As much as it is justified and comprehensible, the organized active collective uprising of the ‘weak’ against the hegemonic attempts of the state

31 See the Amnesty International Report: Bulgaria, p. 27, RFE Bulgarian Situation Report 5, 21.2.1973, p. 4 and 7 as quoted in (Büchsenschütz 2000:57)
32 Hundreds of people were arrested and kept in jail for many years without a sentence. More than five hundred of the arrested were sent into the re-opened labour camp Belene on an island in the Danube. Belene was built in the very early years of the socialist period in order to accommodate the numerous political prisoners. It was closed down in 1956 only to be reopened in the 1970’s for the Bulgarian Muslims, and then once more in 1984 for the Turks.
proved to be an unsuccessful strategy for changing the general direction of state actions. There were, however, other forms of hidden resistance throughout the period, which were more subtle, while at the same time more enduring. One line was the development of so-called ‘vernacular academic attempts’ to re-invent the history and origin of the group. The state education policies have managed to create wider local elite which in this period produced parallel clandestine versions of the history which were one more way for grouping and creating an individual historical path for the Bulgarian Muslims (Konstantinov 1997:56).

Another course of opposing the name-change in particular were the various strategies for uses and dis-uses of the old and new names, an aspect which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. An even more discreet form of interplay between the imposed changes and the traditional practices can be seen in the adjustment of Muslims rites into the socialist secular system of holidays. For example the kurban, the ritual slaughtering of a ram- traditionally at the end of the Ramazan period, but also on other occasions, was strictly forbidden and hindered in all possible ways (including through numbering the cattle in the agricultural cooperative). A way of circumventing the ban was attuning the occasions with the socialist festivities and secretly warning everyone that the meat is consecrated (Karamihova 2003:93). In this way, the link between this world and the transcendent which the kurban holds was preserved, albeit in a slightly modified way. The creation of a new dress code discussed earlier, which ostensibly conformed to the new regulations, but in fact recreated the old traditional parameters and status distinctions of the community, is another way of hidden resistance. (cf Neuburger 2000b). These examples aimed at fleshing out the complicated interplay of violence and pressure for conformity which the state imposed on the Bulgarian Muslims in order to homogenize them with the rest of the nation and the corresponding forms of resisting to these attempts. The outcome of these counter-movements was a consolidation of a
group which did not necessarily exist as such in the earlier periods. In this sense, the nation-state project, especially in the socialist period, created a minority group by trying to eradicate and deny its distinctiveness.\footnote{In 1984 the state initiated another assimilation campaign against the Turks this time. It got the name Revival process. Even though it was primarily directed against Turks, there were some re-namings taking place among Bulgarian Muslims again. Just to reassure its positions, but also in an attempt to erase the possible remnants of Turco-Arabic names, some people’s Bulgarian names were changed into even ‘more Bulgarian’ ones. In a way, this secondary re-naming wave reminded the Bulgarian Muslims more of their (religious) similarities with the Turks, rather than homogenize them more with the rest of the Bulgarians. With its assimilation strategies the Bulgarian state in fact constructed a community of shared suffering, which encompassed both Bulgarian Muslims and Turks standing against the majority, which was identified with the state not only because of the power positions in the administration, but also because many of its members supported the assimilation campaigns, and participated in them.}

### 3.6. A parallel logic: socialist modernization and ‘even development’

Socialist modernization processes spread over the whole nation, including its margins. Among the Bulgarian Muslims the main objective of the modernization process was framed as ‘de-peasentization’ and ‘civilization’. (Mihaylova 2003) The whole Rhodope mountain region, which was predominantly rural and rather poor, was subjected to rapid development measures. Industrialisation was one side of this process. Uranium and ore mines were developed in the whole region, factories and workshops of various sizes were established in almost every village, dams and water reservoirs were built. The land was nationalized and grouped in larger collective farms, TKZS (Trudovo Kooperativno Zemedelso Stopansvo). Thus most people had full time ‘state’ jobs as miners, drivers or factory workers, or were employed in the administration. Very few people remained full time farmers, even though tobacco was massively cultivated in the region.\footnote{Tobacco cultivation was in fact considered as overtime work for the weekends, holidays and before and after work (sometimes all night long) and was considered a second category and a ‘woman’s job’ (Mihaylova 2006:58). It also brought extra money, which considerably raised the living standards of the Bulgarian Muslim and Turkish population} With all these measures, the socialist state was striving to transform the peasant into a member of the
working class. Indeed, through collectivization the link with the own land (and stock) was broken, and with introduction of state jobs the pace of life and time management had changed. In this way the state managed to disengage local Bulgarian Muslims identity from a pure farmer identity and simultaneously proclaimed agriculture as a retrograde activity, slowing the socialist progress (Creed 1998:273). In this sense, in this period the socialist state managed to transform the main means of living and the actual everyday working patterns of the people living in the region (Gruev and Kalyonski 2008).

The 1960’s brought another aspect of the modernization process - the raising of the living standards and educational level. New roads and tunnels were built all through the mountain terrain. Central sewerage system was constructed and reliable supply of water and electricity was secured. In addition, the state invested in building bigger and better equipped administrative and school buildings in the villages. The private houses also transformed immensely under the influence of the ‘model projects’ of the socialist architecture. The one-two-room houses expanded to two- or three-storeys buildings, with the cattle-shed separated from the actual living space, while the toilets became part of the house. All these transformations were not at all specific for the Bulgarian Muslims, but they did come one generation later. Thus the aim of even development was achieved even in these considered as extremely ‘backward’ regions. Finally, the level of education rised significantly from the 1930’s when the biggest part of the Bulgarian Muslim population in the region was still illiterate. With state subsidies, special school and university quotas for the border population, and additional incentives (higher benefits and salaries) and scholarships the state managed to raise the percentage of people with secondary education substantially. The social benefits, non-existent before 1944, and tightly associated with the ‘state jobs’ included free healthcare, high pensions, long paid leaves etc. All these aspects are particularly important for the
present conceptions of what is a ‘good state’, what is a ‘caring state’, and what are the attributes of ‘citizenship’, which are discussed in later ethnographic chapter.

Even though the modernization processes were common for the whole territory and population, the divide with the dominant majority was still present in the distribution of power. The key positions of power, such as leaders of the municipal party organizations, heads of the co-operative farm (TKZS), and higher administrative positions in the city halls were allocated only to Bulgarian Christians. Even in the late socialism period, when a small but faithful Bulgarian Muslim elite was formed, the top positions of local power still remained inaccessible. In this way the actual everyday interaction with the state was distributed along an “us-them” which was expressed in the understanding that “they” had an “intimate and advantageous relationship to the state, while “we” remained subject to its power.” (Mihaylova 2003:49) As in the case of managing the border, the Bulgarian Muslims were put in the position of assistants. Interestingly enough, according to one of the etymologies of Pomaks, the alternative group name, means ‘helpers’ (of the Ottoman state in controlling the Christians). A quote from the ethnographic material of Dimitrina Mihaylova illustrates this tension: „We are Pomaks, that is Helpers, we have always been left helping the states, never allowed to lead.“ (2003:51). In this sense, the continuing re-creation of marginality was silently present even in the state attempts for modernization, development and de-peasantization.

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35 Bulgarian Christians as a designation for the majority population is in fact an incorrect term for this period, due to the communist regime’s atheistic stance, but is used here for the sake of clarity.
3.7. Human rights and neoliberal predicaments: the post-1989 walk into ‘the age of migration’

The time after the collapse of state socialism was marked by two diverging paths of the transformed relationship between the Bulgarian Muslims and the state. While the new democratic state quickly terminated all legal repressive campaigns and measures against its minorities, the economic hardships related to the falling apart of the socialist centralized economy and the gradual development of a neoliberal governance placed them in yet another marginalized position. The legislation was changed as to grant ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic freedom to all citizens. However, the Constitution treats ethnic and religious minorities on an individual, not on a collective basis, which leads to certain restrictions (Koinova 1999:148). The change in the legislation opened once more the Bulgarian Muslims identity for redefinition. Shortly after 1989 Bulgarian Muslims massively returned their Turco-Arabic names, there was a wave of re-introduction of traditional clothes, mosques were rebuilt and re-opened and religious practices restored. Islamic influences and funding for new mosques and for the education of students in theology in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, resulted in the ramification of different levels of rigorousness in practicing and different understandings of what does it mean to be a good Muslims. At the same time, Bulgarian Muslims nevert seriously attempt to receive an ethnic minority status and remained categorized by the state only

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36 For example, the formation of political parties along ethnic or religious lines is prohibited, which has serious implications for the political representativeness of minorities’ interests.

37 The fervour to wear the traditional shalvari and different styles of kerchiefs from the early years soon decreased and it is mainly elderly women that keep wearing the traditional attire. The only exception is the village of Ribnovo where there are almost no women in non-traditional clothes.

38 There were some early attempts to infuse the Bulgarian Muslims cultural identity with political relevance. For example, Kamen Burov, the mayor of an Eastern Rhodope Bulgarian Muslims village, attempted to emancipate the designation “Pomaks” from its negative connotations and to impose it to the whole Bulgarian Muslims population as an official ethnic term. He established a party and sought for popular support, however, his attempts remained unsuccessful. (see more in Todorova 1998)
through their religious difference from the majority, which obscured their cultural differences, and stimulated an even more ethnically marginal position. Moreover, structural discrimination against members of the Muslim minorities continued (Bates 1994; Eminov 2007), as did widespread prejudice and negative stereotypes (Pilbrow 1997).

The state did not only withdraw from people’s lives by terminating its direct interference in the identity construction and everyday practices of its citizens, it also practically withdrew from the whole region in economic and infrastructural terms. The agricultural cooperatives were liquidated and the land was privatized in a controversial way, the large industrial enterprises (especially in textile, mining and armaments) were closed down, the border zone was opened and the special border privileges terminated. The Bulgarian Muslims, who according to Konstantinov (1997) have developed a specific peasant-worker economy managing to extract maximum efficiency out of the generally inefficient co-operative farm system, were hit the hardest by the postsocialist restructurings. The unemployment rate in the region reached over 60 per cent during the 1990’s, which was 3 to 4 times higher than the average for the country (Tomova 2000:224-225). In the subsequent period the uneven development of the region got more and more striking. The only employment left was tobacco cultivation, previously mechanized and considered as side occupation. Apart from that, the large state textile factories were replaced by small private Greek owned sewing workshops in almost every village, which operated under enslaving conditions. Most of the Rhodope region population worked without any social security hardly managing to make ends meet (Todorova 1998:491-492). By 2003-2004 the textile sweatshops decreased in

39 In the censuses from 1992 and 2001 he category Pomak did not exist, as it was pointed above, thus leaving the Bulgarian Muslims once more as a residual category in the statistics.

40 More on the early working conditions and the transformation of tobacco production will be said in chapter IV, devoted on labour market and employment strategies.
number, replaced by fewer but fairer factories offering better conditions (but also employing less people). In addition, tobacco purchase prices kept going down, while the production state quotas allocated per family decreased rapidly. This made the sector become not only less profitable, but also insufficient for family sustaining. As a result of these harsh economic conditions and the complete negligence of the region by the state, labour migration has become the main means of living for the largest part of Bulgarian Muslims in the Rhodopi mountain.

The new economic conditions condemned the population of the Rhodope mountain region to poverty, re-peasantisation and a new type of marginalization, which also lead to a rhetoric of ‘loneliness, devastation and abandonedness’ (Tomova 2000). The so developed ‘poetics of suffering’ (Herzfeld 1985) was an expression of the tensions between the socialist and the post-socialist cultural style, but also of the dissatisfaction with the state which neglected the region and allowed its transformation into an impoverished periphery (Mihaylova 2006:54). The ‘transition’ period was considered as a route into backwardness and loss of the modernization assets of socialism.

Tobacco is an expression of these tensions. Ever since the 1950’s the state has been the sole owner and manager of the tobacco industry. Although, recently part of this sector was privatised, the state keeps regulating the prices and the quotas. In this sense, as Mihaylova argues “for Bulgarian Muslims tobacco embodies their relationship with the state, and it is the very last link that people perceive to be alive today” (2006:61). While during the socialist period, tobacco was considered as another small privilege ensuring extra income, in the 1990’s it came to be associated only with poverty and social suffering. This is an expression of the general discontent with the negligent state, which has further developed in high migration rates and other actions of circumventing this very state.
In terms of political representation Bulgarian Muslims are caught in the paradox of the Bulgarian political system which does not allow officially the establishment of ethnically based parties organized (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996), but in practice it is divided along ethnic (and religious) terms. The party that supposedly represents the Turkish and the Bulgarian Muslim population is the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). It is composed predominantly of Turkish members and its main votes come from the Turkish minority. Over the years of its existence it remained overwhelmingly Turkish, without allowing other Muslim minority representative to take higher positions (Zhelyazkova 1997). Bulgarian Muslims have continuously voted for the party too, but there were hardly ever representatives in the Parliament. There are no other parties that ever managed to draw any of the Bulgarian Muslim vote, or did ever include among their candidates Bulgarian Muslims representatives. Thus political representation remains at a local level. In the recent years mayors in different villages in the region have run for office from different political parties, thus starting to break the model of solid MRF presence in the whole region. The lack of group political representation, however, is a sign for the lacking identity politics which could solidify the group boundaries.

3.8. A “group” in flux

The historical long durée presented in this chapter aimed to show the complex relationship that Bulgarian Muslims have developed with the state over the last one hundred years. The state acted towards Bulgarian Muslims following two parallel logics. On one hand, it aimed at disambiguating them by trying to negate their difference. On the other hand, these attempts to eliminate their distinctiveness were combined with modernization efforts and the development of an
encompassing social security system. The two logics worked simultaneously and did not contradict each other on state level, while at the same time, they were experienced as a politics of the stick and the carrot by the local population. The first logic was embedded in the nation state project. Bulgarian Muslims’ inbetweenness in terms of ethnic and national categories was a threat to the order of the nation state. The state policies placed them in a position of an inferior Other, neither fitting within the nation, nor anywhere outside it. Thus, Bulgarian Muslims were turned into an ultimate stranger in Zygmunt Bauman’s terms (1993), present, yet unfamiliar; a threat to the order of familiar and manageable categories. Following Bauman, I would suggest that this state logic of dealing with the Bulgarian Muslims as an unqualifiable and hence dangerous non-category, is part of the order making efforts of modernity. In this sense, the effort for disambiguation of the Bulgarian Muslims from ‘strangers’ into the clear categories of ‘us’ or ‘them’ was ultimately an attempt of restoring the order of the nation state. As a result, the Bulgarian Muslims remain being trapped in an immanently ambivalent position, that allows them only a relational categorical position which is both external (the way other ‘hard’ groups define them) and internal (how they define themselves).

On the other hand, the parallel logic of socialist modernization included Bulgarian Muslims in the common national project of developing and improving the material life of the population – from social services, through education, to employment for everyone. In addition, in different periods the Bulgarian Muslims were used as political resource, border support, and economic supplier, which privileged them in comparison to the rest of the population. These two state logics have intersected in people’s lives as an apparent politics of the stick and the carrot. The constant alternation of rewards and punitive state acts resulted in a creation a docile population, but also generated various internal hierarchies. What was particularly crucial was the conformist role of the
local elite, which on several occasions translated their desire for de-marginalization and upward mobility into blending with the majority terms. In this way, the Bulgarian Muslims did not craft a clear and coherent group identity and the question of their ethnicity remains open unto this day. In this sense, as much as this is a chapter about the history of the state-minority relations, it is also about the different conceptions of who the Bulgarian Muslims are.
PART II

Work and Social Security as Sites for Act of Citizenship
Chapter 4: Re-positioning the Worker-Citizen: Regimes of Regularity and Irregularity and the ‘Successful Migrant’

I will start with a story, a story about time in migration. On a late autumn Sunday afternoon I found myself in front of the pensioner’s club in Tafalla. A young man in his 30s, who was about to enterq waved at me and invited me in. He was a construction worker and I have just met him in the morning drinking coffee on the central square along with the other Brushlyani migrants gathering there on a Sunday morning. We went in the pensioner’s club, only to discover that all tables were full not with Spanish pensioners, but with other young migrant workers. There were at least fifty men playing cards or just watching. Nobody seemed too passionate about the game, nobody was consuming anything. The club was apparently only used for the many available tables. My guide explained this is the usual way to spend a Sunday afternoon for migrant men, even if one did not have a particular interest in cards. He told me he finds it boring, but still keeps coming regularly.

“Youth is about work, Spain is about work. Free time is lost time. Free time is for the pensioners,” he concluded but nevertheless joined one of the teams. Free time for most migrant men was puzzling, it was a wasted time for those in work, and a sign of failure for those without work.

Many of the men in the pensioners club were construction workers or drivers in factories. On top of the regular 40 hours per week, they were working an extra hour on a week day and got home only after 8 pm. On Saturdays, they worked an extra half-day. This was the maximum overtime allowed and paid officially. Saturday afternoon was devoted to the weekly food shopping with the family in one of the local big chain food stores or to a trip to the nearby Pamplona with its shopping mall and large outdoor market. The social gatherings and guest visits were usually done on
Saturday night. On Sunday mornings the whole migrant community gathered on the main square for coffee and socializing. Women would take the children home or to the part or visit relatives afterwards. But men conceived these free afternoons as a wasted time. It is work that they migrated for and it is through work that they justify to themselves their being in Spain. The time of migration is the time of work.

While at first work might seem as practiced and conceived by migrants mainly as a money making enterprise, it is also their main venue for acquiring access to rights, entitlements, and inclusion in a wider community of citizens. By moving between regimes of irregularity and regularity of employment and residence, migrants re-position themselves vis-à-vis the state and other citizens. In this process of re-positioning they constitute themselves as claim-makers and as participants in the local society. This process is not a straightforward shift from the category of the individual conceived as an illegitimate resident or worker into the category of a legitimate rights-bearing claim maker. Shifting between statuses is a complex and dynamic process, in which migrants have to constantly re-negotiate their positions of legitimacy. Therefore in this chapter work is explored as a site of migrants’ struggles between regimes of regularity and irregularity through which they constitute themselves as citizens.

The chapter traces the process of how migrants re-position themselves through work from two aspects: 1. what are the acts of claim-making and participation reflected in and activated through changes in migrants’ work status and practice; 2. how do migrants relate implicitly or explicitly their position as workers to their position as citizens. To this end I examine the changes in the structural conditions brought about by formal regularization and the enabling or constraining effects of these changes on migrants’ lives. I move the optics beyond the formal opportunities, rights and entitlements that are opened up by regularity as a status and focus also on the manoeuvres
between *conditions* of regularity and irregularity, between formal entitlements and informal networks, and between various labour categories as defined by employment contracts. It is in these shifts and negotiations that migrants enact themselves as claimants of rights and ultimately as citizens. This is further reflected in the way migrants make sense of their employment in a wider framework of membership and inclusion, inequality and difference, by making comparisons with other migrants, with the Spanish citizens and with the working conditions in Bulgaria. Thus, by exploring how migrants are affected by and navigate within emerging new opportunity structures and barriers, I trace the connections between work and citizenship in their practices and discourses.

This chapter is about the experience of Bulgarian Muslims as intra-EU migrants shortly after Bulgaria’s accession into the EU in 2007. The time-frame of my study situated in this early post-accession period prompted an analysis of the immediate effects that the change of status from third-country nationals into EU citizens had on the lived experience of migrant workers. Similarly to earlier migrant regularization campaigns in Spain, which granted irregular migrant workers the right to legitimately live and work in the country, EU accession opened new opportunity structures for Bulgarian migrants not only by changing the normative conditions for employment and residence within the EU, but, by extension, by changing the very conditions for access to participation and claim making. What earlier regularization waves granted to some of the Bulgarian migrants, was now granted universally to all Bulgarian migrants by virtue of becoming EU citizens. In this sense, EU accession is a radical turning point in terms of status change, which potentially opens new spaces for being a migrant worker. However, the newly acquired status still involved certain hurdles for the first two years after accession. Regular work was accessible for all, but only

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41 Free labour mobility and unrestricted access to the labor market for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens only applied to some EU countries after 2007, one of which is Spain. Other countries, like Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK retained their right to restrictions to the labour market for new member states and are only lifting them in 2014.
after a work permit was issued with the assistance of an employer. This placed Bulgarian labour
migrants in an in-between position of relative regularity, depending on the good will of their
employers.

How migrant workers experience and act upon this status change, however, evolves simultaneously
in diverging directions. The changed structural conditions coming with the new status involve both
new openings and new barriers. By focusing on how migrants navigate between these openings
and barriers in their working lives I seek to reveal the heterogeneity and unevenness of the
European Union space as experienced by those who are positioned inside it by virtue of their status
as opposed to those who still face restrictions. In other words, I am interested in how and why some
internal EU labour migrants like the Bulgarian Muslims experience irregularity and do not or
cannot enact fully their labour and citizenship rights. On one hand, I show how migrants position
themselves as citizens through their status of regular workers, by becoming taxpayers and
contributors and consequently beneficiaries of the welfare system for example. On the other hand,
I examine the barriers that they face as migrants continuing to experience precarious labour
conditions, shifting between regular and irregular jobs, or facing highly flexible insecure conditions
in their positions of regular workers. The lines of the argument thus develop simultaneously in two
directions. At the level of status EU citizenship provides the possibility for universal regularization
(despite the work permit additional step) which opens new opportunities to migrant workers to
negotiate better conditions of work, and to insert themselves in a new position vis-à-vis the state.
At the level of practice and lived experience, there is a complex interplay between actualized
regularization and constantly luring irregularity, which renders the EU space of free labour mobility
much more heterogeneous than a universal change of status might imply.
Regularization here stands for the act through which the Spanish state acknowledges the right to residence and access to the labour market to migrants who until that point have resided and/or worked illegitimately at its territory. This is done either by providing irregular migrant workers with a work and a residence permit or by an overall change in status from third-country nationals into EU citizens. Becoming regularized through a change in status allows migrant workers to enter the labour market formally. This further opens the possibility for signing employment contracts, which also entails paying taxes and social contributions and having wider access to welfare benefits (like unemployment benefits, retirement and extending wider healthcare to family members). Becoming part of the tax and welfare system inserts migrants in an essentially new relationship with the state and with other regular workers (both migrants and local citizens). Furthermore, this provides additional extras like a certain level of security and protection at the work place, and wider opportunities in economic terms (like bank loans and mortgages). In this sense, regularization gives migrants the opportunity to approximate their position as residents and workers to the one of the local citizens.

Being ‘on equal terms’ is what migrants strive for in their work trajectories and consequently in their position vis-à-vis the Spanish not just as workers, but also as citizens. The trope of the ‘successful migrant’ reappears in Brushlyani migrants’ discourses to denote not simply a migrant who has succeeded economically, but a migrant who has established himself (always male) in an equal position to the Spanish citizens. While it is based on a subjective view of the conditions under which Spanish citizens work and it masks many of the risks and precarious aspects of migrants’ work even after regularization, this trope denotes an understanding of success that is framed in the language of rights and is to be achieved through the venue of work. But even under the conditions of formal free and equal access to the labour market granted by EU membership, not all migrants
manage to be ‘successful’ in this sense. Turning the focus on the actual work practices and the way they manage to enact their rights reveals a complex dynamic of moving between different statuses and conditions. Some migrants continue working irregularly (without contracts), or slip back and forth between regular and irregular employment, or work under highly precarious conditions with temporary flexible contracts. These different actualizations of the status of the regular worker reveal the tensions inherent in formal regularity and practiced regularity and the blurring of boundaries between regularity and irregularity, and consequently between formal and substantive citizenship.

Understanding the dynamics of migrants’ repositioning through regularization or irregularization requires a critical discussion of the very concepts of regularity and irregularity in regard to migration and citizenship. Large part of the academic literature on irregular migration replicates the view of migration management policies adopting a pre-given distinction between legitimate and illegitimate mobility, and thus discusses irregularity through an objectivist perspective defining it as a status of illegitimacy (Squire 2011). ‘Irregular’, ‘illegal’, ‘clandestine’ or ‘undocumented’ migration is commonly framed in a discourse of securitization and criminalization describing illegitimate forms of international migration in which the irregular migrant is defined as a non-citizen who enters or resides in a nation-state without authorization, or works without authorization. This approach positions the migrant in opposition to the ‘regular’ subject of the nation-state, i.e. the citizen or the authorized migrant, through categories crafted by the state (Jordan and Duvell 2002). Within this framework researchers measure the size of irregular migration, the main paths out of irregularity, and the differences in policies for restricting or finding solutions to irregular migration (Engbersen et al. 2006, Levinson 2005, Laubenthal 2007, Triandafyllidou, ed. 2010). Another direction of analysis follows the effects and consequences of irregularity, analysing
irregular migrants’ vulnerable position in terms of hampered access to rights and provisions (Bloch 2010, Willen 2007a, 2007b), propensity to exploitive conditions of work and precariousness (Bloch, Sigona and Zetter 2011, Calavita 2005), coping strategies and tactics (Chimienti and Achermann 2007, Coutin 2003, Ellerman 2010), and the interplay between provisions and exclusion (Khosravi 2010).

Focusing on the effects and ways of tackling irregularity, however, presupposes a conceptualization of irregularity as rooted in and thus depending on a pre-given status of illegitimacy of residence or work. The experience of irregularity is thought of as the result of an already existing status of irregularity. Limiting the experience of irregularity to a result of a pre-given status, however, fails to capture in-between states like the irregular conditions of work within a regular status, which might affect migrants and citizens alike, which is what the case under scrutiny in this chapter is about. The conceptual way out of this analytical conundrum is proposed by critical scholars of irregularity who challenge the idea of irregularity as an end-state, as a pre-given status and a problem to be solved by the states (see De Genova 2002). Instead they propose to study it as a process (Jordan and Duvell 2002, 2003, Bloch and Chimienti 2013) and as a condition that is produced and contested, resisted or appropriated in a series of political struggles (Squire 2011). This approach also allows to blur the dividing line between citizen and migrant in terms of security and accommodate cases of citizens experiencing their citizenship unmade by state practices of regularization, as it is demonstrated by Peter Nyers (2011).

It is this approach to irregularity as a process and a condition that allows me to conceptualize the *irregularity in regularity* that Brushlyani migrants experience by working irregularly even after having a status of regular workers by virtue of their EU citizenship. Scholars have started addressing the multiplicity of positions in between the two ends of the spectrum of regularity and
irregularity, by pointing to the diversification of modes of irregularity as a result of more restrictive policies (Triandafyllidou 2010), the production of hierarchy in the different irregular statuses (Cvajner and Sciotino 2010) and, most notably, by looking at cases of migrants who have partial rights (right to residence, but not to access the labour market for example) and experience irregularity only in certain aspects of their existence. Anderson and Ruhs (2010) analyze a case of what they call ‘semi-compliance’ of informally working legally residing migrants in the UK, while Ayse Caglar and Sebastian Mehling (2013) examine the acts of citizenship of Romanian Roma migrants in Berlin as EU citizens with limited labour rights, who claim their European citizenship through acts of squatting public spaces. What these studies highlight is the heterogeneity of the European space produced by different categories of irregularity from within, in the case of EU citizens with restricted rights.

What is more, such an approach to irregularity has to be employed by extension to regularity as well. Regularity needs to be examined as a condition and as a stake of contestation both by states and institutions, and by migrants and citizens. The mobilization of regularity is tied to but not automatically resulting from regularity as a status. Regularity needs to be enacted and re-enforced by migrants in a constant interplay with a ‘luring’ irregularity. In this sense, the case of the Bulgarian Muslim migrants’ shifts between regularity and irregularity further probes into the production and contestation of both categories as conditions and as experiences, which ultimately makes them sites where migrants struggles become struggles for citizenship.
4.1. Working in Brushlyan and Tafalla – a labour market overview of two localities.

