United States Cultural Diplomacy in the post-9/11 World: Crafting a Grand Strategy in the War of Ideas

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ABSTRACT

Deemed an indispensable soft power instrument in stemming the spread of communist ideology and contributing to the end of the Cold War, cultural diplomacy was integrated into a balanced grand strategy that relied on all four tools of statecraft – diplomatic, economic, military, and ideational. In the decade after the Soviet threat had dissipated, policymakers saw little need for such programs and the cultural diplomacy apparatus was disassembled, leaving the United States without a coherent strategy to face the imminent struggle of ideas in the Islamic world. At the onset of the Global War on Terrorism (GWT), military action was justified as a reasonable, but sufficient response to the 9/11 attacks on American soil and the sudden emergence of another ideological threat.

Relying on an intensive case analysis of the GWT, the present study aims to solve the empirical puzzle that emerges from the decision to reduce reliance of cultural diplomacy – a mechanism expressly forged to assist in defeating such ideological adversaries – in the formation of a grand strategy to combat Islamic radicalism. Taking a political science approach, I apply Graham Allison’s three models of foreign policy analysis in an effort to understand these policy outcomes. My findings show that the policy outcomes were primarily a product of a misunderstanding of the adversary, institutional mismanagement, and bureaucratic rivalry with an ultimate increase in the political bargaining power of top leaders of neoconservative persuasion whose influence permitted them to craft a grand strategy that heavily emphasized military tools of statecraft.

Keywords: cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, Cold War, War on Terrorism, grand strategy
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INTRODUCTION

The means through which a state ensures its security – its grand strategy – demands a keen understanding of the adversary and the threats it poses to national security and requires the coordination of every resource of a state’s power – its diplomatic, economic, military, and ideational tools of statecraft (see appendix 1).\(^1\) Portrayed as “a war of ideology and a fight unto the death,”\(^2\) the Cold War was not only a political power struggle, but also as an ideological battle over the relative attractiveness of the values and culture of the two antagonists of the bipolar world. To contain the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and roll back communism’s appeal in key areas of vital security interest, the United States crafted a balanced grand strategy that employed a combination of all four instruments of statecraft.\(^3\)

Not only did the government mobilize its military power in the nuclear arms race and through the deployment of forces in Europe and Japan, it also relied on its economic power through efforts such as the Marshall Plan and the Alliance for Progress. In addition, it employed diplomatic tools establishing NATO, which created a security umbrella against Soviet expansionism and fostered alliances between free Europe and the United States. Finally, turning to ideational resources, policymakers during the Cold War exhibited an appreciation for “the link between engagement with

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\(^3\) Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy in the Post-September 11 World”; Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror.”
foreign audiences and the victory of ideological enemies and considered cultural diplomacy vital to [...] national security.” Cultural diplomacy is the diplomatic practice of a government to initiate the international deployment and exchange of ideas, values, and a wide range of manifestations of culture, targeting a wider foreign audience, and carried out by non-state actors in support of the host government’s foreign policy objectives. Understanding cultural diplomacy’s primary strategic goal of fostering mutual understanding and enhancing long-term relationships, acutely targeting ideological foes, policymakers in the Cold War period incorporated this ideational tool in an effort to shape the playing field, making it more conducive to foreign policy implementation, the advancement of vital national interests, and overall enhancement of national security.

Deemed a critical soft power instrument in stemming the spread of communist ideology during the Cold War, cultural diplomacy was extensively sponsored and supported by U.S. government educational, professional, and cultural exchange programs. Drawing on the pre-World War II cultural diplomacy efforts to stem the spread of Nazism in Latin America – which resulted in the establishment of the Department of Cultural Relations, Office of War Information, and Office of Strategic Services – policymakers in the Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower administrations established a robust cultural diplomacy apparatus to influence foreign public perceptions behind the Iron Curtain and elicit change from the bottom up. In short, the

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6 Examples include the Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Leadership Program, and Arts America, among others.
United States simultaneously recognized the multidimensional nature of the threat and the importance of smart power\(^7\) in subduing it, making rational policy decisions accordingly, with leaders in most government institutions willing to take a multifaceted approach in an age of McCarthyism and the Truman Doctrine.

While the efficacy of cultural diplomacy tactics was debated at times among elites in the height of the conflict, many scholars as well as government and independent reports alike retrospectively conclude that the exchange programs of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and Department of State (DoS), by spreading American knowledge, skills, and ideals, were an indispensable tool in winning the war of ideas with the Soviet Union and contributing to the end of the Cold War.\(^8\) As Rajan Menon observes, “few Americans appreciate the degree to which knowledge about American culture, whether acquired by participating in our exchange programs, attending our cultural presentations, or simply listening to the Voice of America, contributed to the death of communism.”\(^9\)

In the decade after the Cold War threat had dissipated and international tension relaxed, policymakers in the United States government saw little need for such programs and the cultural diplomacy apparatus began to be disassembled. Cultural programming was slashed, with staff and budgets both reduced by about thirty

\(^7\) Pwono, in “Fostering a Cultural Diplomacy Policy Dialogue,” makes reference to Nye’s ‘smart power’ approach which combines diplomatic, cultural, and economic resources, as well as the use of force when critically necessary to achieve national security objectives.

\(^8\) Schneider, “Culture Communications”; Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy”; Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the US Government; Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy; Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila, International Cultural Relations.

\(^9\) R Menon quoted in Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy.”
percent. A bureaucratic reorganization followed, ultimately leading to the abolishment of the USIA in 1999, the primary institutional home of cultural diplomacy, and an overall reduction of America’s cultural presence abroad. White House involvement in cultural diplomacy, having peaked under President Ronald Reagan, began to see a marked decline in the first years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and all but disappeared in the Bill Clinton years. The DoS was left with an ad hoc assortment of programs, administered mainly by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA).

These developments are not wholly unreasonable given the lack of a coherent ideological threat to the United States, the new hegemonic power in a unipolar world. Indeed, Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated article of the period boldly claimed that the Cold War’s end may in fact signal the “end of history,” with liberal democracy definitively triumphing over non-liberal ideological alternatives to it. Traditionally, domestic support for cultural diplomacy initiatives – and international involvement more broadly – has fluctuated “according to political changes in the international environment” and in response to extant crises. Moreover, Americans have a historic reluctance to endorse a national cultural policy or anything resembling propaganda. Hence it can easily be understood that the drastic reduction of cultural diplomacy initiatives both in terms of investment and practice was commensurate with America’s new foreign policy objectives in the wake of the Cold War. But the restructuring left the United States

10 Schneider, “Culture Communications.”
11 Lord, Losing Hearts and Minds?, 2.
12 Fukuyama, “The End of History?”.
without a coherent cultural diplomacy policy to face the imminent struggle of ideas in the Islamic world and the threat it posed to national security.

With the onset of the Global War on Terrorism (GWT) after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of George W. Bush found itself with a significantly weakened ideational mechanism to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Muslim world and ultimately inspire moderate Islam to prevail over Islamic extremism. In Republican senator Richard Lugar’s assessment, the government was left to ‘wage the battle of ideas with one hand tied behind its back.”16 Military action was justified as a reasonable response to an attack on American soil and the sudden emergence of a military threat that international terrorism posed. But it was also considered an exclusively sufficient instrument of statecraft to combat Islamic radicalism – as much a transnational ideological challenge as a national security threat.17 Numerous politicians and scholars, as well as official government and independent reports alike in the early 2000s advocated for increased investment in cultural diplomacy activities.18 And although President Bush did acknowledge the presence of an ideological threat – hiring Madison Avenue executive Charlotte Beers to take a public relations approach to sell the GWT to the Muslim world – his administration opted not to re-engage in cultural

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16 Lugar, “To Win Hearts and Minds, Get Back in the Game.”
17 Ross, in Statecraft, argues that America’s foreign policy problems stem from the Bush administration’s inability to effectively use the tools of statecraft.
diplomacy efforts at the same levels previous policymakers had deemed effective to combat the ideological battles of the Cold War.

The decision of policymakers to reduce reliance on cultural diplomacy tools and rely more heavily on military instruments of statecraft in the formation of a grand strategy exposes an empirical puzzle. Given the repeated calls for amplified cultural diplomacy efforts from nearly all spheres of government as well as independent bodies, and considering the U.S. government’s successful track record of expanding its cultural diplomacy instruments in the face of a national security threat rooted in opposing ideologies, one would expect an equivalent approach to help mitigate the growing anti-American attitudes in the world, which provide added fodder for terrorist animosity.19 Moreover, decision-making models relying on the assumption that the government is a rational, unitary actor focused on national interests and attempts to minimize the costs while maximizing the benefits of multilateral international cooperation would lead to predictions of a revamping of the United States’ cultural diplomacy apparatus in the face of another war of ideas. The seemingly incongruous foreign policy outcomes call into question a number of pressing issues. I intend to investigate the reasons why the Bush Administration responded as it did to an emerging war of ideas comparable to the battle against communist ideology during the Cold War – a struggle that the U.S. Government (USG) deemed warranted an unprecedentedly robust commitment to cultural diplomacy.

There are a number of secondary questions that correspond to this main research question. What role do institutional arrangements and governmental

19 According to the Pew Research Global Attitudes report, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power,” anti-Americanism in parts of the Muslim world that had previously had positive attitudes grew at the onset of the Iraq war.
structures play in the decision against reinvesting in cultural diplomacy? Are structural changes in the international context – such as the rise of transnational adversaries opposing a hegemonic superpower rather than the bipolar context of the Cold War – an adequate explanation for the shift away from reliance on cultural diplomacy? Which policymakers in the Bush Administration were campaigning for increased cultural diplomacy efforts, and which policymakers considered cultural diplomacy a last resort after carrots and sticks failed?

Although numerous, the answers to the research questions will intertwine to form a fuller picture of the forces that led to the Bush Administration’s formation of grand strategy in the face of an ideological threat. Discerning which factors have the explanatory power to answer these research questions is critical to understanding inconsistencies in government policymaking and the decision-making processes surrounding them. In my research, I focus on shifts in U.S. foreign policy, evaluating the Cold War surge in cultural diplomacy initiatives, the dismantling of the cultural diplomacy apparatus in the 1990s, and the post-9/11 decision against reinvestment during the Global War on Terrorism. In the end, this investigation has invaluable policy implications for the development of a more diversified grand strategy that better integrates cultural diplomacy efforts to combat ideological foes such as Islamic extremists.

