FACING EUROCENTRISM, FACEING MODERNITY: QUESTIONS OF MODERNIZATION AND GLOBAL HIERARCHIES IN TURKISH INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

By

Ömer Turan

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Supervisors:
Associate Professor Prem Kumar Rajaram
Associate Professor Judit Bodnár

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STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date

Ömer Turan
ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores Turkish intellectuals’ criticism of the West and Eurocentrism along with their imagining of modernity in the twentieth century. To this end, the analysis includes four groups of intellectuals: the Unionists from the very late period of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalists from the early republican period, the conservatives from the single and the multi-party eras, and the leftwing intellectuals from the 1960s and the 1970s. Historically, Turkish intellectuals have been experiencing being on the border of the West; since the West and Europe have been a source of inspiration for progress and a general reference point in establishing modernity, yet at the same time, a threat for their country in the realm of the realpolitik. This constitutes the main dilemma investigated in this dissertation.

This study argues that, for a comprehensive history of the global hierarchies in the nineteenth century, the buffer zones between the European metropolis and the formally colonized peripheries need to be focused on. As such, as a background for the intellectuals’ criticism in the twentieth century, the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire by the European Great Powers throughout the nineteenth century is analyzed by referring to a complex network of informal colonialism, arguing that Ottoman modernization was a search for increasing the state capacity to counter this subjugation. This study highlights that the idea of “saving the state,” which dominated the modernization efforts both in the Unionist and the early republican eras, should be conceptualized as system integration in the terminology of historical sociology.

Referring to this historical background of “space of subjugation,” it is argued that for those Turkish intellectuals, facing Eurocentrism included colonial criticism and critical awareness about global hierarchies. Imagining modernity in their locality necessitated challenging the superiority claims of Europe and searching for parity and recognition. The interplay between facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity has always raised the issue of...
nativism, as it is commonly observed that criticizing Eurocentrism was coupled with essentialist superiority claims of identity. Thus, the issue of nativism is discussed separately for each group of intellectuals scrutinized in this study. The analyses reveal that most of the intellectuals in question had to assume multiple intellectual roles simultaneously, being rational planner, legislator, and interpreter at the same time, due to the necessity of reconciling different universalist positions with the peculiarities of their societies and the necessity of countering prejudices against their culture.
DEDICATION

to Çimen and Ali Eşref

“Hayat sürğit değil, sonu başından belli
Yaşadık ve öğrendik
Her şey başka şekilde
Taşırım hâlâ ayrıntıları içimde”
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It was probably 1997 or 1998 when Hakan Doğruöz encouraged me to buy the book by Ahmed Rıza, Batının Doğu Politikasının Ahlâken İflâsi (La Faillite Morale de la Politique
Occidentale en Orient), the Üçdal Neşriyat edition, on one of our tours to secondhand bookshops in Istanbul, which we took regularly then. This was probably one of the earliest bricks laid in this dissertation project. Much before I started thinking about this project, İlhami Gülcan provided me with the full collections of both Kadro and Yön journals. These valuable gifts made my later research much easier. My thanks are to both of them.

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I would never be able to complete this dissertation without the support of Sevgi Adak. From the initial step of brainstorming about possible research questions to the very final step of drafting, Sevgi’s contribution to this dissertation has been immense. I always considered myself fortunate to have her as not only my soul mate but my intellectual and scholarly comrade. The discussions I had with her about social sciences and Turkish history and
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My father, Ali Eşref Turan, passed away unexpectedly at the very final stage of the dissertation process. When he died, he knew already that the draft was completed and that I had dedicated the dissertation to him and my mother.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICATION .......................................................................................... II

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. III

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................. V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................... VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ IX

LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... XII

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... XIII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... XIV

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

1.1 INTELLECTUALS AS A UNIT OF ANALYSIS .................................................................... 11
1.2 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AS HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY .............................................. 16
1.3 EXISTING PERSPECTIVES ON TURKISH MODERNIZATION AND TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE .......................................................... 27
1.4 PLAN OF THE STUDY ......................................................................................................... 39

PART I THEORETICAL AMBIGUITIES AND THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .................. 45

CHAPTER 2 – THE WEST AND THE REST: THEORIZING SUBJUGATION AND REACTION ...... 46

2.1 CLUSTERING SUBJUGATIONS BY THE WEST .................................................................. 48
2.1.1 The unequal treaty system and extraterritorialities in Asia ....................................... 53
2.1.2 The unequal treaty system and extraterritorialities in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire .................................................................................................................. 58
2.2 CLUSTERING REACTIONS TO SUBJUGATIONS BY THE WEST .................................. 62
2.2.1 Spaces of subjugation and the commonality of intellectual agendas ...................... 64
2.3 NATIONALISM OUTSIDE THE WEST: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE .............................. 68
2.3.1 Theoretical ambiguity ................................................................................................. 68
2.3.2 Nationalism: contradictoriness and derivation ......................................................... 72
2.4 MODERNITY OUTSIDE THE WEST: THE AMBIGUITY OF MODERNIZATION THEORY ................................................................. 75
2.5 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 80

CHAPTER 3 – THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS SPACE OF SUBJUGATION: INFORMAL

COLONIALISM, INTELLECTUALS AND COLONIAL CRITICISM ....................................... 82

3.1 THE “BORROWED COLONIALISM” APPROACH ............................................................ 85
3.2 INFORMAL COLONIALISM: THE GALLAGHER-ROBINSON THESIS ............................ 89
3.3 INFORMAL COLONIALISM: WORLD-SYSTEM ANALYSIS ........................................ 93
3.4 THE COMPLEX NETWORK OF INFORMAL COLONIALISM ....................................... 95
3.5 OTTOMAN INTELLECTUALS AND COLONIAL CRITICISM ......................................... 99
CHAPTER 4 – THE OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY ...........................................109

4.1 STATE CAPACITY: AN OVERVIEW ..................................................................................111
4.2 THE ARMY ..........................................................................................................................115
4.3 EDUCATION ..........................................................................................................................122
4.4 COINAGE ..............................................................................................................................125
4.5 THE COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS ..............................................127
4.6 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................130

CHAPTER 5 – TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE YOUNG TURK ERA: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE .................................................................................................................................135

5.1 THE CUP AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1908........................................................................136
5.2 THE UNIONIST SOCIAL IMAGINARY: REACTIONARY MODERNISM ....................................141
  5.2.1 Prince Sabahaddin and La Science Sociale ..................................................................144
  5.2.2 The Idea of military-nation ..........................................................................................145
  5.2.3 Solidarism, corporatism and the CUP ........................................................................147
5.3 THE UNIONIST NATIONALISM: ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND TURFYFYICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SPHERE ........................................................................................................152
5.4 THE UNIONIST NATIONALISM: TURFYFYIFICATION OF ANATOLIA ..................................157
5.5 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................164

CHAPTER 6 – REPUBLICAN MODERNIZATION AS SYSTEM INTEGRATION .................................167

6.1 SYSTEM INTEGRATION: AN OVERVIEW ..............................................................................168
6.2 THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF KEMALISM ..................................................................174
6.3 KEMALISM AND THE ETHNIC INTEGRATION .....................................................................188
6.4 KEMALISM AND THE CULTURAL INTEGRATION .................................................................197
  6.4.1 The Language reforms .................................................................................................198
  6.4.2 The Music reform ........................................................................................................201
6.5 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................204

PART II MULTIPLYING TRAJECTORIES IN TURKISH INTELLECTUAL HISTORY .....................208

CHAPTER 7 – THE UNIONIST INTELLECTUALS AND THE WEST .............................................209

7.1 CRITICIZING COLONIALISM, CRITICIZING THE WEST ..................................................215
7.2 COUNTERING PREJUDICES AGAINST ISLAM ...................................................................224
7.3 IMAGINING MODERNITY ......................................................................................................228
7.4 NATIVISM IN AHMED RİZA AND ZİYA GÖKALP .................................................................235
7.5 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................239

CHAPTER 8 – THE KEMALIST INTELLECTUALS AND EUROCENTRISM .................................241

8.1 KEMALIST UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJUGATION ..............................................................246
8.2 KEMALISM VIS-À-VIS EUROCENTRISM ..............................................................................258
8.3 IMAGINING MODERNITY .....................................................................................................266
8.4 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................273
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – The Ottoman Empire and the Vicious Circle of Informal Colonialism .......................................................... 110
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Major Unequal Treaties of Informal Colonialism in Asia............. 56
Table 2 - Ottoman State Capacity and the Network of Informal Colonialism................................................................. 131
Table 3 - Ottoman Population in 1914......................................................... 158
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMP - Asiatic Mode of Production
CND - The Committee of National Defense
CUP - The Committee of Union and Progress
DİSK - Confederation of Progressive Workers’ Unions
DP - The Democratic Party
NDR - National Democratic Revolution
PDA - The Ottoman Public Debt Administration
PRP - The Progressive Republican Party
RPP - The Republican People’s Party
SR - Socialist Revolution
TCP - Turkish Communist Party
WPT - Workers’ Party of Turkey
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The debate over Westernization and modernization has been the most important one in Turkish intellectual circles at least since the nineteenth century. One might argue that Westernization has actually been an ordeal for Turkish intellectuals—the West being a constant point of reference, yet never fully trusted. This study is about how Turkish intellectuals perceived the West, the expansion of European countries, Westernization and the modernization process taking place in their country. By referring to the intellectuals of Turkey, I limit myself to the twentieth century, including the very late period of Ottoman Empire and the following republican era.

The main research question of this study is fourfold: a) How did Turkish intellectuals understand and criticize the West and Europe? b) How did they conceive of Western penetration into their own and other countries? In relation to this question, what will be explored as a major theme of this study is the perception of Turkish intellectuals of European control over other territories. To put it differently, the way they interpreted the direct and indirect intervention of Western/European powers is part of the main discussion. The terminology they used (imperialism, colonialism, semi-colonialism and others) will be analyzed in order to obtain more insights into their assessments about the global hierarchies. c) What were their positions with respect to the Turkish experience of Westernization and modernization? d) What were their positions with respect to universalism and particularism?

As this question suggests, a major concern of this study is to scrutinize the continuous efforts of Turkish intellectuals to reconcile different universalist positions with the peculiarities of their own societies; in other words, this study considers these efforts as a search for reconciliation of universalist viewpoints with national self-respect.

This is not a comparative study. However, the major questions of this study are by no means unique to the Turkish case. They have been part of the intellectual agenda probably in
every country that has experienced modernization outside or at the margin of the West. Moreover, the countries outside or at the margin of the West have also experienced the European capitalist expansion, and, consequently, have been subject to formal or informal colonialism, or Western penetration, in one way or the other. This means their experience with modernization has been shaped within the setting of global hierarchies. In this context, a major argument of this study is the following: problems concerning modernization, Westernization, universalism and particularism, at both the practical and theoretical levels, are observed in different parts of the globe; yet, for a certain subfield of the social sciences, these problems have been taken seriously as long as they are observed in the geographies of the colonial encounter in the form formal colonialism. However, such problems are not peculiar to these geographies. Hence, I argue for the need of a new concept to include the experience of various types of Western penetration, including informal colonialism. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I develop the idea of “space of subjugation” and situate the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish case within this context. In short, this is not a comparative study; yet, with the fourfold research question of this study, I argue that various discussions related to these four themes in Turkish intellectual circles have by no means been peculiar to the Turkish case. More precisely, by defining colonial criticism as a comprehensive questioning of global hierarchies, I argue that the way in which Turkish intellectuals have understood and criticized the West or Europe is an example of colonial criticism, which could be conceptualized in the context of space of subjugation.

Indeed, to quote Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), this study is about the positions of Turkish intellectuals vis-à-vis the idea of Europe and how Europe has been provincialized by them. Obviously, not all the intellectuals included in the study were in favor of provincializing Europe; some of them were stubbornly Westernist. Yet, being a characteristic of the space of subjugation, this does not underestimate the criticism of the West voiced in
Turkish intellectual circles, and one should also note that intellectuals who had the most Westernist stand in terms of modernization could utterly be anti-imperialist at the same time.

When I suggest the concept of space of subjugation, I maintain that the basic dilemma stated by Chakrabarty (2000: 6), namely, Europe’s indispensability in thinking through the various life practices that constitutes modernity yet at the same time its inadequacy in that regard, is a dilemma for intellectual agendas in all spaces of subjugation. In this sense, Turkey is not an exception.

This study is not about capitalist penetration per se, but rather focuses on intellectual reactions fueled by the capitalist penetration of the West. While emphasizing the indispensability of historical imagination for anthropology, John Comaroff (1982) argues the necessity of a dialectical approach, especially for a better understanding of imperialist/capitalist penetration and the local reaction to it. Comaroff’s methodological caveat is against denying the active role of local communities within the dialectics of their own history and to acknowledge the (ideological) diversity of local responses to colonial domination, and perceiving expanding capitalism as an absolute power. Drawing on a similar caution, the dialectics of colonial encounters are now studied by various authors.

It is significant that in the existing literature on colonial histories, the general concern has been with the former formal colonies. As can be expected, with such a disciplinary bias these studies do not include non-Western countries that were not formal colonies but were affected negatively in any case by the capitalist expansion of the West. In fact, these were also the cases where complex dialectics of resistance, emphasized by Comaroff, were observable. Michael Herzfeld (2002) states that the processes well documented for colonies have not been studied likewise for the “buffer zones between the colonized lands and those yet untamed.” He conceptualizes these buffer zones as crypto-colonies, where political independence was coupled with massive economic dependence. Among others, Greece and
Thailand are the main examples of crypto-colonies. A common characteristic suggested for the basis of this typology is “aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models.” This means the former crypto-colonial countries were inclined to “respond to that hierarchy by deploying a world-dominating discourse about ‘culture’ in defense of their perceived national interests and specificity” (Herzfeld 2002).

Drawing on Meltem Ahıska’s argument (2010: 185), this study situates Turkey within the perspective offered by Herzfeld, bearing in mind all the complexities about the power dialectics of expanding capitalism and local/national resistance. This will be further developed in Chapter 3; at this point, it suffices to state that this study considers the subjugation of late Ottoman Empire by Western powers as a path-determining factor for the way in which Turkish intellectuals evaluated and criticized the West. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the implementations of reforms and possibilities of countering the decline of the empire were of utmost importance for Ottoman intellectuals. As a result of the “inter-imperialist rivalry” (Pamuk 1987: 6-7), the European penetration led to the partial loss of sovereignty (Owen 1981: 191-192), and this made many Ottoman intellectuals suspicious of the Westernization process. “The Ottoman elite understood … well that their world was exposed to mortal danger from within, as from without.” (Deringil 1998: 3)

A major argument of this study is to consider the criticism voiced by Turkish intellectuals as challenges to Eurocentrism. An immediate question is how Eurocentrism is to be defined. To a certain extent, Eurocentrism claims European uniqueness and European superiority (Alatas 2002). In this sense, it is used to refer to a certain set of values, attitudes, ideas and ideological orientations. Arif Dirlik boldly emphasizes that Eurocentrism needs to be thought in relation to European expansion, and its different forms. In his words, “Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon is not to be understood without reference to the structures of power that EuroAmerica produced over the last five centuries, which in turn
produced Eurocentrism, globalized its effects, and universalized its historical claims” (Dirlik 1999). The concept of Eurocentrism also implies the Western claim to universalism. According to Immanuel Wallerstein,

European social science was resolutely universalist in asserting that whatever it was that happened in Europe in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries represented a pattern that was applicable everywhere, either because it was a progressive achievement of mankind that was irreversible or because it represented the fulfillment of humanity’s basic needs via the removal of artificial obstacles to this realization. What you saw now in Europe was not only good but the face of the future everywhere (Wallerstein 1999).

In his seminal book Eurocentrism, Samir Amin (1989: vii) argues that Eurocentrism should be defined as a culturalist phenomenon, which flourished mostly in the nineteenth century and constitutes one dimension of the culture and ideology of the modern capitalist world. When we look at different definitions of the concept, we see that all are critical of Eurocentrism. Whenever one talks about Eurocentrism, it is within the realm of criticizing the claims with respect to Europe’s superiority, uniqueness, or model position. Following all these definitions, in this study, I define Eurocentrism as the connection between European claim for superiority and Europe’s search for control/dominance over others’ territories. Moreover, by following Arif Dirlik (1999), I argue for the conceptualization of Eurocentrism within the framework of capitalist expansion. This is one of the meanings I attribute to Eurocentrism.

The other meaning encompasses a characteristic of Turkish modernization. This study refers to the model of progress adopted by the Kemalist regime as the “Eurocentric model of progress.” Following the declaration of the republic, two key elements of the new regime became Westernization and the creation of a national identity, and most of the time they were jointly emphasized, without either one having priority over the other. In the very first years of the republic, the model was basically “selective appropriation of Western modernity,”
following the perspective of Ziya Gökalp, based on a distinction between “culture” (hars) and “civilization.” However, soon after the consolidation of the regime, the Kemalist ruling elite adopted a radical form of modernism, distinct from both the Ottoman’s faltering attempts of reforms and Gökalp’s search for a synthesis. It is safe to argue that the “Eurocentric model of progress” of the early republican era was an “acultural model of modernization,” following Charles Taylor’s conception. For Taylor, an acultural theory of modernity assumes that the growth of reason, scientific consciousness and development of secularism can take place everywhere in a similar format. “Modernity in this kind of theory is understood as issuing from a rational or social operation which is culturally neutral” (Taylor 2001). Once the acultural theory of modernity had been internalized, it was inevitable to assume that “the march of modernity [would] end up making all cultures look the same.” Taking this theory into account, this study aims to contextualize the positions of Turkish intellectuals vis-à-vis the Kemalist “acultural model of modernization.” In other words, their evaluations, supports and criticisms of republican modernization constitute the main question of this study.

As a theoretical intervention, I argue that “Eurocentric model of progress” has constituted the local history of the Turkish context, as a response to Western dominance. I borrow the specific meaning of “local history” from Walter Mignolo (2000: 92), who refers to different subaltern reasons, criticizing Western expansion, in different contexts. For him, subaltern reason turns into be a different local history (the critical voice of peripheralized people), in different geographies, as a reaction to global design (which is European history, with a special emphasis on the process of Western expansion). In this sense, the “Eurocentric model of progress” as local history in the Turkish context has two implications: First, in order to establish an independent state as a reaction to Western penetration, the republican regime adopted a “Eurocentric model of progress.” According to Niyazi Berkes (1998: 464), this was modeled after the dictum, “towards the West in spite of the West.” In other words, to resist
the global design, the Kemalist regime equated modernization with Westernization. Second, the “Eurocentric model of progress” as local history implies that since the beginning of multi-party era in 1950, Turkish intellectuals started becoming more vocal about the radical modernization project of the regime. Hence, they engaged in writing local history as the history of a “Eurocentric model of progress.” This is the point where they became outspokenly critical of Eurocentrism.

By situating the Turkish case within the context of space of subjugation, this study argues that the peculiarities of the Turkish intellectual history can be made sense of by referring to certain concepts developed within the context of colonial histories and the history of decolonization. Nativism is a crucial point in this sense. For different groups of intellectuals, the question of the extent to which they fell into the trap of nativism while criticizing the West and the acultural model of Westernization was very much relevant to this study. That’s why the essentialist and particularist dimensions of their arguments are discussed. “Double consciousness” is another significant point. As a genealogical account of the critique of Eurocentrism in the history of ideas in Turkey, this study examines the “double consciousness” of Turkish intellectuals vis-à-vis the idea of the West and the process of Westernization. Here I do not use the concept of “double consciousness” following W. E. B. DuBois, who suggested that it connotes the difficulties of being black and American simultaneously. My problematic is rather different from the issues of race. Nevertheless, the idea of simultaneity is quite useful and the uses of the term by Paul Gilroy and Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (2001) are enlightening. Especially Gilroy’s (1993: 30) emphasis on “being both inside and outside the West” fits well in the Turkish context, where modernity is experienced at the margin of Europe and the West. In this sense, the “double consciousness” of Turkish intellectuals means that they had to deal with a series of dichotomies. To begin with, reconciliation of different universalist positions with local peculiarities is the basis for
“double consciousness.” Moreover, Europe being an object of desire as well as a source of frustration (Ahıska 2003), demands for equalities coupled with claims for difference, a feeling of belatedness with respect to modernization combined with assertions of strong cultural/ethnical identity are other instances of “double consciousness.” Gayatri Spivak asserts that “the free Turk is obliged to a perennial acknowledgment of European debt” (1993: 266). This debt is part of “double consciousness” because freedom does not only mean individual freedom obtained through modernization following the Western model, it also is a value gained as a result of national resistance against European countries. Therefore, when all these paradoxes are considered, the concept of “double consciousness” is illuminating for the Turkish context.

As Gaonkar maintains, in provincializing Western modernity, inspiring discussions have been developed around the concepts of alternative/multiple modernities. The interest in theories of alternative/multiple modernities could be explained by the failures of both modernization theory and developmentalism. Even a general outline of modernization theory and developmentalism is beyond the scope of the discussions within this study. It suffices to say that both projects were instances of the parochial universalism of the West or attempts to ground the ahistorical and delocalized universalism of European origin. According to Wolfgang Sachs (1992), this universalism assumed the unity of the world, which would be realized through its Westernization. “The differences between countries came to be seen as mere delays, condemned as unjust and unacceptable, and the elimination of this gap was planned” (Latouche 1992). Yet, in the 1990s it became obvious that several main assumptions of modernization theory were dubious (Knöbl 2003). It is now understood that modernization is not a global and/or an irreversible process, concerning all societies of the world evenly. The sharp antithesis between tradition and modernity became an obsolete position to defend. In addition, many different cases showed that social change towards
modernity in different societies was neither uniform nor linear. In this context, the debates on alternative/multiple modernities appeared as an acknowledgment of already existing diversity and multi-dimensionality of the experiences of modernity.

Though they are certainly inspiring in terms of emphasizing that modernity is not the monopoly of the West, the ongoing debates on alternative/multiple modernities have proceeded with a considerable culturalist and civilizationist tone. In his article, “Two Theories of Modernity,” Taylor (2001) develops a cultural understanding of the rise of modernity, as a result of his dissatisfaction with the “acultural model of modernity.” Accordingly, a cultural theory of modernity will offer a framework in which to “think of the difference as one between civilizations, each with their own culture.” Within this framework, the transformation that occurred in the modern West could be understood mainly in terms of the rise of a new culture. The growth of science, individualism, negative freedom, and instrumental rationality are offered by Taylor as the cultural basis of Western modernity. Once the differences between cultures and several cultural conceptions are acknowledged, it becomes possible to talk about neither one singular way toward modernity nor a singular type of modernity. Thus, according to Taylor, “instead of speaking of modernity in the singular, we should better to speak of ‘alternative modernities’” (2001). Therefore, not only are there differences within the modernities of Western societies, but also Japanese modernity, Indian modernity or Islamic modernity are considerably different from Western modernity. The most important task of social sciences for Taylor is to understand the range of alternative modernities. Similarly, for Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2002), different modernity experiences gave rise to different/multiple institutional and ideological patterns. These patterns were not the simple continuation of traditional structures, but they were mostly influenced by specific cultural premises, traditions, and experiences. Eisenstadt underlines the fact that “[m]any of the movements that developed in non-Western societies articulated strong anti-Western or
even anti-modern themes, yet all were distinctively modern.” According to the idea of multiple modernities, the best way to understand the history of modernity and the contemporary world is to pay attention to the multiplicity of cultural programs, and to remember that “modernity and Westernization are not identical.” “Western patterns of modernity are not the only ‘authentic’ modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others” (Eisenstadt 2002).

While this is a culturalist and civilizationist framework, it still well illustrates the theoretical difficulties involved in challenging the Eurocentric model. Therefore, it is legitimate to cross-read these debates with certain discussions within Turkish intellectual circles. For Taylor, the first step towards the idea of alternative modernity is to understand Western modernity within a cultural(ist) perspective. Accordingly, he argues that Western modernity is partly a result of peculiarly Western understanding of person, nature, society and the good. Correspondingly, some Turkish intellectuals argued that certain aspects of Western modernity that the republican elites attempted to adapt to the Turkish context are peculiar to the West. Moreover, the key idea of the ongoing debates is acknowledging “the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of this Western program of modernity” (Eisenstadt 2002) as well as emphasizing the multiplicity of the experiences of modernity. As it is discussed in Chapter 9, Turkish conservatism had been voicing a comparable argument since at least the 1950s. Furthermore, not only Turkish conservatives but even some left-wing Turkish intellectuals argued for the necessity of a local modernity—a modernization project distinct from Westernization. In short, the alternative/multiple modernity project is a stand against understanding modernity and tradition as dichotomous. For Taylor, an error of the acultural theory of modernity was to perceive modernity as an evolution from traditional to modern society. Yet, it has since been understood that different modernity experiences were based on multiple traditional patterns without being the simple continuation of traditional
structures (Eisenstadt 2002). Chapter 9 argues that the conservative intellectuals Peyami Safa and Mümtaz Turhan would agree not to comprehend tradition in opposition to modernity, and in this regard, their quest for a local modernity was a search for one where tradition would continue to exist without constraints.

1.1 Intellectuals as a Unit of Analysis

This study takes intellectuals as the unit of analysis. Throughout this study, the intellectual as a social category is understood with reference to the dualistic nature of intellectual craftsmanship. There are at least two advantages of considering the two-fold function of the intellectual. First, it creates a research space within which the intersections of different agents within society can be seen. Second, it prepares the groundwork for combining theoretical discussions with historical/empirical analysis. Since the fin-de-siècle Dreyfus Affair, a dominant aspect of the concept of intellectual has been dissent and opposition. Carl Boggs (1993: 56) argues that “oppositional intellectuals perform a variety of ideological functions: attacking myths that conceal power relations, putting forth critical views of social reality, offering alternative visions of the future, and so forth.” Throughout the twentieth century, there was always a strong tendency to match the concept of intellectual to the idea of resistance. Various definitions of the term intellectual have indeed emphasized its oppositional dimension. Lewis Coser’s (1965: viii) definition of intellectuals as those “who never seem satisfied with things as they are” is an example for this general tendency. In his search for an outline of sociology of intelligentsia, Karl Mannheim positioned himself clearly in favor of the oppositional identity of the intellectual, and he suggested the expression “relatively uncommitted intelligentsia.” For him, “the expression simply alluded to the well-established fact that intellectuals do not react to given issues as cohesively as for example employees and workers do” (Mannheim 1992: 106). The free-floating intellectuals, which
can be defined only with the criterion of education, are much more worthy compared to the engaged ones, because only they have the chance to transcend the interest-based partiality of both capitalists and working-class.

However, a considerable number of theorists do not regard the concept of intellectual one-dimensionally, and rather offer different two-fold conceptualizations such as organic and traditional intellectuals, rational planners and social movement intellectuals, or legislators and interpreters. Through the use of these two-fold conceptualizations, the emphasis is placed on the fact that intellectual craftsmanship does not only entail dissent or opposition, but rather on the notion that existing systems necessitate different types of intellectual labor for different purposes. Hence, I argue that focusing on the two dimensions of intellectual craftsmanship, namely, reproducing as well as opposing the system, requires a relational analysis, attentive to both the interior and exterior of the system. In his classical essay entitled “The Formation of Intellectuals,” Antonio Gramsci (1975: 125) conceptualized two levels of intellectual activity: “in the highest grade will have to be placed the creators of the various sciences, of philosophy, art, etc.; in the lowest, the most humble ‘administrators’ and propagators of already existing traditional and accumulated intellectual riches.” Then, in order to have a better understanding of the function of the intellectual in society, he specified two dimensions of intellectual craftsmanship as “traditional type of intellectuals” and “organic intellectuals.”

Traditional intellectuals consider themselves as the “true” intellectuals. According to Gramsci, traditional intellectuals have a sense of their own uninterrupted continuity, both in the sense of their activities and qualifications. This led them to see themselves as autonomous and as independent of the ruling social group. Gramsci pointed out that these claims of

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1 In “The formation of Intellectuals,” Gramsci (1975: 121) also noted that “all men are intellectuals, one could therefore say; but all men do not have the function of intellectuals in society.” He added, “every man, outside his own job, develops some intellectual activity; he is, in other words, a ‘philosopher’, an artist, a man of taste, he shares a conception of the world, he has a conscious line of moral conduct, and so contributes towards maintaining or changing a conception of the world, that is, towards encouraging new modes of thought.” This emphasis is relevant in terms of not perceiving the boundaries between intellectuals and the others as absolute. By the same token, the boundaries amongst different intellectual categories are also elusive.
autonomy and independence are dubious, and he noted the traditional intellectual function in reproducing the existing hegemony. In contrast, “organic intellectuals” do not have the claim of autonomy; for them, independence or amateurism are not significant concepts worth considering. For Gramsci, each new class creates with itself its organic intellectuals, as part of the general need for specialization. Organic intellectuals are a group of persons who are aligned with institutions and who produce the legitimacy of their positions as well as their perspective with their institutional alignments. Most of the time, the aligned institution is the state. In his *Prison Notebooks* Gramsci (1987: 16) states that “it happens that many intellectuals think that they are the State.”

The sociologist Ron Eyerman observes the dual nature of intellectual craftsmanship in the evolution of intellectuals’ social position. For Eyerman (1985), in the 1940s and 1950s, being an intellectual mostly corresponded to being active in rational planning within the state apparatus. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, “movement intellectual” emerged as a new position and became more commonly observable (Eyerman 1994: 11). The existence of new political spaces and opening of new politicized areas by social movements encouraged intellectuals to detach themselves from bureaucracy. In other words, by being movement intellectuals, they re-gained their autonomy. By the same token, Zygmunt Bauman offers another type of two-fold conceptualization, by indicating two types of intellectuals, namely, legislators and interpreters. He states that

The typically modern strategy of intellectual work is one best characterized by the metaphor of the “legislator” role. It consists of making authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct and binding. The authority to arbitrate is in this case legitimized by superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better access than the non-intellectual part of society (Bauman 1989: 4).
Bauman also notes that intellectuals as “legislators” are not bound by localized, communal traditions; accordingly, the knowledge they produce is not sensitive enough to local particularities (Bauman 1989: 5). On the other hand, the intellectual work that can be described by the metaphoric role of “interpreter” is much more careful about local and traditional differences. Whereas the legislators are more inclined to make authoritative statements about the universalistic ambitions, for interpreters, the growing independence of societal powers is more crucial (Bauman 1989: 122).

Bearing these discussions in mind, this study approaches Turkish intellectuals by emphasizing the two dimensions of intellectual craftsmanship. Joel Migdal aptly states that “it is impossible to understand social and cultural change in the Turkish republic, or any other twentieth-century state for that matter, without confronting the effects of the modernity project.” The dynamics of this change and its manifestations “can be found not in an examination of elites and their institutions exclusively, nor in a focus solely on the poor or marginal groups of society, but on those physical and social spaces the two intersect” (Migdal 1997). Here I argue that intellectuals, as a level of analysis, offer a considerable opportunity to understand the elites and the related institutions as well as the society as a milieu of interaction. This is the first advantage that I referred to above. In Chapter 8, while I discuss the Kemalist writers’ perspectives (who were within or close to the ruling elites, in one way or the other), the focus is on the role of intellectual labor in establishing and reproducing the system. In Chapter 9 and Chapter 10, the critical (and in some cases oppositional) intellectuals’ evaluations are elaborated. The abovementioned two-fold conceptualization is also useful for further discussions. For instance, some left-wing intellectuals aimed to have a function similar to “representative of rational planning” and “legislator;” however, I will argue that they also functioned as an interpreter between the universalist claims and their locality.
This choice of unit of analysis coincides with the calls for relational understanding in sociology. Rather than searching for a fixed state-society boundary, Timothy Mitchell argues for the need to examine the political processes through which the uncertain distinction between the state and the society is produced. He calls for the necessity of a relational approach to understand the elusive boundary between the state and the society. The state is neither a freestanding entity nor a structure apart from or opposed to the society. Mitchell’s proposal is not disregarding the distinction between the state and the society altogether. “The state cannot be dismissed as an abstraction or ideological construct and passed over in favor of more real, material realities” (Mitchell 1999). With an emphasis on the two dimensions of intellectual craftsmanship, taking intellectuals as a unit of analysis helps to go beyond the state-society dichotomy. Throughout the study, the double function of intellectuals, producing the regime’s perspective as well as voicing society’s concerns, are elaborated.

Concerning the second advantage of using intellectuals as a unit of analysis, in other words, studying intellectuals, it is, by definition, scrutinizing some theoretical problems within a concrete historical framework. Such a choice is inspired by the recent calls to go beyond a series of dichotomies such as generalization versus specification, multiple cases versus a single case, or theorization versus description. All these can be regarded under the rubric of the supposed dichotomy between the idiographic and nomothetic approaches. In his discussion of the current state of affairs in social science paradigm, Wallerstein (2000) argues that even asserting the merits of combining idiographic and the nomothetic approaches reinforces the legitimacy of seeing them as dichotomies. If this is not a simple combination, as Wallerstein suggests, what could be done about it? At this point, I take the insight of critical realism seriously. Andrew Sayer maintains that critical realism makes two contributions to the ongoing debates on the methodology: a) the basic task of the theory is not
formalizing the regularities in empirical events, but rather carrying out conceptual analysis; and b) “empirical analysis is never theory-neutral” (Sayer 2000: 136). He concludes that the overlap between theory and empirical research has to be greater in the social sciences and history. According to the solution he suggests, empirical research should not only be theoretically informed but also be theoretically informative and creative. In this context, Sayer does not see idiographic and the nomothetic approaches as competing, but rather as two extremes of a continuum. This is the position of this study. I do not make a distinction between intellectuals, their circles, and their career paths on the one hand, and the theoretical questions they are dealing with on the other. For this reason, when I study intellectuals, my object of study is particular to the Turkish case, yet at the same time it is in relation to common problems, especially the ones for the space of subjugation. This is the point that links my study to historical sociology. For Sayer, historical sociology is the best example of the overlap of idiographic and the nomothetic approaches. This is the reason why historical sociologists take seriously critical realism in their battle with methodological positivism (Steinmetz 2005). In this sense, I position my study at the intersection of historical sociology and intellectual history.

1.2 Intellectual History as Historical Sociology

This study falls under the domain of historical sociology. Put it differently, this is a study positioning itself at the intersection of historical sociology and intellectual history. The first question then is how to bridge intellectual history with historical sociology. One way of answering this question takes the linguistic turn seriously and suggests bridging these two fields of social sciences by following recent trends within the intellectual history circles, privileging perspectives inspired by the linguistic turn. The new perspective within intellectual history is a semiologically oriented history of meanings. It draws on the
assumption that meanings do not simply mirror or represent but actually constitute or create the reality experienced by human beings (Toews 1987). In his book *Rethinking Intellectual History*, Dominick LaCapra suggests a renewal of the field around this perspective. After LaCapra questions the distinction between representation and reality, he goes on to suggest reconceptualizing the issue of how to deal with text and context. Both text and context are complex relations of “signifying practices.” In his understanding, the context never “explains” the text in the sense of providing the cause of its effect. At best the connections between them can be interpreted as “intertextual” reading (LaCapra 1983: 117). More recently, Peter Wagner has stated that the linguistic turn—including discourse formations and conceptual history—is the space where intellectual history has begun to meet historical sociology. For Wagner, the effects of this *rapprochement* are yet to be seen, as “intellectual history has effectively challenged a language-unconscious historical sociology, but it has not yet demonstrated what a language-conscious historical sociology could or should look like” (Wagner 2003).

This study does not consider the linguistic turn as the point of intersection between intellectual history and historical sociology. In bridging these two fields, a more classical path is followed: contextualization. Appropriating the history of ideas as the level of analysis, the study carries out a textual analysis without following textualism in an absolutist way (Jay 1993: 158-166), which constantly observes an acknowledgment of the context. Many authors have already emphasized the interdisciplinary or even eclectic nature of intellectual history. As an academic discipline, intellectual history is the field where many major disciplines overlap, most notably political theory, sociology and cultural history. Some others add to the list literary studies, art history, history of sciences or history of economic theory. One crucial difference needs to be emphasized between a political theory-oriented and a sociologically oriented intellectual history. The former, being the major domain of intellectual history,
predominantly deals with the history of normative thinking. Normative thinking includes key questions of political philosophy such as what state is, what justice is, who should govern, what the best form of government is. In the field of political theory, the task for the commentators of the old texts is not limited to analyzing the argumentations of former political philosophers. The task is also to produce some new answers to the old normative questions. Sociologically oriented intellectual history differentiates itself by rejecting to provide answers to normative questions. Occasionally, normative questions and how they were treated can be the subject matter of intellectual history situated within sociology, but such an approach in intellectual history never gives answers to these questions. Having denoted this important distinction, I must also emphasize that both strands in intellectual history, sociology and political theory, share the common ground of dealing with theoretically inspired and informed questions.

If normative thinking is the border line between intellectual history as political theory and intellectual history as sociology, what is the border between other non-normative fields of intellectual history such as between intellectual history as sociology and intellectual history as cultural history? To answer this question, one must point out that the latter’s preoccupation is mostly with circulation of ideas, whereas the former focuses on ideas themselves. Allan Megill (2004) suggests drawing this border line by stating the distinctive feature of intellectual history as its focus on ‘articulate ideas’. In this understanding, “intellectual history focuses on ideas that have some substantial degree of explicit, consciously thought-out and often conceptually inclined development and expression, rather than on beliefs and practices that appear as quasi-natural aspects of the ‘form of life’ of a particular group, or even of an individual.”

The next question concerns the distinction between intellectual history as sociology and intellectual history as history. This line is more difficult to draw than the previous one.
This study tackles this question by emphasizing the framework of “intellectual history as historical sociology.” What follows is how to define the basics of this framework? This is a study of intellectual history as historical sociology, and it argues that historical sociology borrows from political theory the emphasis on contextualization. In the long debate within the political philosophy circles about the text versus the context, Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School are known for their defense and application of an intellectual history privileging the context. Contextualization is first and foremost taking “the more general social and intellectual matrix” (Skinner 1978: x) into consideration. In his seminal article, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” Skinner states that knowledge of the social context of a given text seems at least to offer considerable help in avoiding anachronistic mythologies. According to him, understanding of any idea must lie, at least partially, in grasping what sort of society the given author was writing for and trying to persuade. In his words, “if it is true that the understanding of a text presupposes the capacity to grasp any oblique strategies it may contain, it is again clear that the relevant information ... must at least in part be concerned with the constraints of the given social situation.” (Skinner 1969)

Skinner has been criticized for limiting the context to the linguistic milieu, at the expense of not fully acknowledging non-linguistic features of a given historical context (Levine 2005), most notably class relations and global power structures. By the same token, Ellen Meiksins Wood argues that Skinner’s contextualism has a tendency to over-emphasize the existing vocabularies and to reduce the political life essentially into a language game. She maintains that the “social” matrix of Skinner has little to do with the “society,” the economy, or even the polity. For Wood (2008: 9), Skinner’s history of ideas lacks substantive consideration of agriculture, the aristocracy and peasantry, land distribution and tenure, the
social division of labor, social protest and conflict. These are all valid criticisms and they are guiding the scope of context in this study.

It is true that contextualization is a key component in achieving positioning intellectual history within historical sociology. But at least since Philip Abrams’s book *Historical Sociology* (1994), we know that historical sociology is not something about giving historical work more “social context” nor about the need to give sociological work more of a “historical background.” In this sense, this study understands the context as the context of global hierarchies. The context of global hierarchies made the non-Western geographies the space of subjugation, and the intellectuals of this space had to deal with a series of specific questions. In other words, the context imposed some theoretical difficulties and the ways in which Turkish intellectuals have responded to these theoretical issues is the main point to be explored in this study. All in all, contextualization matters as long as the context determines the intellectual agenda.

To further situate this study within historical sociology, I will refer to the edited volume *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology* (2005) and more specifically to the substantial introduction, written by Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens and Shola Orloff. It is common to state that the main subject of sociology is modernity or modernization. Adams and her colleagues argue that this is even truer for historical sociology: “historical sociologists have offered analyses and narratives of how people and societies became modern or not” (Adams et al. 2005: 2). This study is an example of historical sociology at two different levels. As a reflection of this, there is clear division of labor between Part I and Part II. Part I includes five chapters, focusing on the historical background. The main theme of this part is Ottoman/Turkish modernization situated in the scene of global hierarchies. Thus, Part I discusses questions concerning European expansion and especially how to cluster its different types and how to cluster reactions to them. The history of Turkish modernization,
both in the late Ottoman and early republican periods, is reevaluated in different chapters of Part I. Part II is based on the background established in the first part and it situates four different groups of intellectuals within this general framework, namely the Unionist intellectuals, the Kemalists of the 1930s, the conservative intellectuals, and the left-wing intellectuals.

For Craig Calhoun (2003), historical sociology stands between the idiographic and the nomothetic in both history and sociology. Yet Adams and her colleagues argue that the main preoccupation of historical sociology is with theory: “our main brief is theory: the theoretical issues associated with understanding social and cultural change in the light of the intellectual challenges that beset and entice the present generation of historical sociologist” (Adams et al. 2005: 28). Informed by this argument, this study discusses some major theoretical questions within a specific context by focusing on how the selected Turkish intellectuals dealt with such issues as modernization, universalism, Eurocentrism, identity, and the like. While studying the history of ideas of Turkish intellectuals, I have always kept in mind that the theoretical puzzles with which Turkish intellectuals had to deal were not particular to Turkey. In this sense, this study goes beyond the description of a specific case. Obviously my intention is by no means to draw some law-like generalizations or regularities out of the Turkish case. Another point Adams and her colleagues make is that historical sociology is a primary case of the erosion of boundaries among social theory, scientific method, and historical research. In this sense, historical sociology is a truly interdisciplinary perspective. This is also valid for this study, which is based on an interdisciplinary approach. Adams and her colleagues warn us about the fact that historical sociologists are under attack on two fronts. For mainstream social scientists, the work of historical sociologists is not general or abstract enough. Equally for historians, historical sociology lacks adequate engagement with the particularities of each case, fails to investigate primary documents, sometimes reduces
historiographical debates to generalizations, and might often end up being ungrounded (Adams et al. 2005: 26). While writing this dissertation, it is impossible not to experience similar apprehensions. I am aware of the fact that my work is too detailed for sociologists, and lacks sufficient detailed analysis for historians. Writing about the intellectual history of Turkey in English by targeting an audience larger than the usual followers of area studies literature makes finding the correct balance of details even harder. The only thing I can say is that I do not pretend to be an historian, but if we are to remember E. H. Carr saying “history means interpretation,” (1988: 23) I can only hope that my interpretative work will have some relevance for historians as well. However, obviously my targeted audience is larger, more interdisciplinary and more theoretically minded.

Hitherto, I have listed the three characteristics that make this study a work of historical sociology: that it deals with the process of modernization, replete with the full complexities of adopting a model, partial or full adaptation debates, and a search for recognition; it deals with how Turkish intellectuals tackled a series of theoretical problematics; and it has an interdisciplinary perspective. But I still need to refer to Adams and her colleagues’ map of the state of the art of historical sociology to situate my own work more precisely in the field. They argue that there have been three waves in historical sociology. The members of the first-wave were those who are now canonized as the founding fathers of sociology: Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, as well as less canonical figures such as Georg Simmel and even W. E. B. DuBois. The second-wave, which covers the period of the 1970s and the 1980s, comprises the prominent names of Barrington More, Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol. Adams and her colleagues (2005: 7) list the shared set of commitments of the second-wave historical sociologists as a substantive interest in political economy, class formation, industrialization and revolution. It is argued that the second-wave fails to include colonial peoples (Adams et al. 2005: 8). But, at the same time, the second-
wave is understood as a rejection of Eurocentrism (Adams et al. 2005: 3). As for the third-wave, which emerged in the 1990s and spans to the present, Adams and her colleagues observe that there are different perspectives that go beyond the political-economic structuralism of the second-wave without the emergence of a dominant paradigm.

There are five identifiable groups within the third-wave: the first, institutionalism represents a moderate modification of the second-wave by replacing its Marxian perspective with Weberian themes. The others are rational choice theory, cultural turn, feminist challenges and the scholarship on colonialism and formation of empire (Adams et al. 2005: 32). The fifth group is where this study belongs. Adams and her colleagues maintain that with the fifth group of contemporary historical sociology, sociologists turn their eyes to the world beyond the West. The work of Immanuel Wallerstein, or more generally, the world-system approach is a distinguished example of this perspective. Another trajectory in the fifth group is composed of the studies focusing on the circulation of discourses, categorization, and identification in colonial, imperial and postcolonial settings, most commonly called postcolonial studies. The lines of connection between the colonizer and the colonized are the primary concern of this group of study. This perspective is summarized as “‘Provincializing Europe’ … [as being] the overall intellectual project” (Adams et al. 2005: 60). In brief, this study situates itself somewhere between the world-system approach and the histories of global hierarchies. Adams and her colleagues state that historical sociologists are relatively free of the romantic version of the “agency” of the Other, which is sometimes exaggerated by “its self-appointed academic representatives” (Adams et al. 2005: 62). By following Edward Said, Adams and her colleagues are against re-Orientalizing non-Western societies and selves (Adams et al. 2005: 63).

Edward Said’s books *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism* are the primary sources of inspiration of this study. I need to be more specific about my indebtedness to Said.
This will also help me to be more specific on what do I mean by situating this work between the world-system approach and the histories of global hierarchies. I will start with the definition of global hierarchies. Two defining elements are indispensable to describe global hierarchies: above all, global hierarchies are caused by the macrostructure of global capitalism, which is based on an uneven spatial division of labor. In this sense, global hierarchies include all kinds of formal and informal colonialism, with their varieties including direct rule, unequal treaty system, extraterritorialities, capitulations, gunboat diplomacy, and the like. Second, global hierarchies are about Western claims of cultural superiority of the West, coupled with all kinds of derogatory prejudices about the non-Western peoples. In this sense, it is impossible to disentangle Eurocentrism from global hierarchies. Third, global hierarchies are generally nested both in terms of political domination and in terms of claims for cultural hierarchies and prejudices. The global hierarchies have always functioned with the help of sub-colonialism or sub-imperialism. Moreover, on the scene of global hierarchies it has always been possible to observe expressions of gradated Orientalism, as in a society subjected to Orientalist biases perceiving its neighboring societies (especially the ones on its East) in some sense inferior.

Said’s books and Wallerstein’s world-system analysis are two sources constituting the background of this study, which aims to have a macro level perspective on global hierarchies. Said’s Orientalism coined the term to explain the mentality and the style of thought, assuming an absolute distinction between “the Orient” and “the Occident.” He highlighted that this style of thought has also functioned as “a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1979: 2). Equally importantly, Said’s work emphasized the function of cultural dimension within the global hierarchies, with all superiority claims, biases, and prejudices. In Orientalism, he elaborated how Orientalism first

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2 I thank Judit Bodnár for her innovative support while defining global hierarchies.
justified the Western domination over other geographies (Said 1979: 39). In *Culture and Imperialism*, he pointed out once more the compelling cross-over between culture and imperialism (Said 1994: 6). In this sense, Said’s framework has been very influential for the way this study defines global hierarchies. Moreover, a series of works inspired by Said’s *Orientalism* contributed to the literature by noting the nestedness of Orientalisms and thus global hierarchies (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Todorova 1997).

As already mention above, this study is not about the history of capitalism as such. Nevertheless, Wallerstein’s work is highly relevant for the perspective of this study, as it discusses first and foremost the hierarchy of power relations distributed spatially between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. Wallerstein stated that the key characteristic of the capitalist world-economy has been expansion. He observed the effects of the expansion in two phases: first, incorporation into the world-economy, and second, peripherilization. In this context, the history of the Ottoman Empire is not so much different than the histories of other world-empires with a unified political system. It was first incorporated into and then peripherilized by the world-system. In the world-economy, there is no unified political system; nor is the dominance based on military power alone. Within this structure, the Ottomans could safeguard their nominal independence and could experience their early modernization.

As a historical sociologist taking the point of view of totality seriously (Wallerstein 1979a), Wallerstein does not deny the cultural dimension of the inequalities between the core and the periphery. He is no doubt well aware of the fact that culture has been an ideological battleground in the modern world-system:

The successive expansions that have occurred have been a conscious process, utilizing military, political, and economic pressures of multiple kinds, and of course involving the overcoming of political resistances in the zones into which the geographic expansion was taking place. We call this process “incorporation,” and it too is a complex one. This process points to a second contradiction which
the populations of each successively incorporated zone faced. Should the transformations that were occurring in their zone be conceived of as changes from a local and traditional “culture” to a world-wide modern “culture,” or were these populations rather simply under pressure to give up their “culture” and adopt that of the Western imperialist power or powers? Was it, that is, a case of modernization or of Westernization? (Wallerstein 1990)

These questions formulated by Wallerstein, are the questions imposed to Turkish intellectuals by the context of global hierarchies, and the answers provided by the Turkish intellectuals are thus the main focus of this study. Wallerstein was interested in how these and other related questions, for instance whether to imitate Europe, to reject European thought, or to discover new concepts, were handled in the intellectual agendas of the non-Western geographies (Wallerstein 1979b). Moreover, Wallerstein seems to be in full agreement with Said about the function of culture for the justification of inequalities of the system. In his words, “it is argued that one group is genetically or ‘culturally’ ... inferior to another group in such a way that the group said to be inferior cannot be expected to perform tasks as well as the presumably superior group” (Wallerstein 1990). In this sense, the indebtedness of this study to Wallerstein’s work is not limited to being informed about the structural dimension of the capitalist world-system, but also is to be informed about the issues of cultural claims.

Drawing on the contributions by Said and Wallerstein, this study appropriates the global hierarchies as its background. By situating Turkey within the global hierarchies, this study suggests analyzing and understanding the Turkish intellectual as the intellectual of the space of subjugation. All three defining elements of global hierarchies, namely the uneven power relations within the macrostructure of global capitalism, cultural superiority claims of the West, and the nestedness of hierarchies are the factors which have shaped the space of subjugation. Furthermore, both Said and Wallerstein warn us repeatedly against the pitfalls of culturalist analyses. This is specifically the position of this study, which distances itself from any kind of culturalist, as well as over-postmodernist stands. In the same way, this is a study
of intellectual history within the broader set of colonial histories. If we are to accept C. L. R. James’s *The Black Jacobins* (first published in 1963) as a milestone for colonial histories (Magubane 2005), we do acknowledge that this book is not only about the San Domingo Revolution; it is equally an example of intellectual history of Jacobinism and Toussaint L’Ouverture. Since then, intellectual history has been seen as a way of countering Eurocentric prejudices, reserving the intellectual field to the West. “For generations,” says Chakrabarty (2000: 29), Eurocentrism has argued that “only ‘Europe’ ... is theoretically knowable; all other histories are matters of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton that is substantially ‘Europe.’” The intellectual history of “the rest” has been about demonstrating that theoretical problems and theoretical endeavors have not been monopolized by Europe. The Subaltern Studies Group is a reputable example of colonial histories studies as intellectual history. In this sense, this study aims to contribute to this genre of scholarship.

### 1.3 Existing Perspectives on Turkish Modernization and towards an Alternative

This section reviews the existing approaches to Turkish modernization as a preparatory step towards Part I, where different aspects of the experience are reevaluated. The review starts with the mainstream approaches, namely modernization theory and the Kemalist approach, which are now less powerful. Second, it focuses on the strong state tradition approach. Third, an overview of sociological approaches is presented. And finally, the possibility of an alternative perspective on Turkish modernization is discussed by referring to relational approaches.

In the post-1945 world, modernization theory held a hegemonic position. Mainly being a framework produced in the US, it had the function of determining how to deal with the countries that were not yet modern. The task was two-fold: first, theorizing the non-
modern, and at the same time its development, second, providing—if not imposing—a development model for the (actual or potential) US allies. Modernization theory assumed modernization as a global and an irreversible process that had originated in Europe, but had, since the end of the Second World War, become a process which would take place in a rather uniform and linear way, concerning societies all over the world (Knöbl 2003). Modernization theory always had a special interest in Turkey (Ahıska 2010: 12). It took the Turkish case as a success story and considered the Eurocentric modernization project of Kemalism as a proof of the possibility of a uniform modernity in non-Western geographies. It saw in Kemalism a modernization theory before an academic corpus dealing with it had been formulated. In addition, the success story was achieved in a society with a Muslim population, which made it even more praiseworthy. In this context, it was neither a coincidence nor an arbitrary choice that the seminal book of modernization theory, *Passing of Traditional Society*, reserved considerable space for the Turkish experience, which Lerner highly acclaimed.

The Kemalist interpretation of Turkish modernization appeared within the Turkish mainstream academia as an appendage to official republican ideology. It was highly influenced by the modernization theory. A major reductionism determined the trajectory of the approach: it denied the Ottoman roots of modernization in Turkey, and mostly established the history of Turkey as it started in 1919 with the War of Independence. Two assumptions shaped the general framework of this approach: first, the Kemalist interpretation of modernization argued that Kemalism was a “paradigm of modernization,” restructuring the society and the state based on Western positivism (Kili 2007). Second, the Kemalist interpretation evaluated the history of Turkish modernization as an attempt to change the civilizational identity of a nation. For this view, Kemalism was a retreat from the Eastern world by substituting religious dogmas with a rational, scientific, and realistic approach (Feyzioğlu 1982). Several authors of Kemalist interpretation argued for the originality of
Kemalism, if not uniqueness (such as Ateş 2001). This emphasis on originality was coupled with an attempt to situate Kemalism as the model for all non-Western nations, on their way towards independence and development. The Kemalist interpretation of modernization became the most prodigious one in terms of literature; however, despite its large volume, because of its firm rejection of comparative thinking, it remained parochial and had less and less influence on the new interpretations of Turkish modernization. Nowadays, its main function is to reproduce the writings of Mustafa Kemal and his personal perspective on different issues.

In the early 1980s, another interpretation of Turkish modernization appeared. This interpretation, mostly developed by the political scientist Metin Heper, was the strong state tradition approach. As a representative of the institutionalist approach, Heper synthesized some findings of the Ottoman studies through a peculiar reading of Weber. In his book *The State Tradition in Turkey* (1985), he suggested reading the entire history from the Ottoman Empire to the republican period as a continuum of a strong state tradition. This reading of history assumed the absence of civil society, acknowledging at best a weak one, doomed to be ineffective. His concept “strong state tradition” became very influential in Turkish social sciences and several writers—even who did not share Heper’s perspective—employed the “strong state tradition” by referring to him. For him, it was possible to read Kemalist authoritarianism as an instance of the state tradition. However, he disagreed with the Kemalist reading of modernization experience because he did not see a rupture caused by the republic; the Kemalist era was just another phase of *longue durée* of state tradition, starting with the Ottomans. Heper’s approach had considerable commonalities with modernization theory. Above all, the strong state tradition approach did not consider a vibrant societal realm, and therefore, it reduced the entire political agency to the state. This meant that
whenever there was going to be a reform, this had to be generated by the state elites. This bias overlapped with the elitist characteristics of the modernization theory.

As an institutionalist, Heper took “stateness” as the key concept of his analysis. By stateness he meant “the extent to which the major goals for society are designated and safeguarded by those who represent the state, independent of civil society” (Heper 1985: 5). For the strong state tradition, the history of stateness started with the Ottoman Empire. In his arguments pertaining to the Ottoman period, Heper argued against Orientalist historiography, where the state structure was depicted as a mere personal rule, often called sultanism. Opposed to this way of reading Ottoman history, Heper maintained that the “Ottoman version of raison d’état” did away with personal and arbitrary rule, and implemented a “rule based on carefully delineated norms,” or “enlightened despotism” (1985: 26, 28). These delineated norms corresponded for Heper (1985: 25) to örf-i sultani, or a series of fixed state norms, fabricated through the sultan’s use of customary law, having a considerably secular character. Accordingly, “government was to be based on the measuring rods of ‘necessity’ and ‘reason’ and not on the personal whims of the sultan” (Heper 1992).

Heper concluded that this led to the emergence of a fundamentally state-oriented tradition, formulated independently of civil societal elements. When he analyzed the Ottoman history, Heper observed the absence of a tradition of Ständestaat, the feudal notion of “social contract,” where resolving conflicts through law became habitual. Moreover, “in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, the moderating influence of intermediary structures, namely, an aristocracy and/or an entrepreneurial middle class with political influence, had been absent” (Heper 1985: 117). These series of absences made the state omnipotent, whereas the periphery remained disorganized. As it remained disorganized, “the Turkish periphery could not develop a public interest and emerge as ‘civil-society-as-public’” (Heper 1985: 103). Though the periphery was weak and had an apparent dependency, this did not prevent tension
between the center and the periphery. In effect, Heper saw this ever-present tension as the most distinguishing characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish political culture: “the state elites were sensitive to the crisis of integration, and therefore, were intolerant of the periphery, whilst the periphery, mostly smothered, was, therefore, whenever possible, over-defiant, adding fuel to, thus reinforcing the prejudices of the state elites” (Heper 1985: 16-17).

The work of Metin Heper has been widely criticized (Dinler 2003; Kaya 2005). A major criticism states that “something ‘historical’ is not necessarily continuous” (S. Aydın 1998a). It is true that, historically speaking, it is easy to observe a continuity of statehood since the fourteenth century; however, as it will be discussed in Chapter 4 in detail, one should note that state capacity always varied, most of the time not being very high. Another criticism against Heper is that he accepted the strong state tradition as a factor the consolidation of Turkish democracy. He argued that Turkish political elites should have acted as “wise state elites,” thus becoming incorporated in the state tradition. Thus, he ended up in an ambivalent position where, on the one hand, he observed that the strong state tradition had made the Turkish democracy more fragile, and, on the other hand, he advised that in order to solve the practical problems of the Turkish democracy, politicians should follow state elites and, hence, respect the strong state tradition (Özman and Coşar 2001).

Another way of studying Turkish modernization is through what can be called “sociological perspectives.” This is not a coherent group of scholars and those having this orientation are not only sociologists. Yet, this approach deserves to be referred to as sociological as it privileged the social level in its analysis. It was a challenge—sometimes moderate, sometimes more radical—to both the Kemalist approach and the modernization theory. In time, sociological perspectives became multi-dimensional and developed enough to
include critical approaches having recognizable gender and space dimensions.\(^3\) This study is the heir of this tradition. Since the 1970s, two pillars have been dominant in sociological perspectives on Turkish modernization: the center-periphery approach developed by Şerif Mardin and the works which are directly inspired by the world-system analysis.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the mainstream Turkish social science was predominantly ahistorical. In sociology, most of the scholars were preoccupied with empiricist research agendas. In political science, the main inspiration was derived from legal studies, especially constitutional law. The main focus in Ottoman studies was the Classical Age; hence the important contributions to the field did not cover the late Ottoman Empire. However, the picture started to change to some extent with the publication of a book in 1952, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler* (Political Parties in Turkey). With this book, Tarık Zafer Tunaya focused on the political parties between 1859 and 1952, and showed that the recent history of Turkey did not begin in 1919, as Kemalist propaganda would have it. His detailed analysis proved that there was a lively political life on the heels of 1908. Additionally, this book signaled that the problems of republican Turkey were not very different from those of the late Ottoman period. Tunaya’s book was a call for not reducing the Ottoman history to the Classical Age, as most of the Ottomanist historians of the period were inclined to do. Yet Tunaya’s work had two important deficits: it was purely political history, excluding the social dimension, and it was not based on an interpretative approach.

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\(^3\) To provide a full list of the works dealing with the Turkish modernization in the context of gender is beyond the scope of a footnote, yet the following works, targeting international audience, have a leading position in the literature: Abadan-Unat 1981; Kandiyoti 1987; Özbay 1990; Arat 2000. The same is true for the works on spatial analyses of Turkish modernization; hence, without intending it to be a full list, the following works are worth mentioning: Bozdoğan 2001; Tekeli 2001; Sey 1998; Tükel Yavuz 2000.
In 1962, Şerif Mardin published his first major book *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. In contrast to the general ahistorical social sciences milieu of the period, it was an utterly historical analysis, and as an example of intellectual history, it included a strong social dimension. As a political scientist by training, Mardin was not a follower of the modernization theory, and his work was mostly shaped by the interpretive approach. He then published another book on Young Turks, this time in Turkish (*Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri* of 1964). He never hesitated to incorporate a historical dimension in his analyses, and he evolved into being an historical sociologist, mostly preoccupied with the *longue durée* of Turkish modernization. From the 1970s onwards, Mardin based his analyses of Turkish modernization on the framework of “center-periphery relations,” mostly following the conceptual innovation of Edward Shils. Mardin’s starting point for center-periphery analysis is quite similar to the starting point of Heper in his strong state tradition approach: both Mardin and Heper read the Ottoman-Turkish social formation by assuming the absence of a coherent civil-society, which was observable in the history of the West. Mardin states that

In the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century, these characteristics of multiple confrontation and integration seem to be missing. Rather, the major confrontation was unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery. In addition, the autonomy of peripheral social forces was not more than anything de facto, an important difference from the institutional recognition accorded, for example, to estates in Western Europe… (Mardin 1973)

Through the center-periphery analysis, Mardin (1974) argued that the debate or the social conflict concerning Westernization could not be understood (at least only) as a conflict between the religious order and modernization/secularism, but rather as a conflict between the center and the periphery. By center Mardin meant the ruling elite, the Sublime Porte, the

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4 The primary audience for *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, published by the Princeton University Press, was international social scientists, and English-speaking social scientists in Turkey.
bureaucrats, and wealthy people of the capital. In direct contrast to the center, the periphery referred to the masses. They were also—geographically speaking—in the periphery, in the provinces, or in non-fashionable quarters of Istanbul. For Mardin, the main dimension of the dichotomy was the following: the center had been the tax collector, and the periphery had consisted of taxpayers. Initially, the religious institutions were on the border of the center and the periphery; however, during modernization, due to the secularizing policies of the center, they had moved towards the periphery. The basic aim of center-periphery analysis is not only to analyze the overall dichotomous social structure of the Ottoman Empire but equally to explain the social tension accompanying Westernization.

Mardin evaluates the dynamics of the republican period again within the center-periphery framework. When the schema is applied to the republican era, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the political party of Kemal Atatürk and the political organization of the single-party era, is considered as the “bureaucratic” center. Mardin maintained that the founders of the Republic prioritized strengthening the state, and to this end, they established a political structure dependent on local notables. Once again, the priority was the survival of the state. Strengthening the state meant strengthening the center, and consolidating the party against the periphery. As the members of bureaucracy had little notion of identifying themselves with peasantry, the RPP was unable to establish contact with rural masses. This made the center-periphery dichotomy even more apparent. The Democratic Party (DP), the victor of the first multi-party election, which was held in 1950, is considered by Mardin as the “democratic” periphery. The DP “relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values” (Mardin 1973). For Mardin, the first military coup of the republican period in 1960 was yet another scene of the center-periphery tension, with the early republican order embodied by the army “against those who wanted change.”
Although Mardin’s highly respected position seems unchallenged, recently some criticism of the center-periphery approach has been voiced. One criticism of Mardin’s approach focuses on the question of whether it is possible to draw borders between the center and the periphery. Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008: 183) emphasizes that, contrary to what the classical version assumed, the center and the periphery are no longer sharply dichotomous. Instead, there are peripheries within the center, as well as centers within the periphery. Similarly, Fethi Akıkel (2006) argues that Mardin underestimates the fact that the Islamic-conservative “periphery” is frequently reassured by coordinates close to the center. The question of borders is relevant, too, while thinking about the borders between the state and the society. Menderes Çınar (2006) maintains that Mardin assumes the state-society distinction in its absolute form and understands power as a social reality detached from coercion and conflict. Once the state-society distinction is taken as absolute, it becomes impossible to observe their interactions and interdependences. Another criticism emphasizes the similarities between strong state tradition approach and center-periphery approach; indeed, both Heper and Mardin argued that there was an absence in Turkey of a civil society powerful enough to counterbalance the state power (Güngen and Erten 2005). In this sense, the center-periphery approach shared the basic idea of strong state tradition approach, yet cared more about the periphery, which is able to create tensions.

A third line of criticism of Mardin’s center-periphery approach argues that it overemphasizes the particularities of Turkey and its history, to such an extent that it becomes Orientalist. Suavi Aydın (2006) qualifies the center-periphery approach as Orientalist reductionism, as it does not acknowledge the complexities of the Ottoman history, such as the local dynasties, compromises in the face of the revolts, and non-standardized strategies for centralization, but rather depicts the Porte as a strong center. Yet another line of criticism argues that this approach makes generalizations from what is observed in a specific era. In his
critical notes on the center-periphery approach, Açıkel (2006) stresses that this approach creates an epistemic inertia by perpetuating the tensions of the early republican period. For Açıkel, by functioning through a series of dichotomies, such as “authoritarian state” versus “democratic mass,” or “Kemalist power” versus “Islamic opposition,” the center-periphery analysis fails to understand the complex power networks, which incorporate traditions, as well as diverse social oppositions. The dualism of center-periphery is unsuccessful in deciphering the moments of entanglements, the hybrid forms and placement changes. Açıkel claims that as an analysis focused on religion and secularization process, the center-periphery approach remains silent on the issue of ethnicity.

Mardin’s perspective was highly culturalist in the sense that it did not incorporate any political economic analyses. The political economy dimension was added to sociological perspectives by the slightly younger generation of social scientists, inspired and informed by the world-system analysis. In 1977, Huricihan İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder published their article “Agenda for Ottoman History” in the first issue of Review, the journal of the Fernand Braudel Center at SUNY-Binghamton. This article was the landmark of the Annales School-type social science and of Wallerstein’s neo-Marxism influences on Turkish social sciences (Özel and Çetinkaya 2002). The Marxist Asian mode of production debates as well as Wallerstein’s capitalist world-economy perspective dominated this new pillar of sociological perspective. Wallerstein personally supported this route, collaborating with his Turkish colleagues, co-authoring with them, visiting Turkey, and thinking about how to position the Ottoman Empire within the world-system. Reşat Kasaba and Şevket Pamuk were the social historians following this path. But the paradigmatic example of analyzing Turkish modernization through a global sociological perspective, having been inspired by the world-system approach, is State and Class in Turkey, Çağlar Keyder’s book, published by Verso in 1987. As an interpretive work of history with macro-sociological concerns, State and Class in
Turkey situated Turkey within the development literature, and became highly influential. In State and Class in Turkey, Keyder’s contribution was twofold: first, for the first time, the economic history of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and the republican period was considered as a single unit of analysis. Second, with this analytical framework, he offered a history of social and political tensions among the bureaucratic elite and a burgeoning bourgeoisie. The overall argument of Keyder’s reading of Turkey’s social history was based on the continuity of an unchallenged bureaucracy from the nineteenth to the twentieth century: “The nature of agrarian structure implied that a bureaucracy deriving its power solely from its position in the state structure was unchallenged by a landed class with an autonomous social base” (Keyder 1987: 2).

As I have already mentioned above, the sociological perspectives on the Turkish modernization have been developed partially as a criticism of the mainstream approaches. Comparing the impacts of the two pillars of sociological perspectives on Turkish modernization, it can be seen that since the 1980s, Mardin’s center-periphery approach has become the dominant paradigm, determining the Turkish social sciences agenda and adopted frequently by political analysts. Moreover, works inspired by the world-system analysis have become auxiliary to the center-periphery approach. The major reason why Mardin’s center-periphery approach has become more dominant than analyses having a political-economy dimension is that the center-periphery approach offered a more direct answer to the deficiency of democracy in Turkey. In particular, analyses of the authoritarian secularism of the republican period commonly adopted Mardin’s approach as a background assumption. Having said that, one needs to keep in mind that Mardin’s center-periphery approach and studies inspired by the world-system analysis have some commonalities: the impact of strong state tradition approach is visible in Keyder’s State and Class in Turkey, where the argument is based on the idea of unchallenged state bureaucracy—once more the strong state without
counterbalancing social factors (Dinler 2003). Furthermore, as it has become more influential than the other pillar inspired by the world-system analysis, center-periphery approaches reduced the history of Turkish modernization and the related issues to a crisis of morality—a crisis about coerciveness of social norms, caused by a shift from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*. In understanding the nature of the conflict, Mardin does not refer to European penetration but only mentions “Western ideas,” which were “of no benefit to the man in the street” (1974: 413).

By considering these weaknesses of the center-periphery approach in particular, and sociological perspectives on Turkish modernization in general, I argue that further comments should include the following three points: a) More emphases should be put on the “situatedness” of Turkey within the global hierarchies. In other words, while writing the history of Turkish modernization, European capitalist expansion and struggle against global hierarchies should be incorporated into the analyses as key concepts. In this sense, Turkish modernization and its intellectual problems should be taken into consideration in relation to European penetration, as well as to the West and Westernization, with all its supposed meanings. b) The second point is a derivative of the emphasis on “situatedness”: further analysis should pay more attention to the defects of culturalist perspectives; the emphasis on the situatedness should not lead to a reproduction of the culturalist/Orientalist clichés. c) In re-writing the history of Turkish modernization, the state should not be perceived as the only agent, free-floating in a scene of absences.

When I argue for these three points to be considered in furthering the studies on Turkish modernization, two of them, namely, the emphasis on situatedness and not privileging the state as a detached agent from the society, I draw on the relational approach. In manifesting his call for a relational sociology, Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) states that in relational understanding, agency is not separable from the dynamics of situations. In this
conceptualization, emphasis is on the situatedness of agency within structures, which are also thought of as relational: “agency entails the engagement by actors of different structural environment which both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations.” (Emirbayer 1997) In this framework, this study is about how Turkish intellectuals confronted Eurocentrism and modernity by emphasizing the positionality of Turkey within global hierarchies. In other words, this study argues that the questions and the theoretical problems with which Turkish intellectuals were preoccupied can only be understood through an analysis incorporating the situatedness of Turkey and its intellectuals. This means, first and foremost, an analysis which goes beyond a textual reading and dealing with the context, both in the sense of global hierarchies and intellectual agendas of different localities. This study suggests that only by such a contextual analysis can the historical sociology of Turkish intellectual history be written with all its complexities. In order to conceptualize positionality, Chapter 2 suggests the idea of “space of subjugation” to connote the commonality of intellectual agendas in different contexts, influenced by the Western expansion, and Chapter 3 refines its definition. All in all, this study argues that focusing on the intellectuals as the unit of analysis is one of the ways to go beyond the state-society distinction in rewriting the history of Turkish modernization. The intellectuals, sometimes within the state apparatus, sometimes positioned outside the bureaucracy, but all the time with a certain degree of embeddedness in the society, have a special position in this sense.

1.4 Plan of the Study

The core of this study has two parts. Part I is titled “Theoretical Ambiguities and the Historical Background.” It consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 raises some questions as to how to theorize the subjugation caused by the European capitalist expansion. One of the
questions discussed here is how to cluster subjugations by the West. In order to illustrate the relevance of this question, the chapter refers to the unequal treaty system in the nineteenth century in both the Asian and Ottoman contexts. Another question tackled in Chapter 2 is how to cluster reactions to subjugations by the West. After these two questions on clustering, it deals with nationalism and modernity outside the West, as realms of theoretical ambiguities. Chapter 3 offers some insight that can be used to address the questions of clustering by suggesting two key concepts: space of subjugation and the complex network of informal colonialism. It also contextualizes some concerns of Ottoman intellectuals with respect to European Great Powers within the context of colonial criticism. Chapter 4 is about the question of state agency within global hierarchies. This can be considered as a sub-category of the question of how to cluster subjugation by the West. Put differently, given that the European Great Powers employed various techniques at the operational level of their expansion, what was the space left for the subjugated states? Chapter 4 answers this question by employing the concept of state capacity as an historical sociology abstraction. Chapter 5 presents a general perspective on Turkish nationalism in the late-Ottoman period by focusing on the then main nationalist political party, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The primary aim of this chapter is to comprehend Turkish nationalism as a derivative discourse of the European expansion.

Chapter 6 shifts the focus to the republican period. This chapter contributes to the existing literature with an alternative reading of the republican modernization process by situating historical facts within the framework of Jürgen Habermas’s system integration. The main argument in this chapter is that republican modernization cannot be understood unless its system-integrative dimensions are acknowledged. The chapter maintains that the failure of the Ottoman Empire to survive led the republican elite to establish a system powerful enough to generate its own integration. They were convinced of the indispensability of system
integration at the domestic level in order to resist any systemic threat at the international level. Following a theoretical overview, the chapter continues to shed light on the Kemalist political integration. This section focuses on the establishment of republican symbolism in a context-free language, and on how politics was conceptualized in the single-party era. In addition, the chapter reserves two separate sections for the ethnic integration and the cultural integration, intended and implemented by early republican Kemalism. This chapter’s main contribution to our understanding of the republican history is translating the phrase, often used in the history of Turkish modernization as the primary goal of modernizing elites and intellectuals, “saving the state,” into the terminology of social theory, by conceptualizing it as system integration.

Part II is entitled “Multiplying Trajectories in Turkish Intellectual History.” It consists of four chapters, dealing with two intellectuals in each. Why these eight intellectuals were chosen as the direct focus? The main justification for choosing these eight intellectuals is related to the questions undertaken by them. This study argues that the context of global hierarchies imposed some theoretical difficulties and a series of specific questions to the intellectuals of space of subjugation. The Turkish intellectuals who had a deeper understanding about these questions were included in the scope of this study. In this sense, the extent of their articulateness about their contemplation on these questions determined on whom to focus in this study. Throughout the study, four groups of intellectuals are covered: the Unionists intellectuals, the Kemalist intellectuals of the 1920s and the 1930s, the conservative intellectuals from the 1930s well into the 1950s, and the socialist intellectuals of the 1960s and the 1970s. From each group, two intellectuals are on focus. These two intellectuals were chosen as the most prominent names of a specific political position, or ideology, and they represent two different paths within the group. Sometimes these two intellectuals were the two parties of certain polemics, but not always specifically. They were
the developers and spokespersons of different interpretations or even wings within the same political perspective. In fact, focusing on two intellectuals in each political position enables me to scrutinize different positions and different answers to the key question I discuss throughout this study. Part II starts with Chapter 7, “The Unionist Intellectuals and the West,” focusing on two prominent names within the CUP, Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp. It revisits the works of Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp, as criticisms of the West, an example of admiration for Europe coupled with a search for recognition as an equal partner of the international community. In the successive chapters, the republican intellectuals are discussed with a focus on their emphasis in a similar line. Chapter 8, “The Kemalist Intellectuals and Eurocentrism,” links the efforts of pro-regime intellectuals of the 1920s and the 1930s to the overall discussion by focusing on Celâl Nuri, and Şevket Süreyya. Chapter 9, “The Conservative Intellectuals and Alternative Modernities,” deals with the uneasy synthesis of nationalism, critique of radical modernization, and imperial nostalgia in the context of conservative intellectuals by focusing on Peyami Safa and Mümtaz Turhan. Chapter 10, “The Socialist Intellectuals and Universalism/Particularism,” explores the intellectual dilemmas of the Turkish left by focusing on the leader of the Workers’ Party of Turkey (WPT) Mehmet Ali Aybar, and Doğan Avcıoğlu.

What are the intellectual categories, which these intellectual fall into? Three of them had a serious academic career. Gramsci (1975) emphasized that the popularized traditional type of intellectual is represented by the literary man, the philosopher, the artist. Ziya Gökalp was the first person in Turkey who taught sociology at university level. Mümtaz Turhan, as a psychologist spent his entire career at the university. Mehmet Ali Aybar was an expert on international law and taught at university for many years. Peyami Safa was a novelist, and his novels were as important as his other books and essays. Ziya Gökalp and Şevket Süreyya had some literary products, poems and biographical novels respectively, which were all of
secondary importance in their overall works. Therefore, we have good reasons to consider the
majority of them somewhat closer to the traditional type of intellectuals. As one common
characteristic, they all were highly engaged in politics. With their political engagements and
affiliations, all of them functioned as public intellectuals, wrote for newspapers and popular
journals, and took seriously addressing the masses. Majority of them need to be qualified as
oppositional intellectuals at different stages in their lives. Ahmed Rıza was an opponent of
the Abdülhamid’s regime before the 1908 revolution; Peyami Safa and Mümmtaz Turhan were
wary opponents of the Kemalist establishment, and both Doğan Avcioğlu and Mehmet Ali
Aybar were the important figures in the leftwing politics and intellectual leaders of the
socialist opposition. In line with their political engagements, four of them were members of
the parliament. Ahmed Rıza became a deputy soon after the revolution of 1908. Both Ziya
Gökalp and Celâl Nuri were members of the parliament both in the Ottoman and republican
periods. And as the leader of the WPT, Mehmet Ali Aybar was elected as a deputy twice. In
this sense, these four were legislators, not in the sense suggested by Bauman, but in the first
sense of the word. The proximities of these eight intellectuals to the establishment were
diverse. When he defines what the organic intellectual is, Gramsci (1975: 118) mentions the
example of the specialist in political economy, the organizers of a new culture or of a new
legal system. Obviously, Ahmed Rıza was a respected figure within the Unionist
establishment. Likewise, Ziya Gökalp was a prominent figure and the main ideologue for the
Unionists. As the founding father of Turkish nationalism, there is no doubt that he suggested
creating a new culture and provided a concrete outline for it; hence, he was an organic
intellectual. Celâl Nuri was an organic intellectual for the republican regime, contributing to
drafting the constitution. Şevket Süreyya positioned himself as a specialist in political
economy and with his journal Kadro, he aimed to be influential over the single-party regime,
but his power to shape the intellectual agenda could not last too long. During the Democratic
Party (DP) rule in the 1950s, both Peyami Safa and Mümtaz Turhan were close to the establishment. Chapter 11—Conclusions accentuates more the interdependency between facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity. It also emphasizes that most of the intellectuals included in this study had to assume multiple intellectual roles simultaneously, being rational planner, legislator and being interpreter at the same time due to the necessity of reconciling different universalist positions with the peculiarities of their societies and to the necessity of countering Western prejudices against their culture.
PART I

THEORETICAL AMBIGUITIES AND THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 2 – THE WEST AND THE REST:
THEORIZING SUBJUGATION AND REACTION

This study traces Turkish intellectuals from the late Ottoman Empire until the 1970s. Its main questions are about their understanding of the world order and the place of their country within it: What did Turkish intellectuals understand by the West? What were their aspirations and reservations with respect to Europe? How did they understand modernity and the modernization process of their country? How did they position themselves vis-à-vis Eurocentrism?

Part I aims to offer the theoretical and historical background necessary to explore the answers to these questions. While the next four chapters more specifically deal with the Ottoman/Turkish case, this chapter focuses on questions that can be approached as theoretical problems not specific to the Turkish case. There is no consensus in the social sciences over how to answer these questions, many of which are not studied sufficiently. There are five theoretical questions that are relevant to this study. Four of them are dealt within this chapter and one is discussed in the introduction of the following chapter.

The first theoretical problematic concerns the matter of clustering colonialism. It basically emphasizes the existence and relevance of different types of subjugations to Western capitalist expansion, which forms a network of colonial subjugations. The question of clustering colonialism raises another closely related question about political subjectivity within this network of different types of colonialisms. In the histories of colonialisms, it is commonly argued that Western domination created a world of sharp dichotomies. Several authors of the anti-colonial movement, such as Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon or Albert Memmi, described the colonial world as a Manicheanist world, where grey tones are imperceptible. As long as the histories of Western expansion are written by accepting Manichaeanism as its key characteristic, these analyses inevitably attribute an absolute
victimhood to non-European peoples. However, I argue that emphasizing victimhood is insufficient for understanding the complex network of colonialism and attaining a more detailed understanding of global hierarchies. I suggest that the possibility for agencies within the network of colonialism should be taken into consideration. Once the dualistic view is taken for granted and, hence, the emphasis put on victimhood, all changes in societies wrought by Western expansion are conceived as having an external stimulus. Nevertheless, I argue that there should be a balance between internal and external dynamics in explaining social change in non-Western societies, and therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that external dynamics do not exclude the possibility of agency.

The second question concerns clustering reactions to colonialism. It mainly underlines the commonalities observed in intellectual reactions voiced under different types of colonial subjugations. The third question refers to the issue of nationalism outside the Western context. It asserts that as a reaction to colonialism, nationalism outside the West does not easily fit the classical typologies of nationalism derived from European experiences. The fourth question discussed in this chapter has to do with modernity, modernization and the Eurocentric connotations of these two concepts. It basically raises the issue of how modernity can be conceptualized outside the West: can non-Western modernity be characterized in the same way as the Western one, or is it second-rank modernity by definition?

