REVISITING THE LIBERAL PEACE AND THE FOURTH GENERATION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT SCHOLARSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF SOMALIA AND AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract

In approaching the question how peace and statebuilding can be made more sustainable and just, this thesis revisits Oliver Richmond’s typologies of the liberal peace and subsequently engages with the ontological, normative and practical shortcomings of the ‘conservative’ and ‘orthodox’ models of the liberal peace as well as post-liberal and hybrid forms of peace with reference to Somalia and Afghanistan. Here it will be argued that for more sustainable and just peace to be built, concepts of emancipation, empowerment and local ownership requires to be rethought, both by practitioners and scholars. Although emancipation, local ownership and empowerment have come to serve as justificatory buzzwords cloaking projects of war and violence in verbal commitment to peace and justice, it will be argued that emancipation and empowerment still has a place in normative reformulations of external engagements in complex emergencies. However, rather than employing liberal, universalist notions of justice, peace, the state and the good life, emancipatory approaches ought to endeavour deconstruction of the same concepts, ask who the peace is for and instead of monopolising these concepts, should seek to open up the discursive space for a greater spectrum of speakers and actors in the pursuit of peace and statebuilding. Enhancing the conditions for dialogue and involving previously excluded groups from peacebuilding does however not qualify as fully emancipatory unless the overarching global power structures of knowledge, power and access to resources is radically transformed.
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Introduction

More than 20 years, respectively 30 years, of protracted war, instability and precarious life circumstances haunting Somalia and Afghanistan despite of massive external intervention suggests that internationally sanctioned peace and statebuilding need to be subject to an immanent critique. This thesis seeks to tackle the issue how peace and conflict and critical security studies scholars reason around the prospects of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding in the contexts where the secular powers of the state currently is, and in the past always has been, very weak and the primary social mode of organisation has been evolving around clan-membership. How can a more sustainable and just forms of peace be conceptualised and possibly implemented in these contexts? is the lead question guiding this thesis.

In recent years a substantial body of literature critiquing what is broadly referred to as the “liberal peace” has been emerging. The “liberal peace” has taken many shapes and forms and continues to morph discursively and practically in different way as we speak. This thesis picks up on the call for re-evaluation of the liberal and post-liberal peace, arguing that research and practices of internationally sanctioned peace and statebuilding ought to be re-geared into a manner that is truly context sensitive, emancipatory and works with and for the local populations rather than against them. Context sensitivity does not only denote an understanding of the changing nature of local power structures and ontologies concerning legitimacy, the good life and justice, but also a smart incorporation of this knowledge into the practices of peace and state-building as well as addressing material inequalities.

Pursuing this line of argument, it is proposed that no fixed panacea exists for neither Somalia nor other “failed” states but that the solution lies in
rethinking the standards by which “success” and “failure” in peace and statebuilding is measured, and re-gearing internationally sanctioned peace and statebuilding in a manner that embraces hybrid forms of agency, governance and political imagination on all levels of society.¹

Drawing on what Richmond calls the 4th generation of peace and conflict studies, the critiques of the liberal peace and “the critiques of the critiques of the liberal peace” will be explored. In the context of violent geopolitical agendas on behalf of interveners, what are however the prospects for real empowerment and emancipation of local populations by outsiders? Can there ever be any qualified local ownership? How is the involvement of traditional sources of authority to be understood in the context of emancipation and empowerment in violent externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding à la Somalia and Afghanistan? are the sub-questions that will be tackled.

Attempting to address with these questions the thesis will take the following turns. First, Somalia and Afghanistan will be situated with the existing literature on the securitisation of aid and the “War on Terror”. Second, Oliver Richmond’s genealogy spanning the three first generations will be revisited in conjunction with an exploration of the three graduations of the liberal peace that he identifies. These are the “conservative”, “the orthodox” and the “emancipatory” graduations of the liberal peace. The “emancipatory” strand of peace will not be discussed in this chapter, but is will initially be dealt with in chapter three, where the Fourth Generation of peace and statebuilding will be fleshed out. The fourth and final chapter will briefly elaborate on the prospect for reformulation of the paradigm of

externally sanctioned peace and state building. How might more emancipatory approaches look like? is the puzzle that the final chapter will address.
Research design: Scope and Method of Inquiry

Attempting to write a piece with an emancipatory objective, whatever that may entail, I have been contemplating to which extent and in which way my theory of peace best should be anchored in what one might call “realities on the ground”, i.e., empirical data and local specificities. A rigorous project doubtlessly has to be grounded in everyday meanings and social realities of the subjects it seeks to engage with. A study of social relations cannot stand by itself as an empty theoretical skeleton divorced from the experiences and agency of human beings, because it is the lives of human beings that this and any piece on peace and statebuilding concern.

Peace and war is and can only be made by concrete human beings in the name of and with the support of particular human beings in settings that they are familiar with and enjoy legitimacy in. Since peace-building and other interrelated concepts deal with specific human beings and socially defined groups, practical engagement in the process ought to the greatest extent possible map, trace and problematize the social relations of the subjects involved in projects of peace and war and seek to understand all of the variations and shifting interpretations and alternatives thereof and thereto. Productive practical engagement in processes of peace-building, would gain immensely from microscopic analysis derived from field-based research. Unfortunately the majority of the works produced within the discipline of International Relations still remain largely theoretical, engaging with the social world it studies on a meso, macro and global level in a distanced manner.

The question to what extent does an analytic piece and peace and conflict have to operate on the very micro-level, and in doing so draw from first-hand data collected in the field, in order to be of any value is a question that continuously has been chasing me since I started this project. “Have you been to Somalia?” Is a question that frequently pops up. “What is your connection to Afghanistan?” others
have asked. I have to confess already at this introductory stage that I have not been to these places.

When I embarked on this project I found it important to focus on my case study, then being Somalia, but restricted as I was in terms of time and resources I chose a different course. As my initial research faded into a second phase, I became more and more certain that my focus, given the circumstances ought to be theories of peace and criticisms of the way that the “international community” has engaged with some of the world’s most vulnerable populations. The principal goal of this project thus involved into one seeking understand how externally imposed peace and statebuilding is situated in a genealogy of theories and practices. Currently a huge number of scholars are working on the same topic, confirming how many we are who consider it time to rethink the principles of intervention and examine the specificities of the local-international-global encounter and the productive element of it, i.e; how these actors, practices, and ontologies are constitutive of the process of constructing, shaping, and reshaping the encounter itself.

Given the stated objectives of the research, I do not base my methodology on fieldwork in these locations. In the conduct of my study I instead decided to primarily look at academic literature recently written on the topic, and complement this with reports written by consultants hired to evaluate externally sanctioned “local” peace initiatives, to be precise: traditional sources of authority such as the elders, community leaders and non-secular judicial institutions. I am not fully convinced that all conflict analysis has to be grounded in personal experiences of the people and the places concerned, although it certainly helps. What I do believe, however, is that any piece investigating issues of local ownership and empowerment in the case of “fragile states” has to be grounded in some sort of
practical experience of local project management and/or implementation in an environment of precariousness, identities constructed as conflictual, material scarcity and competition for legitimacy and resources. Practical involvement is key because it opens up eyes for concrete situations of conflict and collaboration without which it is impossible to understand how the seemingly small things can play such a great role, and on the reverse side, how situations that at first may appear to be of very little significance to some come to take on meanings that cannot be predicted for.

Practical involvement also enables the researcher to approach the subject of inquiry on an emotional and not only rational level, although it is contestable whether the Cartesian dichotomy truly holds. As human social relations work so deeply on an emotional level, being involved exposes the researcher to situations where one can get a taste of what project ownership, inclusion, exclusion, empowerment and disempowerment may feel. Although I have not been able to conduct action-research in Somalia and Afghanistan, previous time spent working and conducting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tana River District in Kenya informs my readings of these particular conflict settings and the theoretical works on the topic.

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Selection of case studies: Why Somalia and Afghanistan?