Taking a political science approach, I apply Graham Allison’s three models of foreign policy analysis – rational policy, organizational process, and bureaucratic
politics\textsuperscript{20} – in an effort to understand the policy decisions that led to the scant integration of cultural diplomacy into U.S. grand strategy relative to other tools of statecraft. Primarily scrutinizing domestic forces, these models not only consider the cost-benefit analysis presumably performed by states, but also take into account the possible effects of internal bureaucratic rivalries as well as a state’s strict reliance on standard operating procedures derived from its institutional arrangements. Ultimately this thesis will illuminate the processes, causes, effects, and outputs of foreign policy decision-making in the GWT. I uncover explanatory forces related to national interests, domestic politics, procedural constraints, and leadership style. My findings show that the policy outcomes were primarily a product of a misunderstanding of the adversary, institutional mismanagement, and bureaucratic rivalry with an ultimate increase in the political bargaining power of top leaders of neoconservative persuasion whose influence permitted them to craft a grand strategy that heavily emphasized military tools of statecraft.

The investigation is organized in four comprehensive chapters. I begin by presenting my empirical puzzle, comparing the depth of integration of cultural diplomacy instruments into a grand strategy during the Cold War and the GWT. The next chapter outlines the theoretical framework to be tested along with my methodology and research design. Chapter three provides an operationalization of cultural diplomacy as a concept, critically reviewing the literature surrounding the topic. The final chapter evaluates empirical data from the GWT, applying Allison’s three models of foreign policy analysis in sequence. Structuring the comparison in this way will yield a clearer

\textsuperscript{20} Allison, \textit{Essence of Decision}; Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
understanding of the decision-making processes driving the formation of grand strategy in the post-9/11 period, testing the robustness of each model and revealing the effects of explanatory independent variables on policy outcomes. Finally, the conclusion synthesizes the main findings of the research and offers policy implications.
CHAPTER 1: EMPIRICAL PUZZLE

1.1 Comparable Battles, Divergent Outcomes

Although admittedly unique battles with multifarious actors in ever-changing international contexts, the Cold War and the Global War on Terrorism provide an ideal opportunity for comparison because “there are important similarities between the Cold War and the current global terrorist threat that give the foreign policy tools developed during the Cold War relevance today.”21 Most importantly, both conflicts were understood to be long-term, with global reach, originating from adversaries thriving on “ideologies that are antithetical and hostile toward the United States requiring strategies aimed at de-legitimizing their message.”22 Barry Buzan underlines the perception in Washington of the GWT as a “long war” comparable to the Cold War as a “similar sort of zero-sum, global-scale, generational struggle against anti-liberal ideological extremists who want to rule the world.”23

The notion of a war of ideas or ideological battle denotes a conflict that is aimed at combatting or stemming the spread of opposing ideologies perceived as the root of a national security threat. Framed as ‘wars of ideas’ aimed at containing the spread of communism on the one hand and Islamic extremism on the other,24 both conflicts of study would invariably elicit a grand strategy response that incorporates cultural diplomacy initiatives – tools acutely honed to assuage such ideological tensions. Most

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22 Ibid.
23 Buzan, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?,” 1101.
critical here is not the ontological similarities of the two conflicts as ideological battles, but their epistemological likeness. I do not assume that policymakers would accept a direct equivalence between the Cold War and the GWT, but my assertion is that they considered them similar battles in the sense that cultural diplomacy offers a potentially robust, long-term strategic tool to wield soft power in the face of an opposing political ideological threat.

Indeed, if politicians and government officials perceive a conflict as an ideological struggle, and also understand cultural diplomacy to be a soft power tool fashioned for the purpose of combatting opposing ideologies, policy outcomes that aggressively exploit cultural diplomacy would be expected to result. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication issued a report in 2004 proclaiming that the “contest of ideas is taking place […] in Arab and other Islamic countries”\(^{25}\) while the National Security Strategy of 2002 asserted that “we will wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism […] This is a struggle of ideas and this is an arena where America must excel.”\(^{26}\)

Moreover, the fact that many respected politicians, academics, and NGO leaders in the GWT context understood the need for a revamped cultural diplomacy apparatus to face the struggle of ideas in the international relations landscape further strengthens the empirical puzzle. A steady stream of more than twenty studies and reports by a variety of official, semi-official, and independent bodies from across the political

spectrum\textsuperscript{27} told a similar story of institutional ineffectiveness, lack of strategic direction, and insufficient resources, calling for an offensive that regenerated the government’s run down cultural diplomacy apparatus as an intangible soft power instrument.\textsuperscript{28} The public diplomacy recommendations for increased funding and attention for media outreach, broadcasting, scholarships, and cultural exchange laid out by the 9/11 Commission dovetail with the imperatives of cultural diplomacy, vociferously advocating that the United States “defend [its] ideals abroad vigorously.”\textsuperscript{29} The report goes on to warn that “if the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.”\textsuperscript{30} Scholars have also highlighted the use of cultural diplomacy as an implement of war using the “general public” as a theater of conflict.\textsuperscript{31} David Caute asserts that the Cold War was not a conventional political-military conflict, but an “ideological and cultural contest on a global scale and without historical precedent,”\textsuperscript{32} while Kennedy and Lucas compare both conflicts as ideological

\textsuperscript{27} Even in the early days of the GWT, the CIA, in its ““DCI Worldwide Threat Briefing 2002,” stressed the crucial need to influence foreign attitudes in order to prevent the spread of terrorism: “We must also look beyond the immediate danger of terrorist attacks to the conditions that allow terrorism to take root around the world. These conditions are no less threatening to US national security than terrorism itself. […] Primary and secondary education in parts of the Muslim world is often dominated by an interpretation of Islam that teaches intolerance and hatred. The graduates of these schools—“madrasas”—provide the foot soldiers for many of the Islamic militant groups that operate throughout the Muslim world. Let me underscore what the President has affirmed: Islam itself is neither an enemy nor a threat to the United States. But the increasing anger toward the West—and toward governments friendly to us—among Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly is a threat to us. We have seen—and continue to see—these dynamics play out across the Muslim world.”

\textsuperscript{28} See footnote 18

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{The 9/11 Commission Report}, 377.

\textsuperscript{30} ibid

\textsuperscript{31} David Caute’s argument for cultural diplomacy as a weapon of war is laid out in Lenczowski, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence and Integrated Strategy,” 6. See also Waller, \textit{Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War}.

battles that demanded increased public diplomacy functions as a tool of national security and political warfare.\textsuperscript{33}

Even more remarkable is that the neoconservative exponents of American unilateralism, who lobbied for ‘preemption’ as a central element of the Bush Doctrine as laid out in the National Security Strategies of both 2002 and 2006, succeeded in justifying military operations as the primary tools to combat the GWT, banishing the more “moderate, pragmatic descendants of Truman and Eisenhower” to the fringes.\textsuperscript{34}

President Eisenhower vehemently opposed preventive war, detailing the hypothetical proposition that “If the U.S. had destroyed Russia, or China, at low cost to itself […] American would face hundreds of millions of ordinary people permanently possessed of a searing hatred of the United States and an implacable desire for vengeance.”\textsuperscript{35}

Although few would successfully argue that Stalinism was a benign threat to U.S. national security, an equally scarce contingent would make serious claims that it would have been just or sensible to launch a preventive nuclear war to destroy the Soviet Union. And yet the Bush Administration managed to justify its pursuit of an arguably irrelevant campaign against Saddam Hussein as a ‘preemptive strike’\textsuperscript{36} in lieu of confronting the ideological struggle with Al Qaeda head on using tools of statecraft better suited at defeating the opponent.\textsuperscript{37} Paradoxically, the Iraq war is likely to have further “inflamed the Muslim world against the United States [and] helped al Qaeda to

\textsuperscript{34} Lieven and Hulsman, “Neo-Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror,” 65.
\textsuperscript{35} Eisenhower quoted in Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{36} Van Evera, in “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 13, sees the ousting of Saddam Hussein as a “pure diversion from the war against al Qaeda” since they “had no operational ties and did not work in concert against the United States.”
\textsuperscript{37} Lieven and Hulsman, “Neo-Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror.”
recruit and to find friendly places to hide,“38 thereby undermining the effectiveness of strategic efforts to win the GWT.

The shared characteristics of both periods of study render the conflicts sufficiently analogous to lead to an expectation of equivalent foreign policy responses, at least in terms of the need for a duplication of the cultural diplomacy response based on the “war of ideas” dimension. And yet the grand strategies devised to challenge the two ideological opponents were markedly different in terms of a proportionate integration of cultural diplomacy efforts.

1.2 The Cold War: an Integrated Grand Strategy

As the United States emerged from World War II as a hegemonic power, efforts became necessary to convince international society that America merited “an unprecedented degree of global activism and leadership.”39 Additionally, with distrust of the Soviet Union leading to the adoption of George Kennan’s containment policy, the political elites understood the Cold War not only as a political power struggle, but also an ideological battle that warranted a diversified grand strategy. The government response was to develop a blueprint for victory over communism that augmented cultural diplomacy efforts, building on exchange programs for students and artists established under the 1936 Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations.40 The Informational and Educational Exchange Act, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was approved by President Truman in 1948, its purpose “to

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40 Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, 7; Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror.”
promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between Americans and foreigners.” From this legislation birthed cultural, educational, and professional exchange initiatives. The Arts America division presented top performing artists and exhibitions abroad. Fulbright Scholarships, created in 1946, gained heightened support for the exchange of scholars, students, and teachers. The International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) was inaugurated to provide opportunities for current and emerging foreign leaders in a variety of fields to gain firsthand knowledge about U.S. policies, politics, society and culture. Alumni who benefited from the IVLP program include Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. With the Smith Mundt Act’s mandate for “the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the U.S., its people, and its policies,” cultural diplomacy could carry forth the rhetorical command of the Truman Doctrine “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

The breakout of the Korean War in 1950 infused the U.S. government with a heightened determination to check the Soviets. A National Security Council directive in 1950 asserted that “our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement, and insecurity.” In his Campaign of Truth, launched that same year, President...

