IN DEFENCE OF LIBERAL VALUES? THE RADICAL RIGHT AND ISLAM: 
THE AUSTRIAN AND DUTCH FREEDOM PARTIES

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Abstract

Islam has become a highly politicized issue in Western Europe since 2000. Some authors have argued that in response a new xenophobic discourse was created. In this discourse, the West is seen as having to defend its liberal Enlightenment values against the illiberal Islam in a clash of civilizations. This is said to apply to the radical right as well, which has become quite successful in the last decade. This thesis looks more critically at this claim. The anti-Islamic discourses of two radical right parties – the Dutch and Austrian Freedom Parties – are analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis to find out what argumentation is used. Defending liberal values is part of the discourse – more so for the PVV than for the FPÖ – yet this is thus not the full story. While the PVV now identifies liberal values as national values, the FPÖ still has a stronger conceptualization of identity focusing on more primordial ties. Next to this new discourse, the parties use to a large extent the same discourses as before: welfare chauvinism, increased criminality and new racism.
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1. Introduction

1.1. General background

Until the 1980s, radical right parties were unsuccessful in Europe, acting on the margins and often seen as parasites. Since then, however, there has been an electoral rise of these parties, which are now increasingly becoming part of mainstream politics, leaving their pariah status behind them. The first real upsurge of the radical right was in the early 1990s, though some parties did not manage to become successful then, such as in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. However, even in those countries, the radical right has gained successes in the 21st century.\(^1\) Reflecting on the electoral success of radical right of the last thirty years, many authors\(^2\) argue that this party family has a consolidated position. While sometimes seen as a temporary phenomenon in reaction to a (social, economic) crisis, the radical right is now believed by many to be ‘here to stay’. Next to becoming successful electorally, these parties have also largely moved away from their ‘pariah’ status, increasingly treated as part of mainstream politics. Part of the mainstreaming process, as argued by Tim Bale, is that centre right parties have adopted themes and issues traditionally linked to the radical right. Seeing the appeal of such themes, they start to address these issues. The distance between the centre and the radical right has thus diminished. Another reason why centre-right parties might adopt similar themes is the possibility of having these parties as coalition partners.\(^3\)

With their electoral success and the (partial) acceptance into the mainstream, radical right-wing parties have also started to influence policies. And indeed, in several countries –

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\(^2\) Including for example Tim Bale, Dick Pels, and Lars Rensman

such as the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark – these parties have been part of government coalitions. In those situations, radical right parties have a direct influence on policy-making, though they have to make compromises. According to Bale, the influence can only be seen in the immigration policies and related issues such as integration, and is not extended to other areas. For example, the welfare chauvinism of these parties has not really influenced the economic policies of these governments.4

All this also applies to the two cases discussed in this thesis; the Netherlands and Austria. In the latter, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) started to become more successful in the nineties, gaining over 20% of the votes. After it gained almost 27% of the votes in 1999, the party became part of the coalition government. After new elections in 2002 it remained part of the government, though it now had only gained 10% of the vote. Since then, the success has been on the rise again, with 17.54% of the votes in 2008. In the Netherlands, the radical right has been largely unsuccessful until 2001. In that year Pim Fortuyn entered politics. For the May 2002 elections, his newly created party followed an anti-Islamic campaign. The party gained 17% of the votes, becoming the second largest party and part of the coalition government. However, Pim Fortuyn was shot shortly after the elections, and the party did not long survive his death. The government only lasted for several months until October, and in the new elections the party got just under 6% of the vote. In 2004 the party disintegrated. Since then, Geert Wilders has created a new radical right party in 2006, the Freedom Party (PVV). In the 2010 elections, the party got 15.5% of the vote, becoming a supporting party for the minority government.

In reaction to the electoral success and increasing influence of these parties, the radical right has become a widely studied subject. Much research focuses on explaining the success and failures, looking at socioeconomic factors, cultural cleavages, political processes, and so

4 Ibid.
on. One of the main claims is that the agenda of these parties has changed from before the 1980s. Some authors also claim that since 2001, the anti-Islamic agenda has become one of the key features of these parties. Unfortunately, the focus of the majority of the research is on explaining the success, mainly by looking at what motivates voters. The parties and their ideas themselves tend to be neglected in the study of this phenomenon, with only a handful of scholars that actually focus on the parties’ agendas themselves.

1.2. Research Question and Hypothesis

This thesis will look at the ideas these parties propagate, and in specific the arguments against Islam, which has become one of the main features of these parties. The research focuses on the way ‘liberal values’ are incorporated in the xenophobic discourses of these radical right parties. The question is to what extent, and how this has happened. The focus is on the anti-Islam agenda, which is now seen by some as the one of the main features defining the radical right, and the main form of xenophobia. The anti-Islamist is especially relevant since some authors have argued that radical right parties have adapted their argumentation as a result of the focus on Islam. In short, the traditional or ‘brownish’ arguments mainly focused on the idea that these people did not or could not adapt to the native culture and were a threat to that. Now, some argue that the opposition to Islam is not based on the supposed general threat to the native culture, but more specifically the threat to ‘liberal’ norms such as democracy, tolerance, emancipation of women (and homosexuals), freedom of speech, separation of church and state, and so on. The aim of the thesis is to find out to what extent the parties use these different lines of argumentation. The literature on the new ‘liberal’ line

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7 For example Cas Mudde, Dick Pels, and Pedro Zuquete.
of argumentation often focuses only on that line, and does not consider whether parties also use the ‘brownish’ arguments. This thesis aims to fill that gap, examining to what extent these parties actually use these arguments, and how this differs between parties.

I expect both parties to use both lines of argumentation, the new ‘liberal’ one and the traditional ‘brownish’ ones. However, I do expect to find a difference between the parties regarding to what extent they use the one or the other line of argumentation. Probably, the Dutch Freedom Party will focus more on the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation than the Austrian Freedom Party. The PVV is a new party, and thus could create its ideology from scratch. It did not have to adapt the argumentation to fit the anti-Islamic discourse, since this was one of the key features form the start. Next to this, the PVV is the party that is sometimes seen as the successor, in a way, of Pim Fortuyn’s party, who was the exemplary of the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation. However, I do also expect to find the more ‘brownish’ arguments, meaning that the party did not simply copy Fortuyn’s ideas. The Austrian Freedom Party existed already before Islam started to play an important role, and therefor I expect that, while they did incorporate the ‘liberal’ line into their argumentation, a bigger emphasis is on the more ‘brownish’ arguments.

1.3. Research Design

1.3.1. Case Selection

Two parties are selected for this research: the Dutch Freedom Party and the Austrian Freedom Party. The Dutch Freedom Party was chosen because it is often seen as one of the

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8 An exception to this is an article by Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulou. They claim that some parties are more successful in adopting the ‘civic’ values, instead of ethnic or primordial values. Other, often longer-existing parties, have more difficulty in adopting these values, which then influences their potential for electoral success. Unfortunately, the article aims not at showing what arguments the parties use, the authors simply claim it is this way, and then link it to the variation in electoral success. Halikiopoulou, Daphne, Steven Mock, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. "The civic zeitgeist: nationalism and liberal values in the European radical right." Nations and Nationalism. 19. no. 1 (2013): 107-127.
new parties that do use this ‘liberal’ line of argumentation. In addition the ideas of Pim Fortuyn will also be described, both to set the background for the ideas of the Dutch Freedom Party, and because it is used by many authors as the example of the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation. The Austrian Freedom Party was chosen for comparative purposes. It is one of the longer-existing parties, so perhaps the argumentation against Islam is different. Unlike the PVV, which was an anti-Islamic party from the start, the FPÖ only incorporated this aspect at a later point. This means that while the PVV developed their argumentation based on opposing Islam, the FPÖ had an already developed argumentation based on opposing other immigrant groups, and then had to adapt this to opposing Islam. One could thus expect the parties to have somewhat different argumentations. Importantly, for both of these parties Islam is an important feature. This means that there is enough party literature on the issue, unlike with parties for which Islam is only a minor issue. In addition, both the parties also have had similar electoral successes. What makes the comparison also interesting is that both parties – having both the word Freedom\(^9\) in their name – have some link with liberalism. The Austrian Freedom Party has been a member of the Liberal International, and had a significant liberal wing for a long time, which even was in power for a while. Geert Wilders, who previously was a member of the Dutch Liberal party, created the Dutch Freedom Party. Lastly, these parties were chosen because of pragmatic reasons; both use languages I know well enough to analyse them.

\[1.3.2. \textit{Methodology}\]

The analysis will be done by the means of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA sees discourse – which refers to social interaction by using language, either written or spoken

\[^9\text{In fact, the FPÖ uses the word ‘freiheitlich’, which translates as liberal. However, the official english name for the party translates it as the Freedom Party.}\]
– as a social practice. It is both shaped by and shapes the social structures, institutions and situations behind it. CDA aims to go beyond what is visible in the text at first glance, looking at the ideological loading that underlie the use of language which are often unclear to many. To be able to do that, contextual information is also used, such as when the discourse took place, what the history of the country is, and what the history and status of the specific issue the discourse focuses on.\textsuperscript{10}

Others have applied this method to discourses by radical right parties before.\textsuperscript{11} In fact, some of the main developers of the method focused on the FPÖ. Indeed, in several of the main introductory texts analysis of the FPÖ is used as an example. The research will thus also follow Wodak’s and Riesigl’s school of CDA. Wodak explains how the ‘rhetoric of exclusion’ works. It creates Manichean dichotomies between insiders and outsiders; ‘us’ and ‘them’. These groups are discursively constructed. According to Wodak, political discourse is fundamentally based on distinguishing between the two in order to create positive self-images and a negative presentation of the out-group. The out-group (which can be minorities, foreigners, but also political opponents), are often blamed for social phenomena which have more complex causes. In official settings the focus is more on positive-self presentation and implicit language in which the prejudices and stereotypes are embedded.\textsuperscript{12}

The analysis of the discourses aims to identify the main topics or contents of the discourse, investigation of the discursive strategies, and it looks at the linguistic means. Wodak and Riesigl (also known as the discourse-historical approach) identify five main discursive strategies:

1. Referential/nomination strategies: how the social actors are linguistically constructed by being named.

\textsuperscript{11} Mainly Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl.
2. Predicational strategies: the traits, qualities and features attributed to the constructed actors (i.e. the positive or negative representation of social actors)

3. Argumentation strategies: the topoi through which the positive and negative representations (and related policies) are justified.

4. Perspectivation / framing strategies: from what point of view are the above strategies expressed.

5. Intensifying and mitigating strategies: the sharpening or toing down or the discourse.\textsuperscript{13}

Next to this, Wodak mentions some specific linguistic terms and strategies. ‘Allusions’ are especially relevant since they enable to give a negative association to something without being responsible for it. The political actor depends on shared knowledge, and counts on the recipients to call this knowledge into mind. Another important strategy is ‘calculated ambivalence’; an utterance that can be interpreted in several ways. It is thus intentionally ambiguous.\textsuperscript{14} It should also be noted that texts in general can be ambiguous. They are rarely the work of one person, and different ideologies and discourses compete within one text for dominance.\textsuperscript{15} If one applies this to the anti-Islam discourses, it means that there will probably be more than only one discourse or ideology – e.g. the defence of liberal values as one discourse – and these different discourses will be competing for the most dominant spot. In other words, the thesis aims to identify the different discourses in the more general topic of anti-Islamic discourses, and look at which are the most dominant.


\textsuperscript{14} Wodak, Ruth. "Populist Discourses: The Austrian Case. (2005)"

1.3.3. Data selection

In the selection of the data, several things have to be looked at according to CDA, which include, among others, the discourse, political actors, field of political action or genre of discourse, and period of time. The selection of political actors has been discussed above. As for the discourse, the focus is on Islam. Mention will be made of the positions the parties take in other issues to give a general background and to show how the anti-Islamic discourses relates to the other lines of argumentation the parties use. The focus on liberal values as part of the national identity that needed to be defended emerged mainly in relation to Islam. It is thus in this discourse where this theme will be found, and other lines of argumentation might be used regarding immigration in general. For the field of action or genre, the research will be based on an analysis of sources that reflect the party positions, such as their election programs. As Cas Mudde argues, if one wants to study the ideology of the party, the official party literature should be focused on. This data, and not the ideology of the voters, of party members, or of their leader, best represents the party. Of course, there are still limitations to this, since not everyone in the party will exactly agree with the official line, the ideas change over time, and there might be strategic employment of rhetoric. However, these problems are the least present in the official party literature as compared to the other sources of the party ideology. In specific, the research will mainly focus on the party programs. These offer a summary of the main issues and priorities of these parties, as agreed by the members. These documents are well thought-through; everything in it is there for a purpose. In a way, these documents also function as the way for these parties to identify themselves. The party programs, being authoritative statements of the ideas of the parties, will thus be the main focus of the analysis. This will be supplemented by other documents, all official party

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literature published by these parties themselves, that focus more on Islam to further clarify the arguments used in the election programs. These supplementary documents might not be as representative of the party agenda, and are therefore only used to further clarify points made in the election programs. Lastly, the time frame of the sources is in general the late 2000s / early 2010s, more specifically material from 2011 in Austria\textsuperscript{18}, and from 2010 in the Netherlands, both in combination with some other publications by the parties that focus explicitly on Islam.

1.4. Terminology and Definitions

The terminology on these parties is extremely problematic. There is no consensus on how to label these parties, a wide range of options is available: far right, extreme right, radical right, populist, national-populist, neo-fascist or combinations of these. There is also no agreement on how to define each of these terms. In addition, the terms are also used as categories of social and political practice, and are meant to be either legitimizing or delegitimizing. Using them as categories of analysis is thus problematic. It is not in the scope of this thesis to discuss which term is the best. Therefore, a choice is made for one of the terms, without making any claims as to whether this is the best term

1.4.1. Radical right parties

The term ‘radical right’ has been chosen to denote this party family. It is used by some of the main scholars on the party family, such as Cas Mudde and Jens Rydgren. The definitions of this party family list the most general characteristics that define these parties. Since the second chapter deals with this issue and the contestations over it, no definition will be given. Next to this, some have argued that giving a definition of the party family is

\textsuperscript{18}There were no elections in Austria that year. However, the party publishes their programs separate from the elections. When the last elections took place in 2008, no party program was published. In 2011 both a party program and a handbook for party officials was published.
inherently limiting since they fail to reflect the complexity of the phenomenon. Definitions are also static and thus cannot reflect the dynamic changing nature of such parties.\textsuperscript{19}

1.4.2. Anti-Islamic

When journalists talk about the radical right in relation to Islam they often refer to Islamophobia. This term is thus a category of practice, and used to delegitimize the parties. According to Zuquete, the term has a moralistic dimension, and the potential to reject all parties that critically look at Islam. Several scholars thus prefer not to use this term. He, and some other as well, prefers anti-Islamic as an analytical category.\textsuperscript{20}

1.4.3. Liberal values

A term as ‘liberalism’ is highly ambiguous and flexible. It is used to describe many things: a normative theory, specific policies or ideas, or a culture. In this thesis, ‘liberal values’ has a more or less thin meaning. It does not refer to the comprehensive normative political theory. Instead it refers to some of the main values linked to the theory: democracy, (gender) equality, tolerance (for example towards homosexuals), freedom of speech, and separation of church and state. These values are not just normative concepts; they can also be seen as values linked to a specific culture. In short, defending these values does not necessarily mean that these are primarily liberal parties.

