The German Islam Conference & Emergent Modes of German Turkish Islamic Associational Organization

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“Almanya bize neler öğretmedi ki
Geleneğimiz, göreneğimiz kökten değişti”
...Almançı olduk, onlara uyum sağladık
Türkçe konuşmayı yavaş yavaş unuttuk.”

“What all hasn’t Germany taught us?
Our ways and customs have radically changed
...We’ve become Germans, we’ve adapted
And as time went on, we’ve forgotten how to speak Turkish.

Ahmet Ayten, “Bizim Almanya” (Our Germany)

Introduction
On December 12, 1962, the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations
(Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitsgeberverbände, BDA) issued an open letter to the
West German government reprinted in leading newspapers. The BDA formally requested an
amendment of the Anwerbeabkommen recruitment agreement which had fixed conditions for
the screening and placement of skilled guest workers (Gastarbeiter) from Turkey in German

1 Author’s translation. Taken from Aytaç Eryilmaz and Mathilde Jamin (eds.), Fremde Heimat, Yaban Silan Olur: Eine
Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei, Türkiye’den Almanya’ya Göçün Tarihi (Foreign Homeland: A History of
Immigration from Turkey) (Essen: Klartext, 1998), 306.
industry.\(^2\) Stressing their “satisfaction with the Turkish workers,” the BDA asked the West German ministries which had drafted the treaty to remove language which had limited the length of work and residence permits for \textit{Gastarbeiter} to a maximum of five years, thereby eliminating the inefficiency of recruiting and training a new group of workers every five years. The various ministries had no objection to this request, as West Germany’s labor shortage remained acute and demand for \textit{Gastarbeiter} was steady. For its part the Turkish government was satisfied with any treaty changes so long as economically vital \textit{Gastarbeiter} remittances continued to flow back to Turkey. The BDA’s requested alterations were thus quickly ratified by Turkey and the West German government.\(^2\) With that change, West Germany laid the legal groundwork for a permanent Turkish presence within its borders, as hundreds of thousands of \textit{Gastarbeiter} took advantage of the new terms of the treaty to settle in economically and politically stable Germany. West Germany had unwittingly and with remarkably little fanfare paved the way for a lasting Turkish presence in the country, making permanent German Turks out of transient \textit{Gastarbeiter}.\(^4\)

\(^2\) Both the BDA letter and the text of the \textit{Anwerbeabkommen} can be found in Aytaç Eryilmaz and Cordula Lissner (eds.), \textit{Geteilte Heimat: 50 Jahre Migration aus der Türkei} (Shared Homeland: 50 Years of Migration from Turkey) (Essen: Klartext, 2011).


\(^4\) This is not without its ironies, in that the treaty signed with Turkey was the only \textit{Anwerbeabkommen} which did not explicitly make allowance for family reunification. This can be contrasted with the text of the \textit{Abkommen} with Italy: “\textit{Bekanntmachung vom 11. Januar 1956}” (“Declaration from 11 January 1956”) in Deniz Göktürk et al. (eds.), \textit{Transit Deutschland: Debatten zu Nation und Migration} (Germany in Transit: Debates on Nation and Migration) (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2011): 46-8. The term “German Turk” is employed in this thesis, in lieu of a better English term for the more precise Turkish \textit{Türkiyeli} (“those from Turkey” but not necessarily Turks). I use
West German state and society only gradually and belatedly acknowledged the permanent presence of the former *Gastarbeiter* and their families, even after the 1973 *Anwerbestopp* halted the recruitment of foreign workers and supposedly rendered their presence in the country superfluous. Family reunification and refugee migration during Turkey’s politically turbulent late 1970s swelled the German Turkish population from roughly seven thousand in 1961 to an estimated 1.7 million at the moment of German reunification in 1990.\(^5\)

Starting during the initial labor recruitment period, a number of Turkish social, political, economic and religious associations were founded in West Germany in areas of high Turkish concentration.\(^6\) The first Turkish sports club was founded in West Berlin in 1965 and the first worker’s investment cooperative in Cologne in 1966. A year later, the Turkish Federation (*Türk Federasyonu*) was founded as the putative national coordinating council for local Islamic cultural centers and *Hinterhofmoscheen* (backyard or courtyard mosques) founded by *Gastarbeiter*.\(^7\) As the population of German Turks steadily increased in the 1970s and 1980s, the scale, sophistication and sheer number of Turkish associations in West Germany grew

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\(^6\) These areas, generally speaking, were the industrial cities of the *Bundesländer* of North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg and in West Berlin, though Leo Lucassen cautions scholars against overemphasizing the concentration of Turks in particular cities and neighborhoods, given their relatively low segregation index when contrasted with, for example West Indians in England. Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 1850* (Urban, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005): 159.

\(^7\) A timeline of organizational firsts for German Turks can be found in “Chronologie” in Eryilmaz and Jamin (eds.), *Fremde Heimat*: 391-403.
correspondingly. Following a brief interregnum when Turkish political parties dominated organizational life, by the end of the 1980s Islam had become the most prominent, though certainly not sole, organizing principle in the development of German Turkish associational networks, especially as Turkish unemployment in Germany rose and the influence of labor unions waned. By 1995, more than two thousand Turkish Islamic associations operated in Germany, with members and their families comprising fully one-quarter of the country’s Turkish population.

Four national Islamic organizations, the four largest Turkish ethnic organizations by membership, united hundreds of local mosques and community and cultural centers in loose federations. Despite these national structures, Islamic associational life remained centered around local communities. Within these communities, local Islamic institutions extended their purview beyond religious life, absorbing many of the functions of earlier ethnic, cultural and migrant self-help organizations. These local associations – some affiliated with national organizations and many not – played a diverse and variable role in organizing the lives of their members. An individual association might sponsor sports teams and women’s groups, run Koranic schools, offer German language courses or assist in the transfer of remittances back to Turkey. A function of these associations which remained consistent was the intermediary role they played in representing their primarily non-citizen members to local

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8 As will be clarified below, German Kurds can be seen as an exception to this trend towards Islamic organization, though the slow emergence of Kurdish organization at the national level relative to the rapidity of corresponding Turkish Islamic nation-wide structures perhaps speaks best to the tremendous effectiveness of Islam in this regard. Analysis of broad shifts in Turkish organization is drawn from Gökçe Yurdakul, “‘Wir sind gemeinsam stark?’: Die unglückliche Ehe zwischen Migrantenvereinigungen und Gewerkschaften” (“We are strong together?: The unhappy marriage between Migrant Associations and Unions”) in Yurdakul and Michael Bodemann (eds.), Insider-Outsider: Bilder, ethnisierte Räume und Partizipation in Migrationsprozess (Insider-Outsider: Images, Ethnicized Spaces and Participation in the Migration Process) (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2005)

government in West Germany and, through the financial and electoral clout of the four largest national organizations, participating in political life in Turkey.  

**Approaches to the study of German Turkish Islamic associations**

It is this latter function of German Turkish organizations that has attracted the most sustained scholarly interest in the field of migration studies. Turkish associations in Germany transcend national boundaries, fostering the simultaneous political, social, and economic engagement of their members with both Germany as the host society and Turkey as the sending state. Before nationality law reforms were passed by the Bundestag in 1999, Germany could be considered the archetypal *ius sanguinis* nation-state, defining eligibility for citizenship in ethnic rather than territorial terms. Many works of transnational migration scholarship view the pre-2000 difficulty of full legal integration for German Turks in either West Germany or the united Federal Republic as among the most significant contributing factors to the continued depth and intensity of German Turkish associational linkages with Turkey, in that these groups offered members a voice in the political process in both Turkey, the country of

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citizenship, and Germany, the country of residence. The social fields created by these associational connections across borders are a central focus of transnational migration research.\textsuperscript{12}

The importance of transnational ties for understanding the diversity of German Turkish associational life cannot be ignored. This is particularly obvious when the DİTİB, the largest Turkish association by membership, is directly sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, existing transnational scholarship on Turkish Islamic associations suffers from two notable weaknesses. Firstly, the majority of authors – political scientists, geographers, and sociologists – are overwhelmingly concerned with currently-existing conditions and as such can be accused of a certain level of reverse historical determinism. This approach treats the present state of affairs for Islamic associations as a function of broader trends in globalization and emancipatory post-national membership and elides specificities of place and time. As such, scholarship informed by these perspectives can be useful in clarifying why Islamic associations are transnational in the broad sense but not why their transnational practices have taken the


\textsuperscript{13} It should be stressed that, contrary to a common misconception, the DİTİB is not a formal representative of the Turkish state, though it has close ideological ties with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Gökçe Yurdakul, \textit{From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany}(Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 89-90.
specific decentralized, clientelist and highly localized forms characteristic of associational activity in Germany.\(^{14}\)

A second weakness of the transnational migration approach is its emphasis on politics at the national scale. Ostergaard-Nielsen, for example, devotes considerable attention to the influence of the four largest national German Turkish Islamic organizations on party politics in Germany and Turkey.\(^{15}\) This thesis argues that research on the local scale illuminates patterns and processes of Islamic associational organization which this national-level analysis tends to overlook. The confluence of trends towards greater ethnic, political, and religious differentiation among German Turks and opportunity structures present within West German integration policy produced a variety of locally and regionally specific modes of organization. Those larger, nominally centrally-organized groups with the capacity to interact with the state on the national scale were exceptions to the rule of everyday Turkish associational life.\(^{16}\) The transnationalism of these national organizations may be easier to study – particularly their highly-visible financial influence in the Turkish political system – but to privilege the analysis of


\(^{16}\) Data from the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees suggests that no more than two percent of German Turks could be considered active members of the four largest Turkish Islamic organizations to which Ostergaard-Nielsen devotes the most attention. This can be contrasted with the twenty-five percent of German Turks affiliated with other, more localized Turkish Islamic associations. “Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland,” (“Muslim Life in Germany”) Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, June 2009, http://www.bamf.de/cln_092/nn_441298/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb6-muslimisches-leben.html.
national organizations leads to the false impression of a unity of purpose and function among the constituent associations which composed those Germany-spanning groups. National Islamic organizations may have promoted that unity rhetorically and may have spoken with one voice in Turkish politics but as a matter of practicality, the role their affiliated local associations played in the lives of members in individual German communities and regions was highly variable. To conduct research only at the national scale risks overlooking such specificities.