4.1.1. On sewing clothes and cutting stones: employment opportunities in a Rhodope mountain village

Since the 1990s the employment opportunities in the Rhodopi mountain region have been shrinking significantly. As I have already demonstrated in the previous chapter the postsocialist period of the 1990s witnessed rapid deindustrialization, disintegration of agricultural cooperatives (TKZS) and restitution of scattered and often unwanted pieces of land. All this resulted in mass unemployment and impoverishment of the local rural population. There was a symbolic move away from the secure full-time state jobs in factories or in the administration, into the insecure and poorly paid work in private small enterprises or agriculture. For a limited period of time tobacco turned from a side job for the women into the main occupation and source of income or the whole region. By the mid 2000’s, however, tobacco cultivation was already on decline. When I first arrived in Brushlyan in 2006 employment was limited to two major highly gendered paths: sewing workshops for the women and stone cutting for the fit and young men. A small number of people were engaged in the administration or worked as teachers in the nursery or the primary school. In addition to that, there were two small woodcutting and saw-mill enterprises, employing no more than 20 men altogether. The several small cafes and bars, as well as the local shops, employed high school students or family members of the owners. Finally, tobacco was still cultivated by a small number of people, but it had again become a side job due to quota restrictions, decreasing prices, and ultimately, migration of the younger villagers.
The types of employment typical for young men in Bulgarian is essential for their future migrant trajectories. Overall, workers in the region are low skilled. Male employment is often precarious, irregular (in the sense of informal without contracts with employers or self-employed registration), and partly seasonal. But it was much more lucrative than the rest of the available jobs in the region occupies by women or the few administrative positions. Young men managed to earn up to 1500 leva per month in the active summer season (app. 750 euro which was a wage significantly above the average for the region and for the country for this). The typical male employment since 2005 has been stone cutting/tiling and production of “Gneiss” stone tiles. Stone cutting has gone through several transformations in this period, initially starting as individual workers cutting tile stones independently and selling them to a buyer company. Since 2007 these practices have developed into a more organized business, with small companies/firms hiring wage workers, and using machines for the initial steps of the process. In addition to the wage workers, there were still a small number of men who worked independently and sold their product rather than their work. Most workers worked without contracts, hence did not pay any taxes, but also did not have any social benefits through the employer. Most of them were either registered as unemployed, or as self-employed with a minimum wage. This aspect of irregular work in Bulgaria is further discussed in the next chapter in relation to questions of security and expectations of the state.

This type employment was insecure on the long-run, with the constant changing regulations for stone concessions. In addition, because of its hard physical labour nature, it was suitable only for younger men, under 45 years old. Workers did not have contracts or social benefits. And it was partly seasonal, due to its open-air character. Therefore, stone cutting was not considered a desired employment and was taken only as a last resort, albeit quite too often. An anecdotic story that I heard several times from different people went like this: An old man from the village saw a group
of workers cutting stones and asked: “Boys, what have you done wrong? Stealing? Murder? What is it that you’re punished for with these stones?” A man replied they have done nothing wrong; they were just working and getting paid for it. The old man shook his head in dismay: “In my times, it was only prisoners who would work on stones.” And indeed, the stones business was regarded as hard work, even as a sort of undeserved punishment. In this sense, it was not unemployment per se then, which drove people to migrate to Spain, but rather the unfavourable conditions that precarious employment offered.

4.1.2. Labour migration to Spain: Migrant Niches in Navarra

Over the last 10 years the status of Bulgarian immigrants in Spain and the different procedures for legalization and regularization have gone through several changes due to Bulgaria’s transformation into an accession country after 2001 and into an EU country after 2007. Before 2001 Bulgarian citizens needed an entry visa that was usually for a single entry, for a short period of time and was rather complicated to get. Between 2001 and 2007, a three months visa-free stay in any Schengen country was introduced. This new regulation led to the intensification of migration flows to Spain of potential labour migrants who planned to overstay the three months period provided they found work. Thus the change in status – from unwanted immigrants into future EU citizens immediately resulted in the change of practices. In this period the main venue for regularizing and moving out of the informal labour market were extraordinary - through periodic regularization (or amnesty) waves which aimed at taking migrants out of the informal market and allowing them to continue working regularly) The conditions included being registered in the country for at least 12 months, proved by address registration in the local municipality, and an employer willing to sign a contract, which was to be renewed periodically (Calavita 2003, Levinson 2005).
Consequently, Bulgaria’s accession into EU in 2007, made it much easier for migrants to enter other EU countries (and Spain in particular), spend unlimited time there (as opposed to the previous 3 months limit), and a much easier procedure to regularize and work freely. In the first two years after the accession Spain applied a transition period of 2 years for Bulgarian (and Romanian) citizens, in which access to the labour market was given through a work permit, tied to providing evidence of a job offer and the approval of the employer. The conditions involved the employer’s guarantee of an initial six-month period of employment, in order to avoid fraudulent application. Given an employer signed the application there were no further restriction or quotas. Nevertheless, this still made regular migrant work dependent on the employer and limited the access to the labour market. Migrants with reluctant employers or without an employer used different strategies to acquire a work permit in order to be able to work regularly, which are discussed in greater details further in the chapter. While the work permit was an additional barrier, the regularization procedure was still significantly more beneficial for them in comparison to the third-country nationals. Hence, even with this conditionality for regularization Bulgarian Muslim migrants were still in a much more favourable position in comparison to other non-EU migrants. At the same time being put in a category of some of restricted access to the labour market differentiated and inferiorized them not only vis-à-vis the Spanish citizens, but also in comparison to the other EU citizens from the older member states.

Immigrants in Spain work in a segmented labour market taking jobs that the local population does not want – temporary, low paid, heavy or dangerous (Baldwin-Edwards 2004) The labour market niches, in which migrant workers are concentrated, are in five main sectors: domestic service, agriculture, low-skilled hotel and catering services, low-skilled construction and retail (Calavita 2005, Markova 2006). There are regional variations in the distribution of the sectors across the
country, with agriculture attracting more workers in the Southern regions, while construction and industry are concentrated in the Northern regions of Navarra and the Basque country, as well as in and around bigger cities like Madrid and Barcelona. In Navarra the construction and industry sectors attract most of the male migrants, while women are engaged in domestic services and catering. The type of work is also status dependent. Regularized workers have access to jobs as higher qualified builders, lorry drivers, or in bigger factories, while irregular workers remain trapped in lower-skilled and worse paid jobs. In regard to the Bulgarian migrants in Spain more specifically, there are some variations between sectors and regions based on class and ethnicity of the migrants, as well as on the type of locality they come from. Chain migration further contributes to the concentration of people coming from the same place in Bulgaria into one locality in Spain, which is particularly relevant for the rural migrants from the Rhodopi mountain who move ‘by villages’. (see Troeva and Grigorov 2003)

Tafalla offered a limited range of employment to migrants. As a small town in the vicinity of the regional capital Pamplona, it was favourable both for those who work in construction on small private sites in other small towns in the area, or on bigger sites in Pamplona. It is on a commuting distance from the main local industry sites. At the same time it offers little work for women with very few cafes and bars, and low need of domestic services. There was a sharp distinction between the local population and the migrant. The majority of the local population were retired elderly people, many of whom living in one of the 5 nursing homes. Or they were young families with children whose work was still located in Pamplona. The sectors that men occupied were indeed migrant labour niches with predominantly Spanish employers and only seldom Spanish co-workers. Thus, in terms of work, Tafalla and the region offered a segmented niche for migrant workers to take up jobs unwanted by the local Spanish population.
The different types of migrants’ employment in Spain are mostly gender-specific, just as in Bulgaria. Men work in construction, as factory workers (there is a VW assemblage factory for example), drivers (of international lorries or internal smaller trucks), and very few in agriculture. Women mostly work either in domestic services (cleaning houses or taking care of children or elderly people), or in hotels and restaurants (cleaning staff or in the kitchen). Net payment for the workers does not depend on their legal status. If the worker is regularized, i.e. with a work permit, the employer is obliged to pay the extra amount of money for social security and life insurance, when required. Extra hours, beyond the nomina (40 hours per week) however are paid differently depending on the legal status. Vacation days are also differently paid according to the status or the arrangement with the employer. With the extra hours included a full-time employed man would usually get between 1500 and 2000 euro per month. Women earn less money, both because the type of jobs they have paid less per hour and because most of them work part-time. Thus, the few women who work full time in a restaurant or in a supermarket, or combine several types of employment, reach up to 1000 euro per month, but the average income does not exceed 600 euro.

Regularization usually depends on the type of employment. Thus, certain jobs which are more exposed to check-ups and fines require regularized workers, while other jobs on the contrary are more suitable for irregular worker. Overall, construction and factory employment requires a legal status of the workers because of the visibility, the higher risk factor and the tighter control. The fines for hiring irregular workers, which are imposed on employers, are between 25 000 and 35 000 euro per worker. Therefore, most employers in these areas prefer to hire legalized migrants or

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42 In general, a construction worker gets 7-8 euro per hour, with 15 euro (if with legal status) for extra hours. Most construction workers work Saturdays till 1 pm as well and often take 1 or 2 extra hours each day of the week. Thus, they manage to get about 400 euros above the nomina (which is 1100). Drivers are better paid, with about 2000 euro or more per month. Finally, factory worker usually work on shifts, and have approximately similar salaries as the construction workers.
to provide the required documents for them to acquire a work permit. In comparison, in agriculture or in domestic services most workers are hired without contracts and social benefits and are paid their daily wage cash. Thus, while some of the men do manage to get a regular employment, most women do not. This means, then that the gendered tendency of regularized work and security observed in Bulgaria is turned around in Spain, whereby women hold the more precarious jobs. This aspect, along with other details specific for female employment, is discussed in chapter VI.

4.2. The successful migrants

In the rest of the chapter I explore how the drafter above issues of regularity and irregularity, of access and claims of rights as contained in work practices, are played out in the concrete stories of Brushlyani migrants. I start with the path of a ‘successful migrant’, Yavor, who served as role model in the migrant community, moving from irregular low-skilled seasonal jobs into a self-employed construction entrepreneur with 3 workers. By following his trajectory through his different moves, acts and decisions, and through how he makes sense of these and frames them in the wider context of work and citizenship, I focus on the openings related to different status and context transformations, and the exploitation of and manoeuvring within these changing conditions. Yavor’s story starts in the early 2000s typically with precarious, low-skilled, poor-paid jobs. Slowly, he moved into a more lucrative job with a better employer, got regularized and started working with a more reliable contract, which ultimately allowed him to have his wife and young son join him in Spain. During my fieldwork he changes his worker’s status to become autonom, i.e. self-employed construction entrepreneur. This was the critical step which turned him into a success for other migrants, and for himself. Through his story I tease out the meanings of success as encoded in a work trajectory, which denotes not only an economic advancement, but also a move into ‘being like the Spanish’, through the lens of rights and obligations available to citizens. In this
sense, the story of the successful migrant, I show, is a story of a re-positions vis-à-vis the other migrants, and more importantly, vis-à-vis the receiving society.

I first met Yavor in Bulgaria on my trip to Brushlyan in 2006. The two girls I asked to introduce me to someone who lived and worked in Spain pointed at him, agreeing: “Yavor is the best Spanish\textsuperscript{43} you can meet.” As we were later sipping our coffee, Yavor started introducing me to the turns and twists of his migrant life. He was the grandson of one of the most powerful people in the village during the socialist period. His grandfather was the mayor of the village for many years, respected by some, but secretly loathed by more for his role in the re-naming campaigns of 1972.\textsuperscript{44} Their extended kin is one of the two largest and most influential ones. Their family house is a four storeys building on the main road in the beginning of the village. Unlike most village kids, he went to a vocational high school specializing as an electrician in a small town on the other side of the mountains. Nevertheless, this strong start did not help him with making a successful career in Bulgaria. After coming back from the mandatory military service, he started working in a shoe factory in the nearby village. The factory was closed soon after and he became a bartender in the café opposite his house. He worked there for a year and a half without a contract or social benefits, which was the common case for most of the workers in this period. In the meantime, he got married to Rumi and they had their first son.

4.2.1. Funfairs and the importance of being ‘civilized’

Even when working without a single free day, the money Yavor made and the money his wife earned from the sewing factory was still hardly enough to cover their everyday expenses. With no

\textsuperscript{43}Migrants to Spain were shortly called the Spanish in the village. The word ‘migrant’ itself was rarely used among the villagers.

\textsuperscript{44}Both Yavor and Rumi kept their Bulgarian names and very few close kin referred to them with their Muslim names. Their reflections on the duality of the name are discussed in Chapter III.
prospects for a more lucrative job at the time and with his son growing, he decided to try his luck as a migrant. So he joined the first wave of migrants towards Spain in 2002, soon after Bulgaria became an accession country and the visa regime for Schengen countries got relaxed. With the opportunity of entering any EU country for up to three months at a time, many Bulgarians started migrating to various places in search of a job. The Rhodope region villages sent their men predominantly to Spain and Portugal for irregular often short term unskilled labour. 45 One of these men was Yavor. He joined his best man who was working in Galicia as a day-labourer on funfairs. With his help Yavor started working irregularly, assembling swings and roundabouts day and night from city to city. He remembers this period as a rather bleak moment of his life, not only in terms of work, but also in terms of everyday social contacts.

45 The story of who is the first migrant from Brushlyan and how did it happen that all of them ended up in Tafalla was already told in the previous chapter.

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These swings were the most tiring work I’ve ever done. Get up early in the morning, assemble the swings, supervise whether all is working fine all day while there are people, until 4-5 am, go to bed for a couple of hours, get up again, clean for the following day, again stay up until early morning, disassemble all the next day, and hop on the van to the next town. No time for fun, no time to have a chat, no time for anything. And what fun, what conversations? Even if I knew the language, these Spanish workers were like monkeys. They didn’t take showers ever and looked at me with dismay when I was pouring water on myself with the hose. We didn’t have a bathroom of course. And they were not only dirty, but uncivilized as well. I was the only one eating with a fork and knife. The boss’ wife even said once: Look at Yavor - he, the Bulgarian, knows better how to eat and behave properly, and he takes a shower every day.”
Yavor’s account of the harsh routine of a seasonal irregular worker shifts straight into a discussion of his ill-mannered ‘uncivilized’ Spanish colleagues. This type of comparisons came up in many of our subsequent conversations with Yavor, in which he often took pride in his superiority of manners and skills. For example, he claimed that his Spanish colleagues in the construction company where he worked later on had only primary education and were hardly literate. He constantly astonished them with his ability to make mental calculations and his knowledge of Spanish. I heard many remarks along these lines from other migrants too, which were usually used as a point of reference for the unequal position they have in comparison to the Spanish workers. As other researchers of the Spanish labour market have noted immigrants fill critical niches in the economy by taking the jobs vacated by Spanish workers. They do not simply provide a supplemental workforce, but “particular kind of workforce, i.e. one that will do the jobs, and under conditions, that local workers no longer accept despite rising unemployment” (Calavtia 2005:68)

These jobs were perceived by the migrants as suitable for the lowest strata of Spanish citizens – unskilled, uneducated, mannerless. Yavor’s words demonstrate this well: “If I were Spanish, I would have never been forced to work in such a place with my high school diploma and the vocation that I have.” Clearly, he was pointing to his unequal status he had due to his migrant’s position, and to his citizenship difference.

By stressing his superiority of manners, skills and knowledge dubbed as ‘being civilized’ Yavor was drawing a demarcation line between his Spanish colleagues and himself, thus emphasizing his disadvantaged position due to his irregular status. He aimed for regularization as a way to get into a job he was qualified for not only because of the economic benefits, but also because of the status that this will give him in relation to the native workers.
4.2.2. The meaning of regularity as a status and as a practice

Yavor worked at the fun fairs for six months and returned to the village in Bulgaria with some saved money. Still without real prospects for a more lucrative job in the village, after he spent his savings from Spain, he decided to go back again, to join his brother and three cousins who were in Tafalla. In 2004, the place had already attracted a small community from Brushlyan, comprised mostly men who left their families at home. The more migrants established themselves there, the more attractive the place became for new migrants. Yavor moved in with his brother and another eleven men in a three bedroom apartment. One of Yavor’s cousins arranged for him to work for his employers as a low-skilled construction worker without contract. They were pulling down old houses in the region and transporting the material to other construction sites. In 2005, Spain granted amnesty to 700,000 illegal migrant workers. Yavor’s employer wanted to transfer Yavor to larger outdoors projects, where he only used workers with proper contracts and insurance, so he applied for regularisation documents. This is how Yavor got a work permit along with a number of other migrants from Brushlyan. He told me the story in 2007, while still working for the same employer:

*My employer really likes me. I was working very hard, and was constantly learning new things. And I wasn’t lazy. Most of us are not lazy, unlike the Spanish. That’s why he applied for my documents. But not everyone was so lucky. Some employers are trickier. They want workers with no contracts to control them and lay them off when it suits them. Even now, when it’s so easy to make the documents for a Bulgarian, some of them still refuse to do it. Especially if it’s not construction, but something less risky and with lower fines, like the chicken factory here. But my employer trusted me and I became one of his favourite workers. After more than three years working together, we were never in a fight, he was never discontent with me. So I had to earn my position as a legal worker, you see.*
As Yavor noted, not everyone was so lucky. While many Bulgarians got indeed regularised in this campaign, many other remained without documents and kept working irregularly until 2007 when the regulations changed. Regularisation depended partly on the type of employment. Construction workers on larger open sites more prone to inspections were regularised, while those engaged in internal renovations for smaller building companies or worked in small workshops often remained irregular. All the women engaged in domestic services and part-time restaurants services did not receive work permits either. However, the route to regularisation depended on other conditions as well. Applicants had to prove they have resided in Spain before August 2004 and that they have been working continuously since then. Residence status was to be proved through *empadronamiento*, address registration with the local authorities, which was guaranteed by the landlord, which sometimes created difficulties for migrants living in crowded flats. At the same time, employers had to be willing to admit they have been hiring unauthorized workers and to pay backdated tax and social security contributions on the workers they regularised. This situation allowed many employers to blackmail or force workers into precarious positions.

Regularization campaigns demonstrate the inherent constructedness in irregularity and the contingency of shifting into regularity. The very aim of these campaigns was to solve post-factum the problem with informal market participation of irregular migrants in a singular unsystematic way fighting with the effect rather than offering a legal systematic mechanism for regularization. (Calavita 2003) Moreover, these campaigns in fact ironically rewarded those who endured long enough into irregular work under possibly exploitive conditions, i.e. the ‘most patient offenders’. And in addition intensified the power relations of dependency between workers and employers. By lack of other venues for regularization of the necessary for the labour market migrant work force,
regularization campaigns are the epitome of the randomness of the Spanish migration policy in categorizing migrants into regular and irregular.

Soon after Yavor received his work permit his wife and son joined him. The sense of stability, His status as a regularised worker gave him a sense of security. Even if his salary remained the same, the work permit granted him a more secure position in terms of employment, but also opened up further opportunities for his family like obtaining a residence status and access to health insurance and other social benefits. In addition to supporting his wife and son, Yavor started paying the whole rent and only occasionally renting out one of the rooms to different relatives. These moves signified a stabilisation of his position in Spain and an attempt to ‘normalize’ his migrant experience by including his family in it. They also meant that his initial plan for very short term labour migration, has changed. Soon after that, Yavor recalls he was even able to start saving for building a new house in Brushlyan.

For more than four years Yavor worked in the same construction firm learning different skills. When we met, he was working mostly indoors, in refurbishing or finishing tasks like plastering, tiling, painting, laying electricity installation etc. He worked nine hours per day Mondays through Fridays and another four hours on Saturdays, thus making the full number of permitted extra hours. His base salary was 1100 euro after taxes, and another 550-600 euro depending on the extra hours, making up to 1700 euro per month. In addition, he received two extra salaries, in August and in December. He also had 45 working days holidays and his health insurance covered his wife and children as well. His regime and earnings were the standard among the other regularised migrants from Brushlyan who were employed with full-time contracts in construction.
Regularity changes radically the relation with the state. From an offender of state law the migrant worker becomes a tax payer and contributor to welfare. This transformation of the role in turn opens a space for making a new type of claims to the state. First of all, it guarantees economic rights – the right to work for making a living. It also opens negotiation grounds with the employers for better conditions of employment. Second, it is a ground for legal residence and extended stay. And third, regularization allows access to full social rights in terms of welfare. This includes not only full access to healthcare, but also additional benefits tied to employment like unemployment benefits and retirement plan. And in addition, there is partial coverage of family members extended access to healthcare. In this in sense regularisation is a key to a bundle of rights beyond the right to work, but these rights can be claimed only through the venue of work.

Ironically, regularization in Spain placed migrants in a position vis-à-vis the state that they did not exercise at home. As citizens in Bulgaria they worked irregularly not being registered or paying taxes and social contributions. As non-citizens in Spain they were contributing to the Spanish welfare system and claiming the right to be part of it. In this sense, through regularization in Spain they acquired wider social rights and obligations, than they had in Bulgaria. Yavor joked about this, saying: “I pay these social taxes here, even for pension. But I don’t plan to stay here that long. And in Bulgaria, where I want to retire, I haven’t paid any contributions and will probably never get a pension there.” These sort of contradiction related to social security are discussed in more details in the next chapter. Suffice is to say that through work and through the act of regularization migrants positioned themselves in a closer relationship with the Spanish state than with the Bulgarian on the axis of social rights.

Regularity as a work status allows migrants to practice as citizens. And while the state of being a regular worker who is a law abiding tax payer is about the practice of citizenship, the move into
regularity ruptures and transforms the habitus of work by inserting the migrant into a new position, and in this sense, I would suggest, it is an act of citizenship.

4.2.3. ‘Becoming the ideal’ or EU spaces of empowerment

Yavor’s boss sometimes ‘sub-contracted’ him to another construction manager in Tafalla, for the same daily wage. However, during my stay Yavor started arranging commissions directly with the other manager, taking short leaves from his primary employer. This not only secured him additional non-taxable income, but also made him aware of the percentage that he loses off his actual wage to his regular employer. This realisation overlapped with his desire for achieving more than being just a worker, and became the impetus for a major turning point in his career. Upon my return to Spain in early 2008 Yavor was feverishly talking of becoming self-employed (autonom). This was a big move, which very few migrants had made, and he was scared and insecure. Day after day he was discussing with his wife and other relatives the possible benefits and risks involved. The requirements he needed to fulfil were many, including a serious financial investment into a van (furgoneta), and various sets of instruments, which required a new loan from the bank. Finally he had the decisive conversation with his boss, who not only agreed to let him go, but also suggested to support him.

Yavor explained his decision to become autonom as a move in his career, as a desire to independence and to become ‘more like the Spanish’. “I want to work on my own commissions, to hire my own workers, and to work as much as I want. If I’m the autonom, I can work in the weekends too, enough with the Sunday cards....”, “The fact that I’m a migrant doesn’t mean I have to work for someone, for a Spanish. I can work for myself, just like they do. I’m good enough. And now I can do it. I know how, and I have the right to do it.”, “Now, when we are European citizens, they
cannot kick us out just like this. We can stay. Even if I don’t have work for a month, no one can tell me to leave”, “I have the right to be here and to have my own business as an autonom, that’s why I’m doing it.” While Yavor was answering my questions and justifying his choice, he was slowly moving from the idea of being independent to the idea that he’s entitled and he has the right to do it, as an European citizen. The trope of EU citizenship kept coming up in different occasions regardless of whether it actually brought new rights or not. Here, the symbolic aspect of ‘no one can tell me to leave’ was as significant as the practical opportunities that the new status opened.

The decision to become an autonom was about actualising rights and using entitlements, and was framed by Yavor in the language of becoming equal with the Spanish citizens, and in this sense was an act of claiming rights and participation as an equal member of an imagined community of independent employers.

At the end of March Yavor interrupted prematurely his fijo contract and applied for an autonom status. He continued working informally for the sub-contractor for a month, while arranging his documents. Throughout the whole process he was supported with advice about the forms and procedures by the local office of the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT). He was a member of the UGT for two years already and was using them for different kinds of legal and administrative support, not only for himself, but also for various issues concerning his relatives and friends. He was advised to ask his employer to make him redundant so that he can claim unemployment benefits (paro). He then had to apply for autonom status, thus formally moving from unemployed

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46 When I first arrived to Tafalla he insisted to help me and his father-in-law who had just arrived, with our address registrations. He took us to UGT first for filling the forms and then later to the city council. Even though this was obviously an issue not directly concerning him, nor related to work, the employees in UGT were happy to help.
to self-employed. This elaborate procedure allowed him to receive the whole sum of unemployment benefits he was entitled to in one instalment, which amounted to about 10,000 €.

Taking his unemployment benefits, that he had accumulated for almost 3 years of regular work on a contract, gave him an additional boost in setting his new status. Being a regular worker and paying social contributions gave him now the benefit of taking his unemployment allowance in one lump sum. Having the right to use benefits when moving between different employment statuses not only inserted him in a social rights relation with the Spanish state, but signified a position that he never had in relation to the Bulgarian state. Not paying taxes or social contribution there, but also knowing how small if any such benefits were in Bulgaria, Yavor experienced support coming from the state in such form for the first time in Spain. “The foreign state pays me, because I’ve given it my money. My state never paid me anything”, he laughed, in fact using a popular discourse among migrants in regard to social security, discussed in the next chapter.

As an autonom in the construction sphere he was eligible for taking commissions as a subcontractor and he could hire up to six employees. He had to pay different tax category and cover his own social security. In addition, he had to use his own instruments (or hire them from someone) and to transport the workers with van which he should own. It was this last requirement that caused a small crisis just after he got his autonom papers.

We were just discussing over coffee in Rumi’s kitchen that Yavor was searching for a van, when he stormed in and announced that he had just learned he has to buy it by the end of the day or he will lose the paro money. It was 10.30 am. By the evening he had managed to take a loan, find a van in Pamplona, make the transfer, arrange the insurance, and register it on his name. At 7.30 pm he called and offered a tour of the village with their new acquisition. Later he explained in details
all the tricks and networks that he used in order to succeed. After not succeeding to get a quick loan without a guarantors from his bank, he went to another one where his sub-contactor’s brother was a manger. He quickly signed a loan contract there with no guarantors or extra documents required. In the meantime, one of his wife’s cousins in Pamplona, an auto mechanic, was frantically searching for a good priced second-hand van. While driving to Pamplona to pick up the van, Yavor arranged with his insurance agent to fax him an insurance policy for which he would pay later. Yavor had always paid his instalments on time, and brought a number of clients to his agent, hence the favour. In Pamplona Yavor signed the contract, arranged by the cousin, showing the faxed policy. In the meantime, the cousin had arranged the contract, along with the faxed policy and drove immediately back to the Tafalla UGT office, picking the original insurance policy on the way. From there at 5 pm sharp he faxed all the documents to the office responsible for the unemployment benefits. Only then, he drove back to Pamplona to pick up the new van. “If one thing had gone wrong, I would have lost the money. Without the help of all these people, I wouldn’t have managed. But that’s because in all these years here, I worked for the connections. I showed them I am a responsible worker, I was never late with payments. It’s all about how you set yourself and then it pays off.” Yavor concluded in the end of the day.

The successful end of the story was explained by Yavor through the mix of his connections – Bulgarian relatives and Spanish professional ones, which have turned personal. He dared using his Spanish connections because he felt he has the right to do it, he told me later. Having been employed regularly for three years allowed Yavor to establish institutional connections with banks, with more than one employer, with the insurance company, to become a member of the workers union and learn more about his options. These factors played a significant role in his move to a more independent position. But to this, Yavor added the role of the EU. He, like many other
migrants, often mentioned the accession. Even if it was because this was a recent change giving them somewhat unrealistic hopes, this fact still worked on a symbolic level strongly. Yavor told me on several occasions he feels now ‘entitled and secure’ to make such serious steps because he knows he’s now in a better positions as an European citizen. He mobilized the EU citizenship as a justification for acting in a certain way. The additional EU citizenship that he now had served to open new horizons for actions, it allowed him to take a risk. He felt he can be like his employer. ‘If he [the employer] can do it, so can I.’ Yavor said. Becoming an autonom then was explained by Yavor as an act of claiming a place among the Spanish citizens, for which EU played a strong symbolic role, if not directly a practical role.

4.2.4. Migrant employers – model citizens, exploiters, or a safety net?

Yavor became self-employed just when the financial crisis was starting to hit Spain. He kept working as before for his sub-contractor, receiving the whole wage, rather than a percentage, but paying higher for benefits and taxes. At first, it was not clear whether he will succeed. I kept inquiring regularly about his progress in the following years. His answer in our skype conversations was always: It’s going fine. Slowly, but fine. or It’s more difficult now, but not impossible yet.” When I met Yavor again in Brushlyan in the summer of 2010 he was still working as an autonom, employing two to three workers on temporary contracts, working predominantly for the same two contractors, with whom he kept his good relations. He was mostly doing small finishing jobs or renovations, signing short-term commissions for up to three months. He first started with his younger bother-in-law, then took another migrant form the village who got laid off. When we spoke the next year, he had up to three workers at a time, depending on his work load, and he always hired from within the Brushlyani community
Keeping all the regulations very strictly, only working with regularised workers with whom he signed the required type of contracts was something that Yavor did not have a chance of avoiding. First of all, his contractors did not want to risk a fine. But also, to use Yavor’s words again: It’s not like I like paying taxes and social benefits for my workers. But to be honest, I don’t really know whom to bribe. This is not Brushlyan, where the policeman is a cousin and he owes you a favour anyway. It’s not even Gotse Delchev where you know how much to put in an envelope for the favour. I’m sure the Spanish know their ways. They wouldn’t have hired so many irregulars otherwise. But I don’t know their tricks, and if there is a check-up, I won’t be able to afford the fine afterwards. And in the end, these rules are not that bad, this is how to go forth, by keeping the rules.”