\textsuperscript{19} Mamonne, Andrea, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins. \textit{Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe; from Local to Transnational}. 2012.

2. Literature review

This chapter aims to outline the traditional ‘brownish’ lines of argumentation and the new ‘liberal’ line of argumentation by giving an overview of the literature on it. Firstly, the main description of the new radical right of the 1980s and 1990s will be described. Much has been written on this subject, with many claiming that these parties – which either are newly created, or have innovated – are different from the traditional radical right.\textsuperscript{21} In the 2000s, still more parties were created and became successful, even becoming part of government coalitions.\textsuperscript{22} The second part will focus on the line of argumentation that justifies exclusion based on the proclaimed need to defend ‘liberal norms’. Some have argued that their opposition to Muslim immigrants, now one of the key features of the radical right, is not based on the brownish – old extremist, based on racism and xenophobia – arguments these parties previously used against immigration, but on a ‘liberal’\textsuperscript{23} opposition to Islam.

Before giving descriptions of these new parties, several things have to be noted. First of all, there is no consensus on the classification of these parties, which means that some parties are included in the ‘radical right’ (or any other label they use) category by some, while not by others. The descriptions authors then give of the group of parties they found is an ideal type. There is – and all authors indeed recognize this – no homogenous or static radical right-wing ideology. There are two main reasons for this: gradual changes over time and more short-term changes for pragmatic reasons. Regarding the second, Betz argues that populist

\textsuperscript{21} Alexendra Cole, who focuses on party ideology, has checked the theory that these parties represent something new. In a study of several election campaigns of four radical right parties, she aimed to check the ‘new politics’ thesis, which argues that these parties are part of a new stage of political development (with new radical right parties and the new green left). After a statistical analysis of several election campaigns of four radical right parties, she concludes that these parties indeed fit the ‘new right’ hypothesis.


\textsuperscript{23} Here liberalism does not refer to liberalism as an ideology, but to a set of values. These values – including tolerance and non-discrimination of for example homosexuals, gender equality, freedom of speech, separation of church and state, and democracy – are generally seen as typical liberal, Enlightenment or civic values.
parties have no comprehensive ideology, no grand vision of the world. Instead of ideology, the parties follow pragmatism; they appeal to the commons sense of the people, the party programs are shaped according to the volatile electorate. He also argues that with the decline of party loyalties and class-based voting, issue voting became more important. Immigration and law and order became quite important issues for many, and the populist right benefited from this. In a more recent work, Mammone et al agree with this, claiming that these parties do not always seek ideological coherence, among others to maintain electoral advantages. According to some, searching for respectability or legitimacy in the political system is also a motive to change ideas, or at least the rhetoric. Jim Wolfreys agrees and claims that sometimes the role of pragmatic or strategic considerations is underestimated, and as a result, too much value is accorded to statements made by party leaders. He even states that there is a dislocation, which is intrinsic to these parties, between what these parties officially state, and what they do. This is done in order to reach the respectability or legitimacy required to participate in the contemporary political system.

The changing environment influences the parties’ ideology, and when this environment changes gradually, the parties will do so too. Very clear distinctions between different ideologies can therefor not be made. This is especially the case when the ‘old’ and ‘new’ ideologies are compared, since the change is gradual, and continuities exist. As Aristotle Kallis notes, a ‘political space’ – which refers to a specific set of ideas and policies, and is a more loose, or less territorialized concept than ideology – is being constantly redefined in relation to the key beliefs and attitudes, the overlaps with other spaces, and the boundary-creation between different political spaces. He also notes that the values of old and

25 Mammone, Andrea, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins. Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe; from Local to Transnational. 2012.
new versions of a ‘political space’ have not changed, but the translation into polities and practices has. In short, the description given of the new radical right parties are ideal-types, and changes between the old, the new, and the parties that use the defence of ‘liberal norms’ as an argument are not clear-cut, and there will be many overlaps.

2.1. The rise of the ‘new’ radical right wing

Herbert Kitschelt has done one of the first and most comprehensive studies on these parties. Writing in 1995, he claims that the old and new right are indeed different, both in their success, who votes for them, and in the demands they make. According to him the new radical right combines authoritarianism and neoliberal appeals, more specifically arguing for exclusionary, particularistic citizenship, an authoritarian style of decision making, and a pro-market stance, arguing that resources should be allocated through market institutions. In short, they argue for a strong, small, and exclusivist state. These parties differ from fascism in that they are not anti-capitalist, argue for a different kind of authoritarianism, and are not militarist, and usually not racist or nationalist. However, Kitschelt also claims that there are similarities: the exclusionary citizenship, the use of conspiracy theories and scapegoating, the promotion of strong leadership and law and order, intolerance of political pluralism and the rejection of democratic competition.

In an updated version of his theory, he argues that in the nineties these parties moved from a neoliberal to a more centrist economic position, though their authoritarianism remained. He also differentiates between radical right parties and populist anti-state parties, a subtype that is more neutral and slightly libertarian instead of authoritarian. Sarah de Lange tests these hypotheses by looking at the French Front National, the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the Dutch

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Lijst Pim Fortuyn elections of 2002 and 2003. She generally confirms his description of the parties in the 1990s. However, she also finds some flaws and makes useful adaptations of his theory. Mainly, she claims that this his authoritarian-libertarian dimension does not fit these parties well, since the parties adopt populist appeals, which are not typical authoritarian, but also not genuinely libertarian. Radical right parties and their populist anti-statist subtype thus share this populism. What differentiates these two according to her is the absence of nationalism in the case of the latter. 29

Hans-Georg Betz, one of the most known scholars on the subject, agrees that these are a ‘new type of party’, having moved away from fascism, and describes their ideas more extensively. What distinguishes these parties from other (both contemporary and earlier) parties is first of all their attack on the socioeconomic and sociocultural status quo; mainly the social welfare state and the multiculturalism. Next to that, they have a populist appeal (which according to Betz includes a populist structure, strategy, and ideology), which includes simple language, the claim to speak for the silent majority, and the call for true democracy. Thirdly, these parties rely on the mobilization of resentment, mainly against the ‘political class’, immigrants and refugees (mainly North Africans, Turks and Muslims). Part of the resentment used by the parties is welfare chauvinism; the claim that immigrants are abusing the welfare system and taking up native people’s jobs. Next to this, the resentment is also based on the claim that immigrants threaten the identity and cultural heritage of the host country. Fears about security and crime are another cause of this resentment. The last characteristic Betz describes is the neoliberal economic policy. Unlike the traditional fascist movements, they tend to support the free market and capitalism, and promote a productivist and entrepreneurial

Betz acknowledges that this is a general description of the parties, and differences within the party family exist. In his 1994 book he distinguishes between neoliberal populist parties and national populist parties. The difference between these two is which issue is the most salient; the neoliberalism for the former, and immigration for the latter. While in the mid-1980s most parties fitted the neoliberal populist category, from the end of the 1980s parties started to focus on the immigration issue. In a later essay, Betz considers what he calls ‘differentialist nativism’ as one of the core doctrine of these parties. It is based on the preservation of cultural diversity, and rejects the idea of superiority. According to them this can only be done by separation. Essentialist and romanticized ideas of cultures are used as a justification for exclusionary politics. This new form of ‘differentialist nativism’, more often referred to as ‘new racism’ – which will be looked at more closely later on – does not focus on ethnic superiority, but on maintaining ethnopluralism, ‘the right to difference’. For the current radical right-wing parties, this ‘differentialist nativism’, according to Betz, can mainly be seen in a strong Islamophobia, and a rejection of globalization (such as the influence of American culture).  

Paul Hainsworth, writing in 2000, also argues that these parties are new. While he argues against an essentialist definition of them, he still claims that they do have certain central elements. Firstly, there is nationalism, xenophobia and racism, which is a central to the value system of the radical right. The parties emphasize ethnic identification and exclusion of those who do not share that identity, mainly immigrants, who take priority over for example Jews. The immigrant – ‘the other’ – is scapegoated. Next to that, their exclusionary politics also is the basis of the welfare chauvinism of these parties. Thirdly, they are anti-party and anti-democratic parties; criticizing elites, corruption, and the lack of

representation of the disaffected electorate. Finally, they support a strong state and emphasize law and order.\(^{33}\)

Piero Ignazi, in one of the most influential cross-national studies of the extreme right parties, also argues that the parties that became successful from the 1980s, were either newly created or had innovated themselves. They were no longer neo-fascist, which had been the main ideology among the extreme right until the 1980s. He describes these parties as post-materialist or post-industrialist, and sees the anti-system profile as the main identifier. A more specific form of this anti-systemness of these parties is their xenophobia or nationalism. However, inspired by the *Nouvelle Droite* and neo-conservatism, their exclusionary anti-immigration politics was reframed in a non-biological form, fitting the ‘right to difference’. Other characteristics of these parties, according to Ignazi, are their calls to strengthen law and order, opposition to the American political-cultural hegemony, and a laissez-faire pro-market entrepreneurialism.\(^{34}\) Elisabeth Carter, in her own cross-national comparative study, agrees with Ignazi. She bases her definition of the extreme right on features all these parties have. Firstly, they are anti-constitutional and anti-democratic features (making them extreme). Secondly, they reject equality (making them right-wing), meaning the belief in the institutionalization of social and political inequality based on nationality, religion, race or ethnicity.\(^{35}\) In a similar vein, Jens Rydgren argues that these parties have two main features in common. Firstly, there are movements of exclusion – meaning that they aim to assimilate immigrants and either stop or reduce immigration. They oppose immigration because of their more narrow conception of ‘the people’, welfare chauvinism, or because they belief

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immigration leads to insecurity and unrest. Secondly, they are anti-establishment, populist parties; aiming to give back the power to the people instead of the political class.\textsuperscript{36}

A more recent description of the radical right comes from Cas Mudde. Writing in 2007, he already includes some of the recent changes into account and mentions sometimes how things have changed in the 2000s. He is one of the few scholars who really focus on the ideology of these parties, instead of giving a general description and trying to find the conditions and reasons for the rise as the other authors do. He defines the parties by looking at which ideological features are shared by most parties. According to him, three features can be found: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. For Mudde, nativism refers to preferring the native not because he is superior, but just for being native. According to him, the parties always have some ‘enemy’; which can be internal, external, inside the nation, or outside the nation. An often-used enemy is the Jewish people, though since the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, philo-Semitism also exists, with parties now taking Islam as their main enemy. Another important feature is populism, which refers not to a political style but an ideology that opposes the ‘pure people’ against the ‘corrupt elite’, and thus argues for rule by general will. These parties are indeed also often opposed to liberal democracy, arguing instead for a more nativist (excluding foreigners), authoritarian (stricter rules, tougher law and order) and populist (more power to the own people, more plebiscitary politics) democracy. On these parties economic policies Mudde states that these are secondary. According to him they might have been pro market neoliberals at one point as many claim, but he mainly sees them as in favour of nativist economics nowadays (including welfare chauvinism). Mudde also mentions some other features that are characteristic of these parties: a sceptic attitude to or rejection of the

European Union, and a support for patriarchal family values, though with the fight against Islam some parties are now turning very pro-emancipation.37

Aristotle Kallis identified seven political and ideological characteristics that define the new radical right. Even though the parties in this political space are very heterogeneous, he claims that they do have these characteristics. The most interesting ones for this thesis are firstly that the boundary between the mainstream and the radical right is the attitude towards cultural identity and citizenship. Next to that they focus on threats to sovereignty, in geopolitical, socio-economic and cultural matters. Part of this is the scapegoating of specific groups that are regarded as threatening the national community. Thirdly, these parties are anti-political or anti-establishment, seeing the mainstream parties as acting in their own interest and disregarding the interests of the ‘people’. Lastly, the parties, especially since 9/11, nationalize security threats (such as Islamic fundamentalism), and securitize social and cultural phenomena (i.e. they securitize migration related issues).38

The idea of ‘new racism’ – sometimes referred to with other terms – features in many of these theories, and has to be highlighted since it deals with why these parties oppose immigration, which is the most interesting part for the purposes of this thesis. The main idea of this ‘new racism’ is that the biological characteristics that were once the basis of racism are now replaced with culture, or even more specific ideas as Jewish, immigration, African or Muslim. Balibar, on of the main theorists on this concept, also calls this new form ‘racism without race’, where culture, or according to him immigration, has replaced the notion of race. Different cultures and life-styles are seen as incompatible and inassimilable. The idea is

not that one’s own culture is superior, but that all have their own value.\textsuperscript{39} As Tariq Modood explains, the main focus is no longer the biological race, since the existence of races had been discredited by science and the Holocaust, but on culture. In order to preserve these different cultures, they had to be kept separate, and the own cultural identity – and the homogenous nation – has to be protected.\textsuperscript{40} Michael Stewart also describes this ‘new racism’, referring to it as the politics of cultural difference – in Eastern Europe mainly portrayed as anti-Gypsyism, and in Western Europe as Islamophobia. The conflict is no longer based on race, but on Huntington’s model of the clash of civilizations. Cultural differences are seen as incompatible. He argues that this cultural difference has become more important in the last years, since ‘the other’ is no longer just different, as was the case with the ‘differentialist racism’ described by Taguieff. Now, it is seen as causing disorder and threatening the national identity. He claims that because of this, the European social imaginary is changing, and that this is becoming an increasingly prominent feature in public life.\textsuperscript{41}

2.2. A new shift? The ‘liberal’ opposition to Islam and immigration

In the last decade, authors have identified a new line of argumentation opposing (mainly Muslim) immigration and promoting stricter integration policies. The main idea is that the ‘liberal norms’ of the Western civilization might be threatened by an increasing amount of (un-integrated) immigrants. As said in the beginning of this chapter, changes in ‘political spaces’, or the main ideas of parties, are gradual and not clear-cut. This new line of argumentation will thus probably be used in combination with the previous lines of

\textsuperscript{40} Modood, Tariq. Multicultural Politics; Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
argumentation. The use of this line of argumentation has been described in the case of some radical right-wing parties (mainly Pim Fortuyn), as well as in stricter migration policies.

Liberalism is often understood to be inclusive and tolerant towards outsiders. As Marc Helbling explains, people who hold liberal values are often expected to have a more tolerant position towards (Muslim) immigrants. Research has indeed shown that this is true. Helbling argues however, that while people with liberal values might be more tolerant to outsiders, this might not be the case for groups holding non-liberal values. He expects people who hold liberal values to have positive attitudes towards Muslims as a group, but to be critical of certain practices that are seen as illiberal (for instance the veil). His research, based on six countries (including Austria and the Netherlands) confirms this hypothesis. 42 While previously a liberal migration policy was understood to mean and lead to an inclusive immigration policy, now a policy based on ‘liberal norms’ can be exclusionary. In recent years, these policies in Europe have become stricter with for example citizenship tests and mandatory immigration courses. Several authors argue that states use these policies are based on the ground that they further liberal ends; in other words, they use liberal norms for exclusion.43

In 2011, a special edition of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies was published on the issue. In the introductory article this trend is described. Nowadays, liberal norms have in a way become the ‘ideology of belonging’ in Europe, delimiting the boundaries of the state. The authors argue that liberalism has always had contradictions, and the use of illiberal means to promote liberalism is not new. The contemporary exclusionary liberal

42 Helbling, Marc. Islamophobia in Western Europe: Opposing Muslims or the Muslim headscarf? Unpublished Manuscript.
rhetoric is sometimes referred to as ‘liberal fundamentalism’. Triadafilopoulos describes these aggressive civic integration policies as reflecting what he calls ‘Schmittian liberalism’. This form of liberalism, named after Carl Schmitt, aims at using state power to protect the core values of a liberal society from dangerous illiberal threats. In more specific terms, they aim to protect the survival of Western civilization from fundamentalist Islam. According to him, this is not a new form of xenophobia or racism; it is a self-conscious response to the challenges of cultural pluralism. He argues that these policies might be normatively justifiable, but regarding the pragmatic side this is more problematic.