The environment produced by the West German (and later German) citizenship regime is another subject of considerable scholarly attention, particularly in the fields of political science and history. Germany’s *ius sanguinis* nationality law, a holdover from the National Socialist era, has attracted interest for its inflexibility in the face of international migration and for the contradictions exposed by the almost automatic receipt of citizenship by ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, the so-called *Aussiedler*. The ancestors of many *Aussiedler* had left Germany as early as the 18th century, while second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants who had never lived anywhere but Germany lacked a path to naturalization. Scholars of citizenship point to meaningful continuities in German attitudes towards membership and belonging from the pre-war period to the present day. More pertinently, research on citizenship stresses the significance of West German and German citizenship law in limiting German Turkish participation in the political life of the country and

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17 Ayşe Çağlar is one of the few scholars attempting transnational research without emphasizing the larger national organizations, focusing instead on the transnational practices of local-scale hometown associations. Çağlar, “Hometown associations, the rescaling of state spatiality and migrant grassroots transnationalism” *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 6(2006): 1-22.

encouraging sustained – and if one follows this logic to its conclusion, unnatural – transnational engagement with Turkey.

Citizenship remains a useful paradigm for the study of migration in the German context but the centrality of formal citizenship regimes should not be overemphasized. Though for decades the protracted naturalization process may have been a hurdle preventing formalized participation in political life, German Turks nevertheless engaged with German state and society through modes of citizenship outside the legalistic and nation-state-centered liberal-democratic Westphalian tradition. Yasemin Soysal has elaborated on postnational models of membership which appeal to human rights discourse at the global level, thus transgressing and bypassing the national order. While this thesis does not share fully in Soysal’s presumptions about the waning of the nation-state’s sole claim to citizen loyalty, Soysal does shed light on highly-localized forms of informal and economic citizenship relevant to the German Turkish case. Turkish citizens in West Germany and Germany were unable to vote in national elections but did participate in local foreigner’s councils in German cities and played an important economic and role in the communities in which they lived. At the local and regional level individual Turkish associations, whose membership consisted almost entirely of non-citizens, at times succeeded in lobbying the state for certain informally granted rights, especially in


education. Unquestionably, German Turkish associational engagement in German politics would have taken a very different form had Turks been offered an easier path to naturalization before 2000. That being said, research which overemphasizes formal state citizenship denies agency to migrants who availed themselves of alternate modes of citizenship expressed within local associations to make contributions to the political, social and economic life of local communities.

A similar criticism can be applied to another scholarly trend which stresses the power of the state to marginalize migrant minorities. Frank-Olaf Radtke and Christian Joppke argue – with considerable historical justification – that the well-developed West German welfare state’s initial Gastarbeiter policies fostered a client system of institutional dependence among German Turks, thus preventing the mobilization “of an ethnic bottom-up movement which could efficiently claim group interests.”  

Transnational Turkish political trends exacerbated this lack of unity, especially when paired with state policy towards German Turks best summarized in the oft-repeated slogan of the 1980s: Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland (Germany is not a country of immigration). This combination of factors precluded the emergence of a truly national, unified and representative German Turkish umbrella organization to serve as a counterweight to the state and an advocate for collective interests and group rights.  

Depending on the interpretation, the West German state either intentionally fostered divisions among German Turks or simply declined to lend its authority to the establishment of a unified

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23 Both of the West German mass parties – the CDU (Christian Democrats) and SPD (Socialists) – engaged in this rhetoric at alternating points, usually when the other party was in power. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 90-94.
Consequently, Radtke and Joppke argue, German Turks were marginalized in the political process and integration policy was virtually nonexistent before the late 1990s.

Klaus Bade and Leo Lucassen have critiqued this focus on national politics as a misunderstanding of the difference between rhetoric and concrete action. Lucassen writes that “below the hectic and anti-immigrant surface of German politics from the 1970s onward, a de facto structural integration policy has developed”. In that sense, 

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nderungsland served as rhetorical cover, diverting attention from the variety of ground-level integration initiatives undertaken by local governments, many of which were carried out with the participation of local German Turkish associations. This is not to suggest that high-level political discourse is unimportant or that Joppke and Radtke’s diagnosis of clientelism in West German Gastarbeiter policy is not keenly observed but, once again, the local scale should be considered, for it is at this level that Turkish associations were most influential in shaping government policy and organizing the lives of their members.

**Periodizing modes of Turkish Islamic organization in Germany**

This thesis integrates elements of the transnational migration, citizenship studies and state-centric migration policy perspectives in arguing for the historical specificity of particular

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24 Joppke argues the latter and Radtke the former. Joppke’s argument is more convincing given the concrete evidence which will be discussed below that the West German state attempted to engage in dialogue on Islamic education issues but was unable to find a partner organization suitably representative of German Turks as a whole. See Joppke, *Veil: Mirror of Identity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 53-80. Notably, some leaders within Turkish national organizations have publically advanced a narrative reminiscent of the Radtke argument. See Yurdakul’s interview with Mustafa Yoldaş, a former senior member of Milli Görüş in Yurdakul, *From Guest Workers into Muslims*, 97.

modes of German Turkish Islamic associational organization. The transnational perspective offers an explanation for the forces of religious, ethnic and political differentiation which helped create the diversity and disunity characteristic of contemporary German Turkish associational life. The citizenship paradigm clarifies the central role of these organizations in organizing German Turkish lives in a state which denied formal membership to German Turks, even after decades of residence in some cases. Finally, the state-centric approach helps to explain clientelist tendencies and the lack of truly national and unitary German Turkish organization prior to 2006. To these various perspectives, the author brings an emphasis on the importance of alternate modes of citizenship and *de facto* structural integration – particularly at the local scale – and for the role local Islamic associations played in these integration processes.

The central argument of this thesis is that the constellation of forces identified in earlier research – transnational political and ethnic differentiation, state integration policy, the German citizenship regime, and the informal local scaling of integration – has been fundamentally altered by three interrelated trends which presage greater centralization of Islamic associations, the strengthening of unitary national-level Turkish Islamic organization across religious and ideological lines and greater and more formalized national-scale collaboration with the German state within this emergent national framework.

Chapter II traces the history of Turkish associational life in West Germany until German reunification in 1990. A brief overview of the development of Turkish associations highlights the aforementioned constellation of forces which produced a particularly German Turkish mode of
Islamic organization: that is, decentralized, disunited and sending-state focused. Throughout, this survey highlights the historically contingency of these developments, emphasizing their rootedness in German and Turkish state policies which began to change in the 1990s, reaching a symbolic culmination with the passage of German citizenship reform in 2000 and the election of the AK Parti government in Turkey in 2002. This decade saw the piecemeal introduction of a new organizational environment which slowly shifted the dominant mode of Turkish associational life from localized to nationalized, disunited to united and Turkey-centered to a new emphasis on claims making with the German state.

Chapter III elaborates on the trends contributing to this reorganization of Islamic associational life, the first being the shifting interests of the German state. German citizenship policy was reformed in 2000, making possible future German Turkish influence as an organized electoral bloc in the German political process. Concomitantly, citizenship reform removed a potent symbol driving the necessity for all-encompassing parallel social organization and alternate modes of citizenship.\footnote{Notable changes in the law include a shorter period of residence required for naturalization and the automatic acquisition of citizenship by children born on German soil and residing there legally. See Kay Hailbronner, “Country Report: Germany”, European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, January 2010, rev. April 2010: 9-12; Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties, 210-6.}

In a parallel development, the institutions of the German state, despite the continued relevance of nativist rhetoric in national politics, have belatedly embraced an international trend in state-minority relations towards engagement with civil society actors. These developments have incentivized German Turkish organizations to organize

The second factor driving the shift in German Turkish organization is the securitization of state policy in a post-September 11 world. Whereas German Turks, despite the overwhelming use of Islam as an organizing factor in associational life, might previously have been understood and perceived by the state as \textit{Gastarbeiter}, foreign nationals or an ethnic minority, after 2001 they were constructed first and foremost as Muslims. Rooting out radical Islamists became a primary concern, again incentivizing German Turks to organize at the national level to defend against law enforcement abuses and infringements on group religious rights while pressing the German state to fund self-policing initiatives.\footnote{Werner Schiffauer analyzes the post-citizenship reform, post-9/11 context for German Islamic organizations in Schiffauer, “Enemies Within the Gates: The Debate About the Citizenship of Muslims in Germany” in Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.), \textit{Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach} (London: Routledge, 2006): 94-116.}

Finally, the third factor is the changing political and religious landscape in Turkey. Islamic organizations previously banned in Turkey and with influential counterparts in more politically open Germany were legitimated when the Islamist Justice and Development Party (\textit{Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi} or AK Parti) came to power in 2002. With the AK Party in power, the largest German Turkish organization by membership, the DİTİB (\textit{Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği}, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), an affiliate of the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, softened its attitude towards cooperation with more Islamist Turkish German associations in forming a national German Turkish umbrella organization. As the gap in political
and religious ideology between the largest national Turkish Islamic organizations narrowed, collaboration within a unified national structure in Germany grew more palatable for all involved.

Chapter IV focuses on the first four annual meetings of the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz), first called in 2006 by then-Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. The meetings of the Conference offer an intriguing window into the new environment for German Turkish associational life brought about by the trends discussed in the first chapter. At the Islam Conference, Schäuble brought together officials from the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Labor and Family and representatives of the four largest national German Turkish Islamic organizations. There, associational and state representative held plenary sessions on a variety of themes – from education and Islamic radicalism to economic integration – and the associations presented proposals for possible areas of cooperation with local, regional and national government. Close examination of the documents produced by German Turkish associations at the Conference reveals a distinct shift in organizational policy: namely, an increased interest in founding a national umbrella organization for Muslims – despite the persistence of transnational ethnic, political and religious divisions – and a greater interest in demonstrating reliability as partners for state-funded educational and anti-Islamist securitization programs. Where German Turkish organizations before 2000 were disunited – unwilling and incapable of speaking to the state with one voice – the German Islam Conference offers evidence for a decisive shift towards the creation of a national umbrella organization imbued with legitimacy by the Germans state. Representatives at the conference engaged in rhetoric which stressed the essentialized differences of Turks from ethnic Germans, regardless
of citizenship status, and the usefulness of their national organizations in alleviating the social and economic problems the Conference sought to address. Differences between and within these national organizations were minimized and Turks were constructed as a unified body defined primarily by a Muslim religious identity. If the problems of Turks in Germany were thus problems of a religious rather than an ethnic or national minority, a unified German Islamic organization would be best positioned to act as a reliable bridge between the German state and its Muslim inhabitants. Representatives of the four largest national organizations walked a fine line, portraying the problems of Turks in Germany as intractable to justify state intervention while carefully maintaining the indispensability of their organizations as the only recipients of state resources capable of offering solutions to these problems.

