“The Social Construction of the “Roma” threat: Strategies for desecuritization”

by

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Abstract

Recently developed by the Copenhagen School, securitization theory focuses on the question “what really makes something a security problem”; as such, it conceptualizes security problems as inter-subjective and socially constructed through speech acts. While this theory has attracted many responses and much criticism, “desecuritization”, often presented as its conceptual twin, and considered normatively superior by the Copenhagen School itself, has been less studied. This thesis sets out to narrow this scholarly gap by exploring strategies to desecuritize a deeply securitized minority. This is done in response to an empirical gap in the literature on the desecuritization of minorities, which has so far been largely driven by intellectual and abstract concerns.

By identifying a prevalent security discourse created around the “Roma” minority throughout Europe, this thesis uses securitization theory to explain the discriminatory measures that were legitimized by this discourse. Afterwards, the case of the Roma is used to test the applicability/non-applicability of the few existing theories on the desecuritization of minorities. The conclusions arrived at indicate that, while the best strategy in desecuritizing Roma/majority relations is the initiation of multicultural narratives through the politics of difference, this is only the second step in a desecuritization process; the first step of which entails “preparing” the audience for accepting the desecuritization (read: multicultural as opposed to security discourse), which ought to be done by an “external reality” modification. This thesis ultimately calls for tackling securitized issues socially and contextually first, rather than politically, particularly when dealing with deeply embedded securitizations.

Keywords: Securitization, Desecuritization, Roma, Minority Rights.
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Introduction

"Fear breeds hatred, your majesty. Fear is the greatest enemy of them all, for fear leads us to war." ~The Doctor

We seem to be living in a world of continuously increasing fear, rising insecurity, and growing threats. Danger seems to lurk in every corner; and in order to preserve our physical integrity and safety, we ought to be very well aware of the sources of these threats. How do we know, however, what really constitutes such a threat? The line between what is threatening and what not might seem clearer cut than it actually is. In reality, it can be more blurred than initially assumed; someone’s greatest security danger can be someone else’s blessing. Take the simple example of heavy rainfall for instance. While prolonged heavy rainfall can be seen as a threat to the survival of a dwelling in one corner of the world, it might seem like the greatest blessing for someone in a different part of the world whose crops are on the verge of drying out. While immigrant “gastarbeiter” were seen as a helpful aid in rebuilding post-WWII Germany, in more recent times they are being constituted as security dangers due to higher crime rates among immigrants as opposed to natives. So, how do we know what we should be afraid of in the first place; “what really makes something a security problem”?²

Recently developed by the so-called Copenhagen School (CS), securitization theory was precisely developed around this question. One of the most frequently used theoretical frameworks in security studies, securitization conceptualizes security issues as inter-subjective and socially constructed through speech acts. While this theory has attracted many responses, utilizations, and much criticism, “desecuritization”, often presented as its conceptual twin, and considered normatively superior by the CS itself, has not been dealt with in such academic rigor. The current

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1 Doctor Who, Episode Frontier in Space, March 1973
thesis, by engaging with the contemporary literature on the desecuritization of minorities, presents an attempt at narrowing down this gap.

I will use the complex framework of “securitization”, to inquire into contemporary discursive security constructions in Europe. Specifically, I will look at Europe’s largest yet most marginalized and discriminated against minority, the Roma\(^3\). What will at first be more closely analyzed is whether they have been discursively constructed as embodying societal security threats in countries around Europe. This, in turn, will be used as an analytical framework for the explanation of their continuing discrimination, marginalization, and failed attempts at “integration”. One of the main arguments brought forth is that this security discourse has legitimized political and social practices targeting the Roma. Thus I will be following constitutive and teleological mechanisms instead of causal ones whereby I posit that a specific official security discourse was used to publically refer to the Roma in the language of security, which was subsequently used to legitimize social and political practices targeting the minority more generally. By analyzing the nature of the dominant discourses concerning the Roma throughout Europe, this thesis first shows that the securitization of this particular minority has been deeply ingrained in the societies analyzed, at least since 1989, that it has become institutionalized. The thesis attempts to discover whether there is a general security discourse surrounding the Roma, it does not, however, endeavor to discover specific speech acts through which the securitizations initially emerged.

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\(^3\) Some clarifications need to be made before using “The Roma” as a unified unit of analysis. “The Roma” are by no means a unified, homogenous group; what is referred here as Roma represents a traditionally, culturally, and religiously diverse people. It is thus very problematic to take this term as an uncontested starting point. However, they become securitized as “Gypsies”, “Roma”, “Egyptians”; and are lumped in one group by securitizing agents and audiences. This paper chooses to examine their construction as a unified group, not assuming that they, in fact, are one. For a thorough Foucauldian deconstruction of the term see Simmhandl, 2012, where she examines the term “Gypsy” and tears “realities off their quasi evident nature, making visible what is usually too visible to see” (ibid., 73)
Being thus confronted with an institutionally securitized minority, whose securitization has led to their continued discrimination and marginalization from society, and keeping in mind that the CS itself has expressed normative preference for it; one simple yet important question emerges.

- How can the Roma in CEE be desecuritized?

This is a very important endeavor to undertake for several reasons; first of all, desecuritization, especially the desecuritization of minorities, remains for the most part under theorized with very few publications dealing with the exact topic per se. The theories that exist remain largely devoid of empirics and are driven by intellectual and even abstract concerns. Thus, the main aim of the present thesis is to further explore the possibility of desecuritizing minorities by analyzing one particular case, namely, the case of the Romani people in Europe. It will explore the dynamics of the Roma population in order to draw conclusions about the applicability/non-applicability of the current theories, in response to an empirical gap in the literature.

Thus, the initial aim is to utilize the theory of securitization in order to understand how certain discursive practices made certain political actions and social practices possible, ultimately arguing that discursive security constructions have legitimized political and social practices targeting the Roma. The second endeavor is to inquire into the possibility of desecuritization, or “reversing” this socially constructed threat.

Ultimately, then, the present research will add to two important strands of literature. The first strand is that on the stigmatization and discrimination of European Roma. While there have been many scholarly works analyzing the underlying motivations/reasons for the discrimination and the stigmatization of the European Roma, none has been sufficiently explanatory and all-encompassing thus far. Furthermore, some of the explanatory theories are weak in offering practical
suggestions for future policies. The proposal presented here, that the Roma have been discursively posited as societal identity threats is a novel idea in the field and it might have the power to explain many under-analyzed features of Roma discrimination, particularly the continuing discriminatory practice and the failed attempts at integration.

On the other hand, the second important debate it adds to is that on “desecuritization”, or the deconstruction of certain threats by making implications for how to achieve the desecuritization of minorities, and how to deal with deeply ingrained and institutionalized securitizations. This is a very crucial addition (to the existing literature), since, as explained above, the literature on securitization has been criticized for having left desecuritization largely under-studied and under-theorized. More specifically, the present thesis will add to the academic discussion on the desecuritization of minorities which, thus far, has been largely devoid of empirics and has been conducted in very vague theoretical and abstract terms. Analyzing the applicability of the already existing theories to a hard, empirical case is a very important addition to the existing literature on securitization/desecuritization. Ultimately, the thesis will use the theoretical framework to explain a social phenomenon, and will use social phenomena to add to and improve an already existing theory.

The arguments concerning the case will be presented in three different chapters. The first chapter presents an engagement with the theoretical literature on (de)securitization. It aims to fulfill three endeavors: to engage with the literature on securitization, to craft out a theoretical framework to be applied in the second chapter, and to specifically point out the gap within the literature on desecuritization.

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The second chapter will inquire into the situation of the Romani people in Europe. What this chapter aims to point out is that a prevalent societal security discourse which has been created around the Roma in various European countries, is being used to legitimize various social and political practices targeting this minority. It aims to discover a general security discourse surrounding the Roma, it does not, however, endeavor to discover when this securitization first emerged.

Finally, the third chapter will look at the previous literature on threat deconstruction, or “desecuritization” with particular attention towards the literature on the desecuritization of minorities. If the Roma have been constructed as societal security threats, are there ways of unmaking it? Can we deconstruct the “Roma threat”? It has been posited in the past that it might be a theoretical impossibility to desecuritize minorities, so this is an important claim to confront with an empirical case. Furthermore, this final chapter attempts to inquire into the possibility of desecuritizing institutionalized threats.

Ultimately, there are two important ideas being developed throughout the course of these chapters. The first one is to provide a new theoretical framework for the explanation of the continuing discrimination, marginalization and most importantly the failed attempts at Roma integration in Central Eastern Europe. The second, and equally important one, is to utilize the empirical case of the Roma will be used to further develop the theories on the desecuritization of minorities.

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1) (De)Securitization: Towards a more complex framework

The first chapter will begin by offering some important conceptual and theoretical clarifications and engaging in a discussion on three concepts: securitization, societal security, and desecuritization. This chapter aims to undertake three aims: to craft out a securitization framework to be applied in the second chapter by combining first and second generation securitization scholarship; to introduce the reader to the concept of “societal” security; and finally to present a conceptual summary and analysis of the “how to desecuritize” question.