Keeping all the rules and being a ‘model citizen’ was something that Yavor underlined on different occasions. He often made comparisons between the different ways in which things worked in Spain and in Bulgaria when it came to observing the rules. In this sense, while in Bulgaria there will always be an alternative way of doing things based on the intricate local knowledge of the complicated system of bribes, favours and turning a blind eye, in Spain the knowledge coming from the position of the insider was lacking. This resulted in a much stricter complying with the regulations, which inevitably affected his rhetoric and subsequently his attitude. The order in Spain was idealized and connected to prosperity, while Bulgaria was deprecated as backwards, savage, and hence poor. Paradoxically, the lack of local knowledge which would have allowed flexibility and manoeuvring within the system, contributed to developing an imposed ‘good citizen’ behaviour, which was coupled with the respective rhetoric. In this sense, being in Spain forced Yavor to be also a ‘good citizen’ by following regulations as opposed to Bulgaria where he could circumvent them and ultimately circumvent relating to the state. Thus, being a regularized migrant
worker and subsequently employer changed for him not only his economic situation, but his practice as a citizen.\footnote{Becoming a model employer is, of course, only one possible trajectory. Cases of migrant employers who employ other migrant workers irregularly or in more exploitive conditions are wide spread and well documented in the migration literature. In the case of Bulgaria most commonly this is the case among Bulgarian Turks or Roma migrants in Germany or the Netherlands who find employment through the networks of the already settled Turkish migrants who hire them irregularly, but have the advantage of speaking the same language.}

Nevertheless, even if all the regulations were kept officially, the conditions of employment that Yavor offered were rather precarious. He only offered short-term contracts, rehiring workers only when he needed them. He only kept workers who did not have other more stable offers, in this way turning into a buffer for those who were in immediate need of a job. With his large pool of acquaintances from Brushlyan he did not risk remaining without workers in a case of emergency. Once he even had to summon from Bulgaria one of his cousins, who came for a month and a half. The worker who had been contracted to do the job found a more secure and long-term position and Yavor let him go. In this sense, flexible conditions of work are not only expressed in the worker’s practices, but also in the intermediate migrant employer’s actions, who reacts in accordance to the needs of the worker. In our last conversation about migration, the situation in Spain, and the financial crisis Yavor reflected the full-fledged neoliberal logic of the self-managing flexible individual adjusting to the needs of the market:

\begin{quotation}
You know why we, the Bulgarians, manage fine in these more difficult times, unlike many of the Spanish? We are ready to work everything, to change the job, to adjust to whatever the employer needs now. Look at me, I studied to be an electrician. In Bulgaria, I worked in a factory, in a bar. Then in Spain as the lowest labourer at the funfairs. But then, it was construction work that was available here. So, I started learning more and more new things, from the other workers, depending on what was needed to be done on the construction site.
\end{quotation}
When did I dream in my life that I will be able to raise a whole house with my own hands, to do the plastering, the tiling, the masonry, the roofs... But I had to, so I learned. The Spanish will never do this. They’re stuck in one position and don’t want to move from it. That’s why we are appreciated here, all of us. Look how many people came back to Bulgaria, took professional driving licences and came back to work as drivers now... But you see what is searched for and you adjust yourself accordingly.

Before we parted, he took me to see his house, which had grown with another two storeys in the last two years. The next day, they left back to Spain with their kids in the van full of salami, cheese, waffles, clothes, and blankets.

Yavor’s story starts off as an example of the typical labour migrant from Brushlyan, but the more it gets to the present, the less typical it becomes. He shared the faith of most irregular unskilled workers, he was representative of the segment of migrants who work in construction and got regularised. His wage and extra hours as a construction worker with a contract have been what most migrants strive for. But his entrepreneurial move into self-employment and the fact that he actually managed to sustain his position as such, is something that turned him from a typical migrant, an ideal type, into an exception and an ideal for most of the migrants. What conditioned his trajectory and made him unique was a blend of his urge for a higher status engrained in his family history, the networks and contacts he established and mobilized on different occasions, and the practical and symbolic opportunities opened up by regularization and by the subsequent change of status as an EU citizen.
4.2.5. The adaptable workers: European citizenship as an opening

Adaptability was emphasized by Yavor as the ‘best quality of the Bulgarian workers’. The adaptability and inventiveness of migrant workers was characteristic for all groups. However, in the case of the professional lorry drivers’ to adapt was related to new structural opportunities which came with EU accession. The lorry drivers are a very clear case of upward work trajectory, which also included a certain level of independence from other workers on one hand, and from the tight network of the kin and the community, on the other. At the same time, their high adaptability led to disruption in their social and family life and also revealed the flip side of flexible labour.

Being employed as a driver was a very recent, but highly desired path for several reasons. The substantial salary, higher than in other employment branches, was the most often quoted rationale. International lorry drivers could reach up to 3000 euro per month, I was told, while the regional and internal factory drivers or the construction truck drivers received up to 2000 euro per month48. In addition to the higher salary, most drivers were working with contracts and were part of the social security system, adding to their length of service as well. The relative independence from other workers was also appreciated as a great advantage. However, becoming a driver in Spain was a very recent career move for migrants, only after EU accession in 2007. The reason was that until then any type of driving licence had to be legalised within six months after first entering the country. The legalisation procedure was complicated, included a test, especially for the professional categories, and was rather costly, but it was also linked with a regularisation status.49

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48 Even the lower wage is still with about 400 euro higher than the wage of construction workers doing extra hours
49 There was another possibility of having a EU valid driving licence issued in Bulgaria through some procedure, but apparently none of the migrants had inquired about it, so this option remained unexploited.
After EU accession however, Bulgarian driving licences became valid all over Europe, which allowed many migrants holding a professional one to immediately apply for new jobs.

This very concrete new opportunity opened up by EU accession was further exploited by people who did not have a professional driving license before. Thus, a very substantive number of men arranged longer vacations during the summer and went back to Bulgaria to complete the professional driving course and get a new category on their now valid all over EU driving licenses.

In fact, during my fieldwork I hardly knew a man without a professional driving licence, either acquired before migration, or very recent. Not all of them, however, pursued a driving career right away. But this suddenly became an indispensable asset for everyone with serious intentions to succeed in migration. Alil was one of those adaptable workers. He has been working in construction in Spain for three years, living there with his wife and young son, when he learned about the change in the regulations. In April 2007 he was one of the first to ask for a one month leave to go back and take the professional drivers’ course. He had a work permit from before, so when he came back, he immediately started searching for a new job and by December he was working on a construction site as a concrete-mixer truck driver. He told me, he prefers being a driver, not only because of the better payment, but also because he found it a lighter and easier job, in comparison to construction.

Taking the driving course and the driving license test in Bulgaria was a choice that all migrants made for several reasons. It was much cheaper, easier to arrange for them in terms of language, faster and there was a certainty in taking the exam. The last point is important, because it involves ‘gifts’ to the instructor. Noone really framed this as bribing, but the gifts were in fact money on top of the regular fee ‘just to make sure everything goes smoothly at the exam’, as one migrant formulated it. While everyone took the course seriously, the ‘gift’ made sure they will not have to retake the exam and waste more time. Having the knowledge how and whom to bribe was only
valid in Bulgaria. Thus, the easier conditions for taking a professional driving license and the local knowledge that secured the fast positive result, were a trigger for many migrants to follow this track. With Bulgaria entering the EU the local practice and local knowledge became suddenly relevant in a new way. Spain as an employment space and Bulgaria as a qualification space became connected through the EU in a way which formally changed the recognition of migrants’ skills from unskilled to semi-skilled. The transferrable driving license became an epitome of the advantages that came with the EU, not just as an opportunity, but as a symbolic connection between the two spaces – the space of migration and the space of home.

The international lorry drivers were even more in demand and systematically hired. Kemal, the driver who got laid off because he was one week late coming back from Bulgaria, was driving international big lorries between northern Spain and southern France. His new employer had told him that it is almost impossible to find a Spanish driver willing to drive outside Spain, therefore he mostly hired migrants. Interestingly enough, this is one of the few occupations in which migrants, just on the basis of their type of occupation managed to earn more than the Spanish, who only drove during the day and within Navarra. Kemal was driving in a team with his father-in-law, in shifts of 48 hours, with a short break for sleeping in Bordeaux. They only spend the weekends at home in Tafalla with their wives. But the money that they made was worth the sacrifice, Kemal told me. In addition to that, he felt his status has risen in comparison to the construction site drivers or the regional ones, because of the higher payment (and the bigger lorry). And his father-in-law even told me, he actually preferred this kind of working schedule, because this is what he was used to as an interregional driver in Bulgaria until the early 1990’s, which in a way replicated his lifestyle from then. Thus, the international drivers were ‘migrants in migration’, by taking this specific type of shift migration jobs, which the Spanish did not want.
The case of the lorry drivers reveals how the changes in the structural conditions generated by Bulgaria’s EU accession opened new opportunities for migrants and allowed them to reposition themselves. The act of going back to Bulgaria to pass the professional driving licence is an act of mobilizing these new opportunity structures. In this way migrants claim their rights as European citizens – in this case their right for recognition of professional qualification. Regularization as a change in status, and the subsequent additional openings that came with this change into EU migrants were exploited by the drivers, just as by Yavor, in a very instrumental way. By realizing the new opportunities opened by the status, migrants enacted themselves as citizens.

There are many divergences from these stories of what is considered success. The transition from irregularity to regularity was far from smooth to many of the other workers and not necessarily unidirectional, with some slipping back. Regularity itself was not necessarily a favourable condition from some migrants. In addition, regularity as a status contains in itself precarity through the variety of temporary contracts that workers were offered. What I tease out in the next part of the chapter are these different contradictions inherent in the interplay between regularity and irregularity, between the normative opportunities opened up by a change in the status and the mobilization of informal mechanisms, between the status and the conditions of the practice.

4.3. Shifting between regularity and irregularity

As it was already pointed out, many of the migrants did not get the chance to get a regular status, i.e. to acquire a work permit in the 2005 amnesty campaign. Some of the older migrants had managed to regularise in earlier campaigns, but they were very few. The rest either did not find an employer who would agree to apply for their work permit, or did not fulfil the conditions and remained irregular workers at least until 2007. With Bulgaria’s EU accession, the regulations
changed, but as I have mentioned above, workers still needed an application from an employer for a work permit. Even though it was much easier to receive the status, this did not lead to overall regularisation. Applying for a work permit meant that the employer is able to offer a job with a contract to the respective candidate. It also included obligation to pay social security taxes for at least six months. Thus, on the one hand, some smaller scale employers were reluctant to regularise too many new workers, fearing that they might not be able to offer enough job positions for a longer period and to cover the social security taxes.

4.3.1. Reconceptualizing migration from the vantage point of the new citizens of Europe

Migrants deployed different strategies in order to get regularised and to sign a contract with their employers. For some, it was enough to just ask, while for others it meant finding a new employer. A third course of action was to seek for a fake employer who applied for regularising a worker, without actually intending to hire him *de facto*. Such cases were rather popular among the migrants and by early autumn of 2007 it was well known which employers are willing to do it. While the worker did not pay anything for the ordinary regularisation procedure, there were substantial costs included in this alternative way. Usually, the worker covered the taxes for the procedure and also the first six months social security benefits, which are included in the conditions for issuing a work permit. A contract was signed on paper and the employer had the right to ‘lay off’ the worker after these first six months with no fines. Many migrants invested in this option, while continuing to work for their old employers with no contract. Some, then, changed the employer to sign a contract with a new one. Others managed to persuade their old employers to change their status into regular workers.
Yavor’s brother-in-law, Alil was one of these migrants who had to trick his employer into signing a contract. He had worked for him for two years, but the employer refused to apply for a work permit. Alil managed to find a ‘fake’ employer who agreed to regularise him for a fee. With the ready documents, Alil went back to his own employer and presented him with a fait accompli, forcing him to sign a contract. The day when this happened, Alil came to visit his sister very excited from the victory. “Working without a contract here, without benefits, without length of service, that’s like working in Bulgaria,” he said. “In Bulgaria most people in construction are like this. I’ve done that too – here in Spain, and at home. But now, that I know my rights, I’m not going to give in to some greedy boss, who doesn’t want to pay my benefits. We’ve come here for something better, not to live like monkeys, like the last peasants. Now I will finally feel normal, equal, with rights. Even if my salary will be the same. It’s a matter of principle.”

His salary was indeed the same, but what he wanted was a different position. Not only that he did receive more rights by working regularly, he also actively claimed these rights as entitled to them. Thus, I would suggest that the act of tricking the employer into hiring him regularly is an act of inserting himself as an equal participant in a community of rights bearing individuals, like the other Spanish regular workers. Moreover, Alil differentiates between Bulgaria and Spain along the lines of regular work and rights, highlighting the paradox of having access to certain citizenship right as a migrant in Spain, while missing them as a citizen in Bulgaria. His motivation for migration was not reduced only to better financial opportunities, but was framed in the language of rights.

The mass attempts to regularize should not be read as only an expression of migrants’ attempts to acquire better positioning at the labour market. It was coupled with a re-assessment of the whole migration endeavour and more specifically, a sudden amplification in the requirements and expectations from work conditions. In this sense, the change in the structural opportunities and the
discourse on rights were tightly connected. While when talking of the time before 2007 migrants usually estimated their position in the labour market as a result of a chance, now this was already re-conceptualized as a right. And what is more, these rights started being contrasted with what they have left behind in Bulgaria. Thus the newly acquired status of European citizens transformed the symbolic self-positioning of migrants. At the same time, the same status also hindered in practice the empowerment of many who did not manage to get regularised immediately. Many employers, especially in bigger construction companies, in international factories and in the transportation business, refused to hire irregular workers from Bulgaria, who in principle could acquire a regular status and were not willing to work in exploitive conditions. This left many recent migrants in a limbo between the possible, but not yet actual, regularization and the closed pool of irregular jobs. In this sense, the change of status into EU citizens (in a transitional stage) reinforced certain aspects of discrimination on the labour market.

Being trapped in-between statuses evoked discussions of different types of expectations and requirements that migrants suddenly started expressing after the nominal change of status. Amet, a 33 year old man who arrived at the end of 2006 and has been trying since to find a job with a contract, illustrated the frustration of many: “Before [2007] it was clear, you come, you work illegally, you get paid less than the Spanish workers, you can be kicked out any moment, but still you make much more money than in Bulgaria [...] Now, I still can’t work legally, because I can’t find anyone to make the documents for me, but I also can’t work illegally. They know I won’t work under the nasty conditions from before, so they don’t even bother to hire me without a contract.”

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50 Pumares describes a similar example of Moroccan migrants trying to find legal work with their new permits after the legalization programme in 1991, but many times failing due to the niche or irregular labour they occupy (Pumares 1996, quoted in Calavita 2005)
Amet summarizes the sentiments of this category of more recent migrants who came with a new understanding and higher requirements for life in migrancy. The paradox does not simply demonstrate the ambiguities related to the change of status, but in fact signals a re-evaluation of the meaning of migration. Here migration becomes mobility, intra-European mobility encouraged by the European Unions, rather than feared and criminalized migration from outside. This was already visible in Yavor’s aspirations to achieve more by becoming an autonom. But the category of these unsuccessful migrants also demonstrates the possibility of return and through that, the re-positioning of the place of origin in their conceptual landscape. The reconceptualization of Bulgaria as a possible place for immediate return also means its inclusion in the same symbolic space. Thus Bulgaria became part of the European Union not only on the normative and institutional level, but in the individual imaginaries of migrants who envisaged their lives equally well in both places.

4.3.2. The buffer jobs

The number of those trapped in the limbo of temporary irregularity was not significant, but it indicated an important tendency of reconceptualization of migrants’ positions and expectations. Nevertheless, most migrants without stable jobs, were in fact manoeuvring between statuses and types of jobs with great ease. There were tricks and ways to go around the work permit system, and buffer temporary jobs which softened the hardship of the initial lack of regularised employment. One strategy, already mentioned, was to find a ‘fake’ employer with whom to apply for work permit documents. There was no strictly established system for this and it mostly worked through networks and acquaintances, but it was nevertheless effective for many of the migrants I met. Another strategy, often overlapping with the first one, was to take a poorly paid short-term job, which secured the living minimum, while waiting for regularisation or a better offer. It was mainly the more recent migrants who deployed these strategies. The change in regularisation and residence
conditions in 2007 triggered a new wave of intense migration. Usually young men arrived to ‘try their luck’ with a little money and relying on the support network of kith and kin. In this sense, the new migrants were able to manipulate these different strategies using the knowledge, connections, and image, created by those who had already established themselves in Spain.

Illustrative for the combination of mechanisms deployed is the case of mizho Ismet, a 55-year-old men, who had been in Spain for 7 months. He had his son and daughter, and three of his nephews already settled down in Spain. His daughter had recommended him in a chicken slaughterhouse, where he was working already for half a year with no documents. The conditions and money were not satisfying, therefore he wanted to start working as a truck driver, using his training and experience from Bulgaria. However, he did not manage to find a truck company employer willing to regularise him, only employers willing to hire him, in case he managed to arrange his work permit by himself. Stuck in this position, he complained to his landlord who owned one of the bakeries in Tafalla. It was the landlord who offered mizho Ismet to help him and apply for a work permit as a ‘fake’ employer. Even though it was a rather costly operation and mizho Ismet had to borrow some of the money from his nephew, it all ended up well. Three months after receiving the work permit he was working as an international lorry driver and making three times the money he used to make in the chicken factory. Without his landlord support, however, this would not have been possible, mizho Ismet emphasized to me.

The chicken slaughterhouse for which mizho Ismet worked was a very prominent buffer employment for many other migrants in Tafalla. Almost all members of mizho Ismet’s family had worked for the factory for shorter or longer periods of time, just as many other recent Brushlyani have. In fact, when he quit, his place was immediately taken by his brother, who had recently arrived to Spain. The factory owner had very few workers with contracts, mainly in the
administration. All the others were irregular and changing often. According to the workers, he knew the ‘important people’ responsible for the possible inspections and had a way of solving the issue. The conditions in the slaughterhouse were relatively good, according to most migrants. The working hours were from 4 am to 2 pm four days a week for 700-800 euro per month. Many of them had part-time jobs in the afternoon and/or for the remaining two days. Even though in this way, some of them managed to reach the construction worker’s *nomina*, the slaughterhouse job remained undesirable not only because it was worse paid, but also due to the very tiring working hours. At the same time, this was regarded as a secure job, with a stable monthly income, “*always paid on time, by the 5th every month, unlike in Bulgaria*”, as mizho Ismet underlined. It was also reliable in the sense of offering employment almost all the time to new migrants, because of the high fluctuation of the working force, which had turned it into a transition stage in many migrants’ trajectories.

Another type of temporary buffer job was in seasonal agricultural employment. Grapes picking was the autumn occupation for many who had no job. Because of the flexibility of engagement in terms of hours and days, many migrants with jobs also used it as additional source of income, either in their free hours, or over the weekend and during public holidays. Ilhan, a young man who has been working in the chicken slaughterhouse for a couple of months, managed to make additional 350 euro for a week of working on the grapes field during four afternoons and two whole days. In this way Ilhan managed to make half her monthly salary in the factory. Mizho Ismet’s brother also went for two days, right after he arrived at the end of September. He made 60 euro, with which he

51 Only once, one of mizho Ismet’s nephews told me, was there an actual check-up. All the workers were asked to hide in the heat chamber and remained locked there for a few hours, while the committee was checking the premises and the documents of the few regular workers who remained at their spots. The day after all the workers received a premium of half a salary for their ‘cooperation’.
could ‘buy his coffee and feel a bit independent’, but refused to go for a third day, because it was too tiring for him. Agricultural work was never considered a reliable employment and none of the migrants would have been content with it as a major job, but it was nevertheless considered as a good source of additional money, desired by many.\footnote{This attitude towards agricultural and seasonal job as a whole points to the specificity of Navarra with its opportunities for construction and industrial employment which distinguish this locality from other parts of Spain (in the South, for example) where agriculture is the main employment.} The mechanism for finding a job was always on recommendation from another migrant and payment was always informal, but strict, per kilogram of grapes. It was called ‘the loose safety net’ by many migrants for this quality of securing additional and emergency income to migrants, but being seasonal and short term.

Very short-term construction appointments were a third type of buffer jobs, taken by men in the first months after arrival, or in between other more secure jobs. Such appointments lasted from one day up to a month. As in agriculture, the mechanism for getting such employment was using networks, which were predominantly kin based. Before becoming an autonom, Yavor used to call his brother-in-law sometimes when going to sites where he had more work than he could manage. Many men combined daily agricultural job with such temporary construction appointments, until finding more long term jobs. Others, like the 45 year-old-mizho Djevat, have been asked by their employers to go on unemployment benefits until the construction firm gets a new commission, and would make some extra money, on top of the benefits, by working on such short-term appointments. In a way, what Yavor was offering as an employer, even tough only to regularised workers, was also a similar type of a buffer job.

Even though this kind of employment relied on the vulnerability of the workers with no documents and/or with no permanent job and reinforced the flexibilization of migrant labour, it worked at the
same time as a sort of safety net, which allowed many migrants to start their migrant life or remain in Spain in moments of employment crisis. Moreover, all three types of buffer jobs used the rather large pool of migrants interconnected to each other through kin or strong friendship ties. In this way, the big village community established in Tafalla offered not only flexible, but also easily accessible, reliable and controllable labour force. The relatives did not recommend their ‘lazy’ cousins, and controlled those who got a job, so that “the name of the kin does not get dirty”. I was present at a scene in which Yavor and his older brother-in-law were both scolding his younger brother-in-law, Hassan for being not diligent enough and making bad impression to the employer where they have recommended him. “If you lose your job, if he doesn’t call you tomorrow, that’s not just your problem, it’s a problem for all of us. He [the employer] would never trust us again for anyone,” Yavor said. This type of kin pressure was a widespread mechanism of coercion and control. In this sense, the kin network was used by both sides as opening opportunities, but also as imposing control.

4.3.3. Precarious regularity

The buffer jobs were mostly taken by irregular workers, but also by workers with contracts, who got laid off. The precariousness of irregular labour overlapped with the insecurity which certain types of regularity went along with. Being a regular worker did not necessarily secure a stable job or a long term contract, as it was pointed out earlier. A particular type of temporary contracts was very popular among the construction workers. Instead of signing a one-year fijo contract, extended for another three years after, as it used to be the case earlier, recently employers have started preferring the fin de obra contract, until completion of the project, which in principle had to be renewed for each new project. However, after the contract’s expiration many migrants continued
working for the same employer without a renewal.\textsuperscript{53} They kept receiving the same salary and social benefits, but the employer could lay them off in any given moment, which made the security of the job very low. At the same time, these contracts offered certain benefits that the irregular workers did not enjoy and in this way created a different level of insecurity and hence, inequality.

Mizho Djevat, a 50 years old construction workers who was working for a Spanish \textit{autonom} together with his two sons, was working on such expired contract and had just gotten laid off, when we met in early 2008. His employer explained he had no new commissions and asked his 5 workers to go into \textit{paro} and ask for unemployment benefits for a while. By signing the initial contract and having their social benefits paid, mizho Djevat and his sons had the needed length of service to ask for up to an year of \textit{paro}, which allowed them to stay in Spain, while waiting for new employment. And even though their subsequent strategy was to use the buffer jobs, just as the irregulars migrants did, they kept receiving 90 percent of their base salary through the unemployment benefits.

Drivers also worked in highly precarious conditions. Some of them were self-employed as a requirement to be hired. Others had temporary contracts which were easily terminated or discontinued unexpectedly quite often. The short lorry drivers’ strike in early summer of 2008\textsuperscript{54} was an example for this instability. While none of the migrant drivers took part in the strike, they had to remain idle, because of the blocked roads. This caused serious decrease in their wages for the month, with their employers either terminating temporarily their contracts, or simply not paying for the days in which they did not work. This event draws attention to the more general dependency of lorry drivers on economic downfalls, which became apparent in the subsequent deepening

\textsuperscript{53} The procedure for renewing a contract was easy and fast but employers did not face big fines for not doing it, so they often preferred to postpone renewing it for long periods and have at hand easily disposable workers. 
\textsuperscript{54} \url{http://elpais.com/diario/2008/06/15/economia/1213480802_850215.html}
economic crisis, as a result of which many drivers had to change their job temporarily. Thus, the short term contracts and the self-employment mean that employers can transfer unexpected costs caused by the crises or the strike, for example, to the workers by simply discontinuing their work agreements. The self-employed drivers were in an even more vulnerable position, not having the safety net of claiming unemployment benefits. Thus, while for Yavor self-employment meant being a successful and entrepreneurial worker who works under the same conditions as his Spanish ex-boss, for the drivers being self-employed was an imposed condition which brought more insecurity, without earning them more money.

These examples of Djevat and the drivers aimed to demonstrate the flexibility with which migrant workers are being moved from one status to another and the different possible ways their trajectories might develop as a result of that. But also to show the complicated interrelation between regularity and irregularity, security and insecurity and ultimately to raise again the question of the different nuances of marginality and inequality.

4.3.4. The other side of regularity

Working with a contract, however, was not necessarily something that made migrants content. Some of the men working in firms with predominantly Spanish employees complained that the Spanish do not want to work extra hours and on Saturdays. Djamal, a 29-year-old construction worker who only got regularised in September 2007 when he moved to a new construction firm, was hoping to finally enjoy all the benefits from working with a contract. To his greatest disappointment, his new Spanish colleagues did not want to do the extra hours, hence the whole team worked the regular 40 hours per week.
The Spanish are so lazy, it’s unbelievable. But for most migrants that’s good. Because the bosses prefer to hire them instead of the Spanish, and have more work done. They don’t care about the extra money they pay, they just want the work to be done faster. But look at me – what a mischance. I called my wife to come join me here with our little son, when I got the documents. And since then, it’s been worse. I only get the ‘nomina’, the 1200 euro per month. And there is no way I can make additional money, because of these lazy colleagues of mine. And you know, what’s the most stupid thing? I was better off without documents. I got less money for the extra hours, and no insurance, that’s true. But still, it added up and I was making 100-200 euro more per month. And then, you start asking yourself – why get the documents, why get legal.

Djamal’s frustration points to an often discussed problem about the meaning and practice of being regularised and equal to the Spanish workers. When he was employed as an irregular worker with no contract or social security, he felt different than his few Spanish colleagues, which urged him to search for a new employer who will offer him equal conditions, he told me. And indeed, the new employer offered equal conditions and assisted him with the work permit. Ironically, the equal conditions turned out to include a drawback. Ismet, another construction worker with a similar problem complained to me that the contract and documents mean nothing to him, just trouble. He had worked without a contract or social security in Bulgaria before coming to Spain in 2006 and continued the same way in Spain until his boss insisted on regularising him right after Bulgaria’s accession into the EU and moved him into the team of contract workers, most of whom were Spanish. Similar to Djamal’s case, he stopped working extra-hours. “But I came here for the money, not for the contract,” Ismet said angrily. Interestingly enough, the employer did not give Ismet an opportunity to reject the offer and remain working without a contract. Thus, even though most of the men’s strategies were directed at obtaining a work permit as a way to finding a secure job, some were in fact disappointed from the benefits that came along. These disappointments, I will argue,
are indicative of their more general reflections on the meaning of success and ultimately of equality. How do migrants measure success and whom do they want to be equal with and in what aspects? And how does this related to citizenship through work?

4.4. The successful migrant: changing frames of comparison

The question of success bring back to the issue of comparison, and ultimately of the meaning of equality. The accusation of the Spanish being lazy kept coming up in various conversations from discussing the working hours of the institutions, through the wide-spread siesta and the number of public holidays, to the refusal to do extra-hours. However, the underlying implications of these accusations were connected to broader issues of money and life aspirations, leading ultimately to the question of what does it mean to be successful migrant, what makes it worth it to be a migrant, and what are the acceptable conditions for remaining a migrant. Here, as it is often the case, the comparison revealed much more about the migrants themselves than about the Spanish. In a conversation about strategies of saving and spending money, related also to the reluctance of the Spanish to work extra-hours, Yavor explained to me, he only came to Spain to make enough money to build a house for himself and his sons, to save some and invest in a small business at home some day. “I want more than them [the Spanish construction workers]. They just want to cover their everyday expenses, cover their car lease. They don’t want anything else from life. And I want to be something more than a simple worker some day. I want to have something bigger and to do something better. That’s why I need to work twice as hard as them and earn twice as much money,” he concluded. Once the opportunity of having wide spread work permits and legal contracts became feasible after 2007, the meaning of equality was redefined from ‘being like the Spanish’ into ‘being able to achieve what we came for’. In this sense, the European citizenship opened up new spaces of empowerment not only practically, but also symbolically.
What has become an easy move from irregularity to regularity opened new practical aspects of possible discontent. The examples of Djamal and Ismet above demonstrated the importance of finding a reliable employer who will be willing to offer a secure position and financial benefits. Another whole area for negotiation, however, was related to the different types of contracts. For instance, Yavor, who was regarded as the ultimate example of success, started with a temporary contract (temporal) for a trial period of six months and then another six months, after which he signed a fixed-term contract (fijo) for a 3 years period. Contrato de fijo was regarded as the best possible contract among migrants, and they erroneously translated it to me as the equivalent of a permanent contract. While in fact it is a contract for a fixed period of time, maximum of three years. Yavor took pride in the fact that his employer liked him and trusted him enough to sign a fijo with him and gave this as an example of their good relationship. And indeed, very few of the migrants I spoke to were appointed on such contracts. The myriad of possible short-term contracts reinforced the precariousness of migrant labour and made the fijo seem as the promised land of security and prosperity, turning the actual permanent contract into an option no one had ever heard of. The opportunity of becoming regularized as a right of an EU citizen, rather than an accidental privilege of an amnesty campaign, opened new fields of claims and new understanding of the positions and aspirations that migrants had in Spain.