Given my interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kenya, how did I end up selecting Somalia and Afghanistan as case studies, or to put it in different terms, primary cases of reference? The main objective of the thesis, as previously stated, is a theoretical one. Thus I do not aim to provide rigorous enough empirical accounts on Somalia and Afghanistan that would qualify being called “case studies” in the proper sense. Rather than striving towards detailing the nature of the particular processes on-going in these two cases, I will refer to these cases as a way to illustrate the theoretical points made. The reasons why these two cases, as opposed to Kenya and Bosnia, came to serve as my primary points of reference are threefold.

First, Somalia and Afghanistan constitute two of the most extreme cases of violently imposed peace and statebuilding. Both of these cases constitute two prime examples where securitisation of “underdevelopment”, maldevelopment, terrorism and warlordism has played a role in justifying these bloody, costly, and protracted interventions. In this piece I will argue that peace, stabilisation and statebuilding attempts have long been cloaked in the language of liberalism and counter-terrorism, and should rather than being read as projects of peace be conceived of as projects of war in both of the cases. Second, Somalia and Afghanistan currently suffer from extreme levels of contestation of the state model that external actors as well as their national allies are seeking to impose. The governments are not able to assert monopoly of means of power merely beyond the respective metropolises and have clan-based societal structures and imaginations of what society is and should look like that do not fit neatly with Western liberal ideals. As such they allow for a number of comparisons and similar conclusions to be drawn. A third reason for referring to these two cases is that external actors
increasingly in recent years have geared themselves towards models of “good enough governance”, as opposed to “good governance” that came to dominate the development and aid discourse up until the present. The “good enough governance” model acknowledges the limitations of the Weberian state-model and consequently prescribes mediated forms of stateness, i.e.; formal inclusion of customary apparatuses and actors of conflict mediation and legal administration, as the only viable alternative to what external peace and statebuilders currently perceive and frame as violent and oppressive disorder.

Having outlined some of the methodological concerns and the points of departure of this thesis, next section will provide an initial commentary on the current peace and statebuilding efforts in Somali and Afghanistan and situate it within the theoretical framework of securitisation of aid and the “War on Terror”.

Chapter 1: Situating Somalia and Afghanistan within the morphing discourse of peace and statebuilding

Following 9/11 2001 a new trend in Anglo-American foreign policy emerged, guided by the US and UK interpretation and framing of the new types of threats that the nexus of international terrorism, failed states, and internationally organised crime posed. This trend could broadly be defined as a combination of militarisation of aid and development, combating terrorism through violent confrontation, and continued neoliberal imposition of “good governance”. The discursive construction and operationalization of the broad and politically handy terms of “failed states” and “fragile states” has played a key role in reframing security and development policies. Indeed, the world’s major military, humanitarian and external statebuilding actors, that is the us and the uk, have framed “weak”, “fragile” and “failed states” as threats to national security of dominant western states.

Robert Rotberg’s article “Failed States in a World of Terror” for instance pinpointed the need to take seriously the threat posed by failed states given the increasing global interconnectedness and what was felt by the West/North as increased vulnerability. In 2001 he famously stated:

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Although the phenomenon of state failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever before. In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now, these states pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbours but also to peoples around the globe. Preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are thus strategic and moral imperatives.\(^5\)

This particular type of framing of “failed” or “fragile” states, in urgent need of redemption by foreign intervention in the form of externally “assisted” development, state and peace-building to restore law and order according to the Westphalian and Weberian model of state sovereignty, has continued to legitimise neoconservative joint military-civilian-humanitarian interventionist programs and paradigms.\(^6\) Although the reframing of security interests of the US and the UK marked a shift, it is impossible to speak of any radically new externally imposed peace and statebuilding strategy. Quiet on the contrary, current US interventionism in the form of military invasions, humanitarian and development assistance may fruitfully by viewed in a history of violent attempts (successful and unsuccessful) to quell undesired political leaders and social movements and reinstitute political orders in its own liking.

By now a large body of literature on the nexus of aid and development, conflict, the neoliberal and “post-liberal” world order, security, statebuilding and pursuits of hegemonic interests by the world’s most muscular interventionist powers has emerged since the late 1980s. Although most authors probably would agree on the need to examine the linkages of these phenomena, the literature appearing, dealing with the same issues, often by virtue of diverging language and discursive grammar often tend to end up in separate disciplines. Mark Duffield however set a

\(^5\) Rotberg, Robert I. “Failed States in a World of Terror.” *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2002 (n.d.).

benchmark when he came out with *Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security*, highlighting the connection between protracted wars, the blurring of roles of the aid, development and humanitarian industry in the combat of potentially destabilising “underdevelopment”. So did Roland Paris when he came out with his book *At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (2004) in which he highlights the illiberal effects of neoliberal economic policies, caused by rapid, top-down enforced democracy.

US interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq constitute the contemporary prime examples of a policy combining an initial “shock and awe” strategy without being able to produce the conditions needed for building the particular peace it has envisioned, a Westphalian liberal, democratic state with a deregulated free-market economy.\(^7\) The conditions considered necessary according to “shock and awe” logis are paralysis and a wiping out of the old social structures and replacement with the new structures implemented by foreign external powers through an elite appointed by and insulated by a power external actor.\(^8\) Instead these interventions have evolved into examples of the some of the longest protracted external peace and statebuilding attempts in the post-colonial history. They are now starting to emerge as the prime examples of failures of heavy-handed military externally imposed peace and statebuilding from above. It is within this nexus of

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7 The anticipations the US administration had regarding the effects of its “shock and awe” strategy or “shock and awe therapy” are astonishing. According to Gaddison, it was expected that “just as the removal of economic constraints allows the pursuit of self-interest automatically to advance a collective interest, so the breaking up of an old international order would encourage a new one to emerge, more or less spontaneously, based on a universal desire for security, prosperity, and liberty. Shock therapy would produce a safer, saner world.” Gaddis, John Lewis. “Grand Strategy in the Second Term.” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (February 2005): 2–15.

securitisation and militarisation of aid, the “War on Terror” and Anglo-American great
power politics under the flag of utopian liberalism that external peace and state in
Somalia and Afghanistan best can be situated.

Following the launch of operation Linda Nchi in the southern province of
Somalia and the end of the 8-year transitional government period, the Somali state-
building project is entering a new phase of peace and statebuilding. Somalia, topping
the Failed State Index,⁹ has up until present suffered more than 20 years of
protracted war and lack of a functioning central authority. Attempts to make peace
and install an effective centralised government has not seen much progress since
Siyad Barre’s toppling and the slide into formal lawlessness and war in 1991 and the
1992 Operation Restore Hope orchestrated by the United States and a coalition of
the willing participating in the UNITAF (United Task Force).¹⁰ Numerous attempts to
restore order and create a peace appear to many to have been in vain and future
progress does not seem to lie within the strategic framework informing domestic and
internationally led state-building efforts. Looking at Somalia it is important to
distinguish between the different regions. Somaliland and Puntland in the north are
self-declared unrecognised functioning de facto states since 1991 and 1998
respectively, as such rejecting any attempts to be subsumed under a central
Mogadishu-led government.¹¹ Whereas Somaliland continues to seek recognition as
an independent state, Puntland abstains from secessionist claims enjoying its semi-

¹⁰ The International Crisis Group in its most recent reports notes that the situation still is very precarious.
autonomous status. The rest of the Somali territory is governed in the absence of any functioning formal government structures and large areas continue to be fought over by various rebel factions, amongst which Al Shabaab remains the strongest.

After extended talks in 2004, key political actors agreed to install the national Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for a mandate period of 8 years. The deal did not last very long until Islamist insurgency, primarily the youth-based movement Al Shabaab, took up arms again, seizing control over the majority of the Southern and Central parts of Somalia. In October 2011, the United States paired up with the TFG and the Kenyan Armed Forces and to regain control by military force. After extended fighting, Al-Shabaab now seem to have lost overt military control over key strategic points such as Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo, although its support as an alternative source of authority and governing body remains significant.

