Picturing the Bosnian War in Canadian and American media: A comparative study of front-page images from top national newspapers

By

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Abstract

This thesis employs a quantitative content analysis to investigate how the war in Bosnia was portrayed through front-page photos comparatively in Canadian and American newspapers. It shows that, as expected, due to the countries’ different roles in the war – earlier boots on the ground vs. later influence from the air – and different international positions, that print editors in each country will tend to represent the war differently both in their photo choices and how those photos are framed.
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Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1: Truth beyond the frame – the history of image in warfare ......................................................... 4
  The problem with picturing Bosnia ........................................................................................................... 17
Chapter 2: Finding the Frame: Canada, America the news narratives of Bosnia ......................................... 20
Chapter 3: The results .................................................................................................................................. 32
  The United States: The New York Times ...................................................................................................... 32
  The United States: The Washington Post .................................................................................................... 39
  Canada: The Globe and Mail ....................................................................................................................... 46
  Canada: The Toronto Star .......................................................................................................................... 50
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 53
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................. 56
Introduction

On May 27, 1995, two years into the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UN observer held hostage by Bosnian Serb troops and chained to a lamp post was prominently pictured on the front pages of the top two Canadian newspapers, The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star. In early June he appeared again on the cover of the Toronto Star with a smile and a coffee mug while still held hostage. Finally on June 19, 1995, a prominent photo on the front page of The Globe and Mail celebrated his release. This UN observer was Captain Patrick Rechner. He did not appear on the front pages of either the New York Times or the Washington Post. Why was his plight so prominently featured on the Canadian front pages? Because he was Canadian. This example illustrates the idea that a country will report on a conflict in terms of its own involvement.

For Canada and the U.S., the dissolution of Yugoslavia put them into a situation where they were called to intervene in a country with which they were not neighbours and in which at the time they had relatively small personal interest. This is an example of how, in an increasingly globalizing world, the way the population of one place perceives a conflict in another matters, since that population can actually affect the outcome of a conflict in a faraway place through its nation’s involvement. However, the reporting on these conflicts, including the war in Bosnia, does not seem to have grown more global in perspective. Prasun Sonwalkar, former journalist with The Times of India and lecturer at the University of the West of England, argues that with the conflicts most covered by the media, “there is a distinct sense of these being ‘our’ wars, because ‘we’ are interested or involved, while ‘their’ wars – the numerous wars and conflicts that are taking place right at this moment in much of the
developing world involving much violence and terrorism – do not really matter much."¹ In other words, a country’s media tends to report in terms of itself. If a country’s relationship to a conflict dictates whether it is covered, it is then fair to assume that it would also dictate how it is covered.

This can be specifically applied to images in the media, even more specifically, to photographs. If a country’s role in a conflict affects how it covers that conflict, it would also dictate which photos from that conflict a news organization places importance on. The best way to judge importance is to look at the front pages of national print media – the most deliberate part of any print publication.

This thesis employs a quantitative content analysis to investigate how the war in Bosnia was portrayed through front-page photos comparatively in Canadian and American newspapers. It shows that, as expected, due to the countries’ different roles in the war – earlier boots on the ground vs. later influence from the air – and different international positions, that print editors in each country will tend to represent the war differently both in their photo choices and how those photos are framed.

My main research question

How are the differences in the photographic imaging of the Bosnian war indicative of the differences in military and political roles in the Bosnian war?

Sub questions

1. What were the differences between Canadian and American front-page images of the Bosnian war?

2. Which events were worthy of a front-page image in each country?

3. Which news frames, aside from self-centered coverage, were prominent in each country.

In the first chapter, I look at picture theory to answer the question, what is a photograph and more specifically, what is a war photograph followed by discussion of the difficulties in picturing the war in Bosnia. This leads to chapter two, in which I outline my methodology and the four news frames that serve as the topics of analysis of the results of this study. They are, self-absorbed coverage, the “ancient ethnic hatreds” argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the “Serb aggression” argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the perceived press push for international intervention. The final chapter, chapter three discusses the results of the content analysis and compares and contrasts the four newspapers from two countries.

This research is important to the discussion surrounding the imaging of the war in Bosnia in western media because the “western media” is usually restricted to the United States and Western Europe, but Canada was also involved in the conflict, even leading peace-keeping operations at one point, and therefore the imaging that helped form Canadians’ perceptions of the war counts and provides a more complete picture of North American coverage of the war.
Chapter 1: Truth beyond the frame – the history of image in warfare

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina came on the heels of the Gulf War, known as a “live TV war”\(^2\) for the “unprecedented role played by CNN in establishing an aura of ‘live’ coverage.”\(^3\) With its live coverage that “created the impression that the conflict would unfold before us on the screen,” television was an important medium at the time.\(^4\) For the war in Bosnia, within the broader dissolution of Yugoslavia, television continued with and even increased its instant coverage, adding “the personal report from someone, somewhere, with a video-camera,” making it among the most heavily covered conflicts.\(^5\)

Even to the present day it is still considered as such. In his 2013 response to a series of reviews on his well-respected book *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, author Josip Glaurdic referred to the conflict as “the best documented international crisis of the past two decades”.\(^6\)

And it was not just documented on television. Despite television’s importance at the time, newspapers cannot be ignored. Though readership was already in decline (when the increase in households is taken into account) and continued its decline during the war, paid

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subscriptions in the U.S. and Canada were still in the millions.\textsuperscript{7} Advertising and circulation
revenues were still increasing in the U.S.\textsuperscript{8} and online news was still in its infancy.

Newspapers are relevant to the discussion of war coverage in Bosnia and the pictures
seen on their pages deserve separate consideration. As still images, they present a different
type of imaging than that seen on television, which is associated mostly with moving images.

The stillness of the photographs in newspapers presents a unique problem, with a two-
fold control of the imaging that shifts from taking to viewing. First, a single still image
represents a single moment, a moment that is decided upon by the photographer who controls
the image at its creation. This source of control is not completely unlike the videographer
deciding where to point the video camera; however the control is more concentrated in that
only one moment can be captured at a time. In most cases on the front page of a newspaper,
this moment will be seen in isolation from other images.

This moment, the “decisive moment,” the “pregnant moment, the “story-telling
moment”,\textsuperscript{9} the moment that makes a photograph a “neat slice of time, not a flow” is the
essence of the nature of photography and the key to its effectiveness when compared to
television which is “a stream of underselected images, each of which cancels its
predecessor.”\textsuperscript{10} However, the significance of this moment has not been universally accepted.
For example, photographer Diane Arbus eschewed the candidness inherent in the decisive

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7}Communications Management Inc., “Discussion paper: Sixty years of daily newspaper circulation trends,”
media-cmi.com, http://media-
p. 6, 14.
\item \textsuperscript{8}Rick Edmonds, Emily Guskin, Tom Rosenstiel and Amy Mitchell., “The State of the News Media 2012:
Newspapers: By the Numbers,” The Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism,
http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/newspapers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-by-the-
numbers/ (accessed May 22, 1013).
\item \textsuperscript{9}Cartier Bresson, Victor Burgin and Alfred Eisenstadt respectively quoted in Barbie Zelizer, \textit{About to Die: How
News Images Move the Public} (Oxford University Press, 2010), 2.
\item \textsuperscript{10}Susan Sontag, \textit{On Photography} (New York: RosettaBooks LLC, 2005),
\end{itemize}
moment that is meant to capture the essence of the subject and instead had her subjects pose because of her “view that self-revelation is a continuous, evenly distributed process” meaning that “there is no decisive moment”.\textsuperscript{11}

But the continuity of self-revelation, or life itself, is exactly why the decisive moment is so important. The viewer is seemingly aware of that continuity and, upon looking at a “slice” of it, cannot help but consider what came before, what else happened during and what came after.\textsuperscript{12} As the viewer fills in the continuity surrounding the image, what is imagined often does not resemble what really happened.\textsuperscript{13}

Aside from being a catalyst for further consideration about a moment, “the photograph stimulates a controlled emotive response – because it acts on us sub rosa, under the level of our conscience intellectualizing; controlled because we retain the power of turning the page.”\textsuperscript{14} The above has led Susan Sontag, Susan Moeller and Hanno Hardt and Bonnie Brennen, among others, to consider that the stillness of photographs makes them more memorable than television, while “the power of turning the page” leads into the second part of the two-sided control dynamic of photographs – viewing.

In viewing still photographs, the newspaper reader becomes the one with control over the image in that he or she can decide how long to spend with the photograph, not only upon the first viewing, but also in many cases on multiple viewings which are also under the reader’s control. Newspaper editors can choose which moments to show but once the image goes to press they do not have the ability that television editors do to decide how long the

\textsuperscript{12} Susan D. Moeller, \textit{Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death} (Routledge, 1999), 39.
\textsuperscript{13} Barbie Zelizer, \textit{About to Die: How News Images Move the Public} (Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.
\textsuperscript{14} Susan D. Moeller, \textit{Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death} (Routledge, 1999), 39.
reader spends with the image and what the reader sees before or after it. Roland Barthes writes about this time spent interacting with photographs in his often-cited book *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* and the lasting effect that time spent has. When looking at a photograph, one can have a general appreciation for it without being struck by it. This is the *studium*. However the power of the photograph lies in the detail that “pricks” the viewer and jumps out right away – the *punctum*. This is not a result of intention on the part of the photographer but something embedded in the scene that is recognizable but un-nameable and that, at times, will “prick” the mind long after the photograph is out of view. 

