The Causes of Interstate Dispute Escalation

By

Matthew Stenberg

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Erin K. Jenne

Word Count: 17,232

Budapest, Hungary
2012
Abstract

This paper investigates the potential causes for interstate dispute escalation, and why certain disputes escalate into violence while other disputes are resolved peacefully. Several hypotheses regarding the role of inter-regime political differences are tested to see if having politically opposed regimes, recent nationalizations, or pacific characteristics affect the likelihood of escalation. Binary logistic regressions were run using data from the International Conflict Board and augmented with original research. These hypotheses were shown to have at most limited significance and do not successfully explain dispute escalation. Instead, the models show support for existing research that suggests that geographic contiguity is the strongest predictor of interstate disputes escalating into war. This finding is elaborated upon through a case study of several interstate disputes surrounding the Rhodesian War that emphasizes the key role of proximity.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... i  
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... ii  
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. iii  
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1  
Chapter 1 – Why Violence? ........................................................................................................... 3  
  1.1 Research Question ................................................................................................................. 3  
  1.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 4  
  1.3 Argument ................................................................................................................................... 11  
  1.4 Research Design ...................................................................................................................... 14  
Chapter 2 – Data Analysis ............................................................................................................. 16  
  2.1 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................ 16  
  2.2 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 27  
  2.3 Dataset .................................................................................................................................... 27  
  2.4 Variables .................................................................................................................................... 30  
    2.4.1 Dependent Variable .............................................................................................................. 30  
    2.4.2 Independent Variables .......................................................................................................... 31  
    2.4.3 Control Variables .................................................................................................................. 32  
  2.5 Data Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 35  
Chapter 3 – Proximity ...................................................................................................................... 41  
Chapter 4 – The Case of Zimbabwe .............................................................................................. 47  
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 54  
Appendices ...................................................................................................................................... 56  
  Appendix A ...................................................................................................................................... 56  
  Appendix B ...................................................................................................................................... 57  
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 58
List of Figures

Table 1 .......................................................................................................................... 35
Table 2 .......................................................................................................................... 39
Table 3 .......................................................................................................................... 42
Introduction

Disputes between states are a constant feature of world diplomacy, even among states with historically friendly relations. Many of those disputes are resolved peacefully, through negotiation and mediation; however, a few result in violent conflict between states. Predicting which disputes are more likely to erupt into violence can have major policy implications for states and international organizations that seek to play an active role in conflict mitigation. If accurate criteria can be found to predict when disputes will escalate into violence, actors can behave more proactively to encourage and to stimulate peaceful negotiations. More importantly, the lessons learned can be used in those protracted conflicts that seem ready to escalate further into violence.

Unfortunately, there has been no conclusive study that explains why certain interstate disputes are more likely to be resolved violently than others are. Scholars have addressed this question from normative, ideological, military, and institutional explanations. Among the explanations put forward has been analyzing the characteristics of both initiating and targeted states. Target selection theory broadly posits that the characteristics of the target make it more or less attractive to initiating states, which therefore makes escalation into violence more or less likely.

This paper proposes hypotheses about target selection and escalation, focusing on domestic political characteristics in both initiator and target states. More specifically, it addresses the idea that states that share political and policy characteristics – represented by their position on the left-right political spectrum – might share an affinity. Meanwhile, escalation into violence might occur more often between states with opposite political characteristics, because finding common ground in negotiations can be more challenging with ideological opponents. These hypotheses are supported by subordinate arguments that
hypothesize that pacific states would be less likely to provoke escalation and states with recent nationalizations would be more likely to provoke escalation.

The statistical findings, however, do not support the theories as predicted. Indeed, having similar political characteristics proves to increase the likelihood for violent dispute resolution. Dovish or hawkish regime characteristics have no significant effect on violence, and only preliminary, but inconclusive, support is offered for nationalization of corporate assets playing a role in violence. Instead, geographic proximity – specifically contiguity – is shown to have the greatest effect on the likelihood of disputes escalating into war. This thesis demonstrates this association and explores three important mechanisms by which proximity escalates conflict: territory, regional hegemony, and resources. These explanations are then applied to a case study of Zimbabwe before and after its transition into majority rule, illustrating that proximity supersedes domestic political characteristics.
Chapter 1 – Why Violence?

1.1 Research Question

Dispute escalation arises either when peaceful means of resolution fail or are never undertaken; instead, an interstate dispute is resolved with military means. Conflicts that escalate cannot necessarily be predicted by military capabilities and their likelihood of success. For instance, why might a dispute between Vietnam and China, a more powerful neighbor, escalate into violence while a dispute between Vietnam and Thailand is resolved peacefully? This paper will seek to address the question of why some interstate disputes escalate into war whereas others do not.

This paper analyzes existing disputes between states to determine what is the likely cause of escalation and what differentiates those disputes that turn violent and those that are resolved peacefully. The lower bound of violence is defined here as meeting the International Conflict Board criteria for serious clashes. Minor skirmishes between states, like border clashes, that do not result in military escalation are not classified as violent.

Thus far, the interaction of political characteristics between regimes has been an undertheorized avenue for research into dispute escalation. This research forms hypotheses that test how the relationship between political regimes affects the likelihood of escalation among interstate disputes. This question will be addressed by looking at the position of a regime on the left-right political spectrum as a method of assessing the political relationship between regimes. For example, the conflict between North and South Yemen was a dispute between a rightist and a leftist regime. The Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom was between two conservative, rightist regimes. Ultimately, the answers to these questions find that geographic proximity plays a definitive role in why escalation occurs and that inter-regime political characteristics have limited effects.

Answering why certain disputes escalate and others do not has major policy implications. Determining when violence is likely to emerge between states can help
mediators and diplomats identify those cases most at risk for escalation to effectively minimize the loss of human life. This would allow for more effective allocation of both financial and human capital in an effort to quell those disputes with the greatest risk of escalation, saving both money and lives in the long-term by minimizing violence.

1.2 Literature Review

Democratic peace theory is one of the most enduring, yet controversial, philosophical hypotheses regarding patterns of interstate war, seeking to explain why some conflicts involving democratic regimes escalate and others do not. Jack Levy, in his support of the democratic peace, said that the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” John Owen, another scholar on the subject, notes how President Clinton engrained the democratic peace into U.S. foreign policy principles in saying, “Democracies don’t attack each other” in the 1994 State of the Union address. President Clinton’s quote describes the crux of democratic peace theory: liberal democracies have not gone to war with one another in the modern era. These states have selected their military targets in such a fashion so as to avoid violent escalation with one another. Scholars have pursued various avenues to explain the democratic peace, focusing especially on normative and institutional explanations, for why democratic states choose to pursue only nonviolent means of dispute resolution between them and do not escalate to war.

Lars-Erik Cederman has modeled normative reasons in a three-step process to explain how the democratic peace has emerged over the past two hundred years. Cederman’s

---

approach shares some similarities with democratic selection in that it involves a regime’s conscious decision to not attack another democracy, but he emphasizes the normative reasons for that decision. He argues that democracies change their behavior toward fellow democracies, leading to alliances between liberal states and a subsequent logic of collective security for democracies to align. Several authors have found that democracies tend to concentrate in geographic clusters. This could suggest either that proximity allows for greater contact between states, leading to diffusion of democratic norms as regimes transition successfully, or it could support Cederman’s contention that the logic of collective security leads states proximate to democracies to adopt democratic institutions so as to ensure their own defensive security.

Democratic selection is the most convincing argument to explain the democratic peace and the lack of escalation between democracies, focusing on the more rigorous methods used by democratic states for target selection in violent conflicts to explain why disputes between democracies rarely escalate to war. Democratic selection theory argues that the incentives, abilities, and mechanisms that democratic states use to determine when a dispute should be resolved violently or nonviolently allow for them to make better decisions on conflict escalation and predicting success. Those decisions suggest that democracies tend not go to war with each other: hence the democratic peace. Selection theory need not apply

---

6 Cederman, 489-490.
only to democracies, and literature on it has broadened to analyze target selection more generally.

Theories based on target selection specifically argue that institutions or other incentives only present in democratic societies lead democracies to choose military targets for escalation more carefully than other types of regimes. Game theoretic modeling of democratic selection was conducted by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. Their model articulates the process by which democracies select targets in an effort to explain the democratic peace. Instead of focusing solely on the spoils of war, the model incorporates the likelihood of reselection for leaders of the initiating country as a defining characteristic, an institutional constraint, for the likelihood for peaceful or violent conflict resolution. This calculus incorporates the size of the winning coalition as the explanans for why democracies more often win wars. Autocracies have smaller winning coalitions, meaning that autocrats need to maintain a smaller group of allies to stay in power than a democratic leader would. As such, shifting resources from patronage to war can have a more dramatic effect on the likelihood of staying in power than in democracies, when members of the winning coalition expect minimal spoils given the size. Democratic leaders must be successful in their policies because they cannot compensate for policy failure as readily; as such, democracies pick targets more carefully and generally exert greater effort in winning wars out of fear of leadership transition. This assumes that popular opinion in democracies opposes most violent methods of dispute resolution, so leaders cater to popular opinion. Autocratic leaders have less to lose from a military defeat and put fewer resources into the war effort. As a result, democracies tend to only pursue military means in wars they

---

expect to win. Since democracies are predicted to devote more resources to winning wars, they make less inviting targets and therefore democracies rarely escalate with each other. Democracies will, however, target autocracies (and potentially democracies) when they perceive a military advantage and a high probability of success. This coincides with Dan Reiter and Erik Tillman’s findings that the public in a democratic system is “conflict-averse,” fearing the higher human and economic costs associated with war. Existing research also suggests that democracies are more likely to be successful in wars than autocratic regimes, both as initiators and targets. Reiter and Allan C. Stam III found that the effects of conflict aversion and other democratic variables as posited by scholars indeed have a highly significant effect on democracies winning wars, as they avoid escalating in those when they do not believe they can achieve victory.