Due to the end of the US-backed up Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2011 and the legacy of continued state weakness under the Transitional Government (TG), the Somali territories and its people's are now in a new phase of uncertainty. The greatest challenge in building sustainable peace and governance probably lies in reconciling the different imaginations of what Somalia is and should be in terms of a state alongside making sure that population’s most basic needs are

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16 Lederach, John Paul et al., Somalia: Creating space for fresh approaches to peace building, (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 2011)
met.\textsuperscript{18} Contending imaginations are not only confined to the North/South divide, i.e; Somaliland’s self-declared independence and Puntland’s semi-autonomous status,\textsuperscript{19} but also factions within this divide,\textsuperscript{20} and tensions regarding centralisation-decentralisation in general. 20 years of war has brought with ethnicised geographies, warlordism and the destruction of Mogadishu as an epicentre of power and cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{21}

Any state aspiring to become an internally and externally sovereign entity in the Westphalian sense needs a centre of power, a capital. Lacking a natural capital endowed with power and capacity to extend its rule over the rest of the territory indicates the very high level of both material and ontological contestation the Somali state apparatus is faced with. Ken Menkhaus points out that “There is perhaps no other issue on which the world views of external actors and Somalis diverge more than their radically different understanding of the state”.\textsuperscript{22} In his view, the internationally led development efforts (these are indistinguishable from externally imposed peace and state-building) have been informed by a view of the state as the guarantor of stability and prosperity. The Somali imaginations of the state, on the other hand, are tainted by the brutal dictatorship of Barre and almost 30 years of absence of a functioning government. Menkhaus also asserts “for many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering


\textsuperscript{20} Höhne, 2006, p. 404 points out for instance that many Somalilanders, in particular the generations above 40 years, remember Somalia as a unitary state and consider this a better option than independence.


those who control it and exploiting and harnessing the rest of the population”. The diverging conceptions and imaginations of the state, represented by the key international actors (US State Department, UNASOM, and the World Bank who have pursued a top-down approach) and different Somali actors therefore is bound to be deeply problematic, often resulting in the parties “talking past each other, rather than with each other” when they talk. In addition, the absence of any real security and ideological consensus, shifting contexts on the ground also makes the current peace and statebuilding attempts, both on a local and national level, easily revoked or reversed.

A second, often overlooked aspect of state imaginations is that the younger generation of Somalis outside of Somaliland, on the other hand, have no experience of central, functioning governance at all and may therefore have a quiet vague imagination of what a state is and what effective formal governance may and should look like. Apart from the TFG adherents affirming the need for the creation of a central, potent government, the only significant popular movement striving towards unity appear to be Al-Shabab, whose membership base largely consists of youth. Since Al-Shabaab occupies such a significant role, any state and peace-building initiative ought not to exclude it, but has to first, understand what makes the form of ontological and practical unity it is offering so attractive.

So far the international community has sought to combine local, bottom-up with top-down centralising actors with mixed results. The most successful state and peacebuilding have taken place in the autonomous regions of Somaliland and

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23 Ibid, p. 87
24 Ibid, p. 87
26 Ibid
27 Ibid
Puntland in the north. This happens to coincide with absence of international, top-down meddling and incautious provision of aid, and the emphasis on the role of “traditional” clan leaders in negotiating peace and solving disputes.\(^\text{28}\) The areas under greater violent contestation, the southern and central parts of the Somali territories, have on the other hand been subjected to more heavy-handed top-down internationally led peace negotiations that has included a different type of local actors than elders: warlords.\(^\text{29}\) While it is necessary to engage with key brokers of violence and resources, the inclusion of warlords occasionally seem to have been fermenting their power and legitimacy,\(^\text{30}\) while other actors capable of building peace and coexistence, such as clan-elders and traditional leaders, could have been included more fruitfully.\(^\text{31}\) The danger of engaging warlords in diplomacy and provision of logistics and security does not only reside in affirming their symbolic legitimacy, but have occasionally given them increased capacity and interest in spoiling peace and perpetuate the cycles of violence and poverty, Stig Hansen observes.\(^\text{32}\)

The Somali case, although unique, share many similarities with other on-going peace and state(re)building processes, in particular Afghanistan, where the war launched in 2001 under the name “Operation Enduring Freedom” still drags on and the capacity of existing state-institutions is weak and subject to continuing and even increasing levels of violence and threat, with 2013 so far being the most violent year


\(^{30}\) Ibid


\(^{32}\) see Hansen 2003.
after the peak in 2011.\textsuperscript{33} Viewing the current peace and statebuilding process in its historicity, essential for understanding the current challenges, requires acknowledgement that first, Afghanistan is one of the countries in the world that has been subjected to the lowest level of comprehensive modernisation.\textsuperscript{34} Afghanistan still remains one of the least “developed” countries according to the UNPD Human Development Index, where it ranks 175 out of 187.\textsuperscript{35} Birthing mortality rate is the highest in the world, life expectancy is only 44.5 years, and the literacy rate is 16\% for men and 12.7\% for women.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, Afghanistan never possessed any strong state institutional capacity, social and political capital, trust or legitimacy of the population. The nationalist project of creating a nation-state never took hold as the modernisers during the 1950s and 1960s often were killed, exiled or disabled in other ways.\textsuperscript{37} Nearly four decades of war, persecution and insecurity has further undermined the progress that was made before the 1978 revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion.\textsuperscript{38}

The peace and statebuilding attempts spearheaded by the International Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) and the internationally propped-up Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan are now, in the light of recent events, as highlighted by the retiring French diplomat Bernard Bajolet, starting to emerge as a black sheep, as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Suhrke, Astri. “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘post-conflict’ Project in Afghanistan.” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 28, no. 7 (2007), p.1292-1293
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Suhrke, Astri. “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘post-conflict’ Project in Afghanistan.” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 28, no. 7 (2007), p. 1296
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
a gravely inadequate and unrealistic attempt to create a certain order. In his farewell speech in April 2013 his opening remarks included the following statement:

I still cannot understand how we, the international community, and the Afghan government have managed to arrive at a situation in which everything is coming together in 2014 — elections, new president, economic transition, military transition and all this — whereas the negotiations for the peace process have not really started.\textsuperscript{39}

Michael Boyle, one of the leading experts on counter-insurgency and others have started referring to the war in Afghanistan as an “unwinnable war”, making the point that the solution to the nexus of protracted violence, organised crime, corruption and precarious living of the population does not lie in the near future.\textsuperscript{40} In order to stabilised the situation Washington officials have suggested that the US might need to engage in negotiations and strike a deal with leaders of the Taliban movement.\textsuperscript{41} Needless to say, this represents a clear diversion from the US foreign policy regulations, posing strict prohibitions on engagement with groups labelled terrorist.

Although some progress has been made, the conditions on the ground of the local population does not seem to have improved remarkably improved since the invasion in 2001. Rather, what is discernible is an emergence of new conflicts that has erupted as a result of the Wests engagement as well as deteriorating conditions of the local population on the ground. Peter Jouvenal and Edward Girardet, two of the most experienced analysts on Afghanistan in December 2012 summarised the situation as following:


“Afghanistan today is hardly any closer to a sustainable peace [than it was in 2011]. The future promises to be even bleaker…When the majority of NATO forces pull out in 2014, ordinary Afghans will not be the ones to benefit. Bitter ethnic and religious strife is emerging as a catalyst for an even more ruthless civil war. After seven years working with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Reto Stocker, who was the ICRC’s chief delegate in Kabul until October 2012, warned: “Life for ordinary Afghans has taken a turn for the worse.”42

This is not to say that no progress at all has been made. Jouvenal and Girardet point to the fact that some results have been achieved, for instance development of roads and power-grids, increased levels of school enrollment of children, the establishment of private universities and generation of new employment opportunities, and urban development of Kabul. However, on the whole, the situation looks dire and is likely to deteriorate as the international allies are handing over to Afghani authorities. Much of the symbols of progress, such as the abovementioned, should rather than taken to reflect any real overall progress be read as expressions of an economy inflated by a “highly artificial aid economy”.43

Strong criticism has been voiced by a wide spectrum of other actors and policy makers as well, criticising the violent means by which the objectives have been pursued. Scepticism of the objectives as such is also starting to emerge among leading diplomats and civil servants, starting to pinch the foil of legitimacy that the project has been wrapped in. Had the verdict on the moral efficacy of the project been different in case the outcome had been a more “positive” one? “Positive” implies a compliance with stated objectives on part of the interveners. Possibly. Some commentators are now speculating that the accumulation of failed heavy-handed military interventions, topped by the failure of the international community to

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43 Ibid.
establish and peaceful and liberal democratic society in Afghanistan, may incite a departure from this strand of peace and statebuilding or will at least have a dissuading impact, given the "sheer cost, lack of evident success, waning domestic political support, international geopolitical constraints and strategic 'overstretch', aggravated by the financial crisis and economic recession".\textsuperscript{45}

However, any attempt to with certainty predict future developments in Anglo-American peace and statebuilding is doomed to fail due to the nature of contingencies in political life and constantly shifting interest and agencies. Other, less realist top-down militarist attempts to reinstitute new political order has also come been subjected to fierce criticism from critical scholars from a number of overlapping disciplines due a number of reasons. Having provided a brief background to the current peace and statebuilding efforts in Somali and Afghanistan, the next chapter will delve into Oliver Richmond’s typologies of the “liberal peace”.

