FROM THE MASS MIND TO CONTENT NEUTRALITY: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The following study examines the constitutional and human rights protection of assemblies in five jurisdictions. The default hypothesis has been that public assemblies, street protests, and demonstrations appear to turn so often into scenes of abuse of rights on the part of participants and abuse of power on the part of state authorities at least in part because law related to assemblies is itself problematic. To partially verify this hypothesis a comparative assessment of the jurisprudence of supreme and constitutional courts and human rights bodies of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and of the European Court of Human Rights was undertaken.

Comparative law scholarship – very developed in the field of freedom of expression – has so far not studied freedom of assembly extensively, despite the fact that public assemblies constantly raise major human rights issues all over the world.

Monographs on comparative freedom of assembly are limited to early studies on German and US law, though recently comparisons of ECHR and UK assembly jurisprudence are increasingly published, naturally occasioned by the Human Rights Act. These few studies not only do not provide a broader comparative perspective, but they also do not contextualize the state of the law on assemblies by contrasting it with the findings of empirical scholarship, abundant with regard to street protests and demonstrations. This latter one is necessary because it makes visible several distortions of jurisprudence, especially the dangers of a mechanical transposition of freedom of speech doctrines to assemblies.
Therefore, this project first provides an empirical framework by relying on literature from crowd and social psychology and social movement studies (Part I.A.). Then it goes on to give a general overview of how law traditionally and conceptually has dealt with assemblies, and what reasons (rationales) are given by courts today to protect freedom of assembly (Part I.B.). Part II thereupon examines in detail the limits of freedom of assembly as found in constitutional and human rights jurisprudence. Finally, the Conclusion contrasts the main findings of the legal comparison with that of the empirical sciences.

The results by and large support the hypothesis that law in itself is deficient in protecting assemblies, though the jurisdictions strongly vary in the extent and nature of deficiencies shown. The US Supreme Court’s content-neutrality doctrine very much harms assemblies, a finding which strongly challenges the highly rights protective reputation of that court. The German Constitutional Court allows many preventive and many openly viewpoint discriminatory restrictions on assemblies, sometimes to the extent of threatening the integrity of the basic rights doctrine itself, a finding perhaps known to German, but not so much to international academia. UK courts allow rather distant and intangible harms and interests to justify restrictions, often blanket bans on freedom of assembly, and are not unequivocally determined to leave behind the common law liberty approach. French courts still employ a somewhat intransparent reasoning, and operate often within an etatist or pre-constitutionalist conceptual framework, and in addition exhibit latently all the problems the German Court does. Clearly though French fundamental rights law is in such a turbulence that well-supported conclusions are the most difficult to draw. The ECHR – after an initial period of almost complete disregard for the value of freedom of assembly – has in the last decade or so strengthened human rights protection as much as it is perhaps possible for an international court.
All these critiques notwithstanding, the following argument is first of all meant to be a call for more transparent and thorough examination of the manifold and partly contradictory values, interests, and dangers, which are at stake when drawing the contours of freedom of assembly. Empirical scholarship on the meaning and significance of assemblies in social life, imperfect as it is, ought to be channeled more into legal (including judicial) thinking about assemblies, if decisions are to be grounded in reason and not prejudice.
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INTRODUCTION

“Was das freie Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsrecht zu bedeuten hat und wie wichtig es für die Freiheit ist, weiß ja jedes Kind und ist nicht nötig, viel davon zu sagen.” 1 (Theodor Mommsen)

Freedom of assembly is perhaps the right most naturally exercised, most hard to suppress, but at the same time most abused by both its subjects and by state authorities. Think only of recent scenes about anti-globalization, anti-war, anti-animal experiments protests, Paris banlieu protests, occupations of universities, the movement ‘Occupy’, riots in London, protests against (or for) Putin in Russia, attack on religious assemblies in Egypt, the Duisburg love parade stampede, mass detention before the G8 summit, police shooting a G8 protestors in Genoa, etc. – clearly impossible to list even the most spectacular ones. Many people died, many more got injured, including police, and the damage caused is inestimable. Earlier historical times of course have seen similar outbursts and transgressions of assemblies into mobs, pogroms, or police abuse, and even stampedes appearing as act of God (see the inimitable Elias Canetti), as something of a natural catastrophe. As different countries in very different political and historical contexts appear to have from time to time the same sort of problems, leaves the lawyer with one choice: to blame law. Clearly, there appears to be something more generally or genuinely problematic about “assemblies” and the reaction of law than what could be explained away by specific historical-political contingencies, or more technical ones like lack of culture of crowd control and the like. That has been the default hypothesis of this project.

1 Theodor Mommsen, Die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes, mit Belehrungen und Erläuterungen (Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1969 cop. 1849) 52.
Therefore, a comparative assessment of the human right to freedom of assembly is undertaken in the hope that it sheds light to systematic problems in the nature of freedom of assembly, by critically reconstructing its scope and limits in the jurisprudence of high courts in five jurisdictions. What has become very clear early on is a strong ambivalence or constant duality around freedom of assembly in law, and public assemblies themselves in empirical studies.