A national German Islamic umbrella organization was quickly established after the first meeting of Conference \(^{29}\) The concluding chapter examines the implications of this organization’s establishment for the future of local forms of Turkish Islamic associational life, as state resources are increasingly distributed top-down at the national level. This emerging mode of German Turkish associational organization has paved the way for far greater formalized coordination between the German state and Islamic associations but also decreased the flexibility and responsiveness to local concerns of the formerly decentralized Islamic associations. Though the umbrella organization formed at the Conference has taken time to emerge as a genuine partner for the German state, its existence as a centralized body signifies a

\(^{29}\) Participants in the conference founded the Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany, KMD) in 2007. Legal analysts expect the KMD to apply in the near future for state recognition as a religious community entitled to enjoy the same status and privileges in all Bundesländer as the Catholic and Evangelical Churches. Volker Beck, “Fahrplan zur Integration,” Die Tageszeitung, April 16, 2007.
decisive and irrevocable shift away from historically specific modes of Turkish organization toward a new and untested national model.
Chapter II – A Brief History of German Turkish Associational Life, 1961-1989

Introduction & Early Years

Before proceeding with an analysis of the ways in which Turkish associational life began to change starting in the 1990s, a brief history of German Turkish Islamic organization up to that point is necessary. This history is not meant to be comprehensive but rather seeks to emphasize the role played in the development of the four largest national organizations present at the Conference – the Süleymançı, DÎTİB, Millî Görüş and the United Alevi Foundation – of forces of transnational differentiation, local organization, clientelism and de facto informal integration within local communities. This history serves to illustrate those modes of group organization and state interaction which began to fundamentally change in the period after 1990.

In the initial years of the Gastarbeiter period (1961-73), Turkish ethnic organization was limited to labor unions. Though Gastarbeiter were automatically inducted into existing German unions, their membership was nominal and they quickly developed their own informal organizational structures.\(^{30}\) As early as March of 1962, Turkish miners in Essen and

\(^{30}\) An impressively comprehensive history of the initial period of Turkish migration to West Germany can be found in Hisashi Yano, “‘Wir sind benötigt, aber nicht erwünscht’: Zur Geschichte der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der Frühphase der Bundesrepublik,” (“‘We Are Needed But Unwanted’: A History of Foreign Employees in the Early Phase of the Federal Republic”) in Aytaç Eryilmaz and Mathilde Jamin (eds.), Fremde Heimat, Yaban Silan Olur: Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei, Türkiye’den Almanya’ya Göçün Tarihi (Foreign Homeland: A History of Immigration from Turkey) (Essen: Klartext, 1998), 39-61. Turkish labor organizations declined in significance throughout the 1980s as Turkish unemployment in West Germany reached as high as 20.4%. See Gökçe Yurdakul, From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 47-67.
Duisburg organized a wildcat strike to protest against what turned out to be a misunderstanding of the company payroll systems. 26 ringleaders of the strike were fired and deported back to Turkey.\(^3^1\)

As the number of Gastarbeiter in Germany grew – from 7,000 in 1961 to more than 132,000 in 1965 – Turkish political parties took note of new opportunities among the expanding population. Though the Turkish state had not yet made arrangements for the casting of absentee ballots by Gastarbeiter – and would not do so for decades – Turks in Germany earned salaries three to four times as high as their similarly skilled counterparts in Turkey. The Gastarbeiter thus represented a potentially valuable financial resource for Turkish parties, not to mention a captive audience for political proselytizing. Right-wing nationalist groups were particularly successful in organizing social clubs and political discussion groups among the primarily young and male population cramped into tiny company dormitories.\(^3^2\)

**Arbeiterwohlfahrt and German Turkish clientelism**

Turkish political parties limited their activities to the social realm in Germany and the political realm in Turkey, reflecting the emergent clientelism Christian Joppke and Hans-Olaf Radtke consider so significant in the history of Turkish associations. Joppke employs the term “vicarious immigrant organization” to describe the system whereby the state delegated the

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\(^3^1\) This episode is detailed in “Chronologie”, Eryilmaz and Jamin (eds.), *Fremde Heimat*: 391-2. This was the first of many instances when Gastarbeiter staged labor action against the wishes of their nominal union leaders. A later example – a six-day sit-in in 1973 at a Ford plant in Cologne – is described in Friedrich Kurylo, “Die Türken probten den Aufstand,” (“Turks Rehearse the Uprising”) *Die Zeit*, September 17, 1973.

care of *Gastarbeiter* to semi-state charitable organizations. All non-Christian *Gastarbeiter* – primarily Turks but also smaller groups of Moroccans and Tunisians – were assigned to the Worker’s Welfare Association (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*), a charity affiliated with the SPD, the Socialist Party of Germany.\(^{33}\) The responsibilities of *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* were extensive: distributing unemployment insurance, assisting in family reunification and visa applications, arranging for translators, organizing German classes, providing legal counseling and – later in the period as initial employment contracts began to run out and *Gastarbeiter* left the worker’s dormitories – assisting in finding employment and housing. Functionally, *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* served as an intermediary between individual Turks and the highly-developed West German welfare state.\(^{34}\)

By the 1990s *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* had established more than 600 local foreigner’s bureaus staffed by more than 850 social workers – the majority of whom were Turks themselves. Joppke sees these social workers as an influential class which jealously guarded its position against threats from Islamic associations. As an organization, *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* opposed the formation of ethnic religious structures as “inimical to integration” and refused any cooperation with such associations, instead dealing entirely with German Turks as individual foreign nationals. In the United States, immigrant communities formed ethnic self-help networks to provide many of the welfare and intermediary services which *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* and its social workers offered to


German Turks but in West Germany, the development of such structures was unnecessary. As a consequence, German Turkish associations were smaller in scope and less experienced in negotiating German state bureaucracy.\(^{35}\)

**Germany as a contested associational social field: the rise of Islamic associations**

Though many of the self-help functions characteristic of migrant associations in other contexts had been taken over by *Arbeiterwohlfahrt*, West Germany remained a highly contested space for Turkish associations. This was particularly true after the *Anwerbestopp* increased the pace of family reunifications and the Turkish population in the country grew to an estimated 1.5 million by 1980. In the 1970s, associational life in West Germany grew ever more dominated by Islamic associations which had crowded out the secular Turkish political parties. The success of Islamic organizations is consistent with wider trends of migrant integration in Europe in which religion served as “a core aspect of culture around which other expressive forms – linguistic maintenance, the formation of associations and folkloric practices – may be focused.”\(^{36}\) West Germany was a *terra nullius* for Turkish Islam, a field of operation without the rigidly enforced restrictions on forms of Islamic religious expression deemed constitutionally threatening by the secular Turkish government. Some politically undesirable Islamist religious leaders even immigrated as refugees to West Germany to escape these restrictions and preach their views without interference from state censors. Turkish religious organizations, like the political parties before them, saw wealthier German Turks as an economically powerful

\(^{35}\) West Berlin was a notable exception. In the mid-1980s, the city’s senate cut funding for *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* social workers as a cost-saving measure and instead distributed money directly to Turkish associations. Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 209-13.

constituency whose support could be vital in achieving organizational aims in Turkey. Given these incentives and the more hospitable environment for Islamist tendencies in Germany, Turkish Islamic organizations devoted massive resources to the recruitment and organization of German Turks. Consistent with this system of incentives and opportunities favoring groups outside the Turkish mainstream, the first nationwide German Turkish organization, the aforementioned Türk Federasyonu (now known as the İslam Kultur Merkezleri Birliği, the IKMB or Union of Islamic Cultural Centers) was an affiliate of the banned Islamist Süleymani religious brotherhood.

Though Turkish religious associations organized across national borders, it should be stressed that affiliates in West Germany were not mere instruments of policy set in Turkey. Milli Görüş (National Vision), the second-largest German Turkish Islamic association by membership by 2000, serves as an excellent example. Milli Görüş was founded by the Islamist Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan as both a federation of like-minded mosque associations and a political movement blending Turkish nationalism with Islamism. The German wing of Milli Görüş quickly developed an identity separate from these religious principles and Erbakan’s own political aspirations. Segments of the party faithful in West Germany shifted their allegiance from Erbakan to the self-proclaimed caliph Cemaleddin Kaplan in the early 1980s, coexisting awkwardly with Erbakan loyalists without splintering the decentralized national organization. Erbakan himself was removed from the leadership of Milli Görüş after a brief stint as prime minister.

minister of Turkey in 1997 before he was deposed by the Turkish army and banned from politics for life. Without a personal anchor to Turkey, where the movement dwindled in importance without its charismatic figurehead, Milli Görüş transitioned by the end of the 1990s from a largely anti-Western and Turkey-focused organization to what the sociologist Werner Schiffauer describes as a pragmatic and democratic lobby for German Turkish interests.39

If Milli Görüş represents the extent to which some German Turkish organizations operated independently of transnational political forces, the DİTİB can be seen as the opposite extreme. The DİTİB was founded as an indirectly-administered branch of the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, making a belated entrance into West Germany in the early 1980s only after the Ministry took note of the flowering of support in Germany for both politically undesirable religious organizations like Milli Görüş and wholly illegal groups like the Süleymani. The DİTİB quickly established itself as the largest Turkish organization in West Germany, with a particularly strong appeal among more secular middle-class Turks. As the only Islamic organization with the full backing of the Turkish state, the DİTİB was granted certain privileges by the West German and German governments, including the right to choose and train teachers imported from Turkey to teach native-language or religious lessons in German schools and the right to train the majority of imams placed in German mosques (sometimes even in mosques unaffiliated with DİTİB).40


40 Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State, 215-17. Once again, West Berlin is an exception, as the Islamic Federation of Berlin (Islamische Föderation Berlin), an organization dominated by Milli Görüş is charged with recruiting and training Islamic teachers for religious lessons in city schools. Joel Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114-5. Events in Turkey inspired similar processes of ethnic differentiation among Kurds in Germany. From the late 1970s
By the mid-1980s, German Turkish associational life expanded to accommodate ethnic and cultural differences in addition to the doctrinal religious and political differentiation of the Süleymançı, Milli Görüş and the DİTİB. 1986 saw the founding of a national organization for Alevi characterized by the traditionally liberal politics of the Turkish Shia minority. In 1993 the notorious Pir Sultan Abdul massacre in Sivas, Turkey – in which 37 Alevi were burned alive in a hotel by a Sunni mob – was a formative event for feelings of differentiation from the Sunni Turkish majority. By the end of the decade, membership in the United Alevi Foundation of Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) had risen to nearly 500,000. Alevi national organization in Germany, despite its origins in Turkish religious politics, was a driving force in promoting the expression of distinct Alevi identification in Turkey, demonstrating that processes of transnational differentiation did not occur in only one direction. 41

The services offered by Turkish Islamic associations varied widely, even within the same national association given their very loose organizational structures. Some local associations limited their activities to religious life while others, particularly in larger cities, were active in organizing social events and sports clubs, running Koranic schools for children, administering

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onward, a bloody separatist conflict between the Turkish army and the Maoist rebel group known as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) sharpened the awareness of a separate Kurdish identity among many who had previously been members of other German Turkish associations. To this day, Kurds remain somewhat of an exception to the rule of German Turkish associational life, in that no openly operating national organization emerged during the period in question. The PKK, though recognized as a terror organization by Germany, was active in some quarters and had great success in fundraising among Kurds. As an officially banned organization however, the PKK and its affiliates did not play the same sort of expansive, semi-official role in the lives of Kurds as Islamic associations did for Turks and thus Kurds were not among those groups represented by national organizations at the Islam Conference. General background on Kurds in Germany is drawn from “Durchs deutsche Kurdistan,” (“Through German Kurdistan”), Die Zeit, September 9, 1999. Specific information on the PKK and its activities in Germany can be found in “Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans (PKK), Volkskongress Kurdistans (KONGRA GEL): Strukturen, Ziele, Aktivitäten,” (Worker’s Party of Kurdistan, Kurdistan People’s Congress [KONGRA GEL]: Structures, Goals, Activities”), Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz March 2007.

informal Islamic banking systems and funding development projects in Turkish villages.\textsuperscript{42} It should be noted, though, that beyond the exceptional case of West Berlin, even the largest local associations did not assume any of the semi-state responsibilities of \textit{Arbeiterwohlfahrt} and its social workers.