\textsuperscript{44} For a good commentary on the shortcomings in establishing peace, democracy and stability in Afghanistan, see Ibid.  
Chapter 2: Graduations and Generations of the “Liberal Peace” in Theory and Practice

Attempting to understand why peace and state building in Somalia and Afghanistan so far awaits more substantive positive results, locating current practices within a genealogy of theory and practices of peace and statebuilding. In doing so the following section will start out from Oliver Richmond’s typology of variations of the liberal peace and genealogy of peace and conflict theorisations and then work itself towards the fourth generation of peace and conflict scholarship. Oliver Richmond distinguishes between three ‘graduations’ within the liberal peace: ‘conservative’, orthodox’ and ‘emancipatory’. These ‘graduations’ of the liberal peace can also be understood through the geneology of peace and statebuilding in theory and practice, traced by the same author. These generations, he refers to as the generations of ‘conflict management’ (1st generation), ‘conflict resolution’ (2nd generation), ‘liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding (3rd generation), and ‘liberal-local hybridity’ (4th generation, that is emerging as we speak).

Although Richmond speaks of “generations”, inferring an element of temporality, it is not to be assumed that the later generations have replaced the former ones. On the contrary, current peace and statebuilding continue to be made up of ingredients belonging to all four (artificially separated) ‘generations’. The generations he refers to overlaps with the graduations of the liberal peace. Still it may be useful to think both in terms of generations and graduations, as these two ways of conceptualising the scholarship and practices of peace and statebuilding have a significant overlap and add substance to each other.

The First Generation

The first generation of peace and conflict theory and practices is inspired by Article 33 of the UN charter urging for dispute settlement by peaceful means through negotiation, mediation and legal arbitration. The emphasis on political dialogue of the conflict parties via high-political institutional channels. A realist, state-centric framework that largely excludes sub-state actors and institutions from formal peace processes, informs the first generation understanding of peace and conflict management. This conflict management approach is based on a presumption of ability of the parties to restrain themselves, rationally calculate their interests and act in a manner so as to enhance it both in a short and long-term with the aid of a third, neutral mediating party. Peace, in this sense largely implies the absence of overt military violence and the fading away of the most immediate threats of renewed fighting through mediation by a supposedly neutral third party and maintenance of cease-fire through involvement of external actors and regional organisations. Putting the emphasis on negotiation and upholding brokered deals this approach does not seek to address the underlying root causes of violence and thus may be said to constitute a kind of problem-solving approach as opposed to a critical one that

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51 Ibid.
seeks to transform\textsuperscript{52} or potentially even transcend structures, systems and cultures of violence.\textsuperscript{53}

In terms of perception of legitimate parties of negotiation, only high political representatives of governments are given space in formal political negotiation. To a great extent, this perspective still holds sway, disabling dialogue with sub-state actors\textsuperscript{54} who for instance in the case of Somalia and Afghanistan are the real brokers of violence, peace and legitimacy. The UN and the US do not for instance endorse formal negotiation with representatives of the Taliban movement or al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{55} However, behind the scenes a whole different set of diplomacy is conducted, illustrating the performative aspect of politics. The US laws criminalising negotiation with Al-Shabaab clearly demonstrate the institutionalisation of the belief that negotiation only may occur between representatives of the international community and legitimate state-actors.\textsuperscript{56} ‘Legitimate’ is a fluid concept embedded in power-knowledge structures of domination. The repercussions of the selective exclusion of sub-state actors from negotiations are severe and will be discussed more in detail later on.


\textsuperscript{55} Personal communication, UN Employee, 2013-02-20.

The Second Generation

The second generation, the ‘conflict resolution’ approach, challenges the shortcomings of the first generation that abstained from addressing underlying structural causes of grievance and a recognition of the multifaceted aspects of socio-political life that ‘positive’ peace demands.\(^57\) This trend emerged in the face of outbreak of intra-state violence following decolonisation and consequently acknowledges the need to resolve conflict through multi-level engagements involving a wide spectrum of actors from the bottom to top of the societal hierarchy.\(^58\) The ‘conflict resolution’ generation came to view conflicts as being rooted in psychological, political and economic impediments to human flourishing and considers deprivation of human needs as a major contributor to conflict.\(^59\) Tedd Gurr’s theory of ‘relative deprivation’\(^60\) also came to be influential in shaping this discourse, as well as the theories on ‘structural violence’ and ‘cultural violence’ developed by Johan Galtung.\(^61\) The ‘conflict resolution’ perspective takes a more holistic account of the root-causes of conflict than the both the ‘conflict management perspective’ and the third ‘neo-liberal peace’ generation, in particular with regards to addressing the material needs of the populations at stake.

The Third Generation

What then characterises the ‘third generation’ of ‘liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding’? The ‘third generation’ emerged as peace research, ‘conflict management’ and ‘conflict resolution’ cross-fertilised. Out of this convergence liberal peacebuilding inextricably linked with the externally sanctioned liberal statebuilding project grew. The liberal peace is inconceivable without the liberal state, the state is to protect the citizens, govern them and provide them with avenues for exercising their political rights as individuals. The ontological foundation of the liberal peace rests on the liberal universalising discourses of human rights, in particular civic and political that seldom reflects the value systems on the ground, marketisation and ‘good governance’. The structural adjustment policies coupling impositions of the neoliberal peace has in many instances not only crippled the capacity of states in the remaking to provide the most basic services such as health-care, education and minimum socio-economic assistance. It has also often entrenched or exacerbated economic inequalities and poverty in a way that endangers populations and entrench fertile breeding grounds for conflict.

Although consensus building and legitimacy is considered vital to the construction of sustainable peace and governance, the liberal peace and state project derives from an elite led-perspective that ignores, or fail to take seriously the voices and needs at the grass-root level. It is not only the ‘local’ people’s voices that are being quelled; the national elites involved in the state and peacebuilding business have also often been subject to various forms of coercion and manipulation.

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by external peace and statebuilders. The liberal state, demanding a functioning ‘civil society’ for democracy to materialise, ironically, has deprived countless post-war states of the means and power to govern the present and shape their own future. Examples of its practical implementation include but is not limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, Sierra Leona, Liberia, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of Congo.\(^{65}\)

Despite of the coercive, top-down driven processes, scripted by international elites, actors in the states subjected to internationally sanctioned peace and statebuilding are not passive recipients, as shall be addressed in detail in the main body of the thesis. The resistance to elite-level directives, whether they are of a more ‘local’ or ‘international’ kind, is what is currently being addressed in the literature and practices of the hybrid, post-liberal peace, i.e; the ‘fourth generation’. Prior to the fleshing out what the ‘fourth generation’ entails in theory and practice, I shall briefly return to Richmond’s ‘graduations’ (‘conservative’, ‘orthodox’ and ‘emancipatory’) of the liberal peace.