In legal decisions and commentary, freedom of assembly is widely cherished as a precious human right, indispensable for the individual person, for groups within society, and for the whole society, including for the preservation of democratic governance. However, already at a superficial look it becomes apparent that constitutional and human rights law allows so many and so serious limits on freedom of assembly as perhaps on no other right, especially not on free speech. Prior restraints such as permits, bans, conditions; and restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the assemblies abound in every jurisdiction, de facto in addition to general restrictions allowed on speech or expression, as the activities going on at assemblies are reconfigured as freedom of speech or opinion by courts.

Other disciplines, engaging with assemblies on a more empirical basis, namely psychology and sociology echo this same ambivalence. Early crowd psychology and important currents in social psychology find “masses” dangerous, emotionalized, prone to evil manipulation, where group identity alone increases hostility, reduces rationality, and so on. Social movement studies, in apparent contradiction, claim to document a rational and rationalizable panoply of motivations, grievances, structures, organizations, and events; pointing out incentives to moderation and describing the creation and transfer of meaning incommunicable by other means and ways.

More philosophically oriented works, the few of them focusing on freedom of assembly in particular, oscillate between Schmittian acclamation and fear of subversion, even going as far
as questioning whether there is any basis for freedom of assembly in a democracy which guarantees freedom of speech.

Gatherings of people in public clearly have a potential to transcend or transgress normalcy, be it the psychological, moral, or religious average, or political mainstream, within ordinary rules of the game of democracy (or any other form of government), or even social peace. Revolutions and pogroms start with assemblies, and end – or so we hope – with the establishment of other assemblies, allegedly deliberative and representative ones. What remains in between is freedom of assembly. The object protected by freedom of assembly is foundationally in-between, mirroring and realigning the line between our fears and hopes, between past and future, reason and emotion, people and government, minority and majority. The object protected by freedom of assembly is also in-between in another regard, between the loneliness of the writer or the vulnerability of the speaker and the discipline and strength of the police and army. For some, it might appear as something between the individual and the People. It is also something in between the arguing press and the deciding voting booth, referendum or lawmaking. It speaks as much as it acts. It asserts, shouts and wills, but it has no power to impose. It is a performance, a creation – but only of meaning. It is theatre, but not art. It threatens, but does not kill. It is disobedience, protest or conspiracy but not revolution. It is a challenge.

Certainly a challenge to well-educated, literate people like judges and scholars whose natural form of communication is the argumentative essay. Assemblies are sometimes too messy mass for a learned mind, sometimes too organized and disciplined to a free one. Still, sometimes even judges get to the streets. How do they draw the limits of this activity when pursued by others, often radically others?

To fully appreciate what constitutional and human rights jurisprudence or courts and judges are telling about freedom of assembly, it is necessary to look to empirical sciences describing
and analyzing phenomena related to assemblies. Thus the following inquiry aims first at sketching an empirical model or rather, a list of propositions, distilled from psychology and sociology on how assemblies actually operate in social life (PART I. A.). As already hinted, that will not release the reader from the ambivalence and unease ever present in reflecting on gatherings of people in public. Then this framework will be supplemented by a systematization of general features of freedom of assembly, i.e. something called the legal or normative model of assemblies (PART I. B.). Though these two models are in practice likely co-formed by each other, it is impossible to decipher exactly in what ways. In the second part, the focus will be on the details making out more closely the contours of freedom of assembly: its limits (PART II.). Firstly, a separate chapter will discuss prior restraints (PART II.A.), a characteristic of assembly law all over the examined jurisdictions, including the question of exemptions from prior restraint. This is the only part where it appears that assemblies are not considered “speech” let alone “press” by courts as they allow all kinds of prior restraints clearly impermissible on other expressive activities. PART II.B. thereupon will approach the question of limits from the substantive point of view, mapping values and interests which are considered so important that their protection justifies restriction on freedom of assembly. This part – as it turns out – is in many regards an exercise in comparative freedom of speech law, as the limits overlap because courts transpose free speech and opinion doctrines to assemblies. Indeed many great free speech decisions actually involved assemblies, an aspect lost in translation. The last chapter on limits, PART II. C, examines restrictions on what is called the time, place or manner of the assembly, and hopes to reveal more fully the distortion of jurisprudence caused by a narrow-minded concept of content-neutrality and strict construction of meaning and communication in some of the jurisdictions, while open content-discrimination in others.
The Conclusion revisits in this light the findings of the first part on general empirical features and normative assumptions surrounding assemblies.

The jurisprudence of constitutional and supreme courts and quasi-judicial bodies of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and Germany are selected because I aimed at revealing general problems in the nature of freedom of assembly, and hoped they come to fore by mapping the main constitutional traditions within human rights respecting democracies. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) adds an international dimension. Especially in cases where the ECHR proves either especially cautious, or especially rights protective, it is reasonable to suspect a general problem or pattern less visible from within the legal order of the nation state.