Arun Kundnani gives a general description of what he calls the ‘liberal version of the integrationist discourse’, focusing on attack on multiculturalism from across the political field in the UK. It is not just coming from extremists, but has also become part of mainstream liberal thinking. He claims that while previous attacks on multiculturalism were based on ethnic themes, now the themes are clearly liberal: issues as sexual freedom, secularism, individualism, freedom of speech, and gender equality are prevalent. The focus of these attacks is almost always Muslim communities. The idea is that tolerance has gone too far, and thus a rebalancing was needed. Previously, the liberal ideal was cultural diversity. Now this is seen as a mistake, and the diversity has gone to far, threatening social cohesion. Instead, they need to be integrated into the national values, which are now liberal values. This integrationism helps to fill the ‘void of liberalism’, by which he means that because of liberalism’s belief in autonomous individuals, it cannot generalize social bonds. Previously they looked to leftist ideals as social equality to solve this, but now they moved to looking at the right. In this way, it becomes harder to distinguish between liberalism and conservatism.

By adopting this integrationism, ‘liberalism necessarily undergoes an illiberal transformation’, according to Kundnani.46

The above-mentioned authors focus on immigration policies in general, but in the details it becomes clear that the main group they are aimed at are Muslims. Bhikhu Parekh does focus on Islam explicitly, looking at why some liberals (here meaning those who espouse a liberal ideology, and not just those who defend some ‘liberal norms’) oppose Islam. The first issue according to him is the failure to integrate. Liberals partially blame discrimination, hostility and advantages, but they also blame the Muslim immigrants themselves. According to some, they cannot integrate because their way of life is fundamentally different, being collectivist, intolerant, authoritarian, illiberal and theocratic (similar to medieval Christianity). Next to that, some belief Muslims do not want to integrate, but to transform Europe. As a result, Muslims become seen as an inassimilable group. The second issue is religion. Liberals believe in secularism, and fear that Muslims would religionize political life. It would also put long-settled controversies into question again. Lastly, according to Parekh some rationalist liberals have a problem with the compulsion demanded in Islam, which to them is incompatible with reason as the highest human capacity.47

Next to the stricter migration policies, this exclusivist use of liberal values has also been described in the case of radical right parties. Dick Pels does not focus on this new line of argumentation alone, but claims to see more generally a (libertarian, postmodern) second generation of populist parties, with the Netherlands among the avant-garde. While older parties are still rooted in their radical nationalist, homophobic and anti-Semitic past, these

new parties are of a more civil and liberal-democratic kind. They are often offshoots off the already established liberal parties. He proposes several labels for them: ‘national democratic,’ ‘national individualism’ and ‘populist individualism’. Just like the traditional radical right, they are nationalistic, but in a softer, cultural way, defending the leading culture and national identity against Islamization. While still nationalistic and exclusionary, they propose a weaker sense of identity that does allow for some pluralism. They are also nationalistic in the sense that civic liberties and rights are nationalized. While this makes them seem collectivist, these parties equally defend the freedom of the individual. The parties are also nationalistic in the sense that they nationalize liberal democracy, arguing for government by the people, more specifically ‘our’ people. As a consequence, the EU can also never be fully democratic, since there is not one ‘our’ people but more. In relation to this, these parties act within the established workings of democracy, and instead of calling for a more authoritarian state, they propose to adapt the existing system by introducing more direct and plebiscitary representation. Concerning economic policies, Pels argues that these are secondary to the cultural issues. And while these parties often propose policies in defence of the welfare state, they should not be seen as socialist. They also blame unproductive (mainly immigrant) beneficiaries of welfare for living of taxpayer’s money, and complain about the political and bureaucratic elite who robs citizens from well-deserved earned money through the welfare system. The policies are a result of economic populism (and welfare chauvinism), which does not really fit the left-right dimension. Pels also argues that these parties are not a temporary phenomenon, he expects them to be a permanent part of modern politics.48 His description of these new generation of populist parties is thus in many ways similar (regarding economic issues and the populist stance) to the previous descriptions of the new radical right. The main shift is the reconceptualization of national identity in a softer, more civic form.

Other authors have focused on the complex relation of the radical right with ‘liberal’ values. Tjitske Akkerman for example, writing in 2005, claims that many radical right parties – such as the Flemish Block, Lega Nord, The Danish People’s Party, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Norwegian Progress Party, and the List Pim Fortuyn as her main example – have proclaimed themselves as defenders of liberal values. She argues that because liberal principles and liberal democracy have become so entrenched in Europe, all parties have to deal with liberalism. In reaction to this, the new radical right parties have embraced the liberal ideals. When discussing the nationalist ideology of these parties, she states that these can combine conflicting illiberal and liberal ideals. These parties are anti-liberal in the sense of rejecting universal rights, while on the other hands defending liberal values in order to bolster claims for ethnic exclusion. More specifically values as equality of women and man, separation of church and state, freedom of expression and democracy need to be defended against the Islamization of the host societies. The argument is that, next to immigrants that have not yet fully integrated, Islam in general, which has not gone through a period of Enlightenment yet, threatens these liberal values. The liberalism used by these parties is what she calls a ‘liberalism of fear’, which erects a boundary between the Enlightened West and the rest, or East.49

Another author that describes this exclusivist liberalism is James Tebble, in an article called ‘Exclusion for Democracy’ from 2006. He developed the term ‘identity liberalism’, which means that the dominant national identity has become a liberal one. ‘Identity liberalism’, as Tebble states, is a form of identity politics that rejects multiculturalism and favours assimilation and cultural selection, yet does this by using the discourse and ethical points of multiculturalism. Both aim at the inclusion of immigrants, yet ‘identity liberalism’ does this by assimilation (e.g. of language, dress). This would also help protect those

marginalized or oppressed within the minority. Secondly, inclusion, toleration and democracy—ethical values promoted by multiculturalism—only function when the population supports them. Thus, migrants have to assimilate, or be repatriated, if their communities do not support these liberal values. Thirdly, both use the idea of domination. In the case of multiculturalism, the majority dominates the minorities, whereas in the case of identity liberalism the majority is dominated by the claimed need to protect the diversity of cultures. This is done for example by curtailing freedom of expression with respect to ideas on other cultures. In other words, the majority is discriminated by multiculturalism’s protection of minorities. Lastly, multiculturalism refers to the importance of cultural survival. Identity liberalism does this too, but then by focusing of the survival of the national liberal culture. The advancement of non-liberal cultures or values can thus marginalize the liberal ones. He refers to this line of argumentation as ‘exclusion for democracy’, and also calls it ‘Fortuynesque’ arguments.

Akkerman and Tebble were among the first to describe this move to defend ‘liberal norms’, both focusing on Fortuyn, one of the first who made this move. Recently, the line of argumentation has been described in more parties. Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulou have described the acceptance of civic values by radical right parties in relation to electoral success. According to them, there is a ‘civic zeitgeist’, meaning that civic values have become very widespread. The core values of national identities in European countries have are now tolerance, cultural diversity, liberalism, equality under the law, and the rule of law. As a consequence, some radical right parties have taken these civic values, instead of ethnic or primordial elements, as the basis of the nation (for example the SVP, the LPF and the PVV). The argument is that immigrants who do not share these values and do not adopt them now threaten these values. According to the authors, the variation in the success of these parties can be explained by whether parties have successfully managed to adopt this discourse or not.

Whether this can be done also depends on the country-specific political culture. For example, in the Netherlands and Switzerland these values have for a longer time been a part of the essential character of the nation, making it easier for the parties to adopt these values. On top of that, longer-existing parties might have more difficulty adopting their discourse, since they retain some of the ethnic elements, creating a mixed message of civil and ethnic values.\textsuperscript{51} In a similar vein, Meindert Fennema predicts that only those parties that either do not have an ethnonationalist background, like the party of Pim Fortuyn, or those that can transform into such a party by leaving their ethnonationalist background, will be successful, and become a well-established phenomenon in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{52}

With the increasing importance – some even claim it has become one of the defining features – of anti-Islamic discourses for these parties; some authors have focused on the anti-Islamic dimension in their work. Jean-Yves Camus has recently written on the relation between the extreme right and religious fundamentalism more in general. He claims that the extreme right has roots in Catholic fundamentalism, but with the increasing secularism the influence of this has waned. Now many parties refer to Europe as (Judeo-) Christian, but they are not necessarily religious. He identifies three ways the extreme right currently deals with religion: 1) no reference to religion, taking an ethnic or racial identity as the basis, 2) defending European civilization against Islam based on Christianity as the foundation of European civilization, and 3) fighting Islam based on defending freethinking and libertarian values (with Pim Fortuyn as the main example of this type). As he shows, not all radical right parties are anti-Islamic. Again, he identifies free factions in the extreme right on the issue: 1) parties focusing solely on fighting Islam, 2) parties focusing on fighting both Islam and Judaism, and 3) parties that see Islam as an ally in the fight against Judaism and

Americanization. Camus claims that the most influential faction now is the first; extreme right parties are more anti-Islamic than anti-Semitic. However, the further to the right, the more supportive of Islam, and the more anti-Semitic the parties become.⁵³

Arguing that anti-Islamic sentiment is now one of the basic themes of the European radical right, Zuquete also describes the opposition of these parties to Islam. He also claims that it has the potential to create a reconfiguration, a shift in the ideology, of the radical right. Firstly, the perception of Islam caused an intensification, and in some cases a novel emphasis, on Christian themes and motifs. Secondly, the focus on Islam caused a pro-Jewish trend, moving away from either anti-Semitism or the unimportance of the issue. Thirdly, while previously the focus was on the nation, now there is also reference to a wider source of cultural identity; defending Europe against Islamization. This new point of cultural reference functions as complementary to the reference to the nation. Zuquete also argues that the importance of Islam made the distinction between the mainstream and the radical right more difficult. The radical right has adopted respectable issues as women’s rights, separation of church and state, and animal rights, whereas the mainstream has adopted part of the anti-Islamic discourse.⁵⁴

While Zuquete does not mention the defence of ‘liberal norms’, Hans-Georg Betz mentions this in an article on what he calls the ‘anti-Islamic nativism’ in the contemporary radical right. Nativism, to him, refers to the belief that newcomers hold values incompatible with the local values. Nowadays, the nativist line of argumentation of the radical right closely resembles the ‘clash of civilizations’ idea of Huntington. More specifically, the dominant line of argumentation of the radical right is the one that was proposed by Pim Fortuyn. Based on his personal experiences, he argued that Islamic culture, values and norms were incompatible,

⁵⁴ Zuquete, Jose P. "The European extreme-right and Islam: New Directions?." 2008
and even opposed, to the leading values in the West: separation of church and state, gender equality, democracy, religious tolerance, freedom of speech, individual responsibility and respect for minorities. His aim was thus to defend Western democratic and liberal values. This line of argumentation is adopted because it fits into the general identitarian agenda of the radical right. Identity has become increasingly emphasized in the fight against Islam (instead of for example economic or security arguments). On top of that, according to Betz, it is also adopted for strategic reasons, since claiming to promote democracy hides the cultural xenophobia.  

Some authors have even focused exclusively on the relation between Islamophobia and the defence of ‘liberal norms’. For instance, Liz Fekete wrote on the topic in 2006, referring to ‘enlightened fundamentalism’. She analyses both the general more stricter immigration policies, and the radical right parties, which have a growing influence. According to her, after 9/11 and mainly because of the perception of Muslims, there was a major realignment of the right in the 21st century, which now includes post-fascists, liberals, and even social democrats. The opposition to Muslims is based on cultural arguments, seeing them as an alien culture. This opposition to migration based on the protection of one’s ‘historically rooted homogenous national culture’, is called ‘cultural fundamentalism’, a term introduced by Verena Stolkce in the beginning of the nineties to described the new anti-immigrant rhetoric. Fekete claims that this cultural fundamentalism is now complemented by seeing the Enlightenment as the basis of Western European culture. The opposition is now thus between the intolerant and backward Islam and the Enlightened Europe, reflecting also Huntington’s ideas. The Enlightenment ideas Fekete refers to are similar to the ‘liberal

norms’ referred to by others; such as democracy, equality, tolerance (for example towards homosexuals), individual rights and freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{56}

2.3. Partial Conclusion

In sum, these radical right-wing parties of the 1980s and 1990s are generally seen as different from the traditional (neo)fascist parties, though it is possible to also find similarities.\textsuperscript{57} The main characteristics are firstly the authoritarian, anti-democratic or populist stance. What this authoritarianism exactly entails is not agreed on, but the most recent literature seems to focus on the populist stance of these parties (in rhetoric, but also in proposing a more direct, plebiscitary democracy), and a tough approach to law and order.

Regarding the economic policies there are two views. Some see the radical right as neo-liberal and pro-market, while others argue that the economic policies – which are secondary to these parties – are better described as nativist, with welfare chauvinism as the main feature. Probably, this disagreement might be caused because the policies have changed over time. Possibly the most important, and definitely the most interesting for the purposes of this thesis, is the parties’ exclusivism – the traditional ‘brownish’ lines of argumentation. Immigrants are rejected because of welfare chauvinism; they are seen as taking the native’s jobs and abusing the welfare system. Another line of argumentation focuses more on law and order. Immigration is securitized; immigrants are seen a threat to security, more criminal, and creating unrest. The most important line or argumentation is the threat of immigrants to the national identity, cultural heritage and ethnic community. Part of this line of argumentation is


\textsuperscript{57} Recently, scholars have started to question and be more critical of the assumption of the newness of the phenomenon, which has become more or less consensual. One of the aims of a recently published book was indeed to reassess the nature and intensity of the change from the old to the new radical right. They claim that not all parties have seen a genuine process of democratization, and strands of fascism and neo-fascism are still present among radical right-wing parties. Mammone, Andrea, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins. \textit{Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe}, 2013.
also the new racism, also referred to as differential or cultural racism. The exclusion of immigrants is no longer based on the idea of different biological races. Now the idea is that different cultures should be preserved. The own culture is no longer seen as superior, but just as different. To preserve these cultures, they have to be kept separate; in other words, people should stay where they ‘belong’.

