WALKING ON AN UNCERTAIN PATH:
TURKEY BETWEEN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES

By
Anita Serfőző

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Péter Balázs

Word count: 17 139

Budapest, Hungary
2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Péter Balázs, for his patience, his suggestions, advice and guidelines. He led me on the rugged path of research during an excellent year that I could attend at Central European University. Special thanks for his unwavering faith! I am also thankful for the priceless time of my academic writing instructor Zsuzsanna Tóth, who always payed attention not only on my writing but the nourishing of the soul. I would also thank my family and friends who supported me throughout the past year and respected the writing time of the thesis.
ABSTRACT

Eight years after the opening of the accession negotiation, Turkey is still not warmly welcomed in the European Union. However, the recent crises (economic, political and regional) affected both the European Union and Turkey highlighted that the procrastination of the accession procedure is insupportable. Prioritizing the enlargement procedure is not only vital for the Turkey as a candidate country to finally become member of the European integration but also for the European Union to preserve its credibility in the eye of regional and global partners.

The thesis focuses on the period between 2000 and 2013 through a twofold analysis; I explore the delaying variables that influenced the European Union, and analyze the modernization process and the foreign policy shift of Turkey to discover the main setbacks of the Turkish enlargement procedure. My project is to provide answers on the question, why the European Union and Turkey turned away from each other after the opening of the accession negotiations. Via a deep analysis based on intergovernmentalist and neo-realist theories of international relations, the thesis offers alternative solutions to revitalize the accession talks by highlighting the main setbacks of the negotiations and the possible advantages of an integrated partnership.

Keywords: accession negotiations, European integration, European Union, enlargement, Turkey
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party of Turkey)

CEE: Central and Eastern Europe

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

CoE: Council of Europe

DCFTA: Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area

EERP: European Economic Recovery Plan

EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

EU: European Union

G-20: Group 20

LI: Liberal intergovernmentalism

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE: Organization for Security in Europe

TOBB: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange of Turkey)

UfM: Union for Mediterranean

US: United States of America
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Introduction** .................................................................................................................. 1

**Chapter 1 – The troubled Community: Crisis management of the European Union** ............ 4

1.1. IR theories on European integration ........................................................................ 4
1.2. Preparing for an enlarging Community – Compromises but fundamental changes ...... 7
1.3. European scepticism generated by enlargement ...................................................... 11
1.4. Questioning the success of the Turkish accession .................................................... 13
   1.4.1. The reluctant Germans ................................................................................... 16
   1.4.2. The averse French ....................................................................................... 17
   1.4.3. Turkey’s bad European reputation ............................................................... 19
1.5. Integration inspired by “Euro” scepticism ................................................................. 21
1.6. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 22

**Chapter 2 – Turkey Following the Europeanization Path and Challenging Regional Leadership** .................................................................................................................................................................................. 24

2.1. IR perspectives on EU-Turkish relations .................................................................. 25
2.2. Europeanization process of modern Turkey ............................................................ 27
   2.2.1. Committed to the West ................................................................................. 27
   2.2.2. Missing the “European express” ................................................................. 28
   2.2.3. Successful combination of traditional and modern policy elements ............... 29
2.3. Aspiration for regional leadership ........................................................................... 32
   2.3.1. “From deep Europeanization to soft Euro-Asianism” .................................... 33
   2.3.2. Revitalizing Western Balkans’ relations ....................................................... 33
   2.3.3. Limited South Caucasian partnership ......................................................... 34
   2.3.4. Moving into Africa and the MENA region .................................................... 36
      2.3.4.1. Re-launching relations ............................................................................ 36
      2.3.4.2. Testing Turkey’s regional power ............................................................ 38
2.4. Concluding remarks – Questioning Turkey’s regional power ................................... 39

**Chapter 3 – The Future of EU-Turkish relations** ............................................................. 42

3.1. Need for Strategic Partnership .................................................................................. 42
   3.1.1. Europe in the Middle East and North Africa ................................................. 43
   3.1.2. An enhanced EU-Turkey cooperation ......................................................... 44
   3.1.3. Dialogue on an EU-Turkey strategic partnership ......................................... 45
3.2. Alternative scenarios of the EU-Turkey relations .................................................... 48
   3.2.1. A “privileged partnership” with Turkey ....................................................... 48
   3.2.2. Common framework on the mutual neighbourhood .................................... 49
3.3. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 51

**Conclusion** ....................................................................................................................... 53

**Bibliography** ..................................................................................................................... 56
INTRODUCTION

Although European Union membership has been one of the core interests and strategic aims of Turkish foreign policy since the naissance of the modern republic, eight years after the opening of the negotiations, the accession procedure has radically slowed down between Turkey and the European Union.

Croatia, a country that started negotiations with the EU in parallel with Turkey on the very same day, will become the 28th Member State of the European Union on 1st July 2013. The European community will expand its borders, values, norms and market by adding one more country towards Southern Europe. As a result of the widening phase of the European integration, yet another state will have to approve the accession of any new candidate country. While one state swiftly approaches European Union membership, another one, Turkey has ground to a halt. The EU enlargement process is a key triggering element of the European integration project, and an effective tool of European foreign policy within the borders of Europe. It also proposes membership opportunities to its peripheral neighbours in exchange for the adaptation of European norms and values. However the procrastination of Turkish accession questions the effectiveness of the current enlargement procedure. Turkey’s right of membership cannot be doubted due to Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty and the Communication of the Commission on Enlargement Strategy\(^1\) that clearly includes Turkey among the countries eligible for membership.

Turkey is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well. Despite Turkey’s membership in several European and international organizations it is still not a member of the European Union. After almost twenty years of waiting, in October 2005 the European

Union and Turkey opened the negotiation procedure on EU accession. In 2013 we still cannot welcome Turkey in Europe as negotiations are occasionally halted. In 2012 the recent adaptation of the Positive Agenda\(^2\) should have reinforced cooperation on energy related issues and revitalized the accession negotiations between the EU and the Republic of Turkey. However, the procedure slowed down again when the Republic of Cyprus held the Presidency of the European Council. Turkey froze its relations with the Union for a six-month period because the EU was represented by a country not-recognized by Turkey. At the beginning of the negotiations Turks may have expected accession by no later than 2015, but the date of becoming full member seems to be delayed for a while. Focusing on the last eight years, and analysing the first decade of the 2000s, from both a European and a Turkish perspective, I would like to highlight why the negotiations are stagnant and positions are so distant from each other. Can the extension of negotiations influence the outcome of the Turkish accession procedure?

To answer these questions, my methodology is based on a single case analysis of the Turkish accession procedure to the European Union with a focus on qualitative research in the first decade of the 2000s. Electronic and academic sources were used to provide the most accurate and up-to-date information for my research. Turkey is observed as a single case analysis because of its unique relationship with the European Union. European integration through the enlargement procedure is especially ambiguous when Turkey is considered because analysis of the Turkish case may propose answers to the geographical aspect of European integration, at the same time, it raise more questions about prospective candidate countries from the South Caucasus.

I will divide my paper into three main parts. I will start my analysis with the delay of negotiations from both a European and Turkish point of view. Afterwards, I will highlight the

---

\(^2\) Positive Agenda, 2012.
importance of the EU – Turkish strategic partnership that could boost the accession procedure and break the deadlock eight years after the opening of the accession talks.

In the first chapter, I will analyze key factors that redirected European focus from external to internal affairs. For this reason I firstly provide a literature overview on the most relevant European integration theories to demonstrate the integration dynamics of the EU within the last decade that will serve as an answer on policy shifting.

The second chapter will concentrate on the Europeanization process of modern Turkey, during the AKP era. In the first part, I will review the literature describing the EU-Turkish relations to demonstrate the complexity of the relationship. The send part will analyze how the follow-up of the European model and the delayed accession negotiation generated a shift in Turkish foreign policy from the West to the East that may diminish the Turkish engagement to the European Union in early 2000s.

In the last part of my thesis based on my aforementioned findings and certain changes of the next decade I will highlight why the procrastination of the negotiation procedure between the EU and Turkey is ambiguous and dangerous in political terms. That is why, I will focus on the importance on strategic partnership between the European Union and Turkey, and I will propose alternative solutions to break-up the deadlock of the EU-Turkish negotiations.

In my conclusion, based on my findings due to the research project, I suggest that the enlargement procedure should be revised, as the procrastination of the negotiation could adversely affect both the EU and Turkey and instead of reinforcing can weaken the relations with candidate countries.
CHAPTER 1 – THE TROUBLED COMMUNITY: CRISIS MANAGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In this chapter I will focus my research on European issues that turned the attention of the European Union on questions related to deeper integration or in other words the deepening phase of the European Union that instead of reform programs may be considered as resolution of crises. As the main research area of the thesis is the procrastination of the Turkish-EU negotiations, I will only focus on the events of the last decade that adversely affected the European position about Turkey. To demonstrate the current dynamism of European integration procedure, I will firstly provide a brief literature overview on the most relevant European integration theories. Afterwards, I will describe how the enlargement of the Community influenced its functioning through the overview of those Treaties that should prepare the Union for a growing number of members, starting with the crisis caused by the Constitutional Treaty. I will devote a special focus on the failure of new positions established by the Lisbon Treaty that aimed to provide greater influence for the Community in foreign affairs, such as enlargement. Thirdly, I will briefly highlight why new comers have to fulfil stricter conditions with the growing number of member states through the “Big Bang” enlargement of the Union of 2004-2007. Finally, I will analyze how internal politics of member states affected the Turkish accession procedure in the last decade. And least but not last, I will focus on the economic and financial crisis that detoured again the Union’s attention from the EU-Turkish negotiations.

1.1. IR theories on European integration

The enlargement process of the European Union is the key triggering element of the European integration project, through which candidate countries are able to gain full accession to the European Union. The development of the European integration project can be observed
through several theories of international relations. I will firstly provide a brief overview on the different schools to suggest a definition on European integration related to my research project, the procrastination of EU-Turkish relations. More specifically I observe the integration theories applicable on EU enlargement. Federalists (e.g., Michael Brugess, S. Rufus Davis, Daniel Elazar, Jonh P. Mckay, Charles Pentland, Alberta Sbragia) argue that a federation or a federal union is the integration of independent nation states where nations may unify their forces to solve common problems but may also keep their diversity. With regards to the enlargement process they argue that each and every round of the “widening” process enhances federal elements of the integration. However, the failure of the Constitution proves that the citizens of the European Union are not ready for a federal unity.³

Contrarily to federalists who suggested a deepening cooperation between member states, rationalists (e.g., Kenneth W. Abbot, Michael N. Barnett, Martha Finnemore, Duncan Snidal, Todd Sandler, John T. Tschirhart) argue that the EU is the club of gentlemen where member states define their interests based on individual intentions and cost/benefit analysis, and believe to maximize their net gain earned from membership. Rationalists explain the enlargement of the European Union with member state preferences; in other words, member states favour candidates whose integration does not “exceed marginal costs”.⁴ Considering the enlargement rounds when economically less developed countries joined the European Union,⁵ this approach cannot entirely cover the intentions of the member states, either the European integration project.