In discussing the particular issues in each of the jurisdictions, hard choices had to be made as to the order of discussion, i.e. with which court to start and continue. Most of the times, I claim to have started with the court where the particular issue has been especially controversial or where the court had set an example, or determined the conceptual frame in an influential way. Often, but by far not always, it is the US Supreme Court (USSC), and rarely if ever is it the French Constitutional Council (CC) or the Conseil d’État (CÉ). The German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) and courts in the United Kingdom are mostly in the middle, and sometimes are the starters, while the ECHR is always the last for reasons of its internationality. I also do not stick to forcefully find answers to each question, each issue examined always in every jurisdiction, but to find the answers only where they were given. This method is justified in a thesis aspiring to form a general view of the nature of freedom of assembly by examining arguments judges actually employ and weigh in their reasoning.

Some important caveats are due: this thesis does not take into account Habermasian theory, neither that of John Searle, or other, more general philosophical approaches. This is partly explicable by the fact that to properly establish a connection would explode limits of
disponible space, and also by an aspiration to look at empirical and legal scholarship only. In case of including more normative and philosophical approaches, I would have also needed to take a stance on constituent power and sovereignty, most dubious and controversial issues of political philosophy, though concededly some normative assumptions inevitably frame this research as well. This study only hopes to contribute as a basis for later research in search of a better theorization of assemblies and their wider philosophical contexts. A large and fast developing segment of social movements studies, that of transnational movements is also not discussed, because of the aspiration to form a general view of constitutional and human rights law’s performance with regard to assemblies. The many important questions of practical policing of – especially unpeaceful – assemblies are also largely left out of the scope of this study, not the least because these are largely conceptualized not as issues pertaining to the right of assembly, but to right to life, bodily integrity, right to liberty, and so on. This omission is not to imply that some of these aspects ought not to be conceptualized as interferences with freedom of assembly as well, and that could again be the object of another inquiry. Case law was considered till the end of July 2011, or later where it was possible.
PART I. THE PEOPLE GATHERED IN PUBLIC FROM A BIRD’S EYE VIEW: EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE MODELS

A. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL MODELS, EXPERIMENTS, AND INTERPRETATIONS

Freedom of assembly as an object of human rights law and scholarship displays in the tension field of sociology and mass psychology. At a planned “assembly”, one can anticipate a smaller or larger crowd. Crowds, in the everyday “common” experience, or according to public beliefs, tend to be passionate, uncontrolled, violent, destructive, a race to the bottom in terms of intellectual insight and reasoned argument. Early authors on crowd psychology from Le Bon to Freud have provided explanations for this alleged experience which still animate the common imaginary of judges, police and legislators. Sociology, especially the relevant field of social movements, clearly contradicts mass psychology in that it sees demonstration as a more or less autonomous\(^2\) moment in a rational and rationalizable chain of events where people act purposefully in order to further a cause they deem valuable. In this vein, literature on social movement and protests has introduced a wide range of concepts which describe the movement in relying on assumptions on rationality. The rationality assumption has not remained unsophisticated, just as crowd psychology went beyond Le Bon’s simplistic observations and speculations. In the following the vast material of psychology and sociology will be discussed in a structure which allows to show both differences and points of agreement within the empirical disciplines. Methodological problems abound: while it can be asserted that some theories could not be confirmed in experiments, or protest event analyses,

\(^2\) Charles Tilly less, Matthias Reiss more. See, CHARLES TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768-2004 (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, 2004) and other works where he assumes that demonstration is one among the many in the repertoire of protest movements, and Matthias Reiss, Introduction in THE STREET AS STAGE: PROTEST MARCHES AND PUBLIC RALLIES SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Matthias Reiss ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), who emphasizes that a new agency is gained through coming together in the public place, thus, demonstration is a special, autonomous moment in the life of a social movement, or even independent of a movement.
it is in most cases impossible to state that previous theories were fully rebutted. In others, the theory cannot be tested empirically, for instance it is impossible to go among the rioters asking them to fill out surveys or let them join to machines monitoring their brain activity. At the same time, the following discussion also foreshadows dilemmas related to crucial questions of human rights adjudication: freedom and coercion, dangerosity, possibility of prediction of violence or risk assessment, the view of assemblies as promoting justice or protecting minorities, and the complex issue of expressivity. Though not unequivocally clear in every regard, empirical scholarship actually says something about these issues with more basis in facts than judges rely on when deciding them by some sort of balancing.
1. Psychological models of gatherings: from the mass mind to social identity

1.1. Classical theories: suggestion, contagion, libidinal ties, “unfreedom of the individual in the mass”

Crowd psychology as a systematic field of study originates in Freud’s mass psychology which is in turn strongly influenced by Le Bon’s ‘The Crowd’, usually considered the first important treatise on crowds.³ Le Bon found that the crowd develops a special “crowd mind”, i.e. “[i]t forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of crowds” (emphasis in original).⁴ In the crowd, anonymity causes members to lose personal responsibility, and the number of people present induces in the individual a sentiment of invincibility, a feeling of heightened force and power.⁵ In addition, there are processes of contagion and suggestion at work in the crowd. The former facilitates the spreading of ideas and sentiments like epidemics in a crowd, while the latter releases primitive, “ancestral, savage” instincts. The result is a potentially violent, uncivilized, emotionalized, instinct-governed behavior, “distinguished by feminine characteristics”⁶ as Le Bon also put it. However, the crowd is not only evil: Le Bon takes pains to emphasize heroic sacrifice, disinterestedness, devotion, a lofty morality so often present in crowds which are not observable in the case of the individual who is much more prone to self-interest.⁷ Suggestibility makes crowds vulnerable to influences to which they are exposed. If the influence is a Nazi leader, then the crowd becomes Nazi, if it is a revolutionary sentiment, then the crowd becomes a revolutionary crowd, and so on. As to the ideas and reasons which crowds tend to accept, this early author is not more optimistic:⁸