41 “Program History.”
42 According to Ninkovich, *US Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy*, 48., by 1988, more than 167,000 grantees had “received invaluable cultural exposure abroad.”
43 Truman, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.”
44 “National Security Council Document #68 (NSC-68), Beginning Section VI.”
Truman underscored the critical nature of ideational tools of statecraft, such as cultural diplomacy, in forming an integrated grand strategy to overcome the communist threat, declaring:

The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men... We must use every means at our command, private as well as governmental, to get the truth to other peoples.... We must make ourselves heard around the world... It is a necessary part of all we are doing...as important as armed strength or economic aid...We should encourage many more people from other countries to visit us here, to see for themselves what is true and what is not true about this great country of ours.45

Cultural diplomacy initiatives became “full-fledged weapons in the nation’s Cold War diplomatic arsenal”46 after the election of President Eisenhower in 1952. As a fiscal conservative, Eisenhower believed that dependence on military means alone would bankrupt the country.47 He was also convinced that the battle of ideas would be a long-term enterprise requiring a wide range of means to resolve the conflict, arguing, “It is not merely the beaming out of facts. I would encourage the exchange of students, of scientists, of doctors, of instructors, of even theologians; anything you could think of that would tend to carry back into these various countries an understanding of what we are doing and just how we live.”48 In 1953, he initiated a total reorganization of the information and cultural diplomacy apparatus, resulting in the establishment of the United States Information Agency, whose primary purpose was “to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are consistent with the national objectives of the United States.”49 Besides managing strategic communication

45 Truman, “Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.”
47 Ibid.
and media diplomacy through international broadcasting operations such as Voice of America (VOA), the agency, in tandem with the DoS, sent dance and musical groups, including Dizzy Gillespie and Benny Goodman, on tours to Russia and its satellite nations in Eastern Europe. It also began administering some government exchange programs in 1955 such as the IVLP, opened American libraries, reading rooms, and cultural centers in major foreign cities, and promoted exhibits of American art and innovative products at international fairs, which reached millions of rank-and-file Soviet citizens.

Although there was some debate among decision makers in Washington about the “extent to which public diplomacy should be a captive purveyor of government information or an independent representative of American culture,” the establishment and expansion of cultural, educational, and professional exchanges became an integral part of the grand strategy to contain the spread of communist ideology as the Cold War progressed. Scholars have concluded that these initiatives were brilliantly adapted to their target audience, specifically appealing to the “inherent Russian respect for the intelligentsia and for cultural expression, which challenged some basic beliefs about their own society and ours.” This integrated strategy represents a logical policy outcome stemming from the realities of the international environment, elite perceptions of the global ideological threat, and the confidence in the tools specifically crafted to confront it.

50 Schneider, Diplomacy That Works, 14.
51 Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, 134.
53 Schneider, “Culture Communications,” 6.
1.3 The Global War on Terror: a Unidimensional Grand Strategy

By comparison, in the first decade of the GWT, despite the foundation of Cold War cultural diplomacy policy upon which policymakers could draw to formulate an integrated grand strategy in the post-9/11 world, the Bush Administration relied on force as its primary tool of statecraft at the expense of other instruments – particularly those aimed at shaping perceptions such as cultural diplomacy. Although the administration employed economic tools of statecraft, freezing more than $100 billion of al Qaeda’s financial assets to disrupt its terrorist capabilities, the GWT began immediately with a military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, followed by the counterproductive Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to straining relations with American allies, these hasty military actions “helped fulfill the prophecies of al Qaeda’s ideology, which claims that the United States is out to destroy Islam, through its support of apostate regimes, its ‘occupation’ of Saudi Arabia, and now its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Meanwhile, anti-Americanism skyrocketed with favorable ratings plunging worldwide following the invasion of Iraq and remaining low through 2008. The U.S. image was particularly abysmal in the Muslim world and even declined among the publics of some of America’s oldest allies, with majorities in Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan expressing opposition to American anti-terrorism efforts and favorable views of the United States in the single digits in Turkey in 2007. In the 9/11 Commission’s words, “Bin Laden’s message…has attracted active support from

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54 Farah, “Al Qaeda’s Finances Ample, Say Probers.”
55 Osama bin Laden’s Fatwa, or Declaration of War, quoted in Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy in the Post-September 11 World,” 247.
56 “Reviving America’s Global Image.”
57 “From Hyperpower to Declining Power.”
58 “Global Unease With Major World Powers.”
thousands of disaffected young Muslim and resonates powerfully with a far larger number who do not actively support his methods.”\textsuperscript{59} And yet grand strategy included only feeble attempts to reverse this tide and establish meaningful contact – in ways other than through military force – with the silent majority in the Muslim world who, “deeply confused about their identity and critical of their own corrupt and autocratic rulers, [could] seek refuge in another extreme ideology.”\textsuperscript{60} Despite potentially being “one of the most potent weapons in the United States’ armory” to cultivate favorable impressions of the U.S. and offer an alternative to such extreme ideologies, cultural diplomacy was “downplayed in favor of dramatic displays of military might.”\textsuperscript{61}

The diminished level of commitment to cultural diplomacy instruments as a component of an integrated grand strategy can be measured through a quantitative analysis of spending and staffing levels as well as a qualitative assessment of institutional structures. The dissolution of the United States Information Agency in 1999 saw the termination of the Arts America division and the closure of many American libraries and cultural centers abroad, though many of the flagship exchange programs survived, migrating to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. And yet a brief evaluation of funding levels for public diplomacy, including breakdowns for cultural diplomacy and information programs, reveals a dramatic decline in spending of nearly 50% from the end of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath in the Newly Independent Countries (NICs) to the beginning of the Global War on Terror (see figure 7 below). Funding for cultural diplomacy started at a paltry $285 million at the outset of the GWT and never

\textsuperscript{59} The 9/11 Commission Report, 362.
\textsuperscript{60} Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy,” 15.
\textsuperscript{61} Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy,” 20.
reaching the 1994 spending peak of $510 million in the entire Bush Administration. Furthermore, only $150 million or 13% of the State Department’s FY 2003 public diplomacy fund were spent in Muslim-majority countries.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Figure 1}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Funding for Public Diplomacy Activities (in millions of FY 2008 constant dollars)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{62} Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 17.

Even more striking is the simultaneous near doubling of security and defense spending during the decade following the dissolution of USIA due to the extra budgetary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (see figure 8 below).
Further scrutiny of cultural diplomacy spending levels in proportion to these outlays emphasizes the Lilliputian role that cultural diplomacy played in U.S. grand strategy as a consequence of the dual trends of spiking military budgets and declining cultural diplomacy spending (see figure 9 below). The disparity was so great that even Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, called for a dramatic increase in spending, even if it meant diverting resources from the Pentagon to a public diplomacy effort.⁶³

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Public diplomacy field staff was also significantly affected by the budget cuts and the merger of USIA with the Department of State. While in the 1960s, there were some 1200 Foreign Service officers (FSOs) in USIA, by 2005, there were only 614 public diplomacy FSO staff in the Department of State. In addition, visa restrictions on people from twenty-five Arab and Muslim countries, solemnized in the Patriot Act, thwarted hundreds of cultural exchanges and undermined foreign student access to higher education and exposure to America. Consequently, the increase of exchange students at American universities was reduced from 10 percent per year in the 1990s to less than 1 percent per year in 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, the number of annual exchange participants in ECA programs also fell from 45,000 in 1995 to 29,000 in 2001.

Indisputably, soft power resources are only one of the instruments in the diplomatic toolbox. Nevertheless it is surprising that policymakers would opt against deeper integration of cultural diplomacy efforts as a long-term strategy to contain the imminent threat of the GWT given the growing consensus that the GWT was primarily a long-term ideological battle with global reach; the repeated calls for a regeneration of cultural diplomacy to help shape attitudes in the Muslim and Arab world about the U.S. in the interest of national security; the unsubstantiated claim that the preemptive strike on Iraq played a pivotal role in combatting the GWT; and the historical record of the Cold War heyday for cultural diplomacy, recognized by many as a crucial component of grand strategy in defeating the ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union.

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64 Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, 17.
65 Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs, 153.
66 Schneider, “Culture Communications,” 19.
67 Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, 8.
Hopefully at this juncture, it has become clear that the purpose of this investigation is not to assess whether cultural diplomacy can be or has been an effective soft power tool in winning ideological battles. Undeniably, a significant obstacle facing cultural diplomacy efforts stems from a deficiency regarding a viable metric by which to gauge success in achieving its intended aims to foster mutual understanding, promote national interests, and develop long-term relationships with foreign nations. Most attempts to measure the direct impact of cultural diplomacy resort to reliance on qualitative barometers such as media coverage, surveys, and interviews, but these measures are incapable of providing hard evidence of a causal path from means (cultural diplomacy initiatives) to end (mutual understanding and strategic advantage). Milton Cummings conceded that “a certain degree of faith is involved in cultural diplomacy.” Given the measurement predicament, it is outside the scope of this paper to address the question of effectiveness, tackle the issue of lacking methods of evaluation, or attempt to determine the causal relationship between means and end.

Nor is it my goal to test the validity of soft power as a concept, which has been thoroughly criticized as being weak, underdeveloped, or convoluted. I accept the assumption that soft power resources constitute one of the many instruments in a state’s arsenal of diplomatic tools to deal with security threats stemming from ideological adversaries. Rather, the overarching aim of this research is to explain why cultural diplomacy instruments were employed as part of the Cold War attempts to

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68 Nye contends that the effectiveness of public diplomacy can only be measured by minds changed as shown in interviews or polls, not on “dollars spent or slick production packages.” See Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 101.
69 Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the US Government, 2.
conquer the opposing ideology, but was not resurrected after the new ideological adversary emerged in the GWT – one that seemed to demand deeper integration of cultural diplomacy into grand strategy.

Cultural diplomacy has not received as much scholarly attention as might be expected despite its intersection with numerous subjects as well as the massive investment in the practice by several countries.\textsuperscript{71} Scholarship about the traditional field of diplomacy barely discusses the practice while the various schools of international relations theory almost entirely ignore the subject. One of the seminal works on the topic of diplomacy by Adam Watson does not even make mention of cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{72} An exhaustive series of over one hundred Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, published between 1995 and 2005 included only one on cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{73} Shaun Riordan’s work on \textit{New Diplomacy} that evaluates public diplomacy and soft power only references cultural diplomacy as a practice “not regarded as a serious part of diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{74}

Most of the existing literature on the topic of cultural diplomacy has been more descriptive in nature and has either been a comparative study of numerous states\textsuperscript{75} or has focused on single states, most often the United States. The majority of scholarship on American cultural diplomacy falls into one of three categories. The first theme lays out the divergent understandings of the relationship between cultural diplomacy, strategic communication, and public diplomacy, with the main focus favoring U.S.

\textsuperscript{71} Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila, \textit{International Cultural Relations.}
\textsuperscript{72} Watson, \textit{Diplomacy.}
\textsuperscript{73} Melissen, “Wielding Soft Power.”
\textsuperscript{74} Riordan, \textit{The New Diplomacy}, 121. Ninkovich, in \textit{US Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy}, 1., dismisses cultural diplomacy as “minor cog in the gearbox of foreign policy.”
information programs during World War II and the Cold War era (e.g. broadcasting such as VOA and RFE-RL).\textsuperscript{76} Second, writing on the topic invariably offers a historical analysis of legislative and administrative changes made to United States cultural diplomacy, examining the domestic political machinations surrounding policy and the deep ambivalence about government involvement in the practice.\textsuperscript{77} Finally, a normative approach has bordered on advocacy or lobbying for a return to cultural diplomacy efforts to counter the declining government support for the practice.\textsuperscript{78} No investigation in the literature comes to the fore that seeks to explain the puzzle surrounding seemingly irrational foreign policy strategies to combat the ideological struggle of the GWT, examining cultural diplomacy initiatives as a component of grand strategy. The following chapter outlines how this research contribution fills the lacunae in the literature by offering a foreign policy analysis approach from a political science perspective.


CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Theory Testing

Applying Graham Allison’s rational policy, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics models of foreign policy analysis will clarify the processes underlying decision-making within the U.S. government vis-à-vis its reliance on cultural diplomacy instruments as a means by which to achieve its national interests.\(^7^9\) Allison provides an ideal framework from which to evaluate these changes because his models aim to explain decision-making in the face of a crisis, in consideration of various dimensions of the process at the domestic level. His models also seem to be expressly developed to explain actions contrary to the national interest of democratic regimes. In this section, I lay out what policy outcome each model might predict and what my findings reveal to be the actual result.

The *Rational Policy Model* operates under the assumption that the state acts as a unitary rational actor making decisions in response to the strategic problem it faces.\(^8^0\) Allison contends that this model has received the most attention from analysts attempting to explain or predict the behavior of national governments focused on achieving national interests and minimizing costs. The growing consensus that the GWT was primarily a long-term ideological battle with global reach coupled with the recognition of cultural diplomacy as a tool of statecraft expressly forged to assist in defeating such ideological adversaries would lead to predictions of a rational government response that made use of the most effective grand strategy – especially

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\(^7^9\) Allison, *Essence of Decision*.

\(^8^0\) Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 690.
one that relied heavily on cultural diplomacy – to enhance national security and advance national interests. Moreover, a simple cost-benefit analysis would produce similar expectations given the relatively low cost of cultural diplomacy compared to military interventions. The seemingly irrational outcome of the GWT grand strategy that overlooked national interests and utility maximization renders the Rational Policy Model insufficient in solving the empirical puzzle sketched out in this discussion.

In order to distinguish alternative explanations for government behavior, Allison takes into account that governments are made up of “gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making structure” and that policy actions are often the “consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives.”

His *Organizational Process Model* assumes that the subunits of a state follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) that restrict their actions. At first glance, the notion that states can only dictate policy options that are already in these pre-determined procedures would lead to an expected outcome of an intensified cultural diplomacy response to the GWT using the historical success of the Cold War apparatus as the procedural archetype to suppress the spread of communist ideology, itself a procedural response built on the World War II cultural diplomacy initiatives aimed at preventing fascist expansion in Europe. And yet a deeper exploration of this model reveals that, after the downsizing of the ideational tools of statecraft such as cultural

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81 Ibid.
diplomacy before the terrorist attacks of September 11, inadequate interagency coordination, poor leadership, and a deep misunderstanding of the threat led to a lack of operating procedures specifically fashioned to contend with transnational adversaries. Consequently, the United States government turned to state-centered military strategies as the primary defense against the terrorist attacks in 2001. The Organizational Process Model testing reveals that institutional rules restricted policymakers’ ability to modify the operating procedures of the Cold War cultural diplomacy apparatus to address the unique characteristics of the present-day ideological struggle.

Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model focuses on the internal politics of a government that produce outcomes of “various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government.”82 In this model, government elites in charge of various state responsibilities make predictable arguments based on their present position, and negotiations among these leaders result in policy outcomes that are “not chosen as a solution to a problem, but rather result from compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue.”83 With recommendations for a regeneration of cultural diplomacy efforts to combat the GWT pouring in from nearly all institutions of government including not only the Department of State, but also the Department of Defense, CIA, and the White House, an application of this model to explain the puzzle of the GWT case would predict an absence of bureaucratic infighting due to the growing consensus that the threat called for bolstered cultural diplomacy efforts. And yet, this model offers the greatest explanatory power in understanding policymaker decisions.

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 708.
during the GWT when at the individual leadership level, as government officials were wrangling over how best to respond to the rising Islamist threat, a minority of neo-conservatives and liberal hawks ultimately succeeded in wielded the most influence over policy outcomes that relied more heavily on military strategies.

2.2 Case Selection

An analysis that employs these models provides alternative explanations of policy outcomes and ultimately tests the validity of the models themselves. To achieve my research goal and to test the validity and scope conditions of the theoretical framework, my research agenda relies on an intensive case analysis of the Global War on Terror, following Allison’s methodological approach of employing three theories to isolate the primary independent variables that may cause the variation in the dependent variable. Although this investigation constitutes a single case study, it relies on a controlled comparison of the developments in the Cold War that established an integrated grand strategy in order to establish an empirical puzzle that would lead to predictions of a similar response in the GWT case. In addition, process tracing should further assuage doubts pertaining to the strength of the case comparison by assessing differences beyond a single variable of interest that may account for the different outcome in the dependent variable. Furthermore, process tracing helps identify and test intervening variables through which causal mechanisms produce causal effects by evaluating connections between the environment, perceptions of threat, and implementation of policy. Put another way, this analysis sheds light on the chain of

84 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
85 Ibid., chap. 4.
86 Bennett and George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research.”
events and policymaker rationale in the post-9/11 period that were grounds for the lack of reinvestment in cultural diplomacy initiatives.

The Cold War and the GWT were selected for comparison because they are arguably the two most important security threats the United States has faced from the outside – the communist threat from the Soviet apparatus and the terrorist threat from the Al Qaeda Network.\textsuperscript{87} Although the ideological battle dimension laid out in Chapter One is the most essential focus of this study, I attempt to control for the disparate characteristics of the two conflicts in order to render their comparison more robust. First, critics may contend that comparing a threat based on political ideology such as communism with one that is religiously influenced such as Islamic fundamentalism is a non-sequitur.\textsuperscript{88} Yet many U.S. government elites understood the Islamist terrorist threat to be a perversion of the faith as a political ideology.\textsuperscript{89} And, as previously stated, it is their understanding of the threat that is most critical in this analysis.

Second, to control for the asymmetric timeframes of the two wars – one encompassing more than four decades the other just a decade – the scope of the comparison concentrates on the incipient years of each conflict during which a grand strategy was being constructed. To determine the periods of study, I rely on exogenous shocks as “critical junctures” that triggered the emergence of new strategies in response

\textsuperscript{87} Hughes, \textit{Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas}.
\textsuperscript{88} Ahrari, “The Post-9/11 American Conundrum,” 97.
\textsuperscript{89} George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence for the CIA, emphasized this notion in his 2002 threat assessment: “Let me underscore what the President has affirmed: Islam itself is neither an enemy nor a threat to the United States. But the increasing anger toward the West—and toward governments friendly to us—among Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly is a threat to us. “ See more at “DCI Worldwide Threat Briefing 2002.”
to a new international environment.\textsuperscript{90} The end of World War II and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 serve as the starting points of my analysis for each conflict respectively, although I consider the months leading up to these events at the beginning of the Truman and Bush administrations to show the existing state of cultural diplomacy efforts before the Cold War and the GWT were underway. For the Cold War comparison, I trace the institutional and policy developments to the end of Eisenhower’s first presidential term, by which point the cultural diplomacy apparatus was effectively fully established and integrated into the U.S. grand strategy, and after which it underwent only minor changes in practical terms. For the GWT case, I only examine Bush’s two presidential terms since the subsequent Barack Obama administration reduced its reference to the GWT as such and initiated drawdowns to put an end to both wars in the Middle East. Also, I contend that an eight-year presidency would have been sufficient to establish an integrated grand strategy to fight the GWT given the successful Cold War cultural diplomacy models, assembled in less than a decade, upon which the Bush administration could draw.

Third, the shift in the international context from a bi-polar world during the Cold War to the rise of the United States as the global hegemon by the turn of the millennium would lead some to argue that a public diplomacy effort of any kind would be irrelevant in a unipolar world where the United States would have little reason to defend its ideals. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, should provide sufficient substantiation that the United States faced a legitimate military and ideological

\textsuperscript{90} Collier and Collier, \textit{Shaping the Political Arena}. 
adversary in the form of Islamic extremism – one to be taken seriously considering the relative decline of U.S. power internationally.

Finally, the contention that while the United States faced clear sovereign opposition from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the nascent international system at the outset of the GWT produced a transnational enemy not definable by national borders. This argument raises a logical quandary of whom in fact the United States would have been expected to target its cultural diplomacy efforts in the GWT in the absence of an enemy clearly defined by national borders. But with cultural diplomacy’s emphasis on bottom-up relationship-building targeting the public at large, a strategy that includes cultural diplomacy efforts would actually seem better suited to combat terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda network that relies on grassroots support for their survival with anti-Americanism as the fuel for their success. Also, according to this line of reasoning, the military response of the Bush administration in its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan would seem an anachronistic response to such a transnational threat. Angstrom contends that since “al Qaeda does not have a geographical center of gravity, it cannot as easily be deterred by the US nuclear and conventional arsenal.”\(^{91}\) Such conventional military defense strategies would arguably have been a more logical tactic to combat a clear state enemy in the Cold War context.\(^ {92}\) Given that cultural diplomacy’s purported soft power potential lies primarily in its ability to manipulate foreign public attitudes and establish long-term relationships in order to shape the

\(^{91}\) Angstrom, “Mapping the Competing Historical Analogies of the War on Terrorism,” 237.

\(^{92}\) Carnes Lord in *Losing Hearts and Minds?*, 3, contends that this new terrorism, placed in the service of a truly transnational ideology and political strategy, was analogous to the threat posed by Soviet communism, but was even more dangerous in some respects. “The Soviet Union, for all its unyielding hostility to the West, was a prudent player on the international scene, and could be deterred from using its formidable military power by the countervailing arsenals of the advanced democracies. The soldiers of Al Qaeda, by contrast, gloried in their acts of martyrdom against the ‘far enemy.’”
playing field and contain the spread of opposing ideologies, my primary focus is to examine U.S. cultural diplomacy efforts targeted at states within the orbit of Islamic extremist ideology in the GWT context.\textsuperscript{93}

The conundrum illustrated by the comparison of the two conflicts leaves the question on the table of why the United States would rely so heavily on cultural diplomacy to combat that Soviet threat, but less so to conquer the terrorist one. Ultimately any of the unique factors inherent in the GWT case may be incorporated into an explanatory framework that accounts for the divergent policy outcome.

