The place of the Roman Catholic Church in civil resistance in Poland and Brazil (1979-1985): bystander or facilitator?

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Abstract

The 20th century has been rich in social movements aimed at eliminating state oppression. No surprise, a profound research has been done in order to reveal and systemize key facilitating factors, explain the core mechanisms and define the actors. Yet, a significant gap can still be observed in this filed, as the role of the Roman Catholic Church seems to be generally overlooked in academia. As argued in this paper, based on comparative historical analysis of Freedom and Peace movement in Poland and the CEBs movement in Brazil (1979-1985), the Roman Catholic Church as a social institution appears to be one of the most relevant facilitating factors that unite civil resistance movements from different parts of the world. First, it frames the scope of the movement and brings in the key unifying idea, Liberation Theology and Second Vatican Principles. Second, the Vatican shares its own mobilizing structure, i.e. prior social networks, its premises and facilities, necessary for the social groups to mobilize. Finally, the Roman Catholic Church helps to create an alternative social space in which civil resistance can develop freely and independently from the state. Thus, the thesis is mainly targeted at drawing more attention to the role of the Catholic Church in initiating and facilitating social movements, aimed at eliminating institutionalized oppression, in different parts of the world.
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Introduction

Rediscovering civil resistance

For quite a long period of time, the Church has been widely regarded as a religious organization with its own interests and preferences isolated from the rest of the secular world. Moreover, the general understanding of its social role has been significantly limited to its religious nature and mission. Thus, the role of the Church, as a social institution, facilitating civil resistance, here understood as “actions involving consciousness, collective action, and direct challenges to structures of power,”\(^1\) has been seriously overlooked.

The Church had always been clear in defining its position, in Poland and Brazil in particular. During the Second World War, right after the liberation and the so-called Soviet occupation, the Polish Episcopate played its active part in cultivating national sentiments and spreading liberation ideas. When the martial law was imposed in 1981-1983, the Church was standing by its advents. Meanwhile in Brazil, since 1964, the Roman Catholic Church was fiercely resisting the oppressive regime and supporting citizens in fighting for their rights. Having completed a huge path from a conservative stand (1964-1971) towards the radical sentiments of the Liberation Church based on Marxist ideals (1972-1980) and finally regaining the power of a guide and facilitator (1980-1985), the Roman Catholic enjoyed exceptional authority among the representatives of all social strata, used it in supporting the oppressed and facilitating resistance. Yet, the role of the Church has been greatly underestimated by scholars mainly focusing on “Solidarity”\(^2\) and leftist resistance in Brazil, while ignoring Church-initiated movements.\(^3\)

Thus, it is worth analyzing the most prominent approaches to civil resistance, such as relative deprivation, group self-actualization, resource mobilization and political process, the idea of “political vacuum” in particular, and discover why they fail to fully explain the cases presented in this research. Finally, an alternative hypothesis highlighting the agency-based role of the Church, as the key agent affecting civil resistance, will be proposed and some particular facilitating mechanisms will be investigated.

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To begin with, the deprivation theory⁴ argues that “social movements originate and develop among people who find themselves deprived of some material goods or resources and social benefits.”⁵ Their disadvantageous position, often forces them to participate in protests which serve a perfect tool for drawing public attention to their grievances. According to these theory, bottom-up resistance triggered by “discontent as a motivating state, for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response”⁶ would be enough for the movement to shape and develop. For instance, in Poland and Brazil in late 70s - early 80s widely-spread dissatisfaction was supposed to lead to massive uprisal in a matter of a few months. However, only when the Church got involved and provided the movements with ideological and resource bases, in both cases resistance received a fresh impetus. Thus, massive discontent and understanding of “overall discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities”⁷ is not enough, unless the principal agent contributes to facilitating the movement. Thus, significant attention should be paid to the question of agency and the Church as a potential facilitation agent contributing to resistance development in different parts of the world.

Since in late 90s the deprivation theory did not seem to be in demand, Ingrid Laas⁸ established a theory which combined the idea of relative deprivation and the concept of self-actualization introduced by Maslow⁹ in early 1960s, further developed by Daniels¹⁰ and Geller.¹¹ Maslow characterized self-actualizing people as devoted individuals who, first, “tend to be involved in something outside of themselves,”¹² second, search for the so-called “meta-needs”¹³ such as freedom, rights for expression, self-fulfillment and equal opportunities. Thus, Laas was first to coin the concept of “group self-actualization”¹⁴ and apply it to the community. She extended the old theories by proposing a totally new perspective according to which the self-actualization process can be developed within a group deprived of basic rights and freedoms.

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⁶ Gurr, p. 1104
⁷ Ibid., p. 1105
⁹ Abraham Maslow, “Actualization and Beyond”, New England Board of Higher Education Winchester, Masscenter for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults, 1965
¹² Maslow, p.110
¹³ Ibid., p.111
¹⁴ Ibid., p.78
First, Laas claimed the primary importance of a “freedom of expression versus suppression of expression”\(^{15}\) as the basis for unifying different people. Second, self-actualization is frequently based on promoting plurality of views and beliefs. No overarching idea should be blindly accepted by the society, as Laas puts it: “people before ideology rather than ideology before people.”\(^{16}\) Third, the opposition between state dominance and social liberation constitutes the core of group self-actualization: through discovering new ideas the group can develop its own understanding of social reality,\(^{17}\) justice and freedom, thus, determine its own future. Yet, it would be premature to claim that self-actualization is possible without a facilitation agent – the actor responsible for shaping the idea, providing resources for its performance and development. In this respect, the Roman Catholic Church is quite capable of coping with this role.

Further on, let me focus on a group of authors, John D. McCarthy, Mayer Zald\(^{18}\), Charles Tilly and Doug McAdam,\(^{19}\) and their “resource mobilization theory”\(^{20}\). This approach emphasizes the importance of resources in social movement facilitation: media, knowledge, money, labor, legitimacy, and power elite support.\(^{21}\) The authors argue that it is only possible for social movements to develop if resources are mobilized. The key arguments succeed in explaining ultimate success which the oppressed manage to achieve when others fail. Nevertheless, McCarthy and Zald have been heavily criticized for their biased focus on financial resources and relative disregard for the agency. Meanwhile, in the “political process” theory McAdam adds several crucial factors which facilitate movements: (1) discontent, (2) potential participants and activists, (4) collective identity, (5) leadership, (6) social movement organizations, NGO-s, social institutions\(^{22}\) and (7) “opportunity structures.”\(^{23}\) Among them it is extremely important to distinguish the concept of “political vacuum or power vacuum,”\(^{24}\) elaborated by Charles Tilly,\(^{25}\) Eisinger and Theda Skocpol.\(^{26}\) Charles Tilly was first to emphasize the importance of free space between the state and people. The author claims that

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p.80  
\(^{16}\) Ibid  
\(^{17}\) Geller, p.69  
\(^{19}\) Mario Diani, Doug McAdam, Social movements and networks, Oxford University Press, 2003  
\(^{20}\) Davis Gerald, Doug McAdam, Scott W. Richard, and Zald N. Mayer (eds.), Social Movements and Organizations, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005  
\(^{21}\) McCarthy, Zald, p.534  
\(^{22}\) Diani, McAdam, p.488  
\(^{23}\) McCarthy, Zald, p.560  
protest or further-developed civil resistance occurs when there is “a space of toleration” on the part of the regime which stays oppressive but cannot narrow down resistance potentialities. Such state of affairs seems to be a perfect incubator for a political vacuum.

As has already been mentioned, Theda Skocpol explicitly focused on the concept of a political vacuum by which she implied “incapacities of states to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic circumstances,” in other words the state faces a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of its own population. In this respect, a “political vacuum” may be characterized by challenges the state faces when trying to maintain domestic order, lack of organizational resources, lack of support from economic and military elite, inability to shape “strategies and policies…which precipitate political elites from mobilizing their own potentials for autonomous action.” Moreover, one should not ignore the other three crucial factors: unprofessional and corrupt government cadres, the lack of societal control and inability “to get citizens’ illnesses cured…” As Dix persuasively argues, political vacuum is more likely to emerge within the scope of narrowly-based dictatorships, whether they are based on military power or hierarchical bureaucratic machinery. Finally, the more vulnerable the government is, the more aggressive, sporadic and inconsistent its policy becomes.

One of the key advantages of the theory is that it explains the origin of practically any civil resistance movement while revealing how some groups have the insurgent consciousness and resources to mobilize, but lack political opportunities. However, Tilly, McAdam and others seem to mainly focus on political regime, resources and opportunities as the key facilitation factors and underestimate the importance of social institutions and civil organizations, their agency power in particular. Let alone the fact that the Church has not been mentioned at all and its active role seems to stay overboard.

27 Charles Tilly, 1978 p. 14
28 Ibid, p.36
29 Skocpol, 1985, p.9
32 Skocpol, 1985, p.14
34 Skocpol, 1986, p.138
36 Ibid., p.445
37 Ibid, p.437
38 D. McAdam, Tarrow S, Tilly C, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge University Press, 2001
Therefore, among key facilitation and development factors one may distinguish “top-down factors”, i.e. political opportunities, including political vacuum and regime vulnerability, and “bottom-up factors” which imply the level of social engagement and self-actualization. Yet, all these factors fail to demonstrate how in two states, with different levels of social participation and resiliency of political regimes, civil resistance is facilitated. Moreover, these theoretical frameworks allocate undeservingly little space to the role of social institutions as the key facilitation agents, not to mention the Church which seems to be neglected.

