ON SOCIOCIDE: (NEO)COLONIAL PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE PALESTINIAN WEST BANK

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Abstract
In this a study of sociocide in the Palestinian West Bank. It consists of two parts. Part I shows how Palestinian 'history' is made/created-destroyed/erased, in addition to showing the role of history within the colonial context. Part II discusses the Palestinian present and is made up of 3 chapters; Economy and Growth considers how economic and growth statistics are made to look in order to give the illusion of development. The Humanitarian Statistics chapter reflects upon differing mapping of human conditions yield differing results. Finally Numbers within their Political Context contemplates how both humanitarian and economic statistics are effected by political changes and how these changes effect the population. Overall Part II shows how enumerative processes are used to create illusions that enable the continuation of sociocide.
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Finally, to those who fight power with conviction and live daily chained in darkness, tomorrow will bear the light of freedom.
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Introduction

In Abdul-Jawwad’s theory of Sociocide, Abudul-Jawwad defines socio-cide as “the gradual undermining of the communal and psychological structures of Palestinian society in order to compel the Palestinians to leave by other means”. As such, he lists 4 characteristics that make up the sociocidal practices: 1. Destruction of the Palestinian economy, 2. Decimation of Palestinian national spirit and identity, 3. Depriving Palestinians of their political and civil rights, 4. Transform Palestinian daily life into an endless chain of hardship.

In this sense, one may think that Abdul-Jawwd left nothing out, yet I argue the opposite. I see that the socio-cide theory has two problems; the first is that it was written in 1986 as a place specific theory relating to the Israeli occupation of the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT). Therefore if one were to look at the developments of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since 1986, much seems to have changed and new actors have come in. Indeed the reality of the Palestinian West Bank (WB) that Abdul-Jawwad makes clear in his initial work has all but changed today, although does this still make his theory still hold? In addition to the changes in the situation today, much of the information about the past that was not acknowledged at that time, has recently become clearer, this point will be made clearer below.

Second, the sociocide theory fails to take into consideration the concept of numbers in the colonial imagination. This of course is related to the new situation on the ground, the existence of the Palestinian Authority, the presence of IGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations), and the continued military occupation of the oPT, with the developments entailed to its continued status.
Although the sociocide theory has so far been depicted as a theory that ‘lacks’, this is not the intention here. Rather it is seen by this author as the most relevant theory used to describe the Palestinian reality. The intention of this work is to show the shortcomings of the theory, in order to both update it and advance it by bringing new aspects to it.

This work is divided into two main parts. The first part, the Palestinian Past, I hope to show how ‘history’ is made/created-destroyed/distorted, and how that plays into the concept of sociocide. While in the second part, the Palestinian Present, I hope to show how certain forms of knowledge production are used to mask reality and enable sociocide to continue unchallenged. Finally, both the results of Part I and Part II will be joined in the conclusion of this work.
Literature Review and Methodology

Methodology

In this work, two different approaches were taken in order to attain material. Part I talks about the Palestinian Past, yet in Palestinian history is no easy topic to research. Indeed Palestinian History as will be seen further on in the text, is a contested topic. Yet the particulars of this research allowed for a narrow look at Palestinian history. The chapter on the Palestinian Past focuses on 3 main points: the looting of Palestinian Books from the homes of Palestinians in the 1948 Nakbeh, the confiscation of the PLO archives in the 1982 Israeli siege on Beirut and the 2002 sacking of ministries, cultural centers ect… in Ramallah, and an overview on the new historians.

Each of the three focuses required differing sources. The 2002 invasion of Ramallah by the Israeli Army and the New Historians were both topics that had an abundance of material that was easily accessible. Although the Nakbeh has an abundance of Palestinian Authors who wrote differing aspects of it, from Walid Khalidi (Khalidi 1998), to Sharif Kanaana (Kanaana 1992 ), to Nur Masalha (Masalha 2012). The 1948 book confiscation, historically, would have been an enormous effort to bring to light had it not been for the Aljazeera documentary which was aired in 2012. While the 1982 siege of Beirut had an abundance of material, although relatively little material on the specific event of the PLO archives appropriation.

Part II had an abundance of sources yet also included difficulties. The main difficulty came with the statistical data. First, changes to the official website of the PCBS made data retrieval much more difficult. Initially, the PCBS had long lists not just of their
results, but cross-tabulation. The cross-tabulation allowed for a constant to be seen
with changing variables. For example if one were too look at education, one could
find differing tables that took into consideration sex, age group, locality, place of
residence etc…. Yet since the 2012 the PCBS updated its website, and cross-
tabulation tables were removed.

In addition to the above, often, when I attempted to recalculate the PCBS results by
manually adding up results, the results were not completely accurate. This has led me
to believe that some results may be rounded off.

Another difficulty arose when accessing the reports on the PCBS website. Many of
the reports had some form of corrupted software. There was little difference if the
format chosen was .doc or .pdf, nor was there a difference if it was an Arabic
language version or an English language version. Rather, usually what did survive the
software corruption were the tables and graphs but not the texts. This is undoubtedly
not a problem that I would have had to endure had I been capable of researching in
the field as the main PCBS office could have been visited and the required results
attained.

Second, differing bodies reach differing statistical results, based on different
categorization. For example, the term ‘West Bank’: West Bank was the geographical
body occupied by the Israeli army in 1967, this geographical body included the
eastern part of the City of Jerusalem at the time. Today, some statistics are carried out
without East Jerusalem, others with. Which is which is usually hard to assume, and
needs explicit statement by the issuing body. Other times, like the case of the PCBS,
East Jerusalem is sometimes included in statistics on the West Bank, and at others is mentioned independently.

What adds yet another layer of complexity is that some bodies reference others. For example, I came across an OCHA report that stated the number of Palestinians in the West Bank. The source of OCHA’s reference was UNRWA, which in turn had referenced that number from the PCBS. Hence every reference used by a body had to be traced until the initial source was found.

Then there was the topic of contradicting numbers. A case example of this is the number of current PA employees. Differing sources leave the number anywhere between 153,000 and 180,000. Although there is the issue of roughly 10,000 employees in the Gaza Strip, which were employed during the period of the Unity Government, and after the Gaza-West Bank rift became a problem as the PA refused to pay their salaries. Yet that still leaves 17,000 employees unaccounted for between the minimum and the maximum amount.

**Literature Review**

In terms of the literature, the peculiar state that is the PA required reading into several schools of thought. As neither a state, nor completely institutional-less, any study revolving around the PA requires multi-disciplined look. In this sense, writing on the West Bank required looking at both colonial and post-colonial works. While a Foucaultian approach was needed to both in analysis of power and for deconstruction of constructs. Finally, a look was taken into works related to Palestine.
In terms of colonial and post-colonial theory, the main theorists used were Franz Fanon and Achile Mbembe. Although other colonial and post-colonial authors were reviewed; from Fredrick Cooper, to Ella Shohat (Shohat 1992), Ania Loomba (Loomba 1998), and Depish Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty 2000), Fanon (F. Fanon 1968) and Mbembe (Mbembe 2001) were the essential authors in regard to this text. Fanon was used to analyze the colonial aspects of the colonization of Palestine. As Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth is the classic of colonial studies, such a cornerstone could not be overlooked in terms of both his cultural dialectics and the clinical manner of analyzing colonial power.

While Mbembe’s works on the post-colony proved to be of most relevance. Mbembe’s ability to examine the many forms of violence by post-colonial states was unparalleled. Particularly, state apparatuses creation of relations of dependence with which the population had to operate through. No other work was found that could posit such relations of violence and patriarchy which makes up the relation between the former anti-colonial movement that later became the state, and the people who became subjects. Although the works that have been mentioned above were seen as the most relevant, Palestine does not fit neatly within the colonial or post-colonial theory. This is more to do with the nature of Zionist colonization than anything else, which will be seen later in the text.

While in terms of analyzing the many actors active in Palestine a Foucaultian approach was used. Governmentality is ever present throughout Part II of this work. It was used to look at the many differing, conflicting, and overlapping relations of power of the many actors and agents in the West Bank. In this sense, the inspiration to this method was Tania Murray Li’s ‘The Will to Improve’. While Foucaultian
deconstruction of economy was used in the Economy chapter. In this sense Timothy Mitchell was essential (Mitchell, Fixing the Economy 1998). Although there are many works by Foucaultian scholars on economy, Mitchell was used for 2 main reasons. First, Mitchell, in his ‘Fixing the Economy’, deconstructs the whole basis of economy, which also gives clear reference to growth. This in and of itself gives his argument a powerful hold on the reader. Second, the applicability of such a deconstruction was fitted for analysis of a middle eastern countries economy. As his ‘Fixing the economy’ was written to analyze Egyptian communities. In addition to Mitchells cornerstone work on colonialism ‘Colonizing Egypt’ (Mitchell 1991), which gives additional insight to his later work.

Finally, the works related to Palestine are many and follow several theories or even no theories at all. The mixture of writers ranges from people to transnational organization, to websites of engaged individuals. From Sara Roy (Roy 1995), Joseph Massad (Massad 2006), to Shabbakeh Policy Advisors (Al-Shabaka n.d.), Jadaliyya (Jadaliyya n.d.), OCHA (OCHA n.d.), the World Bank (World Bank n.d.), and the New Historians. All these publications, books, researches etc… were used and analyzed for this thesis.

In summery, all of the above works will be found throughout this work. In hopes that this work will do justice to those whose works I have used.
Chapter 1: Palestinian Past

Abdul-Jawwad states that the ‘decimation of national spirit and identity’ is one of the methods of sociocide. Yet the underlying fact is that in order to sustain a ‘national spirit’ or ‘national identity’, you need a ‘national history’.

Yet any history of a ‘third world’ country is problematic. Or as Dipesh Chakrabarty states “third world historians feel the need to refer to works in European History” (Chakrabarty 2000). In this sense, it is that the history of the non-European is always that of the ‘other’. That which ultimately ties into the particular historical epoch that came with colonialism. Yet does colonialism merely ‘come in’? Does it not change the pattern of life of the colonized? Does it not change the way of thought of the colonized, or the way s/he sees her/himself? Franz Fanon states “Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip […] it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it” (F. Fanon 1967).

As shown by Fanon, the antagonism that exists, the ‘cultural dialectics’ is that of colonialism attempting to distort the history of the oppressed, and the colonized intellecsgtia attempting to re-learn/teach their tradition. This antagonism leads to a third result according to Fanon, that which some native traditions are carried on, but also with new ideals introduced through colonialism, to produce a new ‘national culture’ (F. Fanon 1967). In this sense, when one looks at the traditions of anti-colonial struggle, one finds that, both colonialism and the nationalist movements that opposed it, played a vital role in the production of nationalism and the modern nation state (Loomba 1998) (Shohat 1992 ). So one could assume that although the native
intellegentsia fought the concepts and ideals of colonialism that sought to destroy and/or distort their history and culture prior to colonialism, they still worked within the discourse of colonialism. For the native intellectual wrote to defend the history and culture of the colonized people, of the colonized nation, even though most cases of colonialism that took place, had no prior nation –at least in the modern nation-state sense.

Yet how are vague entities like ‘history’, ‘culture’, and ‘identity’ made, reified, or destroyed? As stated by Rolph Trouillot: “Historical narratives are premised on previous understandings, which are themselves premised on the distribution of archival power” (Stroler 2002). Here we come to some events which Abdul-Jawwad’s text predates, and other events that although predated Abdul-Jawwad’s work, nonetheless remained unknown or unrecognized until very recently. Three main events are worthy of mention here: the ‘great book robbery’ in 1948, the taking of the PLO National Archives in 1982 and the 2002 ransack of the Palestinian Ministry of Culture (MoCulture), and the ‘New Historians’ and the Israeli Archives.

1.1. Great Book Robbery

Recently, Aljazeera aired the documentary “the Great Book Robbery” (Aljazeera 2010). The documentary was the work of Israeli-Dutch Benny Bruner and documents the looting of books owned by Palestinians. The taking of these books was during the Nakbeh, in 1948, where the Israeli National Library (of the Hebrew University) sent librarians out with the (then newly established) Israeli Army who was taking Palestinian villages, neighborhoods, and cities. The result was 70,000 books taken from private Palestinian homes and institutes. The list of these books was initially
found by an Israeli student, Gish Amit, who stated “It is the paradoxical structure of any archive: the place that preserves the power and organizes it is also the place that exposes the violence and wrongdoing. In this respect, the archive is a place that undermines itself”. Amit found the list while working on his PhD in the years 2005-09. This in and of itself holds much of the Palestinian history, heritage, and identity of its time, and the times before even the British mandate began. Of the 70,000 books, 30,000 are today still preserved in the Israeli National Library. In addition to other forms of documentation like photo galleries.

In relation to this work, there are two points from the documentary that are worthy of notice: First, the statements of historian Ilan Pappe\(^1\): “The confiscation and appropriation of the spiritual assets of the Palestinian people, in my mind, is not different from the appropriation of the land the territory the natural resources, everything you want except one thing… the people themselves” (min 35:00). This comment correlates with that of Roy in her view

“Zionist ideology […] (is) distinguished from other forms of colonialism. By restricting capitalist relations to Jewish owners and workers, the Zionists did not fulfill “the historically progressive function of colonialism –the generalization of the capitalist mode of production. Moreover the Zionist interest in Arab land rather then Arab people, of which labor exclusivism was a critical expression, is perhaps the most important factor distinguishing Israeli colonialism from its European counterparts” (Roy 1995)

Pappe’s second statement: It [the appropriation of the Palestinian Books] was done to defeat the Palestinian narrative, it was part of the *orientalist production of knowledge*

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\(^1\) Pappe and other Israeli historians will be discussed in more detail in the part of this work titled ‘New Historians’.
that demonized the Arab, that demonized Islam, through the total Palestinian oblivion, *tried to erase the Palestinian out of history*” (min 36:00-37:00) (italics my own).

Hence, Pappe believes that the robbery of Palestinian books is the ‘appropriation of the spiritual assets’ of the Palestinian people. Within the framework of his understanding of the Israeli colonial system: as a system that is not interested in the Palestinian people, but rather Palestinian land and resources. In addition to the confiscation and looting of cultural heritage and historical documents being part of an attempt to defeat a Palestinian discourse, and erase Palestinians out of history. This very much fits in with Fanon’s observation of colonialism distorting, disfiguring, and destroying the history and culture of the colonized.