\textbf{2.3 Methods and Sources}

Outlining the theoretical framework to be applied and providing justification for my case selection has laid the groundwork for isolating the independent variables that may provide causal explanation for the variation in my dependent variable – the level of commitment to cultural diplomacy in the formation of grand strategy. In applying the Rational Policy Model, I primarily operate within Kenneth Waltz’s second image of analysis, testing for the impact of key independent variables related to domestic forces and vital interests at the state level.\textsuperscript{94} Considering this model’s assumption that the government would maximize its utility, budgetary constraints are not exhaustively considered as an explanatory factor given that the U.S. economy enjoyed a boom in the 2000s that allowed for extra-budgetary military campaigns, putting defense spending at

\textsuperscript{93} Hill and Ajami in the Foreword of Hughes, \textit{Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas}, 592:xi, contend that “the task of reversing Islamist radicalism and of reforming and strengthening the state across the entire Muslim world […] is the greatest strategic challenge of the twenty-first century.”

\textsuperscript{94} Waltz, \textit{Man, the State, and War}.
historically high levels\textsuperscript{95} and allowing for the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security.

Recognizing that, due to the deepening level of globalization and transnational activities, the U.S. is increasingly obliged to interact with non-state actors, the empirical analysis also considers the conceptual potency of macro-level factors and micro-level behavior through a detailed assessment of the ideology and ambitions of the political leadership (first image) and of threats and opportunities emanating from international structural and institutional determinants (third image).\textsuperscript{96} In testing the Organizational Process Model, I specifically consider institutional (mis)management, lack of competent leadership, and misconceptions about the nature of the ideological adversary. In testing the Bureaucratic Politics Model, I evaluate factors related to bureaucratic rivalry, imperial ambitions to maintain the U.S. hegemonic position as a global power, and the personal ideologies and ambitions of the most powerful political leadership.\textsuperscript{97}

This research project relies on multiple sources of data, both primary and secondary, to measure these independent variables. A critical qualitative analysis of public opinion polls, media reports, official government documents, along with memos from policymakers and government officials has been consulted to provide explanations for the policy decisions made in the GWT contexts. I also conduct qualitative content analysis of speeches and statements made by policymakers in this period of study, providing insight into elite perceptions of the potential role cultural diplomacy plays in

\textsuperscript{95} See figure 8
\textsuperscript{96} Waltz, \textit{Man, the State, and War}.
\textsuperscript{97} Buzan, in “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?,” 1101, argues that the United States saw the attacks of 9/11 as a solution to a “threat deficit,” that if “successfully constructed and embedded as the great new global struggle, it would also underpin the shaky legitimacy of U.S. unipolarity” leadership, and unilateralism.
combatting ideological battles and illuminating the rationale behind policy decisions that eschewed deeper integration of cultural diplomacy into a grand strategy.

Additionally, given the limited access to many government documents that are still classified from the Bush era, semi-structured interviews with former and current policymakers and cultural diplomacy practitioners were conducted to include primary sources from the early GWT period that could shed light from the inside on the decision-making process in the formation of foreign policy and institutional changes. The semi-structured interview format allows for a more relaxed setting that elicits responses and follow-up questions that provide material to assess elite attitudes toward the efficacy of cultural diplomacy tools in combatting ideological battles as well as to deconstruct the arguments for and against investing in such initiatives in the environments of each period of study.

The variance among the independent variables ultimately account for the divergent outcome on the dependent variable – the diminished level of commitment to cultural diplomacy instruments such as educational, professional, and cultural exchanges as a component of an integrated grand strategy in combatting the GWT. Having established a robust empirical puzzle and outlined the theoretical framework to be tested, I proceed in the following chapter with an operationalization of cultural diplomacy as a concept, critically reviewing the literature on the topic.
CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT

In order to conduct an institutional analysis of America’s changing cultural diplomacy policies, it is necessary to provide a more comprehensive definition of cultural diplomacy, outlining its goals, practitioners, target audience, and timeframe, conceptualizing it as a soft power tool, and acknowledging its purported advantages and limitations.

The definitions in the literature on cultural diplomacy are remarkably consistent. The most widely cited definition is that of Milton C. Cummings, Jr., political scientist at Johns Hopkins University, who refers to cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.”98 One of the earliest definitions provides a similar explanation of cultural diplomacy as “the act of successfully communicating to others complete comprehension of the life and culture of a people [with] the requirement of mutual understanding” as the basis of success.99

And yet an interchanging use of terms creates considerable confusion about what precisely constitutes cultural diplomacy and what its specific goals entail – both explicit and implicit. The present discussion seeks to operationalize the term in order to distinguish it from related concepts such as public diplomacy, soft power, international cultural relations, propaganda, and strategic communication. To achieve this goal, I

generate a taxonomy delineating the functional mechanisms of cultural diplomacy and the primary agents involved in wielding them.

3.1 Cultural Relations versus Conventional Diplomacy

To arrive at a more succinct definition of cultural diplomacy, it is necessary to deconstruct the concept into its constitutive parts with the term “cultural” providing the context and “diplomacy” implying the means to an end. Semantically speaking, any definition must rely on the assumption that the practice is somehow related to diplomacy, which, broadly conceived, implies “an element of government intention and participation”\(^\text{100}\) in an effort to gain strategic advantage, advance national interests, or find mutually acceptable solutions to a common challenge.

Diplomacy could be envisaged as a two-tier game of chess with interactions occurring among elite officials at the Track I (elite) level and with non-governmental actors at the Track II (societal) level, all of these agents attempting to communicate through a cultural filter when transmitting their message or values to the target country on the other side.\(^\text{101}\) Agents at each level have distinct advantages and shortcomings and therefore produce different results when passing through the cultural filter. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “government agencies have a strategic edge with regards to knowledge of foreign policy objectives, in-depth intelligence on regional

\(^{100}\) McDowell, “Public Diplomacy at a Crossroads,” 7.

\(^{101}\) In the book Negotiating Across Cultures, Raymond Cohen substantiates that culture can indeed interrupt effective negotiation by altering one’s perception of reality, obscuring information inconsistent with culturally grounded assumptions, attributing unintended meaning to words or actions, and incorrectly interpreting motives. He employs Lorand Szalay’s theoretical model to furnish a more systematic analysis of the role intercultural communication plays in dissonance. According to this model, the logical consequence of operating within different cultural frameworks is that a transmitted message will not necessarily convey the intended meaning of the sender since the receiver will inexorably interpret the ideas within the message based on his own perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that make up his characteristic frame of reference.
and local conditions, and a worldwide network of broadcast resources and public affairs officers. The private sector enjoys an advantage when it comes to marketing and public relations skills, perceived independence and credibility, and resources.”

Jessica Gienow-Hecht reiterates the point that the further the distance between agent and political or economic agenda, “the more likely the program is to be successful.”

Yet if interactions in no way involve the governments of either interlocutor, then this practice hardly constitutes diplomacy at all, but would be more akin to international cultural relations – encounters between nations and their peoples that grow “naturally and organically, without government intervention” (see figure 2 below). Nevertheless, some have characterized a non-state actor’s attempts to carry out diplomatic goals independently as citizen diplomacy. After all, this practice provides the highest risk for governments, but the greatest potential return. Without government affiliation, the message being transmitted has the greatest chance of being perceived as credible, rather than as propaganda.

If non-state actors operate consistent with the state mission, home governments gain the most. But lacking external control over the content of their communication, non-state interlocutors are free to act in opposition to government strategy, assume an agenda of their own, and risk producing effects that potentially undermine, blur, or multiply state interests and policy. Pop culture, for example, can stimulate more “distaste for the United States in the global community

102 U.S. Public Diplomacy, 1.
103 Domfried and Gienow-Hecht, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, 4.
104 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, xviii.
105 See “US Center for Citizen Diplomacy.” In John Hoffman’s “Reconstructing Diplomacy,” the author contends that “the state is incoherent, and this incoherence necessarily extends itself to statist diplomacy” (p. 525). He argues that diplomacy “functions much more fully and consistently in a stateless context than in a state centered one” (p. 533).
106 Domfried and Gienow-Hecht, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, 23.
107 Ibid., 10.
rather than contribute to mutual understanding”\textsuperscript{108} considering that “exporting Hollywood films full of nudity and violence to conservative Muslim countries may produce repulsion.”\textsuperscript{109}

![Figure 4: International Cultural Relations\textsuperscript{110}](image)

Conventional diplomacy, at the other end of the spectrum, occurs through the cultural filter between diplomats, politicians, policymakers, and other government elites representing different states at the Track I level.\textsuperscript{111} Usually pursued through formal means such as demarches, discussions, and summits, conventional diplomacy entails negotiations and skilled communication by “trained envoys of governments” to directly “inform and influence foreign governments.”\textsuperscript{112} The diagram below (figure 1) serves to

\textsuperscript{108} Grincheva, “U.S. Arts and Cultural Diplomacy,” 180.
\textsuperscript{109} Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95.
\textsuperscript{110} Graphic by Alexander Hunt
\textsuperscript{111} Murray, “Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies.”
\textsuperscript{112} McDowell, “Public Diplomacy at a Crossroads,” 7.
aid our understanding of traditional diplomacy in order to later distinguish it from cultural diplomacy.

**Figure 5: Conventional Diplomacy**

3.2 Mechanisms of Public Diplomacy

Governments can also engage with interlocutors at the Track II level in an attempt to directly or indirectly “inform and influence foreign publics.” These efforts were conceptually formalized by Ambassador and former Dean of The Fletcher School Edmund A. Gullion, who first coined the term *public diplomacy* in 1965 to describe the actions of governments to “deal with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.” Before we can arrive at a workable definition of cultural diplomacy, we must understand better the umbrella concept of public diplomacy, which some scholars have loosely characterized to include anything a

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113 Graphic by Alexander Hunt
115 “What Is Public Diplomacy?”
government does to project its image and explain its policies. Perhaps the most succinct definition is given by Tuch, who describes it as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”

Given that public diplomacy maintains its utility as an instrument of diplomacy, the overarching implication is that the ability to influence others to achieve national interests is paramount for diplomatic success. The underlying assumption follows that “by engaging in a [foreign] country’s political and social debates, [a state] create[s] the intellectual political climate in which [its] specific policies can flourish” given that “if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to accept a favorable image of the other side, [the target audience] will exert pressure on its government to alter existing hostile attitudes and policies.” Indeed, many scholars and policymakers have concluded that, to attain desired outcomes, states must not only rely on coercion (sticks) and payments (carrots), but must also strive for attraction, capitalizing on culture, values, and policies as its ‘soft power’ resources to project them. Hence, public diplomacy and culture diplomacy by extension are elements of soft power.