**Research Question**

Careful observation of these trends in the academia leads to the question: how does the Roman Catholic Church, as a social institution, facilitate civil resistance movements, aimed at terminating institutionalized government oppression in societies with significant differences in socio-political backgrounds? What are the key mechanisms it applies? These questions have been poorly explored in the academic literature devoted to the Church’s position both in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Indeed, two main directions in exploring the role of the Church have been established. The first one is presented by Peter Houtzager, Ulrich Schneckener, Jose-Maria Ghio, Pomian-Srzednicki, Ronald Monticone who predominantly focus on Church-State relations. They explore strong and weak sides of both actors and the key strategies aimed at strengthening influence among the public. This block of literature emphasizes the equal stance of both institutions and the general tendency towards competition for public support. Meanwhile, the second group of scholars explores the Church’s position regarding civil resistance and revolutionary actions from two opposite perspectives: noninterference and demonstration of socio-political affiliations, usually involving overall support for revolutions.

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41 Jose-Maria Ghio, “The Latin American Church and the Popacy of Wojtyla,” The Right and Democracy in Latin America, ed. D. Chalmers, Maria de Souza, Atilio Boron, the Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies, 1992
and non-violent resistance to the ruling regime.\textsuperscript{46} In this context the Church serves as an external actor who takes only radical stances, thus either ignores or supports social movements. Hence, both approaches consider the Church to be either a powerful socio-political or purely religious actor performing at the state level. However, many scholars seem to neglect the selectiveness with which the Church chooses it potential beneficiaries, i.e. movements in need of support. Moreover, the authors tend to overlook the Church’s role as a civil resistance facilitator and the mechanisms it applies. Thus, this paper intends to shed light on these issues and demonstrate how the Church contributes to organizing and developing social movements.

\textbf{Poland and Brazil: case-study and case-selection}

A comparative case study approach based on historical analysis of civil resistance movements is used in this research. Two perspectives are analyzed: the peak of the Church’s involvement in the civil resistance movement in Poland (1979-1985), later developed in the manifesto of the Freedom and Peace Movement, 1985 (WiP) and civil resistance in Brazil during the period of 1979-1985. This historical period enables us to focus on key mobilizing factors which manifest themselves when the Church participates actively in the above-mentioned events. Comparative case study, according to W. Scott,\textsuperscript{47} seems to be the most preferable method due to the following reasons. It sheds light on the early development of social movements and different forms of social institutions which play the key role in the formation of civil resistance. By analyzing both cases, I avoid any possible bias of a single case study\textsuperscript{48} and broaden the scope of further research. Moreover, comparing two different cases contributes to understanding social and political outcomes of resistance movements and necessary conditions for their formation.

The case selection is based on the “most-likely” or “crucial-case” method, first proposed by Harry Eckstein. He described the crucial case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity.”\textsuperscript{49} Indeed, both cases represent the most prominent examples of the Church activity as a potential tool for social modifications and democratic transformations in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Indeed, both movements in Poland and Brazil can be characterized as the most prominent cases demonstrating how resistance is developed in typical authoritarian societies with an overwhelming Church’s authority. The selection criteria include: the authoritarian regime in both states, rich history of Church-state and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Jan Kubik, \textit{The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power}, The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland, The Pennsylvania State University, 1994
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p.351
\item \textsuperscript{49} H. Eckstein, \textit{Case studies and theory in political science}, In F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of political science, Political science: Scope and theory (Vol. 7, pp. 94-137), Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975, p.118
\end{itemize}
Church–people relations, the level of public trust in the Church. In no other Latin American or Eastern European country which experienced bottom-up socio-political changes, the Church engaged in active participation to such a high extent as in Poland and Brazil in late 70s – early 80s. Although the Church was present, it to stay detached which very frequently contributed to the defeat of the movements as it happened in Hungary in 1956. Finally, I avoid geographical bias by choosing states from different parts of the world and analyze the most prominent cases to demonstrate the Church’s power.

However, it should be noted that the “most-likely cases” method might well lead to the selection bias which, according to Gary King and Sidney Verba, raises distinctive issues in analyses that focus on extreme cases. For the case-study the risk lies in overestimating the importance of causal paths, involving what Alexander L. George called “complexification based on extreme cases.” The only way to avoid this research pitfall will be to construct a clear research path and justify the selection of cases.

Thus, I, first, apply the system of top-down and bottom-up factors as they demonstrate key differences in both movements. To begin with, the movements were developing in different political backgrounds. Political opportunity or a “power vacuum,” was present in the Polish case, while in Brazil the military dictatorship had little power and control in the 1970-1980-s. The Freedom and Peace movement in Poland was developing under the so-called “puppet government” patronized by the Soviet Union. In contrast, the oppressive regime in Brazil was a self-sufficient and independent machine exercising ultimate power throughout the state. Furthermore, the social participation levels among people in both states appear to differ considerably. In Poland civil self-actualization, was sporadic but more widely spread than in Brazil, where the level of social participation and engagement of the opposition was lower but tolerated by the government. Having analyzed different political and social backgrounds in both states, I, later on, demonstrate how the Roman Catholic Church influences both movements.

The data for the case studies comes from primary sources of two major types. First, the archival materials include official documents, notes and recollections such as: Brazilian Catholic

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52 The Sickness of Law - Speech by Jan Maria Rokita at the International Human Rights Conference, Krakow August 24-28, 1989
53 Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, p.167
54 Osa Maryjane, Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition, University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p.33
Church activists’ memoirs, Polish Catholic priests’ and cardinals’ diaries, speeches, manifestoes, Radio Free Europe records and research reports available at the Open Society Archives. The research paper mainly focuses on several types of documents: the speeches of John Paul II and the clergymen, Radio Free Europe Research and Situation Reports and personal correspondence for the period of 1979-1985. These sources provide a unique opportunity to trace the process of social resistance facilitation. The archival data represent the role the Catholic Church used to play and contains particular comments on how the Church framed the unifying idea, what mobilizing resources were provided. Finally, through these data I discover if there was any particular plan to be utilized by the Catholic Church or it simply supported its own advents.

The second primary source combines two levels of interviewing: internet-based surveys (here understood as “a predetermined set of questions that is given to a sample”\textsuperscript{56}) and semi-structured interviews, defined, according to Jennifer Mason, as a research tool with a “flexible and fluid structure…containing themes or areas to be covered during the course of the interview.”\textsuperscript{57} Due to the time scarcity I am planning to interview the representatives of the Polish Catholic Church. Thus, in order to preserve the balance of accessing primary resources, the Brazilian case will be mainly represented by the archival materials.

The key goals of using internet-based surveys and interviews in this project may be characterized as, first, an attempt to trace the process of civil resistance facilitation, in Poland from 1979-1985, in particular. Second, former participants may help to what particular role the Church assigns to itself during the targeted period. This combined method integrates certain advantages from both levels of interviewing. First, surveying enables the researcher to contact respondents from all over the world, thus overcome some geographical obstacles. Second, it helps to group questions and distinguish particular aspects of the topic. Third, interviewing provides the opportunity to get an exclusive insight into respondents’ perceptions by analyzing their verbal and non-verbal reactions.\textsuperscript{58}

\section*{Research outline and Limitations}

Within the scope of this research, it is vital to acknowledge its limitations. First, this paper does not claim that the Church is the only key movement facilitator, but a more relevant and crucial one. Indeed, the power of its mobilization, facilitation and organization resources can’t be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{57} J. Mason, "\textit{Mixing methods in a qualitatively driven way},” Qualitative Research, London, 2006
  \item \textsuperscript{58} N. Newton, \textit{The use of semi-structured interviews in qualitative research: strengths and weaknesses}, 2010, \url{http://www.academia.edu/1561689/The_use_of_semi-structured_interviews_in_qualitative_research_strengths_and_weaknesses} (Accessed, March 1, 2013)
\end{itemize}
denied. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church has proved to have an exclusive authority among regular people and power institutions. Second, the importance of other mobilization factors is not denied; however, in these two cases the Church manifests itself as a highly effective social institution capable of competing with the government for the authority and legitimacy among the public. Third, I intentionally do not focus on Church-state relations as this topic has been substantially investigated, key trends discovered and analyzed. Yet, the models of cooperation between people and the Roman Catholic Church have been undeservingly neglected. i.e. not enough research has been done in this field.

The paper analyzes how the Church as a social institution facilitates civil resistance movements. The first chapter presents a comparative analysis of military dictatorship in Brazil and the authoritarian regime in Poland. It focuses on the extent of “political vacuum” in both states. Further on, the level of “self-actualization” in both states is explained. Finally, the main hypothesis based on Church-people relations is presented. The second chapter addresses the apogee of the Church’s involvement in civil resistance in Poland and Brazil (1979-1985). I demonstrate how the fundamental ideas of the future Freedom and Peace (WiP) and CEBs movements were framed, the mobilizing structure was provided and the alternative social space was shaped. The paper concludes with some final remarks.
Chapter 1. State and Society in civil resistance: key factors or contextual differences?

As has been stated in the theoretical chapter two main perspectives on civil resistance, have been dominating in the academia: the effect of a political vacuum and the role of self-actualization or, in other words, the presence of the opposition, its involvement in socio-political affairs. Despite a profound research demonstrating the crucial role of the above-mentioned factors, still it is highly arguable that unstable political regime and a high level of civil engagement alone can play a significant role in civil resistance facilitation. This chapter discusses different political and social backgrounds in Poland and Brazil in 1979-1985, such as the nature and stability of the regime and the level of self-actualization. Remarkably, despite these key differences, not only did civil resistance emerge in both states, but was actively facilitated.

1.1 Political vacuum in Poland and Brazil: weak states or new opportunities?

To begin with, applying the political vacuum theory on two cases in Poland and Brazil might lead to general reconsideration of the role of a political vacuum in facilitating protest movements. The following section uses the concept of a political vacuum as a prominent characteristic of a socio-political context in which civil resistance was developing in both states.