Continuing the overview of IR schools, the role of institutions is much more important for constructivists (e.g., Adrian Hyde-Price, Sieglinde Gstöhl) who expect an “ever closer union”⁶

---
³ Dutch and French citizens both vote NO for the referendum which aimed to ratify the Constitution.
⁴ Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2002, 512.
⁵ Spain, Portugal, Greece, CEE countries.
⁶ Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2002, 514.
based on “collective identity and fundamental beliefs.” Thus the enlargement preference of the European Union should be influenced by common culture, identity, values and norms. The constructivist approach is applicable to the Central-Eastern European accession but it would fail to integrate Western-Balkan Muslim and orthodox countries or Turkey.

Neo-functionalists (e.g., Ernst B. Haas, Arne Niemann, Philippe C. Schmitter) also treat nation states as main actors of the global arena. Recognizing the limits of their power, governments delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions to resolve problems and to cooperate in the decision-making. Furthermore, neo-functionalists identify the enlargement policy of the EU as the spill over effect of the integration.

Those experts who are engaged in liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Frank Schimmelfenning, Ulrich Sedelmeier) argue that the main actors of international organizations are states who gain the maximum of their interests through intergovernmental negotiations. The foreign policy goals of national states are defined by domestic policies, economic and geopolitical interests. Within an integration, due to the formerly mentioned factors, asymmetrical interdependence characterizes the relation of member states. National governments “delegate and pool” certain part of their sovereignty in order to satisfy the maximum level of their own preferences in the global arena. According to this theory the enlargement process of the European Union is influenced by the preferences and geographical interests of the member states, and candidate countries are willing to fulfil the conditions imposed on them in order to access the European market and capital.

Least, but not last, realists (Edward Hallett Carr, Hans Morgenthau) observe the international system as an anarchic arena where states are the most important actors. Thus, their primary goal in an instable system is survival. Neo-realists (Kenneth Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer) develop this theory which is applicable to the European integration as well. In the anarchical

---

7 Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2002, 513.
8 Andrew Moravcsik introduces this approach of sovereignty sharing.
international system, less powerful states may assure their survival, and safeguard their independence through an alliance with other states within a form of international organization. Thus, the European integration ensures greater security in a bi- or multi-polar world while states preserve their sovereignty and remain the main actors.\(^9\)

Consequently, the international debate on the European integration is a complex phenomenon but we can distinguish the different approaches if we divide the integration process to two phases, namely the deepening phase of the integration which means a stronger cooperation between member states, and the widening phase of the integration, in other words the expansion of the European values and norms through the promise of membership. The first phase may be described by federalist, and constructivist approaches, while the second phase is more characterized by rationalism and neo-functionalism. However, based on the aforementioned overview of theories, liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-realist schools are able to determine the integration process through both perspectives. Considering the EU-Turkish relations, liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-realist theories highlight the transformation of the EU and its foreign policy, while neo-realism emphasizes the Turkish modernization procedure and the Turkish goal to become EU member. Through the analysis of the main challenges of the European Union between 2000 and 2013 I will demonstrate, why liberal intergovernmentalist theory is able to describe the redirection of the EU’s core policies from the outside to the inside thus explaining the procrastination of the EU-Turkish accession negotiations.

1.2. Preparing for an enlarging Community – Compromises but fundamental changes

After the fourth enlargement round of 1995, when the EU had already 15 members it was obvious that the then functioning system of the Community had not been able to deal with the growing number of member states. Yet, the Treaty of Amsterdam had been to prepare main

\(^9\) Pollack 2001, 221-244.
documents of a renewed European Union, but the member states delayed deep reforms of the voting system, the increase of the number of Commissioners, because the next enlargement round with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states still had not have a concrete date for accession. But intergovernmental conferences (IGC) of prospective reforms were held and led to a new Treaty, the Treaty of Nice which unfortunately neither was capable to imply deep changes in institutions nor in decision-making process, but it forwarded the need of a reform conference on institutional renewal. In 2001, the Laeken-summit declaration indicated a schedule and appointed the phases of a reform process in order to improve the functioning of the EU. It also pointed out the establishment of a Convention, an IGC series to handle the negotiations between member states with the involvement of candidate states and members of the national parliaments. As a result, the Convention prepared the Constitutional Treaty to genuinely change the functioning and policy-making process of the EU. But French and Dutch citizens refused the Constitution. Consequently, in 2005, the reform process of the EU was frozen and the deepening project was stalled. Nor citizens, nor governments were prepared for an “ever closer” Union as the Constitution would have founded the basis of a federalist integration. Although the modifying Treaties started to prepare the basis of a closer Union and delegated more tasks to European institutions, they preserved the sovereignty of member states. Although the EU was not ready for deepening, one year after the accession of the EU-10, it opened negotiations with Croatia and Turkey to widen the integration process of the European project. However, Turkey

11 The representatives of the countries join in 2004 and 2007 were represented and as the thirteenth candidate state Turkey also had a seat. See: European Convention, http://european-convention.eu.int/EN/Static/Staticed7c.html?Lang=EN&Content=Candidats_Gouv (Accessed: May 10, 2013).
14 The Treaty of Maastricht created a closer Union, deepened the economic integration and established the Monetary Union and simultaneously established the pillar system that divided the tasks and functions among member states and European institutions. Furthermore, it introduced the name European Union for the Communities. Likewise the Treaty of Maastricht deepened the integration the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice only modified it and introduced measures to improve the functioning of existing procedures instead of extended reforms.
could not follow the rapid development of the CEE countries and it was only able to join an
other candidate state, Croatia to follow its path into the European Union.

Not only the Constitutional Treaty failed, but new governments took office,¹⁵ thus those
bureaucrats who started the preparation of a deeper Union were changed as well. However, the
Conservative-Christian led governments of the EU aimed to resolve the institutional questions of
the deepening phase. But, instead of fifteen, twenty-seven governments created it, and had to
ratify it as by 2007 the Union numbered 27 members. Thus, in 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon was
born to amend the existing treaties, but still remained a political compromise with extended
functions instead of an overall change to an “ever closer union”. It preserved the transparency
part of the Constitutional Treaty but its basis was still left intergovernmental. In the next section
of the chapter I will briefly focus on those new top posts that due to their role could have had an
effect on the European integration process related to the deepening and widening phase, but
their effect is questionable and cause more ambiguity than certainty.

Beyond several reforms the Lisbon Treaty established two new posts to improve the
management and the representation of the EU in international relations. Next to the President of
the European Commission, in 2009 the Heads of States and Governments of the European
Union appointed the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy for two and a half years.

The first newly established top post is the President of the European Council. Beyond
managing and chairing responsibilities of the European Council, the President also represents the
common position of the member states towards international partners without prejudicing the
High Representative.¹⁶ Currently Herman Van Rompuy – former Belgian Prime Minister 2008 –
2009 – is appointed to fulfil the post for his second term. The second post is the High

---

¹⁵ Just mentioning the biggest changes in Germany, Gerhard Schröder’s office was took over by Angela Merkel, in
France Nicholas Sarkozy was elected instead of Jacques Chirac, in the United Kingdom Gordon Brown established
government instead of former Prime Minister, Tony Blair.

¹⁶ European Council, “The role of the President,” http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-president/the-
Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, who is simultaneously the Vice-President of the Commission and President of the Foreign Affairs in the European Council.\textsuperscript{17} The responsibilities of this \textit{triple-hat post} include traditional diplomacy, foreign policy, security policy and the representation in international organizations. Currently, former Trade Commissioner, Lady Catherine Ashton fulfils this post.

Indeed, as member states did not want to delegate foreign policy tasks to the new posts these posts remained empty, without real influence or bargaining power. The ambiguity of the Lisbon Treaty is more apparent if we further examine tasks related to the integration process as they have several \textit{executives}. For instance, according to the current program of the President of the Council (between 2012 and 2014) he also pays attention to EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, the Commission has its own Directorate General to deal with the enlargement of the European Union and neighbourhood policy, besides the HR who is also responsible for these policies.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, instead of creating one post responsible for the external actions of the EU, the Community divided one duty between different institutions. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty cannot separated overlapping functions and created a Union with two heads at least that can even disprove each other.

To sum up, instead of ensuring one voice for the Union, the Lisbon Treat established new posts and generated an even complicated situation by duplicating the same function, namely the positions being responsible for external relations related to EU integration. Without granting real authority to the new top posts, or establishing extended reforms the Union preserved its intergovernmental decision-making exercise among member states. It neither applied fundamental, federalist-like reforms but ratified compromises between those members that prefer

\textsuperscript{17} Ivaylo Iaydjiev, 2011.
the deepening of the integration and those that favour a less integrated cooperation. Consequently, the European integration still follows the LI model of Andrew Moravcsik considering the Treaty amendments in lieu of a European Constitution. However, the new post of the HR could gain more responsibility in international affairs. I will focus on this opportunity latter in this paper and I will examine how her responsibility can be increased in regard to the Turkish admission. (Chapter 3)

1.3. European scepticism generated by enlargement

Widening and deepening phases of the integration develop the EU, but gradual enlarging is decided by unanimity decision-making. In other words all member states of the EU have to accept and approve simultaneously the accession of any new member(s). Besides the positive effects of the extension of the EU the “Big Bang” enlargement have some less prosperous aspects that warns the EU considering future expansion.

The consequences of the fifth enlargement indirectly slowed down future accession, accordingly the Turkish one. In the following paragraphs I will briefly highlight why prospective member states have to face stricter conditions before joining the Union through the experience of the CEE enlargement and latest suspension of negotiations in EU-Turkish relations. Moreover, the “enlargement fatigue”20 occurred after the enlargement procedures of 2004-2007 and the “integration capacity”21 present the negligence of member states related to future accessions.22

Since the first enlargement round of the 1970s member states are rather sceptical with candidate countries considering the costs and benefits, and the interests of negotiating parties

---

20 Notion used to express the unwillingness (the lack of interest) of member states to widen the European Union with new countries.
21 Integration capacity refers to the ability of the European Union, mainly to the different decision-making procedures that make functioning the EU as an international cooperation after an successive widen project. See: Szolucha 2011, 1-6.
22 Schimmelfennig 2008, 919.
about the accession of a new member. Due to the decreasing engagement of member states, the accession procedure of prospective candidates (Western Balkans, Turkey) will prolong and that they will have to fulfil even stricter rules to gain entrance and will have to face with a considerably reinforced accession procedure. Although, the conditions of the accession (Copenhagen criteria) change constantly, the CEE enlargement demonstrates that these are rather useful than disadvantageous. For instance, Poland and Hungary failed to fulfil the requirements of the European Social Dialogue in 2007 even though they joined the Union three years earlier. An other failure of the conditionality purpose is connected to Bulgaria that fought against corruption effectively before accession but in 2008 funds were suspended due to fraud. Slovakian and Croatian negotiations were also suspended when the former one did not fulfil political criteria or the latter one failed to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. As a result, economical and politically less developed countries imply the introduction of new rules to promote European economic and political model before becoming member state.

Related to Turkey, the EU also suspended negotiations because Turkey violated the criteria of the Customs Union and refused to open its borders to Cypriot ships. While the negotiation about Turkish EU accession was open in 2005, within a year the European Council froze eight negotiation chapters due to the Turkish-Cypriot conflict. On the other hand, at the beginning of the Cypriot Presidency of the European Council in 2012, Turkey was the one that froze relations with the EU. Consequently, while the EU cannot present common position on Turkish accession and find a compromise for member states in this question, the negotiation procedure will depend on the state of play instead of partnership development.