Relations between different associations were variable. In small towns, competition was generally nonexistent as one association – more often than not the DİTİB – would run the local mosque or religious center and organize associational life in the community. In larger cities, competition for members and recognition on foreigner’s councils was often fierce.\textsuperscript{43} Rivalries between the DİTİB, Süleymançı and Millî Görüş emerged wherever there was a large German Turkish concentration, while Alevis and Kurds were left largely to their own devices. These conflicts were often driven as much by the ambitions of local associational leaders as by ideas of a separate religious, ethnic or political identity.\textsuperscript{44} As a consequence both of these battles for status and of political and religious trends originating in Turkey, coordination between the various associations was virtually nonexistent before 1990.


\textsuperscript{43} Yalçın-Heckmann describes a particularly contentious election to the local foreigner’s council in Bamberg in 1994. The rancor competing DİTİB and Süleymançı candidates directed at one another was inversely proportionate to the significance of winning seats on the largely symbolic council. \textit{Ibid}, 103-5.

\textsuperscript{44} Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, \textit{Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany} (London: Routledge, 2003), Appendix C. A particular source of conflict between the associations was the special privileges granted to DİTİB. Several associations have sued to have this special status revoked. See Anna Amelina and Thomas Faist, “Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration Pressures and Transnational Linkages,” \textit{Revue Europeene des Migrations Internationales} 24(2008): 91-120.
German Turkish associations & the German state

This lack of unity limited cooperation between state institutions and Turkish associations at the national level. The Süleymani-affiliated Turkish Federation, the first national German Turkish association, applied with the West German state in 1979 for public corporation status (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), an established legal status which would accord the organization certain legal, financial and educational rights. The petition was rejected by West German courts on the grounds that the Turkish Federation could not presume to represent Turkish Islam when West Germany was already home to so many associations which interpreted Islam divergently.\(^{45}\) In some instances, national and regional governments used Turkish associational disunity as cover for a lack of engagement with German Turkish stakeholders in decisions primarily affecting members of that community. For example, in most Bundesländer, Islamic religious education (Religionsunterricht) in public schools was limited relative to that available to Catholic and Protestant pupils, even in schools in which the majority of the student body was Muslim. Whereas Catholic and Protestant pupils received Religionsunterricht – religious education with a curriculum approved by the respective churches and taught with the conviction that its religious doctrines were true – Muslim students in many Bundesländer received only Religiöse Unterweisung, an objective descriptive course in the history and practice of the Islamic faith. Others were forced to participate in Protestant or Catholic Religionsunterricht or abstain from religious lessons entirely. Education officials in

\(^{45}\) “Chronologie” in Eryilmaz and Jamin (eds.), Fremde Heimat, 394.
these Bundesländer justified this inequity by pointing to the lack of a national Islamic coordinating organization to train teachers and design lesson plans.46

The limiting effects of German Turkish associational disunity for cooperation with the German and West German state should not be overdrawn, however. Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia, the largest Bundesland by population, began offering Islamic lessons in the early 1980s which, while constitutionally prohibited from being referred to as Religionsunterricht were functionally similar. The DITIB, Sültemanci and Milli Görüş all participated in the writing of textbooks for lessons which preached Islamic doctrine non-objectively.47 In the conservative south, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg continued to educate Turkish nationals in separate home-language classes through the late 1980s and in these cases, the DITIB fixed the religious curriculum and imported carefully vetted teachers from Turkey.48 The federal structure of the German state influenced variable models of state-association collaboration on Islamic education, from the close but informal collaboration of North-Rhine Westphalia and the formal


47 The design and implementation of this curriculum is detailed in Werner Schiffauer, “Islam as a Civil Religion: Political Culture and the Organization of Diversity in Germany” in Modood and Werber (eds.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: 147-66.

partnership of the southern *Bundesländer* to the complete lack of cooperation in other
*Bundesländer*.  

Within local communities, German Turkish associations were represented on foreigner’s councils, a common feature of urban government without formal power but with considerable cultural and economic influence within the city. In some instances, notably in Hamburg, these councils were spaces for coordination between associations and local government on social, economic and political issues. In other cases internecine infighting between associations rendered the councils too sclerotic to function. Outside of these bodies, local government partnered with Islamic associations on a variety of projects: sponsoring Turkish cultural festivals, open houses at mosques or German classes for Turkish parents in local schools. After instances of far-right racial violence or abuse – particularly prevalent in the early 1990s – police reached out to local associations to keep community leaders informed of developments in their investigations. Such initiatives were generally informal and thus often fell in and out of favor depending on the composition of the local government or the interest of individual local Islamic association in such partnerships.

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49 Fetzer and Soper point to Hamburg as a good example of the latter model. Fetzer and Soper, *Muslims and the State*, 116.
51 Yalçın-Heckmann’s account of the Bamberg foreigner’s council is an excellent example of dysfunction within these institutions. Süleymançı and DITIB representatives refused to work together on any issues and, eventually, the city government began ignoring the foreigner’s council altogether. Yalçın-Heckmann, “The Perils of Ethnic Associational Life” in Modood and Webner (eds.), *The Politics of Multiculturalism*: 95-110.
Nevertheless, these and other instances of informal coordination between associations and local and regional government should not be discounted merely because of their informality. Taken in the aggregate across Germany, they represent a mode of engagement between Islamic associations which circumvented the national organizations and the German state, neither of which was inclined to support such collaboration for much of the 1980s and 1990s.\[55\]

Conclusion

This was the state of Turkish Islamic associational life in Germany at the end of the 1980s: fractured by transnational and intra-group competition, weakened by clientelist state policies, closed off from formal collaboration with national government but nevertheless active in local communities and in informal partnerships at local and regional scales. The next chapter details emergent trends, beginning with tentative moves in the early 1990s toward German citizenship reform, which upset this balance and moved German Turkish associations towards new modes of centralized national organization and interaction with the state.

\[55\] Joppke describes the attitudes of leaders of national organizations like Milli Görüş and the Süleymançı as “against Germanization and alienation” and marshals considerable documentary evidence in support of this contention. Joppke errs in conflating attitudes of national leaders with actual concrete local policies within these highly decentralized organizations. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State, 215-17.
Chapter III – German Turkish Islamic Associations in the New Germany, 1990-2006

Introduction: German Reunification and the new organizational context

German reunification, legally consummated after October 3, 1990, fundamentally reshaped the social, economic and political context in which German Turkish associational life operated. This was not merely a function of the German state expanding to absorb 11 million new citizens from the East. Instead, as Christian Joppke has argued, reunification represented the completion of the “German project”. Where previously the incompleteness of the German nation had served as the rationale for “wir sind kein Einwanderungsland”, the new Federal Republic was free to define membership in new and potentially de-ethnicized ways.\(^56\)

Despite this seismic shift in German understandings of nationhood and belonging, inherited legal and cultural traditions governing citizenship were not swept away suddenly. It would be three years after reunification before any movement was made on the citizenship reform question. Another seven would pass before that process of reform culminated in a sweeping citizenship law redefining national membership and changing the status of hundreds of thousands of foreign residents overnight. Most citizenship scholars point to the arson attacks

\(^56\) Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999): 95. The new preamble to the German Basic Law makes reference to the completion of the German unification project: “The Germans...have completed the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. This Basic Law is now valid for the entire German people.”
on Turkish families in November 1992 and May 1993 in the towns of Mölln and Solingen respectively as foundational moments in the history of the redefinition of German citizenship.  

Mölln, Solingen & the long road to citizenship reform

Speaking at a memorial service for three Turkish girls killed in a far-right arson attack in Solingen, Bundespräsident Richard von Weiszäcker explicitly questioned whether the foreign citizenship of the girls – aged eighteen, nine and four and all born in Solingen – contributed to their victimization. Addressing a crowd in nearby Cologne, von Weiszäcker asked the audience: “[D]o we not speak too easily of ‘the Turks’?...Would it not be more honest and human to say: ‘German citizens of Turkish heritage?’ They live by the rules of the German state, but without the ability to influence it that other citizens have. Should this remain so forever?”

Von Weiszäcker’s support for citizenship for long-term Turkish residents of Germany, coming as it did from a politician from the ruling CDU government, signaled a shift in attitudes towards citizenship and immigrant inclusion among the German political elite. Where previously the offering of citizenship for German Turks had been a position held only by marginal figures in German politics, Rita Chin has argued that the post-Solingen era saw a rapid

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shift in which the exclusivist “wir sind kein Einwanderungsland” logic common to the major parties on both ends of the spectrum in the 1980s became tainted through its association with right-wing violence and racism.\textsuperscript{59} With ethnicized notions of German nationality out of favor and the constitutional argument against the expansion of the ranks of German citizens rendered moot by reunification, citizenship reform began in earnest in 1993, short months after the Solingen attack and von Weizsäcker’s landmark address.