The second point that is worthy of notice are the documents of the National Library itself, of which translations appear in the documentary, the first is: “if a decent share of these books is given to the national library our research capacity would significantly expand” and “First we must take in books we don’t already have, as for the rest we are mostly interested in classic literature (min 36:00). Second is the statement: The oriental department surpasses any similar institutions in the near east” (min 37:00).

Hence if we were to apply cultural dialects to this, we come to an interesting result. The cultural assets of the colonized are confiscated and destroyed, denied their original owners, which is effectively erasure of Palestinian national history. Then when looking how the books made the oriental department of the Israeli National Library ‘surpass any similar institutions in the near east’ we see that with the
destruction of the “indigenous” culture, an increase in the capabilities of colonial knowledge production arise. Giving the colonizers intellectual control of discourse and historical narrative. Therefore the “orientalist production of knowledge”, mentioned by Pappe, can only come about when the history, documents, and representation of the colonized have been appropriated by the colonizer. The product is the development, specialization, and capacity of the institutes of the colonizer, built on not just the bones, but also on the history and culture, of the colonized.

1.2. Palestinian Archives and Libraries: 1960-Present

Neither the Nakbeh nor the ‘Great Book Robbery’ has stopped Palestinians from insisting on their historical narrative. Although dispossessed, scattered, and to this day in almost every effective way either colonized or refugees, Palestinians have continued to try and reconstruct their history. Although there are many ways in which they have fought to re-create, remake, and/or reclaim, Palestinian history, culture, and identity, for matters of space and time I will only elude to systematic attempts by Palestinian institutes as apposed to all the others. In addition to that, I will also show only the large scale Israeli attacks on such institutes, even though there were, and still are, many other ways that throughout the years have allowed the Israeli establishment to confiscate Palestinian cultural heritage. For the matter at hand, the examples given below are seen to be sufficient to illustrate the point at hand.

1.2.1. PLO Archives

The PLO, which was established in 1964 to be the representative body of the Palestinian people, established its own research center. The Palestine Research Centre, which aimed to document and archive Palestinian history and culture. But in
the 1982 siege of Beirut, the Israeli Army looted the Palestinian National Archive from the PLO Research Center, which was located in Beirut. At the time it was recorded that 25,000 volumes in Arabic, English, and Hebrew were taken, in addition to manuscripts, microfilms, and archives (Hijazi 1982).

Although little is documented about this particular event, the New York Times Archives has been instrumental for this work and without it no known references to this specific event would have been found.

In terms of the NYT archives, it seems that the first author to write about the PLO archives was Ihasan Hijazi. Hijazi wrote for the NYT on Lebanon from the 1966 till 1993. Yet the Hijazi October 1st 1982 article “Israeli Looted Archives of P.L.O. Officials Say” seemed to have gone without drawing much controversy. In the article, Ihasan quotes Dr. Sabri Jaryas, the then director of the center: “they have plundered our Palestinian cultural heritage”. It was a straightforward article that directly addressed the issue of the PLO research center, their archives and documents.

Another NYT piece, by David Shipler, drew responses that were enlightening for the topic at hand.

The February 20th article by Shipler titled “A Blind Spot Shows in the Jewish State” talked about the underlying rejection of Israeli society to accept the nationalist aspirations of the Palestinian National Movement. Yet in the article, a Meron Benvenisti who is interviewed by Shipler brings up the topic the PLO archives. Benvenisti, who was the former deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, commented on the looting of the PLO archives:
‘This was not only to destroy them [the PLO] as a political or a military power, but also to take from them their history, to erase that because it is troublesome. This was a profound need or urge not to allow the Palestinians to be a respectable or historic movement.’ (Shipler 1983)

In a response written to Shipler’s article and Benvenisti comments, American literary Cynthia Ozick [in a ‘letter to the editor’] stated that the archives were really a PLO intelligence center. Following cues from official Israeli press releases, Ozick stated “the center compiled personal files on high-ranking Israeli military officers, monitored Israeli police, military and civilian radio and television broadcasts”, and continued to claim that the center was a clearing house for exchange of information between terrorists world wide. She also stated that the faculty of the center, like Sabri Jaryas had ties with PLO terrorist groups.

In response to Ozick’s “What the PLO call a cultural-archives”, a group of academics issued their own ‘letter to the editor’, titled “Bona Fide Archives of Palestinian History” (AHMAD, et al. 1983). The signatures of the letter were Eqbal Ahmad, Richard Bulliet, Irene Gendzier, Don Peretz, George Saliba, and Stuart Schaar. In their response they state:

‘As individuals engaged in Middle East studies, we wish to state that the Palestine Research Center had been a most valuable resource for the study of Palestinian history and culture. Access to it had been easy and open. Miss Ozick correctly states that the center had profiles on Israeli leaders and records of Israeli television and radio broadcasts. It also had profiles of other
world leaders, including Arabs, and broadcasts from other countries on
Palestine-related matters. These are standard holdings for a research library.’
(AHMAD, et al. 1983 )

This response also brought to light an update to the news of the looting. It stated
“after the Israeli authorities had removed the library and archives of the re-
search center, and while its staff was trying to reconstitute the library, it was bombed”. The
letter goes on to state “We are deeply saddened by the destruction of an educational
institution that housed the archives, family records and manuscripts of an ancient
people and has been useful to several of us”. The letter ends with an appeal to the US
government to ensure the Israeli government return the library and archival material
to their rightful holders (AHMAD, et al. 1983 ).

1.2.2. Operation Defensive Shield
The sacking of the MoCulture came during Operation Defensive Shield, where the
Israeli Army besieged Palestinian cities throughout the West Bank. Although the
MoCulture was not the only institute attacked, it had the Palestinian national achieves
which the PLO had started re-gathering in the MoCulture since 1994. The ministry at
the time recorded the loss of ‘an invaluable library, art gallery, and artifacts of
historical importance’ (International Responsibilities Task Force 2002 ). The report
also lists the MoCulture as just one of 14 places where libraries and archives
belonging to Palestinian municipalities, universities, cultural centers, and ministries
were taken, destroyed, or vandalized.
Of the other Palestinian Government Institutes attacked, with material confiscated, and vandalism and destruction heavily present, were: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and Trade, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Central Bureau of Statistics. (International Responsibilities Task Force 2002)

According to media sources several libraries and cultural centers were also looted or vandalized during the offensive. Of the recorded cases in Operation Defensive Shield were cultural institutes attacked, libraries attacked, and civil society organizations attacked. Finally, there were also the attacks on radio stations, tv stations, an insurance company, a commerce room, and universities (International Responsibilities Task Force 2002). The list includes 19 attacks on places categorized as governmental, and 14 attacks on non-governmental libraries and archives. Although not even all the archives and libraries were specifically Palestinian, the list also mentions the Greek Cultural Center-Macedonia and the French Cultural Center. Although the compiled list is not claimed to be comprehensive, and is based on news reports published at the time. The list can be found in Appendix A.1.

In 2011, Birzeit University launched its ‘Palestine Archives Project’². Here what is of relevance from the above stated are the constant attempts of Palestinians to write their own history, and the constant use of colonial military violence to erase this history. If we take the statement that “Archives as both transparencies on which power relations are inscribed and intricate technologies of rule themselves” (Stroler 2002) we can also claim that the erasure of archives are also power relations and intricate technologies

² www.awraq.birzeit.edu
of rule. Yet does this mean that the “previous understandings” that are assumed on the “distribution of archival power” which premise the historical narratives – that Trouillot talked of - can no longer be reached if such archives no longer exist?

Here the answer is both a yes and a no. Yes because what is lost can no longer be found again in the same manner it previously was. Yet rarely is archival material read in the manner they were intended. Indeed most re-visiting of archival materials constitutes a re-reading. Here we come to reading archives ‘against the grain’ or ‘with the grain’ (Stroler 2002) yet to constitute a critical understanding of what was or wasn’t and how and why certain events were stated in the manner they were in any archives. What differs in the Palestinian context isn’t that there is an archive to read against or with the grain, it is that there is no Palestinian archive present. Hence one would assume that that would mean reading the Israeli archives would answer the questions needed. Yet that is not so simple, as will be shown in the next section.

1.3. The New Historians

The ‘New Historians’ are a group of historians who in the late 80’s started writing books that challenged the predominant Zionist historiography on Israel. The new historians were enabled to write their works due to the declassifying of archival material in the late 70’s (Shapira 1995). The new historians challenged the Zionist historical version of the founding of the state of Israel and focused mainly on the years 1947-1952. Due to the also existing debates at the time in Israel on post-modernism, those who were critical of “Israel and its policies were dubbed ‘post-Zionists’” (Shapira 1995) in the press. Although the new historians, ranged greatly in both their interpretation of the material accessed from the Israeli archives, and their
focus and view about the state of Israel, Zionism, and the Palestinian Nakbeh. What is the focus here is that Israeli historians after accessing Israeli archives reached some conclusions about the 1948 war that the Palestinians had long insisted. In this sense, what can be seen as the ‘Palestinian Narrative’: the claims of forced expulsion, of asymmetrical Zionist fighting capabilities, massacres and rape, were also claimed by Israeli historians.

This reading of the Israeli archives to reach such a conclusion gave much support to claims held by Palestinians for decades. Although, it is worthy of note that it was not necessarily the intention of all the new historians. Some of them are to this day demanding political solutions based on humanist stances. Others used the very same archives to justify what Zionist and Israeli forces did in the ‘Nakbeh’ along the lines of necessary evils. What is of interest to this thesis is not the debates and stances of these historians, but rather two things: first, the responses of institutes of power to dissentience within Israeli academia, and second the Israeli Archives.

In the case of new historian Ilan Pappe, “By the time he left the University of Haifa, he had been condemned in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset; the minister of education had publicly called for him to be sacked; and his pictures had appeared in the country's biggest-selling newspaper at the centre of a target. Next to it, a popular columnist addressed his readers thus: ‘I'm not telling you to kill this person, but I shouldn't be surprised if someone did.’” (Arnot 2009). While in the case of the Political Science Department of Ben Gurion University, which was accused of being anti-Zionist (Nesher 2012), it was almost closed (Rose and Rose 2013).
Second; the Israeli National Archives. According to a recent work, the de-classified documents used by the New Historians have been reclassified. The previous statement came from a Ph.D. Student in NYU, to quote at length:

‘Most files relating to the 1948 Palestinian exodus remain sealed in the Israeli archives, despite the fact that their period as classified files – according to Israeli law – expired long ago. Even files that were previously declassified are no longer available to researchers. In the past two decades, following the powerful reverberations triggered by the publication of books written by those dubbed the “New Historians,” the Israeli archives revoked access to much of the explosive material. Archived Israeli documents that reported the expulsion of Palestinians, massacres or rapes perpetrated by Israeli soldiers, along with other events considered embarrassing by the establishment, were reclassified as “top secret.” Researchers who sought to track down the files cited in books by Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim or Tom Segev often hit a dead end.’ (Hazkani 2013)

In addition to reclassification, as of October 2012, the Israeli State Archives officially closed until further notice due to licensing problems. According to news sources the archives had been operating for 19 years in a building without the proper licensing permits (Hasson 2012 ), seeing as how the state archives operate directly under the Prime Ministers office, that is newsworthy information indeed. The closure was expected to last a couple of months. As of the writing of this work it was yet to be opened.
1.4. Conclusion

In conclusion to the above we see certain patterns. First, Palestinian history, and society as a whole, was uprooted in the 1948 Nakbeh. This confiscation of Palestinian cultural heritage while displacing the population has left the Palestinians who became refugees torn from both their land and history. The continued onslaught on Palestinian attempts to archive their history is a constant attempt to control historical discourse and stop the development of national identity and culture. The use of military force to ensure this erasure is a marker of the resolve of colonial forces to maintain not merely physical control, but also control of discourse and history of the colonized.

Although it is also important to point out that within Israeli society attempts to bridge the gaps of Israel’s historiography have brought vital information to light and strengthened Palestinian claims. Yet even here state (and semi-state) power have intervened to either silence discontent or end ability to access documents needed to make and sustain claims. Although the new historians may have published many works, no new works can be done without more access to the Israeli archives, which even if the official offices are open (which they inevitably will be), the re-classified, and the never-yet-declassified documents make more research into the topic even more difficult. This is not to say that the Israeli archives as a whole cannot be accessed, on the contrary they can and are. What it does say is that the part of the Israeli archives that relate to the issue of Palestinian disposition are not accessible, with the exception of the period between the initial works of the new historians until re-classification. Censorship even of alternative views to mainframe Zionism ideology within Israeli society. Hence no archives to read against or with the grain, only the view of the dominant, military-victorious, and powerful remains as the
accepted and dominant narrative and historiography. This does not mean “the subaltern cannot speak” (Spivak 1988), nor is that the point of this work. Rather, it means that the knowledge of the colonized is denied them by their colonizer, by power of arms and power of bureaucracy.
Chapter 2: Palestinian Present

In this chapter, I will show how different agencies use numbers to achieve specific aims and convey messages. Although these differing agents have different messages, the point of this is to show that regardless of their differences, the use of such enumeration - knowingly or unintentionally - covers up, distorts, and disfigures the sociocidal reality of the West Bank. This will be done by looking at the theoretical aspects underlying statistics, how they are enforced, and to what ends by applying them to examples in the West Bank.

Enumeration and statistical data have long been scrutinized by sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and within the wider field of academia. Talal Asad claims: “the statistical universe […] as well as the categories of which this universe is made up, are products not of experience but of enumerative practices” (Asad 1994). But this ‘lack of productive experience’ is not without power. Indeed ‘Numbers have an unmistakable power in modern political culture’ (N. Rose 1991).

Generally it is agreed that statistics have been used in the contemporary form since the rise of the industrial revolution, which saw the need for more advanced methods of states abilities to govern (N. Rose 1991) (Asad 1994) (and also, simultaneously to govern the colony (Appadurai 1993)). Yet the other side of the coin here lays in both the how and the to what ends.