Indeed, as part of the foreign policy agenda, the enlargement procedure may be seen as bargaining opportunity for asymmetrically interdependent current members in order to be

---

23 Szólucha 2011, 6.
24 Ibid., 7-8.
compensated for future disadvantages that can be caused by the newly joined member. On the other hand, a new model may be observed based on the conditionality that new members have to fulfil before accession. In this context, we can argue that the monitoring of these conditions before accession is not enough as they can miss the fulfilment of their requirements after becoming member. Consequently, learned from previous enlargement procedures the establishment of new conditions and the introduction of sanctions against non-performing countries are worth considering.

1.4. Questioning the success of the Turkish accession

Regarding Turkey, the bargaining power becomes more important for EU member states that make core decisions based on intergovernmental basis. But the bargaining power, instead of providing real advantages for individual countries, represents the mixture of internal politics and foreign policy interests and slows down the pace of the enlargement procedure. Even if the European Commission supports the Turkish accession, it finally depends on member states. This ambiguity prolongs the accession negotiation as the Commission must represent the common position of member states towards the candidate countries. For now, the divergent view of member states makes the negotiations ambiguous with the Turkish candidate.

One of the independent variables affecting the Turkish-EU negotiations is the growing Turkish population that could influence the actual decision-making process of the EU and threaten the member states with growing immigration or with the absorption of funds from current beneficiaries. Furthermore, the country’s geographical location in an instable area and its different culture and religion cause controversial relations between Turkey and the member states. In

---

25 See also Schimmelfennig 2011, 111-130.
26 According to Schneider bargaining power is “the ability to overcome the resistance of others.” See in: Schneider, Finke and Baier, 2010.
27 Müftüler-Baç 2011, 8.
addition, the varying positions of member states regarding their support or opposition to Turkish accession weaken the overall negotiating power of the European Union. Considering the Ankara Agreement, and the Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty, Turkey is inseparably part of Europe. However, European governments may use “the Turkish card” in home politics, through their campaign to gain votes. Thus, the European public support – which also influence the pace of the enlargement procedure – of the Turkish accession can vary depending on how positively or negatively European governments present the Turkish issue for electoral mobilization. In the next section, I will provide a brief overview on general government positions about the Turkish accession. I will focus on the main opponents of the Turkish issue by analyzing the German and French viewpoints before and after the opening of negotiations. Finally, I will analyze why Turkey has a bad reputation among European citizens and in party politics.

In 2005 the accession procedure finally started but the European public view reflecting Turkey remained ambiguous. The United Kingdom is a desperate supporter of the Turkish full membership. Sweden and Italy also strongly support the procedure and admit Turkey’s strategic role to the EU. CEE countries are also in favour of Turkish accession as governments expect to weaken the alliance of bigger states by the Turkish accession. Spain, Portugal and the Czech Republic are more conservatives, but support the accession, provided that Turkey completes the membership criteria. The main opponents of the Turkish EU accession are Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Greece and Cyprus.

Furthermore, we can distinguish member state preferences according to their ties to the United States. Those member states (the United Kingdom and CEE countries in general) that

29 Schimmelfennig 2011, 111.
33 See also: Schimmelfennig 2011.
34 Both the Prime Minister David Cameron and the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband ensure Turkey about constant support of the United Kingdom and consider full membership as a fully beneficial step in development.
35 Schimmelfennig 2011, 115.
would preserve more of their sovereignty and groom closer relationship with the USA are in favour of Turkish accession due to Turkey’s close relation to the Atlantic cooperation. By contrast, member states supporting deeper European integration and less dependence on the United States are rather critical with the Turkish accession. 

Government/country preferences also depend on how a given state identifies Turkey’s place within the European Union. According to this classification, those governments that determine the Union’s core function through its influential power on third countries and focus on foreign affairs are generally pro-Turkish while those countries which relate the policies of the Union to internal affairs are more against the Turkish accession. Beyond the finalité politique of the European Union preferred by member states, left and centre left governments are generally in favour of Turkish accession as they consider the aim of the integration within a “political project” and due to their “multi-culturalist orientation” they consider Turkey’s reform in a positive manner. Contrary to leftist parties, right wing parties and Christian democrat governments visualize Europe as an “inward entity” thus, for them the accession is based on the similarity between the member states and the candidate, and the full respect of the Copenhagen criteria. However, in recent years, the changing viewpoint of European governments divided the position of political parties within one country. For instance, Germany holds a mixed opinion. Despite the considerable population of Turkish migrants (in Germany 2.4% of the population has a Turkish origin which is about 2 million people), the German home politics still use the Turkish accession to gain votes. While current Chancellor, Angela Merkel would support a “privileged partnership” with Turkey instead of full membership, increasing number of voices from her own coalition admit that the EU will need Turkey more than the

---

36 Öniş 2004, 19.
37 Both Barysch 2007(b) and Tocci (2007) share this point of view.
38 Barysch, 2007(b).
40 Ibid., 19.
41 Ibid., 19.
43 Redmond 2007, 309.
latter one would need the EU. In the next subsection I will only indicate the most adverse opponents of the Turkish accession: Germany and France, where in previous years conservative and Christian democrat led governments took office that supported the European integration in parallel with common Christian values and did not support immigration. By this brief observation of the last decade I will indeed highlight the constantly changing preferences of the aforementioned countries to indicate how national/government interest influence the negotiation procedure regarding Turkey and the European Union.

1.4.1. The reluctant Germans

One of the main adversaries of the Turkish EU accession is obviously Germany. However, in recent years, the view of the Turkish accession means different things to every German government coalition, thus it is varying as governments succeed each other. While the former government, in the early 2000s, led by Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer, strongly supported the Turkish accession and claimed for equal and fair treatment, the present government is more opposed to the full membership perspective and would favour a “privileged partnership.”

Indeed, summarizing the Turkish problem within the EU: “On the whole, support for Turkey’s membership is lukewarm at best and its biggest obstacle lies in the sphere of domestic politics.” In addition, according to Katinka Barysch, German citizens see citizens of Turkish descendants as bad immigrants. Migrants or guest workers from Turkey arrived in Germany in the early 1960s from underdeveloped inland regions, thus during their stay in Germany they wanted to protect their own traditions. In fact, while Turkey became more modern and opened, the descendant of the guest workers live in diasporas and protect the ancient traditions, thus they

---

44 Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Energy, Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Affairs Minister of Germany, Ruprecht Polenz, Head of foreign affairs committee.
46 Lippert 2008, 149.
47 Barysch 2007(b), 4.
cannot really be integrated in the German society.\textsuperscript{48} For instance, Turkish immigrants are less educated and more than 2/3 of them do not have a vocational qualification. Furthermore, this trend can be related to old traditions that do not allow women to be educated.\textsuperscript{49} Consequently, the German public see Turkish immigrants as a hostile and aggressive part of the population that increase islamophobia within the country.\textsuperscript{50} Despite moderate political talks, the two countries cherish good economic relations and Germany is interested in Turkish development. For instance, with more than $ 23 billion Germany is Turkey’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} largest supplier of goods.\textsuperscript{51} Even if the current government would not credit Turkey with full membership, not all German parties share this viewpoint. Social democrats remained active supporters of the accession procedure.

1.4.2. The averse French

To observe the massive French refusal of the Turkish accession I will analyze the events of the early 2000’s in both European and French politics. After the signature of the Treaty of Nice in 2001 the EU had to face several issues. The CEE enlargement project and postponed institutional reform, as I argued formerly in this Chapter, forced the Union to start a deep reform in order to improve the efficiency of the EU and create a more democratic and transparent institutional system for EU citizens. For that reason a Convention was established to determine the basis of the future European Union and, instead of modifying treaties, to create a European constitution. The Convention was chaired by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former centrist President of the Republic of France who strongly opposed the Turkish accession.\textsuperscript{52} For instance, right after the start of the daily work of the Convention in 2002, Giscard d’Estaing was interviewed about the future of Europe and in order to reinforce the political engagement of member states in a deep reform of the EU, he envisaged the death of the Union by the accession of Turkey and the

\textsuperscript{48} Barysch 2007(b), 4.
\textsuperscript{49} Lippert 2008, 139.
\textsuperscript{50} Both Barysch and Lippert support that view in the aforementioned publications.
\textsuperscript{51} Knaus and Altfuldisch, 2013.
attempt of Morocco. Thus, he first installed the geographic and then the demographic barriers of the European Union.\textsuperscript{53}

In France, relations between Muslim and non-Muslim population became harsh in 2005, the same year when Turkish negotiation procedure on membership started and the same year when French EU citizens voted no on the European constitution. Thus, the promise of a greater internal security was presented in the forthcoming campaigns for presidential election. The conservative party\textsuperscript{54} won the election and their president, Nicolas Sarkozy declared a program to resolve the conflicts with the French Muslim community – that presented almost ten per cent of the French population in 2007\textsuperscript{55} – and integrate the immigrant population into the secular French society. Therefore, he appointed an Algerian-Moroccan descendant woman, Rachida Dati as Justice Minister. While he aimed to calm home affairs and convince the French-Arabic population about the possibility of living in a peaceful secular state within Europe, Sarkozy addressed a hostile policy towards Turkey. He did not admit Turkey as part of Europe, but welcomed it in the Mediterranean Union.\textsuperscript{56} With this statement he not only criticized Turkey, but sent a message to French Muslims: no matter how secular a state is, how developed it is in economic terms, or how engaged it is in security policy to Western allies and respect Western type values of democracy, it will never be able to become part of the EU.\textsuperscript{57} France not only considered an EU without Turkey within EU borders, but also blocked four chapters\textsuperscript{58} of the negotiations to be opened.

\textsuperscript{53} Visier 2009.
\textsuperscript{54} Union for a Popular Movement
\textsuperscript{56} Katinka Barysch, 2007(b).
\textsuperscript{57} Visier 2009.
\textsuperscript{58} Economic and Monetary Policy, Agriculture and Rural Development, Institutions and Regional Policy, Financial and Budgetary Provisions
Unfortunately, Turkey started to promote its similarity\(^{59}\) to France when France struggled with deep identity crisis in 2007 that deepened the antipathy of French voters against a Muslim country.\(^{60}\) By contrast, while France prohibited wearing any symbols referring to religion in public institutions, in 2007 Turkey allowed wearing headscarves. From a Turkish point of view it was a step forward democracy – not to discriminate anybody because of his or her religion – but from a European viewpoint it was a threat against democracy and the renewal of Islamic traditions in a secular state. Consequently, while Turkey found similarity with the secular France, France was directly opposed to the Turkish EU membership and indicated Turkey as a non-European state.

With his policy President Sarkozy gained uncertain voters, but lost a significant part of the Muslim population in 2012 who voted for François Hollande’s less aggressive program.\(^{61}\) The socialist leader admitted Turkey’s economic and strategic importance for the EU, and one year after the elections, in 2013 he declared his official visit to Ankara in order to revive Franco-Turkish relations and to break the deadlock in EU-Turkey accession negotiation.\(^{62}\) As the presidential election broke the deadlock in Franco-Turkish relations, it can promote the normalization of relations between Germany and Turkey after 2014.\(^{63}\)

### 1.4.3. Turkey’s bad European reputation

As we saw before, Turkey can be viewed through several points. EU citizens identify the Turkish accession as general threat. In other words, newcomers are dangerous as they present a cheaper workforce and they have a negative influence on national traditions and culture. Turkey as a Muslim country is related to terrorism in Europeans’ eye, without considering its secular

---

\(^{59}\) Both countries finance religious institutions and religious leaders are paid from national budgets. See: Kuru 2008, 101-110.