³ There have always been serious accusations of plagiarism of Le Bon, as to the works of Scipio Sighele, Gabriel Tarde and Henry Fournial. See Jaap van Ginneken, The 1895 Debate on the Origins of Crowd Psychology, 21 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 375 (1985) I, as an outsider, follow the convention of the discipline in treating Le Bon as the groundbreaker.
⁵ Id. at 6.
⁶ Id. at 13.
⁷ Id. at 18-19.
⁸ Id. at 30.
Whatever be the ideas suggested to crowds they can only exercise influence on condition that they assume a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape. They present themselves then in the guise of images, and are only accessible to the masses under this form.

It follows that crowds are uncritical, open only to the most simplistic arguments, and even the most simple-shaped ideas and reasons have to be masqueraded into “images” – whence the overwhelming presence of symbols, verbal or materialized, in crowd phenomena.

Le Bon points out the importance of leaders in a crowd, who are often the initiators of the suggestive process. He describes the most effective leader as one with extreme narrow-mindedness, strong conviction, and little tendency to reasoned argument. These qualities give him the necessary *prestige* to animate the crowd. “Crowds instinctively recognise in men of energy and conviction the masters they are always in need of.”

Predicting the coming age of the crowd, he suggests that political leaders be aware of the qualities of the crowd and put them in the service of politics.

Le Bon’s theory, together with that of McDougall and Tarde whom I do not consider here for reasons of limited space, was taken up by Freud, who undertook to give a more profound explanation of the more or less correct factual description given by his predecessors, within his general psychoanalytic framework. Freud compares the mass mind to that of children and

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9 Id. at 129-130.
10 They both argued something similar to LeBonian, or, for that matter, Sighelian, idea of suggestion. McDougall would claim that „the principle of direct induction of emotion by way of the primitive sympathetic response” explains the behavior of the unorganized group. McDougall differentiates, however, the *organised group* from the crowd, which he considers more developed, intellectually less regressed, and socially less dangerous. The organized group is characterized by (i) heightened continuity; (ii) higher self-awareness of the member as to his function and value to the group; (iii) a relation with similar, possibly rivalling groups; (iv) traditions, usages, and institutions which regulate intragroup relations; and, (v) a structure which distributes the roles of each individual member. I find it sufficient here to refer to Freud, who sees in McDougall’s five conditions upon which the degree of organization depends an attempt to deprive a group of mass characteristics, and render it more individual-like. See WILLIAM MCDougALL, THE GROUP MIND (Cambridge, 1920), cited after SIGMUND FREUD, MASSENSPYCHOLOGIE UND ICH-ANALYSE (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag GmBH, Leipzig, Wien, Zürich 1921) 33-36. Gabriel Tarde, in turn, employs the concept of *imitation* to describe processes similar to contagion and suggestibility in the LeBonian sense, though he foresees that public opinion will take place of physical crowds in some significant ways, hence he can be considered one of the founders of mass communication studies, too. For an analysis of Tarde, see SERGE MOSCOVICI, THE AGE OF THE CROWD. A HISTORICAL TREATISE ON MASS PSYCHOLOGY (Cambridge, 1985, original published in 1981), especially Part IV. The Leader Principle, and Part V. Opinion and the Crowd, 155-206.
neurotics. Thus, he shares with his predecessors a certain judgment of prematurity or deviancy about the crowd. But crucially, he strives to look behind the “Spanish wall” of suggestion, and finds that it is love (the Greek *eros*, or libido) that keeps the mass together. However, this love is in the first place not the mutual love of equals toward each other, but the love believed to come from the leader and fall on everyone equally. Freud’s examples in this regard are that of the Catholic Church and the army, i.e. artificial crowds. In the church the bond keeping together the mass is the perceived immense love of Christ who stands in the center of the whole movement. In the army, everybody is equal in front of the commander, and the (vertical, one might say) bond between him and each soldier is reflected in the (horizontal) bond among fellow soldiers. Both of these bonds are libidinal, and Freud claims that they are the causes of the central phenomenon of mass psychology, i.e. “the unfreedom of the individual in the mass.” In the libidinal bond, the leader takes up the role of the Ego-Ideal of the individuals in the mass, thus he becomes the love-object to which every self-love is projected. At the same time, the love towards him allows the crowd members to identify with each other. Proof for such a theory comes, inter alia, in the situation of panic. Panic occurs when the leader is lost, and thus the libidinal structure which had kept the mass together suddenly collapses. The elimination of the bond between leader and led directly eliminates the bond among the led, and everybody falls back into the lonely self-love, and only cares about himself to such an extent that might even kill others, e.g. while fleeing a crowded theatre. Freud gives the following formula of the libidinal constitution of the primary, i.e. a non-organized mass in the McDougallian sense: Such a primary mass is a number of individuals who have placed one and the same object in the place of their Ego-Ideal and as a result they