**The Conservative Liberal Peace**

The first strand within the practices of the liberal peace, he refers to the ‘conservative peace’. This approach is most clearly exemplified by the US-led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, as touched upon above. The onus here have been to defeat a military enemy, combat terrorism and piracy, ensure top-down realist notions of security, and regulate illicit trade in arms and narcotics.\(^{66}\) To clarify, “the conservative graduation of the liberal peace has come hand in hand rigours top-down

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\(^{66}\) For Afghanistan, see Richmond, Oliver P. *A Post-Liberal Peace*. NYC: Routledge, 2011.
plementation of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding. Richmond moreover presupposes that "these [approaches] have been widely accepted as a transitional necessity in most post-war environments".\(^67\) The first statement about the nature of the 'conservative' approach certainly holds true. However, the author, in support of his otherwise critical stance towards the 'liberal' peace would benefit from specifying who the speakers are who have accepted the former as a 'necessity'. Richmond, however, in his elaboration of the fourth generation problematizes legitimacy as concept and argues for a transformation of the discursive field in favour of emancipation of the silenced subaltern.\(^68\)

Whether this 'conservative' graduation really can fall under the category of 'liberal' or be a project of peace at all, one may very well object to. As Richmond, Jabri and Williams and many others have argued, the way that the liberal 'peace', in its most conservative form, has been promulgated has in fact been one of a "liberal war".\(^69\) The broader neo-liberal-neo-conservative agenda, constituted within the 9/11 "war on terror" legacy can be said to promulgate "a project of war" that is "inherently concerned about the propagation of the western liberal self into the social realms of the "other."".\(^70\) I will however keep this approach under the label of the 'liberal peace' due to the liberal elements in the motivations (i.e; the rhetoric of saving populations from "evil", delivering freedom, democracy\(^71\)) articulated by states in an effort to mobilise support for costly overseas military operations. Keeping this 'conservative'

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approach under the label of liberal in addition facilitates dialogue with the authors operating within the discourse of the liberal peace and the critiques thereof. I shall not go into more detail here but continue the second strand that Richmond calls the ‘orthodox’ approach.

The Orthodox Liberal Peace

The ‘orthodox’ approach in its application has been intimately bound up with the ‘conservative’ approach, with top-down peace agreements and militarised conceptions of security seen as a necessity to enable successful bottom-up initiatives. The ‘orthodox’ liberal approach to peace and statebuilding envisions the construction of a state based on liberal principles, legitimised through free and fair elections, democracy, ‘good governance’ and the respect for human rights and the rule of law. \(^{72}\) Civil society is viewed as an essential component as a consultative and lobbying institution working as a medium of dialogue between the state and its citizens. Individual human rights, especially political freedoms, are key to the ‘orthodox’ model, relegating collectively enjoyed rights and political subjectivities grounded in non-Western, secular values as well as economic well-fare and redistribution to a subsidiary position. \(^{73}\) The ‘orthodox’, “good governance” approach combines top-down with bottom-up. “Good governance” in this sense also entails Westphalian statemodels, neoliberal economic priorities such as privatisation,

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\(^{72}\) Richmond, Oliver P. “A Post-liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday.” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 03 (July 2009), p. 560

deregulation, keeping inflation at bay, fighting corruption and holding major war criminals legally accountable and banning the same from political power positions.\footnote{For the meanings of “good governance” and neoliberalism in post-war contexts, see Pugh, Michael. “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspevctive.” \textit{International Journal of Peace Studies} 10, no. 2 (n.d.): Autumn/Winter 2005.} 

This model has a potentially emancipatory potential. Unfortunately, due to a number of reasons, the emancipatory potential, apart from the contradictions inherent in its logic, that will be spelled out later, often fail to materialise. Instead the state-society model that it seeks to advance is resisted and provokes illiberal behaviour on behalf of both governing institutions and the subjects the state seeks to govern. The structural adjustment policies coupling impositions of the neoliberal peace has in many instances not only crippled the capacity of states in the remaking to provide the most basic services such as health-care, education and minimum socio-economic assistance. It has also often entrenched or exacerbated economic inequalities and poverty in a way that endangers populations and entrench fertile breeding grounds for conflict.\footnote{Paris, Roland. \textit{At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict}. Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 2004.}

Although consensus building and legitimacy is considered vital to the construction of sustainable peace and governance, the liberal peace and state project derives from an elite led-perspective that ignores, or fail to take seriously the voices and needs from the grass-root.\footnote{Richmond, Oliver P. “A Post-liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday.” \textit{Review of International Studies} 35, no. 03 (July 2009): 557–580.} It is not only the ‘local’ people’s voices that are being quelled; the national elites involved in the state and peacebuilding business have also often been subject to various forms of coercion and manipulation. The liberal state, demanding a functioning ‘civil society’ for democracy to materialise, ironically, has deprived countless post-war states of the means and power to govern the present and shape their own future. Examples of its practical implementation
include but is not limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor and Congo DRC.\(^\text{77}\)

Although coercive and top-down driven, the ‘orthodox’ liberal peace scripted by international elites, actors in the states subjected to internationally sanctioned peace and statebuilding are not passive recipients, quiet on the contrary. The nature of resistance to elite-level directives, whether they are of a more ‘local’ or ‘international’ kind, is what is currently being addressed in the literature and practices of the hybrid, post-liberal peace, i.e; the ‘fourth generation’.\(^\text{78}\) I do not wish to advance a full-fledge critique of this model here, but leave this for the next chapter where I will flesh out some of the critiques that the fourth generation of peace and conflict scholarship has waged against the liberal peace. The concepts of local ownership, empowerment and emancipation stands at the centre of the critiques by the fourth generation and the alternatives it proposes.


Chapter 3: The Fourth generation

This chapter will start out by articulating the basic premises and the fourth generation of peace and conflict scholarship. Then it will proceed to an elaboration on what emancipation in theory and practice of peace and statebuilding may entail. To start, the fourth generation of theory and practices of peace and statebuilding can be characterised in many different ways. In using the term fourth generation, I will however not restrict myself to Richmond’s conceptualisation of the fourth generation. The following summary contains both ingredients present in his summary in addition to extra elements and aspects that broadly fits with the outlook and aims of the fourth generation. Broadly speaking the fourth generation of peace and statebuilding has emerged as a critique of the liberal peace project. It also suggests amendments to it and in certain limited ways seeks to articulate alternatives.

Central in the analysis of the fourth generation of peace and conflict studies is power. The fourth generation of peace and conflict scholarship, although not homogenous, does not only pose a powerful critique of the liberal peace. It also asks questions the category ‘liberal peace’ in three main ways. First, it questions whether the term liberal peace is an appropriate one given the diversity of peace and statebuilding practices that is subsumed under this category. Second, it questions how liberal the liberal peace is and third, it asks whether the liberal peace better can be conceived of as a project of utopian ideological and material warfare.

As Oliver Richmond, Vivienne Jabri, Andrew Williams and many others have argued, the way that the liberal ‘peace’, in its most conservative form, has been promulgated has in fact been one of a “liberal war”.79 The broader neo-liberal-neo-

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conservative agenda, constituted within the 9/11 “war on terror” legacy can be said to constitute “a project of war” that is “inherently concerned about the propagation of the western liberal self into the social realms of the "other"”, they argue. While developing the points below I will however keep continue using the term ‘liberal peace’ to facilitate dialogue with the authors operating within the discourse of the liberal peace and the critiques thereof.

As indicated above, the liberal peace is criticised on grounds of the coercive nature of its enforcement as well as the strategic interests of dominant states that it serves. The fourth generation of peace and conflict studies engages not only with what overt forms of material and military violence but also pays due attention to the power dynamics in knowledge production and its insertion into machineries of governance. The dissatisfaction with the (neo)liberal peace and the felt urge to reshape peace and statebuilding practices and the structures in which they take place has given rise to a whole set of issues the be pondered upon and implemented in practice. The following section does not claim to be exhaustive, but solely aims to summarise sum of the key concerns. As an over-arching aim, the fourth generation and commentators belonging to other disciplines than IR calls greater self-reflectiveness on behalf of external actors.