**Weak statehood in Poland?**

In one of his articles Richard Spielman characterized the situation in Poland as “an unspeakable tragedy: citizens are in anguish and without political hope; its rulers are cornered, hated and incapable of anything but repression. Stalemate reigns, disaster looms.” 59 Indeed, in late 1970s - early 1980s the Polish society was facing a huge power legitimacy crisis: the state was unable to fulfill its former pledges, the pressure from Soviet Russia was hard to cope with, the economic situation was becoming more disturbing, the young population was suffocating from a lack of basic civil rights. 60

In the late 70s negative sentiments were dominating. The Communist power in Poland was imposed and artificially maintained by the Soviet Union. 61 Both cabinets headed by Edward

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59 R. Spielman, “Crisis in Poland”, Foreign Policy, No. 49, Winter, 1982-1983, p. 21
60 Bronislaw Misztal, “Between the State and Solidarity: One Movement, Two Interpretations - The Orange Alternative Movement in Poland”, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1992
61 William R. Avery, “Political Legitimacy and Crisis in Poland”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 1, Spring, 1988
Gierek and, subsequently, Wojciech Jaruzelski demonstrated their high dependency on the SU Communist Party. There were several spheres in which the ruling regime demonstrated its incompetence and weakness.

First, in early 80s the Polish Communist Party demonstrated its controversial divisions within the party structure. The key origin of the so-called “intraparty relationships” was rooted in Gierek’s attempts to reform the cadre policy and attract a high number of young and qualified professionals. Thus, at one side the Ruling party had a coalition of old communists, known as “nomenklatura,” while a new generation was pushing forward its own understanding of the future of Poland. Constant conflicts between two camps would never contribute to effective state management. Another reform facilitated by Gierek was aimed at weakening bureaucracy and strengthening control over local units. However, the project resulted in the “party as a whole loosing much of its previously firm control over the state administration due to the elimination of midlevel units.”

Second, the economic situation in Poland was crossing a point of no return. Against all expectations, the economic crisis was extremely severe. According to Poznanski, Muller and Simes the government failed to stabilize Polish economy, although the crisis was not as severe as it might have been. There were three basic strategies that the socialist government was trying to implement but, due to the lack of professional cadres and interior divisions within the party did not succeed. Among them were: an adjustment policy, the expansionary policy of Edward Gierek and the “adequate rescue package” aborted by the government. Indeed, all reforms initiated by Gierek and later developed by Jaruzelski focused, on “amalgamating enterprises into associations and converting them into "account units." However, the so-called modernization obviously lacked coherence and resembled a hysterical policy of a colonial leader desperately attempting to demonstrate his independence from the metropolis.

Third, the lack of trust towards the ruling regime was gradually accumulating followed by a demonstrative public disinterest in official party politics. The level of political apathy among citizens was high in the early 80s. For instance, less than half of the population in mid-1970s hardly knew anything about the president and the party cabinet. Public attention to plenums,

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63 Poznanski, p. 479
64 Simes, p. 468
67 Poznanski, p. 455
68 Ibid., 460
“show trials” and fake elections was extremely low. Moreover, total lack of involvement in social life heavily regulated by the state apparatus, non-voting, establishing underground communities such as “The Amnesty”, “Glos”, “NOWa”, the Social Self-Defense Fund - all these symptoms intensified in the early 1980s. These organizations were aimed to achieve two key goals of the opposition at its “embryonic” stage: turn a non-participation strategy into a well-structured movement and create an alternative social reality where there would be no place for the ruling. The government’s disproportionate reaction was multiplied by the state’s incapacity to conduct a mature dialogue with emerging opposition movements, repressions against dissidents, detentions, refusals of passports, “fines imposed on various occasions,” work dismissals and beatings. Moreover, censorship, targeted against Robotnik, ROPCiO publications, Tarnowskie Wiadomosci, Kronika Lubelska, Information Bulletin, was one of the most wide-spread strategies applied by the government.

To sum up, the political vacuum in Poland demonstrated itself explicitly in late 70s – early 80s in a number of ways which all converged in a dreadful inability of the state to face economic, social problems, administrative mismanagement. In this respect, it is high time to compare the political situation in Poland with the opposite one in Brazil - such difference might prove the idea that political vacuum is not always the only crucial factor affecting civil resistance.

Brazil: controlled “Abertura” or power twists?

Brazil, one of the most developed countries in Latin America, experienced a long history of authoritarian rule, especially during military dictatorship (1964-1985). State control was overwhelming and manifested itself in all spheres, censorship was pervasive, even the opposition was artificial. However, according to the academia, the 1979-1981 period brought dramatic changes and marked a radical twist towards democratization, but did it? This section demonstrates that the transition period in Brazil should not be associated with a systematic crisis of power.

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69 Mason, p.5
72 KOR Communicque № 24,25, 50, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
73 Lipski, p.308-309
74 KOR Communiques, April 19, 28, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2; Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
75 Lipski, pp.406-408
Indeed, military dictatorship was losing its authority and its control over society. According to Ronald Schneider, Tomas Skidmore and Alfred Stepan the ruling regime in Brazil was about to collapse in 1980 when economic hardships were becoming unbearable, the “shock of electoral defeat”\textsuperscript{76} followed by the “April Package”\textsuperscript{77} was having its effect on the whole political life in Brazil. Political opposition was gathering momentum, interior controversies did not seem to constitute an ideal basis for concentrating power in the hands of ARENA, the only “official government party.”\textsuperscript{78}

In late 70s - early 80s the official policy called “distenszo,”\textsuperscript{79} (step-by-step relaxation of authoritarianism) later developed into “abertura,”\textsuperscript{80} (“opening”) was initiated by the Geisel military government in order to reduce negative effects of the economic crisis and prevent public dissatisfaction by investing in the key industrial fields, opening domestic market to the foreign oil companies. Geisel’s successor General Joao Baptista Figueiredo allowed limited political organizations and social groups, introduces amnesty to almost all political prisoners, relieved the burden of censorship.\textsuperscript{81} According to official rhetoric the country was heading towards democratization. However, I would claim that the policy was nothing but a cover-up aimed at regaining power and exercising control hidden under symbolic political reforms.

First, Abertura was developing as the policy of ambiguous liberalization.\textsuperscript{82} In other words, the ruling regime managed to create an unhealthy atmosphere in which “unions, the nationally and internationally oriented industrial sectors, the urban middle classes, and the agricultural exporters were expected to avoid trampling each other’s interests.”\textsuperscript{83} By this token, the military government paralyzed emerging seeds of civil society as a potential challenge to its power monopoly. The only official opposition party, called the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) was skillfully deterred during Abertura by limiting its resources, agitation opportunities, and imposing selective censorship.

\textsuperscript{76} Thomas Skidmore, “Brazil’s Slow Road to Democratization: 1974-1985”, Democratizing Brazil, ed. by Alfred Stepan, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.5
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p.15
\textsuperscript{78} Scott Mainwaring, “Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Oct., 1988), p. 96
\textsuperscript{80} Howard Wiarda, Harvey Kline, A concise Introduction to Latin American Politics and Development, second edition, Westview Press, 2007, p.35
\textsuperscript{81} Ronald Schneider, Order and Progress. A political History of Brazil, Westview Press, 1991, p.286
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p.422
Second, the military regime was applying the so-called “technocratic pragmatism” based on control over potentially unreliable social units. Under Giesel’s motto “the maximum of development possible with the minimum of indispensable security” true suppression was hidden. The common corporate culture and ethics “uniting civilian and military wielders of technical skills” inevitably developed through “the management of the varied economic projects controlled, aided, or participated in by the military.” As a result, the state did not lose its control over society, meanwhile, technocrats became the state backbone which would never challenge the government in order to secure its own benefits, such as: “positions of clear influence,” private firms for retirement, the so-called “parastatal structures” (the parallel structures copying the state networks), based exclusively on personal relations and networks. Hence, the key positions in private and state agencies were occupied by a strong coalition between the military and technocrats.

Third, such characteristic features as “patrimonialism” and “clientism” revitalized the state “personalistic” power monopoly. Influential militarists and their supporters usually formed powerful coalitions, while opposition activists preferred to keep silence in return for their safe future, financial independence and freedom. Furthermore, “pervasive clientism” and populism aimed to secure the ruling position of the military. ARENA always seemed to be a perfect space for personal power struggles rather than healthy political competition, while populist pledges and official manifestos shaped a firm basis for clientism.

The fourth and final pillar of the regime stability was the “the servico de informacoes” – the intelligence service. The agency possessed exclusive autonomy and represented a unique type of the so-called “shadow government.” However, the SNI never seemed to be interested in challenging military dictatorship but considered it as the source of its own stability and the channel for securing further “omnipresent supervisory authority.” At the same time, the

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84 Markoff, Baretta, p.427
85 Mainwaring, p.105
86 Ibid., p.430
89 Wiarda, Kline, p.36
91 O’Donnell, p.295
92 Ibid., pp.294-295
94 Markoff, Baretta, p.425
95 Ibid., p.426
96 Ibid.
military was highly interested in cooperating with the SNI to effectively control civil population, provide state security and secure its power monopoly. Very frequently, “gentlemen agreements”\(^7\) between the state and the intelligence service were the only way to uphold status quo and ensure mutual safety.

Thus, the state in Brazil was far from experiencing a political vacuum: “Brazilian politics was following a pattern of personalistic relations, colossal clientelism, strong regionalism, and extremely nebulous ideologies.”\(^8\) Yet, these factors did not weaken the power monopoly but effectively helped the oppressive regime to stay afloat.

1.2 Bottom-up resistance in Poland and Brazil: organized resistance or fragmented movements?

The arguments developed in the theoretical chapter clearly show how important the self-actualization process is. It serves as a firm basis for facilitating civil resistance through providing a community with a fundamental idea. Yet, the question “if and when” remains: is the self-actualization theory applicable to all cases? The following two sections aim to demonstrate how despite different levels of group self-actualization, civil resistance still emerges and develops.