Some authors have suggested that radical right parties now use a new line of argumentation opposing immigration and promoting stricter integration policies; the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation. The line of argumentation is similar to Huntington’s clash of civilizations idea, and claims that Islamization threatens the core values of our national identities. The aim is the survival of the own culture. Unlike the new racism of the traditional line of argumentation, this new line is not concerned with preserving the culture of the immigrants as well. The values or the national identity re not based on ethnic or primordial elements, but on civic, liberal, Enlightenment values that are dominant in the Western civilization (and thus not very country-specific). This includes gender equality, respect for homosexuals, separation of church and state, freedom of expression, tolerance and democracy. The ethnonationalist aspect still present in the traditional line of argumentation is completely left behind. Another new line of argumentation that sometimes comes up with the focus on Islam is the stressing of Christianity or Christian values. The question for this thesis is to what extent radical right parties actually use this argument, and to what extent it is still mixed with arguments of the previous ‘new right’, which argued more along the lines of new racism, taking the maintenance of culture – which was not (explicitly) based on these civic liberal values – as the main justification of exclusion. It will also be interesting to see whether there is a difference in the arguments used by the PVV and the FPÖ, as the article by Halikiopoulou et al seemed to suggest.
3. The Dutch Party For Freedom

3.1. The Dutch context

Before providing a description of the party itself, some background information on immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands will be given that set the scene for the development and ideas of the Dutch Freedom Party. Dutch integration policies have changed over time, and are now known to be one of the strictest in Europe. Even Kymlicka, who does not believe in a real retreat from multiculturalism, claims the Netherlands are an exception to this, where a retreat has taken place. After a period of assimilatory policies, the Netherlands moved to a more multicultural policy. From the 1980s the motto was ‘integration with preservation of identity’. In the 1990s, with the two purple coalitions (Social Democrats together with the Conservative Liberal party), an even stronger move was made towards multiculturalism.

The beginning of the 2000s saw a change in the integration debate, with some strongly questioning the current policy. This was not the first time the policy was questioned though, a prominent member of the Conservative Liberal party, Frits Bolkenstein, had already questioned the soft approach to integration in 1991. However, at this point these opinions were mainly on the level of the intellectual public debate and were not reflected amongst the electorate. This was also true in 2000, when a social democrat publicist published a book called ‘the Multicultural Drama’, in which he attacked the policy for ignoring the problems that were developing (unemployment, higher school drop-out rates, criminality), and promoted a more assimilatory approach. He also focused on the differences between Islam

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and Dutch culture. It was only in late 2001 that the issue became truly politicized and gained significant media attention. In the autumn of that year, Pim Fortuyn entered Dutch politics. His political career was short and dramatic. He became the leader of a political party, but was kicked out after some controversial statements on Islam and discrimination.\(^{60}\) He then created his own party, only just over two months before the elections. Nine days before the elections an animal rights activist shot Fortuyn. His party (the List Pim Fortuyn) got about 17% of the votes, making it the second biggest party. The LPF became a member of the government coalition, which lasted only until October of the same year. Fortuyn was mainly known for his opposition to Islam, anti-establishment view and promotion of libertarian values. His ideas are taken as the example of the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation by many and will thus be described in more detail later on.

Some other events have influenced the political debate as well, namely 9/11, the Madrid bombings, the London bombings, and the murder of Theo van Gogh. Especially the latter was important for the political and public debate. Jolle Demmers and Sameer S. Mehendale focus on this event in relation to the representations of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in the media in the Netherlands. They see this moment as the first (Fortuyn’s murdered was an animal rights activist) that could be used in the Netherlands as ‘proof’ for the clash of civilization discourse, opposing Islam to the libertarian West.\(^{61}\) As a result, the Van Gogh murder was not just referred to in the Netherlands, but also in other European countries.\(^{62}\)

\(^{60}\) In a newspaper interview in February 2002, he called Islam a backward culture. He also claimed that the first article of the constitution, which prohibits discrimination, might be in conflict with freedom of speech.


Since 2001 the integration policies changed. More focus was put on the acceptance of some basic norms. From 2003 to 2007, Rita Verdonk was the minister in charge of integration. She was known as ‘iron Rita’, and favoured a stricter integration policy, which required immigrants to express their loyalty to liberal values and the Dutch nation. A compulsory civic integration test was introduced for non-Western immigrants in 2007. Immigrants were also required to take a Dutch proficiency test before coming to the Netherlands. Since this time, immigration policies have kept changing, depending on which parties were in power. From 2007 until 2010 integration policies acquired a slightly less strict character, though no major changes took place. From 2010, with the PVV as a support party to the minority government, there was a favour for stricter policies again.

Debates on integration also touch on what the migrants are integrating into, in other words, what the Dutch identity is. According to Marc de Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen, Dutch identity is now defined in terms of liberal values. There is also a move away from a proudly ‘weak’ identity. The liberal values became widely accepted from the 1970s, after the depillarization process and several emancipatory movements. More specifically, it refers to women’s and homosexual’s emancipation, a critical way of approaching religion, freedom of speech (instead of political correctness), sexual freedom, and abortion. Due to making moral values part of essential Dutchness, and the myth of tolerance and political neutrality, certain more negative parts of history have not really been acknowledged (such as the colonial past, and the role in Srebrenica). Part of the defining process of Dutchness is clarifying what the ‘other’ is. The ‘other’ in the Netherlands currently refers to Muslim immigrants. The two

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63 During this period, another influential person in the integration debate was Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee, and a member of the Conservative Liberal party. Eventually she had to leave the country because she had given false information during her asylum application. She worked together with both Verdonk and Wilders. With the latter she wrote a pamphlet arguing for a ‘liberal jihad’ against Islam.

64 The government fell in 2007 as a result of controversies concerning her functioning. She left the Conservative Liberal party, and created her own party, ‘Proud of the Netherlands’, which was not successful.

65 Prins, Baukje, and Sawitri Saharso. “From toleration to repression; the Dutch backlash against multiculturalism,” in The Multiculturalism Backlash; European discourses, policies and practices, eds. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf. (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2010): 72-91
groups are seen to clash (similar to the clash of civilizations), Dutch gays being threatened by Islamization, and Muslim women oppressed in the name of Islam. The defining of Dutch identity is partially done by what they refer to as the new right, or the populist liberalists (such as Fortuyn, Verdonk and Wilders). However, this interpretation of Dutchness can also be found in the movie that is part of the civic integration course. The former Christian Democrat Prime Minister, Balkenende, was also known for stressing norms and values.66

3.2. Pim Fortuyn’s argumentation

Since many articles focus on Pim Fortuyn’s ideas as the main example of the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation, an overview of his ideas will be given here. In the book ‘The Islamization of our culture; Dutch identity as fundament’ Fortuyn outlines his ideas on how Dutch society should deal with Islam. The aim of the book is to promote

“A consciously experienced Dutch identity, to stand up for essential norms and values, to enter into debate with those who have a (completely) different opinion on that, that is what this book is about. I hope it inspires to think, to write and an active participation in, and starting up of the necessary broad societal and political debate, so that the multicultural society can take form and content.”68 (page 109, emphasis added)

This quote is the final line of the book. He starts the book with a focus on Islam, and how it is in contradiction to modernity. He calls Islam a problem for modernity, since “the core norms and values of modernity, thus those of the developed and rich west, are contrary to it, particularly those of the political Islam.” (page 9). To deal with the threat, he proposes an ideological war against it, a war with words. Essential to this fight is awareness to what the own identity is, and to protect it from ‘attacks from within and from outside’. He argues

68 Quotes are my own translation from the revised Dutch version of the book from 2001.
against the cultural relativism that dominates in the Netherlands. A society according to Fortuyn needs a consciously experienced identity, otherwise the society will end up being a collection of people, and ‘with such a people things don’t end well’ (page 18). Fortuyn does not argue for attempting to eliminate Islam from the world. He claims we cannot interfere in foreign countries, and having groups with a different culture is not a problem, as long as the essential values of our culture are not harmed, which he claims is the case. He claims that the right answer to the problem of integration is multiculturalism. However, he takes issue with how it is currently formulated by the government. His conception of multiculturalism is as follows:

“A good concept of the multicultural society should start with a definition of the core values of the own culture: that what is defining, of decisive importance for the society […] and which furthermore marks the space for the new cultures to integrate. Such a concepts limits itself to the core values and core problems of course: for the rest it’s live and let live. After all, new cultures form in many cases an enrichment of the own culture: they make the society richer and more polymorphic, and create in that way also more space within the own culture.” (page 42)

In other words, he proposes a model of society that does have a dominant culture. The other cultures are seen as enrichments to this society, but have to adapt (or assimilate) to some core norms and values. Fortuyn sees these values as big achievements, which should not be lost in the fight against Islam, which is the context in which Fortuyn formulates his model.

What are these norms and values of the Dutch identity according to Fortuyn? In the beginning of the book, he claims “the fight begins with a conscious experience of the own identity, knowing what the core norms and values are of modernity and the conscious experience and knowing of the own (national) history.” This sentence might be confusing, since he talks about the ‘own identity’, but refers to the values of modernity’. In the rest of the book he does talk about Dutch identity, and it becomes clear that the core Dutch norms and values are those of modernity. At one point, when talking about asylum seekers, he claims that those coming from western countries will have no problems adapting, since they are from
the same ‘culturecircle’. (page 99). In short, Dutch identity is based on modern values that are shared in the West. He claims that Dutch identity is based on Judaism, Christianity and humanism, but these have gone through a process of secularization, and thus also have accepted the values of the Enlightenment, and with that modernity (a process with Islam has not completed yet). He does not see identity as something fixed and unchangeable. The development of norms and values is a living process with a lot of variation. Yet there are also some constant factors. He claims that these constant values define the identity, and make the Dutch different from others. He claims that even now the identity is changing, with the process of globalization. This is not a problem as long as we consciously deal with it.

The main body of the book focuses on several core values of the Dutch identity that are under threat because of Islamization. Firstly, there is the individual responsibility that is put above collective responsibility in Dutch culture. He mentions this value as one of the core ones, but only describes it in two pages, while he has separate chapters on the other ones. The second core value, which might be the most essential terrain of conflict, is the separation of church and state. He stresses that this is an achievement, and should not be taken for granted as it is now, which leads to cultural relativism. He calls it a universal value, one that is a precondition to democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of opinion, and respect for minorities. Indeed, a mature democracy, according to Fortuyn, will leave space for the existence of deviant opinions of minorities. However, he stresses that in the toleration of minority opinions there are limits. The third essential issue is the equality between the sexes, no matter what sexuality people have. He states that

“Emancipation is a (constitutional) right of every inhabitant, and we have the duty to promote it with vigour, also when it concerns Islamic women and man. It is a cultural attainment to which they also have a right, for which a long fight has been waged, for which much has been suffered and which brought us the freedom to develop ourselves to our possibilities and sexuality. An achievement that is worth propagating and if necessary to defend with vigour.” (page 77, emphasis added)
While perhaps there is no complete economic and political equality yet, there is formal equality, and equality on mental and cultural levels. He calls this the biggest achievement of mankind in the modern world. He claims that the position of women in Islam is terrible, and that of homosexuals even worse. Thus, there is an obligation to defend this attainment for all Dutch citizens, including Muslims. The last essential value Fortuyn describes is the relation between adults and children. After a long struggle, a certain measure of equality has been reached between them, both within families and in the public. Children growing up in families that still have a patriarchal and authoritarian structure, like Islamic families, will have difficulty adapting to the equality on which the society is build according to Fortuyn.

Fortuyn’s ideas clearly fit the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation, yet still some of the traditional lines of argumentation are used too. In other statements, Fortuyn and his party did mention the issue of criminality and the abuse of the welfare system, but these were minor issues; the focus was clearly on the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation. Of course, the party only existed for a short period, and we cannot know how the ideas would have developed over time when the party would have to create its position on other issues and events. The idea of differentialist racism – preserving diversity by keeping cultures separate – can be found in the book. He mentions he does not want to destroy Islam. He sees the existence of different cultures not as a problem, as long as the core values of the cultures are not harmed by this coexistence. He differs from the new racism, though perhaps not as clearly in this book, on the conception of cultures as different, but not inferior. One of his most notorious statements from the newspaper interview that caused him to be kicked out of the party he joined was that Islam is a backward culture. It has not gone through the Enlightenment and secularization, and is thus not modern yet. The ‘liberal’ line of argumentation can clearly be found in this book. The national identity is conceptualized as a weaker, cultural identity as Dick Pels
described. Fortuyn even argues for (or claims to argue for) multiculturalism. There is no reference to ethnicity or primordial attachments. The culture is seen as being enriched by other cultures, and also seen as changing, though with some constants. The focus is on the ‘core values’, which are the liberal or civic values so many authors have described. Fortuyn focuses on individual responsibility, separation of church and state, gender equality, and no discrimination against homosexuals. He was also a big proponent for freedom of speech. The national values are also the values of modernity or the West, which are opposed to Islam, in a ‘clash of civilizations’ model often described by the authors writing on this new line of argumentation.

3.3. The Dutch Freedom Party

3.3.1 Historical Overview

Geert Wilders established the Partij voor de Vrijheid in 2006. Wilders had entered politics in 1990, when he became a political assistant to Bolkenstein, the prominent liberal who criticized multiculturalism and the progressive cultural relativism. Wilders became a MP in 1998 for the VVD, the Liberal Conservative party. He became their spokesperson on foreign affairs in 2002. He was on the right side of the party, and promoted a move to the right in the party. He leaked his own internal memo on this in 2004, and refused to promise to restrain himself on the issue, for which he was expelled from the party. He remained a member in Parliament, and entered the next elections with his newly created party. In the Parliamentary elections, the party got 5.9% of the votes in 2006, 15.5% in 2010 (becoming the third largest party, and subsequently a ‘tolerating’ party to the minority government), and 10.1% in 2012.

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3.3.3 The Party Program

As Koen Vossen notes, to which ideological family the PVV belongs has become somewhat of a national debate, and is a controversial issue. Many terms that are used, like racism or nationalism, have a strongly polemic connotation. However, not many academic articles have been written on it yet. Vossen attempts to contribute to the debate by describing Wilders’ ideological development. At first, he classifies Wilders as a conservative liberal, with ideas similar to Bolkenstein, but with a special interest in the Middle East and Israel. In the first half of the 2000s, he moved to being an American-inspired neoconservative. Vossen means with this a preference for free market and small government, the restoration and maintenance of communal values, and the construction of a morally evil enemy. The main difference with the previous period are the promotion of radical measures against those who threaten Dutch security, a criticism of the left progressive elite, and a bigger focus and stronger animosity to Islam. Vossen labels the period since the creation of the PVV as a national populist phase. The anti-Islamic discourse became stronger again, both in content and focus. However, other groups of immigrants have been added as concerns; mainly immigrants from Central Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria) and those from the Dutch Caribbean. Well-integrated ethnic minorities, such as Chinese, Surinamese, Moluccans, and Indo-Dutch (Wilders mother was of Indo-Dutch background) were not aimed at. The party was also increasingly nationalistic according to Vossen, with the rejection of the EU, and pleas for focusing more on national history in schools among others. Vossen also notes a difference in the manner of speech, which as become increasingly populist, blunter and more vulgar. The biggest change, however, was away from neoliberal economic policies to more left-interventionist economy, combined with harsher cuts in some areas (culture, art, development aid, public broadcasting, environmental policy, and of course asylum and
immigration). In a side note, Vossen mentions the libertarian opinion on ethical values (euthanasia, abortion, homosexual and women emancipation), which he calls a ‘remarkable aberration’ in the context of other national populist parties.\(^70\)

Paul Lucardie has attempted a classification – focusing mainly on the terms extreme right and populist – of both the PVV and the party of Rita Verdonk, based on official party literature. He does give definitions\(^71\) of these terms, but mentions they are controversial, and there is no consensus on the meaning of them. Lucardie – writing in 2007 – also brings up the fact that the ideologies of these parties have not ‘crystallized’ yet. It is not yet clear what the positions are on all issues. When the party was created, Wilders turned against the ‘equalitysyndrom’, rejecting mainly cultural equality. The focus of course, was on Islam. He also promoted neoliberal economic policies. Next to this, he aimed at giving more power to ‘the people’. Interestingly, Lucardie also focuses on the liberalism of Wilders. He claims that Wilders is ‘too liberal’ to conceptualize the people as a homogenous entity as populists do.