David Chandler for instance makes a useful distinction between “idea-based” and “power-based” critiques. “Power-based” critiques often draw on Robert Cox’s neo-Gramscian framework of ‘critical theory’ vs ‘problem-solving’ theory. Cox’s ‘problem-solving’ theory does not refer to ideas and practices seeking to address the root-cause of conflicts, but approaches conflict and stratifications in a technocratic

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manner tackling the symptoms. A third type of practical and analytical frameworks that Chandler and others have identified are the so called “bottom-up” approaches, urging for the need to transform violent social orders through consent built from below.²²

Starting with power-based critiques, Neo-Gramscian and Coxian critiques, examine how the (neo)liberal peace and development regime has become hegemonic and how this hegemony is being maintained through discourse and practice. Hegemonic in the Coxian sense entails a state of ‘semblance of universality’³³, or “common sense” within the discourses of foreign policy offices and the policies of development organisations. Some of the fourth generation scholarship is aware of the author’s participation in the reproduction of discourse and social realities and engage in an exploration of the relationship between the text and the subjects that texts are representing. Still, a lot of the critiques of the liberal peace do not engage in a reflection of the role of the author in perpetuating the discursive dominance of the broadly defined ‘liberal’ peace in all its fuzziness.

As Chandler points out, the discussions about the oppressive and counterproductive liberal peace is suffers not only from lack of clarity due to the tendency to subsume all policies and practices of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding under the same liberal umbrella. The discursive engagement also contributes to the creation of an image of a liberal project that does not necessarily have that much to do with liberalism outside of the policy writings and the institutions. Richmond refers to this exaggerated impression of the “virtual peace” that the

constructed shell-like institutions invite to\textsuperscript{84}. Often it turns out to be the case that the institutions and the services they provide and outcomes generated just have a very marginal impact on the societies in which they are created. The acknowledgement of the limited impact that he pays lip service to, stands in contrast with a Foucauldian understanding of governmentality that may overestimate the disciplinary efficiency of the governing machine.

To elaborate the abovementioned point about the (re)production of realities it can be argued that when attempting a representation of “realities on the ground” that representation, as much as it derives from a socially situated knowledge production, texts contribute to the production of subjective realities, in this case about Somalia and my other key reference point, Afghanistan. Jef Huysman describes the relationship between the theorist, his/her writing and the social world in the following terms:

The deconstructivist starts from the assumption that he/she is not looking upon the world from the outside but rather that he/she is fully inside it. He/she is a story-teller who supposes that, by telling a story in a particular way, he/she contributes to the production and reproduction of the social world; telling a story is considered as an action inside the world which helps to structure it…to tell a story is a to handle the world.\textsuperscript{85}

Through the reiteration of the idea that external interveners seek to completely remake societies from both outside-in and inside out through a combination of top-down and bottom-up, an distorted image is created of what is going on the ground. Moreover, as we as scholars engage in writing, we are not merely representing an objectively existing reality, but are contributing to the ever-evolving production of

\textsuperscript{84} Richmond, Oliver P., and Jason Franks. “Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia” (2007). P. 47

subjectively and intersubjectively conflicting, coinciding and coexisting realities that takes on their own life as organic, living discourses.

Writing is a political activity in itself, one that never can avoid taking a stance and never should strives towards being indifferent to the political process which any production as well as non-production of writing implicitly and explicitly inevitably is taking part in. In writing about local ownership and emancipation the writer is contributing towards the establishment of certain meanings of the concepts it is playing around with and in addition but also contributes towards the perpetuation of certain forms of discursive grammar, frames of scholarly inquiry and the image of a liberal peace that holds little bearing outside of the formal, skeleton-like institutions that are being created.86

If one takes a step back from the discourses of liberal peace and instead looks at the actual practices of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding it appears questionable however to what extent the (neo)liberal peace really is hegemonic today. By now, some authors have noticed a slow shift from the obsession of the western liberal model of ‘good governance’ towards a principle of ‘good enough governance’ that in many ways stand at odds with the commitment to liberalism for reasons that will be explained later.

Foucauldian critiques of the liberal war is a form of biopolitical practice of regulating life and societal-forms through inscription of power and different kinds of regulatory and disciplinary practices, that aims at a complete transformation of societies and the entire international system.87 Others claim that it never has been the intention of external actors to transform the societies of southern/eastern


societies into replications of the Western Westphalian model. Some of these suggest that the liberal consensus ie ‘good governance’ now is merging into something that might morph into a post-liberal consensus of pragmatism both in terms of analysis and practice. Roger MacGinty and Merilee S. Grindle for instance show how a kind of pragmatism has emerged both within the vocabulary and practices of practitioners of state-building, peace-building, development and aid provision. In MacGinty’s observation “the term ‘good enough governance’ has crept into the governance lexicon, suggesting minimally acceptable standards rather than an exhaustive list of institutional standards fragile contexts are expected to meet.” This would possibly hold a potential for more emancipatory approaches to space and statebuilding as greater leeway is given to improvisation and responsiveness to the morphing local dynamics and the need to think and act beyond the Westphalian model of sovereignty, were it not for the absence of a deeper critique of the principles of intervention, development and aid.

Another power-based critique that may be added to the power-based critiques is Judith Butler’s work and Agamben-inspired readings of the sovereign and bare life. This critique can The liberal peace risks subscribing to a consequentialist ethics in evaluating the successes and failures in peace and statebuilding is faulty, due to the acceptance of instrumentalisation of human life of the just war tradition. Human beings, according to a consequentialist logic, can be sacrificed as a means to an end, and this exactly what the liberal doctrine of war not only accepts, but

demands: sacrifice of life and mass-murder of certain lives and forms of life to create and safeguard the lives and life of desired individuals and communities.\textsuperscript{90}

One may also argue that in the current knowledge-power regime and practices of the liberal war doctrine, some human beings belonging to the community subjected to forceful intervention are constructed and discursively represented and perceived as non-lives. Judith Butler suggests that the loss of life of some third-world populations due to the discursive framings, is not perceived as loss of life, because the human beings whose lives were taken have been rendered unmournable and thus do not qualify as human life.\textsuperscript{91} It would in addition not be incorrect to say that the cover ups of detain and killed members of the populations subjected to forceful intervention in the name of the “War on Terror” exemplifies the unmournability of those lives in the eyes of the state apparatus that authors those actions. The unequal power relation between those who have the power to define a population as a legitimate target for indiscriminate violence and those who do not legitimately have the capacity or means to do so, those who only are able to resist such a framing by submitting to the project of the external interveners or stand as a legitimate target or subject that can be neglected in the world of liberal-peace-as-war policy makers and implementors.

Less radical critiques of peace and statebuilding within the paradigm of the “War on Terror” focus their attention on how to make externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding more effective, humane or ‘empathetic’. It argues for the need to incorporate local and everyday forms of knowledge into the practice of peace and

\textsuperscript{90} Michael Dillon and Julian Read succinctly labels the liberal way of warfare a project of “killing to make life live” in their work \textit{The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live}. London: Routledge, 2009.

statebuilding and to enhance facilitate more dialogue between ‘locals’ and ‘internationals’. Given the bunkerisation of aid and increasing security risks for international staff in for instance Afghanistan, enhanced dialogue between locals and internationals might prove increasingly difficult to sustain in the future.\(^9\) DFID for instance does not have any permanent staff on the ground in Somalia to implement its projects and deliver humanitarian aid. Instead they occasionally send staff for short periods of time and rely on United Nations affiliated bodies and will seek to intensify its reliance on private contractors in the next coming years.\(^9\) This can be seen as an indicator of the growing gap between the designers of projects and the receivers and the minimal dialogue that could possibly take place. Where is the place for local ownership when the capacity to author projects and agendas already have been removed from the project site itself? one may wonder. How does this rhyme with the emphasis in the literature and policy papers of aid and development agencies. Aid agencies within the paradigm of this late stage of neoliberal and postliberal peace and statebuilding cannot be conceived of as mere deliverers of humanitarian aid packages, but as agents seeking to have a stake in strengthening governance and provision of security of “poor countries”.\(^9\)

A further point relating to the gap between the ‘locals’, the ‘internationals’ and the representation of the realities on the ground can be found in the politics of project evaluation. This is an issue that needs to be further explored in the literature.

According to a private peace and conflict consultant the gap between the donor

communities and the agencies carrying out peace and statebuilding there is a deep-seated tendency of skewing reports to tailor the brand management of organisations. Often according to this source, is it that employers in their instructions for project evaluators already have set strict frames of reporting. Deviating from the already defined narratives is not looked upon with appreciation by those who hire project evaluators. Due to both explicit and explicit demands on the standards of reporting self-censorship in reporting is frequently practiced, perpetuating an image reflecting the interests of the agencies carrying out practical work in peace and statebuilding, development and aid as a well as a skewed image of the larger structures of the politics of peace and statebuilding. This point relates back to the earlier point made about the politics of reality production and perpetuation of images that legitimate certain sets of policies and practices that do not always correspond to what may be more fruitful priorities.