This chapter addresses these theoretical questions and their relevance for understanding the intellectual history of the late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. It should be noted right away that comprehensive answers to these macro questions fall beyond the scope of this study. They are elaborated here with reference to the Turkish case, to which the theoretical remarks put forward in this chapter are primarily relevant. This does not exclude the possibility that some insights derived from these questions might have some relevance for comparable cases. However, the primary concern here is to emphasize the
relevance of these theoretical problems for Turkish intellectual history. The main argument is that in order to understand Turkish intellectuals, a historical perspective that situates the late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey into the scene of global hierarchies is imperative. Without having a solid historical basis for the relationship of Europe with the rest of the globe, it would not be possible to fully comprehend the intellectual trajectories at the margins of Europe. In other words, the majority of the aforementioned theoretical questions are either related to European expansion or reactions to it. Therefore, both an historical background and more theory-oriented macro-level questions have to be considered at the same time.

2.1 Clustering Subjugations by the West

Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, first published in 1978, brought new perspectives to studies of colonial histories. It is indisputable that with *Orientalism* Said had a great impact and has transformed the name of an academic discipline into a label referring to a specific way of thinking about the East. The timing of *Orientalism* was propitious for such a shift. The post-1945 decolonization process made it possible to denote Orientalism as a body of theory, “an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness” (Said 1994a: 6). Said states that “by the end of World War I, Europe had colonized 85 percent of the earth. To say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable.” (Said 1979: 123) Later on, in *Culture and Imperialism*, he repeats the same percentage by referring to Magdoff (1978: 29, 35) and offers a more nuanced account of the forms of relationships between metropolis and peripheries by listing colonies, protectorates, dependencies, dominions, and commonwealths as possible forms of domination (Said 1994: 8).

[^5]: For the same percentage see (Von Laue 1987: 25).
The massive scale of the European expansion is beyond dispute. Yet, precisely due to this massive scale, there is an uncertainty about how to cluster different forms in which this expansion was experienced. There are three layers to this problem: first, listing different forms of domination between the metropolis and peripheries fails to provide a structural analysis, and does not exhaust different forms of subjugation. Various faces of Western expansion are well documented by employing different sets of concepts; however, there is still need for a more detailed analysis that highlights different practices of expansion, and in relation to this, different experiences of subjugation.

Second, in the histories and analyses of colonialism, there is a conceptual uncertainty about whether to use colonialism or imperialism, with some authors using them interchangeably. At least since Lenin’s *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, there has been an approach defining imperialism as monopoly capitalism and considering it as the highest stage of colonialism. In recent literature, this perspective remains very powerful (see for instance Loomba 1998: 6). However, there is also an alternative perspective. For example Jürgen Osterhammel (1997: 22) conceives colonialism as a specific manifestation of imperialism. While for the stage-based perspective that stems from Lenin’s analysis the definition criterion is formal colonies, the latter perspective considers empires of all kinds since the ancient periods, including the land empires, with formal colonization appearing as a subset of imperial expansion. I believe the confusion stems not from a dispute over vocabulary but rather from the problem of how to cluster colonialism.

The third layer of the problem of clustering colonialism concerns buffer zones. For the most part, existing perspectives exclude different forms of subjugation in their analyses; moreover, they fail to adequately account for the spaces which were neither metropolis nor periphery per se. Put differently, existing literature on colonial histories has been less attentive hitherto about the cases of imprecise areas located between the metropolis and
peripheries. Anthropologist Michael Herzfeld (2002) argues that the processes have been well documented for formal colonies thus far, but that there has been insufficient research dealing with the “buffer zones between the colonized lands and those yet untamed.” Herzfeld conceptualizes these buffer zones as crypto-colonies, where political independence was coupled with massive economic dependence. This conception is an effort to transcend the strict binary, the colonizer and the colonized. A common characteristic underlined to address such cases is an “aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models.” This means that crypto-colonial countries were inclined to “respond to that hierarchy by deploying a world-dominating discourse about ‘culture’ in defense of their perceived national interests and specificity” (Herzfeld 2002). For Herzfeld, Greece and Thailand are the main examples, and he cites Mexico, Japan, the former Yugoslavia as other examples to be possibly placed within the category of crypto-colonialism.

As a reflection of this problem of clustering colonialism, the existing literature on colonial history reproduces itself in a reductionist manner by privileging certain types of colonial histories, with considerably less or even no attention given to other types of colonial power relations. Two main focuses of the existing literature are the British Empire—with a specific emphasis on India, and the other formal colonies, with a specific emphasis on the encounters between the settlers and the locals (Sidaway and Power 2005). This bias in the literature favoring formal colonies results in minimal theoretical debate about the spaces that were not formally occupied, yet subjugated by the imperial powers (McClintock 1992; Sidaway 2000).

These problems related to clustering colonialism make it difficult to situate the late Ottoman Empire and Turkey within global hierarchies. This is mainly because of the geographic position of Turkey, which has been situated on the margins of the West since the nineteenth century, as a buffer zone between the colonized lands and the European
expansionist powers. The Ottoman imperial legacy and the War of Independence waged against European occupiers (1919-1921), which led to the formation of today’s Turkey as a republic, make the picture even more complex. But this complexity itself can be considered as yet another call to deal with the problem of clustering colonialism. And evidently, this is a two-way relationship: dealing with the problem of clustering colonialism helps in understanding the complexities of the Ottoman/Turkish cases, and, by the same token, studying the details of the Turkish case illuminates the theoretical difficulties concerning clustering colonialism.

To underline the complexity of the Ottoman/Turkish case, let me return to Said. He notes that despite the widespread scope of colonialism, the real rivalry between the French and British empires during the “Age of Empire” was mainly for the Near East, and the Islamic geography:

The two greatest empires were the British and the French; allies and partners in some things, in others they were hostile rivals. ... It was the near Orient, the lands of the Arab Near East, where Islam was supposed to define cultural and racial characteristics, that the British and the French encountered each other and “the Orient” with the greatest intensity, familiarity, and complexity. (Said 1979: 41)

This observation makes the absence of the Ottoman/Turkish case in the existing literature on colonial histories, and in Said’s own work, even more interesting because in the heyday of European imperialism, these lands were part of the Ottoman Empire. For Said, this does not constitute an inconsistency. Although in Culture and Imperialism he attempts to write intertwined histories of the overlapping territories, the Ottoman Empire does not seem to him as part of this endeavor. In his perspective, Istanbul’s rule over the Arab world has been neither benign (hence, not approvable) nor any less imperialist (Said, 1994: xxii). This is the point where we should remember the difficulty of classical Orientalist paradigm with respect to the Ottoman Empire. Adopting several culturalist clichés such as “Oriental despotism,” “unchanging nature of the Orient,” or “Oriental spirit,” classical Orientalism assumes that the
history of the Islamic societies had been in continuous decline after the end of a golden age in
the twelfth century. Then the Ottoman Empire appears as an anomaly that challenges this
biased historiography as an independent power reigning over large territories for centuries
(İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1990). While this was the case for classical Orientalism, it is
interesting to note that the critical thinking developed by Said has a similar difficulty with the
Ottoman case. In a sense, Said describes the Ottoman lands as the true scene of Orientalism,
but his analysis does not acknowledge any subjugation for Ottomans, neither at the level of
the state nor people.

Likewise, the Turkish case is totally absent in the postcolonial studies literature
(Ahıska 2010: 185). Apart from Spivak (1993: 269), who says, without going into any detail,
that “Turkey is especially interesting because it is not a case of decolonization, but rather an
obligatory self-de-imperialization,” Turkey does not appear in the literature. While stating
that the Turkish case has not really attracted the attention of postcolonial critics, the
sociologist Meltem Ahıska argues that it is more appropriate to consider Turkey within the
postcolonial context. She argues that “although Turkey does not really fit into a postcolonial
model due to the fact that it was never overtly colonized, we can argue that it constitutes
more or less a proper object for postcolonial criticism...” (Ahıska 2010: 234) What led her to
think of Turkey as being within the sphere of postcolonial criticism is the historical
distinction between the Western “model” and its “copy” (the Turkish copy), or being bound
to be a “copy”, or assuming a “temporal lag” between the model and the copy are not unique
to Turkey, but these are general problems of the postcolonial context. In fact, these issues are
also addressed in postcolonial theories for other countries. Hence, by referring to Bart Moore-
Gilbert, Ahıska suggests a broader scope for postcolonialism, which will be the analysis of
cultural forms, resisting or reflecting upon various forms of relations of domination and
subordination between (or within) nations and cultures, triggered by modern colonialism and imperialism.

Indeed, the absence of the Turkish case in the histories of global hierarchies is rooted in the problem of clustering different types of subjugations by the Western powers. Because histories of colonialism have been one-dimensional, disregarding buffer zones, indeterminate cases have not been included in the literature. Chapter 3 offers a detailed solution to the problem of clustering subjugations. However, at this point, a brief review of the unequal treaty system in Asia and in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century is in order so as to illuminate the relevance of studying different types of subjugation by the Western powers for understanding the social history of the Ottoman Empire.

2.1.1 The unequal treaty system and extraterritorialities in Asia

One immediate remedy to the problem of clustering colonialism in theorizing about and writing the history of global hierarchies is to emphasize the unequal treaty system. Throughout the nineteenth century, this system had been of critical importance for connecting the buffer zones and the centers of the capitalist metropolis. In other words, wherever it was possible to obtain trade privileges without formal colonization, the unequal treaty system was the preferred option for the Western powers. In several instances, trade privileges were coupled with extraterritorialities. Turan Kayaoğlu (2010: 18) highlights that in extraterritorial imperialism, Western states rejected the application of non-Western laws over Western citizens and, claimed the jurisdiction over their citizens in Asian and African states. In his book, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China, to describe this imperial vision Kayaoğlu coins the term “Legal Orientalism,” whereby the European positive law and sovereignty had been established with reference to their opposites. In other words, “European, mostly British, positivist jurists constructed the
idealized European rule of law together with the image of non-European lawlessness.” (Kayaoğlu 2010: 32) Idealized Western law and sovereignty were constructed through the criticism or even the denial of non-Western law and sovereignty. As long as the non-Western societies were portrayed as the zone of lawlessness, the solution was formulated as extraterritoriality in order to protect the rights of the Western subjects, such as merchants and missionaries, traveling to and living in non-Western societies. Kayaoğlu (2010: 34) concludes that extraterritoriality was nothing short of legal imperialism.

Historian Richard S. Horowitz (2004) maintains that relations with the Ottoman Empire—and the related treaties—offered European Great Powers a model for the kind of relations they needed to establish with the Eurasian states. In this sense, he argues, for example, that the trade treaties signed with the Ottoman and Chinese governments are similar to the treaties signed with Siam. “The three bear notable similarities ... All managed to avoid European colonial occupation, but at the cost of humiliating treaties.” (Horowitz 2004) The first Foreign Jurisdiction Act was legislated in 1843 in London. The purpose of the act was to establish the legal basis of extraterritoriality by extending British legal authority into the Ottoman Empire. It reads “by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen has jurisdiction within diverse foreign countries.” The act authorized the British government to exercise its legal authority in the Ottoman territory “in the same and in as amply a manner as if Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the cessation or conquest of territory.” Kayaoğlu (2010: 44) emphasizes that although the Ottoman Empire had not been conquered or colonized, the British government could extend its laws into the Empire as if it had been. He adds that though specifically prepared to justify and organize British jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire, the 1843 Foreign Jurisdiction Act

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6 In defining “Great Power,” I mostly follow Kenneth Waltz’s five-fold criteria, namely “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, (and) political stability and competence” (1979: 131). In this sense, the European Great Powers in the nineteenth century were the British Empire, France, Prussia/Germany, Austria and Russia. If we are to use an international relations’ parlance, the late Ottoman Empire was a medium-sized power, despite its territory, so is modern Turkey (Hale 2000: 1-11).
was then broadened to have a universal reach to secure, justify, and legalize British formal and informal colonialism.

In the Siamese case, the benchmark treaty is the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1855, imposed by Britain. The treaty granted British merchants the right “to trade freely in all seaports of Siam” (Sayre 1928: 70). Bangkok was authorized as a city where foreigners could reside permanently. Equally important, the treaty fixed that “on all articles of import the duties shall be three per cent” (Sayre 1928: 71). Soon after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty was signed, many other European states—including Denmark, Italy, and Austria-Hungary—concluded similar treaties.

In the case of Iran, when early capitulations of the sixteenth century are taken into consideration, there are similarities with the Ottoman case. But when we focus on the Treaty of Turkomanchai of 1828, unlike the British-Ottoman Convention of 1838, which was not imposed by military force, we see that it was a treaty ending a war, and also designed to be a trade agreement. In the early 1810s, the Russian army occupied northern Iran. The Iranian army launched an attack on the Russians in 1826 but failed, and after Iran’s defeat, the Treaty of Turkomanchai was signed in 1828, resulting in new gains for Russia. These include more territory and cash indemnity as war reparation. There had already been some capitulary privileges granted to Russia; the new treaty formalized and made them permanent. “Both extraterritoriality and the fixed low tariff later spread to other Western powers, the key treaty being that with Great Britain in 1841” (Keddie 2006: 41). Similar to the Ottoman case, the European expansion in Iran succeeded in establishing tax immunity for European businessmen at the expense of local traders. A. Lamton (1986) notes that the capitulations were less elaborate in Iran than in the Ottoman Empire, and less burdensome. However, he adds that this legal interventionism granted to foreigners (consular courts, and veto power of consuls) resulted in derogation of sovereignty.
Table 1 – Major Unequal Treaties in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Name of the Treaty</th>
<th>Signing Countries</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1828 Treaty of Turkomanchai</td>
<td>Iran – Russia</td>
<td>Territorial gains to Russia, formalizing the old capitulary privileges, low import tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838 Convention of Baltalimanı</td>
<td>The Ottoman Empire – Britain</td>
<td>Confirmation for existing capitulary privileges, low import tax, British citizens obtained the “most favored” Ottoman subject status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842 Treaty of Nanjing</td>
<td>China – Britain</td>
<td>China opened five ports to Britain, and ceded Hong Kong to Queen Victoria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce</td>
<td>Siam – Britain</td>
<td>Siam opened all sea ports to Britain, with extraterritorial privileges to British subjects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858 Treaty of Tianjin</td>
<td>China – Britain, France, Russia, the US</td>
<td>China opened ten other ports to international trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce</td>
<td>Japan – Britain</td>
<td>Japan opened three ports to British trade with partial residence permit to foreigners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876 Treaty of Kanghwa</td>
<td>Korea – Japan</td>
<td>Korea opened three ports to Japan with authorized extraterritorial rights to Japanese.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The history of unequal treaties in China represents another dimension of the process of European expansion. Possibly, the Chinese case is the best example of how “formal and informal empire are essentially interconnected,” as argued by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953: 6). Furthermore, unequal treaties imposed on China are the best example about how informal colonialism functioned with the support of military intervention and war. The interconnectedness of formal and informal empire is best seen in the India-China-Britain triangular trade, as Immanuel Wallerstein describes in his world-system analysis. Once incorporation of a particular zone was accomplished, the logic of capitalist expansion forced the incorporation of the adjacent zone into the world-economy. After the incorporation of India, China was the new zone where European capitalism would penetrate. Wallerstein informs us that Europe had been a traditional importer of the Chinese tea, with payment being made in silver. When India started supplying tea, the triangular trade was established with the primary goal of substituting silver with something else. The first attempt was to use Indian cotton, which was uneconomical to transport to Europe. According to the initial plan, Indian cotton export to China would eliminate the need to buy Chinese goods with silver. However,
this plan failed due to limited Chinese demand for imported cotton. “The British then found a substitute for cotton—opium, grown in Malwa and Bengal” (Wallerstein 1989: 168).

However, trading drugs was forbidden in China; nevertheless, the British Empire kicked off the opium trade in Canton. Naval weakness and corruption were among the reasons—as Wallerstein notes—for how a forbidden trade could take place in Chinese ports. Another reason was probably the overall state crisis: in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there were several ethnic revolts in China, which had led to a draining of the imperial treasury (Goldstone 1991: 398). Despite these difficulties, the central government decided to implement the opium ban more rigorously in 1836. The British response was the first Opium War of 1840. The war ended with Chinese defeat and, consequently, The Treaty of Nanjing was signed in 1842. Like the British-Ottoman Convention, the Treaty of Nanjing, too, formalized the ongoing international trade. The treaty had two crucial results: it opened five Chinese ports—including Canton and Shanghai—to opium trade; and it ceded Hong Kong to Britain, as a harbor for British traders. Moreover, China was obliged to pay reparation for the opium, which had been confiscated by the Chinese authority. “As a result of these concessions, the foreign communities in the treaty ports developed into autonomous settlements completely removed from the jurisdiction of the government of China” (Davidson and Forster 1988: 333).

The Second Opium War of the 1850s was yet another instance of how informal colonialism functioned as a network. The Great Powers, despite their rivalry in several other contexts, were able to easily form an alliance, fight together, impose treaties and make profits collectively out of the extended privileges. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Nanjing, Britain started making further demands on China, including the opening of all Chinese territory to British trade, broader legalization for opium trade, and an embassy in Beijing. Britain and France joined their navies for the war. The Anglo-French troops entered Beijing in October
1860; France occupied Tientsin in 1860, and hung onto the city for three years, together with foreign concessions (Fitzgerald 1979: 443). The Treaty of Tianjin was signed in 1858. Russia and the United States were on the side of Anglo-French coalition. The treaty granted these four states the right to establish embassies in Beijing, opened ten other Chinese ports to international trade, and authorized the rights of foreigners (including traders and missioners) to travel in the inner part of the country. China was also forced to pay war repartition to the triumphant states. China did not become formally colonized land, but after Nanjing, Tientsin and succeeding treaties, Chinese subjugation by the Western imperial powers had eventually become almost absolute.

To some small extent, its survival had been assisted by the American ‘open door’ policy, directed towards the maintenance of equality of commercial opportunity for the nationals of all the powers. But, fundamentally, it had maintained its nominal independence because none of the powers was willing to press its demands to the point at which it might have found itself at war with its rivals. (Davidson and Forster 1988: 334)

2.1.2 The unequal treaty system and extraterritorialities in the nineteenth-century

Ottoman Empire

Although the Convention of Baltalimanı of 1838 has a negative reputation as the benchmark of European economic penetration into the Ottoman sphere, the European trade privileges did not start in the nineteenth century. The Porte granted the first proper capitulation, as commercial privileges, to France as early as 1569. From the sixteenth century on, several other capitulations were granted to different European states. But until the late eighteenth century, the diplomacy between the Porte and the European states regarding free trade had been established on an egalitarian basis, even though most of the treaties were not bilateral. Edhem Eldem (2006: 284) rejects the argument about Ottoman passivity with respect to the capitulations from the sixteenth century onwards. He notes that although the capitulations
evolved “into full-fledged domination of a quasi-colonial type,” positions were equal at the beginning. For Eldem, the primary aim of the Port in granting capitulations to the promotion of the development of the East-West trade. Halil İnalcık (1986: 1179) also underlines the advantages expected by the Ottoman state from granting capitulations to European powers: financial interests, finding political allies within Christendom, and increasing customs revenues. In the egalitarian phase of the capitulations, the privileges authorized by one sultan would be valid until the end of his reign, and was subject to the renewal of his successor.

However, in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of Baltalimanı in 1838, the positions of the two parties were anything but equal. For the Porte, the crisis of Mehmed Ali⁷ was not over yet, which made the Ottomans still dependent on foreign support. This crisis situation was a perfect opportunity for Britain to press for a trade treaty. The resulting convention guaranteed all existing capitulary privileges. It fixed the custom duties to three percent on imports and to nine percent on exports. In İnalcık’s words,

…the English obtained the abolition of the old limitations on their freedom of movement within the Empire and of the monopolies in internal trade they were to enjoy the status of the ‘most favoured’ Ottoman subjects, and could both export and also sell freely within the Empire the goods which they bought. (İnalcık 1986: 1187)

The Convention of 1838 was renewed in 1861 for Britain, and in the meantime, other Great Powers also succeeded in acquiring similar privileges as a result of a network-like informal colonialist policy. Following these treaties, European states obtained different extraterritorial rights. The main privilege was tax exemption for their traders. Moreover, sizable Ottoman nationals (mostly Christians) received the status of protégé, and thus entered the realm of

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⁷ Mehmed Ali Pasha, or Muhammad Ali of Egypt, was the Ottoman vassal to Cairo from 1805 to 1848. He is mostly considered as the first modernizing ruler of Egypt. He organized several military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, and in early 1830s, his troops even reached Kütahya, a city in the Western Anatolia. Sultan Mahmud II was helpless against his nominal vassal, and the European powers encouraged parties for a solution in May 1833, known as the Convention of Kütahya. Egyptian forces withdrew from Anatolia. Mehmed Ali was granted Crete and the Hijaz, together with governorship of Syria, as compensation. The crisis of Mehmed Ali was an unqualified indicator of the vanishing strength of the Porte.
extraterritoriality. “By the mid-nineteenth century these protégés numbered in the million and constituted the primary activity of foreign courts in the Ottoman realm” (Horowitz 2004).

It is very common to see the Convention of 1838 as the hallmark of Ottoman political and economic subordination to Western Europe. In Chapter 10 (“The Socialist Intellectuals and Universalism/Particularism”), I discuss in more detail the leftwing interpretation of this convention. However, in order not to fall into the trap of one-sided, victimhood discourse, further comments are essential. First, the Convention acknowledged or formalized the British-Ottoman trade in its already existing form, rather than creating a new pattern (Quataert 1996: 825). Second, with the Convention, the Porte secured an alliance with Britain (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 50), which would soon become vital during the Crimean War in 1853-1856. Moreover, it is common to refer to the Convention as the reason for the sudden collapse of the Ottoman manufacturing sectors. However, as Halil Berktay (1988) warns us that it is more reasonable to expect that every opening would lead first to an increase in the trade and production volume, and then to a decrease in the production volume.

When analyzing the Ottoman subjugation by the Western powers, it needs to be noted that unequal treaties and extraterritorialities were one side of the coin, the other side being territorial losses. In several instances of territorial losses—if not in all of them—international balance of power was part of the picture. The long nineteenth century started for the Ottoman Empire with the Greek independence (1829), and the loss of Algeria, which was then an Ottoman province, to France. In the former case, the Western powers were influential at a diplomatic level, whereas in the latter one, a Western power was the direct occupier. The Ottomanist Donald Quataert observes a general pattern in the territorial losses in the Balkans through independence of nations: “Often a revolt would meet success or the Russians would drive very deep into the southern Balkans. But then a troubled international community, fearful of Ottoman disintegration or Russian success, would convene a gathering, undo the
worst results but allow some losses to ensue.” (Quataert 2000: 57) In 1829, with the Treaty of Edirne, both the independence of Greece and the autonomy of Serbia were undersigned. As it will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the Crimean War of the mid-nineteenth century was another example of the model about the influence of Russian aggression and European diplomacy. The Crimean War did not cause any territorial loss for the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time it showed the Porte’s inability to protect its own territory without the support of Western powers. Major territorial losses were caused by the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. In the aftermath of this war, as a result of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania became independent states. At the turn of the twentieth century, Libya, Macedonia, and Albania were still within the Ottoman territory, and Bosnia and Bulgaria were nominally under Ottoman sovereignty. All of these provinces and autonomous zones were lost before the outbreak of the World War I.

The Ottoman Empire, Iran, China and Siam were not the only Asian states subject to an unequal treaty system. In this sense, Japan had an ambivalent and changing status, too, throughout the nineteenth century. In 1850s the European Great Powers could impose unequal treaties on Japan. But the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed Japan’s metamorphosis into a regional power, able to impose an unequal treaty on Korea. Thanks to this dramatic transformation, in 1899 Japan was the first state to end the extraterritorialities on its territory. In each country, capitulations, unequal treaties and extraterritorialities fuelled severe reactions at official, popular and intellectual levels. With the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman government declared the capitulations abolished in 1914. But their mutual abolition was guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which ended the War of Independence launched by the national resistance movement. The abolition of extraterritorialities was an issue for Siam as well. Thongchai Winichakul (1994: 94) informs us that Siam gave four Malay states to Britain in 1909 in exchange for the limited concession
of British extraterritoriality. Siam could achieve its full abolition in 1925. Iran succeeded in abolishing the capitulations, after a series of legal reforms, in 1928. China had to wait until 1943, when it could abolish the extraterritorialities during World War II.

2.2 Clustering Reactions to Subjugations by the West

In her article “Western Rule Versus Western Values: Suggestions for Comparative Study of Asian Intellectual History” (1959), Nikki Keddie deals with the question of how to establish a comparative framework for the intellectual history of Asia. She offers a hypothesis to serve as the basis for this task:

In countries without direct colonial experience but with extended contact with the West intellectual leaders have tended increasingly to drop traditional values and adopt Western values. In colonial countries, however, an early trend toward identification with the West has been reversed by many thinkers and met by a reaffirmation of modified tradition. (Keddie 1959: 80-1)

In this sense, Keddie suggests “the colonial-non-colonial distinction” as the key criterion for her framework. Accordingly, India, Indonesia and the Arab countries are the colonial countries whereas China, Turkey, and Iran are the countries of the second group. If we paraphrase Keddie’s distinction, it corresponds to the distinction between formal colonization and subjugation by other means. The logic of Keddie’s hypothesis is as follows: formal colonialism leads to neo-traditionalism; and other forms of subjugation leads to enforcement of Western ideas and their relatively uncritical adaptation. The historical reason for this difference is that in the formal colonial context, the West and its ideology appear as the oppressor and traditions become an alternative to this oppression. In countries with the experience of other ways of subjugation, in contrast, traditional rulers appear as the oppressors while Westernization emerges as the alternative to the traditional authority. Consequently, she argues that in countries where formal colonization was absent, “gradualism was associated with traditionalism and radical nationalism was westernizing”
(Keddie 1959: 85). Conversely, in direct colonies where the Western government was the main enemy, progressive nationalists were more inclined to traditionalism.

Keddie lists four possible objections to her hypothesis. The first is that traditional attitudes, rather than the colonial-non-colonial divide, can be seen as the most important determinant of a country’s reaction to the West. That is to say, the fact that the dominant cultural tradition of a particular country has been more religious than others, for example, an alternative religious–non-religious divide can be more illuminating in explaining different reactions to Western domination. A possible second objection is that “intellectuals in both colonial and non-colonial countries have appealed to past traditions” (Keddie 1959: 93), which maintains that the difference that the colonial–non-colonial divide emphasizes and tries to explain is in fact not very relevant. The third possible objection asserts that traditional trends coexist with the calls for comprehensive Westernization in all Asian countries. And the last possible objection reminds us that rather than direct colonial rules, internal threats—such as ethnic divides—have strengthened traditionalism in some Asian countries.

I take the objections mentioned by Keddie more seriously than her initial hypothesis. In other words, I argue that the objections listed above, which underline similarities rather than differences between various experiences of Western domination, are more relevant to comprehending the intellectual histories of subjugated countries than any explanation based on the colonial–non-colonial classification. The colonial-non-colonial divide can be relevant to understanding the differences at the policy level, rather than for categorizing intellectual agendas. In this sense, I argue that the intellectual dilemmas in the countries subjugated by means other than formal colonization were not that dissimilar to the intellectual agendas of countries with the history of formal colonial experience. Hence, I suggest using “spaces of subjugation” as an inclusive concept, encapsulating all experiences of being subjugated by both formal and informal colonialism. In the following section, the commonalities of
intellectual agendas in both formally colonized and informally subjugated countries are emphasized and discussed within the framework of spaces of subjugation.

2.2.1 Spaces of subjugation and the commonality of intellectual agendas

Spaces of subjugation is an inclusive concept, one encapsulating the experience of being subjugated by either formal or informal colonialism. In each space of subjugation, there appears a common intellectual dilemma, not easy to solve. Following Lila Abu-Lughod (1998), this dilemma can be summarized in one question: “how might one become modern when one was not, could not be, or did not want to be Western?” In effect, a series of dichotomies, including “partial adaptation versus total borrowing,” “nativism versus universalism” and “religious politics versus secularism” have dominated the intellectual discourses in different spaces of subjugation. This points to the fact that the issue goes beyond the formal-informal colonization distinction. In other words, the intellectual dilemmas and answers given to them in various different spaces of subjugation can be approached as grounded on a much more common terrain than the formal-informal colonization distinction suggests. This can be seen in the intersecting experiences of several different spaces of subjugation.

In the Subcontinent context, Keddie observes neo-traditionalism as the dominant intellectual position in the political domain. When we remember the secularist dimension of Indian politics, one might question this claim. But perhaps more importantly for our discussion is the fact that there has always been a discussion amongst Indian intellectuals on whether partial adaptation or a wholesale modernization should be chosen. While it is true that a traditionalist position has always existed in mainstream Indian politics, this does not mean that there have been “unalloyed modernist” Indian intellectuals as well (Chatterjee 2001). Furthermore, the Indian search for a modernization that was not to be equivalent to
Westernization was by no means unique to India. In China, for example, throughout informal colonialism, some intellectuals argued that China had to adopt Western technology in order to cope with the superiority of the West. Some others used the slogan “combining Western function with Chinese substance.” Still others defended wholesale Westernization (Wei-ming 1991: 113). Hence, to recall Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000) metaphor, “imaginary waiting room of history” was big enough to include several spaces of subjugation. Likewise, in intellectual debates occurring in various countries, the search for recognition brought the common agenda of “catching-up with the West,” as well as the necessity to tackle the concepts of linear time and progress. Chakrabarty indicates that the key theoretical difficulty in the Indian context is the issue of appropriating the West as the model, which also has practical implications. All in all, this study argues that the same difficulty is valid for the Turkish case. Each chapter in Part II is concerned with a different intellectual position dealing with this question.

Needless to mention, I do not use “spaces of subjugation” as a concept limited to Asia. Obviously, intellectuals dealing with different contexts, such as the Black Atlantic or North Africa, have faced similar problems. In different milieus of spaces of subjugation, people have encountered parochial dimensions of universal ideas, and have had trouble clarifying their own positions. In other words, they have had to reconcile different universalist positions with the peculiarities of their societies. In this endeavor, almost no one has been exempt from the risk of nativism. While defining nativism, I follow Syed Farid Alatas, for whom nativism refers to the search for “essences” of the cultures, putting the emphasis on differences and absolute oppositions between Western and non-Western cultures. Nativism might appear as a wholesale rejection of Western thought, by substituting it with an indigenous one, or alternatively it might appear as “the tendency to uphold and perpetuate the superiority of Western cultural and political system” (Alatas 1993). Culturalist
stands that search for a national essence have always been coupled with searches for recognition. Nonetheless, for several intellectuals, nativism has not been a calm niche, with which to be content. In fact, they have always felt the tension between nativism and universalism. In this sense, the double consciousness, which Paul Gilroy (1993) observes in the context of Black Atlantic is also relevant for the other cases of spaces of subjugation.

By the same token, my usage of spaces of subjugation is inspired by Walter Mignolo’s emphasis on the common characteristics of different subaltern knowledges. For Mignolo, post-Occidentalism refers to a subaltern knowledge, challenging the colonial modernity and the colonial difference, rooted in South America. Postcolonialism refers to the cultural critics raised in the former lands of British Empire; and post-Orientalism refers “to criticism of the coloniality of power on and from local histories of what is today the Middle East” (Mignolo 2000: 92). Although these three sets of knowledge were shaped in different local histories, Mignolo maintains that they all challenge the Eurocentric imagination of the world. This is the reason why I argue that the critique of Eurocentrism, as it was articulated by Turkish intellectuals, can be fully comprehended, only if it is situated within the spaces of subjugation.

There is no case of space of subjugation, where one cannot observe a debate between the defenders of wholesale Westernization and intellectuals with a nativist standpoint. For instance, Iran has known for various kinds of nativism in its intellectual circles. Even Keddie accepts that Iran appears to be a fuzzy case for her hypothesis. She admits that although Iran was never a formal colony, and therefore is expected to follow a modernist stand, “Iranian intellectual life has not been characterized by as thorough-going a Westernization as that of modern Japan, China and Turkey” (Keddie, 1959: 83). In the same line with this observation, Mehrzad Boroujerdi summarizes the intellectual history of Iran as “the tormented triumph of nativism.” Boroujerdi, however, also notes that some Iranian intellectuals advocated imitative
Westernization and modernism, either entirely or selectively (1996: 176). In an essay of 1920, Hasan Taqizadeh provides an interesting example for such a stand and formulates a threefold guideline for Iran to modernize herself:

First, the adaptation and promotion, without condition or reservation, of European civilization, absolute submission to Europe, and the assimilation of the culture, customs, practices, sciences, arts, life, and the whole attitude of Europe, without any exception save language; and the putting aside of every kind of self-satisfaction, and such senseless objections as arise from a mistaken, or, as we prefer to call it, a false patriotism… (quoted in Mirsepassi 2000: 54)

The clash of wholesale Westernization and nativism has been a definitive characteristic for the majority of the spaces of subjugation. Similar discussions in Turkey constitute the primary focus of this study. Different chapters will discuss different political positions, namely Kemalism, conservatism and the Turkish left, and the debates between them. In these discussions, I hope to show the striking similarities between the arguments of Turkish intellectuals and intellectuals from other spaces of subjugation, such as an almost one-to-one reappearance of Taqizadeh’s suggestion for Iran in the discourse of a Kemalist pushing for an uncompromising Westernist path for Turkey.

Besides intra-country debates, inconsistencies and ambivalences, that is, the uncertainties in the journey of a particular intellectual, will also receive utmost attention in the rest of this study. In other words, each chapter of Part II will show how the intellectuals in Turkey, who otherwise adopted different perspectives, tried to balance emphasizing the particularities of their society, history and culture, and accentuating the similarities of their society with other cases. I argue that although each group of intellectuals employed different reference sets, such as national unity, national independence, democracy, class politics, or cultural imperialism, and even though they develop different approaches, they had common
macro questions, which led them to intersect at a certain level. This is the level that is impossible to comprehend without referring to spaces of subjugation.

So far, I have listed mimicry, catching-up with the West, searching for authenticity, and search for recognition as main characteristics of spaces of subjugation. But there is also another central item on the intellectual agenda of spaces of subjugation: nationalism. While talking about spaces of subjugation, one should never fail to recognize that colonialism—whether formal or informal—created considerable nationalist reaction to Western hegemony. For instance, in post-monarchy China, the struggle for the abolition of unequal treaties significantly contributed to the emergence of Chinese nationalism (Wang 2003). Transformed into a symbol of subjugation, unequal treaties linked the contemporary problems of Chinese society to global hierarchies at the level of popular consciousness. The efforts of Treaty Cancellation Movement challenged the international position of China, and by doing so, aimed at internal unification. This unification was secured through the alliance of Nationalists and Communists (GMD-CCP) (Fung 1987). There was extensive participation in mass protests, strikes, and boycotts of British trade, and at the discursive level, the popular nationalist movement succeeded in equating informal colonialism with “threat,” “slavery” and “misery.” Almost during the same period, in the Turkish context as well, nationalism was on the rise. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the political agent of the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, was built on this new nationalist wave. Hence, Turkish nationalism is the focus of Chapter 5.

2.3 Nationalism Outside the West: a Derivative discourse

2.3.1 Theoretical ambiguity

Juan Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti (2002) argue that theories of nationalism have at least one difficulty when applied to the Middle East. The modernist theory of nationalism, as in the
case of Ernest Gellner, explains the rise of nationalism by referring to a shift in the mode of production, i.e., the transition to capitalism. Then the question is to understand nationalisms that emerge in the absence of industrial capitalism. Cole and Kandiyoti state that in the Middle East, many societies were mainly agrarian, depending on large-scale cash-cropping for the world market, a case some call “agrarian capitalism,” when the first nationalist-like movements emerged. They add that agrarian capitalism “cannot be made to perform the work Gellner wanted his transition-to-industrial-society theory to perform, insofar as it clearly does not affect kin ties” (Cole and Kandiyoti 2002). This is only one dimension of the difficulty. Another dimension is noted by Edmund Burke, III. Burke (1998) asserts that European observers were slow to accept the fact that nationalism exists in the Middle East. At this point, the burden is, once more, on Orientalism. If we are to follow Edward Said, the Orientalist distinction assumption reserves the means of political subjectivity to the Europeans. Being Western means being active and being Oriental is connoted by passivity and the lack of political activism. This is where Cole and Kandiyoti insert the challenge of European imperialism into the picture.

Cole and Kandiyoti maintain that so far, most of the discussions on the post-colonial condition have centered on South Asia, and it is time to restart the debate by considering the very different cases of the Middle East, as well as, of Central Asia, which have been subjected to capitalist colonialism. For Cole and Kandiyoti, “it matters whether a nationalism developed in a powerful metropole or under anti-imperialist or post-colonial conditions.” At this point, the question is not about whether we should have a two-fold categorization for nationalism (metropolis versus colonial), or add a third category for the Middle East or other spaces of subjugation, that is, “anti-imperialist nationalism.” The matter is to establish the connections, or more precisely, one-way causal relations between the European expansion and nationalism in the Middle East or in other space of subjugations. This causality has been
established hitherto only at the superficial level. For instance, one can read a monograph entitled *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism* (Marlowe 1961). Nevertheless, such case studies do not solve theoretical ambiguities as long as they do not establish the causal link between imperialism and nationalism of the subjugated people.

Alongside this theoretical ambiguity, there are some problems making the historiography of the Middle Eastern nationalism even more complicated. The first one, at the general level, concerns the peculiar path nationalism followed in the Middle East in its period of ascent. The reaction to European expansion in the region first took shape as pan-Islamism. In his seminal book, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Şerif Mardin (1962: 60) informs us that around the 1860s, more and more civil servants of Istanbul began asserting that it “was the time for the Ottoman Empire to escape the tutelage of the Western Powers,” and that according to these people, particularly the key intellectual group of the time, the Young Ottomans, the means through which the Empire could be freed from its inferior position was Pan-Islamism. Namik Kemal, a prominent Young Ottoman, used the phrase “unity of Islam” (İttihat-ı İslâm) to push for a stand against Western penetration. In the same way, Nikki Keddie (1969) reads the rise of Pan-Islam as “an indigenous reaction against growing Western encroachments and conquest, and in this it is analogous to nationalist movements in colonial or subjugated countries.” In her reading of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afgani of Iran, the intellectual star of pan-Islam, Keddie sees a will to resist foreign encroachments, appearing as proto-nationalism. She states that Afgani saw Islam as an effective common ground of solidarity against the Europeans. In Keddie’s reading of Afgani, we see that, beyond the issue of Islam as a tool of resistance, the dilemmas faced by Afgani were similar to the intellectual difficulties of other spaces of subjugation. Consequently, the birth of nationalism in a form entangled with pan-Islam made the picture of the Middle East more difficult to decipher.
When we look at the specific case of Turkish nationalism and the CUP, there is another difficulty. The opposition against Abdülhamid’s despotism\(^8\) did not start as a Turkish nationalist movement as such. On the contrary, the émigré opposition was always careful to demand reforms for all the communities of the empire, Muslim and non-Muslim, Turk and non-Turk alike. In fact, the members of the CUP in Paris in particular were representing the ethnic and religious diversity of the empire themselves. In the summer of 1908, when all communities celebrated the arrival of liberté, this was by no means the liberty of Turks. Hence, while thinking about the nationalism of the CUP, it is necessary to keep in mind that it was not a nationalist movement or organization in origin. Rather, it evolved into a nationalist movement only over time. What makes the picture even more complex is that throughout this evolution, the leaders of the CUP continued their support for pan-Islam (Landau 1994: 86-94).

In short, by acknowledging such complexities of the history, it is imperative to remember the political agency of people who encountered European expansion in the form of formal or informal colonialism. Burke makes a strong call to remember this agency, nationalism, together with its causal connection to European expansion.

I’d like to argue, at a deeper level still, that as products of the European Enlightenment orientalism and nationalism are deeply imbricated in one another in ways hitherto largely unsuspected. Thus, for example, orientalists revalorize and systematize the indigenous pasts of Asia. As an Enlightenment discourse, one can note, orientalism assumes a world of ethnic nations, while in observing non-Western societies, it pre-marks their ethnic fault lines, tracing in advance the borders along which new lines of cleavage would emerge and new identities would blossom. Nationalism, like orientalism, is imbued with the idea of progress, accepts the idea that human history unfolds according to stages, and

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\(^8\) Abdülhamid II was the Ottoman sultan from 1876 to 1909. Soon after his accession to the throne, he declared the constitution, and hence, the opening of the first Ottoman parliament. The first constitutional period was unable to last very long, as Abdülhamid suspended the constitution and closed down the parliament in February 1878. The rest of his reign is mostly referred to as the era of despotism (*istibdad*). In this period, potential or real dissidents were closely monitored by the secret police service of the Palace. There was also severe censorship on the press. The memoires of the era tell that Abdülhamid’s despotism also interfered in personal lives, reporting almost all the routine of the high-officials, elites and intellectuals to the Sultan directly.
regards non-modern traits as survivals from an earlier age. Indeed, nationalists are inside-out orientalists, who revalorize what orientalists perceived as lacking. Thus, orientalism, in effect, summons nationalism into existence. Also we can note that orientalism’s critique of religion was adopted by nationalists, who sought to portray themselves as secular, in opposition to the retrograde forces of religion. (Burke 1998)

Following Burke, this study makes even a stronger call to establish the causal connection between European imperialism and nationalism, and argues that theories of nationalism produced in the “classical” geographies of colonial encounter have relevance for understanding the nationalism appeared in spaces of subjugation. In this context, the relevance of the work of Partha Chatterjee, a theorist of nationalism mostly dealing with the Indian case—a space of subjugation par excellence, to the Turkish case is worth discussing.

2.3.2 Nationalism: contradictoriness and derivation

Political scientist Ayşe Kadioğlu (1998) considers Chatterjee’s perspective on nationalism relevant to dealing with the paradox or contradictoriness of nationalist thought in Turkey. Kadioğlu refers to Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, where Chatterjee says, “there is … an inherent contradictoriness in nationalist thinking, because it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power nationalist thought seeks to repudiate.” The contradictoriness is directly related to the fact that nationalism in the colonial context is a derivative discourse, driven by the European power network. But since she sees Turkey less related to the colonial context than I suggest in this study, Kadioğlu focuses her reading of Chatterjee on the distinction of Western nationalism (supposedly civic model, attributed to the French case) and Eastern nationalism (romantic premises, emphasis on ethnicity, with its paradigmatic example of German nationalism). This distinction helps Kadioğlu to show the paradox of Turkish nationalism: “it contained elements of both a cosmopolitan French nationalism and an
organic, anti-Western and anti-enlightenment German nationalism. This paradoxical synthesis ... posed the national question in the Turkish context as an insoluble problem...” Consequently, Kadıoğlu argues that Chatterjee, pointing out the dilemma about coexistence of “Westernizing” and narodnik tendencies and suggesting the paradox of genuine modernism coupled with local culture, is helpful while rethinking the Turkish case.

I do not take issue with Kadıoğlu’s interpretation drawing on Chatterjee. On the contrary, I suggest to further the relevance of Chatterjee’s thought in order to comprehend Turkish nationalism. I argue that what he says about “anticolonial nationalism” (Chatterjee 1994: 5) is relevant for geographies subjugated by both formal and informal colonialism, and has the potential to transcend theoretical ambiguities concerning non-European nationalisms. For Chatterjee, anticolonial nationalism had two addressees, the people and the colonial power. Nationalism’s primary target was the colonial claim, the basis of political domination. The colonial claim was that “the backward people were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world” (Chatterjee 1993: 30). Nationalism, by denying the inferiority of subjugated people, proved the falsity of the colonial claim. At the same time, it asserted that a backward nation could modernize itself by maintaining its cultural identity.

Therefore, the main premise of Chatterjee emphasizes that anticolonial nationalism targeting the colonial domination is a derivation of its target. Two points are to be made: first, being a derivate discourse does not mean being a negation. It is a positive discourse seeking to replace the colonial power by national power. In this sense, it is a search and will towards political subjectivity. In the colonial context, nationalism constitutes itself through its struggle against colonial rule, and in this constitutive struggle it borrows from its rival; for instance, “nationalist thought accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on
the distinction between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’” (Chatterjee 1993: 38). The acceptance of an essential cultural difference between the East and the West is especially important for the moment of departure of nationalist thought. Second, the relation between nationalist discourse and the Western power structure is not a simple relation of correspondence, or a mechanical derivation. As long as it is a search and will for subjectivity, it is a vivid—even endless—discussion process about what to take from the West. Hence, the borrowing from the West “is deliberately and necessarily selective” (Chatterjee 1993: 41). Additionally, Chatterjee states that the nationalist bourgeoisie is a crucial dimension of anticolonial nationalism. Accordingly, the nationalist bourgeoisie always has the tendency to search for relatively independent capitalist development.

In short, nationalist thought constitutes itself by challenging the “rule of colonial difference,” or alternatively, attempting “to erase the marks of colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1993: 26). Here, the rule of colonial difference means “representing the ‘other’ as inferior and radically different, and, hence, incorrigibly inferior.” Chatterjee talks about the knowledge of backwardness. But this is not the (only) reason why his perspective on nationalism is relevant for spaces of subjugation. His perspective is relevant because the rule of difference was not only based on race, but also on culture. “Race was perhaps the most obvious mark of colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1994: 20), yet the cultural difference assumed to exist between the colonizer and the colonized was also important to establishing the rule of colonial difference (Chatterjee 1994: 26). In cases of informal colonialism, nationalisms had to fight against the colonizer’s claims of superiority while challenging their dominations.

Also inspired by Chatterjee, Arif Dirlik summarizes the interconnectedness of colonialism and nationalism as follows: “Nationalism itself … is a version of colonialism in

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9 This point is also emphasized by Burke. He states that Orientalism and nationalism are deeply interconnected and the works of Orientalist scholars “were often appropriated by nationalist in order to legitimate their claims about the Volk” (Burke 1998).
the suppression and appropriation of local identities for a national identity. All identity, historically speaking, is a product of one or another form of colonialism…” (Dirlik 2002)\textsuperscript{10} This study argues for the interconnectedness of the Unionist nationalism—the primary locus of Turkish nationalism—to the European expansion. Chapter 5 is about how Unionists developed a reaction to the pressure posed by informal colonialism. First, the focus will be on the economic sphere, and then on large-scale Turkification of the population in Anatolia. The latter, in particular, will illustrate that nationalism is a version of colonialism, employing similar perceptions and techniques.

\textbf{2.4 Modernity Outside the West: The Ambiguity of Modernization Theory}

So far, this chapter has introduced a general discussion of how to understand Western expansion, with specific reference to the problems of clustering. However, while theorizing the subjugations emerging as a result of the capitalist expansion of the West, there is another important component that has to be incorporated into the framework. This is basically the problem of modernity outside the West. This is a theoretical problem, because in its historical origin, “modernity represents a powerful claim to singularity” (Cooper 2005: 113). This claim to singularity includes certain egalitarian tones, not only among individuals but also among different states, nations and cultures. However, as it is also the case for the egalitarian claims at the individual level, the egalitarian claims at the inter-state level turned out to be trivial since the age of Enlightenment. As Chakrabarty (2000: 4) puts it, “The European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice.” While non-European peoples encountered modernity throughout the process of \textit{mission civilisatrice}, they faced a theoretical problem: the discourse of modernity, supported by philosophy, humanism,

\textsuperscript{10} Together with Chatterjee, another source of inspiration for Dirlik is Eugen Weber, and his \textit{Peasants into Frenchmen}. 
scientific revolution, technological advances and the army, imposed sameness, while at the same time stating that being the same is impossible. The imposition of the Western expansion taught non-European people that they have to become Western, although being totally Western is impossible. The same was true for being modern. Eurocentric imagination of modernity reserved “the most modern” title to European, and therefore allowed for non-European peoples a modernity of the second rank, a less modern modernity by definition.

Eurocentric modernity assumed a temporal gap between the European modernity and the non-European one. Accordingly, the European modernity was positioned as the model to be followed by the others with an indispensable time deferral. Therefore, every non-European modernity is in fact a result of “belated modernization.” Gregory Jusdanis defines “belated modernization” as social and political transformations on the peripheral countries of Europe; an experiment on the margins. This includes the construction of a modern state apparatus, replacing ethnoreligious identities with a national culture, and harmonizing local loyalties and linguistic variations. According to Jusdanis, “all such projects after the Netherlands, England, and France are belated” (1991: xiv). The key feature of “belated modernization,” according to Judanis, is as follows:

Belated modernization, especially in nonwestern societies, necessarily remains ‘incomplete’ not because it deviates from the supposedly correct path but because it cannot culminate in a faithful duplication of the western prototype. … Hence, ‘incomplete’ attempts to catch up with the West are followed by calls for a new phase of modernization. (Jusdanis 1991: xiii)

For Chakrabarty, the temporal gap between the European modernity and other modernities is a result of “the politics of historicism.” In its simple form, the politics of historicism means “first in the West, and then elsewhere.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 6) According to Chakrabarty, this historicism enabled European domination of the world in the nineteenth century. “Historicism is what made modernity,” and whenever the colonial expansion met a
challenge based on an egalitarian claim, “not yet of historicism” (Chakrabarty 2000: 8) was ready as a counter-argument and practice. The “not yet” mentioned by Chakrabarty is mostly about the colonial discourse in the Subcontinent, but it is also commonly observed in other spaces of subjugation and in the ways the Western Great Powers have established their relations with spaces of subjugation. The twentieth century version of the “first in the West, and then elsewhere” formula was systematized by the advocates of modernization theory, mainly in the United States, in the second half of twentieth century.

Modernization theory constitutes the theoretical framework of how the West establishes its relations with the rest of the world, with considerable practical intent. The abovementioned ambiguity was present in modernization theory as well: what would modernity outside the West be like, or, would it be possible to have an equally modern modernity in other parts of the globe? By following the politics of historicism, modernization theory reproduced the distinction assumption between the West and the rest.

It would not be farfetched to argue that modernization theory emerged as an academic response to the US quest for international hegemony in post-1945 period. With the beginning of Cold War, American social science circles engaged in close cooperation with the government in the defense of the “Free World.” The borders of this so-called “free world” were seemingly contingent, yet they were large enough to include countries on the margins, or even outside of the “modern West.” In this context, modernization theory offered an answer to the question of how to deal with the countries that are not modern yet. The task was two-fold: first, to theorize the non-modern, and at the same time its underdevelopment, second, providing—if not imposing—a development model for (actual or potential) US allies. Initially, modernization theory offered an abstract model about the difference of non-modern societies. The theoretical background was based on Talcott Parsons’ structural-functionalism, Weber’s ideas about occidental rationality and occidental rationalization, and the crude
dichotomy between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as formulated by Tönnies. Thus, it implied a sharp opposition between tradition and modernity.

During the peak of the Cold War, modernization theory was totally blind to social conflicts, in general, and class-based analyses, in particular. Accordingly, the difference of non-modern societies was perceived as follows: industrial societies are characterized by rational, universalistic and functionally specific value orientation and role structures; in contrast, non-industrial societies are characterized by non-rational, particularistic and functionally diffuse values and roles. Yet modernization theory was optimistic about the possibility of change and progress: economic growth would sooner or later completely change non-industrial societies and thus bring forward the same cultural and social patterns observed in the industrial West. In this sense, modernization theory emphasized a series of social indicators, such as urbanization, literacy, mass media, voting, as key factors determining the level of modernization. From the late 1950s onwards, the classical examples of modernization theory began to appear: *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* by Daniel Lerner (1958), *Political Man* by Seymour Lipset (1959), *The Stages of Economic Growth* by Walt Rostow (1960). A latecomer classic was *Political Stability in Changing Societies* by Samuel P. Huntington, in 1968.

Sociologist Wolfgang Knöbl (2003) offers a good summary of the main assumptions of the modernization theory. Modernization theory assumed modernization as a global and irreversible process, originating in Europe; but since the end of the Second World War, it has become a process concerning societies all over the world. An important constituent of modernization theory was its emphasis on secularism. The “West” was understood as a predominately secular civilization, where individualistic and scientific values and corresponding role clusters dominate social norms. Knöbl maintains that modernization theory understood modernization mainly as an endogenously driven process to be localized
within societies that should be regarded as coherent wholes. Last but not least, Knöbl adds that modernization theory comprehended social change towards modernity in different societies as a process, which would take place in a rather uniform and linear way.

An immediate question that challenges modernization theory appears at this point: is there not an inconsistency in perceiving modernization as an endogenous driven process to be localized, and simultaneously assuming that it will be a uniform and linear process? This question captures the weakest point of the modernization theory. The advocates of the modernization theory insist on approaching modernization as an endogenous process for two reasons: Modernization of non-Western societies did not start in the post-1945 period, but much earlier, mostly through the encounter with European expansion. But since modernization theory did not incorporate any awareness of conflict, at either the domestic or international level, proponents chose not to read the history of global hierarchies as the history of “conflicts leading to modernization.” Second, within the framework of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, it was more appropriate to talk about endogenous change in order to have a politically correct inauguration of US-centered developmentalism.

Another challenge to modernization theory is the question of difference: Within this understanding of modernity as a uniform endeavor, is there a space for differences? Edward Shils replies this question affirmatively. Shils states that the democratic structures in non-Western countries would be different from the Western ones. The difference is justified by the elitist dimension of modernization theory. If modernity is to be achieved, the requirement was elite mobilization. In this sense, modernization theory reduces the endogenous stimulus for modernization to elites’ voluntarism, always at the cost of neglecting social dynamics. Accordingly, Shils (1966) states that “the zealous effort of modernization, the doubts and ambivalences of the elites about political democracy, and the narrow radius of public opinion, all push in the same direction of a greater concentration of authority than political democracy.
would countenance.” Shils proposes a more authoritative political structure for developing countries than political democracy, because the institutions of public opinion and the civil order do not seem qualified to carry the burden that a proper political democracy would impose on them.\footnote{Along the same lines, Dankwart Rustow and Robert Ward (1964a) maintain that their definition of modernization does not imply democracy or representative government.} In brief, he suggests “tutelary democracy” for developing countries; a democracy *bon pour l’Orient*. In this sense, modernization theory perpetuates the distinction between the “developed” and “developing” countries, and it makes explicit that it does not take universalism as its premise, despite its emphasis on uniformity. Perpetuating the distinction was also the position of the modernization theory with respect to Turkey. As Ahiska (2010: 12) has noted “even the modernization theories that have celebrated the Turkish development nevertheless imply an inevitable failure in the long run.”

As other theoretical issues mentioned in the previous sections, the issue of modernity outside the West is crucial while studying Turkish intellectual history. The ambiguity of being modern in a non-European space was not only a problem for the European; it was even a more important problem of the non-European intellectuals. Intellectuals in the spaces of subjugation were well aware of the fact that modernity’s claim to singularity offers some egalitarian perspectives while jeopardizing their claim to identity. Moreover, they also realized the limits of this claim, mostly bounded to Eurocentric claim to superiority. As in other spaces of subjugation, these were the main items for intellectual agenda of Turkey.

### 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter exposed different questions concerning the Western colonial expansion, the subjugations created by this expansion, reactions to subjugations and spreading of nationalism and modernity. Throughout the chapter, theoretical ambiguities about these questions are emphasized and some fresh insights are offered about how to overcome these
theoretical difficulties. The following chapters in Part I offer more detailed answers to these questions. Chapter 3 offers a more complete discussion about the problem of clustering subjugation of the West. Chapter 4 deals with question of political subjectivity while being subjugated by the European expansion. The problem of nationalism outside the West is revisited in Chapter 5 as part of the discussion on the birth of Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism is also a major theme in Chapter 6, which is reserved for republican modernization. Chapter 6 also offers a more detailed analysis about the question of “being modern outside the West,” with specific reference to early republican Turkey.

This being the plan for the rest of Part I, this chapter has some important conclusions about the commonality of intellectual agendas in different space of subjugations. The massive scale of Western expansion is indisputable, and obviously, it had different characteristics in different contexts. However, despite these differences of forms of subjugation, encountering the Western expansion led to similar intellectual agendas in different geographies. The primary item of these agendas was how to deal with Western modernity? Several other questions were included in the discussion: whether to choose comprehensive Westernization or a partial adaptation; how to define the mimicry; and whether it is possible to become an equal member of the modern world, among others. For non-European intellectuals, the fact that their modernity was doomed to be incomplete or second-rank was a source of anxiety. All in all, in different spaces of subjugation, a non-European intellectual’s journey was shaped by the dichotomy between universalism and particularism. This was also the case for the intellectual history of Turkey. For some intellectuals—or circles—the pendulum swung towards universalism; for the others to the opposite direction, in favor of particularism. The swings of the pendulum between universalism and particularism in Turkish intellectual history are analyzed in four chapters in Part II.
CHAPTER 3 – THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS SPACE OF SUBJUGATION:
INFORMAL COLONIALISM, INTELLECTUALS AND COLONIAL CRITICISM

In Chapter 2, several problems concerning how to study the global scene of hierarchies were delineated. In this chapter, two of them are taken into account and more inclusive perspectives on how to overcome them are offered. The first problem is about how to cluster different faces of Western expansion. Chapter 2 already indicated informal colonialism as a concept which should have a role in more comprehensive analyses of global hierarchies. This chapter develops a more inclusive definition of informal colonialism and discusses how to employ the concept to see the peculiarities of the late Ottoman Empire. The second problem undertaken in this chapter is how to cluster reactions to Western expansion. Chapter 2 already introduced the concept “space of subjugation” to connote the commonality of intellectual agendas in different contexts influenced by the Western expansion. This chapter aims at contributing a sound definition for space of subjugation. This study argues that for a better understanding of Turkish intellectual history, it necessary to acknowledge the subjugation of Ottoman Empire by informal colonialism, the anti-imperialist fight of Turkish republicanism and the difficulties of experiencing modernization on the margin of Europe. In this sense, this study might be read as an attempt to rethink Turkish intellectual history within spaces of subjugation. In other words, it argues that without situating Turkish intellectual history within the spaces of subjugation, neither Turkish intellectuals’ criticism towards Europe and its imperialism nor their position vis-à-vis the modernization of their own society can be comprehended in its entirety.

The first and foremost reason to locate Turkey within spaces of subjugation is the occupation of Anatolia and Istanbul by the Entente troops at the end of World War I and the successive War for Independence. The triumphant states imposed a peace treaty (the Treaty
of Sèvres) on the Ottoman Sultan, partitioning Anatolia into zones, each under the control of different state that fought on the Allies’ side. British troops occupied Istanbul and controlled the Straits. Greek troops occupied Izmir and almost the whole of western Anatolia. French troops occupied southeast Anatolia, while the Italians’ share was the southern shores. The War of Independence lasted three years, from 1919 to 1922, and in 1923, the republic was declared in the new capital, Ankara. The success of the resistance was noteworthy. It was not only a shift from sultanate to republic, but also a concrete resistance to European Great Powers. The Kemalist regime incorporated a certain anti-imperialist tone to its official discourse. It was a success generated by the joint efforts of regular troops and locally organized militia-type groups. This made it possible to write the official history of the War of Independence, around the theme, “a people fighting against imperialism.”

There was a considerable amount of interest in the Turkish War of Independence in different colonies, ranging from North Africa to Southeast Asia. One reason for the sympathy was probably the following: Their colonizers had come to occupy the vestiges of the Ottoman Empire, and a single nation had been struggling against them. The other reason was related to Islam. The sultan was the caliphate of all Muslims and, at that time, the largest Muslim population was not in the Ottoman Empire but in India. While some Indian Muslim intellectuals, for instance Muhammad Iqbal, considered Mustafa Kemal a hero (Rahman 1984, F. Ahmad 1987), a sizeable number of Indian Muslims joined the Khilafat Movement. The movement did more than publicly protest British policy; it organized very crucial financial support for the Ankara government (Özcan 1997; Qureshi 1999). The events in Turkey were not remarkable only for the Muslim Indians. The Entente occupation of the Ottoman Empire, which left the Arab provinces to colonial mandates, and the Treaty of Sèvres, which imposed the partition of Anatolia, were significant for Mahatma Gandhi, who was on his way to challenging the British Empire (R. Gandhi 2007: 222-225). The Khilafat
Movement gave Gandhi the fortunate opportunity to showcase Hindu-Muslim unity and integrate the Muslim masses into the non-cooperation movement. He called for the total boycott of the British government and urged the collection of money for Ankara. In one of his essays on *Young India*, he wrote, “When it is incontestably proved that Britain seeks to destroy Turkey, India’s only choice must be independence. The duty of the Hindus is no less clear. We should try our best to save Turkey from destruction” (quoted in Sinha 1994: 104). There are similar accounts in the North African colonies (Georgeon 1987; Perkins 1996; El Mansour 1996). Probably, by taking all these into consideration, the sociologist Salman Sayyid indicates the centrality of Turkey within the Muslim world in the early twentieth century. He suggests using Kemalism “as a metaphor to describe the various Muslim regimes that emerged following decolonization” (2003: 52).

Although the resistance to the imperialist Entente occupation is crucial to understanding Turkey’s position within the spaces of subjugation, this chapter deals primarily with the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and its subjugation to the European Great Powers. The effect of the Entente occupation will be discussed mostly in Chapter 7 with a specific reference to Ahmed Rıza’s *The Moral Bankruptcy of Western Policy towards the East*. Why would it be more appropriate to discuss the late Ottoman Empire period first rather than the War of Independence? The answer is that the occupation and the successive war of resistance are directly connected to the Ottoman subjugation, and they cannot be understood without discussing the level of subjugation, in a longer durée perspective. Saying that the Ottoman Empire is the constitutive other of the republic is almost a truism. In this sense, I argue that the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire by the complex network of informal colonialism shaped the intellectual agenda in Turkey throughout the republican period. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of the position of the Ottoman Empire in global
hierarchies will illustrate why some items are privileged in Turkish intellectual agenda and what theoretical/intellectual difficulties needed to be resolved.

The first section reviews a number of existing answers on how to re-study the late Ottoman Empire using insights derived from colonial studies. The “borrowed colonialism” approach is the main focus of this section. Then, in the second and third sections, different ways of defining informal colonialism are discussed by focusing on the Gallagher-Robinson thesis and world-system analysis, respectively. These two sections also present preliminary perspectives on how the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire occurred. More on this subjugation is discussed in the fourth section. Section four defines the complex network of informal colonialism and relates the subjugation of the Ottoman state to this network-type power relation. The fifth—the final section—argues for a shift from the perspective based on a state-level analysis to intellectual-level one. It incorporates a brief discussion on how the subjugation at the state level shaped the personal encounters of Ottoman intellectuals with the West, both in terms of Western ideas and personal visits to Europe. This section also situates intellectual reactions to subjugation within the context of colonial criticism.

3.1 The “Borrowed Colonialism” Approach

Recent works on Ottoman studies have been relatively more influenced by interdisciplinary perspectives; within this context, some have aimed at re-thinking the Ottoman Empire using notions derived from the global colonial histories. There are mainly two ways to position the late Ottoman Empire on the map of colonial hierarchies. The first is to analyze nineteenth-century-Ottoman centre-periphery relations, especially the policies of the Sublime Porte towards the Arab provinces as a type of colonialism, similar to European colonialism. In his work on the relationship of Ottoman studies and the postcolonial debate, the Ottoman historian Selim Deringil is representative of this perspective, by conceptualizing it as
“borrowed colonialism.” For Deringil (2003: 341), “the Ottoman state was never a colony. In order to avoid becoming a colony and to stake a legitimate claim to existence in an increasingly hostile world, the Ottomans decided that they had to become like the enemy—to borrow his tools, so to speak.” In the Age of Empire, the West had imposed a subaltern role to the Ottomans, and they generated the creation of their own subalterns as a survival tactic. In this sense, Deringil argues that it is possible to talk about the Ottoman “mission civilizatrice,” aiming at regulating the nomadic Arab population so as to make them visible, thus facilitating the imposition of the state bureaucracy, tax collection system and military recruitment. He also adds that the regulative attempts were supported by a colonial discourse appearing in official memorandums. This discourse depicted the locals as “living in a state of nomadism and savagery” and talked about the necessity to “gradually include them in the circle of civilization,” or the Ottoman administration had to have “civilization and progress brought to them.”

During the Hamidian era, in province of Trablus Garb (Tripoli), modern symbols such as the promenade or clock tower were introduced to public spaces. There were plans to establish fire brigades, telegraph lines, and roads, and, for instance the justification for omnibus was the necessity “to demonstrate the fruits of civilization” to locals. All these led Deringil to think of the “project of modernity” in provinces as a “colonial project.” Reforms in the provinces of Hicaz and Yemen, and particularly the attempts for the “construction of government buildings and military establishments which would reflect the glory of the state” (Deringil 2003: 327) are to be evaluated in a similar way. Once Ottoman diplomacy internalized the “borrowed colonialism,” it did not hesitate to participate in the 1884 Berlin Africa Conference, where the spheres of influence in the continent were negotiated, because the Porte has also possessions in Africa (Deringil 1998a: 172). Another Ottomanist, Edhem
Eldem, seems to agree with connecting the late Ottoman Empire and the map of colonialism in this way. Eldem says that, following crucial steps of disintegration of the empire,

…within its remaining territories, the Ottoman state began imitating western colonial empires. The state consolidated the homogeneity of the core region – i.e. the Anatolian peninsula and the eastern regions of Thrace – along a proto-nationalist line even as it gradually pushed the periphery – principally the Arab provinces – into a colonial status (as long as it did not attract the attention and appetite of the European states in their own race for colonies) (Eldem 1999: 200).

Writing the history of the late Ottoman Empire by putting it in the position of a colonialist power was an approach with which historians of the Arab lands were not unfamiliar. For instance in his article “Ottoman Orientalism,” Ussama Makdisi (2002a) extends Said’s analysis of Orientalism by looking at how the Ottomans represented their own Arab periphery, in the context of the Mount Lebanon region. According to Makdisi, Ottoman reformers aimed at Ottomanizing the Arab provinces. For this reason, Ottoman modernization perceived a temporal gap between the capital Istanbul and Arab provinces, and then attempted to reduce this gap through better territorial integration of the state through a telegraph system, railways, and imperial monuments. Within this framework, which Makdisi calls Ottoman Orientalism, Ottoman modernization generated its discursive opposite in the sands of Arabia, the cities of Syria, and Mount Lebanon. While the Sublime Porte and its capital were the symbol of modernity and “stream of time,” the peripheries were the “pre-modern” within the empire. For instance, the “Mountain of the Druzes” (Cebe-i Dürüz) was coded as a turbulent, dangerous place. The central authorities had a respect for the Arabs thanks to their association with Islam, but still sought to discipline their provinces. In this sense, efforts to secure the territorial integrity overlapped with those to catch-up with Europe. This led Ottoman imperialism, for Makdisi (2002b), to become a project struggling against both internal and external forces. In Makdisi’s perspective, the project of reform overlapped
with violence. For him, Ottoman imperialism perceived physical and symbolic violence as integral elements of reform, modernization and stability.\textsuperscript{12}

One should also note that the historians who talk about Ottoman colonialism emphasize the differences between the Ottoman colonial vision and European colonialism, as well. For Deringil, the most obvious distinction was that in the Ottoman context, the rulers and rules were of the same religion, and the title of Caliphate was the basic source of legitimacy for Ottoman sultans. Deringil stresses that for the local elites of Arab provinces, inclusion in the elite circles was not an issue, “they were the Ottoman elite; ... Istanbul was their city.” More importantly, after the loss of Libya to Italy in 1912, the Syrian notables started to worry because the Ottoman Empire was no longer able to protect them against “real” colonialism (Deringil 2003: 341).\textsuperscript{13} Some European observers noted that in Syria, “France was not recognized as being a legitimate overlord as the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire had been” (Deringil 1998a: 175). On the same account, Thomas Kühn (2003), who re-writes the history of Yemen as a borderland Ottoman colony, remarks that the difference between European colonialism and “colonial Ottomanism” was not only the absence of the race discourse in the latter; in addition, the distinction of metropolis citizens versus colonial subjects did not exist in the Ottoman context. During both constitutional periods (1876-78 and then 1908-1918) Yemen sent deputies to the parliament.

In fact, the writers who prefer the Ottoman colonialism argument take seriously the imperialist/colonialist pressure on the Ottoman state, and they almost unanimously maintain the imitative colonialism as an attempt to counter this pressure, as an element of “Ottoman image management.” For instance, according to Deringil, “the Ottoman elite understood ... well that their world was exposed to mortal danger from within as from without” (1998a: 3);

\textsuperscript{12} An emphasis on the Ottoman colonization may be observed in the Balkan historiographies, for instance see (Todorova, 1997: 174; Zhelyazkova, 2002). But in the Balkans, Ottoman colonization is referred to within the context of the early conquests, during or even before the Classical period of the empire, much before the modernizing reforms.

\textsuperscript{13} For the same point, see (F. Ahmad 1969: 153).
but the reforms of the Ottoman bureaucracy were restricted by “lack of financial resources, and interference on the part of foreign powers, two increasingly overlapping phenomena” (1998a: 11).

3.2 Informal Colonialism: the Gallagher-Robinson Thesis

As it has already been stated, focusing on “borrowed colonialism” is not the only way to position the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire on the map of colonial hierarchies. This study suggests an alternative path, namely, to consider the late Ottoman Empire as a space of subjugation. The pressure on the Ottoman state might be understood as long as the change in colonialism is taken into consideration. Put differently, in the heyday of colonial rivalry, the European powers started to employ different strategies simultaneously. According to Jürgen Osterhammel, as of the mid-nineteenth century, the colonialist powers had realized the excessive cost of direct colonial rule and envisioned informal colonialism. Besides excessive cost, there were two other reasons for the rise of informal colonialism: first, it had become more and more difficult to find new geographies for settler-type colonialism; second, the latecomer countries to the race of colonialism lacked sufficient naval forces to initiate overseas expansion (Ortaylı 1981: 5). Informal colonialism basically involved getting politically independent states, by means of diplomatic pressure, military threats and selective naval interventions, to open their markets to the products of colonial industries and to guarantee foreign property by law. For Osterhammel, the position of Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis Great Britain first, and then Germany, was an example of “informal colony” (2000: 19). Osterhammel’s argument coincides with that of some economic historians of the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire. For instance, Roger Owen (1981: 191-192) emphasizes that “unlike the cases of Egypt and Tunis, Ottoman bankruptcy in the 1870s did not lead to foreign occupation;” but the result was a system of international financial control, which meant “an
equivalent loss of sovereignty.” Here Owen refers to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA), effective on 1881, which aimed both to safeguard the regular deposit of Ottoman debt and open up the Ottoman economy to further European economic penetration. The PDA meant considerable sacrifice for the sovereignty of the Porte—as it will be discussed in Chapter 4.

What is informal colonialism? Although, they did not coin the term, it is common to see the article by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson “The Imperialism of Free Trade” (1953), as the first sound formulation of informal colonialism. Gallagher and Robinson developed their argument within a wider perspective on Africa in their books *Africa and the Victorians* (1968). Since then, the Gallagher-Robinson thesis has dominated a certain genre of imperial history, and simultaneously, it has been widely criticized (for instance, MacDonagh 1962; Stokes 1969; Platt 1973) and particularly revised by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins (1980). When the overall Gallagher-Robinson thesis is taken into consideration, I entirely agree that it is Eurocentric, as Stuart Jones (1985) put forward. The Gallagher-Robinson thesis tries to challenge the Hobson-Lenin thesis by arguing that the primary reason for British expansion was not an internal one concerning British society—i.e., any domestic crisis of capitalism; and that, instead, it was ethnic division in Africa that necessitated the colonial venture. Having offered this alternative and polemical reading for the scramble for Africa, the Gallagher-Robinson attempts to detach the economic dimension from colonial expansion by saying that “although imperialism is a function of economic expansion, it is not a necessary function” (Gallagher and Robinson 1953: 6). To put it differently, it perceived economic motives only as an afterthought (Stokes, 1969: 287).

There is no question that this is a Eurocentric way of reading all colonial history, one which has an overwhelmingly revisionist and apologetic tone. However, some insights “The Imperialism of Free Trade” had about informal colonialism are still useful for a critical
history of colonialism. In this sense, Oliver MacDonagh’s (1962) criticism that their
definition is not sufficiently exclusive, seems disputable. There are at least three significant
points made by Gallagher and Robinson. The first, which is the main one, is that British
expansion was a multifaceted process and that “formal and informal empire are essentially
interconnected” (1953: 6). In the mid-nineteenth century, the mercantilist techniques of
formal empire in India and informal techniques of free trade used in South America had the
same purpose. Both techniques included extending the pattern of overseas trade, investment,
migration, and culture. Second, they state that while creating satellite economies, informal
colonialism encouraged stable governments, in order to reduce any kind of investment risks.
Third, they indicate treaties of free trade and friendship imposed upon weaker states as key
elements of the process:

The treaties with Persia of 1836 and 1857, the Turkish treaties of 1838 and 1861, the Japanese
treaty of 1858, the favors extracted from Zanzibar, Siam and Morocco, the hundreds of anti-slavery
treaties signed with crosses by African chiefs—all these treaties enabled the British government to
carry forward trade with these regions. (Gallagher and Robinson 1953: 11)

This general framework of informal colonialism is not necessarily a subunit of the
(notorious) Gallagher-Robinson thesis, but it is rather illuminating as part of an inclusive
history of global hierarchies. In addition, it must be noted that there are considerable parallels
between such an approach to informal colonialism and the world-system approach in
analyzing the European expansions to India, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and
West Africa as a simultaneous processes having “substantial similarities” (Wallerstein 1989:
129). On this account, drawing on later contributions to the literature, further defining
characteristics of informal colonialism are as follows. First, there were two pillars of informal
colonialism: international free trade and extraterritoriality. These were the two main
objectives for most of the unequal treaties. Extraterritoriality was basically immunity of
foreign nationals under the national jurisdiction system, a special legal regime assigning the foreign-controlled consular courts as the authorized institution in case of legal conflict. Obviously, it was a serious limitation for the territorial sovereignty of the undersigned country. Second, geographically speaking, informal colonialism functioned fairly widely, including South America, most of the Middle East, together with important access points in South East Asia (Cain and Hopkins, 1980). Third, it was a mechanism supported by military power, and whenever it was needed, military intervention was at the service of the informal colonial network. Moreover, there are convincing reasons not to consider informal colonialism as something specifically British. It would probably not be far-fetched to say that it was a British invention; nevertheless, once it became part of the apparatus through which global hierarchies in the nineteenth century functioned, it became available for other colonial powers as well. In various cases, records show that the British were the first to secure an open door treaty, which rapidly became a blueprint for others.

Robin Winks suggests understanding informal colonialism as a more rational mechanism than formal empire. Here “more rational” primarily refers to cost efficiency. Winks specifies three factors leading to informal colonialism: the technology gap; the intermediation need of colonialism (colonial sub-imperialism); and big-power conflict amongst colonial powers. Obviously, all three reasons were not present for each and every case, but while thinking about colonial histories it is necessary to keep in mind that “the major powers often found an informal system of control more desirable than formal annexation precisely because of the competition between them” (Winks 1976: 546). Inter-imperialist rivalry was a key dimension of the history for most of the cases. It certainly created room for the agency of the native state, by creating different alliances against different colonial powers. It also accelerated the diplomatic race for informal colonialism: once any privilege was granted to any Great Power, asking the same privilege became
common for the others. Indeed, this inter-imperialist rivalry made the informal colonialism a network-like mechanism. Moreover, Winks notes four areas of concentration of informal colonialism: railways, loans, banking, and extractive staple-related industries. Indeed, these four areas of concentrations were also the main focus of unequal treaties signed throughout the Age of Empire.

### 3.3 Informal Colonialism: World-System Analysis

Conceiving the late-Ottoman Empire as an informal colony is compatible with world-system perspective when this period is conceptualized as the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire. According to this approach, the European world-economy needed to expand its boundaries and began incorporating new zones, most importantly the Indian subcontinent, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and West Africa. There were some differences in the incorporation processes of these four zones, but according to Immanuel Wallerstein (1989), the four incorporation processes occurred within the same span of time—between 1750 and 1850—with substantial similarities in their essential features. Subsequent to incorporation was peripheralization, and Wallerstein argues that the Ottoman Empire had already been peripheralized before 1850. Wallerstein and his colleagues interpret the Edict of Tanzimat (1839)\(^{14}\) as both acceptance and legitimization of the peripheral status of the state. The Ottoman state felt the necessity to lay the legal foundation through which it “could attempt simply to secure its position of the surplus in a system on which it had now itself become dependent” (Wallerstein et al. 1990: 93). The result of the peripheralization was two-fold: on the one hand, thanks to early administrative reforms, there was a more efficient bureaucracy through which state income could be generated; thus an internally stronger state was

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\(^{14}\) This was the first imperial edict—also known as the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane—guaranteeing the life, honour and property of the Sultan’s subjects, establishing an orderly system of taxation, and warranting equality before law for all subjects, whatever their religion.
observable by 1850. However, the same state was externally weaker compared to 1750 (Wallerstein 1989: 177). The peripheralization of the Indian subcontinent took the form of colonization. The Ottoman Empire did not become a British colony. Nevertheless, Wallerstein (1989: 150) adds that “the story is remarkably parallel and the timing even earlier.”

Huri İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder (1990) also define the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth-century as a “colonial state,” which means a state that had been peripheralized by foreign capital, public debt, and trade, serving the needs of merchant capital. Two points are worth underlining: first, while thinking about the concept of “colonial state,” one should remember that due to being a periphery in the world-economy, the state became unable to reproduce itself as an autonomous system (İslamoğlu and Keyder 1990). Second, the European Great Powers did not choose trade-centered peripheralization over a production-centered one. Foreign interveners lacked the power to impose to their advantage the production of a raw material. This was mainly a result of inter-European rivalry. Within this framework, European states could just control trade, state income and financial markets and realize their profits in these domains (Yerasimos 1975: 907).

However, while establishing a framework for bringing the late-Ottoman Empire into spaces of subjugation as “informal colony,” it is necessary to heed some calls for caution in the literature. Disagreeing the “colonial state” argument, the economic historian Şevket Pamuk offers a more refined categorization of the peripheries of the nineteenth century. For Pamuk, being part of an informal empire was the case for Central and South American countries and the determinant characteristic of this category was the dominance of one Great Power without significant rivalry. For the cases of China, Iran and the Ottoman Empire, Pamuk maintains that the argument of informal empire is not accurate and that these countries should be conceived as a separate category of subjugation by the “inter-imperialist
rivalry.” There were four main characteristics of this category: a) strong state structures, b) rivalry between the major imperialist powers in order to obtain greater political and economic advantage and influence, c) struggle between central bureaucracy and social classes supporting less limited integration into the world economy, and d) relatively slower penetration of world capitalism (Pamuk 1987: 6-7).

3.4 The Complex Network of Informal Colonialism

Osterhammel’s argument about how colonialism enriched its tactical repertoire through informal colonialism in search for efficiency is well grounded. However, Pamuk takes issue with positioning the Ottoman Empire as an informal colony; therefore, in light of Pamuk’s warning, Osterhammel’s argument seems too simplistic to represent the overall complexity of the network of informal colonialism. To what extent was informal colonialism a complex network? To answer this question succinctly, three points illustrating the complex position of the Ottoman Empire in the network of colonial hierarchies are worth mentioning. The first concerns the relation of the Sublime Porte and Egypt. At the end of the nineteenth century, Egypt was considered a crucial part of the British Empire. In this period, Egyptian-Sudanese relations can be read as an example of sub-colonization. But what is relevant for our discussion is that even after the British occupation in 1882, Cairo had sent tribute to Istanbul until 1918. Subsequent to occupation, Britain became active in governing Egypt via a network of advisors, without formal annexation, and kept negotiating with Ottoman diplomats the “polite fiction” of evacuation, which would never come (Deringil 2000a; Deringil 2000b). Put differently, until the very end, Egypt was nominally under the Ottoman suzerainty (Kitchen 1996: 64) and the tributary tax the latter received was a very important contribution to the Ottoman budget. During the Crimean War with Russia (1854), for the first time, the Sublime Porte obtained foreign loans. At this crucial moment of subjugation by the
complex network of informal colonialism, the collateral for the loan coming from English banks was taxes coming from Egypt (together with the tributes of Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia) (Göçek 1996: 49; Badem 2010: 294). Moreover, when we remember the fact that some 8,000 Egyptian troops fought on the Dardanelles Campaign for the Entente forces, it becomes obvious that the informal colonialism was a complex network.