An important theme for Wilders is also freedom, with the party aiming at reconquering the political, cultural and economic freedom and independence. This results in scepticism of the EU, stricter rules for immigrants of non-western cultures, but also for the plea for the unification of Flanders and the Netherlands. Nationalist values are thus important for the party, but this is a ‘liberal nationalism’, according to Lucardie, since the freedom of the individual remains central. However, Lucardie mentions the liberalism of Wilders is not


\(^71\) He defines extreme right as an attempt to introduce inequality in all spheres of life. Populist is defined as an appeal to the people against the dominant norms and values of society (though not necessarily all), and the established structure of power. According to some, populism conceptualizes ‘the people’ as a homogenous entity, though according to Lucardie this is not a requirement for defining as populist. He identifies three forms of populism: right or national populism, liberal populism, and left populism.
consistent. To achieve freedom, the party proposes a strict limitation on religious freedom. In the end Lucardie labels the party as hesitant liberal nationalist and populist.  

3.4. Analysis

3.4.1. The general party program

The campaign manifesto starts very positively. The history of the Netherlands is seen as something positive, and if it is up to the PVV the future will be so too. However, the party stresses there are major problems now. One of them is security. The party plans to be tougher on law and order, with higher punishments and ‘zero tolerance’. Interestingly, the party also wants ‘ethnic registration’ in relation to crimes. Non-Dutch that commit a crime have to leave the country, and the Dutch citizenship of those with dual citizenship will be revoked. The party even wants to send back ‘Antillians’, those coming from the Caribbean part of the Dutch kingdom (the party also proposes to make these islands leave the kingdom). The party plans to strengthen the democracy (a radical democratization), which is in a crisis according to them. They also aim at decreasing the bureaucracy and a smaller government. The party defends the welfare state. It also argues for support entrepreneurs by introducing lower taxes for citizens and especially for small companies. Regarding foreign policy the party claims that the Dutch interests should be central again. This means among others no more development aid, and a bigger focus on internal security instead of fighting wars somewhere far away. They quote a mayor who claims the enemy is within our own country, by which he means ‘street terrorists’ according to the party. The section on foreign policy also largely focuses on supporting Israel.

3.4.2. **Position on immigration**

The section of the election program that deals with immigration (‘Choosing for combatting Islam and against mass-immigration’) is half about Islam, and half about mass-immigration. Indeed, the party throughout the program focuses more on Islam or Muslim-immigration than on immigration in general. Immigration in general is said to cost money (7.2 billion euro per year to be precise). It also leads to higher rates of criminality. The party also claims that dependence on social benefits, violence against homosexuals and women, honour killings, and school dropouts would be less if there had not been cultural relativism. While this is mentioned in relation to mass-immigration in general, the focus is indirectly still on Muslim immigration, since they refer to violence against homosexuals and women and honour killings, which they relate to Islam in the rest of the program. To deal with all this, the party proposes to send back non-Dutch criminals, and to exclude immigrants for the first ten years from social benefits. It also argues for a decrease in asylum seekers. Double nationality is also to be prohibited. Immigrants also have to sign an ‘assimilation contract’. If they refuse to do it, or do not obey it, they have to leave the country.

3.4.3. **Conceptualization of the self**

“The Dutch are a people that does not know its equal. We are born out of a rebellion, a struggle for freedom. Our ancestors have transformed a swampy delta into something the whole world is jealous of. Here, behind the dikes, a welfare and solidarity has been achieved that did not know its equal, with freedom for everyone and traditionally a tolerance for those who were tolerant.”

This is the second half of the first paragraph of the election program for the 2010 elections. The self is the Netherlands and Dutch people. The words that are used to refer to it are the Netherlands, the Dutch people (*Nederlanders*, *volk*) and ‘us’. Words like homeland or nation are not used; instead the more neutral ‘*Nederland*’ is used. Unlike in the differential racism
where all cultures are seen as equal, but different, the party sees Dutch people as superior. The equality of cultures and the values linked to them is stated to be an illusion.

The country is said to have Jewish-Christian and humanist roots. The party wants to include this in the first article of the constitution as the dominant culture. All the positive things in the Netherlands are based on these roots. Interestingly, while Christianity is mentioned as one of the roots of the Dutch culture, no reference is made elsewhere in the election program to it at all. Values that are mentioned as characteristic for the ‘self’ are first and foremost freedom and tolerance, but also democracy, solidarity and welfare. Two more specific Dutch values are often stressed: the freedom of homosexuals, and the equality between women and men. In the section on ‘our culture’ the party concludes by saying that ‘it is time now to choose for the defence of essential elements of our culture: the freedom of homosexuals and the equality between man and women.’ The idea of freedom comes back very often, and is part of the name of the party. In the program, the party calls the Dutch flag a symbol of freedom. Individual responsibility is also stressed, Dutch people are said to take action, to take their destiny in their own hands. This is mainly in reference to history: the transformation of the swamps, the golden age when the Netherlands was a world power and the reconstruction after the Second World War. This idea of taking action is also extrapolated to the present: action has to be taken now to change the future for the better.

As can be seen in the first quote as well, the self is conceptualized as something of the past. The party claims that all these things, and it adds democracy to this list, are now threatened. On the first page the party lists all the threats they identify in one paragraph:

“In the meantime there exists by many the feeling that we are losing the Netherlands. District after district, street after street, school after school are being Islamized. The mass-immigration reaches a sad record year after year and will only explode further the coming years. Criminality is rampant. Our flag no longer waves in freedom but has to tolerate a flag next to it of a European superstate.”
Next to the Islamization, mass-immigration, and the European Union, the elites are also identified as a threat. The Dutch people are thus conceptualized in two subgroups: the people or normal citizens and the (leftist) elite (or ‘The Hague’). Elites are said to be out of touch with reality, and destroy ‘everything that is dear to us’. According to the PVV the leftist elites think ‘the world looks like Woodstock’. The political elite at one point is even proclaimed not to be Dutch. The party claims it wants to go to The Hague to make the Binnenhof (where the parliament is located) part of the Netherlands again. The leftist elite is also said to be in alliance with Islam. They are also seen as responsible for the ‘multicultural nightmare’, which the Dutch people did not ask for. Similarly, the party claims the European multicultural superstate wants to impose more Islam on the Netherlands. The EU is also obviously blamed for trying to take away the sovereignty and independence of the country.

In some cases, the party identifies with a larger community: Europe. This is specially the case when the party defines the other: Islam. It is said to threaten not just the Netherlands, but the whole of Europe and turn it into Eurabia (thanks to Brussels).

3.4.4. Conceptualization of the other

Several ‘others’ can be identified: the European superstate, mass-immigration and the elites. When talking about immigrants, the party often refers to non-western allochtonen. Immigrants from Central Eastern Europe are also mentioned once as causing problems for the welfare state. But the main other is very clearly Islam. It is rejected in its totality. In a 2007 interview, Wilders claimed that Islam is evil (Het Kwaad zelf), and that Mohammed is the devil. Islam is seen not as a religion, but a ‘political ideology, a totalitarian doctrine that aims at domination, violence and oppression.’ Islam is said to be problematic in many ways.

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It aims at introducing the sharia and gaining power over the Dutch territory, or in more general world domination. Many Muslims are said to support the ‘jihad-attacks’ of 9/11. According to the party Islam is based on the fundamental inequality of people: Muslims and non-believers, of which the latter is inferior. Especially Jews and the West are hated. The Quran also propagates behaviour that conflicts with the Dutch legal system: anti-Semitism, discrimination of women, the killing of non-believers and the jihad. In a newspaper interview, Wilders once ambiguously conceptualized the opposition to Islam as World War III: ‘The former head of the Mossad Efraim Halevy says hat the Third World War has started. I do not take those words in my mouth, but he is right.’ Elsewhere, in reference to Pim Fortuyn’s claim that a cold war against the Islamization should be fought, he claimed that Fortuyn was right, but that by now the war has become a ‘warm’ war.

The party claims that while moderate Muslims exist, a substantial part of the Muslims is not moderate. A moderate Islam, according to the party, does not exist. Geert Wilders, the leader of the party, also often stresses that he has nothing against the persons; he only has a problem with the religion. In a rare newspaper interview, Wilders stressed this again. He also spoke of all the friendly, beautiful people he had met during his travels in the Middle East. But from his experiences there he saw that there was a religious problematic in the region, and that this ‘misery’ (ellende) is being imported to the Netherlands. From the foreword to the program it becomes clear the party believes Muslims do not belong. The party asks, following Theo van Gogh, ‘[w]hat are they doing here actually? Who let them in?’ To be precise, the ‘they’ in this question refers to Moroccans. While most of the time the party refers to Muslims, Islam or Islamization, sometimes nationalities are referred to instead: mainly Moroccans and Turks.

3.4.5. The topoi: lines of argumentation

The issue of Islamization is mentioned in relation to many different issues. While there is a section that focuses on Islam, it is mentioned in other sections as well. In the foreword of the program the party then also clearly states:

“Who believes Islamization is a thing of one-issue cannot count. The mass-immigration has enormous consequences for all aspects of our society. It is economically seen a disaster, it affects the quality of our education, increases the insecurity on the street, lead to an exodus from our cities, expels Jews and homosexuals and flushes decades of women emancipation down the toilet.”

3.4.5.1. Health Care

In order to show how vast the problem is, the program describes how ‘even’ the health care is influenced by Islamization. Several examples of this are listed: Muslim women that refuse to be treated by male doctors or helped by male nurses, Islamic elderly that demand halal food from the cooks and the need for interpreters because patients only speak Arab or Turkish. The party then asks the rhetorical question who has to pay for those interpreters. The problem is thus not just the Islamization of the health care system, but also that it costs extra money that the local population has to pay.

3.4.5.2. It costs money

The issue of the costs can be seen as a separate line of argumentation; it is raised in relation to many other topoi as well. The question ‘who pays?’ or the claim the Dutch or ‘Henk and Ingrid’ pay for ‘Ali and Fatima’, comes back several times. At one point, the party asked the parliament to investigate the costs concerning mass-immigration. The parliament refused, so the party asked a research institute to do the research. The conclusion was that the immigration of 25000 non-Western ‘allochtonen’ costs 7.2 billion a year. Non-western
allochtonen (immigrants or those with an immigrant background) pay less taxes and contributions, are more often dependent on social benefits, and are more often criminals, which also costs money. 40% of the money for social benefits is used by non-western allochtonen. In reaction, the party proposed an immigration stop for Islamic countries, a reduction of the number of immigrants and asylum seekers in general, and not allowing migrants to get social benefits for the first 10 years.  

3.4.5.2. Abuse of the welfare system

The issue of who pays comes back again when the party talks about the welfare system. According to the party Muslims abuse the welfare system, for which the local population has to pay. The party states in the introduction of the election program that the ‘welfare state has become a magnet for those seeking luck from Islamic countries. No longer a shield for the weak, but a pickup counter for an unreasonable amount of lazy Muslim-immigrants. Henk and Ingrid are paying for Ali and Fatima’. In the section on the welfare state, the party claims that the abuse of the welfare state lead to Islamization of the country, since it subsidizes Muslim immigration. The party claims a choice has to be made between a welfare state or being in immigration country.

3.4.5.3. Criminality

Immigrants in general are said to be more criminal than the native population. In the interview with a newspaper, Wilders tells that he once heard a Moroccan social worker say that the parents are stimulating the little criminals (crimineeltjes) by saying that they could do whatever they wanted since it is not their country. When referring to the criminal youth the word tuig (scum) is often used. For instance, in 2012 the party published a document on the

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76 PVV, "10 jaar immigratie kost 72 billion euro." Last modified May 19, 2010.
Ramadan and all the problems related to it. The word *Ramadan-tuig* or just *tuig* was consistently used to refer to the criminal Muslim youth. In an opinion piece, the party stated that immigrants are not more criminal because of their socio-economic background. Even if this, and other, factors are controlled, Moroccans are still three times more often suspect of criminal facts than *autochtonen*.

### 3.4.5.4. Islam discriminates (against women, Jews and homosexuals)

Islam is said to be based on the idea of inequality (between believers and non-believers). It is also said to not support gender equality. Very often when Islam is mentioned discrimination against Jews, women and homosexuals is mentioned in the same sentence. This seems to be the main issue the party has with Islam. The party thus also proposes to prohibit the burqa, tax headscarves, prohibit gender ‘apartheid’, and high punishments for circumcision. The party even proposes to ban the Quran.

The party made some statements in parliament on anti-Semitism in the beginning of 2011. They link contemporary anti-Semitism and Islam, stating ‘the more Islam, the more anti-Semitism’. Several examples of anti-Semitic incidents by Muslims (or Turks or Moroccans) are given, ranging from physical attacks and vandalism on schools, and mosques, violence and the threat of violence against Jews, and the behaviour of Moroccan and Turkish students in schools when the Holocaust is discussed. The party quotes a research that states that 20% of the history teachers in the four big cities does not treat the Holocaust anymore because of the disruptive and aggressive behaviour of some students. Reference is made to professors and studies that show the link between Islam and anti-Semitism. According to the party it is not just a small radical group that does this, but ‘big masses of normal Islamic believers’ throughout the whole world that are ‘brainwashed’. The Quran claims Jews are cursed, that they are apes, pigs and servants of the devil according to the party. The Quran
also asks Muslims to kill Jews. They thus conclude that Islam is the fundament of the rise of contemporary anti-Semitism, and that Islam is therefore a big problem.\textsuperscript{77}

3.4.5.5. Islam vs. liberal democracy

Several times the party stresses the importance of democracy, and the need to protect it. Islam is seen as in opposition to it. According to Wilders, the lack of democracy exists in all Middle Eastern countries. This is mainly because the word of God is supreme in Islam. There is no divide between the worldly and religious power. Not surprisingly, according to Wilders, Israel is the only democracy in the region. In one of the founding documents of the party, Wilders stresses the need to defend and strengthen liberalism. He claims that our open, modern, liberal-democratic society is vulnerable, mainly – though he mentions some other threats as well – to the ‘violent ideology of the political Islam’. He states that while freedom is essential to liberalism, it, together with other constitutional rights, is not absolute. The rights and freedoms are only open to those who share the common basis of constitutional norms and values.\textsuperscript{78} The document in which Wilders makes these statements is from 2006, and is a more normative document. The claim to defend liberalism – as a philosophy or ideology – has not often been used since. However, the idea that freedom or tolerance has limits does come back. For instance, in a speech by Wilders against the construction of a mosque near ground zero in 2010, he claimed that ‘[a] tolerant society is not a suicidal society. It must defend itself against the powers of darkness, the force of hatred and the blight of ignorance. It cannot tolerate the intolerant – and survive.’\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{77} PVV, "Inbreng PVV bij AO antisemitisme." Last modified February 2011.

\textsuperscript{78} Wilders, Geert. PVV, "Een nieuw realistische visie."

\textsuperscript{79} Wilders, Geert. PVV, "Speech New York."
3.5 Partial conclusion

In general, the party seems to fit the description of the radical right parties. There is a focus on being tough on law and order, and a strong populism by arguing for a more direct democracy and decreasing the bureaucracy. The economic policies first promoted neoliberalism, and now seem to be more in favour of a welfare state. The main feature of the radical right, the anti-immigration stance, is also obviously present.