The architecture and urban planning of the international quarters of Kabul also signify the distance between the locals and the internationals. The main compound of UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, which is the high political division of the United Nations family, is surrounded by two metres thick walls that are built to withstand a blast from a bomb weighing 2000 pounds, the road leading up to the entrance is designed as a labyrinth forcing cars to meander extremely slowly towards the gates to prevent any sudden arrival at the gates. Outside of the wall compounds are heavily armed guards and inside the walls 15 snipers are always present, with enough of them on duty to cover every possible angle inside the compound. The United Nations bodies in Kabul, as well as DFID, have also been tightening up their security due to increased threat levels and attacks

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96 Interview with Independent Peace and Statebuilding Consultant specialised in Afghanistan and Somalia, February 2013.
on its compounds. The employees have a strict reporting schedule both during and after office hours, are subject to early hour curfews, and are not allowed to have any visitors after 8pm. The list of places the UN employees are allowed to visit are also extremely restrictive, with one UN employee reporting that the only place that they are allowed to stay overnight apart from the fortified compound is the densely guarded hotel Serena.\footnote{Interview with UN employee, February 2013.} Such are the precautions taken to prevent any unexpected attack and loss of foreigners' life.\footnote{Interview with UN employee, February 2013.} The locals, on the other hand, are so unprotected, despite of at least $61.5b being spent the last ten years on humanitarian aid and development assistance, that many babies died of a combination of cold and poor nutrition in the refugee camps inside Kabul notably during the winter of 2012.\footnote{By February 2012 it was reported that that the cold and poor nutrition that winter had taken at least 22 babies lives, according to Rod Nordland. This is only the number of reported and known deaths during that particular time. Nordland, Rod. “Driven Away by a War, Now Stalked by Winter’s Cold.” New York Times, February 3, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/world/asia/cold-weather-kills-children-in-afghan-refugee-camps.html?pagewanted=all. One can just imagine how many babies had died from the combination of the cold and malnutrition outside of Kabul, in the remote parts.}

Comparing this to the numbers of starvation deaths in Somalia in 2012, this is very little. 2012 was a very dry year in Somalia and the fighting stood high in the south and central parts of the country. UN reports that 5% of the adult population and an estimated 10% of the children starved to death in South and Central Somalia between October 2010 and April 2012. During the peak period, as many as 30,000 human beings lost their life per month, due to lack of adequate response.\footnote{UN News Centre. Somalia Famine Killed Nearly 260,000 People, Half of Them Children – Reports UN. UN News Centre, May 2, 2013. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44811#.UaSzLUJvmqk.} How is this possible after twenty years of international presence and billions of dollars spent on peace-building, governance, development and humanitarian aid one might ask? The simple answer would be lack of long-term as well as short-term impact, however,
to explain why none of the 14 peace processes that Somalia has been involved in never took hold, is a more tricky task at the centre of the fourth generation of peace and studies scholarship.

The most recent Somali disaster and the precarious situation of internally displaced Afghanis are not isolated instances of the ironies of the huge amounts of spending that still fail to generate the most basic of results – preventing mass starvation during protracted conflict. The lack of concern provision of adequate welfare is also reflected in a 2006 DFID report through the complete omission of the term social welfare. Instead the onus was laid on ‘culture’. Patterns of failing to provide the most basic security of the populations, endemic in the current peace and statebuilding models, have called for a return to human security and needs-based engagements.

Focus on immediate human need for shelter and nutrition has however been intensely criticised for failing to address the underlying power structures that perpetuate a state of destitution and patterns of conflict to begin with.

Neoliberal blue-prints for peace and statebuilding see a need to assist local populations but does not seek to address the underlying structures and thus, when implemented, has had destabilising effects, has provided a fertile environment for illicit trade and the

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grey economy and has moreover often exacerbated inequalities and contributed towards increased levels of poverty. Human security, despite of its commitment to put the human instead of the state in the focus of attention in terms of security, cannot, unless coupled with a radical critique of socio-economic injustices be viewed as a critical one, but ends up in the “problem-solving” box.

The debates on the needs for provision of social and material welfare would also benefit from moving beyond the debate concerned with the extent to which legitimacy of state structures can be bought through provision of social welfare, since well-fare better ought to be provided for its own sake, rather than as a means towards an end. If welfare is considered a means towards an end, and that it is discovered that no casual relationship exists between provision of welfare and support for statebuilding, reducing welfare is easily justifiable to the detriment of the populations concern. As previously stated, but worthy of repetition, welfare is already low on the list of priorities of development organisations and state institutions, exemplified for instance by the complete omission of the importance of social welfare mentioned in the 2006 DFID report.

More frequently stressed than social welfare in the fourth generation of peace and statebuilding is the virtues of hybrid forms of governance and opening up the space for a wider spectrum of actors, i.e the elders, women, youth and ethnic minorities, to engage in and script peacebuilding and governance processes. The virtues of post- and non-Westphalian state models based on hybrid forms of

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identities, groupness, and justice as bound up in multi-tiered nexuses of access to material resources, power and statuses;\textsuperscript{118}

Moreover, it adds context and depth to the analysis of ethnic, non-ethnic and religious claim-making, stressing the myriads of overlapping, multitier conflicts underpinning what can be understood as the master conflicts in Somalia, Afghanistan and beyond. It also proposes that for peace and statebuilding to become attractive to all parties involved, ability to deliberatively participate in the process thereof must be opened up to a broader spectrum of actors than the liberal mainstream blue-print for peace and good governance prescribes. Space has to be given to actors that are endowed with legitimacy and power in the local contexts, such as the elderly, but also has to empower those that usually are marginalised in formal political processes, such as women, elderly and the youth. In the contexts of Somalia and Afghanistan the elders have played a vital role in externally sanctioned as well as indigenous attempts to create peace on a local level. Elderly are however not the only one’s that hold power and legitimacy within local contexts of protracted wars. Also those who are labelled rogue or illiberal ought to be recognised as partners to work with rather than against, as suggested by John Paul Lederarch, Ryne Clos and Harmonie Toros amongst others.\textsuperscript{119}

Hybridity, in this sense also entails a recognition of the shifting interests, understandings and nature of the roles that are played in the “theatre” of peace and statebuilding but also daring to include non-liberal actors, like clan leaders, Al-


Shabaab and the Taliban movement in negotiations and pursuits for peace. For this to become possible, a real dialogue has to take place and basic political imaginations to be reconciled. The key challenge here is to create a situation where a dialogue can take place to begin with. Understandably, inclusion of violent organisations, imbued with deeply violent patriarchal values endorsing terrorism as a strategy, may be opposed on moral grounds but this moral condemnation and accompanying exclusion comes with a price. Attempting to successfully enable traditional sources of authority to effectively take part in peace and statebuilding processes requires the absence of immediate violence and threats thereof, which most often only can be achieved by working with armed military factions of all kinds in the context of Somalia and Afghanistan.\(^{120}\)

How can however the absence of immediate forms of violence be brought about when the political imaginations of the spokesperson of the Taliban movement, Zabihullah Mujahid, differ so radically to that of the US and the Afghani president, Hamid Karzai, that the former have declared it their obligation to exterminate the latter and anyone collaborating in the protraction of the foreign invasion of Afghanistan?\(^{121}\) How can the vision of Al-Shabaab be made compatible with the objectives of creating any form of secular state, not to say liberal state? Realist approaches takes actors and their views as relatively fixed. In this reading, terrorism and insurgency cannot be transformed in the short run, but is something that has to be managed and contained through harsh military means if that is what it takes to guarantee stability and regime survival.\(^{122}\) To clarify, what is classified as terrorism and insurgency is best addressed by “rooting out” the agents of violence.