In June 1993, the Bundestag passed a revision of the nation’s citizenship laws, previously a largely ius sanguinis regime similar in most key details to its original incarnation as the German Nationality Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) of 1913.\textsuperscript{60} The new law facilitated naturalization of foreign citizens born in Germany, entitling those with at least 15 years of residence in Germany, a means of earning a living and a clean criminal record to automatically acquire German citizenship.\textsuperscript{61} The upshot of these reforms was a tremendous

\textsuperscript{59} Heinz Kühn, the former Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, West Germany’s most populous federal state, was a courageous exception, issuing a famous memorandum in 1979 advocating, among other reforms, a streamlined path to citizenship for Turkish residents in Germany. See Heinz Kühn, “The Present and Future Integration of Foreign Workers and Their Families in the Federal Republic of Germany” in Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005, Deniz Gökturek, David Gramling, Anton Kaes, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007): 247-9. Chin points to the negative reception received by an odious Bundestag address by CDU politician Alfred Dregger. Chin judges Dregger’s speech to be boilerplate “wir sind kein Eindwanderungsland” rhetoric familiar from similar discussions in the 1980s. The criticism Dregger received even from the right indicates to Chin the extent to which an undeclared attitude and policy shift on citizenship issues had occurred within unified Germany’s major parties. Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 150-6.


\textsuperscript{61} Though the 1993 act theoretically required renunciation of previous citizenship(s) before acquiring a German passport, Hailbronner points to numerous exceptions, including an exception for nationals of countries which, like Turkey at the time, demanded military service before recognizing citizenship renunciation. In practice then, dual nationality was de facto permitted between 1993 and 2000. See Hailbronner, Ausländerrecht, Kommentar (Alien’s Law, Commentary) (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1999) and Hailbronner, “Doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit” (“Double Nationality”), Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht 2(1999).
increase in naturalization. In 1995, 313,606 foreigners naturalized, versus only 34,913 in 1985.\textsuperscript{62}

Citizenship reform continued piecemeal throughout the 1990s, with small changes in 1994 and 1997 governing special nationality for children (Kinderstaatszugehörigkeit) the most notable achievements.\textsuperscript{63} This slow process of change culminated in late 1998 when the left-liberal SPD party formed a coalition government with a majority in the traditionally conservative Landtag, the upper house of parliament.\textsuperscript{64} This majority enabled the passage of sweeping reform. Where alterations to citizenship law in 1993, 1994, and 1997 were written within the confines of the 1913 Nationality Law, the new coalition government proposed a sweeping new law replacing the 1913 standard entirely.

Despite a favorable coalition majority in both legislative houses, the Nationality Law Reform of 2000 took nearly six months to pass, meeting particularly strong resistance in state parliaments. The reform introduced ius soli principles into German nationality law, making the acquisition of citizenship automatic for children born to foreign parents legally residing in Germany. Additionally, the naturalization process was streamlined, reducing the requirement for legal residence to eight years from the fifteen year minimum of the 1993 law.\textsuperscript{65} The new law brought about another increase in naturalizations, with 2.43% of all resident foreigners in Germany naturalizing in 2000, versus a mere 0.46% in 1991. German Turks constituted a two-

\textsuperscript{62} Statistics drawn from Hailbronner, “Country Report: Germany”, 4. Ruth Mandel has argued that the rate of naturalization would likely have been far higher had the German government invested sufficient resources in informing resident foreigners of their legal rights. Mandel points to an information campaign in Berlin spearheaded by Barbara John, the venerable state parliamentarian responsible for immigration and integration affairs, which contributed to a significant uptick in naturalizations in Berlin the next year. Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008): 206-12.
\textsuperscript{63} Hailbronner, "Country Report: Germany", 3-4 and Yurdakul, From Guest Workers into Muslims, 13-17.
\textsuperscript{64} Hailbronner offers the most readable and least arcane legalistic summary of this process in “Country Report: Germany”, 6-10.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 6-7.
thirds majority of these naturalizations, disproportionate even relative to their status as the most prevalent foreign nationality in Germany.\textsuperscript{66}

Increasingly, Turkish organizations were forced to adapt to a new context in which many of their older members remained non-citizens but younger constituents were increasingly naturalizing at a high rate. This presaged an entirely new relationship with the German state, as community leaders were able to exercise formal influence in the German political process at the local, state and national level.\textsuperscript{67}

**German state Ausländerpolitik: from integration policy to the securitization of migrant communities**

The nationality reform culminating in 2000 was just one aspect of the reorientation of the German state vis-à-vis the German Turkish minority. Before 1990, public intellectuals and leading scholars of migration were eminently justified in saying the West German state had no national integration policy and preferred to indulge in the discredited fantasy that German

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid, 21-22.

\textsuperscript{67}Milli Görüş was the quickest to recognize this new opportunity and began to encourage its members to naturalize in the early 2000s. See Werner Schiffauer, *Nach dem Islamismus: Eine Ethnographie der islamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (After Islamism: An Ethnography of the Islamic Community Milli Görüş)* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010). This policy can be explicitly contrasted with pre-citizenship reform rhetorical efforts by some Turkish Islamic organizations to retard citizenship integration of their constituents in German society. See Schiffauer’s study of radical elements within Milli Görüş and the Süleymanci. Schiffauer, *Die Gottesmänner: Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland, Eine Studie zur Herstellung religiöser Evidenz (The Men of God: Turkish Islamists in Germany, A Study of the Production of Religious Evidence)* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2000) as well as Joppke’s less nuanced summary in Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 212-22. The Turkish state, recognizing the potential economic and political advantages of a large enfranchised Turkish minority in Europe’s largest economy, began to actively encourage naturalization as well. This became, by extension, the policy of DİTİB as well. See Nalan Soyarik-Şentürk, “Legal and constitutional foundations of Turkish citizenship: changes and continuities” in *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, eds. E.I Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduyu (London: Routledge, 2005): 124-144 and Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu, “Country Report: Turkey”, *European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship*, December 2009, rev. May 2010, 3-10.
Turks would return to Turkey of their own volition. In the 1990s, this began to belatedly change, as the German state recognized the need for national-level policies to foster the social, political and economic integration of Turkish citizens living in Germany. If local-scale economic and informal political integration and interaction between local government and Turkish associations was the norm before 1990, the 1990s saw tentative steps towards national-level collaboration.

To some extent, the *Leitkultur* debate in German media in the late 1990s can be seen as an important precursor to national-level action. The term “*Leitkultur*”, variably translated as “leading culture”, “core culture” or “basic culture”, was first employed by German-Arab sociologist Bassam Tibi in a subtle survey of the practice of German multiculturalism, but quickly became a buzzword for a debate about the desirability, necessity and practicality of the cultural and social integration or assimilation of Germany’s foreign population, especially the German Turks. While elements of the discussion in German newspapers seemed similar in

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content and tone to debates along the same lines in the 1980s, Yükleyen points to a stronger emphasis on specific national-level proposals by partisans on either side. Instead of leaving integration policy to local authorities, proposals were floated for nation-wide integration action across a variety of ministries: Justice, Interior, Education, Infrastructure, Family, etc.

Some scholars have interpreted the lack of concrete achievements in integration policy at the national level as a signal of a retreat away from the idea of “deep” integration itself after an exhausting and ultimately open-ended debate about the role of culture in the nation-state. Notably, this interpretation was offered before 2006, which saw a flurry of national-level integration initiatives. With the benefit of hindsight, the Leitkultur debate can be seen as a less than significant event on its own merits but one which nevertheless shifted the terms of the debate surrounding integration in Germany to the national level. Proponents and opponents of immigrant assimilation both saw the national scale as the only appropriate venue for their favored reforms. Though ultimately neither side’s proposals were enacted immediately, the ground had been laid in elite-level discourse for future national-level action engaging directly with the reality of the permanent presence of a foreign population in Germany. If the German government required German Turkish civil society partners for national-level initiatives, the

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national Islamic associations seemed the logical choice. And, as the next chapter will demonstrate, if no suitable partner existed, the state would have to lend its resources and legitimacy to the creation of one.

A further source of legitimization for national-level policies emerged after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Three of the nineteen hijackers involved in the attack, including the leader, Mohammed Atta, had lived in Hamburg for several years, where they became radicalized and planned their eventual attacks in the U.S. The three foreign nationals had been active members of the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg, which the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz had identified as a radical congregation without acting on that information. The embarrassment of this domestic intelligence failure, coupled with public and international demands for increased surveillance of possible radical Muslim extremists, incentivized coordination at the national level and the securitization of integration policy as it related to foreign Muslims present in Germany.

In looking to international models for collaboration between law enforcement agencies and Muslim communities, German authorities drew extensively on Dutch, French and American examples. In both states, however, Muslim civil society and religious organizations were more centralized, had a broader and more national membership base, and possessed greater

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The specific historically-produced mode of Islam association described in the preceding chapter – characterized by intra-group rifts, state-fostered clientelism and highly-localized informal host state integration – rendered German Turkish Islamic associations unsuited for national-level law enforcement partnerships. If Germany hoped to emulate the national law enforcement model prevalent in the Netherlands, France and the United States, a new mode of German Turkish Islamic associational organization would be necessary in order to create suitable civil society partners.

The AK Party and secularism in the Turkish diaspora

While the German state was incented to lend its support to a reorientation of German Turkish Islamic associational life – the better to facilitate cooperation on security and integration policy – the Islamic associations themselves belatedly began to rethink the logic of their factionalization. On the one hand, the ethnopolitical religious entrepreneurs who dominated the national associations were presented with an opportunity to gain state resources and recognition of an entirely unfounded claim to leadership of the German Turkish community. On the other, collaboration between associations involved the bridging of substantial differences – ethnic Turks vs. Alevis, Islamist vs. secularist – with implications for politics in Turkey, given the outsized influence their financial clout offered German Turkish

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77 Fetzer, Soper, Yurdakul and Yükleyen’s monographs, as the most recent comprehensive works on the subject, are more sensitive to these changes. Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 98-130; Yurdakul, From Guest Workers into Muslims, 28-47; Yükleyen, Localizing Islam in Europe, 198-220.
78 The term “ethnopolitical entrepreneur” is borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu by way of Rogers Brubaker. See Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004): 8.
associations in homeland politics.\textsuperscript{79} Though substantial barriers still remained, one stumbling block in the way of greater collaboration between associations was removed with the election of the AK Parti in Turkey in November, 2002.\textsuperscript{80}

The landslide election of the AK Parti upset notions of strict secularism which had been prevalent in Turkey since Atatürk’s reforms in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{81} The party’s intellectual progenitor was Necmettin Erbakan’s banned Refah Partisi – itself the political movement from which \textit{Milli Görüş} originated – and the AK Parti’s leaders and prime ministerial and presidential candidates respectively, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdüllah Gül, had been active members of Refah before the military’s so-called “post-modern coup” of 1997 removed Erbakan from office.\textsuperscript{82} The election of the AK Parti, while the party itself remained somewhat of a cipher in terms of its ultimate intentions, nevertheless signaled a clear rebuke of the military’s tight control of religious practice and organization in Turkey. If the AK Parti’s ascension into government presaged a redrawing of the boundaries between state and Islam in Turkey, the same held true for Turkish organizations in Germany as well.