The second point is related to the era following the Revolution of 1908, or the Second Constitutional Period. During this time, the empire had already been considered to be within the German sphere of influence (Ortaylı 1981; Gencer 2003). Only the history of Baghdad Railway project (Earle 1923) sufficed to justify Osterhammel’s argument. During these periods of considerable German influence in the Empire, Kâmil Pasha, who was reputable for his pro-British stand, acted several times as the Grand Vizer. The government of Kâmil Pasha failed to receive the vote of confidence in parliament. Following this failure, the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which would go down in history as strongly pro-German, visited the British ambassador. Their objective was to ensure that they would support the new government with the condition that it would continue Kamil Pasha’s policy of friendship toward Great Britain (F. Ahmad 1969: 38). On the eve of World War I, German-Ottoman relations were by no means problem free (Corrigan 1967). The Porte signed a treaty with Britain in 1913, giving it transportation privilege in the Shatt al-Arab, therefore recognizing British claims on the Persian Gulf (Akşin 2006: 346).

A third point worth remembering is that the Ottoman Empire’s strong tie to Germany protected it from the annexation of neither Libya by the Italians, an ally of Germany in the Triple Alliance, nor of Bosnia by the Habsburg, another member of Triple Alliance. German diplomacy was, to a large extent, interested in preventing a Turco-Italian war, and so asked Italy not to deepen its occupation. However, as the crisis persisted, German diplomacy placed greater priority on ties with Italy within the Triple Alliance framework, and cared more
about Italian complaints that German was not supportive of their African bid. Finally, German support in the Balkans and for the Dual Monarchy, and in Libya for Italy was secured (Wrigley 1980).

By looking at these three instances, I argue that in the late-Ottoman Empire, state (diplomatic and institutional) autonomy and the state capacity were shaped significantly by the complex network of informal colonialism. More detail about state capacity appears in Chapter 4. For the time being, it suffices to say that informal colonialism worked through a highly complex network. The functioning capacity of the state was by no means symbolic. In this sense, to borrow from Said, for the proper study of “overlapping territories and intertwined histories” incorporating informal colonialism into the picture seems inevitable. In this perspective, situating the late-Ottoman Empire in the context of spaces of subjugation does not mean reproducing the old decline paradigm within Ottoman studies, which has been rightly criticized (Kafadar 1997-1998). Nor does it mean denying opportunities of the state for building capacity and for political subjectivity. This was mainly visible in state-led reforms. In other words, situating the Ottoman Empire as a state subjugated by informal colonialism is not a regurgitation of the Orientalist cliché of the “Sick Man of Europe.” Although capitalist penetration defined the structural limits of every colonial encounter, it is imperative to remember that transformation of local systems were shaped by the ongoing dialectic between internal and external forces (Comaroff 1982). As the Ottomanist Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj (2005: 71-72) maintains, external pressures—such as European commercial and economic competition, and even military threats—were not the only reason for political change. On the contrary, internal dynamics were also important in initiating the reforms in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.

Consequently, this study establishes a framework that synthesizes insights derived from historical works and social sciences in the broader sense. It evaluates the
Ottoman/Turkish case as a state and people subjugated by the complex network of informal colonialism. Therefore, I argue that the Ottoman/Turkish case should be considered within the space of subjugation. My definition for space of subjugation is as follows: in the broadest sense, it refers to an experience of being subjugated by (formal or informal) colonialism and imperialism, in the landscape of global hierarchies. Therefore, colonial criticism is embedded in the intellectual agenda of spaces of subjugations. This is the most basic form of the definition. Four additional, secondary, components of the definition need to be delineated: 1) Experiencing modernity and modernization, either on the border, or outside the border of the core countries, with a peculiar self-perception of belatedness, with a search for model, and assuming a temporal gap between the model and the local experience (Chakrabarty 2000); 2) Facing the necessity of reconciling different political or intellectual perspectives with local realities; 3) Searching for recognition, together with pursuing political and intellectual equality; 4) Experiencing all these three points in the realm of realpolitik, therefore, dealing with this intellectual agenda concurrently with various concerns, such as security, trade, or development.

It has been already mentioned in the Introduction that sociology of intellectuals tend to conceptualize the roles and typologies of intellectuals by referring to a series of dichotomy. For Roy Eyerman (1994) two key intellectual typologies are “movement intellectuals” and “representative of rational planning.” For Zygmunt Bauman (1989), key typologies are “legislators” and “interpreter”. These typologies are also inspiring while thinking the intellectual history in spaces of subjugation. Nonetheless, one should note that because of different components of the intellectual agenda of space of subjugation, intellectuals of these contexts have had most of the time multiple functions, hence had fallen under multiple typologies. Put differently, intellectuals dealing with the issues of development were “representatives of rational planning” to follow Eyerman’s perspective, or “legislators” to
follow Bauman’s terminology. However, it was impossible for these “legislators” not feel the necessity to reconcile the universalist perspective with the realities of their locality, or opposing to the prejudices against their own culture. For this reason, their function was being an interpreter between their context and the universal one, sensitive about the differences of their locality, and dealing always with the problem of searching for model and the inadequacy of existing options.

3.5 Ottoman Intellectuals and Colonial Criticism

The complex network of informal colonialism did not only create subjugation at the state level, but beyond the economic and political spheres, it was also influential in the cultural sphere. In this context, Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals encountered a series of prejudices in their contacts with Europeans, much before the nineteenth century, the period when the complex network of informal colonialism became fully structured. Aslı Çırakman (2002: 164) shows that although the image of the Ottoman Empire as the “Sick Man of Europe” became fashionable in the nineteenth century, it had been believed since the eighteenth century in European circles that the fall of the empire was inevitable, and would take place in few decades. Within this framework, in late eighteenth century, European diplomats started voicing the idea that the sovereignty of the Porte was close to nil. For instance in 1788, French ambassador to Istanbul Choiseul-Gouffier could characterize the Ottoman Empire as one of the richest colonies of France (“une des plus riches colonies de la France”) (quoted in İnalçık, 1986), by possibly referring to early period capitulations. I suggest calling this discourse “diplomatic Orientalism.” Most probably, for the European diplomats employing this discourse, it was an accepted fact that the sovereignty of the Porte was not nil.15 But its use was part of the psychological war. A key argument of diplomatic

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15 Eldem (2006) maintains that the domination of Western economic actors over Ottoman markets, production and consumption can be qualified as a “quasi-colonial situation,” as of the nineteenth century. But he also adds
Orientalism was that the Porte did not morally or rightfully deserve to reign over its territory, which had been conquered centuries ago. The travel notes of the famous Lady Craven, published in 1789, were a typical example of this perspective. While saying, “Yes, I confess, I wish to see a colony of honest English families here; establishing manufactures, such as [those] England produces, and returning the produce of this country to ours ... waking the indolent Turk from his gilded slumbers...” (quoted in Çırakman 2002: 170), what she probably had in mind was an informal colony. For her, colonization would not make the Ottoman land English country, only could the products of this land be English. If one of the pretexts for colonization was the indolence of the Turks, the other one was the oppression of the Greek people. Fair and free trade would bring freedom to oppressed Greeks. Soon diplomatic Orientalism turned into a curiosity towards Ottoman peoples and land, coupled with the European feeling of superiority. Ahmed Azmi Efendi, appointed as ambassador to Prussia in 1790, says “the people of Berlin were unable to contain their impatience until our arrival in the city. Regardless of the winter and the snow, both men and women came in carriages, on horseback, and on foot, to look at us and contemplate us” (quoted in Mitchell 1991: 2-4)

Diplomatic Orientalism towards the Ottomans had been objectified in the nineteenth century in the metaphor of “Sick Man of Europe.” First used probably by the Russian Czar Nicholas I, it was as a summary all Orientalist prejudices. The metaphor was partially based on the organist understanding of social reality. Hence, as long as it emphasized the life-and-death dichotomy, it also referred to the past glory of the Ottoman Empire in the classical period. Instead, it emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was already an archaic political entity. It introduced the idea that the Ottoman state no longer had the ability and capacity to

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that this undeniable fact should not lead the historians to an a posteriori reading of the earlier centuries, misjudging earlier economic relations between the Ottomans and the European. For Eldem, in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were relations but not domination.

16 I thank Gil Anidjar for drawing my attention to the Orientalist dimension of this cliché. About the history of “Sick Man of Europe” cliché, see (Livianios, 2006).
rule and, therefore, only the European states were politically influential in the Ottoman geography (or more generally in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East or Near East). Put differently, the Orientalist perspective, which saw the non-European as passive, was embedded in diplomatic Orientalism, and being active was understood as a characteristic unique to Europeans. As long as it denied the Ottoman political subjectivity, it did not recognize the Ottoman will for reforms. For the diplomatic Orientalism, Ottoman reforms were significant enough to neither change the predetermined end of the Porte (its death) — nor ease the pressure of European states on the Ottoman Empire. An example of such an attitude was observed during the Istanbul Conference, a diplomatic summit held in 1876-1877 on the future of Ottoman lands in the Balkans. As a reminder of the structural link between the formal and the informal empire, it should be noted that Britain was represented by Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India. Although the conference was hosted by the Porte and the subject matter was Ottoman land, Lord Salisbury had been reluctant to perceive his Ottoman counterparts as his addressee and took the Russian representative, along with the British diplomatic corps, as the major decision-makers (M. Aydin 2006). During the conference, Abdülhamid II took an important step toward reform and declared the constitution in December 1877. However, diplomatic Orientalism was unwilling to accept the relevance of such reforms. The Ottoman representatives argued that the conference became unnecessary given the reform, but other parties did not pay attention to this view, and the conference resumed as planned. With the exception of the German media, European press reaction to the Ottoman Constitution was similar to that of the diplomats. The Constitution was characterized in French newspapers as a “stillborn, bizarre creature.” For the Russian press it was “misleading, fraud, nonsense” (M. Aydin 2006).

The prejudices of both the diplomatic circles and European public opinion had great influence on the personal contacts of Ottoman intellectuals with Europeans. In these contacts,
in their encounters with European ideas and in their visits to Europe, the admiration of Ottoman intellectuals were mostly coupled with desire to be taken seriously by their counterparts and to be seen to be on equal footing. This desire might be described as a search for recognition. Just as Asian intellectuals had been criticizing the West for having established a double standard in international relations by denying some of its own principles (C. Aydın 2007: 9), Ottoman intellectuals criticized the European states and the inconsistency of European attitudes. For instance, following his visit to the Exposition Universelle in Paris in 1889, Ahmed Midhat Efendi said that he encountered a Europe that had achieved a progress that was beyond his wildest dreams. In addition to this admiration, he had to spend much time at the Eighth Congress of Orientalists in Stockholm correcting misimpressions of Europeans about Islam (Findley 1998). On the one hand, he perceived Europe as having a truth-loving culture (*hakikat-perest*), with some positivist connotation, but, on the other hand, he was surprised at how the same Europe could be content with fantasies and imaginary depictions, when it came to the Orient. As Timothy Mitchell (1991: 2) states, “throughout the nineteenth century non-European visitors found themselves being placed on exhibit or made the careful objects of European curiosity.” Meeting with Europeans had been perceived as a spectacle by the Ottoman intellectuals. In some cases, the targeted audience was public opinion at home. For instance Ahmed Midhat says in his travel notes that he made a spontaneous presentation at the Congress in French, but as Carter Findley figured out in one of his personal letters, Ahmed Midhat’s French was mostly limited to reading skills. In some other instance, Ottoman intellectuals felt as if they were the object of a spectacle in front of a European audience. In 1893, four years after Ahmed Midhat’s tour, Ubeydullah Efendi was a passenger on a steamship called the Germanic, cruising from Liverpool to the United States, and his travel notes are quite telling in this respect. On the ship, after the dinner, there was an entertainment slot, where the guests were expected to showcase one of their talents. When it
was Ubeydullah’s turn, he made a speech in Turkish. He started talking by saying “I am a Turk from Asia,” and then added that he is an admirer and lover of European civilization. Later on he noted this evening to his notes:

It was surely bizarre that on a steamship, Germanic, I addressed in Turkish to three hundred people who did not understand a single word of Turkish. I felt like laughing a few times while making my speech. I barely managed to control myself. “What are you saying and to whom?” I asked myself. Humans are indeed such ludicrous creatures. There was me, proud to deliver my speech to an audience attentively listening yet understanding nothing; and they were, satisfied with listening to a speech they did not understand at all. Is this not ludicrousness? (quoted in Alkan 1997: 149)

As these examples prove that global hierarchies were not only influential at the inter-state level, but they were equally active in shaping the personal encounters and communication of people from different geographies.

By taking diplomatic Orientalism and other kinds of European prejudices at the interpersonal level into consideration, this study suggests positioning the nineteenth century-Ottoman Empire on the map of colonial hierarchies, by focusing on Ottoman intellectuals’ criticism of European expansion, colonialism, racism and prejudices toward other cultures. At least since the Young Ottomans of 1860s, the colonialist and imperialist practices of European states were a priority on the intellectual agenda of Ottomans, and objection to the European discourses on the Orient and race became common ground for Ottoman intellectuals (C. Aydın, 2006: 449). European prejudice vis-à-vis Islam produced both in

17 In 1893, Ubeydullah Efendi was able to speak French, but did not know English. It might be an exaggeration to call the situation “ludicrousness,” because from his memoirs, we learn that the French version was prepared ahead of time and, after his talk in Turkish, one of his fellow travelers read the French version. But the satisfaction of the passengers on a steamship felt toward a speech they did not understand is an interesting example about the distance of Europeans and their curious gaze to the local worlds of meanings, for which they were looking. But this is not the end concerning Ubeydullah’s “lost in translation” stories. The real problem arose when he started reading examples from classical Ottoman poetry, as he failed to translate them into French. He then read some lyrics of the Ottoman classical music and translated them into French. The lyrics evoked sarcasm in the audience. He became irritated and said “You have a French mind and no capability to grasp it. Only the Orientals can understand such niceties.” (quoted in Alkan 1997: 137) For sure, Ubeydullah’s voluntary participation in this spectacle should be considered as an example of search for recognition. I thank Selim Deringil for drawing my attention to memoirs of Ubeydullah Efendi. See also (Deringil 2011).
academic and diplomatic circles were also subjected to rejection. Namık Kemal, who wrote a book countering the ideas of Renan on Islam (*Renan Müdafuânamesi*) (Mardin 1962: 324), Ahmed Midhat, who not only translated but also criticized John William Draper’s views on Islam and science, the Unionist politicians, who reacted to the fantasies of Pierre Loti of the harem or journalists publishing anti-imperialist cartoons in the aftermaths of 1908 (Brummett 2000) are all examples of this kind of criticism. In his outstanding article, Davison (2006) not only considers Ziya Gökalp’s work as a case for the project of provincializing Europe, but also observes a postcolonial split in Gökalp’s thinking, which includes differentiating modernization from Westernization, problematizing the difference, and rejecting imitationist Europeanism. More specifically, this study reads the late-Ottoman intellectuals as examples of colonial criticism, by focusing on Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp, and argues that the intellectuals of republican Turkey had to deal with similar questions, which constitute the agenda for spaces of subjugation.

How can colonial criticism be defined? First and foremost, it implies a critical awareness about the global hierarchies. Colonial criticism signifies a critical stand against the capitalist expansion of the West, colonialism, racism and other types of prejudices. While I observe colonial criticism in the intellectuals of late-Ottoman period and of modern Turkey, the primary examples that I have in mind are the intellectuals of the decolonization period. Aimé Césaire and C. L. R. James from the Black Atlantic context, Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi from North Africa and Rabindranath Tagore from the Subcontinent are primary examples of colonial criticism. However, I argue that the colonial criticism is not limited to formally colonized lands. In this sense, Jalal Al-e Ahmad of Iran and his book *Gharbzadegi* showcase the pressure of colonial criticism for non-formally colonized spaces of subjugation. If the intellectuals of decolonization are primary examples of colonial criticism, the postcolonial criticism literature is also related to colonial criticism, but probably in a less
direct way. When I take postcolonial criticism as a secondary benchmark, I do not impose a narrow or specific definition on it. For instance, Gyan Prakash, who prefers a narrow definition, understands postcolonial criticism as “a radical rethinking of knowledge and social identities authored and authorized by colonialism and Western domination.” Prakash (1994) talks about an emergent postcolonial critique and Subaltern Studies group “developing into a vigorous postcolonial critique.” One might argue that this interdisciplinary postcolonial criticism is an utterly academic pursuit. But for me, postcolonial criticism is related to the more broadly defined colonial criticism. For Bart Moore-Gilbert (1997: 12), postcolonial criticism is to be understood as “analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the relations of domination and subordination … between nations or cultures, which characteristically have their roots in the history of modern European colonialism and imperialism.” Once such an inclusive definition is accepted, the criticism towards European imperialism voiced in the late-Ottoman Empire, a target of European expansion and domination, could be considered in relation to the general framework of postcolonial criticism.

While thinking about this relation, two points needs to be emphasized: First, although recent hegemony of culture studies regarding postcolonial criticism it is imperative to remember that the basic motive of postcolonial studies was generated by the decolonization movement. Moore-Gilbert (1997: 5) reminds us that postcolonial criticism denotes a variety of practices, predating the period when the term “postcolonial” began to be used. Second, postcolonial criticism questions the links between colonialism and global inequalities, on the one hand, and humanism and modernity, on the other (Grovgogui 2004). In this sense, it makes apparent the inconsistency of European power politics, which are at odds with the European heritage of humanism and, as it will become clearer in Chapter 7, Ottoman intellectuals of the late period produced a similar genre of criticism.
When I suggest thinking about colonial criticism in relation to postcolonial criticism, I do not use the concept of the postcolonial as a derivative of postmodernism. In the postcolonial studies literature, there is a tendency to perceive anything postcolonial in the context of postmodernism. This equates the postcolonial with being fascinated by hybridization, displacement, and politics of in-betweenness. This perspective has already been criticized (Dirlik 1994; A. Ahmad 1996), and I take these concerns seriously. Another characteristic of existing postcolonial studies literature is the over-emphasis on the symbolic dimension of the colonial encounter, at the cost of neglecting the colonial power relations and of forgetting that colonialism was part of capitalist expansion (Hall 1996). This is mostly due to the fact that postcolonial studies were born as a sub-field of literary studies. Sometimes this overemphasize on symbolism appears as deciphering colonial encounter as a textual contest, a bibliographic battle, between oppressive and subversive books (L. Gandhi 1998: 141). Once post-colonialism is defined with reference to identity politics, together with an emphasis on symbolic realm, decoupled from concrete subjugation, there is less room to express the postcolonial criticism and challenge the global hierarchies. For instance, Benita Parry (1987) argues that certain types of postcolonial studies deny the possibility of challenging imperialism’s ideological aggression and restricts “the space in which the colonized can be written back into history.” In the same vein, Aijaz Ahmad (1996) claims that, in contrast to the era of decolonization, the culturalist agenda of the current postcolonial studies suppresses the questions of resistance. Following Neil Lazarus (2002), one might refer to this criticism as “the materialist critics in postcolonial studies” and this study accepts their relevance. Therefore, neither arguing for colonial criticism, nor linking it indirectly to postcolonial criticism means a convergence towards the postmodernist, symbolic realm.
3.6 Conclusion

The capitalist expansion of the West was a multidimensional process that incorporated different characteristics in different time periods and spaces. It was almost a global process, with a small number of geographies not directly influenced by it. It implied a hierarchical relationship between the Western Great Powers and non-Western peoples. In this context, for a better understanding of these global hierarchies, an inclusive perspective is necessary. This means a problem of clustering different forms of colonialism. This chapter develops the inclusive perspective in two steps. First, it contributes the concept of complex network of informal colonialism, to denote how the formal and informal colonialism were component of a single system, organized around the mercantilist techniques. Inter-imperialist rivalry was an important dynamic of this network and it was reinforced by the military apparatus, which made possible the colonial conquest. The complex network of informal colonialism reveals the subjugation caused by the Western expansion in different spheres, including political, diplomatic, economical and cultural. Second, this chapter contributes the concept of spaces of subjugation. By suggesting the space of subjugation, my primary aim is to argue for the commonality of the geographies of formal colonialism and with the geographies of informal colonialism. I argue that criticism directed at the colonial expansion is an embedded item in the intellectual agenda of spaces of subjugation. This overall framework allows me to situate the late-Ottoman Empire within the global hierarchies, as a space of subjugation. Therefore, I evaluate the critical voices of Ottoman intellectuals with respect to Western expansion, as examples of colonial criticism. In short, this chapter is a basis for dealing with the Ottoman history and within the history of global hierarchies. The next chapter, Chapter 4, focuses on a theoretical problem, the problem of political agency with the network of global hierarchies. Put it differently, how was it possible for a state to appropriate its autonomy within the
complex network of informal colonialism? Chapter 4 answers this question for the Ottoman case.
CHAPTER 4 – THE OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY

The Ottomanist Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj’s cautions that it is important not to see external factors as the sole initiator of change in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and that it is necessary, instead, to balance the external pressures and the internal variables in the analysis of change are crucial. Two main endogenous factors leading to change can be identified as the Sublime Porte’s search for a more efficient and effective state apparatus and local demands for certain public services. Since the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), there had been attempts at achieving a centralized administration, better tax collection, and a modernized army. One of the main targets of efforts at centralization was local dynasties in provinces, which, following a compromise in 1808, were obliged to accept a decrease in the amount of control they wielded. Nevertheless, this was also a period when considerable territorial losses (including Greek independence and Algeria lost to France) were coupled with considerable decline in manufacturing sectors. Due to being incorporated first within and then peripheralized by the world-economy, as of the 1860s, the empire was practically a non-producing country, and Britain’s fourth best customer (Wallerstein 1989: 151, 177). In this process of subjugation by informal colonialism, free trade agreements had a crucial function. Territorial losses and declining tax revenues convinced the Porte of the need for reforms as the only antidote to the existing problems. Moreover, various local demands also shaped the reform agenda. For instance, the rising Levantine bourgeoisie pushed hard for better urban services, which resulted in the establishment of the first municipality in Istanbul in 1855.
But the financial crises turned to be permanent. While it was possible to postpone some administrative reforms for some periods, various external threats, which became more visible with the speeding race of colonialism, made it impossible to postpone military reforms. What was more, besides the cost of reformed army units, the sources to finance the overall army were insufficient. This led to financial subjugation through foreign loans. Crimean War was the starting point of the vicious circle of informal colonialism. As the Porte was unable to finance its war against Russia, it did not only acquire British and French military support but also loans from European market. Hence, “cycle of indebtness” has started (Göçek 1996: 111). Keyder names this process as “debt imperialism.” Perpetual indebtness of the Ottoman Empire offered to European states both mechanism and legitimacy to exploit. “Debt imperialism frequently served to force the Ottoman state to agree to concessions or to instituting desired measures and policies” (Keyder 1987: 38).

At this point, what is needed is an historical sociological abstraction able to balance the external stimulus and internal dynamics pushing for change.\footnote{For a longer discussion about the indispensability of balancing external stimulus and internal dynamics while studying the Ottoman modernization, see (Turan 2008).} I argue that the concept of...
state capacity offers such an abstraction, situating the inner dynamics of change within the structural web of global hierarchies. Different sets of literatures, including the classics of political philosophy, the sociology of Weber dealing with bureaucracy, Habermas’s perspective of modernization focusing on system integration, or historical analyses of power completed or inspired by Foucault, have taught us that every state apparatus has an eternal search for better control mechanisms and efficient tactics, and, therefore, an ever-increasing state capacity. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was by no means an exception. The long nineteenth century was the age of innovations and new technologies, and with each novelty, the state capacity was re-defined. For instance, when new arms were introduced to the global balance of power, this meant a shift in the state capacity; though no state had been without capacity hitherto, this novelty defined the new level of state capacity. The Porte took its place in this race for better state apparatus as this was the only way for state survival. Furthermore, during the long nineteenth century, it was impossible to increase state capacity without interacting with the European Great Powers.

In this context, it must be emphasized that the vicious circle of informal colonialism contributed to the state capacity of the Porte. While using the concept of state capacity, it is common to relate it with the state autonomy. But, as Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh (1991) maintain, “it is important to recognize the analytical distinction between them and then to study the manner in which the two concepts interact.” Being subjugated by the imperialist rivalry did not mean a state without any capacity; but as long as its capacity depended on the informal colonial network, the Porte lacked autonomy with respect to European Great Powers.

4.1 State Capacity: An Overview

There are several ways of defining state capacity, the most common one being the institutionalist one, which defines state capacity mostly in terms of taxation capacity; state
capacity is seen as something based on a state’s fiscal resources, together with internal coherence and legitimacy. A less travelled path to defining state capacity is the approach that tries to analyze the governmentality of a given state, through its capacity to control, discipline, and manage the population, by developing its complex of *savoirs* (Foucault 1991). Theda Skocpol (1985) refers to the precondition of the state capacity as sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrative-military control of a given territory. For some other sociologists, the defining variables for state capacity are rational bureaucracy, model agencies to bridge state and society, and the embeddedness of state within society (Chibber 2003: 19-23). In addition, some other writers emphasize the embedded autonomy of state while defining state capacity, meaning an interactive relationship between state and society. According to this view, “state capacity is crucially founded on a high degree of social power” (Hobson 1997: 236). In this context, defining state capacity as being detached from private interest, and having the ability to actualize objectives without depending on societal resources appear as points of consensus.

However I follow a more classical historical sociological approach, and define state capacity, drawing on Michael Mann’s perspective on state power. For Mann, state power has two components: despotic power and infrastructural power. The despotic power corresponds to state’s might without routine negotiation with civil society. One can talk about state’s despotic power, simply because state has a monopoly position as the unique territorially centralized organization, functioning with economic, ideological and military power actors (Mann 1993: 59). Infrastructural power corresponds to state’s might to penetrate civil society, and its power to “implement logistically political decisions throughout the (civil) realm” (Mann 1984). Infrastructural power has four constituents: a) “a division of labor between the state’s main activities,” coordinated centrally; b) “literacy, enabling stabilized messages to be transmitted through the state’s territories;” c) coinage, “allowing commodities to be
exchanged under ultimate guarantee of value by state;” and d) “rapidity of communication of messages and transport of people and resources, through improved roads, ships, telegraphy etc.” In order to have an operational template to discuss state capacity, first, I condense the despotic power to the army, and then I merge the despotic power and infrastructural power. I thereby obtain a four-fold schema about state capacity, including army, education, coinage, and communication and transportation systems. Discussing the Ottoman state around these four domains will illustrate that its capacity was dependent on informal colonial network. However, before proceeding with the detailed analysis, I have to make three points about how to produce an operational template out of despotic and infrastructural powers.

The first concerns condensing the despotic power in the army. For Mann (1986: 11), it is wrong to understand the state as the repository of physical force in society. Despotic power is the junction of military, ideological and economic powers. I deal with the economic dimension in the next section. In addition, the reasoning regarding the need for reforms, which might be considered as the ideological dimension, is spread across four operational items of state capacity. So the remaining one is the military power and it is a focus for this section. Moreover, Mann (1986: 148-153) details despotic power by listing five aspects of compulsory cooperation, namely, military pacification, the military multiplier, the authority on economic value, the intensification of labor, and the diffusion and exchange of techniques through conquest. Let me state the position of each compulsory cooperation aspect in the Ottoman Empire, in brief. With incorporation, the pacifying effect of the army was replaced by the network of informal colonialism, employing both diplomacy and selective naval interventions, and in the process, the role of the Ottoman army was reduced to a weak—and mostly inner oriented—deterrence power. The incorporation into the world-economy had another effect: the state lost most of its power in determining the market prices. Tim Jacoby, who has already applied the historical sociology model of Mann to Ottoman/Turkish case,
maintains that military multiplier effect, army capacity to generated economic dynamism, “was reduced to state bureaucracy, and then overseas contractors, increasingly administrated centrally planned infrastructural enterprises” (Jacoby 2005: 51). Intensification of labor was not observed, as the existing manufacturing capacity decreased without being able to shift to massive industrialization. And lastly, as the ages of conquests for Ottomans ended in 1683, the diffusion and exchange of techniques through conquest is not directly relevant for a discussion about the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, I argue that the Ottoman Empire received new techniques by interacting with Europe, and this sense, the import of technology was related to the network of informal colonialism. I think these are all sound reasons for condensing the despotic power to the army.

As for merging the despotic and infrastructural power in the same operational template, for Mann, these two powers of state depend on each other, and this perspective makes the merging legitimate. He says that their relation is not a peculiar oscillation but rather a dialectic one. Additionally, Mann (1984) notes that “in the whole history of the development of the infrastructure of power there is virtually no technique which belongs necessarily to the state, or conversely to civil society.” I take this caveat very seriously. A dominant perspective in social sciences perceives the state as a totally separated—or even isolated—entity, outside of the society. However, as Timothy Michell (1991) warns us, “the state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, organization or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called society.” In this context, Mann’s caution is crucial for discussing the capacity of the nineteenth-century Ottoman state. First, it indicates the interdependency of these four items, i.e., the army, education, coinage, and communication, and, therefore, legitimizes the merging of despotic and infrastructural power. We know that the Ottoman General Staff had a vital interested in railway development plans, which would help link different army units, and facilitate mobilization (Griffiths 1966:}
81). Put differently, what would be the education capacity of a state, if it lacks financial ability? Second, it reminds us that the position of initiating the reforms was not monopolized by the state. As indicated in Figure 1, there were local demands pushing for reforms, and in some cases—for instance, in the local governments—they were the sole originator of the reform process.

With respect to the third point, Mann (1993: 60) asserts that imperial states have high despotic and low infrastructural power. This means that although they have a functioning government apparatus they lack a deeper capacity to penetrate and coordinate the civil society realm. At this point I do not consider the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire as an example of Mann’s imperial state ideal-type for various reasons; I consider the late-Ottoman state as a weak state, both in terms of despotic and infrastructural powers, since it depended on foreign support and intervention, at the cost of subjugation.

4.2 The Army

One might observe a dual dependency of the Ottoman Empire on European Great Powers in terms of despotic state power. It was dependent both on the expertise of the European military to reform its own army, and on direct or indirect military support of Europe to secure its territorial integrity. The Ottomans were convinced, as early as the era of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807), about the indispensability of European advice in order to have higher army capacity. When Selim established a new army, *Nizam-ı Cedid*, he invited French officers to train the new corps (Shaw 1965). The foreign expertise was mostly needed to learn new tactics and to become familiar with new-style imported rifles from France, Britain and Sweden. Although Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt made the atmosphere favorable for a radical army reform, Selim remained compromising, and could not abolish the age-old Janissaries. The Janissaries’ reactionary conservatism resulted in the end of the new army, together with
Selim’s own life. The radical step of abolishment was able to be taken by Selim’s successor, Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839). In 1826, Mahmud abolished the Janissary corps, along with the heterodox sect of the Bektaşi Sufi order. Once radical steps were taken, the need for foreign expertise became more visible. Nevertheless, there were at least two major barriers which made knowledge import difficult: the first one was the barrier of realpolitik. European Great Powers had been supporting the Greek independence movement, and they were reluctant to simultaneously supply military expertise to the Ottomans. The second was a cultural barrier: members of the Ottoman army felt uneasy about being trained by non-Muslims (Levy 1971).

But it was not the time to stop for reforms: The nominal vassal of the Porte, Muhammad Ali of Egypt, was also actively engaged in a general reform movement, with a specific emphasis on the army and recruitments. As Bernard Lewis (1968: 80) formulated, “in the competition for the support and goodwill of the West, it was necessary to show that the Sultan could be as progressive and as liberal as his vassal.”

Mahmud asked for the support of Muhammad Ali when the Ottoman army turned out to be insufficient in controlling the Greek insurgency. The defeat of Ottoman army, which had been backed by the impressive Egyptian navy, by joint British and French forces, proved that the Porte’s army capacity was considerably weak. After taking a couple of years to restore his army, Muhammad Ali sent his army to occupy most of Anatolia in 1832 (Fahmy 1997: 47-77). This was a blow for the capital and an absolute revelation about their weakness. “The sultan swallowed his pride and asked his arch-enemy, the Russian czar, for help. This was the first time in its long history that the Ottoman Empire had asked a European power to help with an internal problem” (Fahmy 2005). In order to demonstrate their military support for the Ottomans, Russians sent their navy to Istanbul. A peace between Istanbul and Cairo, mainly facilitated by Russia and France, was established in 1834, and the Porte officially recognized the dynasty of his vassal Muhammad Ali.
This was the first instance of the weak despotic power of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. The second one was the Crimean War of the 1850s. Russia, the supporter of the Porte against Muhammad Ali, was now the aggressor. Initially, on the diplomatic level, Russia declared territorial claims on the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), and demanded to be the formal protector of Orthodox peoples in the Ottoman Empire. Britain and other European states were concerned about Russian claims over Ottoman territory, mostly because they did not want another major player in the Levant. On December, 1853, the British government sent orders to its fleet to protect “the Ottoman flag as well as Ottoman territory” (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 138). France followed the same policy. Prussia joined the alliance in order to attain further influence in the north, albeit without active military involvement. The Kingdom of Sardinia was more active, having placed 18,000 troops on the battlefield. Hence, the alliance to protect the Ottoman territorial integrity was ready before the actual start of the war in March 1854. When the Treaty of Paris was signed on March 1856, no party seemed to be victorious, and the agreement was an acceptance of pre-war status quo. The Ottoman suzerainty in Moldavia and Wallachia was re-established, and equally importantly, the parties signing the agreement declared their joint guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Although it resulted in more than 250,000 causalities on the allies side (and more than 700,000 causalities on the Russian side), the war was inconclusive.

But it was by no means inconclusive in determining the position of the Ottoman Empire within the complex network of the informal colonialism. First, it made the weakness of Porte’s army and, thus, the dependence of the Ottoman on foreign powers for its survival, explicit. However, it had even more direct effects on Ottoman modernization because it led to the first massive encounter with Western people and various aspects of modernity. Before and during the war, thousands of British and French troops arrived in Istanbul and spent
considerable time there. They established permanent barracks. Higher ranking officers rented villas on the Bosphorus, and a European presence was felt in the city. This was an ambivalent encounter with all its tensions, and reciprocal prejudices. “Though most of the foreign troops went on to fronts first in Bulgaria and then in the Crimea, the Turkish capital was host to a kind of foreign occupation from 1854 to 1856” (R. Davison 1990c: 78). Various new technologies and novelties—a list ranging from telegraph to nursing, as well as the idea of municipality—became part of the Ottoman social imaginary during the Crimean War. If we recall what Michael Mann (1986: 148) calls “diffusion and exchange of techniques through conquest,” in the mid-nineteenth century, this took place in the Ottoman Empire not through conquest, but rather with a defensive war, performed with strong support of European Great Powers. And this foreign support made the diffusion and exchange of techniques effective. All these new Western improvements were proof of European superiority and the indispensability of reforms for the Ottomans. Yet, they also showcased the capacity the Great Powers had to determine how the Ottomans would finance their war expenses, their reforms and—to a certain extent—the agenda of those reforms. In this sense, one might argue that during the Crimean War, the informal colonialism network started determining the Ottoman state’s capacity.

Beside this general impact of the Crimean War on Ottoman modernization, the war had two more direct impacts on the subjugation of Ottoman Empire by the complex network of informal colonialism: external borrowing and the Imperial Rescript of 1856 (İslahat Fermanı). Although financial crises had been observable since the early decades of the nineteenth century, formal long-term borrowing in European financial markets began in 1854 (Pamuk 1987: 57), as the cost of the war became unbearable. During the Crimean War, the Porte received foreign loans in 1854 and 1855. In 1855, the Loan Control Commission—with British and English members—was established, and the members of the commission defined
their function as “…introduce[ing] something like order and regularity into Turkish finance” (Badem 2010: 324). Within the larger context of the Crimean War, fighting for the Ottomans gave to the Great Powers a specific opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of the Porte, and, more specifically, the loan justified early financial control. Two loans during the Crimean War were followed by eleven others until 1875, when the Porte officially declared its inability to pay the interests due. This was the moment of Ottoman fiscal bankruptcy, where the establishment of the Public Debt Administration became inevitable. Therefore, the loans during the Crimean War were the initial steps of European control over Ottoman state finance.

Since the early stages of the capitalist expansion, the Great Powers had perceived the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire as their natural trade partners, with whom they could form a dialogue free of culturalist barriers. Seeking different privileges for them was a priority of European diplomacy. It was common for ambassadors to grant protected status to Christians (Keyder 1987: 21), mainly saving them from the legal cohesion of the Porte. The Crimean War offered new opportunity to Britain and France to demand further rights for the Christians. As being fought for the Ottoman’s territory added considerably to their bargaining power, they asked from Ottoman bureaucracy for further reforms and more effective application of the doctrine of equality between Muslims and Christians. British ambassador Lord Stratford pushed the Porte to declare an imperial edict. The ongoing peace talks with Russia facilitated British efforts. The Porte was convinced that the declaration should be made before the start of the peace conference. The Imperial Rescript of 1856 was declared in February, before the Paris agreement was signed with Russia in March. Hence, the Porte had granted further rights before Russia had asked for them formally during the peace negotiations. This was a peculiar tactic of the informal colonialism. The demands of the Great Powers were communicated to the Porte at the informal level and, without having power to
say no and to counter a possible military intervention the Porte had been acting accordingly. This was rather a unique opportunity to save the image of the Ottoman Empire.

At first, the Imperial Rescript of 1856 appeared to be simply a repetition of the Edict of Tanzimat of 1839. Both guaranteed the rights of the subjects with respect to the Sultan. However, there were at least three significant differences between these two edicts. First, the basic reason for Tanzimat was an internal push for limiting the nominally omnipotent power of Sultan. It had considerable Islamic references. But in case of the Imperial Rescript of 1856, the initiators were obviously European diplomats. The language shifted from an Islamic set of references to a basically legal code without religious reference. The change in style was observable in listing the reforms to be made. The Imperial Rescript of 1856 was detailed enough to function as a precise prescription for reform. Second, the old edict of Tanzimat did not touch upon the issue of equality between Muslims and Christians, whereas for the new edict, this was a high priority. And third, it was possible to get a sense of the financial crises and foreign loans when the new edict was read. The Imperial Rescript of 1856 included “strict observance of annual budgets, the establishments of banks, the employment of European capital and skills for economic improvement, the codification of penal and commercial law and reform of the prison system, and the establishment of mixed courts to take care of a greater proportion of cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims” (R. Davison 1973: 55) as principles to implement. Consequently, since the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman modernization had taken place within the limits of the complex network of informal colonialism. In this sense, the weak state capacity of the Porte, especially in terms of the army, accelerated the subjugation and limited considerably the Ottoman’s sovereignty.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the army capacity of the Ottoman Empire had been even more limited. Two examples will suffice to illustrate how the army was weak in the period 1900-1918. The first is the gendarmerie reform in the Macedonia. In the
first decade of the twentieth century, the Porte had to accept a series of foreign interventions for its ethnically mixed provinces of Macedonia; this included the establishment of a Financial Commission, which gave executive control to foreign agents. The reform package gave foreign officers the functions of gendarmerie commanders. Accordingly, Austrian officers served in Kosovo, Italian officers in Monastir, and in Salonika, the major city of the province, there was a Russian sector. By 1905, Britain had decided to increase the numbers of foreign officers and gendarmerie and to decrease the numbers of Turkish troops (Tokay 2003). The despotic power of the Porte was not great enough to counter these foreign pressures. Similar to delays in salary payments for civil servants, delays and non-regular payments for gendarmeries were very common, including for the troops in Macedonia (Özbek 2008).

The second example is the position of Ottoman army within the Central Powers during World War I. Although the Treaty of Alliance had been signed ostensibly between equal partners, from the beginning, the unbalanced position between Ottoman and German financial and military assets was obvious. Together with Austria-Hungary, Germany made massive transfusions of gold, money, war material and other supplies (Trumpener 1968: 67). However, Germany did not only offer monetary and material support to the Ottomans. The number of German officers who had been appointed to the Ottoman Army between 1914 and 1918 surpassed 700 (Zürcher 2004, 121). This meant that the diplomatic equality, observable in the treaty, was only nominal and, on the ground, speaking of a “German military control” was more accurate (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 313). General Otto Liman Sanders, who arrived in Istanbul in 1913 as the head of a German military mission, became “the de facto commander of the entire Ottoman army” (Trumpener 1966: 179). During the war, most of the high-ranking positions of the Ottoman army were reserved for German commanders: “Von Sanders’ chief assistant, General von Seeckt, became chief of the Ottoman General Staff, von
der Goltz succeeded von Sanders as the chief of the First Army for a time and then of the
Sixth Army in Mesopotamia; von Falkenhayn became adviser and then commander of the
Ottoman army in Palestine; and German officers were put in command of the Ministry of War
departments of Operations, Intelligence, Railroads, Supply, Munitions, Coal and Fortress.”
(Shaw and Shaw 1992: 313) As these two examples show, the capacity of the Ottoman army
was limited and, therefore, the Porte was both dependent on the military support of European
countries and weak to counter their demands.

4.3 Education
Throughout the nineteenth century, several educational reforms were carried out in the
Ottoman Empire. For most of the Ottoman reformers, education was the basic remedy for all
evil, as formulated by Deringil (1998a: 93). The first serious attempts at reform corresponded
to the reign of Mahmud II. Though he was unable to implement compulsory elementary
schooling, he was able to open some schools that had a more secular curriculum, different
from the traditional Islamic medreses. This was also the beginning of a bifurcation in the
educational system (Berkes 1998: 109). The duality of the education was due to the fact that
primary education remained traditional whereas higher education—open to fewer people and
mostly aiming to train officers and civil servants—was more Western in style. Moreover,
there were always severe budgetary constraints for educational reforms, and this was a more
important reason than the traditionalist-reformist clash for the slowness of the reforms. By the
mid-nineteenth century, educational statistics were disappointing. For instance, during the
Crimean War, in the entire empire, there were only 60 rüşdiyes (a school for the graduates of
elementary school, before they continue to high school), with a total of 3,371 students, all
male. In the same period, in Istanbul alone, there were 16,752 medrese students. But in terms
of state capacity, what was even more shocking was that the minority schools (with only non-
Muslims students) had nearly 20,000 students, again only in Istanbul, and this time the figure included girls as well (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 107).

Following the establishment of the Ministry of Education (Maârif-i Umûmiyye Nezareti), with the Public Education Law of 1869 (Maârif-i Umûmiyye Nizâmnâmesi), elementary schooling was made compulsory. The law assumed a certain modernization of the curriculum and teaching methods. However, the financial responsibility of the central government was perceived as being only partial. The Porte was responsible for the training of teachers, but their salaries were funded locally (Somel 2001). Put differently, although funding of higher education was provided by the state, that of primary education was left to private charity (R. Davison 1990a: 172). Despite this considerable local dependency, at the elementary level the law of 1869 was not entirely unsuccessful. 1895 statistics show that almost “90 percent of school-aged boys and a third of school-age girls were attending elementary school” (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 107), before the turn of the century.

However, together with this accomplishment, there were many areas in which the Ottoman educational system was severely weak. First, even though the ratio of schooling at the elementary level was satisfactory, and there were different institutions for higher education, the ratios of schooling at the intermediate level, i.e., for rüşdiyes, and for high school was disappointingly inadequate. This was an indication of the practical-oriented elitism of Ottoman education reform. After a certain point, the low-schooling ratio for high schools created a problem for higher education, as the higher education colleges were unable to obtain a sufficient pool of students (İhsanoğlu 1995). During the same period, minority and foreign schools established by the Great Powers were more successful in achieving more

19 With a utilitarian agenda, all the institutions for higher education were technical schools. The War College, the Civil Service School (Mekteb-i Mülkiye), the Army Engineering School, the Naval Engineering School, the Imperial Medical School and the Civilian Medical School were all established during the nineteenth century; they were established to train military staff or civil servants, but a proper university could open its door only in 1900.
widespread schooling at the intermediate level. The statistics of 1895 show that the state rüşdiyes had 31,469 Muslim and 4,262 non-Muslim students, whereas non-Muslim rüşdiyes had 76,359 students. The same disproportionate ratio was observed for high schools. State high schools had 4,892 students in 1895, while non-Muslim high schools had 10,720 students, more than double (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 107). This lopsidedness might be better understood in light of the ratio of non-Muslim population to total population: 4,938,362 to 14,111,945. This disparity can be traced to the fact that the commercial bourgeoisie of the empire was predominantly non-Muslim (Göçek 1996: 86).

Second, the project of creating schools where Muslim and non-Muslim would receive their education together failed. The Ottoman state could not incorporate non-Muslims into its own schools. Third, besides being unable to incorporate the minorities into the state schools, the Porte even failed in registering and controlling the minority and foreign schools. There are several records demonstrating this incapability. For instance, Göçek (1996: 86) informs us that an official document of 1894 “revealed that there were 413 foreign and 4,547 minority schools, of which 4,049 operated without a permit from the Ottoman sultan.” Similarly, Deringil notes that an official report discovered that there were almost 200 American educational institutions in the empire. Only four of them had imperial authorization before opening. 75 received official permission only after they started operating, but the majority did not have valid licenses (Deringil 1998a: 131). The second and third weaknesses accelerated the ethnic segmentation in the empire. Different Western-style schools for Muslim and non-Muslim communities led to different and also divergent conclusions for their target communities. Göçek (1993) maintains that while the Ottoman Muslims focused on reforming the state, Westernized education for non-Muslim communities accelerated their political mobilization and eventually the idea of independence. Thus, the non-unity of the education system accelerated the disintegration of the empire.
4.4 Coinage

As it has already been mentioned, financial crises were permanent throughout the nineteenth century. For the Ottoman finance system, debasement of coinage was a common method used to generate medium-run solutions for the crises. The last debasement, which consisted of the establishment of a bimetallic system, took place in 1844, after which no further change in metallic coinage occurred until 1922. But in 1840, the Porte had had its first experience with paper money. This was an interest-bearing paper money, called kaime. Pamuk states that during the Crimean War, the supply of kaime increased to such an extent that its market price in gold lira declined by more than half its nominal value. The inevitable result was a major wave of inflation (Pamuk 1996: 971).

In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the idea of the establishment of banks and the employment of European capital was officially accepted with the Imperial Rescript of 1856. A national bank became indispensable not only to function as the central bank, but also to regulate and facilitate the foreign loans the Porte needed. There were plans to establish the banks with local capital, but it was realized that for international recognition there had to be international capital. With an agreement being reached between British and French capital groups, the Imperial Ottoman Bank was established in 1863. Initially, the Ottoman Bank had 135,000 shares, with 80,000 belonging to a British consortium, and 50,000 to the Bank de Paris; only 5,000 shares consisted of Ottoman assets. The Ottoman Bank was a peculiar mixture of central bank, functioning as the public treasurer, and a commercial bank, with a widespread network of branches. As the central bank, the Ottoman Bank was granted the monopoly of issuing paper money. With the short-term loans of the bank, former kaimes were removed from circulation. In this sense, by privileging the Ottoman Bank, the Porte had transferred a basic state’s power, namely, coinage, to an international consortium, and thus
became dependent on the complex network of informal colonialism for monetary regulation. André Autheman (1996: 51-52) informs us that the bank was also involved in the railway project through an agreement signed by the Porte and the bank for the Istanbul-Edirne line in 1866.

However, the financial dependency of the Ottoman Empire accelerated after the declaration of financial bankruptcy vis-à-vis foreign creditors. The Public Debt Administration (PDA) was established in 1881 as a multi-national body to secure the rights of European creditors and to control the Porte’s resources in order to ensure that the relevant payments be made. Every European nation was represented on the executive board of the PDA and the Ottoman Bank also had a say in the management of the institution. According to Keyder,

The organization built by the PDA was large enough to rival the Ottoman finance ministry, and controlled about one-third of the total revenue of the Empire. The PDA served as an alternative to the formation of a colonial apparatus: it reflected a compromise among rival imperialist powers in establishing a degree of stability in the financial relationship of the Empire with European sources of credits, while the commercial sphere remained open to competition. (Keyder 1987: 40)

In fact, the number of employees of the PDA is a clear indicator of how gigantic was its organizational structure. Soon after its establishment, more than 3,000 people worked there. In 1915, it was more than 5,000. The PDA did not only control one-third of the revenues of the state, but by 1907 it had started controlling almost all of the export earnings of the Porte as well (Kasaba 1988: 110). Revenue sources for the PDA were the salt monopoly, the stamp tax, the fish tax, and the annual tributes from different provinces. The tobacco sector was also left to the monopoly of the PDA and, in 1883 the PDA transferred the tobacco monopoly to a private German-French company, the Régie Cointeressée de Tabacs de l’Empire Ottoman, and shared its profits with the Ottoman treasury. All in all, the PDA was
the ultimate symbol of how the Ottoman sovereignty was limited and of how the Porte was subjugated by informal colonialism.

4.5 The Communication and Transportation Systems

The telegraph was an important innovation of modernity, freeing communication from spatial constraints. It was cheap to establish, therefore, it proliferated rapidly throughout different parts of the world. Although the Morse’s invention was heard and demonstrated in Istanbul in the 1840s, the first telegraph line in Ottoman lands was a submarine line, established by the British and French, between the Crimean peninsula and Varna. This was yet another impact of the Crimean War on the diffusion and exchange of techniques. Subsequently, the British military staff set up another line connecting Istanbul and Varna, and with the installation of a French line between Varna and Bucharest, the capital became part of the European telegraph grid. At the end of the war, a concession was awarded to two enterprising persons, the Frenchman A. de la Rue and the Ottoman citizen Mr. Blacque, for the establishment of the first civil lines. Within couple of years, the Porte had cancelled their contracts and begun setting up telegraph lines in its own capacity. Adopting telegraph technology had two impacts on the Ottoman state. First, this new technology made significant contributions the administrative system. Governmental communication came to be conducted with greater ease and speed. This was especially the case for the Ministry of Finance, for which dependence on local contractors (mültezim) decreased considerably (Ata 1997). Second, less difficult communication facilitated trading, too. For both local and foreign merchants, communication with their European counterparts and following current developments in the world market became easier. Moreover, through the construction of lines to Baghdad and then to Basra, the telegraphic connection between London and India was achieved, which was a high priority for British foreign policy (R. Davison 1990b).
When the issue came to the railroad, the story was very different compared to the telegraph for two reasons: the necessary capital was incomparably higher, and the expertise needed was too difficult to acquire. Yet the entire history of the Ottoman railroad is an excellent example of how the Porte struggled in order to increase its state capacity, because with the advent of railways to the theatre of global hierarchies, they soon became a definitive aspect of state capacity. Following their construction in Egypt and the Balkan provinces, the first lines on the main land were constructed by the British in Western Anatolia, between 1856 and 1866. These Izmir-Aydın and Izmir-Kasaba lines and related privilege contracts were part of the post-Crimean War package, where heavy British hegemony persisted. Yet one should note that, after the 1870s, the Porte attempted to be more active in the construction of railroads, and even tried to depend on its own resources (Engin 2002). But self-funded projects were basic failures, with only a single line of roughly 100 kilometers, between Haydarpaşa and İzmit, starting on the eastern shore of Bosphorus. Subsequently, international incorporation—both in terms of financing the project and construction, and further operating the lines—was accepted as the realistic option.

Pamuk states two main reasons why railroad construction by foreign capital appealed to the Porte. First of all, it was reasonably expected that the decreasing transportation cost would lead to development of export-oriented agriculture in distant areas and would generate more tax revenues. Second, together with its advantage in mobilizing the army, the railroad was expected to reduce central government dependency on local intermediaries for tax collections (Pamuk 1987: 70). In 1888, the Porte signed an agreement with the Deutsche Bank for the eminent Baghdad Railway. This was a shift from the British and French hegemony in the Ottoman economy, which fuelled strong British and French reactions. In the era of informal colonialism, it was evident that strong diplomatic reactions had the potential to
proceed to another level; and for this reason, smaller shares were granted to British and French companies in the consortium (Shaw and Shaw 1992: 227).

There was obviously agency on the part of the Porte in the railroad projects, but by examining the growth of external trade in each region, Pamuk (1987: 68) concludes that these projects were “key developments in the partitioning of the Empire into spheres of influence among the European imperialist powers.” The export of construction equipment and trucks was a major component of the international trade of Europe. Moreover, once the line started operating, the nation that had been granted the privilege had an advantageous position in the zone and could there dominate the trade of the regions penetrated. The arrival of the railroads meant the commercialization of the traditional sector, and rising market relations led to increasing demand for European goods. The advantageous position of the privileged European nation was often supported by the new branches of the same country’s banks, and in several cases, in different infrastructural investments such as water, gas or electricity. Along with the partition into zones of influences, together with construction of line around Izmir, British capital was active in Western Anatolia; French companies dominated the economy in Syria and German capital penetrated Central and Southeast Anatolia with the Baghdad Railway project. This zone of influence through railroad projects was the macro-level connection between informal colonialism and railway construction.

At the micro level, railway construction projects were associated with informal colonialism by a specific mechanism of finance called “kilometric guarantees.” By the initial agreement, a certain minimum revenue per kilometer in operation was agreed upon, and when the actual operation started, if the actual revenue figured out was less than the agreed minimum revenue (which was usually the case), the government had to pay the difference. The PDA acted as the agent through which the payment was made. Donald Quataert (1996: 807) asserts that the system relieved the state of the need to provide start-up capital and left
that burden with private company holding the concession. However, he adds that the kilometric guarantees could serve as a disincentive to more efficient operations. For instance, the designs of the lines included many unneeded curves in order increase the total number of kilometers.

Under these conditions, by the fin-de-siècle there were some 7,500 kilometers of railway line in the entire Ottoman territory. Compared to the Habsburg Empire, however, which had nearly 23,000 kilometers by 1913 on much less territory, it was only a limited achievement. One of the reasons for limited success was the absence of a central coordinating authority to plan railway development (Karkar 1963: 143). But it was still a remarkable improvement, albeit at considerable cost. There are different historical accounts of the financial burden of the railway projects. Quataert (1996: 811-2) argues that “the price paid seem extremely high, mortgaging the future to build in the present, with ever-more intricate entanglements in the European financial web and, hence, additional losses of autonomy.” Optimistic accounts put kilometric guarantee payments between 1889-1911 at 194 million piasters, with tithe collections increasing to 254 million piasters and net profits of 60 million piasters (Engin 2002: 664). Nonetheless, Pamuk (1987: 71) maintains that the kilometric guarantee payments far exceeded the increases on revenues. In addition, Quataert (1996: 812) states that increases in the amount of agricultural tithes collected in the newly opened railroad district offset the sums paid as kilometric guarantee. It is beyond any doubt that all railway projects contributed significantly to the tax collection capacity of the state as well as brought enormous fiscal burden.

4.6 Conclusion

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a system that was capable of reproducing itself autonomously, or as İslamoğlu and Keyder formulate (1990:
61), it was no longer “a self-contained unit of reproduction.” The state was dependent on the network of informal colonialism to generate and modernize its capacity. As the section on the army showed, even the organization of cohesion was problematic, only to be solved (partially) by the support of Great Powers. However, any one sided description of the Ottoman interaction with informal colonial network, only portraying the burdens on the Porte, would be misleading. There were also some crucial benefits for the Ottoman state. Let us focus, for instance, on the case of the PDA, which was a “colonial apparatus” to certain extent. There is no question that the PDA restricted Ottoman sovereignty; and it is not possible to consider it as a mere compromise, preventing direct colonial rule. However, it also offered two advantages to the Porte. First, it somewhat stabilized the Ottoman financial system. Second, “Foreign loans, made possible by the state’s agreement to restructure its international debts and allow formation of the Public Debt Administration, financed the trade deficits” (Quataert 1996: 829). True, most of the new loans facilitated by the PDA were used for interest payments on the former loans, but, still, the remaining amounts were greatly needed. Moreover, it helped in protecting Ottoman financial prestige in international business circles by regulating the exploitation of Ottoman resources (Akarlı 1976: 216).

Table 2 - Ottoman State Capacity and the Network of Informal Colonialism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Dependency on foreign army for securing territorial integrity, Foreign gendarmerie in Macedonia from 1900 onwards, Hundreds of German officials in the Ottoman Army by 1914.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Inability to control the minority and foreign schools, Lower schooling ratio for Muslims compare to minority and foreign schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coinage</td>
<td>Transfer of the monopoly of issuing paper money to the Ottoman Bank, a joint venture of British capital and Banque de Paris, Partial control of the state revenue by the Public Debt Administration (PDA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication System</td>
<td>The Ottoman state was more self-dependent for developing the telegraph system but totally dependent on the railroad system (kilometric guarantees, i.e. Baghdad railway as a autonomous state, within the state)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependency on European experts in various domains of reform efforts

131
A similar argument can be made with respect to the Ottoman Bank. In 1877, just on the eve of yet another war against Russia, the bank contributed significantly to the Ottoman war efforts by playing a role in the Defiance Loan. More remarkably, thinking that it had the monopoly to supply paper money, the bank agreed to suspend its monopoly during the financial crisis of 1878, thereby enabling the Porte to issue new kaimes (Clay 2000: 561). Likewise, in the context of communication and transportation systems, though limited, all the progress was due to the interaction with informal colonial network. All in all, there are good reasons to argue that, in the era of external pressures, the Porte managed to achieve a series of infrastructural improvements. The Ottomanist Engin Akarlı (1976: 221) maintains that infrastructural investments of the Porte “contributed significantly to the political, social and economic integration of Anatolia,” during the War of Independence in the early 1920s.

Ottoman searches for increasing state capacity, in general, and these points, in particular, indicate that the history of the late Ottoman Empire was not written by the Great Powers alone, and the Porte had an active will to be a subject in shaping the history. But this is the point where one must read once more frequently quoted sentence by Karl Marx, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” By the same token, the Porte attempted to shape its own history not in favorable circumstances, but in given circumstances. European capitalist expansion and informal colonialism as a peculiar type of it were the main processes defining these circumstances. In order to tackle these conditions, the Porte ceaselessly strove for more state capacity. The European capitalist expansion was the structural limit in the search for subjectivity. Yet, one more point, one concerning the relation between this structural constraint and political subjectivity, should be underlined. This point is
also important in terms of balancing external stimulus and internal dynamics. Since the structuration theory of the 1980s, it has been widely accepted that “structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (Giddens 1989: 25). This means that one fails to understand the relation between structure and agency if the enabling dimension of the structural relations is not incorporated into the larger picture. The insight contributed by the theorem of the duality of structure is valid when the relation of Ottoman Empire within the complex network of colonialism is taken as a case. Disparities on capital accumulation, technological competence, and military strength determine the structural dimension of this relation. Obviously, there is a constraining dimension of this relation, best illustrated by capitulations. Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the fact that the Ottoman Empire acquired certain abilities through the same network of informal colonialism. As already mentioned above, in the cases of banking and railways, the initial plans concerned making investments with Ottoman resources, but it soon became obvious that the Porte’s financial means were limited, and consequently, the projects came to be realized by international incorporation.

When the overall picture is taken into consideration, this narrative verifies John M. Hobson, who argues that states are not mere victims of foreign powers (1997: 250). For Hobson, the international system and international economic relations have the potential to provide states with the basis for domestic and international power. In this context, Hobson states that partial waiver of sovereignty would not lead in every case to less power for the state. Reading the Ottoman modernization as the history of the Ottoman search for state capacity has a similar approach. True, the increase in capacity was limited when all four items are taken into consideration and in education, for instance, the increase in the capacity was highly dependent on foreign powers, but there was still an increase in state capacity. This is where we have to remember Wallerstein (1989: 177) once more, saying that the Ottoman state
was internally stronger in 1850 compared to 1750, but externally weaker when the same time frame is held. This observation seems true for the whole modernization period. The internal strength was fueled by state capacity, established at the cost of an externally weaker state. Therefore, while talking about the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire by the informal colonialism, the proper interpretation should not depict absolute victimhood, but rather attempt to find a fine balance between subjugation and agency and capacity acquired through the network of informal colonialism.
CHAPTER 5 – TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE YOUNG TURK ERA:  
A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE

It has already been stated in Chapter 2 that there are several reasons for arguing that nationalism outside the Western context is a theoretical question for the social sciences. But why is this the case? Nationalism is mostly theorized as a historical development resulting from the transition to capitalism, and, therefore, whenever nationalism is observed in a pre-capitalist country, theories of nationalism fall short of explaining the phenomenon. At this point, what is needed is the establishment of a more explicit causality between European imperialism and nationalism for the nationalist movements emerged in the spaces of subjugation. The overall argument of this chapter is that the history of Turkish nationalism in the twentieth century should be read in relation to European expansion. Maintaining that Turkish nationalism emerged as a reaction to European expansionism does not mean that external factors were the only determinants. Balancing the external factors with internal stimulus is crucial in discussing Turkish nationalism, and this is one of the aims of this chapter.

It is frequently observed that the efforts of modernization had unintended consequences. The educational reforms initiated by Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1877-1909) shared a similar fate. Together with the despotism of the sultan, these reforms laid the foundation for dissenting intellectuals (Mardin 1983). An émigré opposition consisting of Ottoman intellectuals appeared in Paris and soon established the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1895. Students of the military college, mostly aggravated by the despotism of the sultan, went into self-imposed exile and other Ottoman intellectuals such as Ahmed Rıza and later on Prince Sabahaddin in Paris. When the group called Jeunes-Turcs started publishing Mechveret Supplément Français, they formulated their political perspective by
stating that “nous ne sommes pas des revolutionaire.” At the outset, they limited their demands to the reinstatement of the constitution of 1876, abolished in 1877, and the reopening of parliament. In addition, there was a peculiar positivism, coupled with an anti-imperialist stance, observable in Unionist circles. They were opposed to the capitulations and the privileges to foreign nationals. Şerif Mardin (1969: 9) states that the Unionist anti-imperialism also included certain disillusionment with the West. The focus of this chapter is the emergence of Turkish nationalism at the very end of the nineteenth century. The main argument of the chapter is that this emergence needs to be read as a derivative discourse of informal colonialism. In order to establish a basis for this argument, the first section deals with the revolution of 1908, the CUP and its reactionary social imaginary. The chapter ends by discussing Unionist nationalism in two specific contexts, namely, the economic sphere and ethnic homogenization.

5.1 The CUP and the Revolution of 1908

Internal disagreement within the CUP, together with the fact that the association/party had multiple branches acting like separate wings in different European cities and in Cairo, makes impossible to talk about a monolithic CUP. But from 1900 onwards, a new wing within the CUP had organized as an underground group in the provinces of Macedonia, mostly by young officers. A split within the CUP was hard to avoid, as the group in Macedonia became the most important component within the CUP, even more important than the dissidents in Paris. Suavi Aydın (2001a) summarizes this divide as “two Union and Progresses” and “two styles of politics.” Accordingly, the first CUP, or the émigré opposition, was basically composed of civilians, and had internalized a certain open style of discussion within the group. It was explicitly Ottomanist, and did not appropriate a nationalist stand as the remedy to the

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20 Mechveret (Supplément français), no. 1, 1 December 1895.
21 For instance, Mardin (1964: 45) maintains that in 1895, there were at least four wings or groups of Jeunes-Turcs, one being in Istanbul.
persistent problems of the empire. There was a strong French component evident in the intellectual background of this group. Aydın states that the second CUP, the underground organization in Macedonia, was first recognizable as a distinct group with dubious tie to the émigré opposition. The second CUP was founded primarily by officers and low-ranking civil servants who were discontent with the strict censorship of the sultan. It was almost a paramilitary organization—bands—lacking intellectual leadership, active formally and informally in the ethnic conflict of the Balkans. Their political imagination was mostly shaped by Prussian outlooks, specifically the ideas voiced by Prussian military staff.

Since the 1890s, Ahmed Rıza had been an outspoken opponent of using violence for their political cause. However, at the second congress of CUP, held in Paris in 1907, a consensus was reached to incorporate violent means for their ends. At this moment, the Unionist circles had a truly Ottomanist stance, and the émigré opposition, in particular, was careful to establish positive liaisons with the Armenian opposition movement, given that the latter supported revolutionary violence against Sultan Abdülhamid. The shift to accepting violence was an important step for the quasi-paramilitary groups in Salonika. The young officers in Macedonia had been waiting for the specific moment to revolt against the Sultan. They decided that the long-awaited moment had arrived when the Russian tsar and King Edward VII of Britain met in Reval on 9-10 June 1908. According to the news arriving in Salonika, at the end of the summit, Russia and Britain reached a consensus on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The news reported that the initial steps of the partition plans concerned Macedonia. The Russian-British plan foresaw foreign control of Macedonia, which would reduce the Sultan’s sovereignty to mere suzerainty. The young Unionist officers considered that the sultan and his government were ready to compromise with this plan. Then, a Unionist officer Enver Bey, together with another Unionist Major Ahmed Niyazi, positioned themselves in the hills, with a few hundred troops at most. Though their troops were limited,
they were ready for a long-term guerrilla-type battle. Through a declaration addressed to the Palace Secretariat, the Inspector-General of Rumelia and the province of Manastır, they manifested the political dimension of their disobedience and their demands, which was the restoration of the constitution and the reopening of parliament.

Most of commentators agree that, at the beginning, the sultan was unable to estimate the seriousness of the problem. He sent a military inspector to Manastır, but Şemsi Pasha was shot dead, without having been able to suppress the uprising. Then, Anatolian troops supposedly faithful to their sultan were transferred to Macedonia, but thanks to the success of Young Turk propaganda, they refused to fight against the rebellious groups. On 23 July, 1908 the CUP proclaimed the constitution, and this was followed within hours by similar declarations in other cities in Macedonia. The Sultan chose to accept their demands (Lewis 1961: 209). The Unionists emerged as the heroes of freedom in a short period of time, much shorter than they anticipated.

It has always been a source of contention in the historiography of modern Turkey whether it is more appropriate to speak of the declaration of the constitutional regime as a coup d’état or, on the contrary, to refer to it as the “Revolution of 1908.” If we were to follow strictly such approaches as “narrative positivism” (Abbott 1992), “evenemental sociology” (Sewel 1996), or “event-structure analysis” (Griffin 1993), it would be hard to deny that what happened in the summer of 1908 was a coup. A relatively small number of disobedient troops, led by young officers, made a demand without any reliable public support, and the sultan accepted it in order to safeguard his position as well as to prevent any civil war. In effect, what happened in the summer of 1908 can read as proof what was already argued in Chapter 4: the state capacity of the Ottoman Empire was limited. Obviously, one must also add that together with this low level state capacity, the regime of Abdülhamid had been suffering a

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22 In his memoires, Ahmed Rıza (1988) argued that the Paris-wing of the CUP had coordinated the rebellious officers of Macedonia, and even supplied them financial means from Paris. With due respect to the narrative positivism, one must note that this narrative remains fictive.
deep legitimacy crisis for more than two decades. The legitimacy crisis was probably a more crucial factor explaining the sultan’s submission.

But at least equally important, the popular celebrations for the restoration of the constitution support the revolution thesis. The masses in different cities of the empire, seemingly not interested in the underground activities of the CUP bands, were extremely happy about the constitutional monarchy. In every major city of the empire, huge demonstrations were organized to celebrate the end of Abdülhamid’s despotism, though he was still the sultan. Considerable photographic material about these mass rallies makes it possible to indicate two points: a) peoples of the empire participated in these rallies in large numbers, and b) in the rallies it was obvious that the participants were comparing the summer of 1908 in Ottoman Empire to the 1789 French Revolution. The banners at the rallies contained the slogan “Hürriyet, Müsavat, Uhuvet,” together with its French original “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.” The masses added “justice” (adalet) to the French tripartite motto. “Tremendous joy and relief” (Zürcher 2004: 93) was the atmosphere common to the rallies. People from all social backgrounds and different communities, Muslims, Jews and Christians, celebrated the end of Abdülhamid’s era, which lasted more than three decades. 1908 was a time for optimism.

In the historiography of the Young Turks, another discussion concerns the role of the Reval meeting in the sequence of events: how much the summit held between the Russian tsar and King Edward VII of Britain contributed to the revolution? For Feroz Ahmad, without denying the psychological significance of Reval on the reformers, the origins of the insurrection must be sought elsewhere (Ahmad 1969: 3-4). By relying on the memoires of key Unionist figures, such as Enver, Niyazi and Fethi (Okyar), Eric Jan Zürcher (1984: 43) disagrees with Ahmad and argues for the significance of the Reval meeting. Şükrü Hanioğlu emphasizes the fact that for the Muslim community of Macedonia, the fear of a European
intervention, first favoring the Christians and then detaching their provinces from the rest of Ottoman territory, was real. Then Hanioğlu (2001: 237) concludes that the Reval meeting provided the Unionists with a propaganda thesis and also encouraged the Unionist leaders to risk all.

Evidently, no one can explain an event such as the Revolution of 1908 without incorporating its inner dynamics into the analysis. Donald Quataert (1979) states that the severe winter in early 1907, and subsequent drought in the spring resulted in crop failure and an increase in food prices to unprecedented heights on the eve of the revolution.23 Zürcher notes increasing discontent in the army from 1906 to 1908 because of the rising prices. Delays in the payment of salaries were not uncommon. Beyond army circles, in the empire, strikes and small-scale rebellions were signs of discontent (Zürcher 2001: 90). While incorporating the internal factor into his analysis Hanioğlu focuses primarily on the local specificities of Macedonia. As already put forward in Chapter 4 (see 4.2), in the first decade of the twentieth century, the Porte had accepted a series of foreign intervention for the provinces of Macedonia, including foreign gendarmerie commanders and other international agents. Therefore, when the Unionist propagandist voiced the fear of foreign intervention (or Christian domination), for the Muslim population of the region, it was something tangible. Hanioğlu (2001: 238) reads from the memoires of the leading Unionists resentful comments regarding the arrogance of foreign representatives.

In effect, what is implied by Hanioğlu is the causal impact of European penetration, even as he refers to internal factors. In this context, it is safe to argue that the foremost priority for the Young Turks was the survival of the Ottoman state. Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1996: 66-69) maintained that the political climate of the Young Turk era was dominated by the question “Bu devlet nasıl kurtarılabilir?—How can this state be saved?” Keyder (1987: 54)

23 Quataert adds to his analysis international factors, such as “brief but severe American financial crisis ... causing Istanbul and Anatolian bankers and merchants to tighten their credits,” or crop failure observed both domestically and internationally (Quataert 1979).
adds “thus, ‘saving the state’ became the symbolic formula for safeguarding the traditional order with the privileged status of the bureaucracy.” Once saving the state was determined to be the foremost item on their agenda having the greatest urgency, the Young Turks—especially the second CUP of Salonika, agents of the revolution,24 underestimated how much effort it would take to build a complex ideological system of thought and privileged activism, the real asset of the Unionist soldiers. In such an atmosphere, the modernization project articulated by the Young Turks was shaped as “defensive” and “conservative modernization” (Kabakçı 2006: 170). It was a defensive modernization project because its basis was the need to acquire enough domestic stability and strength to protect the state against European imperialism. In this sense, “national security,” which was in extreme danger, was the basic political item (Ward and Rustow 1964b).

5.2 The Unionist Social Imaginary: Reactionary Modernism

Why should the Young Turks modernization project be defined as “conservative”? Put succinctly, it is because of its European intellectual origins. Most of the Young Turks, both members of the émigré opposition and the Macedonia wing, were highly influenced by the fin-de-siècle reactionarism of Europe. Mostly fuelled by German romanticism and its suspicion of the rationality of the Enlightenment, but equally nourished by French conservatism, reactionarism was basically discontent with the social change of the industrial society, such as class struggle, urban problems, disappearance of old aristocratic manners and

24 The argument put forward by S. Aydın (2001a) about two distinct CUPs makes sense when we remember the fact that there is almost no staff continuity from the émigré opposition to the CUP of the parliamentary era. The only exceptions are Bahaettin Şakir and Doctor Nâzım; no other members of the émigré opposition were able to attain positions of real influence. Ahmed Rıza was accepted by the Unionists of Macedonia to symbolize the long-lasting fight against Abdülhamid’s despotism. He was, therefore, elected as the president of the parliament, but again void of any real influence. The historian Kemal Karpat’s interpretation supports the “two distinct CUP” thesis: “Aside from certain talks held between a representative of the Young Turks living abroad and the Union and Progress members of in Salonica, there is not yet truly convincing evidence that the two collaborated in any meaningful fashion. ... In principle, one must regard the revolt of 1908 solely as the work of the Salonica and Monastir organizations and consider the Young Turk associations abroad only superficially related to it.” (Karpat 1975: 291)
privileges, among others. Moreover, reactionarism considered the political systems that incorporated the masses by formal equality as a novel problem created by the modern society. Thus, they had objections to the parliamentary model and the principle of electoral equality. At face value, the project of Young Turks could be read as a peculiar synthesis of German reactionarism with French ideals such as constitutionalism and parliament. But this is inaccurate for two reasons: first, reactionarism was by no means a German monopoly. On the contrary, throughout the Third Republic, it was equally vocal in France. The historian Zafer Toprak (1977) notes that the intellectual climate of Third Republic France was very influential for both the Young Turks and republican leaders of Turkey. Second, Hanioğlu (1995: 31) argues that for the Young Turks, the constitution was just a romantic symbol of Western modernity, and concepts such as “parliament” or “representative government” meant little to them. For some Unionists, these concepts were understood as tools to be used in preventing the intervention of the Great Powers, and for others, the lack of parliament and the suspended constitution of 1876 were symbols of the sultan’s despotism. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the Unionist politicians to be true lovers of democracy. Furthermore, Hanioğlu notes that the French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon and his book *La psychologie des foules* (1895) had an impact on Unionists attitude towards parliament. The main idea of *La psychologie des foules* was that the crowd is a dangerous body, and “assemblies are a type of mob that could be hazardous to any society” (Hanioğlu 1995: 32). Conceiving the parliament within such a framework could not lead to a democratic political culture. Following the 23 July, 1908 there was an optimistic atmosphere in Ottoman cities, and it was easy to detect the spirit of freedom in the air. Even the boom in the number of newspapers and journals in all languages of empire’s communities was proof of the fact that the basic slogan of the revolution, “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” could become the reality of the empire. But soon afterwards, the CUP supported a labor legislation that banned trade
unions and made strike action very difficult. This was the end of widespread strikes that had been made possible by the revolutionary atmosphere of the freedom of thought.\textsuperscript{25}

In this context, this section argues, by focusing on three snapshots of the phenomenon, that the Unionist social imaginary was mostly shaped by reactionary modernism: first, the ideas of Prince Sabahaddin are examined; then, how the idea of a military-nation gained currency in the Unionist era is reviewed; and finally, the solidarism of the Young Turk period is emphasized. When I use the concept social imaginary, I generally follow the ideas of Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis reserves a special place to social imaginary, when he deals with the question “what holds a society together.” He does not exclude the institutional dimension in the process of institution of society. This dimension is crucial to understand the “unity of the total institution of society” (Castoriadis 1997: 7). But he also adds the unity of the society depends on the complex web of meanings, beyond the institutional setting. This complex web of meanings is the source of social imaginary significations, and it permeates, orients, and directs the whole life of the society. In Castoriadis’ understanding, polis, gods, God, citizen, nation, state, party, money, taboo, virtue or sin are all examples of social imaginary. He qualifies these significations as imaginary, “because they do not correspond to, or are not exhausted by, references to ‘rational’ or ‘real’ elements and because it is through a creation that they posited” (Castoriadis 1997: 8). The significations are social because they are formed and shared by an anonymous collective. Through social imagination, what is “real” and what is not, and what is “meaningful” and what is meaningless is determined. In this sense, the social imagination supplies an organizational, informational and cognitive closure.

By focusing on these three snapshots, my aim is to decipher how the Unionists imagined society, members of society, and the political realm. Then, the subsequent section examines the concrete steps taken by the CUP towards making this social imaginary a reality.

\textsuperscript{25} In the second half of 1908, more than 100 strikes were observed in the Ottoman territories (Karakışla 1995). For a detailed account of “strike wave” on 1908, see (Sencer 1969: 172-210).
5.2.1 Prince Sabahaddin and La Science Sociale

Although a member of sultan’s family, Prince Sabahaddin moved to Paris in 1899 with his father Mahmud Pasha to support the émigré opposition. Indeed, this support from the sultanate family was crucial for the movement at a time of despair and disintegration. Relatively quickly, Sabahaddin appeared as a leader within the CUP and, in 1902, he organized “the Congress of Ottoman Liberals” in Paris. If Ahmed Rıza was the leader of centralist wing, Sabahaddin was the spokesperson for those who defended decentralization. In 1906, he established the Private Enterprise and Decentralization Association (Teşebbüsü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti) and, following the revolution of 1908, his followers established the Party of Ottoman Liberals (Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası). In Turkish studies literature, Sabahaddin has been canonized as the first liberal in Turkish political thought.26 But, despite the title of “first liberal,” the intellectual sources of Sabahaddin were anything but liberal: he was mostly influenced by the French authors Frédéric Le Play and Edmond Demolins (Zürcher 1984: 17), who were not known as liberals, apart from their peculiar admiration for the British education system.

Aykut Kansu (2001a) then asks the following question: if in his writing he never refers to the classical founding fathers of liberalism but only to some obscure figures in French pedagogy, and if his arguments seem closer to reactionarism than liberalism, why should Sabahaddin be accepted as a liberal? Kansu suggests re-writing the biography of Sabahaddin by focusing on Demolins and the intellectual circle around the journal La Science Sociale. This group was driven by nostalgia for the pre-1789 period; put differently, they defended a glorified feudal social system. It is within this sense that they formulated decentralization, a system where the aristocracy would act as a balance between the state and the ruled. Demolins observed that throughout the history, whenever there is a strong state, the result was

26 For an example of how this canon was established, see (Mardin 1964: 215-224).
not promising for the well-being of the people. According to Kansu, the ideal of freedom, observed both in Demolins and Sabahaddin is to be understood within the framework of decentralization, without any reference to the late nineteenth century liberalism and its understanding of freedom, which is based on the idea of social contract.

Moreover, Kansu notes that the circle of *La Science Sociale* had disgust for capitalism, including the modern production system and its repercussions such as class struggle. Likewise, they were highly critical of democratic representation, which denied all aristocratic privileges. The nostalgia for aristocracy led them to articulate a peculiar individualism. Sabahaddin appreciated this individualism and argued later on that every region should be governed by the most powerful man of the region—possibly the richest landowner. He also suggests that the local notables should act as judges. Once more, Kansu observes a parallelism between this suggestion and French reactionary nostalgia for the pre-1789 period, claiming that the judiciary is a natural duty (and right) of aristocracy. Needless to say, a position disgusting capitalism and democratic representation could hardly be liberal. But different from his French role models, not only did Sabahaddin label himself as such, so did public opinion. This shows how the concepts of constitutionalism and parliament were understood in the first decade of twentieth century. Their meanings were detached from democracy and pluralism; liberalism was not known in its proper sense and, consequently, nobody, including himself, could identify the gap between Sabahaddin’s idea and liberalism. The influence of *La Science Sociale* on Sabahaddin can be noted as an instance of how the intellectual climate of France of the Third Republic shaped the intellectual background of the Young Turk era.

5.2.2 The Idea of military-nation

The reactionary modernism of the Young Turks was not only influenced by French sources, but German sources were equally influential. Hanioğlu indicates *Das Volk in Waffen* (The Nation in Arms) as an important book to understand the mentality of Young Turks in the post-
revolutionary era. Written by Baron von der Goltz in 1883, it was immediately translated into Ottoman Turkish as Miillet-i Müsellaha in 1884, with the second edition appearing in 1888 (Altınay 2004: 14). According to Goltz, the military had to play an active role in reshaping society because the armed forces represent almost the distilled essence of the nation (Jenkins 2007). In his view, the best way to preserve peace was organizing the nation by considering each member as soldier. Once the military organization of the nation has been established, “all the intellectual and material resources of the nation” will be “available for the purpose of carrying [out] a war” (quoted in Lauterbach 1944).

Şükrü Hanioğlu (2011: 34-35) informs us that Goltz thought that his ideas were particularly applicable to the Ottoman Empire, where an “honorable, proud, brave and religious people ... deprived of the leadership of the upper class” cried for the guidance of a new officer class. According to Hanioğlu, the absence of strict distinction between civil and military spheres in the Ottoman society made the military commanders as the natural leaders of the society. Moreover, it was usual to see the commanders as cabinet ministers in the political arena. In this context, the idea of military nation became the world-view of several generation Ottoman officers from 1886 onward. Hanioğlu concludes that Goltz’s ideas gained more currency in the Ottoman Empire than they did in Germany.