All this talk of power and state interest is evocative of the ideological tenets outlined by the Neorealist School of International Relations. Even Neoliberal scholar

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116 Schneider, “Culture Communications”; Schneider, “The Unrealized Potential of Cultural Diplomacy.”
118 Riordan, The New Diplomacy, 122.
Joseph Nye argues that the challenge for the United States after the Cold War was to make efficient use of its military, economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological resources in order to “control the political environment and get other countries to do what it wants,” a suggestion that certainly hints at the Neorealist principle of milieu shaping. Even traditional realists such as E. H. Carr recognized ‘power over opinion’ as one category of international power. How then is public diplomacy different from a Machiavellian pursuit of national interests that would readily turn to propaganda? Certainly, any government attempt to communicate directly with a foreign society runs the risk of straying into the realm of propaganda through the “manipulation of cultural materials and personnel” and dissemination of biased or misleading information to further its cause or injure another’s. To assess public diplomacy’s relationship to propaganda, it might be useful to turn to Jan Melissen, who situates public diplomacy and propaganda as being on a “continuum ranging from crude and manipulative propaganda aiming at short-term political effects to two-way public diplomacy for the ‘long haul’ based on dialogue with foreign audiences.” Nye goes further to insist that public diplomacy that degenerates into propaganda not only fails to convince, but can undercut soft power. His 2008 article outlines specific soft power resources at a country’s disposal – its political values, foreign policies, and culture, but acknowledges that these resources are only effective if hypocrisy is avoided in the embodiment of political values,

122 Carr referenced by Nye in Yasunshi and McConnell, “Foreword.”
124 Frederick Barghoorn (1960) quoted in (Donfried and Gienow-Hecht 2010, 13)
125 The Free Merriam-Website Dictionary defines propaganda as “ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause.”
foreign policies are seen as legitimate and morally sound, and cultural exports are welcome. Put another way, if a state’s “foreign policy is insensitive to the interests of others, and if it makes global problems worse rather than better,” no amount of public diplomacy efforts can convince the rest of the world that “it is really acting in the best interests of mankind.” Even Realist scholar Stephen Walt agrees that “power is most effective when it is seen as legitimate, and when other societies believe it is being used to serve their interests.”

The limitations of public diplomacy certainly must be presupposed in “a world that is far more skeptical of government messages,” but Nye argues that, in addition to selling a positive image, states must also emphasize relationship-building to ensure an environment that is conducive for the implementation of favorable policies. In his estimation, these relationships are preserved through two-way communication that is frequent, sustained, and strategic. Soft power thinking also acknowledges that, while critically necessary to achieve national and international security objectives, economic inducements and military intervention on their own are intrinsically limited, not to mention costly. As Joseph Nye puts it in explicating this integrated approach, “when you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction.”

128 Walt, “In the National Interest.”
129 Ibid.
133 Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 256.
In short, soft power resources purport to offer a strategy that attempts to work by indirection.\textsuperscript{134} By extension, public diplomacy is tendered as a means to translate these soft power resources into action.\textsuperscript{135} Building on Mark Leonard’s segmentation of the concept of public diplomacy into three tiers characterized by the timeframe of the relationship,\textsuperscript{136} the instructive diagram below illustrates the continuum of strategies reflected in the various forms of public diplomacy efforts (see figure 3 below).

\textbf{Figure 6: Continuum of Public Diplomacy Strategies}\textsuperscript{137}

Public diplomacy essentially operates in two separate but closely linked ways. The first is the “articulation of policy [...] in as many media and languages as are

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy}, 15.
\textsuperscript{136} Joseph Nye also adopted Leonard’s conceptualization of public diplomacy in Nye, “Soft Power,” 107. The first tier is short term, reactive news managements, taking hours or days. The next tier is medium-term strategic communications, which takes months. The third tier is cultural diplomacy concerned with the development of long-term relationships, which can take years.
\textsuperscript{137} Graphic adapted from “Evaluation of the Arts Promotion Program of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.”
necessary to ensure that the message is received,”¹³⁸ by informing, educating, and influencing foreign audiences primarily through international broadcasting, libraries, information programs, publications, language training, web-based social media output, and media campaigns. Termed media diplomacy, the mechanism in the upper tier is based on techniques of news management, “which operates at the immediate level, [reacting] within hours or a few days to developing events, usually to minimize damage or exploit an opportunity.”¹³⁹ The middle tier mechanism represents strategic communication at the medium-term level, allowing for weeks or months for proactive planning. Conducted by governmental agencies, it is the most direct transmission of government messages and wagers the least risk of misrepresentation (see figure 4 below). However, it is also the most likely to be received as propaganda or never break through the elite-societal barrier to reach a wider audience.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” 77.
¹⁴⁰ American researcher and diplomat Bill Ivey is particularly critical, doubting that this practice “can produce desired outcomes,” or target anything but the “elite population.” See Ivey, Cleggett, and Hurlburt, Cultural Diplomacy and The National Interest.
Cultural diplomacy, the mechanism of public diplomacy at the other end of the continuum, employs the “expression and exchange of ideas, information, and people” through “educational, professional, and arts exchanges.” Represented in the lower tier of the triangle, cultural diplomacy certainly fits within the sphere of public diplomacy, but is distinct from government information programs (i.e. media diplomacy and strategic communication) in that it focuses less on promoting acceptance of policy through government media and public relations activities than on the use of a state’s culture to achieve its objective and is therefore much more implicated in national identity and operates as a “two-way communication process.”

Acknowledging that the practice is an instrument of diplomacy, Arndt underscores that “cultural diplomacy can

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141 Graphic by Alexander Hunt
only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interest."\textsuperscript{144}

But what makes this form of public diplomacy ‘cultural?’ Culture is notoriously one of the most difficult concepts in the human and social sciences to define, but it is nonetheless necessary to establish a working definition in order to better understand the concept of cultural diplomacy. For the purposes of this investigation, it may be most useful to build on Richard Arndt’s conceptualization of the term, which relies on an anthropological underpinning to describe it as “the complex of factors of mind and values which define a country or group,”\textsuperscript{145} who finds expression in artifacts, institutions, behaviors, and ideas. In practice, the group’s transmitted system of social organization may include what has been termed ‘high culture’ (e.g. visual arts, literature, theatre, dance, and music), but may also include ‘popular culture’ – that cultural activity which has a mass audience (e.g. sports) – or even professional and academic domains.

Cultural diplomacy has been viewed as an interactive communication enterprise that incorporates “efforts to project a nation’s image and values to other countries and peoples as well as to receive information and try to understand the culture, values, and images of other countries and their peoples.”\textsuperscript{146} Former deputy assistant director of the United States Information Agency Gifford Malone reinforced the importance of this aspect of the concept stating that “we must first understand the motives, culture, history, and psychology of the people with whom we wish to communicate and certainly their

\textsuperscript{144} Arndt, \textit{The First Resort of Kings}, xviii.
\textsuperscript{145} ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila, \textit{International Cultural Relations}, 1.
language” in order to better understand the environment in which international politics and foreign policy are being conducted.\(^{147}\)

In short, cultural diplomacy endeavors to engage in the arena of “low politics,” not just in the “great power settings” of statesmen, diplomats, and policymakers,\(^{148}\) in order to reach “international citizens on a personal rather than political level.”\(^{149}\) With publics generally skeptical of authority and governments often mistrusted,\(^{150}\) government policies can “lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others [and] attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce […] leverage.”\(^{151}\) In an effort to regain this legitimacy and credibility, states entrust agents from its civil society, private sector, or citizenry to transmit its message through the cultural filter using these non-state actors as a proxy in an attempt to transcend the elite-society barrier (see figure 5 below).\(^{152}\) This arms-length approach naturally requires states to surrender a certain amount of control over how the message is transmitted and received, but substitutes it with an increased level of legitimacy, rivaling that of international cultural relations between societal actors that is free of government influence (see figure 1 above).\(^{153}\)

\(^{147}\) Malone, Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication, 12.

\(^{148}\) Zalewski, “All These Theories and the Bodies Keep Piling Up.”

\(^{149}\) Grincheva, “U.S. Arts and Cultural Diplomacy,” 171.

\(^{150}\) Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 105.

\(^{151}\) Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 257, 267.

\(^{152}\) Nye emphasized this point, arguing that “it behooves governments to keep in the background and to work with private actors [who may] enjoy more trust than governments do, and though they are difficult to control, they can be useful channels of communication.” See Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 105.

\(^{153}\) Kennedy and Lucas, in “Enduring Freedom,” 315, argue that “the autonomy of the ‘private’ individual was nonetheless compromised as a diplomatic subject, and Kennan’s invocation of private American citizens banding together was a convenient fiction that glossed state propaganda as collective civic action.”
Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy’s scope include exchanges and programs that are either government-sponsored or administered by stand-alone entities with some degree of governance and funding links to national foreign ministries. The practice involves exchanges of a wide range of non-state practitioners and participants such as artists, musicians, athletes, speakers, writers, journalists, students, and academics who manifest their skills and project or promote their state’s traditions, values, ideologies, and other aspects of culture or identity.

The goals of these exchanges – implicit and explicit – are closely linked to the overarching objectives of diplomacy more broadly conceived. While many definitions in the literature stress the role of cultural diplomacy in fostering mutual understanding, there is an implicit implication that enhanced long-term relationships will shape the

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154 Graphic by Alexander Hunt
playing field, making it more conducive to foreign policy implementation, the advancement of vital national interests, and overall enhancement of national security.\textsuperscript{155} Former Secretary of State George Schultz’s analogy comparing diplomacy to gardening seems particularly applicable to cultural diplomacy: “You get the weeds out when they are small. You also build confidence and understanding. Then, when a crisis arises, you have a solid base from which to work.”\textsuperscript{156}

The practice seeks to harness the range of cultural elements within a society to influence foreigners in several ways: to have a positive view of a state, its people, culture, policies, and values; to improve cooperation with a state; to adjust the policies of foreign governments in a state’s favor; to induce political or cultural change abroad; and to prevent, manage, and prevail in conflicts with foreign adversaries.\textsuperscript{157} Due to the potentially reciprocal nature of cultural diplomacy, it is also “designed to encourage [citizens’] understanding of foreign cultures so as to lubricate international relations […], enhance cross-cultural communication, improves one’s intelligence capabilities, and understand foreign friends and adversaries, their intentions, and their capabilities.”\textsuperscript{158}

Having delineated its practitioners, target audience, scope, mode of communication, and objectives, it is now possible to conceive of cultural diplomacy as the diplomatic practice of a government to initiate the international deployment and exchange of ideas, values, and a wide range of manifestations of culture, targeting a wider foreign audience beyond elites alone, and carried out by non-state actors in

\textsuperscript{155} Lenczowski, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence and Integrated Strategy,” 7.
\textsuperscript{157} Lenczowski, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence and Integrated Strategy,” 7.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
support of the host government’s foreign policy objectives. The practice’s overarching aims of facilitating improved long-term relationships, improving the image and perception of the host country’s culture, and fostering mutual understanding ostensibly shape the playing field, ultimately advancing vital national interests and enhancing national security.