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The question of the relation between regularity and irregularity of migrants is approached in this chapter not simply as a matter of formal access to the labour market, but as a question of citizenship. The stories of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are stories of struggles, of migrants struggle to constitute themselves as citizens. The moves between regularity and irregularity, the types of contracts, the new regulations coming with EU accession are all framed by the state and its institutions. At the
same time, the flexibility of the workers and the inventive mechanisms that they deploy manoeuvring in between the state categories demonstrate a space of creativity and agentic powers. Moreover, this interplay between institutional definitions and individual acts, traceable in the stories I have told, reveals a complex picture of the migrant, who is neither just a pawn of structural forces, nor the sole conductor of his own life. The question of citizenship, as acts of participation and equality, then, can be translated into everyday employment moves and decisions, and the motivations behind them.
Chapter 5: Unemployment: Security through Insecurity and the Discourse of the Deserving State

In October 2011 in response to the deepening crisis in Greece the Bulgarian Prime Minister then Boyko Borisov said, “Bulgaria won’t pay Greece’s bills.”\(^{55}\) To this, he added that “It is not logical for the disciplined countries to pay for the richer non-disciplined ones”.\(^{56}\) These statements triggered a public debate over the European Union principles of solidarity. The PM gave a clear message that only those who have deserved it by proper behaviour should rely on help by way of solidarity. In a similar vein, a few months later there was a political outburst in regard to the mandatory health insurance. The Health minister of that time, Stefan Konstantinov, suggested applying more serious sanctions to those who did not pay all their contributions, that would involve material fines, including confiscating the debtor’s property.\(^{57}\) A year earlier the Prime Minister commented that this practice should be criminalized and offenders should be sent to jail.\(^{58}\) What reverberates in these public statements on issues as diverse as state financial support for Greece and healthcare contributions in Bulgaria is a wider political discourse which substitutes the principle of solidarity and redistribution with a direct reciprocity principle that distinguishes between different categories of disciplined and undisciplined citizens (or countries), which respectively turns them into deserving or undeserving citizens. This discourse trickles down to the way “ordinary” people like my informants conceptualize what is good citizenship and what are the

\(^{55}\) [http://bta.bg/bg/c/IN/id/226325](http://bta.bg/bg/c/IN/id/226325)


\(^{57}\) [http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=1144470](http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=1144470)

\(^{58}\) [http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=632229](http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=632229)
proper relations with the state, a view which is based on an individualized contractual principle which qualifies citizens as deserving or undeserving.

This process of reformulating the basis for citizenship is framed in a global tendency of reconfiguring the relationship and the distribution of responsibilities between states, markets, families and individuals for solving social problems (Kingfisher 2002, Pierson 2006). One such issue is how is social security provided and by whom. In recent decades welfare systems have been undergoing transformations in almost all advanced industrial countries with privatization and retrenchment of public services, marketization of healthcare, and new insurance based contractual relations. While these processes take different shapes in different parts of the world, Nikolas Rose (1996) suggests they pose similar questions about the new strategies of governing, which have at their centre discrete and autonomous actors, rather than society as a whole. With the welfare state being a major embodiment of social citizenship, the issue at stake then is whether it is possible to transform social rights by individualizing social problems without destabilizing the basis for citizenship and social membership, as Giovanni Procacci (2001) points out. This question is part of the wider process of decoupling of political, civil and social aspects of citizenship (Benhabib 2007), which has resulted in new forms of inclusion and exclusion, and in a process of contractualization and marketization of citizenship, as I have discussed this in chapter I.

Social security is the site where these processes of reconfigured responsibilities, new opportunities, and reformulated conceptualizations come to the fore. In this chapter I use the case of unemployment to unpack the tensions and openings between formal status and substantive rights and the way these statuses and rights are enacted. At the same time I look at the discussions that unemployment triggers of what does it mean to be a good citizen and what should be the proper relationship with the state. This chapter is framed within a broad understanding of social citizenship...
as the „the moral and performative dimensions of membership which define the meanings and practices of belonging to society.” (Holsten and Appadurai 1999:4). Following Enging Isin (2008) I focus on the process-oriented character of citizenship. I approach social citizenship both as a set of rights and entitlements (i.e. status), and as the enactment and lived experience of these rights and entitlements (i.e. practice), which are in a dialectical relationship (Lister 1998).

I approach unemployment at three analytical levels, similarly to my conceptual approach to citizenship: as a status, as a practice and as a discourse. I explore the institutional openings and closures that my informants experience as migrants, workers, and members of the European Union by looking at the particular conditions for receiving unemployment benefits in Spain. At a second level I analyse how migrants enact this status and how do they mobilize the entitlements coming along with the status in Spain, and the lack thereof in Bulgaria. These practices of unemployment then trigger discourses which go beyond concrete status conditions and strategies of achieving it to describe the emerging idea of a deserving citizen, of proper relations with the state, and of the good state. Therefore, I look both at people’s practical manoeuvres and the way they make sense and interpret their actions in the larger framework of interacting with the state. Thus I analyse social security as a site where people position themselves in different ways vis-à-vis the state by using different social benefits, by paying taxes and welfare contributions, by registering in different statuses (like maternity, unemployment, sick leave etc), and even by circumventing welfare by informal support mechanisms etc. By doing this they also craft conceptualisations of the good state as caring and responsible by comparing the actual practices of the Bulgarian and the Spanish state and their institutions. At the same time they develop a view of themselves as claim makers and entitled (or disentitled) members of a community of citizens, which is divided between Bulgaria and Spain. The discourse of the caring and responsible state develops along with ideas of
deservedness, rights and obligations. These conceptualisations are often contradictory and interwoven with tensions. Hence, the two themes that I follow throughout the chapter are what are the conceptualisations of the good state and the good citizen, and how these conceptualizations are linked with concrete practices and interactions with welfare institutions and social security policies.

By exploring two ways of being unemployed – in Brushlyan and in Tafalla – I show how people accommodate and act upon this status in different institutional contexts. Unemployment is a site where people interact with the state through making use of social security. Migrants in Spain and workers in Bulgaria develop different strategies of manipulating what the state offers them and they interpret in different ways what the state owes them. This respectively triggers different views on the state as caring or negligent. It also opens the discussion of rights and entitlements coupled with obligations which regular employment involves in terms of contributions and taxes. In this sense, unemployment is a site where we can clearly see the process of claim making towards the state, both from people with and without formal citizenship status. Moreover Spain and Bulgaria do not operate as purely separate spaces, in which people develop different institutionally contextualized views of the state and of themselves. On the contrary, opinions, view and experiences are constantly flowing back and forth between migrants and non-migrants. Thus comparisons and juxtapositions of the two states inform people’s views and underlie various imaginings of the ideal state.
5.1. Spain: the security of unemployment and how to be a deserving citizen.

Unemployment is often understood as a negative experience of having no job and of being endangered of having little or no means of living. But the status of being unemployed only becomes institutionally meaningful if coupled with its opposite – being employed. These two statuses exist in the framework of regularised and institutionalised work. Being employed is not the same thing as working, as being unemployed does not equal not working. Work can involve irregular, non-contractual, or unpaid activities, including care work for example. From a policy perspective employment and unemployment, on the other hand, are categories that attach the person to a web of institutionally devised rules and regulations of the labour market and of the welfare state. ‘Being unemployed’ means to be registered as such in the respective agency, and to be entitled to some form of unemployment benefits and support (like professional courses for example). The link between unemployment and regularity becomes particularly salient in the context of migration. Migrants who have just arrived to Spain and are without jobs do not qualify as unemployed, neither do those who were working irregularly and lost their jobs. At the same time, people registered as unemployed might continue to work irregularly, either in Bulgaria or in Spain. For this reason, in the following section I explore unemployment not as a state of being without work, but as a position vis-à-vis the (welfare) state.
5.1.1. Boril – between two institutional context and three jobs

Towards the end of my fieldwork in Spain I was sharing a flat with a migrant family in Pamplona. The previous tenant of the flat came to visit for a few days. Boril, as he presented himself to me\textsuperscript{59}, was sitting in the living room going through his post, showing me proudly monthly phone bills of 300 euro. He has arrived from Bulgaria with a minibus and he was searching for a small car to buy and drive back. The car was ordered by a friend of his in Bulgaria. He was supposed to buy the car and drive back to Bulgaria, delivering it to his friend and making some profit. He had bought four other second hand cars during his stay in Spain and had already sent them to Bulgaria with a car truck. At first I thought this is his fulltime business, as it was the case with many small entrepreneurs delivering second hand cars from Germany and other Western European countries. But it was not. Since he left Spain four months ago he had lived and worked in Bulgaria as a Ministry\textsuperscript{60} civil servant on a permanent contract. Simultaneously, however, he was registered as unemployed in Spain and was receiving \textit{el paro}, (unemployment benefits). This was the reason he was in Spain. Every three months he had to sign in the unemployment register office that he is not employed yet in order to continue receiving his benefits. And so, the second hand car business was really a side job for him to ‘not waste his time travelling back and forth for nothing’.

Boril was one of the pioneer migrants from Brushlyan. He arrived in Spain in 2000 and got regularised soon after in the campaign of 2001. He had been working regularly on different types of contracts for almost 7 years starting in Tafalla and moving later to Pamplona. For this period he had accumulated 23 months of unemployment benefits. Regularized workers with contracts who

\textsuperscript{59} Boril was his Bulgarian name which he used talking to me, but also under which he was known in Spain and in Sofia. Within the Brushlyanian community he was known with his Muslim name. I respect here his desire to be referred to by me with his Bulgaria name.

\textsuperscript{60} I will not refer to the exact Ministry for anonymity reasons.
pay taxes and social security contributions accumulate 3.5 months of unemployment benefits for each year of being employed. The maximum period for which one can be on the dole and based on prior salary is two years. So when Boril approached the seven year period beyond which he would not receive any extra benefits, he decided to interrupt his stay in Spain, to register as unemployed and return to Bulgaria. He asked his employer to lay him off, in a way in which he would be eligible for the unemployment benefits, which equalled 90 per cent of his base salary \((\text{nomina})\) or about 1200 euro. He took his wife and two teenage daughters with him and settled in Sofia, where he used to live before. Using his old contacts he managed to get a job in the Ministry unit where he used to work before. His wife remained registered as residing permanently in Spain while living in Sofia with Boril.

Boril thought of this move in the language of deservedness: “Well, you see, I have worked hard for seven years in Spain, and I had paid all the taxes and the social contributions. When you are ‘legal’ you have no choice, you pay everything, they just take it from your salary. And it’s a lot, it was 500 euro every month. So now I registered as unemployed and I’m taking this money back, cause the state owes it to me.” For Boril being on the dole meant taking back what he deserved as a diligent worker and taxpayer. Unemployment then was not a precarious status for which the system of social security provided a safety net. Unemployment for Boril was a way to “get even”, as he phrased it, with the state. In this sense, unemployment was deliberately chosen and mobilized as a resource. This was the case with many other migrants who were registered as unemployed in Spain. Combining this with a state job in Bulgaria did not seem a contradiction in terms. “These are different states, so it’s not like I’m taking the benefits and the salary from the same place. And anyway, from Spain I get what I deserved and in Bulgaria I get my salary for my work. Nothing is a present here,” he smiled. Social security in the sense of unemployment benefits has to be deserved
first and capitalized afterwards. This view was shared among many of the migrants in Spain and it had further implications for their conceptualizations of their relations with the state, as I will shortly discuss.

In his ability to manipulate two state systems and combine three types of income across borders Boril was both an exception and the rule. Indeed, there was no other migrant who managed to be simultaneously on the dole in Spain and with a state contract in Bulgaria, while having informal business on the side. He was also one of the very few people from Brushlyan who migrated internally to Sofia prior migrating to Spain. But at the same time mobilizing unemployment as a resource was a common practice among migrants. Boril’s entrepreneurial spirit was regarded as something which most people aspired to, both in the migrant community and back in the village. An exception as he might be, Boril was generally thought of as a example of a successful migrant. “Ah, Boril, he knows how to use the system. But he’s also hardworking and follows the rules. And then he takes what he deserves. That’s what we should all learn – how to pay when we have to pay, but then take what we’re entitled to,” my host in Pamplona told me framing this in the language of rights and obligations. In this sense, Boril was regarded not just as a model migrant, but also as a model citizen. Being employed as a regular worker, paying taxes and social contributions meant he had fulfilled his obligations towards the Spanish state, which then gave him the right to use the unemployment benefits.

5.1.2. Capitalizing unemployment – a safety net and an alternative source of income

Long term planned unemployment was a wide spread phenomenon among the older/pioneer migrants who got regularised in the early campaigns and had accumulated at least a year of
unemployment benefits. This was not really regarded by them as unemployment, but rather as an alternative form of income and security. In fact, no one ever referred to this state as unemployment. Instead people used the Spanish word for benefits – *el paro*. As opposed to the Bulgarian *bezraboten* (workless), which they used for someone who has lost their job unwillingly, *el paro* was used to emphasise the aspect of receiving benefits. So *bezraboten* was considered as a passive condition in which one finds himself, while being on *paro* is a choice and involves active decision making. Boril expressed it with the following words: “I was never in trouble with my job, my boss liked me, and I could have still been working there if I wanted to. I wasn’t laid off. I chose to be laid off in order to get the paro.” In this sense, being unemployed in the case of these older migrants is not a fate, it is a choice to enter a different status vis-à-vis the state.

The status of being unemployed allowed migrants to capitalize what they have ‘invested’ in the Spanish state. The contractual nature of the relationship with the state is conceived as reciprocal, but also temporary. Migrants have ‘invested’ in the state by paying taxes and contributions and expect something in return. But this is additionally framed in a language of future insecurities coming from their partial citizenship status and the temporariness of their migration plans. When I asked him whether any of his Spanish colleagues use their potential unemployment benefits in a similar way, Boril responded: “The Spanish doesn’t do this. He works all his life, and only uses the paro if he really gets fired. But he’s at home here. And he’ll be taken care of in one way or another by the state, whether when he gets sick, or when he retires. We are here for a short time, who knows for how long there will be work for us and whether we’ll ever get pensions. Now it’s good for us, also with being in EU, but who knows how long this will last. If I don’t take this money back now, I’ll just lose it.” For Boril, then, not being a Spanish citizen meant he cannot enjoy the imagined long-term security and the promise of a future care, which the state provides
for its own citizens. Hence, he felt the need to periodically cash in his benefits as a sort of dual enactment of conceived contract with the state.\textsuperscript{61}

The realization of their partial membership in Spain was a recurrent theme among migrants, even among the long-term well established ones and it was one reason for them to long for a return. The \textit{paro} was an opportunity to take a break from migrant life and try a life back in Bulgaria - a trial return migration with the safety net of unemployment money. There were several examples of migrants who returned to Bulgaria to settle down in their houses in Brushlyan. Like Boril, they took their whole families and found a job, typically in construction in the region. Those who had previous construction experience from Spain often managed to get a master builder (\textit{maystor}), rather than an unskilled worker (\textit{obsht rabotnik}), which secured them a higher pay. Thus, combining the \textit{paro} money (usually about 1000 euro) with a net salary of another 600 to 700 euro (1200-1500 leva for a master builder) they got a monthly income way above the average for Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{62} Unlike Boril, none of the migrants worked regularly. In this way, they received the net wage without tax or social security deductions. In addition, as all other migrants, the returnees had invested in village houses or town apartments, where now they could comfortably live.

Planned unemployment is a family project, just as employment is, even if it is initiated by men. It was indeed men who were in a position to claim unemployment benefits, but they took their spouses and children with them to Bulgaria, securing financial support to the whole family through

\textsuperscript{61} A very similar case got into the news in June 2013, when it turned out one of the newly appointed ministers has received unemployment benefits form France, while already in Bulgaria and working as a professor and having opened an architectural firm. (http://www.vesti.bg/index.phtml?tid=40&oid=5822231)

\textsuperscript{62} The construction jobs were mostly in the region of Bansko, a fast-expanding ski-resort about 80 km away from Brushlyan. Whereas these jobs provided very good income, they could not grant a long-term security in any way. First, the resort had only a limited spread out capacity. Return migrants came back for the peak in construction, but slowly the jobs got less and less. In addition, the financial crisis started affecting Bulgaria, and especially the construction industry, as well. The flourishing life – combing unemployment benefits and wages – did not last long. By 2010 many of the return migrants were back in the village, considering local stone tiling jobs.
their benefits and work. The most usual scenario for women was to give up their often part-time irregular jobs in Spain and start working in one of the sewing shops in Brushlyan.

Living in their own renovated houses and having jobs which paid well created a sense of stability in their lives in Bulgaria which they lacked prior migration. Mehmed, a friend of Boril, who had been on paro for 6 months and had settled back in Bulgaria explained this feeling as a sign for accomplishing the migration project. They have gathered enough money to build a house for their son, and to expand and refurnish their own house, they still had savings, and they both had jobs back in the village, where they also had relatives and friends. Their two sons were married and had been working in Spain. He saw a return to Spain only in case his sons needed them for grandchildren care assistance or if he lost his job in Bulgaria. For him the paro was the closure of his relationship with Spain. “It’s true that the job in Spain paid better, but life was worse there. And now we don’t need to save money, we need money just for the everyday expenses. And we don’t need much. We have lived modestly before, we will do it again.”

The fact that a tentative return to Bulgaria was even considered, let alone realized (accomplished), signifies a turning point in migrants’ conceptualizations of Bulgaria. The EU accession in 2007 was discussed as a symbolic sign for the improvement of the situation. What seemed as a land of no opportunities has become a feasible place for return. “Europe wouldn’t have taken us, if the situation hadn’t improved. That’s why I want to see how it is now. Whether we can really make money and have a normal life back here. If yes, then we’re not going back to Spain,” Mehmed said. Bulgaria has become part of the same European space, which until then was referred to as the West, i.e. the developed, prosperous world. Europe did not only mean an upgrade in Bulgaria’s status, but it also provided a common space for weaving life projects. The freedom of mobility and labour which the newly acquired European citizenship granted them, suddenly made migrants much more
flexible in their future plans of (temporary) return. In the case of the voluntarily unemployed these plans were carried out. And even though they were not such a substantial number, their act of settling back home was taken as a prognosis by other migrants. By being pioneers in Spain they have paved the way for migration. Now, they were maybe paving the way for return migration, other migrants were saying.

The theme of Europe was consequential not just on a conceptual level. The practical opportunities which the new EU citizenship granted to Bulgarian migrants stimulated a new way of acting upon space, geographically, economically, and politically. The borderless freedom of movement, the cheaper and easier travelling, and the lack of residence control allowed returnees to be simultaneously incorporated in Spain and in Bulgaria. These semi-return migrants kept being part of the Spanish social security system not just through the unemployment benefits, but through all that their status entailed – access to free healthcare, opportunities for trainings, chances for finding a new job in Spain, keeping a social network of professional contacts. At the same time, they were incorporated in the Bulgarian labour market, albeit informally, and have quickly reconstructed their social network of relatives and friends which supported them through all stages of settling back. In this sense, simultaneous incorporation provided two modes of security - the formal welfare social security in Spain and the informal security of kith and kin in Bulgaria. The accomplished migration project of Mehmed, then, was not as accomplished and permanent. The door to Spain was kept open wider than he cared to admit.

Through entering the seemingly insecure status of unemployed, migrants are in fact weaving a safety net. Paradoxically, then, unemployment is utilized not just as an alternative form of income,
but also as a security strategy. Upon return to Bulgaria, however, they remain outside the welfare system. By virtue of working irregularly, they were not paying taxes or social contributions. This placed them in a position of invisibility vis-à-vis the Bulgarian state. One of the reasons for working irregularly was that they were afraid of being caught for violating the unemployment regulations in Spain, which required them to announce any additional income or indeed employment they might have. Another reason, however, was more conceptually grounded in how they felt about the way the Bulgarian state was treating them. Even Mehmed, who saw his migration experience as coming to an end, had a bitter view. I was accompanying him on his weekly commute back to the village from his construction job in the nearby ski resort. We were driving through the centre of Gotse Deltchev when he pointed to the municipality building and said angrily:

“These people there, this whole institution – they’re useless. The state here is nothing. There is no state in the whole region here. We’ve been abandoned for years. The Spanish state is taking care of us with the paro, and the healthcare, and the UGT. And what does Bulgaria for me? Nothing! Why pay taxes, if I won’t get anything in return, anything – no proper healthcare, no proper pension, no jobs, no security [from crimes]. And that’s absurd, if you think about it – we’re at home here, and guests there. But who takes more care of us? That’s why we went to Spain in the first place, because no one cares for us here... So I’ll stay registered in Spain for as long as I can and will work here just for the money. The taxes that I could pay, they will vanish, just vanish...”

Mehmed’s words expressed the bitterness of many other migrants and non-migrants alike. The Bulgarian state is viewed by him as non caring, non reliable and not worth to be invested in through contributions and taxes. In this sense, he has no trust in the possible contract with the state, because

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63 With the emerging financial crisis at the end of my fieldwork, the cases of people going into such voluntary unemployment and returning to Bulgaria started growing.
he sees no reciprocity, as he does with the Spanish state. Working irregularly then was not just out of fear for being caught. It was also a sort of resistance/silent protest against the non-caring Bulgarian state. There is a contradiction in Mehmed’s views and actions which points to the tensions that many migrants experience. On one hand, he thought of his return as permanent because of the new opportunities in terms of jobs and proper pay – something which he associated with Bulgaria’s EU accession. But also because he thought of Bulgaria as his home and was trying to reconstruct his life there after seven years of migrancy. On the other hand, he had no hope or trust in the Bulgarian state per se and wanted to remain connected to the Spanish state as long as possible. In this sense he was circumventing the Bulgarian state upon his return, just as he did when he left. This time, however, with the safety net of the Spanish state. So, while he hoped his return is permanent, he remained in a way dependent on his migrant status.

Migrants refer to the Spanish state as a caring state, but are aware of their partial membership in Spain. At the same time in Bulgaria they circumvent the state without relying on it neither for jobs, nor for social rights and in this sense, institutionally they do not relate to the state. In Bulgaria, however, they feel ‘at home’. But this refers to the village, and the kith and kin community, rather than to a shared citizen’s community. Long-term paro is an extreme manifestation of these membership tensions and reflects the issue of vertical and horizontal incorporation.

5.1.3. On formal and informal security: the role of the employers

Planned unemployment was not activated just by established migrants with maximum benefits right, but also by more recent migrants who only take it for a short-term. The short-term planned unemployment resembles the long-term one as a strategy, but is different as a life-project. Young male migrants who have been working regularly for more than a year and have rights to
unemployment benefits deliberately step into unemployment. This is an active move and a choice, rather than a passive fall into precariousness, as in the previous examples. The *paro* is mobilized as an alternative form of income for a short term break from regular employment, which is described in terms of reciprocal relationship with the Spanish state, similar to the way Boril talked of his right to take back what he has invested. But unlike the long-term reliance on *paro* this mode of unemployment does not revolve around the idea of a trial long-term return. Instead it allows temporary intermissions in migration life for fulfilling short practical tasks or duties in Bulgaria: repairing the village house roof, taking a professional driving licence, or preparing and attending a son’s wedding. These intermissions end with migrants returning to Spain and resuming the same job.

Enver, my landlord’s elder brother, was considering changing his job at the *Fagor* factory in Tafalla and wanted to use some of his accumulated months in *paro* while searching for a new job.

“*I’ve worked there for three years and a half. I didn’t get a raise, I hate the shifts, and I hate these machines. And in the meantime, the construction workers, like my brother, are making much more money than me. So, now, my contract had to be renewed in February, and I decided not to wait anymore. I asked my boss to ‘fire’ me, he knows how, so that I was eligible for the paro. I have the right to receive this money for about a year, but I just want to use 2-3 months until I find something else. And in the meantime, the house in Brushlyan needs repairing, the roof is leaking. We are all in Spain now [the three brothers] and in the summer we’re all busy with other things. But why pay someone else for the job, if I can do it myself and get the paro, that I anyways should use up at some point if I don’t want to lose it. So, now I’m going and when I come back in a month I’ll be searching for a new job. But if I don’t find anything, I’ll just go back to my boss and ask him to rehire me.”
Three months later Enver was back in the Fagor factory at the same position. After he returned from Bulgaria, he tried two other jobs – in construction and in another factory in Pamplona – but did not like either of them. He wrapped up his experience with the following words: “If I have to be honest, I just needed a break. So I took it. This paro is perfect for that. But in the end, all the other options for a job weren’t really good. And my boss is a nice fellow and we know each other well. He does this for other people too. They need a longer vacation, they have some business to attend to, but he doesn’t make them quit or go in unpaid leave, he arranges the paro for them, and takes them back afterwards.”

And indeed, many employers were willing to negotiate such longer leaves through paro, often upon the condition that the worker finds a replacement. This was facilitated by the temporary contracts that migrants usually signed, which had to be renewed every year, or terminated for a certain period. In this way employers in fact keep the workers they are satisfied with on the long run, without signing permanent contracts with them. And in addition they also exercise a form of control over the short replacements based on the recommendations and the network of migrants. This scheme creates a complicated web of favours which transcends the formal opportunities opened by the welfare system in terms of unemployment. Even though short term planned unemployment is made possible through formal participation in the welfare system, it can only be realized through personal informal connections. Without an employer willing to arrange the short term unemployment for the worker and then to rehire him, this scheme would not have been possible. This creates a feeling of informal indebtedness towards such employers. At the same time, the network of migrants who

64 Russi first worked for his brother Yavor on a construction site, but this was a short term job which did not guarantee security. Then he replaced informally one of his cousins as a truck driver in a VW factory in Pamplona while the cousin was on vacation. He could have applied for a driver job there, but he did not want to commute to Pamplona everyday.
recommend each other for short term replacements is also a *sine qua non*. In this sense, short term planned unemployment highlights the intertwinment between formal and informal ways of creating security.

### 5.1.4. Precarity of labour – workers kept in reserve.

The more conventional type of unemployment is also to be found among migrants, even if in smaller numbers. That is, people who have been laid off against their desire or their contracts have not been renewed upon the decision of the employer. In 2007/2008 such cases were rare and often short term decisions for managing a concrete critical event on the part of the employer, rather than a tendency. For example, a small scale construction employer had difficulties obtaining his new permit, therefore he asked his workers to step into *paro* for two months, until he manages the situation. Another example was an *autonom* who did not have enough work for his six workers and had to lay them off until he got a new commission. Since they were on contracts of the type *fin de obra*, all he had to do was discontinue their contracts. Even if not numerous these cases point to a mechanism of controlling workers through keeping them as a reserve. This is made possible by the regular status of the workers and their incorporation in the welfare system, but would not have been possible without the flexible and temporary contracts that they are employed under.

In June 2008 lorry drivers blocked the roads for several days protesting over diesel prices. Long fuel lines and a shopping panic spread around Spain. The car industry was particularly affected relying on parts supply from other regions which lead to partial suspending of factory operations. One of the affected factories was the VW branch in Pamplona, where Djeka worked on the assembly line. She had a three months temporary contract, which had to be renewed at the end of the month. Together with her Romanian colleagues with similar temporary contracts, Djeka was
warned that would the strike disrupt production, her contract will be terminated earlier and she will sent back to the *empressa* (the unemployment office). In the meantime, her husband Alil who worked in another car factory on a *fijo* contract was forced to take his paid leave earlier, even though he had already planned his vacation to Bulgaria for August. Other workers were warned that if the strike were to continue longer, they would be forced to take unpaid leave and eventually be sent on paro. The only workers who remained on a skeleton schedule were the Spanish workers, supervisors and administration, who were on permanent contracts, Djeka and Alil told me, with resentment in their voices.