“*I may know better a photograph I remember than a photograph I am looking at*” Barthes writes, and in doing so, highlights the potential lasting effect an image may have by sticking itself in the mind.

Sontag observes that “Life is not about significant details, illuminated by a flash, fixed forever. Photographs are.” The photograph’s “inaccurate relation to the real world” raises the much-debated question of how a photograph could be trusted to show the real world, how truthful it can really be.

At its emergence, photography was considered to be “credible and objective evidence”, and was used to help the press’ fading credibility. In the 1920s and 1930s, the

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“documentary style,” of photography emerged with an “affinity to ‘the real’ and therefore to the claims of journalistic objectivity or social truth”.  

At the start of the second World War, newspapers were suffering from a skeptical public, with a third of Americans saying that they did not believe what was printed in the press, while photographs were gaining popularity. Traditional reporters were wary of photographs and only allowed them in the newspapers as support or illustration for a story, making photographs play an “indexical role in news rather than an interpretive one.”

As Nazi concentration camps were liberated at the end of World War II, “the press needed to establish an authoritative record of what it was seeing, and images became central in doing so. For many, pictures offered the crowning proof of what the liberation forces saw.”

World War II then became the “ultimate proving ground for photo-reporting on a massive scale” in which “photojournalism truly came of age.”

However, despite photojournalism’s roots in the aim of objective representation, as scholars started to spend more time discussing photography starting in the mid 1960s, the subjective aspects of the medium were explored and “attempts by writers such as Sontag and

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Alan Sekula to establish critical discourse that examines photography both as art and information fueled continuing reactions and debate."

Dona Schwartz, in writing about this debate (and bringing it into the digital age of photo manipulation), looks at the logical fallacy “which simultaneously asserts the objectivity of the news photographs while praising the skill and artistry of its best practitioners.” Essentially, photographs were considered objective compared to hand drawn illustrations because a machine could more accurately capture real life; however “it is the photographer who sees, not the camera; nor do cameras themselves make pictures.” The photographer’s choices, between lenses, lighting, framing, and of course the ‘decisive moment,’ “contribute to the way in which objects and events in front of the camera appear in the image.”

She looks at how “journalism has framed news photographs to appear to have excised the photographer’s viewpoint – yielding an objective, machine-made reflection of the world” and concludes that “the strategic elevation of recording above expression, of fact above art, that emerged along with the commercial press has encouraged denial of the constructed, authored nature of photographic representations.”

Related to this debate have been controversies surrounding allegations that photographs have been staged. One of the subjects of these controversies is *The Death of a Loyalist Militiaman*, which appears to show a soldier flailing backwards at the moment he is

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hit by a bullet during the Spanish Civil War. The photographer, Robert Capa, considered to be “the photographer who came to epitomize the war photojournalist in the 20th century,” was accused of passing off a simulated war exercise as a real battle. Griffin quotes Phillip Knightley, who muses about how a caption that says the photograph took place during a battle, meaning the photographer was in real danger, creates a valuable image. The photo would have been worthless, he argued, if the caption had said the photo was taken during training, “and there is nothing in the photograph to deny this”.

This inability of Capa’s photograph itself to deny the allegations of staging, touches on the aspect of photographs that Sol Worth explored in “Pictures Can’t Say Ain’t”. He argues that they cannot really be deemed true or false since they “cannot deal with what is not,” they don’t have the ability to negate like written language does. “A picture-maker cannot specify, out of all the things that his picture does not show, which he means to say are not the case… all that pictures can show is what is – on the picture surface.”

However, just because a photograph (manipulation aside) cannot lie, does not mean it is necessarily true, or fully representative. To say that “all that pictures can show is what is – on the picture surface,” is to correctly identify the denotative aspect but ignore the connotative aspect of photography. “Any designation of a photograph as a mirror of the world is a superficial explanation that ignored the cultural and political dimensions of seeing and

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constructing reality.”

To debate the truth or falseness of an image is to oversimplify what an image is and discussion of photography has moved to include the exploration of its connotative aspects and beyond.

Essentially, what makes photography a special medium is the duplicate nature of an image, the “two forces” as described by Zelizer through which photographs work. They are, as previously mentioned, denotation, the realist approach to photography that “suggests that images reflect what ‘is there’,” and connotation, which “suggests that images provide more than what is physically caught by the camera, where associated with symbolism, generalizability, and universality, the image draws from broad symbolic systems in lending meaning to what is depicted.”

Even though photojournalism often derives its authority from denotation, photographs are actually “frequently used in ways that depict not the core of a news story but its peripheral, symbolic and associative sides – scenes removed from those described in the text but valuable because they play to broader mind-sets about how the world works.”

Robert L. Craig outlines this duplicity and goes one step further by attributing a photograph’s power to its subjective elements:

“On the one hand, they are representational. Their mode of coding meaning replicated, in some stylized fashion, their referent. This representational mode codes pictures in a way that connects them to the real world and makes them familiar. That is why they become an easy form of address to viewers.”

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39 Barbie Zelizer, About to Die: How News Images Move the Public (Oxford University Press, 2010), 5.
“Most of the political power of images comes from how they engage viewers’ subjectivity and allow a certain degree of free association in the process of interpretation.”

This is shown in Zelizer’s look at photographs from World War II, that despite “referentiality” being the expectation of photojournalism, “it was within the move from referentiality to universality that the pictures became particularly meaningful,” which suggests “an inversion of what it was expected to do for journalism.” So photojournalism relies on denotation but its significance lies in its connotation, hence, as Elizabeth Edwards put it, “The polarization of visual production should not necessarily be read therefore as oppositional, realist versus expressive, document versus art, but as objectively related and dialectically interdependent phenomena.” Interdependent they may be, however they are not the only pieces to the puzzle. According to Zelizer, denotation and connotation do not fully describe the nature of a photograph, especially “when dealing with events of an unsettled nature.” In this case, contingency and the imagination may constitute a particularly useful stance for those needing to establish meaning.

Zelizer introduces a third element, “subjunctivity,” which “offers a way of transforming the relationship between the possible, probable, impossible and certain by

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accommodating contingency, the imagination, and the emotions.”\textsuperscript{45} She connects this third element to Barthes’ “third meaning” of a photograph, “involving what he called the image’s obtuseness, accent, or anaphoric side” which he used “to push discussions of the photograph toward the idea of ‘the punctum,’ which saw the onlooker’s engagement with the image as key to understanding the image itself.”\textsuperscript{46} This “subjunctive voice,” Zelizer notes, “helps explain how people might engage with images differently,”\textsuperscript{47} and it becomes particularly useful in the unsettled times associated with war, terrorism, natural disaster, epidemic, torture, and planned violence.”\textsuperscript{48}

Even though a reader’s understanding of a photograph is shaped by factors other than its factuality (such as the imagination or the emotions), the newspaper reader comes away with the feeling of understanding a news event after engaging with an image because there is still an expectation that that image is “real”, and this expectation is based in the history of news photography as previously outlined.

And “combat photojournalism,” as Michael Griffin notes in his analysis of war photographs, “has come to represent the height of photographic realism.”\textsuperscript{49}

“The general tension in photojournalism between a presumption of naturalism on the one hand and an emphasis on the craft of picture making on the other becomes heightened in war photography, a genre largely defined by an ultra-realistic sense of ‘capturing action,’ but its use and meaning is most often generated by a symbolic relationship to operative national mythologies.”\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{45} Barbie Zelizer, \textit{About to Die: How News Images Move the Public} (Oxford University Press, 2010), 14.
\textsuperscript{46} Barbie Zelizer, \textit{About to Die: How News Images Move the Public} (Oxford University Press, 2010), 12.
\textsuperscript{47} Barbie Zelizer, \textit{About to Die: How News Images Move the Public} (Oxford University Press, 2010), 15.
\textsuperscript{48} Barbie Zelizer, \textit{About to Die: How News Images Move the Public} (Oxford University Press, 2010), 14.
Essentially, the images that become iconic are not the informative photographs that preserve specific historic details, but the ones that stand as symbols.\textsuperscript{51} As an example, Griffin cites an analysis of British war photography from World War I, World War II, the Falklands, and Northern Ireland that found that “the recurring themes of British wartime photography were the necessities of fulfilling one’s duty without hesitation or complaint and maintaining a semblance of normality in the midst of destruction, disruption, and sacrifice.”\textsuperscript{52} This idea of national “duty” was also central to the war photography in Canadian newspapers during World War I, as was the “image of the soldier as tourist” that “gave a clear indication that joining the service was a risk-free ticket to excitement and adventure with very few life-threatening consequences.”\textsuperscript{53} Further, as will be addressed in more detail later, national consciousness was central to the British press’ coverage of the war in Bosnia.

As we have seen, “photography as a medium is characterized by two powerful and potentially contradictory qualities: its apparent ability to capture a particular moment and its tendency to transcend the moment.”\textsuperscript{54} Photographs tend to be the most transcendent and the most useful “as markers of collective memory” when they can “symbolize socially shared concepts or beliefs rather than present new or unfamiliar information.”\textsuperscript{55}


Hence war photographs, as Zelizer notes, tend to fit within existing criteria for what a war photograph is. They do not always depict the reality of the conflict they are picturing, but how it is thought the conflict should be portrayed based on images of previous conflicts. Griffin, drawing on Taylor’s observation, concludes that “photographs offer meaning and memory only in the forms in which they are used an in terms of the news narrative in which they are embedded.”