1.1 Securitization

The idea for the development of the notion of Securitization, the conceptualization of security as socially constructed through speech acts, lies in Ole Wævers 1995 attempt to combine intersubjective understandings of security with Austin’s theory of speech acts as being performative in themselves. Initially, Wæver advanced the claim that security threats are not about objective dangers, but that they have to be socially constructed and “presented” as security threats through a speech act. Specifically, he claimed that someone needs to speak “security” in order for something to be seen as a security threat; in order for it to become “securitized”. The foundational idea (further refined three years later by Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde) is that by saying “Security” the “state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming the right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.” Thus, the enunciation of Security itself creates a new social reality, the utterance itself is the act. This is in essence based on the idea that language, instead of being a mere mirror of reality, actively constitutes and shapes the “real” world. The utterance itself enforces the idea that there is a threat we need to perceive as dangerous, and the audience acts

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7 Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization." 1995. 55
8 Ibid.,
accordingly. More specifically, for something to be securitized, a certain issue needs to be presented "as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure". Essentially, then, "security" is what brings a certain issue past the usual rules and procedures; "securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization", a justification for breaking the already established rules. They speak of security as a "self-referential practice", because labeling something as security essentially makes it a security issue, regardless of whether the issue at hand is threatening or not; whether a threat is "real" or not is not analytically important for the original securitization framework.

By emphasizing the need for the existence of an existential threat, as opposed to merely a threat, the analytical framework of securitization "allows for the widening and deepening of security, without opening it up to an unlimited expansion which would render the concept meaningless" which is ultimately one of the main reasons the framework achieved such prominence as an analytical tool; it is applicable throughout a wide range of social issues. So, in theory, everything is able to become securitized, provided that "it can be intensified up to the point where it is presented and accepted as an "existential threat".

According to this logic, we can pin point four important "components" or actors within a securitization framework. The first important component is the securitizing agent, the person or entity who initiates the securitization process by enunciating security and making the securitizing move. The securitizing agent needs to make a securitizing move whereby he presents the audience with an existential threat. This securitizing move will only be successful if the audience accepts it as such.

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10 Ibid., 23
The acceptance of the audience is the second important component of a successful securitization; the securitizing move remains merely a move until it is accepted by the public. The other two crucial components are the *referent object*; the object that is being threatened, and the “threat” itself. The securitizing actor designates a specific object that is under a precise threat and makes the securitizing move. However, the Copenhagen schools specifically emphasizes that the threat needs to be an existential threat; something so important that if we do not deal with it as soon as possible, we will no longer be around to deal with other threats, it takes absolute priority. In more general terms, it is something that concerns our very own survival. It is a threat that allows one to use “extraordinary politics”, to move away from normal politics and use extraordinary means that would otherwise be considered unthinkable, but that are acceptable under such circumstances. It justifies political and social actions that would otherwise be socially or even legally punishable.\(^{13}\)

This is the original framework presented by the Copenhagen School in a nutshell, with its different components. This theoretical framework has attracted much academic attention, and has been lauded for its effectiveness and simplicity. Indeed, Jef Huysmans even called it “possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda for security studies”\(^{14}\). Furthermore, the framework has been successfully utilized to explain many intricate phenomena, ranging from immigration policies\(^{15}\) issues of foreign policy\(^{16}\), to

health\(^{17}\), to climate change\(^{18}\) and much more. However, this prominence has also drawn a lot of criticism aimed at the structure of the theory itself.

One of the earliest and most prominent criticisms came from Bill McSweeney who (among other issues) criticized the society/identity pairing that is inherent in the writings of the CS\(^{19}\).

According to McSweeney, the CS assumes a very essentialist, statist, and even objectifying definition of “identity” and “society”:

“Collective identity is not out there, waiting to be discovered, what is out there is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others […]\(^{20}\)

Through this rather statist conceptualization of identity and society they exclude a more fluid understanding of the terms, ruling out the notion that identities change with or without the presence of any perceived “threat”. Moreover, as Williams contends, McSweeney’s criticism goes deeper than that, in that he accuses the CS of “fostering and legitimizing intolerance, and encouraging and exacerbating securitizing dynamics between identity groups”\(^{21}\). However, in an in-depth reply to McSweeney’s criticism, Buzan and Waever argue that one can consider identities to be stable and

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\(^{20}\)Bill McSweeney, Identity and Security (1996) 90

socially sedimented, while nevertheless keeping in mind that they are socially constructed. Being socially constructed does by no means imply that something cannot become socially embedded.

Another rather prominent point of criticism is aimed at the non-applicability of securitization theory outside of a liberal democratic context. Wilkinson, for example, has criticized the theory for suffering under the “Westphalian Straightjacket.” Applying the framework to Kyrgyzstan she concluded that it is problematic to apply this framework to situations where, what may be considered an “exception” in liberal-democracies is the normal, since the approval of an audience is not necessary to make big decisions. However, Vuori’s publication one year later on the applicability of this theory makes the framework seem plausible for non-democracies as well, largely because of his suggestion to reconceptualize the “audience” not as necessarily the “general public” but some sort of elite or other entity which needs to nevertheless be convinced by the initiator of a particular securitization.

However, most of the other criticism aimed at the structure of the theory has criticized it for being narrow in many senses and has been accused of the exclusion of important components. Specifically the literature which has been dubbed “second generation securitization scholarship” has criticized numerous ways in which the original framework is narrow. Lene Hansen, for example, by criticizing the absence of gender considerations from the original theory by alluding to a “silent security dilemma”, has criticized the problems of concentrating too narrowly on the speech-act itself, which renders the theory non-applicable in cases where one cannot actively speak security.

The narrow focus on the speech-act has also been criticized by Williams, who argues that this

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25 Lene Hansen, ”The little mermaid’s silent security dilemma” (2000) 288
limited focus is quote problematic in that it due to it implies that speech is “key form of communicative action” in modern days, whereas this is not true. He makes a call for the closer analysis of other types of means of communication, particularly televisual images. The CS, he claims, “must confront the fact that contemporary political communication is increasingly embedded within televisual images.”

The theoretical framework in the present thesis will combine parts of first and second generation securitization scholars to craft out a theoretical framework to be applied in the second chapter. Specifically, Balzacqs’ and McDonalds’ critiques will be utilized in order to amend parts of the original framework to make it more encompassing for the situation at hand.

Balzacq calls for a more sociological understanding of securitization; he calls for the adoption of a strategic and pragmatic approach to securitization instead of merely considering it a speech-act as the Copenhagen School essentially does. For Balzacq the original framework is problematically narrow in that its narrow focus on speech acts entirely ignores the social, political and cultural context of a particular situation. His suggestion is that in order to win the audiences acceptance, security speech acts must be somehow connected to an external reality; “success rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its vulnerability.”

According to Balzacq, thus, whether a securitizing move becomes a successful securitization largely depends on a perceptive environment. Is it a historically appropriate time to securitize a particular issue? Some securitizations are easier to achieve at a particular time and space than others. Balzacq posits

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29 Thierry Balzacq, “The three faces of securitization” (2005) 179
30 Ibid.,188
that the security discourse itself should be only seen as a “blueprint” for a certain state of affairs: “it relies on the audience to flesh out the missing details”\(^{31}\).

Another important second generation criticism concerning the contextual circumstances comes from McDonald, who claims that the original frameworks’ concentration on the speech act itself renders the process of securitization too narrow. According to the original framework, the speech act creates the new social order, so essentially there must be a specific moment in time where a certain securitization comes into existence. This logic, according to McDonald, entirely excludes the possibility for securitizations being “constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations”\(^{32}\). McDonald contends that the securitization framework is problematically narrow in its focus on the speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs, his contention points out to the possibility of a certain securitization developing through decades of various overt and covert speech acts, and decades of the development of a certain external context. Thus he calls our attention towards, what he calls facilitating conditions. By this he refers “to those dynamics, developments and institutional contexts that enable securitizing moves to become successful in the first place”. The original framework, McDonald contends, directing its focus on the performative role of a speech acts, ignores the “conditions in which securitization itself becomes possible”\(^{33}\).

Thus, the original framework needs to be amended, according to both McDonald and Balcazq, to strip it off its narrowness and strictness. Focusing on the historical experiences, the

\(^{31}\) Ibid.,190
\(^{32}\) Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the construction of security” (2008)
\(^{33}\) Ibid.,568
external context, the perceptiveness of the environment calls for “a looser and more interpretative approach” than the original securitization framework allows for.\(^3\)

Ultimately, this section presented the theoretical framework that will be utilized throughout this thesis in order to be applied to the case study below. As should have become clear, the framework represents a combination of first and second generation securitization scholarship, which largely takes the original framework and adds the criticism concerning its lack of attention towards the historical and current social, political, and cultural context. It will present reasons as to why the public was readily receptive to the securitization moves, and it shows that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to point towards a clear moment when something became a security issue, it is a historical process that lead us to where we are. It rejects the idea that there is a certain moment where a securitization occurs, and it rejects the idea that one can pinpoint a specific securitizing move. Instead, it adopts a looser understanding of securitization moves which goes beyond mere speech acts. It will assume that the securitization analyzed was a historical process, as Balzacq says “every securitization is a historical process that occurs between an antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions; this involves concurrent acts carrying reinforcing or aversive consequences for securitization”\(^3\). With the help of Balzacq and McDonald, the argument brought forth will be that the securitization of the Roma has become an institutionalized securitization, it does not need explicit speech acts at this point in time since it has become part of everyday life.