The conclusions of Bueno de Mesquita et al have been challenged on several grounds; notably, other scholars have challenged the emphasis on the relationship between democracies and the size of the winning coalition. Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone correct for omitted variables in Bueno de Mesquita et al’s research and conclude that the relationship between winning coalition size and the likelihood of violent conflict does not behave as predicted. They argue that the relationship between increased coalition size and a reduced likelihood of initiating unwinnable wars is not in fact significant. In fact, their models draw the opposite conclusion: expanding the size of the winning coalition was likely to increase, rather than decrease, the probability of war breaking out.

9 Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith.
10 Reiter and Tillman, 812.
The conclusion that democracies have greater incentives to win due to the greater likelihood of dictators being able to hold power after a defeat has also been challenged. Jessica Weeks’ research on bargaining and credible commitments has found that autocratic leaders have less maneuverability in policy signaling and face greater difficulties in staying in power than often argued. If elites are properly incentivized to punish leaders for failure, then leaders may not be able to appropriately redistribute resources to compensate for military defeat. This suggests that autocratic leaders may not, in fact, be able to withstand military defeats to the same extent as Bueno de Mesquita et al have argued. This implies that autocratic leaders will also be selective about those conflicts to which they devote resources to escalate to war.

Reiter and Stam suggest that democracies target each other less, and tend to target weaker regimes, because their selection methods are supported by greater information than the average autocracy. This theory is somewhat tied to the functional explanation of the democratic peace by focusing on the exchange of ideas in a free society; however, it instead focuses on the policy effects of the exchange of ideas. This builds on existing work by Jack Snyder and Stephen Van Evra, who separately argue that debates in the media of open societies with traditions of freedom of the press result in better policy outcomes, minimizing the likelihood of escalating to war with a more powerful opponent. Reiter also argues that professional bureaucracies are more capable of effective policy advising, which helps to limit the likelihood of democracies initiating an unwinnable conflict. Both arguments rely on the institutional effects that democratic societies have on political structures and policy decision-making.

---

making; these effects would not be replicated in a society without freedom of debate and are therefore less likely to be present in autocratic regimes than in democratic societies.\textsuperscript{16}

Not all scholars focus on this single institutional effect. George Tsebelis and Seung-Whan Choi argue that different institutional constraints can explain the lack of escalation between democracies: the number of veto players present in a political system. The more veto players there are in a system, democratic or not, the more difficult it will be for deviation from the policy status quo to initiate a military conflict. With multiple veto players not limited to democratic regimes, Tsebelis and Choi argue that the democratic peace is artificially limited to democracies and instead is representative of the veto points within each individual society, not regime types. They acknowledge a correlation between veto players and democratic regimes but argue that the conceptual connection between democracies and large numbers of veto players is weak, with significant numbers being neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy.\textsuperscript{17}

Other scholars have expanded target selection theory beyond democracies. Brian Lai and Dan Slater have also conducted research that suggests that the democratic peace may have been artificially limited to democracies. They maintain the focus on regime types as a defining characteristic for the likelihood of conflict escalation, but their typology differentiates between different types of nondemocratic, authoritarian regimes, both in collective vs. individual rule and one-party vs. military state structure. Their findings indicate that – for both collective and individual rule – violent interstate conflicts are more likely to be escalated by military regimes than one-party regimes. One-party regimes are not more likely to initiate conflicts than democracies, having greater state capacity than military regimes to redistribute resources to ensure mobilization in favor of the state. This research


\textsuperscript{17} George Tsebelis and Seung-Whan Choi, “The Democratic Peace Revisited: It is Veto Players,” Unpublished manuscript, February 2008.
suggests that democratic peace theory is too limited in scope and other factors often correlated with democracy can best explain the low incidence of conflict between democratic states. These results also challenge Stanislav Andreski’s findings; he argues that military dictatorships are less likely to use their military resources abroad – and implicitly less likely to escalate – because so much attention must be focused on controlling the peace domestically.

All of these scholars have readily established why some regimes select targets more carefully and explained how the internal processes selecting conflicts for escalation into war are conducted. Subsequent research on escalation has focused on who those targets have been and why they are perceived to be easier targets. As such, the same constraints cannot be universally applied across regime types, and research as to what regimes are targeted for escalation is still ongoing.

Some existing literature has begun to explore which regimes are more likely to be targeted in violent escalation. Dahee Bak and Glenn Palmer have built on Lai and Slater’s in differentiating between autocratic types while investigating the types of regimes that have been targeted. Basing their criteria of selectivity on the military strengths of regimes in disputes, they found that autocratic regimes are less selective than democracies or mixed-democratic regime, and military regimes are less selective than other autocratic regimes. This largely coincides with Lai and Slater’s findings while beginning to explain how more selective regimes decide on which targets to pursue escalation into war.

Existing literature does not answer all questions about dispute escalation. Explanations of institutions and military capacity explain some of the variation in target selection but are not exhaustive. Democratic peace theory fails to explain why democracies escalate against some autocratic regimes but not others. Other factors could contribute to perceptions of target weakness among selective regimes. But these explanations cannot explain those instances where states with objectively weaker military capabilities instigate violent disputes with stronger opponents, like Iran against the United States in 1979 or Argentina against the United Kingdom in 1982. As such, capacity alone cannot explain how targets for escalation into war are selected. This research will pursue other potential explanations of target selection, namely, if certain political ideologies are targeted more often by states initiating violent disputes.

Inter-regime relations between states have not been sufficiently tested as a potential explanation for the puzzle as to which conflicts turn violent and which disputes are resolved peacefully. Democratic peace theory cannot account for all of the variation in dispute resolution among democracies because it fails to account for why disputes with autocratic regimes might be resolved differently. A focus on pure strategic capabilities cannot explain why a weaker state like Argentina would challenge the United Kingdom in the dispute over the Falkland Islands or Grenada’s antagonizing the United States under Ronald Reagan.

1.3 Argument
Existing literature has found that the role of party ideologies in foreign policy can matter a great deal and even cause shifts in overall party strategy among leaders, suggesting there can often be significant links between a regime’s foreign policy positions and location on the left-right political spectrum. This logic emerges from the approach to foreign policy that suggests that ideology of opposing regimes and dispute escalation are irreversibly
Robert Saldin argues that as wars affect national politics, “it is natural for political parties to adjust their ideologies to the new terrain.” Other scholars have addressed how both violent and nonviolent interstate disputes have played a role in moving parties along the left-right spectrum, suggesting that there is a relationship between ideological positioning and dispute resolution. Rather than simply arguing that disputes can change the political ideology of disputants, the initial position and ideology may in fact impact when conflicts escalate into violence.

Glenn Palmer, Patrick Regan, and Tamar London argue that, among parliamentary democracies, right-wing regimes are significantly more likely to be involved in military disputes. This finding is logically supported by empirical findings regarding defense spending. While some studies have found that there is not actually direct competition for funds between defense and welfare for government funding, that does not preclude rightist

---


and leftist parties from supporting those ideological positions, respectively. Left parties in
democratic regimes are more likely to favor lower defense spending, preferring cuts in
military funding to cuts in social expenditures.\textsuperscript{26} For example, this is true in the United
States and Japan\textsuperscript{27} among others. By contrast, right wing parties typically favor increased
defense spending, including Gaullist parties in France and the Canadian Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{28}
This is not limited solely to the views among party elites: in a general population survey,
Herbert McClosky found that American voters who supported the Republican Party were
45% more likely to favor increased defense spending than voters who supported the
Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{29} Perhaps more importantly, conservative regimes are often perceived to
be stronger on national defense issues. Jack Snyder, Robert Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon
outline how the Republican Party in the United States was able to use national security as a

\textsuperscript{26} Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard Stoll, “Representing Defense: Democratic Control of
the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution}
47:4 (August 2003), 413 outline a series of studies that support this position. Not all studies
have found this conclusively. Louis M. Imbeau, François Pétry, and Moktar Lamari, “Left-
right party ideology and government ideologies: a meta-analysis,” \textit{European Journal of
Political Research} 40:1 (2001), 1-29 found that military spending could not be purely and
successfully correlated with the left-right policy domain in an analysis of 23 existing studies
on the subject, but found that there were significant effects for foreign policy as a whole, of
which defense spending was considered a component.

\textsuperscript{27} Andy Sullivan, “Take hike, defense cuts in House Democrats’ Budget,” \textit{Reuters}, April 12,
idUSTRE73B4PR20110412; Sachiko Sakamaki and Takashi Hirokawa, “Japan Should Cut
‘Useless’ Military Defense, DPJ Official Says,” \textit{Bloomberg}, September 11, 2009,

\textsuperscript{28} John Bacher, “How Socialist France Embraced the Bomb,” \textit{Peace Magazine} (June-July
1986), 13, http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v02n3p13.htm; Canadian Conservative Party,

\textsuperscript{29} Herbert McClosky, “Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation,” in
\textit{Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy}, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press,
1967), 94. The data in question refers to those voters who do not favor isolationist policy;
among those who do favor isolationist foreign policies, the data is roughly similar between
both parties as one might expect.
wedge issue to appeal to more traditional democratic voters because it was thought to be stronger on defense issues after the Vietnam War.\(^\text{30}\)

This evidence clearly shows that security has been polarized within countries on the left-right spectrum with trends crossing borders and having fairly standard effects. Should this spectrum also manifest itself ideologically in foreign policy as suggested by Saldin, it stands to reason that states should seek alliances with like-minded governments because it will be easier to find common ground and policy positions among similar regimes. Conversely, leftist regimes should be expected to be more likely to resolve disputes violently when in conflict with rightist regimes and vice versa, as common positions would be more difficult to reach.