The strike lasted effectively five days, after which goods supplying went back to normal. Alil had to take two days of vacation and Djeka’s contract was not terminated eventually, but she was not paid for the five days in which the factory was idle. While this development was not the worse that they expected, the tension that it triggered was great. The strike had suddenly unlocked a series of questions and uncertainties, that were kept suppressed. Working with a contract stopped being equivalent to security. The opportunity of getting *paro* transformed from getting even with the state into a threat. Alil kept walking through the flat, rubbing his beard and saying repeatedly: “We’re doomed, all the migrants are doomed. We’ll be fired and that would be the end of it. They will only take care of their own.” Djeka’s worries were more concrete. “If they send me on *paro* now, I’ll exhaust the two months that I have the right to, and then I’ll have no more security if something similar happens again. And what if they don’t renew my contract after this turmoil. This whole insurance thing [she means the social contributions and unemployment benefits] is bullshit. It only makes you think that you have security and you can use it whenever it suits you, like Boril does. But in fact, nothing is certain and I’ll have no income and no money to pay the rent, if I get kicked out because of the strike.”
Other migrants were affected in similar ways by the strike. The flexibility of their contracts put most migrant workers in a precarious position and allowed employers to shift risks and expenses onto workers. At the same time, the safety net of the welfare security allowed them to keep the workers on hold as a reserve. And indeed, the few acquaintances that experienced such involuntary and short term unemployment waited to be rehired by the same employer, instead of searching for a new job. “If I have to go on paro, I’ll wait to see if they rehire me. Where will I search for a new job, new contract? It is much more difficult. The strike will be over eventually and I think there is a chance they rehire me,” Djeka told me in one of the conversations in these tense days. A construction worker who was on the dole while waiting for his employer to find new commissions reasoned along similar lines: “It is not good to get only 90 per cent of the nomina, no extra hours or anything, and no security that you’ll get back to work. But if you had good experience with your boss, you wait patiently. If you don’t have the paro, what would you do? Search for another job immediately. And with the paro, you’re part of the system and you still have some security, so you wait.” In this case, then, the opportunity to be on paro was interpreted on one hand as providing security, but on the other hand as a taming strategy for preventing migrants from searching for other jobs.

“Being part of the system” was something many migrants referred to in regard to unemployment benefits, and to being a regularised worker in general, as the previous chapter also demonstrated. The “system” here refers to a general institutionalised framework which provides security through state means, rather than through personal connections. Unemployment then, in all three variations, was considered in terms of practical security. What is more, being registered as unemployed is in fact a sign for inclusion and participation in the welfare system. Whether migrant workers use it as a strategy for simultaneous incorporation and a safety net for a trial return migration, or they use it
to deal with some small tasks which require time off, or when it is an actual safety net for losing
their jobs, the eligibility for unemployment benefits is a social right, which makes migrants equal
to their Spanish colleagues. The state treats them indiscriminately, as long as they are regular
workers with contracts. Even though many migrants felt their partial membership compared to the
Spanish citizens, they still talked about their relationship with the Spanish state in terms of fairness.

5.1.5. The other side of the contract – the good citizens.

Being “part of the system” has two meanings. On one hand, it signifies having equal benefits rights
to the Spanish citizens. Through granting institutional social security, the paro signifies
incorporation in a community of citizens with equal social rights which do not depend on a formal
citizenship status. In this sense, using unemployment benefits is an act of citizenship (Isin and
Nielsen 2008) through which migrants construct themselves as claimants of rights. On the other
hand, in order to become “part of the system” migrants need the entry point of regular employment,
which provides access to entitlements at the price of paying taxes and contributions. Thus paying
taxes is also an act of citizenship which grants inclusion. While these acts are not a direct expression
of political will (like voting, protesting or resisting), they nevertheless locate migrants within a
community of citizens on equal terms with the Spanish citizens.65 In this sense, migrants’ social
citizenship is acquired through regular employment, but it is activated through paying taxes and
through receiving benefits.

Even though all regular migrants paid taxes, their understanding of the procedure was limited. Most
of them got assistance from UGT for filling the income tax form.

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65 By using the comparison with Spanish citizens here I do not mean to suggest that all Spanish citizens are
positioned equally within the state space.
One day I was listening to a conversation between two young men at the parking lot in front of the supermarket. They were discussing whether they should include their kids’ school lunch fee in their income tax form. I wanted to know more, so Ilhan, the younger of the two explained to me: "During the year you get some money taken from your salary, and then at the end you fill this form and say all the expenses that you had during the year - rent and other things. And you also fill in the percent of your salary that you have been putting towards saving. Then they calculate and they tell you how much the state will give you back. Now, I have a 2 percent saving rate, so I only got 200 euro last year back. But it was still saved money, so we bought a camera and a new phone for my wife with it." The other man continued "Mine was 12 percent, but somehow you don’t really feel it, you get used to it every month. And it’s like putting money in a bank. After I filled the return form, I got back quite a sum – about 1000 euro. Which was really helpful for some renovations on the house in Brushlyan.” I listened carefully and suggested that this is like in Bulgaria where one pays a certain percent of his salary for income tax in advance and then after filling the tax return form receives back what was overpaid. But they both were looking at me rather puzzled and did not seem to understand what am I talking about. Finally the older one smiled and concluded: "I wouldn’t know what you are describing, I’ve never filled such a thing in Bulgaria."

This short discussion points to two issues. First, taxes were treated as a sort of a saving account, which then the state returns in one way or another, either through reciprocal payment of benefits, or through direct cash return. Second, paying taxes and contributions was something that migrant men started doing for the first time when they got regularized in Spain. For them paying taxes then was directly linked to the experience of regularized work in Spain. Similarly to Yavor who was hiring workers regularly partly because he knew no way to circumvent this, Ilhan was paying taxes because he lacked the local knowledge how to avoid it and not necessarily because he believed or
understood a just state mechanism and the principle of redistribution. Nonetheless, even if the act was involuntary, it was subsequently framed as part of a relationship with the state. Answering my inquisitive questions about the tax declaration in Bulgaria, Ilhan said: "You see, Neda, no one ever pays taxes in Bulgaria. Everyone tries to hide something, and spend all the money straightaway. But that’s why things will never get better. Look here, how the civilized people do it, and look at their state. Everyone pays and then the state cares for everyone, when they need it."

Through a process of rationalization and self-justification of his actions Ilhan was juxtaposing himself to the people in Bulgaria, constructing himself as a “good citizen” as opposed to the uncivilized and irresponsible bad citizens. This was further translated into a corresponding opposition of the good and the bad state. Now there is a contradiction in Ilhan’s opinions on tax paying which was typical for many of my informants. Tax paying was simultaneously a “saving account”, it was unavoidable because of the lack of local knowledge, and at the same time, it turned migrants into “good citizens” in comparison to those who do not pay taxes in Bulgaria. Even though tax paying was not an intentional act towards becoming a “good citizen”, it was conceived as such.

Migrants use formal insecurity to create informal security of a different temporal and spatial order. By mobilizing the recourses of unemployment benefits as a reciprocal investment in the state which they withdraw when they need it, they reinterpret the meaning of unemployment itself and turn it into a strategy for a potential secure future somewhere else. By this, in fact they create an insecurity of a new order. Withdrawing their unemployment benefits, they in fact deprive themselves wilfully from the safety net against the actual risk of unemployment. They create a security here-and-now in an entrepreneurial way by manipulating diverse resources from different contexts. But in the long duree of their lives this move in fact opens the possibility of a more large scale insecurity, which is not just individual, but systemic.
This can be interpreted in the framework of general lack of trust in the social institutions of the state, but also, and maybe more importantly in the case of Spain, in the realization of their partial membership. In the process of enacting unemployment in such a way, migrants develop the idea of the deserving citizen, and along with it, the image of the state as caring of this deserving citizen. The deserving citizen is a disciplined side of a reciprocal bilateral contract with the state. Then, a paradox occurs: the Spanish state acts as a strong welfare state in the discussed period, which is visible in this case in the generous unemployment benefits and the little institutional control exercised on how they are spent. But this generous and encompassing welfare state triggers a strong neoliberal view of citizenship, in which the relationship with the state is limited to a reciprocal individual contract, in which the state can ultimately be replaced by any other institution – a bank or a private insurance company for example.

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5.2. Bulgaria: unemployment as a fate and as a critique

While in English (or in Spanish) “work”, “job” and “employment” are different concepts, in Bulgarian the word for all three is the same – rabota. Respectively, the word for being unemployed is a derivative – bezroboten – and literally means ‘workless’. This overlapping of terms often leads to linguistic puns: “He counts as unemployed (workless), but he’s working his fingers to the bone (“Bezroboten se vodi, ama se skusva ot rabota”). This is what the villagers would jokingly say for a man, working in stone tiling while being registered as unemployed. But the joke has a bitter taste referring to the paradoxical situation in which everyone in the village was working hard in one way or another, but the share of jobless and unemployed men and people working irregularly reached up to 70 percent, according to local estimations. As opposed to migrants’ experience where
unemployment is an effect of regularisation and incorporation in the welfare system granting security and income, in Bulgaria unemployment is a wider category used to describe insecurity, low wages, and little social services, while simultaneously involving hard work off the record. The contradiction in terms that the joke describes is a contradiction between the official state categories of employment in which people position themselves and the practice of work. As such, it is in fact a critique of the dire economic and social situation of the whole region that drives people into complicated schemes of simultaneous relying on and avoiding the state.

I was sitting with Amet on a chilly winter afternoon in one of the small smoky Brushlyan cafes. He was still with his working clothes, just returned from the main road where he and his brother were tiling stones. In the winter, he explained, they work much less, because of the weather conditions. Tiling takes place in the open air, just next to the road where the trucks bring the big stones from the nearby slope. During the summer workers spend at least ten hours per day using the good weather. In the winter, if it is not snowing or raining, they only get 3 to 4 hours per day. Amet and his brother do not work for wages. They do not have an employer and they are not bound by contract with anyone. They buy stones, cut them into tiles and sell them to the entrepreneurs. There is no security in this arrangement, but until now there was always a buyer for their produce. He tells me they earn up to 1500 leva (750 euro) per person in the summer months, but in the coldest winter months they sometimes make nothing. In principle they should have been registered as self-employed and paid taxes and social security contributions on the basis of the income they make every month. Instead, he tells me, they are both registered as unemployed and the transactions they make are informal.

The conditions for being registered as unemployed remain unclear to me from my conversation with Amet. The legislation regulating social security, including unemployment, has been changed
many times since the early 1990’s. Amet only has a limited and instrumental knowledge of his own status at the time of our conversation. He knows he has to register in the regional municipality office in Gotse Delchev once a year and then pay the minimum health insurance contribution every month. Until two years ago he was not registered anywhere. In terms of status vis-à-vis the state he existed neither as a worker, nor as an unemployed. Before he started selling his tiles directly he worked as a waged labourer for the same person. He had no contract and he received his money cash. Prior to the stone tile business he was working random jobs, none of which regular. His registration as unemployed, he tells me, does not provide any cash benefits, but allows him to be part of the health care system by paying the minimum instalment. Through his unemployment status Amet has become part of the welfare system for the first time.

5.2.1. Categories of unemployment and joblessness

The categories of unemployment and joblessness are in fact more complicated than Amet presents it to me. People refer to being “registered as unemployed” to most men in the village, who are working with no permanent contract. What is more, when talking of unemployment in the region in general, villagers and local experts alike, mean all people without regular contracts, i.e. all people with no secure income and limited access to social benefits. Thus, local administration’s estimations of unemployment rates are about 20 percent on average, strongly skewed towards men of all ages, among which the rate reaches up to 70-80 percent. At the same time, the official unemployment rate for the municipality is about 7 percent for 2008, which is lower than the average for the region and for the country (NSI 2008). This number, however, reflects only a limited category of non-working people, who have registered as such in the unemployment office (Buro
According to a local municipality expert, unemployed people rarely register, because the conditions are too difficult to fulfil, and what they get in exchange is not worth it. “People have to travel up to 35 km at least once a month to sign in the unemployment office. If they are offered a qualification course, they cannot refuse to enrol, so they have to travel every day. This is very expensive and the benefits are rather low, about 100-140 leva\textsuperscript{67}, so when you put the numbers together, it’s simply not worth it. And these courses won’t help them find a good job. There are simply no such jobs in the region. All the men have no other choice, but to break their backs with the stones,” the young woman in the municipality tells me with a resigned tone.

In addition to the officially unemployed, there are other categories for people who do not work, or more precisely, for people who do not declare any income. For example, “persons on social aid”, and “self-insured persons who have not been active” (samoosiguryashtii se lica, koito ne sa uprazhnyavali deynost). Amet and most of his co-workers fall into the last category. As such they have to register once a year as self-insured and non-active and confirm they have no income. In this way, they are relieved from all social contributions and taxes, except for health insurance which is 16.80 leva per month (8.60 euro)\textsuperscript{68}. Another, even more general and obscure category in which they fit is “persons who are not subject to health insurance on any other grounds” (lica nepodlezhashti na zdravno osiguryavane na drugo osnovanie po ZOO) which only refers to their

\textsuperscript{66} The conditions are to be actively searching for a job, to accept an offered job, even if below the qualifications, to accept public work in some cases, to accept enrol in qualification and professional courses, and to sign every month in an unemployment office as far as 35 km away. The maximum period for receiving unemployment benefits calculated on the basis of the previous salary is 12 months (for more than 25 years of service!). After that people move into the category of long-term unemployed and start receiving social aid. (Employment Agency).

\textsuperscript{67} The minimum unemployment compensation for 2008 is between 144 BGN (70 euro): \url{http://www.noi.bg/benefits/benefits/101-unemployment/625-pokso}

\textsuperscript{68} This amount is calculated on the basis of the Minimum welfare income (minimlen osiguritelen dohod). It is considered managable even in the village and everybody is willing to pay it.
health insurance status. While their position can be subsumed to a category of voluntary unemployment, it is described by the official statistical data through the lens of social insurance rather than through employment. In this way they are not a concern for the State Agency of Employment (\textit{Agencia po zaetostta}) and become visible (and significant) only in the data of the National insurance institute (\textit{Nationalen osiguritelen institute}) by virtue of their insurance status. Thus through complicated and long statistical categories lack of employment remains hidden.

5.2.2. The fate of a region.

Let me go back to Amet and the contradictory and overlapping categories operating in his case. He works irregularly, he is registered as self-insured non-active person, he says he is registered as unemployed, and the rest of the villagers and the local administration refer to people like him as actually unemployed. Where does this discrepancy come from? I would like to suggest that the answer is to be found in the varying meanings and interpretations that different actors (whether state institutions, statisticians, local administration or village residents) invest in unemployment. From the point of view of the state unemployment rates are measured through the number of those officially registered and fulfilling the conditions. Thus, in a self-celebratory manner, the Agency of employment announces a steady decrease in the unemployment rates in the last years for the region of Gotse Delchev. Not only that this rate does not reflect the actual number of people unable to find employment, but it is also criticized as an administrative, rather than a real tendency. At the same time, local population describes as unemployment the general lack of secure jobs or access to welfare. While young men do work and have some income, this work is insecure, it is low-

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69 The numbers were criticized as reflecting the artificial administrative decrease in unemployment rates which was caused by deregistering many people for not fulfilling the conditions (like signing every month, or attending a class), rather than by people actually finding jobs. (http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2011/07/10/1120976_bezraborticata_namaliava_i_izkustveno/)
skilled hard manual labour, and it provides no access to social benefits. In this case then, we can see how state devised statistical categories masque local experience and concerns of lack of secure employment and access to welfare.

Amet is considered neither a hero, nor a villain for tricking the state. He is just one of the many men in Brushlyan working hard to make ends meet. Finding ways to avoid taxes and additional social contributions is regarded as a matter of survival. He has no savings and he cannot accommodate unplanned emergencies or additional spending for house renovations. His income might be higher than the average for the region, but this involves extreme insecurity both in terms of regular income and in terms of future welfare, like pension for example. “You can’t rely on this work. You never know what will happen next. They might stop buying the stones, or even worse, stop digging the stones at all. You might injure yourself or just get older and stop being able to do it. It’s ok for young people, but what will I do when I grow older? I probably won’t even get a proper pension.” His worry reflects not only his own uncertain future, but the future of the stone tiling business as it is. The mayor, who also owns a stone tiling company, explained that the business has been flourishing in the last 5-6 years (since 2004), in a highly unregulated manner, which might change any time. Moreover, the recent decent wages that Amet and the rest of the young men are making now cannot erase the long period of living in insecurity on the verge of economic and social survival. Trickling the state through hidden employment then, is not about cheating or being cunning, it is a coping strategy, informed by a past fraught with difficulties, poverty, real unemployment, and uncertainty, and by equally uncertain future.

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70 The concessions for digging stones form the mountain slopes are not clearly regulated and can be reconsidered at any point, which will change the face of the business altogether, the mayor added.
Just like the migrants, Amet treats unemployment as a bilateral contract of reciprocity with the state, but in a negative sense. “The state doesn’t give me anything, so I don’t give anything back. Does it secure any job for me? Does it repair the roads? Does it build the water pipes in Brushlyan? No. So, why should I pay anything back? That’s why I register as unemployed.” His views are shared by many men working in stone tiling, whether as waged labourers or as self-employed. The mayor and the local administration pretend they are unaware of the many cases like Amet’s. “Clearly, we are obliged to pay taxes and register as who knows what – self-employed maybe. If there is a check up, we’ll get a solid fine. But they know we’re hardly managing to meet both ends here and they just don’t check us. If we pay taxes and social contributions and all this we’ll just not manage to get by with what we make. And that’s clear for everyone. It won’t last forever, this situation, but until we can, we’ll keep going that way,” Amet says with an apologetic face before I managed to ask anything. And indeed, the mayor tells me a few days later that he does not want to know whether the workers work regularly and he will not advise any inspector to go after them: “We’ll just lose them. With the high unemployment in the whole region, there are no other jobs for them. They won’t have any incentive to stay here, and then really the whole village will have to move to Spain!”, he adds with a grim face.

Being unemployed then means two things for Brushlyani people. On one hand, it is a code for insecurity. “Since all the factories closed down, there has been no work here, no work at all. All men are unemployed, all women work for these small wages, it’s like they’re unemployed too. Young people are doomed,” an old lady tells. Unemployment is a blaming word. Blaming the state which deserted them, blaming employers who are not willing to employ workers with contracts or pay higher wages. Unemployment is a way to describe entrapment and lack of choice which the structural conditions condemn them to. In this sense, unemployment is used as a proxy to describe
the fate of the whole region. At the same time, being registered as unemployed (even if in actual terms this is not even the case) signifies a pragmaphic status vis-à-vis the state, which allows people an entry into the welfare system. In the sense of a status unemployment is stripped of its existential meaning and only refers to the formal meaning of a concrete administrative category. Through the act of registering as not employed the two meanings come to coexist. It is in this act that people objectify their relationship and their image of the state.

5.2.3. The comparative images

The fear of migration resonating in the mayor’s voice reveals a permanent frame of comparison in which both migrants and non-migrants live. “Is it worth it to migrate?”, “Is it worth it to stay in Spain?”, “Is it worth it to return?” In a context in which half of the population are migrants such questions are pestering everyone: the trial return migrants, the not-yet-settled migrants, the people who boast with their good lives in Brushlyan, the successful migrants. In the course of determining the “worth” people enter in endless discussions of the nature of the two states and of their own position in them. And unemployment is an entry point into such discussions. When Amet tells me the state is not providing any security for him, he immediately adds: “Look at the “Spanish” [the migrants in Spain] that return here with their huge unemployment benefits, after just a few years of working there. How can we compare the two states at all? Here no one cares for us, there… the foreign state gives them money just because they gave their labour to its employers.” In his words

71 This sense of abandonment by the state has shaped people’s experience of post-socialist transformations in other contexts as well. (see Pine 1998:116, Mihaylova 2006). However, as Rebecca Kay (2011) points out, this picture of withdrawal should not be extrapolated beyond the level of experience. There is no question that a lot of what was previously provided by the state has been lost or has become less reliable. Kay argues referring to Russia, but the state has taken on new responsibilities in order to deal with unprecedented numbers of vulnerable citizens, which the picture of total withdrawal fails to capture (see also Read and Thelen 2007:9, Thomson 2002).
echoes the indignation of Mehmed, the return migrant, who was juxtaposing the two states in a similar manner.

Two images of the state crystallise in these comparisons. These images are constructed through the lens of security and responsibility that the state provides. Through the category of unemployment we can see Spain depicted as a state that cares even for those who are not citizens, by virtue of their contract. The same concept of unemployment reveals an opposite image of Bulgaria – a state that has deserted the region and the people there, by which it has broken its side of the the contract with its citizens and acts in a negligent way. Both Amet and Mehmed articulate this opposition as paradoxical – Bulgaria neglects its own citizens, while Spain cares for migrants even if they only have partial membership there. In this sense, the idealization of Spain as a caring state is used as a critique against Bulgaria.

5.3. Conclusion: the deserving citizens and the deserving state

In this chapter I have discussed unemployment as a strategy for creating security through insecurity. I have demonstrated the discrepancies and overlaps between formal and informal security both in Bulgaria and in Spain. Through the lens of the way people interpret and practice social security, I have shown how the conceptualizations of the good citizen have been framed in a language of deservedness. In Bulgaria unemployment is used as a trope in order to develop a critique towards the Bulgarian state. Conversely, in Spain unemployment is interpreted as the field of security which the state provides to good and deserving citizens. According to the migrants the good citizen in this context is the regularly contracted worker who pays taxes and social
contributions, and hence deserves to be taken care of by the state. This idea of the deserving citizen, is further extended to the state, which starts being defined on a scale of being deserving or undeserving. The good and caring state deserves citizen’s taxes, it deserves to be ‘invested in’, as migrants put it. In this way the concept of the deserving citizen is further extended to the idea of the deserving state. Within this interpretative context the Bulgarian state is not a deserving state, because it is thought of as a caring state in the first place. The critique towards the Bulgarian state develops through a praise of the Spanish state. Thus, the two states are mirrored and contrasted along the lines of what the good state is supposed to be which then is translated in the language of deservedness.

The concept of the good state constructed through the trope of deservedness juxtaposing the Bulgarian and the Spanish state is a highly contractual, individualized and strictly reciprocal. There is no view of the community of citizens (both taxpaying workers and the rest) who are in a collective relationship with the state, based on solidarity. In the case of unemployment, this relationship is interpreted as bilaterally and immediately reciprocal and it is even expressed in the financial language of investments. The idea of the reciprocal contract allows citizens to formulate claims towards the state and decide the level of involvement with the state they want to have (in the sense of contributing taxes and social contributions). At the same time, this conceptualization is exclusive in its definition of the good citizen, because it is centred on the regular worker with a secure job. In this way it reproduces the discourse of marketization of citizenship which excludes all those who do not fit the category of the ideal worker-citizen. This causes an internal

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72 This bilateral contractual relationship with the state is, of course, limited to only certain areas. When it comes to free healthcare or childcare, for example, the idea of the good (caring) state shifts towards a more collective view, irrespective of the individual personal contributions.
contradiction of the way migrants formulate their position, because it leaves out the groups of irregularly working, those in unpaid work (like care work), and those who are dependents.
PART III

Kin and Ritual Constructions of a Community
Chapter 6: Caring Satellites: the Role of Wives, Mothers and Grandparents in the Transnational Family Project

In spring 2008 Fatme, a woman in her 50s, arrived in Tafalla to take care of her 9-year-old grandson while her daughter worked shifts in a restaurant. Fatme had taken two-month's unpaid leave from a sewing workshop in Bulgaria. Just days after her arrival in Tafalla, Fatme had decided to go to Portugal where her son lived. She looked worried and wondered what to do, while her daughter and son-in-law were rather silent, repeating: “It’s your choice, you have the right to go, it’s up to you, we can’t decide anything for you.” The son wanted her to help and care for his two teenagers, even though neither really required supervision. He had found her a temporary job in an orchard but the conditions were onerous. Less than a week later Fatme arrived back in Tafalla, because she could not bear the work conditions and realized she is not really needed for care purposes in Portugal. She travelled back the 1000 kilometres only to discover that her daughter had lost the job because she could not find a carer for her son and hence no longer needed child care assistance. A week later Fatme resumed her work in the village sewing workshop. Throughout the whole affair she was referred to as the “problematic grandmother” by her relatives.

The two women in this story experienced different types of disruptions in their lives. The daughter did not manage to start working without her mother support, and remained dependent on her husband in her role of sole carer of the home and of her child. At the same time, in the attempt to fulfill her care obligations Fatme was torn between several locations of her transnationally

73 A briefer version of this chapter has been previous published in the Journal of Social Politics (Deneva 2012)
dispersed kin, without being able to assist any of them. However, the immediacy with which she changed plans three times within two weeks show her willingness to give up her own life plans in order to help the reproduction of the family of the younger migrants.

The migration process I describe here is a family project. It is a family project in the sense of family members migrating together in an attempt to sustain and reproduce the family relations and the ideal of the ‘normal family’. Women follow their husbands, children join their parents, and elderly people come as care-takers. At first sight, migration does not disrupt the family fabric, but only allows improvement of the overall wellbeing of the family unit. It is not the previously popular for the Balkans male only temporary migration (gourbet) which would take men away from their families for extended periods of time, neither is this the exclusively female care migration widespread among middle-aged women who support their children and husbands through remittances. On the contrary, this migration aims to reinforce the replication of family and kinship relations and the reproduction of a village community, while upgrading people to a better economic status, and giving them access to social entitlements that they lacked at home. And indeed, walking on the streets of Tafalla, one would often see whole migrant families strolling together. Living arrangements for most people would be organized along the lines of the nuclear family and a care-taking grandparent. And when members of the nuclear family are divided spatially, this is only as a temporary stage before the whole family is united in one place, usually in Spain. The unit of migration, in this sense, is the family and everyone plays a different role for the reproduction of the family, and by extension for the village community in migrancy. A closer look, however, uncovers the cracks in this picture of re-enacted social relations.

Turning the attention to the position of the different actors in the migration project reveals the new inequalities and dependencies that migration creates and the reinforcement of old ones. At the
centre of the migration project is the young male migrant worker. In the previous two chapters I have shown how young working men are the trigger for migration and the main actor in providing financial support and social security for the other agents in the family project. In his orbit there are different satellites that make the family migration experience possible, but ultimately depend on him. In this chapter I look at the role of the women as wives and mothers, and of the different ageing relatives that provide care. These ‘caring satellites’ play a crucial role in the reproduction of the family in migrancy, but their experience is essentially different than the one of the young male migrants. Including them into the analysis means moving the lens from a focus on the individual to the level of mechanisms for creating certain types of sociality.

Moreover, exploring the migration experience of women and elderly people through the lens of citizenship I demonstrate the unevenness of the migration field and of the different actors in it from the perspective of access to rights and spaces or lack thereof to act as claim-makers. I argue that migration changes the relations between the different actors as citizens and the states, but it also changes the relations between themselves. Thus, new dependencies and inequalities appear in the process of migrating for reproducing the family. While the male migrant workers are able to claim citizenship rights that they lacked at home and thus become more empowered, the other migration agents experience a much less celebratory trajectory. The care and support motivated migration ruptures economic and social citizenship of women and the ageing in different ways and makes them dependent solely on the male migrant. This changes the relations both in generational and in gender terms. Turning the attention to these aspects of the migration process disrupts the celebratory rhetoric of the successful European migrant. While men fit both institutionally and symbolically in the discourse on the self-managing, entrepreneurial individual who enters in contractual relations with the state, the rest of the migration actors play supporting roles in this
project at the expense of their own social security and economic advancement, but also at the expense of their autonomy. Ultimately, what I show here is that the male migrant can act as the ‘prefect neoliberal subject’ only with the support network (and at the expense) of the family and the kin.

In what follows I explore how family-reproduction and care-triggered migration leads to two interrelated lines of transformations – in kinship and in citizenship. First, I look at the changes in gender and intergenerational kin relations. This involves people’s understanding of family composition and family roles, of authority and masculinity, and of duty and shame, all of which are affected in different ways for the different actors in the care network. By looking into these questions, I seek to understand the new models of family relations that emerge and the way these new models affect kin solidarity and reciprocity. Second, I focus on reconfigurations of social and economic citizenship. The different categories of migrants – younger or older generation, carers or workers, regularly or irregularly employed – experience different shifts in their citizenship positions. I look at the interdependencies created in this process of gains and disruptions. Ultimately, I argue that transformations in kinship and citizenship generate new forms of inequalities between individuals and generations. What I seek to understand here is how the different actors in this care network experience and reconcile the tensions that arise from these two types of transformations.
6.1. Intersecting migration, gender and age

For a long time migration literature has only looked at women migrants as wives and mothers and thus conceptualized them as ‘followers, dependents, unproductive persons, isolated, illiterate and ignorant” (Morokvasic 1983:16). In more recent decades migration scholars challenged this perception and turned their attention to women as autonomous actors in the dynamic migration processes. Special attention has been paid on the central role of women migrants in the feminizing global labour market, with a special emphasis on care work. (e.g. Andall 2000, Anderson 2000, Hochschild 2003, Hondagneu-Sotello 2007, Hondagneu-Sotello and Avila 2007, Lutz 2010, Morokvasic 1984, 2004 Sassen 2000, Yeates 2009). The role of women migrants for maintaining transnational connections and for transforming their home-towns through remittances has been also explored in details (Smith 2006, Levitt and Waters 2006, Gamburd 2000, Parrenas 2001, 2008). In these studies women are at the centre of the migration process and are conceived as triggers of migration streams, as breadwinners, and as remitters, rather than as followers and dependents. But in the case under scrutiny here we need to turn the lens back to women who migrate exactly in their roles of mothers and wives in order to reproduce the family in migrancy. Focusing on the aspects of how different citizenship elements are being reconfigured for the different actors in the field, highlights the role of women exactly as followers who remain largely dependent on their husbands in which patriarchal family models get reinforced.