\textsuperscript{80} Like most things associated with the AK Partisi (official: \textit{Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi}, Justice and Development Party), the party’s name is somewhat controversial. “Ak” is Turkish for “white”, in the symbolic sense meaning purity. Opponents of the party tend to refer to it as the AKP to avoid even unintentionally endorsing the party’s claim to purity. This thesis, for simplicity’s sake, chooses to use the term the party itself prefers. See “AK Parti mi, AKP mi?” (“AK Party or AKP?”), \textit{Haber Türk}, 5 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{81} Excellent analyses of the history of Turkish secularism and the implications of the AK Parti’s domination of government since 2002 can be found in M. Hakan Yavuz, \textit{The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti} (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006); Zeyno Baran, \textit{Torn Country: Turkey Between Secularism and Islamism} (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{82} Background on Refah and the “post-modern coup” can be found in Cengiz Çandar “Post-modern darbe”, \textit{Sabah}, 27 June 1997.
Yükleyen observed an almost immediate change in DİTİB policy after the 2002 elections. Though it must be stressed again that DİTİB is not officially an arm of the Turkish government, as a practical fact its legitimacy and in particular its access to state-trained imams for its German mosques depend on its close ties to the Turkish state. As such, DİTİB was responsive to the change in government in 2002, moving from a public stance of promoting integration without sacrificing essentialized Turkish identity towards an embrace of Islam as a unifying factor. In the years between 2002 and 2006, DİTİB engaged in information campaigns aimed at educating the general German public about the tenets of Islam. In this project, DİTİB collaborated with VIKZ, the Süleymançı organization, as well as the Islamische Föderation Berlin, a local association dominated by Milli Görüş. This might seem an unimportant step, but when examined in the context of decades of turf wars and competition for members and recognition, this collaboration signaled the effect of the AK Parti’s new conception of Turkish secularism on bridging the divisions which had separated German Turkish Islamic associations for decades.

Conclusion: Islamic associational life on the eve of the German Islam Conference

When comparing the state of German Turkish Islamic associational life in 1989 at the end of the previous chapter to 2006 on the eve of the first German Islam Conference, broad similarities can be observed. The associations were still highly federal and weakened by state clientelism. Despite the best efforts of ethno-political entrepreneurs in national leadership, the

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83Yükleyen’s analysis of DİTİB and its post-2002 policies in both Germany and the Netherlands can be found in Yükleyen, Localizing Islam in Europe, 210-22. Yükleyen’s work is, somewhat surprisingly, one of the few which deals directly with DİTİB. Milli Görüş, the Aleviitische Gemeinde, the Süleymançı and German Kurds have all been studied to a greater extent than DİTİB, perhaps reflecting an academic bias towards more marginal groups over those larger and better-established.
vast majority of association activity took place locally outside the influence of the national organizations. Formal collaboration with the German state was nonexistent, though informal local-scale initiatives remained vibrant loci of collaboration. Lastly, the associations were still riven by deep divisions along political, confessional and ethnic lines, despite token efforts like DİTİB’s information campaign which strove to bridge those gaps.

Despite these similarities, there were clearly discernible trends towards change. Citizenship reform transformed Islamic associations from clientelist groupings with little formal influence into potentially powerful election blocs, given the number of their members who had acquired German citizenship. Though nation-wide German integration policies were slow in developing, the Leitkultur debate indicated a new willingness on both sides of the integration debate to consider the need for national-scale reform. The securitization of integration policy after 11 September had much the same effect in incentivizing the German state to find – or even create – suitable partners for civil society partnerships with law enforcement. Finally, cooperation and coordination between associations might have been the exception rather than the norm, but the election of the AK Parti and its more Islamist-friendly attitudes influenced the willingness of DİTİB, the largest association by far, to work together with associations previously ideologically opposed to the secularist government in Turkey. All of these developments, with the exception of the highly-publicized citizenship reform, went largely unnoticed at the time.

The formal proposals drafted at the German Islam Conference in 2006 reveal the magnitude of these seemingly subtle changes in shaping a new conception of German Turkish Islamic associational life.
Chapter 4 – The German Islam Conference & Emergent Modes of German Turkish Associational Organization

Introduction: The German Islam Conference – founding principles and participants

2006 was a year of great activity on the integration front in Germany. In Angela Merkel’s first full year as Bundeskanzlerin, she tasked Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble with developing an energetic policy initiative at the national level, aimed at facilitating the integration of foreigners and, just as importantly, improving the state’s ability to counteract radical Islamist terrorism. The new government’s first major project in 2006 was the Integration Summit (Integrationsgipfel). The Integrationsgipfel, convened in July, was aimed at fostering dialogue and “over the course of some years” ("im Laufe eines Jahres") assembling a workable integration plan. The Integration Summit, while lauded as a historic first step, was

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84 Schäuble served as Interior Minister from Merkel’s election in 2005 to 2009, after which he became Finance Minister in Merkel’s second cabinet. A readable though somewhat dated account of Schäuble’s career in public service can be found in Ulricht Reitz, Wolfgang Schäuble: Die Biographie (Wolfgang Schäuble: The Biography) (Berlin: Gustav Lubbe, 1996). Schäuble’s own statement of his political philosophy, including significant coverage of migration and integration issues, can be found in Schäuble, Mitten im Leben (In the Middle of Life) (Berlin: Goldmann, 2001). An excellent resource offering a statistical and analytical summary of 2006 in migration in Germany can be found in Werner Schiffauer and Michael Bommes, eds., Migrationsreport 2006: Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven (Migration Report 2006: Facts, Analyses, Perspectives) (Hamburg: Campus Verlag, 2006).

85 Description of the summit and quote found in “Ein fast historisches Ereignis” (“An Almost Historical Event”), Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 14, 2006.
nonetheless criticized for producing a very broad plan lacking concrete or even politically feasible policy proposals.\(^{86}\)

From its initial conception, the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islamkonferenz*, DIK) was intended to shape specific policy. Schäuble introduced the conference – largely his brainchild – in a speech to the *Bundestag* in September, 2006. Schäuble explicitly differentiated the DIK from the *Integrationsgipfel*, stressing both the DIK’s wider reach – in that the conference concerned itself with both citizen and non-citizen German Muslims – as well as its goal of producing readily implementable policy recommendations. “The end result [of the DIK],” Schäuble emphasized, “should be concrete guidance derived from careful analysis.”\(^{87}\)

Though the entire DIK met as a group in plenary sessions, Schäuble made clear to the *Bundestag* that the real work of the conference would be achieved in smaller working groups (*Arbeitsgruppen*) which would bring together high-ranking federal officials from a variety of ministries and representatives of Muslim organizations.\(^{88}\)

Speaking in an interview months after the end of the first DIK, Schäuble again cited the *Arbeitsgruppen* as the fulcrum of the DIK and

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\(^{86}\) *Ibid.* While the National Integration Plan was endorsed by the *Bundestag*, this should be seen as a symbolic gesture, especially when the document itself contains vague proposals along the lines of “make the economy more open to the world” or “improve the quality of life of women and girls.” See *Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, “Nationaler Integrationsplan” (“National Integration Plan”), July 14, 2006, [http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-12-nationaler-integrationsplan-kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-12-nationaler-integrationsplan-kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2).


\(^{88}\) *Ibid.*
the place where “it would be made visible with whom one actually deals with in setting conditions for willingness to integrate.”89

At the first meeting of the DIK, the German government invited representatives of the organizations “with whom one actually deals”90. The heads of the largest Muslim organizations by membership in Germany were invited to join representatives from the ministries of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Labor, Family and Culture.91 The five Muslim organizations invited were DİTİB, Verband der islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ, representing the Süleymani movement), the Alevi Community (Alevitschen Gemeinde in Deutschland), Milli Görüş, and the Arab Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland (Central Council of Muslims in Germany).92 Meeting in Berlin, state and Islamic organization representatives came together first in September 2006, and then annually afterwards. The working groups commissioned reports on Muslim

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90 The specific goals of Schäuble, Merkel’s CDU government or the German state in convening the DIK are outside the purview of this project. Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson see state-Islamic organization partnerships as motivated by a desire on the part of the state “to coopt minority movements and their leaderships and build them into state strategies of surveillance and control”. Castles and Davidson, Citizenship and Migration (London: Macmillan, 2000), 154.


integration and topics as diverse as mosque construction controversies or the expansion and official recognition of Islamic religious education in German schools.93

A close analysis of these reports and their proposals for the role of German Turkish Islamic associations reveals an attempt by the national organizations to codify a new mode of Islamic associational life in collaboration with the German state. This chapter identifies three decisive breaks with pre-1989 norms; norms previously under pressure in the 1990s from forces identified in the previous chapter. Firstly, the proposals of the Arbeitsgruppen included the creation of a unified national Islamic umbrella organization encompassing all four German Turkish associations and the Arab Zentralrat. Secondly, state and Islamic representatives proposed an officially-sanctioned spokesman role for this Dachverband and its constituent associations; notably, at the national, not local or regional level. Thirdly, particularly in the third DIK in 2009 the working groups broached, in a roundabout manner, an eventual application for public corporation status (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) for the Dachverband, entitling the associations which ran the Dachverband to collect church taxes (Kirchensteuer) and create religious curricula for German schoolchildren.94

This chapter will examine each of these three developments in the context of one – or in the case of the first, two – annual meeting of the DIK in its first phase (2006-2009). Though

94 This chapter examines the documents produced by the DIK from the perspective of illuminating new modes of German Turkish associational organization. Useful discursive analysis of the language of DIK documents conducted by Levent Tezcan offers a perspective on the construction of certain key concepts in DIK discourse, e.g. “Terrorism”, “Islam”, “Integration”. Tezcan, Das muslimische Subjeckt: Verfangen im Dialog der Deutschen Islam Konferenz (The Muslim Subject: Entanglements in the Dialogue of the German Islam Conference) (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2012)
certain overlap does exist between conferences, this approach helps to highlight the cumulative nature of these proposals, as at each DIK the national German Turkish Islamic associations accrue more power, funding and recognition, moving decisively away from a traditional of localized, informal organization characteristic of the 1961 to 1989 period.

The 2006 & 2007 Conferences: creating an Islamic Dachverband

It is necessary to treat the first and second Deutsche Islamkonferenzen as one unit, as the first September 2006 meeting convened the Arbeitsgruppen which would spend the period from September to May 2007 preparing reports and proposals. The research themes fixed by the Interior Ministry for the 2006 DIK were vague – for example, “Questions of Religion in the German Constitutional Framework” or “The Economy and Media as Bridges” – and the DIK was roundly criticized for this, given Schäuble’s promise to the Bundestag of concrete action. Nevertheless, the first DIK did see a watershed event in the history of German Turkish Islam, as the three largest associations – along with the Arab Zentralrat – founded the Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM, Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany) at the conference. The three German Turkish associations – DİTİB, the Süleymançı and Milli Görüş – had for the first time in their history agreed to a national framework for cooperative projects.