This paper tests these hypotheses and ultimately concludes that geographic proximity provides the strongest explanation for which conflicts escalate into violence. These effects supersede the effects of inter-regime differences or any other explanatory factor included in the models. Proximity promotes conflict escalation for reasons of territory, hegemony, and resources: mechanisms that tend to be operative between contiguous states rather than those that are geographically distant.

1.4 Research Design

This research will be conducted through a multi-method approach with large-N analysis and a detailed case study. Several hypotheses are proposed to test the potential ideological methods of target selection in violent disputes, focusing on ideological regime characteristics largely associated with the left-right political spectrum. In Chapter 2, these hypotheses will be tested against a large-N dataset of 135 interstate disputes after 1975 to check for the significance of several ideological factors. This dataset is based on the

International Conflict Board systemic dataset of interstate disputes since 1918. Additional variables have been collected from several other datasets, including the ICB actor level data and left-right characteristics for democracies from the Manifesto Project supplemented with original research for autocratic regimes. Nationalizations are also tested as a potentially destabilizing action that might lead to escalation as states seek to protect their citizens and assets. The tests indicate that the statistical effect of opposite political ideologies goes against expectations and provide only conditional and preliminary support for the impact of nationalizations on violence.

The third chapter will explore the findings of the variable that, even beyond the significance of some effects of the political spectrum, exerts the greatest influence on the likelihood of violent resolution: the geographic proximity of conflict actors. Proximate actors in violent disputes will be classified, and the overarching thematic reasons for their conflicts will be discussed.

Finally, the statistical approach will be augmented with a longitudinal case study on Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe and its interstate disputes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Zimbabwe meets the scope conditions for the study by having a dramatic shift in the domestic political spectrum from the conservative government of Ian Smith to the leftist, redistributionist government of Robert Mugabe. In spite of this dramatic shift, interstate disputes with contiguous states continued. Several nationalizations on both sides also served to contribute to escalation. Zimbabwe will serve as a pathway case, demonstrating the effects of geographic proximity on the likelihood of violent resolution even in the face of major political changes.
Chapter 2 – Data Analysis

The research on democratic selection theory persuasively argues that a democracy is more likely to pursue dispute escalation into war when it perceives that victory is more likely. Existing research has investigated some of the situations in which selective regimes might perceive a competitive advantage, but many political characteristics are as yet untested. The following hypotheses investigate the impact of political inter-regime differences on the likelihood of dispute escalation. The first four hypotheses are tested in a series of models that account for violent dispute resolution between states from 1975 to 2007. An additional subordinate hypothesis is temporally limited by different criteria and subsequently tested in independent models.

2.1 Hypotheses

Andrew Moravcsik argues that, “the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics.”\(^{31}\) Along those lines, states with similar ideological preferences, as measured by their position on the political spectrum, should be more likely to resolve disputes using peaceful means. Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans note the affinity between ideological groups across borders in post-independence Central America, noting that “conflicts between Conservatives and Liberals often did not remain confined within each state. Ideological opponents instead sought and often found ideological allies in other republics.”\(^{32}\) These groups were seen to have more in common than disparate groups within the same country. If ideological conflicts are not limited to international borders, then there can be greater conflict between states when they are administered by leaders and/or parties

---


with different ideologies. States can offer refuge to groups and opponents when proximate, increasing the likelihood of conflict breaking out.

Beyond this, William Lewis argues that regimes with different ideologies have different conceptions of the world, which will result in different propensities for conflict. This suggests that parties of the left or right might behave differently in areas of the world where regimes with similar ideologies are predominant. Those regimes that share a similar place on the left-right political spectrum can therefore be constrained by shared values with regimes they are in disputes with. Palmer, Regan, and London demonstrate that political ideologies along the foreign policy spectrum are generally similar and that conservative regimes should face fewer constraints in the use of force than leftist ones. Scholars of the democratic peace have long posited that shared values can explain why democratic states act peacefully, with the norms associated with that peaceful political culture constraining action and leaders. Normative arguments for the occurrence or absence of violent conflict between states have demonstrated the robustness of the effects of shared values on international conflict resolution policy. These results suggest that:

**H1:** Regimes are less likely to go to war with regimes that share similar space on the political spectrum.

---

33 Ibid, 136.
Similarly, if we assume the importance of state preferences, we might also assume that regimes might find ideological solidarity with others that share their political position within each society. As Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver point out, “by its very nature the left-right scale…is likely to vary in meaning as we move from country to country.”\(^{39}\) For example, the Party of European Socialists defines itself as an agglomeration of socialist, social democratic, and labor parties within the European Union, with 34 members, 11 associate members, and six observers\(^{40}\). Those parties all occupy the same area of the left-right spectrum within their domestic political cultures. However, they do not objectively share identical ideological spaces.

The Manifesto Project codes each party’s political position on a left-right scale called the RILE score, with -100.0 being the furthest left and 100.0 being the furthest right\(^{41}\). Constituent members of the Party of European Socialists varied considerably on this scale. At present, RILE scores among PES members range from -38.18 with both of the Norwegian Labour Party (\textit{Det Norske Arbeiderparti}) and the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland (\textit{Parti Socialist Suisse}) to +0.65 with the Dutch Labour Party (\textit{Partij van de Arbeid}) and a +6.90 with the Democratic Party of Moldova (\textit{Partidul democrat din Moldova}), both of which would be classified as centrist, but right leaning, regimes. In the post-Maastricht era of European politics, constituent member parties have had RILE scores as diverse as the Italian Democratic Party of the Left’s (\textit{Democratici di Sinistra}) +16.82 RILE score in 1997.

---


\(^{41}\) The RILE scale was developed by Michael Laver and Ian Budge, eds. \textit{Party Policy and Government Coalitions}, (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1992), and has been applied to many modern democratic party ideologies by the members of the Manifesto Project.
and the Serbian Democratic Party’s (Demokratska stranka) +18.30 in 2011, which would be
classified as a rightist regime according to the typology used in this study.\footnote{Andrea Volkens, Onawa Lacewell, Pola Lehmann, Sven Regel, Henrike Schultze, and Annika Werner, \textit{The Manifesto Data Collection: Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MAPOR)}, (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2012). https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/}

Despite the objective differences in their policy goals and ideological manifestos, these parties have all chosen to affiliate themselves with the Party of European Socialists at the European level. This signifies that they each conceive of themselves as occupying the same political space (center-left) within their own democratic systems. This mutual conception of the domestic political spectrum therefore matters more than any objective assessment of their particular party ideologies. If objective measures mattered more, the Dutch Labour Party might ally with the Swedish Christian Democratic Community (Kristdemokraterna) with a RILE score of +0.81 and a member of the European People’s Party or the Czech Public Affairs party (Věci veřejné), scored at +0.83 and unaffiliated at the European level. These parties, however, do not occupy the same center-left domestic space as does the Dutch Labour Party, and they chose to ally with parties in that same segment of different domestic political systems rather than those parties that are similarly ideologically positioned.

Perceptions of shared values and common interests do matter at the international level, perhaps more than if something is in fact objectively beneficial for both parties. In a case study of Norwegian foreign policy, Johan Galtung demonstrated that the position of national political parties on the relative, domestic left-right scale was indicative of their support for inviting Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for an official visit.\footnote{Johan Galtung, “Social Position, Party Identification, and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study,” in \textit{Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy}, ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 161-193.} Yongjin Zhang notes that when China began to perceive of itself as a member of the international community, it began
to cooperate more fully with other states. Kim and Bueno de Mesquita have illustrated the significance of perceptions of other systemic characteristics on the likelihood of conflict escalation. The influence of perceptions suggests that:

\[ H2: \text{Regimes are less likely to go to war with regimes that they perceive to be operating in the same relative political space within their respective domestic systems.} \]

One of potential source of conflict between leftist and rightist regimes comes in the form of economic nationalism, specifically the nationalization of industries and resources developed by transnational firms. A policy of nationalization indicates three factors. First, it demonstrates potential instability in the economic sector as well as a likely shift to a different point on the political spectrum. Second, it could demonstrate a possible impetus for conflict among certain participants. Third, it offers an indication of the presence of resources as a potentially destabilizing force in a country. Natural resources have been demonstrated to have a correlation with violent disputes, both for physical control and financing military efforts. When transnational corporations invest in a country, they expect the government to make a credible commitment that property rights will be maintained. They also can, intentionally or not, undercut the power of the local government in whose countries they are

---

investing. In response to this threat, and with the promise of liquid currency resources from natural resources, governments often choose to nationalize privately held companies or resources.

The decision to nationalize, however, is not without consequences. Nationalization has periodically been met with military responses from the host countries of transnational corporations whose resources have been appropriated. The United States developed the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, which it used as a rationale to act as “an international police power” to enforce the property rights of American and European individuals and companies against potential seizure across Latin America. Sometimes, this manifested itself in either covert or overt military action both inside and outside of the Western Hemisphere. The United States supported coups in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973, and sponsored an attempted invasion in Cuba in 1961, partially in response to the expropriation of U.S. corporate assets. Such actions were not limited solely to the United States. Israel, France, and the United Kingdom undertook a joint military venture in response to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.