1.2 Societal security

What needs to be clarified in advance, before moving on to the more empirical part, is what kind of intersubjective threats we are talking about. Perceived threats can come from various different sources and can vary quite substantially in their nature. Whether the current framework will

\(^3\) Ibid.,571
\(^3\) Thierry Balzacq, “The three faces of securitization” (2005) 193
deal with military, political, or environmental threats should become clear before we present the case study. The Copenhagen School advanced five different sources or “sectors” where perceived threats can emerge from. The present thesis will predominantly work with the sector of societal security. The concept of societal security is one of the five sectors of security laid out in “Security: A new framework for analysis”\textsuperscript{36} \textsuperscript{37}. While the CS does not delve deeply into definitional matters of “society”, they state that they are adopting a definition of “society” following Giddens’ and introduce it as “a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity”\textsuperscript{38}. Waever claims that “society” is about identity matters, it is what allows us to use “we” in a certain context, it is a declaration of belonging. In turn, then, the main aim of societal security is to analyze identity as a security unit; specifically, the survival of a particular identity. It is about the capability of a society to persevere its “essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats”\textsuperscript{39}. 

Thus, the referent objects are “societies” or groups, the size of which is not specified and can range from families, clans, communities, nations or any other group forming a “we” identity. As I have argued above, these groups can range from small to very large, however, the most frequent unit of analysis have been ethno-national communities. The Copenhagen School justifies this with the assertion that “national identity” can be a tremendously powerful “mode of subjectivisation” and usually takes priority over other types of identity\textsuperscript{40}. The only other identity to become so powerful, the CS claims, is religion: “like nationalism religion has the considerable political advantage of reproducing its “we” identity across generations in a more or less automatic fashion”\textsuperscript{41}. Thus far the most frequent units of analysis have been the two mentioned above, ethno-national and religious groups.

\textsuperscript{37} The other four sectors being the Economic, Political, Environmental and Military sector.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.,\textsuperscript{23}
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid,\textsuperscript{22}
\textsuperscript{41} Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, \textit{Security: A new framework for analysis},(1998)\textsuperscript{22}
Taking all of this into consideration, when can we say that there is societal insecurity? According to Waever, societies are in danger when their survival as a community is put under threat. These existential threats towards communities can emerge from various different sources. Buzan, for example, claims that in the societal sector, the major hazards come from “competing identities and migration”. Threats from competing identities, Buzan argues, arise when identities are mutually exclusive; “one cannot be a Muslim and a Christian, or both a Turk and a Greek”. Attempting to offer an example for this, Waever asserts that Europeans are very often sensitive to Muslim immigrants, due to their “strong, visible and alien culture” which can be seen as a disobedience towards integration attempts, and therefore as a type of invasion. Threats to identity are thus always a question of the construction of something as threatening, some “we” that is threatened and will not be able to survive in its current character. The referent object remains this certain “we” that is being confronted with a perceived threat.

The crucial issue is the maintenance of cultural independence and the survival as a community of that particular group in question. Waever, Buzan and de Wilde outline the three most common ways of “identity” being under threat in recent decades. The first item in their outline is Migration, the fear that a large influx of people with a different identity will pose danger to the identity of the local population; the fear that a certain identity “is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population”. The second item in their outline is dubbed “horizontal competition”, the fear that the new interfering identity will pose problems to and interfere with the “local” culture and language, for example. The third item is dubbed “Vertical competition”, where

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42 Ibid., 44
44 Ibid.,
the threat persists that a certain people will lose its already established culture because there is either an integration project (for example the EU) or the opposite, a secessionist movement.\textsuperscript{46}

For the purposes of the current thesis, the first two are of essential importance, while the “vertical competition” not as much. The fear that a certain identity is being threatened because of the intrusion of another, completely different identity is of crucial importance for our empirical case. This “other” identity, in turn, has the ability to simultaneously to cause “shifts in the composition of the population” and to culturally influence the “local” identity.

### 1.3 Desecuritization

The final crucial conceptual discussion that needs to be made before presenting the empirical facts concerns the conceptual “twin” of securitization theory, desecuritization.

After exploring the idea of securitization, Waever simultaneously set the foundations for the concept of “desecuritization”; the idea that you can “reverse” securitization and go back to “normal” politics. Indeed, the two concepts were coined simultaneously in a chapter by Waever in the book \textit{On security}.\textsuperscript{47} In this publication, Waever deeply questions the conception that “more security” is always more desirable and beneficial; he even goes as far as making a call for giving up “the assumption that security is, necessarily, a positive phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{48} Hence, it is reasonable to claim that Waever himself has expressed normative preference for desecuritization, at least for the...

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 121
\textsuperscript{47} Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization.” (1995) 54
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 57
long term, as early as the concept was coined. Claudia Aradau has helped define this debate by further commenting on the normative/positive value of desecuritization\(^{49}\).

Given this normative preference for desecuritization, it is very surprising to notice that this concept has been rather neglected both conceptually/theoretically and empirically, especially relatively to securitization, as Claudia Aradau and Rita Floyd/Taureck have pointed out\(^{50}\). This conceptual neglect has led to a gap when it comes to the question of “how” to desecuritize a particular issue. While the idea that you can move a security issue away from the realm of security sounds fascinating in itself, it is surprising to note that the theoretical literature in security studies has not dealt with the issue sufficiently, especially compared to the literature on securitization. Furthermore, Hansen adds that there is “theoretical inferiority attached to desecuritization that it lacks securitizations grounding in popular language”\(^{51}\). While one can securitize through speech acts, one cannot desecuritize in the same way, since it would entail evoking the language of security yet again, which would in itself be counterproductive to the desecuritization process\(^{52}\).

This echoes Behnke’s statement that:

“[desecuritization as a speech act], seems to be a contradiction in terms. To declare that a particular issue or actor no longer constitutes a security threat and does not require extra-ordinary measures simply opens up a ‘language game’ in which more often than not the correctness of the declaration, its implications and consequences become the topic of further debate”\(^{53}\).

Therefore, desecuritizing in a similar manner to securitizing, that is through speech acts, seems to be a theoretical impossibility.

\(^{49}\) See Aradau in footnote 4

\(^{50}\) See Aradau and Taureck in footnote 4

\(^{51}\) Lene Hansen, ”Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the copenahgen school and directions for how to apply it,” Review of International Studies, 38, no. 3 (2012), 530

\(^{52}\) Ibid.,

According to Wæver securitization can (and should) be dealt with in one of the following three ways\(^\text{54}\). Firstly, one has the option to prevent an issue from coming to be seen as a security threat in the first place; you abstain from using the language of security to refer to something. Secondly, if an issue has already been securitized, one ought to avoid it from getting out of hands, exacerbating, or turning onto a security drama. And finally, one can attempt to move the issue back to normal politics, or in other words “de”securitize it. For issues that have already been securitized and turned into security drama’s the latter one is obviously the only viable option.

A scholar that has worked on the “how to desecuritize” question quiet exhaustively is Jef Huysmans,\(^\text{55}\) who studied the desecuritization of immigrants. Huysmans succinctly defines desecuritization as the “unmaking of securitization”, and presents three different strategies according to which migrants could be successfully desecuritized.

The first strategy he presents is called The objectivist strategy, and essentially involves attempts at persuading the local population that immigrants do not really pose a security problem. This strategy involves “the production of statistics, along with various arguments to show that the migrant does not limit the employment possibilities for the natives, or that the migrant has contributed much to the natives’ wealth”\(^\text{56}\). However, as Huysmans himself acknowledges, this strategy is rather problematic for a number of different reasons. First and foremost, is still evokes the language of security while referring to immigrants, and it also reproduces the native/migrant dichotomy. The second, slightly more promising strategy, Huysmans talks about is called the constructivist strategy, which views security practices as social constructs which are produced and


\(^{56}\)Ibid., 65-66
reproduced by “spatial and temporal contexts”\textsuperscript{57}. It is based on first attaining a deeper understanding of the process of securitization, before trying to handle it. This is also a slightly problematic approach as, social practices and contexts are always dynamic and rapidly changing, thus, “any understanding will always be a partial understanding of a social world”\textsuperscript{58}. Finally, the last strategy he presents, and for which he clearly expresses preference, is the \textit{deconstructivist strategy.} Huysmans has a clear preference for the third type, and claims that it can be the most successful one when desecuritizing the individual migrant. This strategy, in essence, requires the deconstruction of the identity of a “migrant” so that they stop forming a threatening “other”. This is largely based on the assumption that “to tell a story is to handle the world it requires “telling the story of the migrant” in a way that presents them as having multiple identities, it shows that the migrant is similar to the natives in that she has multiple identities, “mother, worker, black, woman”\textsuperscript{59}.

The present thesis will check the applicability of a “Huysmans type” desecuritization to deeply securitized minorities, by looking at one particular empirical case, that of the Romani people in Central and Eastern Europe. This is an important endeavor to take at this point in time, because previous attempts at applying the above Huysmans type desecuritization have yielded conflicting results.

Paul Roe, for example, analyzed the applicability of a “Huysmans-type” desecuritization to minorities because, as he rightly points out, in Central and Eastern Europe the “security drama” has concerned minorities much more than it has concerned immigrants\textsuperscript{60}. His results indicated that this type of desecuritization might in fact be a logical impossibility when applied to minorities. According to Roe, minority rights are primarily concerned with the maintenance of a distinct collective identity;

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.,\textsuperscript{66}  
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid,\textsuperscript{67}  
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.,\textsuperscript{68}  
\textsuperscript{60} Paul Roe “Securitization and minority rights: Conditions of desecuritization,(2004) 279.
“a certain minority group might have imbued itself with a certain security-ness that if removed results in the death of the minority itself”. In a nutshell, this means that by being securitized the minority has attained certain rights that would not exist if it lost that securitization. “It is the maintenance of a group identity that underpins the provisions of minority rights”. Roe calls for “managing” the securitization of minorities rather than trying to “transform” and desecuritize them. However, it has been claimed that, if applied to collective minorities, this deconstructivist strategy would bring by the end of the existence of the group as a collective, distinct, minority group. “It is the maintenance of group identity that underpins the provisions of minority rights”, he claims.