\(^{60}\) Barysch 2007(a).


aspect.\textsuperscript{64} I also observed how the “politicization of the Turkish question in France”\textsuperscript{65} mobilized voters of nationalist parties not only in France, but in Austria, the Netherlands and Germany. As previously mentioned, preparing for the French presidential election in 2004 a dramatic turn occurred in French Turkish policy. Moreover, on 1\textsuperscript{st} March 2005, President Chirac announced a referendum on any new member states after the fulfilment of the Croatian accession, thus making prospective enlargements more complex.\textsuperscript{66} Subsequently, due to the threat introduced by Giscard d’Estaing, political parties were able to use the “Turkish card” in home affairs and revitalized nationalism. As a result, right wing parties were able to take office from former left wing, social democrat parties that were generally in favour of the Turkish accession. Considering Turkey’s bad European image, on the one hand, Turkish immigrants and citizens are identified as dangerous people, different from Western citizens. On the other hand, European party politics should not use the topics of external affairs, as the European enlargement, in home politics to gain votes by generating threat and fear against other nations.

Consequently, one key factor that delays the Turkish accession procedure is the reluctance of the European citizens. But as we saw, due to political campaigns in Germany and France the public opinion can be influenced. Another variable is the support of governments which is based on party politics. If the governmental party is not in favour of Turkey or represents a neutral position on the Turkish accession that can adversely affect the negotiations (suspension, freezing chapters). Considering that national governments of member states follow the LI approach, during the Sarkozy era in France Turkey was not in the geopolitical interest of France as it focused on the revitalization of the Mediterranean Union\textsuperscript{67} and feared from the Muslim

\textsuperscript{64} Barysch 2007(b), 2.
\textsuperscript{65} Insel 2012, 3.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{67} The Mediterranean Union (UfM) was established in 2008 as the continuation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as Barcelona Process, started in 1995) during the French Presidency of the European Council to boost economic cooperation between member countries. See also: Official website of the Union for the Mediterranean, http://ufmsecretariat.org/history/ (Accessed: May 21, 2013). However, the French President was accused that with the revitalization of the Barcelona Process he wanted to keep Turkey away from the EU and offer her the UfM membership instead of EU membership. See also: John Laughland, “What is Really Behind the
immigrants who arrived from Africa and the Middle East. In this sense, Turkey was considered as
a buffer zone that could arrest illegal immigrants from the EU. Similarly, the German geopolitical
interest does not support the Turkish accession but advocate a closer European integration.
Moreover, Turkey has bad reputation among European political parties, as they define the
European integration, thus the enlargement procedure, from a different point of view.
Nevertheless, they not only have different opinion on integration at national level but they do not
have a common position at European level connected to this topic. That is why, the view of the
Turkish accession in terms of European integration is ambiguous both at national and European
levels.

1.5. Integration inspired by “Euro” scepticism

In the second half of the first decade of the 2000s the Union had to face not only the
challenge of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the reluctance of member states on Turkish
accession but the adverse effect of the economic and financial crisis. In this section, I will finally
focus on the economic troubles of the Union, as the last independent variable that delayed the
enlargement process and questioned the effectiveness of the European integration.

During autumn – winter 2008, the global economic and financial crisis hit the periphery of
the European Union and the Community provided financial support to Hungary (€6.5 billion)
than shortly after, the Council of the EU ratified a fiscal stimulus, namely the European
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). In 2009, the EU also provided financial assistance to Latvia
and Romania and approved the establishment of a temporary financial facility for non-euro area
members of the Community. Thus, the establishment of an integrated crisis management on EU
level gain crucial importance. In 2010, the real amount of the Greek public debt revealed that
threaten with a domino effect in other euro area members. In order to exit from the crisis, the

European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism were established and the Heads of States and Governments approved the Commission’s proposal on economic governance, the strategic program of Europe 2020 and the renewal to the Stability and Growth Pact.\(^{68}\) Due to the economic governance which entered into force on December 13, 2012, the EU intends to establish deeper fiscal coordination and the reinforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact that introduces special requirements for national budgetary frameworks and aims to prevent macroeconomic imbalances and improve competitiveness.\(^{69}\) Thus, the deeper integration based on LI theory was reinforced by the crisis as it was the geopolitical interest of member states.

1.6. Conclusions

To sum up the main findings of this chapter the procrastination of the EU-Turkish negotiation on accession is the result of several independent variables from a European point of view. In the first decade of the 2000s the European Union had to face numerous issues that redirected its attention from external policies to home affairs. At a European level first of all, the EU should resolve the crisis generated by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty that questioned the whole existence and functioning of the Community. As a political compromise, the Lisbon Treaty was born, but instead of fundamental reforms it intended to satisfy the expectation of an enlarged Union. Although, it created new posts to reinforce its external power in the global arena, these posts were not authorized with real power.

Secondly, with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty a new voting system was revived as well and members states started to feel threatened by Turkey’s apparent weight in the voting system due to the country’s geographical extension, economic structure and growing population. Thirdly, the negative consequences of the “Big Bang” enlargement connected to the conditionality of the


European Union cautioned the European decision makers to be more wary of candidates less developed in political and economic terms. Fourthly, the economic and financial crisis warned the Union that even an integrated form of cooperation could not preserve the stability of the European currency if the economic union was not fulfilled. Afterwards, through several examples I observed how national party politics may affect the view of the Turkish accession among citizens.

Finally, I had to conclude that the different interpretation of the European integration can not only affect national policies, but through governments it has an ambiguous influence at the European level as the geopolitical interests of member states are also divergent. Thus it has a negative impact on EU foreign policies, such as enlargement, because it is able to stand still even eight years after the opened negotiation procedure. In the next chapter I will analyze factors that affected Turkey and caused the slowdown of the accession talks.
CHAPTER 2 – TURKEY FOLLOWING THE EUROPEANIZATION PATH AND CHALLENGING REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

The enlargement policy is an effective tool of the European foreign policy among European countries through which the EU proposes prospective membership opportunity to those countries that are able to and willing to adopt European norms and values. However, the Turkish case of Europeanization is special because Turkey continues to follow the European model even without EU membership. In order to understand this phenomenon, firstly we should define the term Europeanization. According to Tarik Oğuzlu we can distinguish “apparent” and “true” Europeanization process, depending on the purpose of the country that chooses to follow it. In this manner, we talk about “apparent Europeanization” when a country enjoys benefits on its own policies (both home and foreign affairs) adopting European norms, values and practices, while “true Europeanization” is applied to fulfil the accession to the European Union. Consequently, Turkey employs the “apparent” form of Europeanization as it was converging to the European Union and Western-type system right before the opening of the accession negotiations. Although, some can argue that based on the Ankara Agreement Turkey always had a promise for accession without a concrete admission date. Accordingly it was in Turkey’s interest to harmonize legislation with the one of the European Union. However, it does not mean that the promise of accession would not have a positive effect on the pace of harmonisation, but “[...] the negative consequences of the growing instability in the Middle East on national security interests, and the political motivations of the AKP, better account for the

70 Oğuzlu 2010-11, 657-683.
apparent Europeanization in the post-September 11 era. Even if Turkey had not been pursuing the goal of membership in the EU, this process would have continued.\footnote{Oğuzlu 2010-11, 658.}

In this chapter, I will firstly provide an overview on the EU-Turkey relations to highlight Turkey’s engagement to the European Union until the opening of the negotiations and the reorientation of Turkey’s foreign policy due to the delay of the negotiations procedure. Secondly, I will focus on the Europeanization process of Turkey divided into three pillars. On the one hand I will describe how the country always missed the express train\footnote{Train is often used as a synonyme for the European integration, thus I will use it as well. See: Christensen 2009, 9.} of the European integration, and on the other hand I will highlight the internal dynamics that characterized Turkey in the light of candidacy in the early 2000s until the opening of accession. After that, I will analyze the success of the AKP party that intensified the transformation process of Turkey according to European norms and significantly reinforced the country’s economic potential as well as discovered the opportunities that rose regionally and globally. The third sub-section of this part will gradually introduce the regions where Turkey reinforced its ties and relations. Thus, I will devote my attention to the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus and Africa to identify the foreign policy shift that turned Turkey from the West to the East. Last, but not least I will briefly analyze Turkey’s intervention during the revolt of the Arabic countries to finally answer the question whether Turkey became a regional power in the last ten years.

\section*{2.1. IR perspectives on EU-Turkish relations}

Turkey’s accession procedure to the European Union is one of the greatest dilemmas that decision makers should revise. Experts, researching international relations propose several viewpoints analyzing the relations of the European Union and Turkey. Thus, they (Esra LaGros and Knud Erik Jorgensen, Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Ziya Öniş, Sinan Ülgen, E. Fuat Keyman, Bahri Yilmaz) examine the modernization path of Turkey, the EU-Turkish relations and the achieved
goals (Atila Eralp, Berdal Aral) which are mostly connected to Turkey’s interest in the European accession process. On the one hand the authors highlight the main transformative steps of the Europeanization, and on the other hand they indicate the incompleteness of the Turkish democracy. They provide a wide range of analysis on economic, political, social and cultural perspectives thus providing an essential background for further analysis. They summarize the EU-Turkish relationship from a both a European and Turkish point of view which provide a good basis to my research topic, by giving a deep analysis of the former relations. Furthermore, Meltem Müftüler-Baç and E. Fuat Keyman analyze the Turkish party politics in order to highlight fundamental challenges of the European integration process.

Another researcher, Bahar Rumelili argues that Turkey is “the other” – in terms of identity, geography, culture, political and economic system and human rights – for the European Union. By contrast Ebru Ertugal demonstrates how effectively were the pre-accession instruments of the European Union implemented in Turkey thus contributing the European development of the country. While experts analyze the internal procedures affected by the European integration process, they (Ziya Öniş, Şuhnaz Yilmaz, Tarik Oğuzlu, Alexander Jackson, Gareth Winrow or Alain Wicky) also highlight the new foreign policy perspective occured in Turkey’s direct and broader region in the last ten years in parallel with the negotiations on the accession. In another context, experts like Thomas Diez, Frank Schimmelfennig, Natatlie Tocci, Barbara Lippert or Katinka Barysch and Claire Visier observe the Turkish accession procedure from a European perspective, by underlying the existing differences between Turkey and the member states of the EU.

Although, researchers of the Turkish accession procedure observe the obstacles of the Turkish accession to the European Union from several aspects, and provide an excellent historical background, they did not focus on the latest issues that occurred simultaneously in the

---

74 LaGro and Jorgensen 2007.
75 Rumelili 2004, 45.
EU and Turkey, in recent years. Thus, they do not provide an answer to the question: why the negotiation process is entrapped between the EU and Turkey eight years after the opening of the accession talks. Through the analysis of the priority shift in Turkish policies between 2000 and 2013 I will assume how the follow up of a neo-realist based foreign policy explains the procrastination of accession negotiations.