Economist Oskar Morgenstern, one of the creators of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, wrote a paper titled “The Illusion of Statistics” in 1972 (Jemna
and Musteata 2005-2006). Morgenstern’s main point was that statistics are flawed due to a number of reasons:

1. Information gathering conditions,
2. Conditions of describing reality objectively;
3. Research elaborated conditions.

Of the flaws mentioned in the information gathering aspect is the standardization of statistical knowledge process procedures. Where the standardization on the one hand refines the statistical process for observing and processing, on the other reduces diversity (Jemna and Musteata 2005-2006).

Another defining feature of statistics is categorization. Although tied closely to standardization, and indeed is an aspect of standardization, what categorization of national/ethnic/religious groups has done is to make people see themselves within these categorizations. Examples of this are limitless, from the US Bureau of Statistics categorization of immigrants that then inspired them to see themselves as ethnic groups within its boarders (N. Rose 1991), to colonial enumeration and the ethno-religious divides created in such colonies (Appadurai 1993). Yet “the point in assembling and classify figures […], from a governmental standpoint, [is] not merely a mode of understanding and representing populations but an instrument for regulating and transforming them” (Asad 1994).

By using numbers and producing statistics, institutes of power are enabled to: “govern and take decisions based on numeric representation” (N. Rose 1991). This simultaneously de-politicizes politics, by “redrawing the boundaries between politics and objectivity by purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making
judgments” (N. Rose 1991). Statistical numeric representation also affects society as ‘our images of political life are shaped by the realities of our society that statistics appears to disclose’ (N. Rose 1991), this in and of itself is a clear form of dominance. Statistics also constitutes centrality, by having centers that are connected to the state that are centralized for the production of this information (N. Rose 1991). This allows statesmen to deem political problems as social problems (Rose and Miller, 1992 ).
Chapter 3: Systems of Power

3.1. Background

In this brief section, what will be discussed is a historical narrative. They will first briefly be stated without much elaboration and then the relevance of these events and the underlying power relations will be shown in greater details.

In June 1967 the Israeli military defeats the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. It gained control of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem from the government of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip from the Egyptian government. East Jerusalem annexed by the Israeli Government. Here it is worth noting that the administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) fell under the control of the Israeli Civil Affairs office, which is a branch of the Israeli Army. This placed the whole of the population of these territories under military law that continues –in various levels- to this day. In September 1967 the establishment of the first Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, Kfar Etzion, was started.

From 1967 to 1987 the WBGS was administered by the Israeli army. In 1987 the First “Intifada”\(^3\) starts with mass participation of Palestinians in civil disobedience, general strikes, burning of I.D. cards, and stone throwing. This uprising was marked by its ‘peaceful’ resistance, but also had a powerful boycott movement within it that also started to support local production. Leftist factions attempted to create food security

\(^3\) Arabic for Uprising
by introducing self-sufficiency programs. High levels of volunteerism was also present, and organized through popular committees.

In 1994 came the signing of the Oslo Accords, which was Israeli recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, while the PLO recognized the state of Israel and effectively ended the First Intifada. Hence the PLO established the Palestinian Authority, and entered in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the Oslo Agreement, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would be handed over gradually to the Palestinian Authority, and were divided into 3 areas; A, B, and C. Area A was to be under the PA’s security and administrative control. Area B was to be under Palestinian administration and Israeli security control. While Area C was to be under Israeli security and administrative control. Generally area A are high population centers that are usually cities and large towns.

The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) was established the previous year. The AHLC is chaired by the government of Norway and has 15 representatives including one for the EU, US Government, World Bank, Government of Israel, and the PA. The stated aims of the AHLC are:

- coordinate and promote assistance efforts of individual donors to the Palestinian people;
- promote transparency in the activities of donors, Secretariat and recipient;
- take particular responsibility for fostering private sector trade and investment;
- provide a forum for a dialogue regarding assistance activities in order to promote cooperation among donors;
· inform on a regular basis the relevant groups of the multilateral forum of its activities;
· monitor developments in the Palestinian economy as a whole;
· review reports by the Secretariat and pledges made by the donors;
· respond to the needs for assistance to the Palestinian people in the context of the Declaration of Principles.

(Ad Hoc Liaison Committee 2011)

With the creation of the AHLC, funding was channeled into creating a Palestinian Government. The donor aid in most years has roughly been between 1-1.5Bn USD yearly. This sum has changed over the years yet has kept within the above stated. Theoretically, the payment of such donor aid was intended to continue until the Palestinian economy could sustain itself, which it has yet to do. In terms of employment, the PA created a large public sector in order to lessen unemployment. The ICA had previously governed the WBGS with 25,000 employees⁴. The PA currently has roughly 153,000 employees. (Sherwood 2011)⁵

1995 witnessed the signing of the “Paris Protocol” which set the economic basis of relations between the two sides. The Paris Protocol, also known as Oslo II, also set the free trade agreement between the PA and the Government of Israel (GoI). It included tax collection, which was the responsibility of the GoI to be done and then

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⁴ This is not to claim that the 25,000 employees of the ICA were sufficient for administration and development in the WBGS, rather Roy states that in the GS de-development was present (Roy 1995).
⁵ It is worth noting that this number may be contested as there is a conflict regarding about 10,000 employees that were employed by the Hamas government in the GS after its victory in the elections in 2006 which are/aren’t being paid by the PA.
reallocated to the PA. In recent years, this amount nears roughly 100 million USD (Rubin 2013) and is an important source of revenue for the PA’s budget.

The Peace Process continued until July 2000, when the Camp David Summit to talk of ‘Final Status Settlement’ fails. In September 29, 2000 wide scale demonstrations erupt due to Ariel Sharon’s entrance to a Muslim holy site the previous day. The demonstrations increase in scale and the Second Intifada begin. Events quickly escalated, with extreme violence introduced on both sides.

On the 29th of March, 2002, Israeli “Operation Defensive Shield” places Palestinian Presidential compound under siege. Construction of the “Wall”6 commences that same year. Palestinians claim it was built to confiscate more Palestinian land and resources, while Israel cited security needs.

November 3rd 2004 marked the death of Palestinian President Yassir Arafat. On the 9th of January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas is elected as president of the Palestinian Authority. The 26th of January 2006 parliamentary elections brought Hamas to a majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council of 74 of 132 members. This electoral victory brought about sanctions from the United States, Israel, and EU member states that cut foreign aid that Palestinians depended on.

While aid from the Funders was cut, Israel also stopped reallocating the tax revenues. The embargo created one of the worst economic crises in recent Palestinian history, which will be talked about in detail in later chapters.

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6 Palestinians tend to call it the ‘Apartheid Wall’, while Israel uses the term ‘Security Fence’. Hence the use of the phrase ‘Wall’, which was used by the International Court of Justice.
March 2007 saw the creation of the “National Unity Government” made up primarily of both Fateh and Hamas. This was done with an agreement hosted by the Government of Saudi Arabia, and was called the Mecca Agreement (Fattah 2007). Although the signing of the agreement brought back some of the formerly-frozen Gulf funding the PA’s was unable to attain bank transactions, due to the Patriot Act, which did not allow such transactions to reach the Palestinian Authority (UNRWA 2006)

With lack of income, and no payment from the Palestine Government to its employees, clashes between Hammas and Fateh fighters started on June 10th and ended on the 14th with the result being Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. Effectively this led to Fateh control of the West Bank, and an internal split within Palestinian politics –and geography- ever since.

The internal split allowed for the PA to resume the funding and embargo to be lifted off of the WB, while leaving the Hamas-Controlled GS under embargo to this day. Palestinian President Abbas assigns PLC member and former World Bank representative of the PA, Salam Fayyad, as Prime Minister on the 15th June 2007. Fayyad introduces his Palestinian Reform and Development Plan for the years 2007/8-2010. It, and the policies that follow, become known as ‘Fayyadism’ and come to be synonymous with neo-liberalism. August 29th 2009 Fayyad introduces his “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State” Plan.

7 Human Rights Watch condemned both sides for committing war crimes during the fighting
On November 12th 2012 Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas addresses the UNGA in his state-hood bid. As a result; 138 member states vote the ‘State of Palestine’ as an observer state, which was a majority (Ravid, Shalev and Mozgovaya 2012). Yet it also led to the GoI withholding the tax revenues of 100 million USD from the PA (Rubin 2013) citing the debt on the PA to Israeli Electricity Company (Sherwood 2011), and the United States withholding its aid to the PA of another 500 million USD in Congressional aid as well. The US funds were given on March 21st 2013 (Goldman 2013) yet the delay put the PA into a financial crisis.

In the above, historically relevant events have been briefly noted. This has established the historical context. The following section will elaborate on, analyze, and explore the impacts these events have had with an additional analysis of the power relations and agents that make these events relevant. The next section will break down mechanisms of control and show how they operate.

3.2. On Power

3.2.1. ‘Movement restriction regime’ and its mechanisms

OCHA uses the term ‘movement restriction’ regime to imply the system employed by the GoI to maintain control of movement within the WB. This system, deemed comprehensive by OCHA, restricts movement of Palestinians within the WB (OCHA 2010). It is seen as a system that is composed of both physical obstacles and administrative restrictions (OCHA 2010). However, it is also based on preexisting restrictions as well:

“This system came in addition to pre-existing policies implemented by the Israeli authorities in the context of its prolonged occupation, which included
restrictions on the access of Palestinians to large and important areas, such as East Jerusalem, areas designated as “closed military zones” and land allocated to Israeli settlements. The term “access” is used here in its broadest sense, which includes reference not only to the ability of people to reach a given area, but also to use and develop available resources there, primarily land.” (OCHA 2010)

3.2.2. Wall

As of 2011 the Wall was planned to be 708 Km long, with 65% of it complete and 8% under construction (OCHA 2011). Roughly 85% of the Wall is built on WB lands, with the remaining portion on the 1949 armistice line (OCHA 2011), also known as the ‘green line’. The Wall is no straight line, it zig-zags throughout the WB cutting off communities and land from other parts. It is particularly difficult to understand how this looks without a map, hence B. 2.

It is worthy noting the geo-spatial configuration of the Wall near cities, particularly the cities of Bethlehem and Qalqilya. In Appendix B. 3. and B.4. are detailed maps of these cities. We see that in Bethlehem the Wall, which renders on 13% of districts lands accessible to Palestinians (OCHA 2009). While in the case of Qalqilya, it becomes observable that the city as a whole is completely surrounded by the Wall. The only entrance to Qalqilya is a manned Israeli checkpoint.

The Wall disconnects roughly 2 million olive trees from their owners (Oxfam 2010), and has a population of 6,500 stuck ‘on the wrong side’ of the wall. When completed the Wall will have an estimated 25,000 Palestinians living in Seam Zones (OCHA
2011). The people in these areas, also known as ‘Seam Zones’ are entrapped, and can only move in and out of their residential areas through gates in the Wall which are manned by Israeli soldiers (OCHA 2012).

3.2.3. Settlements
Since 1967 Israel has erected 150 settlements and over 100 settlement outposts (OCHA 2012). Although settlements (the fenced in parts of the settlements) take up 3% of the WB, the land allocated to settlements makes up 43% of the WB and renders those areas inaccessible to the Palestinian population (B’Tselem 2011), see Appendix B. 6. The settlements have a population of nearly 500,000 (OCHA 2012). Between the years 2005 and 2010 90% of Israeli Police investigation into settler violence against the Palestinians were closed without indictment (OCHA 2012).

3.2.4. Checkpoints and borders
In 2010 there were 505 “obstacles” in the WB (OCHA 2010). Of the 505 obstacles there were 65 permanently staffed checkpoints, 45 partially staffed, 418 unstaffed including earth mounds, trenches, road gates, and road blocks (OCHA 2010). Although the numbers shift often, see Appendix B. 5. for the list of amounts of roadblocks per annum. Although, it should be noted that according to OCHAs own methodology, this number is the minimum amount of obstacles, not the complete amount.

3.3. Power of System, system of power
Here it is worth pointing out that this ‘movement restriction regime’ operates as a cohesive whole. The placement of the settlements and the Wall as physical obstacles shows the difficulty of movement within the West Bank. When looked at together,
they also show a bigger picture (see Appendix B.7.). Technically these obstacles leave only roads open for movement. They divide the West Bank first into three latitudinal divisions, north, middle, and south. Second, when also adding the closed military zones, nature reserves, and borders, they also divide the Jordan Valley from the rest of the West Bank. Finally, when looking at the maps one can see that only leaves certain roads capable to transport people and products from one side of the WB to the other. Add to that the administrative regime mentioned by OCHA, which makes some roads Israeli only, leaving them off limits to Palestinians and the ability of movement is even more restricted. The power inherent in this system is based on the ability of making movement for Palestinians in the West Bank difficult, if not impossible at times.

When including the checkpoints in this system, it becomes obvious how effective this system of control is. First, the connection of the north, middle, south of the WB and the Jordan Valley (JV); here the main checkpoints come in, particularly Za’atara checkpoint (which is the checkpoint that connects the north of the WB with the middle), the Container checkpoint (which connects the middle of the WB to the south), Hamra checkpoint (which connects the north of the WB with the Jordan Valley), Qalandia checkpoint (which connects the middle of the WB with the Jordan Valley). Should these checkpoints close, it would effectively disconnect any one of the major parts of the WB from another part. Should they be simultaneously closed, it in effect divides the WB into 4 separate parts.

Second, check points that connect cities with their surrounding villages. Should these checkpoints be closed, the city being affected would be completely isolated from its
rural surroundings. Yet as shown in the previous Appendixes, it only takes the closing of a single checkpoint to completely isolate the city of Qalqilya, and when the Wall is complete, so is the case of Toulkarim. Third, checkpoints that isolate neighborhoods in a single city from other neighborhoods. Here is the prominent example of Hebron, which has a permanent status of 16 checkpoints in the city itself.

When looking at the cohesive whole of the ‘movement restriction regime’ it shows just how fragmented the WB really is. It is of little wonder that in the many AHLC meetings, the donors request to the GoI is to lessen restrictions so as to allow movement of goods and people. Such easing instantly allows for more trade, and closures immediately cost the Palestinian economy.