For the Unionist leaders, Goltz’s theory of military-nation was crucial in determining the role of the army: it no longer functioned to conquer new territories, but rather to play an active role in society. For the military Unionists, the army was the symbol of the Ottoman nation and it was the army’s task to lead society on its path towards progress. In the post-1908 period a Unionist from the army said:

The Ottoman army should become the Ottoman armed nation. This is a paramount objective that from now on must be engraved in the depths of the heart and conscience of every individual possessing the revered title of Ottoman. All endeavors, all efforts, all sacrifices, and all steps should aim this sacred goal. (quoted in Hanioğlu 2001: 294)
After appropriating the idea of the military-nation as a framework within which to comprehend politics, society and the world around, the Unionist leaders—who were already soldiers by profession—could not stop categorizing everything seen as friend and foe. Such a perception was not highly problematical when it was employed on the level of international politics. It was the eve of a world war. Moreover, some European states had claims on Ottoman territories, and peace was hardly secured among Balkan states. But, more problematically, the Unionists started to employ the same perspective while thinking about their own society. Then the question became who was fit to be a soldier, and who was not. Subsequently, non-Muslims came to be viewed as suspect, unfit to be trusted as soldiers.27 While thinking about the institution of society, Castoriadis says that in the social imaginary, man/woman/child are specified in a given society beyond biological definitions, and they become real by virtue of the social imaginary significations. This was also the case for the Unionist social imaginary. People were coded as soldiers or enemy by the new ruling imagination.

5.2.3 Solidarism, corporatism and the CUP

The ideas coming from the circle of La Science Sociale or Prussian ideas of military-nation were not the only sources of Unionist reactionarism. Another pillar of Young Turks reactionary modernism was solidarism, which had flourished again in France. Toprak (1977) states that solidarism was a component of official ideology in the French Third Republic

27 It should be noted that, ever since the Unionist era, the idea of military-nation has been a part of Turkish political discourse, particularly with respect to the army, where its currency is observable. For instance, in the 1990s, a military spokesman talked about “the Turkish Nation and its essence - the Armed Forces” (Türk Milletini ve onun özü Sillahi Kuvvetleri) at an ordinary press conference, by reproducing the discourse “the armed forces represent the distilled essence of the nation.” This discourse offers a peculiar way of reading history: it is assumed that, at the beginning, there were armed forces—as the essence—without there as yet being a nation. Then, during the phase of the establishment of nation, its essence—its armed forces—representing the common characteristics, constructed the other components of the nation (Insel 1995: 300). The anthropologist Ayeş Güll Altunay (2004) offers a brilliant account of the continuity of the myth of military-nation in Turkey, from early twentieth century to present, in her historical ethnography.
(1870-1940). Basically, it was search for an alternative, a third way, other than liberalism and socialism and a prescriptive understanding of society, denying the existence of social classes and class conflict. It did not exclude entrepreneurial freedom but rather privileged governmental intervention in the economy and aimed at establishing organic solidarity, and cooperation among different elements of society. Solidarism (tesanîçüülük) was accepted by the Unionists as a convincing framework through which to deal with social diversity. They modified their solidarism with another outcome of Third Republic sociologisme, namely corporatism.

In the post-1908 period, Durkheim was read intensively by Unionist intellectuals as a figure synthesizing solidarism and corporatism, and his perspective on solidarism and corporatism were appreciated more than any other part of his thought (Toprak 1980). Steven Lukes (1985: 351-354) states that though he was not in the main stream of solidarism, Durkheim shared a number of common ideas with solidarists, such as organic solidarity in the sense of conflict-free interdependence, the emphasis on just contracts, and solidarity through reconciliation. Although some commentators do not see a tension between Durkheim’s commitment to corporatism and democracy, for instance for Mackert (2004), Durkheim’s corporatism was tied to the stabilization of democratization, there is enough evidence to argue the opposite. As a moralist, Durkheim considered “malady of infinite aspiration” as a basic problem of modern society. He criticized the liberal state, which situates itself too remotely from individuals and limits its scope as the guardian of contracts. According to Durkheim’s corporatism, the corporation can have the capacity to regulate desires, through a control extending to the greatest part of life (Kaufman-Osborn 1986). Durkheim made explicit the advantage of corporation to the existing trade-unions in his book Division of Labor in Society: all agents of the same industry will be united and organized into a single group (Durkheim 1964: 5), and hence the corporation will draw its members into an integrated totality. In this
totality, individuals will act according to ends which are not strictly their own. Therefore, the corporation will not only erase class conflict, but also teach its members to make concessions, to consent to compromises, to take into account interests higher than their own. Such a social imagination was indeed a normative suggestion of an integrative moral system, which would counterbalance the atomistic tendency of modern society by a collective morality (Ritzer 1996: 205). Once this point was reached, it was one step left to replace the democratic representation with corporatist representation based on professional groups. For the Unionist readers of Durkheim, it was an easy step.

Different Unionist intellectuals, namely Ziya Gökalp, Necmettin Sadik (Sadak), Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) and Zekeriya (Sertel), played an active role in importing the solidarist and corporatist ideas to Turkey. According to Toprak, these ideas became visible in three ways: “political populism,” “economic solidarism,” and “social solidarism.” The “political populism” (siyasî halkçılık) meant a nationalist stand against extraterritorialities to foreigners and non-Muslims, including the capitulations. “Economic solidarism” (İktisadî solidarizm) concerned privileging state-centered capitalism, without a specific restriction for private entrepreneurship. And “social solidarism” (İçtimaî solidarizm) suggested the formation of corporations (or groupements professionnels) to become the real basis of society (Toprak 1977). The populist perspective summarized itself by the motto, “no class, but professions!” (sınıf yok meslek var).

Among the Unionist intellectuals influenced by the solidarist and corporatist framework was Tekin Alp, who was an interesting figure. A Jew of Salonika by the name of Moiz Cohen, he renamed himself as Tekin Alp and acted as an early theorist of Turkish nationalism. In his post-1908 writings, he constantly emphasized the ideas of national economy as a patriotic duty and the principle of solidarity (Landau 1984: 17). He believed that a nation could achieve a high standard of civilization through a strong internalization of
capitalism, and that nationalism, in its forms observed in various countries, only supported capitalism. Yet, throughout its emergence, nationalism had an enemy, and that was socialism. For this reason, Tekin Alp argued that it was necessary to lighten the impact of capitalism. Accordingly, after long and dragged out struggles, nations that had undergone an awakening earlier came up with a formula that synthesized the positive aspects of nationalism and socialism, under solidarism (tesanütçülük). If the Turks were to follow the same path by adopting solidarism, they would be able to prevent the eruption of socialism, and hence, the essence of Turkish nationalism would remain intact (Toprak 1977).

So far, three snapshots about the reactionary social imaginary of the Unionists, namely the influence of La Science Sociale, the idea of the military nation and the set of solidarism/corporatism, have been focused on. But this social imaginary distant to the idea of democracy was not only observable at the level of ideas. It had a direct impact on the daily politics, which was best observed in the Unionist Coup of 1913 (the Bab-ı Ali coup or Bâb-ı Âli Baskını). From the Revolution of 1908 till 1913, the CUP was not directly in power. The governments of this period were mostly coalitions depending on the support of the CUP. Towards the end of 1912, the allied Balkan states mobilized for war against the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman army had to withdraw to Çatalca, a town near Istanbul, by evacuating the vast majority the European territory of the empire. The most significant loss was Edirne, the second Ottoman capital with a Muslim population. During the international peace conference in London, the Unionist leaders suspected that the pro-British Grand Vizer Kâmil Pasha would cede Edirne to the Bulgarians. Then, a group of Unionists, including Enver, raided the cabinet meeting, shot the war minister and took the members of the cabinet prisoner (Zürcher 2004: 108). Acting under duress, Kâmil Pasha wrote his resignation. This was the end of indirect rule of the CUP and the beginning of direct rule of Unionists. From
1913 until 1918, the empire was rule by a virtual military dictatorship of Unionist triumvirs, namely, Enver, Talât and Cemal pashas (Lewis 1961: 225).

To conclude this section, these three snapshots indicate the complexities of importing ideas from Europe to the locality. The process of appropriating intellectual role models was a process which was both complex and one-dimensional. It was one-dimensional, because the second half of the nineteenth century was a period when the canon of democratic pluralism was hardly canonized. In fin-de-siècle Europe, the reactionarism was quite widespread. In this context, there were a series of reactionary modernism available to the Unionists, and this created a complex process. Moreover, I argue that the urgency of “saving the state” led the Unionists to read available materials superficially. When they tried to grasp the ongoing debates, materials external to the progressive canon of European thought, appeared more attractive to them. In his book La Turquie entre l’ordre et le développement, Ahmet İnsel maintains that the political imagination the Young Turks was a despotic model—supposedly enlightened, where elitism and one-party system were established as the basic principles of the regime. For İnsel (1984: 82), one can observe the continuity of the Unionist political imagination in the republican period, as the idea of “society without classes” or the faith on the engine role of elites does not disappear. In this sense, the conservative modernization project of the Unionist era persisted into the republican period. The persistence was mostly facilitated by the adoption of nationalism by the republican regime, made-up of the CUP. The next section is about how nationalism emerged as a reaction to informal colonialism, together with relevant theoretical issues and repercussion of Turkification project.
5.3 The Unionist nationalism:

Anti-imperialism and Turkification of the Economic Sphere

In her remarkable historical sociology of the nineteenth century-Ottoman Empire, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, Fatma Müge Göçek (1996) offers an account of how embourgeoisement was achieved by non-Muslim communities. This uneven embourgeoisement led to the Muslim people being practically left out of the commercial bourgeoisie. By the incorporation of the Empire into the world economy, non-Muslim communities of the Empire started to play an intermediary role between the local economies and the global markets. They mostly benefitted from extraterritorial rights by obtaining passports of European states, thus having an advantageous position with respect to their local counterparts as well as local authorities. Throughout the process, it is undeniable that the Ottoman Muslims grew resentful of them. In this context, opposing European economic penetration had the potential of becoming entangled with a stand against non-Muslims.

As already mentioned, since the beginning, anti-imperialism had been an important component of the ideological repertoire of the CUP. Hanioğlu informs us that the Unionists viewed European policies directed against the Ottoman Empire as a specific case of larger European imperialism, the massacre of the American Indians and the plunder of Africa. They were convinced that the next target was the Ottoman Empire (Hanioğlu 2001: 302). Despite being utterly anti-imperialist, for good reasons, namely, saving the state, Keyder observes that the Unionists had limited understanding of the mechanism of imperialism (1987: 53). He adds that “they were surprisingly ignorant of political economy” (Keyder 1997). This made them naïve about the limits of their political subjectivity. At the intuitive level, they were aware of European penetration. But they were unable to forecast how it was a structural mechanism having the capacity to limit their agencies. For the Unionists, the capitulations were the utmost symbol of European imperialism. In addition, because of their naivety, following the
revolution of 1908, they expected the European states to support the victors of liberty, which had defeated Ahdülhamid’s despotism. For them, the best way that the Europeans could show their solidarity would be to abolish the capitulations. Of course, this did not happen. For European diplomats, the capitulations were not privileges but basic rights of their states or their citizens (F. Ahmad 2000a), a normal fact of the complex network of informal colonialism.

Parvus, a rather unusual member of the Unionist circle, helped them to go beyond this naivety. A Marxist of the Second International, a German economist and businessman and a Russian Jew by origin, Alexander Helphand, or as he is known by his pen name Parvus, was among the first who could utter the semi-colonial position of the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher 2004: 125). This was almost a new phase for the Unionist anti-imperialism. While he was an economic and policy advisor to the CUP, Parvus had stated that despite having been formally accepted into the Concert of Europe, the Ottoman Empire had not been accepted as an equal member of the European power equation. On the contrary, the Empire was a target for the imperialist aggression of European capitalism. He suggested conceptualizing the relations of European powers with the Ottoman Empire as a “colonial exploitation.” Having said that, Parvus inserted the idea of “national economy” (millî iktisat) to the Unionist parlance, and formulated the problem as a question of national independence and economic recovery (Berkes 1998: 425).

The idea of national economy appealed considerably to the theorists of Turkish nationalism. A common theme of early period nationalist discourse was the need for a Turkish bourgeois class. The creation of a national bourgeoisie was accepted as the primary target of national economy. As a leading theorist of Turkish nationalism, Yusuf Akçura stated,
The foundation of the modern state is the bourgeois class. Contemporary prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, of the businessmen and bankers. The Turkish national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie (quoted in Berkes 1998: 425).

Yet, so long as the capitulations continued, the creation of an indigenous bourgeoisie did not seem likely. The Unionists found the opportunity, for which they had been looking, with World War I. In September 1914, the Porte sent a note to all countries that held extraterritorial privileges, declaring the unilateral abrogation of the capitulations (İnalcık 1986). This had both symbolic and concrete importance. 10 September, the day after the note was delivered, became a day of public celebration, and the press referred to it as a day of freedom and independence (F. Ahmad 2000a). Conditions were ripe for the creation of a national economy. Indeed war conditions meant an increase in international demand for Ottoman goods. After the Ottoman army stopped the Entente troops in the Dardanelles, Unionist leaders became more self-confident. Market conditions appeared to have stabilized as of 1915 and an Entente occupation of Istanbul was not anticipated for anytime soon.

Since the beginning of the Unionist era, there had been an urgent need of revenue for the new projects, such as increasing the security level of provinces or improving communication networks. Thus, ever since 1908, étatism had been on the agenda. However, after the abrogation of the capitulations, Unionist étatism became entangled with the aim of creating a national bourgeoisie—one which was Muslim and Turkish. Even on the eve of abrogation, the government introduced a “Bill to Encourage Industry.” The bill announced that indigenous manufactures would be given preference and the operation of local factories would be facilitated. It also obliged the government to purchase from the indigenous manufacturers, even if the foreign substitutes were cheaper by as much as 10 percent (F. Ahmad 1980). In February 1916, a law introducing the policy of import substitution policy was passed. The law had two components. First, it increased customs tariffs to 30 percent on
goods in sectors receiving government “encouragement,” and to 100 percent in sectors under the “protection” of the government (F. Ahmad 1980).

Through protectionist étatism, a significant increase in the number of companies with indigenous capital investment had been achieved. While before 1908 there had been just a handful of joint-stock companies operating without international capital, in just five short years, between 1909 to 1913, 27 industrial companies operating with indigenous capital, for a total capitalization of 79.2 million piasters, were established. Sina Akşin (1995) concludes “this means a five-fold increase in the number of companies per year, and a nine-fold increase in yearly capital.” Equally remarkable was that the flourishing companies were not limited to Istanbul or to other major trade centers, but they were fairly widespread in Anatolia. The government initiated a law in March 1916 prohibiting the use of foreign languages in all companies in their written exchange with their customers and government. The intention was to restrict international firms more, after the abrogation of capitulations, and to replace French—the lingua franca—with Turkish. Toprak (1982: 79-83) maintains that following the new regulation, some international companies stopped their activities, while others preferred to accept the new rule. Indeed, the Unionist aimed to have more Turks working in international firms, which had not the case hitherto. As the conditions for international banks were made tougher, new city-banks were established with indigenous capital in relatively small cities in Anatolia such as Akşehir, Karaman, or Adapazari. In addition, several other companies in various sectors became active in Anatolia, again with indigenous capital. Indeed, the Unionist network was quite active in spreading the entrepreneurial spirit among the Turkish population. F. Ahmad (1980) states that “most of the companies—small and large—set up in the towns of Anatolia were established under the initiative of the local CUP club… Almost every Anatolian town of any size had a trading company, and it would seem
that in most of the cases the local branch of the CUP was responsible for setting up these enterprises.”

By mostly drawing on Toprak (1977; 1982: 345-351) and other historians, I have already argued that the Unionists had internalized the capitalist model as part of their ideological repertoire, or, put differently, the economic model that they had was one based on state-centered capitalism. In order to see how Unionist étatism was state capitalism, we need to go back to the anti-strike law of 1908, where the railway workers’ strike had been forced to discontinue. This episode shows us, once more, the relevance of state capacity, irrespective of the source of the capital generating it. The historian Yavuz Selim Karakışla informs us that an important component of the Strike Wave of 1908 was the railway workers’ strike. The Anatolian, Rumeli, Aydın, Oriental and Beirut-Damascus-Hama lines, which made up nearly the entire railway network of the Empire, were closed. Soon after the strike began, Unionist papers began publishing criticisms of the railway workers, labeling their demands unrealistic. The Unionist columnists argued that the nation would not allow them to keep railways closed, and suggested replacing the strikers with soldiers as an implicit threat. As it had already been shown in Chapter 4 (see 4.5), the railways companies were international joint-stock companies operating on the basis of kilometric guarantee system. In short, they were by no means the national establishment. Here we have arrived at the crucial moment: what should be the position of the Unionists, trying to formulate their ideas of “national economy,” with respect to these international firms and the Ottoman workers? They did not hesitate in the slightest; the Strike Law (Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu) accepted these companies as public investment and legislated that strikes of public workplaces are forbidden. Sami Pasha, then general of the gendarmerie, stated “as the [railway] strikes will cause an increase in the kilometric guarantee system, it is harmful to the Ottoman government. For this reason, it should be banned with all kinds of legal means” (Karakışla 1995). This Unionist stand
showed how easily the symbols of European economic penetration—international railways companies—were transferred to the domain of the national when the state capacity was jeopardized. As is the case with every government, the Unionists were also in search of greater capacity to govern the country, and therefore, they were ready to compromise on how they defined the “national.” This was the nature of state-centered capitalism.

5.4 The Unionist Nationalism: Turkification of Anatolia

Soon afterwards, international business as well as diplomatic circles started to condemn the Unionist “national economy” policy as xénophobie. Tekin Alp refuted the claim and stated that foreigners, who were used to seeing a lazy (miskin) Turkish nation, were then surprised to encounter Turks pursuing their own interests (Toprak 1982: 93-95). By 1908, some Western observers had already been calling attention to the chauvinistic tendencies of the Unionists. However, the summer of 1908 was probably too early to make such a judgment. Moreover, the economic sphere was by no means the right place to look for the chauvinistic policies of the Unionists. The chauvinism of the Unionists was best observed in their violent and large-scale Turkification policies.

The Unionist era was shaped mostly by wars: first, the Turco-Italian wars of 1911-1912, the two Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and then, from 1914 onwards, World War I. With war raging, the CUP unofficially set up the Committee of National Defense (CND, Müdafaaî Millîye Cemiyeti) in 1913. The prescribed mission of the new network was not only the promotion of Turkish nationalism but also—more concretely—to encourage people to support the war efforts (F. Ahmad 1969: 162). The CND was active in interfering with the commercial activities of non-Muslim merchants and channeling their trade volumes to Muslim merchants (F. Ahmad 1980). In this atmosphere, the CUP mobilized its know-how in
establishing organizations, which was based on its experience a band group in Macedonia, to establish formal party organizations and informal groups alike.

Table 3 - Ottoman Population in 1914
(Adjusted to the present borders of Turkey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>12,696,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>1,542,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>1,184,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>128,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>49,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suryani</td>
<td>51,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>46,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,700,999</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Karpat 1985: 188-189)

Throughout subsequent decades, the Empire experienced considerable territorial losses. At least since the fifteen century, the center of the Empire had been the Balkans, which were the center of production, wealth and human resources for army and bureaucracy. Therefore, shrinking Balkan territory had a severe psychological impact. Consequently, the Unionist adopted Anatolia as the new center of gravity for the state (F. Ahmad 1969: 153). Yet, the population of Anatolia was anything but homogeneous. As one can follow from Table 3, on the eve of World War I, the number of non-Muslims in Anatolia was more than three million. In an atmosphere of war, the Unionist started to consider the non-Muslims of Anatolia as the “enemy within.” In addition to the war atmosphere, the vivid memories of the armed clashes of various ethnic gangs in the Balkans fueled this conception. The scene was ready for the Unionists to make their move on the Turkification of the Anatolian population.

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28 The figures are derived from Kemal Karpat’s classical work *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (1985). I adjusted the figures provided by Karpat to conform to the republican borders of Turkey by excluding five administrative districts that existed in 1914. Obviously, the categorization of the Ottoman census was problematic, as the category “Muslims” includes Turks, Kurds and other Muslim ethnic groups.
Caution is needed when taking the Turkification policies of the Unionist into consideration. Because of the massive tragedies created by the Unionists, one might observe a non-nuanced historiography of the Unionist Turkification project, depicting it as omnipresent policy, without differences or exceptions whatsoever. However, some recent works point out that the Unionist did not only employ policies of territorial nationalization, but also implemented some policies towards integration and dissimilation. For instance, the Unionists continued the policy of adopting Turkish as the language of education inaugurated before the revolution of 1908. But, at the same time, they allowed the use of local (Kayalı 1997: 90-91) or communitarian language (Toprak 2006) in the curriculum, including courses in Ottoman history, Ottoman geography, as well as those on respective local or communitarian language.\(^{29}\) It also has to be realized that in addition to assimilation, another crucial objective of Turkification was the integration of non-Muslim minorities into the central administrative system (Ülker 2005).

Obviously, this circumspection does not deny their Turkification policies, but in fact, acknowledges their relevance. In his seminal book *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre understands the state as a strategic instrument in the production of controlled space. For him, the role of the state as an instrument can only be understood in relation to the ideas of nation and nationalism. When Lefebvre considers the relationship of nationalism and space, he points out two moments or conditions: first, nationality necessitates the existence of a market. Second, nationhood implies violence. This violence can be produced by a feudal, bourgeois, or a military state. The moment of violence implies “a political power controlling and

\(^{29}\) When the Sublime Porte considered the teaching of Turkish as the *sine qua non* of the cultural unification of the empire in the post-1908 era, the Greek Orthodox community rightly took this policy as a violation of their “privileges” (*imtiyazlar*). The notables of the community voiced their criticisms by asking why the new policy imposed on the Greek Orthodox schools was not also introduced in foreign schools. For instance, Istanbul deputy Pantelis Cosmidis stated in 1909, “I am sure that the Ottoman unity we have accomplished is not a fused ethnic unity (*ittiḥad-i hærçümêrê cêvêmî*) but a political one (*ittiḥad-i siyâsî*). Each of the Ottoman nations preserves its own religion, its own ethnicity, but at the same time accomplishes the political unity which is the common interest of the motherland (*vatanin menafî-i umumîyêsi*).” (quoted in Kechriotis 2007). Cosmidis was politically kind in his formulation but, obviously, his statement implied that the Ottomanist project was becoming ethnically biased.
exploiting the resources of the market or the growth of the productive forces in order to maintain and further its rule” (Lefebvre 1991: 112). As a consequence, Lefebvre states that economic control and violence are two key moments that explain the relation between space and nationalism. These two moments produce space: the space of a nation-state. The raw material of the production of space is nature, or better to say, land. Nature is “threatened in its very existence, probably ruined and certainly localized” (Lefebvre 1991: 123) and these processes are mostly performed by economic control and violence. The framework offered by Lefebvre is totally compatible with the history of the second constitutional period. The first Unionist target was the nationalization of the economic sphere. They aimed at controlling and exploiting the resources of the market. Then the violent phase emerged. This was about reshaping the population structure of the space, Anatolia.

As Table 3 indicates, in 1914, Armenians, mostly living in the east, and Greeks, mostly living on the Aegean coast, were two Christian Anatolian communities exceeding one million. Both communities were perceived by the Unionist as the “enemy within,” located in strategically crucial border zones, helping Greek irredentism or the Russian plan of invasion. Muslim immigrants—more than 400,000 people—coming from Balkans were another factor fuelling the ethnic tension. For the nationalization of the Western Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, the Unionist mobilized a synthesis of formal diplomacy and violence organized by the local branches of the party. First, in 1913, the Treaty of Istanbul was signed between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, allowing for a voluntary population exchange for people living within 15 kilometers on each side of common border. “The Muslims had an option—to become Bulgarian subjects within four years, or to leave Bulgaria and become Ottoman subjects, which they massively decided to do.” (Loizos 1999) The historian Fikret Adanır maintains that the treaty was assumed to include roughly 50,000 people, most of whom had already escaped to the other side. Hence, the treaty was rearranging the property regime in
retrospect and it became the model for upcoming treaties of population exchange, whether voluntary or compulsory.

In the context of Western Anatolia, the CUP implemented a project of forced migration, which was supported by formal diplomacy. In this project, a key figure was Mahmud Celâl Bey, the general secretary (mes’ul kâtibi) of the CUP Izmir branch.30 His memoirs are quite telling with respect to how the process was designed by the CUP leaders in Istanbul and operationalized in Izmir. Mahmud Celâl described the situation in Izmir, the most cosmopolitan port-city of the empire, where the Muslim population was in the minority, as follows: “we were within a colonial economy in our own homeland” (Öz vatanımızda sömürge ekonomisi içinde idik.) (Bayar 1997: 90). Mahmud Celâl reports that “the national movement” (read “informal Unionist bands”) forced 130 000 Greek people (Ottoman citizens) to immigrate in the summer of 1914. He referred to the process as the deportation of Greeks (Rum Tehciri) (Bayar 1997: 110). The historian Fuat Dündar offers more details about the forced-migration of Greeks, and states that the attacks on the Greek towns and villages were carried out not only by bands but also by gendarmerie troops (2008: 212). Apart from attacks by gunmen, another tactic used in Turkification was resettling Muslim migrants who had fled violent cleansing in the Balkans. In this way, the Unionist government encouraged them to seek revenge for their recent experiences (Dündar 2008: 207).

While the persecutions of Western Anatolian Greeks were continuing, the Ottoman Ambassador to Athens, Galip Kemali Bey (Söylemezoğlu), suggested to the Greek government to sign a treaty of population exchange, following the treaty with Bulgaria as a model. Initially, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was not reluctant to sign one, provided that it would be conditional. Venizelos hoped to secure through the treaty the end of persecutions

30 As the Unionist local leader in Izmir, he organized a series of forced-migration and persecutions in 1914, and then he secured a political position for himself in Ankara in the republican period, played an active role in the single-party era—as minister of economy, and prime minister and ended his political career as the third president of the republic in the multi-party era.
of Greeks, and to convince the Unionists to accept the Greek annexation of the Aegean islands. For the Unionists, the suggested treaty was significant in order to formalize the already actualized forced-migration (Loizos 1999). Though the treaty was signed in July 1914, it lacked force, either retrospectively or in furthering the population movement due to the outbreak of World War I.  

In 1915, the Unionist government once again combined formal/legalistic means and informally organized persecutions, again favoring the latter, this time for the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia. At the end of December 1914, the Ottoman Army had a terrible defeat at Sarıkamış even before having a chance to realize an attack on the Russians. Enver Pasha commanded 90,000 troops in the attack, and was able to return with only 10,000 troops. This defeat made the eastern border of the Empire completely vulnerable to Russian invasion. Meanwhile, some Armenian nationalists were hoping for a Russian victory to further not only their claims of autonomy and but also their separatist cause. Early in the spring of 1915, after some small-scale deportations and massacres had started in the area behind the front, the government decided to formalize these unsystematic occurrences and, in late May 1915, it issued a deportation decree. The idea was to relocate the Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia to a desert zone in Syria, Der Zor, remote from the war zone. Yet, it was certain that the deportation was not limited to the war zone, but widespread in different parts of the Empire.

The true tragedy was not the arrival at the Syrian Desert, but rather the journey itself. In his book, The Dark Side of Democracy, historical sociologist Michael Mann offers a model summarizing the sequence of events, leading to massive massacres of Armenians:

First came a sudden roundup of political and intellectual leaders and those supposedly possessing arms. Some of these were imprisoned; mostly were marched off, and usually not heard of again. Then any remaining Armenian men

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31 For the details of the diplomatic contact on the issue, see (Efıloğu 2011).
of military age were assembled, roped together, and marched off, supposedly to be resettled in desert areas in the unthreatened south of the country. Some local massacres were committed in the towns and villages of Cilicia and the Russian frontier regions, but not many elsewhere. In these communities this might initially look like a deportation—but why the men first? In reality most of the men were deported only to the nearest desolate area, where they were killed. The remaining Armenians lacked arms, leaders, or even many men. Some weeks later, the women, children and the elderly were rounded up and marched into the desert. Since they were no threat, they were not immediately killed but marched for several days. Many died as they starved or fell to disease or were butchered in waves of irregular attacks on the straggling columns by tribesmen or brigade. (Mann 2005: 151-152)

Mann (2005: 149) emphasizes that the official orders for deportation did mention neither the killings nor any names of regions or particular ethnic or religious groups. For this reason, in order to understand the framework within which the tragedy of the Ottoman Armenians occurred, it is indispensable to incorporate a synthesis of formal means with informally organized persecutions into the picture. Taner Akçam notes that first an official deportation order was sent to the provincial regions by the Interior Ministry. This was then followed by separate, unofficial orders for the annihilation of the deportees (Akçam 2006: 161). Within the Unionist network, “the Special Organization units, in cooperation with the gendarmerie, would join the convoys of deportees and set about their murders.” According to Akçam, in some regions there were strict orders to prohibit military involvement, whereas in some other regions, massacres were carried out directly by the military.

The discussions on the historiography of Armenian deportation are immense, and this section by no means aims to provide a complete mapping of these discussions. 32 Suffice it to emphasize that even though the official Turkish historiography argues for a death toll of around 300,000 (Gürün 2001: 220), more respected historians estimate the number of people who died due to the deportation to be between 600,000 and 800,000 (Yerasimos 2002; Zürcher 2004: 115). Moreover, the extant private documents of Talât Pasha—Minister of Interior and a member of the Unionist triumvirate—indicate that the number of all deported Armenians cannot be less than 972,000 (Bardakçı 2008: 109).33

32 With respect to this tragedy, I adopt a position by following these works and the academic honesty of their writers: (Akarlı 1998; Deringil 1998b; Deringil 2002; Timur 2000; Aktar 2007; Berktay 2011; Belge 2011).
33 For a critique of 2008 edition of the documents compiled by Murat Bardakçı, see (Koçak, 2009).
To conclude this section, the ties between economic control and violence à la Lefebvre need to be reemphasized. These ties reveal the connections between Turkification of the economic sphere and Turkification of Anatolia. In their recent book, Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel maintain that the annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians consisted of an overlapping set of processes: elite homicides, deportations, massacres, forced assimilation, destruction of material culture, and expropriation. By the end of the war, approximately 2,900 Anatolian Armenian settlements (villages, towns, neighborhoods) were depopulated and the majority of their inhabitants were dead (Üngör and Polatel 2011: 65). As had been the case in the earlier practices mentioned above, with the involvement of an extensive bureaucratic apparatus, confiscation was carried out as a twofold process, where the formal/legalistic means and informally organized persecutions were employed once more, this time the former being privileged.

The confiscation process began right after the deportation of the Armenian owners. As a rule of thumb, no prior arrangements were made regarding the properties. The CUP regime launched both the deportation and the dispossession of Armenians well before the promulgation of any laws or official decrees. The categorical decree of 23 May 1915 and the deportation law of 27 May 1915 were issued after the deportations had already begun. Decrees and laws merely served to unite the hitherto diverse practices and render the overall policy more consistent. So too was the CUP’s approach to confiscation. Telegrams to various provinces ordering the liquidation of immovable property were followed by the streamlined program of 10 June 1915 that established the key agency overseeing the liquidation process—the Abandoned Properties Commission (Emvāl-ı Metruke Komisyonu). These were not yet christened “Liquidation Commissions” but nevertheless mostly fulfilled that function. (Üngör and Polatel 2011: 66)

5.5 Conclusion

Space of subjugation has always been the space of reaction. In Chapter 3, I defined the space of subjugation as a geography that experienced subjugation by (formal or informal) colonialism and imperialism, and I argued that colonial criticism is, therefore, embedded in the intellectual agenda of spaces of subjugation. When we look at the history of Turkish nationalism in general and the history of the CUP in particular we encounter enough evidence
to argue for the interconnectedness between the European expansion and the rise of Turkish nationalism in form of Unionism. This interconnectedness should be emphasized on at least two levels. The first level is the one that is more easily observable. As the rivalry among imperialist powers accelerated, the concern about “how to save the state” started to be voiced by increasingly more people. This question also included an opposition to the sultan’s despotism. This situation led the Young Turks to shape the history of the empire through the revolution of 1908, and they attempted to develop a more explicit anti-imperialist stance.

It is important to recall the relevance of Chatterjee’s conceptions in understanding Turkish nationalism. To put differently, according to my argument, the “anticolonial nationalism” described by him was not unique to the classical geographies of the colonial encounter, but was equally valid for other spaces of subjugation, as well. Here, I particularly emphasize the will to erase “the marks of colonial difference” as an aim of the “anticolonial nationalism.” The Turkish nationalism in the Young Turk era was a derivative discourse of the European expansion. And the Unionist nationalism, which developed as a reaction to the pressure of informal colonialism, aimed to erase the marks of colonial difference. For instance, Unionist attempts to terminate capitulations and extraterritorialities was nothing but a fight against “the rule of colonial difference,” following Chatterjee’s conception.

The second level is slightly more difficult to scrutinize but is equally valid. On the scene of global hierarchies, the European Great Powers appropriated the right to interfere in other geographies—spaces of subjugations—in different ways, the rights including imposing trade regimes, military interventions, and missionaries. In this process, the complex network of informal colonialism labeled people in order to create categories and ordered these categories within a hierarchy. In effect, anti-imperialist nationalism’s strategy was not much different from that of its counterpart. Turkification of the economic sphere and ethnic homogenization of the residual territory, namely Turkification of Anatolia, were projects very
similar to the project of the Great Powers. This is the moment to recall Eugen Weber and Arif Dirlik, who both emphasize the interconnectedness of colonialism and nationalism. In his remarkable book, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, Weber argues that the modernization of rural areas in the late nineteenth century France was a process akin to colonization. To Weber, economic and cultural homogenizations were the key steps of establishing national unity. Roads, railroads, schools, markets, military service, and the circulation of money, goods, and printed materials provided the common experiences, “swept way old commitments, instilled a national view of things in regional minds” (Weber 1976: 486). In this sense, the Unionist nationalism had benefited considerably from earlier attempts of the Porte to increase the state capacity. Better army capacity, better education system, more efficient coinage system and better communication and transportation systems made the ground ready for the Unionist projects of Turkification of the economic sphere and ethnic homogenization.

For Dirlik, one might think nationalism as a type of colonialism as long as it suppresses local identities for the creation of a national identity. This was also the case for the Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. What took place were the dismemberment of an empire and the creation of a nation-state at the same space—the same but shrunk in size. “All identity, historically speaking, is a product of one or another form of colonialism…” says Dirlik (2002). Turkish nationalism did not only create the Turkish nationalist identity as a reaction to European imperialist, but at the same time, it created this identity by imitating its rival. The Unionist projects benefited from earlier attempts at higher state capacity, and contributed significantly to the republican project of system integration as well. Both the Turkification of economic sphere and the ethnic Turkification of Anatolia carried out by the Unionists directly facilitated the republican regime’s objective of establishing the nation-state. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the continuities and differences between the Unionist and the republican eras.
Chapter 6 – Republican Modernization as System Integration

Chapter 6 concludes Part I, “Theoretical Ambiguities and the Historical Background.” So far the primary focus of Part I has been Ottoman modernization. This chapter focuses on republican modernization and the continuities and ruptures in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the republic. Throughout the chapter, several differences between the Unionist way of doing politics and Kemalism are emphasized. Despite these differences, the points of continuity, especially from the Unionist era to the early republican, are at least equally important. At the macro level, there is continuity in terms of intellectual agenda. The survival of the parliamentary system from 1908 to 1923 is another point supporting the continuity thesis. Again, in terms of macro-level continuities, several authors (most recently Dündar 2008) have pointed to the emergence in the 1910s of the idea of establishing a nation-state, and its continuation in the post-1923 period. At the micro level, personnel continuity was of critical importance. The actors in the Unionist network facilitated the national resistance—the War of Independence (Zürcher 1984). The main argument of this chapter is that Ottoman-Turkish modernization cannot be understood unless modernization policies in both periods are seen as efforts making the survival of the state as their top priority. Despite differences, the overarching commonality between the early republic era and the preceding Unionist period was appropriating “saving the state” as the primary goal. This chapter reevaluates attempts at saving the state by referring to Habermas’s concept of system integration. For the founders of the republic, the systemic threats faced by the late Ottoman Empire were evident. From the beginning of World War I onwards, major European powers became enemies, and at the end of the war, they appeared as occupiers. But much before the actual occupation, to follow Herzfeld’s (2002) term, the “specter of colonialism” was present. This chapter argues that this “specter of colonialism” had a significant impact on Turkish modernization both in
the late Ottoman and early republican periods. Since the founders of the republic knew that the empire had failed to survive as a self-reproducing system, their main task was to establish a system powerful enough to generate its own integration. In other words, they were convinced of the indispensability of system integration at the domestic level in order to resist any systemic threat at the international level.

The chapter consists of four main sections. The following section is an overview of the concept of system integration and answers the question of why system integration, as a concept, is relevant in rethinking the Kemalist republican project. Section two focuses on republican and political integration and discusses how the new regime would able to establish integrative measures in the context of both the Treaty of Lausanne and defining politics. This section also incorporates the symbolic tactics of the republican regime into the larger picture. Section three discusses the official policies of the republican regime with respect to non-Muslim communities and Kurds within the system integration logic, and conceptualizes these homogenizing policies of the Kemalist regime as ethnic integration. Section four deals with the cultural integration model of Kemalism by focusing on the language and music reforms. In each section, the Unionist roots of the policy at hand are also discussed in order to provide a more informed discussion of the continuity and/or change from Unionism to Kemalism. The chapter concludes that in rethinking Turkish modernization, it is illuminating to translate the often used phrase “saving the state” into the terminology of social theory. It suggests that the goal of saving the state, which can be seen as the gist of the continuity from the Unionist era to the republic, should be conceptualized as system integration.

6.1 System Integration: an Overview

The British sociologist David Lockwood was the first to use the concepts of system integration and social integration. For Lockwood, system integration means the sum of
compatible and incompatible relationships between the parts of the social system; and social integration means relationships between actors, orderly or conflictual. Later on, Habermas and Giddens reformulated Lockwood’s distinction and attributed a special importance for these concepts in their social theories (Mouzelis 1997). What is the relevance of system integration as a concept to understand the Turkish modernization? If we are to follow Habermas’s perspective, system integration is relevant for any modernization project because it implies a macro process observable in different contexts. For Habermas, the macro process of system integration becomes visible in “societal modernization.” In his words,

> Under the pressures of the dynamics of economic growth and the organizational accomplishments of the state, this social modernization penetrates deeper and deeper into previous forms of human existence. I would describe this subordination of the life-worlds under system’s imperative as a matter of disturbing the communicative infrastructure of everyday life. (Habermas 1981)

The organizational accomplishments of the state are to be read as the expansion of system integration. In Habermas’s perspective, the source of protests over and discontent with modernization projects are “the spheres of communicative action, centered on the reproduction and transmission of values and norms, are penetrated by a form of modernization guided by standards of economic and administrative rationality” (Habermas 1981). The societal modernization achieved through the organizational success of the state may lead to the subordination of the lifeworld, which is the symbolically structured milieu of social integration, under the system’s imperatives. This subordination is the main issue for Habermas. In his terminology, this is the dominance of system integration—the realm of technical rules, defined goals and strategies—over social integration, which is the realm of intersubjectivity (Habermas 1970). Briefly, Habermas characterizes modernity as the expansion of system integration.

In this characterization, Habermas follows a Weberian perspective as he defines system integration basically as the hegemony of “purposive rationality.” He is not against
purposive rationality per se; this type of rationality is necessary in some domains, but its dominance in all areas of social life needs to be criticized. By system integration, which is almost equal to “purposive-rational action,” Habermas understands either instrumental action or rational choice, or their incorporation. Technical rules, strategies based on analytic knowledge, and defined goals under given conditions are the basic characteristics of system integration. If the state is the culmination of different capitals, such as coercive capital (e.g., army, police), economic capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2003: 41), these different capitals can be activated by system integration.

In contrast to system integration, social integration is based on communicative action and can be thought as a medium of interaction working with social symbols. Social integration is governed by binding consensual norms. These norms define reciprocal expectations about the behavior of the social actor, and they are enforced through sanctions. Habermas observes fundamental differences between system integration and social integration in three aspects: a) level of definitions, b) mechanism of acquisition, and c) rationalization (Habermas 1970: 40). First, system integration defines itself in a context-free language. Technical rules are designed in order to function in all kinds of environment. In contrast, social integration is defined in intersubjectively shared ordinary language. Second, while they are in the sphere of system integration, social actors acquire their position within the system by acquiring skills and qualifications. While they are in the sphere of social integration, however, they appropriate their positions by role internalization. And third, for Habermas, a fundamental difference is also observed in terms of how they define “rationalization,” in other words, the success of integration. For system integration, the success means the growth of productive forces and the extension of technical control. But for social integration “rationalization” or achievement corresponds to emancipation. In Habermas’s perspective, as long as the level of social integration increases, there will be more
individuation and extension of communication, and less domination. While developing the concepts of system integration and social integration, Habermas indicates that the lifeworld is assimilated to formally organized domains of action, and it is cut off from cultural tradition. For this disconnection from tradition, Habermas indicates the barriers between science, morality, and art. Such a differentiation means, on the one hand, the increasing autonomy of sectors led by experts and, on the other hand, a loss of credibility for tradition. (Habermas 1992: 327)

After Habermas, several sociologists contributed to the definition of system integration. Habermas’s perspective never envisages an omnipresent system integration which is dominant over social integration. However, he observes that there is a general tendency for system integration to expand over the space of social integration. Later contributors, most notably Giddens, argue for the interdependence of system and social integrations. In his book *The Constitution of Society*, Giddens incorporates system integration and social integration into this theory of structuration. He understands integration as reciprocal practices between actors or between collectivities. For Giddens (1989: 28), “system integration refers to connections with those who are physically absent in time or space.” To put differently, lack of co-presence is the key characteristic of system integration. On the contrary, social integration exists thanks to co-presence or face-to-face encounter. In this context, Giddens’s basic definitions are not very different from what Habermas had in mind. But, Giddens’s structuration theory considers integration as a case for duality of structure. By doing this, Giddens provides a more concise account of the interdependence of system and social interaction. By the duality of structure, Giddens means that there are two faces of power: “the capacity of actors to enact decisions which they favor” and the power of institutions (1989: 15). This dualism might be understood within the context of dialectic of control, as well. Giddens states that subordinates can always influence their superiors because whenever
structures of domination are examined, there are no docile bodies, behaving like automata. Even more importantly, the theorem of the duality of structure proposes that structures not only have a constraining dimension but an enabling one, as well. This is the reason why structures are not external to actors or individuals. Drawing on these perspectives, there are at least two points to emphasize: (a) the power of system integration over social integration is never absolute; there is interdependency; and (b) system integration does not only limit social integration; it also enables it. This interdependence makes the reproduction of society continuous.

The concept of system integration as developed by Habermas and others is relevant to understanding Turkish modernization, and, more specifically, to creating a framework that better reflects the links between the Unionist and Kemalist projects. The founders of the republic had witnessed the Ottoman state’s weak capacity and its subjugation by European powers. In Deringil’s (1998: 3) words, “the Ottoman elite understood … well that their world was exposed to mortal danger from within, as from without.” For the Kemalists, system integration appeared as a solution to both internal problems and external threats. By system integration, they aimed to shape and redefine several aspects of their country. The link between the success of system integration at the domestic level and the search for an equal position in the interstate system was obvious for the Ankara government. Put differently, the Kemalist project aimed at establishing system integration at the domestic level in order to resist any systemic threat at the international level. First, by promising and then, by implementing a series of reforms, it might be possible for the new republican regime to secure a better position in the global hierarchies.

In its search for system integration, the Kemalist regime constituted itself around two “defined goals”—Westernization and creating a unified national identity. This twofold formulation aimed at defending the state against both internal and external threats. The new
regime adopted various strategies according to these defined goals. Several reforms were implemented without considerable interaction between system integration and social integration. In other words, throughout the course of the reform process, the voice of the social realm was hardly heard. Both in the definition of the goals and in the implementation of the reforms, a context-free language was employed. With the language and alphabet reforms, even the ordinary language was detached from its former context; meaning, the lifeworld was cut off from cultural tradition. The perspective produced by the intersubjectively shared ordinary language was both disregarded and undervalued. Consequently, a context-free language gained a hegemonic position.³⁴

System integration means for Habermas the extension of technical control. In the context of republican state formation, several reforms meant various prohibitions. For instance, as Kemalist laicism aimed the disestablishment of Islam, in 1924, the medreses and tekkes were closed and outlawed. The clothing reform implied the prohibition of Islamic styled cloths and especially the fez. As a component of music reform, even the broadcasting of Turkish music on Turkish radio was prohibited between November 1934 and September 1936 (Stokes 1992). As system integration left less space to the lifeworld, it was cut off from tradition and there was a loss of credibility for tradition. This was precisely what happened in Turkey: the republican cultural atmosphere was cut off from traditional heritage, and in the new regime, tradition lost its credibility. In this sense, by following Charles Taylor’s concept, this chapter understands the republican modernization as an example of acultural modernization, as it overemphasized the growth of reason, the development of secularism, and the convergence of different societies in the same model. Therefore, it is safe to argue that

³⁴ Depicting Westernization as a goal of Kemalism necessitates a series of cautions. Neither in the Ottoman period nor in the early republican era was Westernization only a target of the state, subjected to top-down practices. There had always been a local/popular demand for it; people saw an opportunity structure in it to shape their lives. True, the voice of the social realm was hardly heard and reactions were unable to influence reforms, but this does not mean that there was no discussion at all about the reforms in the 1920s and 1930s.
the Kemalist modernization project was a Eurocentric model of progress. Its target was to replace the traditional society with a modern one.

6.2 The Political Integration of Kemalism

During the initial phase of the national resistance movement in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal and his inner circle were well aware of the fact that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had been caused by its failure to ensure integration. As it is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the integration of the empire depended upon the state capacity generated by the complex network of informal colonialism, and that after a certain point, it was obvious that the empire was no longer a political system able to reproduce itself. Thus, for the commanders of the resistance, political integration was the most important concern. For them, political integration was a two-fold roadmap. The first step of political integration was republican integration, which aimed at solving two major problems that the resistance movement faced in ensuring unity: (a) Entente occupation in various parts of Turkey and the plan for the partition of the residual part of the empire, and (b) Istanbul-Ankara dualism, or the conflict between the Sultanate and the resistance movement. The second component of political integration, which followed republican integration, was to redefine politics, with its primary target being to establish the limits of the political sphere under the new Kemalist regime.

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the resistance succeeded in establishing a regular army, mostly with the help of the existing Unionist underground network.35 The

35 While discussing the continuity from the Unionist era to the Kemalist period, it is crucial to note that the War of Independence won by the Ankara government was made possible through a substantial Unionist network of resistance, established by the CUP on the eve of World War as a preparation for a civil resistance movement. F. Ahmad (1969: 162) informs us that The Committee of National Defense (CND) was set up in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars as an unofficial body encouraging people to support the war effort. Zürcher sharpens the role of CUP in the preparatory steps of the War of Independence. Accordingly, in 1915 “the CUP decided to continue the war from Anatolia. This plan was worked out in details and emergency instructions were sent to a number of officers to start regional defense organizations in different parts of Anatolia in case of an occupation” (Zürcher 1984: 104). Thanks to the unexpected success of the Ottoman army at the Dardanelles, the Allied occupation of Istanbul did not take place in 1915 but was postponed till the end of the World War. But at the end of World War in 1918, the Unionists already had a plan for resistance available. According to the armistice agreement signed in
success of the resistance was achieved by a realist mixture of army power and adroit diplomacy. Without becoming a satellite of the Soviets or an ideological partner of the Comintern, the Ankara government secured important financial aid, together with fair amounts of arms and ammunition. When the Turkish troops defeated the Greeks in Izmir in September 1922, the stage became ready for republican integration, and the Ankara government’s first achievement in this regard was the signing of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne with Entente states in July 1923. Most significantly, the Treaty of Lausanne was an official recognition for the Ankara government, legitimizing it as the sole political authority in Turkey. It also helped the Ankara government to solve other dimensions of the integration problem. When the Western powers organized the conference at Lausanne in Fall 1922, they issued separate invitations to the Ankara government and to Sultan Vahdettin, who held but vestigial power. This was simply unacceptable for Mustafa Kemal, and it gave him the long awaited opportunity to make a radical move with respect to the Sultanate in November 1922. The parliament in Ankara voted for the abolition of the Sultanate. This was the end of the Istanbul-Ankara dualism, which had the practical impact of paving the way to republicanism.36

In terms of territorial demands, the Ankara government was satisfied with the treaty. Except for Mosul, all the territorial claims of the Ankara government were recognized. In contrast to the Treaty of Sèvres, an independent Armenia or an autonomous Kurdistan were not mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. The issue of abolition of capitulations was one of the key disagreements among parties, and the most difficult to be resolved. The Entente powers were especially reluctant to include the abolition of capitulations and extraterritorial

Moudros on October 1918, the Ottoman army should be demobilized. But loyal to the plan of 1915, Unionist officers decided to halt the demobilization and the surrender of arms and ammunitions, and move the troops to inner Anatolia, which was less likely to be occupied. Zürcher argues that while securing the material basis for a war of resistance, the Unionists encouraged Mustafa Kemal, who was also a former Unionist, to move to Anatolia to command the national war. Zürcher (1984: 112) maintains that there are some evidences indicating the decisive role of the Unionist underground, during the War of Independence.

36 The resolution of the parliament separated the Sultanate and the Caliphate and appointed a member of the dynasty, Abdülmecit Efendi, as the new Caliph.
privileges of their citizens and protégés in the treaty. The first phase of the conference in Lausanne had ended specifically due to this disagreement.

The discussions in Lausanne on the abolition of capitulations sheds light on how the aim of defeating the “specter of colonialism” directly shaped the republican modernization project. The new details put forth by Turan Kayaoğlu in his book *Legal Imperialism* about the negotiations on extraterritorialities further point out the significance of the Treaty of Lausanne further for the political integration of Kemalism. The main argument defended by the chief Turkish negotiator, İsmet Pasha, was based on the sufficient quality of the Ottoman legal system in terms of offering an equal status for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. He argued that since the era of *Tanzimat*, many reforms improved the legal system, reorganizing the courts and adopting the legal codes along European lines. The diplomats of the Entente powers were not convinced, however. Their main argument in supporting the indispensability of the capitulations and extraterritorialities was based on the religious character of the Turkish Civil Code. The American delegate Richard W. Child, who was there with the American mission as an observer, suggested that the Turkish government should revise and secularize the Civil, the Penal and the Commercial Codes (Kayaoğlu 2010: 142). Following this suggestion, a legal reform—or at least a convincing roadmap to implement it—became the precondition for the abolition of the extraterritorialities. Kayaoğlu concludes that the promises that the Allies demanded from the Turkish government shaped the Turkish legal reforms in the years following the conference. Before the final agreement was reached in the conference, the Turkish mission made a declaration, entitled “Declaration Relating to the Administration of Justice”: “The Turkish Government proposes to take immediately into its service, for such period as it may consider to necessary, not being less than five years, a number of European legal counselors… These legal counselors will serve under the Minister of Justice… The will take part in the legislative commissions.” (quoted in Oran 2010)
Finally, with the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, European states had agreed to the abolition of extraterritorialities, and the new republic had achieved this by promising legal reforms. Within five years period after Lausanne, the republican regime actualized several reforms to secularize the legal system. In 1926, the Swiss Civil Code, and the Italian Penal Code were adopted. Especially the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code was a radical step, a unique case in the Middle East in terms of an uncompromised secularization of the legal norms regulating the family life. Although Kemalists were coming from a positivist background and many of them were dedicated supporters of Westernization, above all Mustafa Kemal himself, it is still rather difficult to explain the timing of such radical legal reforms, and especially the Civil Code of 1926, since the regime was far from full consolidation, and there was a considerable way to go before the establishment of the authoritarian single-party rule of the 1930s. Together with the termination of foreign-controlled Public Debt Administration, another symbol of Ottoman subjugation to the Western powers, complete abolition of the capitulations was a definite success for the new regime. And this needs to be understood not within a deterministic reading of the intellectual background of new regime leaders, but within the framework of fighting against the “specter of colonialism,” which sometimes imposed the necessity to compromise in certain issues.

After Lausanne, the proclamation of the republic in October 1923 was another major step towards republican integration. However, maintaining integration was still an issue, coupled by the necessity to secure the new regime. This was particularly so because after the withdrawal of the occupying forces, as Suna Kili (2007: 130) maintains, “the unity that was derived from the presence of a colonial power, enemy or occupier no longer existed.” The first important measure to secure the new regime was the abolition of the caliphate in March 1924, breaking any aspiration for returning to the ancient régime. This was followed by others targeting two primary aims: centralization and standardization of the state apparatus. İltır
Turan (1984) takes the Village Law of 1924 as a key moment to further state centralization. With this law, the village was assumed as a legal person having a variety of responsibilities. The headman was accepted as a functionary of the central government. The system made conscription and tax collection more efficient. Also with this law, peasants were asked to contribute resources for the construction of schools and roads, including unpaid labor. The new regime made itself visible in the countryside by increasing the number of gendarmerie posts. In the context of standardization, Turan claims that the new regime aimed at creating a general framework for the civil service system, and thus eliminated the irregularities of the Ottoman bureaucratic system, such as low and irregularly paid salaries. All in all, in the early years of the republic, Turan observes an expansion of the bureaucratic system leaving fewer issues left to local customs’. In this sense, the system integration perspective of the early republican regime had a bureaucratic component.

The day the caliphate was abolished on the 3rd of March, 1924, another important law was also accepted by the parliament in the way towards secularization. The Law on the Unification of Education unified all schools and the entire education system under the administration of the Ministry of Education. Another law issued on the same day abolished the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriyeye ve Evkâf Vekâleti), the main body responsible for the administration of the vakıf37 system. Two separate directorates, the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Riyaseti) and the General Directorate for Pious Foundations (Evkâf Umum Müdürlüğü), were founded to replace its functions, both attached to the office of the prime ministry. There were two main implications of these laws: First, while all religious affairs were left to the management of the Directorate for Religious Affairs, the religious education was separated from this system and became the responsibility of the Ministry of Education (Kara 2010: 57). Second, the old religious educational institutions were not only closed down, but the main financial source of these institutions, the

37 Turkish vakıf, pious foundation, is from Arabic waqf. The plural is evkâf.
Vakıfs, was also transferred to a secular directorate, the Directorate General for Pious Foundations rather than to the Directorate for Religious Affairs. In other words, the religious affairs and the whole vakf system, which had been historically closely linked, were also separated. This meant the loss of a natural source of income for the newly established Directorate for Religious Affairs, which was designed to be an ordinary part of the state bureaucracy from the very beginning, financially entirely dependent on its share from the state budget (Kara 2010: 60). The administration of the vakıfs, with all of their income and financial assets, became under the control of the secular state bureaucracy. It has to be underlined that the administration of the vakıf system had already changed considerably during the late Ottoman Empire, with the state penetrating into the sphere of these institutions. The republican attempt to take the vakıfs into full state control was in this sense a continuation; but it was considerably more radical since it completely secularized their administration. The function of the vakıfs was not limited to religious and educational activities; they had been the center of a whole system of social welfare system. The complete secularization and integration of this system into state bureaucracy meant a major transformation not only in the religious life, but also in the social and cultural life of the society, entering to a new era with the republic.

Apart from the bureaucratic or institutional component, the new regime also employed a number of symbolic tactics to strengthen republican integration. The functions of these symbols were twofold: The first was to showcase general perspective of the new regime, namely Westernization; the second was to underline the rupture with the Ottoman past, and thus, buttress the republic. In the symbolic realm, the new republic reshaped the cultural

38 A directorate (later ministry) was established, for example, during the reign of Mahmud II in 1826 to bring the pious foundations under a single jurisdiction and to increase state control over them. Such reforms gradually decreased the financial and administrative power of the ulema already in the late Ottoman Empire (Lewis 1968: 93, 97-98). In 1917, the administration of the pious foundations was removed from the jurisdiction of the office of Şeyhülislam (the highest religious office in the Ottoman system) and transferred to the ministry. Moreover, the Şeyhülislam was removed from the Ottoman cabinet, the religious courts were transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and the religious colleges (medreses) were brought under the Ministry of Education. For more on these reforms in the late Ottoman Empire, see (Berkes 1998: 415-416).
landscape of the country. Different sets of symbols were established, ranging from the adoption of the Latin letters to the reforms in the dress code. The symbolic tactics included spatial politics as well. The most important “visible politics” was transferring the capital city from Istanbul to Ankara. Istanbul was perceived as a city of imperial paradoxes: it represented the traditional Islamic culture, given its old quarters, as well as a wrong incorporation with the West with its cosmopolitan quarter Pera. In contrast to Istanbul, Ankara was almost an empty, small Anatolian town, far from the sea and any negative influence, ready to be turned into a “national” capital (Turan 2005; Uluengin and Turan 2005). Another example of Kemalist spatial politics was the case of Hagia Sophia. The conversion of the mosque into a museum was a key issue in understanding the secular dimensions of Turkish modernization, together with how spatial politics was employed to erase the weight of the passé.

In addition to these spatial politics, the Kemalist regime carried out specific reforms with respect to the calendar, the measurement of time and holidays. On 26 December, 1925, the eclectic Ottoman calendar was abolished, and the Gregorian calendar and its way of measuring the year were officially adopted (Lewis 1968: 270-271). Turkey also adopted the “international” clock, confirming it as the only legally valid method of measuring time. Ten years later, after the full consolidation of one-party rule, a decree making Sunday the official day of rest instead of Friday was declared in 1935. This was a radical break with the Islamic past. Without a doubt, these reforms aimed at facilitating communication with European countries; but in order to have a fuller picture, it is necessary to acknowledge their radical modernizing characteristics. Through its five-times-a-day compulsory worship namaz, Islam regulates time and the rhythm of daily life according to the sun. In this system, every locale had a different time to pray. The reference point of the time system was obvious for everybody; the sun was the arbiter and its indicator was ezan. But with the “international” clock, two cities a thousand kilometers away from one another have the same standardized
time because the reference point of the time measurement is not directly the sun that people see in their city. Standardized time allowed for territorial-wide unity. Put differently, the conception of time and its measurement was no longer left to the contingencies of social integration; instead, they were appropriated as an item of system integration. To follow Giddens’ terminology, with the reforms concerning calendar, time measurement and holidays, a “supra-individual durée of the long-term existence of institutions,” or “the longue durée of institutional time” had been established in republican Turkey. This was a crucial step towards the institutionalization of the republic.

In the early days of the republic, the new regime aimed at fortifying the first component of political integration, namely, republican integration, through its second component, which was the redefinition of the political process. Political integration meant redefining politics in a way different from the pluralism of the first Grand National Assembly. In fact, the new constitution of 1924 was not particularly designed for a single-party regime. This being the legal framework, some prominent generals of the War of Liberation and other old colleagues of Mustafa Kemal established an opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) in 1924. Even before the PRP had a chance to organize itself, a Kurdish rebellion with Islamist pretentions—the Sheikh Said rebellion—broke out in Eastern Anatolia. This was a crucial moment for the definition of politics in the republican system. The response of the Ankara government to the rebellion was to impose martial law in February 1925. The parliament passed the Law for Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükün Kanunu), thus empowering the government for two years to ban any organization or publication allegedly or substantially causing disturbance. The opposition party was outlawed and the press was silenced. Following a renewal, the law remained effective until March 1929.

While the Law for Maintenance of Order was in force, the Ankara government implemented several important reforms. The Hat Law of 1925 was passed during this martial
law period. When Mustafa Kemal read his *Speech* in 1927, he was quite frank about the causal link between the Law for Maintenance of Order and the Hat Law. In *Speech*, he first qualified the fez as a “as a sign of ignorance, fanaticism, animosity toward progress and civilization.” Then he told how the reform was implemented:

We did that while the Law for Maintenance of Order was still in force. If it had not been in force we should have done so all the same; but one can say with complete truth that the existence of this law made the thing much easier for us. As a matter of fact, the application of the Law for Maintenance of Order prevented the morale of the nation from being poisoned to a great extent by reactionaries (Atatürk 1963: 738-739).

This is a good example of how politics was seen as a technical process in the political integration of republicanism, and how system integration became widespread and left no space for social interaction. For a considerably long time, the fez had been a normal headgear in the sphere of social interaction. True, the fez had been inaugurated by a law in 1829, replacing the ancient community and occupational signs of differentiation by a dress with a homogenizing status marker (Quataert 1997). But, to remember Habermas’s schema about symbolic interaction, it had gained an almost neutral connotation within the “intersubjectively shared ordinary language,” within the social routine. However, by an abrupt shift, system integration detached the neutral connotations of the fez from the ordinary language of the social realm, and coded it as “a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of animosity toward progress and civilization.” This was the moment when system integration reduced male clothing to a technical matter and codified it by a context-free language. Serious precautions were taken—including capital punishment—for dissenting voices.

When Kemalism was codified as an ideology in the 1930s, principles known as the “six arrows” were accepted and ratified as the fundamental doctrine of the RPP: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, laicism, and revolutionism/reformism. There
was no mentioning of democracy in these principles. Feroz Ahmad states that from 1930 onwards, following the unsuccessful experience of another opposition party, the Free Party, the democratic model of politics was discredited in the eyes of the Kemalist elites, largely due to the instability in the Western Europe. He adds that Mustafa Kemal assessed liberal democracy as a brake to his own radicalism (Ahmad 2000a: 56, 61). On the European scene, single-party regimes appeared as strong alternatives to democratic governance, redefining politics around the personal cult of a chef. Thus, Mustafa Kemal, the chef of the republic, was neither an oddity nor an exception.

Amongst these six principles, republicanism and statism were especially crucial for the political integration of Kemalism. As a principle, republicanism implied for Kemalism the principle of unity of powers between various branches of the government. Hence, as a principle of unity, republicanism blurred the boundaries between the state, the government, the party and the people. In this context, the meaning of statism was not limited to étatism in the economic sphere. Under the hegemony of Recep Peker,39 the RPP conceptualized statism in the economic context in conjunction with statism in the context of liberties. Ahmet İnsel (1995: 191) refers to this two-fold policy as “holistic statism.” It certainly included intervention in the economy, but it also implied a series of state interventions to different social spheres.

If the exclusion of democracy was the first step in Kemalist political integration, corporatism was the second step towards the same goal. The corporatist state discourse was constructed to argue that there was no class conflict in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal maintained that classes in Turkey were “in the nature of being necessarily complementary to each other” (quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 60). Similarly, the program of the RPP made establishing harmony between labor and capital an important goal of the party. In effect, populism, another principle of Kemalism, was understood by the RPP leadership as a kind of solidarism,

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39 Secretary General of the RPP from 1928 to 1936.
exclaiming that the interests of the members of the society are not and should not be considered to be in conflict. In order to harmonize the interests of the working class with those employers—public sector or private entrepreneur—the RPP adopted in 1936 the Italian labor code, which prohibited class-based politics.

Some scholars, like Ahmet Makal (2002), argue that although there were some formations, practices, and legal arrangements that give corporatistic impressions during the single-party period, these practices of a corporate character did not become generalized and were not transformed into a system. Makal emphasizes that Kemalist Turkey was not a political system organized on the model of an Italian-type corporate structure. Makal’s caution is relevant as long as it states that Turkey was never Italy. Yet Aykut Kansu (2001) argues that the corporatism of the single-party era was something more than an impression or thought experiment. In his discussion, Kansu reminds us that if corporatism is defined as the replacement of representative democracy with a system based on professional representation, even Mussolini’s Italy was not totally corporatist since the Italian fascist regime failed to implement the idea of an “economic assembly” to the full extent. Kansu points to the Higher Economic Assembly (Âli İktisat Meclisi) as the primary corporatist practice of the Kemalist era. It was formed by law in 1927 and had twenty four members: one representing the armed forces, eleven business men, and twenty economists representing the public sector. It was to convene for two weeks every six months. It was designed mainly as a consultative body. The agenda of the assembly was to be determined by the prime ministry. Kansu notes that the assembly was unable to attain real influence due to the tacit opposition of the business sector, and was disbanded in 1935. He argues, however, that the disbandment of the Assembly did not mean the end of corporatism in Kemalist Turkey. The alleged harmony between clashing interests was maintained by the Kemalist state discourse.
The corporatist dimension of the Kemalist political integration was a significant illustration of the dominance of system integration. Once society was assumed as an organic body composed of interdependent rather than conflicting parts, then the problem of governance became a technical problem to be solved with a systemic logic instead of a pluralist one. By recalling Habermas’s definition of systemic integration, one might argue that corporatism was the “extension of power of technical control,” functioning by technical rules rather than social deliberation. This was the case for the single-party era: public discussions were largely curtailed, and the government acted as a social engineer aiming at shaping the society by the “right kinds” of politics, education, and economy (Parla and Davison 2004: 135). As an almost logical consequence of political integration and being inspired by the Third Reich, the RPP accepted a resolution uniting the party and the state in 1936. In Ankara, the secretary general of the party assumed the post of minister of interior, and in the provinces, the posts of governor, mayor, and local party chairman were to be held by the same person. In Ahmad’s (2000a: 64) words, “the Kemalists had taken the final step towards formalizing a party dictatorship.” Years later, the Minister of Justice, Mahmut East Bozkurt, formulated a succinct summary of Kemalist imagination, seeing everything as one and indivisible: “Nation, state, government are not different things. All have the same meaning, and all are nation (hepsi millettir). There is nothing other than nation.” (quoted in Bora 1996: 29-30)

To what extent was Kemalist political integration the continuation of the Unionist period? Evidently, the idea of republicanism was something new; nevertheless, its very core—the principle of the supremacy of the parliament, had already been achieved by the Unionists, especially between 1908 and 1913. One must also note that even before the Revolution of 1908, the struggle of the exiled Unionists for constitutionalism had contributed
Despite this continuity, however, at least three differences of the Kemalist perspective on republican integration must be acknowledged. First, the Kemalist regime was much more determined to follow the principle of publicness. In contrast to the informal style of the Unionist triumvirate, the Kemalist regime respected the parliament and sought a parliamentary decision in all matters. Second, different from the Unionists, Kemalists purposefully distanced themselves from irredentism (with the minor exception of Hatay). This made the territory of republican integration more limited, and at the same time, more realistic. Third, the Unionists also employed symbolic tactics to showcase their modernism; however, the modernism of the republic was much more radical.

While discussing the continuity from the Unionist period to the republican era, it is crucial to note the enduring anti-imperialist stance. Since the early days of the movement, anti-imperialism had been an important item in the ideological repertoire of the CUP. The Unionists viewed European policies toward the Ottoman Empire as a part of the European imperialist agenda. They were convinced that the next target was the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations were the paramount symbol of European imperialism. But at the same time, because of their naivety, following the revolution of 1908, they expected the support of European states of the victors of liberty who had defeated Abdülhamid’s despotism. For them, the best way that Europeans could show their solidarity was to abolish the capitulations. Of course, this did not happen. For the

40 While discussing the continuity, the personnel continuity also needs to be emphasized. Mustafa Kemal himself was the prime case of this continuity. He was a member of the CUP, though could not achieve an active position within the party and in the politics in the post-revolutionary period. But when he was encouraged by the Unionist officers to go to Anatolia, he was still considered by the Unionist as a member of their circle. The personnel continuity was valid for politicians and bureaucrats. Mahmud Celâl Bey (Bayar) was an example of how a Unionist local leader became a republican high-level politician. He started his political career as local Unionist leader in Izmir; then, in the 1930s, he served as minister of economy, and closed his political career as the third president of the republic. Examples are numerous. Şükrü Bey (Kaya) the Director General for Deportation (Sevkiyat Reis-i Umumisi) of 1915 served in Ankara as the Interior Minister for nine years; Mustafa Abdülhalik (Renda), the governor of the Unionist government, became president of the national parliament in Ankara; Doctor Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), another Unionist bureaucrat served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the republic from 1925 to 1938. Needless to say, the personnel transfer from the Unionist era to the republic was not direct; only some people of the Unionist era could survive politically in the republic. It was yet remarkable. The personnel continuity was significant for the intellectuals as well. For instance Celâl Nuri (İleri), who will appear in Chapter 8 as a prominent modernist of the republican era, was a famous Unionist writer.
European diplomats, the capitulations were not privileges but rather basic rights of their states or citizens (Ahmad 2000b), a normal part of the network of informal colonialism. In the post-1908 period too, the popular reaction against European imperialism had been a rising agenda in the Ottoman press (Brummett, 2000). In September 1914, the Porte sent a note to all countries holding extraterritorial privileges, declaring the unilateral abrogation of the capitulations. But this Unionist goal could be fully accomplished only by the republican regime. But even after the abrogation of capitulations, Kemalist intellectuals analyzed the international status quo around the concept of imperialism (Türkeş 1998). All in all, the Unionists and the Kemalists understood the subjugation of their country in similar ways.

On the second component of political integration, which is the issue of how to define politics, the continuity from Unionists and to the Kemalists is stronger. Although, as stated above, the early republican regime differentiated itself from the Unionist past by privileging open politics based on the decisions made by parliament, the intellectual agenda of Unionism was the primary source for the Kemalist understanding of politics. In other words, the main components of the Unionist ideology were transmitted to the republican era, becoming manifested in Kemalist politics. One of these components, solidarism (tesanıctülük), which was basically a search for an alternative to liberalism and socialism and a prescriptive understanding of society denying the existence of social classes and class conflict, was critical in shaping the Kemalist understanding of the political sphere in particular (Zürcher 2005). According to Toprak (1977), there were three constituents of solidarism. Political populism (siyasi halkçılık) implied a nationalist stand against extraterritorialities, including the capitulation, allowed to foreigners and non-Muslims. Economic solidarism (ikitsadî solidarizm) was about privileging state-centered capitalism, without a specific restriction for private entrepreneurship. Finally, social solidarism (içtimai solidarizm) entailed the formation of corporations (or groupements professionnels) to become the real basis of society (Toprak
1977). All three versions of solidarism served as intellectual underpinnings of the Kemalist regime significantly determined the borders of ongoing discussions in the single-party era. All in all, republican integration and the definition of the political sphere as two components of political integration were mutually dependent. These two components made further integrative steps of the Kemalist regime possible.

6.3 Kemalism and the Ethnic Integration

While political integration formed the initial stage of the Kemalist project, ethnic integration constituted an important part of its social engineering dimension. The founding elite of the republic were mainly composed of those who had been socialized in Unionist circles and had a certain nationalist stance. Kemalist nationalism had two faces—one inclusive and one exclusive. There is a good deal of evidence supporting the argument that the inclusive phase of Kemalist nationalism was most visible in the pre-republican era, whereas a more exclusive nationalism, supported by system integration with its republican, ethnic and cultural subunits came to dominate the republican era. For instance, when the parliament was reconvened in Ankara in 1920, there was no mention of Turkishness, or even of “Turkey” in the name of the parliament. Rather, it was simply the “Grand National Assembly,” the representative body of all the Muslims of Anatolia unified against the occupation, without emphasizing ethnic divisions. At this stage, Mustafa Kemal was careful not to alienate the Kurdish notables, in particular, and referred to the existence of many nations among the Muslim elements living within the “national borders.”

Before system integration was initiated, ethnic identities were not, in fact, free floating in the social sphere. In the classical Ottoman millet system, identities were more in line with social norms, meaning that they were not mere technicalities of a context-free language. Moreover, they were also regulated by a certain systemic logic, allowing the communities

41 For one of his speeches along these lines, see (Özkırmlı and Sofos 2008: 163).
some autonomy and regulating state-community relations by appropriating community leaders as key intermediaries. In 1919 and 1920, before system integration became predominant, Mustafa Kemal referred to ethnic identities as they were already defined in the social sphere. However, as the modern system integration logic became influential, questions like “who is a Turk?” “who is a Turkish citizen?” and “whether Turk or Turkish citizen should be the key identity for the new regime?” were answered through a discourse detached from the usages of ordinary language. Put differently, while defining ethnic identities, system integration depended more—though not consistently—on technical logic. To even define the Turkish identity, they employed a context-free language. In this sense, the system integration logic went hand-in-hand with social engineering. Once the Turkish identity was defined technically, homogenization became the next step. This was a clear instance of systemic intervention in the social realm. Identities, ethnic or religious, were always part of social realm—the source of its social norms and reciprocal expectations about behavior. When system integration came to prevail over social integration, identities were no longer defined as part of the social realm, but rather coded by the system integration corresponding to the homogenization of ethnic identities.

When the Kemalist nationalism was about to launch its ethnic integration project, the first project of homogenization had already finished. By deporting more than 900 thousand Armenians from Anatolia, the Unionist regime had made a major step towards social engineering. Doubtlessly, the Armenian deportation carried out by the Unionists paved the way for further acts of homogenization. Like the key role it played for Kemalist republican integration, the Treaty of Lausanne had a crucial function for the ethnic integration process in Anatolia. This function was twofold. First, as already mentioned above, the Treaty of Lausanne did not undersign any Armenian claims—neither the independent Armenia nor any reparation for the tragedy of 1915 (Akçam 2004: 180-181). The second function was that it
included a convention signed by the Turkish and Greek missions in January 1923: the Convention on the Exchange of Populations. In total, 1.2 million Christian inhabitants of Turkey were forced to migrate to Greece, while around 355,000 Muslims came to Turkey to settle permanently (Hirschon 2004b: 14). While formulating the convention, the systemic logic needed a solid criterion with which to define the ethnic identity; what was adopted was a religious one. Hirschon (2004a: 8) maintains that “the population exchange … was in no sense a repatriation for either the Muslims of Greece or the Ottoman Christians.” When identities were transformed into technical categories, some people became tragically misfit. For instance, most of the Muslim population of the Aegean islands, especially of Crete, was not speaking Turkish, yet they were coded as “Turkish.” Similarly, some Orthodox communities of Central Anatolia, or more specifically of Cappadocia, were not Greek speaking. However, the homogenization policy organized at a macro level overlooked to differentiate these peculiar cases.

The convention was an inter-state legal framework forcing more than one million Orthodox out of Anatolia. But it should be emphasized that at the time the convention was signed, the majority of these people were already in Greece, and, therefore, the convention was to institutionalize this de facto population displacement (Hirschon 2004a: 8). The Unionist government had synthesized the formal/legalistic/diplomatic means, and informally organized persecutions that forced more than 100,000 Greek-Orthodox to immigrate to Greece (Dündar 2008: 194-248). As it is already discussed in Chapter 5, Unionist diplomacy had in fact dreamed of a population exchange treaty with Greece, which was not realized due to the outbreak of World War I.⁴² Therefore, by securing The Convention on the Exchange of Populations in 1923, republican diplomacy not only accomplished an originally Unionist project, but perhaps more importantly, formalized the informally organized violence of the Unionist groups. In the Convention of 1923, Greeks who had been forced to leave Anatolia

⁴² For details see, 5.4 “The Unionist Nationalism: Turkification of Anatolia.”
before the convention were considered as migrants that had left Anatolia based on the convention, and were banned from returning. The compulsory population exchange was a major project to prove the continuum from the Unionist era to the early republic. Both regimes employed a synthesis of the formal/legalistic means and informally organized violence in order to achieve the ethnic integration of Turkey. For the Unionists, informal violence was the main tool, whereas the republican regime preferred formal/legalistic means.43

In terms of the formal/legal framework, the republican regime seemed inclusive. Article 88 of the 1924 constitution defined the people of Turkey as Turkish in terms of their citizenship, regardless of their religion and race. Indeed, the article defined the liaison between the state and the individual not based on “being Turk,” but rather as being a “Turkish citizen.” While this was the legal framework, it was much different in practice. From 1924 onwards, the Turkish press began pushing minorities to give up their rights secured by the Treaty of Lausanne. Consequently, in May 1926, Jewish, Greek-Orthodox and Armenian communities sent letters to the Ankara government, declaring their abnegation from some of the rights granted at Lausanne (Bali 1999: 90; Hür 2009). Although, Article 38 of the treaty guaranteed the non-Muslim citizens the right to work in the public sector, as Yıldız (1998: 443) points out, the recruitment of non-Muslims into the public bureaucracy ceased first de facto, and then later de jure. The Law of Public Employees (Memurin Kanunu) of 1926 stated “being a Turk” as a precondition to becoming a public employee. This law signaled the formal move from an inclusive conception of “Turkish citizenship” to an exclusive one, which dictates “being a Turk” as the condition to be a first class citizen. Turkishness

43 The compulsory population exchange was also a continuation of the Unionist policies with respect to Turkification of the economic sphere since in the early republican period, too, Turkification of the economic sphere and ethnic integration (Turkification of Anatolia) were closely linked. Expelling the Greek-Orthodox bourgeoisie was a crucial element of the larger project of creating a “national” bourgeoisie (Keyder 2004). The vacuum created at the systemic level functioned as leverage for the Turkish people to acquire better positions in various business sectors.
continued to be defined mostly in religious terms, allowing members of other ethnic groups who were Muslim to have the chance to be accepted as Turks, especially if they did not insist on their difference. However, for non-Muslims—members of the communities coded as “minorities” at Lausanne, a discriminatory policy was inescapable.

Without amending the 1924 Constitution, the republican elite adopted an anti-minority discourse that complemented its policies of ethnic integration. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, a prominent Kemalist and minister of justice between 1924 and 1930, defined the place of Turks and non-Turks in a speech in 1930 with the following words: “My idea, my opinion is that … the master of this country is the Turk. Those who are not genuine Turks can have only one right in the Turkish fatherland, and that is to be a servant (hizmetçi), to be a slave (köle)” (quoted in Parla and Davison 2004: 77). This ultra-nationalist discourse was a signal that following a phase where the formal/legalistic means of homogenization was predominant, the republican regime would make informally organized measures for ethnic integration a top priority. In 1928, the Student Union of Istanbul University, Faculty of Law launched a campaign, “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” (Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!), which would last until 1937. Students argued that not speaking Turkish meant not recognizing the law of Turks (Bali 1999: 135). The campaign spread through the participation of some other nationalist associations. Initially, the pressure was only psychological, albeit with a clear anti-Semitic tone. Violence broke out in June 1934 in Thrace.

The Thrace events started first in Çanakkale. There was physical aggression and looting of Jewish properties, and as the threats grew, Jews began to leave the city for Istanbul. In July, events spread the entire region. A mob attacked the Jewish quarter in Edirne and looted houses. More than 60 houses of Jews were raided in Kirklareli (Hür 2007). A rabbi was killed and several rapes were reported in different cities. During the events, the local officials were anything but protective, and gave orders to the Jews to leave their cities within forty
eight hours. At the end of the events, thousands of the Jews left the region, and the property structure of the region changed significantly, as the leaving Jews had to sell their real estate in a short time for very cheap prices. Events have been interpreted as local, anti-Semitic attacks caused by journals published locally and nationally, and the state apparatus simply failed to control the popular rage. Yet more recent studies argue for the responsibility of Ankara government, based on new evidence on the role of local officials and branches of the RPP. Hatice Bayraktar (2006) maintains that the aim of the government was to homogenize the border zone on the eve of World War II, in line with the strategic need for re-armament of the demilitarized zones in Thrace and at the Straits.