57 Derek Varble, The Suez Crisis 1956, (Oxford: Osprey, 2003). France also had a major dispute with Guinea in 1959, according to Sigmund, 6.
Some have speculated that Gaddafi’s threats toward further nationalization of the Libyan petroleum sector motivated the NATO intervention in the Arab Spring in March 2011. By the 1970s, the wave of nationalizations had clearly become mainstream. The Principles on the New International Economic Order, endorsed at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in May 1974, assert that states enjoy “permanent sovereignty...over [their] natural resources” and have “the right to nationalization.” Amendments to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties that December that would have required “just compensation” and “good faith” dealings with foreign capital and corporations were rejected 71 to 20 (with 18 abstentions) and 87 to 19, respectively. This UN posturing coincided with the wave of nationalizations that began across the developing world in the early 1970s, creating new economic disputes with multinational firms’ home countries.

Neo-mercantilist policies have been frequently used by developed countries in order to protect their citizens’ economic interests abroad. Home countries intervene to protect their citizens and national (often corporate) capital abroad. Indeed, the modern conception of mercantilism now focuses on protecting corporate goals through diplomacy rather than the traditional focus on balance of trade conflating national needs with those of the biggest domestic enterprises. This protection has often been carried out through aggressive

---

59 Sigmund, 5.
60 Ibid, 5.
61 Geoffrey Jones, “Multinationals from the 1930s to the 1980s,” in Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History, eds. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Bruce Mazlish, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 89. The wave of nationalizations in the 1970s begins before the dataset, but can still be seen in many of the early conflicts.
but once nationalization has taken place, negotiation is of limited effectiveness in restoring the assets of multinationals. For these tests, a nationalization occurring within two years of a dispute was considered to be recent enough to have a potential effect on its resolution.

**H3: Interstate disputes in which one state has undertaken nationalizations of corporations in the oil industry within the past two years are more likely to be violent.**

Though the findings from this research have been contested, many scholars have shown that democracies are more likely, on average, to have pacific characteristics than other regime types. Kenneth Benoit investigates the pacific nature of democracies on a primarily normative basis, finding that there is a high correlation between higher levels of democracy and fewer instances of violent dispute resolution. That is, the average democracy fought fewer wars than the average autocracy. Randall Schweller argues that democracies never initiate preventative (or offensive) warfare, which he sees as exclusively the purview of autocratic regimes. While the experience of the U.S. Invasion of Iraq in 2003 is not accounted for by his theory, the preponderance of Schweller’s evidence still points toward the typical democracy avoiding preventative conflict initiation and therefore being more dovish than the average autocratic regime, which is predicted to engage in preventative war.

---


Democratic peace theory research has long demonstrated that democracies are less likely to go to war with other democracies than with other regimes. This statistical evidence is based on a long tradition of philosophical arguments in favor of democratic peace stemming from Immanuel Kant. A world of democratic societies would not necessitate military buildup, as popular opinion would favor peace over war. Though the public has not always favored pacific foreign policy, public opinion tends to act as a constraint on foreign policy decisions in democracies. As such, leaders pursue foreign policies that they anticipate will result in electoral support. Steve Chan and William Safran show that a range of scholarly literature supports the notion that waging war has electoral consequences in democracies. This necessarily follows the utopian view that public opinion favors peace and stability in a democratic system.

Finally, Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita undertook game theoretic modeling of perceptions of hawkishness and dovishness on the likelihood of conflict initiation. They first found that regimes would not initiate conflict unless the targeted regime signals hawkish characteristics. This signaling increased the likelihood that preventative

---

70 A positive view of the role of public opinion is of course not without critics. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (London: MacMillan, 1946); and Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), both challenge the notion that public opinion is inherently more moderate than foreign policy leaders.
violent action would be taken. If the targeted regime signals that it is pacific, the initiator would similarly pursue a peaceful path.\(^{71}\)

\[H4: \text{Regimes are less likely to escalate to war in disputes with pacific governments.}\]

During the Cold War, realpolitik concerns and alliances were the overriding foreign policy motivators for democracies. As the Soviet Union supported leftist regimes worldwide (especially after its split with China created rivalry within the Communist camp)\(^{72}\) the United States and its democratic allies pursued a similar series of coalitions. The primary criteria for alliances with the United States and the West was freedom from Soviet influence, not domestic political freedom.\(^{73}\) Indeed, the United States behaved as if the Soviet Union exercised diplomatic control over all communist states regardless of their internal policy differences.\(^{74}\) The American foreign policy response to this was containment, attempting to minimize the geographic spread of the Communist threat and “expansive tendencies.”\(^{75}\) This continued even after President Jimmy Carter initially indicated that the containment strategy might be phased out of American foreign policy.\(^{76}\) Conservative dictatorships often proved to be amenable allies to the United States, being the sort of “strong administrations” necessary to support American foreign policy goals.\(^{77}\) Potentially hostile democratic regimes

\(^{71}\) Kim and Bueno de Mesquita. This model assumes that “all the players prefer negotiation to war (55).”


\(^{75}\) George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947), 576.


were not encouraged. The United States and its allies therefore installed and supported anti-communist, conservative regimes worldwide throughout the Cold War to ensure that American economic liberalism remained paramount wherever possible. Right-leaning regimes, democratic and nondemocratic alike, were ideological allies in this regard.

However, since the fall of the Cold War, democracy promotion has become a central tenet of American foreign policy goals. The U.S. State Department’s current mission statement contains the phrase “shape and sustain a peaceful, just, and democratic world.” This mission is shared by other major democratic powers, including the European Union, Japan, and India. Democracy aid in the “1990s [was] directed at countries…at least openly attempting to move away from dictatorial rule.” So as the Cold War came to a close, democratic support for ideologically allied dictators did as well, especially when the U.S. Congress and other organizations with budgetary control saw the possibility for nascent democracies to emerge in place of autocratic regimes. Of course, democratic support for democratization abroad was still contingent on foreign policy interests and the preservation

of the state however, the United States and other Western democracies began to lessen support for rightist dictators and less comprehensively oppose leftist governments. With these changes in foreign policy rationales, one would expect that without the ideological safety net provided by the Cold War, rightist regimes are more likely to be targeted than they were prior to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

H5: During the Cold War and prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracies were less likely to go to war with rightist regimes.

2.2 Methodology
The regressions are run using binary logistic models, as the dependent variable is an indicator of whether or not violence has reached a serious level in a conflict. These models will test for the determinants of violent dispute resolution in an interstate dispute. Hypotheses 1 through 4 will be tested in a series of three models accounting for the study variables and several control variables informed by the literature on interstate conflict. Hypothesis 5 will be tested in a separate series of models that test for the periodization of democratic regimes’ target selection.

2.3 Dataset
Primary data on conflicts comes from the system-level International Conflict Board dataset. This dataset focuses on international disputes between states with existing diplomatic ties. This data is augmented with data from several sources. Data on regime

---

87 Schmitz, 242.
types of initiators and targets have been transposed from the ICB actor level dataset. Disputes which were initiated internally, by non-state actors, or by a multi-state event have been removed from the dataset as they fall outside the scope condition of dispute initiation between two sovereign states. The dataset has been truncated to begin in 1975 following the end of the Vietnam War.

The unit of analysis is interstate disputes: bilateral conflicts between any two states beginning after 1975 and enduring for any amount of time. Protracted international conflicts have been broken up into specific disputes between pairs of states. This solves two potential problems of the use of dyad-years. First, it avoids creating spurious effects as a result of long periods of peace among alliance members throughout the Cold War. Second, the use of disputes as the unit of analysis avoids the problem of longstanding peace among state dyads with limited political relevance because there was little interaction, (i.e. Nepal and Fiji). Use of disputes rather than dyad-years, however, does create a potential issue in making issues of non-violence a rare occurrence, with most state disputes having at least a minor level of violence.

Variables regarding position on the political spectrum were manually coded. For objective position on the right-left political spectrum, data when possible was collected from the Manifesto Project Database. Regime RILE scores were used to calculate their position on the left-right political spectrum. Scores below -10.0 on the RILE scale are coded as left; scores from -9.99 to 9.99 are coded as centrist; scores above 10.0 are coded as right regimes. For non-democratic regimes excluded from the database, other coding rules were used.

---

89 These disputes were coded 995, 996, and 997 for the TRIGENT variable in the ICB system-level dataset.
90 Volkens et al.
91 Most RILE values are fairly concentrated around the center, resulting in the fairly narrow band for qualification as a centrist regime. Data is taken from the manifesto in effect at time of the initiation of the crisis. For those cases which predate RILE scores for their particular party manifesto, the RILE score available for the oldest manifesto is used. This happened in

28
followed. All communist regimes were coded as leftist regimes, while all fascist and theocratic dictatorships were coded as rightist regimes. Remaining regimes were coded according to political institutions, keeping in mind Juan Linz’s proposed typology of authoritarian regimes and his warnings of the difficulty and danger in classifying dictatorial regimes, in saying, “Scholars are likely to be confused in studying authoritarian regimes because of the frequent inauthenticity of their claims…actual policies and the operation of political institutions might be very similar despite such pseudoideological differences.”

The initiator is coded as described by the ICB Data Viewer descriptions for each crisis in the dataset; the target is the state initially (and typically primarily) targeted by the first action of the initiator.