### 2.2. Europeanization process of modern Turkey

Turkey started to follow a European path in 1923 when the country broke with the former Ottoman Empire and formulated a republic. Between 1923 and 1938 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the basis of the modern Turkey. “Since the founding of the republic, Turkish leaders have sought to embed Turkey in the West. This represented a fundamental shift in outlook from empire to a modern republic.”

#### 2.2.1. Committed to the West

To indicate its engagement to the Western system, Turkey applied to several European and international organizations; in 1948 Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), in 1949 it became member of the Council of Europe (CoE) and it allied the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western security alliance led by the United States in 1952. Turkey is founding member of the OECD (the successor of the OEEC) and the World Trade Organization. Moreover, it also got a seat in G-20. The absolute proof of its commitment was indicated with its application for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.

---

76 He was an army officer of the Ottoman Empire during the WWI and Turkey. He led the Turkish Independence War and after victory he became the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey.
78 Ulgen 2011(a), 10.
79 Ibid., 19.
80 See also: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/g-20-en.en.mfa
The EEC recommended an association agreement that consisted three phases towards the establishment of a Customs Union. Thus, the Ankara Agreement was signed on 12th September, 1963. Article 28 of the Agreement already indicated the possibility of future membership.\(^81\) The period between 1963 and 1970 may be considered as the preparatory phase during which Turkey received unilateral preferences from the EEC without reciprocal obligations.\(^82\) In 1970, in order to revitalize the cooperation the Parties signed the Additional Protocol to set out the next steps and to establish a Customs Union throughout reciprocal obligations.\(^83\)

2.2.2. Missing the “European express”

Even if the modern Republic of Turkey is engaged to the West, Europe is still hesitating to greet Turkey with open arms within its member states. Considering Turkey’s long term commitment and previous enlargements we can state that Turkey is the biggest loser of the widening phase of the European Union. First of all, while Turkey started to abolish quantitative barriers, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined the EEC which implied internal changes and obscurity within the Community, thus the Turkish partner waited for the stabilization of European powers and did not urge the deepening of relations with a changing organization.\(^84\)

Due to economic difficulties Turkey suspended the Ankara agreement in 1978, then afterwards a military coup of 1980, it was the EEC that froze its relations with Turkey in 1982.\(^85\) Even if the EEC were interested in South Europe, the Turkish internal politics did not make possible the reinforcement of cooperation. Losing its interest in the Near East, the EEC started negotiations with Spain, Portugal then Greece in the early 1980s and completed the second and

---

\(^81\) Ankara Agreement, 1963, 15.
\(^82\) Aral 2007, 100.
\(^83\) It was set up to abolish quantitative barriers and trade tariffs to boost foreign trade between the Parties. The EEC abolished quantitative barriers and tariffs on imports from Turkey and in exchange Turkey applied the same protocol within 12 and 22 years depending on different products.
\(^84\) Müftüler-Baç 2005, 19.
\(^85\) Ibid., 20.
third enlargement rounds. Although, the democracy has been restored in Turkey by 1983 and the relations normalized between Turkey and the EEC, the EEC devoted its attention to internal institutional reforms.86

In 1987 Turkey applied for full membership. However, the Commission did not recommend the opening of negotiations but the fulfilment of the Ankara Agreement by establishing the Customs Union.87 When in the late 1980s, the CEE countries became independent and represented their clear engagement to the West they were able to redirect the EEC’s attention.88 Furthermore, while the EEC finished negotiations with Austria, Finland and Sweden under the forth enlargement round in 1995, CEE countries gained advance against Turkey and become the next priority of the Community.

Despite the long relations, Turkey was still in front of the waiting room, and while the more countries could join the Community, instead of a prospective membership promise Turkey only completed the Customs Union with the EU. Vainly submitted application in 1987, Turkey had to wait more than a decade to eventually gain potential candidate status in 1999, at the Helsinki Summit. The progress report of 2004 on Turkey finally found that Turkey made sufficient progress to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, thus, after ten Central and Eastern European countries joined the “Club”89 in 2004, on 3rd October 2005, the EU opened negotiation on accession procedure with Turkey.

2.2.3. Successful combination of traditional and modern policy elements

Even if Turkey had to wait for forty years, the Helsinki Council Summit on 10-11 December 1999 gave green light to the Turkish accession procedure. But in November 2000, and then in February 2001 Turkey was hit by financial crises, thus the country had to face adverse

86 Erdogan 2006.
88 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 520.
89 Synonym used for the EU by Yilmaz 2008.
economic conditions, regain its international credibility and start a serious reform procedure in order to fulfil the recommendations of the European Commission towards accession.90

The country gained financial support from the IMF and the World Bank and prepared a national recovery program to reform its economy and to generate capital investment.91 As a result, the banking sector was transformed and cleaned from politics, while the banking law and the regulatory systems were renewed.92 The coalition government (Democratic Left Part, Motherland Party and Nationalist Action Party) also started Constitutional reform to satisfy the recommendations of the Commission. Through three amendments, between October 2001 and August 2002, the government “abolished death penalty in peace time, revised the anti-terror law, and allowed broadcasting in languages other than Turkish.”93 The establishment of a New Civil Code in November 2001 admitted gender equality, and in this manner allow women to have the right in sharing common goods and property.94 Although, the government begun the reform process they could not agree on political issues. As a result, its public support decreased and it lost the forthcoming elections in November 2002.95

In November 2002, the AK Party – a party that follows the European path marked by Kemal Ataturk but with a “hidden Islamist agenda”96 – won the elections with 34.2% and received two-third of the parliamentary seats.97 During its “golden years”98 – between 2002 and 2005 – the AKP continued the amendment of the Constitution and established a new Penal Code. As a result, it abolished all verdicts decided in State Security Courts; it accepted the European standards on death penalty (introduced the life-long imprisonment), signed Protocol

92 Ülgen 2011(a), 23.
93 Müftüler Baç 2005, 23.
94 Ibid., 24.
95 Ibid., 22.
96 Ibid., 25.
97 Keyman 2010, 313.
98 Önış and Yılmaz 2009, 9.
13 of the European Convention on Human Right; it ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\textsuperscript{99} In 2003-2004 the AKP reduced the power of the military and reinforced its civilian control by increasing the number of civil members of the National Security Council and nominated a civilian servant as Secretary General of the organization.\textsuperscript{100}

One of the core elements of the AKP success is based on its attitude to modernisation and traditions. Instead of dictating harsh modernization or follow Islamist tradition, the AKP try to satisfy a greater population by keeping the balance.\textsuperscript{101} However, the party continues the modernisation of the republic in parallel with European requirements but preserves tradition and stays loyal to Western allies.\textsuperscript{102}

In lieu of the old fashioned nation-building practice of former Turkish governments, the AKP is aimed to sustain the balance between Islam, democracy and free market.\textsuperscript{103} The current Turkish government intend to satisfy the needs of poorer parts of the society and pays attention to the demand of the “new middle class”\textsuperscript{104} while relies on market economy and democracy, and is able to maintain a reform policy to continue the reconstruction of the state in parallel with Europeanization. Although it is committed to the European integration it promotes a proactive foreign policy and aims to become a good neighbour. Meanwhile it intends to become a “soft power”\textsuperscript{105} – on what I will focus later in this chapter – it is also willing to resolve minority issues with the Kurds, develops its economy\textsuperscript{106} and aims to develop Turkey to an energy hub.\textsuperscript{107} In addition, Turkey is no longer a poor country. With its liberalized market economy Turkey is the 5\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{99} Müftüler-Baç 2005, 26.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{101} Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012, 91.
\textsuperscript{102} Keyman 2010, 317-318.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 316.
\textsuperscript{104} Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012, 91.
\textsuperscript{105} Keyman 2010, 317.
\textsuperscript{106} Within ten years the income per capita doubled and due to its national program established after the financial crises of 2000-2001, Turkey’s economy became one of the fastest growing in 2012 with an annual GDP approximated $1 trillion. See: Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012, 89.
\textsuperscript{107} Keyman 2010, 316.
supplier of the European Union and the EU is the 1st trade partner of Turkey. With its 16th largest economy of the world and the 6th largest one in Europe, Turkey is member of the G-20, and recently joined the BRIC countries. Its active labour force of 25.7 million people ranks Turkey the 4th largest market comparing to European countries.\textsuperscript{108}

Consequently, the essence of its power is the balancing between old and new traditions and the procrastination of modernization.\textsuperscript{109} On the other hand, this governance policy confuses European states. In other words, while Turkey is balancing between different traditions it represents an ambiguous image in Western societies by simultaneously being mysterious and old fashioned, and developed as an emerging market with a multi-cultural society installed as a bridge between the West and the East as a transitory country. At the same time, Turkey is still searching its own place by maintaining a proactive foreign policy in the closer and wider neighbourhood.

\textbf{2.3. Aspiration for regional leadership}

Similarly to its internal policy, Turkey is balancing between the European Union, the United States and the neighbouring countries to find its own place in the international political arena. In the aftermath of the “post-September 11 era”\textsuperscript{110} the maintenance of a politically independent, economically developing large sized country is crucial in an instable region.\textsuperscript{111} In this subheading, I will provide an overall view on Turkish foreign policy through different regions to identify a shift within it. In economic terms, Turkey oriented its capacity toward the East, the South and the West and to reach African, Latin American and Central Asian potential consumers of Turkish goods.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109} Oğuzlu 2010-11, 671.
\textsuperscript{110} Term used by Oğuzlu to express the security concerns arising after the attack of terrorists in the United States.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 664, 682.
\textsuperscript{112} See also: Oğuzlu, Öniş, Yılmaz, Müftüler-Baç and Keyman
2.3.1. “From deep Europeanization to soft Euro-asianism”\(^{113}\)

In the early 2000s a new form of threat appeared in the Western world in form of faceless terrorism related to non-state actors and extremist groups that aimed to transform the world order remained after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, it was essential to Turkey, and simultaneously to the political Islamist AKP, to differentiate itself from Islamic fundamentalism. With the electoral victory of the AKP, Turkey ceased to be a buffer zone and challenged to practice a more proactive role in its neighbourhood. Thus in 2004, Turkey started to campaign in the Organization of the Islamic Conference for freedom and women’s right. As a result, one year later, a Turkish high ranking diplomat, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu was nominated for Secretary General in the world’s second largest inter-governmental organization.\(^{114}\) Referring to the neo-realist concept of Kenneth Waltz, in an instable region, one of the main interests of an emerging power like Turkey is assuring a secure environment through internal political and economic capability, based on military strength and resources.\(^ {115}\) In this regard, it is essential for Turkey to become more powerful via an effective relationship building with neighbouring countries.