**Poland: sporadic self-actualization?**

It has been widely acknowledged that the opposition movement in Poland achieved its peak with the establishment of Solidarnosc. However, very few scholars emphasize the sporadic and disorganized character of self-actualization. “There were many social groups coexisting in constant controversy and conflict:”\(^9\) KOR (1976-1980), Fighting Poland (Polska Walczaca), the Polish League of Independence (PPN), the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights in Poland (ROPCiO), Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), Young Poland Movement (RMP), Experience and the Future (DiP). The movements and organizations were numerous, promoting different understanding of the future of Poland. Thus, the bases for self-actualization differed significantly.

In this section a number of early-established communities are analyzed. The first group is presented and consists of “Fighting Poland”, PPN, ROPCiO and RMP united by their ideological bases of self-actualization, and organizational structures. “Fighting Poland”, founded in 1974 in

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\(^{8}\) O’Donnell, p.296

Warsaw,\textsuperscript{100} was well-known for its radical and nationalistic sentiments.\textsuperscript{101} NS emphasized its hidden or the so-called “clandestine character”: “very few people in Poland or abroad knew about its existence, let alone its aims and activity.”\textsuperscript{103} First, its main objectives were nationalistic in nature: Polish independence, ultimate sovereignty and integrity, “anti-Sovietization”\textsuperscript{104} and achieving the so-called “social democracy,” close to the Western type of liberal democracy. Second, the structure of the organization would never be revealed apart from its strong hierarchy, narrow orientation towards intelligentsia and “illegal dissident activity.”\textsuperscript{106}

Another opposition group “obsessed with conspiracy,” the Polish League for Independence (PPN), was known for its avoidance of subversive activities and focus on publications and discussions. Yet, its rhetoric remained quite non-compromising. According to one of its leaders, Zdzislaw Najder, “Poland was meant to be free from Soviet oppression.”\textsuperscript{108} The main target was to revive social-political consciousness among Polish people and direct it against the suppressive regime.\textsuperscript{109} Finally, PPN was remarkable for presenting Soviet bloc countries as the victims of “the Soviet political anachronism.”\textsuperscript{110} Meanwhile, Poland was supposed to play the key role in the future Eastern European anti-Soviet movement.

The third opposition group, organized in 1977, was called the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights in Poland (ROPCiO).\textsuperscript{111} A nationalist organization manifested itself as a wide community with no strict membership but clear dissident orientation. Its anti-Semitic rhetoric and a firm belief in the outstanding role of the Polish nation constituted the basis for

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{100} Polska Walczacza Communique, HU, OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest

\textsuperscript{101} Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland, The Workers’ Defense Committee “KOR”, Praeger, Westpoint, 1992, pp.186

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p.142

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid

\textsuperscript{104} Appeal to the Society and to the Authorities of the PRL, 1976, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest

\textsuperscript{105} Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power, The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland, The Pennsylvanian State University, 1994, p. 25

\textsuperscript{106} Zuzowski, p.143

\textsuperscript{107} Kubik, p.34

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p.88; Pismo PPN 1979-1980, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2; Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest

\textsuperscript{109} Manifestacje PPN 1979-1980, Krakow, Lublin, Gdansk, Katowice, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest


\textsuperscript{111} Zuzowski, p.152
\end{flushleft}
self-actualization. Eventually, ROPCiO demonstrated deep internal tensions when soon the organization split in five independent groups among which only two survived, the ROPCiO and the Young Poland Movement.

The second cluster of movements is represented by two organizations: the “Confederation of Independent Poland” (KPN) and the “Workers’ Defense Committee” (KOR). At first sight, these groups might seem different, but their opposition to aggressive nationalism, a higher level of development, explicit emphasis on alternative means to achieve Polish independence demonstrate consistency between them. KOR was established and widely supported by intelligentsia and politically conscious workers in September, 1976 as an overarching organization, powerful enough to afford significant resources and build the ideological basis rooted in “social, rather than political action.” Unlike KOR, KPN positioned itself as a political party, with its own structure and the basis for self-actualization. This organization aimed to establish “an independent and democratic republic” through displacing the ruling regime. A strong hierarchy of goals could be observed within the group: independence comes first, and, as a result, freedoms and rights follow. It seemed self-evident that a fight for sovereignty would inevitably lead to establishment of a civil society.

The last group of social communities, organized by students and professors self-actualizing themselves through fighting against censorship and state control, for the quality and freedom of education, significantly differed from all those previously mentioned. “Experience and the Future” (DiP), numerous Student Solidarity Committees, “Freedom and Peace Movement” (MiP) can be characterized as social opposition groups intentionally refraining from but affecting politics dramatically. The key techniques applied by the groups mainly consisted in non-violent protests and pickets, publications, public university lectures.

112 ROPCiO Communiques №32,33,40, 1979, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
113 Ibid., p.155
114 Lipski, p.51
115 Ibid., p.62
116 Lipski, p.156
117 KOR, KPN, Deklaracje z narodu 1979-1980, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
118 “Appeal to Society”, Warsaw, October 10, 1978, Komitet Samoobrony Spolecznej KOR (Social Self Defence Committee KOR) - publications: "WYPADKI CZERWCOWE"; "APEL DO SPOLECZENSTWA". Communiques, declarations, open letters, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
120 Studenckie Komityte Solidarnosci SKS (Student Solidarity Committees). Communiques, statements, declarations, reports, resolutions - October 1977 - September 1980, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2, Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
Finally, it should be emphasized that the first two groups of social organizations isolated themselves and dramatically overestimated their role in building the future of Poland. Such elitism produced tensions within groups which negatively affected their self-actualization level. The key points of contention focused on achieving independence and promoting civil rights: the list of techniques varied from publications and discussions to protests and sabotage. Second, inter-group cooperation was hard to achieve: while the KOR leaders believed in future collaboration and opposition vis-à-vis the state, \textsuperscript{121} ROPCiO, and later KPN, claimed their exclusive understanding of future for Poland. Third, the membership principles differed significantly: from a non-discriminative approach, in ROPCiO and KOR, to elitism, as it was in the Fighting Poland and the PPN. \textsuperscript{122} Finally, either political or social orientation served as a stumbling block between organizations: nationalist (ROPCiO, PPN, the Fighting Poland) and politically-affiliated groups (KPN), believed in fighting the state, while KOR and Student Solidarity Committees preferred achieving their key goals through social activism.

\textit{Brazil: puppet opposition or emerging bottom-up civil resistance?}

“There has never been something in between: either tolerated opposition or grass-root movements predestined to extinction,” \textsuperscript{123} According to Douglas Chalmers and Atillo Boron, \textsuperscript{124} Alfred Stepan \textsuperscript{125} and Howard Wiarda, \textsuperscript{126} the level of self-actualization and civic awareness has always been low in Brazil. Two main dimensions of civil resistance can be observed: an official opposition party called MDB (Movimento Democratico Brasileiro), created in 1965 as a product of “extinguishing the old political parties in Brazil” \textsuperscript{127} the grassroots movements, among them MAB (Movimento de Amigos do Bairro), Commissions for Urban Improvements of the Neighborhoods of Nova Iguacu, \textsuperscript{128} “state-wide neighborhood federations (FAMERJs), etc. \textsuperscript{129} In

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item To All Working People in Poland and Trade Unions Throughout the World, 1978, 300-50-1:107.2; Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
\item Pismo Ojicialne PPN, 1979-1980, Polityka i Rzad, HU OSA, 300-50-1:107.2; Old Code Subject Files Polish Unit; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest
\item John Dos Passos, Brazil on the Move, Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday, 1963, p.195
\item The Right and Democracy in Latin America, ed. by Douglas A.Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campelllo de Souza, Atilio Boron, Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies, 1992, pp.321
\item Alfred Stepan, Democratizing Brazil. Problems of Transition and Consolidation, Oxford University press, 1989, pp. 404
\item Howard Wiarda, Harvey Kline, A concise Introduction to Latin American Politics and Development, second edition, Westview Press, 2007, p.35
\item Mainwaring, p.96
\item Ibid., p.170
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
order to understand the basis for self-actualization in Brazil, both divisions of civil resistance should be considered.

To begin with, one state-controlled opposition party was never enough for civil resistance. The MDB was organized in 1965 as a part of a two-party system represented by a “loyal government party,” ARENA, and the so-called opposition party. MDB was formed on the basis of former political associations such as: Brazilian Labour Party, Brazilian Communist Party, Christian Democratic Party, Brazilian Socialist Party. Thus, the ideological basis for self-actualization was versatile: promoting labor rights, Christian values and universal equality. Moreover, anti-authoritarian sentiments united all participants: state oppression was never considered to be a viable option for Brazil. Yet, the lack of a clear political position inevitably led to the split of MDB and guaranteed the military regime survival at least for a few years to follow.

Another “part and parcel” of civil resistance revealed itself through grassroots movements, such as MAB, Commissions for Urban Improvements of the Neighborhoods of Nova Iguacu, FAMERJs. The self-actualization process was identical among all of them. First, membership in social groups was considered as a basis for “a true democratization process.” Indeed, joining opposition was the only way for poor citizens to have their voices heard. Second, the so-called “neighborhood movements”, (FAMERJs, MAB) served as effective self-representation tools among vulnerable social groups. Finally, the neighborhood movements were uniting people around powerful core ideas, such as equality, egalitarianism, freedom of opportunities. Yet, the engagement level among regular citizens was insignificant. A deeply entrenched belief in the patrimonial society and a charismatic military leader led to poor mobilization and general apathy. Such was a tendency until the key social institution, the Roman Catholic Church, got involved.