The chart below (figure 6) illustrates the unique characteristics of the two public diplomacy mechanisms.

**Figure 9: Two Mechanisms of Public Diplomacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Practitioners</th>
<th>Target Audience</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Modes of Communication</th>
<th>Examples in Practice</th>
<th>Advantages, Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Information or Media Diplomacy</td>
<td>Policy education, strategic communication, advocacy, communication, profile-raising</td>
<td>State actors</td>
<td>Wider public and elites</td>
<td>Short- and medium-term</td>
<td>Direct, one-way communication</td>
<td>Information programs such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Al Jazeera</td>
<td>Most direct transmission of policy information. Risk of messages being perceived as propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Diplomacy</td>
<td>Grassroots relationship-building, foreign public opinion shaping, encouraging state acceptance of policy through foreign grass-roots influence, eliciting foreign political change from the bottom</td>
<td>State-sponsored and state-supervised non-state actors (e.g., NGOs, students, artists, non-government agencies, etc.)</td>
<td>Wider Public</td>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Indirect, Two-way communication</td>
<td>Educational, Professional, and Cultural Exchanges such as Fulbright Program, YES, TechWomen, International Visitor Leadership Program, Arts Exchanges</td>
<td>Potentially strong soft power resource because most likely to be received as legitimate and credible. Risk of message distortion due to arms-length proxy actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acknowledging the difficulty in establishing a universally accepted definition of cultural diplomacy, this discussion is in no way meant to be regarded as the final word on what is, or is not, cultural diplomacy. Rather, drawing on the perspectives of the concept discussed above and on my own hands-on involvement in the field, the working definition of cultural diplomacy I have outlined provides a foundation on which it will be

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159 Graphic by Alexander Hunt
possible to build a better understanding of their rationale behind the foreign policy outcomes in the GWT. By exploring GWT decision making through the lens of Graham Allison’s three models of foreign policy analysis, the final chapter that follows seeks to uncover the logic behind these developments and understand their effect on strategic coherence of cultural diplomacy implementation as a component of grand strategy.
CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING POLICY DECISIONS IN THE GWT

4.1 Rational Policy Model

The origins of Allison’s Rational Policy Model (RP) are derived from variations on standard frames of references used by many analysts to explain the behavior of national governments. Under this conceptual model, decisions are made by governments treated as a unitary actor that examines a strategic problem and set of related goals, evaluates possible courses of action according to their relative cost and benefit, and then rationally selects the option that maximizing this utility.\textsuperscript{160}

As the discussion so far has revealed, a rational foreign policy response to the nascent ideological threat of Jihadist radicalism would be expected to include a deeper integration of cultural diplomacy efforts in grand strategy for two main reasons. First, ideational instruments of statecraft, such as cultural diplomacy, are cheaper than other tools of foreign policy in terms of both capital and human cost. Richmond argues that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism were consequences of Soviet contacts and exchanges with the United States, at a cost that was miniscule in comparison with expenditures for defense and intelligence over the same period of time.\textsuperscript{161} Spending levels on cultural diplomacy as a proportion of military spending (as illustrated in Figure 9) further substantiate this assertion.

Second, a cultural diplomacy strategy is acutely targeted at attracting and persuading ideological adversaries at the grassroots level – such as those at risk of succumbing to the threatening dogmas of radical Jihadists. The investigation above

\textsuperscript{160} Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
\textsuperscript{161} Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, XIV.
has shown that government elites not only perceived the GWT as a conflict rooted in ideologies, but also claimed to understand the utility of ideational tools in confronting such challenges. Condoleezza Rice heralded the importance of an integrated strategy in her 2004 address to the U.S. Institute of Peace:

> Our strategy must be comprehensive, because the challenge we face is greater and more complex than the threat. The victory of freedom in the Cold War was won only when the West remembered that values and security cannot be separated. The values of freedom and democracy -- as much, if not more, than economic power and military might -- won the Cold War. And those same values will lead us to victory in the war on terror.\(^\text{162}\)

The rhetoric surrounding the ideological nature of the threat and the recognition of the power ideational tools like cultural diplomacy possess to defeat it would suggest a regeneration of cultural diplomacy. But states are not always as committed to policy as they are in rhetoric, and the process tracing outlined in the previous chapters shows that the actual policy responses to the GWT defied this logic. The USG failed to adapt to the non-state ideological threat posed by the GWT and pursue deeper integration of ideational tools of statecraft such as cultural diplomacy. Government leaders essentially overlooked national interests, failing to take the course of action that maximized their utility. As such, the RP Model cannot convincingly explain the puzzling GWT policy decisions.

### 4.2 Organizational Process Model

The first alternative model Allison offers operates under the assumption that government leaders, when faced with a crisis, break down the threat into thematic

\(^{162}\) Rice, “Address on War on Terror.”
elements and delegate each function to pre-established organizational structures.\textsuperscript{163} His Organizational Process Model (OP) is based on two propositions. The primary precept of this model asserts that due to the time and resources required to mobilize action within a large governmental bureaucracy, a nation’s actions are limited, and the final outcome is often dictated by pre-existing repertoires or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).\textsuperscript{164} Considering that government leaders during the Cold War turned to the tactics employed to combat the spread of Fascism in the interwar period as standard operating procedures to be adapted in the fight against the Soviet threat, this aspect of the OP model leads to preliminary expectations of a similar response to the emerging threat of the GWT given the successful track record of cultural diplomacy efforts in defeating the anti-American ideologies proffered by the Soviet Union. Organizational routines were impeded, however, due the low resources for cultural diplomacy that prevailed at the beginning of the GWT, having been stripped leading up the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Furthermore, the sense of urgency in addressing the national security threat applied additional constraints dictating which SOPs would be implemented.

The model’s second proposition, building on the first, postulates that rather than making policy decisions that maximize their utility in the long run, government leaders settle on the solution proposed by government bodies that limits short-term uncertainty and adequately address the issue. In effect, a combination of inadequate interagency coordination and lack of competent leadership coupled with misperceptions about the target audience and how to exert influence on it restricted the government’s inability to

\textsuperscript{163} Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 698.
adapt quickly to the complexities of the new terrorist threat. The result was incoherent cultural diplomacy strategies, which in turn created a vacuum in U.S. grand strategy to be filled by military tactics at the Pentagon. According to Brad Minnick, former director of the Office of International Visitors, “the dissolution of the USIA left the USG without a coherent strategy [to combat the GWT], and public diplomacy initiatives ended up spread across the various branches of government.”

Former President of the National Council for International Visitors, Sherry Mueller, reiterated that cultural diplomacy is no longer centralized, so “policy is more fragmented by definition” and people managing cultural diplomacy programs are “scattered across the government.”

One government official intimately involved in cultural diplomacy during the GWT estimated that “the guiding force of cultural diplomacy had changed as a result of consolidation. By bringing [USIA] into the department, they diluted the cultural side with the press or information side.” The U.S. Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy also pointed to institutional ineffectiveness asserting that the consolidation “marked the end of a formal cultural policy and the beginning of a retreat from the war of ideas raging around the world.”

The frequent turnover of leadership at the Office of Public Diplomacy – the seat of which sat empty for nearly a year and a half throughout the Bush administration – further explains this retreat from cultural diplomacy. The position of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was first filled by Madison Avenue advertising executive Charlotte Beers who, during her tenure of just over one year,

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165 Minnick, Telephone Interview.
166 Mueller, Skype Interview.
167 US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview.
168 Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, 8.
approached the conflict as a communications issue rather than a relationship problem. In an effort to produce short-term results, preliminary public diplomacy efforts were characterized by a preference for public relations over cultural diplomacy. To sell the brand of America and the GWT itself to the Muslim world, she oversaw the production of documentaries on Muslims in America for distribution abroad. But "American values cannot be sold overseas in the manner of a consumer product"\textsuperscript{169} because public diplomacy that "appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection is unlikely to succeed."\textsuperscript{170}

Keeping focus on the form rather than the content of the message, Beers also oversaw the dismantling of Voice of America Arabic language service, launching in its place two new media outlets – Radio Sawa, an Arabic-language radio station and Alhurra, a satellite television news channel – as well as a set of minor exchange programs. Widely accepted as propaganda\textsuperscript{171} and deemed ineffective, all three new initiatives were largely suspended by 2006. As one public diplomacy official put it, "informing the Muslim audience was done through media rather than cultural programs."\textsuperscript{172} Senator Richard Lugar understood the fallacy of applying an advertising approach to public diplomacy rather than focusing on relationship-building strategies like cultural diplomacy. At a hearing on public diplomacy and Islam, he observed: "The missing ingredient in American public diplomacy between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks was not advertising cleverness. It was a firm commitment by the American people and the American leadership to all the painstaking work required

\textsuperscript{170} Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 102.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{172} US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview.
to build lasting relationships overseas and advance our visions of fairness and opportunity.”

The successor appointee to the seat, Margaret Tutwiler, left her post after only a few months to accept a Wall Street offer. Karen Hughes, the third director to oversee the office, received mixed reception in her travels in the Arabian Peninsula, some resenting her presumptuous proselytizing of American values. These initial public diplomacy efforts suggest that the Bush public diplomacy team was poorly led and displayed only a superficial understanding of its audience. One diplomat argued that “in the Cold War, there was a freestanding agency and a known entity to counter a Soviet message,” while in the GWT] there was a struggle to define the ideology, the adversary, the vision, and the public diplomacy goal.

Ultimately, the constraints posed by the lack of interagency coordination and poor leadership left decision-makers incapable of seriously considering the long-term strategy of cultural diplomacy, instead settling on solutions they deemed adequately addressed the issue in the immediate-term. Brad Minnick acknowledged that “some policymakers during the GWT felt that cultural diplomacy was just fluff and that it lacked an ability to demonstrate instant results” given its limitation as a long-term strategy. One government official contended that “Washington…as an entity…their immediate focus is on what’s going on right now. So exchange programs with long-term goals

175 US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview.
176 Minnick, Telephone Interview.
didn’t receive as much support. Cultural diplomacy was never really at the top of the equation.”

“As a consequence, considering its function of minimizing immediate uncertainty surrounding national security, the prompt military reaction to the September 11 attacks was reasoned to be “the most appropriate of the programs in a previously developed repertoire,” thus becoming the primary component of U.S. grand strategy. Yet misperceptions of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its network led government leaders to wage military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan based on the basis of state enemies. The decision to invade Iraq delivered dubious connections to GWT strategic goals, and the increased hatred the invasion spurred in the Muslim world ultimately thwarting these goals. Not until the final year of the Bush Administration, when the government accelerated its targeting drone strikes on al Qaeda leaders, was the military tool of statecraft effectively targeted at non-state enemies, normative judgments about the practices aside.