According to Roe, hence: “Taking away the language of security is to stop talking about group distinctiveness”. Thus, Roe’s main assertion is that minorities are “necessarily imbued with a certain societal security-ness”, thus concluding that their desecuritization may, in fact, be a logical impossibility. Hence, he proposes a strategy of “management” instead of transformation, when dealing with securitized minorities. Management, Roe claims, is about moderate, instead of excessive securitization, about sensible, instead of irrational securitization. Where societal security dilemmas occur, management is about “mitigating” or “ameliorating” securitized issues, “not transcending them”. This would lead to a situation where “minority and majority identities continue to constitute an “us/them” dichotomy, but relations are managed in such a way that an escalation to friend/enemy is unlikely. In a nutshell, management still retains the us/them dichotomy but it avoids turning it into a friend/enemy one.

Mati Jutila, dismissing Roe’s theory as “too deterministic”, rejects it, by saying that the desecuritization of minorities is always possible, just maybe not in the near future. He proceeds to

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61 Ibid., 288
62 Ibid., 279
63 Ibid., 293
present another strategy for the successful desecuritization of minorities, called “resecuritization”\(^\text{65}\), whereby the stories of the majority and minority are told in such a way that these groups do not exclude each other from the political community, basing it on Huysmans “constructivist” strategy. This strategy is very similar to a Huysmans’s constructivist strategy, but rather than dealing with the securitization process, it attempts to combat the “exclusive narratives of identities and political communities”. It essentially aims for incorporating “the question of minority rights in the quest for an alternative founding of the political community. Since the notion of “society” and political community are not final and static, but continuously changing and dynamic, Jutila’s theory of resecuritization calls for promoting identities that can coexist\(^\text{66}\). He essentially calls for creating a dominant multicultural, rather than security, discourse in which minorities do not have to have their identities securitized in order to continue their existence; they can continue to exist as a distinct group with specific minority rights, which is part of a larger, multicultural political community. In a nutshell, it suggests the public promotion of identities, both for the majority and minority, that are not mutually exclusive and can coexist.

However, upon closer analysis this resecuritization strategy does not seem to exclude the possibility of managing minorities as it seems to be an extension to management. Roe says that Resecuritization is only possible in the case of successful management\(^\text{67}\). Before “initiating” the new narratives, minority-majority relations must be managed for a certain period of time. By management, Roe essentially refers to multination federalism\(^\text{68}\). In effect, Roe and Jutila are in agreement on a couple of issues. First of all, they both support the notion of political, or cultural,

\(^\text{66}\) Ibid.,172
\(^\text{67}\) Paul Roe, “Reconstructing identities or managing minorities?”(2006). 431
\(^\text{68}\) Ibid, 433
autonomy. The entire debate was succinctly summarized by Roe’s assertion that: “management first, intercultural dialogue later”\textsuperscript{69}.

Considering the Jutila-Roe debate, in relation to Wævers and Huysmans’ desecuritization theories, it becomes apparent that many questions regarding the desecuritization of minorities have been left open. First of all, desecuritization, especially the desecuritization of minorities, remains for the most part under theorized with very few publications dealing with the exact topic per se. The theories that exist, those by Roe and Jutila, remain largely devoid of empirics and are driven by intellectual and even abstract concerns. Thus, the main aim of the present thesis is to further explore the possibility of desecuritizing minorities by analyzing one particular case, namely, the case of the Romani people in Europe. It will explore the dynamics of the Roma population in order to draw conclusions about the applicability/non-applicability of the current theories. The question that emerges is whether minorities can be desecuritizied while still maintaining that security-ness that Roe talks about. Can a minority group be desecuritized while still being recognized for its distinctiveness that has imbued it with certain rights and privileges?

Ultimately, the endeavor of the next chapters will be to apply the theoretical premises developed in this chapter to the empirical case of the Roma people throughout diverse European countries, not geographically restricted to one particular area.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 436
2) The social construction of the Roma threat

Keeping in mind the theoretical framework crafted in the previous chapter, this chapter sets out to apply the framework of securitization to the Roma minority in Europe. The main argument I am making is that their securitization throughout Europe has become successfully institutionalized, at least after 1989, thus not requiring specific speech acts anymore; they are constantly, recurrently and persistently referred to through the language of societal security by the political elite, journalists, public officials and private citizens. This securitization, in turn, is used to legitimize political and social practices targeting this minority. While the securitizations observed are different in nature, in that they are used to legitimize different political and social practices across different countries, they nevertheless pose signs of a deeply ingrained, even institutionalized, societal security discourse. Furthermore, the economic, political and social context the Roma communities find themselves in throughout Europe, helps sustain and reproduce this securitization.

The goal is not to point towards a clear moment where a securitization came into life, since, as McDonald contends, it can be “constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations”, the ultimate goal is to show that regardless of their geographical location within Europe, the Roma minorities are being securitized in the societal sector.

2.1 The “Roma”: Historical and current discriminatory practices.

Some historical context is necessary in order to introduce the discussion, since the “Roma” are a unique minority in many aspects. Historically, the “Roma” have migrated from India around the 14th century; specifically, they left India between the 6th and 11th centuries and arrived in Europe

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71 Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the construction of security”(2008) 564
around the 14th. Most of the contemporary literature on the issue seems to be in agreement about this early origin, there is, however, quite some academic controversy on exactly when and, more importantly, why they decided to move East. The reasons commonly listed range from mere economic deprivation in India, to discrimination due to the caste system. However, it remains difficult to capture the early history of this movement, the difficulty of providing a comprehensible historical account of the European Romani populations is captured by the following quote by Kenrick, a prominent Roma historian, who claims that:

“Describing the early history of the Gypsies is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle when some of the pieces are missing and parts of another puzzle have been put into the box.”73

What is known for sure, however, is that today they are thought to represent a very diverse, yet culturally rich ethnicity that comprises the largest “collective minority” in Europe which has been subject to discriminatory measures for centuries on end. Upon their arrival, they were greeted with discriminatory measures and often enslaved by the local populations. First, while today the Roma community is commonly referred to by the dominant discourse as “Gypsies”, or “Roma”, it needs to be clear that what is referred to with the identical name and treated like the exact same population represent a very diverse group of people whose traditions and culture, depending on their geographical location, differs tremendously. In many ways, they still comprise a very unusual and unique ethnic minority group in Europe, many of these features have led to this uniqueness, the main one being that they comprise a “transnational, non-territorially based people who do not have

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a home state to provide a heaven or extend protection to them”74. One of the most common stereotypes and judgments Roma have to face is that they are commonly assumed to compose a homogenous group, however, studying the Roma shows that the exact opposite is the case; they comprise a very diverse ethnic group that can be differentiated according to many features, “lifestyle (peripatetic or sedentary), tribal affiliation, occupation, language, religion, and country of residence”75. However, while being very different in language, religion, and culture some similar and preserved cultural traits have been noticed on Roma people living in different European countries. Religious rituals are but one example of this: regardless of whether they are Christian or Muslim, “there are certain Roma rules which are preserved and passed from generation to generation which are typical Romani and do not belong to Christianity or to Muslim religion”76.

Historically speaking, having arrived through travelling they quickly attracted stereotypes which considered them travelers, and inadaptable nomads; such stereotypes stayed with them regardless of the choice of many Roma to settle down in specific places very early on after their arrival in Europe. They were often even considered to be “spies” of the Ottoman Empire due to their darker complexion which set them quite apart from the “local” population at that historical point in time77.

The historical trajectory of the Roma communities continued in terms of enslavement, discrimination, and marginalization in subsequent decades and centuries; an important time period

74 Zoltan Barany. The east european gypsies: Regime change, marginality, and ethnopolitics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) 8
75 Ibid., 12
exemplifying this is, undoubtedly, World War II, where their prosecution by the Nazi regime amounted to 250,000 people.\textsuperscript{78}

Another very crucial historical point to be mentioned, is their situation during communism/under communist regimes, mostly because this period prepared the way for the difficult conditions the Roma have to face in current times. The situation during communism was relatively stable, the literature on Romani history frequently posits that CEE Roma lived under much better conditions under communist CEE regimes. This assertion is frequently made due to the regimes offering the Roma low skilled jobs and frequently even allotting lands and funds such as social support, and making employment possibilities available. The communist regimes considered the Roma within the realm of “social problems”, and during the 70s and 80s they “embarked upon a policy of supporting Roma activities and culture which was quite exceptional at the time in Central and Eastern Europe”\textsuperscript{79}. However, while they did receive financial support, communist regimes treated them problematically as well. The sterilization of Romani women in communist Czechoslovakia and Hungary is but one example\textsuperscript{80}. Nevertheless, the situation after the breakdown of communism in Europe found the Roma as poor as ever; their social, political and economic marginalization in CEE deteriorated during that period. This had many reasons, mainly because of the rapid change to a free-market economy, which brought an end to various different initiatives and social programs on which many Roma depended on\textsuperscript{81}. As mentioned above the Roma held jobs that require low skills during communism, thus losing them after the rapid period of privatization.


Scholars have also noted that the number of unprovoked attacks, racially motivated assaults, police beatings has dramatically increased in the aftermath of the downfall of communist regimes.\(^{82}\)

### 2.2 External Reality: Everyday life and the sensitivity of the “audience”

As the previous section illustrated, post-communist Europe found the Roma in a very inconvenient situation politically, economically, and socially. This section will briefly inquire into the current context. As I hope to have shown in the previous chapter, every securitization must be related to some sort of external reality in order to become a successful securitization. This section shows why the social, political, and economic context was so conducive to the securitization of the Roma. In line with Balzacq’s and McDonald’s argumentations, this section will show why societies around Europe were so ready to embrace, sustain, and reproduce the societal securitization of the Roma.