At this stage several important conclusions regarding political vacuum and self-actualization should be made. First, both theories appear to be far from universally applicable: while in the

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132 Ibid., p.254
133 Keck, p.258
134 Love, p.23-24
135 Wiarda, Kline, p.59
136 Mainwaring, p.168
137 Ibid., p.173
138 Boron, 78
139 Schneiber, p.269-270
Polish case the political vacuum was developing, the military regime in Brazil was still enjoying its power, substituting real democratic changes and suppressing civil resistance. Second, the level of self-actualization is overestimated in both cases: social groups operating in Poland significantly differed in approaches, techniques and goals, thus brought inconsistency and a lack of coordination. Meanwhile, in Brazil the combination of a puppet opposition party and neighborhood groups hardly posed a threat to the ruling regime with an exclusive power privilege. Thus, it can be observed that the regime weakness and the level of self-actualization play a contextual role rather than represent decisive factors. In this respect, it is worth proposing a different approach, i.e. the role of Church in facilitating civil resistance, which adds a different angle for analysis.

1.3 Church-People framework

As has been demonstrated, two mainstream theories of political vacuum and self-actualization seem to lack a profound explanatory basis, thus another approach with an emphasis on agency should be developed. This research seeks to explore how the Catholic Church, as a social institution, influences civil resistance aimed at eliminating institutionalized oppression, here defined as “the systematic mistreatment of people within a social identity group, supported and enforced by the society and its institutions.”

Thus, the paper states that the Church, first, frames a social movement within a state by fulfilling three core framing-tasks: diagnostic framing, i.e. identification of a problem, prognostic framing which implies suggesting solutions and motivational framing when the facilitator motivates for action.

Next, this social institution brings in:

- a sense of community and exclusive commitment based on the unifying idea - Liberation Theology, a theory which stems from a belief that Christianity can change social and political conditions from within the oppressive societies, and the Second Vatican Council principles (1962-1965).
- mobilizing structure, understood as a resource which allows contentious acts to be sustained as social movements. The mobilizing structure is based on the networks, provided by the Church, and an alternative social space, created or modified for the movement.

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Facilitation mechanism

The Church as a social institution appears to be a key factor which facilitates civil resistance aimed at halting institutionalized oppression within a country. In this respect the concept of a “social institution” should be distinguished. A typical definition was suggested by Jonathan Turner: “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment.” However, not every social unit can be called a social institution. In this respect it is worth incorporating the measurement system proposed by Patricia Martin, who argues that some key indices need to be considered, including collectiveness of people, entailment of distinct recurring social practices, social positions and relations, norms and procedures, inclusiveness, legitimating ideology, organization and structure. Thus, it is reasonable to define the Church as an independent social institution capable of facilitating and directing civil resistance.

The most plausible criteria for measuring the concept of “civil resistance” within the scope of this research were proposed by Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner who discovered two key elements in this term. The first group of definitions includes a sense of action based on verbal, cognitive of physical behavior:

- expressive behavior that inverts, contradicts, abrogates, or prevents alternatives to cultural codes (Pitts, 1998:71).
- actions that not only reject subordination but do so by challenging the ideologies that support that subordination (Weitz, 2001:670).
- either any kind of organized, collective opposition or any subversive action directly intended to damage and/or disrupt the functioning of an organization. (Prasad and Prasad, 1998:226)
- actions involving consciousness, collective action, and direct challenges to structures of power (Rubin, 1996:245).

The second element common to all definitions is the presence of opposition:

143 Turner, p.98
144 Ibid., p.102
146 Ibid., p.1250
147 Martin, p.1256
148 Ibid., p.1257
-conscious questioning and rethinking of the existing structure of domestic roles (Brown, 1994:167)

-deliberate rejection of values that sustain existing power relations (Faith, 1993:8).

-any behavior or discourse...that countered or disrupted the dominant bureaucratic discourse (Trethewey, 1997:288).

For the goals of this research it is worth choosing the definition suggested by J. Rubin, who claims that civil resistance implies “actions involving consciousness, collective action, and direct challenges to structures of power.” On the one hand, this measurement focuses on a conscious collective action that proves rationality and solidarity of actors. This aspect is important since in this paper resistance movements are coherent actions rather than the products of public rage. At the same time, Rubin claims that the act of resistance poses challenges to the ruling regime, thus undermines its legitimacy and stability. Thus, I may conclude that Rubin’s definition takes community actions into account, follows the dynamic approach and makes analysis of the cases less ambiguous.

Civil resistance is very often targeted against the institutionalized government oppression. By definition, institutionalized oppression is “the systematic mistreatment of people within a social identity group, supported and enforced by the society and its institutions.” In this respect, the research focuses on social, economic and political inequality rooted in laws and social institutions, sharp social stratification, social hierarchy, prosecution of dissidents, state violence, a lack of political pluralism.

In order to start effectively facilitating the movement, the Church, first, applies the so-called “framing technique” or the “frame alignment,” proposed by D. Snow and R. Benford. The scholars argue that this sort of alignment is only possible when individual frames coincide and “become linked in congruency.” According to Snow and Benford, “the robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort” can only be achieved if three initial steps are undertaken: diagnostic framing, i.e. identification of a problem, prognostic framing

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151 Cudd, p.17
153 Cudd, p.12
154 Deutsch, p.33
156 Ibid., p.198
157 Ibid., p. 200
which implies suggesting solutions and motivational framing when the facilitator motivates for action.

To maintain the frame and build the movement upon it, the facilitator needs to establish a large belief system. Moreover, Snow and Benford persuasively argue that a frame should be highly relevant to participants’ needs and expectations, thus let ordinary people identify themselves as the moving force or resistance.\textsuperscript{158} Proper frames foster significant changes in people’s minds, thus shape large-scale civil resistance.

The second level of social movements’ facilitation implies constructing a unifying idea, expressed herein as Liberation Theology and the Second Vatican Council Principles, providing a mobilizing structure and shaping an alternative social space.

To begin with, the mobilizing power of unifying ideas seems hard to deny according to the frame theory.\textsuperscript{159} According to Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston,\textsuperscript{160} profound systems of ideas let people develop collective values, norms and beliefs in order to promote social changes. The frame theory demonstrates how ideas can be transformed to mobilization frameworks reinforcing civil resistance.\textsuperscript{161} In this research one of the key roles is allocated to the so-called Liberation Theology. In his book ‘A Theology of Liberation’\textsuperscript{162} Gustavo Gutierrez elaborates a theory claiming that Christianity is based not only on faith in God but also a commitment to change an oppressive socio-political order.\textsuperscript{163} At the same time, Richard McBrien summarizes this concept the following way: “God is disclosed in the historical ‘praxis’ of liberation. It is the situation, and our passionate and reflective involvement in it, which mediates the Word of God. Today that Word is mediated through the cries of the poor and the oppressed.”\textsuperscript{164} Thus, the Church provides the key values and fundamental principles on which the ideological structure of the movement can be based.

However, even the strongest and most influential unifying idea alone would hardly manage to mobilize social masses lacking collective identity which refers to common interests, experiences, and solidarity within a group, and provides the movement with a particular niche within a field of political actors.\textsuperscript{165} Collective identity affects mobilization, defines its trajectories and strategies of social movements. Moreover, Owen Whooley, in his article

\textsuperscript{158} Snow, Benford, p.211  
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{161} Oliver, Johnston, p.55  
\textsuperscript{162} Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Orbis Books (Maryknoll, New York), 1973, p.56  
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p.32  
“Collective identity,”\textsuperscript{166} claims that collective identity very often serves as a key basis for formation and development of communities without which civil resistance may cease to exist.

Upon providing the resources, collective identity and a unifying idea, the Church initiates the second step and shares the so-called “mobilizing structure”. As S. Tarrow, who coined this concept\textsuperscript{167} claims, a "mobilizing structure" is a resource that creates suitable conditions for civil resistance and "brings people together in the field, shapes coalitions, confronts opponents, and assures their own future after the exhilaration of the peak of mobilization has passed."\textsuperscript{168} As Tarrow persuasively argues, the most successful movements will have their own "connective tissue operating within and between formal movement organizations."\textsuperscript{169}

In order to contribute to the initial idea I would claim that the mobilizing structure finally leads to construction or modification of the alternative social space challenging the socio-political discourse dominated by the oppressive regime. For the purpose of this research the definition of a social space, provided by Henry Lefebvre is provided. The scholar claims that “a space is social: it involves assigning more or less appropriated places to the social relations of reproduction and possesses a current totality with its links and connections to action.”\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, the scholar implies that the social space is hardly static but resembles a dynamic organism: “the production and the product are inseparable sides of one process.”\textsuperscript{171} This understanding of the social space is valuable for several reasons. First, this concept is closely connected to action thus perfectly fits the facilitation framework provided in this paper: in order to either create or act within the space the social movement needs to be initiated and developed. Second, the dynamic nature of the social space opens up unique opportunities for facilitating the social movement through established networks. Finally, the reproduction capability of a social space contributes to challenging an oppressive regime: the social movement is capable of functioning within the space unavailable to the government.

Hence, this research proposes that the Church facilitates civil resistance by undertaking several steps. It, first, frames the issue, second, contributes to shaping the sense of community, third, shares its mobilizing structure by providing its networks and creating or modifying the alternative social space.

\textsuperscript{166} Owen Whooley, Collective Identity, Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p.48
\textsuperscript{167} Tarrow Sidney, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.120
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p.123
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p.187
As this chapter has demonstrated, the Church does not necessarily limit itself to religious activities. On the contrary it actively cooperates with the secular world, defends human rights and social freedoms. Moreover, the Catholic Church is capable of facilitating resistance and mediating conflicts which frequently occur during civil transition. Thus, the following chapters demonstrate the role of the Church’s involvement in civil resistance in Poland and Brazil (1979-1985).
Chapter 2. Church-People: networking resistance

“As churches constitute the single most widespread form of voluntary organizational affiliation…their potential socio-political impact appears to be considerable.”