For coding the remaining objective ideological positions and relative political spectrums prior to and including the early 1990s, the reference guides of political parties published by Longman Current Affairs were used. For those regimes that either were inaugurated or shifted ideologically after the publication of the applicable Longman guide, mentions of the party and/or its leader in State Department Background notes were used.

For regimes coded as left relative to their own political system, search terms and variations of “left,” “communist,” or “socialist” were used. For regimes coded as centrist, “moderate”
Objective positions were coded according to Benoit and Laver, who advise that left-right positions can be devised by taking economic and social policy positions a priori and using that basis to synthesize a position on the left-right scale across countries. Relative position was based on information provided in the Longman Guides and State Department Background Notes, which typically offered guidance on where regimes were located on the relative domestic political spectrum. Special care was taken with authoritarian regimes, especially in one-party states, to determine where they would fall on a relative political spectrum if opposition were allowed; Paul Brooker notes that many military regimes have broadly centrist orientations, with party positioning being “milder” than in other authoritarian types, and this factor was kept in mind when coding military regimes. In some cases, the presence of unsanctioned opposition in either direction was used as a reference point.

2.4 Variables

2.4.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable indicates whether the interstate dispute escalated to war. It is coded as an ordinal variable in the ICB system level dataset, with four levels of violence: none, minor, serious, and full-scale war. For these tests, the ICB variable has been converted into a dummy variable, with 0 indicating there was either no violence or only minor clashes in a dispute, and 1 indicating either serious violence or full-scale war. Conceptually, if

95 Benoit and Laver, 130.
97 Variable 10, VIOL.
violence does not escalate to the point of significant battle deaths, a dispute is considered to be nonviolent.

2.4.2 Independent Variables

States were coded as hawkish if they had been credited by the International Conflict Board for initiating a violent conflict within the past ten calendar years of a dispute initiation and pacific if they had not initiated a dispute. This also serves as a conflict lag variable to account for protracted disputes. It is a dummy variable, with previous initiation coded as 1 and lack of initiation as 0. If multiple disputes were initiated during the same calendar year, all conflicts chronologically after the first were coded as having violent precedent. This measure is not perfect, as it neglects cases with multi-state causes or non-state actors. For example, Yugoslavia is not credited as having hawkish tendencies in its 1999 conflict with Albania despite the violence of the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s. Similarly, the United States is not coded as hawkish during the Iraq invasion in 2002 because the Afghanistan military intervention was initiated by a coalition of multiple states.

As previously discussed, left and right variables have been coded in part from the Manifesto Project and in part from the Longman series. This data has been used to create two dummy variables, which measure if the relative regime types and objective regime types are opposite among the bilateral disputants. These two variables show multicollinearity, so will be run in parallel models. For Hypothesis 5, the left-right data has been used to create a separate variable, which is a dummy variable indicating whether a regime is rightist, which will test if support shifted after the end of the Cold War.

The variable nationalization captures whether there has been a nationalization of an oil company in a participating country within the two years prior to conflict initiation. Data

---

98 See Appendix A.
comes from Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin, and Konstantin Sonin’s work on nationalization in the petroleum sector. It is a dummy coded variable indicating if nationalization has occurred on either the side of the initiator or the target.

2.4.3 Control Variables

Several control variables are necessary to ensure that the relative capabilities of states are accounted for and existing explanations of dispute initiation are tested.

Existing research on democratic peace theory, and supplemented by Lai and Slater for differences in authoritarian regimes, means that the regime type of both the target and the initiator must be controlled for, as different types (and relationships between types, especially democracies) have been demonstrated to behave differently in interstate disputes. The regime type variables were transposed from the ICB actor dataset for initiating and targeted states, indicating whether the states were democratic, civilian-authoritarian, or military regimes. ICB classifications for direct military rule, indirect military rule, and dual authority military rule were simplified into a unified military regime variable. Some missing data was supplemented by data from other conflicts in similar time periods and research using the Longman guides; cases that were ambiguous upon more than introductory research were coded as missing so as to not skew the results. For Hypothesis 5, the regime type variable

---


100 This is supported by Lai and Slater’s findings that there were no significant differences in conflict initiation between the tested types of military regimes.

101 Apartheid-era South Africa was coded at several points in the ICB study as 2, for civilian authoritarian regime, given the level of political disenfranchisement present in the society as per Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Geography, Democracy, and Peace,” 320. Some missing values (for conflict numbers 313, 365, 355, 360, 347, 339, 323, and 331) were similarly coded as a 2. Qatar and Bahrain, both monarchies in the 1980s without significant military components, were also coded as 2 values for conflict 364.
was recoded as a dummy variable indicating if the initiator of the dispute was democratic (1) or not (0).

*Geographic proximity* is an ordinal variable that accounts for how proximate the states involved in a dispute are to one another. A classification of 1 indicates states directly bordering one another, 2 indicates non-contiguous proximity, and 3 indicates significant conflict distance outside the immediate region. Much existing research suggests that more proximate states are more likely to have disputes escalate into violence; a negative coefficient would support this existing research.

The *power discrepancy* variable is derived from the ICB system level dataset and measures the gap in the military, economic, alliance, and geographic capabilities between the two states involved in a dispute. These data have been grouped into three equal ordinal categories for modeling, with an ICB-coded discrepancy of less than three indicating roughly similar capabilities, between three and eight indicating a moderate level of superiority, and above eight demonstrating a highly significant advantage for one combatant.

A variable measuring the status of the targeted state as a *nuclear power* checks for the likelihood of effective deterrence leading to more peaceful conflict resolution. It is a dummy variable coded if any of the nuclear power states were targeted in a dispute. This falls in line with the theories of nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction that governed much of the logic of weapons proliferation during the Cold War. By possessing nuclear weapons, a state would become a less attractive target to aggressor states, who would fear

---

102 ICB system variable 57.
104 United States, U.S.S.R/Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, and India for the entirety of the time period under study; South Africa from 1979 to 1990; and Pakistan after 1998.
potential catastrophic response. Among fellow nuclear states, this manifested itself as mutually assured destruction, when nuclear weapon use could not be used because your opponent would respond in kind: the ultimate deterrent. With these effects, one would expect less violent escalation when would-be targets had nuclear capabilities.

The presence of Cold War-era proxy wars (and subsequent American and Russian foreign policy intervention) is measured by the power involvement variable from the ICB system dataset, here named proxy war. Involvement from either power is coded on a 2-7 scale, with seven being a conflict directly between the two states (and not involving proxies in any form). Fundamentally, this variable serves as a measure for whether an interstate dispute was being used as a proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union. Generally, higher values for this variable should predict greater violence, with significant support from alliance leaders; however, with seven indicating that both states are directly involved, this should skew the results insignificantly in the nonviolent direction. However, disputes directly involving the U.S. and USSR are rare in the dataset, minimizing the effect.

Finally, for hypothesis 5 only, there is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a conflict was initiated after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This simply measures the date of conflict initiation to determine if democratic regimes behaved differently after November 9, 1989.

---

107 ICB system variable 19.
108 Direct disputes between the U.S. and Soviet Union never crossed the threshold into violence, so having this coded as seven would have the potential to skew the data with such a high result actually indicating an always non-violent dispute. Luckily, in this particular dataset there is only one case of direct conflict between the two and the effect on the results should be marginal.
2.5 Data Analysis
The coefficients of the variables demonstrate their effect on the likelihood of serious violence occurring in an interstate dispute. Table 1 shows three models accounting for independent variables. The two variables assessing inter-regime political differences are run separately due to multicollinearity in Models 1 and 2. Model 3 shows the results of running the regression without either variable testing political differences and only the nationalization and conflict lag study variables.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiator Regime Type</td>
<td>.153 (.324)</td>
<td>.141 (.321)</td>
<td>.228 (.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Regime Type</td>
<td>.727 (.356)**</td>
<td>.642 (.344)*</td>
<td>.629 (.338)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>.298 (.299)</td>
<td>.282 (.299)</td>
<td>.293 (.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy War</td>
<td>.561 (.246)**</td>
<td>.587 (.248)**</td>
<td>.548 (.242)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>-1.079 (.477)**</td>
<td>-1.117 (.472)**</td>
<td>-1.126 (.465)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Target</td>
<td>1.502 (.795)**</td>
<td>1.278 (.761)*</td>
<td>1.287 (.747)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp. Political Spectrum (Relative)</td>
<td>-.891 (.507)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp. Political Spectrum (Objective)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.540 (.509)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalization</td>
<td>1.172 (.712)*</td>
<td>.987 (.706)</td>
<td>.656 (.648)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Lag</td>
<td>.176 (.469)</td>
<td>.109 (.463)</td>
<td>-.076 (.441)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R-Square</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>.185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Is significant at the .1 level; ** is significant at the .05 level; *** is significant at the .01 level.

The models show unexpected findings. These results are surprising for several reasons. First, the direction of several effects is counter to what was hypothesized or controlled for. Hypothesis 2 predicted that regimes administered by leaders at opposite ends of the political spectrum within their domestic systems would be more likely to engage in conflict with one another; instead, the effect is found to be both negative and significant. This only applies to relative left-right inter-regime positioning; the perceptions of states as to other leaders appear to matter more than any objective policy similarities. The objective

---

109 The case universe is 135 interstate disputes for Models 1 through 3.
results are not significant. The negative sign and significance of the relative positioning could potentially be for two reasons. First, regimes of different types have been found to cluster. If the same held true for regimes similar to each other on the political spectrum, this could coincide with the geographic relationship variable to explain why more conflicts might emerge. Second, it could simply be an artifact of the dataset. By excluding conflicts with multilateral or non-state initiators, and by including protracted conflicts as component disputes in the ICB coding, the data may have been unintentionally structured to create a negative effect by excluding important cases and emphasizing protracted conflicts, potentially skewing the results. These results disconfirm Hypotheses 1 and 2.