2.3.2. Revitalizing Western Balkans’ relations

Challenging one of the Union’s interest spheres Turkey also advocates the development of the Balkan countries. Due to historical and cultural ties, Turkey traditionally maintains good relations with the Balkans. That is why contrarily to the EU or other Western powers, Turkey is able to understand complicated relations, for instance between Serbia and neighbouring countries after the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Being a crossroad between the East and the West, the territory of the Balkan has always had a special role thus powers like the European Union, the United States or Russia are also interested in the region. However, in the last decade, the volume

\(^{113}\) Öniş and Yılmaz 2009, 7.
\(^{114}\) Oğuzlu 2010-11, 665.
\(^{115}\) Brljavec 2011, 523.
and dynamism of Turkey’s investments quintupled (from $3 bn to $17 bn between 2000 and 2008). \(^{116}\)

As a NATO ally and candidate of the EU, Turkey also supports the integration of Western Balkan countries into the Union and participates the peacekeeping campaigns and civilian missions to train and equip armed forces of the region and fight against terrorism. In 2004, Turkey deployed armed forces in several European operation thus ensured security and maintained peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and participated missions in Kosovo and Macedonia. \(^{117}\) Turkey contributes to educational and economic development of the Western Balkan through the Official Development Assistance. Although, Turkey is aim to become EU member state it criticised the EU’s “Janus-faced” \(^{118}\) policy and unfair treatment of Western Balkan countries, related to the visa liberalization policy of the former mentioned organization. \(^{119}\) Consequently, over its own interests, Turkey indirectly contributes the convergence of Balkan countries to the European Union.

### 2.3.3. Limited South Caucasian partnership \(^{120}\)

In the early 2000s Turkey attempted to improve relations with the Russian Federation. As a result of opening diplomatic negotiations in 2003, the Gazprom became Turkey’s major gas supplier thus making Turkey a highly dependent state. Moreover, the two countries cooperate on Turkish territory including pipeline projects. \(^{121}\) As Turkey intends to become an energy hub between the South and the West it attempts to normalize its relations with the countries of the South Caucasus. But to achieve this goal it has to face Russia. The necessity of a cautious Turkish

---

\(^{116}\) Brljavac, 2011, 521-531.

\(^{117}\) Grabbe and Ülgen 2010, 2.

\(^{118}\) Benchev and Nikolaidis 2010, 476.

\(^{119}\) Öğuzlu 2010-11, 665. and Balcer 2013.

\(^{120}\) As the aim of this chapter is to briefly summarize the attempts of the Turkish foreign policy related to the European integration process, I will not focus on energy issues but only mention it regarding Turkish-Georgian relations.

\(^{121}\) According to Alexander Jackson, Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy import reaches 70% in 2010. See: Jackson 2010, 84.
foreign policy revealed during the Georgia-Russia war, in 2008. While Russia aimed to liberate South-Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgian suppression the Turkish foreign policy were tested at first time. Turkey offered the establishment of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) to resolve the problem. Without involving Western powers such as the UN, US or EU in the conflict resolution process, Turkey achieved to embrace Russia in negotiations but it had to keep in mind its energy dependence on the mentioned giant, thus it was not possible to dominate the process or play the role of mediator.\textsuperscript{122} Even if Turkish-Georgian relations are relatively good – considering the fact that Turkey is Georgia’s first supplier, that Turkey trained Georgian armed forces for NATO missiles, that Turkey founded military academies, reconstructed airbases and military bases\textsuperscript{123} – the Turkish government could not forgot its dependent position on Russia during the Georgia-Russia dispute. However, Turkey’s initiative, the CSCP was not effective in the conflict resolution, in a recent interview, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated that Turkey attempts to restore peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, which demonstrates Turkey’s aim to continue its plan and become mediator in conflict resolutions and peace-building processes thus increasing its regional power in the basin of the broader Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{124}

With Armenia and Azerbaijan Turkey’s relationship is rather complex. First of all, as Armenia significantly depends on Georgian economy, the war of 2008 caused several problems for the landlocked country. Secondly, the non-recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915 by the Turkish state makes the relations more controversial. However, after the explosion of the Georgian-Russo war, Turkey intended to harmonize relations through “football diplomacy”, as Turkish President, Abdullah Gül was invited to participate in a World Cup football event in

\textsuperscript{122} See Jackson 2010, or Winrow 2009, 1-16.
\textsuperscript{123} See Winrow 2010, 6.
Armenia. In 2009, the Parties were to sign two Protocols\textsuperscript{125} to normalize the relations, but adverse nationalist campaigns opposed the subscription in both countries, and the ignorance of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation made Armenia suspicious that Turkey would support Azerbaijan rather than Armenia related to the issue. However, relations were not closed, the parliamentary ratification of the Protocols were delayed.\textsuperscript{126} The ratification is complicated as the Protocols concern the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, if Turkey signs the Protocols it weakens relations with Azerbaijan. Consequently, the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relation not only depends on Turkey, but on a third country and external conflicts.

2.3.4. Moving into Africa and the MENA\textsuperscript{128} region

By defining a more opened foreign policy, Turkey gained new horizons and destinations. Due to a regional specific policy Turkey revitalized relations with African and Middle Eastern countries. Turkey's new, “zero problems with neighbours”\textsuperscript{129} foreign policy reached Africa and the MENA region.

2.3.4.1. Re-launching relations

In 2005, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared the “Year of Africa” and he visited the core important cities of the African Union. In 2007 a new initiative was launched to provide development aid to least developed countries including 33 African ones. The first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit took place in 2008. As a result, Turkey won a non-permanent seat for 2009-2010 in the Security Council of the United Nations due to the massive support of African countries. To boost economic relations, Turkey opened more and more

\textsuperscript{125} “Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and the “Protocol on Development of Relations”
\textsuperscript{126} Winrow 2010, 10.
\textsuperscript{127} Ülgen 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{128} MENA: Middle East and North Africa
\textsuperscript{129} Kibaroğlu 2012.
embassies on the continent, gain an observer status in the African Union, became member of the African Development Bank (among non-African members) and started to found the basis of a cooperation with the East African Community.

Alongside with the UN peacekeeping forces, Turkish armed troops were also deployed in military intervention.\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, Turkey aims to become a “long-term player in the field of humanitarian response.” In 2011, the AKP’s Prime Minister visited Somalia and a huge development program was started over, through which Turkey assisted in building infrastructure (roads, hospitals), assuring clean water and providing a generous full scholarship to Somalis wishing to study in Turkey. Turkey’s aid to Somalia in 2011 was almost $ 500 million.\textsuperscript{131} As a result of intensive economic relations and the growing interest of business associations,\textsuperscript{132} in 2011 Turkey’s export to Africa exceeded $ 10 billion (the main partners respectively are: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and South Africa), while the import were almost $ 9 billion.\textsuperscript{133} Considering Turkey’s poor relations with the continent during the Cold War these figures indicates significant positive changes. Africa might became an important partner for the Turkish Republic, not only because it provided economic perspective to emerging Turkish economy but it provided the possibility of establishing a challenging “new diplomatic portfolio” at a time when the integration into the European Union became uncertain.\textsuperscript{134}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{130} Wick 2011.\\
\textsuperscript{132} Business Associations interested in Africa are: Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD) and the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM). İbrahim Kalin: “Turkey in Africa,” \textit{Today’s Zaman}, January 9, 2013, \url{http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-303579-turkey-and-africa.html} (Accessed: May 14, 2013).\\
\textsuperscript{133} See: \url{http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=0} (Accessed: May 14, 2013).\\
\end{flushright}
2.3.4.2. Testing Turkey’s regional power

Turkey’s more independent foreign policy revitalized cooperation with neighbouring regions but not all Western allies welcomed it. For instance, due to its own regional interests March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly prohibited US troops to invade Iraqi territory through Turkey.\(^{135}\) Diverting its overall attention from the West to the Middle East in 2009, Turkey criticised Israel’s Gaza policy on the World Economic Forum, in Davos, because according to Turkey, Israel used too much force against Palestine. In 2010, after a maritime incident\(^ {136}\) – in which a ship, the Mavi Marmara, full with passengers sank – the Turkish-Israeli relations were frozen and Turkey accused Israel with “state terrorism”.\(^ {137}\) As a result, the Mavi Marmara incident seriously downgraded the relations between Turkey and Israel. Considering Iran, Turkey also has its own policy. In line with Brazil, Turkey played a mediator role to resolve the nuclear dispute and was not willing to apply Western-like sanctions against Teheran in 2010.\(^ {138}\) But the explosion of a revolution in Tunisia that had a domino effect in the Arab world gave another chance to test the Turkish “zero problem with neighbours” policy.

Competing with two regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Turkey had the opportunity to apply its foreign policy declared in 2008. Despite economic loss, Turkey supported the democratic transition of the revolutionary Tunisia that spread through the modern communication devices and social media to change the suppressing authoritarian regime. The transformational wave that characterized Eastern Europe and caused the collapse of the Soviet Union reached the Arab world where the young middle class claimed for more involvement into political decision.\(^ {139}\) Turkey welcomed the Arab uprising but when it reached Libya it became less

\(^{135}\) Öniş and Yılmaz 2009, 12.
\(^{136}\) A passenger ship that delivered humanitarian aid to the Gaza strip was scuttled by Israeli military thus 9 activist which whom 8 was Turkish were killed. See: Öniş 2010, 6.
\(^{137}\) Öniş 2010, 6.
\(^{138}\) Ibid., 6-7.
\(^{139}\) While in the case of the collapse of the Soviet Union the transition was rather peaceful, the revolutionary movement of the so-called Arab Spring claimed more civilian victims. But both transitions was due to an economic

38
supportive and even if Turkey joined NATO forces it did not take serious actions. But, in order to preserve its reputation in the Arab world and in the international community, Turkey supported the Western coalition and became more proactive. When the revolutionary wave reached Syria, Turkey stated criticism against the el-Assad regime but insisted to implement diplomatic resolution – due to its good relations (flexible visa regime, free movement of labour force established with Syria in the first decade of the 2000s).

Before the next parliamentary elections in Turkey, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Egypt and ensured the Egyptian Muslim population on Turkey’s support in Egypt transition to a secular state. During the elections the Turkish government did not care much about the consequences of the revolutionary spread, but after the glorious victory of the formal government, Turkey aligned with Western forces and supported sanctions against Syria and Iran.

2.4. Concluding remarks – Questioning Turkey’s regional power

While the negotiation about Turkish EU accession was open in 2005, within a year the European Council froze eight negotiation chapters due to the Turkish-Cypriot conflict. Refusing to open its ports towards a ship coming from the non-recognized Republic of Cyprus, Turkey violated the Agreement on the Customs Union. On the other hand, at the beginning of the Cypriot Presidency of the European Council in 2012, it was Turkey that froze the relations with the EU. Consequently, while the EU cannot present its own position on Turkish accession and find a compromise for member states in this question, the negotiation procedure will depend on the state of play instead of partnership development.

Focused its interest on the East instead of the Union in the last decade, Turkey started to fill the gap left fallow by the EU, the collapsed Soviet Union and unconcerned the United States. However, we have to admit that ten years was not enough even for a consolidated Turkey – in
downturn; the Soviet Union was drained out, while the Arab world was shocked by the global economic and financial crisis of 2008.

Öniş 2012, 45-63.
economic and political terms – to develop and implement a long term strategy on its near abroad.\textsuperscript{141} Despite its good relations with neighbours, frequently controlled by authoritarian regimes, with the uprising of the Arab Spring, Turkey had to choose between its own economic interests and the transition of its Arab neighbours.\textsuperscript{142} Continuing a soft foreign policy, Turkey declared again its commitment to Western values and supported the “peaceful transition”\textsuperscript{143} of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt and for the time being Syria.