Migration in later life, albeit a less popular subject of study than youth and mid-life migration, has been approached from different angles. There is a general distinction between older people who migrate for the first time and former labour migrants who have “aged in place” (Warnes and Williams 2006). The way people experience moving at an advanced age is one way to approach
the issue (Blakemore 1999, Evergeti and Zontini 2006). The cases vary from UK migrants retiring to Southern European countries (King et al. 2000) to elderly Pakistani women joining their husbands and grown up children in the UK (Gardner 2002). Another direction explores the structural disadvantages (especially in terms of welfare) ageing migrants might face either upon return migration or by staying in the host country (Ackers and Dwyer 2002; Yahirun 2009). Elderly migrants are sometimes categorized as a social problem (Torres 2006), and policy is designed in such a way as to diminish rather than enhance their social security (Ackers 2004; Dwyer and Papadimitriou 2006). As a result, there is a category of circulating migrants, who split their time between countries, trying to reconcile welfare difficulties (Bolzman et al. 2006; Ganga 2006). These approaches raise the pertinent question of being trapped in between or outside welfare systems and the way this affects ageing migrants’ social citizenship. None of these studies, however, engages with the type of short-term circulating migration starting at a later age and the implications this has for their own citizenship status.

To understand the case of the transnational carers we need to look at the global transformation of care regimes in relation to migration and age. One way of approaching this is through the category of left-behind parents of younger migrants and the tensions that arise from renegotiated care arrangements and intergenerational reciprocity (Baldassar 2007; Baldock 2000; 2003; Mazzucato 2008; Pyle 2006; van der Geest et al. 2004). Coming from a different perspective, Hochschild (2003) develops the concept of care-drain to describe the phenomenon of immigrant young women providing care in wealthier countries while leaving behind their own families and children. This care gap is usually filled by other female kin, creating a global care-chain (Chamberlain 1997; Lutz 2007; Parrenas 2001). Ageing people can be part of different ends of the care chain. They can be in need of care at home, or cared for by migrants (Andall 2000), demonstrating the difference
between caring and care-giving (Baldassar and Baldock 2000). Alternatively, they can be carers themselves for children left behind (Olwig 1999) or for children and older people in the receiving country. What is absent from this range of possibilities, however, is the category of ageing migrants moving between geographic and institutional localities to provide care for different members of their own families. By doing this they move the care-chain itself thus creating new types of tensions in their own lives, and in their relations with the dispersed kin.

Thinking of women and elderly people in their role of caretakers requires framing this in the transformations in global care regimes which is tightly related to the globalization of kinship. The concepts of transnational family (Bryson and Vuorela 2002), transnational domestic sphere (Gardner and Grillo 2002), global kin networks (Olwig 2002) or global householding (Peterson 2010) emphasize that families are not discreet geographically or state bound entities, but can be maintained across time and distance. This involves, however, (re)negotiation of commitments, reciprocity and duty, and of practical mechanisms and strategies that are deployed for the reproduction of the family. In Nakano Glenn’s (1992) broad definition reproductive labour includes activities that maintain people both on a daily basis and intergenerationally, such as caring for children and adults, preserving community and family ties, and performing household tasks. So not only care-giving, but care-work in general is seen as a form of reproductive labour, as it involves maintaining other people’s families and thus contributes to the globalization of social reproduction (Misra et al. 2006; Pérez Orozco 2009). The transnationalization of families then is framed not only by care chains, but also by reproduction chains (cf. Kofman 2012)

Using these conceptual intersections of migration, age, gender, and care I analyse the way migrants make sense and negotiate the disruptions in their citizenship, kinship positions, and their flexibilized lives in general. In this context the broad concepts of kinship and citizenship need to
be defined. By kin relations I will refer to all extended family relations, both patrilineal and matrilineal, which are constructed as relatedness by people themselves. The emphasis here is on kinship relations evolving around care obligations and care, but ultimately what is at stake in a temporal perspective is the question of kin reciprocity. What I am interested in then is a set of rules, but also the process of reformulating these rules. In this sense kinship is considered here as processual and dynamic (cf. Carsten 1997). In terms of citizenship, as I have already outlined in the previous chapters, I embrace a definition of social citizenship both as rights and entitlements (status) and as their enactment and lived experience (practice), which define the meaning and practices of belonging to society (Holsten and Appadurai 1999; Lister 1998). In this chapter, however, I discuss a very particular and limited manifestation of social citizenship, which is its substantive aspect understood as access and use of welfare entitlements. Hence, I explore how through their moves across borders and states elderly migrants experience inclusion or exclusion from concrete welfare entitlements in Bulgaria, which has further implications for their future.

The rest of chapter is divided in two main parts. I first go through the experience of women who have migrated along with their husbands. I show what are the changes in terms of social citizenship that they experience due to this move. The second part is devoted to the complex experience of the ageing carers who migrate to provide assistance to the young migrants’ familial needs. I first present the accepted and expected ideal care arrangements in the Bulgarian Muslim village community prior to migration. The last part is devoted to four ethnographic cases which highlight the particular ruptures and transformations in the care arrangements that had been established locally in the village, before transnational migration became common. At the same time these cases are indicative of the impact that care-triggered migration has on ageing carers’ social citizenship. I focus on four different aspects of kin relations – duty and shame, care for free and care for money,
choosing between grandchildren and parents, and finally, transformations of masculinity. I conclude with a discussion of the way the family fabric is being transformed by the straining of the ideal care regimes and suggest what the future implications of these transformations might be.

6.2. Flipping social citizenship for women

Female employment in Brushlyan is poorly paid, but on the whole it is regarded as more reliable and providing security, even if it is much less lucrative than male employment. There were three sewing workshops in the village, owned by Greek entrepreneurs, and one larger in the nearby village, sewing lingerie for a French company. The conditions in all workshops were similar. All women were employed with permanent contracts (trudov dogovor), which included social benefits and counted towards the length of service. They worked for the minimum wage at that time (125 €), with the French workshop paying slightly better. The conditions were bad and the extra hours and shifts in cases of urgent orders were exhausting. Nevertheless, since this was the only mass employment for women in the region, the conditions were not negotiable. A new sewing workshop was opened while I was in the village in January 2008 and immediately employed about 50 new women. At the time this not only signified an improvement of the economic context, but also emphasized the security of female employment, albeit poorly paid. The work of women was not regarded as a significant income generator, but rather as a mechanism for providing security. Not only did women have health insurance, paid maternity leave, and future pension benefits, but their contracts and regular income allowed them to take bank loans on their names. In this sense, their employment provided a security and reliability not only to themselves, but to their whole families.
Framing this in the language of citizenship means that in Brushlyan the majority of women had formal access to social rights as autonomous individuals. While their income was not enough to support themselves or their families, their position of regular workers gave them access to substantive rights. Healthcare and pensions provided a safety net outside the family and kin network. At the same time, the women working in the sewing factories largely depended financially on the additional income provided by men. This would be either the men working in stone-tiling in the village or men sending remittances from Spain. The position of younger and elderly women in the village was very similar in terms of income, opportunities for jobs, and ultimately access to social rights. In addition to the day jobs in the sewing factories, most women were engaged in tobacco cultivation. This practice was especially widespread in the years before the mass migration waves and started slowly fading away with younger women joining their husbands in migration.

Migrating to Spain causes a flip of this model of dependency and places women in new types of vulnerable positions. As a strategy for achieving economic and social citizenship migration does not affect all migrants alike. There is a discrepancy between the experience of the young and the elderly migrants. The majority of migrants are young families, while elderly people have started to migrate only recently. While most men started working irregularly, but have been subsequently regularized and by 2007 most of them already had work, this was not the case with young women, who came to Spain in their capacity as mothers and wives joining their husbands. Many of them did not work, or only worked part time for a few hours per week. Among those who work most have precarious part-time employment mainly in domestic service and in restaurant/hotel jobs. Not only are these jobs more poorly paid, but they are also irregular, with no contracts or social security. Their role in the migration project is not as financial supporters. They are part of a traditional
breadwinner model, in which the male migrant is responsible for the financial wellbeing of the rest of the family members.

The case of Rumi, my landlady, demonstrates a pattern in the female migration trajectory and shows the clear gender differentiation in terms of employment and access to social rights. Just like most other young women, Rumi arrived to Spain in her capacity of a wife, only after Yavor had acquired a legal status and felt the security to support her there. Until then Rumi has remained in the village with their son, working at the sewing factory and living with Yavor’s parents, like most young families would do. She could accommodate caring for her son and working in shifts only with the support of her mother-in-law, who picked up the child from kindergarten and stayed with him, whenever Rumi was working. If the mother-in-law couldn’t do it, then Rumi’s mother who lived just around the corner helped. Rumi and her mother-in-law also tended the cow, which provided milk for the family and for selling. In the summers Rumi and her mother-in-law cultivated tobacco. When Yavor settled down and asked Rumi to join him, she quit her job, and left immediately together with their son. Her move disrupted her own working routine, which provide independent, albeit small, income and social security. It took away, at least temporary, the support care network of grandmother, by turning her into the sole carer of her son. It also disrupted her mother-in-law’s routine, who remained without a daughter-in-law to help her with tobacco cultivation and with breeding the cow.

While women are not the main migration drive and they are almost never the ones who migrate first, they are expected to join their husbands with or without the children, once the husbands have settled. Thus, women have started arriving to Spain later, and their arrival often indicated a turning point both in a man’s career, and in his lifestyle. In this sense, they rarely experience the insecurities and risks which the pioneering men struggle with when they first arrive. At the same time, they are
expected to quit their jobs, lose their individual social rights, and remain without the care support coming from the kin network at home. Rumi arrived to Spain alone, leaving her son with her parents-in-law in Bulgaria. Yavor had just reorganized his living conditions and was sharing the big flat with his other two brothers. Rumi arrived with the wife of the younger brother in April 2005. Her initial role in Spain was perceived both by her and by her husband as centered on the household and taking care of Yavor. She was hoping to find a part-time job as domestic aid in a house. At this point this was the only type of job that was available for women who did not speak the language and had no work permits, i.e. for most of the women. However, finding a job in a house in Tafalla turned out to be much more difficult than they thought and she stayed without a job until the summer.

Rumi then got pregnant and stayed at home during her pregnancy and in the first nine months after her son was born. Her pregnancy monitoring exams and her birth giving were covered by Yavor’s health insurance. The same held true for her subsequent health insurance. Her main task in this period was to take care of the home and of her two sons. When I got there, the younger son was one year old, and he was trying to put him in a private nursery, so that she can start searching for a more permanent job. Until then, she only managed to work for one month as a substitute in the kitchen of a hotel. For this month, her mother-in-law came from Bulgaria to help with the two children. The process of searching for a job continued throughout all the months while I was doing fieldwork. She only started working part-time in one of the nursing homes in the autumn, after I left (4 years after she first arrived in Spain). Next time we talked, she had changed jobs twice, working shortly for an old lady a couple an hours a day assisting her with everyday activities. This had lasted for two months, after which she started working part-time in a restaurant. Only the job at the nursing home was regularized with a contract and included social benefits. It was, however,
a substitute job only for one year with no option for extension. The other three jobs she got were irregular, without benefits or any type of security.

All the jobs Rumi was able to find were precarious and with one exception, left her outside the welfare system. This did not worry her, because throughout all the years she spent in Spain, her health insurance was covered by her husband as part of his contract. But in this way, she did not position herself formally as a worker in Spain, which in turn did not allow her access to social citizenship rights, like maternity benefits depending on employment, retirement schemes, unemployment benefits. Such entitlements would grant independence from reliance on her husband, by participation in the welfare system. Since she was not formerly employed, she had no access to such venue of independence and remained tied to her husband’s financial support. She did not further claim these rights individually, exactly because she had the safety net provided by her husband. In addition, what she was paid was much lower than what her husband Yavor, was making. In general, women earned less money than man, both because of the type of jobs like domestic aid or working in a restaurant, and because most of these jobs were part-time. Even the few women who worked full time in a restaurant or in a supermarket, or combined several types of employment, reached no more than 1000 euro per month, but the average income did not exceed 600 euro. In comparison, the average male income was 1500 euro. Thus, women were in an unequal position both in terms of income and in terms of access to rights. This made them dependent on their husbands not only financially, which was the case in Bulgaria as well, but also as possible claim-makers.

Rumi is a typical example of the work trajectories of most of the migrant women in Tafalla. There were very few cases of women who actually managed to find more permanent full-time employment in a restaurant or in a supermarket. In most cases, women either did not work and took
care of their young children, or worked in part-time irregular jobs. In this sense, migration turned around the social citizenship positions of men and women. While men’s main employment in Brushlyan, stone-tiling, which is seasonal, non-contractual and with no social benefits, women largely work in the village sewing workshops with permanent contracts. The decision to migrate deprives women of the security of their, albeit very poorly paid, employment positions, by emphasizing their role in reproducing the family.

Ironically, while women do not work full time, their working hours and shifts often extend beyond nursery and school opening hours, which makes it impossible to actually work and have young children without any additional help. Thus, the intergenerational imbalance was causing various informal difficulties, especially with regard to care. Therefore, young migrants started inviting their parents, the young-old, to Spain for limited periods of time in order to help with child-rearing and household activities. This second wave of migration of ageing carers aims at restoring the kin support network, which allows the reproduction of the family on Spanish territory.

**6.3. The transnational ageing carers**

In the rest of this chapter I look at the case of ageing migrants like Fatme from the opening vignette to look at the ruptures in the lives of ageing people who are in constant movement between contexts, families, and states. These transnational ageing carers include grandparents who move between their place of origin (which they often call their home) and the places where their children and grandchildren reside (which might be in different houses, different towns, or different countries). Conversely, they may also be middle-aged people based in the destination country who have left their ageing parents at home and consequently have to travel between places to fulfil their care duty towards the older generation. Often, these people are trying to juggle their obligations
towards parents and grandchildren at once. These ageing people are the epitome of transnational living, sometimes moving up to five times per year, spending every two months in a different location, in their attempts to fulfil various care obligations.

While most migration studies deal with a very limited category of ageing people in terms of social class or social age (be it British retirees in Spain or elderly grandparents left behind in Bangladesh), there is an analytical tendency to place all ageing people together in one large homogenous group of “the elderly”, “the aged”, or “the ageing”. At the same time, social psychology and social gerontology have underlined the need to distinguish between different stages of later life and have developed a more refined set of categories (Karp et al. 1982; Warnes 1992). The transition between middle age and old age is contextually sensitive and socially constructed (Gubrium et al. 1994; Hazan 1992; Laz 1998). Moreover, old age itself has stages. One is an ageing person with grandchildren and elderly parents, and the next is a person in need of care. I use the concept social age group as a tool for distinguishing the nuances in the expectations, obligations and care patterns among different groups of ageing people. Thus, social age in this case is defined through a position in a care network. I will refer to these two stages of old age as the young-old and the old-old, loosely based on Neugarten’s (1974, 1996) definition\textsuperscript{74}. The transnational ageing carers fall in the category of the young-old, who need to provide care in two directions – to their parents and to their

\textsuperscript{74} Based on research in the urban USA, Neugarten defines the young old (55-74 years old) and the old old (75 and older). This is too rigid when applied to other contexts, as in the case of the Bulgarian Muslim migrants a much lower age limit would make someone an old-old. Thus, the division should take a social constructionist perspective of age rather than a biological understanding.
grandchildren (a kind of a shifted sandwich generation)\textsuperscript{75}. In this sense, social age groups overlap with generations bound by care commitments \textsuperscript{76}.

Whereas migration of young people was considered more permanent from the outset, the transnational ageing carers initiated their mobility as temporary and strictly care-oriented, even though this has often developed into a more long-term practice. The particular migration trajectories take different scenarios. More typically it is women who arrive first for short periods of time to solve a particular care crisis. After a few visits, their husbands might also join, trying to find a temporary job through their children’s contacts. This sometimes turns into a long-term solution with both elderly parents moving permanently to Spain. Alternatively, they keep coming for short periods every few months to provide temporary care relief. Another trajectory is when elderly men join the younger generation searching for a job and bring over their wives, once they have settled. In both scenarios, the elderly migrants are a subsidiary group, being in Spain as temporary or permanent assistants to their children. They are thought of and think of themselves as having reached the end of their active lives in terms of career, home building and raising children. Their life plans are not directed towards their own development anymore, but are instead adjusted to their children, arranging plans and movements accordingly. These movements aim at reconstituting the care support network, but at the same time they disrupt in different degrees elderly people’s employment and social security in Bulgaria.

\textsuperscript{75} The term sandwich generation usually denotes middle-aged women who simultaneously work and provide care for both their still-dependent children and their ageing parents. The case here differs since the in-between generation provides care for grandchildren.

\textsuperscript{76} “Generation” in this text refers to the narrow sense of a position within a family, which changes over a lifetime from grandchild to grandparent. It does not refer to other meanings like birth cohort, political cohort, or second generation in migration.
Elderly women in Bulgaria, like young ones, are also employed in sewing workshops on a mass scale. In addition, they used to grow tobacco for subsidiary income and often owned a cow for dairy products. Young people’s migration first led to a decline in tobacco growing, which became impossible without the assistance of young women. Subsequent care migration further hinders elderly women’s economic activities, both by making it impossible to breed any stock, and, more importantly, by endangering their position in the sewing factories. Taking long unpaid leaves or quitting their job affects not only their income, but more importantly, it disrupts their social benefits and future welfare security. Unlike younger women, however, their migration to Spain does not include either employment plans, or possible subsidiary social benefits through their husbands’ contracts. Similarly, elderly men who move between Spain and Bulgaria as part of a care scheme experience losses in their social citizenship status in Bulgaria, although not to such an extent. Like younger men, their employment in Bulgaria is precarious – stone tiling, wood cutting, with temporary contracts, if any, and no proper welfare benefits for healthcare, unemployment or pension. By giving up these jobs, however, they risk falling out of a network of colleagues and possible employers, which provided their only security in Bulgaria. In Spain, they remain outside the regularised labour market, even if they take a part-time or hourly job, mostly depending on their sons for these connections. Being normatively a European citizen does not balance these economic and social benefits losses, since EU citizenship bestows social rights on mobile individuals not universally, but conditionally, privileging those in paid (regularised) work (Ackers 2004). As a result, the transnational ageing carers fall into a highly precarious position, losing social citizenship entitlements in Bulgaria, while not gaining anything institutionally in Spain.
6.4. **Ideal care regimes**

Migration moves of elderly people are not designed to enhance their economic or social citizenship status, but aim to reproduce the family relations existing prior to migration within the confined space of the village and through this to reproduce the family itself. The reproduction of the family is realized through strict care regimes based on reciprocity. Thus, the wellbeing of one part of the family chain guarantees the future wellbeing of the other. The care regimes prior to migration that I delineate below are based on migrants’ conceptions and discourses, rather than on observed practices. In this sense, they are the ideal version of actual care relations and are the yardstick against which people measure the ruptures that migration brings about in the fabric of the family. Ideal care regimes then refer to an ideal family, which migration endangers 77.

The norm in the village of Brushlyan is to maintain the patrilocal tradition. Typically, the youngest son remains to live with his wife in the house of his parents, which he will later inherit. Living in the same house, grandparents provide assistance with the upbringing of the children, while at a later age, the daughter-in-law takes over the responsibility of caring for them. In theory, there is no intersection between the care obligations of different kin, but in practice, especially in the case of childcare, often both grandmothers are willing to help. This is facilitated immensely by cohabitation in the same small-scale village space. Moreover, this also allows combining care obligations and employment, tobacco growing and stock breeding. Migration of different family members, then, introduces a challenge to this support scheme.

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77 Migration is not the only but the most dramatic and abrupt trigger of ruptures and transformations in family relations. Spatial distance creates new challenges to ideal care regimes, which cannot be overcome the way they are in the confined space of village life.
In the case of caring for the old-old, ideally there were two possible scenarios: either people who have migrated and have elderly relatives at home were not the ones responsible for taking care of them or, if the responsibility for care rested with the migrant son, then his wife, the daughter-in-law, stayed behind. If she had already joined her husband and an emergency arose, for example the elderly person suddenly became ill and incapable of taking care of him/herself, then the daughter-in-law would return and remain in Bulgaria for as long as she was needed there. The mechanism of staying behind or temporary return seemed a widespread practice. The other care obligation of the young-old was to take care of the grandchildren with migrant parents. Again, there were two mechanisms for fulfilling this. In some cases the children were taken to Spain by their parents, along with the man’s mother who would come in the sole capacity of a care provider. The other strategy was to leave the children behind to the care of the grandparents. This was common for the initial stage of migration. Alternatively, children who lived in Spain for some time would be sent back when approaching school age in order to be schooled in Bulgaria. This strategy was framed as a desire for “proper education” and for learning to read and write in Bulgarian. In all these cases the respective grandmother usually quit her job for a certain period of time in order to devote all her time to the grandchildren, whether in Spain or in Bulgaria.

In the above described practices it seems that migration does not violate the traditional care mechanisms. So, if for example the son responsible for caring has migrated with his family, it will be his wife coming back to fulfil her caring duties, even if there were other daughters-in-law living in the village. Similarly, even if the mother of the daughter is already in Spain, it would still be the mother of the son arriving specially from Bulgaria to assist with caring for the grandchildren. Thus, while the daily family life or the employment pattern of the responsible carer is being disrupted, the kin safety net keeps functioning in the same way as prior to migration. Nevertheless, by
scrutinizing individual cases it becomes apparent that the neat structure is in fact starting to go through certain transformations. This will be illustrated by four ethnographic cases.

6.5. Transformations and disruptions: the young-old in a state of flux

6.5.1. Duty and shame

Alil lives with his wife and son, sharing a flat with his wife’s parents in Spain. The grandmother helps with their 3-year-old son when both parents are at work during the week: she picks him up from the school bus and stays with him until her daughter, the mother, returns from work. Alil’s wife’s only free day is on Wednesday, which leaves their son in need of alternative care over the weekend. However, her mother only takes care of him during the week leaving this duty to Alil over the weekend. For Alil this means to do things that other men would not do: he takes his son to the park and hangs out with mothers and grandmothers there, he goes to visit his sister and nephews in the early afternoon, just as the rest of the women with children do, instead of playing cards on Sunday afternoons in the pensioner’s club with the other men, or hanging out in the main square café. This undermined his masculinity and his male friends and relatives pity him. When I asked why his mother-in-law did not take care of her grandson over the weekends as well, he explained: “Well, she’s busy, she visits her son in Pamplona, or she just has other things to do. She is not obliged to help us after all.”

This disruption of traditional gender roles and intergenerational relations only takes place in Spain. When Alil and his wife return to Bulgaria on vacation they all stay in his parents’ house. Alil’s masculine authority is only challenged in Spain, and therefore is considered as temporary and easier
to accept, even though he has been in Spain for five years now and does not plan to move back to Bulgaria in the near future. The temporary nature of his position leads to a series of complicated semi-transformations of his relations with the rest of the relatives. By helping with their son during the week, his mother-in-law in fact helps her daughter, rather than the family as a whole. By leaving the son to Alil’s care over the weekend she underlines the exclusiveness of her help. The longer I stayed in Tafalla, the more I realised that Alil’s case was not unique. For various reasons, many men end up living with their parents-in-law in Spain. This leads to a mixing of power relations in which male authority and status roles get confused. Moreover, it creates a complicated web of mutual help and reciprocity issues which did not exist prior to migration.

Over the summer, however, the care scheme required readjustment. Alil’s parents-in-law take their vacation in July, while Alil and his wife have their holidays in August. The grandparents are not willing to change their vacation plans, even though they could, while Alil’s wife is not allowed to take her vacation earlier than August. Not only do they remain without assistance, but the nursery also does not work in July. This creates a dire need for a full time carer for their son. For two years, the solution was to summon the other grandmother, Alil’s mother Zaira, who would stay with them for a month. This eventually led to a disruption both in her daily practices and support mechanisms at home, and in her employment status. She stopped growing tobacco over the summer, sold her cow, and had to take unpaid leave from the sewing factory. This deprived her and her husband of alternative sources of income and food, affected them financially due to receiving one less monthly salary, and disrupted her length of service accumulation for retirement. In addition, she shared with me that she felt uncomfortable in Spain and did not manage to get used to the everyday routines in Tafalla. But even though being a transnational ageing carer disrupts Zaira’s life on several levels,
this is regarded as her duty and is considered to be the norm. At the same time Alil’s mother-in-law’s support during the year is thought of as a favour.

The situation got even more complicated the second summer when Zaira was in Spain. Her daughter, who also lives in Tafalla with her family, was pregnant for a second time. She was due in September, so after Alil left for Bulgaria, Zaira decided to stay with her daughter until she gave birth. She moved to her daughter’s place and helped with her elder son, but when Alil came back from vacation, she felt obliged to continue helping with his son as well, even though the other grandmother was also already back. For Zaira this meant running from one part of the town to the other four times a day. When I asked why the other grandmother, the mother of the wife, did not take the child to nursery as she usually does, Zaira explained: “Oh, no, how could she, if I am here. It doesn’t matter that I live in another house, I am obliged to help my son. What would other people say, if I only helped my daughter? But then, how could I have left my daughter without help. Her own mother-in-law is in Bulgaria… It was difficult; I lost ten kilos from all this running back and forth. But that’s what migration does to all of us. It makes our lives more difficult in so many ways.”

6.5.2. Care for money, care for free

Ayse, who lives in Spain with her husband, daughter and son-in-law, is a similar example. Her son is also in Spain, but lives in Pamplona. She accompanied her daughter’s children to Spain in order to take care of them. The arrangement was that the daughter would pay for her accommodation and food and give her pocket money. However, once Ayse’s son who lived in Pamplona learned that, he decided to bring his two daughters to Spain as well and to leave them in his mother’s care. He could not take them to Pamplona, because his and his wife’s working schedules did not correspond
with the nursery hours. Thus, Ayse’s household suddenly increased with four little girls. She was living with her daughter who paid her to take care of her children, but at the same time taking care of her son’s children for free in the same household. Like Zaira, Ayse explained that it is her duty to look after her son’s children, while taking care of her daughter’s children is a favour. This, of course, would not have happened had the daughter’s mother-in-law been able to fulfil her own duty to provide child care. But she was ill in Bulgaria and unable to travel.

By coming to Spain more permanently, Ayse changed her status in terms of both her social and her economic security. She had to quit her job in the sewing workshop in Brushlyan and thus she stopped paying any social security contributions. By leaving Bulgaria, Ayse fell out of state produced welfare categories – employed, self-employed, unemployed or on social aid. She did not have the needed length of service for retirement, and depending on when and whether she goes back to Bulgaria, she will either have to make up for the years she had missed in Spain, or ‘buy’ them through a substantial contribution tax. And even in this case, her pension will probably remain the minimum one, which for the time being is below the poverty line for the country. At the same time, by not being officially employed in Spain, she did not figure in any of the welfare state categories and thus had no right for social insurance there either.

Ayse also had to discontinue her other daily practices like growing tobacco, having a cow and chickens, and growing vegetables in the garden of her house. Apart from the additional financial insecurity that these changes triggered, this also disrupted her habitual daily routines. In between

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78 Women in Ayse’s position would usually have pension slightly higher than the minimum. But it also involves free healthcare, which is especially important when it comes to serious interventions like operations which cost up to 4000 euro at present.

79 At present the minimum pension is 136 leva per month (about 70 euro), and the poverty line for Bulgaria for 2010 is estimated at 211 leva per month (105 euro). (http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/02/11/856711_minimalnata_pensiia_moje_da_se_povishi/)
preparing and picking up the children from nursery, she complained: “If only I had a little garden here, to sow some potatoes, some peppers, tomatoes… this would have helped. Never would I have thought that I wouldn’t be able to grow at least some of my food. I am stuck in this house all day long, with my only walks to the school and to the park. And soon the girls will grow, and they won’t need me here anymore. I’ll have to return home – no job, no pension, no garden, no cow… But it’s all for the children.” Being a transnational ageing carer, then, involves interrupting the entitlements which are related to social citizenship at home, but are not available in Spain due to the unfavourable position of migrant carers. It also means discontinuing other forms of security like stock breeding, tobacco growing or having a garden. At the same time, it also triggers emotional frustration, which is balanced with a feeling of fulfilled duty.