A flawed understanding of the nature of the threat also led to a failure to recognize that cultural diplomacy tools are expressly suited to win over adversaries bred in a seedbed of hatred stoked at the grassroots level. As a cultural diplomat put it, policymakers didn’t “have a depth of understanding of why [cultural diplomacy

177 US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview.
178 US Diplomat 2, Personal Interview.
179 Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 702.
180 According to the Pew Research Global Attitudes report, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power,” majorities surveyed in many Muslim nations opposed U.S. anti-terrorism efforts and did not believe the GWT was a sincere effort, but rather a “smokescreen to hide the real objectives, such as gaining control of Middle Eastern oil, targeting unfriendly Muslim governments, protecting Israel, and dominating the world.”
181 “Drone Strikes Killed High-value Targets, US Tells Pakistan.”
programs] might be beneficial.” Once it became clear that the war in Afghanistan would not be an economical or instant victory, but rather the GWT would be a long-term ideological battle, one would expect policymakers to turn to other repertoires of statecraft such as cultural diplomacy according to SOPs employed in the Cold War context. Yet, as the terrorist threat evolved, the “limited flexibility and incremental change” emphasized by the OP model help explain the constraints on policymakers to properly refashion the Cold War cultural diplomacy apparatus with the new target in mind or to regenerate cultural diplomacy at levels proportionate to the threat posed by the global threat of Islamic radicalism. Considering the procedural restraints on policymakers’ decision-making, the OP model provides a partially elucidatory framework to explain the heavy emphasis on military tactics over ideational tools like cultural diplomacy in fighting the GWT.

4.3 Bureaucratic Politics Model

The final conceptual model Allison developed regards government actions as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders. While this model takes into consideration first image factors such as personal interest and background, it accepts that governmental behavior does not presuppose intention by any individual or group according. Rather, “What moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course of action, nor the routines of organization which enact an alternative,

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182 US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview.
183 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report termed the GWT ‘the long war’ similar to the Cold War in that it was not fought by military means alone nor were they dominant in US strategy. Also, in his 2008 State of the Union address, President Bush insisted that “We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the twenty-first century.” See Angstrom, “Mapping the Competing Historical Analogies of the War on Terrorism,” 236.
184 Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the actions in question.”

What follows are the primary claims put forth by this model as they apply to the GWT case.

First, this theoretical framework contends that a leader – even one with absolute power such as the commander-in-chief – ideally gains consensus within his or her inner circle to avoid having an order misunderstood or ignored, or having opponents take advantage of infighting. Given that many independent bodies along with practically every branch of government in the 2000s called for increased cultural diplomacy efforts, and yet top leaders did not heed their unanimous advice, this aspect of the Bureaucratic Politics Model does not explain why cultural diplomacy was “relegated to the sidelines of foreign policy, making it effectively impotent.”

A theoretical proposition related to the first is that a leader with enough conviction about a policy decision will not seek input from advisors, but approval. As such, advisors seeking to exercise influence on policy outcomes must operate within the framework of the decision made by the leader. Ultimately, a “decision has critical consequences not only for the strategic problem, but for each player’s organizational, reputational, and personal stakes.”

Minnick characterized the post-9/11 culture in Washington up until the mid-2000s as being fraught with fear of appearing “soft on terrorism” and failing to realize that “you cannot use muscle alone,” instead perceiving the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a proportionate and adequate response to attacks on U.S. soil, in spite of the fact that the perpetrators of 9/11 were unaffiliated with a

\[185\] Ibid., 707.

\[186\] see footnote 18

\[187\] Walt, “In the National Interest.”

\[188\] Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 710.
foreign national government. He added that, although “there was genuine interest, support, and appreciation for public diplomacy [...] on both the Republican and Democrat side, [...] funding decisions didn’t reflect that personal interest and appreciation for public diplomacy because tradeoffs had to be made.” Hence, officials allowed Bush to make what they considered unwise moves because of concerns over political backlash due to the general public support for a unilateral military response as a reprisal for the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. In short, moderate decision-makers feared a loss of political capital as the only recompense for incorporating ideational tools of statecraft such as cultural diplomacy into a grand strategy to confront a national security threat as tangible as terrorism.

Finally, according to the BP model, the composition of a leader’s entourage will have a significant impact on policy outcomes. Substantiating this claim, neoconservatives and liberal hawks at the top, such as Richard Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Kenneth Adelman, Paula Dobriansky, Lewis Libby, and many other “unipolarist” defense policy intellectuals in the administration were able to drown out the moderate voices who were calling for deeper integration of cultural diplomacy into the grand strategy, which they saw as “insufficient to the task of defending either national or universal human interests.” A diplomat privy to the debates surrounding the issue confirmed that:

In the run-up to the Iraq war, we had a team of retired diplomats with their war-time plan in place, [but] the Defense Department did away with the public diplomacy action plan. No doubt that following 9/11, there was a shift in funding to the Defense Department. We got a lot of blowback from the Hill because they considered cultural diplomacy

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189 Minnick, Telephone Interview.
190 Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
initiatives a waste of money. The military became more prominent [while] an ideological approach was lacking.\textsuperscript{192}

Not only did these leaders see a policy of containment as no longer necessary in a unipolar world, they regarded deterrence as an immoral refusal to challenge a dangerous regime.\textsuperscript{193} The attacks in 2001 offered the promoters of neoconservative foreign policy the opportunity to reclaim America’s hegemony, asserting that “an aggressive foreign policy that promotes the spread of America’s central values represents the only legitimate path to winning the war on terror and preserving American identity.”\textsuperscript{194} Minnick put it more simply, asserting that “In the Bush administration, there was an effort to go after the bad guys. But cultural diplomacy is not targeted at the bad guys, but the good guys who could go bad.”\textsuperscript{195} Ultimately, as “the Bush administration saw a continuation of power and influence moving towards the Pentagon,”\textsuperscript{196} preferences by hawkish leaders for military tools of statecraft designed for a state enemy lead to a heavy reliance on them in the grand strategy to fight the GWT. In short, the United States was left to wage a largely one-dimensional war on terror\textsuperscript{197} while the “waning of American cultural presence abroad left a gap in public perception eagerly filled by those with political agendas diametrically at odds with the United States – particularly extremists in the Islamic world.”\textsuperscript{198}

Having tested each of Graham Allison’s models of foreign policy analysis, my investigation has shown that the surprising grand strategy formulated in the GWT in the

\textsuperscript{192} US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview.
\textsuperscript{193} Noon, “Cold War Revival,” 93.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{195} Minnick, Telephone Interview.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 20.
\textsuperscript{198} Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, 8.
face of an ideological struggle analogous to the Cold War is inexplicable using the Rational Actor theoretical framework. Rather, the Organizational Process Model offers factors related to procedural constraints inherent in governmental structures and a deep misunderstanding of the opponent to explain the government’s inability to adapt the Cold War cultural diplomacy apparatus to the GWT context. Alternatively, first image factors surrounding the hawkish personal interests of top leadership, represented in Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics framework, are instructive in accounting for the unidimensional grand strategy cultivated in the Bush Administration to fight terrorism with “the mailed fist and the mailed fist alone”\(^\text{199}\) rather than through a deeper integration of ideational tools such as cultural diplomacy.

\(^{199}\) Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 17.
CONCLUSION

The present study set out to investigate the reasons why Bush-era policymakers developed a grand strategy that emphasized military tools of statecraft over ideational ones in the face of an emerging war of ideas comparable to the battle against communist ideology during the Cold War. The contribution of this investigation lies in its intensive analysis of grand strategy formation in the GWT, addressing a gap in the literature through an assessment of cultural diplomacy from a political science perspective.

The conflicts examined were particularly illustrative of an empirical puzzle given the elite consensus that both conflicts constituted long-term ideological battles with global reach, the growing pleas for deeper integration of ideational tools of statecraft such as cultural diplomacy, and the historical record of the successful cultural diplomacy efforts as a substantial component of grand strategy in defeating the ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union. Applying Graham Allison’s three models of foreign policy analysis to the GWT allowed for a deeper understanding of the rationale behind the decision-making process of policy-makers to justify changes in cultural diplomacy policy in the United States. Closer examination of the empirical data revealed that factors related to institutional mismanagement, misperceptions about the nature of the adversary, and personal ideologies of the political leadership who succeeded in wielding influence over the formation of grand strategy have the explanatory power to clarify the puzzling policy decisions.

Testing Allison’s alternative models was particularly challenging in light of the limited access to data due to the classified nature of many internal government
documents as well as the difficulty in garnering valuable information about internal bargaining from interviews of government elites, who may have been wary of sharing sensitive or potentially incriminating information. Allison himself accepted the criticism that the massive amount of information needed to apply these theories makes a thorough interpretation of decision-making difficult. Yet, he also maintained that this limitation does not justify a regression back to a parochial rational actor perspective. Following the declassification of official documents from the GWT period, additional research could further contribute to this investigation.

The findings of this research suggest that ideological adversaries who threaten national security and vital state interests demand a proportionate response using tools of statecraft specifically designed to target such threats head on. The policy implications of this discussion should be clear. In order to develop a more effective and diversified grand strategy that better integrates cultural diplomacy efforts to combat Islamic extremism as well as future ideological adversaries, future administrations can make significant progress toward winning the war of ideas in the following ways. First, a revitalized cultural diplomacy effort demands a substantially bolstered budget. Funding of similar proportions to defense spending during the Cold War would ensure a more integrated and diversified grand strategy. Second, to overcome inefficiencies arising from woeful interagency cooperation, the reconstitution of an agency resembling the USIA, whose sole mission is to lead the cultural diplomacy efforts, is an essential element of any serious improvement to America’s soft power tools of statecraft. Finally, stronger leadership of American cultural diplomacy efforts would help overcome deficiencies in performance.
The United States cannot win every heart and mind in ideological struggles such as the GWT. But it is crucial that it move away from a one-dimensional commitment to the military tools of statecraft and instead rely more heavily on ideational instruments such as cultural diplomacy in developing an effective grand strategy.
APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Tools of Statecraft\(^{200}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomatic</th>
<th>Psychological/Ideational</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Conventional heads of state negotiation | • Public Diplomacy including information programs and cultural, educational, and professional exchanges  
• Military psychological operations  
• Coercive diplomacy | • Trade  
• Aid  
• Sanctions  
• Military stabilization  
• Reconstruction | • Military Action  
• Covert Operations |

\(^{200}\) Adapted from Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy in the Post-September 11 World,” 240.
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