In fact, none of the interfering powers (the EU, the US and Turkey) had have been able to respond the revolts in smart way, thus we could not evaluate the Turkish intervention as obvious result of becoming regional power. However, we have to admit that the incomplete “Turkish model” has several elements that uprising democratic governments could apply during the transformation of then-authoritarian regimes. The Western-like model that effectively combines modern democracy, liberal market economy and political Islam proves that Islam and democracy are compatible. Thus, the model can inspire other states in the region to follow the Turkish democratization and modernization process. For Egypt, the maintenance of the balance between the civil society and the armed force could be a positive example to follow. The political Islam and secularism that the AKP exercises could be a path for emerging Tunisian and Moroccan governing parties. In addition the Turkish model of economic development also could be applied through joint business associations and activities. The reconstruction of the banking sector, the resolution of urbanization problems due to growing population and young labour force are also parts of the success story of Turkish modernization.\textsuperscript{144} Subsequently, even though Turkey is still not capable to dominate the region of the Mediterranean, its role in the transformation of the region cannot be controverted.

\textsuperscript{141} Tocci 2012(a), 5-6.
\textsuperscript{142} Alessandri and Altinişik 2013.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{144} See also: Tocci 2012(b), 5-6, Alessandri and Altinişik 2013 or Ülgen 2011(a).
Considering the procrastination of the accession procedure, Turkey should pay more attention on European policies. The rediscovery of its region is vital for development and security but in order to break the deadlock of the negotiations, Turkey must be present on the European stage as well. We saw in this chapter, that on the one hand the foreign policy aspirations of Turkey slowed down the accession and on the other hand, in spite of economic development, the moderate adoption of EU policies influenced adversely the country’s European integration. Consequently, in the next chapter I will analyze how the EU and Turkey could boost negotiations, close eight years of reluctance and reinforce cooperation for mutual benefits.
CHAPTER 3 – THE FUTURE OF EU-TURKISH RELATIONS

Considering that 2014 will be the year of changes in the European Union – implementation of the multi-annual financial framework, renewal of the Commission, European Parliamentary elections, end of the mandate of the High Representative, Lady Catherine Ashton and the President of the Council, Herman Van Rompuy – given that Turkey proposed an end date to accession talks, and considering that Turkey attempts to become a regional power, the EU has to decide whether it is willing and able to cooperate on accession, or it will expect the time when Turkey becomes disinterested. Although, the latest option would not only adversely influence the EU-Turkish relations, but would undermine the credibility of the Union. Furthermore, it would diminish the attraction of the membership, namely the enlargement tool of the European foreign policy. In this chapter I will direct the focus on two main issues. In the first part I will highlight why the EU-Turkish strategic partnership would be advantageous for both parties, while in the second half of this chapter, I will analyze two alternative scenarios for EU-Turkish relations; one that would propose a “privileged partnership” and another in which Turkey and the European Union would share a “mutual neighbourhood” and would closely cooperate on strategic issues. In this way, I aim to propose alternatives based upon the findings of the previous chapters to break the deadlock of the negotiations.

3.1. Need for Strategic Partnership

Before observing the necessity and relevance of an EU-Turkey strategic dialogue, I will provide a brief overview on the role of the European Union in the Middle East and North Africa to highlight the weaknesses of the proposed programs and initiatives and to underline the benefits of Turkey’s involvement in the European neighbourhood policy due to previously

145 Grabbe and Ülgen 2010, 2.
successful joint missions. Secondly, I will analyze how the EU aims to boost cooperation with Turkey in 2012 through an enhanced energy partnership but I will also highlight why it was not manageable because of bad timing. And finally, I will describe the basis and the relevance of a possible strategic cooperation.

3.1.1. Europe in the Middle East and North Africa

While Turkey was rather reluctant\textsuperscript{146} regarding its direct neighbourhood during the Cold War period, the EU always maintained closer ties with former colonies of the Mediterranean basin. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War era, the EU intended to maintain stable relations with Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Declaration launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995 to enhance strategic and economic cooperation between the EU-15 and the Mediterranean Partner Countries\textsuperscript{147} without creating a common institutional system. In 2003, the EU established the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and besides Mediterranean countries focused on the new Eastern partners, like Ukraine and Belarus. Beyond economic cooperation the new initiative concentrated on the promotion of good governance and human rights.\textsuperscript{148} In contrast, the motto of the new framework was “everything but institutions”\textsuperscript{149} which meant that the ENP is a “membership-neutral” initiative, one of the biggest “carrot and stick” of the EU that does not promise membership in exchange for the adaptation of EU reforms.\textsuperscript{150} In 2008, the French Presidency of the European Council intended to revive stronger relations with the Mediterranean countries and re-launched the Barcelona Process under the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), but it focused on high level diplomacy instead of civil society engagement and business promotion.\textsuperscript{151} In fact, while the EMP

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{146} Altunişik 2011, 7-22.
\bibitem{147} Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
\bibitem{148} Hollis 2012, 82-83.
\bibitem{150} Benchev and Nikolaidis 2010, 476.
\bibitem{151} Rosemary Hollis 2012, 88.
\end{thebibliography}
and the UfM was created to Mediterranean countries the ENP focused on an extended neighbourhood including Eastern Europe, but in reality they did not concentrate on local issues or on the demand of the civil society. Ultimately, the goal of these initiatives was mainly to secure energy supply, to control illegal migration and to offer the EU’s conditionality thus securing the external borders of the Union.\footnote{Benchev and Nikolaidis 2010, 476.} Although, the EU renewed its neighbourhood policy in 2011, experts specialized in EU affairs already criticized it for its “new tools, old toolbox” approach as it promises money, markets and mobility and continues its “donor mentality” instead of involving locals into the planning and managing procedures.\footnote{Fernandez and Behr 2013. and Alessandri and Altinisik, 2013.} 

3.1.2. An enhanced EU-Turkey cooperation

A strategic cooperation was launched between the European Union and Turkey, in 2012, under the so-called Positive agenda\footnote{Turkey-EU Positive agenda, Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation, (12 June, 2012) \url{http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/doc/turkey/20120622_outline_of_enhanced_cooperation.pdf} (Accessed: November 10, 2012).}, to revitalize EU-Turkish relations and to enhance energy cooperation. The common framework focused on energy related issues, thus the parties agreed on long-term infrastructure cooperation considering the supply of fossil fuels (oil, gas) and electricity. They also agreed on regular exchange of information on both regional and global level. Even if the agreement included renewable energy promotion, the improvement of energy efficiency and the standardization of nuclear safety, the cooperation was not able to boost and re-launch the negotiation procedure. Most noteworthy, the timing of the Agenda came in a time when it could not reach outstanding results. The Agenda was set up in June 2012, and one month later, the EU-Turkish negotiations reached a deadlock as the Republic of Cyprus took the office of the Presidency of the European Council for the next six-month period.

However, the reinforcement of a strategic partnership could not only strengthen the foreign policy position of the EU or Turkey but could boost the accession procedure and could
result the opening of a new chapter, namely Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security and Defence Policy). In parallel with the proposal of the Future of Europe Group, supported by the foreign ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, the EU should enhance its role as a global player. Cooperating with Turkey on strategic issues could be incorporated in this framework through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the Union. The strategic dialogue would not only advocate the negotiation process on accession – including the decreasing reluctance of opposing member states –, but would also strengthen the position of the High Representative in external actions.

3.1.3. Dialogue on an EU-Turkey strategic partnership

The revolt of the Arab countries forced the EU to rethink its neighbourhood policy in the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). At a time of the financial and economic turmoil, the EU’s reaction was overdue and minimal and could not respond effectively to the imbalances of the regions. While the Arab societies rebelled against oppressive regimes in Tunisia, Libya and in Egypt, the EU as a whole hesitated to intervene. The United Kingdom and France were pushing for military intervention, but Germany insisted on a UNSC adopted solution.157

As we formerly saw, neither the EU nor Turkey was able to propose an ultimate solution for the events of the revolution uprising in the MENA region. However, the current HR, Lady Ashton, and the actual Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu already meet on biannual basis to negotiate the issues of the MENA and to encourage the accession talk. This cooperation

156 UNSC is for the United Nations Security Council.
157 Tocci 2012(b), 10.
could be reinforced if the two would find an “appropriate institutional mechanism”\textsuperscript{158} to work together on strategic issues concerning the common neighbourhood.

Instead of considering the Turkish foreign policy aspiration as a threat on European interests, the EU has to recognize the potentials of an EU-Turkish strategic dialogue. Due to Turkey’s active foreign policy in its neighbourhood, and the attractiveness of the “Turkish model”\textsuperscript{159}, the EU-Turkish cooperation would have a crucial role in the peaceful democratization of profoundly transforming countries after the Arab Spring. As a committed NATO member, Turkey already showed its military professionalism and also reinforced the “EU’s military and civilian capacities in crisis management.”\textsuperscript{160}

In 2004, Turkey deployed armed forces in the Operation EURFOR ALTHEA\textsuperscript{161} to ensure security and maintain peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to contribute to the peaceful democratic transformation of the country. The PROXIMA operation in Kosovo, the CONCORDIA in Macedonia or the EUPOL mission in Kinshasa conducted by the EU was also reinforced by Turkish soldiers and policemen.\textsuperscript{162} As a NATO member state\textsuperscript{163} Turkey also participated in military actions hors Europe and jointly with EU forces intervened in several countries (Congo, Western Balkans, Afghanistan and Sudan)\textsuperscript{164} in peace-making and keeping campaigns thus supporting the crisis management of the EU at the same time. In this regard, the effective cooperation of an EU-Turkish partnership is proved. Thus the involvement of Turkey in CSDP mission would be advantageous and another advice of the Foreign Ministers could be completed in parallel with the Turkish accession procedure, namely the reinforcement of the external borders of the Schengen area.

\textsuperscript{158} Graf Lambsdorff 2012, 52.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{160} Grabbe and Ülgen 2010, 8.
\textsuperscript{161} See: http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=132
\textsuperscript{162} Grabbe and Ülgen 2010,
\textsuperscript{163} Turkey has the second largest army within the NATO.
\textsuperscript{164} Turkey to Europe Future
Being transitory country along the Caspian and Arabian gas corridors, Turkey has potential chance becoming the energy hub of the region. Aligned the aforementioned policy recommendations of Foreign Ministers, with its attempt to establish a “more sustainable energy policy”, to “improve the energy efficiency” and to “define common external relations”, Turkey as a prospective energy hub and a candidate country cannot be left out.

Continuing with the analysis of the advices of the Foreign Ministers of the European Union who recommend the reinforcement of relations with strategic partners, and simultaneously propose the enhancement of the so-called Gymnich meeting I suggest that Turkey could be more involved in the common foreign and security policy of the EU. Considering that as candidate country Turkey has been attending some sessions of these informal meetings, and upon its candidacy, Turkey could join declaration on CFSP tasks. This forum would provide an excellent opportunity to involve Turkey in the decision-making of the EU on strategic issues, concerning the common neighbourhood and joint actions. However, for the time being, the Cyprus dispute blocks not only accession talks but the reinforcement of CFSP and CSDP cooperation. Moreover the island does not allow Turkey to participate “in EU discussions on sanctions against Syria.” On the other hand, while Cyprus is able to block Turkey accession to the European Union, Turkey is the one who can ban Cypruss’ accession to the NATO. Consequently, the arrangement of the Cypriot-Turkish dispute is mutual interest of the parties; for the EU to gain its credibility in the Mediterranean region, for Turkey to honour the Customs Union and to continue to maintain good neighbourhood policy.

\[166\] Grabbe and Ülgen 2010, 7.
\[167\] Graf Lambsdorff 2011, 52.
\[168\] Tocci 2012, 7.
3.2. Alternative scenarios of the EU-Turkey relations

In this section I will focus on two alternative scenarios that due to the previous challenges can influence the outcome of the EU-Turkish relations. The first scenario will be based on the German preferred “privileged partnership” that would be exhausted in economic cooperation upon the Customs Union, while the second proposition would lead to the boost of the negotiation procedure through the enhanced strategic cooperation on the common neighbourhood.