This idea that a war photograph needs to look like a war photograph, regardless of the specifics of a particular war and that, connected but conversely, they must conform to certain existing “news narratives,” means that there is a clue to reading photographs that goes beyond denotation, “what is there” but stops short of “subjunctivity”, lying in the realm of connotation where meaning is drawn from “broad symbolic systems.” This is framing.

Framing analysis theory, developed by Goffman in the mid 1970s, basically looks at how information is portrayed, which elements are emphasized and which are understated. Robert Entman explains framing as “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”

Following Entman’s definition, Philip Hammond used framing as part of a textual analysis to look at “how the causes of conflicts and crises are understood, and what the

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56 Barbie Zelizer, “When War Is Reduced to a Photograph,” in Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, ed. Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer (Routledge, 2004), 116, 124.
appropriate international response is thought to be,"^61 but it can be applied to images as well, even if the frame becomes more difficult to detect. In her analysis of *Associated Press* photos of Afghan women, Shahira Fahmy notes that, “as images look more natural and closer to reality, it is possible for viewers to be unaware of visual framing. It is easier to overlook than the more obvious verbal framing.”^62

Fahmy looks at framing in terms of stereotyping, a reliance on “oversimplified” opinions “that can be identified by examining the way a particular group of people is being depicted.” She uses the example of teenagers regularly being depicted as troublemakers to show how “if a particular group appears mostly within one category, then we must assume that stereotyping has taken place.”^63 In other words, teenagers are “framed” as troublemakers. The press has been accused of “creating and perpetuating stereotypes,”^64 which Fahmy cautions could “result in misunderstanding of the reality of an environment, especially a distant one.,”^65 since “most people learn about foreign events, places and people through visual media.”^66

Essentially, images, and images of conflict in particular, are important for what they show, their emotional appeal, but also how they are framed because the framing plays a major role in how the images are understood and therefore how a conflict such as the one in Bosnia

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is understood. Analyzing the “visual frames” that were most used can help to situate photographic coverage from both Canada and the U.S. in the discussion and analysis of media coverage of the conflict in Bosnia.

The problem with picturing Bosnia

As Yugoslavia was disintegrating, James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State under George Bush, famously (or infamously), said that “We don’t have a dog in this fight,” in reference to his country’s position on the conflict. The problem with studying the conflict in Bosnia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, especially as an outsider, is that it seems that everyone in the discussion does, in fact, “have a dog in this fight.”

This problem is twofold. First is that the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the war in Bosnia was a traumatic event, as Payam Akhavan, a legal scholar in Canada of Iranian origin who was the ICTY prosecution’s first legal advisor notes in his preface to a collection of essays by regional scholars. After writing of the “horror of the devastation and human suffering” that he saw while doing fieldwork in 1992 and 1993, he notes that he “cannot pretend to be a historian or scholar on Yugoslavia, but my views are born of a brief but hard experience. Perhaps this is why I am somewhat impatient with sterile academic treatment of the subject.” He continues, “This grim reality is worth remembering lest we betray the suffering of the Yugoslav people through callous and haughty intellectualizing.”

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68 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Revised (Penguin Books, 1997), p. 29-30
This trauma, which rightly gives reason for Akhavan’s condemnation of “callous and haughty intellectualizing” means that the topic is emotionally charged. This leads to the second part of the problem, which is that one has to tread exceedingly carefully through the topic because everything in the discussion can be deemed problematic, as film scholar Kriss Ravetto-Biagioli pointed out in a piece on Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav film published in 2012:

“Such extraordinary revisionary and reactionary forms of identity politics make it difficult to ‘locate’ or ‘situate’ oneself without assuming some, if not all, of the political baggage that goes with such a predicament. Furthermore, highly-charged debates over territorial rights make it almost impossible to engage critically at any level in the discourse on the Balkans without seeming to take sides…”\(^\text{71}\)

There is also a third problem with discourse surrounding the conflict in Bosnia. As mentioned earlier, Glaurdic referred to the conflict as “the best documented international crisis of the past two decades.” In doing so he was marveling at how the field has become “marred by useless debates over ‘controversies’ which should not even exist in the first place, and by very slow progress in improving our understanding of what happened in Yugoslavia and why.” This trouble with understanding is worth marveling at because the conflict was so well documented, though Glaurdic also considers that this abundance of documentation could actually be hindering the process of understanding.\(^\text{72}\)

The war Bosnia is situated within this charged and complex Yugoslav conflict. This study looks only at images of the war from within the boundaries of, or directly relating to Bosnia because, not only did it make up the bulk of the photo coverage, but Bosnia was


treated as a microcosm of the wider dissolution. Its population was 44 per cent Muslim, 31 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat, making it the center of many territorial disputes as Croatia and later Bosnia declared independence while Serbia was attempting to consolidate its ethnic population. This also housed the longest modern day siege of a city (Sarajevo) and a massacre (Srebrenica) that saw parallels drawn to WWII, reopened the debate over what constitutes genocide, and is the reason for ongoing trials at the Hague.

As we can see, a key problem may be that there are a multitude of perspectives to understand and make sense of the war in Bosnia, each with its own sensitivities attached. From a media standpoint, when covering a conflict of this nature, information needs a way to be portrayed in a way that can be interpreted in a meaningful, understandable way. This is where framing comes in. By choosing a media frame for the images of the war in Bosnia, news organizations are perpetuating certain themes relevant to the region. As we will see, there are many topics that are relevant to the war in Bosnia, however some have more visual potential. What follows is a look at some of the main “news narratives” relevant to images that appear in the discussion of press coverage of Bosnia.

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Chapter 2: Finding the Frame: Canada, America the news narratives of Bosnia

Given the complexity of looking at images of such a complicated war with a wide variety of analysis available, I am studying the photographs through a quantitative content analysis, in order to try and focus on exactly what was pictured. A time period of four years was chosen, in order to allow patterns to develop.

Despite this complexity, however, media coverage of the war in Bosnia has been discussed at length from the perspectives of dominant countries, specifically British and American. As the dominant world power since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States proves to be an interesting study because, despite its leadership role in the world, it is widely noted for, criticized and contemplated, for not getting truly involved until the end, at which point it played a leadership role in the November 1995 Dayton conference in Ohio that led to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was only at this time that the United States made a real commitment of its military to the conflict.

I am bringing another country to the table, Canada, not only because its media coverage of the conflict has been less discussed and an analysis of print photos from the country has yet to be done, but because it contrasts with the United States. The two countries share a border and history, however they are politically different, starting, but not ending with Canada being a parliamentary democracy. Canada, being a commonwealth country, has a

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74 Reporting war, Framing Post Cold War conflicts, Bosnia by Television among others.
75 The study that comes closest to resembling this one is a linguistic analysis of actors in The Globe and Mail
specific relationship to Great Britain that sees Canada’s international interests often tied to Britain’s. In the case of the war in Bosnia, Canadian forces were part of UN peacekeeping mission from the beginning, a task that is closely tied to Canadian national identity, unlike the Americans who were generally reluctant to get involved in peace-keeping operations since they considered them detrimental to “combat readiness”. They instead preferred to go into a conflict ready for combat and equipped with higher body protection. The Canadians were closer in philosophy to the Europeans and sent soldiers to talk to people on the streets without helmets or flak jackets in order to collect intelligence. Not only were Canadian troops on the ground from the beginning, a Canadian General, Lewis MacKenzie, was a leader of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force. Canada was, however, not a part of the Dayton conference. By adding Canada into the mix, a more complete image of the North American coverage of the war in Bosnia can be achieved.

The newspapers studied from each country – The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, New York Times and Washington Post – were chosen because they are reputable major daily broadsheet newspapers that are at the top in their respective countries and place an importance on foreign reporting (all have foreign bureaus, even the Toronto Star and the Washington Post, even though they are essentially municipal dailies, just with slightly broader distribution).

The Globe and Mail was Canada’s only truly national paper at the time (the rival National Post was not created until 1998) and has long been considered the country’s paper of record. It is geared towards an affluent, influential and educated readership and has a strong business

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76 World War I is an examples of this, as can be seen in David R. Spencer, “Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy: Canada and the War to End All Wars,” in Picturing the Past: Media, History, and Photography, ed. Bonnie Brennen and Hanno Hardt (University of Illinois Press, 1999).
reader base. The Toronto Star has more of a social justice aim than the Globe and is the most-read paper in the country though it is mainly distributed in Ontario.

The New York Times and the Washington Post were chosen not as sister publications to the Canadian ones but as comparable leading national print publications. The New York Times is considered the paper of record and the Washington Post is also geared towards an affluent, influential and educated audience but with a focus on news, as opposed to the Wall Street Journal’s focus on business.

The front page is the best place to analyze the differences between newspapers in the two countries because it is the most deliberate part of the whole publication that requires input from top editors at multiple points throughout the day. It is also what the public sees without buying the product. This means images on the front pages are deemed the most important or relevant and can be considered to show a certain intent on the part of the news organizations, including the intent to reach and attract the largest possible audience. Researchers have come to the same conclusion: “Overall, the literature on photographic dominance suggests that editors would select to run the most important images of the day on the front pages. These images would attract attention and have a strong impact.”