3.4. Beyond mere ‘movement restriction regime’: Food, Water, Energy

In addition to the movement restriction regime there are other mechanisms of control—or punishment—of the Palestinian population that is even larger. This is based on control of borders and the source of water extraction and electricity production. Effectively, control of the borders of the WB by the GoI enables the GoI to dictate what is allowed in and out of the WB. This includes basic foodstuffs and nutrition, and fuel. The Palestinian agriculture sector is in such a weak state to due to multiple reasons (listed in the chapter titled ‘Economy’), leaving the population reliant on food imports. The result of this reliance—and how the claims of food-security/insecurity are looked at by actors—will be discussed in the chapter titled ‘humanitarian’. For now, it is important to point out the following on water and electricity; the majority of both water and electricity are bought from the GoI.
Although the WB is rich with aquifers and wells, drilling is based on permits issued by the GoI (B'Tselem 2010) While most electricity is bought from Israel, that leaves some to be produced by generators which are powered by fossil fuels; fossil fuels that also have to pass through Israeli borders to reach the WB. Finally, a small amount of electricity is bought from the Kingdom of Jordan (see Appendix B.8.).

Taken into the wider picture, this leaves Palestinian society at large a dependent on the GoI for their water, electricity, fuel and food. Adding yet another layer of power into the machines of coercion that are hung above the heads of every Palestinian in the WB. While use of such power is not just theoretical, which will be shown in the final chapter of Part II.

3.5. Donor Regime

As stated in the History Section at the beginning of this chapter, in 1994 the PLO signed the Oslo Accords, and the AHLC (which had been established the year before) started the task of funding the PA. The funding, which has ranged anywhere between 1.3-1.5 Bn USD a year since 1995, has since sustained the PA. The PA also relies heavily on 100 million USD reallocated to them through the GoI. These are tax returns that are collected at the borders for imports and exports that is done by the GoI on behalf of the PA. Although the GoI has withheld these amounts at certain times in the past/

The donor aid and tax reallocation technically not only sustain the PA, but the Palestinian economy as a whole. Even if people are not direct beneficiaries of this aid, which those employed by the PA are, the indirect cycle of cash flows within the
economy makes the Palestinian society in the WB as a whole in one way or another tied to these funds. Not only those in the Private Sector who do outsourced work on behalf of the PA profit, but rather everyone from bakeries, to mechanics, to taxi drivers, all, in one way or another, attain their livelihoods through this funding. This makes the donor regime responsible for peoples’ economic being in one way or another and renders them dependent.

3.6. On Dependency

In the section, I will be drawing on the previous sections to show how the stated mechanisms of power are used as a means of coercion. Drawing upon the work of Achille Mbembe and colonial theory to show how these mechanisms of control operate.

Mbembe claims that the post colonial state, which inherits much of its practices from the former colonial regime, uses specific mechanisms for control of its population and asserting its presence (Mbembe 2001). Although the WB is far from being ‘post’-colonial with the active presence of the Israeli army, settlers, and the continued resource and land grabs. Yet the PA, even though it lacks the autonomy of post-colonial states, has important similarities with post-colonial states.

Of the most eminent in this case is; the use of allocations. These allocations are within two imperatives; I) provisions of utilities vital to survival and II) political pay-offs, which “partly explain the proliferation of public and semi-public bodies and policies concerned with recruitment and allocation of benefits, salaries, and perks” (Mbembe 2001).
Here what is of interest to this work is the ‘salary’. Although benefits and perks are undoubtedly present under the guise of PA and Fateh corruption, it becomes too broad a topic that also lacks supporting works. Yet the size and scale of the salaries are more then sufficient to enable us to understand how control is created. As Mbembe states, “the salary as an institution was an essential cog in the dynamic of relations between state and society. It acted as a resource the state could buy obedience and gratitude and to break the population to habits of discipline”. This salary is what “legitimated not only subjection but also the constitution if a type of political exchange based on the principle of political equality and equal representation, but on the existence of claims through which the state created debt on the society”. Mbembe continues:

‘In other words, the construction of a relation of subjection was effected in redistribution and not in equivalence among individuals endowed with inherent natural and civic rights and thereby able to affect political decision-making. By transforming the salary into a claim, the state granted means of livelihood to all it had put under obligation. This meant that any salaried worker was necessarily a dependent’ (Mbembe 2001)

When applying such a mode of analysis, we see that the PA in 1994 conscripted to its political-program over a 50,000 such dependents. Today it is roughly 153,000 dependents (Sherwood 2011). That is not to say that all the PA’s employees agree with everything done, but it is to say that the livelihoods of 153,000 and their families are dependent on the existence of the PA.
In addition to those directly employed by the PA, there are other factors that need to be taken into consideration. First, every employed person in the Palestinian Territories feeds 5.7 people (PCBS 2012) this means that every individual wage is the livelihood of 6 people, the employee and 5 family members. When taking into consideration that 153,000 employees are on public sector wages; that means 918,000 Palestinians are enable to sustain themselves. It also means that 918,000 Palestinians are dependent on the PA’s salary payments. That amounts to roughly 23.5% of the population of the WBGS being directly dependent on PA salaries.

Second, the scale of such employment and its affects; since those directly dependent on the PA for a livelihood consist of 23.5% of the population, the indirect effect of which on the economy as a whole is very large. This will be elaborated on, and its effects on ‘growth’ statistics will be shown, in the chapter titled ‘Economy’.

In theory, one can say that Mbembe’s statements fit the Palestinian situation as it does the African states he wrote about. Yet, this is not completely true in this instance. For although his statements hold on the level that the PA employs and creates dependents in Palestinian society, the PA does not have sovereign control of its economy and is reliant on donor aid. Hence, the PA is dependent itself. Its dependence is on both the donor community (for 1.3-1.5 Bn USD a year) and the GoI (for the 500 million USD a year in tax revenues and control of borders).

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8 Average household size in the WB in 2012 was 5.3, in GS it was 6.1
9 Based on the PCBS statistical claim of the WBGS (including east Jerusalem) that the population of these areas is 3.9 million.
10 UNRWA claims this number is higher, placed at 30% (UNRWA 2006)
Although as shown above, the Palestinian situation differs from Mbembe's account of Africa, it no less has a power affect. As people are tied to their employment, which is tied to the PA’s adherence to its funders, the majority of the population becomes dependent on the occupation. While even if it is not the majority of the population, should such funding cut it eventually leads to the economy as a whole to collapse and those who are not direct dependents of the PA also lose. In this sense, if one is to claim that colonialism maintains itself through the agency of a class/sect/ or group, it is only partially true in the Palestinian scenario: as the population as a whole is made a dependent and complicit with the occupation and the donor regime.

How this dependence is sustained, maintained, reproduced, and what affects it has on the population and the PA’s political program and how it is related to sociocide will be elaborated on in the conclusion of Part II of this thesis.
Chapter 4: Economy and Growth

If Morgenstern thought that the use of statistics in some instances produced an illusion, Timothy Mitchell took it one step further. Mitchell is renowned for his ‘Colonizing Egypt’, which is a unique source for colonial studies. In his ‘Fixing the Economy’ (Mitchell, Fixing the Economy 1998) Mitchell argues that the use of the word ‘economy’ as a totality has only existed since mid-twentieth century. Mitchell explains that even up until John Keynes ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money’ phrases like ‘economic society’ and ‘economic systems as a whole’ were used to mean what is today generally understood as economy. He traces the changes in the understanding of economics to the 1870’s where physics terminology and imaginaries came to be used in economics. Physics arose on the unification of the discipline around the ‘protean, unique, unknowable force’ of energy, this twist in the discipline of physics was also introduced into economics. To quote Mitchell in length:

‘The fact that the central concept of both disciplines was conceived as an invisible and unknowable force encouraged this tendency. This in turn encouraged a predisposition to substitute mathematical description and quantitative measurement for an analysis of the actual nature of the phenomenon being described, and to accept such description as a form of proof (Mirowski, 1988:17). (Despite the aping, a big problem: the law of conservation of energy in physics –the principle that made it possible to constitute diverse phenomenon as a single field- had no parallel in economics, creating a fundamental contradiction in the mathematics of the new science.'
When Mathematicians pointed out to economists the basic flaw in their mathematics, the economists told them not to be so picky – while continuing to berate non-mathematical economists for their lack of scientific precision. (Mitchell 1998: 86) (italics my own)

The 1930’s saw the rise of econometrics. The econometrics-ists started to develop the idea of a market not just tied to rises and falls of prices in a particular commodity but rather as a dynamic economic process that represents an entire economy. The first such model representing an entire economy was Jan Tinbergen’s ‘The General Theory’ (Mitchell 1998: 87). The idea of economy as a coherent notion was solidified by the Great Depression.

Overall, the notion of economy as a coherent totalizing structure came to be by the use of scientific terminology adopted from physics, with people (read men) trained in physics moving into the field of economics, and introduction of ‘measurements’ that allowed for the production of ‘data’. It also solidified due to the socio-political unrest that was a product of the great depression, and by the end of WWII it had become a novel concept.

4.1. State? Economy?

The above mentioned traced the development of ‘economy’ as a coherent total concept, but what effects did this have and to what agents? Mitchell explains 3 aspects of this ‘total process’; how it provided a new way for the nation-state to represent itself, a new representation of the international order, and a novel conception of politics as growth (Mitchell 1998: 89). Of the previously mentioned points, we are concerned with the first and last which will be the focus of the following section.
Mitchell explains “the emergent discourse of the economy represented, in the first place, a re-imagination of the nation-state”. This new economy was seen to be a whole, or a whole within the geo-political boundaries of the state. It also was accompanied by new terminology and vocabulary and methods of statistics which represent new aggregates. “Thus the development of the economy as a discursive object between the 1930’s and the 1950’s provided a new language in which the nation-state could speak for itself and imagine its existence as something natural, bounded and subject to political management” (Mitchell 1998: 90) italics my own. While the new order, which Mitchell sees as being consolidated by the Leaguge of Nations, then by the UN, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund which pictured the world “in the form of separate nation-states, with each state marking the boundary of a distinct economy” (ibid). He continues on to explain growth. Stating “the economy was […] the new object [that] could be imagined to grow –without altering its physical limits” (ibid). As the new geo-spatially bounded total economy became capable of looking at growth in terms of “the internal intensification of the totality of relations defining the economy as an object” (ibid). Rather then measuring growth as spatial and material expansion and the development of new markets and manufactures.

Having stated the above, one can see several structureal power relations. First, national ‘economy’ (also known as macro-economics) is subject to geo-political and spatial boarders, bounded within the ‘nation-state’. Although as Mitchell points out “the borders of the state do not in fact contain the economy, for economic powers and relations oftern extend beyond the geographical limit that represents the imaginary
space of an economy” (Mitchell 1998: 92). Second, nation-states are responsible for the “proliferation of models, statistics, plans and programmes of economic discourse all claim to represent the different elements and relationships of a real object, the national economy” (ibid) (italics my own). Although this too can be questioned due to the current international order, which through institutes like the IMF and World Bank that produce their own statistics, conduct their own plans and programs for what they believe to be ‘good governance’, ‘accountability’, advertise austerity, or any other of the neo-liberal concepts endorse by such IGOs. Finally, the nation-state establishes the spatial borders of the economy, creating the currency, the customs barriers, and geopolitical borders that appear to separate one economy from the rest (Mitchell, Fixing the Economy 1998).

Finally, I would like to state that even though Mitchell succeeds in demolishing the bases of both economy and growth, and continues to put the concept of state –within the corelation of economy- into question, he does not further his analysis. He fails to point out that this ‘construct’ of a totalized economy is no less real then the lives of people involved, indeed he divides ‘economy’ into catagories of ‘real’ and ‘abstract’ (Mitchell 1998: ??). In other words, Mitchell’s shortcomming falls within his decontrustion. The concept of a totalizing economy he deconstructs is a self reifying concept that is responsible for the real employment/unemployment/underemployment, poverty/wealth, and nutritionally secure/insecure population which resides within both the totalized economy and the totalized state, and not just seen as accompanied by a ‘real’ economy which is illuded by a representation. Rather, the totalized economy which was constructed now marks the livelihoods of real peoples. This last point will be shown at a later point in this chapter.
4.2. Palestinian Context

Within the Palestinian context, different results arise. Initially and superficially, no Palestinian state exists. In this sense, even as an authority, it has been incapable of any real developments that would further the livelihoods of its population. Furthermore, this authority can only truly govern within areas A, which are nothing more than islands of urban centers and high population areas surrounded by a sea of areas B and C, checkpoints and settlements, in addition to being enclaved with the Wall, and boarders (which the PA does not control). The PA cannot establish their spatial borders of the economy (though it might be seen as attempting to do so with the Settlement Boycott), they cannot create currency, and they cannot separate the Palestinian Economy from that of the Israeli Economy. Rather, the Palestinian Economy has operated as an auxiliary for the Israeli economy since 1967 (Hiltermann 1992) So without spatial continuity, geo-political borders, and a bounded existence, it is a wonder in the first place the PCBS publishes statistics it can claim to be representative of any sort of economy or state.

4.3. The Claim of Growth

One might come to ask how these abstractions and deconstructions of economy and the nation-state fit in with the particular situation of the ‘Palestinian National Economy’ and the ‘State of Palestine’ which are so often paraded around by those involved in the ‘state building project’ in the West Bank. In this section, I will use some of the statistical data from a variety of organizations with differing aims and goals to try to reconstruct the geo-political and socio-economic situation. In this sense, the very statistics that Morgenstern addressed as illusionary will be at first taken
at face value, but then contrasted against contradictory and corelative statistical results from other actors for a critical reading in order to create further understanding of the realities these statistical aggregates claim to represent. This will be done in order to show how numbers, and the way they are produced, omit specific results for specific reasons.