Quite so, the Church has always been one the most influential and powerful social institutions. Due to its significant facilities the Church had every opportunity to facilitate non-violent resistance, demand peaceful but crucial social changes and attract a significant number of followers. The second chapter claims the crucial role of the Roman Catholic Church as a facilitating agent in both countries and demonstrates a step-by-step process of developing a social movement through the cases of Freedom and Peace Movement (WiP) in Poland and CEBs in Brazil.

2.1 “Wolność i Pokój”: Freedom and Peace without political affiliations

Much has been said about opposition groups emerging and developing in Poland in late 70s and early 80s. While the academic agenda was predominantly occupied by KOR and Solidarnosc, very few paid significant attention to the so-called Wolność i Pokój group (Freedom and Peace movement) which emerged in Poland in 1980s and rapidly became a real challenge to the authoritarian regime by effectively dominating the opposition discourse. Indeed, in 1985 WiP appeared as an active community of students and professors aiming, first, “to spread the true idea of peace among…Polish people,” second, provide and defend civil liberties for vulnerable social segments, third, to achieve common understanding and preservation of peace. It took almost five years for WiP to evolve in a self-sufficient and independent civil movement claiming the primary importance of such basic principles as human rights, national liberation (“the struggle of nations which have been the victims of the violence of foreign powers”), peace, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental protection, struggle against world hunger, ultimate importance of humanitarian assistance, tolerance and human development. While looking through the WiP Declaration one is unlikely to find any appeals for revolutionary actions or a violent struggle. On the contrary, the WiP group

175 Ibid.
176 Introduction, Founding Declaration of the WiP
177 Ibid.
persistently called for reunification, mutual dialogue, non-violent means of resistance and civic enlightenment.

This is the very moment when the Roman Catholic Church came into play, when its exclusive role in shaping the ideological basis for the movement became apparent. Indeed, the Catholic clergy was effective at framing core WiP principles which eventually constituted the key unifying idea: social and national revival through peaceful changes and fundamental reforms in the fields of human rights, social, humanitarian and ideological policy. Primarily, the WiP Declaration was formulated on the basis of the II Vatican Council Principles and official statements pronounced by the Pope John Paul II during his first pilgrimage to Poland in 1979. To begin with, the Declaration of Christian Education and the Declaration on Religious Freedom had an obvious influence on the WiP Founding Declaration (1985), in other words their core principles were borrowed and secularized by WiP. First, in the introduction its activists openly gave credit to the Pope:

“We the undersigned, inspired by, in particular, the peace messages delivered by John Paul II, do ordain and establish the Freedom and Peace Movement in Krakow.”

Such acknowledgement of the Church’s involvement meant a lot to both sides. For the first time in the history of Communist Poland, a non-violent, civil-resistance movement emerged and proclaimed its direct connection to the Church. Second, such core principles, as human rights (“the freedom to express one's own ideas and opinions, the freedom to organize labor unions and other associations, and full religious freedom”), national liberation (“solidarity to nations and minorities which demand their own rights and destiny”), domestic and international peace (“we will not successfully oppose war if we do not overcome political systems based on state violence against their citizens”), human development (“organizing and encouraging lectures, publications, and other means of helping people to find their own direction in life”), tolerance, followed a clear path paved by the II Vatican Council.

Indeed, in 1965 the official Church policy was explicitly stated in two fundamental documents: “Declaration on Christian Education (Gravissimum Educationis) Proclaimed by His

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179 Diskin, p.236
180 Introduction, Founding Declaration of the Freedom and Peace Movement (WiP)
182 Founding Declaration of the WiP
183 Ibid
Holliness Pope Paul VI” (October 28, 1965)\textsuperscript{185} and “Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) on the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious Promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI” (December 7, 1965).\textsuperscript{186}

First, the Vatican openly expressed its commitment to defending human rights for religious education and its zero-tolerance to their violation. The Sacred Ecumenical Council claimed an indispensable role of the universal right for Christian education so that “the baptized…become ever more aware of the gift of Faith they have received.”\textsuperscript{187} Second, the Church pledged to take a leading part in supporting Christian education by organizing “groups of mental and physical development, youth associations, and schools.”\textsuperscript{188} Third, the importance of Catholic schools, colleges and universities, their financial support, freedom from censorship – all these demands the Roman Catholic Church found vital for facilitating networks between the clergy and regular people. The fourth point mainly focused on the value of human dignity, freedom of speech and conscience (“a precious opportunity to freely profess religion in private and public”\textsuperscript{189}) and “immunity from coercion.”\textsuperscript{190} All four above-mentioned pillars served as the ideological basis for the WiP activists and were included in their Declaration on peaceful means of achieving freedom.

Yet, not only was the II Vatican Council the source of guidelines and inspiration for the WiP. The Pope’s visit to Poland in 1979, which was marked by the press as a “legendary” event,\textsuperscript{191} gave a fresh impetus for new movements. During his numerous masses in Warsaw, Krakow and Wadowice,\textsuperscript{192} meetings with the clergy, the youth and intelligentsia, workers and social activists, he persistently emphasized several key ideas and principles Poland should follow.

First, the Pope revitalized existing links between Poland and the Roman Catholic Church. Through historical allusions John Paul managed to reconstruct an ideological bridge between

\textsuperscript{185} Declaration on Christian Education (Gravissimum Educationis) Proclaimed by His Holliness Pope Paul VI, \url{http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html} (Accessed, April 25, 2013)

\textsuperscript{186} Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) on the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious Promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI” \url{http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html} (Accessed, April 25,2013)

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{188} Declaration of Christian Education…, p.5

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p.7

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 4

\textsuperscript{191} British Press Roundup on Pope’s Visit to Poland, 1979, 300-50-1:107.2,, Old Code Subject Files, Polish Unit; Polityka i Rząd: Wolność i Pokój, 1985 - 1986, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; OSA at Central European University, Budapest

\textsuperscript{192} Pope in Poland Calls For Christian Europe, Munich, 1979, 300-50-1:107.2,, Old Code Subject Files, Polish Unit; Polityka i Rząd: Wolność i Pokój, 1985 - 1986, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; OSA at Central European University, Budapest
Polish people and their Church. Second, national liberation would never be possible with a ruthless and oppressive political regime in charge. Indeed, “Poland had a moral right to independence, sovereignty and self-determination” through the following means: “people’s participation in the government of the country,” introduction of human rights, economic progress leading to the nation’s prosperity, “freedom of movement, religious expression and exchange of thought.” Third, individual freedom was the only way for the Polish society to achieve welfare and equality. Opportunities for open speech, free movement, variety of political and ideological affiliations, both religious and secular education, choice between military and civil service – those were the core principles which constituted the basis for freedom and liberty, according to John Paul II. So persuasively in one of his masses in Krakow the Pope appealed to young people: “I express the wish that you may be strong and speak the basic truth and be willing to take risk for the sake of Christ and your internal freedom.”

Apart from the unifying idea the Church provided WiP with a mobilizing structure, i.e. indispensable resources enabling an opposition group to develop into a social movement. A broad support campaign was organized by the Roman Catholic Church in favor of the WiP movement. The Vatican chose two key techniques to achieve the goal: first, sermons and preaches delivered by John Paul II during his visit to Poland in 1979, second, social networks based on church schools and universities, especially John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin which remained the temple of a national idea, catholicity and anti-communist resistance.

To begin with, John Paul’s II pilgrimage to Poland had a huge influence and produced an enormous effect on establishment and development of the WiP movement in Poland. According to the Time magazine journalist, Aileen Mary Rankin, “at that crucial, life-and-death time for country and the Church, there burst upon the world from the prison of Poland a powerful,

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195 Ibid.
199 Ks. mgr Dariusz Firszt, kapelan Ojca Świętego, Personal Interview, 12 April, 2013
electrifying personality, John Paul II.” Indeed, the power of his personality and a historically-established authority of the Roman Catholic Church allowed this institution to provide people with an open space for discussion and sharing their religious views. The Pope’s trip lasted “nine full days which changed the world,” from June 2 till June 10, 1979 and almost defined the WiP future. The key speeches mainly addressed students and professors who strived for socio-political changes and spiritual renovation. The holy masses and informal talks with the Polish intelligentsia included: the open-air Mass in Victory Square in Warsaw, devoted to commemoration of the 900th anniversary of St. Stanislaus’s martyrdom, a couple of masses for university students in John Paul II Catholic University in Lublin which turned into an open forum for debates over the future of Poland, the meeting with teenagers and students at the Archbishop's Palace, a profound and inspiring lecture for youngsters in Wadowice, the Pope’s native town. Finally, the trip was crowned with an emotional speech in front of the Polish studentship on June 8.