The Kemalist search for ethnic integration was not limited to non-Muslims. As the regime moved further in defining nationalism in ethnic terms, it became more anxious about the non-Turkish Muslim population of Anatolia, especially about the Kurds. Measures taken by the Ankara government vis-à-vis the Kurdish populations were by no means less violent than its attitude toward non-Muslims. Right after the declaration of the republic, there were at least three points of tension between the Ankara government and the Kurdish notables. First, the Kurdish demand for autonomy was not realized in the Treaty of Lausanne, and the 1924 Constitution was also silent about it. Second, the abolition of the Caliphate, the most important symbol of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood (van Bruinessen 1992: 281), caused further deterioration in relations with the Kurds (Bozarslan 2004: 29). The third, and more general point of tension, was the centralization policies of the Ankara government. Military stations, schools and tax collectors were the only visible symbols of the centralization. The division of Ottoman Kurdistan between Turkey, Iraq and Syria by militarized borders was indispensable to the systemic logic of the new nation-state. But, as Hamit Bozarslan (2004: 28) notes, for Kurds, this new control mechanism meant a barrier making trade and communication among family and tribe members more difficult.
These points of tension gave rise to several violent clashes between Kurdish rebels and Turkish military forces, but two of them were especially crucial: the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, and the Ağrı uprising in 1930. In both cases, the rebellions were able to mobilize thousands of insurgents, yet failed to achieve decisive military success. Each time the central government repressed them violently. Rebellions were punished by militarily and punitive measures, including mass arrests, deportations, and summary executions. In the aftermath of the Sheikh Said rebellion, a period shaped by the Law for Maintenance of Order, the Eastern Reform Plan (ŞarkIslahatPlanı) was drafted in 1925. Three items of the reform plan were noteworthy: prohibition of speaking Kurdish in public sphere; deportation of families—supposedly posing a security risk—to the Western part of Turkey and their reallocation to Turkish towns; and the establishment of an Inspectorate General to rule the region by taking military measures (Çağaptay 2006: 22). The Eastern Reform Plan was a pioneering example of many forthcoming official statements codifying non-Turkish speakers ipso facto as the “enemy within.” Language, maintains Bozarslan (2004: 29), was the new criterion of distinction between majority and minority. This was the inauguration of the Turkish state discourse about the Kurds, which was based on the denial of the Kurdishness of the Kurdish question (Yeğen 1999). The Kurdish question was first renamed as the “Eastern question,” then several other euphemisms were employed to replace the taboo word “Kurdish,” including “resistance of pre-modernity,” “banditry,” or “regional backwardness.” Yeğen concludes that the Turkish state discourse enunciates the exclusion of Kurdish identity. Once again, the Ankara government employed a context-free language in its search for systemic integration, and limited the space left for social interaction.

The most violent clash between the Kurds and the republican regime took place in Dersim, today’s Tunceli, in 1937 and 1938. Dersim, a region of Alevi Kurds, had always had an autonomous status in Ottoman periods. As early as the mid-1920s, the systemic logic of
the Ankara government was aware of the fact that Dersim was a hole in the massive system of the new regime. There was no state symbol in Dersim, let alone control. In December 1935, the parliament passed the Tunceli Law, which brought the administrative and spatial rearrangement of the region. The province was renamed Tunceli. The law also made the whole region a forbidden zone, and several army barracks and military stations were established. These were the symbols of the centralization policy as well as main causes of the rebellion.

The leaders of the rebellion were organized enough to voice their causes in international diplomatic circles. A letter sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations signed by various rebellious tribal chiefs stated the ban on Kurds becoming officers in the Turkish army or civil servants in the Kurdish provinces, the elimination of all references to “Kurd” or “Kurdistan” from the public scene, and the Turkification of a part of the Kurdish nation and extermination of the other part as the reasons for their rebellion (White, 2000: 80). The Ankara government reacted violently with a massive military operation, which included air raids. Civilians, who had taken refuge in caves, were killed by dynamite having been flung at them. Even the official publication of the Turkish Army mentions that nearly 8,000 Kurds were killed (Yeğen 2011: 158). Nearly 40,000 people were deported from Dersim/Tunceli. All in all, the Kemalist ethnic integration project was utterly unable to temper the initial points of contention between the Kurds and Ankara government. Even worse, by generating a non-ending cycle of rebellion and military measures, new traumatic memories had been created in the minds of the Kurdish people. The Kemalist ethnic integration project was anything but integrative.

The final move of the single-party regime in terms of homogenization came during World War II. On November 1942, the parliament passed the Capital Tax Law. The basic logic of the law was to tax the excessive profits made on the black market under wartime
conditions. In the implementation of the law, four different categories were created for taxpayers. M stood for Muslims, E for foreigners (ecnebi), G for non-Muslims (gayrimüslim) and D for crypto-Jews (dönme). This categorization was an official confession that the prevailing nationalism was an ethnic nationalism. From January 1943, hundreds of tax delinquents were sent to the Aşkale labor camp in Eastern Anatolia (Bali 2005). The Capital Tax was the single-party regime’s most successful policy in bringing about a Turkification of the economic sphere (Aktar 2000).

The dual characteristic of Kemalist Turkish nationalism, inclusive and exclusive at the same time, determined all the processes of ethnic integration, including its inconsistencies and contingencies. Soner Çağaptay argues that by adopting three different definitions of nation—based on territory, religion and ethno-religious identity, the Kemalist regime produced three concentric zone of Turkishness: “an outer territorial one, a middle religious one, and an inner ethnic one. Only when a group was located in the innermost, ethnic zone, did it enjoy close proximity to the Turkish state” (Çağaptay 2002).

The model offered by Çağaptay is illuminating and facilitates our understanding of the policies of ethnic integration discussed so far. The process started with the Compulsory Population Exchange. Only after this “civilized version of ethnic cleansing,” if we are to follow Keyder (2004), did the inclusive nationalism of the 1924 Constitution become possible. To translate into Çağaptay’s model, only after achieving a certain level of homogeneity within the territory, could the regime formulate a definition of nation based on territory. Yet, from the perspective of the Ankara government, the overall population of Anatolia and Thrace was still far from being homogeneous. Hence, the regime anticipated a shift from the third concentric zone of Turkishness (territorial) to the second one (religious). This shift meant the formal/legalistic discrimination of non-Muslims, coupled with informally organized violence against them. Simultaneously, the single-party regime attempted to
increase the level of state control in the Kurdish provinces and to make the Kurdish identity invisible. This included the prohibition of speaking Kurdish in the public sphere, violent clashes with Kurdish rebellions and a series of military precautions taken against the entire population of some provinces. According to the system integration model of the Kemalist regime, being a Turk was seen as a technical term, detached from the social context, and in this systemic logic, there was limited or no place for other ethnic identities in its context-free language.

6.4 Kemalism and the Cultural Integration

This section incorporates the cultural integration perspective of the Kemalist regime into the general discussion by concentrating on two projects of the Ankara government—the language reforms and the music reform. It is necessary to incorporate the cultural sphere into the discussion on system integration because it is a crucial point where system integration intersects social integration. It might be argued that appropriating a context-free language puts the cultural sphere into relief as the main obstacle for system integration simply because the cultural sphere, emerging out of historical accumulation and common efforts of the people, is the source of the very language the regime tried to reshape. In this sense, this chapter understands the cultural sphere with reference to two defining elements. First, it includes all kinds of mediums of human interaction, above all language. Second, it implies all discourses whereby people understand life and attribute a series of meanings to it. Therefore, avoiding a culturalist and essentialist perspective, culture, here, is not understood as a set of specific attributes belonging to each society.

The intersection of system integration with the cultural sphere can be analyzed in three domains. The first one is the “high culture,” where the system visualizes itself, and codes what is valuable in cultural terms. The second includes all kinds of cultural elements taught to
the masses by system integration. Regulation of language, such as canonization of its grammar and orthography, falls into this category. The third one is the popular culture. Social interaction is the main source of the popular culture, but one should not forget that high culture is also a source of the popular. Moreover, system integration both enables the spreading of the popular and attempts to regulate it. This section provides details about the Kemalist acultural modernization by focusing on the languages and music reforms.

6.4.1 The Language reforms

Like many other Kemalist reforms, the language reform was first uttered as a necessity during the nineteenth century. When the Porte’s search for a more effective bureaucratic apparatus became apparent, the partial standardization of Ottoman orthography was seen as an obstacle for a uniformed functioning of the state apparatus. Moreover, the difference between written language (the language of classical literature) and daily parlance was huge, causing problems for mass education. Therefore, in addition to the standardization of orthography, simplification, which was understood as purifying the language from Arabic and Persian influences, was also considered necessary. During the Unionist period, Turkification of the language became the hegemonic position.

This development laid the groundwork for a more inclusive language reform in the republican era. When the new alphabet was ready in 1928, the commission offered Mustafa Kemal two schemes for the transitional period, a fifteen-year plan, and a five-year plan, to which he replied, “This will either happen in three months or it won’t happen at all” (quoted in G. L. Lewis 1984). He devoted his personal time to introducing the new letters, giving lectures in public parks, and touring Thrace and Central Anatolia. For republican systemic integration, the question was again how to decide what the term “Turkish” meant technically. Within the systemic logic, the old Arabic alphabet was characterized as “alien,” so was the
Ottoman; while the Romanized writing system was designated as Turkish. Yet again, the shift in technical terms was carried out by Mustafa Kemal. In a meeting with university professors and writers, he maintained,

To deliver the nation from illiteracy no other course is open than to abandon the Arabic letters, which are not suited to the national language, and to accept the Turkish letters, based on the Latin. The alphabet proposed by the Commission is in truth the Turkish alphabet and is definitive. It is adequate to meet all the Turkish’s nation’s needs. The laws of grammar and spelling will evolve in step with the improvement of the language and with the national taste (quoted in G. L. Lewis 1984).

There were voluntary public classes for the general public. For the civil servants, special courses were organized. In October 1928, they were examined on their knowledge of the new Turkish letters. Only then did parliament enact, on 1 November 1928, the law concerning the alphabet change. In the wording of the law, the new alphabet was referred to as the “Turkish letters.” The law stated that the new letters should be used uniformly in the bureaucracy as of 1 January 1929. In the transition period, the dailies were allowed to use both alphabets. Soon it was understood that Mustafa Kemal’s radical approach was the right way to conduct the transition.

As an example of a comprehensive alphabet change, the adoption of Latin letters in Turkey is unique in the world. In terms of system integration logic, it can be seen as a successful reform. However, its success does not veil the fact that system integration searched for context-free language cut off from cultural tradition. Moreover, regulating the language, including the canonization of the grammar, sorting the vocabulary, or preparing dictionaries, is crucial in this sense—simply because the language is the context in itself. By changing the alphabet, the Kemalist system integration re-channeled the context of the language. The new context was free from both Ottoman and Islamic connotations, which, most of the time, were treated as the same. In 1928, writing Turkish with Latin script was the outmost important
symbol of a “new beginning.” True, other reforms had also functioned to symbolize the imaginary gap between the Ottoman past and the republic (Zerubavel 2003: 89); however, the alphabet reform made all the written materials of the past inaccessible to new generations; therefore, its impacts were remarkable.

The alphabet reform soon achieved sustainable success, but the language reform was not over yet. The second phase came in 1932. Following the first Turkish History Congress and the establishment of the Turkish History Society, where pseudo-scientific work had been done on the origins of the Turks (Ersanlı 2011), Mustafa Kemal initiated the formation of the Society for Turkish Language Research (Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti, later reformed as Türk Dil Kurumu) in July 1932. At the time the society was established, the alphabet reform was, for the most part, over. But the language society functioned as an engine for the purification of Turkish, the core of the second phase. The main purpose of the society was to form a new vocabulary corpus for Turkish. Three main methods were used to do so: first, collecting and publishing words from local dialects and old Turkic texts; second, coining new words from Turkish roots and establishing principles for word coinage; and third, proposing and propagating genuine Turkish words to replace “foreign terms” (Perry 1985). One controversial issue was to code a large number of words, widely used both in written and daily language, as “foreign” by referring to their either Arabic or Persian origins. According to Mustafa Kemal, the goal of the language reform was to “conquer Ottoman” (G. L. Lewis 1984). With the alphabet reform, the first move was to decontextualize the language, and the purification movement was the second move to create a language cut off from the cultural tradition. Thus, the Kemalist system integration successfully detached the cultural milieu of Turkey from the Ottoman influence by using the language reforms as a tool.
6.4.2 The Music reform

Employed within the logic of system integration, Kemalist policies regarding music were in fact strategies to reach defined goals of the regimes, namely Westernization and the creation of a national identity. The Kemalist music reform to a large extent repressed the interactive milieu of music, and thus the milieu of social interaction. Like the language reform, the republican music reform was mainly shaped by the Unionist intellectual agenda. Music was first accepted as a serious issue by Ziya Gökalp, and he considered the music reform primarily as a tool for creating a synthesis of the Turkish national identity and the requirements of Western civilization. Instead of the “ill” state of the non-national urban music based on modal structures (makam), Gökalp found Turkish national music in folk culture. Anatolian villages were the source of “healthy” music, and this healthy music was a part of the Turkish culture (hars). For him, there were two kinds of music not foreign to Turks: Western music, seen as a part of their civilization, and folk music, regarded as a part of their culture. Gökalp concluded, therefore, that “national music [would] flourish out of the synthesis of folk music and Western music” (Behar 1987: 93-106). Gökalp’s formulation about how to reform Turkish music became the main guide of the republic’s music project (Tekelioglu 1996).

In the 1930s, with the consolidation of the one-party rule, the official concern for indoctrination increased, and the music reform was part of this endeavor. Mustafa Kemal declared his perspective on music in 1928, after a concert where both Turkish music (the modal traditional music) and Western music were performed:

This unsophisticated music, cannot feed the needs of the innovative Turkish soul, the Turkish sensibility in all its urge to explore new paths. We have just heard the music of the civilized world, and the people, who gave a rather anemic reaction to the murmuring known as Eastern music, immediately came to life… (quoted in Tekelioglu 2001).
Hence, Western music was coded as “civilized” music, and the Eastern music as “boring.” It was the fault of the Ottoman period to adopt such uncivilized musical forms and therefore to prevent the Turkish nation’s march toward civilization.

The reform of Turkish music became an issue in the early 1930s with experts and intellectuals getting involved in the discussions (Üstel 1993; Üstel 1994). In June 1934, a reputable poet and essayist, Ercüment Behzat (Lav), published his ideas in a music magazine where he referred to Russian music modernization as a suitable model for Turkey to follow. Russian music had been seen as mundane until Russian composers like Tchaikovsky worked on the folk tunes of the masses. Using this method, he argued, Russian music reached its mature stage. Likewise, he suggested, “the nucleus of tomorrow’s Turkish music” could be found in Anatolian tunes. What he advocated was a strict constraining of non-polyphonic music: “As the first step in this sorting and cleansing operation of the ear, the publication and printing of the record of songs should be strictly limited and controlled” (quoted in Tekelioğlu 2001).

Intellectuals, who can possibly be qualified as organic in the Gramscian sense, were, most of the time, reproducing the leader’s perspective, and searching for a basis to make Kemal’s ideas persuasive. Referring to Habermas (1970), these writers can be considered as “social actors [who] acquired their position within system by learning skills and qualification,” rather than as free and autonomous intellectuals. But even the influence of these semi-official voices was not so puissant. To put into Habermas’s perspective, in the systemic logic of Turkey of the 1930s, setting “defined goals” and determining “strategies” was the privilege of the leader. This is why the reform officially began only after his inaugural speech for the parliamentary year in November 1934, where Mustafa Kemal reserved a special place to the issue of music:
The measurement of the change undergone by a nation is its capacity to absorb and grasp the new change in music. The music that they are trying to get people to listen to today is not our music, so it can hardly fill the bill. … What is required is the collection of national expression that conveys fine thoughts and feelings, and without delay putting it to music along the lines of the most modern rules. Only in this way can Turkish national music rise to take its place among the music of the world (quoted in Naci 1968: 97).

Two days later, the Ministry of Interior announced a decree to interdict the broadcasting of Turkish music on Turkish radio (Kocabaşoğlu 1980: 92). The ban of Turkish music on radio lasted from 3 November 1934 to 6 September 1936. Although some argue that it is unclear whether the ban covered only modal traditional Turkish music or it was a restriction on any kind of Turkish music including folk tunes (Güngör 1993: 65), several other sources argue that it was a comprehensive ban (Tura 1988: 65; Özbek 1991: 149; Kocabaşoğlu 1980; Stokes 1992). The immediate response of the Ministry of Interior to Mustafa Kemal’s speech deserves to be noticed. Ercüment Behzat Lav was appointed as the chief director of radio programs. This ban was a good example indicating how the logic of system integration could go to extremes to shrink the milieu of social integration.

The ban ended in 1936. However, the ban on radio was not the only ban concerning Turkish music. Another regulation was implemented in 1926: the Oriental Music Section of the Conservatory in Istanbul was closed down (Paçacı 1994). And in 1927, a complete ban on monophonic music education in public and private schools was issued. As a result, up until 1976, there was no educational institution providing training in Turkish music. Moreover, as this ban lasted for many generations, its effects were observable on Turkish music for many decades (Behar 1987: 121 and 140). Chapter 9 discusses the conservative reactions to the music reform, by focusing on Peyami Safa’s novel Fatih-Harbiye, in which discussion of Eastern and the Western music were depicted with a special emphasis on the closing down of the Oriental Music Section of the Conservatory.
6.5 Conclusion

Gavin D. Brockett (1998) argues that the historiography of the early republican Turkey has been dominated by a monochromatic approach, limited to explicating political developments especially related to the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This monochromatic approach tends to explain the contours of the republican modernization by privileging the ideas and biography of Atatürk as key explanatory variables. This chapter is an attempt to go beyond this mono-dimensional approach. Studies based on the modernization theory or the Kemalist perspective have been unable to go beyond conventional narratives of the republican era. The model offered in this chapter is a new interpretation of a well-known history. It is an interpretation based on a theoretical reformulation of the available material rather than unknown historical facts.

The chapter argues that Turkish modernization cannot be grasped fully unless its system integration dimension is taken into consideration. In other words, drawing on the concept developed by Habermas, it suggests that Turkish modernization, from its late Ottoman origins to the republic, should be read as an attempt at system integration. It also argues that system integration provides an overarching framework within which to analyze the continuities and changes seen in the transition from the Unionist period to the republican era. The major line of continuity from the Unionist to the republican era is that in both periods the major goal was to establish a nation-state. This goal was considered as a major precaution vis-à-vis the international threats. Put differently, the nation-state model was accepted as a way to secure internal stability and to gain an equal position in the international arena. Both in the Unionist and the Kemalist parlance, this major goal was phrased as saving the state, and to save the state, Westernization was appropriated as the strategy, although with different degrees of radicalism. Drawing on Habermas, this chapter translates the phrase of “saving the
state,” which was the predominant political goal in the discourse of the Unionist and the Kemalist elite alike, into the terminology of social theory as system integration.

It has already been argued in the Introduction that the “Eurocentric model of progress” has been the response of Turkish modernization to the Western dominance. This chapter provides evidence for this argument. Admittedly, Mustafa Kemal had a positivist background.\(^\text{44}\) Certainly this background had an influence on appropriating Westernization as a goal of the regime. But monochromatic analyses are not enough to have a full picture. Benefiting from new details available, this chapter argues that some of the most radical modernization projects, such as the Civil Code, need to be understood not with a perspective privileging the intellectual horizons of the republican leaders, but as a response to the Western dominance. The link, which has hitherto been underestimated, between the abolition of capitulations and extraterritorialities and some aspects of the republican secularism, needs to be incorporated into a multi-causal analysis. The “specter of colonialism” was a concrete fear and hence resisting to it, and making claims of parity with European states were the primary items on the agenda for the republican regime.

What are the advantages of rethinking this well-known history by the help of a concept of social theory? Put differently, what are the advantages of translating the phrase of “saving the state” into the concept of system integration? Contextualizing Turkish modernization as system integration rejects the vocabulary chosen by the leaders of the period; it offers instead an abstraction. This abstraction helps to underline the commonalities amongst different reform processes. The chapter has shown that in three integration spheres of the Kemalist regime, i.e., the political, ethnic, and cultural integrations, it was possible to

\(^{44}\) In his new monograph \textit{Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography}, Şükrü Hanioğlu states that Mustafa Kemal’s intellectual background was an amalgam of scientism, materialism, social Darwinism, positivism and nationalism. Hanioğlu notes that German vulgar materialism, Gustave Le Bon’s elitism, and Durkheim’s solidarism (via Ziya Gökalp) were highly influential on him. “Typical of this background were the unflinching scientism that view religion as the major obstacle to human progress, the perception of a single modernity to the exclusion of other possibilities, and an authoritarian organization monopolizing politics for the lofty aim of serving the public good.” (Hanioğlu: 2011: 229-230)
observe key characteristics of system integration. Two components of system integration are to be restated: first, system integration functions through a series of definitions formulated in a context-free language. In this sense, the systemic definitions are akin to technical rules, sometimes even being explicitly stated technical rules. The milieu where these definitions are shaped is a formally organized domain of action detached from the social integration—the vibrant society. Second, following the process of definition, the phase of technical control starts, and according to Habermas, the more established system integration become, the more technical control expands. For instance, the redefinitions of the limits of the political sphere, the question of “who is a Turk” or the question of “what is a ‘healthy’ and national music” were amongst major issues of the definitional phase. Then, the closing down of medreses and tekkes, prohibition of speaking Kurdish in public sphere, and prohibitions about broadcasting Turkish music on radio were instances of technical control, in the contexts of political, ethnic and cultural integrations, respectively.

When the three components of early republican system integration—the political, ethnic, and cultural integrations—are closely scrutinized, it can be seen that all of them had some Unionist roots. It was stated above that political integration had two elements: republican integration and redefinition of politics. At first glance, the Unionist roots of republican integration seem dubious. True, for the Unionists, replacing the sultanate with a republic was not a set target; but it is also indispensable to acknowledge that without the revolution of 1908, the republicanism of the early 1920s would not have been possible. The 1908 revolution proved to every party, including the Unionists, the bureaucracy, and the society that it is possible to limit the power of the sultan. And the permanence of imagining politics around the concepts of solidarism and corporatism from the Unionist to the early republican era supports the continuity thesis as far as the element of redefining politics is concerned.
In the context of ethnic integration, the basic support for the continuity thesis comes from the permanence of two-fold strategies for the Turkification of Anatolia. The Kemalists learned from the Unionists to simultaneously employ formal/diplomatic means and informally organized violence. Their difference should not be underestimated: the Unionists synthesized these two means by privileging violence, whereas the Kemalists relied more on formal/diplomatic means rather than violence. But the major formal/diplomatic tools employed by the Kemalist regime towards ethnic integration had already been used by the Unionists. The idea of compulsory population exchange is a good example to underline this line of continuity. The first population exchange treaty, signed between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria in 1913, and diplomatic efforts in Athens a year later to have a similar treaty with Greece, indicate that, indeed, in Lausanne the Kemalists had made a Unionist project real. In the context of cultural integration, the Kemalist projects of language reform and music reform owe too much to the Unionist heritage; Unionists were the forefathers of these reforms and although unsuccessful, they had attempted their very first application. However, it needs to be emphasized that, the early republican regime achieved a much more radical tone than its predecessor in cultural integration while the Unionists being more radical in ethnic integration. In truth, the continuous warfare from 1912 until 1922 made the setting ready for Unionist radicalism for ethnic integration; and likewise, the peace achieved by the republic made a radical cultural integration possible.
PART II

MULTIPLYING TRAJECTORIES IN TURKISH INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
CHAPTER 7 – THE UNIONIST INTELLECTUALS AND THE WEST

The Unionist period was the formative period for Turkish modernization. Chapter 6 discussed the continuity from the final decades of the empire to the republican era in different contexts. The Unionist period was an era where the typical left-wing/right-wing divides were not observable. What is interesting is that despite the absence of overarching splits, the intellectual agenda of the Unionist era shaped the agenda throughout the twentieth century. An important item of this agenda was a practical question: “how to save the state?” This question did not disappear in later periods since Turkey has hardly ever enjoyed a stable period with a consolidated political system. Other questions on the Unionist intellectual agenda were more theoretical and sometimes identity oriented. As Bernard Lewis reminds us, “to what civilization did the Turks belong—and in what civilization did their future lie?” was an important question, covering both the identity and modernization issues. Whether to imitate the West and “win the respect of Europe by conforming to European patterns of culture and organization” (Lewis 1968: 234) or to opt for a selective adaptation of Westernization, without being imitative was another item on the agenda. Put differently, for Unionist intellectuals, the main task was a search for a balance between universalism, on the one hand, and local identity, differences, and particularities of their society, on the other hand. Throughout the twentieth century, this task did not change for Turkish intellectuals, probably because it is a difficult theoretical problem, not easy at any level. For this reason, the Unionist era is the formative period for intellectual agenda and for later generations of intellectuals, the key question remained the same.

This chapter focuses on two prominent Unionist intellectuals, Ahmed Rıza and M. Ziya Gökalp. Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp had commonalities: both were active in politics and had an important position within the CUP, yet had always had a strong interest in
intellectual pursuits, and, hence, positioned themselves as ideologues of the CUP. Both influenced considerably by French positivism, they were admirers of Western culture and followers of Western ideas. Yet their differences were also significant. Their admiration for the West was remarkably different, as was their positivism. Ahmed Rıza was suspected of being a non-believer, whereas Ziya Gökalp had an Islamic/nationalist perspective. Above all, Ahmed Rıza was the symbolic leader of the opposition in exile or the Paris wing of the Unionist, whereas Ziya Gökalp joined the CUP just on the eve of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. This is the point where we need to remember Suavi Aydın’s (2001a) distinction between the first Union and Progress and the second Union and Progress, already summarized in Chapter 5. The first CUP consisted of the émigré opposition and had an Ottomanist stance. Its intellectual sources of inspiration were basically French. Ahmed Rıza was leader of this group, both as an intellectual and as a politician. The second CUP was the underground organization in Macedonia, composed by officers and low-rank civil servants discontented with the strict censorship of the sultan. Aydın attributes an intellectual vacuum to this group, within which Ziya Gökalp appeared as an intellectual leader. In this sense, he was not only the leading intellectual figure of Unionism after 1908, but also the first systematic theoretician of Turkish nationalism (Berkes 1954; Parla 1985). Therefore, by focusing on both Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp and acknowledging their commonalities and differences, this chapter covers two wings of Unionism.

This chapter has four components: First, how Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp criticized the West and the Western expansion is analyzed. This analysis reviews not only how they criticized European imperialism, but also how they positioned Europe as a source of knowledge and universal principles. This section also includes how the two Unionist intellectuals reacted to the prejudices held of their society. Second, their positions with respect to Islam are discussed. Third, the patterns of modernization suggested by them are
examined. This section deals with how they conceptualized Turkish modernization as a general path to be followed by society. Fourth, their positions with respect to universalism and particularism are scrutinized. This section also includes an overview of the nativist argument in the writings of Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp. These four topics function as a grid through which the ideas of Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp are filtered; nevertheless, they obviously did not write at equal length on them. For instance, Ahmed Rıza wrote more on the first subject whereas Ziya Gökalp was more systematic in thinking and writing about the third. These four issues will help me to read Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp as intellectuals of a space of subjugation. As I have already defined it in Chapter 3, space of subjugation first and foremost means experiencing subjugation by (formal or informal) colonialism and imperialism, with colonial criticism appearing as an embedded item for the intellectual agenda of spaces of subjugations. How the two intellectuals approach the West and Western expansion is very much concerned with the first meaning of space of subjugation and colonial criticism. One of the secondary defining items for space of subjugation is search for recognition. This chapter approaches this in terms of how the two intellectuals deal with negative prejudices held vis-à-vis Islam. Another secondary defining item for space of subjugation is the problematic of modernization, with all its complexities, including a search for model and assuming a temporal gap between the model and the follower. This issue is examined within the context of patterns of modernization. Lastly, the question of how to reconcile different universalist perspectives with local realities, yet another defining component of space of subjugation, appears in the conclusion of the chapter with specific reference to Ahmet Rıza and Ziya Gökalp.

Throughout the chapter, these four subjects are discussed by focusing on the writing of Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp in the post-1918 period. For Ahmed Rıza, the main focus is his
book published in French in 1922, *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidental en Orient*.\(^{45}\)

For Ziya Gökalp, his books *Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muâsırlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamization, Modernization, published in 1918), *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Principles of Turkism, published in 1923) and his essays of 1922, published on *Küçük Mecmua* constitute the main material to be discussed.\(^{46}\)

Before proceeding to examine these topics, biographical notes are necessary. When reading the biographies of the two men, the following similarity stands out: both Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp are almost autodidact intellectuals, meaning that although they had a university level education, their degrees were not related to their writing, which made them dependent on personal effort to improve their horizons. Besides this similarity, two differences must be emphasized. Ahmed Rıza spent many years in Paris and in other European cities, and his autodidact education owed much to the European circles in which he found himself, whereas Gökalp spent all his formative years in Anatolia. More importantly, Gökalp had a strong interest in social sciences, and especially sociology; he even began to consider himself as the first sociologist of Turkey. This made his work more comprehensive and, especially when their writings on modernization are compared, Gökalp’s are by far more systematic. However, Ahmed Rıza’s writings were more vocal on the issue of criticizing European imperialism.

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\(^{45}\) For Ahmed Rıza’s book, I follow the English translation *The Moral Bankruptcy of Western Policy towards the East*, published in 1988 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism Publications, by comparing it with Ziyad Ebüzziya’s translation into Turkish *Batının Doğu Politikasının Ahlâken İflâsı*, published in 1982. There also is another translation into Turkish by Ergun Göze, published in 2004, with the title *Batının Politik Ahlâksızlığı*.

Ahmed Rıza was born in Istanbul in 1859, the son of Ali Rıza Bey, who was member of first Ottoman parliament, ambassador to Vienna and Berlin, and known for his familiarity with British culture. His mother Naile Hanım was an Austrian who converted to Islam. After graduating from Galatasaray, a famous lycée in Istanbul providing a French education, Ahmed Rıza went on to study agriculture in France with the intention of alleviating the suffering of Anatolian peasantry by promoting advanced farming methods (Özden and Lök 2001). Shortly after his return, he was appointed as director of education in Bursa. Most likely a career in the bureaucracy was not challenging enough for him so, after a relatively short tenure in the post, he obtained permission in 1889 to travel to France. The explicit purpose for going there was to visit the international exhibition in Paris. Nevertheless, the implicit reason turned out to be more determinative; he became an active member of the opposition in exile and became a leader of the CUP. While he was in Paris, Ahmed Rıza published a journal entitled *Mesveret* (Consultation). He returned to Istanbul only after the Revolution of 1908.

In the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution, Ahmed Rıza was first elected as Member of Parliament from Istanbul and then elected to the senate, where he also served as president. After the declaration of the republic in 1923, Ahmed Rıza vanished from the political scene. Yet, it would not be accurate to consider him as being inactive in the transition from empire to the republic. In the summer of 1919, he received a letter from Mustafa Kemal asking him to leave Istanbul for Paris and initiate public opinion activities to help the national resistance movement. He immediately left Istanbul and went to Paris, where he remained until 1923. During his third stay in Paris, he wrote in French *La Faillite Morale de la Politique*

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47 Bernard Lewis (1968: 198) informs us that in this period he was mostly influenced by Pierre Lafitte, a follower of Auguste Comte, who taught him positivist philosophy. During his stay in Paris, Ahmed Rıza published two books (*Tolérance Musulman* of 1897 and *La Crise de l’Orient* of 1907), and essays in *Revue Occidental* and *Positivist Review* (the French and British positivist journals, respectively). For Eric Zürcher, Ahmed Rıza “went much further in his rejection of religion than most Young Turks were prepared to go” (2004: 87). Yet his uncompromising personality turned out to be an advantage for his career as a leader. When Sultan Abdülhamid offered an official position to all Young Turk leaders to break the émigré opposition, Ahmed Rıza rejected the offer, and secured his leadership vis-à-vis two challengers, Micanzi Murat Bey and Prince Sabahaddin. In effect, Ahmed Rıza’s consistent position prevented the dissociation of the movement in exile.
*Occidental en Orient*, which first appeared in 1922. His book *The Moral Bankruptcy* was published when Istanbul was under British occupation, following decades of hegemony of the Western states over the empire.

Ziya Gökalp was born in 1875 (or 1876), in Diyarbakır, the most important Kurdish city in the empire. He always emphasized the Turkishness of his family but he possibly had Kurdish roots on his mother side. When he came to Istanbul for the first time in 1896, he said “I feel I am a Turk” (Heyd 1950, 21). As a young boy, his education was mostly shaped by private lessons covering a verity of domains: he studied the classical Ottoman literature, Persian, Arabic and the Islamic philosophy. He also learned French. He read Turkish revolutionary literature published by the Unionist circles in exile. From his memoires, we learn that his adolescence was marked by a crisis over reconciling idealist and rationalist philosophies. He attempted suicide but survived, with the bullet remaining in his skull (Ülken 1966: 494). He arrived in Istanbul in 1896 and chose to attend the Veterinary College, which did not charge tuition. In Istanbul, he became more active in politics, and due to his Unionist ties, he could not finish the college. After a short period of imprisonment, he returned to Diyarbakır, where he acted as the central figure for the Unionist underground. Following the Revolution of 1908, he became the public figure of the Diyarbakır branch of the CUP. In this capacity, he was invited to the Congress of the CUP in Salonika in 1909. At this congress, he was elected to the central council (*merkez-i umumi*) and, thereafter, had an influential position within the party. During his Salonika years, he started teaching sociology at the high school of the CUP, and, from 1915 onwards, he had the first sociology position at Istanbul University. In the post-1908 period, he focused on theorizing about Turkish nationalism. After the dissolution of the empire, he did not receive an immediate welcome in Ankara due to his Unionist credentials. But, in the second election of 1923, he was selected as the deputy of Diyarbakır, before his death in 1924.
7.1 Criticizing Colonialism, Criticizing the West

Anti-imperialist stance was the common denominator for the first CUP and the second CUP. Since the first issue of Mechveret (Supplément français), the opposition in exile positioned itself against European imperialism and colonialism. European imperialism was seen by the Unionists as the primary reason for the dissolution of the empire. For the Unionist anti-imperialism, fighting European prejudices against Islam, in general, and about the Ottomans and Turks, in particular, was an important aspect of their agenda. For instance, for Mizancı Murad Bey, characterizing Turks as “barbarians” was the continuation of the Crusades mentality (Mardin 1964: 72); therefore, standing up against these prejudices was a must. In the first congress of the CUP in 1902, organized in Paris, the main discussion was about the possibility of cooperation with the Great Powers in the struggle against the sultan’s despotism. For some Unionists, it was legitimate to cooperate with the Great Powers in order to overthrow Sultan Abdülhamid II. However, another group, led by Ahmed Rıza, declared that the independence of the empire was more valuable than anything else. Hence, for the proponents of non-interventionism (ademî müdahalecî), abnegation of independence was not considered an option. While making this position explicit, Ahmed Rıza emphasized that rejecting the support of Great Powers to reform internal politics did not mean enmity toward Europe. For him, defending independence was the virtue disseminated by the European powers, and European patriotism was source of inspiration for them (Petrosyan 1974: 221).

As it is already mentioned in Chapter 5, anti-imperialism was an important item in the ideological repertoire of the CUP. But in the period after the Entente occupation, anti-imperialism came to have exceeding importance on the agenda of the Unionist intellectuals. The year 1922 was important for both Ziya Gökalp and Ahmed Rıza with respect to making their anti-imperialism more explicit. What was noteworthy was that both Ziya Gökalp and Ahmed Rıza established their criticism on ethical grounds. In 1922, Ahmed Rıza had been in
Paris since 1919. During his third stay in Paris, he published in French La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidental en Orient as a means of adding an intellectual dimension to his public opinion efforts.\textsuperscript{48}

At the beginning of his The Moral Bankruptcy, Ahmed Rıza reiterated his commonly known position and stated that, for years, in his journal Meşveret, he had attempted to arouse the sympathy of his compatriots for the “true civilization,” namely the virtues of European institutions (1988: 17). He defined the material civilization as a ladder to be used to attain moral excellence, the peak of all perfection (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 7). Yet, he claimed that European policy towards Turkey had never been governed by moral principles, but rather dominated by mere interests (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 1), and that on the more general level, the conquest of Muslim countries, the seizure of their wealth and the destruction of their power had always constituted the basis for European policy (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 5).

All the while he was attempting to propagate a pro-Western worldview, as a positivist and admirer of European civilization, the Great Powers of Europe were engaging in a “bloody war” for non-European people, by separating the world into two sections. This was forcing the peoples of the East, according to Ahmed Rıza, to resist with horror anything that came to them from the West (1988: 19). Therefore, in his opinion, due to the aggressive foreign policies of the European countries, “words such as civilization, humanity, and religion, by which they had ensnared the world, now inspired nothing but suspicion and apprehension” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 22). Due to the immoral aggressiveness, the notion of civilization had been declared bankrupt.

Ahmed Rıza’s criticism of the Western powers was twofold—one more general and the other, specific. The former encompassed his criticism of colonialism. For Ahmed Rıza, tolerance had never been practiced in Europe as a national virtue, and the most prominent

\textsuperscript{48} He first went to Paris in 1884 to study. He went in 1889 for the second time and stayed in exile until 1908. His third stay was between 1919 and 1923. During this period, he gave some interviews to newspapers, such as Petite Parisienne, and Le Matin (Özel and Hacıibrahimoğlu 2010: 202-207).
case for this claim was the harsh treatment of the Negro, simply because of the color of his skin (1988: 2). In different contexts, European countries were unable to find any justification for their military campaign, and then could only declare the unfortunate natives as an “inferior” race and a “danger” for humanity. So-called “inferior beings” lost all their possessions and the blessing of European civilization did not provide them any happiness. Briefly, the result of the colonialism was moral and physical degeneration (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 6-7).

At the specific level Ahmed Rıza’s focus was the Entente occupation in Istanbul and other parts of the country. For him, the extraordinarily brutal behavior of the British occupying force in Istanbul, including the violation of the Ottoman Parliament, or high fines for failing to obey the orders of the Allied police, was new proof of the moral bankruptcy of Europe. He reported that the Allied troops had burned some ornate buildings in which they had set up quarters as a result of pure negligence, and argued that the British police openly countenanced prostitution under the guise of furthering women’s emancipation. Moreover, industry, transport and general commercial activities of the capital were suspended as a way of forcing the Turks to accept a disadvantageous “monstrous” peace treaty (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 21).

The general criticism towards Europe spelled out in The Moral Bankruptcy contained two components. First, European countries were criticized for a foreign policy based on material interests. Accordingly, at the turn of the century, religious interest had ceased being the mainspring of Western policy and material interests came to dominate endeavors to acquire new territories. The search for new colonies was stimulated by the need to cover the cost of European elites living in luxury—“senseless expenditure on futile pleasures and the satisfaction of inordinate vanity” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 10). In this account, Ahmed Rıza

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49 The treaty to which Ahmed Rıza referred is the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 1920 between the representative of the Entente powers and the Sultan. It was never implemented and was annulled by the Treaty of Lausanne which was signed by the Ankara government in July 1923.
attacked European countries for being Machiavellian and employing the most despicable means to achieve their ends. He added that the ends were also despicable (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 15).

The second criticism was directed at the prejudice European countries held with respect to Turkey and the East, in a broader sense. Being a positivist, Ahmed Rıza indicated ignorance as the most dangerous of political lies (1988: 18). Moreover, he argued that their prejudices which kept Europeans from being able to assume a truly objective point of view, were the result of ignorance: “This is one of the causes of their erroneous attitude towards the East” maintained Ahmed Rıza (1988: 3-4). He continued by stating that

In the last thousand years Europe has sacrificed millions and millions of victims to its religious prejudices, its desire to dominate and its claim to the right to the possessions of distant countries. It has aroused bitterness and hatred; it has upset the established order, placed obstacles in the path of peace and the development of civilization in the East. The time has come to cry a halt and demand a truce (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 25).

For *The Moral Bankruptcy*, the most disturbing example of the prejudice was the one against the Turks. Arguing that the Turks are barbarians or members of an inferior race was an example of this type of prejudice. For Ahmed Rıza, Europeans perceiving Turks as “butchers and murderers” were victims of their own hatred, ignorance and fanaticism (1988: 29).\(^{50}\)

\(^{50}\) The stereotype of “Turks, the butchers and murders” was connected to the Armenian deportation of 1915, and Ahmed Rıza was well aware of this fact. Ahmed Rıza was the Unionist leader who was in favor of good relations with Armenian political organizations, and in 1897, in the aftermath of the Adana massacres committed by the Hamidian regime, he wrote that the Armenians were the victims, and shared their sufferings by saying “leur souffrance est la nôtre” (Ahmed Rıza 1897). Following the events of 1915, as a member of the Ottoman Senate, he proposed a Parliamentary Investigation Committee to bring the culpable to the High Court. “Furthermore, he demanded that ‘the atrocities committed under the name of deportation’ be investigated; that the negative impact throughout the country be determined; and that those involved in these affairs be prosecuted. The final section of the motion declared that ‘many acts and even crimes were perpetrated against all Ottomans; in particular, injustices without precedent in Ottoman history were committed against my Arab, Armenian and Greek fellow-citizens’.” (Aktar 2007) For more details, see (Turan 2009a). Concerning the Armenian Deportation, the position of Ziya Gökalp was just the opposite. Being member of central committee of the CUP, he thought the deportation was a necessity.
In 1922 Ziya Gökalp was in Diyarbakır, where he started publishing his journal, Küçük Mecmuı, after his return from Malta.\footnote{Gökalp was arrested by the British troops in 1919 and deported to Malta for complicity in war crimes, particularly the Armenian Deportation of 1915, as a former member of the central committee of the CUP. He was released in 1922 without verdict.} That year, he published a series of essays condemning the Entente powers and, above all, Great Britain. In the first essay of the series, Ziya Gökalp (1982: 135-137) summarized nineteenth-century Ottoman history. He stated that Britain had guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but that this guarantee did not mean preventing the Great Powers from occupying and annexing the Ottoman territory. What was more striking, the guarantee did not include any support for the Porte in his effort to stop the nations within the empire from seeking their independence. Ziya Gökalp (1982: 136) then concluded “England\footnote{A note on translation: Ziya Gökalp used mostly “İngilizler,” sometimes to mean the name of the country Great Britain, sometimes to mean the government and sometimes the English nation. Most of the time, these different connotations overlap, and this leads to a pervasive nativism. There is more emphasis on nativism in the last section of this chapter. I translate “İngilizler” as “English people,” as “England,” or as “Britain,” depending on the sentence.} did not introduce this rule (i.e., the guarantee) in our favor, but to the disadvantage of the Russians. They literally deceived us and the Russians, and all the nations.”

In the second essay of the series, entitled “English Morality,” Ziya Gökalp drew a distinction between patriotic morality (vatani ahlâk) and international morality (beynelminel ahlâk), arguing that the English people were especially powerful with respect to the first one. According to Gökalp, English people tended to consider the interest of their nation in their businesses first. Gökalp praised the British political system and the English people. The basis for praising the political system was national sovereignty, the constitutional monarchy, and the national character of the Anglican Church. The reason for praising the nation was the priority on national interest while engaging in politics. This was where the praise stopped because for Gökalp, the English people, with their high patriotic morality, had low international morality. The English people had transformed their patriotic morality into a common selfishness. Gökalp likened the English to a selfish man who, while pursuing his...
own self interest, concerns little that he may be making others worse off, in that they have been daring to destroy other nations for their own interest. This is the reason why Britain has been “immoral,” “barbarian,” and “savage” in the international arena. Gökalp concluded that while praising the patriotic morality of the English people, it was necessary to develop a defensive position with respect to Britain by qualifying its attitudes as “savage and monstrous” (Gökalp 1982: 142).

In another essay of the series, “English Politics,” Gökalp (1982: 143-146) maintained that English politics concerning the Ottoman Empire had been based on prejudice that saw the Ottomans as unable to establish simple rule of law-type government, let alone constitutional government. Because of this prejudice, it was thought that the Ottoman Empire would never break away from the theocracy, and, hence, would never reach democracy. For Gökalp, this prejudice was the basic reason why the British considered Ottoman sovereignty as something illegitimate. Therefore, Gökalp argued, there were British plans to give the capital Istanbul, as well as the eastern provinces (Vilâyet-i Şarkîyye), to Russia. Gökalp believed that the British wanted to make Turks completely renounce any claims to sovereignty. For Gökalp, such prejudiced arguments, unsupported by the facts, were yet another attempt to deceive the Turks.

Gökalp characterized the War of Independence as resistance operating democratically: “The people and the army in Anatolia gathered around the Grand National Assembly [and] struggled for the principles of national sovereignty, by ignoring the Caliph in Istanbul and the fetvas of Şeyhülislam.” He argued that the English were surprised to observe Turkey becoming one of the most modern and democratic states, by amending the constitution and transforming the caliphate in line with democracy. By Turkey having been victorious in the War of Independence, it was time for Europeans to understand that Turkey was not only experiencing a rescue operation (istihlâs hareketi) but reform and renewal processes.
Gökalp continued the series with his essay “The Question of the West” (Garp Meselesi: I), which begins by distinguishing the political question of the West and the question of the West as a civilization (medeni garp meselesi). He argued that being deceived by European is mostly the result of the inability to distinguish between these two questions. Gökalp stated that Europe had wise scholars, highly spiritual poets, and philosophers with high ideals and that by reading their works, their genius could be observed. He said that they had the ability to show the best examples of “right, beautiful, and good” ideals, and that, consequently, it was a duty to respect their works and virtues. “These exalted persons show us the civilized Europe” (Gökalp 1982: 147). However, he then indicated that it was a major mistake to consider European politicians, diplomats and businessmen to be similar to these intellectual heroes. Gökalp emphasized that the European philosophers, poets and scholars produced for their own nations—for internal consumption. Consequently, their works were full of affection, goodwill and kindness. However, European diplomats and soldiers by definition target other nations, and, thus, are full of enmity and viciousness. They had the habit of considering every foreigner as enemy. Gökalp (1982: 148) concluded, “We are the archenemy of Europe. For this reason, we shall never have the respect and trust we have for civilized Europe for the political West.”

While dealing with the political question of the West, Gökalp maintained that exploitation is a constant factor in its history. He argued that the first form of exploitation was feudalism, under which the peasants were exploited. Then came the industrialization and the workers were exploited. However, none of these internal oriented exploitations could endure forever, and it was for this reason, according to Gökalp, that the Europeans started to exploit colonies. “The population of colonies are captives, serfs, and at the same time workers” (Gökalp 1982: 150). In the colonies, there is no public opinion (efkâr-ı âmme) to criticize the cruelty perpetrated by the Europeans. The first target for European ambitions and eagerness
were the weak nations of far geographies. First, the native people of Africa and Oceania were colonized. At this point, Gökalp made a racist argument and stated that “as the black and red races were inferior in terms of intelligence and skill, the white master could not make enough fortune. In order to be a good worker in today’s standard of agriculture and industry, it is necessary to have a high level of civilization” (Gökalp 1982: 151). Out of this necessity, Gökalp argued that the European started to search for non-Christian countries with high level of civilization. This new definition led the Europeans to “the Islamic world, the China and Japan.” But, according to Gökalp’s reading of history, the Chinese and Japanese took up arms to defend the future of their homeland (vatan). Then, the only remaining target was the Islamic countries (İslâm ülkeleri). Gökalp (1982: 151) concludes, “This is the reason why Europeans have been attacking our countries nowadays. Their goal is in general to make us workers in their farms and factories for their own interests.”

Gökalp argued that England wanted to make all the Ottoman land a colony, just as India or Egypt. In fact, for him, “their aim is to turn the entire Islamic world (İslâm âlemi), including Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkistan, into a profitable plantation for themselves” (Gökalp 1982: 153). Gökalp furthered his criticism for colonialism by distinguishing between colonial rule and economic dependency. He asserted, “today, the British colonies are on the road to independence.” Yet, let alone mixing with the natives, the settler colonizers hate the natives even more than the Europeans in Europe do. In this sense, “political Europe is a source of catastrophe for the whole of humanity” (Gökalp 1982: 152). In case of Turkey, Gökalp was concerned of the possibility of lasting economic captivity (iktisadi esaret, read it as dependency) after having liberated the homeland from military invasion. He pointed out the necessity of European-styled economic institutions, including factories, banks, railways, and administrative institutions. He also added that the Peace Conference at Lausanne might bring a peace between Britain and Turkey at the state level. However, besides peace at the
inter-state level, what the English needed to attempt was an ummats peace (ümmet sulhu), a peace between all the Muslims and all the Christians. For Gökalp, the initial condition for this is to renounce their colonial claims to Islamic countries and to evacuate the already colonized lands.

When Ahmet Rıza and Ziya Gökalp’s writing in 1922 are reviewed, there are at least two conclusions to be drawn, first about their way of perceiving the Entente occupation of Turkey and second about the nature of their morality-based criticism of Europe. It needs to be emphasized that both the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century and the occupation of Turkey in the aftermath of World War I were considered by Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp as specific cases of a larger process. For them, this larger process was European colonialism. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was not yet another defeated country of the Great War, but unlike Germany and Austro-Hungary it was occupied and had begun to be partitioned. Therefore, these two Unionist intellectuals clustered their country with the typical case of colonial subjugation such as India. In terms of the nature of their criticism of Europe, neither Ahmed Rıza nor Ziya Gökalp was the first Ottoman intellectual to voice a moral criticism of Europe. However, the focus of the moral-based criticism was different in previous examples. For instance, as has already been in Chapter 3, in his travel to Europe Ahmed Midhat was impressed by the advancement of the European countries; yet, at the same time, he was surprised to witness different types of immorality, which were publicly observable (Okay 1991; Findley 1998). He concluded that the “ancient civilisation and Islamic religiosity” of the Ottomans were clearly superior to the Europeans. We can consider Ahmed Midhat’s criticism as an instance of what Cemil Aydn names as Occidental dichotomy. For Aydn (2007: 12), many Asian intellectuals were persuaded “the Occidentalist dichotomy of the moral East and the materialist West.” The morality-based criticism made by Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp was much different. The focus of their
condemnation of Europe was not lifestyles, but colonialism. Put differently, for Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp the issue was not about how the Europeans live in their own space, but rather colonial occupations, slavery and prejudices. In this sense, their criticisms were more grounded compared to criticism based on the Occidentalist dichotomy.

7.2 Countering Prejudices against Islam

Already mentioned above, countering the prejudices was a step in searching for recognition and a component of the intellectual agenda of the space of subjugation. Ahmed Rıza’s efforts in this context began with focusing on the Crusades. He devoted eight of seventeen chapters of *The Moral Bankruptcy* to this issue. Although in the introduction he stated that “religious interests have now ceased” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 1), he went on to offer an essentialist argument and maintained that “the sentiment of hate and vengeance that incited the Crusaders against the Muslim have not yet been dispelled” (Ahmet Rıza 1988: 2). For him, Europe had taken a hostile stance against the Turks and the East, not simply since the most recent war (i.e., World War I) but ever since the time of the Crusaders (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 18-19).

Ahmed Rıza’s account of the Crusades covered eight expeditions from 1095 to 1270, a period extending over roughly two centuries. He perceived them as the attacks of the still barbarous West on the East, the latter being a world long civilized (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 59). Pillages and massacres were the main characteristics of the long march of the miserable masses. He repeatedly stated that the Jews and the Orthodox, including the Byzantine Constantinople, were among the victims. He also argued that the Crusades had an extended impact by creating hate in the East towards the West, a distinction between the two worlds:

Moreover, the Crusade had doubly devastating repercussions on the moral attitude of the Muslim world, repercussions the effects of which are still in evidence today. The savage ferocity of the Crusaders, their gross superstition, their lack of any respect for promise given, their violation of a sworn oath and their cowardly
brutality towards their prisoners left a sorry but lasting impression of Christian Europe. (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 66)

After defining the East as a world long civilized in his discussion on Crusades, Ahmed Rıza attempted a more detailed “defense” of the “Muslim civilization,” in an entire chapter (1988: 106-136). In *The Moral Bankruptcy*, Ahmed Rıza defined Muslim civilization temporally up until the twelfth century and spatially in the radius of Cairo and Damascus. According to him, the main achievement of this civilization was restoring the seven-century arrest of human progress. He designated four related factors that made possible this Golden Age, all purely Muslim in origin. First, he maintained that Islam owned its great superiority to its recognition and respect for the past. Second, during this period, it was obligatory for all Muslims to read the Qur’an. Third, he considered the absences of ecclesiastical caste, the intermediary between believers and God, as a significant advantage. Fourth, there was a general atmosphere of tolerance in the Islamic civilization, something unknown to the West.

While he outlined these four factors with a considerably essentialist tone, it could be argued that Ahmed Rıza recognized the danger of such essentialism and then tried to balance his account. In order to obtain a more nuanced framework, he inserted two more arguments: a) He identified as an important mission of the Muslim civilization the transmission of the Ancient culture, including Hippocrates, Euclid, Plato and Aristotle and b) In order to “reassure (his) Christian reader” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 110), he stated that the rise of such a civilization could not be explained by its Muslim identity, because “religion alone, particularly when it is badly interpreted and poorly applied, is incapable of reviving a nation” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 110). Then he incorporated an argumentation based on geographical factors and redefined civilization as the intersection point of different cultural spheres accumulated by different nations:
Science is the accumulated product of all the research into the truth from the earliest times to the present day. Every nation has contributed towards scientific progress in accordance with its own genius, its own social condition and its own resources (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 106).

By the same token, Ziya Gökalp dealt with the prejudices vis-à-vis Islam in his writing in Küçük Mecmua in 1922. First, he made a comparison between Christianity and Islam through which he argued that Christianity is monopolist religion, which means it does not allow any other religion to exist. Gökalp maintained that Christianity perceives all other forms of faith as representation of evil for humanity. Hence, Gökalp argued that Christianity becomes hostile other faiths, including Islam. Gökalp claimed that, in contrast, Islam has a totally different perspective on Christianity. Islam has a deep respect for other monotheist religion, Christianity and Judaism (Gökalp 1982: 148). In times of peace, Christianity accepts the existence of Islam, as a case of tolerance, Gökalp argued. At this point he made a distinction between müsâafe and müsamaha. Müsâafe means permission to something favorable. Müsamaha means tolerance, or acting with negligence in permitting improprieties. He concluded that Christianity had some müsamaha, some tolerance for Islam but never müsâafe. Gökalp linked his assessments of Christianity to what he called the political question of the West. He believed that the source of European enmity with respect to the Ottomans was Christianity. All the capitulations and all the attacks of Russia on the Ottoman territories had the same origins. Nevertheless, for Gökalp (1982: 149), Islam is a totally egalitarian (müşavatçı) and democratic religion. He added that it was surprising how the Europe, so developed intellectually, could not comprehend these qualities of Islam.

Observing such a defense of Islam in the writing of Ziya Gökalp is not surprising. In his book, Turkification, Islamization, Modernization, he formulated a Turkish nationalism based on Islam. For him, “Turkism is the real support of Islam and of the Ottoman state,” and “there is no incompatibility between Turkish nationalism and Islam” (Gökalp 1959: 74, 75).
In short, he was searching for “an up-to-date Muslim Turkism.” But, at this point we need to remember two points made by Taha Parla, who states that “although Gökalp’s early emotional and intellectual outlook was formed by religion,” “he did not subscribe to orthodox Islam and did not defend Islam as the official religion of the state” (Parla 1985: 38). Perhaps more importantly, Parla adds that Gökalp’s interest in religion concerned its social function and not its theology. This is a point to keep in mind. In the case of Ahmed Rıza, defending Islam as a stubborn positivist was more surprising. Was it being a positivist and defending Islam inconsistent? Ahmed Rıza seemed well aware of the possible tension, yet did not consider it as an inconsistency. What he was doing was countering European prejudices towards it rather defending it in theologically. The position was first justified in an anonymous comment on Mechveret Supplément Français, probably drafted by Ahmed Rıza, in 1907:

Auguste Comte’s doctrine, far from forming itself as the bitter enemy of all beliefs, considers them as fatal and necessary phases in the evolution of human progress, and if Islamism is often defended by the pen of Ahmed Rıza, it is rather against the unjust attacks of the European fanaticism; furthermore, this defense was not done with a theological preference or interpretation; it is the manifestation of the social and the legislative accumulation of this religion that is the mother of a great civilisation. (quoted in Hanioglu 2001: 303).

Consequently, both Ziya Gökalp and Ahmet Rıza’s defense of Islam was not theological; they, instead, took seriously its social and normative function and defended it against European prejudices. To better interpret this defense, it should be noted that for the intellectual agenda of the space of subjugation, the priority was on objecting to European prejudices, whether they were with respect to the Orient or to race. Cemil Aydın (2007) maintains that in the Ottoman case, racial prejudices were replaced by a religion-based distinction. In this sense, while defending Islam, Ziya Gökalp and Ahmed Rıza objected to the hierarchical stereotypes, and challenged the Eurocentric claims of distinction in order to search for intellectual equality and recognition.
7.3 Imagining Modernity

Amongst the intellectuals of spaces of subjugation, the problematic of modernization had always been an important item. The debate included the questions of the extent to which Europe and the West should be taken as a model and whether to follow the option of partial adaptation or an unconditional adaptation of the Western model. Right from the beginning, these questions had been important for the Unionist intellectuals, as well. An early indicator was the declaration entitled “Notre programme,” published in the first issue of Mechveret (Supplément français) in December 1895. Şerif Mardin (1964: 144) reminds us that Ahmed Rıza was considerably free in expressing his ideas in the French supplement; hence, thought it is anonymous article, we have good reason to take this declaration as the formulation of Ahmed Rıza. Although he was a positivist who took the idea of science very seriously, Ahmed Rıza did not support the idea of unconditional Westernization. In the declaration, “Notre programme,” it was emphasized that in order to safeguard the peculiarity of the Eastern civilization (garder l’originalité de notre civilisation orientale), only the general results of scientific evolution necessary for the people on the march for freedom and can be assimilated by them will be taken. But this idea of partial adaptation was not the only idea defended by the Unionists. Şükrü Hanioğlu (1985) maintains that among the Young Turks, there was a considerable interest for biological materialism, and some Unionists accepted the basic social dichotomy as the tension between science and religion. In this framework, some Young Turks were in favor of unconditional adaption of the Western model. This perspective stated that there was only one civilization, the European civilization, and internalizing all the dimensions of this civilization was a must. Abdullah Cevdet was the prominent name of this perspective.
When he wrote *The Moral Bankruptcy* in early 1920s, Ahmed Rıza returned to the issue of civilization, but this time he privileged the idea of one common civilization rather than mentioning the Oriental and Occidental civilizations. He referred to the motto of Auguste Comte, “Humanity is a continuous whole converging towards the same end of perfection,” and in this context, he demanded the recognition of the Muslim contributions to human civilization (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 207-215). Despite his harsh criticism, in the final analysis, Ahmed Rıza sought an optimistic account of both Europe and the future of humanity. He argued that “behind the Europe of imperialism, the clergy and finance, there is arising a Europe of free thought and social peace” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 28). He did not consider political bankruptcy as equivalent to bankruptcy of humanity. As a positivist, Ahmed Rıza (1988: 26) maintained that theological ideas were incapable by themselves of realizing the unity of peoples and facilitating world peace. Similarly, mere economic interests were far from providing a peaceful common ground for people. Then, he concluded that religious ideas, interest-based action, and hatred for strangers should be excluded from the realm of international relations. He attempted to offer a basis for the re-establishment of fruitful relations among peoples. The first condition for such a world peace was to break all the prejudices. Reciprocal knowledge was expected to stop conflict. Accordingly,

Let us try to get know each other better, to reach a better understanding, and act only in full awareness of our motives. The free exchange of ideas between our various countries seems to me to be as necessary as the exchange of food products—without any fraud or swindling (Ahmet Rıza 1988: 209).

This search for a world without prejudices was certainly destined to the elitism of positivist thinking. As the initiator of the project, Ahmed Rıza favored the “devoted patriots,” people who love their countries, without nurturing hatred for foreigners. What was needed was an international association that would be established by the joining of “the élite of
goodwill and enlightenment in every country of the world” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 210). For him, the success of the project depended on the ability to exclude interest-seeking politicians and the masses, led more by their feelings than their intellect (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 214).

The writings of Ziya Gökalp on modernization were much more systematic and much more voluminous than those of Ahmed Rıza, but thematically both dealt with a similar set of questions. Gökalp’s work on modernization was in fact a search for the aforementioned question of identity, “to what civilization did the Turks belong—and in what civilization did their future lie?” (Lewis 1968: 234). Gökalp (1959: 269) stated, “on the question of the civilization to which we belong, there are still differences and, perhaps, serious conflicts of view.” He argued that the main reason for the ambiguity was the problem of how to define civilization, “the confusion existing with regard to the concepts ‘civilization’ and ‘being civilized.’” By making this question the focus of his work, both in Turkification, Islamization, Modernization, in 1918, and Principle of Turkism, in 1923, Gökalp developed a distinction between civilization and culture, and he established his imagination for modernization on this distinction.

First, culture is national, civilization is international. Culture is composed of the integrated system of religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic, and technological spheres of life of a certain nation. Civilization, on the other hand, is the sum total of social institutions shared in common by several nations that have attained the same level of development. … Civilization is created by men’s conscious actions and is a rational product. … The elements that constitute a culture, on the other hand, are not creations of conscious individual actions. They are not created artificially. (Gökalp 1959: 104)

Following this distinction, Gökalp maintained that in the course of Turkish history, conversion to Islamic civilization occurred at a historical moment and he observed that in the last century Turks “began to accept European civilization” (1959: 167). He was not against this acceptance. He did not consider this as a development that was contrary to national
identity. He insisted that “national life is the life which actually exists” (Gökalp 1959: 166), and as the adaptation to the requirements of European civilization had already started, he supported the civilizational transformation. His formula about the transformation was the following: “only the material civilization of Europe should be taken and not its non-material aspects” (Berkes, 1954: 382). Following his distinction of culture and civilization, the non-material aspects corresponded to culture and the material civilization to the commonalities amongst nations that were within the same civilization group. He argued that “as civilizations consist of the sum of the common features of several national cultures, each national culture would naturally distinguish itself from others, and then seek the international features it has in common with other cultures” (Gökalp 1959: 287). Put differently, being a member of a civilization-group was not counter to national identity, as “a nation considers modern civilization a whole and itself a unit of it” (Gökalp 1959: 133). In this sense Gökalp foresaw that in order to make Turkish nation more powerful, it was necessary to adapt the material civilization of the West. In his words, “in short, on the basis of our analyses above, the foregoing principle of our social policy will be this: to be of the Turkish nation, of the Islamic religion, and of European civilization” (Gökalp 1959: 279).

While establishing the civilization/culture distinction as the basis of his modernization project, Gökalp emphasized that it is wrong to define civilization as a derivative of religion. For him, “civilization and religion are two different things.” “No civilization can ever be called after a religion. There is neither a Christian nor an Islamic civilization. Just as it is incorrect to call Western civilization a Christian civilization, so it is equally incorrect to call Eastern civilization an Islamic civilization” (Gökalp 1959: 272). As an example of his argument, he maintained several times that the Jews and the Japanese people share the same civilization with European nations, without changing either their culture or their religion. Japanese modernization, in particular, was an important case for Gökalp since it convinced
him of the possibility of his own project: “The Japanese have been able to take the Western civilization without losing their religion and national identity; they have been able to reach the level of Europeans in every respect. Did they lose their religion and national culture? Not at all! Why, then, should we still hesitate? Can’t we accept Western civilization definitely and still be Turks and Muslims?” (Gökalp 1959: 277).

Gökalp’s model for modernization included the idea of protecting Muslim identity, which was considered as compatible with Western civilization. Hence, his model did not only detach religion from the Oriental civilization, it also separated religion and state (Heyd 1950: 88). In one of his early essays of 1913 Gökalp asserted:

The separation between religion and state is a goal sought by all civilized nations. Not only politics, but even ethics, law, and philosophy have freed themselves from their previous dependence on religion and have gradually won their autonomy. In spite of the separation of these areas of social life, religion has not lost its appeal to the heart. On the contrary, religion has begun to fulfill its function more effectively as it has demarcated its private domain (Gökalp 1959: 102-103).

In Principle of Turkism, he also set the secularization of legal corpus as a target of Turkish nationalism. Gökalp (1959: 304) emphasized that to establish modern law in Turkey, the complete cleansing of all traces of theocracy and clericalism was necessary. Thus, his imagination for modernization excluded laws made by Caliphs and Sultans, and also traditions saying that laws can be only interpreted by spiritual authorities. For Gökalp, these two exclusions were important for establishing equality among all members of the nation. Gökalp’s understanding of modern law included the secularization of the civil code and family law, as well. He supported the equality of men and women in marriage, divorce, inheritance and in political rights. In this context, he stated, “all provisions existing in our
laws that are contrary to liberty, equality, and justice and all traces of theocracy and clericalism should be eliminated” (Gökalp 1959: 305).

As a sociologist, Gökalp had an organist understanding of society, and he coupled his organist understanding with positivism. For him, nations were thinking entities, similar to individuals, and hence they could develop science, religion, art, morality, and politics. He maintained that “a modern nation is a creature which thinks in terms of modern science;” “Therefore, if a nation does not want to say farewell to thinking, it has to acquire the positive sciences” (Gökalp 1959: 279). Gökalp understood the modern state not only as the sovereignty of the people, but also as the government of science. In this context, he accepted large-scale industry, public hygiene, railways and electricity as the symbol of modern sciences. He concluded, “It is the positive sciences that can bring these material as well as spiritual attainments. Therefore, our first objective, as individuals and as a nation, is science” (Gökalp 1959: 280).

While formulating his project of modernization, Ziya Gökalp took the problematic of partial/full adoption seriously, as well. His distinction between civilization and culture was a framework mostly suitable for a partial adaptation perspective. In different essays, Gökalp defended partial adaptation. In an essay in 1911, Gökalp wrote, “the New Life will be created, not copied.” A major source of concern for him was the possibility of a modernity doomed to be a copy. He argued that a genuine modernity, based on national values, was the condition for evoking the praise of the Europeans (Gökalp 1959: 59). In his search for a modernity that is not a copy, Gökalp had the tendency to equate modernity with technology or the techniques of the age. With this equation, what was necessary to protect the national identity was to take from the West the technology and synthesize it with national culture: “For us today modernization [being contemporary with modern civilization] means to make and use the battleship, cars and aeroplanes that the European are making and using. But this does not
mean being like them only in form and in living” (Gökalp 1959: 75). In this sense, Gökalp’s project was about “dividing European civilization into two levels, and accepting the ‘civilization of society’ because it is common [to humanity]” (Gökalp 1959: 102). This implied first, being authentic at the community level, and second, employing the methods of international civilization to strengthen the community. For instance, by referring to Gabriel Tarde, Gökalp accepted that the idea of nationalism was the product of the newspaper. This example illustrated how the techniques of international civilization could enforce national identity.

Gökalp established his imagination of modernization on partial adaptation; but after dividing European civilization into two levels, for adopting the civilization level, he suggested an uncompromised change. For him, reservations about importing the technologies of the West would be the worst mistake, and he argued that it was indeed the mistake of Ottoman reform movement in the Tanzimat era:

… (A) civilization must be accepted in its entirety; one cannot borrow only certain parts of it or, if one does, he cannot digest and assimilate them. As in the case of religion, civilization must be accepted inwardly, not merely outwardly, for civilization is exactly like religion. One must believe in it implicitly and must be committed to it heart and soul. The Tanzimat reformers failed in their efforts to lead us into European civilization through outward imitation because they did not understand this point (Gökalp 1968: 39).

While confronting modernity, both Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp imagined a modernity having European origins. In this endeavor, their first steps were to disentangle the idea of Europe and the West from Christian culture, hence functioning as the source of universalism. In this context, Ahmed Rıza (1988: 28) stated that “behind the Europe of imperialism, the clergy and finance, there is arising a Europe of free thought and social peace.” Andrew Davison (2006) summarizes the overall intellectual project of Ziya Gökalp as theorizing the conditions and terms under which Turkey could make its transition to
modernity. While theorizing this transition, Davison argues that Gökalp was well aware of the indispensability of the master codes of European modernity. Yet, at the same time, the idea of Europe’s indispensability was coupled with the idea of its inadequacy. This split dominated the work of Ziya Gökalp in the form of his distinction between civilization and culture. Europe’s indispensability and its inadequacy and the distinction between civilization and culture are the basis for the general problematic of facing Eurocentrism and modernity. On the one hand, there is a will for modernity, symbolized in Europe’s indispensability and civilization; on the other hand, Europe is perceived as a player in the scene of global power balance, with its imperialist agenda. Not only the imperialist threat of Europe, but also its search for recognition and identity claims led him to question the adequacy of Europe as source of modernity. This question led both Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp to different nativist arguments.

7.4 Nativism in Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp

I already mentioned in Chapter 2 that nativism had been a common denominator in the intellectual agendas of different spaces of subjugation. Different intellectuals of spaces of subjugation went through a process of searching for the essences of their culture and emphasized its superiority. Nativism cultivated all types of nationalism, exceptionalism, and atavistic projects. The risk of nativism was valid for both Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp. In fact, when these two Unionist intellectuals are compared with respect to nativism, Ahmed Rıza appears as an author well aware of the risk, whereas Gökalp, being a nationalist theorist, was not particularly concerned with being nativist.

53 While developing this argument, Davison makes a cross-reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe and the writings of Gökalp. He emphasized that the same indispensability is acknowledged by the subaltern studies, but he concludes that the indispensability of Europe is much stronger in Gökalp’s thought than in Chakrabarty’s subaltern analysis.
While examining Gökalp’s nativism, the discussion has to start with his perspective on Turanism. Turan, a name of a geographical zone in Central Asia, represented the ideal of unification of all Turkic peoples. In his poems, Turan and Turanism was a constant point of references for Gökalp. For instance, his poem “Turan” reads: “The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan / Their country is a broad and everlasting land—Turan” (quoted in Heyd 1950: 126). Another poem, “Kızıl Destan” (Red Epic) reads: “The land of the enemy shall be devastated / Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan” (quoted in Heyd 1950: 128). Although these verses have certain racist connotations, Uriel Heyd maintains that Gökalp was not a racist and that in his opinion race did not determine nationality (Heyd 1950: 127). He was, in fact, in favor of an inclusive nationalism based on language and culture. By the same token, Niyazi Berkes insists that Gökalp’s nationalism is not based on a racist perspective. Berkes underlines that for Gökalp, the new modern nation is a new type of social organization. The primary basis in the formation of the new modern nation is neither race nor ethnic unity, but the idea of a community embodying a unique combination of cultural values. Moreover, Parla (1985: 35) reminds us that the quasi-racist discourse employed in Gökalp’s poems is totally absent in his theoretical and political articles and essays. Parla states that the Greater Turanism was an ideal for Gökalp, and he believed its necessity to enable the rapid spread of Turkism, the cultural unification of the Anatolian Turks.  

54 Several Armenian historians reject this interpretation of Gökalp’s works, his role in the course of events and his responsibility for the Unionist decision on deportation. For instance, Peter Balakian sees in Gökalp “a virulent racist” comparable to Goebbels. Similarly, James Reid argues that “what Wagner was to Hitler; Gökalp was to Enver Pasha” (quoted in Lewy 2005: 45). In his article entitled “Modern Turkish Identity and the Armenian Genocide: From Prejudice to Racist Nationalism,” Stephan H. Astourian attempts to make a genealogy of Turkish nationalism and the ties of nationalist discourse to the Armenian massacres. Astourian quotes the same verses by Gökalp: “The land of the enemy shall be devastated / Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan.” He comments on these verses by emphasizing that this “mystical vision” of blood and race would be devastating for the Armenians and many other non-Turks (Astourian 1999). However, some other historians have some reservations about such a perspective. Although he praises Astourian’s work, Ronald Grigor Suny (2011) argues that “there is a danger of overgeneralizing from such material.” In his book The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann (2005: 132-133) highlights that as member of the central committee of the CUP, Gökalp was formally suggesting coercive assimilation, not deportations or murders. In his words, “Armenian accounts of the genocide often assume too easily that earlier events—like the emergence of Turkish organic nationalism, the 1909 massacres, the formation of the ‘special forces,’ and so on—were steps indicating Turkish premeditation of a final solution” (Mann 2005: 112). In this sense, Mann regards the Armenian
Ahmed Rıza, emphasizing that he was “neither a chauvinist nor a xenophobe” (1988: 10) and that positivism had developed both his beliefs and his emotions, was more careful to distance himself from nativism. Throughout the book, he repeated his deep admiration for European culture, stating

I can have nothing but admiration for nations that have produced so many great master-pieces. If I have harbor thoughts of revolt against Europe, I am fully aware that in so doing I am following in the footsteps of its greatest thinkers. And if I raise a vehement protest against the acts of certain of its rulers, it is because I find them unworthy of countries that have produced men like Descartes, Bacon, Leibnitz, Hume, Diderot, Kant, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Bichat, Newton, Auguste Comte, and so many others, and because what they do is in direct contradiction to everything these great men wrote and proclaimed (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 11).

Ahmed Rıza seems conscious enough not to propose a wholesale rejection of Western thought. It needs to be emphasized that Gökalp was also opposed to the wholesale rejection of Western thought. In his poem “Türklük,” he wrote that the Turk “listen to the voices of the West / and makes the West hear their voices” (quoted in Parla 1985: 35). But while balancing patriotism and universal values, Ahmed Rıza tried to position himself closer to the latter one. He followed the motto of Lessing, “May God preserve me from a patriotism that would prevent me from being a citizen of the world” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 10). In this sense, he characterized himself as a believer in patriotism, nowhere near being full of hatred, and bounded by reason and morality. For him, only this type of patriotism could lead to equity and harmony among the nations of the world. Another point that distances Ahmed Rıza from nativism is his continued optimism for the European culture. In effect, all his arguments deportation as a case exemplifying his sixth general thesis on ethnic cleansing; namely, “murderous cleansing is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators” (2005: 7). Mann adds that contingent causes contributed to the tragic end (Mann 2005: 177). Suny (1998; 2011), too, supports the contingency thesis. By considering all those debates, I argue that the contingency thesis is more pertinent than assuming a direct causality between Turkish nationalism and the tragedy of 1915 and also including Gökalp amongst the perpetrators of the Armenian massacres.
aimed at being corrective for Europe, as well. He believed that Europe could free itself from its prejudices and policies, which were motivated by mere economic interests.

Nevertheless, there are at least two significant reasons for characterizing Ahmed Rıza as a nativist. First, in different chapters of *The Moral Bankruptcy* he lays out several positive characteristics of Turks and the East in an overly essentialistic tone. For instance, he wrote that the Muslims—the Turks, in particular, had no animosity towards Europeans (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 10). For him, while tolerance had never been practiced in Europe (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 2), Muslim civilization had been shaped by tolerance and an understanding of spiritual freedom unknown in the West (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 114). He gave illustrations of many religiously motivated wars between Christian sects and categorically denied that similar internecine wars had occurred within Islam. For Ahmed Rıza, the East was characterized by an almost eternal peace.

Second, he coupled his criticism for contemporary Europe with the hostility ingrained during the Crusades. Indeed, one of the main arguments of *The Moral Bankruptcy* was that there was an overarching European hostility towards Turks and the East since the time of the Crusades (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 19). For him, “the sentiments of hate and vengeance that incited the Crusaders against the Muslims have not yet been dispelled” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 2). It is obvious that such a perspective assumes an eternal, fixed European identity, almost independent from social conditions. Due to his essentialist position, Ahmed Rıza was unable to see any change in Europe. Once he internalized such an essentialist view, he indicated the victims of the Crusades as Turks and Arabs, interchangeably. At least for these two reasons, his assessments regarding the European culture were doomed to be nativist.
7.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviews the intellectual agenda of Unionism by focusing on two prominent names of the CUP, representing two different eras of the political party. Moreover, by discussing primarily their post-1918 writings, this chapter deals with the specific time period of transition from empire to republic. This was the last phase of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, when the Western powers occupied different regions of Turkey. Hence, these post-1918 writings were the products of an era in which Turkey became in its most concrete sense a space of subjugation. In this sense, reviewing the intellectual journey of Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp offers a framework for analyzing the intellectual agenda of spaces of subjugation. It has already been mentioned above that for this period, it is not possible to speak of ideological splits. Nevertheless, the questions addressed by Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp and their difficulties in answering them shape the intellectual paths of later periods where intellectuals identified themselves according to their political identities. This continuity needs to be understood by the overarching continuity in the intellectual agenda of space of subjugation.

This agenda includes both the colonial criticism and search for recognition. Another primary item of this agenda was the question of how to deal with Western modernity. These questions indicate the issues of facing Eurocentrism and modernity are inseparable from each other. Modernity was appropriated as the main tool for reversing the European imperialist threat, which had been supported by European claims of superiority. Therefore, criticizing Eurocentrism was also related to reversing European expansion. By the same token, searches for modernity on a concrete level and criticizing Eurocentrism on the level of ideas were the main pillars of the search for recognition. All in all, facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity went hand in hand as components of the intellectual agenda of space of subjugation.
As intellectual figures of a space of subjugation, the intellectual task for Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp was to reconcile two ideas. On the one hand, they were observers of Eurocentrism, together with the European claim to superiority and its prejudiced views of other geographies; on the other hand, they were the beneficiaries of Europe as a source of ideas. Their first task of reconciliation was to resolve this problem. Their second task was to mediate the fact that the modernization project’s primary goal was to counter European threat, and the fact that the same Europe was indispensable for modernity. These tasks of reconciliation were also related to identity claims. Their project was a search for ways of being equal to Europeans, yet at the same time not being dissolved within the European identity. Ahmed Rıza’s reference to the uniqueness of Eastern civilization or Ziya Gökalp distinction between civilization and culture are examples of this concern. At the theoretical level, this project was a difficult one. Balancing universalism and particularism had been always an issue and the inclination towards particularism brought about the risk of nativism. Hence, the same set of questions predetermined the intellectual agenda of Turkey in the forthcoming decades in the republican periods.
CHAPTER 8 – THE KEMALIST INTELLECTUALS AND EUROCENTRISM

It has been already stated in Chapter 3 that the Kemalist regime had a certain anti-imperialist discourse. Both during the War of Independence and after the consolidation of the republican regime, Kemalists depicted their nation as “a people fighting against imperialism.” Chapter 7 discussed the anti-imperialism of two important Unionist intellectuals. It would not be far-fetched to consider Ziya Gökalp as the most influential intellectual figure shaping the background for Kemalism. Kemalism incorporated the anti-imperialist heritage of Unionism.

This chapter focuses on two Kemalist intellectuals—Celâl Nuri and Şevket Süreyya, in order to discuss how the global hierarchies, modernization and Eurocentrism were understood in the single-party era. Put differently, these two Kemalist authors will make it possible to scrutinize Kemalist perspectives on the establishment of an experience of modernity on the border of the West. This chapter has three components: first, Kemalist perspectives on the European expansion and colonialism are analyzed. This section starts with reviewing how the official discourse of the single-party regime, voiced personally by Mustafa Kemal, positioned the new Turkish republic vis-à-vis European colonialism. Then, it continues with reviewing how Celâl Nuri and Şevket Süreyya understood the space of subjugation and the subjugation of their country by imperialist powers. The second section focuses on the positions of Celâl Nuri and Şevket Süreyya vis-à-vis Eurocentrism. And the third section links their modernization imaginations to their position with respect to Eurocentrism by situating these two Kemalist intellectuals on the universalism-particularism spectrum.

This chapter focuses on the 1920s and 1930s, the first two decades of the republican period. On the historiography of Turkey, several differences in the characteristics of the regime and its ideology between the 1920s and 1930s are widely accepted. The first major difference concerns the consolidation of the regime. The regime was unable to consolidate itself as a single-party regime before the end of 1930. The final attempt at a multi-party
system was in 1930 with the Free Party, which lasted three months. Moreover, only after this attempt the regime was consolidated, by taking a series of precautions. The second major difference was related to economic policies. The 1920s had been dominated by economic liberalism, according to which the private sector was given priority in the economy. However, this perspective could not survive in the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929. Hence, most of the 1930s were dominated by economic étatism. The third major difference was with respect to the regime’s ideology. Although, some key reforms of the republic, including the closing down of the medreses and tekkes (1924), the introduction of the Civil Code (1926), and the alphabet reform (1928), had already been accomplished in the 1920s, the regime did not formulate its own ideology until 1931. It was at this time that the Third Party Congress of the RPP adopted the six fundamental and unchanging principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, laicism, and revolutionism/reformism. Only then was Kemalism defined as an ideology and provided with content.