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11 See Freud, Massenpsychologie, *e.g.* 19-21.
12 *Id.* at 45.
13 Es will uns scheinen, als befänden wir uns auf dem richtigen Weg, der die Haupterscheinung der Massenpsychologie, die Unfreiheit des Einzelnen in der Masse, aufklären kann. *Id.* at 50-51.
identified with each other in their Ego.\textsuperscript{14} In this sense Freud substitutes Trotter’s famous “herd instinct” theory with a “horde animal” theory which spells out that the man is the individual animal in a horde which is led by a single head.\textsuperscript{15}

The need for being in a mass led by a single man (only man, not woman) originates in the original or primal horde which is considered the first human community by thinkers as different as Darwin, Freud,\textsuperscript{16} and, it seems to me, even Hayek. What is special about Freud is the connection between that original horde and today’s mass phenomena. By way of the libidinal ties (identification and replacement of the Ego-Ideal and the leader), something like “genetic memories” of the original horde still determine the dynamism of crowd. As the libidinal tie in the mass is inhibited in its aims (zielgehemmt), not a direct sexual drive, – just as it was in the original horde, where only the father was exempted from “abstinence” --, the direct sexual drives “remain with the individual”. Whenever these direct drives overwhelm the inhibited ones, the mass collapses, or the individual quits the mass.\textsuperscript{17} This latter occurs e.g. in the case of neurotics or those falling in love with someone, especially someone outside the mass.

As we can see, the “founders” of crowd psychology emphasize that in the mass individuals lose their personality, they become prone to emotions, and they act mindlessly. Each of them mentions the suggestive role of the leader, while this is most central in the psychoanalytic account of Freud. Freud also expressly states that, in the crowd, the individual loses his freedom. A like-minded contemporary author engaging with early mass psychology, Serge Moscovici, on the other hand, claims the state of mass brings about freedom:\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{quote}
When saturation point is reached, there is an attempt to escape, to change the situation. The ego, anxious for unity, attempts to effect
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} “eine solche primäre Masse ist eine Anzahl von Individuen, die ein und dasselbe Objekt an die Stelle ihres Ichideals gesetzt und sich infolgedessen in ihrem Ich miteinander identifiziert haben.” Id. at 87.
\textsuperscript{15} Id. at 99.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 100.
\textsuperscript{17} Id. at 135-136.
\textsuperscript{18} MOSCOVICI, supra note 10 at 280 et seq.
reconciliation with the super-ego. If they come together again, like a child once more rejoining his parents after a long separation, there is a honeymoon period of rejoicing for the psyche. The super-ego no longer harasses the ego and allows it both to love itself, identify directly with all the other egos in the crowd and become one with them. Things could not be better. The freedom goes into their heads, and they reach a point where all prohibitions are violated, all taboos are broken, and they become as feverishly excited as someone in a manic state. (Emphasis added.)

Of course, this formulation should not mislead us to believe that Moscovici and Freud would not agree on this point. On the other hand, one cannot expect psychology to tell what “human freedom” means. Still, we can draw the statement already on the basis of the early psychologists that individuals in the crowd become de-individualized. This will be called the deindividuation effect of the mass, a central tenet of contemporary theories, to which I will return later. Here it suffices to say that Le Bon’s factual description of “deindividuation” is accepted by both Freud and Moscovici, the difference is that Freud tries to explain why it happens what happens. The cause is emotional, psychologically dictated and universally valid: libidinal ties are established which overwrite norms normally, i.e. outside-crowd, reigning in society. The explanation is individual-based, despite the fact that the crowd situation recalls and repeats drive formation which had appeared in the primal horde.

There is no mention that reason somehow would be able to block or divert the usual process of mindless, impulsive and dangerous crowd sentiments: in Le Bon’s case, it is the strong leader who should manipulate the crowd in the “appropriate” way, while for Freud, only direct and active sexual drives, even if suppressed as in neurosis, are able to tear out the individual from the crowd. The founders did not deal with possible, objectively or subjectively existing grievances, injustices, etc. which might motivate the crowd. The grievance, if any, is the human condition itself, being “deprived” of instant and complete fulfillment of needs from birth on.