The effect of nuclear powers as targets also runs counter to the predicted effect as a control. Nuclear power is not a clear deterrent to initiating violent conflict; rather, it appears to increase the probability of escalation greatly, with it being significant all three models with fairly large coefficients. This could be because the targeted nuclear states choose to escalate the disputes to greater levels of violence than the initiator states anticipate. An example of

---

110 Nils Petter Gleditsch, 316, has found that the average geographic distance between democracies has been less than the average distance among all dyads in the world system for most of the modern era. Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Conquest and Regime Change: An Evolutionary Model of the Spread of Democracy and Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 48:3 (September 2004), 605, confirm regional clustering does not just apply to democracies but authoritarian regimes as well.

this would be Argentina’s offensive actions taken toward the United Kingdom in the Falklands War, when they did not anticipate British military escalation.\footnote{Lawrence Freedman, “The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 61:1 (Fall 1982), 196-210.}

Other effects go in the predicted directions. The greater the geographic distance between two states, the lesser the likelihood of violent escalation in disputes between them. The size of this effect is large and quite significant. Proximity should indeed have this impact on the likelihood of conflict because it creates opportunity for violence at less cost. This effect has among the greatest influence on what conflicts are likely to escalate.

Similarly, involvement by the superpowers in the Cold War era (and Russia and the United States after the end of the Cold War) increased the likelihood of violence. This coincides with the funds, weapons, and military training that the Soviet Union and United States would often provide when neighboring states were in conflict, acting as a proxy war.\footnote{John Lewis Gaddis, \textit{The Cold War: A New History}, (New York: Penguin, 2005), 121-124.} This again reduces the cost of violence for states involved in a dispute.

The effect of a recent nationalization in the oil sector had a positive effect on the likelihood of violence breaking out in a dispute. Statistical significance is demonstrated in Model 1. This shows preliminary and conditional support for the potential role of nationalization on violence; however, the models are ultimately inconclusive. More comprehensive data on nationalizations across a range of industries, rather than just oil, could provide more conclusive results; therefore, Hypothesis 3 is inconclusive.

These results in Models 1 through 3 show fairly conclusive evidence that previous violent dispute initiation plays no significant role in whether or not subsequent disputes become violent, thereby disconfirming hypothesis 4.\footnote{Several other iterations of the model including the conflict lag variable were also run but not reported here; the size of the effect remained small and never approached statistical significance.} The effect was not significant in models with either relative or objective political spectrum variables. This is somewhat
surprising given that many protracted conflicts appear multiple times in the dataset, providing ample opportunity for these previous initiators to be active in multiple dyads. Other variables are clearly more important than previous violent initiation when determining which conflicts are likely to escalate into violence. This could mean that circumstances in an initiator state have changed significantly over time\(^{115}\) or that states do not take previous violent initiation as a strong signal of escalation when they are determining if negotiation could be a successful method of dispute resolution.

Among control variables, the target regime type is always significant and the initiator regime type is not significant in any model, meaning that all regime types are selective. The positive coefficient for the target regime type indicates that non-democratic regimes (coded as 2 for civilian and 3 for military) are more likely to be targeted than democratic ones (coded as 1). This result is not incompatible with the target selection literature, but also does not offer unconditional support. Specifically, it offers support for Lai and Slater’s arguments that non-democratic regimes are also selective by finding no significance for the initiator type. All regimes factor in likelihood of victory when deciding when to escalate. It also offers additional support for Bueno de Mesquita et al’s theory, that democratic regimes are less likely to be targeted because they are potentially more dangerous military opponents\(^{116}\).

Hypothesis 5, that the behavior of democracies would change after the fall of the Berlin Wall owing to changing systemic political conditions, necessitated a separate model to restrict the case universe to democratic initiators of violent disputes, as shown in Table 2.

\(^{115}\) This is possible as the variable is coded for states, not individual regimes, leading to the possibility that a violent initiator regime could be replaced by a more pacific regime in later disputes. Further study could study individual leaders more than states to more comprehensively assess pacific characteristics.

\(^{116}\) As civilian regimes were coded as 2 and military regimes as 3, the positive, significant values for regime type suggest that those regimes were more likely to be targeted than democracies (which were coded as 1).
The results of Table 2 appear to conclusively disprove Hypothesis 5 and suggest that democracies did not behave significantly differently toward rightist regimes in the period between 1975 and November 1989 as compared to the period between November 1989 and 2007. This time shift was represented by the Berlin Wall dummy variable and was significant in neither model. There are three main differences between the results in Table 2, as limited to democracies, and the results from Table 1. First, power discrepancy is significant in disputes initiated by democracies. This coincides with much of the existing target selection literature, especially Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, Reiter and Tillman, and Reiter and Stam. Second, the status of a target regime as a nuclear state is now insignificant. This is probably due to potential sample size restrictions with only democratic initiators India, the U.S., and the United Kingdom involved in the sample. Third, democracies appear to be more likely to attack regimes based on their objective status as a rightist regime but not their relative position within their political spectrum, which runs counter to what the data for all regime types suggests in the previous three models. The size of the effect suggests that democracies are considerably more likely to attack rightist regimes than either centrist or leftist regimes.

---

117 Given a full universe of disputes in the Cold War from 1945, it is possible that the significantly larger-N could still result in significance, but this truncated test strongly suggests rejecting the hypothesis.
This result is unexpected, given that democracies are demonstrated in Models 4 and 5 to focus more on military capabilities than all regime types. Previously discussed evidence suggests that right regimes are characteristically associated with higher military spending and therefore, according to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s arguments for democratic selection have more resources to devote to war. This also runs counter to the expectations of the Cold War alliance structure, in which democratic NATO members allied with rightist, anti-Communist regimes. This could be an artifact of a small number of democratic initiators of violent disputes over the time period\textsuperscript{118} but it is still demonstrative of a potential general trend for democracies to be targeting conservative regimes more widely than regimes located elsewhere on the political spectrum.

In spite of these differences, there is one key similarity between the models testing Hypothesis 5 and the previous models: the sign and significance of the geographic proximity variable. Again, geographic proximity exerts the greatest influence on whether or not a dispute between states will turn violent. Other variables are statistically significant and have an effect, but even when controlling for those democratic initiators that previous theorists have argued are the most selective, contiguity has a huge effect on escalation.

\textsuperscript{118} After narrowing the case universe to democratic initiators, the N for these models was 28 cases.
Chapter 3 – Proximity

Geographic proximity, more than the variables pertaining to inter-regime position on the left-right political spectrum or any other control variable, seems to have a clear influence on the likelihood of conflict escalation. Conflicts between contiguous states are less manageable by nonviolent means than distant ones. The widespread significance of contiguity is present in the general definition of politically relevant dyads – the most common parameter used to analyze international relations between states – which includes direct borders as one of its two measures for relevance, essentially mandating that it be an implicit control in all tests.\textsuperscript{119} Indeed, contiguity and proximity provide opportunity, and opportunity is half of the prerequisite for war.\textsuperscript{120} The size and significance of the effect suggest that it is a decisive factor in predicting which conflicts will escalate into violence.

Geography plays a major role in state behavior\textsuperscript{121} and proximity necessitates different and more frequent interactions than distance. However, as suggested by John Vazquez, in a globalizing world with increased communication on a worldwide scale, the amount of interactions cannot alone explain disputes.\textsuperscript{122} Present relations between distant states are far less costly in terms of both finances and time than they have been throughout history, and increased interaction on a global scale can be seen even across great distances. As such, there must be characteristics present in many disputes between contiguous states that are rarer in conflicts that are less geographically concentrated.

Most states cannot project power worldwide, so opportunities for conflict are limited for all but the most powerful. This has not changed with increasing economic globalization.

\textsuperscript{120} Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 23 argue that opportunity and willingness are the two prerequisites for war.
Over the period of 1816 to 1976, Charles Gochman notes a trend for the percentage of military disputes to be more likely to be among proximate states, increasing steadily from 40.7% of militarized disputes between contiguous states in the period from 1816 to 1848 to 59.8% from 1946 to 1976. Stuart Bremer finds contiguity to be the single most important factor in explaining military disputes over a similar time period. Paul Diehl finds even more dramatic results, demonstrating that 92% of wars escalate out of disputes between contiguous states. Overall, when a dispute is militarized, it is five times more likely to result in war when between contiguous states. Gochman considers it likely that 80% (both nonviolent and violent) is the maximum percentage of disputes at a time between contiguous states; the bilateral disputes in this dataset largely follow that prediction and confirm the emphasis placed by previous scholars on contiguity as a decisive factor in the escalation of interstate disputes.

Table 3 – Percentages of Geographically Contiguous Cases Meeting Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Gap</th>
<th>No Political Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>13/16 cases (81.3% contiguous)</td>
<td>34/39 cases (87.2% contiguous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Violent</td>
<td>18/32 cases (56.3% contiguous)</td>
<td>38/48 cases (79.2% contiguous)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not all disputes between contiguous states are motivated by the same issues. Broadly speaking, they fall into three major (though not exhaustive) categories: disputes over territory.