Yet, the Pope’s trip was not the only way to spirit the youth on bringing changes to their community. Although he came and left, church schools and parishes, missionaries and universities remained. The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin had always been the center of religious and civil enlightenment which later became the fundamental basis for developing the Freedom and Peace movement. Indeed, the Church provided massive support the WiP movement which was born within the walls of the Catholic University in Lublin. Through this oldest academic institution the Church was successfully providing future WiP activists with such mobilization opportunities as basic ideas, premises where they could meet the academics

202 Ks. mgr Dariusz Firszt, Kapelan Ojca Świętego, April 12, 2013
203 The Pope’s Visit to Poland: the Aftermath, Munich, 15 June, 1979, RAD/de Weydenthal, 300-50-1:107.2,, Old Code Subject Files, Polish Unit; Polityka i Rząd: Wolność i Pokój, 1985 - 1986, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; OSA at Central European University, Budapest
206 G. Davies, p.9
207 Ks. mgr Mieczysław Augustynowicz, Personal Interview, 13 April, 2013
supporting peaceful changes in the country. Even after its establishment WiP members could always find shelter at the university as well as numerous perishes in 1985-1986, when the state witch-hunt became even more non-compromising and resulted in dozens of activists exposed to “swift but unpublicized repression”\textsuperscript{208}

Finally, the Roman Catholic Church granted legitimacy to the WiP movement in the eyes of the public. Civil protests against state social and defense policy, political repression, lack of freedoms were approved by the Polish community only due to the Church’s support which provided enough resources for agitation, credibility and an alternative social space. WiP was operating within its own social domain where the government could not block existing mobilization resources\textsuperscript{209} as well as challenge the ideological basis, more attractive to the public compared to the imposed communist idea. Within that alternative social space WIP was relatively free to perform actions, organize protests\textsuperscript{210} and challenge the dominating state rhetoric.\textsuperscript{211}

To conclude this section, it is worth reiterating the crucial role of the Roman Catholic Church in facilitating the Freedom and Peace Movement through, first, providing it with the fundamental idea of social and national revival through peaceful changes. Indeed, the Church brought the bricks, and the temple had to be built by the nation itself. Second, the educational, infrastructural and ideological resources were also shared by the Church and effectively utilized by WiP activists. That was the path towards establishing and strengthening the alternative social space – the parallel domain hardly available for the authoritarian state.

2.2. The Church and civil resistance in Brazil: another turf war or a fight for freedom?

While in Poland the Roman Catholic Church was obviously granting the Freedom and Peace movements its full support, civil resistance in Brazil was taking a much more complicated path towards democracy. First, the split between the Vatican and the People’s Church in Brazil had an obvious impact on shaping the unifying idea. Contrary to popular belief, the effect was far from negative: a unique combination of ideas about the Church’s involvement in civil resistance

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{209} Ks. mgr Mieczysław Augustynowicz, Personal Interview, April 13, 2013
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contributed to the development of the opposition. Second, the mobilizing structure was supported by both Churches - liberation theologians and the Vatican - which led to double success civil resistance achieved in Brazil.

The most prominent manifestation of non-violent resistance in late 70s – early 80s was the so-called Basic Christian Communities (Comunidades Eclesial de Base) movement promoted by the Latin American Council of Bishops. Back in 1968 CEBs were conceived as “autonomous religious groups” based on the neighborhood principle. Indeed, the communities were mainly perceived as the only pathways to challenge oppression and poverty faced by “the grassroots which represented the key unit of civil resistance.” Two main objectives were to be achieved through CEBs: first, providing material support to the poor, second, offering a unique opportunity to fight for civil rights. On the one hand, CEBs proved to be the most effective option for the oppressed to enjoy basic social benefits and “logistical resources” which let the rural majority occupy lands, thus support themselves. On the other hand, CEBs was successful at encouraging people to participate in the life of the community and establishing “new forms of consciousness,” such as civil responsibility and people’s power to bring socio-political changes. Such a broad spectrum of initial goals could only be achieved with the support of an influential institution – the Roman Catholic Church. Yet, deep controversies between the Vatican and Liberation Theologians had a significant impact on the overall development of the CEBs movement, especially its unifying idea.

In the late 70-early 80s the Roman Catholic Church was coming through the crisis marked by its internal division between the Vatican official position and The People’s Church commitment to Liberation Theology. The doctrinal basis which took its roots from the fundamental principles expressed in the “Declaration on Religious Freedom…” of 1965, and “Liberation Theology,” interpreting Christianity as a liberating path for the oppressed to escape from grievances and achieve human rights and freedoms. The unique interpretation of

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214 Bruneau, p.541
218 The Pope’s Trip, Struggle Within the Church, 1980, 300-50-1:122, Old Code Subject Files, Polish Unit, Polityka i Rząd: Watykan i Jan Paweł II.: Wizyta do Brazylii, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: OSA at Central European University, Budapest
219 The Liberal Catholic Church, The Statement of Principles, Summary of Doctrine and Table of the Apostolic Succession, St. Alban Press, LA-London-Sydney, 1926
Catholicism as the so-called “people’s religion” appealed to regular people suffering from poverty and deprivation.

The first time the doctrine was discussed and adopted when The Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB, National Conference of the Bishops of Brazil) was established in 1952 aimed at unite all Catholic Bishops committed to organizing and facilitating civil resistance in Brazil. Their ideological framework became public at the “Conference of Latin American Bishops” Medellín, Colombia. Although slightly developed and modified, the doctrinal basis stayed the same: to respond to the popular “hunger and thirst after justice,” promote such values as “authentic liberation,” i.e. equality and brotherhood, “truth as foundation,” human dignity, civil “conscience of believers,” and social change. A truly innovative idea was to fight internal colonialism, which prevailed all over Brazil. Finally, the indispensable role of peace-building and non-violent resistance to institutionalized oppression constituted the key ideas. In this respect, CNBB considered military dictatorship to be the “axis of evil” based on institutionalized oppression. For instance, one of the ideologists of civil resistance in Brazil, the Cardinal Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, advocated for “a better future for the nation” which deserved to establish and develop civil society. The only obstacle, in his view, was the military regime which unlawfully secured its exclusive monopoly on power.

Yet, the case of CEBs in late 70s – early 80s demonstrates unexpected convergence of two opposite ideologies. Although, the founding idea of CEBs was constructed by liberation theologians and won public support, it lacked official approval from the Vatican. Moreover, the People’s Church was facing the Pope’s criticism of its deep involvement in politics.

Thus, the more influential “the Marxist clergy” was becoming, the more important it seemed for the Vatican to start acting. Indeed, in 1979 during the Conference of Puebla

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220 Della Cava, p.145
223 Ibid., p.5
224 Ibid., p.7
225 Ibid., p. 13
226 Ibid., p.15
227 Conference of Latin American Bishops, Medelin, Colombia..., p. 21
organized by CELAM, the new Pope John Paul II demonstrated a new Vatican approach regarding Liberation Theology, its supporters, and their role in facilitating CEBs. His decisive rhetoric against the People’s Church philosophy brought the Vatican to reconsidering the main principles CELAM was based on. The emphasis on Marxist ideals, an interclass struggle and the ultimate change of a socio-political order in Brazil was ignored by the Pope. Instead, the ideas of equality, brotherhood, religious enlightenment, freedom of choice, speech and conscience, freedom from persecution and state harassment, peace-building were the only relevant principles the CELAM focused on.

At the same time, the Pope wisely accepted the fundamental ideas expressed by liberation theologians, such as justice, human dignity, equality, freedoms and human rights, assisting the oppressed and the impoverished. However, the revolutionary and liberation rhetoric disappeared after the Conference of Puebla in 1979. Hence, unique combination of postulates borrowed from both former rivals constituted an ideological basis for the CEBs movement. Indeed, even after giving up the most controversial principles CEBs proceeded to a brand new level and succeeded, i.e. led to the end of military dictatorship in 1985.

However, not only did the unifying idea serve as a facilitation basis, but the mobilizing structure, provided by both the People’s Church and the Vatican, contributed significantly. In the case of CEBs the mobilizing structure was mainly represented by the Church’s social networks. To begin with, Basic Christian Communities served as the key resources for inspiration and action. 80,000 of them were organized “along the length and breadth of the country” and headed by 350 bishops strongly committed to articulating the demands of the oppressed. Each CEB had a clear structure based on equality, mutual cooperation and assistance which enabled the impoverished to talk and collaborate productively. Each family was provided with an opportunity to “get together in groups and discuss common problems…in the light of the Bible.” Such meetings were held on the basis of local neighborhoods, “territorial and class

234 The Liberal Catholic Church, Statement of Principles, Summary of Doctrine, and Table of Apostolic Succession, St. Alban Press, LA-London-Sydney, 1926, p.8-9
235 Ralph Della Cava, p.144
236 Burdick, p.421
237 Mantilla, p.562
238 Bruneau, p.539
proximity." Not only were spiritual questions discussed but also some daily issues often solved by the Church and CEB members through cooperation and mutual assistance. As a result, CEB activists started demonstrating their civil responsibility and deepest interest in the causes of poverty, social vulnerability and injustice. A positive example of the first successful CEB in Vitoria, when its members engaged in the struggle for their pieces of land with the landowners in 1981, proved to other CEB activists that indifference would only lead to further humiliation and oppression.

Yet, in this respect, it is highly important to highlight the apolitical nature of Basic Communities. Indeed, in 1981, two years after the Conference of Puebla, when John Paul II condemned political involvement of the People’s Church clergy, the IV Inter-Ecclesial Encounter was held in Itaici which brought together all CEB members and proclaimed any opportunity of establishing political parties based on CEB, unacceptable. “CEBs have established the reputation of practical and indispensable instruments of action in society, but appear to be far away from political affiliations of any kind.” This way, the Church managed to prevent CEBs from politicizing themselves and deepening into the Marxist rhetoric. Instead, combining the Vatican teaching of equal human rights, bestowed by God, and the basic principles of liberty and peaceful resistance, lifted the CEBs movement on a new level of a non-violent struggle.

Such balanced combination of labor, civic education, material and spiritual support seemed to play its indispensable role in strengthening CEBs in their fight for human rights and civil freedoms. Through this facilitation path The Roman Catholic Church provided CEBs with their own alternative social space based on the unifying idea, resources and social networks, independent from the oppressive regime. Indeed, the idea of liberation and social equality turned out to be a strong basis which enabled the oppressed to establish their own communities and mobilize. In a few years neighborhood communities developed into a broad network of well-structured social groups capable of formulating their socio-political demands and resisting state

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239 Ibid., 540
240 Zirker, p. 254
242 Partial Text on Pope’s Speech , Vatican City, December 25, 1979, 300-50-1:122, Old Code Subject Files, Polish Unit, Polityka i Rząd: Watykan i Jan Paweł II.: Papież, 1980, Records of Radio Vatican/Radio Liberty Research Institute; OSA at Central European University, Budapest
244 Ks. mgr Zdzisław Błaszczyk, Personal Interview, 11 April, 2013
oppression. Hence, the mobilizing structure and indispensable guidance from the Church prevented CEB activism from embracing a radical Marxist stance and helped civil resistance to be much more successful than ever expected.