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19 The mental state of disinhibition is unfree if we take freedom to be conscious control over one’s acts. The mental state of individual responsibility manifest in behavior in accordance with everyday social norms is unfree if we take freedom to be free from external restraints. In psychology, it appears to me, tertium non datur. Certainly such simplistic notions would not help constitutional law anyway.
They certainly do not talk about “protest” against an “idea” either, while there is a lot of talk about hostilities against outsiders. The relation of crowd and speech, so overwhelming in constitutional adjudication, is simply non-existent. If the leader talks, it is not because he wants to say something, but because he wants to exercise power, to realize his own (narcissistic) ego. Clearly, the crowd itself is such that it needs psychological uniformity, and the crowd situation itself creates bonds which keep the mass together, and disapproves outsiders. What causes people to come together in the first place, seems completely irrelevant. As if people needed to come together because they need a leader, they need a moment of mindlessly following the dictates of someone, to come together for the sake of getting rid of responsibility, “letting out steam”. In short: motivation for gathering is the “massing” itself. Moscovici in 1981 cites approvingly social practices that allow for such “outbursts” on a regular basis:

Societies which can look ahead and are concerned for the well-being of their members set aside certain times of the year – the Roman Saturnalia, for example – for this purpose and provide appropriate places for them. Disorder and protest beyond all measure and the waste of the patiently-amassed wealth are the price paid for the peace of mind of everyone and a means of increasing subsequent toleration of routine and boredom.

1.2. Current social psychology of intergroup relations: ingroup favoritism, polarization

Sofar discussed works all approach the question of “crowd” with a focus on the individual. This is readily understandable considering that the clinically observable unit, i.e. the one which psychiatrists like Freud had to deal with anyway, is the individual. Later on, social psychology has expanded its methods, so as to include laboratory experiments, archival studies, surveys, field studies where psychologists went into the real life situation with

20 Moscovici, supra note 10 at 281.
questionnaires, and field experiments where the experiment is conducted outside the laboratory situation.\textsuperscript{21} Also, in mainstream theory, there has been a definite turn from psychoanalytic tradition to behavioral and cognitive approaches; crowd psychology of the individual became social psychology of groups.

Parallel to this, there has been a shift in focus from “personality” to identity, which includes social identity. Experimental social psychology strongly discredited the idea that there are stable personality traits,\textsuperscript{22} and now we rather face the question what influences people to behave in a more stable or more capricious way. A separate theme in social psychology became “intergroup relations”, which maintains that relations between groups are radically different from relations between persons. More precisely, any social interaction can be located somewhere on a line between interpersonal and intergroup as the two extremes.\textsuperscript{23}

In relation to street protest activity, accordingly, relevant appears not so much the protesting individuals’ personal identity and personality: assemblies are \textit{eminently intergroup phenomena}. The demonstrators, the “ingroup”, always faces at least an abstract and often stereotyped outgroup (such as the state, the factory owners, socialists, “Whites”, “Blacks”, “men”, heterosexuals or, rather, homophobes, etc.), which is sometimes concretized as counter-demonstrators, addressees (e.g. protests in front of the Chinese embassy), or targets (e.g. Holocaust survivors in the planned march of American Nazis in the Skokie case), but at the very least, there is some police present on the spot. Thus, the question arises, what social psychology tells about intergroup relations, how groups form at all, why intergroup relations are so often hostile, and how they relate to change in the political system. To address these issues, psychologists conducted numerous empirical researches, which by now have

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{21} See \textit{e.g.} \textsc{Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, Social Psychology. An Introduction} (Pearson, Prentice Hall, 1995) 6-13.
\textsuperscript{22} Id. at 21 \textit{et seq}.
\end{flushleft}
developed into a relatively clear line of findings, and into a much less clear theoretical interpretation, which will be shortly discussed next.

Early on, Sherif demonstrated in field experiments with children in summer camps that the sole fact of being categorized in different groups generates group identity, internal norms and hierarchy, but does not in itself generate hostility. When, however, the experimenters created an intergroup conflict, attitudes towards the outgroup became dramatically hostile.\textsuperscript{24} It also seems clear that conflicts enhanced the internal cohesion of the groups, and restructured the internal hierarchy in a way that more aggressive members became leaders. One way to reconcile the groups was to create overarching, superordinate goals, and thus the groups started to cooperate instead of competition. Nonetheless, other studies showed that common goals bring about positive attitudes only if the two groups succeed. If cooperation fails to achieve the common goal, prejudices and hostilities might actually petrify or even increase.\textsuperscript{25}

The so-called contact hypothesis, according to which prejudices can be decreased by contact between the groups, is thus also discredited, unless contact is accompanied by a successful common endeavor. Therefore, it does not necessarily hold that presenting oneself as “different” in the public sphere will enhance one’s social status and acceptability.

The next, but probably the single most important finding in intergroup studies was that the sole fact of belonging to a group (whatever random group, lacking any real social ties) creates incentives to privilege the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup.\textsuperscript{26} Henri Tajfel’s famous minimal group experiments also showed that people discriminate outgroup even if as a result the ingroup’s reward would be significantly less. What matters is not the objective well-being (in the test case, “money”), but the difference between ingroup and outgroup. There is no


\textsuperscript{26} Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination 178-186 in INTERGROUP RELATIONS. ESSENTIAL READINGS (Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams eds., 2001).
regard even for objective private interest, let alone the common good. These findings were later confirmed in several different settings.\textsuperscript{27} However, no evidence was found that the more we identify with a group, the more we tend to disfavor the outgroup.\textsuperscript{28} There is no correlation, if not negative, between the strength of social identity and ingroup favoritism.