---

127 Gochman.
and boundaries, disputes over regional hegemony, and disputes over access to resources. These reasons are of course highly interrelated. Distilling a conflict completely to any one classification risks oversimplification however, general trends within conflicts can still show patterns. Some conflicts can be a combination of two factors, like some of the disputes between China and Vietnam. Such disputes are less likely to occur among states without direct borders simply because interactions on these issues will be less common. Distant states have fewer opportunities to dispute territorial claims, harbor rebel groups, feud over resource-rich lands, or battle for regional dominance because those issues all derive from proximity.

Historically, territory has been the leading cause of war and remains fundamentally important in neorealist conceptions of power and conflict John Vasquez and Marie Henehan find that territorial disputes have the highest probability of resulting in violent conflict of any type of interstate disagreement. Territory has both tangible and intangible benefits to a state, adding resources but also projecting an image of power and retaining psychological benefits for potentially adding territory that ethnic kin may reside in, helping to solidify national identity. Indeed, states sometimes fear not the loss of territory but the potential precedent that such a loss of sovereignty might set. Disputes become intractable, taking the longest to resolve of any dispute type. And of course the territory may simply

---

have economic or strategic value sought by states in conflict. Disputes over hegemony and natural resources often have a territorial component, but they have fundamentally different drivers than disputes based on land.

Other times territorial conflict can be a function of spillover from civil wars and domestic conflicts when neighboring states are supporting and providing sanctuary for rebels\footnote{Salehyan.} or irredentist states can be motivated by internal political factors instigating which territory should be pursued\footnote{Stephen M. Saideman, “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia,” \textit{Security Studies} 7:3 (Spring 1998), 51-93.}. Though these disputes arise out of domestic situations, they have international implications when they spill over borders.

Regional hegemons attempt to exert influence over weaker neighbors amidst the constraints of great powers\footnote{David R. Mares, “Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 32:4 (December 1988), 453-471.}. Conflicts, especially protracted ones, are sometimes derived from longstanding disputes over who is the dominant power in a region. Hegemons have to be able to project their power within their region and be perceived as the regional leader\footnote{Miriam Prys, “Developing a Culturally Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’” German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers, 77 (May 2008).}\footnote{Mares.}. Competition for regional hegemony can have a major influence on foreign policy actions, as demonstrated by the competition between Brazil and Argentina during World War II\footnote{Ruth Iyob, “Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa,” \textit{Journal of Modern African Studies} 31:2 (June 1993), 257-276.}. Successful hegemons are able to maintain legitimacy that results in unchecked offensive policies within their sphere of influence; this may result in rejection of hegemonic status and the emergence of violent conflict\footnote{Iyob.}.\footnote{\textcopyright{} CEU eTD Collection.}
Natural resources play an especially significant role in conflicts between border states. Michael Ross and several other scholars have shown evidence that the emergence of violent conflict can in certain cases be attributed to the presence of resources. Michael Klare argues that, unlike in the ideological Cold War era, economic interests now govern international relations, with a special emphasis on the strategic geography of essential resources. These conflicts generally have a strategic component, as states seek to reduce vulnerability by controlling supply of necessary energy sources, metals, and other important materiel. Resource access has a range of benefits for a state, not just the property rights and control of land that states fight for. The conflicts in question, motivated in part by resource rents, have the potential to shape the economic futures of countries. This can be directly seen with the emerging violent conflict between Sudan and newly independent South Sudan, where control over oil resources – previously under Sudanese control before South Sudanese independence – is driving militarization only a year later.

The violent disputes in the dataset have been classified into these three broad categories according to the conflict analyses provided by the International Conflict Board. 83.6% of these disputes fit into the three themes of territory, regional hegemony, and natural resources, suggesting that the issues present in these violent conflicts are those that are most readily found in disputes between contiguous states. The full breakdown of cases into categories can be seen in Appendix B. Even several of the noncontiguous disputes fall into

140 Spykman, 22-23.
143 Le Billon, “Geographies of War,” 165-166.
these categories, suggesting that though these issues are more salient with bordering states, they still drive more distant conflicts with reduced frequency. With these issues driving a great proportion of violent conflicts in the sample, the importance of geographic proximity as the major explanatory variable for when escalation emerges in interstate disputes is clear.

Chapter 4 will discuss the cases of Southern Rhodesia (and subsequently Zimbabwe), as it had longstanding disputes with neighboring states over nontraditional territorial issues, primarily harboring and supporting rebel movements within their borders. These disputes endured in the face of regime changes and shifts in other factors shown in Chapter 2 to have an effect on conflict escalation. The series of disputes between Zimbabwe and its neighbors should provide compelling evidence for the significance of proximity over other important drivers of conflict escalation.
Chapter 4 – The Case of Zimbabwe

There are many cases worldwide of protracted bilateral conflicts that turned violent; however, the series of bilateral disputes emerging between many states during the Rhodesian War and continuing into the 1980s makes Southern Africa an especially rich study. Zimbabwe meets Stephen Van Evra’s criteria for selection for qualitative case comparison by having a large within-case variance on two important independent variables from the statistical analysis: first, there is a major shift from a conservative regime led by Ian Smith to a Socialist regime led by Robert Mugabe. Additionally, neighboring countries nationalized Rhodesian assets under Smith, and the Mugabe regime undertook major land redistribution schemes once taking power. This is thus a form of nationalization, predicting a higher likelihood of conflict escalation. However, in spite of these shifts, external conflicts continued with contiguous neighbors across the political spectrum. The case of Zimbabwe shows that geographic proximity, more than other factors found to be statistically significant in the model, does the best job of explaining the emergence of violent dispute resolution mechanisms.

Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing mandate of the United Kingdom in the 1920s and was considered a dominion equal to Canada and Australia, never having been ruled directly from London. Most importantly, the white minority government controlled its own military forces without British participation. This arrangement remained until 1963, when Southern Rhodesia – under the backdrop of general decolonization – began to negotiate for independence. This negotiation failed, and Rhodesia declared independence unilaterally in 1965. In response to this, trade sanctions were applied to the Ian Smith regime and a series of rebel groups began guerrilla conflicts against the minority government. In the face of

growing insurrection, Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Africa entered a covert alliance to secure white dominance in Southern Africa that lasted until the Portuguese government collapsed. Ultimately, the white-dominated Southern Rhodesian government began a series of violent conflicts with neighboring states as they harbored groups seeking revolution against the Smith regime.

The history of the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia in particular demands closer attention. In the 1960s, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda announced his support for nonviolent methods of regime change in Southern Rhodesia, offering to act as a mediator between Smith, London, and rebel organizations. However, the lack of progress on this front led to escalating rhetoric, with Kaunda offering “all possible assistance” to rebel organizations in Zimbabwe by 1974, reversing his earlier position extolling nonviolence. The ongoing dispute between the two states escalated into war.

Zambia participated in the conflict escalation by offering safe harbor to ZIPRA, the military arm of the ZAPU party led by Joshua Nkomo. The Zambian government, along with Tanzania, served as an intermediary to funnel support and resources from movements worldwide to the ZIPRA bases near the Rhodesian border. ZIPRA’s training was funded and organized by Moscow and brought the Soviet Union into the Rhodesian War, turning the rebels into proxies for continued Communist advancement in Southern Africa.

---

149 Accounts differed on the nature of the targets of Rhodesian attacks across the border. Moorcraft and McLaughlin generally characterized the targets as of military significance. Mtisi *et al* disputed this and generally characterized the encampments as hosting refugees. Either way, the targets were tied to the Rhodesian War broadly and the nuances of the nature of their encampments is beyond the scope of this paper.
151 Ibid, 90.
153 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 73.
statistical data in Chapter 2 also demonstrates that American or Soviet involvement increases
the likelihood of violent dispute resolution, and Soviet involvement in Zambia training
ZIPRA troops is demonstrative of this effect. The Rhodesian government, in response to this
support, undertook cross-border raids against ZAPU and their sponsors, reaching their most
violent in 1977-1978. These raids had a major disruptive effect on the Zambian
economy and were meant to guarantee Rhodesian security while also trying to undercut
Zambia to minimize their support.

Camps were not limited to Zambia. Contiguous Botswana and nearby Tanzania also
housed rebel bases and Mozambican independence allowed for more territory to serve as a
guerrilla base against the Smith regime. Even before independence, guerrillas had been
based on Portuguese territory, but Rhodesian forces could engage rebel forces without risking
interstate confrontation because of an agreement with Lisbon. Like Kaunda in Zambia,
Mozambican leader Samora Machel strongly backed the guerrilla struggle in Rhodesia. ZANLA, Mugabe-led ZANU’s military arm, received military support from Mozambique
after Zambia exclusively threw its lot in with ZAPU and ZIPRA. In 1976, Rhodesia
undertook Operation Thrasher, the military campaign against guerrillas and their hosts in
Mozambique. As the conflict escalated, the Rhodesian Air Force attacked villages and
launched more than forty attacks into Mozambican territory. The most significant of these
involved a convoy of scouts infiltrating a major guerrilla grouping at Nyadzonya and killing
over 1,000 ZANLA troops. Subsequent attacks were timed to undermine a peace
conference in Geneva, when Rhodesian forces seized supplies, attacked camps, and bombed

154 Mtisi et al, 149.
155 Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 40.
156 Mtisi et al, 162.
157 Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 39.
158 Ibid, 43.
159 Ibid, 41.
160 Ibid, 42.
161 Ibid, 43-45.
Mozambican infrastructure in the region\textsuperscript{162} Napalm and other more deadly weapons were used, attempting to deter other states from harboring anti-government forces\textsuperscript{163} The narrow focus of Rhodesian offensives demonstrates that the escalation of the conflict related to Mozambican support for guerrillas, specifically safe harbor. Though the two nations were ideologically opposed at this time, direct violence with the Machel regime was contextualized by their support for rebel forces in the Rhodesian War.