Analyzing the political, social, and economic situation of the Roma today, it can be said with certainty that Europe has failed its largest ethnic minority, which remains, at the same time; the most excluded and most discriminated against minority in the entire continent. The inclusionary campaign launched by the EU called “Decade of Roma inclusion” in 2005 has, to a large extent, failed. Studies show that exclusionary governmental policies are still largely prevalent, and that popular discrimination and stereotyping have not been declining. Human rights violations against the Roma population are rampantly widespread in both newly democratic countries, and in long-consolidated ones throughout Western, Eastern and Southeast Europe. These exclusionary measures have found application through various means and in an assortment of different sectors, leading to their marginalization both in the private and public life. This marginalization, as Tomovska points out,

has led to extensive exclusion from “labor markets, exclusion and segregation within the education system, difficult access to services including health care, extreme forms of spatial segregation; in a word, exclusion from citizenship”\(^{83}\) Additionally, violent physical attacks against the Roma both by citizens and the police have been on the rise, and they are deprived of several basic needs. Statistics on the employment and education of Romani youth are frightening and one would not expect such marginalization in modern day EU countries.

Reforms have been implemented both at the EU and the national level to eradicate this marginalization and stigmatization, most of which have failed thus far. The European Commission has acknowledged its failure to act in this respect:

“At the European Institutions, Member States, and candidate countries as well as civil society have addressed these problems since the beginning of the 1990s, there is a widely shared assumption that the living and working conditions of Roma have not much improved over the last two decades.”\(^{84}\)

Organizations in Europe and around the world have taken note of the conditions Roma communities have to live in the past few decades. The Council of Europe, for example, recently heavily condemned Europe’s treatment of the Roma communities, denouncing the repeated discrimination, violence, and racism they are subject to. The United Nations called it “Europe's most serious human rights problem” A recently issued EU report called it “one of the most important political, social and humanitarian questions in today’s Europe”\(^{85}\).


\(^{85}\) A succinct summary of these reports was taken from Kyuchukov, Hristov, and Ian Hancock. Roma Identity. Prague: international Visegrad Fund and the USA Embassy to the Czech Republic, 2008:14 (accessed May 27, 2013).
As can be seen the EU and various other organizations have long taken note of the atrocious conditions the European Roma are subjected to but, as should have become clear by now, their attempts to combat these measures have ran into difficulties. Hundreds of verbal and physical attacks against the Roma are reported each year, these attacks are perpetrated both by authority figures like policemen, and private individuals. Despite of continuous EU efforts, including financial aid, to candidate countries EU intentioned at the integration of Romani communities, the vast majority of these citizens are “even more marginalized than before”.

As we can see the Roma have been marginalized through decades, in various European countries and regions, and across different sectors. Attempts to leave these discriminatory measures behind mostly by human rights NGO’s and the EU, largely failed. The important argument that I am making is that this continued marginalization, discrimination, and deep poverty, has led many members of Roma communities around Europe into criminal activities. Official statistics posit the Roma as being in the highest in criminal activities, highest in poverty and convictions, lowest in education, and still remain heavily marginalized from society.

As a first instance, to exemplify the context more specifically, I will talk about the context the Roma found themselves in post-communist Hungary. In Hungary for example, the conditions of the Roma communities of the population remain significantly worse than the national average. Roma are considerably less educated, have below average income, below average life expectancy and much higher unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for Roma communities is 70 per cent, “more than 10 times the national average, and most Roma live in extreme poverty”. As this minority rights group article summarizes, the prevalent discrimination and stigmatization against the

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86 Will Guy Eu initiatives on roma: Limitations and ways forward.(2009) 22
87 Some of these official statistics can be found below in the country reports
Roma remains very widespread, covering a wide range of areas such as “education, housing, penal institutions, employment and access to public institutions, such as restaurants and pubs”. Recent years have witnessed the deterioration of this discrimination mostly due to the center-right party Fidesz taking office in 2010. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report notes that Fidesz has been following an ongoing campaign to “undermine the rule of law and its clampdown on human rights has contributed to the current state of chauvinistic attitudes in the public domain toward minorities and other vulnerable groups”, of which the Roma have been particularly targeted. Considering this, Hungary seems to provide a very easy case as examples of Roma securitization can easily be spotted in many areas of public life, from high-ranked politicians to journalists. The notion of “Gypsy Crime” became popular in recent years; crimes committed by Hungarian nationals of Roma origins to be blamed on their ethnicity; it is argued that “Gypsy Crime” is a natural feature found across Roma nationals, not something that is to be blamed on their social situation.

As we could see above Balzacq claims that in order for securitizations to become successful security speech acts must be somehow connected to an external reality; “success rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its vulnerability”. The societal and historical context in post 1989 was very appropriate for such a securitization, given the high unemployment rates of the Roma communities which led to increased racially motivated segregation and found many Roma getting involved in criminal activities to sustain a living and rid themselves of the extreme poverty conditions. For example, according to a Helsinki watch “60% of male inmates in Hungarian prisons are Gypsies, 12 times the national average”.

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89 Ibid.
90 Lydia Gall. "Hungary's Alarming Climate of Intolerance." Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2013,
91 Balzacq, The three faces of securitization (2005) 188
Such a social context provided very fertile societal ground for the securitization of the Romani communities. Thus, securitizing moves were very quickly received by the general public which in turn resulted with the legitimization of social and political practices targeting the Roma community. The frequently occurring hate crimes are very good indicators that the “general public” has long accepted the securitization, however, recently conducted polls ultimately confirm it as well. In a 2011 survey, for example, one eight out of ten Hungarian respondents were of the opinion that the “Roma problem” would be solved “if they finally started working”. Additionally, out of ten respondents agreed with the statement that criminality “‘is in the blood of the Roma”, and four out of 10 thought “clubs and pubs which Roma are not allowed to enter” should still exist.\textsuperscript{93}

Hungary is not a big outlier when it comes to the situation of the Roma communities throughout Europe. Indeed, it is only one illustrative example of the “fertile ground” for securitization that is more widely observable; other countries throughout Europe exhibit similar patterns. If we look further west, to France for example, we see very similar patterns. Roma poverty and crime rates are much higher than that of the “local” population; 1 in 5 theft crimes in Paris is committed by an immigrant Roma.\textsuperscript{94} Very similar patterns are apparent in Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{95}

In conclusion and in line with Balzacq’s call for a more sociological understanding of securitization moves, and his suggestion that security speech acts must be somehow connected to an external reality, this section illustrated why the environment to securitize the Roma has become very conducive, and why securitization moves were ready to be embraced by the audience. The external

\textsuperscript{93} A Barnat, A Juhasz, P Kreko, C Molnar  The roots of radicalism and anti-Roma attitudes on the far right. Hungary: where do we stand in 2012? A conference on economic conditions and social cohesion (2012) 1

\textsuperscript{94} "Minister cites crime statistics to justify Roma deportations." International News 24/7, August 31, 2010.

reality in post-communist Europe saw the Roma in poor living conditions, many of who had to turn to crime to sustain a living. Balzacq claims: “success rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its vulnerability.”

The audience, thus, was very sensitive to the “Roma” vulnerability due to the external context of everydayness. The next section shows how this very receptive environment led to the public embrace of securitizing moves and even to the institutionalization of this securitization.

Ultimately, this section of the chapter showed that the social context throughout Europe provided, and still provides, a very fertile ground for sustaining and reproducing the institutionalized securitization of the Roma. While it is not a big finding that the Roma minority is generally economically weaker and lives in secluded areas, this section showed how that rather obvious fact made them very prone to securitization moves and to sustaining already institutionalized securitizations. The next section will look at how narratives of societal security have been so ingrained in different countries that one could claim they have become successfully institutionalized; the point made here is that the language of societal security has been used by political figures and public officials to refer to these crimes and to the entire Roma community, creating a dominant discourse which posits the Roma as security threats to “mainstream” society. This has lead to the construction of the Roma problem; constructing them as a source of an imaginary existential threat. It is posited that this construction has legitimized political and social practices targeting the Roma communities in different countries. It will concentrate on a few different observed patterns that transcend country borders and are prevalent in different European countries, from consolidated democracies and economically successful EU members such as France, to Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria. These patterns, which I posit are very strong indicators of societal securitizations, are very wide in nature. They range from statements that see criminality as a racial characteristic of the Roma, to

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consider them inherently un-assimilatable; as the “eternal other”, recurring statements of them having higher birthrates than “the locals”, and the notion of Gypsy Crime. The conclusions arrived at indicate that the “Roma/Gypsies” have been securitized in the societal security domain, and this is an easily observable cross-country and cross-region pattern.

For these purposes I will look at many, albeit geographically distant, countries around Europe, some of which have been EU members for quite some decades and some which are new members. Specifically, I will look at examples from Hungary, France, Italy, and Bulgaria. I will take cases from post 1989 since, as elucidated above, the period following the fall of communism came with deterioration and worsening of the situation of the Romani people. As explained above while crafting the theoretical framework, the current and historical social context is very important, to reiterate, some securitizations are easier to make at a certain point in time. The claim is that post communist Europe provided an appropriate context for the securitization of the Roma.

The goal is not to point towards a clear moment where a securitization came into life, since, as McDonald contends, it can be “constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations”\(^97\), which is precisely what has happened in this case.