The historian Hamit Bozarslan also makes a distinction between the Kemalism of the 1920s and 1930s. He states that the Kemalist government was strong enough to imagine itself as “a truly revolutionary regime” in the 1920s; however, this revolutionary momentum was not supported by a codified ideology (Bozarslan 2006). According to Bozarslan, the Kemalism of 1920s was nationalistic; but at the same time, it conceived of Western civilization as the sole horizon of the Turkish nation. The aim of the regime was “entering into Western civilization,” and the hidden rationale behind this goal was becoming stronger in the international arena. Bozarslan also states that the making of Kemalism as an ideology took placed in the 1930s. He maintains that the policy of Westernization and civilization of the 1920s was not abandoned during this period. On the contrary, Bozarsan argues that, more than before, the very concept of “civilization” was Turkified: “The Turkish Thesis of History even concluded that all civilizations in world history have a Turkish origin” (Bozarslan 2006).
This chapter discusses two sets of texts, from the 1920s and 1930s, in order to cover two phases of Kemalism and two different Kemalist perspectives with respect to modernization. One of these is Celâl Nuri’s seminal book *The Turkish Revolution* (Türk İnkılâbi), which was published in 1926.\(^{55}\) Another consists of the publications of Şevket Süreyya, who became a very influential intellectual by publishing with his colleagues the journal *Kadro* (The Cadre), from 1932 to 1934. Some of Şevket Süreyya’s newspapers essays, Kadro articles and his book *The Revolution and The Cadre* (İnkılâp ve Kadro), which was published first in 1932, are analyzed throughout the chapter.\(^{56}\) Moreover, several details, both with respect to his biography and his imagination on modernity, are read from his autobiographical novel *The Man Searching for Water* (Suyu Arayan Adam), published in 1959.

Before discussing the aforementioned questions, biographical notes are necessary. Celâl Nuri was born in 1882 in Gelibolu, on the shores of Dardanelles (Uyanık 2004). He was educated at Galatasaray Lycée and then at the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. Hence his French was good enough to publish in this language, and his English was sufficient to follow the literature. As a young lawyer, he read extensively the works of Western thinkers such as Spencer, Ludwig Büchner, Darwin, Le Bon, and Renan (Buzpınar 2007). He gave up his career in law and became a prominent Unionist intellectual. In a cartoon, he was portrayed as a writing machine. This was an accurate depiction, since he published more than 2,000 newspaper articles, together with 40 books, some in French. Within the Unionist circles, Celâl

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\(^{55}\) A note on translation: the Turkish word *inkılâp* has two different connotations, hence it is not easy to translate it into English. With the Kemalists circles and the RPP the moderates interpreted it as reformism, and the radicals as revolutionism (Ahmad 2000: 63). Here, I translate the book title as *The Turkish Revolution*, as Celâl Nuri was a supporter of the radical interpretation. In 1926, *The Turkish Revolution* was published with the Ottoman alphabet. Recently, the book was published twice: *Türk İnkılâbi*, edited by Recep Durmaz, published in 2000; and *Türk Devrimi: İnsanlık Tarihinde Türk Devriminin Yeri*, edited by Özer Ozankaya, published in 2002. The first edition, which I follow, is a transcription from the Ottoman alphabet to the modern Turkish alphabet, whereas the second edition is a transcription with vocabulary adaptation, by replacing old Ottoman words by their contemporary substitutes.

\(^{56}\) Same note on translation in the previous footnote applies for *İnkılâp ve Kadro*, as Şevket Süreyya was also on the radical camp within the Kemalist circles.
Nuri was close to the group, Garbcılar, the Westerners. As a free-lance writer, he devoted considerable time to traveling and publishing his travel notes. He was elected Gelibolu deputy for the last Ottoman Parliament in 1919 and soon afterward he joined the resistance movement in Ankara. With his doctoral degree in administrative law and his familiarity with both Eastern and Western culture, he became one of the most sought-after advisers of the republican regime (Alpay 2011). He played an important role in the preparation of the first Constitution of the new republic in 1924. He was elected four times to the Grand National Assembly; hence, he was an active politician until 1935. He died in 1938.

Şevket Süreyya was born in 1897 in Edirne. He went to the Teachers College in the same city. When he was conscripted into the army in 1915, he was a nationalist young man, with a certain pan-Turkist dreams. In line with his political stand, he was attached to a regiment in the Caucasian front. After the armistice, the independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan requested the Istanbul government to send teachers to Baku. He volunteered for the post and was appointed to Nukha, the northwestern Azeri city, as a teacher, in 1919. When Nukha was occupied by the Red Army in 1920, already disappointed with Turanism, he encountered new political horizons. Opposed to his nationalist past, he now started taking more seriously humanism, freedom and equality. He represented Nukha in Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East. His new political motto was “the weakening of the Eastern Peoples.” In 1921, he moved to Batumi, where he affiliated with the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Socialist Party, the legal body of the Turkish Communist Party. Then he went to Moscow to attend to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV). The party sent him to Istanbul in 1923, where he would become involved in publishing the newspaper Aydınlık.

57 The leader of this group was Abdullah Cevdet. For the group members, materialism and scientism were two important source of inspiration. Most of its members believed that “science is the religion of the élite, whereas religion is the science of the masses” (Hanioğlu 1997). Some of them argued that Islam and modern life could not be reconciled.

58 In 1901 he visited London. After the Revolution of 1908 he visited Greece, Belgium, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Scotland, and Island. In 1914, he made a tour in the United States.

59 For details of his biography, see (Tekeli and İlkin 2003: 42-70; Türkeş 2001).
Following the Law for Maintenance of Order of 1925, he was imprisoned twice, and after his second release, he began questioning his communism and detached himself from the Turkish Communist Party. When he moved to Ankara in 1928, the Kemalist regime offered him a high-ranking position in the bureaucracy. From 1931 onwards, he was an outspoken Kemalist intellectual, especially dealing with economic policy recommendations. In 1932, he started publishing the journal Kadro. The chief objective of the journal was codifying the ideology of the Turkish revolution. Accordingly, the journal aimed at analyzing the world economic system, and the place of Turkey within this system. Şevket Süreyya remained active in the bureaucracy until 1951, and he died in Ankara in 1976.

Reading the biographies of these two Kemalist intellectuals, the following similarities stand out: first, both aspired to have an influence on political leaders. For both of them, this meant that the primary function of the intellectual was shaping the agenda of the rulers. However, their tools of influence were not the same. While writing was the primary tool of each, Celâl Nuri supported it by activism in the parliament, and Şevket Süreyya supplemented it by publishing a journal. Second, both had considerable experience outside of Turkey. It is safe to argue that their travels helped them to develop a deeper understanding concerning the place of their country within global hierarchies, and a better sense of the space of subjugation. By thinking about other countries’ experience, both had developed the ability to think in terms of making comparisons, which contributed to their evaluation on Turkey. At least one difference should be noted with respect to their writings. Celâl Nuri, the old Unionist, is far less systematic than the young Şevket Süreyya in his argumentation. The latter, aspiring to be an ideologue, could produce much more systematic texts, both in book and article format.

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60 Şevket Süreyya, Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), Burhan Asaf (Belge), Vedat Nedim (Tör), İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin), Mehmet Şevki (Yazmán) were six member of the inner circle publishing Kadro. Historians İlhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin (2003: 144) argue that there are many reasons to consider the Kadro movement as a movement of Şevket Süreyya. He was not only initiated the idea, but also wrote leading articles and functioned as a spokesperson for the journal.

61 With the Surname Law of 1934, Celâl Nuri chose İleri, and Şevket Süreyya chose Aydemir as his surname. As this chapter deals with their writing predating 1934, I refer them without their surnames.
8.1 Kemalist Understanding of Subjugation

True, there were considerable differences between the official discourse of the 1920s and the 1930s; however, there were also indicators of continuity. It has been already emphasized in Chapter 3 that the Kemalist regime incorporated a certain anti-imperialist tone into its official discourse. It can be argued that the theme “a people fighting against imperialism” was one of those instances of continuity from the 1920s to the 1930s.

As the leader of the Ankara government, Mustafa Kemal was accustomed to perceiving the resistance movement as a fight against imperialism. For instance, when he accepted the Iranian ambassador on 7 July 1922, he declared,

> Although all of our friends have expressed it before, I feel the necessity to confirm again that the struggle of Turkey today does not pertain to Turkey alone. If the present struggle of Turkey were only in her name only and for her sake it could, perhaps, be shorter, less bloody, and could be over sooner. Turkey is showing determination and making a great effort. Because what she defends is the cause of all oppressed nations and of the whole East, and until it is won, Turkey is sure that all the nations of the East will march together with her. To attain all this, Turkey will not follow the requirements of history books, but the requirements of history. (quoted in Kili 2007: 36-37)

This speech made before the military victory, which would take place on September 1922, indicates that Mustafa Kemal had a perspective about spaces of subjugation. In his terminology, it corresponded to “oppressed nations” (mazlum milletler) and his cause was the cause of “the whole East” (bütün șarkin dâvasıdır). In different occasions, Mustafa Kemal stated that the struggle for independence of Turkey is a struggle between the West and the East. In his interview given to the correspondent of Neue Freie Presse right after the declaration of the republic in December 1923, he explicitly criticized European Orientalism. He stated that there was resentment and enmity in European people with respect to Turks, and that these ideas, established in Western mentality, created a specific way of thinking.
Accordingly, “it is believed in Europe that the Turk is against all kinds of progress, spiritually and mentally incapable of developing.” He stated that “the West, not content with perceiving us as a nation that is destined to be subaltern (mâdun olmağa mahkûm bir kavim), did everything possible to accelerate our destruction” (Atatürk 1997: 86-87). In this sense, he put forth the new republic as a refusal to be a subaltern nation.

On the 10th anniversary of the republic in 1933, Mustafa Kemal’s stance was still the same:

As I look at the sun that will now rise from the East today, I see the break of day. I see from afar the awakening of all the Eastern nations. There are many brotherly nations that shall attain their independence and freedom. Their rebirth will be in the direction of progress and welfare. These nations shall be victorious in spite of all the hardships and obstacles, and shall reach the future awaiting them. Colonialism and imperialism shall be annihilated from the face of this earth, and in their place, a new era of harmony and cooperation between nations shall prevail, regardless of differences of color, race, and creed.
I am telling you all this not as the President but only as an individual member of the Turkish nation. (quoted in Kili 2007: 36-37)

His reference to annihilation of colonialism and imperialism was not only wishful thinking; on the contrary, through this reference, he qualified the War of Liberation of Turkey as a struggle against colonialism and imperialism. For him, the British troops that had occupied Istanbul did not constitute an ordinary attacking army, but rather, a fraction of a larger system of colonialism.

This being the position of Mustafa Kemal, many intellectuals of the single-party period adopted an anti-imperialist discourse. As expected, Kemalist anti-imperialism and its understanding of the space of subjugation was the heir to Unionist anti-imperialism. In this sense Celâl Nuri was a remarkable author of Unionist anti-imperialism in the 1910s, especially with his book published in 1913, Islamic Unity: the History, the Current Situation and the Future of Islam (İttihat-ı İslâm: İslâmın Mazisi, Hâli, İstikbalî). As already mention
in Chapter 2, the reaction to European expansion in the Middle East first took shape as pan-Islamism. With his writings in the 1870s, Namık Kemal is a good example within Ottoman intellectual circles of pan-Islamism, which was a stance against “the tutelage of the Western Powers” (Mardin 1962: 60). According to Nikki Keddie (1969), pan-Islamism needs to be understood as “an indigenous reaction against growing Western encroachments and conquest,” a proto-nationalism. Although criticized by some for being materialist, Celâl Nuri defended pan-Islamism as a search for solidarity with Muslims living outside Ottoman territory, in order to break the isolation imposed by the European Great Powers (Aydın 2007: 93-104). In his book *Islamic Unity*, Celâl Nuri stated that “the real civilization is moral purification of humanity, elevation of virtues to the level of nobility and ascending of ideas. Unfortunately, from this point of view Europe is not that civilized” (quoted in Buzpınar 2007). He perceived the international balance of power as a confrontation between the East and “the imperialist West.”62 As a remedy to this balance of power, he proposed that the destiny of the Islamic world should not be separated from the Ottoman resistance against imperialist powers. Nevertheless, he also emphasized that his defense of pan-Islamism was not a religious, but rather political because he accepted the international problems of the Muslim world as questions of progress and liberty. While this formed the basis for his Unionist perspective, in his *Turkish Revolution* of 1926, Celâl Nuri softened his anti-imperialist tone. Although, throughout the book he referred to the East-West dichotomy, he mentioned imperialism only once (Celâl Nuri 2000: 56), and here it was in linking the capitulations to the Ottoman Empire’s inability to survival (*beka hassa ve kabiliyeti*). Why did

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62 One should note that within the group of Garbcılar (Westerners), there was no consensus on an anti-imperialist stand-point. Şükrü Hanoğlu describes the debate within the group in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars (1913): “One wing led by Celâl Nuri claimed that the Westernization movement should be against European imperialism, which had a strong Christian bias. The other wing under Abdullah Cevdet’s control maintained that ‘Western civilization’ should be taken ‘with its roses and thorns,’ and that the relation between the West and the Ottoman Empire was a relation between ‘powerful and powerless’ and between ‘learned and ignorant’” (Hanoğlu 1997). For further details of Celâl Nuri-Abdullah Cevdet polemics, see (Uyanık 2004).
he mitigate his anti-imperialist tone from 1910s to 1920s? The following section will provide an answer for this question.

While this was the case for Celâl Nuri’s *Turkish Revolution*, Şevket Süreyya developed a much more systematic understanding regarding situating Turkey within the space of subjugation, and being subjugated by the Western powers in general. Even before starting to publish *Kadro*, he gave a series of lectures in Ankara, and published an article “Ideology of the Revolution” in *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, the daily published by the RPP, in January 1931. In this article, a clear proof of his intention of being the ideologue of Kemalism, Şevket Süreyya declared his thesis on eight points.

*First*, Turkey was the quintessential model of a national liberation movement. *Second*, this fact imparted an international aspect of solidarity between all such national independence movements. *Third*, the Turkish revolution contained all the ideological elements for a general theory for all national liberation movements, but needed to have these identified, codified, and reduced to slogans to accord them permanence. *Fourth*, the duty of revolutionaries was to pass on the understanding to the new generation in order to give it direction. *Fifth*, the revolution required the accumulation of national capital to use in creating an industrial sector. *Sixth*, revolution was the ability to make society leap from one state to another and not merely administrative or passive reform. *Seventh*, the revolutionary order was not democracy, although Turkey might be heading toward eventual democracy. *Eighth*, in short, Turkey’s revolution was not the satellite or copy of any existing movement, but an independent and original event, an innovation of humanity. The duty of revolutionaries was to define and explain the dimensions of the revolutions. (quoted in Harris 2002: 122)

The official discourse of Kemalism had been already labeled the War of Independence as a fight against imperialism; in this sense, Şevket Süreyya’s calling it a “National Liberation Movement” was not something totally new. However, he clearly accentuated the emphasis, and added a dimension of solidarity with all prospective national liberation movements. When he started to publish *Kadro*, he defined the key political contradiction as being the conflict
between industrialized countries, which were also the colonizing, and non-industrialized countries, which were colonized or subjugated by semi-colonialism (Şevket Süreyya 1933c; 1932e). For him the true meaning of the Turkish Revolution could be grasped only in so far as this global contradiction is acknowledged.

In the third issue of Kadro, Şevket Süreyya asked the question “Is the Revolution Over?” (1932b). One level of this question was related to a political debate between different interpretations of Kemalism. He had been criticizing the conservative Kemalist, whose aim was to have a moderate reform agenda. As long as the conservatives spread the idea that the revolution was over, Şevket Süreyya would make an inventory of needed reforms and any conflicts that might have to be entered into. Indeed, for the inner circle publishing Kadro, this was the true function of the journal. In this early article of the third issue, Şevket Süreyya pointed out what was missing in the revolution was a national industrialization plan. In later issues, Kadro writers expanded this list by adding land reform and struggle against feudalism on the Eastern Anatolia. But for Şevket Süreyya, the continuing revolution was a process observable at the world level. For him, in the aftermath of world war, there were ongoing social changes (cemiyet değişiklikleri) in different countries and these changes were not over yet. The source of the social change was the aforementioned basic contradiction. The contradiction concerned the extraction of the surplus value (fazla kıymetler) produced by 1.5 billion people in colonies and semi-colonies by 400 million Europeans. However, he believed that this contradiction led to national liberation movements, which broke the colony-metropolis relations (müstemleke ve metropol münasebetleri) of the past century. The new Turkey, for Şevket Süreyya, represented replacing the subjugated nations system (tabi milletler nizami) of the nineteenth century with a new nation, politically independent and economically self-sufficient. In this sense, the new world balance and the complete inner

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balance of the Turkish society were still in the making, hence, at the world and national levels, revolutions were not yet over.

Şevket Süreyya’s perspective was impressively systematic, thus many contemporary readers of him found in his writings and in *Kadro* in general, early formulations of later theoretical frameworks. For instance, according Ayşe Buğra-Trak (1985), some arguments voiced by Şevket Süreyya were very similar to the arguments of economic development literature. Haldun Gülalp (1985) sees in *Kadro* an early dependency theory, as it incorporated into its analysis concepts such as “world system” and “colony-metropolis.” Eyüp Özveren (1996) sees both a developmentalist perspective and a horizon predating dependency theory. In the same vein, Eyüp Özveren argues that as the *Kadro* authors saw in the Great Depression an opportunity for Turkey to appropriate Western technology and establishing a planned economy, they prefigured an argument of dependency theory, many decades earlier.

Indeed, the target set by the *Kadro* authors for their journal was not easy to achieve. They positioned themselves as the ideologues of Kemalism, under the circumstances of a single-party regime. When Şevket Süreyya started giving conferences on the ideology of the revolution, the RPP Secretary General Recep Peker declared his disapproval. For Peker, the task of codifying the party’s ideology was the party’s task alone. At the same time, four members of the *Kadro* inner circle, including Şevket Süreyya, Burhan (Belge), Vedat Nedim (Tör), and İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin), were former communists. In order to get the approval of Mustafa Kemal, they invited the famous novelist and parliamentarian Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), who was also in good contact with Mustafa Kemal. Then, Mustafa Kemal tacitly approved the publication of the journal, by subscribing to 10 copies of it (Türkeş 1999: 93).

This being the setting for *Kadro*, its authors wrote several articles on the issues of colony-metropolis contradiction, semi-colonialism and economic dependency on Europe. In
this sense, both understanding the space of subjugation and developing remedies to break the
subjugation were important agenda items for Kadro. Şevket Süreyya, too, furthered his
analysis and offered a more detailed account on the subjugation. In his article “Is Imperialism
Rearing Up?” (Emperyalizm Şahlanyor mu?), he divided the history of colonialism into two
periods: colonialism before and after the industrial revolution. The first age of colonialism
started with the Age of Discoveries, and continued until the end of the eighteenth century.
Lootings, conquests, and slavery were the key characteristic of the first age. Early capital
accumulation, which would then facilitate Europe’s cultural hegemony (kültür hegemonyası)
also took place during this first age (Şevket Süreyya, 1933c). The second age of colonialism,
which started with industrialization, had a more civilized appearance, since it replaced the
piracy, capture trade and looting with colonial trade activities. Merchants, missionaries, and
compradors were the new actors of this second age. The industrialization in Europe made
another difference in the second age of colonialism: in the first one, the target was newly
discovered lands; however, with increasing trade volume, colonialism started pushing the
borders of the Far East and then the Near East. In the Eastern countries, which were gradually
becoming semi-colonies, commodity invasion (emtia istilâsi) destroyed local craftsmanship
and production capacity. Once the local production had stopped, replacement was not a
modern factory-type production operating European-style, but rather unproductive colonial
trade.

Şevket Süreyya argued that in the second age of colonialism, labor became more
valued in Europe, whereas in colonies and semi-colonies, together with declining production
capacity, the opposite was the case. Military force, diplomatic maneuvers and the tactics of
missionaries prevailed. All in all, stated Şevket Süreyya, in the mid-nineteenth century a
series of semi-colonies from the Yellow Sea to the Aegean Sea were added to the old
colonies. In his historical account of colonialism, Şevket Süreyya is quite clear on the fact that
colonialism was a constitutive element of modern Europe. He stated that “if the colonies had not been looted and if machines had not been invented, today’s Europe would not have come into being” (Şevket Süreyya, 1933c).

While developing his historical account of colonialism, Şevket Süreyya was in favor of the human brotherhood discourse, rejecting any kind of divides between human beings. For him, there were two distinctive camps within humanity. First, the colonialist camp, monopolizing the large-scale industries, and second, the non-industrial colonized camp. Şevket Süreyya argued that while there may be differences within each camp concerning color, language or faith, their destinies of those within each camp were the same. Taking these differences into consideration, he defined imperialism as a system of enmity and exploitation that countries with colonial power and industry established and intended to maintain over countries that had no capital accumulation or industry. The colonialist order, he noted, was sufficiently powerful to establish its own science and ideology. Racial hierarchy was the outcome of this type of science. The colonialist order attempted to ideologically justify the extraction of the surplus value produced by 1.5 billion people for to the benefit of 250 million people. However, he argued that neither the racial hierarchy nor the ideological justification were convincing anymore. Against the colonialist order, Şevket Süreyya announced another order, one of national liberation movements. This new order represented rebellion, liquidation of colonial records, and equal global distribution of industry. In short, this new order concerned the new arrangement of the world.

The eighth issue of Kadro was dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the republic, 30 August 1922—Victory Day of the War of Liberation. In the editorial essay, it was stated that the Turkish national struggle was a national liberation revolution (millî kurtuluş ihtilâli), which had taken place as a frontal war. In this revolution, the people did not attack colonialism as a street fight, but as a war (the War of Liberation) and as a rebellion against the
internal institutions of colonialism (the government in Istanbul, the sultanate). By saying this, the sultanate, and the last Ottoman Sultan, was seen as an institution of colonialist powers. The military victory against occupying forces was praised as a crucial moment that had made the Turkish Revolution possible.

In the eighth issue of Kadro, Şevket Süreyya’s new book, The Revolution and the Cadre (İnkılâp ve Kadro), was introduced to the readers. The book had two purposes: first, situating the Turkish revolution by ascribing to it a specific meaning, and second, emphasizing the need for an enlightened cadre for directing and reproducing the revolution. In fact, the latter one gave the journal its name Kadro, a Turkish word derived from the French word “cadre.”[^64] The key chapter of the book appeared in Kadro as an article, “Main Principles of National Liberation Movements” (Şevket Süreyya 1932d).

The article started by stating that national liberation movements are the result of contradictions between the colonizer countries and colonies and semi-colonies. The international inequality (*beynemîle müsavatsızlık*) in the distribution of industries was pointed out as another source of this contradiction. Şevket Süreyya then defined the aim of national liberation movements as being the resolution of the colonialism conflict, including both the economic and political dependency (*iktisadî ve siyasî tabiiyeti*) of some countries on others. In this sense, their cause was an autonomous one, which was not a satellite or reserve-army of any other ideology or movement. He emphasized that these movements should not be seen as regressive. For him, the remedy suggested by the national liberation movements was protectionism, which would prevent colonies and semi-colonies from being suppliers of cheap raw material and a free market for colonial trade. This meant neither a closure, which would last forever, nor reluctance for international corporation in different fields. The objective was

[^64]: Şevket Süreyya presented the book first to Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal ordered that 100 thousand copies of the book be printed. Şevket Süreyya, afraid of potential intervention from the RPP, accelerated the printing process and did not allow any modifications to its text. Then the book was not printed 100 thousand copies. (Tekeli and Ilkin 2003: 207).
maximizing the production capacity of the former colonies and semi-colonies in order to participate in world trade with a stronger position. In this framework, Şevket Süreyya argued that protectionism should go hand-in-hand with a planned economy. Hence, he emphasized an étatism, not totally rejecting private sector, as long as it does not lead to class conflict within the society, but giving the primary role in production to public initiative.

Şevket Süreyya emphasized that the primary goal of national liberation movements was a national independence. He claimed that not only for achieving this independence, but also for protecting it, all individualistic, class-based, and group-based perspectives should be eliminated from politics. In a sense, he denied any conflict of interest within the society, and, consequently, he argued for the necessity of an altruist and disciplined “avangard” groups of leaders, who would rule without being bound by class relationships. “This cadre” he said, “is the primary condition and dynamic power of a revolution” (Şevket Süreyya 1932d). He believed that a national liberation movement could only be achieved by armed struggle, as an imperialist power would not accept the change with other means. These movements could not be reduced to political, economic or legal domains. It was a comprehensive change, including all ideological components; for this reason, it was a revolution. For him, it was obvious that these movements would expand; hence, it was indispensable that they be considered on a world scale. He emphasized the common destiny of all nations, which had been already joined the movement or were candidates for participation. Şevket Süreyya concluded his article by stating that Turkey was the true example and representative of national liberation movements; this was because the new regime had achieved a two-fold victory both against the colonialist powers, and against their representative in Istanbul. He also argued that all the prospective national liberation movements would march on the path pioneered by the Turkish national revolution and would follow its main principles.
In reviewing Şevket Süreyya’s views on colonialism, semi-colonies and the subjugation in general it can be seen that his understanding of global hierarchies were much deeper and systematic than that of the Unionist intellectuals discussed so far—Ahmed Rıza, Ziya Gökalp, and Celâl Nuri. True, the Unionist intellectuals did succeed in going beyond the Occidentalist dichotomy in their criticism of European powers, so their criticism no longer consisted of an attack on Western culture because of having an immoral lifestyle. Their morality-based criticism of European powers was formulated in universalist terms. However, as already emphasized in Chapter 5, their perceptions of the mechanism of imperialism were limited (Keyder 1987: 53) and they tried to cover their ignorance of political economy with the assistance of Parvus, who mentioned for the first time in the Unionist circles the semi-colonial position of the Ottoman Empire.

Şevket Süreyya’s training at the KUTV obviously enabled him to develop a deeper understanding of imperialism. His years in Baku and Moscow were an opportunity for him to both observe the larger international context, and think about the key books of Leninist literature, including *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* and *Theses on the National and Colonial Question*. Mustafa Türkeş (1998) suggests that with his experience at the Baku Congress and his readings on Lenin, Şevket Süreyya drew two conclusions: all colonized countries would achieve their independence and this would lead to the collapse of capitalist system. In addition to a standard reading of Lenin, Şevket Süreyya’s had been influenced by a peculiar communist current, initiated by the Tartar communist leader Mir Sultan Galiev (Buğra-Trak 1985). In *Kadro*, there had been never an explicit reference to Sultan Galiev, yet it is most probable that Galiev was a well-known figure to Şevket Süreyya, since Galiev was a lecturer at KUTV. Galiev was suspicious of prospective social revolutions in Europe, and had been emphasizing that they would be insufficient to resolve the conflict between industrialized and agrarian countries. He stated that “Deprived of the East, and torn away
from India, Afghanistan, Persia, and the other of its Asian and African colonies, Western European imperialism would be obliged to wither and die its own natural death” (quoted in Özveren 1996). With this emphasis on colonialism, Sultan Galiev argued that in Muslim societies, as the oppression of colonialism prevailed, all classes were to be assumed as proletarian. From here, he reached the concept of “proletarian nations.” Very much in accord with the “oppressed nation” concept of Kemalism, Galiev’s “proletarian nations” influenced Şevket Süreyya to a large extent (Buğra-Trak 1985; Özveren 1996). Because of this influence, Şevket Süreyya defined the key dichotomy of politics as the colonial dichotomy, the conflict between industrialized and non-industrialized countries, and hence, he came out with a political agenda giving priority to national liberation movements, rather than class struggle (Türkeş 1998).

Comparing Şevket Süreyya’s perspective on imperialism with Unionist intellectuals criticism reveals that for all of them their intellectual journey were determined by the agenda of space of subjugation. All developed a certain critique of colonialism, and the subjugated position of their country. But Şevket Süreyya’s account was more sophisticated than that of the others. In this sense, the shift from the Unionists to Kadro authors meant a deeper understanding of political economy and global hierarchies. I have already stated in Chapter 3 that one of the components of the intellectual agenda of space of subjugation was facing the necessity of reconciling different political or intellectual perspectives with local realities. Indeed, as his analysis became more sophisticated, this became a necessity for Şevket Süreyya. He was 24 years old when he was enrolled in the KUTV, and 35 years old when the first issue of Kadro was published. In the ten years from Moscow to Ankara, he had contemplated communism, Leninism and the framework suggested by the Comintern, and came to the conclusion, “to stay away from the classical conception of orthodox Marxism and work with a loose body of concepts” (Özveren 1996). Possibly, the difficulties of doing
politics in Turkey as a communist led him to adopt a reconciling perspective, but at the same
time, his vision was enriched by debates within the Soviet communism, especially by the
ideas defended by Sultan Galiev. With a probable overlap of these two reasons he replaced
the idea of class struggle of a universalist understanding with the idea of colonial conflict,
which he observed in his local reality.

8.2 Kemalism vis-à-vis Eurocentrism

As already noted in Chapter 3, another characteristic of space of subjugation is experiencing
modernity and modernization, either on the border, or beyond the border of Western
countries. When modernity was experienced there, questions of searching for model, and
partial or unconditional adoption of the model arose. We see in this question the
interconnected meanings of Eurocentrism: the first regards the claim of European superiority.
The second is more a question of methodology. It concerns accepting Europe and/or the West
as the first and foremost source of knowledge, theoretical or practical. This is inevitably
related to the question of whether to reconcile different perspectives that flourished in Europe
and/or in the West with local realities. In the spaces of subjugation, intellectuals who were in
favor of Eurocentric modernization rejected the idea of reconciliation with local realities, and
hence, defended an unconditional adoption of the model. On the other hand, intellectuals who
were critical of Eurocentrism, defended the idea of reconciliation with local realities, and
hence, either defended the search for an authentic modernity, or supported the idea of partial
adoption by rejecting some dimension of the chosen model. In the early republican Turkey, in
the 1920s and in the 1930s, the two positions were observable. Celâl Nuri, especially in his
book *Turkish Revolution*, stubbornly defended Eurocentrism. In contest, in his different
articles, Şevket Süreyya developed a furious criticism of Eurocentrism. This section reviews
the positions of these two Kemalist intellectuals with respect to Eurocentrism and, by this
means, sketches the differences within Kemalism about the question of situating the republic as copy of European model or as a *sui generis* project.

For Celâl Nuri’s *Turkish Revolution*, the question of civilization was the fundamental issue. It implied both the question of “how many civilizations exist” and the question of “which civilization should Turkey join.” In discussing these questions, Celâl Nuri took a persistent position favoring Europe as the civilization having a superior position vis-à-vis its rivals. He assessed European civilization as the civilization of progress, the civilization of liberty (Celâl Nuri 2000: 64; 75). While appraising European civilization Celâl Nuri frequently compared it with supposed opposites, commonly in the form Europe versus the others. Moreover, in most of the comparisons he made, he reproduced Orientalist clichés both about Europe and the East. It has been already stated that Orientalists such as Le Bon or Renan were influential in the development of his ideas and his judgments of the civilizational divide demonstrates the extent of this influence. He opened his chapter “Civilization” (2000: 59-71) by stating that the superior civilization, i.e., the European civilization, has a “*dynamique*” nature, whereas the other civilizations have a “*statique*” one. He argued that every nation (*kavim*) becoming part of joining the European civilization progresses and every nation outside of this civilization loses against the rival civilization, i.e., the European. Celâl Nuri took Turkey as the only exception for this general process—as a country outside of the European civilization but not defeated by it.

Celâl Nuri’s incorporated Islam into his comparative thinking and almost directly concluded that Islam was responsible for the lack of dynamism of the East. Celâl Nuri did not blame the true Islam. For him, the religion of the prophet incorporated both the belief (*akîde*) and human behavior (*muâmelât*), and set interpretation (*ictihâd*) as a duty. However, the religious leaders underestimated the second component of this principle and, consequently, the people’s opinion (*icma-i ümmet*), though being a key principle of Islam, had been totally
excluded (Celâl Nuri 2000: 63). Celâl Nuri asked whether priority should be given to life or to tradition. He replied that it should be on life, seeing tradition as embellishment for life. He claimed that tradition numbed people in Muslim societies, and made them static. In the Muslim society, politics, civilization, daily life, clothing, and nourishment were considered by a religious point of view. He even contended that religious tradition prevented the acceptance of progress in the Muslim world (Celâl Nuri 2000: 65).\(^{65}\) As long as religion detached society from the idea of progress, religion failed to complete its function as the determiner of morality. According to Celâl Nuri, the first nation which could awake from this deep sleep was that of the Turks.

While religion is so powerful in the Muslim world, Celâl Nuri argued that the opposite was the case in Europe. He maintained that it would be wrong to refer to it as a “Christian civilization.” Generally speaking, what he described in Europe was a process of secularization, without actually using this concept. While observing a static Islam, he claimed that Christianity could avoid stagnation due to Europe’s dynamism. While religion determined almost everything in the Islamic world, in Europe, scientific thinking (fennî düşünüş), based on freedom of thought, existed (Celâl Nuri 2000: 64). Hence, in the West, the domain of ideas was not determined by spiritual guides, by mentors, or by an old text.

Celâl Nuri (2000: 66) maintained that due to these differences the gap between the East and the West had widened over the centuries and that these two worlds became more and more alienated from each other. He stated that all the European nations had contributed to the progress of Europe both in science and culture. And now, he argued the accumulation of this progress did not have a national color, and that they had become the property of all humanity (Celâl Nuri 2000: 68). All the steps taken by the West were taken not for sake of Western civilization but for the sake of all humanity. He gave the example of the innovation by

\[^{65}\text{Indeed, several members of the group Garbcılar (Westerners) defended before and after the revolution of 1908 that religion was one the greatest obstacles to social progress (Hanioğlu 1997). In this sense, in the 1920s Celâl Nuri had still the same position on this issue.}\]
Pasteur, and stated that without using the methods of Pasteur there would be massive epidemics in India. By this account, Celâl Nuri attributed a firm universality to European civilization and appropriated Europe as the ultimate source of knowledge.

Having stated the universality of European civilization, he returned to comparing Western and Eastern civilizations. For him, the sciences of the East were not suitable for generalizing to the whole of humanity, and to a certain extent, they had lost their validity (Celâl Nuri 2000: 69). He added that mastering different Eastern sciences does not make anyone a scholar capable of addressing the necessities of the contemporary world. Furthermore, he did not see any potential benefit for humanity out of renovating obsolete Eastern sciences even through dedicated efforts. According to Celâl Nuri’s comparison, the intellectual activities carried out with Western methods necessitate liberty, because in the West, these activities are executed with realist (se’ni) logic. In contrast, in the East, the logic is not free; it is obliged to acquire support via transmission and did not have tradition of free thinking (Celâl Nuri 2000: 70). For Celâl Nuri, Europe meant a realist civilization, where all superstition and intemperance are limited by realism. Asian nations, by contrast, are not realist at all (Celâl Nuri 2000: 71).

After all these Orientalist comparisons between the East and the West, Celâl Nuri asked the following question: “is European Civilization good or bad? Is it worth outsiders adopting it?” (Celâl Nuri 2000: 73). He emphasized that it was impossible to create a new civilization out of nothing since every civilization is the inheritor of several different civilizations. Therefore, he assumed that even if the aim is to create a new civilization, it is necessary to appropriate a basis for it. Taken all these points into consideration, he concluded that the soundest (en salim) civilization is the European civilization. Subsequently, the path chosen by the Turks was correct. By Turks becoming part of Western civilization, the West would no longer be set off by itself and imparted with uniqueness, and probably more
importantly, the Turks, repeating European methods would be the vanguard of an Asian victory over Europe (Celâl Nuri 2000: 78).

This was the Eurocentrism defended by Celâl Nuri in 1926; in the early 1930s, on the pages of Kadro, Şevket Süreyya criticized Eurocentrism by giving one of the earliest examples of the use of the term as such. Şevket Süreyya’s article “Liquidation of ‘Europacentrisme’” (‘Europacentrisme’ in Tasfiyesi) was published in 1932, only seven years after the publication of the German geopolitician Karl Haushofer’s book Geopolitik des pazifischen Ozeans (1925), where the term europa-zentrisch first appeared and five decades before Samir Amin’s L’eurocentrisme, critique d’une idéologie (1988). It should be noted that the way Eurocentrism was defined by Şevket Süreyya was surprisingly similar to Amin’s perspective, or more generally speaking, to debates on Orientalism, Eurocentrism and critical perspective on European cultural hegemony, which have taken place since the 1980s. Şevket Süreyya’s (1932c) definition of Europacentrism was quite simple and apt: “considering European history as the center of world history.” He compared Eurocentrism to Ptolemy’s (Batlamyostan) “Geocentrisme.” With “Geocentrisme,” the earth was believed, over the centuries, to be center of the universe, though it is a small and natural component of it. Similarly, Eurocentrism is a perceptual mistake that continues to dominate, according to Şevket Süreyya, man’s perception. For him, the source of the Eurocentric thinking went back to Ancient Greece. Although it is a small and natural component of the world history, with Eurocentric perspective, European history was believed to be the center of world history. All researches, ways of thinking and what were considered authentic focused on Europe. Şevket Süreyya argued that Eurocentrism had had a negative impact on human history as it assumed the non-Europeans were to be subjugated to Europe. He established a strong causal link between Eurocentrism and colonialism. In the modern period, Eurocentrism had a brutal characteristic. Due to discoveries of the new continents, new trade routes, new markets, and
colonial wars, for a period of time, the destiny of the world had become connected to Europe. Colonialism made the ground ready for Europe’s worldwide hegemony (cihanşümül hegemonyası).

Şevket Süreyya also discussed Eurocentrism as a bias in the methodology of history. He claimed that the basic mistake of Eurocentric historiography was periodization and naming of ages, as “the early age,” “the middle age,” “the modern age” and “the contemporary age.” This periodization was based on the history of Europe, and for this reason, non-European courses of events were considered as brutal (kaba) and abstract (mücerret) experiences. In this way of writing history, “everything outside of Europe, or contrary to Europe were depicted as destructive and barbarian” (Şevket Süreyya 1932c). By such a sequencing of the course of history, it was possible to reflect neither the general progress of world civilization nor the peculiar periods of Turkish history. He asked “when did the early ages of the Turkish history start, and when did its middle age end?” (Şevket Süreyya 1932c). He emphasized that for the age European historians called the middle age, the renaissance of the Turkish history had already been achieved.

Şevket Süreyya furthered his criticism of Eurocentrism in his article “Our Thesis on the National Liberation Movements.” This article was organized as a polemic against a certain understanding of modernization. Within the terminology of this study, we can refer to the model attacked by Şevket Süreyya as the Eurocentric model of modernization and progress. He maintained that this model maintained the following thesis: “European order is for today the universal order. All its social forms, including economical, legal, political and artistic ones, and its forms of etiquette are valid and reasonable for all humanity. For other countries, what other truth and science could there be than examining and adopting these social forms?” (Şevket Süreyya 1932e) Accordingly, the development path of European society would be the natural development path of all societies, consisting of the same set of conflicts between...
individuals, political parties, social classes, and having the classical definition of democracy. Şevket Süreyya’s directed his criticism to the liberal politician Ağaoğlu Ahmet as the defender of a Eurocentric modernization. However, though addressing a very specific person, most likely Şevket Süreyya’s intention was to criticize a more common perspective.

Şevket Süreyya utterly rejected this Eurocentric model and perceiving the characteristic of European societies as universal. He insisted that the rules, perspectives, laws, and the destiny of European are peculiar to Europe. He added that all these characteristics are appropriate for a social system based on capital contradiction and colonial contradiction. He furthered his inquiry by asking whether the capitalist model was universal. He accepted the fact that capitalism and its exchange mechanisms are worldwide (âlemşümül). This being the case, he emphasized that the social structure and the class relations shaped by capitalism were not universal. For Şevket Süreyya, the very reason preventing capitalism from being universal is its own logic, which is based on unequal industrialization of nations in the world. Put it differently, as capitalism anticipated that some countries would have their industries while other would not, this system cannot evolve into a system valid in every part of the earth. In addition, the aftermath of the Great War was a period for him when European capitalism was challenged by the working-class within Europe and by revolting nations on a world scale. Hence, he argued that it was understood that the capitalist political and social institutions were peculiar and suitable to Europe. This was a challenge to the worldwide hegemony of capitalism (kapitalizmin cihanşümül hegemonyası). Ayşe Buğra-Trak comments on this argument and states that the Kadro writers presented capitalism as an “unnatural” system where, economic activity is not subject to social control. She thinks that the argument of Şevket Süreyya and Kadro is compatible with Karl Polanyi’s key argument in The Great Transformation, predating it by a decade (Buğra-Trak 1985).
For Şevket Süreyya, the critique of Eurocentrism includes a critique of methodological Eurocentrism in the social sciences. He especially underlined that in economics, the mainstream European discipline should not be followed (Şevket Süreyya 1933b). According to him, the scholars defending capitalism could not comprehend the worldwide role of colonial conflict (*müstemleke tezadi*), simply because this would destroy both the economic and intellectual hegemony of Europe. By the same token, Şevket Süreyya blamed the socialist scholars, who were predominantly preoccupied with class conflict.⁶⁶ For these reasons, he concluded that explaining colonial conflict was the duty of intellectuals in countries where national liberation movements were achievable. The intellectuals of national liberation movements should develop a non-European perspective, one not borrowed from somewhere else. In a very direct way, this was his definition for his self-assigned intellectual function. According to this function, Turkish intellectuals should not take the conditions of other countries as their own society’s conditions, but instead should develop their own model. As Turkey discontinued its own erstwhile social system, it should not follow European society, but should come up with an original path. In this sense, Şevket Süreyya was an intellectual of the space of subjugation. He believed that the 1930s was period when global hierarchies were widely challenged. In the period before the Great War, the world was under European economic and intellectual hegemony and, hence, the destiny of Europe was taken to be the same as that of the world. But after the War, the destiny of the world was no longer equated to the destiny of Europe; this was because there were differences in terms of social forces and the development path between Europe and other nations of the world. One must note that for Şevket Süreyya, the critique of Eurocentrism was directly connected to the critique of capitalism and even liberal democracy, and, hence, he attempted to position the new republican regime along the lines of a non-capitalist doctrine.

⁶⁶ Şevket Süreyya extended his criticism of Eurocentrism to Marxism’s Eurocentrism. He argued that Marxism was insufficient to analyze the differences between the industrialized Western societies and non-industrialized Asian societies (Şevket Süreyya 1933d; Türkeş 1998).
8.3 Imagining Modernity

The previous section detailed the Eurocentrism of Celâl Nuri. The way he imagined modernity and his support for the Kemalist reforms were in line with his Eurocentric perspective. When he published *The Turkish Revolution* in 1926 only a few reforms had been accomplished, most notably the abrogation of the caliphate (1924), the closing down of the *medreses* and *tekkes* (1924), the Hat Law (1925), the Civil Code (1926). It was still two years before the alphabet reform (1928), and there were no discussions yet about the reforms which would take place in the 1930s. In this atmosphere, Celâl Nuri (2000: 111) did not hesitate to state that all the steps that had been taken and reforms made by the revolution were right.

While developing his own perspective concerning modernity, Celâl Nuri discussed first the Ottoman reforms in the nineteenth century. It was a period of “legendary struggle” between advocating change and repressive fanaticism (*taassub*) (Celâl Nuri 2000: 107). He acknowledged that these reforms were important and specifically noted that the Tanzimat reforms, the Constitution of 1876 and the Revolution of 1908 contributed to the state organization that would subsequently be transformed into the republic (Celâl Nuri 2000: 50-52). Having said that, he also observed an important weakness of Ottoman reformism: its aim was not the unconditional adoption of European civilization. Consequently, a peculiar dualism became widespread: while Western law was imported the old *Mecelle* could continue to function or, similarly, the old-styled *medreses* were still active even after modern schools were opened (Celâl Nuri 2000: 113; 120).

For Celâl Nuri, the true success of the Turkish Revolution lay in its disentangling of the reform agenda from this old dualism. The radicalism of the new regime was analogous to a geological separation from the Asia and a reuniting with Europe (Celâl Nuri 2000: 83). For the first time in history, a nation coming from Central Asia was detached from the social and
historical destiny of this continent (Celâl Nuri 2000: 115). Another meaning of Turkish revolution was a separation from its Ottoman ties (*Türk milletinin Osmanlılıktan tecridi...*) (Celâl Nuri 2000: 81). For Celâl Nuri, the Turkish Revolution was not partial but holistic (*küllî*). Its program was about unconditional (*bilâkayd u şart*) participation in Western civilization. Furthermore, he maintained that the revolution did not have anything original. This meant that through this revolution, Turks did not create a new style of thinking, living, state organization, or education system, unknown hitherto. The Turkish Revolution was imitative (*ittibâî*). Abandoning the Eastern way thinking and administrating, the new task was just to quote (*iktibas etmek*) or to copy from the West (Celâl Nuri 2000: 84). In this context, lack of originality was the best quality of the revolution, which was appreciated by Celâl Nuri. He claimed that attempts to be original can lead to unknown consequences in the future; for this reason, following the path with predictable end-results was better (Celâl Nuri 2000: 89).

He claimed that the Turkish Revolution was democratic: “The Turkish Revolution is democratic, in other words, it is the guide for the nation” (Celâl Nuri 2000: 102). He did not elaborate on the link between its being democratic and guiding the nation, but deliberated more about the guiding issue. The revolution exhibited a lifestyle hitherto unknown by the masses and convinced them of its acceptability. For him, what was essential in this context was not liberty (*serbestî*), but rather making people accept a certain lifestyle and way of thinking. In a political system based on unlimited liberty, no one intervenes in the dissemination of different ideas, regardless of where they are good or bad. He stated that Turkish Revolution did not permit such liberty; it instead protected the public interest, thereby limiting old-styled ideas, and archaic life-styles. As an example for this general perspective

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67 It must be noted that while he was defending unconditional Westernization in the 1920s, he was in favor of “partial Westernization” in the previous decade. In the early 1910s, he had been suggesting adoption of Western science and technology and preservation of Ottoman culture (Buzpınar 2007). This indicates a certain mentality change from the Unionist era to the Kemalist single-party regime.
Celâl Nuri chooses the Hat Law. He argued that legislating hat reform confirms the democratic characteristic of the revolution. He added that the Turks were not conservative mystics by nature. Consequently, there were no considerable reactions when traditional religious headgears were abolished (Celâl Nuri 2000: 109).

Celâl Nuri argued that Turkish people were content with the reforms. He asked whether this contentment was secured by the weight of the state (*hükûmet kuvveti*). His reply was negative. According to him, dissenters—people opposing the reforms, were tiny minority. He declared that the Turks were adopting the Western civilization. From one point of view, this might be accepted as the victory of Europe. However, from another point of view this is the victory of a non-European nation over Europe (Celâl Nuri 2000: 119). He emphasized that demolition was also an important process. He even accepted that it was a radical (*cezrî*) process (Celâl Nuri 2000: 121). In addition, he stated that the time for construction had now come. Celâl Nuri was in favor of unconditional modernization; in this sense he was a radical. Yet, when he started discussing how to construct in the aftermath of revolution, he emphasized the necessity of an evolutionary path in two contexts, namely, religion and language. The new epoch was favorable to beginning a new lifestyle and copying international civilization. However, he emphasized that the revolution must be followed by evolution because while revolution demolishes the past, evolution constructs the future (Celâl Nuri 2000: 206). When he was writing these lines in 1926, it was the eve of the language reform, and the official decision about alphabet change had not yet been made. Celâl Nuri was worried about a radical purification campaign, the goal of which would be the elimination of the majority of Arabic and Persian words from Turkish. He stated that too much purification would result in the bankruptcy of the Turkish language. (Celâl Nuri 2000: 141). Although he was not a supporter of the Ottoman alphabet, he was suspicious about applicability of an
alphabet change, and stated that he worried about a sudden (fevri) decision in this regard (Celâl Nuri 2000: 145).

Similar to Celâl Nuri, the way Şevket Süreyya imagined modernization implied a comprehensive change in both the political and societal realms. It was a search for new political regime, new ideas, and even “new men” (yeni insan) (Şevket Süreyya 1932e). He summarized the model that he had in his mind in terms of three elements: étatism both in economy and culture, rejection of liberal parliamentary democracy, and opposition to colonialism (Şevket Süreyya 1934-1935). Unlike Celâl Nuri, Şevket Süreyya’s search for modernity was considerably shaped by the idea of Turkish nationalism. Especially the rejection of pluralist democracy and the emphasis on nationalism added a certain authoritarian dimension to Şevket Süreyya’s understanding of modernity. Moreover, whenever he discussed his model, Şevket Süreyya emphasized that the revolution should not be conceived as a finished process, but a continuing one. His aim was to encourage the single-party regime to be more radical in defending and extending the components of revolution. He stated that the Turkish society had been experiencing a holistic conversion. It was a harsh battle waged to attain advanced techniques and advanced social institutions (Şevket Süreyya 1932a). In this battle, the resistance came from the vestiges of semi-colonialism and the capitulations regime, as well as of the old theocratic autocracy. The resistance wanted to halt the revolution; however, for him, the main driver of the revolutionary process and what made it dynamic was the revolution’s enthusiasm, love for the revolution and believing in it. He compared the Turkish revolution to 1789, a date marking a set of events in which he saw a flow of enthusiasm. However, in the case of French Revolution, he argued that individualism and people taking to the streets dominated the process. He believed that in the Turkish revolution, in contrast, there was neither the imprint of individualism nor of the street (Şevket Süreyya
1932a). Şevket Süreyya’s reservation with respect to individualism needs to be read together with his authoritarian tendencies.

In another article, he developed further his comparison between the French and Turkish revolutions. He attempted to make a distinction between the substance and form of the 1789 spirit. Şevket Süreyya (1933e) accepted that the Turkish revolution took from the French revolution its substance, namely, the idea of national sovereignty (hakimiyeti milliye), but he added that the Turkish republic did not adopt such French models as parliamentarism. Şevket Süreyya criticized French parliamentarism, arguing that members of parliament did not represent national or common interests but merely engaged in politics for the benefit of a specific group or idea. For instance, he stated that the priests in the parliament were not representative of the whole nation, but only of the church. Moreover, their supports indeed supported clericalism, and sought its victory over laicism. In a similar way, the communist deputies did not represent the common interest of the nation but rather the revolutionary proletariat. And their supporters’ true inclination was to destroy all existing social and political institutions, including the national parliament, by armed force. For Şevket Süreyya, although the substance of the French Revolution, namely the idea of national sovereignty, was important to the Turkish revolution, the democratic forms of government that developed in the French case cannot be used as a model for the Turkish republic. Accordingly, for Şevket Süreyya, the first and foremost duty of the Turkish modernity should be criticizing adorers of Europe (Avrupaperest) and their understanding of democracy. He was utterly for a political model unique to Turkey.

It is argued in Chapter 5 that the Unionist social imaginary was mostly shaped by reactionary modernism. Despite some differences, Şevket Süreyya’s imagination with respect to modernity is a good example of the continuity of the Unionist social imaginary in the early republican era. As it is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, one might speak of two basic
components of reactionary modernism: objection to the parliamentary political system, and denying the existence of different interests within society. Thus, reactionary modernism, and its auxiliary perspective solidarism and corporatism, were outright opponents of class-based politics. Although he was a former communist, while publishing Kadro, Şevket Süreyya’s perspective was the same. He stated that the étatism of Turkish nationalism was not and would not be an étatism of a certain class. According to Şevket Süreyya (1933e), the étatism of Turkish nationalism was a reaction to the exploitation of a class by other social classes, and exploitation of a nation by another nation in the form of imperialism. Şevket Süreyya and other Kadro writers believed that the state could and should represent the interest of the whole nation, as is there was no different interest within the society. Mustafa Türkeş (2001) rightly points out that they failed to explain how this would be achieved.

While imagining modernity, Şevket Süreyya and Kadro writers included in their model, land reform, electrification and industrialization as well. Şevket Süreyya seemed well aware that industrialization would eventually lead to the formation of a working class, and this was against his perspective rejecting class-based politics. He emphasized that as the Turkish nation was saved from the troubles belonging to the past, it needed to be protected and saved from the troubles belonging to the future. Moreover, these future-related troubles were the class struggles; a fearsome, bloody, and merciless combat (korkunç, kanlı ve amansız mücadele) against the survival and the independence of the nation (Şevket Süreyya 1933f). The way to stop this combat was étatism, establishing the high-tech factories, publicly owned.

The publication of Kadro was made possible by the tacit support of Mustafa Kemal in 1932. At the end of 1934, he asked indirectly for it to cease publication by appointing Yakup Kadri, the franchise holder of the journal, ambassador to Albania. Why did the single-party regime withdraw its support from Kadro? Until 1931, the RPP did not have a written program. Kadro’s aim was to offer a suggestion for this ideological vacuum, without being
under the control of the party bureaucracy. For obvious reasons, the General Secretary of the RPP, Recep Bey, was totally unhappy and annoyed about this. Moreover, in 1934 there were two wings within the party: one wing was led by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, and it was in favor of an economy controlled by the state. Obviously, this wing had good contacts with Kadro, and İsmet İnönü published an article in the journal about the étatism of the RPP. The other wing was led by the Minister of Economy, Celâl Bayar, and it defended liberal economy and importance of private entrepreneurship. One might even talk about an open clash between Kadro and the Bayar camp, but probably because of its emphasis on land reform, for instance, the journal was too radical even for the İnönü camp. Most likely, the neutral arbiter between these two groups, Mustafa Kemal, sided with the Bayar camp and thus decided to have Kadro cease publication.

It would have been impossible that the decision of the president Mustafa Kemal not make Şevket Süreyya and his colleagues extremely disappointed. In the final issue, Şevket Süreyya published his article “The Victory of Social Nationalism.” As solidarism was a search for a third way, as an alternative to liberalism and socialism, in the context of reactionary modernism, for Şevket Süreyya Turkish national liberation movement and its political regime was neither socialist nor liberal. He argued that both socialism and liberalism meant class dictatorship, of the proletariat and of bourgeoisie, respectively. Hence, he emphasized that it was absolutely necessary to think about the Turkish national liberation movement within its special set of circumstances (kendi hususî şartları içinde). This is the task for Turkish intellectual. He maintained that with the rise of nationalism, based on the idea of an ordered and classless (nizamlı ve sınıfsız) society, Turkish nationalism found its originality (Şevket Süreyya 1934-1935). He stated that the original model should be formulated without being limited by existing concepts, such as socialism, communism, and fascism, which were barriers to creating original national regimes. His emphasis on “ordered
society” is a clear indicator of the extent to which his modernity imagination was authoritarian. In his last Kadro article, Şevket Süreyya offered a detailed economic program for the republic. The main emphasis of the program was that planning should not be perceived as something specific to socialism, but rather a necessary policy for the independence and industrialization of the republic. In his analysis of the economy, he appreciated that the republican regime took control of national credits and, hence, could control major investments, which used to belong to foreigners during the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to étatism, the state controlled railways, ports, mining, industry and foreign trade, while the glass and coal industries were left to the private sector. In addition to his high regard for these, Şevket Süreyya emphasized that land reform and rural transformation had not yet been achieved.

8.4 Conclusion

Throughout this study, it has been argued that nativism was a common denominator in the intellectual agendas of different spaces of subjugation. While analyzing the existing global hierarchies and thus the subjugation of their own geographies, many intellectuals attempted to balance, on the one hand, generalist or even universalist arguments, and, on the other hand, distinction claims for their own culture, a claim of superiority by emphasizing their cultural particularities with an essentialist tone. In this sense, neither Celâl Nuri nor Şevket Süreyya were exempt from having to contend with the issue of nativism. What were the nativist components within the writings of Celâl Nuri? It is possible to divide Celâl Nuri’s nativism into two categories. The first is characterized by the kind of nativism widely observed intellectuals of the late-Ottoman period. In his different books, Celâl Nuri attributed certain characteristics to Islam, such as a being democratic, which needs to be qualified as a nativist approach. The culmination of this nativism was his pan-Islamist book, Islamic Unity (İttihad-ı
In *The Turkish Revolution*, no nationalist discourse dominated the general tone of the book. He seldom referred to the eternal democratic history of the Turks; somewhat xenophobically, he placed importance on the ethnic homogenization of Anatolia, arguing that so long as there were sizeable Armenian and Greek communities the republican revolution would not be possible (Celâl Nuri 2000: 87, 97). The second characteristic of Celâl Nuri’s nativism was more peculiar to him. As it has been already emphasized in Chapter 2, nativism is not always about searching for claim of distinction regarding the local culture. Syed Farid Alatas (1993) maintains that “the tendency to uphold and perpetuate the superiority of Western cultural and political system” is also a kind of nativism. The Eurocentric model advocated in *Turkish Revolution* was a good example of this type of nativism. He attributed an absolute superiority to European civilization in every respect, including it being the only source of knowledge, and, hence, concluded that it was the soundest civilization. For Celâl Nuri, Europe had a “dynamique” nature, and it had been the soil of liberty, free thinking, and realism. The reader of *Turkish Revolution* can easily observe the spirit of Kipling spirit is in the book, as Celâl Nuri (2000: 172) emphasized that “the West is the West, and the East is the East.” He did not finished his sentence by “never the twain shall meet,” as in Kipling’s ballad. However, he referred constantly to binary oppositions between the East and the West, by assuming these two as non-connected entities, separated by clear borders. He was a nativist, believing in the superiority of West and the inferiority of the East in both the material and cultural realms.

The nativism in Şevket Süreyya was more explicit than Celâl Nuri’s nativism. While publishing *Kadro* in the 1930s, Şevket Süreyya was a nationalist who was trying to theorize Turkish nationalism and an étatist economy for the single-party regime. As an instance of nativism, Şevket Süreyya was against cosmopolitism of any kind, and his novel published in 1959, *The Man Searching for Water*, includes instances of his anti-cosmopolite stand. Again,
we can analyze Şevket Süreyya’s nativism in two ways. First, let us focus on the general nativism in his writings. In his Kadro articles, Şevket Süreyya never employed a vulgarized nationalist discourse. However, he supported the single-party regime, as in many other contexts, establishing a nationalist history thesis, ignoring the Ottoman period, and focusing on the long history of Turks, with a specific emphasis on the Central Asian origin. In this framework, the Turkish History Thesis appropriated the Ergenekon Legend as the creation myth of the nation. In Kadro, Şevket Süreyya (1933a) fully supported this creation myth by stating that revolution was a harsh struggle that needs to be embellished with poetics and ideals. The legend is the story of a people locked on a small plain, circulated by high mountains. The confined people kept searching for the way out, but could not find where to go for centuries, and finally a gray wolf, by the name Börtücene or Bozkurt showed them where to start digging in the mountain. Then, they started melting the mounting with a gigantic fire and finally were able to go somewhere else. For Şevket Süreyya (1933a) this legend was about how a captive people (esir kavim) changed its destiny and became prosperous. While appraising the legend, promoted by the regime, he compared the captive position in the Central Asia to the captive position of the Turks during the Ottoman period. He concluded that as the gray wolf in Central Asia showing the way to go, a hero appeared as the symbol of national will and by diffusing his guiding ideas, saved the nation from its captive position.

Another kind of nativism is evident in the work of Şevket Süreyya. In all his writings, he took very seriously the subjugation of his country, to the extent that he saw the entire country as a unified entity, free from conflicts and clashes of interests. It would be wrong to state that he denied the fact that imperialist powers had always had local collaborators. On the contrary, he constantly emphasized these collaborators, and argued that in the last period of the empire even the sultanate was one of them. By the same token, he never regarded Turkey
as a classless society. For instance, when discussing the necessity of land reform, obviously he referred to the big landowning class and, therefore, class conflict. But more generally speaking, he preferred to shift his analysis from class analysis to the international dichotomy between colonizer nations and semi-colonies (Türkeş 1998). Once this dichotomy dominated his writing, no differences or conflict within Turkish society were incorporated into the analysis. As long as he underestimated the differences within the society, he perceived the state as an entity symbolizing national unity. Mustafa Türkėş (2001) reminds us that the Kadro writers assigned the state an autonomous position above the society and social classes; however, for obvious reasons, the Kemalist state was not free from the penetration of particular interest groups. This was the main reason why Şevket Süreyya ended up with an authoritarian model, where the state dominated every sphere, including the economy and culture.

When these two Kemalist intellectuals from the 1920s and the 1930s are scrutinized, it is seen that both of them took seriously the theoretical and practical problems concerning establishing a modernity on the border of the West, and being subjugated by the European powers. In this sense, both were notable examples of intellectuals of a space of subjugation. It has already been maintained that the intellectual agenda of a space of subjugation included confronting the necessity of reconciling different political or intellectual perspectives with local realities. This chapter has shown that Celâl Nuri and Şevket Süreyya appropriated different strategies in this reconciliation process. Celâl Nuri’s position was not to pay attention to the local reality but rather to implement unconditional cultural change by strictly applying the European model. In his understanding, the success of the republican regime was being unoriginal and completely adhering to that model. Contrary to Celâl Nuri, Şevket Süreyya’s priority was on emphasizing the particularity of the local. With this emphasis, he concluded that Turkish intellectual should develop an original model, both as a political
model and as a framework with which to understand the colony-metropolis relations, the subjugated nations system, and the dependency created by this system.

At this point, it has to be stressed that in his effort to offer a theoretical approach, Şevket Süreyya was not only more sophisticated than Celâl Nuri, but also than any other Kemalist intellectual of the single-party era. In Kemalist circles, theorizing was not encouraged. This was partly due to the positivist stance of Kemalism, and partly to the pragmatism of the republican regime. In such an atmosphere, Şevket Süreyya was brave enough, both intellectually and politically, to deal with theoretical questions (Çulhaoğlu 1998). Probably his years in Moscow as a young communist, when he witnessed the development of a full-scale ideology, encouraged him in his theory-driven work. Having said that, this does not mean he was indifferent to practical matters. As it is argued in Chapter 3, the intellectual agenda of the space of subjugation forced intellectuals to wrestle with practical questions within the framework of realpolitik, while dealing with macro level questions, such as reconciling political perspectives with their local realities or searching for recognition, and intellectual equality. Şevket Süreyya reserved a considerable amount of his time and energy to suggesting a development model, and wrote extensively on the issues of planning and industrialization. He was the defender of étatism and planned economy, where the state is the main actor.

The theoretical framework suggested by Şevket Süreyya was successful in two ways. First, it was so well developed in conceptualizing global hierarchies that he predated some twentieth-century schools of thoughts, such as dependency theory and world-system analysis, in using concepts such as “colony-metropolis” and “world system.” Second, he was fully aware of Eurocentrism, specifically using the term Europacentrisme. His definition for it was to the point: “considering European history as the center of the world history.” He did not reduce the dependency created by imperialism to economic subordination, and equally
emphasized that it concerned methodology and knowledge production system. He always considered the establishment of the republican regime as a case of a “national liberation movement” and made the liquidation of Eurocentrism a goal for intellectuals of national liberation movements. In this sense, the theoretical problems with which he was occupied were the same as those being addressed by the intellectuals in the era of decolonization and its aftermath. For this, he deserves to be appreciated. Very much similar to the discussions in the 1960s around the concept of Asiatic mode of production (AMP), he blamed Marxism for being Eurocentric. This was the moment when he had difficulty striking a balance between learning from the European ideas, including Marxism and socialism and being aware of their Eurocentric biases. It has to be said that he went too far in rejecting the existing conceptual framework by arguing that existing concepts were barriers to developing original ideas (Şevket Süreyya 1934-1935). This was the moment when his criticism of Eurocentrism became nativist. While distancing his ideas from socialism, he declared that the working classes of Europe would not give up the surplus income which industrialized Europe received from Asia and Africa (Şevket Süreyya 1933d), hence, he concluded that socialism would not resolve the qualitative differences between colonizer countries and Asia and Africa (Türkeş 1998).

What is interesting to note is that these two Kemalist intellectuals had two different positions vis-à-vis Eurocentrism. As he defended an unconditional and comprehensive adoption of the European model, Celâl Nuri can be seen as a Eurocentric Kemalist; in contrast, Şevket Süreyya rejected utterly Eurocentrism. Despite this difference, both of them defended the authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist regime. This can be seen as two different justifications for Kemalism, diverging in the way of argumentation, and converging at the point they reach. At the same time, this shows the complexities of the intellectual problems faced by the Kemalist intellectuals, as intellectuals of the space of subjugation.
CHAPTER 9 – THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS AND ALTERNATIVE MODERNITIES

As the title indicates, Part II deals with the diversifying trajectories in Turkish intellectual history. In Chapter 7, two Unionist intellectuals were highlighted. Chapter 8 delineated the Kemalist intellectual agenda by analyzing its two different sources. Based on a discussion of Celâl Nuri, a former Unionist writer, and Şevket Süreyya, a former communist, it showed both the continuity with the Unionist era, and the new perspectives that flourished within the Kemalist perspective. In this sense, what had been achieved by Kadro writers was already an indicator of trajectories multiplying. The last two chapters of Part II offer a deeper analysis in terms of this multiplication. Chapter 9 scrutinizes two conservative intellectuals, Peyami Safa and Mümtaz Turhan by focusing on their writings between the 1930s and the 1950s, and Chapter 10 examines two left-wing intellectuals, Mehmet Ali Aybar and Doğan Avcioglu, by focusing on their writings in the 1960s.

The elections of 1946 were the first multi-party elections in the republican history, in its true sense. In the post-war era, the republican regime considered having an opposition party as a necessity for a country already signed the United Nation Charter, especially in order to acquire a better position in the new international balance of power.68 There was now a strong opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), established by the former members of RPP, who were prominent figures of the party, including Celâl Bayar69 and Adnan Menderes. The historian Kemal Karpat (2004a) notes that despite lacking a long-term program, by depending on their deeply rooted as well as spontaneously created organizations, the DP became the spokesperson of all social groups that had various types of dissatisfaction with the

68 For an analysis evaluating the internal reasons for the transition and reasons regarding the international conjuncturere and balance of power, see (Kara-Incioğlu 1984/1985).
69 For the Unionist phase of Mahmud Celâl Bey political career, see 5.4.
single-party regime. It gained enough power to be able to express its views to the public, but it was too soon for the DP to come first in the first multiparty elections. In the elections of 1946, they could not mobilize enough candidates to secure the majority in the parliament. However in 1950, they received the majority of all votes—53.5 percent, meaning an absolute majority in the parliament.

In the pertinent literature, there is a consensus about the significance of the transition to multi-party system; however, the interpretations of its significance diverge significantly. If we follow the three-fold categorization suggested by Sinan Yıldırımaz (2008), from the Kemalist perspective the transition signifies a counter-revolution—a total withdrawal from the progress achieved in the early republican era. A different perspective is inclined to celebrate the transition and the victory of the DP over the RPP as a revolution or a democratic mass mobilization. A third reading evaluates the transition from a class-based perspective and argues that following the electoral win of DP, Turkey became more integrated into the world markets as a satellite of the United States. Karpat’s account of the transition is a classical example of the second perspective. He states that “the elections of 1950, which ousted the Republican Party and brought the Democrats to power, were the tangible proof that power resided with the people. This was the greatest revolution ever to occur in the mind of the average Turk; and one may add that the Turkish people take democracy far more seriously than they are given credit for in the West.” (Karpat 2004a) One of the first steps taken by the DP government was to relax some secularist policies of the single-party era. The showcase for these actions was making ezan Arabic again. Obviously, this single act of DP contributed enormously to the perception of democracy of ordinary people, observing the power of voting that was able to change one of the most disliked decisions of the single-party era.

70 For overall assessments on the historiography of this transition and the era of DP in general see (Berktay 1988; Yıldırımaz 2008).
The sociologist Çağlar Keyder also thinks that the elections of 1950 constitute a watershed in Turkish history. In his book, *State and Class in Turkey*, Keyder emphasizes that after 1950, the parliament was not an extension of administration anymore but a forum for debate. As already mentioned in the Introduction, the key contribution of *State and Class in Turkey* is to offer a history of social and political tensions among the bureaucratic elites and a burgeoning bourgeoisie. In this sense, Keyder takes 1950 as a turning point. He notes that the DP’s opposition to the RPP had two pillars: economic and religious freedom. With the former they were arguing against statist economy, and with the latter they were emphasizing the local tradition over the political oppression and ideological onslaught of the center. For Keyder, 1950 and the following decade under DP government was the period when the bourgeoisie could first differentiate itself from the bureaucracy at the level of ideology. In his words,

By any measure the Democrat Party’s accession to power in 1950 constituted a fundamental break in Turkish history. For the first time a popular electorate expressed its political choice and voted against a statist tradition several centuries old. Paternalism, control from the center, the reformism from above were decisively rejected while the market (and capitalism) were given free rein. Of course the large majority of the population were as yet ignorant of the implications of an unbridled market economy. Its immediate benefits appeared tangible, and the unknown seemed far more desirable than what had been recently experienced. (Keyder 1987: 124)

The political scientist Galip Yalman rejects both the center-periphery cleavage and state-centric approach while analyzing the transition to multi-party system. Yalman (2009: 198-213) argues that this change of government was rather exaggerated in terms of its role in setting the ground for a process of economic as well as political liberalization. Yalman also emphasizes that the anti-statist discourse employed by the DP was useful to establish a new hegemonic project, which did not aim the autonomy of bourgeoisie from the state. On the contrary, according to Yalman, this new hegemonic project was all about linking various
particularistic interests under the leadership of an emerging bourgeoisie which had no intention of weakening its ties with the state. By taking these points into consideration, Yalman argues that what happened in 1950 was a passive revolution, rather than a revolution in a real sense, since it promoted reform without entailing any fundamental changes in the balance of class forces.

Although there are issues of disagreement about how to assess the transition, it is hard to deny that the decade of the DP ruling, starting with the elections of 1950 and ending with the first coup d’état of the republican history in May 1960, was truly a period of transformation for Turkey. The aid provided by the United States had a significant share in this transformation. In Keyder’s (1987: 119) words, “American funds advanced to Turkey between 1946 and 1950 were equivalent to around 3 per cent of GNP, allowing imports to increase by 270 per cent over the war-time average.” “Supported by US financial and technical assistance, hard-surfaced roads capable of carrying heavy vehicles from automobiles and buses to heavy trucks and tractors increased from 1 642 km in 1950 to 7 049 km in 1960.” (F. Ahmad 2000b: 115) This transformation not only opened up the villages of Anatolia for the first time and exposed the peasants to the alien urban world but also established a national market, by making flows of goods and people much easier.

This being the sociopolitical context of the 1950s, a note on the use of political labels in the early multi-party era is necessary. In the Turkish studies literature, there is a consensus that the left-right divide applies to neither the Unionist nor the single-party eras. Although there has been a discussion regarding the point from which the left-right divide can be meaningfully applied to Turkish political and thus intellectual history, the year 1960 has been seen as a turning point in this regard. For instance, Tanel Demirel (2009) argues that the first years of the multi-party era, the 1946-1960 period, was an era of ambiguity in terms of the positioning of the political parties in the left-right ideological spectrum. The leader of the
newly established DP, Adnan Menderes, stated that the RPP was further on the right than the DP (Taşkın 2009). On the other hand, another founder of the DP, Celâl Bayar, who was one of the strongest men of the RPP in the 1930s, claimed that there were no ideological differences between these two parties, which were both committed to the program of developing a modern Turkey (Ahmad 2000b: 109). In the political discourse of the 1950s, the right-left divide was not frequently and consistently used. It was only after the first coup d’état of 1960 that this divide began to have meaning, however ambiguous, in Turkish politics, especially after the RPP openly positioned itself on the left of the center in the mid-1960s.

There were right-wing intellectuals earlier, however, even if the word was not often used. They preferred to speak of their political position with reference to different ideologies, such as nationalism. Nevertheless, the most common position that characterized these intellectuals was traditionalism (an’aneçilik). They were then retrospectively referred to as the nationalist-conservative (milliyetçi-muhafazakâr) intellectuals. The main components of the conservative thought in Turkey represented by these right-wing intellectuals until the 1960s can be summarized as the following: privileging the state and its survival over individuals’ rights; skepticism about the idea of change and hence supporting the continuity of existing order; referring to religious values as the traditional backbone of Turkish society, accompanied by an uneasiness with secularism and the Kemalist modernization project; and a discomfort with universalism, which demonstrated itself in a constant emphasis on and glorification of the national. Yüksel Taşkın (2009) reminds us that for Turkish conservatives, supporting the continuity of existing order also meant a defense of capitalism. Yet they also had a clear antipathy for liberalism. Given their authoritarian tendencies, they were utterly troubled by political liberalism. They did not dream of a free market economy with minimal state intervention but rather a mixed economy, where private and public sectors collaborate.
For all intellectuals of the spaces of subjugation, identity was an important issue. It was also critical for Turkish conservative intellectuals. All in all, the space of subjugation raised a series of questions with which the conservative intellectuals had to deal. First and foremost was the issue of modernization. On the one hand, they were convinced that certain precautions had to be taken in order to modernize and strengthen the state, but, at the same time, they were concerned of the possibility of losing the national identity, and becoming a replica of other modernized nations. In this sense, reconciling modernization and the protection of the national identity was their major concern. Moreover, they were very sensitive to the realm of realpolitik, and especially the issue of development, which had been seen by most of the conservatives as the *sin qua non* of a strong state, and therefore, a strong national identity (Turan 2012). At the same time, they had a historically sensitive concern with the subjugation of their country. It was in this context that they employed the concept of imperialism, but with utmost care since they did not want to end up with rejecting capitalism. To put it differently, they considered the act of writing the history of subjugation as an ideological debate against the left. Therefore, on the one hand, they did not want to leave the space to the left-wingers in criticizing imperialism and Western domination, but on the other hand, they were careful not to circulate ideas similar to those of the left. Consequently, they found the solution to this dilemma in emphasizing the cultural dimensions of Western imperialism more than its economic aspects. This allowed them to emphasize the protection of the national identity and religious values and to criticize imperialism at the same time, avoiding a criticism of capitalism as such.

This chapter discusses these issues by focusing on two conservative intellectuals, the well-known novelist and opinion essay writer Peyami Safa and the experimental psychology professor Mümtaz Turhan. There are two justifications for this choice. First, these two figures represent both the literary and more social scientific and theory-oriented dimensions of
Turkish conservatism. This also corresponds to including a very popular conservative intellectual, Safa, and a certainly less popular, but more sophisticated intellectual of the conservative circles—Turhan. Second, Safa had an active intellectual life from early 1930s until the end of 1950s, and Turhan published his books throughout 1950s and 1960s. In this sense, by covering these intellectuals, it is possible to scrutinize Turkish conservatism during the single-party era and multi-party era. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section provides an overview of the conservative interpretation of Kemalism and discusses how the conservative intellectuals aimed at intervening in the Kemalist agenda and policies during the 1930s. The following section examines how Safa and Turhan understood the concepts East, West and Westernization. And the third section discusses Safa’s and Turhan’s search for alternative modernities, apart from the Kemalist model.

Before proceeding to these sections, biographical notes are necessary. Peyami Safa was born in 1899.71 His father was a poet who was an opponent of Abdülhamid regime. Due to severe health problems and poor economic condition of his family, he was unable to have a formal education after the age of 13. He deserved to be qualified as an autodidact. As a teenager, he started teaching in a primary school, and what was more interesting, he learned French on his own. He was already an active author of story books in the 1920s, but he established his position in the literary circles with his novel Fatih-Harbiye in 1931. He made a tour of Europe, including Italy, France, Germany and Hungary, and published his travel notes in 1938 in his book, Büyük Avrupa Anketi (The Great Survey of Europe). He never ceased writing fiction. As he never had a state post, this was important to him because he had to support himself. However, when he started to write opinion essays, political and semi-philosophical pieces more regularly, he became less prolific in fiction. As an opinion-essay writer, he had many polemics. He was not known to be an entirely consistent writer. In the

71 The authoritative biography of Peyami Safa is the book by Beşir Ayvazoğlu (1999).
elections of 1950, he was a candidate for the parliament from the RPP, but was unable to get elected, and throughout the 1950s he supported the DP. He died in 1961.

Mümtaz Turhan was born in 1908, in a village near Erzurum, in Eastern Turkey. In 1928, he went to Berlin to study psychology (Özakpinar 1999: 9). In 1935, he received his first doctoral degree, from the University of Frankfurt in psychology. He started teaching at Istanbul University, Faculty of Letters. In 1944 he went to Cambridge University, where he wrote a second doctoral dissertation, under the supervision of Frederic Barlett, in the field of experimental psychology (Kongar 1988). His Cambridge dissertation was published in Turkish as Kültür Değişmeleri: Sosyal Psikoloji Bakamından Bir Tekik (Culture Changes: A Social Psychological Investigation) in 1951. Turhan was also a pioneering academician in social anthropology with his village fieldworks. Following his mentor Frederic Bartlett, he understood culture in terms of “hard” and “soft” features (Magnarella and Türkdoğan 1976), and analyzed villages as milieu of cultural change. He died in 1969.

9.1 Conservative Intellectuals vis-à-vis Kemalism

The single-party era was not sufficiently pluralistic to enable different political opinions to be voiced. As it has been discussed in detail both in Chapter 6 and 8, the Kemalist regime did not volunteer at all to protect or to conserve the old values or the culture of the society. The zeitgeist was for the radical change. Hence, intellectuals privileging the idea of conserving the existing values by harmonizing them with modernity did not adopt the term conservatism until the 1950s. It was obvious that they did not have cordial relations with the new establishment. Several of them were ousted from the university by the University Reform of 1933. However, this group of intellectuals did not have an explicitly confrontational relation with the Kemalist regime. There were several reasons these intellectuals did not choose open opposition. First, Kemalism had aimed at creating a flourishing national identity. Apparently
this was common ground between this group of intellectuals and the new regime. Second, they believed that they had an influence on the ongoing intellectual debates and hence on the regime. They attempted to reinterpret the notion of *inkilâp*, whereby the Kemalist “revolution” was characterized as “reform” instead. Their aim was to limit the radicalism of Kemalism. They were hoping, in particular, to create a reconciliation between the republican regime and religion by restraining secularism. As Tanıl Bora (2003: 76) formulates, they voiced the idea of not overdoing the revolution and returning to what was reasonable. Obviously what was reasonable was defined, in their mind, in the social milieu, a sphere where there is no top-down intervention by a central authority. In line with their call not to overdo revolution, they reinterpreted Kemalism “as a conservative force rather than as a rationalist dogma that aimed at realizing a universal civilizing project, as the positivist humanist groups argued” (İrem 2003). By this reinterpretation, they positioned themselves within Kemalism, by contesting it and by calling attention to its drawbacks and extremism (Yıldırım 2003). This positioning made their position legitimate. To reinforce this legitimacy, they were always careful to distance and differentiate themselves from religious reactionism.

It was in this atmosphere that Safa published his novel *Fatih-Harbiye* in 1931. The title of the novel is derived from a tram line running between an old Istanbul neighborhood in the historical peninsula—Fatih, and a new neighborhood in the north of the Golden Horn—Harbiye, which was near the cosmopolitan quarter *Pera*. In the novel, Fatih was the symbol of conservative lifestyle, loyal to values, and Harbiye or Beyoğlu (*Pera*) was the symbol of the new, the modern and even mimicry and the fake. The main protagonist of the novel is Neriman, a young woman studying at the Oriental Music Section of the Conservatory. The background of the novel at the macro-level is the modernization process in the early republic,

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72 In Chapter 8, the other party of this discussion, namely the *Kadro* movement is discussed in details.
but at micro-level, Safa narrated a story on the eve of the Music Reform. Subsequently, throughout the novel the reader witnesses a discussion of Eastern and the Western music. Safa portrayed Neriman as an individual struggling between the clash of Eastern and Western cultures. Neriman voiced the spatial division within the city. She said that when looking at two neighborhoods in Istanbul, the same difference as that which exists between Kabul and New York can be seen. Until the very end of the narrative, Neriman had been a character who hated Fatih, her own neighborhood, with its poverty, its cemeteries, and people with old-life style. In contrast, for her, Rue de Pera (İstiklal Caddesi) was the space of civilization, courtesy, happiness, newness, and beauty. She was dissatisfied with being deprived (mahrum) and uttered “I want to live in a more civilized way” (Safa 2008: 84). While thinking about the dichotomies within the city, Neriman referred to a series of dichotomies between the East and the West. She believed Eastern people were lazy, daydreamers (hayalperest), indolent (miskin), and sleepyheads (uykucu). With this Orientalist perspective, she hated her own instrument ud, and was very happy to hear the rumors saying that the Oriental Music Section of the Conservatory would be closed-down.