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96 The Alevi Community, the fourth-largest national association by membership, was excluded. The dispute between Alevi and Sunni Turkish understandings of Islam is both theological and ethnic and is detailed in Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
Given the long history of conflict between the three Turkish organizations, their collective establishment of the KRM was, in the words of the Interior Ministry press release accompanying its founding, an “an important and significant step.” The KRM represents the extent to which the AK Parti’s election in Turkey altered the calculus for DİTİB especially, and it was DİTİB which drove the KRM’s creation.

As a symbol, the KRM embodies this new era in inter-associational relations. However, this should not suggest that decades of conflict – both in Germany and Turkey – over theology, politics, resources and legitimacy were swept away overnight. Indeed, the activities – or lack thereof – of the KRM since its founding suggest there are significant hurdles yet to clear before the KRM could hope to implement and influence policy at the national level. The KRM, as of early 2012, possesses a barebones website, no full-time employees solely devoted to its activities and no offices of its own. The “Documents and Speeches” section of the KRM’s website contains a grand total of eighteen press releases and transcripts of speeches at public events by Bekir Alboğa, its founding president. Nevertheless, the KRM’s very existence signifies a new commitment to national-level organization and constitutional scholars and scholars of Islam in Germany expect it to continue to accrue responsibility and resources. Völker Beck, a Green Party parliamentarian and constitutional scholar, interprets the KRM’s establishment, even as a weak and ineffectual organization for the moment, as an irreversible

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99 Though it should be stressed that DİTİB did not sacrifice its preeminent position among German Turkish Islamic associations in a rush to compromise. DİTİB retains a veto right on all KRM decisions and the first head of the KRM, Bekir Alboğa, doubled as DİTİB’s president. Indeed, on the KRM’s barebones website, the correspondence address of the organization is DİTİB’s national headquarters in Cologne. See KRM, “Impressum & derzeitige Sprecher des KRM” (“Imprint & Current Speaker of the KRM”), [http://www.koordinationsrat.de/default.php?p=6](http://www.koordinationsrat.de/default.php?p=6).
step towards a situation similar to Spain, Austria or France, where Muslim organizations are centrally represented in a unitary body with wide-ranging powers and a voice in government policy.\textsuperscript{101}

The 2008 Conference: The construction of “assimilable foreignness”

At the 2008 DIK, Wolfgang Schäuble chaired a working group which sought to define “the German social system and value consensus” and what those aspects of German society meant for the prospects of Muslim integration.\textsuperscript{102} The goal of this exercise was to lay the foundations for concrete policy proposals grounded in an understanding of both German and Muslim perspectives. Dealing first with Germany, the working group concluded that the country’s social system is based on a history marked by conflict between state and religion. These conflicts produced a desire to legally limit the influence of religion in the public sphere in the interests of peaceful coexistence which was enshrined in the German Basic Law. At the end of this exploration of the causes of secular society, the working group somewhat awkwardly adds that “[t]his Basic Law is also exemplary in the opinion of the Muslims represented in Working Group 1.”\textsuperscript{103}

This qualification is typical of the documentation produced by the 2008 DIK. Having spent the prior two conferences producing a report on the state of Muslim life in Germany and


\textsuperscript{103} “Auch aus Sicht der in der AG 1 vertretenen Muslime ist diese Verfassung vorbildlich.”
founding an umbrella organization to coordinate between the national associations, the DIK shifted its focus towards a framing of Muslim integration issues and policy proposals characterized by what I refer to as “assimilable foreignness”. “Assimilable foreignness” is a rhetorical tactic by which the DIK stresses the elemental, enduring foreignness of Muslims in Germany, even those of the third- or fourth-generation. This foreignness presents challenges for the German state, but these challenges can be overcome if the state works through reliable partners like the individual Islamic associations and the KRM. In the documents of the 2008 DIK, individual Muslims are problematic and hold views potentially destabilizing to the German social order. The state is ill-equipped to integrate such a population. The Islamic associations – DİTİB, the Süleymançı, Milli Görüş, the Alevi Community and the Arab Zentralrat – on the other hand, represent a bridge between the foreign world of Islam and secular German society. The associations accept German constitutional and secular values but are also capable of relating to their co-religionists in a way non-Muslims are not, rendering that Muslim foreignness safe and capable of integration. In that sense, the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs present at the DIK “reif[y] groups, treating them as substantial things in the world...and contribute to producing what they apparently describe or designate.”

Immediately after stressing the constitutional reliability of the Muslim representatives at the DIK, the Arbeitsgruppe transitions to a discussion of the differences which create integration difficulties for other Muslims, presumably those who are less enlightened and thus in need of guidance from their co-religionists:

“Immigrants who come from countries where the structures of state and religion are different tend to have difficulty acknowledging the German social system which is marked by the separation of state and religion and find it hard to see this as beneficial.”

This is a puzzling conclusion to draw about Muslims in Germany. According to figures produced by the Conference itself, 63.2 percent of Muslims in Germany have a Turkish background. It would seem to be difficult to claim Turkish migrants have no experience with a secular state. Similarly, four of the next five larger sources of Muslim immigrants in Germany are also secular states. Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq and Tunisia are all at least ostensibly secular. Iran is the exception, but most Iranian immigrants in Germany emigrated in the late 1970s in response to the Islamic Revolution or during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 and thus likely experienced secularism under the Shah. Some Muslims in Germany may oppose the German secular system but their opposition cannot realistically be viewed as an inevitable consequence of their national origin.

The juxtaposition of the endorsement of the working group’s Muslim members of the Basic Law’s secularism with an eminently debatable conclusion about the lack of experience of other immigrants with such concepts serves the idea of “assimilable foreignness”. The working group stresses the challenges of integration – Germany’s Muslims are so foreign as to not be capable of accepting secular principles – but the Muslims leaders in the group use their own acceptance of German values as evidence of integration’s attainability. By implication, if

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105 “Diese für die deutsche Gesellschaftsordnung prägende wechselseitige Begrenzung anzuerkennen and sie als vorteilhaft zu erkennen, fällt Zuwandern aus Ländern mit anderer Ausgestaltung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Religion oftmals schwer.”

German Muslims have difficulty understanding the structure of the German system, then non-Muslim Germans would have similar difficulty understanding German Muslims. It logically follows that if Muslims are to accept the German Basic Law, those Muslims who wholeheartedly and enthusiastically endorse the principles the German constitutional tradition represents are best equipped to do the convincing. The Islamic organizations represented at the Conference and in the KRM thus construct a model of integration in which they are uniquely qualified to address significant Muslim difference.

The Working Group on Security and Islam produced a similar document which stresses the challenges of Muslim integration and the essential role Islamic organizations must play in meeting those challenges. The working group begins once again with an expression of solidarity, writing that “[t]errorism poses a threat to everyone – Muslims and non-Muslims alike.” The Muslim members of the working group reinforce their credentials as representatives of safe, non-radicalized organizations, in contradistinction to “[s]ome Muslim groups and organizations here in Germany [which] are actively propagating extremist ideologies and patterns of behavior.” Unsurprisingly, the methods of combating extremism which the working group proposes emphasized Islamic organizations as a bridge between the state and Muslims. Two previously attempted “trust-building measures” were discussed by the working group and endorsed as models for future initiatives. Both involved cooperation between German authorities and the national Islamic organizations; in this case, DİTİB and the Arab Zentralrat.

107 “Der Terrorismus bedroht alle Menschen – Muslime wie Nicht-Muslime.”
108 „Auch in Deutschland propagieren einige muslimischen Gruppen und Organisationen aktiv extremistische Ideologien und Verhaltensweisen.“
These projects involved formal dialogue between these Islamic organizations and the local police to be carried out at the local level, bringing together at a round table “all the major actors in the respective social areas...social and youth welfare administrators, schools, clubs with Muslim members and recognized Muslim figures.” Lest the German state conclude that national Islamic organizations would be superfluous in this dialogue, the working group recommended “permanent organizational implementation of relevant tasks at the relevant institutions, in order to ensure the sustainable performance of tasks even in the event of staff changes.” National Islamic organizations would be better equipped to permanently implement such a program of cooperation than local notables who would not be able to rely on an organized bureaucratic structure with institutional memory to supply and train a replacement were they ever unable to continue serving in the same vital capacity. Furthermore, the working group argued for the value of some form of national organization:

“Last but by no means least, the possibility of setting up a coordination body at the level of the federal government will be explored in order to gain an overview of all cooperation projects, to broker contacts, to arrange for speakers, etc. and to assist with the development and distribution of information material (clearinghouse).”

Again, the logical organizations to coordinate such a nation-wide effort would be those large groups affiliated with the DIK and the KRM. The working group suggested going beyond even this national coordinating role in promising that “[t]he associations will actively crack down on...
Islamist publications that are available in their establishments. In this role, demonstrably reliable Islamic associations would police other Muslims in a way non-Muslims could not.

This discussion of the threat of Islamic terrorism does not suggest that the Muslim participants in the Conference shied away from their preferred narrative of the challenging but nevertheless realistic possibility of integration. Beyond merely policing their own communities and increasing cooperation with security services, Islamic organizations were assumed to hold the potential to proactively combat extremism before it became a threat.

“These types of projects can have an indirect impact on the risks of radicalization; the better the mutual trust is between security authorities and Muslims, the greater the willingness of Muslims to counteract Islamist tendencies...to have a moderating influence on persons at risk in their surroundings and to marginalize extremists and radicals.”

The unstated assumption here is that without these projects – projects which could not be successfully organized without Islamic organizations – some level of Islamist sentiment would persevere unopposed in Muslim communities. Muslims in this construction are a monolithic group more apt to respond to other Muslims, and by implication less likely to respond to non-Muslims – the “foreign” half of “assimilable foreignness.” This dim view of German Muslims is twinned with an optimistic vision of the development of a critical mass of Muslims who trust state authorities and who will moderate or isolate extremist tendencies – “assimilable”. The working group suggests that the bridge between “foreign” and “assimilable” can and should be

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112 “Die Verbände werden aktiv gegen islamistischen Publikationen vorgehen, die in ihren Einrichtungen erhältlich sind.”
113 “Die Gefahren der Radikalisierung können durch derartige Projekte mittelbar beeinflusst werden: Ein besseres Vertrauensverhältnis von Sicherheitsbehörden und Muslimen kann die Bereitschaft von Muslimen stützen, islamistischen...Bestrebungen entgegen zu wirken, sich gegenüber gefährdeten Personen in ihrem Umfeld mäßigend einzusetzen und Extremisten und Radikale auszuzgrenzen.”