### 2.3 Institutionalized Securitization: The Roma as the eternal threatening “other”

This section will inquire into the nature of the institutionalized securitization of the Roma in Europe and what this persistent and recurrent securitization has led to. This is where McDonalds’ important criticism comes in, which rejects the idea that there is a specific moment in time where a securitization comes into existence. According to him, there is the possibility of securitizations being “constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations”\(^98\) and this is precisely what occurred in the case of the Roma. The question of when these securitizations first

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\(^97\) Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the construction of security” (2008) 564

\(^98\) Ibid.
came into existence is not important for the purpose of this thesis. What is important, however, is that one can see securitizations of the Roma throughout Europe, albeit used to legitimize different social and political practices in different countries. Similarly to above, I will start with Hungary.

In Hungary, it has become common to discursively refer to Roma in the language of security; the notion of “gypsy-crime” has become a popular sentiment in recent years, an implication that Roma are genetically inclined towards criminality. An illustrative example can be seen in this statement by a right wing journalist, popular commentator, member of Fidesz and close friend of PM Orban wrote the following:

“A significant part of the Roma are unfit for coexistence. They are not fit to live among people. These Roma are animals, and they behave like animals. When they meet with resistance, they commit murder. They are incapable of human communication. Inarticulate sounds pour out of their bestial skulls. At the same time, these Gypsies understand how to exploit the ‘achievements’ of the idiotic Western world. But one must retaliate rather than tolerate. These animals shouldn’t be allowed to exist. In no way. That needs to be solved -- immediately and regardless of the method.”

Such public statements are easily observable in Hungary, particularly following crimes committed by nationals who are of Roma origin. The so called “Olaszliszka murder” is in instance thereof; when a Hungarian man accidentally hit a Roma girl in the village of Olaszliszka in 2006, the child was not physically harmed. The child's family, however “broke the windshield of the car, dragged [the driver] out of the driver's seat, and in front his two girls beat him to death.” This event is a good example of how the notion of “Gypsy crime” has become ingrained into Hungarian public discourse, posing the Roma as being inherently and genetically prone to criminality. After this occurrence, the Roma were depicted in mainstream media as being “wild and barbarian, having blind family attachments, an inclination to vigilantism”, and that they exhibited and different patterns of

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behaviour from that of the “majority”, something that ultimately legitimizes their continued exclusion from mainstream life \(^{101}\). Unfortunately sentiments referring to the “entire” Roma community as unfit for coexistence and genetically backward are very common in public discourse. Barnath and Messing, for example, conducted a media study where they ascertained that Hungarian media coverage “tends increasingly to use ethnicity to explain negative features”\(^{102}\).

Again, the question of when this societal security language began to be used is outside of the scope of this thesis, what is important for the case of Hungary however, is that security language is used to refer to the Roma in all areas of public and private life; not least following crimes committed by Hungarian nationals of Roma origin.

While Hungary could, in theory, be considered a “special” case in this aspect, due to its current center-right government and the power the right itself has been acquiring in the past few years, and that it uses this particular language to refer to all other minorities as well, I will now present another example: Sarkozy’s France.

The 2009 Roma deportations in France caused much international uproar attracting various opinions. Negative criticism came from organizations and other entities criticizing Sarkozy’s move as being a blatant transgression of the EU freedom of movement right. To summarize what occurred, France decided on the deportation of Romani communities back to Romania and Bulgaria claiming it was a “security clampdown”\(^{103}\). Although French officials were declaring that Roma camps were not distinctively targeted, a leaked memo indicated that “300 camps or illegal settlements must be


\(^{103}\) Bob Lloyd "Roma Expulsions in France: Racism in Action." Euroncritics, September 17, 2010
cleared within three months, Roma camps are a priority”, this memo was signed by the interior minister of France. As van Baar has already noted before, the French situation demonstrates how the Roma’s problematization and securitization “be it in terms of nomadism, illegality, or public or social security is mobilized to create a legal state of exception and legitimate unorthodox policy interventions”. This securitization enabled the usage of “extraordinary” means such as the overcoming of EU laws that are otherwise adhered to without exception. Baar also quotes an interview with French MP and member of Sarkozy's ruling party, Jacques Myard, for instance, has stated that the key issue of the “European Roma problem" is the way in which the Roma interpret and practice the right to travel freely in the EU. He said that their “excessive mobility" and "related medieval lifestyle" cause serious security problems.

In a nutshell, the deportation of the Roma in 2009 is an illustration of the more widely observable pattern of Roma securitization within France. They were securitized as “public emergencies” thus legitimizing a political practice that would have been otherwise out of the question: the breaking of EU rules.

Now I will give two more quick examples to illustrate how geographically prevalent Roma security narratives have become; I will inquire into the situation in Italy and Bulgaria.

As for Italy, the securitization of Roma communities occurred quite apparently, albeit in a different manner than in France and Hungary. Instead of deporting the Romani communities, the security discourse was used to legitimize relegating and constantly evicting the Roma communities to

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106 Ibid.,206 citing Kahn, 2010
107 Ibid.,
special Roma camps, thus excluding and marginalizing them from the “majority”, a practice that has become common across European countries. Yet, still they were securitized in order to legitimize political practices targeting them, in this case, in order to relegate them to ghettos and consider them non-Italian citizens. In the 1990s, for example, regions all around Italy implemented laws aimed towards the “protection of nomadic cultures”, laws according to which Roma communities should be “protected the construction and surveillance of segregated camps, the so-called campi nomadi”. This blatant, yet lawful, relegation to the “outside” reinforced the idea that Roma are different, and could potentially pose a security threat. As Zygmunt Bauman eloquently put it

“Enforcing the separation of Roma from mainstream society through the use of camps is a key factor in the perpetuation of their status as “enemies” rather than “strangers””

While this is more of a “covert” way of positing the Roma as a security threat, the Italian “security pacts” certainly are not. According to such “pacts” the sole “presence of Roma in Italian public space is considered a security risk and allows authorities to take special measures against them, including eviction and their and their children’s ethnic profiling through fingerprinting. As we can see, in Italy their continued securitization has led to the legitimization of their, continuously increasing, marginalization.

111 For a much more in-depth account of these securitization practices in Italy see Natassa Costi, "The spectre that haunts Italy: The systematic criminalisation of the Roma and the fears of the Heartland," Romani Studies, 20, no. 2 (2010): 105-136,
Another good illustrational example comes from Bulgaria where a Member of Parliament published an article in 2003 called “The Gypsy Conspiracy of the White Color”, where he asserted that Roma should be confined to ghettos since “they do not comply with the laws of the society” (Scicluna, 2007). This case in point exemplifies how unproblematic it is for public officials to refer in such a language to Roma’s without being penalized for it. Bulgaria provides plenty interesting illustrational examples. In 2004, the head of one of its leading trade unions, “broadly characterized all Roma as criminals--and then called for the establishment of vigilante guards to deal with them”\textsuperscript{112}.

The above examples epitomize how common it has become to refer to the Roma through the language of security in everyday lives. It shows that it has become part of political, and daily life to refer to the Roma through the language of security. Going beyond positing them as mere “criminals” they have come to be seen as existential threats to the societies in question, being seen as the eternal “non assimilate-ble” other, who are “genetically” prone to crime. Furthermore, with some societies claiming that the birth rates of the Roma community are higher than that of the “national average”, they pose the existential threat of altering the entire nature of the societies at hand. The term “Gypsy Crime” has become so prevalent in mainstream media, that it has become part of everyday life; media “generalizing the guilt of criminals to the entire Romani community” is noticeable throughout\textsuperscript{113}.

2.4 Summary: The Roma as institutionalized securitizations

There are two important implications made in this chapter. First, that the context throughout Europe has become very conducive to sustaining and reproducing the securitization of


the Roma; which, in itself echoes Waever’s assertion that securitizations in the societal sector “have a particularly strong self-reinforcing character”\textsuperscript{114}. Second, the language of security has become part of daily life while referring to them, almost not requiring specific speech acts anymore.

While one can see different types of securitization across countries, in that they are used to legitimize different social and political practices targeting the Roma, cross-country patterns become immediately apparent when one looks at the above examples. The need for explicit speech acts is almost not at hand anymore due to such securitizations having taken place for decades on end, and the Roma having become deeply securitized. One could make the claim that the securitization of the Roma people in the societal sector has already become institutionalized throughout Europe, at least throughout CEE. While this is, admittedly, a very strong claim to make considering the limited amount of evidence provided above, it nevertheless is a legitimate assertion considering the situation many Roma communities find themselves in.

While “institutionalized” securitizations are not exhaustively analyzed in their original work, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde nevertheless mention that securitizations can be both, either ad hoc or institutionalized. They claim that “if a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized”\textsuperscript{115}. The recurrent and persistent patterns of securitization illustrated above exemplify the institutionalized securitization of the Roma in Europe.

What is important for the endeavor of this thesis, however, is that Roma throughout Europe are being securitized in the societal sector; they are being posited as threats to the identity of the “locals” in each case albeit in different manners. The “existential threat” nature of the Roma is different as compared to other minorities; they do not pose the risk of autonomy or secession. They

\textsuperscript{114} Waever in Roe. \textit{Securitizations and Minority Rights} 2004:284
are either being securitized as “profiteers” who only want to participate in illegal activities; they pose the existential risk of altering the nature of the entire society.