Restricting the photo analysis to front page images also avoids skewing data toward more similarities in photo usage between the Canada and the United States that would occur

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78 I know this because, at the time of writing, I am a Globe and Mail employee, but it is also pretty widely known by anyone who reads the paper.
on inside pages that rely heavily on images chosen by lower-level employees who are looking at the same pool of wire photos. As Zelizer notes, “most news organization use text-based editors rather than photographers to select pictures across all news media, with often ill effect.”\(^83\) It also avoids attributing news intent to photo choices made in order to facilitate layout, though it must be acknowledged that the front page is subject to important business concerns. As Dona Schwartz concludes, “The front page can be conceived as an advertisement that sells the advertising inside the newspaper.”\(^84\) Also, more design energy is put into front pages, so a photo may have been chosen for its image quality over its content. Finally, a top story often make the black-line while the image chosen for the front page is a better visual but more trivial, which means important coverage of less-visual aspects of the war have the potential to be excluded.

The archives for PDFs of Canadian newspapers were available online through the Toronto Public Library while the American newspapers were available through the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.

Each newspapers’ archives were searched for the word “Bosnia” and the results were restricted by page number “1” or “A1”. The timeframe of the search was January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1995, to capture the signing of the Dayton Agreement on December 14, of that year and a couple weeks of the fallout. Though the accepted start date is disputed as either being Bosnia-Herzegovina’s March 1 referendum on independence, or the European Community’s recognition of that independence on April 6, the Republika Srpska (ethnically Serbian territory carved out of Bosnia-Herzegovina) was proclaimed on January 9, 1992.\(^85\)

http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosnia/viewitem.cfm?itemID=690&typeID=386.
Therefore, there is potential for coverage of increasing tension in Bosnia and the build up to the war, as has been common in coverage of other conflicts.\textsuperscript{86} However, understandably, since the war in Bosnia was part of a greater conflict within the disintegration of Yugoslavia, there were no photos of Bosnia on the front pages until days after Canada and the United States’ recognized its independence on April 7 (the \textit{Toronto Star} had a small map on April 6). Photographs from earlier in the year were focused on the conflict in Croatia and were excluded from this study, as were any other photos relating exclusively to conflicts in Croatia or Serbia without direct connection to Bosnia (though of course it can be argued that they are all connected). When an image was directly related to the conflict in Bosnia, it was added to the sample for study. This method resulted in 81 images from \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 63 from the \textit{Toronto Star}, 176 from the \textit{New York Times} and 174 from the \textit{Washington Post}.

Captions were also included in the study as context for the photos and a help to glean identifying information in order to guide my assignment to categories. Headlines and the first couple graphs of the story were also used for identifying information in some cases where the photo was a direct illustration of the text and the caption provided general instead of detailed information. The sources of the images were noted, however they were predominantly wires and were not as crucial to the comparison as other elements. Maps, even though they are not photos, were included as they made up a significant number of the images on the front pages and are used as informative tools for an audience that is far away from the conflict being covered. Even though maps were used, the negligible number of thumbnail-sized cartoons that appeared were excluded from this study.

\textsuperscript{86} Michael Griffin, “Picturing America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ in Afghanistan and Iraq: Photographic Motifs as News Frames,” \textit{Journalism} 5, no. 4 (November 1, 2004): 386, accessed January 11, 2013,
In order to analyze the content of the front-page images, certain categories were used that are based on those found in media researcher Michael Griffin’s 1995 study “Picturing the Gulf War: Constructing an Image of War in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report”. Griffin found that, despite media claims of an era of “liveness”, there was a “scarcity of pictures depicting ongoing events” while “a narrowly limited range of images, with a special emphasis on cataloguing military weaponry and technology, dominated the pictorial coverage.”

His expectation to see pictures of first-hand events in weekly newsmagazines “because newsmagazines hit the stands more than a week after the events they report on, they serve as a kind of news digest” of “visual highlights”, seems a little like a disconnect in logic and makes his conclusion, that there is a lack of pictures of first-hand, on the ground news events, seem a little bit obvious.

However, his method appears to be sound and has been used as the basis for Shahira Fahmy and Daekyung Kim’s content analysis of the differences shown in support for the Iraq war in visual coverage of the New York Times and the Guardian. It has also been recommended by media researcher Philip Hammond as an approach to news images that could be used in content analyses relating to the war in Bosnia, specifically to complement his

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textual analysis of Bosnia coverage in four UK daily newspapers.\textsuperscript{91} This means that Griffin’s approach has already been applied beyond U.S. news magazines and the Gulf War.

Griffin’s categories were developed after extensive research into war photography from past conflicts, both in news coverage and academic discourse to find which patterns can be expected in war photography, which is useful for this study.\textsuperscript{92} However, his categories also resulted from his interest in “how much of the pictorial coverage [of the Gulf War] actually depicted wartime events and combat-related military activity.”\textsuperscript{93}

For this study I am less interested in how “live” the coverage is.\textsuperscript{94} Based previous discussions of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and media coverage of the war in Bosnia, the four main “news narratives” that are used as topics of analysis of the results of this study are, self-absorbed coverage, the “ancient ethnic hatreds” argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the “Serb aggression” argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the perceived press push for international intervention. Specific elements within each of these pillars of analysis are expected to be present based on their visual potential.

The primary interest is to see how much of the “pictorial coverage” by a country’s newspaper reflects the country’s involvement in the conflict instead of images of simply the conflict itself. This comes primarily from Hammond’s previously mentioned study that found this self consciousness and self absorption in the framing of the war in the British press, as Western and particularly British sources dominated the coverage, showing favour for a

\textsuperscript{91} Philip Hammond, \textit{Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention} (Manchester University Press, 2008), 225.


\textsuperscript{94} It should be noted that actual coding for content analysis involves two people who should agree on the coding of the images. For Griffin’s study it was +97.8% and any disagreement was resolved. In the case of this study, for obvious reasons that this is an MA thesis, this inter-coder testing has not been done.
“British news angle”.\textsuperscript{95} A pilot study of front-page images of the war in Bosnia from 1992 in London’s \textit{The Times} that I did earlier this year found that images of British and other Western officials appeared most frequently on the front pages, more so than the victims of the war, which supports Hammonds findings from a (albeit limited) photographic standpoint. Therefore, an abundance of photos of U.S. or Canadian along with other Western political leaders, troops and aid is expected.

The difficult part in dealing with these classifications, was deciding when a photo of world leaders was relevant. For the most part, photos of leaders at international summits during which Bosnia was merely mentioned were excluded from this study. Only if the photo showed leaders signing something directly related to Bosnia or speaking about Bosnia in a meeting where Bosnia was the focus, were these images included. For example, a photo in the Washington Post that showed U.S. President Bill Clinton jogging with his security personnel in France after a meeting was not included even though the story it illustrated focused on the discussion of Bosnia at that meeting. The image they chose to use did not picture Bosnia or international reaction to Bosnia, but instead pictured Clinton in France more generally. Photos of leaders shaking hands or signing to an agreement relating to Bosnia, of which there are many, were included.

Related to this is whether or not there is a common enemy or victim pictured and who that is, in order to establish whether the newspapers framed the photographs in terms of the “ancient ethnic hatred” argument” as outlined by Dejan Jovic in his review of explanatory approaches for the collapse of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{96} The “ancient ethnic hatred” argument”, that

\textsuperscript{95} Philip Hammond, \textit{Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention} (Manchester University Press, 2008).

Jovic notes (as a criticism) was “popular in the media”, contends that ethnic conflict is inherent in the history of the region but was successfully suppressed by dictatorial rule, most recently by Tito’s communist party. However, with the end of communism and the death of Tito, this ancient ethnic strife was unleashed, leading to war and the collapse of Yugoslavia. Jovic in line with current sentiments about this controversial argument flat out rejects it. However, it is relevant to this study because it is considered to have been popular in the press as Jovic points out and was a prevailing Western narrative at the time.

Also involving ethnicity is the “Serbian aggression” explanation for the war, outlined by Hammond as a competing idea to the “‘ancient ethnic hatred’ argument”. He notes that Susan Woodward identified these two explanations in competition. In contrast with the “‘ancient ethnic hatred’ argument” above, the ‘Serbian aggression’ explanation contends that the war was “the result of Serbia’s aggressive territorial ambitions,” meaning Bosnian Muslims, who were in the way of this, would have been victimized.

Because of the two news frames described above, images of aggressors (inflicting destruction, displacement, injury or death) and victims (people displaced, injured, dead or their funerals) are differentiated by ethnicity. Injury and death are highlighted by asterisk in order to glean a sense of severity of the victimization. However, in distinguishing between ethnicities in Bosnia, a Bosnian Serb and a Serb are counted together, for example, because the press did not seem to consistently clearly differentiate in their identification. Another issue with the

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ethnicity groupings is that often the victims and aggressors were simply classified as Bosnian. Though in many instances, someone who knows the region and the conflict well would know in which cases to assume that Bosnian referred to Bosnian Muslim (especially in the Srebrenica enclave), or could glean ethnicity from names, it would however only be an assumption, as it would be to expect that North American readers have that specific knowledge. Even with that knowledge, however, the distinction is tricky, as illustrated by an Associated Press photo on the front page of the April 11, 1992 *New York Times* with the caption, “Muslim and Serbian refugees fleeing their homes yesterday in Zvornik, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Serbian forces threatened to raze the town.” This shows that unless specified, one cannot assume the ethnicity of someone pictured simply by where they are or who they are running from. Therefore, even though in many cases Bosnian could mean Bosnian Muslim, the photo was placed in the ethnicity non-specified category so as not to assume, despite the possibility that data could be skewed.\(^{101}\) However since this study looks at what the public what presented, I must stick to what was presented and not bring information to the images that is not there.