Nationalization also emerged as a major factor in escalating in this dispute. Mozambique closed its borders after independence, nationalizing Rhodesian property, most notably trains and transportation infrastructure\textsuperscript{164} This also cut off Rhodesia’s eastern trade route, restricting their ability to engage in trade and import war materiel. Ultimately, this brought about foreign currency shortages\textsuperscript{165} severely hampering the Rhodesian economy. Operation Thrasher was only undertaken after this nationalization; the seizure of other export goods and transport capabilities is illustrative of the potential escalating effect that nationalization can have on interstate disputes.

These disputes appear to have some ideological components to them, both as Cold War proxies and component parts of the Pan-African movement, but the violence really emerged not over conflicts between the regimes but over their decision to harbor rebels across their borders. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia’s closest ideological ally in the region, began to pull its support for the Smith government in 1976, demonstrating the secondary nature of ideology. The National Party regime in Pretoria began to (nonviolently) pursue a policy of promotion of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, fearful of a potentially hostile, leftist regime emerging in Zimbabwe as it had in Angola and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{166} Another

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, 46.
\textsuperscript{163} Mtisi \textit{et al}, 149.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 144.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, 144.
\textsuperscript{166} Brides, 182.
transition to a leftist regime could endanger South African security and regional hegemony. South Africa did this primarily by stopping supplies of energy and weapons to Rhodesia, essentially joining the widespread trade embargo against Ian Smith’s regime. Though this change in policy was nonviolent, it is illustrative of the supremacy of proximity issues over ideology: South Africa moved to undercut its ally in order to preserve its own regional power, helping to push forward the Rhodesian transition to majority rule.

Ultimately, this transition did come, beginning in March 1978 and changing the country’s name to Zimbabwe. The black population rejected the constitution the next year as it allowed for majority government but only with minority protections to block changes to the constitution. The Lancaster House Conference in 1979 negotiated a settlement, which preserved a form of minority representation and set the stage for free elections. All the different rebel groups, most notably Mugabe’s ZANU and Nkomo’s ZAPU, each with its own militia, anticipated victory in the democratic elections. This belief set the stage for the continued cross-border conflicts between Zimbabwe and its neighbors following the transition.

The final political transition in Zimbabwe came on April 18, 1980, when Mugabe became Prime Minister and the country’s name fully transitioned from any previous connection to Rhodesia and its colonial overtones. Mugabe’s regime pushed to reconstruct the country after its years of violent conflict with neighbors and to develop a black middle class, which had been impossible under the previous regime. Notably, he attempted to integrate the rival militias into one cohesive national force and undertook nationalization of

167 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 125.
168 Brides, 182.
170 Mtisi et al, 166.
farmland from white farmers, confiscating 3.5 million hectares after taking power as a leftist leader.¹⁷²

The earlier hypotheses predict that this shift should have brought an end to its disputes with neighboring states, which were derived predominately from harboring those guerrilla groups that ultimately came to power following the Lancaster House Accords. The ideological disputes between Zimbabwe and its neighbors were over. Violent conflicts, however, continued with neighbors throughout the decade. The antagonistic relationship that developed with South Africa was predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2: South Africa remained a conservative, restrictive regime, while Mugabe was elected to power as a Marxist. However, Zimbabwe remained embroiled in the Mozambican Civil War throughout the 1980s. Primarily this was on the side of the leftist government against the conservative RENAMO rebels; however, Zimbabwe also intervened to protect its oil transit resources that were threatened.¹⁷³ Deployments to protect these installations in Mozambique reached 10,000 troops.¹⁷⁴ This level of military involvement in a neighboring ally to secure the long-term future of a natural resource is further evidence of the preeminence of geographic explanations for Zimbabwe’s violent dispute resolution.

Relations with other Marxist neighbors remained periodically violent as well. In March 1983, Mugabe’s civil war against other Nkomo and other leftist leaders of ZAPU spilled over into Botswana, as refugees fled the Zimbabwean military, leading to conflict between Zimbabwe and the Botswana Defense Force.¹⁷⁵ The border conflicts between Zimbabwe and Botswana directly stemmed from its larger dispute with South Africa, its erstwhile ally. South Africa funded some exiled ZAPU members to form the Super-ZAPU

¹⁷² Ibid, 172.
¹⁷³ Ibid, 188.
militia to split from Nkomo and destabilize Mugabe’s emerging government out of fears of its harboring and supporting the African National Congress. They were supported through 1987 in an effort to keep Zimbabwe militarily occupied so as to minimize their resistance to South Africa’s broader policies throughout the region. Zimbabwe offered support for conflicts against South Africa in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. Such efforts to distract the Zimbabwean military underscore South African efforts to solidify its own preeminence in the region.

Violent dispute resolution continued with Zimbabwe’s neighbors after the political transition. Support for either the Smith or Mugabe regime did not simply and solely follow political lines, though the behavior of the Portuguese settler-colonies and South Africa before and left-leaning neighbors after the transition does suggest that the relationship can be colored by political affinity. That said, violence was present with neighbors both before and after the transition. Apartheid-era South Africa pulled support for the Smith regime in an effort to maintain its regional hegemony. Border clashes, endemic during the 1970s under Smith, continued in Mozambique and Botswana when Mugabe was in power. Politics remained somewhat of a factor – both before and after the transition – in neighboring states’ decision to support the rebel units, but the case of Zimbabwe shows that above all else, proximity and territorial relationships drove the escalation of interstate disputes into violence.

177 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 189.
Conclusion

The results of this study demonstrate the significance of several factors in trying to predict which disputes escalate into violence. Proxy wars, targeting a nuclear state, and having similar domestic political characteristics all have a significant effect on increasing the likelihood of violence in a dispute. However, the variable with the greatest significance is geographic proximity. The use of proximity as a standard control variable in studies of target selection is clearly justified. Subsequent analysis of frequent causes of violence with nearby states demonstrates why proximity can have such an influence on the likelihood of violence, even in a global era when worldwide interactions are on the rise and the costs of projecting power long distances fall.

The significance of study variables suggests that future research on domestic political characteristics could be valuable for understanding when disputes will escalate. First, the nationalization variable – limited to the petroleum sector in this study – reached significance in one model and approached it in others despite being restricted to one industry. The account of conflicts between Rhodesia and its neighbors offers empirical evidence of the role that nationalization in other sectors besides oil can play in escalation. Comprehensive research into nationalization across all industries and its role in violence could address its larger significance in escalation. Second, the effects of the variables relating to the political spectrum ran counter to what was hypothesized. This, too, warrants further study. The findings from Hypothesis 5, that democracies generally target more conservative regimes, were surprising and should be studied with a larger dataset. Similarly, the results from Models 1 through 3 – find that similar political ideologies are more prone to violence than opposite ones – should be expanded on in studies that include multilateral disputes. In this dataset, conflicts with international causes or many initial actors were excluded, potentially removing scenarios in which governments with like ideologies worked together peaceably.
against other regimes; as a result, the significance the opposite political regime variable could be an artifact of the dataset.

This confirmation of the overwhelming influence of proximity on escalation has practical implications as well. International organizations and governments have limited resources to put toward mediation, negotiation, and troop deployments. This evidence suggests that those resources may be best allocated to conflicts between border states rather than those distant states with grievances. Such a policy has the potential to more effectively utilize scarce funding and ensure that violence does not emerge in some of the most susceptible disputes in the world today.
## Appendix A

### Pearson Correlation Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target = NUCLEAR</th>
<th>Initiator Regime Type</th>
<th>Target Discrepancy</th>
<th>Oil Nationalization</th>
<th>Opposite Relative Left Right</th>
<th>Conflict Lag</th>
<th>Proxy War</th>
<th>Geographical Proximity</th>
<th>Violence Dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET = NUCLEAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.462</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INITIATOR REGIME TYPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGET REGIME TYPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>-.462</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>-.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POWER DISCREPANCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.899</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OIL NATIONALIZATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.818</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPPOSITE RELATIVE LEFT RIGHT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.981</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPPOSITE OBJECTIVE LEFT RIGHT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.523</td>
<td>.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONFLICT LAG</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROXY WAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>-.546</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>-.262</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIOLENCE DUMMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>-.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B

### Types of Violent Disputes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TERRITORY</strong></th>
<th><strong>REGIONAL HEGEMONY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco v. Spain</td>
<td>Vietnam v. China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel v. Lebanon</td>
<td>Ethiopia v. Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya v. Chad</td>
<td>Iran v. Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda v. Tanzania</td>
<td>Grenada v. U.S.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina v. UK*</td>
<td>Pakistan v. India (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria v. Chad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand v. Laos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama v. U.S.*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan v. India (1990)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan v. Armenia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia v. Georgia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon v. Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia v. Albania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe v. Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe v. Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia v. Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa v. Angola</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe v. Angola*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar v. Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>NATURAL RESOURCES</strong></th>
<th><strong>OTHER</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso v. Mali</td>
<td>Egypt v. Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq v. Kuwait</td>
<td>Vietnam v. Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru v. Ecuador</td>
<td>South Yemen v. North Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gambia v. Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq v. U.S.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan v. Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia v. U.S.*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates that the dispute is not between contiguous states.

Protracted conflicts between states are only included once in this table regardless of the number of individual disputes.
Bibliography