\(^{121}\) Realist approaches to terrorism, opposite of the views of Lederach and MacDonald, see below.
and their networks according to the realist or neoconservative school of thought, whereas critical approaches such as the fourth generations holds transformation of discourses and political groups to be possible. Rather than seeking to treat the symptoms it seeks to understand and transform the root-causes of terrorism and insurgency in the long-run, while in the short-term dialogue with leaders, members and potential recruits is to be maintained and deepened rather than closed off. Does this imply a potential for emancipation?

Critical security studies and peace research challenges the dominant parameters delimiting what constitutes “appropriate and legitimate” forms of social inquiry.123 This can be seen as act of emancipation but whether it will generation emancipation outcomes is a different matter. Matt MacDonald points out that all critical research is not necessarily guided by an emancipatory objective, as he understands the meaning of emancipation, or lead to truly emancipatory political action. Broadly speaking, what in his view constitutes ‘emancipatory’ in critical is “the process of freeing up space for dialogue and deliberation and the diffusion of the power to speak security.”124 What does discursive unsettling mean in more concrete terms in his reading? First, it entails engagement with the normative role of theory, anchoring theory in the concept of emancipation that takes the most vulnerable as the centre of concern, rather than the security of states. Moreover, emancipation in this sense also entails discovery and utilisation of the potential immanent in the current structures, rather than elaborations on utopias.125

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Chapter 4: Towards empowerment and emancipation

Having sketched out some of the principles of the fourth generation peace and conflict scholarship and revisited critical security studies. This last chapter seeks to start off where the previous chapter ended: the issue of empowerment and emancipation. First, a project of empowerment opening up dialogue with a wider range of actors, not only agents of violence and those involved in civil society initiatives but those who are excluded or marginalised from all meaningful agoras where their voice is heard and taken into account in a meaningful way by all parties involved. Does top-down orchestrated attempts to reinvigorate civil society and invite clan-elders to consultative sessions qualify as empowerment? For the voices to become meaningful the opinions expressed should be taken into account. The forums of dialogue ought also to be recognized as decision-making forums. Merely voting in parliamentary elections is insufficient as a condition for democracy. Democracy, indeed need to be rethought and explained itself to broader notions since it is one of the very few ways to build real legitimacy.

Emancipatory approaches however cannot only address violence and exclusion on a discursive level through enhanced facilities for dialogue and decision-making. It must also address the material structures that render lives precarious and transform the underlying structures of violence and transcend the legacies of war and deprivation through the recreation of discourses and material structures in a way that is understood, authored and consented to by the stakeholders. The current priorities in the external engagements with Somalia and Afghanistan, since it employs a narrow framework of security, fails however not only to address the most

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vulnerable sectors of society through provision of material security. It also shows very little interest in transforming the discourses undergirding the master conflicts: that is diverging political imaginations of society, order, justice and emancipation. Should however greater emphasis be laid on including the voices of the unheard, involving a greater spectrum of actors into formal peace and state building, as well as forms of reconciliatory talks between the parties at conflicts, the externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding cannot be conceived as an empowering one since it rests on the principles of remaking states and societies through force and coercion to suit the interests of the externals, who authored the projects to begin with. Self-reflectiveness on behalf of internationals can never fail to transform a situation of radical inequality or unmake the violence and coercion inflicted parallel to internationally facilitated local forms of peacebuilding.¹²⁷

A potentially emancipatory analysis has to start out with assessing intentions and objectives of political projects, both spoken and unspoken intentions, and framings of populations, not only assess the outcomes of violent interventionism using the blue-prints of the liberal project of war and peace. In this piece I will not be able to expand on the politics of framing, although that clearly would be desirable. Instead the focus will be on discourses of ‘local ownership’ and ‘participation’. In the light of the overall objectives and outcomes of the project of the liberal peace and war, the insistence on the virtue and need for Somalis and Afghanis to assume ownership appear to be problematic and indeed bizarre in many ways. The insistence on involvement of locals can never transform the project of violently imposed orders from outside into an emancipatory one by itself.

¹²⁷ I have not yet been able to find a reference that puts it this way. Perhaps this may count as my contribution to the already existing body of literature.
Although highlighting and praising the potential of involving local capacities may contribute to greater success in achieving more sustainable and long-lasting forms of peace, governance and governing structures, glossing over the violent structure nature of the project itself risks blinding the reader to the greatest paradox of all in the theory and practice of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding, the violence used for the purpose of peace. A distinction needs however to be drawn between Somalia and Afghanistan though, since the rationale for US intervention at the outset of the interventions differed greatly, with the former in 1991 was justified in terms of providing humanitarian relief\textsuperscript{128} whereas the latter was to topple the Taliban regime, capture Osama Bin-Laden, and destroy all Al-Qaeda linked terrorism.

On a final note on emancipation and empowerment, it has been suggested that 'emancipation' from the oppressive liberal peace straightjacket could mean "greater empathy" between the 'locals' and the 'Internationals'. Arguing that empathy would potentially be a step towards emancipation, although an appealing idea, risks falling back into the same liberal pothole that he’s trying to avoid, failing to criticize the overall structures of deprivation, power discrepancy and the forceful nature of externally sanctioned peace and state building. To what extent is it reasonable and realistic to ask of people subjected to the liberal-peace-as-a-liberal war to have empathy with what they perceive as foreign invaders attempting to reconstruct their societies in a forceful manner into something that they do not want and never asked for? Here we return to the issue of authorship and scripting. Who authorized foreign intervention to begin with and to serve whose interests? an emancipatory approach must ask.

Asking international stabilization forces to be more empathetic could also be viewed as a patronizing oxymoron in the way that killing to preserve a certain form of life and lives whereas other lives and life forms are doomed to be elucted through slaughter, starvation and cold. For emancipation the parameters of intervention have to be completely remade to serve the interests of the populations subjected to it. The irony how some of the most precariously living people on earth are subjected to some of the most forceful interventions must be transformed into a relationship of those wanting to be cared for can articulated how and when they want to be cared for and by whom, and be respected. Why should they in addition have to bear the plight of being a playing ground for the US "war on terror" project?
Conclusion

This thesis has sought to explore situate current peace and statebuilding with special emphasis on the cases of Somalia and Afghanistan. It has not sought to give any full-fledged account of the details of these particular cases. The overall project of the thesis was rather to explore different ways of conceptualising contemporary peace and statebuilding within a legacy of generations and graduations of the liberal peace in theory and practice. Using these two examples I have attempted to shed light on some of the contradictions inherent in the liberal peace theory and project and elaborate on the ways to rethink engagements with populations subjected to some of the most pressing forms of complex violent emergencies.

Starting off with an introduction explaining the method and selection of case studies the thesis then went on to place Somali and Afghanistan in the morphing dynamics of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding before the generations and graduations of peace was provided. The third chapter, devoted to the fourth generation of peace and conflict scholarship touched upon neo-Gramscian critiques, reflected on the instrumentalisation of life and the politics of mourning, hybridities and engagement with rouge actors. The last chapter provided a more in-depth reflections on what emancipation and empowerment may mean in the context of externally sanctioned peace and statebuilding.

A lot of peace and conflict scholars now are assuming a pragmatic approach that deviates from more purist liberal strategies. I am also one of them who is in favour of engaging directly with terrorists and other rogue actors, but I do not consider these forms of "hybrid arrangements", as they call it, empowering. It is more of a better-than-nothing strategy and a new expression of real politics that is
becoming domesticated through some of the fourth generation of peace and conflict. However, it appears to have become trendy to talk about hybrid forms of governance, hybridization (although few give a clear definition), resistance, and enhancing local ownership occur sometimes more to be an expression of symbolic politics on part of external peace and statebuilding agencies than real concern for empowering locals willing to make a change.

Afghanistan peace and statebuilding is not liberation of oppressed populations and the creation of a more equitable and just world order, so why talk about the possibility of emancipation of the Afghani Other through coercive forms of peace and state building that, in addition to the excessive force employed, is based on incorporation of warlords into the formal political structures to begin with? Incorporation of warlords into formal political structures is something that has not been explored enough in detail yet because it does not rhyme well with liberalism and utopian ideals. However, it is exactly the contradictions inherent in the “liberal peace” that need to be further explored. The projects themselves for which billions of dollars are set aside also need to rethought in a context of self-replicating order of inequality and stratifications so that the most vulnerable at least can be provided with their basic needs until utopia comes.
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