As will be shown throughout this work, there are certain realities that are represented—and misrepresented—by both political discourse and economic and humanitarian enumeration. These realities overcome some constructs and do not allow for their reification. In other words, they do not allow for the ‘illusions’ of both ‘nation-state’ and ‘national-economy’ to be reified into reality in the Palestinian scenario. This will be pointed out first. Second, they also allude to another construct that has and still is steadily being reproduced and reified by the actors involved. In this section I will discuss how concepts like ‘economy’—within the general frame of ‘statistics’—when applied to the West Bank create a larger illusion then those of ‘state’ and ‘economy’ and how that affects the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. This illusion which can be seen as ‘normal-acy under occupation’ or the illusion that there can be a (semi-)normal human existence, which includes structures of governance and economy, and concepts like ‘growth’ and ‘citizenship’. This point will be returned to at a later point.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and the Ministry of Finance (MoFinance) issue yearly statements of GDP growth in the Palestinian Territories. When strict neo-liberalism began to be applied in 2007 the growth rate reached over 7% (PCBS 2012), through the years 2007-2012 it ranged anywhere between 7% and 10% (PCBS 2013). When looking at this number, a person can be appalled, especially
when looking at the averages of world economic powers between those same years: Brazil 2.7%, Germany 3.0%, Israel 4.7% and China 9.2% (World Bank 2013). This illusion of growth has reasons ranging from increase in consumption due to loaning (Tartir 2013) to the increase of foreign aid (Turner 2013), to the forcing of the informal sector to be dragged into the formal sector and hence merely registering growth while the amount of cash circulated is the same. Seeing as how the PA does not control boarders, collect its own taxes, regulate trade, or control resources—in fact all of that is done by the Government of Israel- it surely must be an achievement of the PA to attain such growth. It is also worthy of notice that the same World Bank database that states the growth of the above mentioned countries, in addition to most of the worlds countries, has an empty slot for the growth of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (World Bank 2013). This leads one to assume that such statistics are questionable.

These questionable economic statistics of course did not go unnoticed. UNCTAD stated the growth was “jobless growth, aid driven, with an eroded productive base (de-industrialization), non-Jerusalemite, anti-poor, and reflects an economy recovering from a low base” (Tartir 2013) (italics my own). In addition to that, the World Bank stated in a report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee:

Public administration and defense has the largest quarter on quarter growth and if health and education services are added, these government-supported sectors account for more than a third of the increase in both the West Bank and Gaza. Other growing sectors are construction, financial intermediation, and wholesale and retail trade, which grew quarter on quarter by 19, 22, and 8 percent, respectively. Manufacturing grew by only 3 percent and remains
well below its high point in 1999. Initial estimates suggest that agricultural output increased by more than 20 percent quarter on quarter, but given that agriculture is only about 5 percent of GDP, this large increase has little overall effect. Similarly, though output in the hotels and restaurants sector more than doubled -demonstrating an increase in tourism- this sector is only 1.5 percent of GDP so the GDP per capita at constant prices (US$) WB&G West Bank Gaza. Large increase has little effect on the overall economy. In sum, the main source of growth appears to be government spending that is leading to increased consumption, which is driving trade, services, and construction. (World Bank 2010)

It should be noted that the Palestinian economy is still not back up to the 1998 and 1999 pre-Second Intifada levels (World Bank 2010). The last two pieces of information allows one to look at the idea of such growth while needing an average of 1.3Bn per year to sustain the authority under occupation as plausible. Yet no such reports accompany the yearly-published reports by the PCBS and MoFinance. It should also be noted, that in the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting minutes the stake-holders (of them the World Bank, which the above quote was from the report submitted to the AHLC) applauded the PA’s performance (Chair's Summery 2010).

To clarify a bit more: the UNCTAD report stated the line ‘recovering from a low base’ while the World Bank stated “Manufacturing grew by only 3 percent and remains well below its high point in 1999”. These are two very important statements. For the numbers that are supposed to represent the growth of the Palestinian economy need to be compared to show changes, that change (positive or negative) is what is
called growth. In other words, how is growth measured? It is measured by taking the markers of the current years economic statistics and their correlation to that of another year. Yet which year is it that is the backdrop of this measurement? It cannot logically be 1998 or 1999 –i.e. the pre-Intifada years of peace- as if it were then the Palestinian economy would be seen to have produced negative growth, as the Palestinian economy is still at a lower level than it was in 1999. Hence the backdrop year is a more current year that was during the Second Intifada.

Yet in my search for finding out which year, there have been many difficulties. For one, the current changes to the PCBS website, and the amount of information and method of which being distributed make finding out such information difficult. Furthermore, many of the reports available online are actually damaged and no writing is discernable, only graphs and numbers, which make it difficult to second check the health of such results. This problem was faced not just when checking English language reports (when they are available) but also the Arabic ones. Finally, some of the press releases offered by the PCBS on economic growth do not list the year of reference for growth while doing so for other matters.

This specific document, titled ‘Performance of the Palestinian Economy’ can be seen in Appendix C. 1 The 2012 Press release, unlike the 2011 edition in the Appendix lists compares growth with the previous year.
The lack of clarification statement of any sorts, and rather boasting economic growth of 9% (Oxfam; UNDP; 2012) leave those following the economic ‘development’ in the WB misinformed. Rather, an authority produces distorting statistics about an economy that is an auxiliary of the Israeli economy. Indeed here we see Morgenstern’s “since the greatest part of the audience and of the users of statistical information is not specialized, there is an important risk that they should become victims of the illusion of the accuracy of information” (Jemna and Musteata 2005-2006).

What affects do such statistics and claims have on the Palestinian population of the WB? Where can this be seen clearest? To what ends, and what results, and what actors are involved? This will be shown in the following section on the correlation of economic sectors.

4.4. The Agriculture Sector and what that entails

According to the PCBS, in 2008 the division of the Palestinian economy was into 3 categories; Industry, Services, and Agriculture. Roughly the percentage of each was; 67% Service Sector, with the remaining shares that of Industry and Agriculture. (Sabri 2008) According to PCBS growth statistics in 2010, all three sectors had risen, with agriculture at 20% every quarter of the year (World Bank 2010). Yet in the previous section we saw that the World Bank stated that the growth was based on government loaning and spending. Although what was not clarified in the previous section is why and how and to what effects. In this section the developments in the services and agriculture sectors will be shown, from 1994 to the present. In addition
to the role of different actors and their roles in funding, or the lack of it, and the affects of which.

First it is important to point out that the thriving of the services sector advanced with the Oslo Accords signed in 1994. As apposed to the agriculture sector, which with the start of the peace process contributed to 15% of the Palestinian GDP (Abdelnour, Tartir and Zurayk 2012). Hence when taken into consideration, the agriculture sector was 13% of the GDP in 1994 and became less then 5% of the GDP in 2012 (Abdelnour, Tartir and Zurayk 2012). This is not a coincidence, nor is it ‘development’ of a third world country from a rural society to an urban one (with the patriarchal and ‘civilization’ connotations that are usually implied with that). Rather, it is a result of policy and prioritization of some sectors at the expense of others by the PA and the Funders. In addition to availability of land and water resources and infrastructure, all of which under Israeli control. All the actors involved will be explained in detail in the following passages.

4.5. GoI and Area C

In a simplified perspective, the agriculture sector is under the complete control of the GoI. This is due to the fact that the majority of agricultural lands reside in Area C, and it is the vast majority of the West Bank, which, when not calculating East Jerusalem, makes up 60% of the West Bank. (OCHA 2010) That is 60% of the West Bank that includes two historical agricultural areas; the Jordan Valley, and the Marj Ibn Amer plains. In addition to the above, Area C are also area’s where the vast majority of the Borders are (be that the Green Line, or the border with Jordan) which in some cases include mine fields. (B’Tselem 2011) Furthermore, there is the existence of the Wall,
which cuts up the West Bank into 3 distinct areas, North, Middle, and South, each of which is has roads connecting them, but are controlled by checkpoints. Although the Wall is not on the Green Line most of the time, and takes up vast areas of West Bank lands (OCHA 2012) while the lands between the Green Line and the Wall are called ‘Seam Zones’, and sometimes constitute whole communities inside of them (OCHA 2011) which are only allowed in and out of these communities through gates controlled by the GoI and manned by soldiers. The ‘Seam Zones’ also separate Palestinian farmers from around 2 million olives trees (Oxfam 2010). Farmers are only allowed to reach such lands with permission licenses from the ICA, which are most times not issued in harvest season (Oxfam 2010) and even when they are, yields from trees are much less than they would be if the farmers were to be allowed to visit year round in order to prune, plow, water, fertilize, and attend to the trees.

In addition to all of the previously stated, there is also the topic of settlements. There are 133 recognized settlements in the West Bank (B’Tselem 2010), which have a settler population of over 500,000. (B’Tselem 2010) While there are 3 settlement-blocks; Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim, and Gush Itzion. For example, Gush Itzion has taken up to 60% of the lands of the District of the Governorate of Salfit. While B’Tselem claims that the lands around settlements that are Palestinian owned are double the size of settlements and make such lands unreachable to their owners. (B’Tselem 2011) Also, groups of radical settlers have in the recent years taken to organizing ‘price tag’ attacks on Palestinian communities. These price tag attacks are in response to the GoI’s role of stopping and evacuating hilltop settlements (B’Tselem 2012). The

12 Recognized as communities by the GoI, yet another 100 settlements exist in the WB and are called ‘outposts’ which are unrecognized.
13 Interview conducted with Munir Aboushi, Governor of Salfit, 2007.
attacks take the form of vandalism and graffiti of mosques, schools, and even in one case a university. In addition to assaults on both Palestinian farmers and their farm lands (particularly in harvest season) (Oxfam 2010). Finally, less the 1% of the Jordan valley is planned for development by the ICA (B’Tselem 2011)

In addition, there are the demolitions that occur frequently. In 2011 alone 622 Palestinian structures were demolished in area C and Jerusalem (Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions 2012 ). While 94% of Palestinian housing permits for were denied. (Hass, Development agencies slam EU's inaction over Israel's Area C policies 2013)

In terms of Water, the situation is even worse. As according to the Oslo Agreement, the GoI is responsible for extraction of water and its sale to Palestinians. While one would traditionally assume that the Middle East is not a place where water is not a scarcity, recently Areej published a report showing that the amount of average yearly rainfall in the West Bank is higher then that of London. Hence the problem of water shortages in the west bank is not due to scarcity of the resource, but rather discriminatory Israeli policy.

4.6. PA
While in terms of the PA, one sees actions that –at best- can be interpreted as misguided. The PA invests less the 1% of the GDP on Agriculture and of that 1%, 85% is spent on MoAgriculture employee wages. (Tartir 2013) The needs of the farming community have been repeatedly delayed or ignored, of which the need for
agricultural-insurance\textsuperscript{14} which the PA has continually promised yearly since 1994 but has yet to deliver. And even though the PA claims growth in the Agriculture sector, it still has much lower production than its 1994 levels.

Some of this is due to ‘a lack of private sector investment’ (\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater\textgreater). Yet such astute comments fail to take into consideration that 91\% of Palestinian economic establishments are small enterprises (Sabri 2008). Hence private sector in its small size cannot effectively invest any significant amounts in the agricultural sector. The mere statement of ‘private sector growth’ is based on capitalist neo-liberal ideology where the sectors invested in need to have high returns and calculable results –which equals returns- that is never guaranteed in a sector like agriculture as much of its results are based on environmental attributes (like rain fall, mild climates, health of soils and the absence of diseases and pests)\textsuperscript{15}. And makes the statements about private sector investment little more then the PA eluding its responsibility of improving the lively hoods of rural populations. Indeed the PA’s view has been little more then measuring how much money can come of Areas C through agriculture, which is based on capitalist logic of profit rather than the need to ensure food sovereignty of the West Banks population which is technically under siege by the occupation.

Technically, within this framework, the PA is incapable and misguided in its attitude. Yet according to Jeff Halper of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions “what the European Counsel General said in its report is that the Palestinian Authority has given up Area C. Completely. When government or agencies come to the

\textsuperscript{14} Attained in field-work for Optimum.
\textsuperscript{15} Since the start of 2013 alone, the agriculture sector has already lost hundreds of millions of US Dollars worth due to a snowstorm and an attack of swarms of locust that came from Egypt.
Palestinian Authority for investments, the PA tell them invest only in Area A and Area B. Do not invest in Area C. They've given up C”. (Barakat 2012)

4.7. Donors and NGOs

Donors, which are mainly the US, EU, Japan, the Gulf States, and the IMF & World Bank are particular in their forms of funding. The Japanese and USAID have long been involved in financing ‘infrastructure projects’, even when it worked to enhance road segregation of the West Bank. The Europeans have been active in projects that are tied with the PA’s bureaucracy (the Security Forces are mixed, some of which is European funded like the EUROCOPS and others are funded by the US). Although, around 30 million Euro’s worth of projects have been destroyed by the GoI from between 2001-2009 (see Appendix C.1.).

When looking at the funders, we realize that less then 1% of development aid yearly they spend in the WB is on agricultural projects (Abdelnour, Tartir and Zurayk 2012). While in terms of NGOs, one sees a variety, both of who they are funded by and their stances. Yet effectively, when looking at funding: 80% of agricultural NGOs are financed by foreign funders and 94% of water NGOs are foreign funded (Abdelnour, Tartir and Zurayk 2012). Hence when looking the underlying power structure, we see that most NGOs in this specific field have to adhere to funder’s specifications, target groups, and project aims. This technically leaves such organizations controlled by the requirements of funders.

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16 See ‘USAID funds Apartheid Roads’, which are 15% of the roads paved by USAID in the West Bank.
Although, the problem of NGOs operating in the WB isn’t just that of funding. As stated by Wildeman NGOs have to also ensure they are capable of entering the West Bank, this de-facto means they have to be allowed into the West Bank by the GoI, which constrains their abilities to critique the occupation (Wildeman 2012) and places NGOs in the position of either actively advocating stances that oppose the occupation and risk closure, or endure the status quo and fail in their mission to help improve livelihoods of a colonized population.

Here it is also crucial to point out that not all NGOs operate within the funding paradigms. Some do not stick to exactly what donors want, and implement projects how they see best. Other organizations, that are not seen as NGOs, but more of unions or associations work with little or no foreign funding. Other organizations still work and actively advocate views completely different to the PA and Funders visions. Here there is a space of resistance within such civil society organization, yet for the topic at hand, their critic of the institutes of power has been inspiring, but no closer look will be taken. Rather the intent was to show that resistance does exist, even if minimal or marginal.

4.8. Conclusion

In conclusion of this chapter, several things become apparent. First, the PA is responsible for the reification of economy as a totalizing concept in the Palestinian Territories. Through their claims of growth and the work of the PA’s bureaucracy – the PCBS and the Ministries- the PA creates and reifies this concept. Which, by way
of their practice is an attempt to bound the ‘Palestinian Economy’ within the oPT much as Mitchell explains. But this, in and of itself, is impossible to do as geographically the West Bank is not a unified unit, rather enclaves of area A surrounded by area C.