Treated as related to images of victims are also images of destruction, categorized by ethnicity based on who is affected by the destruction. An image depicting the source of destruction would be categorized as an image of an aggressor.

Finally, the perceived press push for international intervention. Called “journalism of attachment” by Nel Ruigrok in a content analysis of Dutch press coverage of the Bosnian war, it “proposes that reporters are participants in the conflicts they report, and as a consequence,

\(^{101}\) One March 17, 1993 photo caption in *The Globe and Mail* is deliberately specifies a pictured woman as “Bosnian Catholic” – likely to distinguish from Muslim, however it also shows further the how complicated and vague the designation “Bosnian” is.
take part in the public debate about the conflict it.” In terms of the war in Bosnia, the intention was “to make somebody do something to end it.” “Journalism of attachment” is accompanied by “preferred framework of ‘good guys versus bad guys’” which the media had a role in creating. In the case of the war in Bosnia, the presumed “bad guys” would be the Bosnian Serbs or Serbs, while the presumed “good guys” would be the Bosnian Muslims, in line with the “Serbian-aggression” explanation.

From these points, a list of categories was comprised and photos were placed in each category. Each category could be chosen only based on what can actually be seen in the photograph. This means that even if a cutline mentions, for example, that a victim is injured by a Serb shell, it only counts as a photo of a victim because the shell is not seen in the image. Photos that fit into more than one category are counted more than once because they do count as an image of each of those categories. For example, a photo of a Bosnian Olympian training in a ruined building shows civilian life as well as destruction. This makes sense if I am trying to gauge the image of the war that was propagated by Canadian and American newspapers. Photos were placed in a maximum of three different categories. However, there had to be an exception for the cases of three photos from the New York Times and one from the Washington Post in which four or more (up to six) categories of political leaders were pictured equally. Therefore, category totals will surpass the total number of images.

Aside from analyzing the content of the images, graphic elements have also been taken into account. Specifically, this study looks at where the photo was placed on the page (above or below the fold) and whether, in terms of size, it was the dominant photo or not, or whether

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it was just a mug shot (a thumbnail photo of a person’s head and shoulders). This is to gauge how important each news organization and, consequently, each country, deemed the images to be.

Finally, this study also looks at which events or times of the war received the most coverage in each country, in order to gauge differences in coverage priorities. This is done by calculating the number of A1 images per month and then identifying which events were taking place in months with higher numbers of photos.

In looking at how photographs were framed relative to the above-mentioned discussions of press coverage of the war, I can see what the public was presented. However I am careful to avoid ascribing intent to the part of editors with whom I have not spoken for this study. I also cannot guess at what readers took from the images or whether the photos had any impact. I can only look at what was presented to the reader, and how what was presented fit within existing conventions.
Chapter 3: The results

The United States: The New York Times

The category of images that appeared most on the front pages of the *New York Times* during the time period of study was that of victims whose ethnicity is not specified, at 36 of 176 images. After that, maps came in second at 29 of 176; American political leaders in third at 25; Bosnian Muslim victims at 12 in fourth; and Western military forces and equipment as well as civilian life: ethnicity not specified, tied for fifth place with 11 each. A analysis of the graphic elements of the front page reflects a similar picture.

The top categories pictured above the fold are: victims: ethnicity not specified, at 27; American political leaders at 24; Maps at 23; American military forces and equipment is tied with other Western military forces and equipment at 10; and Bosnian Muslim victims at 9.

The top dominant categories pictured are: victims: ethnicity not specified at 28; American political leaders at 16; other Western military forces and equipment is tied with civilian life: ethnicity not specified, and destruction: affected ethnicity not specified, at 9; American military forces and equipment at 8; and Bosnian Muslim victims at 7.

At first glance, it appears that the *New York Times* broke with the previously discussed tendency to report on a war based on its country’s own participation and instead pictured the war itself. It showed a total of 55 photos of victims, 34 photos of both local leaders and local military forces (including aggressors), 14 photos of the destruction, 13 of civilian life and one photo of a demonstration, for a total of 117 images of local subjects, which is more than the 70
images depicting international elements, 99 if maps of Bosnia, created specifically with an international (and geographically ignorant) reader in mind, are included.

However, even though majority counts might not highlight them, there are still many indications that the NYT photos reflected the American role in the conflict. U.S.-specified political and military actors make up the majority of political and military actors pictured. At 35, it is more than the 16 other western political and military actors and the 13 other similar international actors. It is also more than the photos of political and military actors identified as Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats combined, which is 32. When these U.S. photos are added to the other western and international ones, the total number of photos representing this aspect of the war is 64, more than the total number of victims pictured throughout the war. Also, when placement and dominance are taken into account, the American political leaders category moves up to second place and the American military forces category moves into the collection of most-frequent images.

Looking more closely at the images of political leaders, there is a clear increase in frequency of U.S. leaders shown as the country became more involved in the conflict, culminating in its participation in an air campaign in 1995, its role as leader and host of the 1995 Dayton conference and finally, a contribution of troops at the end of that same year. In 1992 there are no photos of American political leaders, followed in 1993 and 1994 by four photos each and then finally 17 photos in 1995, with the majority from the second half of the year. The most in a month, five, were from December at around the time of the signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris.

The most frequently appearing American political figure is, not surprisingly, President Clinton at 12 photos, nearly half. All the photos are above the fold, all but two are dominant photos, and in many, he is not alone. He is shown with UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and French President Jacques Chirac, among others, which indicates an active involvement in international discussion of the issue. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who lead the Dayton conference, is shown in five photos, while chief negotiator, diplomat Richard Holbrooke, is not pictured at all.

Photos of the U.S. military and equipment started to appear even later into the conflict than photos of U.S. political leaders, and in a smaller number – 10 in total. The first photo, of American troops in Germany where they are carrying a wounded Sarajevan, appeared on February 7, 1994. Following that was the coverage of U.S. Air Force pilot Scott O’Grady’s rescue after Bosnian Serbs shot down his plane (while he was on a NATO mission). That coverage yielded three photos, all above the fold and two of them the dominant images of the day. It is not until November 30, 1995 that we see a picture of U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia, there for a reconnaissance mission. After that, in early December, there is a photo of U.S. troops ready to deploy to Bosnia from Germany. On December 19, there is a photo of American supplies arriving and finally, starting December 25, three photos of American troops in Bosnia. Among these images, none show American military deaths or injuries.

What is interesting to note is that, despite the relatively late arrival of U.S. troop involvement and therefore its later picturing in the New York Times, there is only one less photo in this category than in the category for other Western military forces and equipment which had 11 photos starting in October 1993 and three more than in the category for other international military forces and equipment (which includes non-specified UN troops), which had seven photos starting June 1992. Therefore going by sheer numbers, the overall impression given by the front page of the NYT is that the American forces were as much a
part of the story of the conflict as the other groups. There can be many reasons for this pattern one of which fits into the idea that a country’s press is more likely to show its own military in a conflict in that the NYT ran possibly fewer military photos when they could only show other countries and then more when the American military was involved. One final point of interest in the military images is that, of all the other nations involved in the peacekeeping mission throughout the conflict, the French forces are the most pictured at seven photos while the only other identified forces were British at two photos and Russian at one photo.

Despite the photos of the American military “catching up” to photos of other international forces, they are still less than half the number of photos in the U.S. political leaders category. The significantly higher total of political leader images reflects the U.S’s more political role in the conflict as previously outlined. This, along with American dominance in images of a political or military nature, indicates that the New York Times photo coverage of the war reflected American’s role in the conflict.

Despite the U.S. and the West dominating the political and military aspects of the imaging, images of victims were most frequently seen and, more importantly, ethnicity, for the most part, is not indicated. As previously mentioned, victims: ethnicity not specified, is the top category at 36 images, and is the category most seen above the fold and as the dominant photo. In comparison, the total number of victims who are identified as either Bosnian Muslim, Serb or Croat is 19. Of these, 15 are above the fold and 13 are dominant. This calls into question the “ancient ethnic hatreds” frame that the western media is commonly accused of using. If the Bosnian conflict was really framed as an ethnic war going back centuries, one would think that it would be important to keep track of who the victims are. This lack of ethnic identification exists in all the local categories that land outside a political or military categorization. In addition to victims, this means destruction, civilian life and demonstrations.
Destruction: affected ethnicity not specified, is seen in 10 photos, with eight above the fold and nine dominant. Destruction specified as affecting Bosnian Muslims, Serbs or Croats is shown only in 4 photos, of which three are above the fold and all four are dominant. Civilian life: ethnicity not specified, is seen in 11 photos, eight above the fold, nine dominant, compared with civilian life with an ethnicity specified, as seen in two photos, both above the fold and dominant. The single image of a local demonstration, above the fold and dominant, does not specify ethnicity.