This concluding chapter demonstrates how significantly the Roman Catholic Church contributed to the success of both movements in Poland and Brazil in 1979-1985. First, the Vatican literally shaped the ideological basis for the WiP group and the CEBs: the unifying idea of non-discriminative liberty and equality based on peace and freedom gave a fresh impetus for further development of both movements. Although in Brazil the Catholic Church had to come through the crisis marked with a dramatic split between the Vatican and liberation theologians, its ability to settle the internal controversies within its own premises affected the CEBs movement in two ways: combined new ideas and prevented the movement from getting into extremes. The mobilizing structure provided within CEBs completed the picture and let the activists build strong networks for further cooperation and resistance. In Poland, the picture was less complex with two powerful actors, the state and the Church, competing for ultimate influence on the public, applying different strategies: violence and coercion on the part of the oppressive regime and a two-staged facilitation mechanism conducted by the Church. Indeed, John Paul II became the symbol of freedom, God wisdom and liberty for hundreds of the oppressed, thus it was quite easy for him to spread the idea and provide future WiP activists with necessary premises and resources for action. All in all, the strategies the Church applied in both cases had one common mechanism and, although differed insignificantly, brought both movements to success.
Conclusion

When asked about his personal view on the Church’s contribution to civil resistance in Poland, ks. Dariusz Firszt persuasively stated: “The Catholic Church has always wanted freedom for its children but no bloodshed. The Church united the oppressed but always looked for compromise with the state. The Church provided help but never affiliated itself with political parties, never called for violent resistance or an open conflict.”

Indeed, neither had the clergy ever looked away from those in need of assistance and support, nor incited violations of the law or provoked masses for violent actions. In fact, the Church managed to occupy a unique position in a tripartite system of interaction with the state and people, thus created a perfect room for further strategic manoeuvre in facilitating peaceful resistance in the cases of WiP and CEB movements.

The most important conclusion, which should be drawn from this paper, mainly focuses on the mechanism which the Church applies in facilitating a social movement. As has been demonstrated, the Church provides a potential movement with a unifying idea, shares its mobilizing structure and, finally, contributes to constructing an alternative social space for further civil resistance.

First, a strong unifying idea, as a basis for establishing and developing a movement, was extremely necessary for both WiP and CEBs. Indeed, the Vatican Council principles promoted such core values as justice, human dignity, equality, basic freedoms of self-expression, conscience and associations, fundamental rights for comprehensive education, civic enlightenment. Supported by the Church’s authority and acknowledged by the majority of the population in both countries, this ideological basis served as a firm foundation for structuring the movement, defining its conceptual framework, shaping its demands and, the same time, gave a fresh impetus to civil resistance. In a Brazilian case the contradiction between the official Vatican principles and Liberation Theology clearly demonstrates how the opposite value systems can be balanced by a powerful institution and, finally, merge for the sake of ultimate success.

Second, the mobilizing structure which the Church provided both movements in Poland and Brazil, is remarkable for its multidimensional composition. Certainly, the Church did not limit its involvement solely to material or spiritual assistance. Combination of resources proved to be the only path towards effective resistance facilitation. The key components, the Church possessed included: open space for free discussion and sharing ideas, educational programs aimed at civil and religious enlightenment, facilities and Church premises used by opposition activists,

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245 Ks. mgr Dariusz Firszt, Personal Interview, 11 April, 2013
intelligentsia, students, professors, civil servants, workers and rural population. These components served as a construction material for organization, development and further facilitation of civil resistance in both countries. In the case of Poland, John Paul II University of Lublin, Church schools and perishes served as ideal premises for communities to gather, exchange views and formulate their future propositions. Meanwhile, rural people in Brazil considered CEBs to be the only source of assistance, support, education and civil enlightenment.

Finally, the combination of a unifying idea and a mobilizing structure quite successfully opened an alternative social space for social movements to freely function in. A well-developed network of perishes, church communities and schools, connections established between members within the WiP and CEBs enabled these movements to operate in a “parallel social universe” where the state had no authority, power or any other significant tools to gain control over the movements. Remarkably, the alternative social space was successfully shaped by both the Church as an independent social institution and people dissatisfied with the status quo in the country. Their mutual cooperation based on developing ideological and mobilizing frameworks proved to be extremely fruitful and resulted in shaping their own space in which the activists could easily and independently operate with the support of the Church.

As a result, one can observe a unique interaction model between the Church and society. This structure, within which the Vatican could effectively operate, I would also call a bipartite framework. It enabled the Church to act as a self-sufficient institution and exercise its influential power as independently as only the state could afford. As discussed earlier, the Vatican provided social movements with their future ideological basis and mobilizing resources, meanwhile never missing an opportunity to establish a constructive dialogue with the state. Finally, this cooperation scheme opened a unique opportunity for the Vatican to participate in civil resistance but, at the same time, stay detached from active involvement which could somehow compromise the Church’s ethics and the ultimate mission proclaimed by this institution. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church had always emphasized its impartiality and objectivity, although never denied its commitment to provide the oppressed with all possible assistance even if it somehow compromised the authority of the official regime.

Finally, it should be emphasized that usually the Roman Catholic Church applies certain criteria when choosing what social movement to support, what particular actions to take and how to justify its involvement. According to the official rhetoric, the only incentive for the Church to engage in civil resistance would be massive violations of human rights and freedoms, oppression and disregard for the Church’s authority on the part of the state. Nevertheless, the selection criteria should not be simplified but considered within the Church-state-people framework. Indeed, only if the government poses actual threat to its own population and seeks to undermine
the Church’s authority, the Vatican decides to act, i.e. facilitate already existing resistance and support it with the Word of God. Hence, when explaining the motivational aspect of the Vatican’s behavior and its alignment with either side of the conflict, the Church’s strategic interests and complicated relations with the state and people need to be considered.

Thus, it should be reiterated that the Church played a crucial role in facilitating social movements in Poland (WiP) and Brazil (CEBs movements). Not only did it support its “children,” provide them with shelter and assistance but also brought new revitalizing ideas, offered opportunities for a non-violent struggle for their rights and freedoms.

Although numerous theories of social movements have been established, conclusions presented in this paper open unique opportunities for further research. First, academia should get a better understanding of the role of internal divisions within the Roman Catholic Church and their ultimate effect on civil resistance. In this context, the case of a CEBs movement in Brazil seems to represent a perfect example of how some contradictions within the institution can be tightly connected to the movement itself. Right from the start the People’s Church did not aim to undermine the official Vatican teaching, but in the course of time Liberation Theology developed so significantly that it started posing a potential threat both to the state and the Vatican. In this case, the conflict was peacefully settled in the interests of the oppressed and for their own sake, when John Paul the Second took initiative in his hands and dramatically changed the development path of the Latin American Church. Yet, very often deep controversies between different branches of Christianity caused damage to the social movements as it happened in Northern Ireland where the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church were involved, the conflict between the Vatican and Quakers that started back in 17 century and many others historical episodes worth considering as potential research cases.

Indeed, is the division within the Church always harmful for civil development and existing social movements in a country? What is the potential effect of possible cleavages on the facilitation process: is the Church capable of sharing new ideas and providing the movement with necessary facilities, premises and structure when handling critical problems within itself? On the contrary, are such dramatic shifts indispensable for further development of both the Church, as a key social institution, and civil resistance? All these questions are still to be covered in the scope of further research which is important for deeper understanding of the nature of people-Church relations in the context of civil resistance.

Another topic that might seem academically attractive is the motivational basis. What exact reasons should the Church have to engage in facilitating social movements in different parts of the world? It is hard to deny that the Catholic missions played a significant role in supporting communities, fighting for their rights and freedoms all over the world. Now, it is hard to imagine
that non-violent resistance in Africa during the 60s, People Power Revolution in Philippines in 1986, Solidarity movement in Poland in the 80s, would be entirely non-violent and that successful without the Church’s assistance. Yet, taking its active participation for granted would result in failing to discover success factors of civil resistance and positive or negative outcomes of civil mobilization. Thus, the question “why” still remains crucial and far from totally settled. Profit, peace, equality or liberty might serve as perfect motives for the Roman Catholic Church to get involved. Yet, there are more to be discovered and analyzed in the future research.

Finally, the facilitation mechanism suggested in this paper by no means should be considered the only relevant pathway the Church undertakes in order to develop a movement. The three stages covered above, i.e. framing, providing a unifying idea and sharing a mobilizing structure, should not represent the only facilitation pattern. Some key junctures and transitional factors can change the whole process significantly, make the Church become either more involved or relatively indifferent. By the same token, any resistance movement might lose support of its “founding fathers” and receive assistance from newly-acquired allies. The so-called contextual factors cannot be underestimated and should be further analyzed in the context of civil resistance and the Church-people relations.

All in all, the role of the Roman Catholic Church in facilitating civil resistance seems to be deeply underestimated. In this paper I emphasize the significant contribution the Church has made to civil resistance in different parts of the world and attempt to shed light on its facilitation mechanism. Although, much still needs to be uncovered in this field, the first step has been done towards analyzing complicated relations between the Church and opposition activists. Personally, I would prefer the following characteristic provided by ks. Dariusz Firszt: “If I ever need to describe what exactly the Church did in Poland and Brazil, I would dare say it helped, mediated and cured as a chaplain.”

246 Ks. mgr Dariusz Firszt, Personal Interview, 11 April, 2013
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