Second the claims of the PA of economic growth are only true if we: 1) take as their base line the years of 2001-2004. Where 2001-2004 were at the height of the Second Intifada with a large presence of the Israeli Army operating in the West Bank with incursions, sieges, arrests, and checkpoints. Yet when compared to the pre-Intifada years of 1998 and 1999 we see that there is negative growth and the Palestinian economy has yet to recover from the latest conflict. In sum, through using Morgenstern: “since the greatest part of the audience and of the users of statistical information is not specialized, there is an important risk that they should become victims of the illusion of the accuracy of information” (Jemna and Musteata 2005-2006)

The nature of not making this distinction by the PA also shows that they wanted to be seen as having made progress, and give a specific vision. Indeed statistical numeric representation affects society as “our images of political life are shaped by the realities of our society that statistics appears to disclose” (N. Rose 1991). This last quote becomes particularly revealing when you put it into the context of the specific time of the PAs claim to such growth. As it was a political attempt to show the Palestinian voters that their election of Hamas was a mistake, and the PA is the only institute capable of creating a situation in Palestine where people can economically prosper. Israel at that time also lessened greatly its checkpoints and border controls in
the West Bank to allow this to happen and donors increased their aid to the PA. In this sense, you can say what has been happening in the WB from 2007-2012 is politically motivated ‘growth’.

Yet the growth is no way permanent, and as shown by UNTCAD and the World Bank reports, much of this growth is based on increased donor assistance and the continued growth of the economy was not expected if the funding did not continue (both reports pointed this out). Indeed the ‘growth’ was hollow, and when looking deeper into the general framework of the PA and Donors development schemes, we see it as clearly discriminatory of the rural populations residing in areas C. Even if we do not take Halpers claim of the PA’s willingness to secede areas C, the lack of MoAgriculture attention and financing of the agriculture sector and the lack of donor funding to that sector shows this case well.

When also looking at the results, one sees that the so-called growth has been based mainly on the services sector. The ignoring of the agriculture sector, has shown this ‘growth’ to be urban. It also leads us to a classical third world class observation; that the bourgeoisie of the post-colonial nation (although the Palestinian Territories are far from ‘post’-colony) invest in trade rather than production. (F. Fanon 1968)

In addition to the above, we can also add that the negligence of the PA towards areas C, in addition to Israeli restrictions and lack of development there, and the coopton of NGO and the lack of Donor projects in the area leave areas C in constant and increasing de-development. (Roy 1995) This in turn will lead to the continued
deterioration of its infrastructure and productive capabilities, in addition to difficulties of creating a livelihood for the residents of these areas.

Finally, the difficulties in the living situation in Area C are not only economic. What happens when both economic difficulty and the ‘transformation of Palestinian daily life into an endless chain of hardship’ that Abdul Jawwad speaks of are coupled together? How does that effect the population and to what results? In the following chapter we will see how the ‘transformation of Palestinian daily life into an endless chain of hardships’ is effectively created and maintained.
Chapter 5: Humanitarian Statistics

In this Chapter, how numbers are used to represent the population of the West Bank will be analyzed. Further to this it will be shown how the use of categorized geographies (areas) produce differing statistics. Initially, I will point out the roles of both the PCBS and OCHA in their production of statistics. I will move on to analyze what such statistics -or a lack thereof- represent with the specific geo-political and socio economic context of the colonial situation of the Palestinian West Bank.

5.1. PCBS Categorizations

The PCBS has a specific categorization of regions in Palestine. The regions in their statistics are usually the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Sometimes Jerusalem is added as a third region, and at other times added into calculations with the WB.

The PCBS categorization of the West Bank is divided along locality lines\textsuperscript{17}. Locality is used to specify a district that is composed of a major city and the surrounding villages and refugee camps (although there are acceptances, the city of Ramallah and Al-Bireh is a twin city and in Jerusalem there is only the claim on the East of the city and its surrounding towns and villages). There are 16 districts in the oPT according to the PA’s administrative divisions which the PCBS follows, of them 11 are in the West Bank. Of the 11 districts is the Jerusalem District, although many of the PCBS statistics mark that East Jerusalem (as a city) was left out of the calculation due to difficulties of their teams to operate there from the occupation. Although the later

\textsuperscript{17} The PCBS does have ‘Area Statistics’, but they are not based on the A, B, C divisions of the West Bank.
comment does not mean that the Jerusalem districts’ villages and towns are left out of the calculations.

The division of territories along localities has categorical implications. The PCBS also marks house demographics into 3 categories, Urban, Rural, and Refugee Camp. Yet the PA does not work according to the administrative divisions set aside in the Oslo Accords, the divisions of Areas A, B, and C. Although an attempt can be made to look at the housing demographics categories as most of Area C is also rural, and most of the urban areas are A, this is not completely accurate. Some parts of cities themselves are area C, such as certain neighborhoods in Hebron. Jerusalem City itself is not even designated as any of the 3 area categories, and the limits of all cities in proximity to settlements and the Wall can make one side of a road A and another B or C. Hence it is very difficult to discern from the PCBS statistics what is or isn’t Area A, B, or C.

This use of localities instead of the Administrative lines that technically do govern every aspect of Palestinian life in the West Bank has political implications. If the PCBS were to use the A, B, C, divisions in statistics it would blur the results of its localities but much more importantly; politically it would be seen as legitimization of Israeli control over Area C. Here we see the predicament of the PA and its statistical wing; to work statistics around the basis of A, B, and C division would legitimize the occupation and its control of the areas under its ‘jurisdiction’.

Not using the A, B and C divisions in statistics gives the false impression of territorial continuity in the West Bank, and people’s use of locality-statistics that do not properly represent the lives of the people. This is seen clearly in water consumption.
Water infrastructure and the amount of water received by people in cities are usually much higher than the villages surrounding the city (this is the case of receiving water from the PWA and the Jerusalem Water Undertaking Authority, those villages who buy water from Israeli Mekerot it is different). Yet when looking at the statistics, it gives locality averages. This in effect also cuts out the most vulnerable of the population that live in small villages and communities. For example, even though the Locality of Jericho and the Jordan Valley is one of the only 2 Palestinian districts in the WB that did not have water shortages—due to a drought—in 2009 OCHA has shown that some of the communities in the locality (which reside in Area C) receive as little as 20mcl per capita of water, which is one-fifth of the WHO minimum of 100mcl per capita, and one-fourth of the average for the WB (OCHA 2012). Statistics like that of OCHA are non-existent to the PCBS. Hence, one sees that of the flaws in the information gathering aspect is the standardization of statistical knowledge process procedures. Where the standardization on the one hand refines the statistical process for observing and processing, on the other it reduces diversity (Jemna and Musteata 2005-2006).

It should be noted that the division of the WB into areas A, B, and C was not intended to be a permanent division. Rather, it was part of the Oslo Process as an interim period where the PA would be established and parts of the WBGS would be gradually handed over to the PA. This of course stopped with the breakdown of the Camp David II negotiations in 1999. Technically this left the A, B, C system intact, and it is still very much in practice today.
Yet the shortcoming of the PA has been to keep its statistics in the manor they are today rather then find a way that accommodates statistical numeration production that can be (at least somewhat) representative of locality statistics and area statistics. This would enable the PA to work more effectively with the Palestinians living in the ‘marginalized’ areas (which is in not way marginal as area C is 60% of the WB). This leaves one to question how the PA, as an institute of power that produces statistics, can ‘govern and take decisions based on numeric representation’? (N. Rose 1991) This fits very much with the claim that “the statistical universe […] as well as the categories of which this universe is made up, are products not of experience but of enumerative practices” (Asad 1994).

This shortcoming is also quite political in nature. Indeed it can be seen as de-politicizing –or to use a term used by a BZU lecturer- ‘political de-politicization’. As such statistics “redraw the boundaries between politics and objectivity by purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making judgments” (N. Rose 1991), or a lack of judgments and actions as is the case of programs to support those living in area C. In addition to the above one must ask her/himself that if “our images of political life are shaped by the realities of our society that statistics appears to disclose” (N. Rose 1991), does this mean the PA as an institute of power, and the PCBS, as an institute of knowledge production, shape –or attempt to shape- Palestinian images of political life by the realities of society that their statistics appear to disclose? Statistics also constitute centrality, by having centers that are connected to the state that are centralized for the production of this information (N. Rose 1991). Hence if we assume that the statistics they appear to disclose are a territorial continuity in the WB, without the area divisions, as if to assume Palestinians were not
under occupation? Does this not constitute ‘white-washing’ the occupation? Whatever it is, it does show that “Numbers have an unmistakable power in modern political culture” (N. Rose 1991).

5.2. OCHA Statistics

OCHA, which stands for the United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, was established in 1991 to strengthen UN response to natural disasters and complex emergencies. In 1998 the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHS) was reorganized into OCHA. According to their website, “OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort”. (OCHA n.d.)

OCHA’s mission statement is to:

- “Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies.
- Advocate the rights of people in need.
- Promote preparedness and prevention.
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.” (OCHA n.d.)

OCHA gathers data within the context of humanitarian information. As such, they concentrate on information such as access to schools, water, and housing, in addition to monitoring violence and attacks, checkpoints, to an extent settlements, and borders.

OCHA started gathering systematic statistics on area C in 2008 (OCHA 2012). See Appendix B.2. from the Economy chapter for map of Areas A, B, and C.
According to OCHA, Area C has an estimated Palestinian population of 150,000 and that population faces many difficulties. The Israeli restrictions on basic life necessities; housing, water, infrastructure, medical facilities access, and security, are of the main reasons the many difficulties exist. In terms of housing construction “As a consequence of territory allocated for Israeli settlements or for the Israeli military, Palestinian construction is effectively prohibited in some 70 percent of Area C. In the remaining 30 percent, other restrictions.” (OCHA 2012)

In terms of education, there are currently 50,000 students in areas C, and 183 ‘schools’. Although “sixteen schools in Area C currently have pending demolition orders and 15 schools have active stop work orders: in 2011, part of a school was demolished in Dkeika (Hebron). Nearly 10,000 students in Area C began the 2011/12 school year accommodated in tents, caravans or tin shacks, with minimal protection from the heat and cold”. (OCHA 2012) In addition to distances of schools from communities that lead to high transportation costs, and Israeli army ‘obstacles’ and settler harassment, creates a high drop out rate.

In terms of water accessibility, OCHA notes some powerful facts;

‘Limited water availability also affects the West Bank, where Israel retains control of all underground and surface water resources, the construction of new wells and cisterns as well as upgrading existing wells and other water infrastructure. Approximately one million people in 492 communities in the West Bank are accessing or consuming 60 litres of water per capita per day
(l/c/d) or less, significantly below the World Health Organization recommendation of 100 l/c/d. In addition, an estimated 313,000 people from 113 communities are not connected to a water network, which translates into enormous costs related to water purchase.’

It continues:

‘the Dead Sea settlements of Mitzpe Shalen and Qalya consume approximately 700l/c/d, while the neighbouring Palestinian village of al-Jiftlik has access to only 66 l/c/d and the villages of al- Nuwei’ma and al-Hadidiya are at humanitarian crisis levels with 24 and 22 l/c/d respectively. This is the result of a discriminatory allocation of water resources between Israeli settlements and Palestinian communities. Moreover, those wells and springs that are available to Palestinians are generally degraded as the Israeli authorities deny Palestinians permits for installing, upgrading or protecting their water sources to provide sufficient quantities, whilst simultaneously continuing to drill deeper and more efficient wells for their own use. In addition, when Palestinians have piped water, it is usually siphoned off from water points for Israeli settlements, albeit with lesser volume. The diversion points are usually placed within settlements, making them vulnerable to settlers disconnecting or shutting down the water flowing to the Palestinian villages.’ (OCHA 2012)

While in terms of food security, “Large population groups in the oPt suffer from food insecurity. For the most part, this is caused by loss of sources of livelihoods, unemployment and restricted movement and access. In 2011, 27 percent of the
population of the oPt was food-insecure, in addition to 14 percent vulnerable to food insecurity” (OCHA 2012).

Furthermore, in terms of residential security OCHA states “The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been characterized by dispossession and forced displacement remains a threat to many Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). Every year, several hundred Palestinian men, women and children are forcibly displaced as a result of policies and practices enforced by the Israeli authorities.” (OCHA 2012) The reason behind such displacement is because “Much of the West Bank’s land and water resources are off-limits for Palestinian natural growth and development due to Israeli policies which prioritize unlawful settlement construction and expansion. These policies especially undermine the presence of already vulnerable farming and herding communities in Area C”. In addition to ” In Area C […] home demolitions due to lack of building permits are the direct trigger for displacement, as a consequence of the restrictive zoning and planning regime in these areas which prioritize settlement expansion at the expense of Palestinian construction. In many cases, displacement in Area C is due to a combination of factors, including settler violence, movement restrictions (including the Barrier), reduced income, and restricted access to services and resources. (OCHA 2012 ). Finally the scope of such displacement becomes clear with the following statement:

‘Over 90 percent of displacement in 2011 occurred in already vulnerable farming and herding communities, who live in very basic structures (tents, tin shelters), and have little or no service infrastructure. Over 60 percent of the structures demolished were located in areas allocated to settlements. Thousands
more remain at risk of displacement due to outstanding demolition orders. The inability to obtain construction permits is disproportionately affecting young couples, who are moving to Areas A and B in order to meet their housing needs’. (OCHA 2012)

In conclusion, we see specific patterns appear as a result of several variables mentioned in the introduction of this part of the thesis. The policies that followed the 1967 occupation e.g. control of basic facilities, bureaucratic mechanisms of occupation, in addition to the Oslo Accords division of areas A, B, and C, and the more recent ‘movement restriction regime’ on the people residing in areas C. We see the difficulties faced by the Palestinian residents of accessing basic life requirements, for instance; food, water, housing, and security. Indeed, we very much see the “rendering Palestinian life an endless chain of hardship” that Abdul Jawwad saw in another form in the 80’s not only still present with many of the mechanisms employed then, but more mechanisms of control have been developed and deployed over the last 30 years.