3.2.1. A “privileged partnership” with Turkey

The opponent position that countries like Germany, Austria or Cyprus represent against the Turkish accession to the European Union suggests that the EU has to rethink alternative relations that it could maintain with Turkey. To keep Turkey among neighbouring countries a privileged partnership was proposed by Germany over full membership. Suggesting that the EU would not able to absorb a Muslim country because of its cultural diversity and Islamic behaviour we can imagine Turkey’s relations with the EU through an economic partnership. In this case, experts propose two alternatives, which I will briefly summarize in the forthcoming section.

The “EEA Plus” could mean the amendment of the European Economic Area, that include countries who do not want or in the case of Turkey cannot be part of the European Union, but share common regulations, the privileges of the single market and common institutions. However, the current EEA members should also approve the Turkish accession which, for the time being is quite unlike. An other alternative could be the “Customs Union Plus”. In this form of cooperation the EU and Turkey would only share an integrated market but the partnership would exclude free movement of people and would not allow Turkey to participate in the decision-making system of the EU.\footnote{Böhler, Pelkmans and Selçuki 2012, 14-18.} However, experts admits that none of the
aforementioned partnership would offer Turkey an acceptable alternative as Turkey “does not ‘need’ the EU to implement reform in human rights and democracy; it can pursue them on the basis of its own convictions of ‘enlightened self-interest’.”170 Furthermore, to set a privileged partnership not only the EU’s attempt but Turkey’s approval is needed as well. And thus far, the Turkish government refused this option for several times. Furthermore, on a conference in 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the “EU will lose Turkey if it hasn’t joined by 2013.”171

Consequently, for the time being the privileged partnership is not an option over membership for Turkey. Even if Turks would not be so strict with the date of the accession, the statement of the Turkish Prime Minister clearly indicates that after eight years of negligence, Turkey wants a clear roadmap with concrete objectives and milestones without the pressure of member states’ internal policies.

### 3.2.2. Common framework on the mutual neighbourhood

Recently, new actors like Russia, China or South Korea appeared in the region and instead of promoting democracy concentrated their interest on economic issues with the MENA countries. Thus, reinforcing the existing trust between Turkey and the EU would create a flourishing environment for both of them and would create a more secure region which is compatible with democracy despite its religious background.172 Instead of a limited partnership it is most likely that the EU and Turkey will break the deadlock of the negotiation procedure and will concentrate on mutual interests to fulfil the Turkish accession procedure.173

In 2011, the European Union renewed its neighbourhood policy to respond the challenges occurred after the economic and financial crisis and the revolutionary movements of the Arab

---

170 Ibid., 18.
172 See Tocci 2012(b) and Alessandri and Altişık 2013
countries in the Southern neighbourhood. The renewed program introduced the “more for more” principle and beyond previous objectives it promised the improvement of people mobility and better economic integration to ensure access for partner countries to the internal market of the EU, through the establishment of Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs).  

Considering that Turkey intends to build close relations with Eastern European and Caucasian countries, that it is also interested in the creation of secured neighbourhood, that it is related to the Western Balkans through strong cultural and historic ties, that “Turkey will be a transit country for the new Southern Energy Corridor of the EU”, that the economic potential provides Turkey a place between OECD and G-20, and least but not last providing that the incomplete “Turkish model” can serve as an example worth to follow for transforming MENA countries, the strategic partnership of the EU and Turkey could be the key for the success not only in the establishment of a stable neighbourhood but in the re-launch of the accession talks. Experts also recommend the involvement of Turkey in the European neighbourhood policy. The most recent advices are the followings:

- The EU should involve Turkey in EU Taiex and Twinning programs thus building on Turkey’s previous experience in the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises, or the Turkish chamber of Commerce (TOBB). Through economic cooperation the “export of the aquis communautaire” would be achievable as well.

- The extension of the EU-Turkey Customs union to MENA countries would enhance trade and serve a good basis for the DCFTA plan of the European Union.

---

174 Štefan Füle 2011, 18-19.
175 Najšlová, Riháčková and Shumylo-Tapiola 2013.
176 Brljavač2011.
177 Štefan Füle 2011, 20.
178 Natalie Tocci 2012(b).
179 Tocci 2012(a), 19. and Balcer 2013, 5.
• To ensure greater security and to boost CSDP cooperation, Turkey should be involved in the “planning” of “military and civil operations”, “crisis-management” and “force generating process” of EU missions.  

As a result, the EU and Turkey could closely cooperate in regional intervention thus the MENA region, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe could become the object of a common interest. As the two already started negotiation on accession it could reinforce their engagement and enforce the democratization process not only in Turkey but in the whole neighbourhood.

Although, the reinforced cooperation would be fruitful for both parties there are several frozen conflict between the EU and Turkey that must be resolved in parallel with rapprochement. Two of these conflicts have to be resolved as soon as possible in order to preserve Turkey’s engagement to the EU and the EU’s credibility in the eye of prospective member states. First of all the Turkey-Cyprus dispute has to be ended. The conflict not only slows down any security related cooperation or complicates the accession procedure but decreases the credibility of the European Union. Secondly, the French-Turkish relations have to be normalized as both countries are interested in the stabilization of the MENA countries, especially, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Moreover, the divided intervention of European countries instead of a joint EU mission also indicates that the EU is not able to create common position in case of emergency as they do not share their enshrined foreign policies.

3.3. Conclusions

To break the deadlock of the accession procedure, the parties first should clarify whether they both willing to continue negotiations towards membership or they would rather favour another form of cooperation. We saw in this chapter that an enhanced Turkey-EU partnership would be advantageous for both parties, as the Union’s current neighbourhood policy cannot

---

180 Grabbe and Ülgen 2010, 10.
181 Balcer 2013, 5.
announce enough engagements to neighbouring countries. As I observed through the analysis of the Positive agenda, and the successful CSDP cooperation a closer relationship could be supported by both parties, but the timing of such a framework is essential considering existing conflicts that can slow down or even freeze relations between negotiating partners. Finally, I suggested two scenarios as alternatives for EU-Turkish relations. Thus we saw that the privileged partnership over membership is not an option for the current Turkish government and Turkey would rather cease cooperation with the EU than accept anything else but membership. However, Turkey’s complete secession from the EU is questionable because of close economic relations. Based upon previous findings and the consequences of the renewed European neighbourhood policy, in parallel with the uprising of Arab countries, I suggested a more advantageous scenario working on a common framework related to mutual neighbours that could not only foster economic integration of the MENA region but would also move from the near standstill condition of the accession negotiations towards activity. The goals and power of the new Commission and European Parliament will determine whether Turkey is able to join in the next decade. But, considering the realistic aspects of both Turkey’s and the Union’s foreign policy the cooperation on the mutual neighbourhood would provide a basic elements of external affairs, namely to provide the greatest security possible in an anarchic international system.
CONCLUSION

The aim of the thesis was to detect those independent variables that are responsible for the procrastination of the accession negotiation from both the European Union’s and Turkey’s part. To identify these factors, I divided my research into two main parts. On the one hand, I analyzed the recent events and factors influencing the policy making of the European Union in the last ten years. Thus, I can assume that the European integration process was slowed down due to several determinants. Firstly the deepening phase of the integration and its crisis redirected the Union’s attention away from the Turkish accession. However, when the integration reached a deadlock inside, the technocrat of the EU rediscovered the potentials of the neighbours, by the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries and by the opening of the accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. Although, the beginning of the new EU-Turkish relations promised the convergence of the Christian Europe with the Muslim Turkey, the crisis generated firstly by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, then by the global economic and financial crisis redirected the EU’s focus to internal issues. In addition, the “politicization of the Turkish question” and the influence practiced by the member states upon their own geopolitical interests also undermined fruitful relations. As a result, we can assert that one of the main variables that delayed the negotiations is based on the definition (whether the Union should focus on deepening or widening phase) and the implementation of the European integration that divide the member states and affected the enlargement procedure.

In the second chapter of the thesis I highlighted how the negligence of the European Union and the global vision of the current governing Turkish party caused a shift in Turkish foreign policies. In this way, the modernization process, thus the convergence to the EU slowed down, but due to international circumstances (orphan countries of the Balkans and the Caucasus, instable neighbourhood, revolt of the Arab countries) Turkey – remaining engaged to the West – was able to rediscover its own regional opportunities. Due to its constant development Turkey
proved that democracy and Islam are compatible thus providing alternatives for newly forming Arab countries. Even if the model is still incomplete, Turkey has a great role in the transformation of the MENA region. On the one hand, the achievements of Turkey are very positive but on the other hand, its assertive foreign policy firstly turned Turkey’s attention away from the EU accession to regional challenges, and secondly its emerging power threatened the opposing European member states with its growing influential power. Consequently, the expansion of the Turkish perspective could only be successful if it does not lose focus, and remains on the path of dynamic modernization.

The goal of the third part of the thesis was to offer alternatives to revitalize the EU-Turkish relations thus boost the negotiation procedure and break the deadlock that characterized the last years. As a result, I proposed a strategic cooperation that could be advantageous for both the EU and Turkey which could benefit from the transformation of the Mediterranean region. Thus, the EU could use more effectively its tools (democracy promotion, financial aid, good governance, etc.) through Turkey’s experience and diplomatic relations.

Considering that the current relations are mainly based on the external interest of the member states and Turkey, we can state that the procrastination of the negotiations not only affect adversely the Turkish accession but can influence the whole enlargement procedure. Without a concrete policy focus, or in other words motivation, neither the EU, nor Turkey can establish an effective enlargement policy. If partners do not clarify their common goals, public support cannot be expected. As governments change constantly, the prolongation of the negotiations threats with decreasing interests in the accession procedure. In order to boost the enlargement process the partners should establish a roadmap, with milestones and reference points. If, a concrete date could not be determined in this phase, 2023, a date proposed by the Turkish Prime Minister, could serve as basis.
The success of the Turkish negotiations is not only the core interest of Turkey, but is of
the European Union to regain credibility in the neighbouring region, among candidate and
prospective candidate countries, and to increase its international power in the global anarchic
arena. Thus, the question of the Turkish accession in the European integration is not basically
related to political or economic issues, cost-benefit analysis or the conditionality criteria of the
EU. If the EU fails to integrate Turkey because it defines Europe on a religious basis, it will mean
that a lot of European countries (Western Balkans, Ukraine, Belarus, and South Caucasus) do not
have a place in the Community. And it was definitely not the core intention of the founding
fathers or those of current member states.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and articles:


Other electronic sources:


European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs. 

European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs. 


Kern, Soeren. “Muslim voters change Europe.” Gatestone Institute, International Policy Council, 


Ministry For EU Affairs, Republic of Turkey.


Turkey-EU Positive agenda, Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation, (12 June, 2012)