When political and military categories are taken into account (this includes the aggressor category), the picture is, however, slightly different. The political leaders are all identified by their “sides”. There are also more military forces identified by ethnicity, eight, than not, one. Finally, aggressors are ethnically identified seven times compared to only one where the aggressor’s ethnicity is not specified. All local, ethnically non-specified categories combined yields 60 photos. All local, ethnically identified categories combined yields 57 photos.

In total, there are not significantly more ethnically non-specified photos, and an element of ethnic framing can be seen, however the vast distinction between ethnically identified categories could point to something aside from the “ancient ethnic hatreds” frame. This is the frame of Serb aggression, which also implies primarily Muslim victimhood, and seems to be visible in the collection of NYT images. The only ethnic aggressor identification is Bosnian Serb/Serb, at seven photos, all of which are above the fold, with three as the dominant photo. Also, even though the military category photos were not identified as aggressor images, the Bosnian Serbs/Serbs are pictured there more often as well with six to the Muslim and Croatian one each, creating a more militarized picture of Bosnian Serbs for the NYT audience. In line with the “Serb-aggression” frame, the Bosnian Muslims are the most
frequently ethnically identified victims appearing in, as previously mentioned, 12 photos with nine above the fold and seven dominant. This is even with Bosnians often being categorized as non-specified when one could assume they are Bosnian Muslims. Bosnians Serbs/Serbs are shown in five images while Bosnian Croats/Croats are shown in two. Bosnian Muslims are also the only ones shown to be specifically affected by destruction from the local war, with one photo of a ruined Mosque. The Bosnian Serbs/Serbs are specified as affected by destruction three in three photos, but all of them are the result of the NATO air strikes, making them appear to be the enemy. The only interruption to the pattern to be considered, however, is that no dead Muslims are pictured, only one image depicting an injury, whereas there is a photo of a dead Serb woman as well as a wounded Bosnian Serb soldier. Still, it would appear that the local frame most used was that of Serb aggression, as the numbers show, however the scale must be kept in mind. When the total is 176 photos, seven photos difference in the victim count is not incredibly significant, though the fact that only the Serbs were identified as aggressors is.

This frame of singling out the enemy, leads to another common assertion: that the press was trying to lobby the government to intervene. This is a difficult to pin down in images that, just like Worth’s previously-discussed assertion that they cannot negate, they also cannot announce their intentions and calls for intervention did not dominate the photo captions. This study also does not include interviews with deciding editors nor with policy makers to find out intent and impact, therefore definitive results in this area are unlikely. One method to establish a push for intervention that was attempted was to see whether coverage of the conflict began with mostly images of victims and destruction, all photos showing a dire situation in need of help, and then ended with mostly images of the intervention. Essentially, photos of local victims giving way to western actors. The numbers, however, do not show this.
While 1992 is the year with the most victim photos, at 18, they hold steady at 10 for 1993 and 1994 and then increase again in 1995. This is not a pattern that suggests a clear call-and-answer scenario between the press and policy-makers.

Also, the images of victims were tragic of course, however, out of 55 total images of victims, only 9 showed injury and 6 showed death, with a total of 5 injury photos and three death photos shown above the fold. Some of the most poignant photos show families being separated as women and children were evacuated from the worst conflict zones. One of these, from August 13, 1992 shows a father crouching to hug his young son goodbye before he is bused out of Sarajevo. The boy grips his father’s arm and presses himself into his father’s shoulder – a packed duffle bag, almost bigger than the boy, sits packed beside them. In another from November 11, 1992 only a man’s hands are seen, pressed against the window of a bus in his final goodbye to his wife and son before they are evacuated from Sarajevo. The man’s wedding ring pops out of the photo, much like Barthes’ previously discussed “punctum” of an image. Still, it is hard to say from this study whether photos like this, or of deaths or destruction aimed to inspire intervention.

The time periods most prominent for the NYT were December 1995 at 14 photos, June 1995 at 13 photos, February 1994 at 11 photos, November 1995 at 10 photos. February 1994 saw a series of medical evacuations and a ceasefire that led to more images of civilian life in Sarajevo, as well as what seemed at the time to be a Serbian military withdrawal, so a month of UN commands that at the time looked promising. June 1995 saw the rescue of pilot O’Grady as previously mentioned, as well as the fragmented release of UN peacekeepers taken hostage by Bosnian Serbs. November 1995 saw the build up to and completion of the Dayton conference and the first American troops’ arrival in Bosnia for reconnaissance, both as

105 Looked promising based on headlines accompanying the photographs.
previously mentioned. Also as previously discussed, December of 1995 saw the signing of the Dayton Agreement as well as the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia. This shows that the dominant categories reflect the most-covered time periods and stories for the *New York Times*.

**The United States: The Washington Post**

For the *Washington Post*, the category of images that appeared most on the front page was also victims whose ethnicity is not specified, at 38 of 174 images total, slightly more proportionally than the NYT. American political leaders came in second with 24 images, Bosnian Muslim victims came in third with 22 photos, other Western military forces and equipment came in fourth with 20 photos and American military forces and equipment came in fifth with 17 photos. This is a very similar picture to the seen on the front pages of the NYT, with shared dominance in victims: ethnicity not specified, American political leaders, Bosnian Muslim victims and other Western military forces, in the same order, and, if maps are removed from the NYT list, in the same positions. The difference is that, for the WP, the American military forces category takes the place of civilian life: ethnicity not specified.

A graphic analysis, like in the case of the NYT, reflects the numeric analysis. The top categories pictured above the fold are victims: ethnicity not specified with 27 photos, American political leaders with 23, Bosnian Muslim victims with 18, other Western military forces and equipment with 16 and American military forces and equipment with 10. This is exactly the order of the numeric analysis. When the categories are sorted for dominance, the order is exactly the same except Bosnian Muslim victims trades places with American political leaders to take second place. So victims: not specified holds 18 dominant photos,
Bosnian Muslim victims holds 14, American political leaders 13, other Western military forces and equipment 12 and American military forces and equipment eight.

Like the NYT, the Washington Post had more pictures of local subjects, with a total of 69 photos of victims (more than the NYT’s 55), 33 photos of both local military forces (including aggressors) and local leaders (just under the NYT’s 34), seven photos of destruction (half the NYT’s 14), five of civilian life (less than NYT’s 13) and three of demonstrations, for a total of 117 images of local subjects, the exactly same number as the NYT and more than the 80 images of international subjects, 90 if maps of Bosnia are included.

As was the case with the NYT, despite the overall numeric dominance of images depicting local subjects, U.S. – specified political and military actors make up the majority of political and military actors pictured. At 41, it is more than the 24 other western political and military actors and the 11 other similar international actors. It is also more than the photos of political and military actors identified as Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats combined, which is 30. When these U.S. photos are added to the other western as international ones, the total number of photos representing this aspect of the war is 76, more than the total number of victims pictured throughout the war. This is exactly in line with the NYT findings and shows a clear trend in the U.S. papers. Even when there are more photos of victims, as seen in the Washington Post, the number of international actors is still greater, and in this case, the number of American-identified political and military actors is more than the total number of victims.

Unlike the NYT, the Washington Post did not have as obvious an increase in the frequency of American political leaders in line with the country’s increasing role in the war. Like the NYT, in 1992 there are no photos of American political leaders, however there is a spike to 10 in 1993, a drop to 3 in 1994 and then another spike to 11 in 1995. This does not
reflect the more gradual increase in consistency of the NYT images, but it does indicate an increase in imaging as the U.S. was playing a key role in the political aspects of the war.

Like in the NYT, President Clinton is the most frequently appearing American political figure, all the photos that include him are above the fold, all but three are dominant and he is pictured with other leaders, international and from the former Yugoslav region. Christopher is pictured five times while unlike the NYT Holbrooke is in fact pictured in three photos. There is one significant difference between the image of American political figures as portrayed on the front pages by the NYT and the Washington Post, and that is the Washington Post’s August 20, 1995 photo of the coffins of three American diplomats who were killed in a car accident near Sarajevo. The coffins are familiarly draped in the American flag and are carried by French UN troops at the Sarajevo airport and the photo is above the fold and dominant.

This break from the tendency to depict a war one is involved in, as Zelizer notes, as “clean, heroic and just” with a tendency “not to be graphic”106 is also reflected in the Washington Post’s picturing of the U.S. military. The final Washington Post image from the last day of the time period of this study depicts what the caption identifies as the first American military “casualty” of the conflict, placed above the fold and dominating the page. The image of the soldier downed is not exactly graphic, the military policeman, Spec. Martin John Begosh, is being carried on a stretcher by four other forces members and is not shown clearly. It is also not completely clear whether he is injured or dead, as the caption says only that his Humvee hit a landmine. However, the photograph shows the forces members running toward the camera, disrupted snow rising up to their knees, creating a sense of chaos and urgency the would indicate that the soldier is merely injured and is being rushed to medical treatment. An earlier photo from December 29, 1995 is less dramatic and less prominently

106 Barbie Zelizer, About to Die: How News Images Move the Public (Oxford University Press, 2010), 16.
placed, but also shows American forces in less than ship shape, with a soldier being treated for hypothermia after the Sava River’s banks flooded, drowning American tents and equipment.