It was also shown that the individual’s possibility to distribute rewards to his or her own group enhances self-esteem, i.e. \textit{intergroup discrimination contributes to self-esteem}.\textsuperscript{29} However, intergroup discrimination does not mean punishing the out-group: preference for ingroup does not usually mean harm-doing to the out-group. This observation, confirmed in \textit{laboratory settings} several times, is called the positive-negative asymmetry effect (PNAE).\textsuperscript{30} But, we know that, in reality, there occurs harm-doing to the outgroup quite often, so a study was undertaken to figure out what can induce the otherwise allegedly simply ingroup-favoring people to harm the out-group. Smith and Postmes\textsuperscript{31} hypothesized on the basis of social identity theory that in case the outgroup obstructs the in-group, like in Sherif’s expriments with children’s groups, the in-group will develop a norm which justifies outgroup punishment, or even a reverse PNAE would be found. They suggested also that it is \textit{intra}group discussion as a reaction to outgroup obstruction which leads to a process of consensualization legitimizing punishment. In other words, the hypothesis included that group discussion

legitimates punishment the individual alone would not find justified. The experiments confirmed the hypotheses. Perceived obstruction of ingroup advancement reduces or completely removes feelings of illegitimacy to punish the out-group. What is more, in the non-obstructed condition, the ingroup established a norm which justified more severe discrimination than the individual alone would inflict: the PNAE was not only eliminated, but even reversed after (intragroup) discussion, a rather unexpected finding.

Several experiments showed that social identity is built on categorization, i.e. we categorize ourselves and others into different groups, and that is what determines our identity. The answer to the question “Who am I?” is a multiple set of implicit (female, Hungarian) or explicit (fan of X football team) group belongings. Although this so-called social identity theory might not have a universal validity (I suppose e.g. Mozart would not reply with solely group belongings to this question, and he might be not alone in this), it certainly captures the essence of what happens on a public assembly. In brief, if Mozart went to a public assembly, even he would go as member of the protestors or the counter-protestors. Social psychology tells that this kind of group identity built on categorization tends to become even sharper in intergroup situations. We not only tend to like our group (because we need a positive identity) and, thus, prefer our group (ingroup favoritism), we even want to make it more distinct from other groups (group polarization). In case of a challenge or confrontation, group-based identity petrifies: there is a psychological reaction to close up, to protect one’s perceived “integrity”, instead of engaging into dialogue, and, potentially, compromise. As a member of a group, one is much less open to critique and challenge than in interpersonal relationships. The parallel holds true, too: prejudices against an outgroup do not necessarily change through

32 E.g., with relation to ethnomlinguistic divergence, Giles and co-workers showed that the more one feels challenged or threatened in his or her linguistic identity, the more one starts to talk in a diverging manner. In the test cases, the challenged person started to strengthen her own way of pronunciation or switched to her own language which would actually make communication burdensome or impossible. Richard Y. Bourhis & Howard Giles, The Language of Intergroup Distinctiveness in LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS (Howard Giles ed., Academic Press, London, 1977), and Richard Y. Bourhis, Howard Giles, Jacques P. Leyens, & Henri Tajfel, Psycholinguistic Distinctiveness. Language Divergence in Belgium 158-185, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Howard Giles and Robert St.Clair eds., Baltimore, University Park Press 1978).
good experiences with outgroup members in interpersonal relationships,\textsuperscript{33} though in this regard there are a number of conflicting theories so far without much empirical validation.\textsuperscript{34}

2. Reasons and motives of gatherers: from social psychology to social movements

2.1. Disadvantaged groups and collective action

A general assumption of constitutional law is that fundamental rights – including freedom of assembly – serve the protection of the individual, or persons belonging to vulnerable minorities, people who are discriminated against, or whose views or lifestyle is radically different from the mainstream, and, thus, the mechanism inherent in majoritarian decision-making systematically disfavors them. Social psychology offers two strains of insights about whether the assumption that it is the vulnerable or weak or disregarded who protest holds true. The one is the research related to the behavior of disadvantaged groups to improve their situation, while the other is the so-called relative deprivation (RD) theory. Here I discuss how disadvantaged groups in general cope with their status, and more space will be accorded to RD theory below.