In addition to the above, we also see how the PCBS statistics fail to be representative of the populations due to their methodology. As the PCBS’ Locality statistics do not take into consideration the Area Divisions put into place in the Oslo Accords and hence fail to be representative of the population of those areas. OCHA’s Area statistics shows how flawed the PCBS’ statistics are by pointing out the stark reality of the populations of those residents.
What is not so obvious are other factors that are not stated by OCHA. Although for the time being what was stated by OCHA was taken at face value, and indeed it is not to my knowledge that any other organization produces comprehensive statistics based on the Areas division. Yet, alike many other organization active in Palestine, OCHA is also not flawless. This is substantiated by their assistance or silent condoning of the fragmentation of the area and its display as apolitical referring to the occupation as a ‘closure regime’ (Turner: 2013). It can also be added that OCHA uses the term ‘Barrier’ to talk about the Wall, even though the International Court of Justice used the term Wall, this UN agency seems to prefer less ‘political’ descriptions. In addition to the above, matters of time, space, and political situation also affect enumeration greatly, which is what is not mentioned by OCHA and will be the focus of the following chapter.
Chapter 6: Numbers within their Political Context

In the previous section, the difficulties faced by the populations that were represented in OCHA’s Area Statistics were discussed. Yet these statistics are not unproblematic. Although OCHA reports do put much of the structural power relations in perspective, they lack the teleological aspects of some of the Israeli capabilities and practices. What is meant is that OCHA fails to point out how capable or willing the GoI is to render the Palestinian population in the WB powerless, hungry, and thirsty. Yet to claim that it is merely OCHA who fails to point out the political context is insensitive, as it is not to my knowledge that any organization or body—or rather those in positions of power—explicitly points out the purpose of Israeli capabilities and practices.

In the introduction, the systems of power and their context were shown in order to point out the roles and abilities of differing actors operating in the WB. The Economy chapter showed how the claims of growth created a certain vision of the Palestinian economy that does not properly represent the reality of the situation. While the role of advancing certain sectors and neglecting others leads to specific results. The Humanitarian chapter showed how the Locality statistics gave off the false impression of unity with districts while not showing the difficulties people living in Area C suffer from. This chapter will be the culmination of the second part of this thesis. Material produced in the earlier chapters will be used to show a comprehensive picture of how power operates and enumeration represents when combined. Using examples from the last decade of Palestinian history I will show how the numbers produced by institutes of power neglect to take into consideration the starkness of the Palestinian reality.
Additionally; how this reality is enforced upon the population by those in positions of power and to what result will be questioned.

6.1.1. 2006 embargo

Shortly after the death of PLO Chairman and PA president Yassir Arafat in November 2004, elections were held in the WBGS. The result was the election of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian President on the 9th of January 2005 and a Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council in January of 2006. The victory of Hamas, which is labeled as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, and Israel, led to an embargo to be imposed on the WBGS.

Although a Unity Government was established, via an intermediary role by the Government of Saudi Arabia in February 2007, it did not last long. Clashes had continued between Fateh and Hamas militants in both the WB and the GS. In June 2007 Hamas launched a large-scale attack on PA facilities in the Gaza Strip. The attack was described by Fateh as a coup d’état, while Hamas claimed it was a preemptive attack to stop a Fateh coup. The attack left the GS under Hamas control, and the WB under PA/Fateh control. With this internal split in Palestinian politics, Abbas assigned former World Bank representative Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister. The internal conflict allowed for the embargo to be lifted from the WB, while it continues to this day –in constantly changing degrees- in the GS. PM Fayyad went on to form a government and with increased donor assistance he was enabled to start his state-building programs. At the time and EU official stated “The signal is that we support 100 percent, politically and financially, Abbas and his transition government” (Kessler 2007). Yet here what is worthy of noting is how the systems of power
operated in the time between Hamas’ electoral victory (January 2006) and the lifting of the embargo on the WB (June 2007). Statistical information of this time period will be used for our analysis.

With the Hamas electoral victory, funders faced the problem of how to fund Palestinian government institutes without the money going to Hamas. In addition to that, the GoI stopped reallocating the collected tax revenues, while banks operating in the Palestinian territories refused financial transactions from abroad into the territories due to the Patriot Act\textsuperscript{18}. The results were disastrous for the Palestinian people in the WBGS.

With the embargo firmly in place, the livelihoods of Palestinians in the WBGS quickly deteriorated. As stated by an UNRWA report; “the Deep Poverty rate of households to increase 72.08% from the second half of 2005 to the first half of 2006” (UNRWA 2006). Considering that the year 2005 marked the 5\textsuperscript{th} year of the second intifada, which had already seen large increases in the poverty levels since 2000, the 72% deep poverty increase marked by UNRWA can be seen as even more stark. In addition to the above, we see for the year 2006:

“46 per cent of Palestinians do not have enough food to meet their needs. The number of people in deep poverty, defined as those living on less than 50 cents a day, nearly doubled in 2006 to over 1 million, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency” (Oxfam 2007).

\textsuperscript{18} A Bush era doctrine that defines what constitutes terrorism
Several protests took place, in addition to strikes. The public sector started with teachers strikes and later involved many sections of public employees. The wage issue was not resolved completely until the embargo was lifted.

6.1.2. State-hood Bid

On November 29th 2012 Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas made his state-hood bid in the UN General Assembly. The bid was successful with 138 member states for Palestinian ‘non-member observer state’, and 41 states abstained. At that point, the GoI cuts the tax allocations of $100 Million USD. The official reason cited for the reallocation freeze was ‘payment of debt for Israeli electricity company’ (Aljazeera 2012). US congress also froze $20019 Million USD of aid (Haaretz 2011). The freeze of Congressional Aid and the tax reallocation were returned with Obamas March 2013 visit to the region (Hass and Haaretz, Defense and Diplomacy 2013). Yet the result was a financial crisis that has led to mass demonstrations and public outcry for wages. Then Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad claimed that the financial crisis created put the Palestinian government in “extreme jeopardy” (Associated Press 2013). Indeed this is a clear example of the political economy of aid in Palestine.

6.2. Power and Willingness

The three above given examples are events that showed that both the humanitarian and economic situation in the WB are tied directly to a specific political context, and

19 The $200 Million is the number stated as the official Congressional Aid stopped, although there were claims that there was a silent freeze of funds even before the start of that fiscal year, and that the amounts were closer to $450 million.
to a specific political direction. Hence the ‘dependency system’ that was created with the signing of the Oslo Accords both perpetuates and reproduces itself.

In addition to its reproduction, the dependency system also leaves most statistics only partially correct. Taken at face value: the statistics that talk about the current situation are somewhat accurate, because in the current context those would be the numbers that ‘represent the reality’. Yet put into the context that the life situation of the Palestinian people in the WB is almost completely controlled by external agents leaves their reality capable of very quick changes. This last fact is where statistics fall into the dangers of becoming redundant. When such reports are published, it is not explicitly made clear that very drastic changes can occur in the lives of the population in such a short amount of time due to mechanisms of control. Add to the fact that it is not only possible that such mechanisms of control can be employed, but rather that they have been used on several occasions in recent memory.

Hence, what statistics in general, and reports by institutes of power and knowledge production in specific lack, is that they fail to point out how vulnerable the Palestinian population is as a whole. Seeing that methods of coercion are used whenever deemed necessary by both funders and the GoI should be more potently pointed out, at least by organizations that claim to work on humanitarian issues, even if they are politically induced humanitarian issues.

6.3. Results of Policies

In this part the effects of policies and mechanisms of power will be looked at as a comprehensive whole to show how they affect Palestinian society. Using the data
produced in the whole of Part II of this thesis, and drawing on all the previous chapters and sections.

Area C: with the intentional lack of development by the ICA, with less than 1% of areas C planned for development, the infrastructure of these areas can only age and further deteriorate for the Palestinian population inhabiting these areas. The policy system used by the GoI for areas C leaves the population incapable of building homes, schools, and medical facilities, in addition to stopping the inhabitants of drilling for water, building wells and cisterns, and attain grid electricity in some places. This willful neglect of infrastructure is what Sara Roy described as ‘de-development’ in the Gaza Strip (Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development 2001).

When also including the neglect of the agencies of the agriculture sector we see that employment, or even the ability to farm your own food is made difficult. The funders place less then 1% of their funds to the agriculture sector, while the MoAgriculture also only receives 1% of the GDP, 85% of which goes to the wages of its employees. Seeing as how the Palestinian agriculture sectors share of GDP went from 15% in 1994 to less then 5% now shows the continued regression of agriculture in the Palestinian territories. As a result, Area C is incapable of providing for itself on the most basic nutritious level.

Then, taking into account that 85% of the Palestinian GDP is a product of the services sector, particularly the public sector that is the PA bureaucracy. The public sector, which is urban-based, leaves little job opportunities in the rural areas. Hence rural
communities have difficulties in attaining a source of income without employment within the West Banks cities. Considering the abundance of checkpoints, even in the theoretical event that someone from a rural community lands a job in the nearest city, practical access to the job place remains largely unattainable, provided the rural inhabitant continues residing in area C. All things considered, this systemic violence can be viewed as perpetuating a forced internal rural to urban migration from area C to area A.

In this way we see that the accumulation of circumstances, created by the accumulation of different holders of power, combine to coerce rural communities away from their place of residence, to ensure the ability to attain housing, electricity, water, medical attention, employment, and security – necessities of life. In other words, these accumulated conditions infringe on the very essence of the rural communities livelihoods. Forcing more and more Palestinians to move into urban areas to ensure their livelihoods, de facto also frees up more land for Israeli colonial expansion. This matches Roy’s assertion that “Zionist interest in Arab land rather then Arab people [...] is perhaps the most important factor distinguishing Israeli colonialism from its European counterparts”. (Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development 2001) Furthermore congruent with a concept termed ‘Bantustanization’.

In apartheid South Africa the Bantustan set ethnic groups in ‘autonomous’ regions. Initially been created as ‘reserves’ by the British colonial administration, Bantustans were used to revoke the voting rights and citizenships of Black South Africans. In the Palestinian context, the term ‘Bantustanization’ was first used by scholar and literary
theoretician Edward Said. (Said 2005) The term was used to describe the shrinking land availability in the West Bank in which Said accused then President Arafat of accepting this in the West Bank.

Yet the Bantustans of the West Bank are nowhere near ‘autonomous’. With the indirect control exercised by funding, the Gol’s movement restriction regime, control of borders, and control of basic utilities like water and electricity, the Palestinians living in Areas A are just as controlled as areas C, yet with higher population concentration and less ‘obstacles’ in the immediate vicinity of the city limits – although Hebron is a case that shows how even cities can be split up by checkpoints and army presence.

There are specific types of knowledge that lead bantustanization to go relatively unnoticed. With such lack of attention to it, any government, humanitarian, or civil campaigns designated to counter such bantustanization and do not present it as a large problem. The Palestinian Economic statistics give the illusion that building an economy while under occupation is possible, just like the ‘state building’ programs are based on the assumption that having a nation-state under occupation is possible. Further underling this dynamic are the internalized colonial connotations embedded within such concepts; as if to achieve the right of self determination the precondition must be proving to your occupier and your funders that you can administer your territories. Or as is the case of the illusion of economic growth, that you deserve to be a state because you have an economy that can be seen to grow and is capable of capital accumulation. Such discourse can only be seen within a Fanonist lens; the
inferiority complex of colonized elites. In addition to the above, the PCBS’ neglect of Area statistics can be seen as turning a blind eye to communities in rural areas.

While the OCHA statistics, even though they are area statistics, render the issue within the lines of ‘humanitarian’. Yet even within the apolitical ramifications of a ‘rights based approach’, OCHA, which has stated as some of its mission goals, to: “Promote preparedness and prevention” and “facilitate sustainable solutions” (OCHA n.d.) we see little sustainable solutions and preparedness and prevention when it comes to the very systems that OCHA staff themselves describe in their reports. Rather what is seen is an increase in the area of producing knowledge that is increasingly ‘humanitarian’. On the whole, the three examples show us that the PA creation of knowledge neglects to take into consideration over 60% of the West Banks land area. While OCHA and other IGOs continue to produce knowledge within the neo-liberal paradigms like the ‘rights based approach’ and apolitical market based logic of individualistic human interaction.

When taking Abdul Jawwads definition, we see that sociocide is: “the gradual undermining of the communal and psychological structures of Palestinian society in order to compel the Palestinians to leave by other means”. If we apply the PA’s neglect of the rural communities of areas C, forcing communities who have historically farmed their lands, and herded their livestock, to forcibly move into urban environments and incorporated into waged labor. This alienates them from their lands and communal structures in order to sustain themselves and their families within the extortion of the funding regime that the PA itself is a perpetuator and victim of. PCBS statistics not only neglect to take into account Area statistics, but shape Palestinian
imagination of daily life as if the situation of these areas is within localities. Technically not only hiding the difficulties faced by these communities but erasing them by mal-representing them. In this sense, we see that the PA is actively and proactively contributing to such undermining of rural Palestinian communal structures. Of course, Israeli policy in areas C works clearly to also achieve the same goals.

With the movement of people out of their rural communities, and being incorporates within the services sector it also destroys a specific kind of knowledge. For alienation from methods of subsistence ultimately means that farming and herding knowledge which was once a necessity of life is lost and replaced with the knowledge needed to perform service sector tasks. Effectively when such knowledge is lost, the ability to sustain oneself from one's land and livestock is eradicated, leaving people only with the knowledge needed for their service sector employment, which is based on the existence of the funding regime. This pushes people to lose the knowledge needed to produce their own food and moves them further into dependence on the PA for wages, on the funders for the PA’s existence, and on the occupation to allow the import of food-stuffs. Creating a deeper cycle of dependence and coercion on the systems of power that create the dependence in the first place.

In addition to the above, the movement of the rural communities into the cities also demands a change in social relations. Community members move into the cities and regardless of the attempts to continue the communal spirit of farming and herding communities, the cities invoke individualism related to making ends-meat and maintaining oneself on the wage acquired. Hence loss of social safety nets which
would have otherwise existed in rural communities due to capitalist relations based on individualism. Rural –food producing- knowledge is lost, urban consumerism is created.
Chapter 7: Part II Conclusion

Here we come back to the Socio-cide theorem. What we saw in the previous chapters concerning both the illusion of the ‘Palestinian economy’ and the mechanisms of power and their application on the population of the Palestinian economy tell us that, sociocide may not be the same thing it was in 1986. Rather, much more present with more powerful methods of control and coercion. The movement restriction regime, the Oslo accords, and the dependency paradigm all are new methods yet are much more capable of attaining the results of ‘making Palestinian life an endless chain of hardships’ that Abdul-Jawwad lists.