Ayse’s sole task in Spain is to maintain the reproduction of her children’s families at the expense of any kind of security she had at home. This leaves her facing a future where she will not rely on any state support, but only on the reciprocity arrangement with her son and daughter. In this sense, there is a move from welfare to kinfare, in which Ayse has to circumvent the state remaining dependent solely on her kin. But kinfare, in this case, might turn out to be very unclear. The simultaneous care she provides both for her son’s and for her daughter’s children blurs the kin reciprocity scheme. The financial compensation by the daughter is regarded as almost symbolic. In addition, it does not neutralize the new emotional attachments created by these arrangements, which put Ayse in a closer relationship with her daughter’s family than with her son’s. This opens new insecurities in terms of reciprocity. “In principle it should be my son supporting us in the

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80 Zaira’s husband quit his logging job in Bulgaria too, which has also deprived him of social benefits at home. And even though he does not work in Spain with a contract yet, he has chances of finding a regularised job through the migrants’ network. Thus, there is an apparent gender divide which puts elderly migrant women in a much more precarious position.
future, but I grew very close to my daughter’s whole family, and also what I’m doing for them here cannot be compensated just by the small money they give me. And then my son might say – “I don’t have to do it, I don’t owe you anything”. And then if my daughter doesn’t want me too, I’ll be left with no one to care for me”, Ayse tells me with a worried face.

In both Ayse’s and Zaira’s stories the main motivation is a combination of duty and shame, expressed in the “what would other people say” phrase. Thus reciprocity and public shame are the two leading social forces behind kin relations. This also entails a well-established concept of what it means to be a “proper mother/grandmother/daughter-in-law” or “proper man”. Variations from the model lead to disharmony. However, with migration relationships become more flexible: grandmothers start taking care of their daughters’ children, men start living with their wives’ parents. While things are not completely transformed and the “old” habits and manners are still influential, new agreements come into force to address new situations. Thus, even though the care arrangements are transformed, these transformations are inevitably cast away as temporary or shameful, or are partially circumvented through complicated adjustments. Nevertheless, the flexibilization of kin relations due to migration and the simultaneous citizenship transformations, which encapsulate ageing women into the kin safety net, pose a paradox. Elderly people increasingly choose to rely on their kin for future security, not only in terms of care, but also in terms of general support, including healthcare and pension, while at the same time the reciprocity regime gets loosened and more complex.

6.5.3. Choosing between parents and children

The other end of the care chain is the care of the old-old. The case of Dordana provides an example of a subtle change in the prescribed care arrangements. Her husband is the youngest brother of
three boys, and the penultimate child of five children altogether. So, following the tradition, he will be the one to inherit the parents’ house and also the one responsible for caring for them. His two elder brothers are also in Spain with their wives and children, while his two sisters live in Brushlyan. Dordana was living in Spain with her husband and her two young sons (19 and 24) for over a year, taking care of the household and working part-time in a restaurant. In the summer of 2007, while on vacation in Bulgaria, her elder son got married and took his wife to Spain. In the meantime, Dordana’s father-in-law became very ill and could no longer live on his own. His other two sons were in Spain and he was living all by himself. The solution was that Dordana would stay behind. She immediately started working in one of the sewing workshops in the village, while her sons and husband continued living in Spain. The two sisters of her husband, though not living far away, did not offer any assistance. They belonged to other kin now with other care arrangements. Thus, as a young-old carer, Dordana had to choose her father-in-law over her husband and sons for a certain period of time.

About a year later the situation changed. Dordana’s new daughter-in-law became pregnant. This led to a minor crisis. If all family members were in the same physical place, it would have been easy for Dordana to combine helping her daughter-in-law with taking care of her ageing father-in-law. However, the distance triggered the need for change, which engendered complications in the extended family relations. Since the young wife was about to give birth in Spain, Dordana decided to go back at the last moment and to leave her father-in-law in the care of his own daughters. This was settled with a lot of reluctance and arguments. I was told by various family members that to offer money in exchange for care was out of the question and would ruin the concept of a family. But at the same time it was not very clear to the members of the dispute how they could solve the imbalance in the care arrangements. When I asked why the mother of the young bride did not go
to Spain for a while to assist with the baby, everybody told me that she had her son’s son to take care of and that, anyway, it would be highly inappropriate. In this sense, not all transformations in the care arrangements are possible. The relation between Dordana and the young daughter-in-law had yet to be established, and could not be violated, while the agreement between the ageing brothers and sisters over the care of their father turned out to be less rigid.

The case of Dordana demonstrates a typical transnational grandmother who has to divide her care between the elderly left behind and the new grandchildren. In this way, she becomes a person without a permanent abode, without permanent employment or a permanent everyday routine. As in the other two cases, her care-motivated mobility to and fro hampers her social and citizenship status in both locations. While she managed to work in both places, the economic benefits of these jobs were minimal and social welfare was nonexistent. In both places she worked with no contracts and no social benefits, knowing that each job was temporary and dependent upon where she will be needed next in the care chain. While her husband enjoyed relative stability in Spain, she experienced a highly flexible life full of insecurities. This gender imbalance is typical for the case of the ageing migrants with care being regarded as mostly a female duty. Thus the care networks between generations takes out ageing people, and especially ageing women, outside the welfare system by hampering their employment and thus creating dependency within the kin.

### 6.5.4. Transnational grandfathers

Care migration among Bulgarian Muslims is predominantly female, as in the above examples, but with the growing demand for carers in Spain, a new category has emerged – transnational grandfathers. They are young-old men who travel to Spain for short periods of time with to assist their daughters with child care. They are supposed to fill the care gaps when the respective
grandmother (mother of the son) is hindered. Paradoxically, grandfathers’ performing care tasks in Spain for their daughters is considered as less shameful than situations in which the ‘wrong’ grandmother is doing the care work. Men are rarely involved in care work at home and so their coming to Spain is qualified as extraordinary, a one-off crisis solution, rather than an actual break in the ideal care regime. This is how Zaira’s husband, Mehmed, arrived in Tafalla in early October to help with childcare, so that his daughter could work as a replacement in a restaurant for a couple of months. She herself did not formulate his visit as care assistance, but rather said that he is there as a guest to see Spain, and would maybe help a bit, if he had the desire to do it. She only managed to work in the restaurant for a week before her younger son got the flu and she had to quit and stay home with him. In the meantime, her father continued living with them for another two months, in case she managed to find a new job. She did not, and he was back in Bulgaria before New Year’s.

Transnational grandfathers’ migration is initially care motivated, but rarely ends up as such, as the example of Mehmed suggests. Instead, all the grandfathers I knew in Tafalla had taken up some temporary employment in agriculture or construction. Mehmed worked for a few days in agriculture picking grapes. Then he replaced his younger son who took a vacation from his construction job for two weeks, and worked with his son-in-law, again in construction, for another month. Even when a grandfather manages to help with childcare, it is often minor tasks like picking up the children from school. As a result, the daughters remain in the main care-taking position, without an opportunity to take a more demanding job. Most people mobilize the concept of shame to explain these moves between care and employment. For women the concept of shame comes from failing to fulfil their care obligations, while men experience shame as a result by stepping out of their traditional male role. By taking care of grandchildren, they not only take up a female obligation, but also give up their role as bread-winners. Through his short-term jobs Mehmed
managed to make his own ‘money for coffee and cigarettes’ and to pay for his fare back. In this way he felt independent. Before that he did not feel comfortable going out to meet with his co-villagers, because he had to ask his daughter for money. Clearly, his temporary job reinstates him in the ‘proper’ position, somewhat normalizing his kin relations.

Money, however, is not the only problem in this arrangement. Living with a daughter also means living with a son-in-law, who acts as the head of the household. While a father has authority over his son, his son-in-law is out of his reach. Transnational grandfathers are long-term guests who have no say in the family matters. This downgraded status is always experienced as traumatic. Moreover, younger men adapt easily to life abroad and gain new life skills that are not transmitted to the older generations. This leaves the elderly in a dependent position. Ageing men experience this as disturbing, especially if they depend not on their own sons but on their sons-in-law. “It confuses me, I do not feel knowledgeable enough, experienced enough to advise them. They [the younger ones] have to advise me. This is not normal. And if only it was my own sons telling me what to do. But that is not the case. Not that I dislike my son-in-law, but it simply seems wrong,” said Mehmed, expressing the view of many other men in a similar situation.

Care migration affects grandfathers’ lives at home as well. Mehmed had sacrificed his stable and well paid job as a forester to come to Spain, where he held a series of dubious jobs. He did not save much money from his trip, and he did not plan to come back for a longer stay in search of a better job. His two-month trip, however, has cost him the money for his social security contribution, including the employer’s share, amounting to 300 leva (150 euro) altogether (with his monthly salary being a little over 500 leva). Since he did not want to have his welfare rights interrupted

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81 see Gardner (2002) for a similar pattern of undermined male authority among Bengali elders in London.
because of his absence, he arranged with his employer to pay all the taxes, as if he was working. What he earned in Spain, he paid for social security in Bulgaria. Luckily, he managed to go back to his old job. But not everyone was so lucky, and many grandfathers found themselves jobless upon their return. Moreover, these short visits to Spain became a routine for quite a few grandfathers. In this way, even if they managed to keep their jobs in Bulgaria, they had to constantly invest substantial amounts of money in order to have their social citizenship rights uninterrupted. As in the case of the grandmothers then, grandfathers sacrificed their own stability in terms of social and economic security, in order to attempt to help their children in Spain. Even though for most of them it did not work out as planned, the consequences were all the same.

6.6. Conclusion: New inequalities, New insecurities

Care arrangements are kept within the boundaries of the extended family and follow a complex scheme of reciprocity and obligations. Through cases of transnational ageing carers I have tried to demonstrate how migration strains these strict regimes of care demanding creativity and new adjustments. This, however, often involves violation and ruptures in the kin relations. New care regimes are emerging, often as a response to a moment of crisis and conceived as a temporary solution. A son-in-law temporarily becomes part of his wife’s family, a daughter agrees to care for her ageing father, a grandmother assists her daughter with childcare, a grandfather shares care and authority with his son-in-law, a woman struggles to choose between a dying father-in-law and a new-born grandchild – all these cases represent a rupture in the family fabric and a new care mechanism. In this sense, the very existence of the transnational ageing carers as a category of practice is simultaneously defined by and instrumental for these transformations.
Along with triggering a reformulation of gender and intergenerational relations in the family, transnational migration also generates transformations in the realm of social citizenship entitlements. The transnational care practices of the young-old are facilitated by a certain regime of EU mobility and enable their children’s economic advancement. At the same time this disrupts their own social citizenship both in Bulgaria and in Spain. Losing employment, welfare entitlements, and additional sources of income in Bulgaria is reinforced by the disadvantageous position of non-working individuals that they occupy in Spain. Transnationality, then, affects their social citizenship status, while allowing their children to acquire a better position. Moreover, this intense mobility also triggers a disrupted sense of home and belonging.

The lives of the transnational ageing carers are flexibilized by their role in the reproduction of the family in the migration context, which requires them to provide care for two different generations dispersed in two or more localities. What is at stake, however, is not only their present, but also their future. While the young migrants are considered the active kernel which organizes the movement of others, the young-old migrants are the subsidiary group which adjusts to the kernel. They regard themselves as having passed the peak of their active lives and now live and arrange their lives according to their children’s needs. In the context of migration, however, this opens new forms of insecurities (whether related to lack of experience in the new context, redefinition of masculinity, or unstable spatial and temporal routines). In this sense migration upsets not only the present, but conditions future anxieties and possible transformations.

Moreover, there is an interdependence of the ways citizenship is transformed for the different generations. Younger people are able to advance both their economic wellbeing and their social citizenship through migration, but only with the support of the ageing carers who, however, lose their few stable guarantees in terms of employment and social security. The emphasis on family
reproduction through care signifies a move from welfare to kinfare, in which kin reciprocity substitutes state support. Ageing women fall into a particularly precarious position being the main providers of care in between localities and states and risking any stability they might have had in Bulgaria for the sake of fulfilling their care duties. Future full dependency on the younger generation along with the uncertainties of their present everyday lives creates new forms of gender and intergenerational inequalities. Transformations in kinship then are tightly intertwined with transformations in citizenship not only in the present, but also in the future of the transnational ageing carers
Chapter 7: Phantasmic Devices: Wedding Videos and a Virtual Community in the Making

“Have you watched our wedding video? No? I’ll play it for you now, while we are talking, then!”

“Have you seen my daughter’s wedding? Wait, I’ll show you, so that you know better how she looks like when you go to Spain.”

“Have they showed you already last month’s wedding of Selim and Sebi at home? You should see it by all means. Sit, we’ll watch it again, the DVD’s with us right now.”

I would hear one of these lines at almost every visit I paid either to migrants’ homes in Spain or to their relatives’ in Bulgaria. What followed was a screening of a wedding video of the ritual in real time, lasting from three to seven hours with a regular rewinding for emphasis on a certain moment. At first I thought watching wedding videos is just a background encouraging the flow of conversation and making the atmosphere more informal. But the more time I spent in the field, the clearer it got to me that this is not a sporadic practice occurring specially for me as an outsider, but a wide spread significant social phenomenon. Wedding videos were omnipresent in every house and were screened on all kinds of occasions – from a ritualistic re-experiencing of the wedding by the kin, through a nostalgic virtual revival of home, to a gossip mechanism for being up-to-date with village affairs. In this chapter I analyse the practices of production and circulation of wedding videos and their role for building a new type of imagined (virtualized) community between migrants and those connected with them in a transnational social field.
My analysis will be two-fold. First, I aim to demonstrate how the wedding video has become an agent in the process of transnationalizing the village community. I explore the new mechanisms of establishing temporal and spatial bridges between ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, and between past and present. I argue that the practices related to the production and uses of wedding videos generate a phantasmic image of home and an experience of an imagined virtual community. This virtual community expands over space and time and sustains a feeling of belonging and membership. A second line of analysis examines what are the transformations of the meaning and texture of the ritual as a consequence of its mediatisation which allows repeated consumption and re-enactment in a different temporal and spatial context. In other words how do migration practices of a relatively closed rural community affect the structure of the highly formalized wedding ritual by introducing a new dimension to it. I would suggest that the mediazation of the ritual allows its profound transnationalization, which brings a new aspect of ritualization of the migration space. Here I will not focus on the performance of the wedding as such and what it means for the wedding couple and the two kins becoming related, but instead I will look at the way the mediated ritual allows a group of people to perform as a community. What is more, I argue that this community, by being virtual and imagined, is also idealised as to represent the phantasm of wholeness and order, which are associated with home, and thus to stitch the ruptures caused by migration.

Analyses of video recordings of life cycle rituals (religious and status initiations, weddings, funerals etc.) can be traced in several analytical fields – visual anthropology, anthropology of media, ritual studies etc. The main focus in visual anthropology studies is on the photographs or the ethnographic film as an evidence for social and cultural processes. Images are either thought of as a research method of gathering data, or as a way of representing certain aspect of the researched groups of people. The more critical approaches discuss the contradictory nature of these images in
regard to their objectivity and representativeness (e.g. Banks 2001; Grimshaw 2001; MacDougall 1998; Pink 2001). The question of authorship and knowledge productions is also scrutinized which has resulted in an already established tradition in cooperation in the films and image productions between the ethnographer and the subjects of his study (see Aufderheide 1995; Carelli 1988; Prins 1997; Ruby 1991; Terence Turner 1992). But even though more than ten years ago Morphy and Banks (1997) insisted on a wider understanding of visual anthropology including all visual systems and visual culture, most research remains focused on the production of images by the active intention of the ethnographer, and not as a result of a spontaneous internal production and use of visual system like the wedding videos discussed here.


However, there is no extensive ethnographic study of exchange of pictures or videos as a medium for private visual communication between home and abroad. The wedding videos analyzed here
are produced by the village inhabitants for themselves and for the migrants from the village. They are not directed at any wider public outside the village community. What is more, the wedding video does not aim to record the specifics or the representativeness of the ritual as a cultural, religious or ethnic identity marker of the group. On the contrary, the goal seems quite straightforward – it is recorded in order to be watched later over and over again both by people who were present at the wedding and by those who were not, but who are all directly related to the ritual. Studies which focus on the private use of media, and more particularly on photography, focus on the social function of pictures, especially in relation to their role for the construction and the integration of the family (see studies on family photography by Marian Hirsh (1997) and Annette Kuhn (2002)). Along similar lines, already in the 1960’s Pierre Bourdieu (1990) has looked into the practice of taking family photographs and analyzed their role for keeping the “cult of unity” of the family, as well as the ritualization of taking photographs itself. Yet, the static reproduction which photographs can offer defers from the dynamic image of the video recording. The analysis of videos are very few and are usually a marginal note along other main topics. Thus, in her article on the visual production of locality through photographs among Turkish migrants in Germany, Barbara Wolbert (2001) also points out shortly the role of videos of important rituals like weddings or circumcision ceremonies. Her analysis is focused on the uses of migrant wedding videos in Turkey and their meaning for the reproduction of the family and for the creation of virtual neighbourhoods. Along these lines my aim here is to further deepen the analysis of the private videos in three aspects: as a medium for supporting social networks in migration context; as a mechanism for creating an imagined family and village community; and finally, as an element which contributes for the transformation of the ritual space.
In what follows, I first outline the main elements of the typical wedding ritual, which are recorded in the wedding videos. Then, I discuss the different types of videos and the variations in their use depending on the practices of watching. In the last part, I point out the transformations in the substance and in the essence of the ritual and of its distinct practices due to its virtualization and reproduction under migration conditions.

7.1. The wedding ritual

7.1.1. The ritual stages

The weddings in Brushlyan take place in the winter. From November to April every weekend there is a wedding, sometimes two. Everyone gets married back in the village, even the migrants. “The summer is the work season, the winter is the weddings season,” people in the village say. And indeed, even though most migrants have their long holidays in July and August, all weddings (including migrant ones) take place in the winter season, often close to New Year’s, as not to interrupt the summer season of intensive agricultural work. The wedding in Brushlyan is a much more public event in comparison to other main rites of passage and important events (like birth, circumcision, death etc.). While other turning points in the life cycle are being conducted in the narrow family circle, the wedding is the event in which the whole village participates. Following Bourdieu (1990) I would argue that there is a strong co-dependence between the centrality of an event and its video recording (photographing in Bourdieu’s case). The image capturing certain events and not of others marks the distinction between the public and the private. Therefore, rituals considered as more private and confined to the narrow family remain unrecorded, and hence single
events, never re-used or re-enacted in contrast to the public event which continues to be re-used in the future through the visual traces.

In addition to the distinction between public and private ritual, the wedding itself comprises two stages - a private, religious ritual, and a public, more secular ceremony. The first stage is referred to as *getting married* (zhenene), the second one is the actual *wedding* (svatba). Only the second stage is video recorded. In the first stage, only very close family members are participating, as well as the Imam, who is leading the event. While it resembles the secular or Christian engagement in a way, it also signifies a practical change in the status of the couple, because at this point the girl moves in with the boy. This is the social validation of the new bond. After the couple is already *married*, the planning of the second stage begins – the *wedding*. The event is centred around the civil marriage procedure in the town-hall and the celebrations in which usually the whole village takes part. It is this public ritual that is being recorded in details and then reproduced and used over and over again. The ritual has several turning points: taking the groom from his house, a procession with him and his relatives to the house of the bride, picking up the bride, endowing the bride’s parents with gifts, displaying the dowry publicly, a second procession with both kin to the main square, ring dances (*hora*) at the square, civil marriage in the town-hall, again dances at the square, and finally, two shifts of guests in the restaurant, in between which there is one more round of dances at the square.

There are no special invitations for the wedding guests, because it is assumed that everyone from the village, who is over 18 and not mourning, will be present. The rule is that there should be at least one representative per family. Guests usually do not bring presents, but are expected to ‘pay’ for the feast. This in itself is turned into a rite. After several dances in the restaurant the bride sets off on a ‘greeting tour’ (called the ‘*tax collector tour*’), in which she passes by every single guest
for greetings and to receive a note of ten or twenty leva (five or ten euro), depending on the gender. The money is collected by a bride’s maid in a large plastic bag. After the lunch is over, there are more unstructured dances in the centre of the restaurant. This is the moment, in which every songs is a special request with a greeting line from a relative or a friend (for which the orchestra is compensated additionally by the guests for each song). There is a strict order starting with the witnesses and the parents and moving to more distant relatives, finishing with friends. This is an especially alluding point for discovering the migrant links to the young couple.

This wedding ritual structure is repeated at every wedding. The possible variations depend on the financial situation of the family, and whether there are any migration influences. The particular migration variations (in case there is a member of the family who is a migrant) can be traced in several directions: the types of presents, the dressed of the bride and the witnesses, the currency of the notes attached to the bride and groom clothes, the amount and type of dowry, and the type of orchestra invited. The differences are usually quite subtle and do not lead to alterations of the style and procedure of the ritual, but signify symbolic distinctions of status and wealth. The most visible differentiation comes from the currency and amount of money given to the couple. At a non-migrant wedding the amount of money usually would be 50 or 100 leva (the equivalent of 25 and 50 euro) for each of the two, at a migrant wedding, this would be 50 or 100 euro notes. The emphasis here is not only the double amount, but also the fact that the money is in foreign currency.

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82 Men pay double the sum that women pay, because of alcohol consumption. Women traditionally do not drink at all in the village, while men do. The sum paid is roughly calculated on the bases of the lunch meal offered (soup, two meatballs with chips, and a piece of cake, plus drinks. The amount gathered is used to pay for the party and supposedly to have twenty per cent on top, which is spent on further furnishing.
Thus, migration is clearly fixed as an affluence marker, even though wealth is not necessarily linked to migration. These variations, albeit subtle, are closely inspected later on when the video record is being watched. As a result the transformations are being activated to a great extent through their verbalisation.

7.1.2. Making the wedding videos

Over the last fifteen years every wedding in Brushlyan has been filmed on video, which has become part of the wedding ritual itself. The wedding videos are produced exclusively by the head master of the village school. This has elevated his status to one of the most influential people in Brushlyan to a far greater extent than his position as a head master.\(^{83}\) A wedding video would cost about 350 euro at the time of the research – a substantial sum of money for the village standards. Nevertheless, this was an indispensable part of every wedding’s budget, which did not depend on the financial situation of the families. The head master in his role of a cameraman follows every step of the wedding processions, enters in the house of the bride for the special internal close kin celebration and drinking in the morning, and later on, tracks all the guests during the ring dances at the square, and then all the main turning points in the restaurant. In addition to this, there is a special filming tour, recording every single guest greeting the newly wed while in the restaurant.

There are two types of videos produced over the years – the old videotapes and the new DVD’s.\(^{84}\) The old videos are real-time recording of the whole wedding day starting at the groom’s house and

\(^{83}\) This is very similar to what Turner has suggested about the Kayapo, where being a cameraman and having access to visual media technology are forms of cultural capital and ultimately a question of power relations within the community (Terence Turner 1992:7).

\(^{84}\) This differentiation is to a great extent conventional in order to get more clarity. The different technical carrier signifies a different moment in time of the production of the video, hence of the wedding itself, which in its turn points to a different attitude towards the wedding video. There is more to this however. The VHS videos were multiplied in a few copies distributed among the relatives, while the DVD videos being much more easily reproducible, are multiples and distributed in much greater numbers both in Brushlyan, and among the migrants,
ending with the last dances at the main square after the two shifts of guests in the restaurant. They often last up to seven hours and are comprised several videotapes. The first one always opens up with thematic panoramic view of the village from afar in winter and summer. This is followed by a staged walk by the soon to be wed, most often in the nearby meadows, finishing with a drink in the most popular road restaurant. This adds to the particularly nostalgic note of the old wedding video tapes. The new ones, recorded on DVD, are cut and edited and are relatively shorter, lasting between three and four hours, still with very long uninterrupted shots of processions and dances.

The two types of technical production of the videos reflect two aspects of their consumption and of their meaning. The old videotapes brought to Spain contain exclusively own wedding recordings from the past. The same videos are watched in Bulgaria by close family members, usually the parents of the couple. In contrast, the new DVD’s show new weddings, which are often watched by relatively distant acquaintances both in Spain and in Bulgaria. This differentiation also defines the practices of watching and experiencing the videos. While the old ones assume a more private use, mostly directed towards creating temporal links between past and present, which overlap with building spatial visual bridges between “the home” and “abroad”, the new DVD’s are much more publicly shared and play a stronger social cohesive role. The old videos are considered as more intimate and aim at re-creating the unity of the family. The new ones serve as a medium for participation in key village events both by close relatives and by the wider village community. In the next section I demonstrate these two aspects of the use of wedding videos.

even when the wedding is not of close relatives. In this sense, the technical parameters of the video contribute to the practical transformations of its use.
7.2. The social use of wedding videos: meanings and transformations

7.2.1. The old wedding videos: practices of reinforcing the cult of the family unity

According to the site and audience, the old wedding videos can be divided in two types. The first type are the videos brought by migrants to Spain of their own wedding. The second type are the children’s weddings watched by elderly family members in Bulgaria. This division also reflects the generational split in the two sites.85

Although migrants arrive to Spain with a relatively small number of personal belongings, the wedding video tape is a crucial object among them. The old wedding videos are being played usually by the women migrants who work part time or on shifts and thus spend more time at home by themselves. Often, the occasion to play the video for me, was a distant question about their relatives or something connected to the village. Badie, 34 years old migrant, who joined her husband in Spain in 2004, worked in shifts in the central restaurant. I remember meeting her for the first time in her house one afternoon. I was not sure whether I had met her husband. She immediately took out the wedding video from under the TV set (the only video tape there!) and played it, instead of simply showing me a picture:

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85 Even though the group of the ageing people, who come to Spain for shorter visits, is growing constantly, in general there is a clear tendency of age division among migrants. The ageing would normally come to Spain if asked by their younger relatives to help them with caring for children. This short term stays are recently more and more often developing into long term relocations Nevertheless, the major part of migrants in Spain are still the younger generations.
“Watch carefully now. This is a real Bruslyan wedding. We have really good weddings in our village, such big celebrations, the dances at the square... You’ll see me, how I used to look eight ears ago. I was a bit chubbier then, but now I have lost quite some weight. I know how to live like the Spanish do, I eat healthier... And you’ll see my parents, my brothers, the cousins. Actually, the whole family gathered at one place. Now that I think about it, we haven’t gathered all of us, like this, since then.”

We started watching and gradually Badie introduced me to all the important moments of the wedding ritual, forwarding the tape just as much as to skip to the next one. She showed me her parents’ house and the house of her husband’s family, where they used to live in Bulgaria. Then she indicated her family members, the wedding witnesses, and all the rest of her wide kin relatives. She paid special attention to the outfits and commented on how did people change since then, who had died, who has moved up in their career etc.

Badie’s example demonstrates a typical use of wedding videos. One of the possible uses of the video is as a document and evidence of people (including oneself) from the past and of particular practices and images from the village. The recording replaces the photo album, as well as the physical presence. Moreover, reproducing the ritual in real time opens up the opportunity to re-experience it in every minute detail. When I asked Badie how come she knows where to find the exact place of each episode on the three videotapes, she told me:

“Well, I play the tape quite often. Here in Spain, when I feel sad for home and start missing my parents too much, I play it to see the village, the views, the steep streets, our house. And it makes me feel a bit better.”
Re-experiencing the ritual then is a strategy to tackle nostalgia. It is not only relatives and close friends who had remained in Bulgaria, that are being remembered in such a way, but also more distant village acquaintances. Watching and commenting becomes a mechanism for normalizing the traumatic experience from the ruptures in the social fabric. At the same time, the video follows not only the presence of the people, but also the landscape of the village, pausing at key sites. Thus, the practice of re-watching and re-experiencing creates not only temporal, but also spatial bridges between home and abroad. In this sense, Loewenthal’s (1985) metaphor of the past as a foreign country is reversed. Here, the temporality and spatiality overlap in such a way that the past becomes equivalent with the space of home.

The own wedding videos are watched not only by women in the privacy of their homes, but also by groups of relatives on family and festive occasions. On Ramadan Bairam a large group of relatives gathered to celebrate in the home of my landlord in Tafalla. At some point they decided to play the ten-year-old wedding video of one of his brothers. At first everyone kept chatting about recent everyday issues from their life in Spain, casting only sporadic glances towards the screen. Gradually though, everyone started watching closely and the whole conversation turned to the wedding video. One line of comments was related to what happened over the last years in the village, who built a new house, which places have changed, which streets were paved. Another line of discussion was the people seen on the main square dancing: who had changed in what way, what happened to each and one of them, who married whom, who migrated to Spain, who’s successful, who failed. The conversation quickly moved to more political topics, when the video reached the point of the civil marriage ritual in the town-hall, which was led by the mayor at that time. This particular part of the ritual also bears evidence to whom is the mayor at the particular year, which opens up wider commentaries on the recent political developments in the village and the success
or failure of the particular mayor and his/her successors. Finally, a huge scandal erupted between two cousins over the present mayor and his decision to buy a new scanner for the medical centre rather than improve the sewerage system, and someone had to stop the video causing such a heated debate.