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the large Islamic organizations which would thus be entrusted with greater responsibility in and over their own communities.

The 2009 Conference: *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts* and the establishment of official Islam

A consistent underlying theme of the 2009 meeting of the DIK was the German constitutional concept of public-corporation status (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*). Established in Article 140 of the German Basic Law, this status allows for the collection of church taxes (*Kirchensteuer*) – approximately 8-10% of all federal income revenues – in the name of the religious group, ensures complete religious autonomy from state interference, and grants the religious group the right to train teachers, run religious studies programs at universities and determine the curricula for religious lessons in public schools in those *Bundesländer* which offer them. Even beyond the official privileges of the status, many leaders of Islamic associations view its eventual achievement as an important symbolic step to in acknowledging the permanence of Islam as a part of everyday life in Germany, one which might have repercussions in areas as diverse as streamlining the process of mosque construction or making it easier for observant Muslim children to abstain from sex education classes.


All three German Turkish associations represented in the KRM had at one time applied for public corporation status unsuccessfully with the state, with the Süleymançı filing its first application as early as 1979. These applications had been rejected for a variety of reasons: insufficient membership, unrepresentative or undemocratic organization, a perceived lack of permanency in Germany. ¹¹⁶ Beck’s analysis of the KRM concludes that, while the organization has a better claim to the status than its members do individually, its membership base would still need to be broadened. The KRM, according to Beck’s calculation, represents roughly 30% of German Muslims, as compared to the established Catholic and Evangelical churches, which represent more than 90% of all members of their respective confession. Beck is still optimistic about the KRM’s chance of attaining public corporation status as the organization evolves into a larger and more representative form. ¹¹⁷

Some leaders of German Turkish Islamic associations are less convinced of the German state’s good faith in assessing the KRM’s candidacy for public corporation status. In an interview with Fetzer and Soper, Ghulam Totakhyl, general secretary of Milli Görüş lamented what he saw as a bias against Muslim associations, claiming that “quite apart from their Kirchensteuer, other religious groups receive public money for their hospitals, for their social welfare groups...But for us, even though we pay our taxes, our tax money goes somewhere else.” Totakhyl attributes this lack of trust on the part of the German state to a fear of public

money being misused for politically embarrassing purposes, a standard not applied to other religious denominations.\textsuperscript{118}

At the 2009 DIK, public corporation status never makes a single appearance in the documents of any working group. Nevertheless, there are numerous instances where policy proposals floated by a working group include a role for Muslim associations which, in a Catholic, Evangelical or Jewish context, would fall under public corporation status. Perhaps reflecting Totakhyl’s mistrust of the German state’s objectivity on the issue, the working group proposals are designed to demonstrate the Islamic associations’ – and by extension, the KRM’s – suitability for public corporation status before actually submitting an application in the KRM’s name.

The “Questions of Religion in the German Constitutional Framework” working group proposed several collaborations between Islamic associations and the state which would normally fall under the purview of public corporation status.\textsuperscript{119} Pointing to the importance of imams and other religious leaders to the worldview of young people, the working group proposed that “basic and further training institutions for Muslim religious staff in Germany is therefore expressly welcomed and should receive the same public support and promotion as is


the case with other religious communities with similarly important social tasks.”

Doing so would require the creation of study programs in Islamic theology in German universities which would be

“shared concerns of the state and the religious communities. This means that the state and the religious communities need to cooperate when it comes to determining the curriculum. The creation of theological programs at universities and comparable education facilities requires the participation of the religious communities, and their approval of curriculum.

This role would explicitly partner Islamic associations with the German state in a manner consistent with public corporation status. No mention of church taxes is made in the working group’s recommendations or of an application for public corporation status. Nevertheless, such an establishment of Islamic associations on par with public corporation status would serve to demonstrate the reliability of the KRM for public corporation status in the future. Not insignificantly, the proposal would also cement the status of the KRM and its constituent organizations as the legitimate mouthpiece of Islam in Germany – a not insignificant goal for an umbrella organization which could only count 30% of German Muslims as members.

Similar proposals were floated at the 2009 DIK for Islamic religious education on German schools, as well as specialized training programs in “intercultural skills” run by Islamic associations for teachers from schools with a large proportion of Muslim students. Again, both proposals would require partnership between the state and Islamic associations and again,

120...Aus- und Fortbildungseinrichtungen für muslimische Religionsbedienstete in Deutschland wird daher ausdrücklich begrüßt und sollte auch von staatlicher Seite in gleicher Weise unterstützt und gefördert werden wie bei anderen Religionsgemeinschaften mit vergleichbar bedeutsamen gesellschaftlichen Aufgaben.”

121 Dies hat zur Folge, dass der Staat Religionsgemeinschaften als Kooperationspartner benötigt, welche die Lehrinhalte verbindlich festlegen können. Die Einrichtung theologischer Lehrangebote an staatlichen Hochschulen und vergleichbaren akademischen Bildungseinrichtungen kann nur in Zusammenwirken mit den jeweiligen Religionsgemeinschaften erfolgen, mit denen Einvernehmen über die Inhalte des Studiengangs, über die Prüfungsordnungen oder über das Lehrpersonal erzielt werden muss.
both proposals reflected rights and responsibilities granted by the state to religious groups with public corporation status. Indeed, when comparing the specific rights granted by public corporation status to the proposals of the 2009 DIK, the only public corporation right missing from the DIK proposals is the collection of church taxes.

Church taxes are undeniably significant. Prior applications for public corporation status as well as Totakhyl’s interview with Fetzer and Soper reflect a clear desire on the part of Islamic associations to gain access to such funds. With that said, the proposals of the DIK can be seen as part of a slow build towards an inevitable application for public corporation status, one in which the arguments used by the state deny prior applications could be refuted by the pre-existing fact of *de facto* public corporation status for Islamic associations in all but the financial sense.

**Conclusion**

The 2009 DIK was the final conference of the so-called “first phase”. Subsequent meetings expanded on the general themes of the prior four conferences, but their overriding aim after 2009 was not to rethink Islamic organization in Germany, but to “embed the DIK into society.”\(^{122}\) The 2010 DIK, for example, expanded on elements of the 2009 and 2008 meetings, advocating for a broadening of a successful state-DİTİB partnership for the orientation of foreign imams to German cultural norms and greater funding for Islamic studies programs at German universities. These proposals for expanded cooperation, while useful to examine in the

context of state integration policy, are less significant from the perspective of German Turkish Islamic associational organization. The DIK conferences of 2006-2009 had been decisive moments in the history of German Turkish associational life, as long-standing norms, already under challenge during the turbulent decade of the 1990s, were definitively and irrevocably altered. DIK meetings from 2010 built upon this new framework without fundamentally altering it or returning to the prior, pre-1989 model.
On March 30, 2011, Aydan Özoguz, a German parliamentarian charged with the integration portfolio of the minority German Socialist Party (SPD), called a press conference and voiced his party’s support for a boycott of the fifth meeting of the German Islam Conference, scheduled for the following day. The 2011 DIK was the second meeting of the “second phase” and the second organized under the watch of Wolfgang Schäuble’s successor, Hans-Peter Friedrich. Friederich shared his predecessor’s commitment to the value of the DIK. What Friedrich had changed and what drew Özoguz’s ire were the conditions of integration. Friedrich, a member of the conservative CSU party in coalition with the ruling center-right CDU, hoped to use the conference to gain the consent of Muslim organizations for greatly expanded cooperation with security agencies to counteract the threat of Islamic extremism in Germany. While the then-head of the KRM, Aiman Mazyek expressed some unease with this proposal, declaring that the DIK “should not become a security policy conference”, not a single participant in the planned conference heeded Özoguz’s call to boycott. The head of the DİTİB, Bekir Alboğa, summarized the response of participating Islamic organizations regarding

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the proposed conference boycott: “It [the DIK] is continuing. That’s what we Muslims want. And that’s what the Minister wants too.”

To borrow Jürgen Kaube’s assessment of that logic, “the ‘Muslims’ simply don’t exist...but these individual groups which were invited to the discussion table have a strong incentive to participate and with it to accept a state-sanctioned role as spokespersons.”

Even if Özoguz was correct and the DIK had strayed from its original purpose and focused too much on terrorism and security, Alboğa and the other representatives of the Islamic associations could not simply walk away from the collaboration with the German state which has given them legitimacy as spokespersons for Islam in Germany.

Alboğa’s casual conflation of the representatives of Islamic associations at the DIK and KRM and German Muslims as a whole is equal parts telling, presumptuous, and empirically dubious. A study commissioned by the German Ministry for Migration and Refugees in 2008 surveyed German Muslims and found that only 9.6 percent of all Muslims had heard of the KRM. Of this 9.6 percent, only 22.7 percent felt represented by the KRM, with 59.5 percent reporting they did not feel represented and 17.7 claiming to feel both somewhat represented and somewhat unrepresented. When Alboğa purports to speak for the common desires of German Muslims, one can more realistically say he speaks for a shade over two percent of the country’s Muslim population.

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125 “Es geht weiter. Das wollen wir Muslime. Das will auch der Minister.”
Nevertheless, Alboğa and the other leaders of the German Turkish Islamic associations and the KRM have exerted and will continue to exert a disproportionate influence on the lives of German Muslims. Through their national-level partnership with the German state and with one another, the Islamic associations have, since the first DIK in 2006, gained a say in fixing Islamic religious curricula, training foreign imams and implementing anti-terror measures. The local Islamic associations – the vast majority of all Islamic associations in Germany – have no such influence. While the local associations will continue to exist and continue to play the same role in the informal work of integration they have since the first Turks immigrated to West Germany in 1961, as state integration policy becomes more nationalized and centralized, their importance in organizing German Turkish life in Germany will decline.

In the German government’s rush to find partners for the first DIK, the state accelerated a longer-term post-reunification trend in German Turkish Islamic organization away from the local to the national scale. The DIK, while an admirable idea, suffered from careless implementation. Instead of working with local associations to build capacity, the German state chose the easy path, opting to partner with national associations, irrespective of these organizations’s remarkably weak claim to legitimacy. In this author’s estimation, the DIK has had a paradoxical effect: offering German Turks a voice in determining and implementing state integration policy through Islamic associations while at the same time helping to make those associations more centralized, less democratic and ultimately less responsive to local concerns and specificities. Based on an examination of the history of German Turkish associational life in Germany from 1961 to the present, this trend is as irreversible as it is regrettable.
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