Aside from these images, however, U.S. military photos in the Washington Post follow the same trajectory as those in the NYT. They do not begin to appear until 1995, later in the conflict than those of American political leaders, and at 17 are also smaller in number. Coverage of the rescue of American pilot O’Grady launches the coverage with five photos, more than in the NYT, and continues with the same photo of the advance reconnaissance forces as seen in the NYT, shows Clinton sending off troops from Germany, though a different photo from a different wire service, and then on December 11, 1995, shows the first marines on the ground. This is earlier than the NYT and results in more photos of American forces in Bosnia throughout the rest of December.

Also, like the NYT, the total American military forces pictured makes up only slightly less (three photos) than the total of the other Western military forces that have been pictured since 1992. The total of the American forces is also much more than the number of other international forces (seven) that were also pictured beginning in 1992. Finally, also like the NYT, of all the other nations involved in the peacekeeping mission, the French forces are the most pictured at 12 photos and the British come in second at five. The Washington Post, however, does show a more diverse group of peacekeepers with the Canadian, Dutch, Egyptian and Brazilian military each identified in one image.

Like the NYT, the Washington Post shows the American military “catching up” to photos of other international forces. However, it shows a much larger number of photos of American military forces, but still fewer than the number of photos of American political leaders. For the same reasons as the New York Times, the Washington Post photo coverage of the war also reflected American’s role in the conflict, if possibly a more intense one. While the
U.S. military forces categorization is much the same in both papers, the picturing of American casualties is the most significant difference between the NYT and Washington Post pictorial coverage of the war.

The Washington Post was also like the NYT in its pictorial treatment of ethnicity, also calling into question the “ancient ethnic hatreds” frame. As previously mentioned, victims: ethnicity not specified, is the category at 38 images, and is the category most seen above the fold and as the dominant photo. In comparison, the total number of victims who are identified as either Bosnian Muslim, Serb or Croat is 31. Of these, 24 are above the fold and 21 are dominant. However, the gap between ethnically identified and non-ethnically identified victims is much narrower in the Washington Post. Like the NYT, the lack of ethnic identification is seen in both the categories of destruction and civilian life, however, in the category of demonstrations, only one photograph is not identified ethnically, while two are.

When political and military categories are taken into account (this includes the aggressor category), the picture is slightly different, as seen in the NYT coverage. Again the political leaders are all identified by their sides, more military forces are identified by ethnicity than not (nine to two) and more aggressors are identified by ethnicity than not (six to one). All local, ethnically non-specified categories combined yields 51 photos, whereas all local ethnically identified categories combined yields 66 photos. This is a reversal of the NYT results and suggests that the Washington Post did picture the conflict through an “ancient ethnic hatreds” frame. However, with most of the ethnic identification coming from the categories of victims, military and aggressors and political leaders, the “Serb-aggression” frame could also explain the use of ethnic identification. Like the NYT, the only ethnic aggressor identification is Bosnia Serb/Serb at six photos, five of which are above the fold, 3 of which are dominant. Also like the NYT, even though the military category photos were not
identified as aggressor images, the Bosnian Serbs/Serbs are pictured there more often as well with seven to the Muslims and Croatian one each, and just like in the NYT, creating a more militarized picture of Bosnian Serbs/Serbs for the \textit{Washington Post} audience. In line with the “Serb-aggression” frame, the Bosnian Muslims are the most frequently ethnically identified victims, appearing in, as previously mentioned, 22 photos with 18 above the fold and 14 that are dominant. Bosnian Serbs/Serbs are shown in seven images, while Bosnian Croats/Croats are shown in two. Also like the NYT, Bosnian Muslims are the only ones shown to be specifically affected by the war’s destruction, also with one photo of a ruined Mosque, however, unlike the NYT, destruction affecting the Bosnian Serbs/Serbs is not pictured at all. The interruption in the pattern present in the NYT results is also presents in the \textit{Washington Posts’}. No dead Bosnian Muslims are pictured, whereas two photos of dead Bosnian Serbs/Serbs are, one a Bosnian Serb soldier as a result of a NATO airstrike. The Bosnian Muslim victims category, however, leads in injuries pictured at five while no injuries are pictured in the Bosnian Serbs/Serbs category, or even in the Bosnian Croat/Croat category which shows no deaths either. For the \textit{Washington Post}, while the “ancient ethnic hatreds” frame is apparently present, the results, like the NYT’s, seem to fit more with the “Serb-aggression” frame.

As previously mentioned, whether the photos were part of an image-driven press push for intervention is difficult to assess. The \textit{Washington Post} appears to fit slightly more within the previously discussed idea of “journalism of attachment” than the \textit{New York Times}. There is a slightly stronger sense of images of local victims giving way to Western actors in that there is a bit of a decline, from 23 in 1992, 20 in 1993, seven in 1994 and 18 in 1995, however still does not make a strong case for the intervention frame. One set of images picturing a series of events does however. On August 9, 1993 a small picture appeared, just barely above the fold,
of Irma Hadzimuratovic, a five-year-old girl suffering from a shrapnel wound in a Sarajevo hospital. She is lying in a bed on her side, with her body bent back in what looks to be an uncomfortable position. The caption reads: “Her doctor says she will die unless quickly evacuated.” The next day, above the fold, in the center of the page, is a big, standalone photo of the girl lying down again, this time with an unidentified adult leaning over her and smiling. The photo is titled “Bosnian Girl Airlifted to London” and the caption reads “Irma Hadzimuratovic, the critically wounded 5-year-old Sarajevo girl who became a symbol of the troubled U.N. mission in Bosnia, was flown to London for urgent medical treatment that could save her life. She was listed in stable condition.”

From the images, this appears to be intervention driven, however one would think that, if the Washington Post was actively pushing for intervention, the original image of Irma would have been the one that was displayed more prominently in order to garner more attention. What this set of photos appears to show is support for intervention. As noted in the caption, it also shows the power of symbolism of news photos, specifically conflict photos. However, this is still the only two of 174 images that are this blatant about intervention, not enough to conclude that an image-driven push can be seen in the images. Like the New York Times, the Washington Post also did not make the conflict look particularly bloody. Again, there are many tragic photos of victims, but of those 69 photos only 19 showed injury and four showed death, with a total of 15 injury and for death photos shown above the fold. These images were also fairly spread out over the four years, which does not give the impression that the paper was bombarding its audience with horrifying images to urge them to take action.

The time periods most prominent for the Washington Post were December 1995 at 15 photos, June 1995 at 12 photos, August 1992 at 10 photos. A handful of other dates are tied at nine each and are therefore not considered most prominent. The first two are the same as the
NYT and in the same order. However unlike the NYT, the December 1995 photos in the
Washington Post do not even show the Paris signing of the Dayton Agreement and instead focus on the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia. The June 1995 photos depict the same events as the New York Times, however with even more focus on O’Grady, as well as local victims and less on the freed UN peacekeepers. In another departure from the NYT, the third most prominent month, August 1992 shows mostly local victims as well as the mug shot of an American journalist who was killed while covering the conflict. In keeping with the New York Times, the dominant categories mostly reflect the most-covered time periods for the Washington Post. The differences present, however, such as the picturing of American casualties, creates a more detailed and complex picture of the Bosnian war imaging in the top U.S. press and shows the value of not only analyzing the single main newspaper (the New York Times).

Canada: The Globe and Mail

For The Globe and Mail, the category of images that appeared most on the front page, was victims whose ethnicity is not specified, at 25 of 81 images total, the higher proportionally than both American newspapers. The overall number, however, is significantly lower, less than half the totals of either paper. Other Western military forces and equipment came in second with 10 images, Bosnian Muslim victims ties for third with Bosnian Serb/Serb military forces and equipment with seven photos each, destruction: affected not-specified comes in fourth with six photos and Bosnian Serb/Serb aggressor comes in fifth with five photos. Though the most frequent category is the same as in the New York Times and the
Washington Post significant differences can already be seen. Namely, there are no specifically identified Canadian actors in the top five categories.

When the top categories are sorted by graphic elements, first for images shown above the fold, the top three stay exactly the same, with the same numbers. Bosnian Serb/Serb military forces and equipment loses one to tie with destruction: affected non-specified at six and Bosnian Serb/Serb aggressor loses one, bringing it to four. At four, it then ties with Canadian military forces and equipment, local military forces and equipment: not specified and civilian life: non-specified. When sorted for dominance, the categories and numbers are exactly the same. This means the graphic analysis either drags Bosnian Serb/Serb aggressor out of the top categories, or brings Canadian military forces up to the top. The former is more the case however, since so many other categories share the same number, and the number, four, is so small. Therefore, no matter how it is sorted, a single category of Canadian actors is not prominent in Canada’s national newspaper like the categories of American actors prominent in the American papers.

However, like the American papers, The Globe and Mail, had more pictures of local subjects, with a total of 35 photos of victims, 19 photos of local military forces (including aggressors), seven photos of destruction, four of civilian life and two of demonstrations, for a total of 66 images of local subjects. Photos of local political leaders are noticeably absent. The 66 images are less than the numbers seen in American papers, however, with only 81 images total, local subjects are pictured, proportionally, significantly more in The Globe and Mail than in the American papers. International subjects are only pictured in 28 images, 28 if maps of Bosnia are included (though in The Globe and Mail they are too few in number to be of the same significance as in the American papers).
Contrary to what was seen in the American papers, Canadian-identified political and military actors, when combined, do not make up the majority of political and military actors pictured, and do not surpass the total number of victims. At only two images, Canadian political leaders are not significantly pictured. The Prime Minister is not even shown.