Ultimately, while securitization provides an important explanatory theoretical framework, its importance could also lie in providing an aid in “reversing” the process. As was mentioned in the previous chapter briefly, securitization has a conceptual “twin”, desecuritization. If securitization itself serves as a framework for the explanation of this continued discrimination and marginalization, then, in theory, its conceptual twin which supposedly helps reverse the process of securitization, and has obtained some normative superiority by the CS could be of help when attempting to rid the “Roma” minority from its securityness. However, as mentioned in the first chapter, the existing theories on the desecuritization of minorities have been so far conducted in very abstract terms and were motivated by theoretical and intellectual concerns. The next section will, hence, inquire into different strategies for the desecuritization of the Roma.
3) Roma desecuritization strategies

The previous chapter showed that there are very strong reasons to believe that the Roma throughout Europe have become institutionally securitized; a securitization which has become so ingrained in the core of society, embedded in the structure of society itself that this specific minority is consistently and recurrently referred to through the language of societal security in everyday life. This has many negative implications, not least since it has contributed to the legitimization of their continued discrimination and marginalization from the mainstream public. Furthermore, the political, economic, and social context Roma find themselves in in everyday life contributes to sustaining and reproducing this securitization. Hence, considering the situation of the Roma, and keeping in mind the Copenhagen Schools normative preference for desecuritization in the long run, this chapter attempts to assess possible strategies for desecuritization.

The conclusions arrived at indicate that the current theories are applicable to the Roma, albeit in a slightly different way than Roe and Jutila had intended. The “management first, intercultural dialogue later” sequence seems to be very promising when applied empirically, albeit only after slight reconceptualizations. Ultimately, it is very helpful as a blueprint which ought to be, however, adjusted for specific cases, which largely echoes Rita Taureck’s assertion that desecuritizations must be tackled on a case-by-case basis. In this case, if the friend/enemy dichotomy is loosened for a sustained period of time, the politics of difference can be used to ultimately desecuritize Roma/majority relations.

3.1 The “desecuritization of minorities” debate revisited

Before assessing the empirical applicability of the theories on the desecuritization of minorities, this section begins with an evaluation of something that is rejected by both Jutila and Roe as being non-applicable to the desecuritization of minorities; namely a Huysmans type deconstructivist strategy.

To reiterate, a Huysmans type deconstructivist strategy calls for the deconstruction of the identity of a “migrant” so that they stop forming a threatening “other”. This is largely based on the assumption that “to tell a story is to handle the world”, and it requires “telling the story of the migrant” in a way that presents them as having multiple identities, it shows that the migrant is similar to the natives in that she has multiple identities, “mother, worker, black, woman”, so that she in essence, rids herself of the identity of a migrant completely. Now, it was seen that Roe and Jutila said that this strategy is not applicable to minorities since they are primarily concerned with the maintenance of a distinct collective identity; “a certain minority group might have imbued itself with a certain security-ness that if removed results in the death of the minority itself”. Would this line of thought be applicable to the empirical case of the heavily securitized Roma? Very much so. While it might not lead to the “death” of the Roma a distinct group, it might nevertheless be seen as a disadvantageous policy, in that it would lead to the loss of important rights and privileges that are only accorded to self-declared Roma. In fact, additional political rights and group specific policies, which differentiate between “majority, local” populations and Roma are absolutely crucial for heavily disadvantaged groups such as this one. A desecuritization that would be “blind” to difference and follow a normative standard of a universal humanity would not be the right approach, because this would not recognize the cultural and especially historical specificity of this group; which was plagued by sustained periods of discrimination and marginalization. Thus, while this strategy

118 Quotas on political representation are but one example.
works when applied to individual migrants, it would not be successful nor normatively desirable for the desecuritization of this particular collective minority. This case shows that empirical evidence also suggests that, very much in agreement with Roe and Jutila’s assertions, a Huysmans type deconstructivist strategy would not work when attempting to desecuritize the Roma minority.

Having ruled out a Huysmans type deconstructivist strategy we have to evaluate the applicability of the sequence of: “management first, intercultural dialogue later”\textsuperscript{119} as applied to the Roma. However, this sequence might only be applicable to CEE minorities; and while the previous part showed that Roma are being securitized throughout Europe, beyond CEE, this section will only look at CEE to do justice to the theories, and because, as was established earlier, Roma represent the largest minority in CEE. So, in essence, what the theories of both Roe and Jutila call for is “the application of multinational federalism”; political and/or cultural autonomy as part of a federal culture”\textsuperscript{120}. If majority/minority relations can be managed for a certain period of time, then they can be “resecuritized”. That is, new intercultural discourses that do not present exclusive narratives of identities and political communities can be initiated. It calls for promoting identities, both for the majority and minority that can coexist. However, before initiating these new narratives, majority/minority relations need to be managed first, since it would be difficult to get new narratives accepted by relevant audiences if the securitization is still deeply embedded.

As for management, Roe, and Jutila both equate it with some form of political/cultural federalism. However, federalism is an inherently problematic option for the case of the Roma since, among many other reasons, political federalism is a “possible solution only when members of

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 433
different ethnic groups and cultural life worlds live in more or less separate geographical areas”\textsuperscript{121}, or otherwise it might encourage massive population movements. In the case of Roma it becomes even more problematic because of them representing a “transnational, non-territorially based people who do not have a home state to provide a haven or extend protection to them”\textsuperscript{122} and being dispersed through various different countries. The next possible solution would be some other form of cultural federalism or higher forms of political representation or participation. However, some forms of federalism, political participation and representation are already in place in many CEE countries, and higher forms of political participation are continuously being acquired.

As Ilona Klimova has noted, political participation/representation practices of Roma communities have undergone some important positive developments in the aftermath of 1989\textsuperscript{123}. The important changes she emphasizes are, among others, an increase in the “number of administrative and representative institutions for Roma; in the number of ethnic Roma involved in governmental institutions throughout CEE; the number of representative institutions created by Roma has been gradually increasing since the 1920s; a rise of the number of Roma parties contesting elections since 1989; a noticeable increase in the number of Romani MP’s, and finally an increase in the number of elected local officials of Romani origin since 1989 as well”\textsuperscript{124}. Eva Sobotka also notes some important positive changes in Roma political participation in CEE since 1989\textsuperscript{125}. She points out two different models of Roma contribution in politics that have emerged since the breakdown of communism: the policy formation model, found in countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Barany, Z. (2001:8). The east european gypsies: Regime change, marginality, and ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
\item Ibid., 126
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
and Poland; and second, the political representation model, as found in Hungary. While she does criticize some of the many drawbacks of these two models, she nevertheless points out the continuously increasing political participation and representation of Roma communities. This increase, however, has not led to the diminishing of the security discourse surrounding the Roma; quite to the contrary. The discourse has either stayed the same or increased.

Hence, Roma political participation and representation has been gradually, yet steadily increasing in the years following 1989, this increase has not always been very smooth, but it has been positively noticeable nevertheless. However, as the previous chapter showed, a societal security discourse remained largely prevalent and did not change with increased political representation; increased political participation and representation did not lead to a decrease in securitization. This is rather problematic since, before one can desecuritize, one first needs to manage for a period of time until the relations between minority and majority are at least diffused.

3.2 Management Rethought: External Context Modification

While Roe conceptualizes management as some form of political and cultural federalism, he also claims that a successful management should somehow keep the us/them dichotomy, yet actively prevent it from turning into a friend/enemy one. The important question regarding the desecuritization of the deeply securitized Roma is how can we keep this us/them dichotomy yet avoid it from turning into a friend/enemy one, when other forms of federalism are unlikely to be achieved at this point in time?

A continuous increase in political participation and representation did not, at least so far, lead to the diminishing or disappearing of the security discourse surrounding the Roma. This is because lack of political participation is not the major problem, it is only a manifestation of the
central problem; social and economic exclusion and marginalization. This is where I would like to
divert attention back to the political, social, and economic context Roma communities have found
themselves in. Going back to Balzacq, McDonald and other second generation scholars who call for
attention towards the external conditions and facilitating factors that make securitizations possible in the
first place, before “initiating” the new multicultural narratives in order to desecuritize, the external
context needs to be altered, so that the desecuritization can be based on something the audience see
in their everyday lives. Saying that the Roma do not represent a security threat, that “they” are just
like “us” and have multiple overlapping identities will not be accepted by a relevant audience if what
that audience sees in their daily life contradicts this heavily.

Hence, desecuritization narratives will be highly unlikely to succeed, unlikely to become
embraced by the relevant audience if it contradicts what they see on a daily basis, that is, Roma
drenched in deep poverty, living in secluded ghettos, higher crime involvement statistics, and higher
convictions. Similarly to what Balzacq said while illustrating successful securitizations: in order to
win the audience’s acceptance, security speech acts must be somehow connected to an external reality;
“success rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its
vulnerability”126. According to Balzacq, thus, whether a securitizing move becomes a successful
securitization largely depends on a perceptive environment. In turn, desecuritization should largely
depend on a perceptive environment as well. While some securitizations are easier to achieve at a
particular time and space than others, the same can be claimed for successful desecuritizations; one
needs to prepare the way for a successful desecuritization. Balzacq posits that the security discourse
itself should be only seen as a “blueprint” for a certain state of affairs: “it relies on the audience to
flesh out the missing details”127. Similarly, desecuritizations should be heavily based on a external

126 Thierry Balzacq. The three faces of securitization. (2005)188
127 Ibid., 190
social conditions that posit minority/majority relations as not being tense; the Roma not being seen as a societal security threat.