In fact, Safa’s Fatih-Harbiye was very similar to nineteenth century Ottoman novels. For the novelists of the nineteenth century, “roman à these” was a widely used genre (Mardin 1974). In these novels, the primary aim was not literary success but either teaching something to their readers, or discussing some macro questions, such as Westernization or the place of women in society. This was the case in Fatih-Harbiye, too. Moreover, in most of the nineteenth century “romans à these,” Westernization was seen as a problem of morality. Şerif Mardin maintained that these novels problematized the over-Westernization. Most of them argued that modernization meant the loss of social norms, by alienating people from traditional values. Similar to Ottoman novelists, Safa ridiculed the modern life-style mostly observable in Harbiye or in Beyoğlu. In a way, his narrative is a warning of the dangers of

73 For details of Music Reform see Chapter 6 and especially 6.4.2.
over-Westernization. While doing this, Safa (2008: 58) put the blame to a certain extent on the republican regime by saying that following the Lausanne Peace Treaty, modernization (asrileşme) was enforced by law.

Nazım İrem reads Fatih-Harbiye as an example of the conservative characterization of the traditional Turkish attitude toward life: “Accordingly, the prevalent state of moral uncertainty, which revealed itself as an ethically schizophrenic attitude, posed the greatest threat to the future of the Turkish Revolution” (İrem 2002). However, Safa gave his novel a happy ending of sorts. Almost all of a sudden, Neriman realized the value of traditional culture and traditional music, and returned to her boyfriend from her old neighborhood. In this conservative revelation process, she also realized that the life that she adored for a short period of time was in fact, artificial, superficial and formalistic (şekilci). At the end of Fatih-Harbiye, Safa describes a gathering of traditionalist intellectuals and music masters in an old Fatih house. The intellectual protagonists list a series of arguments on the issues of the East-West divide and modernization, almost didactically. Accordingly, it is wrong to attribute prototypical characteristic (prototipik vasıflar) to the East and the West, because there are certain Eastern components within the Western culture and certain Western components within the Eastern culture. These two worlds should not be afraid of borrowing from each other. For instance, the participants of this gathering argued that for the West, there is a risk of mechanization due to the barbaric effect of the big industry (büyük sanayiin barbarlaştırıcı etkisi), and the remedy is to increase the Eastern elements in Western culture. By the same token, at the junction of the East and the West, Turkey should not be reluctant to be influenced by the West. Nevertheless, this influence should not be so powerful as to infiltrate the beautiful and authentic roots of our culture. By rejecting the idea of rigid borders between the East and the West, Safa not only countered the Orientalist prejudices that he attributed to Neriman, but also offered an early version of his East-West synthesis idea, which he will
elaborate more during the 1950s. At his gathering, Neriman played her *ud* after a long break, and the participants agreed that it was wrong to close down the Oriental Music Section of the Conservatory, and qualified this decision as formalistic (*şekilperest*).

Sinan Yıldırımaz (2003) makes a distinction between Safa of 1931 and Safa of 1938, when he published his essays under the title of *Türk İnkılâbına Bakişlar* (Reflections on the Turkish Revolution).\(^{74}\) In these seven years, Safa had become a more influential intellectual. He did not only publish a cultural journal *Kültür Haftası* with his brother,\(^{75}\) but more importantly, he published his op-ed essays in *Cumhuriyet*, the prestigious pro-regime national daily. He published the essays first in *Cumhuriyet*, which would be collected under the title *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution*. As he was acknowledged in Kemalist circles, Safa became less skeptical about the reform agenda of Kemalism, and started to have confidence in the regime (Yıldırımaz 2003). Hence, in *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution*, he praised Atatürk, albeit through a certain redefinition of Kemalism.

Safa maintained that Atatürk’s revolution had two unalterable principles: nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) and civilizationism (*medeniyetçilik*). According to Safa, there were three political positions in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, suggesting solutions to the problems of the empire and above all how to reverse the dismemberment process. These were Islamism (*İslâmcılık*), Turkism (*Türkçülük*), and Westism (*garbcılık*). Due to the collaboration of Arab elites with the Great Powers, pan-Islamism could not survive during war time as a vital alternative. Two surviving positions, namely Turkism and Westism were also highly damaged, and needed to be disentangled from their Ottoman baggage. Safa

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\(^{74}\) A note on translation: As already mentioned in Chapter 8, the Turkish word *inkılâp* has two different connotations, and Safa was in favor of reading it as “reform,” rather than “revolution.” But as it had been referred in the available English sources, including the full text translation of the book published by Atatürk Research Center, as *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution* (Safa 1999), I also translate the title of this book by using *revolution* for *inkılâp*. For the paragraphs existing in the first edition but omitted in later editions, see (Ayyavazoğlu 1999: 336-344). Whenever, I quote from *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution*, I follow the second edition (Safa 1958).

\(^{75}\) Mümtaz Turhan also published in this journal his early articles on Gestalt psychology and participated to several rountables organized by this journal.
described Atatürk as an extraordinary man (*harikulâde bir adam*), who could carry out this operation by cutting off the Ottoman ties to these two ideas, and transforming them into nationalism and civilizationism, respectively. He stated that all revolutionary movements had their origins in these two concepts. The policies he thought to have stemmed from nationalism were “… extending Turkish history to its very roots in Central Asia by taking it out its Ottoman framework,” “a process of self-purification and self-discovery of the Turkish language from its origin to the Sun-Language Theory. The “Law on pure Turkish surnames,” and “translation of the Koran Turkification of the call for prayer” were other reforms in the same perspective (Safa 1958: 92). Equally, he listed reforms stemming from civilizationism, such as the new alphabet, the Hat Law, the abolishment of the Oriental Music Section in the Conservatory, adoption of the Western calendar, and “making official all Western life style, etiquette and clothing.” It is worth noting that Safa, who had criticized the closing down of the Oriental Music Section in the Conservatory in 1931, was totally silent on the same issue seven years later.

For Safa, the principle of civilizationism bound the Turkish people to European and Western method, thought and lifestyle. Right after the Great War, Safa (1958: 74) maintained, “One may say that the West came to our doorstep before we had time to go to it, appearing like a pitch-black threat in the barrels of the guns of the Allied Fleet trained on Istanbul in the Marmara Sea.” For this reason, he argued that Turkish people started to confuse the Western civilization with Western imperialism: “We have directed our hatred of Western imperialism towards Western civilization. In our literature of [War of] Liberation, this culture occurs in the form of ‘monster with one tooth left.’” But this hatred felt toward the West disappeared when normal relations were resumed with the European powers after the Peace of Lausanne.” (Safa 1958: 83-84) This was the success of Atatürk. Safa stated that prior to Atatürk, all the Ottoman reforms attempts, such as the Tanzimat or the Second Constitutional Period (1908),

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76 Famous verse of the National Anthem, *The March of Independence* by the Islamist poet Mehmet Akif Ersoy.
“were steps taken in halves by half men.” For Safa (1958: 85), these half measures were the reason for all troubles since they confused the minds of the people, dividing Turkish society into two defective halves between the East and the West, between religion and nationality. For Safa, the true success of Atatürk lay with his ability to abolish this duality by synthesizing attitude. Following the War of Independence, Atatürk brought to the country Western methods and the modern technology of Europe as a revolutionary movement.

Nazım İrem informs us that while establishing themselves as intellectual groups, an important tool for republican conservatives of the 1930s was their polemics with the Kadro authors. They considered the main framework of the Kadro movement as a socialism-inspired revolutionary theory of the Turkish Revolution, hence a direct rival of their position. They saw in Kadro a Jacobinist tyranny of the intellectuals over the people. Some conservative intellectuals “argued that state-society relations in the Kadro perspective relied on a revolution-from-above approach and derived from a rationalist totalitarian model aiming to ensure the absolute control of the state over society” (İrem 2002). Although when Safa published his Reflections on the Turkish Revolution in 1938, Kadro was closed down for three years, it was still a benchmark or a reference point helping Safa to locate his ideas. In Reflections on the Turkish Revolution, Safa revitalized the polemics with Kadro in order to contextualize Turkish nationalism.

Safa argued that there were two conceptions of nationalism: one was the socialist view and the other was the one proffered by genuine nationalists. According to socialists, nationalism is a liberation movement against the pressure of imperialism; thus, socialists aimed at initiating a resistance movement among captive people against the bourgeoisie and capitalism. In contrast, genuine “nationalism is a broad movement covering race, language and history” (Safa 1958: 93) privileging national exigencies (millî zaruretler) over rights and needs of singular man. Safa utterly rejected the socialist view of nationalism. Referring to
Fichte and Renan, and to the history of European nationalisms, he concluded that all European nationalisms were born out of vital necessities that came out at unexpected moments. Put differently, he considered all of them as a response to a common survival threat such as war or occupation. In this sense, for Safa the initial cause of Turkish nationalism was the catastrophe of the Balkan Wars. In his words, “to recover from the inferiority complex (küçülme duygusu) which this humiliation had imposed, it was necessary to cast forth a Turkish consciousness that would look to the future with hope and feel the pride of all the glories of Turkish history. The great humiliation suffered because of the Armistice gave birth to Kemalist nationalism” (Safa 1958: 179).

This polemic between the Kadro movement and Safa was over a disagreement on the cause of the problems faced by their country. Both parties were composed of intellectuals of a space of subjugation, however, their understanding of subjugation and causal explanation for it were significantly different. For Safa, it was a mistake to consider Turkish nationalism as being similar to Ethiopian nationalism struggling against Italian imperialism, or to Chinese nationalism fighting against Japanese imperialism. Therefore, he continued, it was a mistake to show the Kemalist movement exclusively as liberation movement of a semi-colony. Based on this false perspective, Safa argued that the socialists wanted the Kemalist movement to concentrate exclusively on economic policies. However, he emphasized that it was crucial to acknowledge the historical and cultural differences between Turkey and semi-colonies. He concluded “one should under no circumstances confuse Turkish nationalism with the question of liberation of the backward (geri) Far Eastern nations” (Safa 1958: 180). Obviously, Safa was engaging in a struggle over how to draw the boundaries of Kemalism. He asked a further question: “Is Kemalism hostile to tradition?” (Kemalizm an’ane düşmanı mıdır?) (Safa 1958: 99). Safa accepted there were facts giving such an impression. He stated that “there are Christian traditions among civilized customs which we took from the West. The Western
calendar and European etiquette (*Avrupa muaşereti*) are Christian” (Safa 1958: 101). Safa also claimed that through certain republican reforms, Turkey had abandoned Islamic internationality, with all its customs and symbols, and had embraced Christian internationality. But, in his understanding, Western traditions adopted by the reforms were the ones that had already lost their religious characteristic and became civilized (read it cultural.)

This being Safa’s attempt during the single-party era to position his conservatism within the wider contours of Kemalism by redefining it, the overall picture changed considerably with the multi-party era. From 1950 onwards, it was no longer necessary for different political positions to call themselves Kemalist; hence, conservative intellectuals started voicing the word “conservatism.” However, still both the DP and the conservative intelligentsia were careful about not engaging in open conflict with Kemalism. The idea of the DP was not to leave Kemalism to the monopoly of the RPP. Hence, they promoted the concept of Atatürkçülük (Atatürkism) to replace some possibly radical components of Kemalism with a mainstream set of ideas that would function as an overarching framework bridging political divides. In this context, Mümtaz Turhan appeared as an academic figure, suggesting a conservatism incorporating Atatürk’s reform as the basis of his search for modernization together with a critique of them. He collected a series of his essays in 1965 under the title of *Atatürk’s Principles and Development*.

With his considerable familiarity with the social anthropology literature, Turhan, unlike many other right-wing intellectuals, did not perceive the nation as a primordial entity, but rather understood it as “sociological union, a social psychological fact” (1965: 9). In this sense, he did not understand nationality as an eternal reality, but rather as process of formation, an identity in the making (*millet olma*). Hence, as a right-wing social psychologist, Turhan understood Westernization as a struggle for nation formation and the constitution of national culture. Therefore, he attributed a positive value to the Westernization process and
Atatürk’s reforms. For him, the pillar of Atatürk’s principles was to develop and to protect the national existence (*millet varlığı*), and all other components of these principles needed to be integrated with this principle of formation of national existence. Turhan argued that in the history of European nations, social and economic development, progress, becoming a nation, national unity and cultural integrity were all the same. For this reason, he assumed that Turkey needed to scrutinize the Western history of progress with due attention to the differences between Europe and Turkey in terms of their development.

Turhan stated that Turks could finally establish their own nation-state after major losses and violent combat. However, he argued that this nation-state is national only in form (*şeklen*), because it could still not establish the core of a national culture. Turhan maintained that there were different groups in Turkey, and the only tie which linked these groups to each other and to Turkey was religion. He added that, only in some of these groups, was there a common sense of the Ottoman heritage, a vague history or state consciousness (Turhan 1965: 14). In this context, Turhan evaluated Atatürk’s reforms as a package the purpose of which was to make a Turkish nation, at the level of contemporary civilization, and to create a national culture.

While suggesting a type of right-wing conservatism emphasizing Atatürk’s principles, Turhan referred constantly to European history. According to his way of thinking, European history functioned as justification for nationalism and as a history laboratory proving the indispensability of nationalism. In this sense, he accepted that the West could be model for Turkey with respect to certain issues; yet, he also emphasized that in following Europe as a model, caution was always necessary since due to the differences in levels of progress, strictly following strictly the model might have disadvantageous results. For Turhan, as a man of genius and sincere nationalist, Atatürk was well aware of the necessity of being a modern nation.
9.2 The East, the West and the Westernization

The questions “to what civilization did the Turks belong” and “in what civilization did their future lie?” had been always important questions for Turkish intellectuals, as intellectuals of the space of subjugation. As they emphasized the identity issue more than the others did, these were even more important questions for conservative intellectuals of Turkey. These questions had been on the agenda since the nineteenth century and for every conservative, the framework suggested by Ziya Gökalp was a remarkable contribution. Although they were always respectful of his works, conservative intellectuals did criticize Gökalp for being influenced too much by positivist sociology and Durkheim. Moreover, they were not totally satisfied with Gökalp’s distinction made between culture (hars) and civilization, which conservative circles labeled as simplistic. Moreover, conservative intellectuals always took the questions “to what civilization did the Turks belong” and “in what civilization did their future lie?” very seriously, in order to differentiate themselves from religious extremism. They were genuine supporters of modernization, hence they wrote about their own imagination of modernity. This section sheds light on the question how Peyami Safa and Mümtaz Turhan understood and conceptualized the East, the West, and Westernization.

In his Reflections on the Turkish Revolution, Safa (1958: 103) asked the following question: “what is Europe?” After citing different answers, he argued that Europe was both a continent and a mentality. In his travel notes as well, he had emphasized that the location of Europe was indefinite, for the people were not satisfied with the answer provided by the maps. He referred to André Suarès, who had said Europe begins by the Adriatic Sea, and to Valery, who had said Alexandria or İzmir are as European as Marseille or Athens. He also remembered Victor Hugo, who excluded even Spain from Europe (Safa 1938: 4). Having these varieties of definition in his mind, Safa exclaimed that it would be wrong to reduce
Europe into a geographical definition, since the European mentality had overflowed to distant geographies.

In his book, Safa took the Mediterranean basin as the cradle of European culture. He added that Europe was born out of the exchange of moral and material values, the cooperation of races and nations, and the rivalry between religions, systems, and interests. It looked like a market, situated within a narrow strip of land where all kinds of ideas, beliefs, and discoveries were hoarded. In this sense, the basis of European culture, for Safa, was the specific milieu of the Eastern Mediterranean, the meeting point of different cultures, religions and civilizations. Safa identified three influences on the formation of Europe. These were three disciplines which had formed the European mentality: that of Roman society, Christian ethics, and the Greek on intelligence. As it is for today’s European intelligence, for the Greek intelligence, too, mathematics (riyaziye) and logics were the primary ingredients making thought sustain. In every piece of Greek art, science and philosophy, there were mathematics and logics (Safa 1958: 111). Among these influences, which had shaped the European mentality, Safa considered Christianity as the most important point of distinction between Europe and Asia: “Because, feelings distinguish more than thoughts” (Safa 1958: 119).

Then, Safa asked the same question for the East: “What is East?” By the same token, he underlined that it would be wrong to reduce the East to its geographical definition, as it is something more than the spatial boundaries. Safa listed in detail the common characteristics attributed to the East by the Europeans. This can be read as list of Orientalist prejudices about the East. Safa noted that some people in Turkey, too, were influenced by this biased perspective. Some of characteristics attributed to the East by the Europeans included, “there is no individuality in the East,” “Eastern people do not care about today, but care about the past,” “there is no philosophy in the East, but [only] religion,” “for the East, knowing is believing,” and “Eastern people do not grasp the meaning of freedom, law, science, and
morality.” Safa chose to contest these prejudices by arguing that there was not one but two
Easts: the East of Islam and the East of Buddhism. According to Safa (1958: 125), the
difference between these two Easts is as great as the difference between Europe and Asia.
Safa pointed to fatalism as the crucial difference between the Islamic and Buddhist East. The
heaven in Islamic faith, he maintained, will be the reward for actions in this world, with good
intention. In this sense, Safa (1958: 127) reads Islamic culture as a culture of working ethics,
by referring to hadith of the prophet “work hard as you shall never die.” In this sense, the
basic way for Safa to countering prejudices against Islam was emphasizing that the East was
not homogeneous:

When one speaks of the East, the European public opinion confuses the Indian,
Persian, Arab and Turk with each other and takes only one of the different Asiatic
features as it is a general hallmark of all of these nations. What is worse or even
more dangerous than Europe’s judgment of us, is the fact that we have the same
opinion about ourselves. Until quite recently, some journals and groups aiming to
explain Kemalism have attempted to put us into the same category as the
primitive (iptidaî) and oppressed (mazlûm) Asiatic nations. Taking into account
that the Turkish nation is least likely to resemble the Indians and the Chinese in
terms of culture, history, religion and economics, the cause of its liberation cannot
be limited to the framework of struggle between the semi-colonized countries and
imperialism. Moreover, for this reason, we need to pay more attention to the
qualities of the Turkish nation, distinguishing it from the primitive Asian nations
(Safa 1958: 129).

Obviously, once more the target of Safa’s polemical tone was the Kadro writers. After
having defined the East and the West, Safa stated that Europeanization (Avrupalılaşmak) was
the most important objective of Turkey. Probably reading his travel notes is more helpful in
understanding why he put this much emphasis on Europeanization. His book The Great
Survey of Europe tells the reader that Safa was really impressed by what he saw and observed
in Europe. He was deeply impressed by the scale and cleanliness of buildings, streets, squares,
stores, harbors and gars there. Moreover, he realized that all the works written hitherto about
the difference between Europe and Turkey were insufficient to reflect this difference,
concluding that “there is no Turkish issue but this difference” (bu farktan başka Türk meselesi yoktur) (Safa 1938: 21). He suggested Europeanization as the way to get over this gap. In the Reflections on the Turkish Revolution, Safa (1958: 166) had a very short formula for Europeanization: mathematization (riyazileşmek) and urbanization (siteleşmek). Mathematization meant to acquire the mentality of using mathematics in every sphere of life. According to Safa, the reason why the Turks could not develop positive science was that they did not a mentality based on mathematics. The geometric mind, for him, was the basis for all arts, including tragedy, novel, polyphonic music, and due to the lack of this mentality, these arts could not develop in Turkey. With urbanization, Safa emphasized the necessity of having an urban tradition, with densely populated cities. He believed that industrialization would create population density, and this would be the only way to go beyond the tradition of nomadic life. Safa maintained that a mathematical mentality would be created by urbanization.\footnote{Safa published his perspective on the mathematization first in the journal Kültür Haftası in 1936; see (Safa 1936). The journal also organized a roundtable discussion about Safa’s article “Intuition, Analysis and Mathematics” and published in the same issue. In this discussion, Safa argued that what is necessary is the synthesis of mathematics and intuitionism. In his understanding, by this synthesis intuition will be controlled and disciplined. In the roundtable, Mümztaz Turhan disagreed with the main argument of Safa’s article and stated that it is not possible to make a distinction between mathematical perspective and intuitive perspective.}

When compared to the writing of Peyami Safa, Mümztaz Turhan’s perspective on the difference between East and West is far more systematic. Turhan understood the issue within the framework of cultural changes. His book Cultural Changes: A Social Psychological Investigation (Kültür Değişmeleri: Sosyal Psikoloji Bakımdan Bir Tetkik), which was published in 1951, was a Cambridge doctoral dissertation. Cultural Changes was a book in which Turhan synthesized his ethnographical fieldwork with more historical analyses, dealing with cultural changes in a longue durée perspective. Throughout the book Turhan’s main focus was modernization. While he sided with the idea of modernization, he also emphasized the drawbacks and mistakes of the Turkish experience in modernization and attempted to
develop suggestions. Turhan’s ethnography was based on his fieldwork in the villages between Erzurum and Kars in Eastern Anatolia between 1936 and 1942. He also returned to his field in 1948. This ethnography was truly pioneering for the discipline of social anthropology in Turkey, even though it was a dissertation submitted for a degree in experimental psychology. As it was the case in several continental European countries, in the 1930s and the 1940s, anthropology was understood in Turkey mostly as physical anthropology, and majority of the work done in the field was anthropometrical. The main theme of anthropology was the Turkish race, and the overall atmosphere dominating the anthropological works was racism (S. Aydın 2001b). In such an atmosphere, probably thanks to his British training, Turhan chose a totally different path, and developed an account of cultural changes by using the most contemporary theoretical figures, including Malinowski, Levy-Bruhl and Margaret Mead.

The elements that were Turhan’s main focus in his fieldwork were the ones that modernized village life. For instance, in Horasan, near Erzurum, the Turkish Grain Board (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi), a public agency, started to purchase grain crops in cash. With the construction of Erzurum-Kars railway, some village people had become salaried workers, which meant additional income for villagers. These factors, Turhan observed, initiated a remarkable transformation, namely, the mechanization of agriculture. Turhan also witnessed the transformative role of experts. An expert miller had an impact on various fields, from the productivity of the mill to the construction of horse-drawn carriages. For Turhan, both the mechanization in agriculture and villagers’ willingness for this process were indicators of modernization. Beyond his ethnographer role, in his book he developed some policy recommendations. For instance he suggested establishing big farms own by the state in order to speed up the mechanization in the agriculture. While doing his fieldwork, Turhan had also
observed that the education was insufficient. This observation led him in his later work to focus more on education as a general instrument for modernization.

While thinking about the historical experience of modernization, Turhan (1958: 213) argued that there was also a psychological dimension of the phenomenon. He stated that feelings such as helplessness (acizlik), desperation (çaresizlik) and admiration led to the use of “imitation and copying” as a way to become more like the society serving as the model chosen. Based on this argument, Turhan developed a periodization for cultural changes in the Ottoman Empire, and suggested a model of cultural change for each period. The first period corresponded roughly to the eighteenth century. According to Turhan, the period from the Tulip Age until the reign of Selim III was a period of “free cultural change” (serbest kültür değişimleri) (1718-1789). Correspondingly, the feeling of helplessness vis-à-vis Europe, which became more powerful, and the desperation due to not knowing the formative elements of the Western civilizations were the main characteristics of the first, as well as successive periods. The second period encompassed the reign of Selim III, which was mostly a transition period (1789-1807). Turhan considered the period from 1808 to the end of the empire as a period of compulsory cultural change. Together with this threefold periodization, Turhan made a number of general assessments about the modernization experience. Most importantly, he argued that the movement of Westernization had been handicapped by not having a well-defined aim and direction. Turhan (1958: 294) took the position that this lack produced some “admirers of Europe” as well as “certain fanatical Westernists” (garpçılık mutaassipları). The inclination and effort made to resemble Europe as quickly as possible had been dominating every issue; however, privileging scientific thinking and techniques were not internalized. This was the real reason why Europe had a superior position. The result was, in Turhan’s words (1958: 298), “copying form and costumes, lifestyle, and social structure.”
Following the historical account, Turhan drew conclusions from the synthesis of his ethnography and the historical analysis. When he applied his model of historical cultural changes to the contemporary society, he observed that villages were the milieu of free cultural change, urban centers cultural changes were mostly compulsory. Thanks to the free cultural change in villages, the local culture was able to protect itself. Turhan stated that by protecting its peculiarities, the local culture could also progress. How was it possible for local culture to protect itself and also progress? Turhan replied this question by stating that the cultural change was free, not compulsory and he indicated that culture has the characteristic of being selective. Thanks to this characteristic, a culture can sustain its autonomy because, by being selective, when it encounters a foreign culture, it can choose what to copy. Turhan (1958: 150-151) stated that any culture without this characteristic of being selective will lose its independence. This being the picture for villages, Turhan stated that cultural changes in cities were much more complex. The city, especially when it is governed by an authoritarian regime, becomes open to influences and pressures from outside. Particularly when the ratio of students and civil servants is high in the city, the city becomes more open to influence from the existing regime. Turhan stated that in urban centers, not only were several cultural elements eliminated without substitutes being provided, adaptation to Western civilization had not been achieved. For this reason, the old culture lost both its autonomy as well as its ability to provide social control (Turhan 1958: 301).

Two points need to be emphasized when evaluating Turhan’s book Cultural Changes. First, Turhan was in favor of free cultural change. For him, this type was better as it allowed modernization while protecting the characteristics of the local culture. This position can be considered as a new formulation of the old framework developed by Ziya Gökalp: selective modernization. In fact, while privileging villages as the milieu of free cultural changes, Turhan followed the classical nationalist line, which finds the essence of national culture in
villages. Put differently, for several right-wing intellectuals, the rural was the space of the vernacular and, hence, national identity, which was also Turhan’s perspective. Second, while criticizing the formalist and authoritarian modernization, Turhan never mentioned the single-party era or directed his criticism towards Kemal Atatürk. This preference was another instance of the cautious attitude of Turkish conservative intellectuals with respect to Atatürk.

9.3 Searches for Alternative Modernities

It is already stated in the Introduction that recent debates on alternative/multiple modernities are enlightening in that they make it possible to have a better understanding of how Turkish intellectuals differentiate their imagination of modernity from the Kemalist project. Since the 1970s, critical perspectives have emerged in the global social sciences. On the one hand, the assumptions of modernization theory, especially the one about the convergence of all modernizing societies, were no longer convincing. On the other hand, many authors started to argue that modernization theory was part of a larger set of Eurocentrism, which not only produces theories out of European experience, but also attributes a special position to Europe. This attribution argued that non-European cultures had something incompatible with modernity. In Wallerstein’s (2006: 33) words, they were considered frozen in their trajectories, and qualified as incapable of transforming themselves so as to become modern. Recent debates on alternative/multiple modernities have risen from these two criticisms. Although the debates are led mainly by sociologists, most notably Charles Taylor and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, sometimes the concept alternative modernity is used in the anthropology literature as well (for insistence, Appadurai 2003: 49). Authors who suggest thinking about alternative modernities emphasize that contrary to the assumptions of modernization theory, there is no sound reason to associate modernity with a certain mental outlook, namely scientific rationalism, pragmatic instrumentalism, and secularism. Equally, modernity cannot
be seen as the monopoly of certain societies having certain types of institutions, such as popular government and modern bureaucracies (Gaonkar 2001). All in all, recent debates propose that there are different experiences of modernities within a specific cultural context that are different from the Western model.

I argue that there are three reasons to think that theories of alternative modernities and the modernity imagined by Turkish conservative intellectuals are compatible. First, theories of alternative modernities are criticism for acultural theory of modernity, which assumes that the growth of reason, scientific consciousness and development of secularism can take place everywhere similarly. Taylor (2001) suggests replacing this one with cultural theory of modernity. Briefly, the cultural theory of modernity seriously takes the differences of societies into consideration. Especially important are cultural differences and the point from which they begin their journey towards modernization. Secondly, the theories of alternative/multiple modernities boldly argue that “modernity and Westernization are not identical.” This is especially emphasized by Eisenstadt (2002), who maintains that Western patterns of modernity are not the only ‘authentic’ modernities, despite their historical precedence. This is an important point because once it is accepted that modernity and Westernization are not identical, then Europe no longer has a monopoly on modernity. This gives other geographies a chance to claim their own modernities. This brings us to the third point: according to theories of alternative modernities, modernity does not need to be dichotomous with tradition. Hence, it is possible to establish a modernity by accepting tradition as a formative force, or at least not exclude it. None of these three points summarizes the theories of alternative modernities, but they do sufficiently capture what Turkish conservative intellectuals had in mind while imagining modernity. For Turkish conservatives, modernity needs to be careful about the differences of the society. They did not consider European rationalism as the only possible basis upon which modernity could function and
generally speaking, they were always unwilling to end up being too much like a European country. It was within this framework that they attempted to formulate an alternative narrative of modernity, which gave them two concurrent opportunities. By developing such an alternative, they had a framework within which they could criticize Kemalism. For the reasons already discussed in the first section of this chapter, their criticism was always moderate and did not target Kemalism’s integrity, but instead pointed to some radical modernization projects of Kemalism. Moreover, by doing this they could criticize the Eurocentric model of modernization. In fact, by having these two opportunities, they implicitly characterized Kemalism as Eurocentric.

In the case of Peyami Safa, his search for an alternative modernity had two premises: rejecting rationalism and positivism as the basis of modernity, and searching for an East-West synthesis. Nazım İrem (2002) argues that conservative intellectuals of the early republican period were heavily influenced by the French philosopher Henri Bergson. The key of Bergsonism was to replace rationality with intuition. For this philosophical perspective, both rationalism and positivism had underestimated individual will, creativity, and spontaneity. İrem maintains that İsmayil Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Peyami Safa were among the conservatives who were influenced by Bergson. This group found in Bergson’s philosophy a theory to counter determinism and mechanism, which they associated with the positivism of the CUP. By following key Bergsonian terms, namely “vital energy,” “intuition,” and “élan vital,” they could formulate a new voluntarist nationalism. Obviously, Bergson’s mysticism was a point of attraction for most of them. Moreover, Bergson did not consider war as something negative; on the contrary, he took it as a liberating force and as a potential for moral regeneration. This gave an opportunity to Turkish conservatives to reinterpret the War of Independence. In this war, they saw the Turkish will to freedom and national creativity. “Bergsonism provided a mystic

305
philosophical-political vocabulary to consecrate the cause of the nationalist war. For the young Bergsonian nationalist, the War of Independence was a war of quality against quantity and a movement of creative forces against mechanical ones” (İrem 2002).

In his book of 1938, Safa offered some insights about both his Bergsonism and search for East-West synthesis. He argued that in Europe, while there was increase in civilization, intuition was in decline. The reason for this problem, for Safa (1958: 172), was the civilization of machine (makine medeniyeti) and he stated that Bergsonism was a response to this civilization. His position was not to propagate a blind mysticism that would lead to dogmatism, but, equally he was against the excess of scientific perspective. He believed that similar to blind faith, an exaggerated confidence on science would be a barrier for human creativity. Hence, he concluded that what Turkey needed was, on the one hand, mathematization and urbanization and, on the other hand, the creating of a new synthesis (terkip) with its own intuitive power, which is peculiar to the Orient. Safa believed that Turkey’s geographical position also encouraged such a synthesis. In other words, in geography where Europe and Asia meet, the conditions are favorable for this kind of marvelous synthesis.

This was the early phase of Safa’s search for alternative modernities. During the multi-party era, he furthered his search by detailing his idea of East-West synthesis. In 1953, he started publishing a journal, Türk Düşüncesi (Turkish Thought). His essays published in this journal were collected posthumously in a volume entitled The East-West Synthesis in 1963. Major conservative intellectuals, including Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Mustafa Şekip Tunç, and İsmayil Hakkı Baltacığlu, were among the contributors to this journal (Mert 2005). The main purpose of the journal was the establishment of a strong conservative wing on Turkish intellectual scene. The new era, the decade of the DP, was conducive for such an endeavor. Until its last issue in 1959, the journal’s main proposition was the East-West synthesis.
In the first issue of the journal, Safa inaugurated his idea of synthesis by asking the question “which West?” Accordingly, the West had two major schools of thought, creating a crisis: positivism and scientism. For Safa, these schools of thought had reduced everything to rationalism by arguing that everything is knowable and comprehensible by the human mind. They rejected mystery by accepting that science and rationality have the power to explain everything, and to establish the best and happiest order for human societies. Safa claimed that positivism and scientism made the West forget about arts, religion, and morality. Hence, some people in Turkey misunderstood the West by reducing it to mere techniques. Safa then provided an overview by mentioning different Western intellectuals and scientists. His references are quite eclectic and include Max Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg, the existentialist philosophers and the historians Oswald Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee. Providing a very quick summary of recent theories in physics, Safa argued after quantum mechanics and theories of relativism, it was no longer possible to defend determinism, which is the basis of positivism and materialism. Safa (1963: 13) characterized this as the collapse of the dictatorship of science. Two world wars, weapons and mass tortures meant the bankruptcy of technical mentality (Safa 1963: 22), then he argued that many Western intellectuals were attempting to detach the West from positivism and materialism. In this sense, he observed in Europe a certain return to mysticism, a general interest in replacing the old-style anthropocentric world-view, with theocentricism.78

For Safa, the mistakes some Turkish intellectuals (read it as Kemalists) made were not asking the question of “which West?” and continuing to believe in a West of positivism. What did Safa suggest so as to have a better understanding of what was the West? He cited the Civilization on Trial, where Toynbee developed two concepts to describe two possible responses that a society can give when it is in a dangerous position with respect to another

78 According to Safa, one of the worst embodiments of positivism and materialism was communism. During the 1950s, in the early phase of the Cold War, Peyami Safa was a forerunner of anti-communism, and his essays on Marxism, socialism and communist ideology were among the most vulgar of this genre.
society or a member of another civilization. This first option is Zealotism. In this option, the society that is being threatened, closes itself off and becomes overly traditionalist. When Zealotism is employed, the society limits its contacts with the other society, which is an advantageous position, and turns to its past. Safa maintains that in the case of Herodianism, the material and moral weapons of the energy of the enemy are imported for the purposes of defense. He states that for Toynbee, the Egypt of Muhammad Ali and the Turkey of Atatürk are the best examples of Herodian movements. Safa believed that Herodianism had two drawbacks: It is imitative and not creative. Moreover, it has an elitist character. This means that when Herodianism is followed, the other civilization is imitated only by the enlightened people (*münnevverler*) and the masses cannot even dream of being a passive receiver of the other civilization. Safa emphasized that by integrating the language reforms and national history thesis into the Westernization movement, Atatürk attempted to create a particular identity for the Turkish nation and, hence, removed the likelihood of his being seen as an imitator of the West. But Safa insisted on that Kemalists (which, he now called Atatürkists, *Atatürkçüler*) had forgotten this particular nationalism and had aligned themselves to the left-wing politics.

After reviewing these two options discussed by Toynbee—rejecting totally the alien civilization or adopting it to the fullest extent, Safa (1963: 18) offered an alternative third way, which he refers to as a harmonious synthesis, whereby a compromise is achieved between the alien civilization and national and religious traditions. When Safa (1963: 31) proposed a synthesis, he stated that it would transcend all the other theses, and hence be a synthesis of the past and future, the East and West, the substance and meaning, the body and soul. While developing his idea of an East-West synthesis, Safa (1963: 9) proclaimed that in every human being, there is an East and West; therefore, their unity is a precondition for true human existence. Another argument, to which he referred to support his proposal, was that
every civilization was the result of a synthesis. Any Westernization movement, flourishing
without acknowledging this, will lose its own identity. He argued that Atatürk was personally
aware of this, by knowing that the roots of the Western civilization were the Sumerian. He
also added that an East-West synthesis was something qualitative, based on the consideration
of two worlds, and a synthesis of two civilizations and two metaphysics. Safa took the
national spirit (milli ruh) as the force which would determine the process. Every nation not
hostile to the West and able to protect its own national and religious believes comprehends
the material and spiritual components of such a synthesis as a way of life. The integrity based
on a synthesis appears in different countries in different shapes, and Safa considered Indians,
and Far Eastern nations as primary examples. Like many other conservatives in different
countries, Safa (1963: 126) also specifically mentions the “Japanese miracle.” He criticized
the group of Ottoman intellectuals, the Westerners (Garbecilar), including Abdullah Cevdet
and Celâl Nuri, for not examining and not being inspired by Japanese history, social structure,
and revolution. If these Ottoman intellectuals had had a perspective on the Japanese miracle,
they would have had a clue for how to Europeanize without losing national identity and its
spiritual characteristic. Safa found the Japanese case worth examining particularly as success
story for modernization, one in which the alphabet was not changed.

While developing his suggestion of an East-West synthesis in the 1950s, Safa had
more liberty, compared to previous decades, and could criticize the single-party regime in a
more direct manner. He made a comparison between the republic in the West and in the
Turkish single-party experience. In the Western republican regime, there are different political
parties and free elections, whereas in Atatürk’s republic, as a result of the necessary discipline
of revolution, there was only one party, and the deputies were not elected but rather appointed
by the leader. In the Western republics, there was freedom of thought, whereas in Atatürk’s
republic having a political perspective other than which would encompass the six principles
of the RPP would mean betrayal of the regime. In Western republics, no one can shut down a newspaper, whereas in Atatürk’s republic the cabinet can make such a decision without even allowing for a defense (Safa 1963: 105). Moreover, in the new atmosphere of freedom, Safa distanced himself from the official history narrative that had been created by Kemal Atatürk and the single-party regime. Accordingly, he stated that the free elections were not organized for the first time in 1923 but rather in 1908, when popular sovereignty was established by limiting the power of the sultanate (Safa 1963: 56). He also insisted that it was wrong to see Atatürk as the only creator of Turkish Revolution and that the revolutionary process was an accumulation that started with the revolution of 1908 (Safa 1963: 55). He also criticized Kemalist poets, who compared Atatürk to a god and considered him omnipotent. By the same token, he attempted to reevaluate the principle of secularism. He argued that secularism was neither a precondition for Westernization nor the core of Western civilization. He stated that secularism should be understood neither as the domination of religion over the state nor of the state over religion. Each should respect the other’s sphere, and each has the responsibility to protect the other (Safa 1963: 117). Safa gave several examples from European democracies, such as the religious oath in the parliament, in order to convince his reader of the impossibility of absolute secularism. In addition, throughout his writings in the 1950s, Safa can be seen as having a much more courageous position in voicing some conservative demands. For instance, he wrote regularly on the language issue and criticized the Kemalist language reforms. He ridiculed the new language and the purification movement by referring to them as fabrication (uydurmaca). He did not support a return to the old alphabet, but alternatively he suggested adding the Ottoman script to the high school curriculum.80

79 For instance his essay published in Tercüman, 24 December 1959; see (Safa 1990a: 217-218).
80 His essay on the language are posthumously collected in a volume; see (Safa 1990b)
While Safa and his colleagues were establishing their political positions in their journal Türk Düşüncesi, many other intellectuals criticized them. Suggesting that the Ottoman script be added to the educational system for instance, was not only something unthinkable, but also a clear indicator of a conspiracy against the fundamental values of the republic for many Kemalists of the 1950s. As the spokesperson and the editor of the journal, Peyami Safa was a target, and was accused of being reactionary, regressive, and fanatical. As a public figure used to polemics, Safa considered these accusations as opportunities for new debates. While formulating his answer, Safa made two points: he stated that his friends and himself were neither revolutionary fanatics (devrim yobazı), nor religious fanatics (din yobazı) (Safa 1963: 72). In his understanding, revolutionary fanatics, who taking Kemalism to excess, neither knew the true Kemalism nor comprehended the role of spiritual and religious values in the formation of Western civilization. Equally, religious fanatics missed the true Islam, a civilized and tolerant religion, and therefore, rejected the necessities of the modern life. Safa saw in these two groups, the fanatics of the East and the fanatics of the West, a similar mistake, and considered their struggle as dangerous.

The second point made by Safa was probably more important. He stated that, he suggested the East-West synthesis simply because he accepted that nothing could be done without Europe. He repeated that as his travel notes The Great Survey of Europe indicated, he had been an admirer of Europe in the past and he continued to be one. He maintained that he was never against technical progress, but thought that technical progress ought to be supported by spiritual wellbeing. He even added that the very idea of an East-West synthesis belongs to Europe (Safa 1963: 45). Hence, while developing his idea of synthesis, he also pointed out the indispensability of Europe and the West.

While Peyami Safa was circulating his idea of synthesis, Mümtaz Turhan was also engaged in thinking and writing about modernization, albeit by emphasizing more directly the...
necessity of Westernization. In 1958, he published another book, *Where are we in Westernization?* (Garphlaşmanın Neresindeyiz?). As Murat Yılmaz (2002) indicates, the book was somewhat of a reformulation of his main arguments, already developed in his dissertation *Cultural Changes*. Turhan opened his book by stating that the level of Westernization was not satisfactory, and the reason for this was the failure to understand the basic component of the Western civilization. In his words, “the basic components of Western civilization are science, technique applied to the social life, rule of law and freedom” (Turhan 1959: 26). Genuine Westernization could be realized only by following these principles. He underlined that as long as science and technique were not internalized by the society, the Westernization of a nation would not be possible. Turhan (1959: 44) attributed to this internalization a key role because, for him, without increasing people’s know-how and technical skills, and changing their life-style and thinking according to the principles of science, neither development and industrialization nor Westernization could be possible. In this sense, Turhan appropriated a strong developmentalist tone and equated development with Westernization. In this context, Turhan criticized the republican policies on education. Since the early republican period, the emphasis had been on primary education, while the training of experts was given less importance. However, according to Turhan, contrary to what many people believed, the causal relationship between primary education and development was not strong. By opposing the idea of development through primary education, Turhan argued that in Western countries, quality primary education is not a cause but rather the result of a higher level of development. For him, development could be achieved only through the training of experts. He suggested training a group of experts (*mütehassıs zümre*) in the US and in European countries until the Turkish education system was prepared to train first-class scientists and technical staff (Turhan 1959: 63).
It is common for conservative intellectuals, both in Europe and elsewhere, to support modernity with a certain apprehension with respect to its negative aspects. This was true for Turhan as well. He noted that, even in the US and in European countries, where industrialization had been experienced gradually, it had harmful effects on family and religious institutions, and migration to cities was destructive for social order. As Turkey aimed at rapid industrialization, this meant that similar problems due to social change would be experienced in Turkey, too. In this context, Turhan offered two suggestions at the macro level. The real threat brought by industrialization was the boom in urban population. According to Turhan, the solution for this was to establish one “culture and industrial center” for each 40 villages, including schools, several small establishments and one factory. In “cultural and industrial centers,” which would be all over Turkey, the experts would meet with ordinary people, and the positive input of the expert knowledge would be disseminated.

Second, Turhan stated that the “cultural and industrial centers,” should be complemented by spiritual development (manevi kalkınma). He proposed establishing theology high schools (ilahiyyat lisesi) for achieving spiritual development. The curriculum of these high schools would include the same curriculum as that followed in ordinary high schools, with the exception of the addition of a religious component. The graduates would be employed both as teacher and religious staff (din adamı). In this way, Turhan (1959: 76) believed, it would be possible to overcome the duality of teacher-imam, and the villagers would have trustworthy intellectual guides. Hence, towards the end of 1950s, Turhan contributed to Turkish conservatism a model synthesizing modernization and traditional values. In addition to the model, he added a theme of spiritual development to the vocabulary of Turkish right-wing politics. Turhan’s suggestions were highly appreciated by later right-wing politicians and especially his idea of religious high school was implemented widely.
9.4 Conclusion

To what extent can the intellectual projects of Safa and Turhan be evaluated with reference to nativism? It would probably be wrong to search for some specific nativist components within their works, or some indecisiveness with respect to nativism and non-nativism throughout their intellectual journey simply because all their projects were nativist. Both Safa and Turhan were searching for the possibility of establishing a conservative standpoint, compatible with modernity. The pillars of this perspective were nationalism, religious values and the local culture. Within this larger picture, a two-fold nativism was observable in Safa’s writing. On the one hand, it portrayed Europe as a degenerated culture, over-individualistic, over selfish and totally interest oriented. He probably purposefully exaggerated the social problems of modern society. On the other hand, he sometimes used clichés to describe Oriental people. For instance, he could write it was not only Turks but Oriental people in general that were not rational (Safa 1963: 120). In addition, it needs to be emphasized that through his polemical tone, Safa gave the most banal examples of anti-communist discourse. As an academician, Turhan had never used such a vulgar discourse.

Together with this conscious nativism, both Safa and Turhan never suggested a dismissal of the Western culture. Safa even claimed that “nothing can be done without Europe.” He also stated that even the very idea of the East-West synthesis is product of European intellectual circles. Both Safa and Turhan were always careful to differentiate themselves from religious radicals, or ultra nationalists, who suggested a wholesale rejection of anything coming from the West. Search for legitimacy cannot be the only reason for this choice. It was important for them to be within the political mainstream; but we have enough reason to argue that they sincerely believed in the importance of Europe and Western culture. Turhan’s training was European. The writers that considerably influenced Safa and Turhan were mostly European. Indeed, the writing of Safa and Turhan from 1930s to 1950s was not
the first instance of a search for Turkish nationalism having the stance “nothing can be done without Europe.” As discussed in detail in Chapter 7, the primary theoretician of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp had already emphasized the indispensability of the master codes of European modernity, even before 1923. As Andrew Davison (2006) states, the idea of Europe’s indispensability was coupled with the idea of its inadequacy in Gökalp’s thinking. Gökalp’s solution for overcoming this split was to base his imagination of modernity on his distinction between civilization and culture. Safa’s solution to the same problem was the East-West synthesis. Turhan’s solution was complementing Westernization with spiritual development.

Moreover, it needs to be emphasized that creating a nationalist framework by emphasizing the indispensability of Europe is not something particular to the Turkish case. As Gaonkar (2001) maintains, “whether in vernacular or cosmopolitan idioms, that questioning of the present, which is taking place at every national and cultural site today, cannot escape the legacy of Western discourse on modernity.” This brings us to the idea of alternative modernity. For the theories of alternative modernities, a defining component is creative adaptation. As Taylor (2001) reminds us, in several modernity projects outside the West, modernizing elites voiced the idea “we’ll take their technology and keep our culture.” In this sense, every search for a synthesis appears at first as a creative adaptation. But Gaonkar argues that this idea of creative adaptation requires further elaboration. In his words, creative adaptation “does not mean that one can freely choose whatever one likes from the offerings of modernity. It is delusional to think, as the neoconservatives in the West and the cultural nationalists in the non-West seem to do, that one can take the good things (i.e., technology) and avoid the bad (i.e., excessive individualism).” When Gaonkar’s first caution is taken into consideration, Safa’s and Turhan’s imaginations about modernity still deserve to be clustered under the title of searches for alternative modernity, because what they suggested was
something more than a selection process. They suggested a change in mentality. Safa called this mathematization and urbanization. And Turhan defended the need for a more comprehensive Westernization, one that would include the internalization of principles of science by the society. In this sense, what he understood by Westernization was a new lifestyle, not particular to a small elite group, but disseminated throughout the society.

Gaonkar expresses a second caution about the creative adaptation by stating that it is not simply “a matter of adjusting the form or recording the practice to soften the impact of modernity; rather, it points to the manifold ways in which a people question the present. It is the site where a people ‘make’ themselves modern, as opposed to being ‘made’ modern by alien and impersonal forces, and where they give themselves and identity and destiny.” Even after this second caution of Gaonkar, I argue that Safa’s and Turhan’s imaginations for modernity are to be considered within the larger context of searches for alternative modernities. Their efforts were a two-fold critique. By adding a strong national identity and local values dimension to modernity, they criticized the Eurocentric understanding of modernity and investigated on the possibilities of going beyond it. Although they were not reluctant to use the word Westernization as such, their entire endeavor involved the disentanglement of modernization from Westernization. In this way, they tried to prove that it is possible to get modernized without being Western, and without losing national values and characteristics. This was one aspects of their criticism towards Eurocentrism. The other aspect was their criticism towards the Kemalist modernization project. In this project, both Safa and Turhan saw the risk of losing local identity. But their remedy was not less modernity; on the contrary, they were dissatisfied with the formalistic aspect of the republican project, focusing on the mere appearance without substance. Their self-assigned duty was to make corrective proposal for the radical aspects of the republican modernity project. They endeavored to develop a modernity in which conservative people would feel more comfortable. Hence, they
expressed their disagreement with the project which ‘made’ Turkey modern and circulated their alternative modernity project as a framework where Turkish people ‘make’ themselves modern.
CHAPTER 10 – THE SOCIALIST INTELLECTUALS AND UNIVERSALISM/PARTICULARISM

In Chapter 9, it has been already emphasized that before 1960, a clear left-right divide in Turkish politics was not observable. In fact, the 1960s was the first period in Turkey in which the left could establish itself legally, make its arguments and policies visible, and have an impact on the national level politics. This was true both for the center-left and more radical versions of the left. What made the rising of the left possible in this particular period? Paradoxically, one of the end results of the military coup of 1960 was the Constitution of 1961, which guaranteed a large set of civil liberties, including freedom of thought, expression, association and publication. Under the new constitution, “people had more civil rights, the universities greater autonomy, and students the freedom to organize their own associations. Workers were given the right to strike in a state which the constitution described somewhat ambiguously as a ‘social state’” (Ahmad 2000b: 136). The new political setting was favorable for political trade-unionism and for the formation of left-wing political parties.

In this favorable environment, a group of left-wing trade-unionists established a political party, the Workers’ Party of Turkey (WPT) in 1962. An independent socialist intellectual and expert on international law, Mehmet Ali Aybar, became the president of the WPT, and the party won 15 seats in the parliament in the elections of 1965—the biggest victory of a socialist party in Turkey ever. In 1967, left-wing trade-unions established a confederation,DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Progressive Workers’ Unions), with the aim of combining trade-unionism with class-based politics. Meanwhile, İsmet İnönü, the second president of the republic, was still the leader of the RPP, and he also made some moves to position the party on the center-left. With the rise of the left in the political arena, intellectual left-wing activism had also increased considerably, which became visible with the establishment of new left-wing publishing
houses, translations of Marxist-Leninist classics, and with the emergence of politically engaged novelists and poets. For instance, the journal Yön (Direction), a monthly political review directed by Doğan Avşoğlu, shaped the political discussion throughout the 1960s and broke down several taboos, the most important one perhaps being the cover story dealing with the Kurdish Question. All these lively intellectual and political discussions made the left a legitimate political position in the society for the first time since the establishment of the republic. The student activism starting in 1968 added a new dimension to the left-wing politics with their mass demonstrations, university occupations, and the solidarity they showed with the working class, trade-unions and anti-American stands.

In the second half of the 1960s, there were two main positions within the Turkish left. The RPP was representing the center-left, though it was not a social democratic party yet in the proper sense. On the other hand, there was the socialist left, including the WPT, DİSK, and various groups within the student movement. For the socialist left, the political target was radical: to establish socialism. However, there was a serious of disagreement about the way to reach to this goal. One group was in favor of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR), and the other group was supporting the idea of a Socialist Revolution (SR). The differences between the defenders of NDR and SR theses were mainly based on their different analyses of the socio-economical structure of Turkey, different perspectives in defining socialism and on the method to establish it. The NDR-SR divide was also a split between the defenders of the parliamentary democracy and its skeptics. Some in the NDR position were even rejecting parliamentarism altogether.

The main defender of the SR thesis was the WPT, whose main claim was that the Turkish working class was developed enough to establish socialism through democratic means. The leader of the WPT, Mehmet Ali Aybar, had been advocating a European-type socialism, a totally democratic socialist model instead of the Soviet model. Whereas, for the
defenders of the NDR position, the Turkish working class was not yet developed enough to establish socialism. Hence, they suggested the necessity of a multi-stage passage to socialism, and set the short-term target as national democratic revolution. The main components of the NDR supporters were left-wing Kemalist groups that were influenced by Third-Worldism. Although the NDR thesis referred to democracy, their main argument was that true democracy could not be established in Turkey since the voters did not have enough consciousness. Based on this idea of the incapability of the Turkish regular voter, the NDR supporters privileged a certain type of vanguard-politics, where the intellectuals and the young officers would be the main actors. In fact, what had aspired by this group was nothing but a left-wing coup to establish the national revolutionary system they were advocating. Doğan Avcıoğlu and his journal Yön were in a special position in theorizing and promoting this idea within the NDR position.

Although the split was serious, intellectual problems stemming from the subjugated position of Turkey united these two groups. For both groups, the subjugation of their country by the Western powers was the main determinant of history. Their political positions as leftist intellectuals were shaped by their analyses of the global hierarchies. In this context, imperialism was a key term for both groups. Moreover, reconciling universal political perspectives, such as socialism, with their own local realities was a necessity for both positions. In their search for such a reconciliation, both groups adopted universalistic and particularistic perspectives in different contexts. In other words, their difficult position as leftist intellectuals of a space of subjugation was characterized by their often inconsistent political analyses, swinging between universalism and particularism.

This chapter scrutinizes these debates by focusing on Mehmet Ali Aybar and Doğan Avcıoğlu as the leading intellectual figures of these two positions, in particular, and of Turkish socialist left, in general. The chapter is organized around four main questions: How
did Aybar and Avcıoğlu approach the Ottoman/Turkish subjugation and the issue of imperialism? What were their position vis-à-vis Kemalism? How did they analyze the Ottoman/Turkish social structure and history? And finally, what kind of a model did they suggest be followed for a socialist Turkey based on these social and historical analyses?

Before proceeding to discuss these questions, biographical notes are due. Mehmet Ali Aybar was born in Istanbul in 1908 into a wealthy family. After Lycée Galatasaray, he studied law at Istanbul University. In 1944, he was appointed as associated professor of international law at the same university. But due to one of his newspaper articles criticizing the single-party regime, his academic career ended in 1946 (Özman 2007). He started to work as a lawyer while publishing newspapers. Until the early 1960s, he was an independent socialist intellectual, not affiliated with any group or party (Ünlü 2002). He became the president of the WPT in 1962, and elected to parliament in 1965. He resigned from this position in 1970 following a discussion with pro-Soviet wing of the party. In the 1970s, he established two political parties, the Socialist Party (1975), and the Socialist Revolution Party (1977). In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, he contributed to the human rights movement as a lawyer. While he was the leader of the WPT, he took part in the Russell Tribunal in 1966 and made investigatory visits to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which enforced his suspicions about single-party socialist regimes. He died in 1995.

Doğan Avcıoğlu was born in 1926 in Bursa. He studied economics and political science in France. After his return to Turkey, he first worked as a journalist, and then became an advisor for the RPP. Following the coup of 1960, he became a member of the constituent assembly, and involved actively in drafting the new constitution. With a group of socialist intellectuals, he established the journal Yön. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, a former author in the Kadro movement was one of the contributors to Yön. As Şevket Süreyya’s articles in Yön prove, there was a clear continuity from Kadro main theses to Yön overall perspectives. Avcıoğlu also worked for the trade
unions as an advisor. In 1968, he published his most influential book, Türkiye’nin Düzeni (Turkey’s Order). After he discontinued the publication of Yön in 1967, between 1969 and 1971, he published another journal Devrim (Revolution), which manifested the concrete road map of a socialist coup to be realized by the civil and military vanguards (zinde güçler) (Macar 2001). The coup aspired by Avcıoğlu never happened, but after the conventional coup of 1971, he was imprisoned for an alleged coup conspiracy together with left-wing officers. He was released without verdict. After 1973, he ceased his involvement in politics and devoted his time to writing historical books, such as Millî Kurtuluş Tarihi (The History of National Liberation). He died in 1983.

10.1 Imperialism, Ottoman/Turkish Subjugation and the Turkish Left

Western imperialism had always been a crucial factor, perhaps the factor among the Turkish intellectual circles, left-wing and right-wing alike, in explaining Turkey’s underdevelopment vis-à-vis the West. In the left, imperialism received a particular emphasis as a framework with which to explain the subordination of all non-Western societies, since, thanks to Lenin, the left had been in a position to theorize this subjugation in a comprehensive and sophisticated manner. Until the 1970s, Lenin’s theory of imperialism had been the only reference point in the Turkish left’s analysis of imperialism (Ünüvar 2009). Following Lenin in understanding imperialism as monopoly capitalism, or as the latest phase of capitalism, the Turkish left, like other leftist movements around the world, also saw imperialism as the source of unequal distribution of power in the international system and the ultimate reason explaining Turkey’s underdevelopment. As it will be discussed in coming sections, the way imperialism was analyzed was directly related to the answers to the questions of how to shape the socialist struggle in the 1960s, which model to follow, and which classes should lead the fight in the way to the revolution.
In the 1960s, the primary concern of the Turkish leftist intellectuals was American imperialism, which they thought had taken control of Turkey since 1950, the beginning of the multi-party era and the coming of the right-wing DP to power. Aybar was one of those intellectuals who attributed an utmost significance to the fight against American imperialism. For Aybar (1988a: 265), Turkey of the 1960s had two major problems: independence and democracy. In other words, according to Aybar, it was not possible to consider Turkey as an independent state due to its subordination to American hegemony, and without independence, democracy was not possible. In one of his articles published in April 1947 right after the Trumann Doctrine, Aybar (1968: 97) characterized the American policy of providing financial support to Turkey as one of the most critical moments of Turkish history, since it would pave the way for the loss of Turkey’s independence. For him, this financial aid, economic agreements presented as economic cooperation and the penetration of the US capital in Turkey would mean the return of the capitulations, which had devastated the Ottoman economy and had made it dependent on the West (Aybar 1968: 139-144). They would result in an eventual colonization of Turkey (Aybar 1968: 155). In 1965, in his first speech in parliament as the leader of the WPT, Aybar (1968: 434) would claim that 35 million square meters the homeland was under American sovereignty, referring to the US military bases in Turkey.

According to Aybar, Turkey siding with the US after the World War II was a retreat from the founding ideals of the republic set by the War of Liberation, which had brought full independence to Turkey after a period of a hundred and fifty years of subordination (Aybar 1968: 269). Thus, imperialism was not a new threat for Turkey; it had been so since the Ottoman times. For Aybar, the late Ottoman state had become a semi-colony under the British, French and German imperialism and their local collaborators (Aybar 1968: 422). The Ottoman state had been forced to be dependent to foreign capital and a vicious circle of
external borrowing; it had been unable to develop its production power, and therefore, had been left underdeveloped.\textsuperscript{82} It had faced total destruction under Western occupation after World War I, and national existence could only be saved by the War of Liberation and restoration of independence with the establishment of the republic. Therefore, apart from a short interval of national revival, imperialism had been the main determinant of Turkey’s position as a subordinated and underdeveloped nation. That is why, for Aybar, the struggle for socialism in the 1960s was also a struggle for independence, a struggle to revitalize a second period of national liberation to break this two-centuries-old chain of imperialism and Western domination.

It should be underlined, however, that although the fight against imperialism and the idea of independence were so central to Aybar’s thought, these did not lead him to a nationalist, nativist position in his views on the character of the socialist struggle. In other words, for him, the solution for two major problems Turkey faced then, independence and democracy, was only possible through a democratic socialist revolution, under the leadership of the working classes (Aybar 1988a: 291). Aybar’s consistent emphasis on a democratic socialist system becomes all the more crucial given the existence of many intellectuals on the Turkish left who had a tendency to opt for a more nationalist position for the sake of a quick attainment of independence. They were so captured by the imperialist paradigm that they tended to negate the critique of capitalism, or at least to reduce it to a critique of the unequal distribution of power among nations.

Especially for those Turkish leftists who followed a socialist developmentalist position with nationalist overtones, imperialism was the ultimate source of all evils, and thus sometimes functioned as a curtain, overlooking inner social dynamics, including even class conflicts. Avcioğlu can be characterized within this group. For Avcioğlu, underdevelopment

\textsuperscript{82} It was in fact very common both in left and right-wing intellectual circles to explain the decay of the Ottoman state solely as a result of the Western imperialist games; see (Ünüvar 2009).
could be explained primarily in terms of external dynamics. Characterizing the global system as a “system of exploitation,” he was explicitly approaching the issue as a relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed: “This order is an order of exploitation and plunder, which has its roots outside, created by Western imperialism in differing degrees in all non-European societies except Japan” (Avcıoğlu 1968: 105).

Avcıoğlu claimed that the Ottoman Empire had been the first country to feel the necessity to reform its system based on Western models in order to counter this imperialist threat coming from the very builders of those models. From the beginning of the reform process since the era of Mahmud II, Ottoman reforms to modernize the military and bureaucratic structure of the empire had been initiated from above to oppose Western pressures (Avcıoğlu 1968: 37). The Free Trade Convention of Baltalimanı, signed in 1838 with Great Britain, however, had turned the empire into an open market, equating Westernization with the liberalization of the trade regime and erasing the remaining productive capacity of the Ottoman economy. This convention was a turning point for Avcıoğlu, since it had abolished the opportunity for independent development, which he saw as the first condition for transition to capitalism. In other words, the way for Turkey’s development of its own capacity for industrial capitalism had been blocked by Western imperialism.

This view of imperialism as the main factor in explaining the Ottoman subordination and subordination of other non-Western societies vis-à-vis the West led Avcıoğlu to see the struggle between the imperialist and the subordinated nations as the fundamental axis of conflict. Avcıoğlu therefore offers that the class conflicts can be overlooked, and the “national good” must be seen in the liberation of the country from this global network of subordination, and in an independent path to national development. This was in fact not a remote position at

83 For the context of the Baltalimanı convention, see Chapter 2. For a critique of Avcıoğlu’s reduction of Ottoman subordination to the Baltalimanı Convention see (Berktay 1988). In fact, Ottoman economy was not at the edge of transition to industrial capitalism before the convention either, see (Pamuk 1997).
the time. Avcıoğlu’s enthusiasm for a revival of subordinated nations through a program of national development had very much been influenced by the spirit of the Bandung Conference in 1955. From the mid-1950s onwards, the international conjuncture had been shaped by the decolonization process, and by the attempts to apply similar, non-capitalist methods for development, from Latin America to the Middle East. Avcıoğlu and many other figures of the Turkish left in the 1960s saw Turkey’s search for independence and development as part of this non-capitalist developmentalist struggle. For them, this was a search inspired by the progressive movement led by Mustafa Kemal and could be realized only by returning to the national ideals he once set up.

10.2 Kemalism and the Turkish Left

It can be argued that it has been almost impossible in the Turkish political life to develop a position without referring to Kemalism (Parla 1991: 13), and the Turkish left is not an exception in this regard. Leading figures of the left have always felt the obligation to engage in a dialogue with Kemalism, albeit often in the form of a problematic, ambivalent, and tense relationship. One aspect of this necessity originated in the legitimacy crisis of leftist political ideas in Turkey. Silent and illegal during the single-party era, socialist ideas, parties and left-wing organizations had been accused of having their origins from outside and being alien to Turkish society and culture right after their emergence at the beginning of the 1960s. Thus, they had to turn to Kemalism as a source of legitimacy, and tried to present themselves as part of the history of the native and genuine progressive forces in Turkey, the Kemalists being the most successful of them historically.

However, apart from this need for legitimacy, most of the main fractions within the Turkish left had embraced a sincerely positive reading of Kemalism. For some, this reached such a degree that they could be characterized as left-Kemalists rather than socialists.
Avcıoğlu was one of them. There were also more critical voices, such as Aybar. Nevertheless, it is safe to argue that the Turkish left adopted a selective reading of Kemalism, emphasizing its pro-independence and progressive stance, and especially referring to its presumably anti-imperialist character. The War of Liberation and the establishment of the republic were particularly what linked the left with Kemalism as the basis of their relationship. These were the reasons why socialists in Turkey did not or were unable to attempt a clear break, a line of separation between themselves and the Kemalists, despite several elements of uneasiness, especially concerning the Kemalist single-party era.

Like many other important figures of the Turkish left, Aybar also had an undecided relationship with Kemalism. On the one hand, he criticized the single-party era and Mustafa Kemal’s occasionally liberal economic policies; on the other hand, he did not hesitate to declare himself and his party, the WPT, as Kemalist. Undecided as they were, Aybar’s views on Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism had been developed mainly on two different but closely related premises on a particular analysis of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the republic. First, the War of Liberation had a central place in his understanding of both Kemalism and socialism. For him, the war between 1919 and 1922 was the first anti-imperialist popular struggle in Turkish history, and thus, deserved to be celebrated as the birth of the idea of full independence from the Western occupiers. Moreover, it had a universal message for all subordinated nations of the world, encouraging them to get mobilized as part of this anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist struggle. As such, in the eyes of Aybar, the Turkish War of Liberation was a turning point not only for the Turkish history, but also for the history of the humanity (Aybar 1968: 268-269). The War of Liberation was so central to Aybar’s vision of Turkey’s socialist future that he did not hesitate to characterize the socialist struggle of the 1960s, of which he was an important actor, as the “second War of Liberation” (Özman 1998).

It has to be underlined that this characterization of the socialist movement in the 1960s as the

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84 For a more detailed analysis of Aybar relations with Kemalism, see (Adak and Turan 2009).
second War of Liberation was in fact shared by many figures, groups and fractions, which is something that has to be noted as a remarkable commonality in such a fragmented movement, constituting a crucial indicator for the power of Kemalism on the Turkish left. For other examples of this characterization, see (Karadeniz 1975; Ünüvar 2009).

What is crucial about Aybar’s interpretation of the War of Liberation is that it, in fact, heavily depended on Mustafa Kemal’s own narrative on the reasons and character of the war. In other words, Aybar was following Mustafa Kemal’s representation of the struggle, as a struggle for the cause of all “oppressed nations,” a struggle of “a people fighting against imperialism.” One particular speech of Mustafa Kemal during the war, which he delivered at a session of parliament in Ankara on 1 December 1921, had been frequently quoted by Aybar as an indication of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist character of the armed struggle. In the speech, Mustafa Kemal was characterizing the people of Turkey as a poor, working-class people and the struggle as a struggle against imperialism, which intended to devastate this people, and against capitalism, which wanted to absorb them (Aybar 1988a: 126). For him, the struggle he was leading had aimed to preserve the very natural right of the people of Turkey to retain a social order based on labor and law, and to maintain their life and their independence. This emphasis on independence, as we mentioned in the previous section, was central for Aybar’s vision of socialism as an anti-imperialist ideology; that is why he was celebrated the pro-independence spirit of this era and tried to carry it to his own time as “the spirit of the National Forces” (Kuvayi Milliye ruhu) as a part of the socialist struggle of the 1960s.

The second premise that shaped Aybar’s views on Kemalism originated in his interpretation of Mustafa Kemal and his initial vision for Turkey. This interpretation was

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85 For other examples of this characterization, see (Karadeniz 1975; Ünüvar 2009).
86 For a longer discussion on Mustafa Kemal’s anti-imperialist discourse, see Chapter 8.
87 Kuvayi Milliye, the National Forces, was the general name referring to the local armed groups that emerged, initially independently from each other, after the occupation of various parts of Anatolia after World War I. They eventually became the part of the Turkish armed forces during the War of Liberation under the command of Mustafa Kemal.
again based on a selective reading of Mustafa Kemal’s speeches and policies.\footnote{It should be underlined here that when one looks at the quotations Aybar uses from Mustafa Kemal’s speeches and declarations, it can be seen that they were overwhelmingly from the first half of the 1920s, particularly from the period of the War of Independence. Given that Mustafa Kemal was in power until his death in 1938, it becomes apparent how biased and selective Aybar’s reading of Mustafa Kemal was.} For Aybar (1988a: 137), the intention of Mustafa Kemal during the War of Liberation was to establish a “people’s state” (halk devleti), which found its expression after the war in the Kemalist principle of populism. The War of Liberation led by the Kemalists was not only an anti-imperialist struggle, but also a move to overcome Turkey’s underdevelopment. Thus, although Mustafa Kemal openly refused to characterize his vision as socialism and instead claimed that Turkey would be a sui-generis regime, Aybar still interpreted Turkey during the War of Liberation as socialist: “A regime that fights against imperialism and capitalism and creates a social order based on labor is a socialist regime. Because of its principle of populism, it is a regime that is oriented towards democracy” (Aybar 1989: 49). Mustafa Kemal’s vision of Turkey as a sui-generis model was seen by Aybar via his own insistence on formulating an independent, native Turkish socialism. Aybar’s analysis was heavily shaped by his intention of imagining Mustafa Kemal as part of the Turkish left: “Kemalism was a left-wing ideology. It is not important whether Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his friends were conscious of being leftist or not. Their orientation was leftist—it leaned toward the left” (Aybar 1968: 96).

One central reason for Aybar’s premise that Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism had to be seen as part of the left was Mustafa Kemal’s foreign policy. Here, Aybar’s analysis was totally shaped retrospectively, proposing a policy strategy for Turkey in the 1960s by legitimizing it through the foreign policy of the early republic, which had been determined to preserve Turkey’s independence after the war, read as anti-imperialist by Aybar. To put it differently, for Aybar, Turkey in the 1960s was dependent on the US, and this was a deviation from Kemalism. The foreign policy of Mustafa Kemal functioned as a reference point for him.
in his argument against American hegemony over Turkey. Likewise, he used Mustafa Kemal’s emphasis on full independence against those fractions of the left who supported a Soviet type model for Turkey. For Aybar (1988a: 184-185), Turkey should be at an equal distance from both the US and the USSR, even after American presence had been removed from the country.

Aybar’s glorification of the War of Liberation and the Kemalist struggle as an anti-imperialist struggle that had succeeded in attaining Turkey’s full independence did not, however, prevent him from seeing the negative aspects of the Kemalist rule during the single-party era. He was critical of the cult created around Mustafa Kemal, the suppression of opposition, capitalist economic policies of Mustafa Kemal, which neglected industrial production and remained indifferent to the necessity for a land reform. His most severe critique targeted Mustafa Kemal’s characterization of Turkey as a classless society, envisaging a corporatist model rather than a “people’s state,” which Aybar had attributed to his project:

There are classes in our society. They struggle with each other because of their conflicting interests. … Since capitalism is applied in Turkey, though interrupted and despite the fact that it is against our national interest, there is a working class [and] there is a bourgeoisie. .. And because of the nature of the system, these two classes are in conflict. However, this simple fact is not accepted. Even a distinguished mastermind like Atatürk can claim that class interests do not conflict in Turkey, that none of the classes contradict each other, and that on the contrary, they are in solidarity (Aybar 1989: 54).

However, in explaining these deficiencies, which obviously contradicted his socialist premises, Aybar was still hesitant to see Mustafa Kemal as responsible. In general, he was more willing to see them as results of an authoritarian state tradition and an undemocratic political culture inherited from the Ottoman Empire. In other words, while touching upon certain insufficiencies directly resulting from Mustafa Kemal’s policies, generally speaking, Aybar was critical of the era of Mustafa Kemal within the context of a general critique of the
continuity from the Ottoman Empire to the Kemalist republic. For example, the suppression of opposition and the left during the single-party era was a “problem of atmosphere” remaining from Ottoman times. There were no institutions or tradition to prevent a leader’s personal authority (Aybar 1988a: 144). The War of Liberation and certain achievements of the Kemalist regime in the eyes of Aybar were so influential on his thinking that they overshadowed a more critical engagement with Kemalism he might otherwise be able to attain. Aybar was openly against the single-party regime of the 1940s since Mustafa Kemal was no longer in power.  

Compared to Aybar, Avcıoğlu’s socialist position was much more heavily shaped by Kemalism. It can be argued that in some of his writings, he attributes the same amount of significance to Kemalism as he does to socialism, if not more. That is why he was characterized by some commentators as a left-Kemalist or a left-wing nationalist (Ari 1994), rather than a socialist. The main reason for this is the following: as it will be discussed in detail in the last section, Avcıoğlu’s understanding of socialism, different from Aybar’s, was more narrow, local and Turkey-oriented in the sense that its central concern was Turkey’s national development, achievable only by autonomy from American, Soviet or any other force’s influence. In other words, as Avcıoğlu equated socialism with development, the Kemalist project, read as a project of independent national development, appeared to Avcıoğlu as a reference point for the model he envisioned for Turkey. As a nationalist, when Avcıoğlu (1968: 163) considered Atatürk, above all he took him as “the creator of the Turkish nation.” In his positive reception of the War of Liberation, he evaluated this war as struggle against an imperialist plot, executed by the intermediation of local Greeks and Armenians. For Avcıoğlu, the movement lead by Mustafa Kemal had two basic ideas: nationalism and the contemporary civilization. For him independence, which was exposition of nationalism, was also the first condition to initiating social revolutions. He maintained that during the

89 For more on Aybar’s criticisms of the policies of the İnönü rule in the 1940s, see (Özman 1998).
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, while the country was practically a semi-colony, it was useless to discuss what to take from the West and what to reject; this was simply because imperialism had shaped all the values and institutions of the society. Only after the independence had been achieved by the republic and the social revolutions were oriented towards Westernization could the discussions on what to take from the West and what to reject end. With the republic, the main issue became the realization of social revolutions, and the new social structure would determine to a large extent values, culture and institutions compatible with itself (Avcıoğlu 1968: 163).

Since Avcıoğlu placed no emphasis on the necessity of the struggle for socialism or mobilization for development to be democratic in character, he also had no problem with the fact that the Kemalist project was based on a single-party system, postponing democracy for the sake of rapid modernization and development. In fact, although he was critical of the Orientalist and Eurocentric dimensions of the modernization theorists of the time, he nevertheless found their glorification of the Kemalist Turkey valid as a success story of modernization and a model for underdeveloped countries. Having published one of Daniel Lerner’s articles in his journal Yön, Avcıoğlu supported this pioneer of the modernization theory in praising the progressive role of the military elite in underdeveloped countries based on the Turkish example. Likewise, Maurice Duverger’s (1968) characterization of the Kemalist single-party rule in Turkey as non-totalitarian and his argument that democracy can be effective only if a country reaches a certain level of economic development were reference points for Avcıoğlu in his own effort to praise the Kemalist modernization and the early republican period.

This being the general framework, Avcıoğlu had some criticism for Kemalism as well. His criticism of Kemalism concerned the lack of radicalism in the single-party regime. In line with the argument of Kadro movement in the 1930s, Avcıoğlu characterized Kemalism as an
unfinished revolution. He frequently cited the inability to conduct land reform as a deficiency of the single-party regime. In his book *Turkey’s Order*, he discussed in detail the liberal policies of the Kemalist regime as of 1923 and the liberal camp within the single-party regime. In this sense, unlike many other Kemalists, he did not consider the 1923-1938 period as a golden age having no drawbacks. He was also against the personal cult created around the image of Mustafa Kemal, which he thought functioned to make Kemalism less radical and more mainstream.

### 10.3 The Debate on the Ottoman/Turkish History and Social Structure

Suavi Aydın (1998b) argues that there have been two dominant perspectives on the Turkish left. On the one hand, a leftist genre, which can be characterized as the “universalist left,” has emphasized the similarities between different societies, particularly similar class conflicts, as a general Marxist framework for leftist analyses and struggles. The “particularist left,” on the other hand, has underlined the conflict between the imperialist nations and the subordinated nations as the main line of conflict and referring more to the unique aspects of societies, and their specific social and historical conditions. For the particularist left, differently from the universalist left, the main agent of social change is not class but nation.

On the Turkish left, the divide between universalist and particularist tendencies becomes crystallized in the debate on the Ottoman social structure. The main axis of the debate on the Ottoman social structure was the question of whether to approach the Ottoman production system based on its similarities with the historical experiences in other parts of the world or by looking at its specificities, emphasizing its unique aspects. Those who follow the latter path analyzed the Ottoman system based on its difference from European feudalism and supporting what came to be known as the “Asiatic mode of production thesis” (AMP). For scholars like Sender Divitçioğlu (1967) and İdris Küçükömer (1969; 1977) the AMP was a
particularly useful conceptualization for underlining the strong and centralized character of the Ottoman state structure, to which they would refer as the “despotic state.” Those who argued that the differences between the Ottoman and the European cases were not significant enough to justify their classification as two separate systems, on the other hand, claimed that the Ottoman production system could be in fact characterized as feudal.

Evaluated as a whole, the Turkish left has been dominated by particularist thinking, and Aybar has been considered as an original voice against this stream (Aydın 1998b; Özman 1998). This is because of the fact that Aybar formulated his position as a socialist primarily based on universalist concepts and concerns, such as human rights and liberties, democratic leadership of the working class and participation of the working classes in the decision making processes. However, Aybar’s thought was not free from particularist tendencies. Although he was universalist in envisioning socialism and the struggle for democratic socialism compared to his contemporaries, Aybar’s historical analyses, especially regarding the Ottoman/Turkish history and social structure, were very much influenced by the dominant particularist atmosphere of his time.

For Aybar, Turkey was different from the West in terms of its social and economic structure, as well as its superstructure. One fundamental difference was the hegemony of the bureaucracy, of “those who owned the state apparatus” in Aybar’s terms, which had showed a remarkable continuity from the Ottoman Empire to the republic. In other words, according to Aybar (1968: 646), in the Ottoman/Turkish context, the bureaucracy appeared as a sui generis class, which became a united whole with the state. Although contradictory to Marxist analysis, Aybar (1968: 646-647) explained the power of bureaucracy as an independent class by referring to the authority it had retained historically in the Ottoman Empire and the legal rights of this class to extract the surplus and arrange the necessary economic relationships for
this extraction. In contrast to the West, where it was the bourgeoisie, it was the bureaucracy that had been the dominant class in Ottoman/Turkish history:

It is meaningless to draw supposedly scientific schemes for our society by looking at the class structure in the West. The Ottoman state was the owner of the agricultural land. Land was the primary means of production then. The rent of the land owned by the state was also held by the class that owned the state apparatus (the timar system). Those who owned the state apparatus also had the control over the urban economy. They comprised the dominant class in the Ottoman Empire (Aybar 1988a: 45).

Therefore, in Aybar’s analysis, Turkey had historically developed based on a different production system and a different land system. Turkey was unique (Aybar 1968: 640); the main conflict was not between the bourgeoisie and the working class, but between the working classes and those who had controlled the state apparatus since the Ottoman period. In his view, the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the republic was such a strong one in this regards that in republican Turkey, the civil-military bureaucracy was still the most important fraction of the dominant class.

For Aybar, parallel to the power of bureaucracy as a class, another difference of the Ottoman/Turkish case from the West was the Turkish state tradition. The tradition of a strong and centralized state in the Ottoman/Turkish history, conceptualized as the “coercive state” (ceberrut devlet) in his analysis, was at the center of Turkey’s distinction from the West (Özman 2007: 379). According to Aybar, in sharp contrast to the evolution of the state in the West, which was shaped by a serious of attempts to limit the state power, in the Ottoman case, the state had enjoyed an intact and limitless authority; the state was everything in the Ottoman Empire (Aybar 1988a: 68). Moreover, this tradition was carried to the republic, despite the fact that the Ottoman production system had become history (Aybar 1988a: 147). As such, Aybar’s analysis tended to represent the state as an agent independent of classes and as an entity that could remain unaffected by structural changes. This coercive state tradition was the
reason for the absence of a culture of democracy in the Ottoman system, and also, for the
democratic deficit in the Turkish republic (Aybar 1988a: 65).

With his emphasis on bureaucracy, characterizing it as a class in itself, and on the
uniqueness of the Turkish state tradition, Aybar can be seen as being close to the AMP thesis
in the debate among the left-wing intellectuals of the time. In fact, he characterized the
Ottoman timar system which, as a kind of statist relationship of production, together with the
Ottoman military-state model prevented feudal tendencies. For him, the difference between
the Ottoman/Turkish case and the West was there right from the beginning. In contrast to the
linear path Europe had taken towards becoming a modern civilization, the Ottoman society,
lacking the culture of democracy and civil society, “had lived like a stagnant water for
centuries” (Aybar 1988a: 67). Therefore, although he never referred to the concept AMP,
Aybar’s analysis was parallel to the particularistic approach it was implying.

However, it should be underlined that Aybar’s analysis of the class structure of
contemporary Turkey was more nuanced than his analysis of the Ottoman and early
Republican one in the sense that he also added American imperialism to the picture for
Turkey of the 1960s. Because of the development of comprador capitalism, the dominant
class in Turkey in the 1960s was composed of three main fractions: the land owners,
comprador bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, all of which were supported by American
imperialism. Despite the fact that he was aware of a potential for conflict of interest among
these fractions, he nevertheless argued that their coalition was reinforced by imperialism; it
was imperialism that held them together as a “non-national front” (Aybar 1968: 12). Here, it
is crucial to note that combined with his emphasis on the power of imperialism in shaping the
system in Turkey, Aybar was rather ambiguous concerning the main axis of conflict. On the
one hand, he maintained that the position of the civil-military bureaucracy as a dominant class
had been very strong in Turkey, and thus referred to peculiar inner dynamics and class
conflicts shaped by the unique aspects of the Ottoman history. On the other hand, he claimed that the bureaucracy had divided into two camps with the penetration of American imperialism, the pro-American and the Kemalist bureaucrats (Aybar 1968: 649-652), and, hence, attributed more emphasis to the role of imperialism as the determinant of the main conflict in the Turkish society. All conflicts, including the one between the workers and the capitalists, were shaped by imperialism; American imperialism had underpinned the historical distinction between the class of exploiters and that of the exploited, and thus Turkey resembled the Ottoman social model, where there were basically these two main classes (Aybar 1968: 656-657).