The small number of pictures of Canadian military forces (four), and the fact that they are only from the years 1994 and 1995 is surprising because Canadian forces were present throughout the entire period covered. However, since there are more Canadian military photos than Canadian political leader photos (even though the numbers are small), the argument that *The Globe and Mail* pictured the war at least partly in terms of the Canadian role could be supported, in that its role was more military than political. This could be buttressed by the dominance of the category, other Western military forces and equipment, which came in second and shows Canadian military allies.

A more concrete and significant way *The Globe and Mail* pictured the war in terms of Canada’s role in the conflict, however, was when it came to the incidents of the Bosnian Serbs taking UN peacekeepers hostage. Half of the photos of the Canadian military (two), are of Captain Patrick Rechner who was one of the hostages. The first image, from May 27, 1995, is a screen grab from Bosnian Serb video footage, broadcast on Bosnian Serb television, that shows Capt. Rechner tied to a lamp post at an ammunition dump near Pale. The photo is above the fold and dominant on the page. Just under a month later, June 19, 1995, Capt. Rechner is seen again, this time as he is freed. The photo is, again, above the fold and dominant. The caption creates a continuity with the previous photo and establishes Capt. Rechner as a known national figure when it says, “The last time Canadians saw Capt. Rechner, he was chained to a pole in a Serb ammunition dump.”
This is in contrast to the American press, which did not name the soldiers taken hostage, identifying them only as UN troops, sometimes by nationality (French or British), nor did they follow the well-being of any particular soldier, presumably, because none of the hostages were American. As a comparison, a photo from the same day Capt. Rechner was pictured ran in the *Washington Post*, also showing a UN peacekeeper (though, by appearance, likely not Capt. Rechner) handcuffed to a “Serb depot”. It identifies the man only as a U.N. soldier and the *Washington Post* does not follow up on his freeing, though the news is covered with a couple photos of other random peacekeepers as they are released.

Like *The Globe and Mail*’s treatment of its country’s role in the conflict, its pictorial treatment of ethnicity does not fall in line with the American newspapers. The gap between ethnicity not specified and ethnicity specified is significantly wider than in American newspapers, at 41 non-specified and 25 specified. It does, however fall in line with the American papers in that the “ancient ethnic hatreds frame” really does not stick. Also, like the American papers, it appears that the “Serb aggression” frame does. Only Bosnian Serbs/Serbs are identified as aggressors, and they are pictured in a military role significantly more frequently (seven images) than Bosnian Muslims or Croats (one image each). Also, Bosnian Muslims are the group most identified as victims, as well as the only ones specifically affected by destruction. Also, in line with the American papers, the intervention aspect is nebulous. There is only one photo of death and eight of injuries on the front pages, meaning the war was not depicted as especially bloody. There are also no blatant images like in the *Washington Post* and the photos are either too spaced out or there aren’t enough to show any kind of pattern that would hint at an image-driven push for intervention.

The time periods most prominent for *The Globe and Mail* were November 1994 and July 1995, each with 6 images. November 1994 is the month in which the other two photos of
Canadian troops ran, along with photos of local military activity. July 1995 sees a series of images from Srebrenica and Zepa, which were sources of many images of victims, the most-pictured category in *The Globe and Mail*.

**Canada: The Toronto Star**

For the *Toronto Star*, the category of images that appeared the most on the front page, was maps at 18 of 63 images total. This is in direct contrast to *The Globe and Mail*, which had very few maps. Victims whose ethnicity is not specified came in second at 10 photos. This puts the *Toronto Star* almost in line with the other three papers which all had this category as the most frequently pictured. Canadian military forces and equipment came in third at nine photos, Canadian political leaders came in fourth at seven photos (with Prime Minister Jean Chretien shown in more than half the images) and Canadian media personnel came in fifth with six photos – the most media personnel shown of all the papers and the only one where the number is relatively significant.

When the top categories are sorted by graphic elements, first for images shown above the fold, the top five stay in the same order but with smaller numbers and Canadian political leaders loses enough to tie with Canadian media personnel. Sorting for dominance, however, reveals a different picture. Victim ethnicity not specified takes first place with 9 photos, followed by Canadian military forces and equipment in second place with six photos, and Bosnian Muslim victims in third place with two photos. The four other categories that have dominant photos are tied at one, making them far from being designated as most pictured.

In fact, when sorted again by number of pictures, after the top five categories are accounted for, only three more categories have more than one photo in them. They are other
western political leaders with five photos, other political leaders with three and Bosnian Muslim victims with two.

When it comes to looking at the presence of the ancient ethnic hatreds argument, it is clearly not shown in the *Toronto Star*. While this is in line with the other papers, its absence in the *Toronto Star* is more conclusive. Ethnicity is almost not specified at all, with the exception of the two Bosnian Muslim victim photos and two photos of local political leaders. That is only four out of 63 images. This could, however, be related to the limited amount of images of local subjects shown (16) compared to the significantly larger amount of international subjects shown (31, 49 if maps are included).

Unlike the other three newspapers, the Serbian aggressor explanation is really not shown in the *Toronto Star*. There are no images that were specified as aggressors. Bosnian Muslims were the only ethnicity pictured as victims, however it is only two images and the aggressor cannot be assume based on the images of two victims.

Also, in line with *The Globe and Mail* and the American papers, the intervention aspect is nebulous. There are only two photos of death and five of injuries on the front pages, meaning the again, the war was not depicted as especially bloody. There are also no blatant images intervention-supporting images like in the Washington Post that would hint at an image-driven push for intervention.

Like *The Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Star* also follows the Capt. Rechner story, beginning with the same May 27, 1995 photo of Capt. Rechner chained to a pole. The Star however, instead of showing his release shows a dominant above the fold picture on June 2, 1995, while he is still being held captive, of a close up of his smiling face while he holds up what appear to be a mug with a picture of a maple leaf and the words “Canadian Verified” on it. The title on the image is Canadian hostage waits. The surprisingly relaxed atmosphere of
the photo, considering the circumstances, brings to mind Spencer’s observation (for him in the case of Canada and the first World War) that a nation can tend to depict military service on its behalf as a sort of vacation. 107

The time periods most prominent in the Toronto Star are January of 1994 and July of 1995, both with eight images. January of 1994 saw many Canadian figures pictured, from Prime Minister Chretien meeting UN secretary Boutros-Ghali to Bosnian-Canadians to a Canadian soldier surrounded by Bosnian children. July of 1995 saw coverage of the Srebrenica deportation and a short series of articles by correspondent Bill Shiller for which his mug shot was used. It is very clear from the analysis of Toronto Star images that Canadian actors are the most-pictured.

Overall, the Toronto Star looks like almost like an overcorrection for the lack of Canadian actors pictured in The Globe and Mail. There is a chance the extremes seen in the distribution of the Categories seen in Canadian papers could to due to the limited number of images, especially in the case of the Toronto Star, however, it could also add more significance to the photos that were chosen since those few represent the conflict pictorially.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the content analysis of front page images of Bosnia in the four newspapers discussed (two American and two Canadian) shows that, overall, newspapers picturing of the war in Bosnia reflected their own country’s involvement.

This leads to some differences in the content of the images between the two countries, namely that American papers carried more pictures of its political leaders than its military forces, reflecting its more political role in the conflict, while Canadian newspapers pictured its military more than its political leadership, reflecting its more military role.

Different events also pulled the focus of each country’s newspapers. For example, each country appeared to have a national military hero. For the American papers it was American pilot Scott O’Grady, whose plane was shot down by Bosnian Serbs, while for the Canadian papers, it was Captain Patrick Rechner, who was held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs.

However, despite the differences, the American and Canadian newspapers were mostly the same when it came to the four news frames used as topics for analysis. Differences between each country’s own newspapers also illustrate why having more than one paper from each country is important.

As previously mentioned, both countries’ papers pictured the war in terms of their own country’s role; concrete evidence of the controversial “ancient ethnic hatreds” argument was not found in any of the papers, while more convincing evidence of the Serbian-aggressor frame could be found in all the papers, except the Toronto Star. There is a difference in the final frame of international intervention, in that, if manipulated and investigated enough, the data for the American papers could show faint signs of a call to intervene, and the Washington Post
ran a short series of images that fit within the intervention frame. For the Canadian newspapers, the intervention frame was nebulous. However, for all four newspapers this frame could not be properly assessed with this methodology – one of this study’s limitations.

Another limitation of a quantitative content analysis of images is that the captions must be consulted in the process of categorizing. With a conflict such as the one in Bosnia with predominance of wire photos used, decisions about the captions cannot be completely assumed to have been made by the newspaper editors since the wire photos are delivered with captions and in cases there different newspapers are showing the same photos, the same caption information is seen.

A final major limitation of this study is that the concepts of backwardness and othering could not be explored because, as more abstract concepts, they did not lend themselves to a quantitative analysis.

However, despite these limitations, this study contributes to the understanding of press coverage of the war in Bosnia by adding: an analysis of photography related to the conflict; an analysis of photography in Canadian newspapers and therefore another piece added to the puzzle of the North American media perspective of the war. This is important because relative to the Western actors, Canada played a sizeable role in the conflict. To limit the discussion of North America’s role in the conflict to the United States cuts out a significant part of the picture.
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