Hence, the first step in attempting to desecuritize the Roma, not least because of the deeply institutionalized nature of their securitization, is to tackle the securitization externally and socially. Some of Aradau’s assertions on securitization largely help the understanding that the external conditions faced in daily life help sustain and reproduce the processes of securitization/desecuritization. For example, she claims that “everyday life is necessarily linked with the reproduction of hegemonic structures”¹²⁸, and paraphrases Zizek in saying that “securitization is only successful when it finds its support in everyday life, when even the facts which at first sight seem to contradict it start working in its favor”¹²⁹. If an institutionalized securitization is largely sustained and reproduced by the social and economic conditions the minority finds itself in, then a modification of these external conditions would be the right step forward in managing this securitization; because, among other things, it would help discontinue the sustention and reproduction of the security discourse.

Aradau claims that “securitization itself can find its legitimization in practices of everyday life”; and uses the example of the securitization of migration which “creates and subsequently legitimizes itself on the basis of everyday fears, such as the fear of crime”¹³⁰. Thus, successful securitizations must find support in the external context and everyday life, which helps to continuously reproduce, and even institutionalize a certain securitization, which is exactly what occurred in the case of Roma. The important claim I am making here is that the successful management, which must precede active desecuritization must find support in the external context and everyday life as well. More specifically, successful management is the alteration of the external

¹²⁸ Claudia Aradau "Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation" (2004) 400
¹²⁹ Zizek 1992 – 49 as cited in Ibid., 400
¹³⁰ Ibid.,
context. This is why, in order to “manage” the relations between majority/Roma, the very notion of how people understand their daily lives need to initially change. Desecuritization of the Roma needs to be tackled socially and contextually first, rather than politically. This management through context modification is particularly useful when dealing with institutionalized securitizations that have become institutionalized to such a degree that they are reproduced by everyday life, such as the case I have dealt with in the previous chapter.

Ultimately, what is important to take away from this section, is that we can think about desecuritization, that is, the initiation of new Roma/majority relation narratives, only after successful management through external context modification.

3.3 Desecuritization through the politics of difference.

As the previous section clarified, one can only start thinking about desecuritization, both conceptually and empirically, after a sustained period of successful management. In the case of the Roma, where further political federalism is not an option, and increased political representation and participation did not contribute to the diminishing of the security discourse, management equates to altering the external context successfully so daily life itself stops sustaining and reproducing said securitization. Then, desecuritization can indeed successfully occur through the politics of difference, which is a strategy rather similar to Jutila’s “resecuritization” approach. This strategy helps desecuritize the Roma, while at the same time preventing assimilation by assuring group difference.

First, to reiterate, Jutila’s theory of resecuritization essentially calls for incorporating “the question of minority rights in the quest for an alternative founding of the political community”131.

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Since the notion of “society” and political community are not final and static, but continuously changing and dynamic, Jutila’s theory of resecuritization calls for promoting identities that can coexist. He essentially suggests for creating a multicultural, as opposed to security, discourse in which minorities do not have to have their identities securitized in order to continue their existence; they can continue to exist as a distinct group with specific minority rights, which is nevertheless part of a larger, multicultural political community. This idea can indeed be successful in the case of the Roma as well, albeit only after successful management, that is, external context modification.

Thinking in empirical terms, the desecuritization of Roma/majority relations can indeed successfully occur if we follow a politics of difference approach (albeit, again, only after a sustained period of successful management to turn the friend/enemy dichotomy into only an us/them one) as advocated by Iris Marion Young\(^{132}\), which, if successfully employed, would ensure intercultural dialogue and in turn a successful desecuritization, yet promote group differentiation. This approach calls for a bicultural dialogue through which one can accommodate cultural difference, while at the same time promoting interdependence and relativity.

Youngs approach is very similar to Jutila’s in that she calls for preserving “difference” between the groups, but not conceiving it as “otherness” because that relegates different social groups, in this case Roma and majorities, as “categorically opposed”, mutually exclusive and unable to coexist in the same time and space. She calls for highlighting the attributes, experiences and goals that are shared by different groups. That is, it would entail initiating discourses that highlight the shared attributes and characteristics of Roma and local communities. Hence, the difference between, say, Hungarians and “Hungarian Roma” would be conceptualized as “specificity, variation, and

heterogeneity”, instead of “exclusive opposition and otherness”133. It would entail initiating discourses both on the nature of the current political community, and the “Roma” as a distinct, yet similar minority. The political community would be constructed as being multicultural and able to accommodate various different cultures; while Roma/majority relations would be constructed as largely overlapping and created in relation to each other. Thus, the politics of difference narratives would pose the Roma, depending on the country, as Hungarian Roma, Romanian Roma, Slovak Roma; alternatively, as Muslim/Christian/orthodox Roma, and so on; where both, their identities and the identities of the majorities are constituted in relation to one another and heavily overlap. It requires an end to conceiving difference as otherness or exclusion.

While these new narratives would posit Roma/majority identities as largely overlapping, a politics of difference nevertheless would ensure preferential treatment for the Roma in various different spheres of public life. This occurs because a politics of difference approach contends that, in order for social equality to really take place in places where social inequality has flourished for longer periods of time, what is required is a differential treatment for the exploited and deprived groups134. As was illustrated in-depth in chapter two, this exploitation and deprivation is precisely what happened in the case of CEE Roma. Because after a period of sustained “management”, group difference between the Roma and the natives would nevertheless continue to exist, due to the previous decades of unequal opportunities and rights135. this would, Young puts it, imply “coming into the game after it has already begun”. Ignoring this difference, would backfire, and the Roma/majority relations could not be successfully desecuritized as the Roma would remain disadvantaged in many aspects. As explained above, a desecuritization strategy that would be entirely “blind” to difference and follow a normative standard of a universal humanity could

133 Ibid., 161  
134 Ibid.,158  
135 Ibid.,164
backfire really badly in the case of the Roma, because this would not recognize their cultural and especially historical specificity; which was plagued by sustained periods of discrimination and marginalization.

While such intercultural narratives have been attempted to be initiated, as illustrated in section 2.3 of this paper, they have largely failed to become accepted by the relevant audiences throughout CEE due to the fact that the “external reality” heavily contradicted what these narratives attempted to promote. Relational narratives that reject conceiving group difference as “exclusion” will only become likely to be accepted if the Rome are not “other-ed” in everyday life, that is, if this minority is not marginalized from mainstream economic and social life continuously. Only afterwards can the overlapping experiences and identities between Roma and majority can be highlighted, and they will become more likely to become accepted.

Ultimately, this chapter showed that, while the “management first, intercultural dialogue later” sequence really provides a good blueprint for designing a desecuritization strategy for the Roma in CEE, it needs to be modified and slightly reconceptualized in order to become more successfully applicable to the case at hand. While the ultimate step in the endeavor to desecuritize Roma would be the initiation of intercultural narratives, this is only the second distinct phase of a securitization process; the first of which entails “preparing” the audience for accepting the desecuritization (read: intercultural as oppose to security discourse), which needs to be done by modifying the external context. This needs to be done via social and political policies aimed at reducing the social and economic marginalization of the Roma. Only after this is successfully done can intercultural narratives be initiated, and they will become very likely to succeed.
Conclusion

This thesis set out to fulfill two research aims, one explanatory and the other exploratory in nature. At first, it aimed to explain the continued marginalization and discrimination of Roma communities in Europe through the theoretical framework of securitization. This endeavor proved very fruitful in that it helped discover a very strong and prevalent societal security discourse created around the Roma throughout Europe. This discourse, which was being sustained and reproduced by everyday life, in turn, was being used to legitimize a range of different social and political practices targeting the Roma. Securitization ultimately proved to provide a very useful framework for the explanation of this continued marginalization from society.

The second research intent aimed at exploring the possibility of applying the existing theories on minority desecuritization to the deeply securitized Roma, largely in response to an empirical gap in the literature. The conclusions arrived at indicate that the “management first, intercultural dialogue later” sequence, as advocated for by the existing theories, presents a very good blueprint in endeavors to rid Roma/majority relations of their securitized nature. In the present case, “management” was to be equated with the modification of everyday life; which would essentially entail social and political policies aimed at ending the “physical” separation and other-ness of Roma/majority everydayness, while the intercultural dialogue was to be equated with the politics of difference, which would ensure multicultural exchange yet guarantee preferential treatment for the Roma in certain areas.

Hence, while the ultimate goal in the endeavor to desecuritize Roma would be the initiation of multicultural narratives (through the politics of difference) this is only the second step of a desecuritization process. This process should have another prior step, which entails “preparing” the audience for accepting the desecuritization, which needs to be done by modifying the external
context, via social and political initiatives aimed at reducing the social and economic marginalization of the Roma. Only after this is successfully done can intercultural narratives be initiated, and they will become much more likely to succeed. As long as Roma are economically much more deprived than the average population, multicultural narratives through the politics of difference will fail to become widely embraced.

This thesis calls for tackling securitized issues socially and contextually first, rather than politically, particularly when dealing with deeply embedded securitizations. The initiation of new narratives will become much easier to be accepted by relevant audiences, if everyday life stops reproducing the securitization.

Ultimately, the thesis helps in thinking about the desecuritization of Roma in CEE both in conceptual, and in empirical terms. To further aid this understanding, future research on the topic is of utmost importance, however. Other points of departure for future investigation in this aspect should focus on identifying precise social and political policies that are most likely to change the perception of the “audience” on the Roma, policies that are aimed at ending the everyday physical separateness of Roma/majorities. Afterwards, the path would be largely clear for the initiation of intercultural narratives through the politics of difference which would guarantee the Roma certain rights and privileges, yet rid them of the current securitiness.
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