In using such general categories as the exploiters and the exploited, Aybar was, in fact, retreating from Marxist class analysis and blurring especially the role of the capitalist class in Turkey by developing particularistic conceptions like the “non-national front” and by ignoring local capital accumulation at the expense of underlining the role of the state and external forces. For Aybar, the Turkish economy in the 1960s was still a dependent, underdeveloped economy, and there was no national bourgeoisie. Thus, he was, in fact, extending his historical analysis of the Ottoman Empire to include the republic. Turkey had been shaped by particular characteristics that set her off from Western societies: an undeveloped capitalism based on a comprador bourgeoisie, a predominantly peasant society, and a state that had succeeded in leading the first national struggle of liberation, but again fallen under the yoke of imperialism afterwards. As in Ottoman times, a coercive state, comprador classes and the imperialism forces were the dominant actors in the Turkish system.

Avcıoğlu, however, was critical of the particularist analysis of the Ottoman system, despite his particularistic tendencies in many other issues. His position in the debate was closer to the feudalism thesis, but he was also hesitant to openly claim that the Ottoman production system was feudal. What he claimed was that available research regarding the
Ottoman case was inadequate and that the difference between state property and feudal property was in fact less significant than it had been thought. Therefore, he argued that a more general conceptualization, characterizing the Ottoman system as “pre-capitalist system,” would more accurately reflect the similarity of the Ottoman case to the European experience. What is noteworthy in Avcıoğlu’s position on the debate is that his criticisms towards the AMP thesis targeted the Orientalist aspects of this particularistic analysis without using the word Orientalist itself. Echoing later critics of this thesis in the 1970s, Avcıoğlu was especially critical of the basic assumption of the AMP thesis that Asia had been static for centuries. For him, this ahistorical view of Asian societies was then used to explain Asia’s failure in making the transition to capitalism. In other words, he rejected the claim that this was a failure due to some inner dynamics or essential characteristics of Asia (Avcıoğlu 1968: 11). Instead, by referring to Maxime Rodinson’s *Islam and Capitalism*, he offered again a more general framework and argued that what Marx called autarkic society was in fact more or less a general phenomenon as a primitive mode of production, and, thus, it was unnecessary to label it as Eastern or Asiatic (Avcıoğlu 1968: 529).

Similarly, Avcıoğlu was also critical of those scholars such as Toynbee who drew a clear-cut distinction between the Ottoman and European level of agricultural production and reproduced the stereotypical image of the “nomadic Turk.” Characterizing such images as prejudiced myths, his criticism sound remarkably parallel to the critics of Orientalism:

Toynbee and many other Western scholars see nomadism as an unchanging fate and built their theories based on it. Since in the Turkey of the 15th and 16th centuries there remained no connection to nomadism, there is no need to discuss this thesis anymore. A lot of other Western theses, referring to the racial superiority of the Western people, the Christian civilization, or Islam being an obstacle for progress etc., some of which were also accepted by Turkish intellectuals, are of the same quality. If Islam was not an obstacle to interest, banking, trade, scientific and technical progress, and benefiting from the Christian

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90 For a critic of AMP based on its Orientalist connotations and assumptions see Turner 1978. See also Rodinson 1978.
Avcıoğlu was in fact following Maurice Dobb in referring to the direct extraction of the unpaid surplus from the producer as the common characteristic of all feudal systems, and suggesting that as a concept, feudalism should be enlarged to include the Ottoman case. In contrast to Ömer Lütfi Barkan (and other Turkish historians following him) who emphasized the difference between the Ottoman sipahi and the feudal lord, and argued that the Ottoman peasants were much closer to free peasants than serfs, Avcıoğlu (1968: 11-12) underlined that in the Ottoman system, as in European feudalism, the peasants’ attachment to the land was essential. Since this attachment was maintained not only by economic but also non-economic coercive methods, the difference between the European serf and the Turkish reaya was less significant than it had often been thought. Drawing on the Ottoman land laws, Avcıoğlu tried to show that an Ottoman sipahi was in fact very similar to a European lord in his relationship with the peasants, since he was in a position to keep them attached to the land and loyal to his commands. Therefore, enlarging feudalism as a historical category, Avcıoğlu’s analysis can be seen as an early example of a more recent historiographical intervention to redefine feudalism as an overarching concept, a general name for an agricultural regime based on contractual relationships.91

Different from Aybar’s analysis, Avcıoğlu’s approach to Ottoman social structure, which prioritized similarities rather than differences, also implied that the reason for Ottoman/Turkish underdevelopment and subordination could not be the historical and cultural difference of the Ottoman case. Rather, he looked the reason behind the stagnation of the Ottoman Empire in the crisis of the Ottoman land system. Combined with an increasing military weakness, the change of the pre-capitalist land regime made the empire vulnerable to colonialist penetrations. Economic collapse and subordination then followed as consequences

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91 For a recent analysis of the Ottoman production system along the same argument see (Faroqi 1999: 17-18).
of imperialism. Thus, although sharing the emphasis on the role of imperialism in explaining Ottoman Empire’s subordination and Turkey’s underdevelopment, Aybar and Avcıoğlu had departed by having quite different historical analysis concerning the social structure of the Ottoman/Turkish society. While Aybar had an equally strong emphasis on the unique aspects of Turkey, such as the strong state tradition, the power of the bureaucracy, and an authoritarian political culture, and thus, leaning towards a more culturalist and particularist position, Avcıoğlu maintained a more universalist view, which could be seen as being ahead of his time, as far as the debate on feudalism and Ottoman *timar* system is concerned. The models they offered for Turkey, which were developed based on these historical analyses, were also very different; but interestingly enough, in their search for a Turkish path to socialism, Aybar would follow a more universalist analysis, and Avcıoğlu, more particularist one.

10.4 *The Turkish Path to Socialism*

If history and the how to read the Turkish history was one area where Aybar and Avcıoğlu can be seen to have swung between universalism and particularism, another area where they tried to address was the definition of socialism and the way how it will be established. Aybar maintained that his framework for socialism revolved around the concepts of “Turkey’s socialism,” “libertarian socialism,” and “individualist socialism.” Aybar (1988c: 22) argued that the issue of “freedom was in the hearth of socialism.” He understood socialism in a humanist way (Aybar 2002). In other words, he insisted that socialism was for human beings, not that human beings were for socialism. He formulated the aim of socialism as bringing an end to the instrumentalization of humans. Aybar claimed that limiting the socialist model to non-capitalist development and planned economy was not enough. For Aybar (1968: 204-205), in order for planning to be successful, relations of production had to be changed as well.
Social and economic development would come only through the democratic leadership of the working classes and their control; the aim “was to create a planned economic system in whose administration the working people would directly participate” (Aybar 1968: 409). While comprehending socialism beyond economic reductionism, he emphasized that a crucial component of it is morality, a philosophy caring about the concrete human beings. In Aybar’s humanist socialism, alienation appears as a central theme. He repeatedly emphasized that alienation should not be reduced to alienation from the product but should be understood as a more comprehensive process, one that transcends the economic realm. Hence, he suggested that socialism should save concrete humans from all kinds of alienation.

When Aybar’s writings on Marx are read, it is seen that he closely observed the debates on European socialism, and unorthodox comments on Marxism. He claimed that it is problematic to accept Marxism as a scientific framework, as it is propagandized by the Comintern (Mumcu 1993: 140). In line with his detachment from orthodoxy, he stated that it is wrong to assume that the transition from capitalism to socialism is imperative. By referring to French historian Jean-Jacques Goblot, Aybar stated that the teleological interpretation of Marxism is a mistake disseminated mostly by the Stalinist regime, and the Marxist understanding of history is helpful not for macro-level rules but for specific societies and events.

In his unorthodox Marxism, Aybar attributed a special place to the idea of democracy. He defined democracy as an atmosphere and a political regime where citizens can fulfill their intellectual and bodily abilities to the full extent. In other words, democracy is emancipatory. Opposed to some left-wing intellectuals of the 1960s, he rejected the characterization of democracy as the regime of a small wealthy minority in favor of the idea that it was the regime of freedom and equality. Therefore, he concluded that the interest of the masses is for the protection of democracy and making it fully functioning. In this context, he perceived
parliamentarism and legal politics as the only way path for the WPT; because in his understanding, democracy was the only way to establish a true socialism. While many Yön authors took democracy and elections as fiction or a play, in this framework Aybar attributed a revolutionary potential to the electoral process.

In line with his humanist Marxism and democratic socialism, Aybar wholeheartedly criticized the Soviet model and the USSR’s hegemony over other socialist countries. The Soviet military intervention to crush the Prague Spring in 1968 initiated a debate within the Turkish left. In this debate, Aybar and the WPT took a position against the Soviet intervention and the party officially declared that Turkey’s relations with the superpowers should be of equal distance, and stressed that different nations would establish socialism in their own capacities and by jealously protecting their independence. By this declaration, the party made it clear that its perspective on socialism was much different than that of the Turkish Communist Party and any other organization linked with the Comintern which anticipated the establishment of socialism, assisted by the Soviet Union, if not through its direct intervention. After the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Aybar pointed out more that the socialist ideals were not compatible with a single-party regime. He affirmed that the democratic centralism of Lenin was the first step for a party dictatorship. Vanguard politics made Soviet Communist Party to an organization detached from the real workers; it had become the party of professional revolutionaries, “an extremely narrow, closed and secret organization” (Aybar 1988c: 157).

Throughout this study, it has been argued that for the intellectuals of the space of subjugation, it was a necessity to reconcile political perspectives with their local realities. In this sense, distancing his understanding of socialism from the Soviet model, Aybar developed the concept of “Turkey’s socialism.” While defining what he meant by “Turkey’s socialism,” he maintained that socialism was the general name for the historical period which comes after
capitalism. In this regard, there was only one socialism. But as there are differences concerning the development levels of societies, and a disparity in the time and methods of transition to socialism, in practice socialism has different forms (Aybar 1989: 154). In this sense, although he was loyal to the universal ideal of socialism, Aybar emphasized that “Turkey’s socialism” would be particular.

If one has to summarize the socialist model Avcıoğlu envisions for Turkey in one word, it would be development. He can be seen as one of those intellectuals who stand as a “representative of rational planning,” as Eyerman (1992) suggests in the typology he uses to analyze the intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s.\(^\text{92}\) Development (and, as part of it, planning) was so central to Avcıoğlu’s thought that in his analysis, it formed the main axis of the political conflict. The struggle was the one between those forces, inside and outside, that were against development, and the people and their nationalist intellectual leaders whose interests lay in the development of the country. Here, development does not refer to economic development only. For Avcıoğlu (1962a), development meant more than some economic indications; it was a model that would also help creating a “new kind of human being.” For example, a component of national development, such as the transition in agriculture from small-scale producers to large-scale ones, was not significant in the eyes of Avcıoğlu for its economic impact only. It was also necessary for the “modernization of the mental structure of the peasants.” By the same token, the tourism sector was harmful not only because it created irregular employment, but also because of its impact on the mentality of the youth, directing them towards easy ways of making money (Avcıoğlu 1968: 487). Thus, national development was a comprehensive system that would transform both the economic and mental map of the society.

There were two obstacles to attaining such a system: first, a theory of development in social sciences, which also takes non-economic factors into consideration, was lacking, and

\(^{92}\) For a detailed discussion on Avcıoğlu, which also uses Eyerman’s analysis, see (Turan 2009b).
second, theories that were developed for analyzing underdeveloped countries were not yet well-formulated and sophisticated enough. Given these two impediments, Avcıoğlu argued the necessity for and tried to contribute to a model specific to Turkey. The fast development model Avcıoğlu envisages was based on a simple condition: more saving and more investment. His idea of development, which sometimes even led him to opt for corporatist strategies, was possible only by a new understanding of étatism as a development strategy, and this developmentalist étatism was translated, in his thinking, as socialism:

It is a natural end result of étatism that the whole economic life should be planned. Planning, however, would lose its direction if it was not based on a rational doctrine of development. Socialism, as a populist and rational doctrine of development, provides the best conditions for étatism and planning (Avcıoğlu 1962b).

Avcıoğlu’s equation of socialism with planned development does not refer to a communist development model however. He identifies three different models of development for undeveloped countries (communist, American and the national revolutionary model), and explicitly rejects the communist and American models; the former for it assumes the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the latter because it assigns the primary role to the private sector, and it foresees a slow pace of development (Avcıoğlu 1968: 441). The model appropriate for Turkey was the “national revolutionary development path” (millî devrimci kalkınma yolu), the vanguards of which would be the nationalist intellectuals coming from petite bourgeois background. According to Avcıoğlu (1968: 477), the components of this model should be the following: The existence of a public sector that is in a central position and growing much faster than the private sector; the dominance of the public in strategic sectors; dissolution of the feudal classes through a land reform; planned industrialization; and economic independence. In order for these principles to become effective in practice, there

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93 It is obvious that the planned economy suggested by Avcıoğlu was the continuity of Kadro movement and Şevket Süreyya’s perspective on étatism.
had to be a comprehensive reallocation of the available resources, reorganization of the way they were used, and, thus, inevitably, a struggle against those classes, the “coalition of the conservatives” in Avcıoğlu’s terminology, whose interests were in the continuation of the existing structure, the American developmental model followed in Turkey as of the 1950s. Development, for Avcıoğlu (1968: 485), could be characterized as “a political and economic war between those forces who support a system change and those who are against it.” Through a social revolution, the political and economic power would change hands, and by nationalization of resources, conditions for a centralized planning strategy would emerge (Avcıoğlu 1971: 40).

Although Avcıoğlu’s national revolutionary development model was non-capitalist, and, in fact, characterized by him as a socialist model, he nevertheless prioritized development over socialism. Or, to put differently, for him, socialism was nothing but “a method of fast development to build social justice” (Avcıoğlu 1962c). Combined with his analysis of the Turkish social structure as not yet developed enough for a direct socialist revolution, Avcıoğlu envisions a gradual, two-phase path to socialism, or rather, to national development, and argues that all progressive forces, united under the leadership of the nationalist elite, have to develop a democratic national liberation movement (demokratik millî kurtuluş hareketi) first, and that socialism (read as national development again) can only follow once national liberation is achieved. Developed into the National Democratic Revolution Thesis (NDR, Millî Demokratik Devrim Tezi) in the debate on the Turkish left, this position attributed the leadership of the struggle not to the working classes, or even to the socialist forces, but to the nationalist elite, which included the military elite as well, particularly in Avcıoğlu’s analysis. Thus, given the inner tension between developmentalism and democracy, Avcıoğlu had seen sacrificing pluralism and following an elitist position necessary for the sake of development. For Avcıoğlu (1962d), “in the national liberation
movement phase, the ideological spokespersons of the struggle will be the intellectuals, whether we like it or not; primarily they will provide the necessary cadres.”\(^{94}\) This national liberation phase to which Avcıoğlu was referring was the anti-imperialist struggle of all nationalist sectors of the society, since it was not the class struggle but rather “the anti-imperialist nationalist struggle that had been receiving support from those important forces [in the Turkish society] that were not ready for socialism but open to an anti-imperialist struggle with their solid Atatürkist tradition” (Avcıoğlu 1966).

The elitist vision of Avcıoğlu contrasted sharply with the democratic struggle of the working classes that Aybar supported, and the Socialist Revolution Thesis (*Sosyalist Devrim Tezi*), which argued that a gradual path was unnecessary, and that the Turkish working class was mature enough to lead a socialist revolution. Unlike Avcıoğlu, who criticized the WPT and its leader Aybar for their dogmatic insistence on class struggle, and for alienating other progressive forces by romanticizing an abstract idea of the working class, Aybar consistently rejected an elitist vision, and supported a struggle for socialism under the democratic leadership of the working classes of Turkey.

### 10.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviews the positions of left-wing intellectuals in Turkey between universalism and particularism by focusing on the writings and political perspectives of Mehmet Ali Aybar and Doğan Avcıoğlu. Different sections of the chapter showed that both Aybar and Avcıoğlu had universalist and particularistic tendencies in different subjects. So far, each chapter of this study has discussed the question of nativism. To what extent is it possible to see Aybar’s emphasis on “Turkey’s socialism” as being within the context of nativism? It has to be emphasized that not every search for a native perspective or attempts to go native implies

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94 Again the elitist understanding of politics undertaken by Avcıoğlu was parallel to elitist cadre understanding of *Kadro* movement and Şevket Süreyya.
nativism. Nativism does not only entail emphasizing differences; it is more about attributing a superiority or at least positiveness to this difference. But Aybar’s “Turkey’s socialism” does not include a claim for superiority. Through this concept, he offers a normative political perspective by differentiating his understanding of socialism from the Soviet model, and from the Turkish Communist Party, which had been allied with the Comintern. He argued that it was not cultural differences, but rather being in different phases of development that created the necessity for a particular socialism. Moreover, he combined the idea of independence with his “Turkey’s socialism” in order to demonstrate that he does not envisage a socialist Turkey that is a satellite of the USSR. Finally, while formulating “Turkey’s socialism,” Aybar continued to emphasize the universal characteristic of socialism, with full references to the Marxist classics, and this supports the position that “Turkey’s socialism” was not a nativist project.

Nativism is more clearly evident in Avcıoğlu’s position. To begin with, his main aim was to develop a nationalist left-wing political theoretical perspective. In his writings, it is hard to find a vulgar nationalism. However, his anti-cosmopolitanism led him to a xenophobic discourse. For instance, while he praised the ethnic homogenization of Anatolia, he stereotypically blamed the Greek and Armenian communities of the Ottoman Empire for being compradors, the local collaborators of imperialism. Although he did not have a banal nationalist perspective, his nationalism was apparent. For instance, while formulating his political model, he attributed a specific role to the “nationalist intellectuals coming from petite bourgeois background.” He had a strong skepticism for democracy, and believed that Turkey was not ready for a full democracy, with electoral equality. Based on this belief, he suggested a specific role to vanguards, which were the nationalist intellectuals. Indeed, this idea did not remain merely a suggestion by him; in fact, in the early 1970s, he attempted to a left-wing
coup with a few leftist officers. While they were unsuccessful in realizing the coup (the coup of March the 9th), their efforts triggered the conventional coup of 12 March 1971.

Comparing the writings of Aybar and Avcıoğlu, particularly with respect to their historical analysis of Ottoman/Turkish society and the political model they suggest, it can be seen while Avcıoğlu had a universalistic perspective in his historical analysis, he had a particularistic political model, and as just the opposite, while he had some particularistic tendencies in its historical analysis, Aybar offered a universalist political model for Turkey. For the historical analysis, Avcıoğlu held a surprisingly universalistic perspective, emphasizing the commonalities of the Ottoman history with other histories, and argued that the concept of feudalism could be illuminating for understanding Ottoman social structure. Such a universalist perspective by him is surprising because when the issue came to suggesting a model, he utterly rejected the universalist framework and ridiculed the European democracy. In terms of the model he suggested, Aybar was much closer to the universalist position. When his humanistic Marxism, with a specific emphasis on the notion of alienation, is taken into consideration, one might even say that he was fully universalist. But despite this universalism, he had some particularistic tendencies in his reading of history. He insisted that the class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working class observable in Europe was not historically observable in the Turkish context, and the particularity of the Turkish case was the persistence of bureaucracy as an independent class. With this emphasis on bureaucracy, he reduced all the social dynamics in the Ottoman Empire to the state, which did have unrestricted authority. He was even influenced by some Orientalist clichés, reflected in his argument that Ottoman society did not have a dynamic social force outside of the state. In addition to these particularistic tendencies in his historical analyses, his analysis of the social structure of the 1960s also had some particularistic biases. He argued that there was no national bourgeoisie in Turkey since the national capitalism had not developed enough. He
stated that there was comprador capitalism, supported by American imperialism. Although he underestimated the extent to which capitalism had progressed in Turkey, he always considered the working class as the primary force of leftwing political struggle. In this sense, opposite to Avcıoğlu, who argued that there was no developed working class in Turkey, Aybar argued there was. In this sense, by considering the working class as the engine of socialism in Turkey he was closer to a universalist understanding of socialism.

This twofold comparison suggests that although there were differences between Aybar and Avcıoğlu, their similarities need to be emphasized. First, both of them were well aware of the subjugation of their land. Consequently, they were intellectuals of space of subjugation, emphasizing anti-imperialism as a core component of their political positions. Appropriating anti-imperialism as such a central issue inevitably brought nationalism into focus. Discourses on national independence went hand-in-hand with the emphasis on the “national.” This was the common ground shared by Aybar and Avcıoğlu. This common ground implied once more the risk of nativism. When imperialism was over emphasized by the intellectuals of space of subjugation, external factors were seen as the only determinant of socio-historical occurrences, leading to underestimating or even totally denying the local social dynamics. Avcıoğlu’s argument about non-development of working class in Turkey was an example of this kind of nativist underestimation. Another risk of nativism for the left-wing intellectuals was grounded in their ties to Kemalism. Again this tie was related to anti-imperialism, and loyalty to the anti-imperialist struggle achieved by Mustafa Kemal. This not only kept them from developing a full-fledged and consistent criticism of the single-party era, as had been the case for Aybar’s hesitation vis-à-vis Kemalism. Moreover, it made an analysis of contemporary social structure difficult by blurring class relations, the capital accumulation process, and the development of capitalism.
Hitherto, many nativist aspects of Avcıoğlu’s writings have been underlined. However, as an intellectual of the space of subjugation, he also rejected some culturalist prejudices against his own geography. For instance, while many intellectuals in Europe and in Turkey rejected Islam as a key reason for the lack of progress in Turkey, Avcıoğlu firmly rejected the biased perspective. He stated that Islam could not be an obstacle for progress. All in all, the aforementioned twofold comparison showed that finding an appropriate balance between the universalism and particularism was a difficult task for Turkish left-wing intellectuals.

95 Chapter 8 showed that Celâl Nuri had the same idea.
CHAPTER 11 – CONCLUSIONS

It was 1963 when the Egyptian sociologist Anouar Abdel-Malek published his article “Orientalism in Crisis.” The rebirth of the nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, had been witnessed since the end of the nineteenth century and the victories of the national liberation movements had accelerated this process. Therefore, for Abdel-Malek, the edifice of traditional Orientalism had been shaken. The new “sovereign subject” position of the traditional “objects” of Oriental Studies had created a crisis for Orientalism. The crisis was about Europe’s relations with the non-European peoples. In Abdel-Malek’s words, the old typologies of Orientalism were now seen as dubious:

Thus one ends with a typology—based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential—which makes of the studied ‘object’ another being, with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent: we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and, why not, a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man—the normal man’ it is understood—being the European man of the historical period, that is since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engles, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europeocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples. (Abdel-Malek 2000)

Throughout the periods when the old typologies were reigning, “Europe was the model for everything, and the idea of calling into question its civilizing mission could only seem preposterous” (Amin 1989:126). When the basic premises of the Age of Empire became obsolete, at least partially, it was understood that what was considered as normal was not something ordinary. It was understood that the normalcy of the Age of Empire was defined, institutionalized and disseminated as a derivative of European powers’ search for domination and interest. This normalcy had included all types of stereotypical generalizations, culturalist
prejudices, and racism. It was the normalcy of colonialism, slavery, imperialism and the global hierarchies.

Abdel-Malek argued that the old typologies were both historical and ahistorical at the same time. While dealing with the non-European people, the typologies of Orientalism had attributed to them an essence, sometimes even with metaphysical connotations, which goes back to the dawn of history. This being the historical dimension, they were also ahistorical as long as they transfixed “the object” of study within a non-evolutive specificity, by denying the historical change. “Then the pendulum returned,” states Samir Amin (1989: 126). In the new era, many people realized that the normalcy preached by European powers was not something normal but was, rather, Eurocentric. It was not based on the high ideals of equality and peace, but based on the European claims of superiority.

15 years after Abdel-Malek’s “Crisis of Orientalism,” in 1978, Edward Said published his most influential book, *Orientalism: Western Conception of the Orient*. In this book, Said’s main contribution was transforming the name of an academic discipline, Orientalism, into a name of a mentality. The book established Orientalism as a style of thought that assumes an ontological and epistemological distinction between “the Orient” and “the Occident” (Said 1979: 2). This style of thought, according to Said, has been also functioned as “a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.” In his words, “by the end of World War I Europe had colonized 85 percent of the earth. To say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable” (Said 1979: 123). Said also argued that while having authority over the Orient, Western domination made the Orient silent. “Such an Orient was silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects that involved but were never directly responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it” (Said 1979: 94).
Many criticized Said’s argument in *Orientalism* about the silent position of the Orient (for instance Tavakoli-Targahi 2001: 20; Siddiqi 2005), because, in the Age of Empire, the colonized people had never been totally in a passive position, and it has always been possible, especially in the intellectual level, to observe challenges towards Western domination. In his second seminal book, *Culture and Imperialism*, where Said’s focus was more on the response to Western dominance, efforts in cultural resistance, and assertions of nationalist identities, he (1994: xii) revised his old argument on the Oriental silence and argued that “never was it the case that imperial encounter pitted an active Western intruder against a supine or inert non-Western native; there was always some form of active resistance and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the resistance finally won out.”

I

This is the first starting point of this study. By following Said’s insights presented in *Culture and Imperialism*, the main purpose of this study is to examine Turkish intellectuals’ criticism of the West and Eurocentrism. Since the beginning of Ottoman modernization, the West had been the key issue in the intellectual agenda of Turkey. On the one hand, the European Great Powers were the rivals of the Ottoman Empire militarily; but, on the other hand, Europe had been seen as a source of knowledge, a model for reform and progress. This dualism, Europe being a rival and a model at the same time, made the West an issue, a Janus-faced problematic. Europe as the model had offered a potential of acquiring an advantage in the military rivalry, or least closing the gap, but at the same time, appropriating Europe as a model to follow brought the question of identity. Disentangling the idea of Europe as model from European claims of superiority and from European prejudices against non-European people was not an easy task and was not always possible. European search for domination over other geographies had left no room for a cultural parity between Europeans and non-
Europeans (Wallerstein 2006: 33). Throughout the long nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had faced the European expansion and rivalry among European powers to control different part of its territory. Besides accelerating the dissolution of the empire, European imperialism resulted in the occupation of Ottoman soil in the aftermath of World War I. Taking all these points into consideration, facing Eurocentrism was a constant endeavor for Turkish intellectuals.

The second starting point of this study is to understand modernity as a global process. This point might be considered as the end-result of different theoretical debates; but if I had to choose one specific source of inspiration it would be Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe*. Chakrabarty (2000: 43) states that Europe’s acquisition of the adjective “modern” for itself is an integral part of the story of European imperialism within the global history. For Chakrabarty, the project of provincializing Europe is first and foremost about challenging the politics of historicism. For Chakrabarty, historicism is a stagist theory of history: “historicism is what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global *over time*, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it” (Chakrabarty 2000: 7). Historicism had suggested to non-Europeans that they wait in the imaginary waiting room of the history. In this understanding, “some people were less modern than others and that the former needed a period of preparation and waiting before they could be recognized as full participants in political modernity.” Opposing the “not yet” of historicism, Chakrabarty emphasizes that from about the time of World War I to the decolonization movements of the 1950s and the 1960s, anti-colonial nationalisms were predicated on the urgency of the “now.”

The emphasis on the “now” meant full participation in political modernism. It was about emphasizing the role of the non-European societies in shaping modernity and an attempt to redefine modernity as a process that unites all mankind. As Marshall Berman has
suggested, modernity is an experience based on a struggle “to change (the) world and make it our own.” Modern men and women have been trying to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it (Berman 1988: 5). Thus, understanding modernity as a global process is to underline that modernity cannot be considered as a process specific to Europe or to the West. This is not to deny that the agents of many modernization projects have had a feeling of belatedness. After all, as Gregory Jusdanis (1991: xiv) rightly puts, all modernization projects after the Netherlands, England, and France are belated. However, this is to appreciate the central role of these “belated” modernizations in the very making of modernity.

While understanding modernity as a global process, the revolutionary agency should not also be considered as something peculiar to the West. C.L.R. James’s monograph on the Haiti Revolution, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, tells us that peoples of the non-Western societies had the courage, will and imagination to redesign their lives and social setting. Similarly, historians have conceptualized the constitutional revolutions in Iran and in the Ottoman Empire, in 1906 and 1908 respectively, as pathways to modernity. Nader Sohrabi considers these two revolutions that happened at the margin of Europe as moments when the agency of these societies became crystallized, as it was the case in European revolutions. Through revolutionary activism, non-European people could also materialize their cause of progress and could establish a link between global ideologies and their localities. This link was in fact a negotiation of the global paradigm with local traditions. With revolutionary agency, people had become actors who situated their societies in historical and contemporary world contexts, diagnosed social problems, and decided which political system was desirable, which political/revolutionary strategies were to be employed (Sohrabi 2005).
As this revisionist historiography has lucidly displayed, modernity also belongs to the history of peoples outside the West. Turkish intellectuals, like their counterparts in other non-European societies, were in fact advocating this idea. They were aware of their role in shaping modernity in their own setting and were trying to situate themselves as the subjects of history while tackling the dominant Eurocentric understanding of modernity. Facing modernity thus had been a constant endeavor for Turkish intellectuals. They had been trying to become subjects of modernization, and make themselves at home in the modern world, by attempting to shape it.

The main purpose of this study is to shed light on the relationship between facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity in the context of Turkish intellectual history. As it has been argued throughout this study, this relation is interdependency. Facing Eurocentrism includes the critique Eurocentrism, resistance to it, and contemplation about modernity, specifically about the possibility of a non-Eurocentric modernity. Facing Eurocentrism also includes colonial criticism, critical awareness about global hierarchies, and perspectives on subjugation. As Arif Dirlik (1999) underlines, Eurocentrism needs to be understood with reference to structures of power EuroAmerica produced. Put it differently, it is directly connected to the European expansion, colonialism and imperialism. Above all, Eurocentrism is a claim of superiority, both in the realpolitik and cultural realms. As long as it is connected to European imperialism, for the non-European people, the best option for resistance was modernization. As imperialist threat became more concrete, especially with selective military intervention by European Great Powers, the modernization process accelerated. Moreover throughout this study, it has been also emphasized that external factors, the hegemony of the Great Powers and their threats, should not be seen as the unique factor of change and modernization. At the state level, search for an efficient administrative mechanism and at the societal level, local demands were also significant in shaping the modernization projects.
Likewise, facing modernity is dependent on facing Eurocentrism. This dependency can be summarized in three points: First, “modernity is incomprehensible without reference to Eurocentrism” (Dirlik 1999). Although it has a claim for universalism, the European modernity has considered modernity something predominantly European. In this sense, every modernity project outside the Europe is doomed to be less modern, from a Eurocentric perspective. Moreover, it has been observed in many historical instances that European Great Powers had been denying the right to sovereignty and self-rule of non-European societies. Hence, as Chakrabarty (2000: 9) formulates, the achievement of political modernity outside Europe, “could only take place through a contradictory relationship to European social and political thought.” In other words, the critique of Eurocentrism appears as a condition of political modernity. Second, modernity is commonly imagined with reference to a model. Imagining modernity can be considered as process of searching a model, and then establishing a relation with the model in terms of what to adopt and what to reject. This is a moment when facing modernity goes beyond the critique of Eurocentrism; it becomes contemplation about Eurocentrism, which might even lead to seeing Eurocentrism as an indispensable condition for modernization. This brings us to the third point.

Once the idea that Eurocentrism is an indispensable condition for any modernization outside Europe becomes hegemonic among the elites a particular society, then the critique of Eurocentrism gains momentum and inclines towards this non-Europeans’ Eurocentrism. How to reconcile the model with local reality becomes a key question, and in this sense modernity is positioned as a balance between the model, supposedly universal, and local, including all the identities and historical peculiarities.

Turkish intellectual history is the history of this interplay between facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity. The position of Turkey can be interpreted as being on the border of the West. Turkish intellectuals have been experiencing a situation of “being both
inside and outside the West.” In the Ottoman/Turkish context, modernity had to be established by fighting, literally, against the Western forces, and, lastly, against the Entente occupation. In addition to the military threats and fights, the symbolic realm was also a realm of struggle against the European prejudices against Ottoman and Turkish culture and against Islam. In this sense, the interdependency of facing modernity and facing Eurocentrism was also a search for recognition and equality.

This study is situated within the realm of historical sociology. It appropriates intellectuals as its unit of analysis. It can also be seen as a study where a history of ideas intersects with a sociology of intellectuals. As it is already stated in the Introduction, this study disagrees with the mainstream distinction made between idiographic and nomothetic approaches. By following Andrew Sayer (2000) and George Steinmetz (2005), I understand historical sociology as a social science realm where idiographic and nomothetic approaches overlap. Hence, this study is based on a historically focused empirical research, yet at the same time, it aims to include theoretical debates. In this context, because the very empirical material of this study is theoretical questions asked by the intellectuals, their history offers fascinating material. Most of the time, their debates were based on creative arguments and were open-ended. In this sense, this study aims at following the legacy of Eric Wolf, who advised engaging in “theoretically informed history, and historically informed theory.”

II

Part I deals with theoretical ambiguities and establishes a historical framework for situating the intellectuals that are discussed in Part II. Chapter 2 exposes three theoretical ambiguities. The first one is about how to cluster colonialism. The massive scale of the European expansion brings into relief the difficulty of how to cluster different forms in which this expansion was experienced. Social sciences have been able to produce a history-oriented
theoretical corpus dealing with the history of global hierarchies. Within this corpus, one wing is more classical-type historiography of colonialism. Another wing is postcolonial studies. The latter sometimes intersects with studies inspired by Foucaultian analyses of power. Yet another wing is the Subaltern Studies group, with an emphasis on the Subcontinent. The failure of this corpus lays in its not incorporating the buffer zones, the spaces which were neither metropolis nor periphery, into the analyses. Michael Herzfeld (2002) calls these buffer zones crypto-colonies, where political independence was coupled with massive economic dependence.

The second ambiguity concerns clustering reactions to colonialism. While European expansion was massive, so, too, was the reaction to it. In mentioning clustering reactions to colonialism, this study pays attention to a comparative framework for the reactions in the buffer zones, or in the crypto-colonies, and reactions in the direct-rule type colonies. The third ambiguity is related to nationalism outside the West. The ambiguity starts with misgivings as to of whether nationalism exists outside the West. Edmund Burke III (1998) points out that European observers were reluctant to accept that nationalism exists in the Middle East. This might be labeled as the Orientalist layer of the ambiguity. There is another layer of ambiguity due to the Eurocentrism of theories of nationalism. According to the modernist theories of nationalism, the rise of nationalism is something related to transition to capitalism; hence, it is hardly observable in the absence of industrial capitalism.

All these ambiguities are highly relevant for studying the intellectual history of Turkey. Concerning the issue of clustering colonialism, neither Turkey nor its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, was ever formally colonized. However, the Ottoman Empire experienced subjugation by the European Great Powers throughout the nineteenth century, and was occupied following World War I. Therefore, it is crucial to have a more nuanced analysis about the global hierarchies, paying due attention to the buffer zones, and to cases of
facing the European expansion without being formally colonized. This study shows that the
West, its colonialism, its superiority claims, and the question of how to deal with all these
have been the central issues of Turkish intellectual history for many decades. In this context,
clustering reactions to the West is important because while criticizing the West, Turkish
intellectuals voiced arguments similar to other reactions to the West from different
geographies. And regarding the issue of nationalism, throughout the period examined in this
study, nationalism had been an important item for the agenda of Turkish intellectuals. Again,
this is similar to several other cases where critiques of the Western colonialism were
formulated within a nationalist framework.

For all these reasons, this study offers some insights about how to overcome these
theoretical ambiguities. On the question of how to cluster colonialism, the argument put
forward points out the need to emphasize the role of informal colonialism more by
highlighting the unequal treaty system and extraterritorialities. While incorporating informal
colonialism into the overall discussion, this study draws on two sets of literatures: the works
of John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson on the British Empire history and the imperialism of
free trade, known as the Gallagher-Robinson thesis, and the world-system analysis of
Wallerstein and his colleagues.

The massive European expansion was based on a pattern overseas trade, investment,
migration, and cultural penetration. But differently from the direct colonial rule, informal
colonialism encouraged stable governments. The basic logic was to avoid the cost of direct
rule and to reduce any kind of investment risks. Moreover, in some cases, inter-imperialist
rivalry made informal colonialism inevitable. Informal colonialism functioned by imposing
treaties of free trade and friendships upon weaker states. The imposition process was
supported by military power. According to Gallagher and Robinson, British treaties with
Persia in 1836 and 1857, with the Ottoman Empire in 1838 and 1861, and with Japan in 1858
were the primary example of informal colonialism. Wallerstein (1989) also emphasized the interconnectedness of formal and informal empires by referring to substantial similarities in the incorporation of India, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and West Africa into the world economy as a result of the European expansion. Indeed, inter-imperialist rivalry made informal colonialism a network-like mechanism. In the network of informal colonialism, alliances were commonly observed but unlike in direct rule, they did not guarantee protection from another power’s intervention. It was rather a complex network, including both diplomacy and military power, and structural in facilitating world trade, a crucial aspect of global hierarchies.

While developing the framework of informal colonialism, Gallagher and Robinson considered the Ottoman case as a primary example of informal colony. But Wallerstein’s world-system analysis is even more illuminating about the subjugated position of the Ottoman Empire within the complex network of informal colonialism. He states that the Ottoman Empire had already been peripheralized before 1850 (Wallerstein 1989: 150). This means that the Ottoman state had been controlled by foreign capital, debt, and trade, serving the needs of merchant capital (İslamoğlu and Keyder 1990). Therefore, the Ottoman/Turkish case, although not a case of direct colony, cannot be understood outside the global hierarchies, and without referring to its subjugation under informal colonialism. In other words, without paying the due attention to cases of subjugation by informal colonialism like the Ottoman Empire, the history of global hierarchies cannot be understood in a comprehensive way. And such an all-embracing history needs to include the Ottoman Empire, together with other buffer zones.

This necessity to incorporate the cases of informal colonialism and buffers zones into a history of global hierarchies is equally valid concerning the issue of clustering the reactions to colonialism. This study suggests focusing on the similarities of colonial criticisms voiced in
formal and informal colonies. In suggesting this, I disagree with Nikki Keddie’s “the colonial-non-colonial distinction,” which emphasizes the differences between the intellectual histories of formal and informal colonies. In her understanding, formal colonialism leads to neotraditionalism; whereas in other forms of subjugation, intellectuals are inclined to enforce the Western ideas without criticizing them. In contrast to Keddie’s perspective, this study points out the commonality of intellectual agendas in formal and informal colonies. According to the argument put forward, both in cases of formal and informal colonialism, there was a common central dilemma: “how might one become modern when one was not, could not be, or did not want to be Western?” (Abu-Lughod 1998). This dilemma determined the main themes of intellectual debates. All other important questions, such as “partial adaptation versus total borrowing” or “nativism versus universalism” were indeed the derivatives of this central dilemma.

Having the interconnectedness of formal and informal empires in the background, this study introduces the concept “space of subjugation” to connote the commonality of intellectual agendas in different contexts influenced by Western expansion. Space of subjugation is an inclusive concept. By encapsulating all experiences of being subjugated by both formal and informal colonialisms, it brings the cases of informal colonialism and the buffer zones into the discussion on the history of global hierarchies. Chapter 3 defines space of subjugation in a detailed way, together with its secondary connotations. A critical stand against the capitalist expansion of the West, colonialism, racism and other types of prejudices had become widespread among the intellectuals of space of subjugation. Space of subjugation implies a specific experience of modernity and modernization. In space of subjugation, modernity is experienced either on the border or outside the border of the core countries, with a peculiar self-perception of belatedness. Most of the time these experiences were coupled
with a search for model and an assumption of a temporal gap between the model and the local experience (Chakrabarty 2000).

By taking the late Ottoman Empire as a state subjugated by the complex network of informal colonialism, this study situates Ottoman intellectuals’ criticism of European expansion, colonialism, racism, and European prejudices toward other cultures within the larger context of colonial criticism. By focusing on Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökulp, this study argues that the late-Ottoman intellectuals should be seen as examples of colonial criticism, and claims that the intellectuals of republican Turkey, as discussed in the case of Celâl Nuri, Şevket Süreyya, Peyami Safa, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Doğan Avcıoğlu, and Mümmtaz Turhan, had to deal with similar questions, which have constituted the agenda for spaces of subjugation. All in all, according to the general framework developed hitherto, Turkish intellectual history needs to be read by acknowledging the commonality of intellectual agendas, themes and questions in different cases of space of subjugation.

Chapter 4 tries to show why the late Ottoman Empire should be seen as a space of subjugation by linking the discussion on the complex network of informal colonialism to the question of state capacity in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. For defining state capacity, this chapter draws on the historical sociology of Michael Mann. By synthesizing what Mann means by despotic power and infrastructural power of state, a four-fold model is obtained for defining state capacity: army, education, coinage, and transportation and communication systems. It is argued that due to its subjugation by the network of informal colonialism, the Ottoman Empire was not a system capable of reproducing itself autonomously. Having said that, it would be wrong to see states as mere victims of foreign powers (Hobson 1997). True, the complex network of informal colonialism was a structural relationship between the European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire. However, verifying the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1989), informal colonialism brought
several constraints, mainly in the form of limitations on state’s sovereignty, while at the same
time enabling the Ottoman Empire in various ways, by significantly contributing to its
capacity as a state. When the aforementioned four-fold model is taken into consideration, it
can be seen that in the cases of army, coinage and the transportation and communication
systems, the Porte was dependent upon the capacity created by interaction with the network of
informal colonialism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Wallerstein (1989: 177)
maintains that the Ottoman state was internally stronger in 1850 compared to 1750, but
externally weaker. The state was externally weaker due to subjugation, and internally stronger
thanks to the capacity generated by the same set of interactions that, indeed, had brought
subjugation.

The narrative presented in Chapter 4 discredits the Orientalist discourse about the late
Ottoman Empire. For Orientalists, the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was the “sick man
of Europe,” unable to make a move, unable to modernize itself, waiting submissively for its
unavoidable death. When the domains of army, education, coinage, and transportation and
communication systems are focused on, what is seen is not only story of subjugation, but also
a state attempting to modernize its functions. In doing this, the late Ottoman Empire was not a
passive pawn of the Levant, as had been depicted by most of the Orientalists; but rather an
active agent of history. By following Marx of *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, we can argue that the
nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was seeking to make its own history. However, this
search was not possible “under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past.” The existing circumstances were the structural
relations of the Age of Empire. Hence, the history of Ottoman modernization had to be
written on the plane of global hierarchies, facing both the constraining and enabling dynamics
pillars of European expansion.
Concerning the issue of nationalism outside the West, this study suggests following the framework proposed by Partha Chatterjee to transcend the ambiguities of modernist theories of nationalism. In Chatterjee’s understanding, nationalism in the colonial context was a derivative discourse driven by the European power network. This study argues that what Chatterjee (1994) says about “anticolonial nationalism” is relevant for geographies subjected by both formal and informal colonialism. In this context, nationalism’s denial of the inferiority of subjected people was first and foremost a challenge to the Eurocentric claim of superiority. According to Chatterjee, anti-colonial nationalism is a will to erase “the marks of colonial difference.” This point is also highly relevant for the history of Turkish nationalism. Chapter 5 reads this history with reference to Chatterjee and argues that Turkish nationalism in the Young Turk era was a derivative discourse of European expansion. Developed as a reaction to the pressure of informal colonialism, Unionist nationalism’s primary aim was to erase the marks of colonial difference—the unequal positioning of Turkey and the West. For this reason, it was always an important aim for the Unionists to annihilate the capitulations and extraterritorialities, the utmost symbols of “the rule of colonial difference.”

Chapter 5 shows how anti-imperialism was an important item in the formation of the Unionist ideological repertoire. It is argued that the Unionist politics was mainly determined by a single question: “Bu devlet nasıl kurtarılabilir?—How can this state be saved?” (Tunaya 1996; Keyder 1987). This question and its embedded urgency explain many of the steps taken by the CUP, including the Revolution of 1908. Besides reviewing the debates on the Revolution of 1908, the chapter argues that Unionist social imaginary was based on reactionary modernism. Shaped by a strong element of anti-imperialism and aiming at, above all, saving the state from the plans and threats of European Great Powers, the intellectual sources of Unionist reactionarism were again European: German romanticism, the idea of military nation, solidarism and corporatism as they were promoted in the political circles of
the French Third Republic, an overall suspicion towards the values of the Enlightenment, and skepticism towards democracy. Deciphering the Unionist mentality demonstrates that Europe was not a monolithic source of inspiration, always disseminating similar and compatible ideas and political perspectives. Indeed, the reality was almost the opposite. While some Unionist intellectuals were students of European positivism, some others were followers of other European perspectives that had emerged as a reaction to positivism. Hence, Europe had always been a multiple source of inspiration, offering a variety of alternatives. In tracing this argument, Chapter 5 not only offers a background for the Unionist intellectuals to be discussed in Chapter 7, but more importantly, it shows the centrality of the question of “how can this state be saved?” for Unionism.

Chapter 6 takes off from where Chapter 5 ends and displays how the same question of saving the state determined the Kemalist perspective in the early republican period. Herzfeld (2002) maintains that in the buffer zones, the process of modernization was coupled with the “specter of colonialism.” For the leaders of the national resistance movement in Ankara, it was obvious that the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution was related to the fact that it had become unable to reproduce itself as a system. Hence, to combat the “specter of colonialism,” or, in other words, to save the state, they aimed at achieving, I argue, system integration. Drawing on the concept developed by Habermas, Chapter 6 suggests that republican modernization, from its late Ottoman origins to the republic, should be read as an attempt at system integration. In other words, this chapter translates the phrase of “saving the state” into the terminology of social theory as system integration. It is also suggested that rethinking Turkish modernization as an attempt at system integration provides a better framework to analyze the continuities and changes seen in the transition from the Unionist period to the republican era. The major line of continuity is in terms of the major goal of the political elites in both periods: to establish a nation-state. The nation-state, both by the Unionists and the Kmalists, was
considered as the most fundamental condition for “saving the state” from international threats, or from the “specter of colonialism.” In addition, for the Kemalists, Westernization was seen as the only way to achieve this aim. By focusing on three spheres of integration—namely, the political, ethnic, and cultural integrations—Chapter 6 describes how system integration functioned through a series of definitions and goals, which were centered on modernization and the formation of the nation-state, and then how system integration produced technical rules to reach these goals.

III

After the theoretical overview and the historical background, Part II maps out four different groups of intellectuals in Turkish intellectual history in four separate chapters. In each chapter, two prominent names of the group are scrutinized. Part II revisits the works of these intellectuals based on five main points: their perspectives on European imperialism; their imagination of modernity, which also includes their understanding of the East, the West and Westernization; their position on Kemalism; their critique of Orientalism; and lastly, their tendency for nativism. The primary conclusion of my analysis on Turkish intellectuals based on these five points is that an awareness concerning global hierarchies shapes their positions with respect to several issues. In other words, the subjugated position of their country is a major theme for all groups of intellectuals regardless of their ideological positions. For most of them, imperialism is a term frequently employed both to connote the historical background for and the causes of Turkey’s contemporary problems. Colonialism is also used, though less frequently. For some of them, the late Ottoman Empire was a semi-colony, but even for others that do not follow this characterization, the Ottoman subjugation and the occupation that came after World War I should be seen components of a larger process of European colonialism and imperialism. In advocating this analysis, Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp had a direct
influence on the republican intellectuals since they evaluated the subjugation of the late Ottoman Empire through capitulations and other limitations on the state sovereignty within the larger context of European colonialism and imperialism. By the same token, the military victory against the occupiers—the success story of the War of Liberation (1919-1922)—was considered as part of the larger context of decolonization. Moreover, this portrayal was only reinforced by the enthusiastic reception of the Turkish victory against the European armies in the colonies. Turkish intellectuals were certain that their position within the global hierarchies corresponded to a “space of subjugation;” their questions, discussions, and solutions were always linked to the issue of subjugation.

The only exception to the use of imperialism as the key concept in intellectual and political discourse is the conservative intellectuals. When the writings of Peyami Safa and Mümtaz Turhan are examined, it is seen that they rarely mention imperialism. This was probably related to the fact that since Lenin, the critique of imperialism had had a certain tie with the critique of capitalism. For Turkish conservatives, it was not very easy to disentangle the critique of imperialism from an anti-capitalist perspective. It was paramount for them to differentiate their perspective from the left-wing politics. Moreover, throughout the cold war and even before, the Turkish right had had a strong anti-communist discourse, which made difficult for conservatives to accommodate a more detailed discussion on imperialism despite their nationalist perspective. For other intellectual groups of the republican era, which are examined in this study, namely the Kemalists and socialists, imperialism and global hierarchies were very important for their historical and political analyses. This was also the case for the two Unionists intellectuals of the late Ottoman Empire, Ahmed Rıza and Ziya Gökalp. It is possible to argue that for the Unionist intellectuals, their first-hand experience with concrete subjugation of the empire and then with the occupation was the primary reason why they emphasized imperialism to this extent. Kemalists had also lived through the
occupation. For the socialist intellectual of the 1960s, however, the occupation was not a personal experience, but rather an item of social memory. They grew up listening to the stories of occupation and it deeply influenced their perspectives as intellectuals. Moreover, as already emphasized in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, the republican regime also used an anti-imperialist discourse and depicted the War of Liberation as “a people’s fight against imperialism” in the official history. This in fact legitimized the critique of imperialism throughout the republican era and made it part of Kemalist rhetoric.

In his book *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, Cemil Aydı̇n compares the pan-Islamic thought of the late Ottoman Empire with the pan-Asian thought in the Japanese context. He argues that an Occidentalist dichotomy can be commonly observed in these two movements: a tendency of perceiving the West through the dichotomy of “the moral East and the material West.” He adds that one of the main arguments employed by anti-Westernist discourse was that “the West was applying double standard in its international relations by violating the very principles of civilized behavior that Western public opinion proclaimed” (Aydı̇n 2007: 9). Although none of the intellectuals discussed in this study were stubborn anti-Westernist, they employed similar discourses while thinking about global hierarchies and criticizing the European imperialism. It also needs to be emphasized that some of the intellectuals were able of going beyond such simplistic dualisms as West versus East. For instance, Ziya Gökalp was convinced of the indispensability of European ideas while establishing modernity in the Turkish context. Similarly, Mümtaz Turhan aimed at reformulating Westernization by synthesizing modernization with national values, with his search being partially a response to radical defenders of anti-Westernism. The socialist intellectual Doğan Avcıoğlu put forth an agitated critique of imperialism; yet, at the same time, his main agenda was developmentalism. All in all, their analyses were more sophisticated than the examples of anti-Westernist discourse. Although there were some
unjustified over-generalizations concerning the West and Europe in some of their writings, there was always an effort made to provide a balanced account.

As far as the level of sophistication in criticizing European expansion, imperialism and hegemony is concerned, a special parenthesis is necessary for Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, the leading figure of the Kadro movement. Partly thanks to his training in Moscow in the early 1920s, Şevket Süreyya could develop a systematic understanding of European imperialism. Moreover, together with his colleagues in the Kadro movement, Şevket Süreyya incorporated several concepts into his analysis, including dependency, “colony-metropolis” relations and “world system” well before they were widely in use in the international social sciences circles. Even more interestingly, Şevket Süreyya gave one of the earliest examples of using the concept Eurocentrism, as Europacentrisme. This, in fact, can be seen as an indication of how central facing Eurocentrism was to the agenda of Turkish intellectuals. Şevket Süreyya’s definition of Eurocentrism predated Anouar Abdel-Malek’s, Samir Amin’s and those of its other critics. For him, Eurocentrism meant “considering European history as the center of the world history,” a byproduct of Europe’s worldwide hegemony (Şevket Süreyya 1932c). He noted that the Eurocentric periodization of history was simply not compatible with the course of events in other geographies. Şevket Süreyya was well aware of the fact that Eurocentrism was related to the European claim of superiority, and more generally speaking, to global hierarchies. Hence, he proposed the liquidation of Eurocentrism as the primary goal of Turkish revolution. He considered the War of Liberation as a step towards this elimination; but he also emphasized the necessity of transcending Eurocentrism as a way of thinking.
This study focuses on the Turkish intellectuals. The second conclusion is about the role of intellectual, which is what they considered they had to adopt. In the Introduction, it is stated that two-fold conceptualizations offered in the literature for the roles of intellectuals, such as organic and traditional intellectuals, rational planner and social movement intellectuals, legislators and interpreters, were sources of inspiration for the investigation carried out in this study. The overall analysis in Part II reveals that most of the intellectuals examined here had to assume multiple intellectual roles simultaneously. This is especially so when the roles of the intellectual as a legislator and interpreter are taken into consideration. In his book *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity*, Zygmunt Bauman suggests that in the modern period, the typical intellectual work is characterized by the legislator role. This includes making authoritative statements and playing an arbitrating function in controversies through the authority of deciding which opinions are correct. For Bauman, for the intellectuals with the legislator role, the authority to arbitrate is achieved by objective knowledge. This objective knowledge makes the intellectuals superior to non-intellectual actors in the society. Again, within this framework of objective knowledge, Bauman notes that intellectuals in the legislator role are not bound by local and communal traditions. Therefore, he argues that legislator intellectuals are not sensitive enough to local particularities while producing knowledge. Bauman generally observes throughout the twentieth century the rise of a new intellectual role, which he describes as the “interpreter” role. Intellectuals with the interpreter role are more careful about local and traditional differences, and with this shift, intellectuals withdraw from suggesting universalistic perspectives.

Bauman argues that the rise of the new intellectual as interpreter is related to postmodernity. In this sense, he has some uneasiness regarding the abandonment of the
assumption of the universality of truth, judgment or taste. Truth is now understood within
certain “communities of meaning;” it is communally grounded (Bauman 1989: 197). The
analysis developed throughout Part II reaches the conclusion that Bauman’s distinction of the
roles of the intellectual as a legislator and as an interpreter is relevant for the Turkish case on
two points. On the first point, a direct usage of Bauman’s terms is useful and illuminating.
Pointing out that the single-party era was the golden age for the modernist intellectuals,
Yüksel Taşkın (2007: 42) concludes that the legislator role was valid for the intellectual of the
early republican period. Chapter 8 affirms this conclusion. On the second point, I argue that
not the direct usage of Bauman’s definition, but extended definitions for the roles of legislator
and interpreter are necessary to take into consideration. That is to say, inspired by Bauman’s
conceptualization, the second point argues that for a better understanding of the Turkish
intellectuals’ roles, we need to have a broader concept of the intellectual as interpreter, by
taking Bauman’s distinction out of its context, which refers to the divide between modernism
and postmodernism. With its wider and more inclusive definition I have suggested, the role of
the intellectual as interpreter covers both the act of interpretation and the work of translation
with two meanings. The first meaning literally refers to the activity of translation, especially
from Western languages into Turkish. Second, it implies a two-way struggle against
prejudices. For most of the eight Turkish intellectuals studied here, countering prejudices
against their own culture and society constituted a major theme throughout their intellectual
journey. And although much less frequently, they tackled the prejudices of their own society
against Europe and the West. Interpretation, in the latter sense, involved assessing the
modernization project, by both indicating its indispensability and its risks as well as its
drawbacks. Obviously, the interpretation and the work of translation overlapped at times. To
the extent that interpretation concerned imagining modernity, it relied partially on translation.
Consequently, the role of the intellectual as interpreter did not appear on the Turkish
intellectual scene with postmodernity but much earlier. The experience of modernization on the borders of Europe, or the dilemma of “how might one become modern when one was not, could not be, or did not want to be Western?” as formulated by Lila Abu-Lughod, unavoidably led Turkish intellectuals to be sensitive to their locality and its peculiarities. Having said that, this does not mean that they were indifferent to objective knowledge, withdrawn from making any authoritative statements, or opposed to universalistic perspectives. The analysis developed in Part II reveals that the majority of the Turkish intellectuals assumed two intellectual roles—legislator and interpreter—simultaneously throughout their careers.

It needs to be emphasized that the dualism of the intellectual role was not limited to acting as legislators and interpreters at the same time. Several intellectuals had to deal with questions of historiography. They had to develop perspectives concerning the social structure of Turkish society. In other words, each time the existing literature fell short in explaining the Turkish case, they had to study more academically oriented materials, often with an amateur spirit. This multiplicity of intellectual roles was valid for all the eight intellectuals studied hitherto. Even Peyami Safa, the most literarily oriented one among these eight, had a strong perspective for objective knowledge, as his overemphasis on mathematization as a mentality change indicated. In this sense, in the intellectual journey of Safa, one can observe some legislative components together with some interpretive dimensions. Among others, Ahmed Rıza, Mümtaz Turhan, and Doğan Avcıoğlu appear as the leading examples of the intellectual assuming multiple roles. Ahmet Rıza was a positivist; thus he had never retired from his commitment to objective knowledge. But as an intellectual of space of subjugation, he was surprised to see how the Europeans could leave the field of objectivity and become prejudiced against other cultures and peoples. In terms of linking the European prejudices to their material interests, Ahmed Rıza was quite successful. Somewhat disappointed by the European
biases and prejudices, Ahmed Rıza found himself in the position of countering prejudices against Islam. As a positivist, he was a legislator, and as an intellectual struggling against the European prejudices, he was an interpreter. Mümtaz Turhan’s project was to supply a macro-level roadmap for Westernization of Turkey, a new model to be followed. In his model, the emphasis was on education. In this sense, there is no doubt that his purpose was to make authoritative statements; he was a legislator in Bauman’s terminology. But at the same time, as a conservative intellectual, he had a strong emphasis on the significance of preserving the local culture, too. The principal reflection of this emphasis was his perspective on spiritual development. With the idea of spiritual development, he was imagining a model of modernization peacefully coexisting with the national and religious values. In this sense he was an interpreter in Bauman’s terminology.

Perhaps the most interesting example of an intellectual with multiple roles was Doğan Avcıoğlu. He was a stubborn modernist to the extent that he could reduce his entire political analysis to developmentalism. For him, socialism was necessary for Turkey first and foremost as a fast path to modernization. He was an extremist on the issue of secularism. He was a keen supporter of all the steps taken by the single-party regime in order to disestablish Islam. He was not only a legislator in Bauman’s terms, but also a rational planner in Eyerman’s typology. However, even he found himself in certain instances in a position to counter prejudices against Islam. As already overviewed in Chapter 8, while discussing the reason for Turkey’s backwardness, he attempted to disprove Toynbee’s argument. For Avcıoğlu, Toynbee and many other Western scholars were wrong to see Islam as an obstacle to progress. He also strongly criticized those Western historians who depicted nomadism as the main characteristic and unchanging fate of the Turks. For challenging these and other stereotypical characterizations, he referred to the classical period of the Ottoman Empire when an “Eastern” state was in fact a super-power. This challenge Avcıoğlu posed against
Toynbee and others is a typical example of criticizing Orientalism. In this sense, he was an interpreter, aiming at a fair understanding of local history in relation to the histories of global hierarchies. Avcıoğlu did not use the term Orientalism, but Said’s book would clearly have appealed to him a lot.

V

This study argues that the role of the intellectual as an interpreter had been widely observed among Turkish intellectuals with two dimensions, the interpretation and the work of translation. At this point, a caution is needed concerning the addressee of the intellectuals examined so far. In his recent book *Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror*, Hamid Dabashi argues that it would be wrong to see the Europe and the West as the principle interlocutors of the world. According to Dabashi (2009: 273), it is not necessary to try hard to convince the Western audience about “the atrocities of colonialism around the globe—as if unless and until this fictive white male interlocutor is not convinced that the horrors of colonialism actually took place, then they did not in fact happen at all.”

This issue of addressee has to be taken seriously, and it is true that one does not need to directly address a Western audience in criticizing imperialism, Westernization and Orientalism. Yet, at the same time, one can argue that Turkish intellectuals were perhaps too much inner-oriented. With the exception of Ahmed Rıza’s book, which was published in Paris in 1922 as *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient*, none of them had reached the Western audience. They had close contacts with the European circles at different levels and most of them had an international experience, in one way or another. However, they never aimed at having a European audience; they were, not writing and publishing in any language other than Turkish. The addressees of their writings were the

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96 The other partial exception was Mehmet Ali Aybar’s participation into Russell Tribunal, about the war crimes of the USA in Vietnam, but the addressee of the Tribunal was more global, than the Anglo-American world.
national political and intellectual circles. Thus, when Dabashi’s (2009: 272) question of how to write and act in a manner such that “the West” is no longer the principle interlocutor of the critical intelligence is taken into consideration, the suggestion of the Turkish intellectuals examined in this study would be to address the local public and focusing on establishing a national modernity. As interpreters, Turkish intellectuals carried out comprehensive work on translation, but perhaps more importantly, they interpreted the modernity project. Their most significant contribution was imagining modernity. While doing this, they also challenged the prejudices against their own country. Their addresses were the locals; their primary aim was to convince the local public opinion of the equality claim. As it was stated by several of them, these were also responses to self-Orientalist perspectives voiced by their peers.

VI

Part II supports the argument put forward in Part I that it is possible to observe commonalities in the intellectual agendas in different contexts of space of subjugation. Turkish intellectuals attempted to counter Western prejudices against their society, and while doing this, an important battle ground was the notion of barbarism. Their strategy was to indicate the historicity and multiple usages of the term, and hence, to argue that in different time periods, different societies had been also labeled as barbarian, including Europeans. This was a strategy employed by many other intellectuals in other spaces of subjugation as well. Second, while criticizing European imperialism, Turkish intellectuals frequently emphasized that occupying and colonizing others’ land were not acceptable in terms of morality. Put differently, they based their criticisms on ethics; so did many other intellectuals in different zones of space of subjugations.

The third commonality is probably the most important one. It concerns the general anxiety with respect to experiencing modernity outside the West. Chakrabarty refers to this
anxiety as the unhappy consciousness. In his understanding, the Bengali modern was the embodiment of this unhappy consciousness (Chakrabarty 1994), and in arguing this, he is mainly referring to the gender context. It is not the context to which I refer here. In my understanding, this anxiety or unhappy consciousness is more related to a feeling of incompleteness concerning the modernity project. Chatterjee (1998) emphasizes that non-Western modernities have always had a mark of incompleteness. They are considered as incomplete projects of ‘modernization’.” Chakrabarty seems to fully agree. He states that there is a “tendency to read Indian history in terms of a lack, an absence, or an incompleteness that translates into ‘inadequacy’” (Chakrabarty 2000: 32). The feeling of inadequacy is a derivative of the feeling of incompleteness. This is a self-perception; it is about feeling as if one is doomed to remain incomplete. This was the source of anxiety or the unhappy consciousness, and it was by no means peculiar to the Subcontinent. Daryush Shayegan reminds us that this state of mind is common in different spaces of subjugation. In his book *Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the West*, Shayegan (1997: vii) states that “we who were born on the periphery are living through a time of conflict between different blocs of knowledge. We are trapped in a fault-line between incompatible worlds, worlds that mutually repel and deform one another. … The only people really qualified to draw attention to it are those who pay the price, in ‘unhappy consciousness’.”

This anxiety had also been the state of mind for the Turkish experience in modernity and modernization, and, therefore, it was observable in Turkish intellectuals as well. If the concern about incompleteness is one source of the anxiety, the other source was related to the concrete history of modernization. It was experienced as “Westernization against the West” or “Westernization despite the West.” This needs to be understood both at the realm of realpolitik and at the symbolic realm. In the realm of realpolitik, the republican modernization project had started with a war of independence fought against European armies. European
powers were the enemy, and after the victory the leaders of the resistance movement became
the leaders of Westernization movement. The making of the republic was a fight against the
Western powers and it was modeled by following the West. When we look at the symbolic
realm, the literary critic Orhan Koçak (2010) states that, the “Westernization against the
West” was somewhat related to the “curse of belatedness.” The curse of belatedness was a
self-perception. At the same time the new model—with its foreignness, appearing as the
remedy, was signaling the direction the future would take. This was the source of anxiety: the
model, with all its foreignness, had appeared as something unattainable and unachievable. In
Koçak’s words,

This was the original instance of the double-bind, its first moment: Be like me, the
new foreign model seemed to be whispering to the poet – adding, as you know full
well that you cannot. Already before the turn of the century a more apprehensive
feeling had set in, a preliminary stage of that state of ‘unhappy, internally divided
consciousness’ described by Hegel, which would soon lead to a real division
within the ranks of the Westernizing intelligentsia itself, with those recoiling from
the bolder versions of the ‘Western style’ irresistibly drawn toward the
disgruntled traditionalists who had been suppressed or left aside by the first wave
of Westernization—thereby jointly forming a veritable pool of resentment.
(Koçak 2010)

Meltem Ahıska also observes this anxiety in the Turkish context. In her words,
“Europe has been an object of desire as well as a source of frustration for Turkish national
identity in a long and strained history” (Ahıska 2003). The West was celebrated as the model,
yet at the same time, it was perceived as a threat to national values. For her, the history of
Turkish modernization was coupled with a self-conscious anxiety between “the East” and the
timeless fantasy of “the West.” This fantasy aspect prevails around the question of “how the
Europe sees us,” which is still a crucial question in constituting some foundational aspects of
the Turkish modernity. What increased this anxiety, has been the Western audience, finding
“Turkish modernity always lacking the ‘real thing’” (Ahıska 2010: 186-187).
The analysis in Part II offers many instances of this anxiety. Peyami Safa, the notable conservative intellectual and novelist, for example, maintained that “there is no Turkish issue but this difference” (but farktan başka Türk meselesi yoktur) (Safa 1938: 21) after visiting Europe. His anxiety about not being at the same level of progress with Europe was obvious. Yet at the same time, it was obvious in his novel Fatih-Harbiye and in his other writings that he was worried about the possibility of overdoing Westernization, and, therefore, about Turkish society losing its national identity. As already emphasized in Chapter 2, intellectuals in the spaces of subjugation were well aware of the fact that modernity’s claim to singularity offers some egalitarian perspectives while jeopardizing their claim to identity. They were also aware of the fact that this claim to singularity was dubious. At the more general level, one might argue that the anxiety was related to the selective appropriation of the Western modernity. On the one hand, the selective appropriation implied a Eurocentric discourse, degrading the non-Western modernity as secondary experience of modernity by default, something incomplete by nature. On the other hand, it was the very imagination of the local about modernity. As long as their imaginations included a search for difference, which has the potential to appear and to be accepted as a lack, this made the imagination of modernity an unhappy consciousness. In the context of selective appropriation of Western modernity, Chatterjee (1989) states that the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection. In other words, “it was not a dismissal of modernity; the attempt was rather to make modernity consistent with nationalist project.” This was also true for the Turkish case. However, modernization by following a model inevitably caused anxiety. Following the model and the self-conscious decision of having a critical distance to it made incompleteness a perpetual condition.

The anxiety tells us that all theoretical questions concerning identity and difference, or universalism and particularism, were concrete questions, which occupied the agenda and
minds of Turkish intellectuals. These were all difficult theoretical matters, not easily solvable; thus it would be fairer to take them as open-ended issues not having a clear solution. The anxiety also appeared in the writings of Turkish intellectuals examined in this study in the form of a series of inconsistencies and hesitation with respect to different issues. For instance, Ziya Gökalg, who had been evaluated as the first systematic theoretician of Turkish nationalism by several authors, had some reservations concerning the path to take within the context of modernization. On the one hand, his overall project was based on a distinction between culture and civilization. This was a search for a selective appropriation of Western modernity. But, on the other hand, in his book *The Principles of Turkism*, he claimed that when a society takes a certain civilization as a model, it has to take it as a system. He emphasized that civilization has to be taken from the inside and not from the outside. He claimed that like religion, civilization, too, requires sincere believing and loyalty (Gökalg 1968: 38; Gökalg 1959: 270). This was the moment when Gökalg could not follow his own distinction between culture and civilization, and, hence, failed to suggest a consistent list of priorities for the cultural, religious and civilizational identities and related loyalties.

Another example is Celâl Nuri. When he published his book *The Turkish Revolution* in 1926, the main argument refuted the suggestion of selectively appropriating Western modernity. He was an utmost supporter of radical modernization. However, he had also some reservations. Although he never criticized the single-party establishment, he had some concerns regarding the radical way followed in the case of the alphabet reform. In this specific context, he was in favor of a selective appropriation and compromise. Likewise, while he severely criticized Turkish intellectuals for having fully adopted the Western perspective (read Orientalist) while evaluating their own society, Peyami Safa, too, in different instances adopted the same Orientalist point of view in his generalization about the Eastern people. The anxiety caused inconsistency.
VII

The issue of nativism has been one of the central focuses of this study. It is not only discussed in Part I, but in each chapter of Part II, where nativism is discussed separately for each group of intellectuals. It is one of the key arguments of this study that nativism is a fundamental component of facing Eurocentrism. In spaces of subjugation, the interplay between facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity has always raised the issue of nativism, simply because it has been common to refer to some claims of identity while voicing a criticism of Eurocentrism. One might think of nativism as being an inescapable complexity for the intellectuals of space of subjugation, which is also related to the reservations and inconsistencies just discussed. It is already mentioned in Introduction and in Chapter 2 that nativism has different aspects. Syed Farid Alatas (1993) identifies two kinds of nativism. The first one might be called classical nativism, as it is the most commonly observed. Classical nativists attribute superiority to their own culture. It is usually an essentialist perspective, searching for “essences” of the cultures, putting the emphasis on differences and absolute oppositions between Western and non-Western cultures. This type of nativism might lead to a wholesale rejection of Western thought—an attempt to substitute it with an indigenous one. When he refers to non-European nationalist culturalisms as provincialist reactions, Samir Amin refers to this type of nativism. The second type of nativism identified by Alatas is less commonly observed. This corresponds to “the tendency to uphold and perpetuate the superiority of Western cultural and political system” (Alatas 1993). Opposed to the first type, the second type nativists aim at replacing whatever they consider indigenous with its Western substitute. One might call this second type as a Eurocentric nativism. In addition to Alatas’s twofold typology of nativism, I argue that there is a third type of nativism. This type of nativism tends to absolutize the subjugation experienced in the past as the reason of
everything occurring in the present. This nativism is inclined to underestimate local dynamics. Usually this nativism does not acknowledge the complexity of the subjugation and accepts the local as one and unified, by ignoring local collaboration serving Western penetration.

The analyses developed throughout Part II reveals that all three types of nativism were observable among different groups of Turkish intellectuals. The examples of the first types of nativism are numerous. Several Turkish intellectuals attributed different sorts of positive and superior characteristics to their own culture. In this sense, the case of Ahmed Rıza is worth emphasizing. He was a positivist, and one of the most univeralist intellectual covered in this study. However, as the discussion at the end of Chapter 7 indicates, he had also some nativist tendencies. He was aware of such a risk. This is the reason why he quoted the motto of Lessing, “May God preserve me from a patriotism that would prevent me from being a citizen of the world” (Ahmed Rıza 1988: 10). Nevertheless, he could still describe all the Muslim civilization as the land of tolerance and nothing else. Nationalist components in the writings of Ziya Gökalp, Şevket Süreyya and Peyami Safa are other examples of the first type of nativism.

Concerning the second type of nativism, namely the Eurocentric nativism which is perpetuating the superiority of Western cultural and political system, the best example is the book by Celâl Nuri The Turkish Revolution. The book was written against the idea of selective appropriation of Western modernity. In 1926, Celâl Nuri argued for the necessity of a wholesale Westernization, without incorporating the local culture’s contribution. He was a radical in this sense. At the state level, the regime of the single-party era certainly had some Eurocentric policies and reform agenda. Chapter 6 offers a general perspective on this. Celâl Nuri’s book The Turkish Revolution was the best book reflecting the Eurocentrism of Kemalism, by exceeding the dose of Eurocentrism in the official discourse in some issues, and failing to reach it in others. The second type of nativism is crucial to understanding the
tensions related to the interplay between facing Eurocentrism and imagining modernity. Arif Dirlik maintains that the complexities of Eurocentrism become more daunting if we note that Eurocentrism is hardly a phenomenon limited to EuroAmerica. For him, “much of what we associate with Eurocentrism is now internal to societies worldwide” (Dirlik 1999). This made Eurocentrism universal and thus different compared to earlier ethnocentric perspectives. “It is universal in the sense that Eurocentrism may be diffused through the agencies of non-EuroAmericans, which underlines the importance of a structural appreciation of Eurocentrism” (Dirlik 1999). Certainly, the Kemalist single-party regime had a function in the diffusion of Eurocentrism as a way of modernization, and Celâl Nuri contributed to this process. As it is already discussed in Chapter 8, the Eurocentric dimension of Kemalism created tension even within the Kemalist circles and especially Şevket Süreyya, who sometimes had first type nativism tendencies, voiced his criticism of this matter.

The best example of third type of nativism—the absolutizing of subjugation, was the book by Doğan Avcıoğlu *Turkey’s Order*, and his other writings. Avcıoğlu’s book was in fact quite detailed in terms of the penetration of European imperialism into the Ottoman Empire. However, this detail analysis failed to incorporate the complexities of the process. Probably, it would be too much to expect from Avcıoğlu to offer a fully developed analysis, including how European imperialism limited Ottoman sovereignty, on the one hand, and enabled the Porte a higher state capacity, on the other. For Avcıoğlu the complex network of informal colonialism was not a complex phenomenon, but rather a one-dimensional process. If knowledge production is an accumulative process, the uni-dimensionality of Avcıoğlu’s analysis seems unavoidable when the state of the literature in the 1960s is taken into consideration. Nevertheless, there is at least one other repercussion of nativism by absolutizing the subjugation. In his book *Provincializing Europe*, Chakrabarty (2000: 6) mentions the “not yet” of historicism. The “not yet” implies that non-European peoples need
development, getting civilized and education before claiming for democracy and equality. The "not yet" was a recommendation to wait. The global hierarchies had been functioning with the supposed imaginary waiting room of historicism. The opposite of "not yet" was the urgency of "now." The emphasis on "now" was the basis for both political modernity and democracy. The work of Avcioğlu is an interesting example in this sense. He defended the "not yet" of historicism wholeheartedly. In his understanding, Turkey did not have a good educational system; hence, he concluded that it was early to have a fully democratic system. Similarly, he argued that there was no class distinction in Turkey yet, therefore, it was wrong to engage in class-based politics. Avcioğlu argued that the reason for all these deficiencies was European imperialism. Due to his nativist position absolutizing the subjugation, Avcioğlu failed to see the complexities of the Turkish society, including a working class. In Avcioğlu’s case, nativism absolutizing the subjugation lead to an elitist and developmentalist conception of the politics, by denying the popular rule principle of democracy and its urgency.

Consequently, these three types of nativism had been accompanying Turkish intellectuals’ critiques of Eurocentrism and imaginations of modernity. There are at least two conclusions to be drawn from this picture. First, the processes of facing Eurocentrism, and facing modernity were complex processes, both in terms theoretical questions, realpolitik context, and identity claims. The nativist claims need to be evaluated within these complexities. The complexities created inconsistencies, hesitations, and different sorts of nativism. Second, in the Turkish case, we do not observe a monolithic nativism, but different nativisms have conflicting and contradictory arguments. Taking these two conclusions into consideration, I argue, according to the analyses developed hitherto, that Turkish intellectual history in the twentieth century is not a triumph of nativism. When I refer to the triumph of nativism, the benchmark which I have in mind is the intellectual history of Iran written by

In his study on the response of the Iranian intellectuals to the tremendous political, social and economic transformation of the Iranian society in the second half of the twentieth century, Boroujerdi (1996) emphasized the crucial impact of this response in the making of the modern Iranian identity, the self-perception of Iranians, and their perception of the West. He suggests considering nativism as a response to Eurocentrism and colonialism both at the level of text and at the level of political consciousness. In Boroujerdi’s understanding, nativism corresponded to critiques challenged Western social sciences’ nominally universal notions, assumptions and language. He argued that the Iranian intellectuals played a fundamental role in mediating the interaction between the influence of the West and the local historical heritage of Iran, both pre-Islamic and Islamic. In brief, Boroujerdi argued that the dominant tendency in the Iranian intellectual atmosphere in the years leading to the revolution in 1979 was a nativist discourse, a cry for authenticity, which resulted, along with the internal dynamics of Iranian politics, from the confrontation with the Western domination and from a sense of otherness vis-à-vis the West. In other words, the authentic Iranian identity that the intellectuals quested for was shaped based on a “Western other” and thus through Orientalism in reverse.

The analyses put forward in Part II show that the Turkish intellectual history was not based on a search for authenticity, a cry for a lost indigenous culture. There are four reasons to argue that the Turkish intellectual history was not a triumph of nativism. First, for each group of intellectual scrutinized one of the most important themes was to search for a balance between universalism and particularism. The interplay between facing Eurocentrism and facing modernity was indeed based on the search for this balance. The dominant issue was not authenticity, but claims for equality and claims for modernity. Second, since Ahmed Rıza an
important agenda for Turkish intellectuals was developing a morality based criticism of European imperialism. Once the criticism is based on morality, stepping into the realm of universalism is inevitable, simply because without assuming a common ground of morality encompassing all human beings universally, it would not be possible to ground the criticism on morality. Third, it needs to be emphasized that even the conservative intellectuals’ priority was not authenticity, but rather a modernity project not alienated from national and local values. Chapter 9 suggests reading these endeavours as searches for alternative modernities. True, conservative intellectuals had some reservations regarding for the radical modernism of the Kemalist establishment, but even Peyami Safa urged for a mentality change at the society level for a successful modernization. As long as conservative intellectuals sided with modernity project, nativism did not become the dominant discourse in the Turkish intellectual circles. It never disappeared, but did not dictate the agenda. Last and not the least, the analyses in Part II reveal that every reference to locality or difference is by no means related to nativism. For instance, first Şevket Süreyya, then Doğan Avcıoğlu aptly challenged the Eurocentric perspectives in historiography, and argued that Eurocentric history writing had not much to offer to understand the peculiarities of the Ottoman history. While emphasizing this, Avcıoğlu also defended employing general concepts such as feudalism, in support of comparative thinking. Obviously, this had nothing in common with nativism. Another instance is Mehmet Ali Aybar’s search for localizing socialism. Throughout his career, Aybar was against Soviet hegemony over other socialist movements via Comintern, and argued that the socialism could only be established by democratic process. In this context, he maintained that every country should develop its own perspective on socialism according to the local historical and social conditions, without denying the universal socialist principles. By the same token, such an emphasis on locality was not nativism. All in all, the discourse of Turkish intellectuals was not overruled by parochialism.
Samir Amin (1989: 136) concludes his book *Eurocentrism* by emphasizing that “substituting a new paradigm for the one on which Eurocentrism is based is a difficult long-term task.” Dirlik shares the same perspective, when he asks “is there then an outside of Eurocentrism?” He states that “the universalization of Eurocentrism must itself be understood in terms of the ways in which EuroAmerican values were interpellated into the structures of societies worldview, transforming their political, social and economic relations, but not homogenizing them, or assimilating them to the structures and values of Eurocentrism” (Dirlik 1999). Dirlik maintains that Eurocentrism is not universal in the sense that it permits no outside, “it is nevertheless the case that it has become increasingly impossible to imagine outside of it, if by outside we understand places outside of the reach of EuroAmerican practices.” Similarly, Chakrabarty (2000: 44) states that “the project of provincializing Europe must realize itself within its own impossibility.” The difficulty in substituting Eurocentrism or even the impossibility of such replacement has accompanied Turkish intellectuals in their journeys in imagining modernity. The founding father of sociology in Turkey, Ziya Gökalp, was well aware of the indispensability of the master codes of European modernity (Davison 2006). Yet, at the same time, he was conscious of the fact that Europe’s indispensability was coupled with the idea of its inadequacy. This split not only dominated the work of Ziya Gökalp, but also the intellectual agenda in general throughout the twentieth century. This general awareness prevented the intellectual history of Turkey from being captured by the triumph of nativism. This awareness made the “facing modernity” component stronger than the “facing Eurocentrism” component of the intellectual agenda.
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