Wilders started his party with the document that explicitly mentioned liberalism. The focus then was solely on Islam and on populism. At this point, his party could still fit Fortuyn’s ideas. It is important to stress, however, that while many scholars focus on Fortuyn’s ideas, his party and its positions were not fully developed, and we cannot know what would have happened if Fortuyn had not been shot. With the passing of time, the PVV added more lines of argumentation, and the party moved away from some of Fortuyn’s ideas or added issues Fortuyn’s party had never really dealt with, such as the immigrants from Eastern Europe. Fortuyn also focused much more on the liberal values. Another difference is that Fortuyn did not aim to destroy Islam, but only aimed to protect the liberal values in the Netherlands. Wilders does claim to aim at destroying Islam. Perhaps the most interesting difference though is that Fortuyn claimed to favour multiculturalism, whereas the PVV rejects it. By explicitly supporting multiculturalism, though he had his own interpretation of it, Fortuyn in a way distanced him from the extreme nationalist right and its voters. The PVV does not do this, and in that way can include both those who would have voted for Pim Fortuyn for his defence of certain liberal values, but also those who are more radically nationalist and reject multiculturalism. Hans-Georg Betz’s claim that the line of argumentation Pim Fortuyn used has now become the dominant line among the radical right in the anti-Islamic discourse, thus seems to not be completely right. While the PVV, and
perhaps other parties, have adopted some of Fortuyn’s ideas, the arguments that focus on liberal values differ in some ways from Fortuyn’s ideas.

In the 2010 election program, the PVV clearly uses two of the traditional lines of argumentation. Firstly, immigrants in general, and this idea comes back when focusing solely on Islam, are seen as more criminal. Secondly, the party uses welfare chauvinism, talking about how much immigrants cost, and the abuse of the welfare system by ‘Ali’ and ‘Fatima’. The main idea of the traditional line of argumentation on cultural diversity, the new racism, cannot really be found in the PVV’s program. One could say that their form of politics of cultural difference is much stronger. The party clearly does not believe in the equality of cultures, one of the main ideas of new racism. It explicitly rejects this idea, and Islam is conceptualized as a backwards, violent culture. In the movie Fitna, Wilders even claims that the aim is to destroy the Islamization. The aim of new racism to preserve cultures (by keeping them separate) can thus not be found.

One could argue, as Liz Fekete does, that the new racism, or cultural fundamentalism as Verena Stoclke described, is now transformed into an Enlightenment fundamentalism, taking the Enlightenment values as the basis of the culture, which needs to be protected. Indeed, the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation can also clearly be found. The conception of the national identity is not based on ethnic or primordial ties. The word ethnic is never mentioned in the program. This was seen as one of the main differences with the traditional radical right parties that did have this ethnonationalist element as for example Dick Pels argues. In this sense the national identity is also a weaker one, since it focuses solely on culture. In general Pels’ description of the new type of radical right party perfectly fits the PVV. This is not surprising of course since Pels is from the Netherlands and claims the Netherlands is at the forefront of this new type of party. The identity is also a liberal one, fitting the idea of most authors: Tebble’s ‘identity liberalism’, Fekete’s ‘Enlightenment fundamentalism, and
Akkerman’s liberalism of fear, and the idea of liberal norms as the main ideology of belonging as the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies describes. The values that are stressed are gender equality, respect for homosexuals, respect for minorities – mainly the Jewish minority, secularism or the separation of church and state, tolerance, individual responsibility and democracy. In some ways the PVV’s ideas fit the Schmittian liberalism described by Triadafilopoulos, which means that in order to protect liberalism the illiberal elements have to be taken out. It is important to not however that the PVV does not claim to protect liberalism, but the Dutch culture – which is based on liberal values – and that Islam is conceptualized in a very essentialist and homogenic way. The idea of the clash of civilizations – as described by Hans-Georg Betz and Liz Fekete – is also implicit in their discourse. Islam is mainly conceptualized as in opposition to the Western Enlightenment values. Islam is also seen in a very essentialist manner: a moderate Islam is said not to exist. These two civilizations are said to clash; the Islamization threatens Europe and the survival of the national identity with its liberal values.

Some authors – for instance Jose Zuquete – have suggested that with the focus on Islam a new focus on Christianity also arose. The party does mention Christianity as part of the roots of the Dutch culture. However, it stresses Judaism in a similar manner. Elsewhere in the program there is no focus on Christian values so this line of argumentation is only very minor. The main lines of argumentation are thus the ‘liberal’ one, the one focusing on criminality and the welfare chauvinism. There seems to be an equal focus on all of these lines, without having one dominant line of argumentation. While Fortuyn clearly focused on the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation, the PVV uses two of the traditional lines of argumentation and the new line of argumentation equally. Only the differentialist racism is missing, and instead a stronger form of politics of cultural difference is uses, though with a weaker or non-ethnic national identity.
4. The Austrian Freedom Party

4.1. Austrian integration policies and debate

Before going into the development of the party and their political program a general overview of immigration policies in Austria will be given to provide the context in which the Freedom Party operated. Until the 1990s the main immigration flows were refugees that were accepted for humanitarian reasons (Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles). However, the vast majority of these did not stay in Austria. After the fall of the Soviet Union the willingness to give humanitarian assistance declined when Romanian immigrants were met with aversion. Croats and Bosnians were first accepted as refugees, but the longer they stayed, the more negative the public opinion became. Politicians also contributed to this; they often spoke of the exhaustion of resources. All parties also adopted the conception of immigrants as similar to humanitarian refugees, in the sense that they were only welcomed temporarily and would leave after. The Social Democrat and Christian Democrat Coalition enacted anti-immigration laws and used anti-immigration rhetoric, while at the same time condemning the FPÖ for being xenophobic. The FPÖ voted in favour of these new laws, though it called for stricter reforms shortly afterwards. In the second half of the nineties the government aimed to further impede migration, and also started to focus on the integration of those already there, proposing an ‘integration package’.\footnote{Fillitz, Thomas, "Being the Native's Friend Does Not Make You the Foreigner's Enemy!'; Neo-nationalism, the Freedom Party and Jorg Haider in Austria," in Neo-nationalism in Europe & Beyond: Perspectives from Social Anthropology, ed. Andre Gingrich and Marcus Banks (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006): 138-161.} When the FPÖ came into power in 2000 the policy was already restrictionist. During this time, both the immigration and integration policies – especially the citizenship and asylum policy – became stricter again. The party’s ministers and MPs were in the forefront in the policy making and agenda setting. However, the policy
was in line with the previous coalition policies, as well as with the more general European development.\textsuperscript{81}

The Austrian national identity is very recently created. Until the middle of the twentieth century an Austrian nation did not exist, instead the region was considered as part of the German nation. Austrian merely referred to the area that was ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, and after the First World War it referred to the remaining German-speaking territories. Austrian patriotism started to the project of building an Austrian nation only after the Second World War, yet the idea of belonging to the larger German nation still played a role. The cultural identity of the new nation remained focused on the German language, instead of incorporation the multiplicity of languages spoken in the territory. Despite being an immigration country, the country is not conceptualized as an immigration nation. The Austrian nation is often imagined as an ethnic homogenous community.\textsuperscript{82}

4.2 The FPÖ

Whereas the Dutch Freedom Party is quite new, the Austrian Freedom Party was created in 1955. The party is part of all the descriptions of radical right parties, and as a result there has been extensive writing on the development, support, and political program of the party, unlike the Dutch Freedom Party on which articles are scarce. Even the anti-Islam rhetoric has been studied.


4.2.1 Historical Overview

The electoral results of the FPÖ in national elections

The *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* was created in 1955. Austria has largely been governed by the Grand-Coalitions of the SPÖ and ÖVP. The system, which was dubbed ‘Proporzdemokratie’, gave the two political parties proportional influence in all levels of public administration (including education and the state-controlled industrial sector). From the 1970s and 1980s a de-alignment of party loyalties started. The FPÖ stood largely outside this consociational model. Indeed, it was intended to give an alternative to the large number of Austrians without a firm commitment to the other two parties. It has been in government during two periods: from 1983 to 1986, and from 2000 until 2005. The party struggled reconciling the populist stance with the new reality of being member of a government coalition. Internal struggles lead to the fall of the government in 2002, and subsequently to the split of the party in 2005. Haider, the de facto leader, left the party, together with many in the official national leadership, all cabinet members, and a significant proportion of the MPs. They created the *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*; the BZÖ or Alliance for the Future of Austria.

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The BZÖ aimed at being more moderate, and moved to economic liberalism. The party remained a member of the government until the new elections in 2006.\textsuperscript{84}

\subsection*{4.2.2 Party Program}

According to Reinhard Heinisch, the party subordinates ideology to pragmatism (political expediency and opportunism). As a result, it sometimes has contradictory positions, and changes its positions easily.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, the ideology or position of the party has seen several major changes over time. One factor has been constant though: throughout the whole time, the party was one of the main critics of the Proporzdemokratie, and the corruption and privileges that were allegedly involved with it. It is still critical of the established parties and argues for a more direct democracy. The main change over time is whether the party stressed its national or its liberal character. At first, it aimed at representing and reviving the third (the others were the socialist and catholic) ‘Lager’ (similar to the Dutch pillars); the national-liberal Lager which had been influential during the Monarchy and the First Austrian Republic (which ended with the Anschluss). However, it recognized the association with Nazism was discredited, and tried to establish a new profile without this connotation, though sticking to the Pan-Germanism (seeing Austria as a member of a larger German ethnic and cultural community). The modernization was done mainly be creating a new balance between the national and liberal aspects of the party; strengthening the commitment to the latter. This was mainly and successfully done in the 70s, after which the party became a member of the government coalition in ‘83. However, the leader of the party, Seger, who had been elected as chairman in 1980, became increasingly unpopular. A revolt started against him, with Haider – who was a member of the more national wing of the party – as a main figure in it.


\textsuperscript{85} Heinisch, Reinhard. "Right-Wing Populism in Austria; a Case for Comparison." (2008).
In 1986, Haider was elected as chairmen, and the party started to stress the national element more again. Indeed, the nationalism of the party strengthened. Haider downplayed crimes committed by the National Socialist regime, though he later condemned the regime in a 1993 book. The party advocated a homogenic, ethnic and cultural concept of the nation, denying the existence of Austria, claiming that Austrians were part of a larger German cultural community. This became especially clear in the 1989 Lorenzen declaration, which formulated a national and biological, and German nationalistic concept of the Austrian people. It has to be noted though that in the 1997 election program it was stated that every Austrian has a right to define his or her own identity. Several autochthonous ‘Volksgruppe’ were listed (Germans, Croats, Roma, Slovaks, Slovenes, Czechs and Hungarians), to which subjective rights could be accorded. The conceptualization of the nation or cultural community changed during Haider’s leadership. The party turned from pan-Germanism (though it is still present) to a more Austrian patriotism. Haider had called the Austrian national consciousness an ‘ideological miscarriage’ even in 1990. Since then this started to change. In a 1993 referendum on immigration by the FPÖ, called ‘Austria First’, there was no reference to pan-Germanism, whereas previously immigrants were mainly opposed for not being German. The party also propagated a xenophobic program. It was hostile to foreigners and opposed the creation of a multicultural society. According to Gärtner before 1986 foreigners were not important in Austrian politics in general, and also less important for the FPÖ. Immediately after Haider became the leader the anti-foreigner discourse became one of the main issues of the party. This took place around the same time, or just before, anti-immigration sentiments strengthened in general with the fall of the Soviet-Union as explained previously. The media also participated in this.

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However, even when the national dimension started to be dominant, the party maintained its strong (neo-)liberalism, promoting individualism and entrepreneurship. Citizens should take responsibility for themselves, and not expect the community to take care of them. The party also refused to support a ban on abortion, arguing that it was up to the women themselves to make a decision on it. The focus however, was on economic liberalism. Before Haider became chairmen, the party had gradually accepted the non-economic elements of liberalism as well. As a result, it was accepted in the Liberal International in 1979. However, due to the policy change in 86, it was about to be expelled again in 1993, as a result the party left the Liberal International several days before this could happen. In that year a large part of the pro-liberal faction of the party left, and created a new party, the Liberals Forum, which eventually was not successful. According to Reinhold Gärtner, the liberal wing, which was not always hostile to foreigners, has died out in the last fifteen years (writing in 2002). Apart from the changing balance between liberalism and nationalism, in which the latter clearly became the most important, several other things changed as well under Haider’s leadership. The party moved away from its anti-clerical position, and moved towards a more pro-Christian (Catholic) stance. The populism and anti-establishment position of the party also strengthened. Ignazi concludes that – writing in 2003 – the party is no longer a liberal party (though the party’s name may suggest it); instead it should be included in the extreme right party family.

Jon Higham has analysed the discourses on immigration from the 1999, 2002 and 2006 national elections. In 1999, the main themes were organized crime, drug dealing, and social security fraud. The discourse aimed at immigrants in general, though in some cases Africans immigrants were mentioned in specific. In the 2002 election, immigration remained

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a major issue. The party now focused on the importance of integration as well, whereas in the previous election they focused on restricting and reducing immigration. They did not reflect on the immigrants that were already there. Now, the party recognized immigrants had a right to stay, but that they should learn the language and accept the fundamental democratic rules. The rhetoric had toned down from the previous elections. The posters and slogans were also much less aggressive. In the 2006 elections, immigration played a more significant role in the campaign. Main themes were again the welfare state and criminal tendencies. For the first time there was a focus on one specific immigrant group: Muslims. Another related issue was the potential entry of Turkey into the EU. Austrian culture and Islam were represented as mutually exclusive. Islamic and Turkish cultures were also represented as incompatible with Enlightenment values.\(^\text{92}\)

Looking at Islam in specific, it became part of the focus of the party in the latter half of the 2000s. As is the case with radical right parties in Europe in general, the anti-Islamic rhetoric and policy proposals have become one of the core themes of the party. However, this took place later than in other European extreme right parties, mainly due to national particularities and institutional factors. Before 2005 Islam played a smaller role and the rhetoric was more modest. Islam was already identified as an ‘other’ in the 1990s. During this time, immigration was based on socio-economic arguments, as well as the argument it posed a threat to Austrian values and national identity. In 1993, Haider claimed in his book *Die Freiheit, die ich meine* (the freedom I mean) that “the social order of Islam is in opposite to our Western values”. These were mainly human rights, democracy and the belief in equality

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between men and women. However, in general religion was not an issue at first, due to the anti-clerical nature of the party. This anti-clerical nature withered away in the end of the nineties, when Christianity was identified as the spiritual base of the West. In 1997, the party also stated that the right to build mosques should be discussed.

Like elsewhere in Europe, the anti-Islamic discourse intensified after 9/11. However, the party avoided taking an openly harsh tone to Islam, under the pressure of their coalition partner and the diplomatic pressures from Europe. The party underlined the right to religious freedom, and accepted the Islamic Religious Community in Austria as a dialogue partner. The party did not protest when the education minister proclaimed in 2004 that wearing a headscarf was a religious right. Of course, there were internal debates in the party, so it should not be assumed the party actually supported the statement. Indeed, the party also showed its more critical side of Islam: it demanded to restrict or even ban some Islamic practices as for example halal slaughtering. The 2004 campaign against the entry of Turkey into the EU also focused on Islam. After the split of the party, the anti-Islamic rhetoric rose, first amongst the FPÖ since the BZÖ was still in government. In the 2008 policy paper on Islam the party stressed that the occidental Christian culture was threatened by Islamization.