While the production of knowledge by institutes of power further the status-quo. With the PA’s institutes failing to take into consideration area C and the needs of the people there, which furthers bantustanization. In addition to OCHA and others IGO’s rendering a human situation that is purely a political creation as ‘humanitarian’. Such knowledge production de-politicizes and masks the reality faced by the Palestinian population. Furthermore it enables the structural and systematic violence of the occupation to continue unchallenged. Even if not intentional the status-quo services the occupation, contributes to more Palestinian disposition and hardships, and perpetuates the many forms violence witnessed in the West Bank.
8. Final Conclusion

Throughout this work we have seen specific patterns. In Part I we saw how the destruction of Palestinian history time and time again in both systemic and intentional manners. With the attempted erasure of Palestinian history, came the byproduct of increased colonial forms of knowledge. Although resistance has always been present and Palestinian institutes continue to recreate Palestinian history.

Part II showed how rural –food producing- knowledge was being replaced with other forms of knowledge. Mainly, urban consumerism and wage labor, within the framework of the PA’s statehood project. While international agencies compensate some of the statistical shortcomings of the PA, yet also produce knowledge that is ever more apolitical and humanitarian in a crisis that is purely the production of a political situation. In addition to knowledge production, we also saw in Part II how the knowledge produced by agents is used for policies that further place the population into positions of dependence by herding the population within urban enclaves. Finally, we saw how these systems of power and policies enable further Israeli colonial expansion into West Bank lands, more intricate means of controlling of the people, and increased disposition of rural Palestinians.

In colonial theory, we see much reference to the concepts of ‘domestication’. From Fanon who stated “when you domesticate a member of your own species” (Fanon 1968), to Mbembe’s many connotations: breaking in, domestication grooming ect… (Mbembe 2001) Within such terminology, what better a way to ‘domesticate’ any population then to force food, water, housing, energy, and movement dependency upon them?
Yet technically the Palestinian scenario does not fit neatly within colonial theory due to one important factor: most forms of colonialism exploited land, resources, and populations. In the Palestinian case, land and resources are exploited, yet the Palestinian population is not wanted by Zionist colonization. Rather, as pointed out by both Roy and Pappe, Zionist colonization is not interested in the Palestinians. This very understanding of the nature of Zionist colonization of Palestine is what has led people like Pappe to see the continuation of such policies over the last 65 years as an attempt of continued ethnic cleansing (Pappe 2007).

Yet since the 1948 Nakbeh, there have been no large-scale forced transfers of Palestinians\(^{20}\), at least not on the scale as those perpetuated between 1947-1952. So how is ethnic cleansing continued on the Palestinian population? Here we come back to Abdul Jawwad’s Sociocide. We see the definition of sociocide crucial for understanding the “transfer” of the Palestinian people: “the gradual undermining of the communal and psychological structures of Palestinian society in order to compel the Palestinians to leave by other means”. The gradual undermining of communal and psychological structures of Palestinian society has been ever present throughout this work. Therefore, when looking back at the sociocide theorem, and taking into consideration the results of this of work we come to several conclusions.

First, the “Decimation of Palestinian national spirit and identity” may be seen to exist, but the underlying foundation for both national spirit and identity is ‘national history’.

\(^{20}\) There are many ‘small’ forced transfers, almost on a daily basis with house demolitions. While whole communities have their dwellings demolished in areas like the Jordan Valley, and the Bedouin communities in the Negev.
Palestinian histories, which, as we saw throughout Part I, are constantly assaulted and attempts to eradicate it are systematic and constant. Such attempts deny a Palestinian narrative and enable and increase colonial knowledge production.

Second, the “Destruction of the Palestinian economy” can be seen in the productive sectors of Palestinian economy. As we saw in the Economy chapter, the agriculture\textsuperscript{21} sector has been in constant decline. Although here not only do we see the role of the occupation in the demise of this productive sector, but also PA and donor negligence. This increases the need for employing people within the service sector, pushing more people from producing sustenance on their land to wage labor in cities.

Third; the role of knowledge production in sociocide. Where the apolitical and humanitarianism present in the rights based approach is technically ‘political de-politicization’ of not only the people, but also the Palestinian narrative. Deeming, and turning, the results of political actors and actions into a ‘humanitarian’ crisis. While the accumulative effects of the ‘politically de-politicization’ knowledge produced by donors, international organizations, and the PA hide the reality of the West Bank. Rather they create, each in their own way, an illusion that the occupation need not end. That things like ‘state’, ‘economy’, and ‘livelihoods’ can be created and developed within the existing paradigm of military occupation and parallel to the ever expanding settler colonialism.

Considering all the above, we find Palestinian history constantly under attack, the state of the Palestinian agriculture sector to be deteriorating, and knowledge

\textsuperscript{21} And Very briefly the manufacturing sector.
production by agents working to white-wash colonialism. This realization begs the question for the long term implications of these policies on the West Bank.

In all likelihood these will include the continuation of bustantanization, the weakening of Palestinian economy, and an increase of the endless chain of hardships endure by Palestinians on a daily basis. In other words, the continuation of sociocide on the Palestinian population in the West Bank. As such these factors indicate that the Theory of Sociocide remains relevant, possibly more then it was before. Although the reality of the West Bank has changed since 1986, none of the changes render the theory of Sociocide redundant.
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Appendix

A.1. List of Institutes Attacked during Operation Defensive Shield 2002
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name of Institute</th>
<th>Institute</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ayyal</td>
<td>Radio Station</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Angham</td>
<td>Radio Station</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Haq</td>
<td>Human Rights Org</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Nasr</td>
<td>T.V. Station</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Al-Quds Educational</td>
<td>T.V. Station</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Al-Quds University</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bethlehem University</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Greek Cultural Center-Macedonia</td>
<td>Cultural Center</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Health Development Information Policy Institute</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Jenin Municipal Library</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Jenin</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Lutheran Religious Compound</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Palestinian Insurance Company</td>
<td>Private Institute</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Union of Palestinian Medical Relief</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Al-Bireh Municipal Library</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Al-Bireh Municipality</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>Anabta Municipality</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Toukarim</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
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<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Trade</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>Ministry of Industry</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council (Council Chambers)</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council (administration building)</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
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<td>Palestinian National Council (Nablus Branch)</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>PLO Department of Refugees (Nablus Branch)</td>
<td>Governemental</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Presidents Office</td>
<td>Governemental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>Governemental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ramallah Municipality Building</td>
<td>Governemental</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. 1. The Wall

West Bank Wall - Map 2006

- **West Bank Area Percentages After the Wall**
  - Areas West of the Wall: 9.5%
  - Settlement Bloc Areas behind the Wall: 8.0%
  - Jordan Valley: 28.5%
  - Remaining Palestinian Areas East of the Wall: 54%

- **Percentages of Palestinian West Bank Population Directly Affected by the Wall**
  - Population Isolated Outside the Walled Areas: 10.2%
  - Population Separated from Cultivated Land by the Wall: 8.9%
  - Population Separated from Cultivated Land by Wall Sections: 3.1%

- **Setters in OPT 2005**
  - 247,100 Settlers in West Bank
  - 160,000 Settlers in East Jerusalem

- **Land Control in East Jerusalem**
  - 250,000 dunums designated for settlement expansion
  - 200,000 dunums controlled by Israel
  - 50,000 dunums controlled by Palestinians
  - 85% water controlled by Israel

- **September 2006**
  - End of the settlers' occupation of the Gaza strip, redeployment of the Israeli army

- **June 2007**
  - Hamas's take over of the Gaza strip

Map: © Jan de Jong

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Appendix B.2. Qaliqilya City and the Wall
Appendix B. 3. Bethlehem and the Wall

Bethlehem and Wall

![Map of Bethlehem and the Wall](image-url)
Appendix B.4. Israeli Obstacles In the West Bank 2004-2011

Total number of movement obstacles in the West Bank

(OCHA 2012)
Appendix B. 5. Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, 2002
Appendix B. 6. Restrictions on Palestinian Access in the West Bank
Appendix B.7. Electricity in the Palestinian Territories

Quantity of Electricity Purchases (MWh) in Palestine by Source and Month, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Israeli Electric Company</th>
<th>Palestinian Electric Company</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>365,812</td>
<td>43,531</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>5,678</td>
<td>424,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>363,232</td>
<td>40,039</td>
<td>14,239</td>
<td>5,208</td>
<td>418,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>329,897</td>
<td>43,040</td>
<td>6,844</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>379,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>355,812</td>
<td>45,474</td>
<td>8,162</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>409,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>323,396</td>
<td>39,296</td>
<td>8,962</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>361,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>362,886</td>
<td>46,675</td>
<td>10,135</td>
<td>6,205</td>
<td>425,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>354,152</td>
<td>49,623</td>
<td>11,889</td>
<td>11,962</td>
<td>426,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>387,844</td>
<td>51,610</td>
<td>9,819</td>
<td>12,727</td>
<td>462,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>528,704</td>
<td>44,213</td>
<td>9,872</td>
<td>11,368</td>
<td>604,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>364,715</td>
<td>46,084</td>
<td>19,835</td>
<td>9,269</td>
<td>322,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>361,386</td>
<td>47,022</td>
<td>10,766</td>
<td>6,205</td>
<td>425,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>343,344</td>
<td>52,313</td>
<td>19,236</td>
<td>6,784</td>
<td>422,626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total   | 4,637,426                | 542,448                     | 119,832| 75,668 | 5,414,126 |

N. Source: Palestinian Energy and Natural Resources Authority 2012; Unpublished Data. Ramallah, Palestine
Appendix C. 1. Performance of the Palestinian Economy 2011

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)

Performance of the Palestinian Economy, 2011

Gross domestic Product (GDP) in the Palestinian Territory witnessed a remarkable growth during the year of 2011 amounted to 9.9%. The GDP Per capita increased by 6.6%. Construction activity registered the highest growth rate in 2011 and reached 26.9%, followed by public administration and defense at 13.0%, transport and storage by 12.3% and agriculture and fishing at 9.9%. This high growth in the Palestinian Territory during the year 2011 could be attributed to the high growth rate in Gaza Strip, which reached 23.0% compared with 5.2% in West Bank. The services sector contributed of a highest percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in both of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Despite the surge in growth rates in Gaza Strip during the past two years, Gaza Strip contribution to GDP decreased to less than 30.0% of the GDP in the Palestinian Territory in 2011.

The Participation rate in labor force in 2011 increased by 43.0% compared with 41.1% in 2010. This increase in the participation rate is attributed to the remarkable increase in the size of the labor force that entered into the labor market. In 2011, the number of employees by 12.6% compared with 2010, as the number of employees in the Palestinian Territory reached 837 thousand employees in 2011 compared to 744 thousand employees in 2010. As a result, the unemployment rate in the Palestinian Territory decreased to 20.9% in 2011 compared with 23.7% in 2010.

Despite the stability in the average of nominal daily wage that prevailed in the Palestinian Territory during the year of 2011, the percentage of the real daily wage chopped down by 2.8% compared with the year of 2010, which demonstrated a low purchasing power of individuals in the Palestinian Territory, i.e. any increase in nominal pay of the laborer was less than the high level of prices in the Palestinian Territory during that period. The productivity rate in the Palestinian Territory decreased by 3.9% in 2011 compared with 2010.

Where most of economic activities in he Palestinian Territory experienced rise in the number of employees at different percentages with a disparity and inconsistency between West Bank and Gaza Strip. Activities of trade, restaurants and hotels in West Bank recorded the highest growth rate during 2011 by 13.7%, followed by mining and manufacturing at 13.0%. The Gaza Strip. Witnessed a sharp rise in construction activity by 154.4% during 2011, followed by the growth of agriculture and fishing by 57.0%.

The consumer price index in the Palestinian Territory increased by 2.88% during 2011 and reached 132.7 compared with 129.0 during the year of 2010 (base year 2004). The
higher consumer price index during the year of 2011 was mainly attributed to increase of prices of all major groups except for a set of furniture and household goods.

Despite the slight improvement in poverty rate in the Palestinian Territory, 25.7% of individuals were still suffering from poverty in 2010, compared with 26.2% in 2009 according to real patterns of consumption, while the percentage of deep poverty decreased from 14.1% during the same period. The poverty percentage in Palestinian Territory was varied and unbalanced, where the poverty rate in the West Bank reached at 18.3% in 2010 compared with 38.0% in Gaza Strip. The poverty gap also increased in Gaza Strip compared to West Bank, where it chopped down in the West Bank to 4.1%, while in Gaza Strip was upped to 10.3%.

Current account deficit in the Palestinian Territory increased during 2011 reaching USD 1,894.4 million which is the highest since 2000. Such deficit is attributed to the steady rise in the value of imports of goods and services to Palestine; while the Palestinian exports remained in its normal level which in return increased the trade balance deficit by 9.2% compared with 2010. Compensations of employees from abroad increased during 2011 by 3.7%; while current transfers and remittances decreased by 37.3% reaching USD 1,552.5 million after they were USD 2,476.5 million in 2010.

Regarding the financial situation of the Palestinian National Authority, the budget deficit of the Palestinian National Authority increased in 2011 compared to 2010 reaching USD 1,278.3 million. due to an increase in government expenses at a higher percentage than the increase in government revenues where total revenues increased by 6.1% during 2011 reaching USD 2.0 billion. Government expenses increased by 8.0% during the same period as well. External financial support to cover the deficit in the budget of the Palestinian National Authority decreased by 29.0% where the total of the external support reached USD 814.3 million during 2011 compared with USD 1,146.8 million in 2010.

The value of residents' deposits in local banks increased in 2011 by 2.2% reaching USD 6,776.8 million at the end of the year compared with USD 6,630.3 million in 2010. According to the data of the unified balance sheet of banks issued by the Palestinian Monetary Authority, the Palestinian Authority institutions' deposits constituted 6.4% of the total of residents' deposits in 2011.