In this way, the use of wedding videos creates a sense of continuity and participation in an imagined village community, which albeit spread over space, keep being informed of and connected to each other. The diversion of the conversation from the past event to the present political situation in the village generates an even more intense feeling of participation. The personal function of the video as a document for an important event intertwines with the social function of the recording as an archive of the community life and of the village as landscape and consequently as a visually produced locality to use the term of Wolbert (2001).

On another occasion, the brother of the groom whose wedding we have been watching said:

_When I watch this wedding, when I watch our village, I know that one day I’ll go back. I’ll never feel Spain as close as the small streets of Brushlyan. Now they paved the main street already, we are building new houses. You must have seen them when you went there. There are street lamps almost everywhere. Now, the new mayor has to work on the water supply a bit and it will be heaven, this village of ours. Here in Spain, this is not life, renting a place, being a foreigner. We are here just for a short while. For the wedding of my sons, we’ll be back in Brushlyan, you’ll see._

This quote is rather symptomatic of the more general opposition between home and abroad/normal and abnormal life, which is constantly present in the migrant discourse. The initial wedding of the parents at home and the final wedding of the sons, again planned at home, are the two points in time which will bracket the temporary unstable and negative migrant experience and will restore
the normality of being, which migration has disrupted. In contrast to the Turkish wedding videos described by Wolbert (2001), which take place in Germany, here the direction is one-way. The wedding is in Bulgaria, just as the home and the community are perceived in Bulgaria, even though many of the migrants have been living in Spain for about eight years and the small village community have long ceased to be concentrated spatially in Brushlyan. Celebrating the wedding ritual in Bulgaria itself is a sign that Brushlyan is thought of as the home par excellence, which is the place for the significant events, while Spain is perceived as a temporary experience, which only deserves the time of the mundane practice. The feast and the ritual only happen at home.

Watching wedding videos at the other end of the field, by parents in Bulgaria, is used in a slightly different way. The videos are used as a cure for their sadness induced by the physical absence of the children. My landlords, Ismet and Ayse, would usually play one of the wedding videos of their three children, all in Spain, after the usual Sunday night phone call. Even though parents at home have plenty of photos of their children hanging on the walls, the videos offer a moving image, which seems closer to the authentic image. “When I look at Sabrie, dancing at the central square, it’s as if she’s still here,” is what Ayse is telling me, while watching her daughter’s wedding with tears in her eyes. And even though there are video recordings from other events in their children lives in Spain (celebrations of Bayram, birthdays, good bye parties for someone leaving back to Bulgaria) the weddings are what is periodically being played as a true signifier for the reality of the children. The significance of the wedding as the most important and festive event in the life cycle reinforces the feeling of co-experiencing the children’s lives who are far away. As in the other cases, what can be observed here is what Bourdieu (1990) calls the “cult of the family unity”. Thus the recording of the feast has not only a documentary and preservation function, but also accentuates the integrity of the family, which is regarded as especially important under conditions
of migration. The video, which contains all family members, does not only represent the wedding ritual, but in itself becomes a ritual of the family cult.

7.2.2. The new wedding DVD’s: sustaining a transnational village community

Technologically the new wedding DVD’s are much more easily multiplied and distributed among a wider audience immediately and simultaneously, which had deeper implications for their uses and functions. During my stay in Tafalla all the weddings which took place in the village in the meantime were disseminated among a wide circle of people in Spain within days. Two types of watching practices can be distinguished here: showing the own wedding to close relatives in Spain and watching distant acquaintances wedding by migrants.

The own wedding videos are usually played for close kin members who did not manage to go back to Bulgaria for the event.86 The young couple gathers the relatives on both sides who are in Spain and plays the video in a celebratory and festive manner. Watching the video becomes a celebration in itself. There is a lot of food and drinks in the home of the new couple, music usually played at weddings plays along, the relatives bring small presents and often give money to the young couple. The video is watched without any skipping, and the celebration afterwards might last until early morning. In this sense, this is a continuation of the wedding celebration, postponed in time and space. In this way the absence of the important kin members is compensated through the repetition

86 These are wedding in which at least one of the two has established themselves in Spain formerly or right after the wedding. It is very common that the boy goes back to Bulgaria over the summer and “get marries” to his long-term girlfirmed. She then would join him in Spain, and at New Year’s they would go back to Bulgaria for the big wedding. Another very wide spread practice is that the young couple decides to migrate right after the wedding. In both cases usually there are rather close relatives in Spain who do not manage to go back to Bulgaria to be present at the wedding.
and re-enactment of the ritual. The detailed recording serves as a tool to re-create a close to the original type of experience. Even though the guests cannot dance the typical horo dances in the living room, they sing along and clap with hands while watching.

The ritual watching of the videos explain also the length of the videos and the plenitude of real-time episodes, which cannot be attributed to technical limitations, but on different filming conventions. Documenting every moment of the ceremony is significant part of the quality of the recording, as it is demonstrated by Gillespi (1995) in her analysis of religious rituals in South East Asia, and by Barbara Wolbert (2001, 2008) on the uses of Turkish wedding videos. The subsequent show of the video becomes a ritual event, close to the original one. Moreover, video film is a strategy of enhancement of status and prestige.

Lili is a 22-year-old woman, who had lived in Spain with her parents since she graduated from high school. Her husband was her high school boyfriend with whom she kept in touch over the summers. After they got married, he arrived with her to Spain and moved in with her parents there. Her uncle and his two sons, as well as several other more distant cousins did not have the opportunity to go back to Bulgaria for the wedding. Therefore, on the third night of their arrival to Spain, everyone was invited to watch the wedding video. Lili commented on the event, while running back and froth from the kitchen bringing out all kinds of Bulgarian food (brought especially):

> It was so sad that we couldn’t be all of us in Brushlyan for my wedding. I almost felt that some part of my body is missing. Now that we have the rest of my family here with us, watching with us, sharing it with us, only now do I have the feeling that it is real, that I indeed got married. It was unfinished somehow before this evening here. And you know, my relatives here, they didn’t know

my husband that well. They haven’t seen him in a suit, leading the horo, dancing with me. How can they just look at him with his ordinary everyday clothes and know that we got married. But now, after tonight, after watching the video they will accept him as my husband, I know!”

The wedding ritual is completed only after every important kin member has participated in watching the wedding video. In this sense, the wedding video is the final stroke which validates the official marriage ritual. The digital repetition of the ritual widens the opportunities for participation and experience of the ritual. The physical absence is compensated by a repeated and detailed visual sharing post factum. The divided family is being reconstructed through the postponement and extension of the ritual. As with the old wedding videos, but to a far greater extent, the repeated use serves for the restoration, albeit partial, of the damaged family fabric, which migration has caused. The cult of the family unity is reflected in Lili’s words. The wedding does not become fully real, until every important kin member has seen it. The aspect of extending the ritual as to include all the essential participants leads to a level of transnationalization of the community and a sustenance of a transnational social field, which cannot be reached through other media of participation.

What is more, this extension of the ritual which adds one more stage in the actual ritual, before it is completed, creates in fact a longer period of liminality, which was not part of the original wedding ritual. Unlike the period between the ‘getting married’ and the ‘wedding’, this is a new aspect of breaking the ritual into more parts. Thus, the period of time between the wedding in Bulgaria, and the final chords of the video recording in Spain, is an extension of the transition between two states. Not accepting the husband, until the relatives have seen him in full wedding attire signifies the need for accreditation of all family members, before the final transformation (into officially married). Lasting sometime up to two weeks, this period bears the traits of
indeterminacy and ambiguity, typical for the liminality period, discussed by Turner (1969). Thus migration brings out a new aspect into the traditional wedding, which changes the texture of the ritual in spatial and temporal terms – from a two step, into a three step transition. Moreover, the extention of the ritual in such a way as to incorporate people from both localities, points to a construction of a transnational social field, which is ritualized.

Another aspect of this practice of watching is the transformations in the meaning of the ritual which come along. The migrant relatives put different emphasis in the flow of the event than the usual main turning points. Through relatives that were present at the wedding, they have sent special greetings in the form of songs ordered from the band. The greeting my landlord required from the band on behalf of his two sons who were in Spain was: “Hot greetings from the cousins Ismet and Mehmed, from far away Spain.” This moment was then awaited with eagerness, while the respective cousins were watching the wedding already in Spain. They re-winded and played this spot several times and commented on the particular phrasing and the chosen song. I will come back to this modification of the important points of the ritual in a moment.

The second use of the new wedding DVD’s is by wider audience. Once a wedding DVD is brought to Spain by a recently wed couple, several copies are being circulated among the wider community of migrants. They do not watch it in the same ritual way as the close kin, but watch it with certainty nonetheless. Here the idea of restoring the family unity is brought to the level of the community. Watching is accompanied by comments on various participants in the wedding and their recent live development. Those who were recently in Bulgaria, inspired by the images, share the latest news and gossip. In this way, one of the most important aspects of being part of a wedding in the village - the gossiping - is being delayed and recreated from afar. At this level, the watching becomes the participation. As a result, the videos reinforce the idea of an imagined village
community, which includes the migrants. The weddings and the celebrations which go along are an occasion for a recurring experience of the whole village community sharing certain events every week. The wedding video grants an opening into this experience. As in the case of the old video, it disrupts the flow of mundane time by inserting the festivity time of the home into the realm of migration.

This imagined village community, however, is an idealized version of the community as such, which covers all the rupture and social distances caused by migration on one hand, and all the existing conflicts and power relation in the village itself, on the other hand. In such a way, watching the videos covers and even smoothes in a bizarre way the unevenness of the social horizon in the village and creates an idealized version of the village social life and of home.

At the same time, this particular aspect creates an even stronger feeling of absence about those who are in Spain and cannot participate. Similarly, for the migrants the idea that there is an occasion for celebration every weekend, which they cannot attend, emphasizes the feeling of rupture between life at home and life abroad. The fear of falling out from the broader village community while becoming confined in the limited migrant community is palpable and is being verbalized exactly in moments of watching a random wedding video. The video here serves to recreate the idea of integrity at the level of the community. Atidje’s words may exemplify this point:

These videos help me at least a bit to imagine life in the village. I haven’t been at a wedding since I arrived here four years ago. I feel as if I am completely uprooted that way. When I watch a video, even if it’s of someone I don’t even know that well, I feel as if I am back. The same songs, the same
dances, the same streets. Plus, some people I wouldn’t have even recognized on the street, if I hadn’t followed all the videos lately.”

In her comment, we may read an additional aspect in the process of imagining the community. Both the own wedding and the more distant wedding videos are being used to recreate the feeling of unity by weaving a specific type of more flexible connections between the members of this transnational field. In this sense, the videos as a technological medium support the virtualization of the ideal community. With the absence of any well developed internet fora or virtual social network, the wedding videos are the only means of virtual links between the migrants and the inhabitants of Brushlyan.88

There is a subtle transformation in the way videos are used and in their meaning which goes along with the technological aspect of their production. The old videos are produced for the married couple and their closest relatives. The new videos are directed to the whole community, transterritorially and temporally spread. The aim of the video is not only to remind people of an event, but to signify for the actuality of the event. In this sense, the new videos become evidence, not only a reference. At the same time, the ritual is not only being watched after the fact by those who were absent. It is newly experienced, re-enacted, and only thus finally completed. This re-enactment of the wedding becomes the actual closure, without which the ritual is not perceived as finished. Thus the video is not just a sign of the wedding, it has become part of the wedding itself.

88 At the time of my fieldwork internet was still not widely used by migrants or by the villagers in Brushlyan. Already two years later everyone had a personal computer and internet connection at home, which has intensified daily communication through skype and other exchanges online. However, for the period under discussion this was not still the case.
7.3. The extended ritual: when the invisible becomes visible

The public and multi-fold use of wedding videos transforms the dynamics between the visible and the invisible in the ritual. Being present at the wedding permits direct participation in the ritual, partaking in the dance, in meeting people, in consuming the food and drinks and in this sense, sharing the physical and sensory participation. On the other hand, the purely visual insight into the wedding post factum offers a different kind of entrance into the ritual. The camera offers a different point of view to the event both for those who experience the wedding for the first time through the video and for those who re-watch it, after being part of it. Observing the ritual through the camera enables access to moments otherwise invisible for most of the guests present. Such moments would be the procession to the bride's house and to the main square, the dowry display and the ram exchange. These points albeit public, are not shared with the whole village community as opposed to the dances at the main square and the restaurant feast afterwards. Another more concealed moment, inaccessible for direct observation by the wide audience, is the gift giving by the witnesses and the parents in the restaurant. The speeches and the central dance floor opening dances are also to be directly observed only by those who sit nearby or directly participate. Thus, the wedding video provides an all-encompassing view from above, which opens up the opportunity to look into these otherwise hidden and invisible moments.

It is this simultaneous closeness and distance generated by the mediation of an event through its video recording, that Pink (1998) has described in her analysis of televised bullfights. She argues that live and televised bullfights do not fit the ritual/spectacle dichotomy, on the contrary, they become an interweaving of media and ritual agendas, constituting each other (Pink 1998:133). In
a similar way, the personal participation in the wedding with its limited view is intertwined with
the total view of the spectator, which penetrates in every corner, but is only present virtually.
However, what makes this different from the mass television records of rituals, is the interactivity
and creativity of the spectators in the more private video reproduction of the ritual. The spectators
are not just passive viewers, but participators who control and direct the process of watching, which
has become a second order ritual experience. The repeated watching activates the event again, but
in a different way by introducing new accents. Rewinding, fast-forwarding, choosing certain points
to go back to and watch over and over again, while skipping others, creates a different version of
the ritual. The moments that gain importance by being commented upon and re-watched, are not
necessarily the main turning points of the ritual as conceived by the main participants in it. While
the town-hall civil marriage ritual and the speeches in the restaurant might be regarded as the most
central ones by the family and the local village community, the relatives or the other migrants in
Spain often emphasize different points. Consequently, watching the wedding is not simply a
passive reproduction, but becomes an active part of the ritual, which opens it to new interpretations.

This reveals another difference with public rituals shown on television. The level of intimacy in
watching the private wedding videos, in which if not the married couple itself, then at least many
of the guests are friends or relatives of the viewers, introduces an additional aspect of indexing and
referencing in the process of watching. The special camera tour, documenting each and every guest
and their greetings to the newly wed offers a very precise statistics of the wedding guests, of their
presence, their table position, their clothes and their codified (for the camera) behaviour. The
viewers exhilarate when they see a kin member and do not miss to note if someone is missing.
There is a need of visual reference of the existence of village members, exactly because this is what
cannot be reproduced through memories or gossip, while away from home. Moreover, the aspect
of indexicality is complemented by the subtle transformation of the behaviour of the ones who are recorded. While in the older videos the guests were directing their congratulations to the new couple, in the new ones, the greetings are addressed to the whole village and the migrant community, which will follow every gestures and word later on. The constant visibility awareness changes the behaviour of the guests and they become much more formal or witty in the new videos.

An example for the change in status of a mini-event within the wedding was the case with one of the latest wedding DVD’s brought to Spain during my stay there. Both the bride and the groom were very young, under 20, just out of high-school, hence most of their peers and friends from school were in Bulgaria, while the migrants in Spain were mostly older than them. However, their wedding video became quite popular because of one particular case. As seen in American movies, the cutting of the wedding cake is usually accompanied with the groom and bride feeding each other, and subsequently spreading cream on their faces. In this case, however, the fun game became a bit aggressive with both of them slapping each other with huge pieces of the wedding cake and giving each other rather angry looks. For the regular wedding participant, this small incident would have remained invisible due to the position of the main wedding table. The video recording and subsequent wide circulation of the DVD made this instance visible and public not only for the whole village community in Bulgaria, but also for the migrants in Spain. This particular DVD became quite popular, travelling from house to house with a small note on it, pointing to the exact minute in which the incident is taking place. The event was watched, re-watched, and discussed for more than ten days among the migrant community.

The inappropriate slaps in the face opened the floor for all kind of comments as to the personalities of the newly wed, which consequently spread to more general discussion of the two kin sides. Someone remembered that one of the grandmothers was particularly bossy when she was young.
At the same time, an older woman shared with me, that she did not approve these new inventions in the wedding ritual. This small event, not at all central for the main wedding ritual, would have remained unnoticed for the direct participants. Through the multiplication and the distribution of the DVD however, it turned into the most discussed and commonly shared moment which evoked comments about several generations of people and even about the transformation of the wedding ritual over time. Thus the emphasis is shifted and a new parallel version of the event is created by the postponed secondary consumption.

7.4. Transnationalization of the ritual and ritualization of the migrant space

The visual recycling of the event leads to transformations of its substance. From a ritual here and now, for which participation is *sine qua non*, is turns in an extended and interrupted process of self-reproduction, which is taking place in more than one place in more than one time. Thus the ritual deterritorializes, and the time of its total completion unfolds as to include both the physical participants and the migrants. The links between what happens in the village and the absent who are in Spain, already are thought of as part of the practice itself, which consequently allows to call this a transnational ritual.

Following Victor Turner (1969) then, I have argued that the ritual process is an active thing. It is not an invariable restatement of a static or even cyclic state of affairs, but equally capable of making and marking shift in a situation. The extension of the ritual expresses the change in the overall migrant situation by adjusting to it while at the same time it also normalizes the otherwise ambivalent migrant existence. Moreover, as Moore and Myerhoff argue ritual is a declaration of order against indeterminacy, therefore indeterminacy is always present in the background of any
analysis of ritual (1977:17). Migration is a threat to order, it creates absence, distance and fragmentation, and as such generates a rupture in the neatly conceptualized community fabric. The wedding ritual, extended and re-enacted, restores the idea of order. In this sense, the ritualization of the migrant space, albeit partial, is also an act of normalizing the abnormality of the migration experience.

What is more, the extended wedding ritual allows for a creation of a virtual and imagined community, which spreads, just as the ritual, over two localities. Participating in the ritual from a distance allows a claim for participation in the whole community. Using the wedding videos for further aims – like keeping in touch with the latest news and developments in the village – further extends the boundaries of the village community to include the migrants. In this way, the wedding videos allow migrants to sustain horizontal ties of belonging and participation that they do not establish with the Spanish citizens around them.
Conclusion: Assembling Fragmented Citizenship

This thesis has sought to understand how migrants re-position themselves as citizens in the context of multiple citizenship and migration regimes between two states within the European Union. It examined the multiple ways of being, becoming, and conceiving oneself as a citizen by engaging with or circumventing the state in its different faces. Locating the research in the experience of a group of Bulgarian Muslim migrants to Spain, it aimed at unpacking the everyday struggles and negotiations of individuals embedded as semi-insiders/semi-outsiders at the margins of two states connected within one supra-state body. The simultaneous positioning within these multiple institutional contexts has opened up new structural opportunities and brought new constraints, which have been enacted, challenged or mobilized by migrants in their quest to constitute themselves as citizens.

This research has been situated in a conceptual framework of citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’ in the sense of having access to social and political membership in a polity as a moral equal. As a normative ideal, this conception of citizenship is imbued with tensions and incoherencies in its actual manifestations, and points to the discrepancies between formal and substantive citizenship. Drawing on the experience of Bulgarian Muslim migrants in Spain I have traced the process of disaggregation and fragmentation of the different citizenship elements and the disassociation from legal status and territorial bond to a nation state. Studying migration has prompted me to focus on two simultaneous developments of citizenship transformation which are in a constant interplay. On one hand, the unbundling of rights has given migrants access to certain citizenship rights without a formal status and this has opened new spaces of empowerment. On the other hand, I have shown how the disaggregation of citizenship deprives citizens with formal status from access to basic
rights within the state that they are formal citizens of and thus renders them ‘internally stateless’. Migration, then, is an attempt to make up for the gaps created by this process at home, by filing them with the missing elements through claims to another polity. Beyond the economic wellbeing that migrants strive for, migration is also a way into acquiring social rights which they lack at home.

Disaggregation of citizenship then opens a space for non-formal status holders like Bulgarian Muslim migrants to make claims to citizenship rights in a polity that they are external to, thus acquiring a semi-member status in it, while at the same time experiencing the absence of these rights as formal holders of citizen status in a polity that they are internal to. I have shown that these two outcomes of the unbundling of rights exemplify the tensions between formal and substantive citizenship and need to be explored simultaneously. In this sense understanding the experience of Bulgarian Muslim migrants requires examining how they negotiate and manoeuvre between their position of citizens with hampered rights at home and their position of denizens with partial access to citizenship rights in migrancy.

I have studied the relations with the state and the claims that migrants make through their acts of citizenship to understand how they position and re-position themselves as citizens vis-à-vis different states, and how they conceptualize the state in and through these acts. I have argued that through different acts migrants reconfigure their citizenship. Whether it is by changing their passport name, or by changing their worker status, or by supplementing the welfare support with drawing family members into a care network, or by the constant circumventing of the other nation-state of which they are full citizens of de jure, the migrants constantly re-enact their position as members, socially, economically, politically etc. Rather than talking of the different attributes of their citizenship which are constantly in flux, I have focused on the separate acts which allow or
limit their access to rights and entitlements. In this way the static conceptualization (through various attributes) of citizenship as something given and fixed in a certain moment of time is replaced with a processual one, which looks at each and every separate act derived from and constructing a certain type of citizenship as manifested in everyday people’s lives. This approach opens up a way to take into consideration the temporality and the changing nature of citizenship which migrants face in their flexibilized lives.

I have shown how Bulgarian Muslim migrants experience and negotiate their positions as citizens vis-à-vis the different states in the context of citizenship disaggregation by exploring how they claim and enact different rights in different polities. By doing this, I have argued that migrants re-assemble the dis-aggregated citizenship fragments. Within their lives migrants become incorporated in different ways and spheres in the two different polities. By claiming economic and social rights in Spain through acquiring regular worker’s status, thus being inserted into a new type of relationship with the state through taxes and participation in the welfare system, migrants claim vertical incorporation. They constitute themselves as citizens through establishing vertical relations with the Spanish state. At the same time, migrants sustain a vibrant transnational community which spreads between Spain and Bulgaria and claim membership and belonging in this community by establishing horizontal relations of sociality. Simultaneous incorporation in the two different polities develops along horizontal and vertical lines and is thus an expression of the process of assembling citizenship fragments.

In the case under scrutiny here this simultaneous incorporation develops in the context of the supranational body of the European Union. My analysis is located at the turning point of Bulgaria’s accession into the EU and therefore prompted an examination of the immediate openings of new opportunity structures and the way migrants use these structures to make new claims. I have argued
that intra-EU migration has both normative and symbolic implications for the everyday lives of migrants. On one hand, having a status of an internal EU migrant opens a wider pool of opportunity structures for simultaneity of trans-migrant lives which are exploited by migrants in practice – by using home acquired qualifications, by shifting into a regular status, by using the possibility for free EU mobility, by combining receiving welfare benefits from Spain with concurrently working back in Bulgaria, by sustaining a highly mobile support kin network etc. Connecting Bulgaria and Spain in one common space of the European Union enabled in practice a higher degree of simultaneity by facilitating travel and institutional incorporation. What is more, being part of the European Union has had symbolic implications both as a common space and as a status. For migrants placing together their state of origin and their state of settlement in one common space has transformed their way of thinking of Bulgaria. Becoming part of the EU, Bulgaria has ‘magically’ become a viable opportunity for return and has changed the way people imagine their futures. In addition, the status of EU citizen has been mobilized as claim making mechanism and as justification for ‘acting’ as a citizen by requiring access to regular work or to social benefits. Thus, EU citizenship is a crucial element in the process of assembling fragments of citizenship through migrants’ lives.

The story as presented like this is a story of an entrepreneurial successful individual who has found a solution for the current developments that hamper his/her everyday life. It is a story of agency that challenges the structural conditions by using them in a creative way through which a new way of being a citizen is being established. Being a citizen in this case is about agents making claims to different institutions, to different polities, at different levels, and ultimately putting them together in one common picture. Assembling fragmented citizenship is a process of creating a jigsaw of different pieces. The whole picture, albeit discernible, remains fractured and some pieces remain
missing. But there is even more to this. The so-called ‘successful migrant’ who manages to act against the process of fragmentation through a series of claim-making acts and negotiations of statuses within opportunity structures experiences a series of losses which create new insecurities and dependencies. This picture also masks the other agents in the migration process which are not ‘successful’ – the irregular migrant workers, and the ‘caring satellites’, i.e. the women and ageing relatives who experience losses in different areas of their citizenship, while being instrumental for the reproduction of the family and for sustaining the migration project as a family project.

Looking at the experience of different actors in the migration project has allowed me to highlight the heterogeneity of the European Union space. While all migrants have equal rights as citizens of the EU, their actual positions and their practices vary according to their working status. EU citizenship thus is a heterogeneous category itself, containing different subcategories of internal migrants who enjoy different types of rights and hence experience and practice their status as EU citizens in diverse ways. The main dividing line has been between the workers in regularized position and the non-workers or the irregular workers. Social rights for EU migrants are conditional and privilege those in paid regular employment. Thus access to full social rights is contingent on a narrow meaning of ‘work’ as regularized contractual employment. Conditional social rights affect the experience of those migrants who move as part of a ‘male breadwinner’ family model or are in irregular or part-time jobs. This also places in a vulnerable position the people whose migration decisions are motivated by the need to provide unpaid care for family members. Thus the different agents in a migration project have different experiences of access to rights and of spaces for making claims.

This conception of EU citizenship based on a narrow definition of work renders social citizenship of women and ageing relatives indirect, derivative and relational and places them in a position of
dependent individuals, rather than autonomous citizens. This view reinforces patriarchal family relations and conditions generates new dependencies. Women and ageing carers lose their citizenship rights in Bulgaria without gaining new rights in Spain. They become disconnected from both states and start relying on a form of kinfare which evolves around the male breadwinner, moving away from welfare. The new insecurities and dependencies created by this shift are two-fold. On one hand, women lose their independence as citizens and are only acknowledged as such through their role of wives and mothers. On the other hand, the working male migrant becomes responsible for a number of family members which makes their access to limited rights contingent on his own secure employment.

By favouring migrant workers and applying a narrow definition of work as a regular paid employment as a venue for citizenship rights the EU definition of citizenship is based on an individualistic view of the citizen as an autonomous and discrete actor. This reinforces a conceptualization of citizenship as an individual contract with the state. This is well exemplified in the way male migrant workers position themselves vis-à-vis the Spanish state as tax payers and welfare beneficiaries. By using welfare (claiming unemployment benefits) as a strategy for ‘becoming even’ with the state, as taking what was ‘invested’ in the state, migrant workers craft an understanding of citizenship as an individualized contractual relation with the state based on vertical direct reciprocity based on exchange rather than on diffuse solidarity. Thus the practice of citizenship as enabled by the EU citizenship mobility logic transforms the understanding of citizenship into an individual contractual relation with the state. This view excludes horizontal relations with other citizens based on solidarity. Fragmenting social and economic rights from opportunities for political participation in the process of governing, then, opens a space for deepening this limited view of citizenship. This view also excludes the rest of the actors in the
migration project by not allowing them to position themselves as citizens due to lack of employment through which they can enter in a direct relationship with the state. Their relationship with the state and their access to citizenship rights in Spain is mediated through the figure of the male migrant worker.

Intra-EU migration allows migrants to engage with their own fate as citizens and make up for the absences at home by claiming citizenship rights in migrancy. Developing a strategy of assembling the fragments in the context of the EU space which makes this possible both practically and symbolically, they re-position themselves as citizens vis-à-vis two states. This teases out the inherent tensions in the image of the self-managing migrant who develops a highly individualistic self-enterprising view of himself as a worker-citizen, and a contractual understanding of the relation with the state. Thus the process of assembling only favours some of the actors in the migration project, while it positions others in a dependent role depriving them from access to citizenship and creating new insecurities for them. These moves reinforce a conceptualization of citizenship as a contractual and marketized relation with the state that will always leave large groups outside this relationship and ultimately will render them ‘stateless’.

Assembling fragmented citizenship is a strategy that implies individual action and provides solutions for the present, opening future insecurities and placing certain actors in unfavourable positions of limited access to citizenship rights. The conceptualization of ‘the good citizen’ and what ‘the good state’ that migrants craft within this framework, leaves very little space for questioning the systematic logic and the structural conditions that position them in such a fractured state in the first place. Their struggles and subversions of the system are individual and at a micro level evolving within a system which reinforces inequalities. Thus the individual solution through
the strategy of assembling the fragment tames the potential of critique of their position at the margins in both states, and instead reinforces it further.
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