Especially since 2006, Islam is constructed as the homogenous ‘other’, which is in opposition to the self. Islam is rejected as a whole. It is framed more as a culture than as a religion, and the same is done for Christianity. The party also stated in 2007 Muslims should not have religious rights any more since ‘Islam has nothing to do with religious freedom’. The culture is depicted as backward and alien. Christianity became one of the main symbols for the ‘self’. In many of the campaign material cathedrals and churches are contrasted with mosques, and Christian crosses are also used. Next to Christianity, gender equality has

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become one of the main boundary-creating symbols. The Western, or even Austrian, value of
gender equality is opposed to the illiberal unequal gender practices of Islam. The headscarf
becomes one of the main symbols of discrimination against women. The party has also
stressed the Enlightenment values according to some. In the discussion on the entry of Turkey
to the EU, Haider mentioned that Turkey had not experienced Enlightenment and
Renaissance, which were the basis of the European culture. He also named tolerance as one of
the most important European values, and one that was not respected in Turkey. Thus, the FPO
became a protector of a European culture. Jews were seen part of this, and the Muslims were
the main threat, next to Africans and Asians who were also depicted as ‘others’.

4.2.3. Comparisons to the PVV

According to Rosenberger and Hadj-Abdou the anti-Islamic rhetoric is almost
identical in the European radical right. The emergence of the discourse might have been
postponed in Austria due to national particularities; the content of the discourse is similar
according to them. For example, the FPÖ’s motion against the building of mosques and
minarets was proposed a few days after the Swiss People’s Party launched a referendum on
the issue. The agency that created the material for the Swiss anti-referendum campaign also
created the computer game of the FPÖ in which many mosques, minarets and muezzins as
possible have to be shot. Susanne Winter, one of the best known FPÖ politicians that focuses
on Islam, argued for the banishing Islam back to ‘beyond the Mediterranean sea’. The same
rhetoric had been used before by Filip Dewinter, who stated that ‘organized, radical Islam has
to be pushed back to the other side of the Mediterranean’. Important to note also is that Islam

94 Rosenberger, Sieglinde and Leila Hadj-Abdou, "Islam at Issue: Anti-Islamic mobilization of the extreme right
in Austria," in Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin and
95 Sam Cherribi, "An obsession Renewed: Islamophobia in the Netherlands, Austria and
is constructed as in opposition to European or Western values in general, and not just to the national identity. As a result, in the anti-Islamic discourse the focus is not just on the national community but also the European community. Some themes used in the anti-Islamic discourse are specific to Austria, mainly the Turkish siege of Vienna in the 16th/17th century.  

Paul Lucardie, one of the first who tried to classify the Dutch Freedom Party, and concluded it was a half-hearted liberal nationalist and populist party, also identified similar parties elsewhere in Europe. One of the main examples he gives is the Austrian Freedom Party. Just like the Dutch Freedom Party, the FPÖ has a liberal background, combined with a liberal wing. The national wing forced some of the liberals out of the party under the leadership of Haider, and the party also turned more populist. The idea of freedom is central to the party, just like it is to the PVV. The party prefers to be called patriot instead of nationalist, and recognizes the existence of different minorities in Austria that have their own rights. While at first the vision on Islam was more modest than the PVV according to Lucardie, eventually the rejection of Islam became stronger. In short, both parties share a liberal background, put freedom central, are nationalist while preferring to be called patriotic, and reject Islam.  

4.3 Analysis

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4.3.1. The general party program

To give a more general background to the comparison a short description of the general party program\(^98\) will be given. It was adopted in June 2011 in Graz. It is the fifth party program of the FPÖ (previous ones are from 1955-1964, 1968, 1985, 1997/2005). It is a short description of the main principles, aims, and ideas of the party. The main aims of the party are ‘the freedom, security, peace and welfare of Austria and its people’. The foundation of all the positions is freedom, human dignity and democratic solidarity. The party wants to protect the self-determination, independence and autonomy of Austria and German speaking minorities, and further develop the ‘Leitkultur’. Family is seen as the foundation of society, and is based on a union of a man, a woman and their children. The party aims at gender equality, but is against positive discrimination. The economic policy is based on a neo-liberal market-economy, with a focus on entrepreneurship, low taxes and performance incentives. It aims at a legal order based on rule of law and social responsibility. The FPÖ aims to build a more direct democracy. Security is also an important issue for the party. Their priority is to protect the territory and neutrality of Austria and the safety of its citizens. To do that it wants to introduce compulsory military service for men. The foreign policy should also be based on Austrian interests, and the interests of German-speaking minorities. The party is in favour of a European Union as a community of sovereign nation-states.

4.3.2. Position on immigration

Immigration is dealt with in more depth in the Handbook\(^99\) of the party, which is a 300-page long guide for the functionaries of the party and those who have the mandate to represent the party. The FPÖ claims that Austria is not an immigration country. They also

\(^{98}\) FPÖ, "Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs; Österreich Zuerst." Last modified June 18, 2011.

reject multiculturalism and the existence of separate communities (Parallelgesellschaften). The party proposes a temporary immigration stop from third countries, wants to gain back the decision power on internal migration, and proposes to go back to the guest worker model. The discourse is framed as being objective by quoting scientists, experts, newspaper articles and statistics. A large focus of the text in the Handbook that deals with migration is on the quantitative data on migration. They also refer to statements by professors on migration. The party claims that integration is quantitatively no longer possible. The official statistics give lower number of immigrants than there actually are. Next to that, arguments often used to support immigration (e.g. it is needed for our economy, it will help with the social and pension system) are claimed to be fallacies. According to the party, Austria has one of the highest percentages of immigrants in Europe, which are, unlike in many other countries, not highly educated and ‘culturally foreign’ (kulturfremd). This leads to criminality, abuse of the social system, and unemployment. In the chapter on security, crime data is used with specific mention of the amount of crimes done by foreigners. The main idea is that immigration is a burden the country cannot afford. Immigrants should also integrate, and there should be clear rules for this. The biggest focus is on learning the German language. In short, immigrants that refuse to integrate, have committed a crime, abuse the social system or the asylum system, and for those for whom there is no job or place to live, should all be send back. On asylum the party claims that it supports asylum, but only while there still is a threat of persecution, and only if asylum seekers did not enter through safe third countries. The focus when talking about migration and asylum in this part of the Handbook is clearly on Eastern Europe, and some mention is made of African immigrants. Only the last part of the chapter deals with Muslim immigrants.

100 Interestingly, when talking about the Balkans, they reject multiethnic states as an illusion. They support self-determination, and claim that those who believe in the model of multiethnic states in the Balkans have learned nothing from the wars that took place. The statement is made only in reference to the Balkans, so it is not clear whether they believe multi-ethnic states are impossible in general. They do support the autochtonous national minorities in Austria.
4.3.3. Conceptualization of the self

The ‘self’ or ‘us’ is Austria. Words that are often used to name the self are ‘heimat’, ‘eigene’, ‘unser’, ‘autochthonous’. Several times the word ‘ethnisch’ is used, for example when referring to German-speaking minorities outside Austria (mainly South-Tyrol). The party refers to itself as ‘österreichpatriotisch’. Minorities are mentioned as an integral part of Austria and its population. They stress minority protection (also in relation to minorities outside Austria, they refer to the principle of reciprocity: German-speaking minorities on the former territory of the Austrian empire should be treated like minorities are treated in current-day Austria). It is often mentioned that ‘we’ are rooted in history and traditions. The party also refers to customs, norms, values and culture. There is no explicit mention what these traditions, norms and values are. Of course, the party refers to many values it supports and customs, such as democracy, rule of law, separation of church and state, solidarity and a free-market economy. But these are not referred to as ‘national values’. Only when talking about Islam does the party mention values that are supported by ‘us’, but not by ‘them’. However, these values are referred to as western or European, as will be described later. Many times the party proclaims the maintenance and development of the Austrian identity or the Leitkultur as one of their goals. They claim that it is the Gewissensthema (conscious theme) of our age. The party states that ‘in a time of the destroying of identity and the estrangement of peoples from their roots in the interests of global corporations and the global finance jugglers, the idealistic commitment to the preservation of the own identity requires special observance.’

Identity is also seen as threatened by left wing theories from the Frankfurt School.

101 “In einer Zeit der Identitätsvernichtung und der Entfremdung der Völker von ihren Wurzeln im Interesse globaler Großkonzerne und weltweit tätiger Finanzjongluere gilt dem ideellen Engagement für die Bewahrung der eigenen Kultur und Sprache besondere Achtung” (page 255 Handbook)
The party also stresses very often that it is part of a larger German community. For instance, in the Handbook it is claimed that ‘We commit ourselves to the Austrian Republic. On the basis of the common language, religion, art and culture and the shared history of thousands of years, we are embedded in the German cultural community (Kulturgemeinschaft)’. In the section on ‘homeland, identity and environment’, the party states that ‘[t]he language, history and culture of Austria are German’. Thus, while the party stresses the self-determination, independence and autonomy of the Austrian homeland as one of the main aims, and calls itself ‘Austrian patriotic’, pan-Germanism can still be found. Next to being part of the larger German cultural community, the Austrian people are also conceptualized as part of the European cultural space (Kulturraum). Whereas the party does not define what the Austrian national identity is, they do define the European culture. It is conceptualized as having its roots in the Ancient Times, being marked significantly by Christianity, but also by Judaism and other non-Christian religions, and lastly as having experienced fundamental progression by humanism and the Enlightenment. They label the European worldview as ‘Kultur-Christentum’, which is based on the separation of church and state. Elsewhere they refer to a western-Christian value community. The focus in the defining of the European culture seems thus to be on Christianity, but mainly as a culture, not necessarily as a religion. In the policy paper on Islam of the party though, the focus is on civil rights as central elements of the European self-understanding.

4.3.4. Conceptualization of the other

When talking about immigration, several groups are mentioned explicitly: Eastern-Europeans, Africans, and Muslim immigrants. Special focus is also on fundamentalism and

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102 “Die Europäische Kultur hat ihre ältesten Wurzeln in der Antike. Europe wurde in entscheidender Weise vom Christentum geprägt, durch das Judentum und andere nichtchristliche Religionsgemeinschaften beeinflusst und erfuhre seine grundlegende Weiterentwicklung durch Humanismus und Aufklärung.” (Party Program, section 2)
extremism. In the section on ‘homeland, identity and environment’ in the party program, the party claims they will protect European values and the liberal-democraticorder against fanaticism and extremism. They also mention that freedom of religion is protected, but that this also includes the right to be free to escape from religious dogmas. In the handbook, before going into the issue of Islam, the need to commit to the liberal-democratic Rechtsstaat in order to get citizenship is mentioned. In the same section, the Handbook mentions religious fundamentalism. Islam is not specifically mentioned here, the claim is general. Only in the last section of the chapter on identity and homeland is Islam mentioned. Religious fundamentalism and extremism is mentioned in the beginning of the section, but after that the focus is on Islam in general, without making differences between fundamentalists and more moderate believers. In the end of the section reference is made again to fundamentalism and radicalization. The text is thus intentionally ambiguous whether their description represents Islam or fundamentalist Islam. Islam is seen not just as a religion, but also as a system of law; a political belief with its own laws for its followers. It is claimed that Islam sees the world as a theatre of war. The chapter also states that religions that do not support the separation of church and state will lose their official status. The section also references a study by the academy of sciences, which claims that in 2050 half of the children will grow up in an Islamic community.

In 2008 the party published a policy paper on Islam (wir und der Islam). Interestingly, a large part of the paper stresses the positive aspects of Islam. The first sentence when describing Islam is ‘[s]eeing Islam as such as evil, is not appropriate’ The shared roots of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and the overlaps with ‘our’ moral concepts are stressed. The traditions and achievements of Islam are claimed to have influenced the

103 in German the term ‘freiheitlichen-demokratische’ is used. ‘Freiheitlichen’ is generally translated as ‘liberal’. The word is also used in the name of the party. However, the translation of the name, also used by the party itself, is the Freedom Party of Austria. Literally translated, Freedom would be Freiheit, and not freiheitlichen.

Christian West. The scientific achievements, and cultural achievements in Spain under Islamic rule are also mentioned. Several words that aim to strengthen the argument are used (intensification strategies): *wesentlich mitgeprägt* (substantially influenced), and *durchaus Respekt* (thoroughly respected). The main point is that Islamic cultures should be respected. When talking about geopolitics, they claim they support Palestine, are against the war in Iraq, and reject the sanctions against Iran. Instead of listening to the United States, Europe should act in its own interests. They also stress they support the self-determination of Islamic peoples, and support the aspiration of the Islamic world to be free from foreign influence. In this part, the main other is in fact not Islam, but the USA (Bush is called a *kriegshetzer*, a warmonger). The paper also focuses much more on fundamentalist or radical Islam than on Islam in general. They mention that the Quran propagates views contrary to our basic views. This is only a problem however, with a literal interpretation of the book as fundamentalist do. They call Islamic fundamentalism a threat to Europe, also due to Muslim mass integration. What proportion of the Muslims they assume to be fundamentalist is not clear. They quote some numbers on the percentage of Muslims willing to integrate: 45% and 50%. This has led to the creation of a separate community. In short, this policy paper seems more moderate, it stresses the positive aspects of Islam and focuses more on the fundamentalist Islam instead of on Islam in general.

4.3.5. The topoi: lines of argumentation

4.3.5.1. Social security, criminality, unemployment

In general, immigration is opposed because it is a burden on the social system. According to the party, immigration leads to higher rates of criminality and unemployment, and involves abuse of the welfare system. In this topoi Islam is not mentioned, instead the focus is on migration in general.
4.5.3.2. Maintaining cultures and diversity

In general, the Handbook and Party Program focus on maintaining the Austrian culture. Other cultures are valued, but this requires a commitment to the own culture according to the party.\textsuperscript{106} This rhetoric fits the concept of new or differentialist racism. The need to integrate and especially to learn the German language is stressed. Just like the previous line of argumentation, the focus is not on a specific group of immigrants. In newspaper articles and interviews quoted all kinds of groups of immigrants are mentioned. In one article, the claim is that the majority of immigrants feels well integrated. The exception is Turks, which are more reluctant to integrate. When talking about Islam, the refusal to integrate and the creation of separate communities are mentioned. The party rejects the existence of these separate communities, but also rejects the mixing of religious and political worldviews.\textsuperscript{107}

4.3.5.3. The general threat of fundamentalism

Fundamentalism and extremism are seen as a threat in general, without mentioning Islam in specific. They are seen as being in opposition to the liberal-democratic order. Extremists do not respect the Austrian constitution and laws, based on supposed (vermeintlich) religious reasons. When talking about freedom of religion, the party also stresses that this also includes the freedom from religious dogmas. In other words, fundamentalist religion is not seen as a ‘proper’ religion and therefore is not protected by the right to freedom of religion.

\textsuperscript{106} Diversity is also promoted, for example in the European context. The FPÖ promotes a Europe of diversity. However, they stress they are in favor of historically grown and autochthonous peoples and minorities and strongly reject the artificial equalizing of the diversity of European languages and cultures through forced multiculturalism, globalization and mass-immigration. In other words, autochthonous and new minorities should not have the same rights.

\textsuperscript{107} “Multikulturelle Parallelgesellschaften lehnen wir ebenso ab wie die Vermischung von religiösen und philosophischen Weltbildern” (page 33, Handbook).
4.3.5.4. Clash of Civilizations: Enlightened Christian Europe vs. (Fundamentalist) Islam

Several times, the idea of the clash of civilizations of Huntington is explicitly mentioned. In the policy paper the first section aims at defining what the values are that the party supports. Civil rights, for which was fought in 1848, are considered to be part of the communal and legal order. This includes the right to freedom of association, freedom of opinion, press freedom, religious freedom, and freedom of consciousness. These values are called ‘inviolable ground principles of our pluralistic social order’. The separation of church and state is seen as part of the European tradition. Civil rights are also said to be part of the European self-understanding.

Islam is seen as a religion aiming at ruling or dominating the world (Weltherrschaftsanspruch). Minarets are thus seen as symbols of this ‘foreign claim to power’. The Handbook quotes Erdogan, who once claimed that ‘The mosques are our barracks, the minarets our bayonets, the domes our helmets and the believers our soldiers.’ Islam is claimed to reject the Western rule of law and democracy. Especially fundamentalist Islam is said to aim at theocracy, and thus rejects democracy. They quote an Imam from Vienna, who claims that he does not believe in democracy, since God’s word is the only word that counts. The FPÖ concludes from his statements that the problem is the lack of support for the rule of law, democracy, tolerance and the refusal to integrate. Another recurring theme is the separation of church and state, which the party stresses. Islam also aims at introducing the sharia, which allows the death penalty, flogging, and cutting off of hands. Parts of the Quran also propagate violence against non-believers. The party acknowledged the same could be said for Christianity. The difference though is that Christianity has been through enlightenment. In the policy paper, they mention in general that Islam propagates beliefs

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108 Unverbrüchliche Grundprinzipien unserer pluralistischen Gesellschaftsordnung’ (Wir und der Islam, p 1.)
109 Handbook, page 56
contrary to our basic values. The party thus proposes that Imams should take place in Austria, and that they claim their commitment to European civilizational achievements.

4.3.5.5. Gender equality

The equality between man and women is specifically stressed. The party stresses that forced marriages, forced circumcision, oppression of and violence against women are not covered under religious freedom. In the handbook an Islamic schoolbook used in public schools is described. In the book, the claim is that women should obey their husbands unconditionally. If they do not, they have to be brought to reason. If they still do not listen after that the husband is allowed to hit the women. Next to that, women should wear special clothes that only show their face and hands, not wear pants, perfume or fashionable hairstyles. Women have to stay in the house as much as possible to avoid physical contact with other men. Regarding sex, women are the ‘field / farmland’ (acker) of the man, and have no rights in that regard. In reaction to this schoolbook, the party claims that schoolbooks have to be checked by state institutions, and religious education should be done by persons trained in Germany, and in German. The book is supposed to represent Islam in general, and not just fundamentalist Islam. In the section of the handbook that deals with the family, mention is made again of gender equality, and the threat of immigration to it. The veil is seen as a symbol of oppression, and therefor opposed.

4.4 Partial conclusion

In general the party fits the radical right party family, as could be expected. In the 2011 program, the main features of the radical right can be found. The party plans to be tough on law and order. Populism can also be found, the party argues in favour of a more direct democracy. The economic policy is based on neoliberalism. The anti-immigrant and
nationalist dimension is also clear. The FPÖ aims to reduce immigrants and argues for the preservation and development of the *Leitkultur*. In the discourses on immigration the focus is mainly on immigration in general. Islam is mentioned and there is a special section dedicated to it, but it is not the main focus. In the 2008 policy paper there was no opposition to Islam in general, the party only had a problem with the fundamentalist Islam. In the 2011 documents this has changed, now Islam is opposed in general. However, the part on Islam comes after the section that deals with fundamentalism, and the two are somewhat merged, which makes it more ambiguous whether the party opposes fundamentalist Islam or Islam as a whole.

In the immigration discourses in general the focus is on the traditional lines of argumentation. Immigrants are seen as more criminal and causing insecurity and unrest. They are also claimed to abuse the welfare system and are an economic burden. The new or differentialist racism is also clearly present. The rejection of globalization and American influence that Betz and Ignazi mention in relation to new racism can also be found. The party claims to value other cultures. But to do this the own culture has to be protected, preserved and developed. Mixing and multiculturalism are rejected. There is no mention at all of the superiority of Austrian (or German) culture. As typical for the new racism, other cultures are seen as different but not as inferior. In the 2008 policy paper the party stresses the positive aspects and achievements of Islam, making it clear it has just as much value as other cultures. This is not done as clearly in the 2011 documents. There the party is very critical of (fundamentalist) Islam and fundamentalism in general. Because of the above mentioned calculated ambivalence in this, it is a little vague whether certain aspects of Islam as a whole are rejected, making it an inferior culture, or whether it is only the fundamentalist parts that are rejected. In some parts the rise of Islam in general is criticized, but this is linked in some cases to the idea that a rise in the amount of Muslims would inherently mean an increase in the amount of fundamentalist Muslims. In other words, one cannot say whether Islam is
rejected as inferior as a whole, or that Islam is rejected because of the fundamentalist part that is inferior.

Some elements of the liberal line of argumentation can also be found in relation to Islam. Additionally some of the values the liberal line of argumentation aims to defend are also found in the discourse on fundamentalism – both fundamentalism in general and Islamic fundamentalism – mainly democracy and the separation of church and state. This line of discourse cannot be found in relation to immigration in general however. The FPÖ explicitly mentions the idea of a clash of civilizations, in which the own civilization is threatened by the increasing amount of Muslims in Austria, confirming the ideas of Hans-Georg Betz and Liz Fekete. The values that are threatened by Islam are democracy, separation of church and state, tolerance and gender equality. The party also stresses minority protection and individual responsibility. Tjitske Akkerman seems to be right that because these values are now so mainstream, the party has had to adopt and now strongly defends them. However, it is important to stress that the party has endorsed liberalism before. Dick Pels claimed that the parties focusing on this ‘liberal’ line of argumentation also move away from radical nationalism, homophobia and anti-Semitism. While there is no explicit homophobia or anti-Semitism, the party is also not philosemitic and a defender of respect for homosexuals like Pim Fortuyn or the PVV are. The party does not express respect for homosexuality as threatened by Islam; it even conceptualizes the family as a union of a man, women and their children. The party also does not mention discrimination of Jews. In the 2008 policy paper the party states it supports Palestine. However, there is no explicit anti-Semitism in the policy paper, and in the 2011 documents there even is no implicit anti-Semitism. The new Christian line of argumentation sometimes mentioned in relation to Islam is also present. The party increasingly focused on Christianity, though it is not very prominent in the program.
Next to not mentioning some values, which are sometimes linked to the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation, the party also lacks two other aspects linked to this line. Firstly, some authors, like Dick Pels, have claimed that this line of argumentation uses a weaker form of identity, no longer based on ethnonationalist or primordial elements. The FPÖ, however, does still conceptualize the identity as a strong and ethnic identity. The word *ethnisch* is used, and the identity is often stated to be rooted in a long history and culture, and not in a group of values. Secondly, the identity liberalism Tebble describes is not explicitly or directly present. The national values are not clearly described, and the liberal norms are not mentioned as typical for Austria. They are said to be typical for Europe or the West, of which Austria is a part. The values are thus European values, and in that way indirectly also values supported in Austria. This confirms what Julio Zuquete described. According to him radical right parties, because of the increasing importance of Islam, now also focus on Europe. This wider European community is seen as complementary to the national identity. Thus, Zuquete’s description of the changing positions in the new radical right seems to fit the FPÖ better than the liberal line of argumentation. He describes the main changes as a bigger focus on Christianity, a more away from anti-Semitism, and the above-mentioned focus on a wider community, Europe. Part of this wider Europe are the liberal or enlightenment values.
5. Conclusion

This thesis aimed to look at how ‘liberal values’ are incorporated in the xenophobic discourses of radical right parties, focusing on the anti-Islamic discourses of the Dutch Freedom Party and the Austrian Freedom Party. Several lines of argumentation were distinguished. The traditional or ‘brownish’ arguments are those that have been described in the literature on the successes of the new radical right in the 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, there is a line of argumentation known as welfare chauvinism, in which immigrants are blamed for taking up the native’s jobs, being a burden for the welfare system and abusing that system. A second traditional line of argumentation is based on the idea that there is more criminality among migrants. The main traditional line of argumentation is new or differentialist racism; the idea that cultures are different, but equal, and that to preserve them they have to be kept separate. The new ‘liberal’ line of argumentation has been developed based on developments in the 2000s, with Pim Fortuyn as one of the main examples. The idea is that the national identity is no longer based on primordial or ethnic ties, but on liberal Enlightenment values, such as tolerance, emancipation and democracy. These have to be protected against Islamization, in a kind of clash of civilizations. Unlike in the new racism, the aim is no longer to preserve the other culture, only to protect the own national identity.

As expected the Dutch Freedom Party focused more on the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation than the Austrian Freedom Party. There is no reference to ethnic or other primordial ties in the PVV’s conception of national identity. Instead the values that are described as national values are those values typical for identity liberalism. Islam is seen as threatening these in a clash of civilizations. The main traditional line of argumentation, the new racism, is not present; the party does not believe in equality of cultures and does not aim to preserve different cultures, only the own culture. However, the party does not solely use
the liberal exclusionary argumentation. Large parts of the discourse on (Muslim) immigration focus on welfare chauvinism and criminality as well. These two traditional lines of argumentation also play a big role for the Austrian Freedom Party. The FPÖ focuses much more on immigration in general, and only has small sections on Muslim immigration. In the section on Muslim immigration the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation can be found. The idea of a clash of civilizations between an enlightened Europe and an illiberal Islam is mentioned. However, the national identity is not conceptualized as a liberal one, and reference is still made to ethnic ties. The defence of the national identity still follows the line of new racism, supporting diversity and valuing other cultures while aiming to keeping them separate in order to preserve them. The ‘liberal’ line of argumentation can only be found in reference to European values and in reference to Islam.

In comparison, the PVV discourse focuses much more on the liberal line of argumentation than the FPÖ, as was hypothesized. The PVV incorporates this line of argumentation as the definition of the national identity, moving away from new racism. The FPÖ incorporates the new line of argumentation as well, but uses it complementary to the new racism. However, comparing the 2008 policy papers and the 2011 party documents there has been a move towards the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation and away from new racism. In the 2008 paper both could be found, while in the 2011 sections that focused on Islam only the latter could be found. The party also goes less far in the defence of liberal values; unlike the PVV, and unlike Dick Pels described, the party is not philosemitic (though it is not anti-Semitic either) and does not defend the rights of homosexuals. The two parties also slightly differ in their conceptualization of Islam. The PVV conceptualized Islam as illiberal as a whole, and rejects the idea of the existence of a moderate version of Islam. The FPÖ focuses more on fundamentalism in general and on a fundamentalist Islam, which would mean a moderate Islam exists as well, which the party does not object too. However, in the 2011
documents the focus is less on fundamentalism than in 2008, and Islam is opposed as a whole as well.

There are several factors that might be able to explain the difference in rhetoric of these parties. Firstly, what is generally seen as defining of the national identity in a country makes a difference. The thesis thus confirms the ideas by Halikiopoulo, Mock and Vasilopoulou who argued that some parties would be more successful in adopting these civic values as the basis of the national identity than others. If the values have been supported in the country as an essential part of the nation for a longer while, this will be easier as is the case in the Netherlands. From the 1970s liberal values became widely accepted in the Netherlands. These values include mainly women’s and homosexual’s emancipation, a critical way of approaching religion, freedom of speech, sexual freedom and abortion. Eventually these values became defining of what is essentially Dutch. As a result, a Dutch radical right party is very likely to adopt these values as part of the national identity, instead of primordial or ethnic ties. The Austrian national identity is not based on such values. Instead, the conception of the nation, as Rainer Bauböck explains, is more ethnically and linguistically based. This does not mean the FPÖ cannot still refer to the liberal values in relation to Islam, but it is less likely to see or adopt them as defining of the national identity.

Another factor is the history of the parties themselves. The FPÖ is a longer-existing party, which has to adapt their rhetoric to the changing circumstances, meaning the increasing political importance of the presence of Islam. The Dutch Freedom Party has never had to adapt the rhetoric to these circumstances, since it was created in reaction to this. Perhaps it is also not surprising that the FPÖ only really started to focus on Islam after 2005. The creation of the BZÖ, and the leaving of Jörg Haider, meant that the party had to re-establish itself and show how it was different from the BZÖ, which remained in government. In other words, this
gave them the opportunity to adapt the discourse, and to increase the focus of Islam. Nevertheless, the old discourses that base the national identity on primordial or ethnic ties still remain. The civic and ethnic bases of the national identity are thus combined. The Dutch Freedom Party never had to deal with the idea of an ethnically based identity. Their ‘predecessor’, Fortuyn, argued very much for a civic based identity, and thus it is not surprising this was the discourse that was adopted. The personal history of Geert Wilders, the leader – and officially its only member – and creator of the party, being a former member of the Dutch liberal party, can also help to explain the focus on liberal values. Wilders promotes his ideas on Islam internationally as well. Since his main interest is Islam, and as the creator and leader of the party, it is therefore not surprising the focus of the party is on Islam, and with that on the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation.

This focus of the PVV on Islam might be another possible explanation for the difference in discourse. Scholars who have described this ‘liberal’ line of argumentation – however they call it – all either focus on Islam or have mentioned that those that use this line of argumentation mainly focus on Muslim immigrants. And indeed, in the discourses of the FPÖ one can only find the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation in the section dealing with Islam. As for the PVV, the line of argumentation can be found throughout their discourses, but the party also mentions Islam in almost all sections of their program, so this is not surprising. This would thus suggest that an increasing focus on Islam in the party, or in the country in general, also leads to the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation to become more prominent.

Unfortunately, the current research has its limitations due to time and linguistic constraints. A more extensive research should include more parties. Especially the discourses of other newly created radical right parties, which often have a bigger focus on Islam similar to the PVV, such as those in Scandinavia, can turn out to be interesting. This could be
contrasted to parties that do not extensively focus on Muslim immigration. If the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation cannot be found there, this means that it is solely linked to anti-Islamic discourses. Additionally, including more parties might also give more information on the line of argumentation that focuses on Christianity. Both the PVV and the FPÖ mention this, but neither have a Christian background. It will be interesting to see whether parties that do have stronger link with Christianity, or Christian parties, use mainly the ‘liberal’ line of argumentation like the PVV and the FPÖ, or whether they mainly oppose Islam and Christianity. Additionally the focus of further research could be extended beyond the radical right parties to mainstream political parties’ discourses on immigration and Islam. The actual immigration policies could also be examined. The most interesting way the research could be improved in the future is a longer-term analysis. This would show better how the discourses have changed over time, instead of looking at the discourses at one point in time as this thesis did. However, the main point of doing a long-term analysis would be to examine how the parties’ position will develop in the future. The FPÖ’s focus on Islam is still quite recent and increasing. The position on Islam changed from 2008 to 2011, and will probably keep changing. The same will probably also be true for other parties that were not dealt with in this thesis. If the party will mainly focus on Muslim-immigration like the PVV does, perhaps the party will be able to leave the ethnic conception of the nation behind. How this will influence the electoral successes also has to be seen. Some have argued that only those who are able to leave the ethnic-based identity behind will be able to be successful electorally. So far, the FPÖ has not completely done this, but is not unsuccessful either. How this will all change in the next decade has to be seen.
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