There are basically two ways to react to social disadvantage which has the prospect of change: either individual mobility, or collective action. In the first case, the individual can only try to leave the group, and integrate into the mainstream. For my purposes, it is more important to examine “When will disadvantaged-group members take collective action instead of pursuing

\textsuperscript{33} See Brown & Turner, \textit{supra} note 23.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{E.g.}, decategorization model suggests that prejudice is best reduced if personal identity is salient, while mutual-differentiation model claims the opposite (group identity salience), as I mentioned above. In a third current model, common-in-group-identity should be formed, i.e. intergroup bias is reduced if people come to see the outgroup as belonging to the same larger ingroup. \textit{See} Stephen C. Wright & Donald M. Taylor, The Social Psychology of Cultural Diversity: Social Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination \textit{in} \textsc{The SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology} (Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds.,London, 2003) at 447 with further references.
their individual interests or doing nothing?"  Wright and Taylor identify several factors contributing to collective action. The first of these factors is the degree to which one identifies with the ingroup. Low-identifiers usually prefer individual action, while high-identifiers are more likely to advocate collective action. The strength of identification might be influenced by “boundary permeability”. The more the boundary between the disadvantaged and the advantaged is permeable, the less likely will be collective action. The more closed the groups are, the more incentive is there for collective action, even for “nonnormative” collective action as Wright and co-workers claim. Nonnormative action here means actions violating social norms, i.e. it does not necessarily mean violence or illegality. There is some showing that nonnormative collective action is the most effective strategy, but at the same time, that is of course the most costly and most risky.

Traditionally, boundary permeability is taken as a yes-or-no question, but recent studies show a phenomenon called “tokenism.” Tokenism means that the advantaged let into their ranks very few from among the disadvantaged; and thereby in a way “appease“, or, co-opt them. Already by 2 percent of the disadvantaged coopted this way, experiments have demonstrated a drastical turn-away from collective action, and a preference for individual action among members of the disadvantaged ingroup. In other words, “[t]he slightest hint of permeability appears to undermine interest in collective action.” In case the boundary is basically impermeable, people in the disadvantaged group choose collective action if other conditions are fulfilled. Among them, very important seems to be – according to social psychology – a sense that their social situation is unjust, i.e. the social structure is illegitimate. Most often, the injustice manifests itself in unequal treatment, discrimination, or factual inequality. However, even social psychology study books state that boundary impermeability and a sense of

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35 This question is “most interesting” also according to Wright & Taylor, id. at 445.
37 Id.
illegitimacy of low status are in themselves insufficient for collective action if ingroup members do not believe that the system is instable, and their group has sufficient resources to affect change. These latter issues are, though, naturally more explored by social movements literature, as we will see below. Here it is important to notice that social psychology is not overly optimistic about the psychological bases of “progressive change”, and studies and experiments showed that intergroup relations are construed in a way that imposes already numerous psychological (i.e. apart from resources) obstacles for disadvantaged people to even raise their voice, let alone effectively change the status of their group. As influential scholars of this particular field have put: “[g]iven the near universality of intergroup inequality, it is perhaps surprising that protest and rebellion are relatively uncommon events.”38 Compare this with statements of Le Bon and Moscovici about the age of the crowd, or, perhaps even more strikingly, with the enthusiasm of social movement scholars who see grassroots mobilization everywhere. The explanation, sad as it might sound, is that “participants in collective protest [are] far from marginal and isolated.”39 Relative deprivation theory discussed below is different from the research on collective action of disadvantaged groups in that it explicitly dispenses with the existence of an objective disadvantage as a criterion, and tries to measure feelings of satisfaction as the basis for further research.

2.2. Relative deprivation: theory and experiments

Relative deprivation (RD) theory in relation to protests claims that people mobilize if they feel aggrieved in comparison with other similarly situated persons or groups, or if they make a disappointing comparison between one’s expectations and the perceived reality. The idea that we compare ourselves to similar others, and the resulting subjective perception determines our

38 Wright and Taylor, supra note 35 at 446.
feelings of satisfaction and discontent, appeared first in an extensive World War II study on American soldiers, but is of course inherent in much social psychological literature which emphasizes intergroup relations. RD gradually became a basic notion in social psychology, and was also applied to the political context, closer to my focus here. Literature differentiates two main kinds of RD, egoistic and fraternalistic. Egoistic deprivation is when one feels “dissatisfied with his position as a member of what he [sees] as his group”, while fraternalistic RD is when one feels “dissatisfied with what he [sees] as his group relative to other groups in the larger system.”

It is commonplace in social psychology, though far from undisputed or demonstrated that RD might cause attitudinal and, thus behavioral changes. Most prominently, RD allegedly increases mobilization, even militancy, and counts as one of the causes, if not the necessary predetermining, of aggressive acts. In this regard, a separate strain of RD theory developed which derives aggression from frustration. The so-called frustration-aggression model contradicts Freudian psychology as it does not consider aggression an innate instinct, but rather takes it as a reaction to frustration. In Ted Robert Gurr’s theory frustration-aggression

40 STOUFFER, SAMUEL A., EDWARD A. SUCHMAN, LELAND C. DEVINNEY, SHIRLEY A. STAR, AND ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR. STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD WAR II: THE AMERICAN SOLDIER, VOL. 1, ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), in which the idea of relative deprivation enabled the authors to explain phenomena like why people in the airforce felt aggrieved when they were not promoted, while members of the military police did not when not promoted. The solution is that promotions in the airforce were rather frequent, while being very rare in the military police; thus, those not promoted in the airforce were relatively deprived in comparison with their colleagues, while in the military police there were no such others, let alone in significant number, to compare with.


44 Id. at 31.

45 Joan Neff Gurney & Kathleen J. Tierney, Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research, 23 SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY (1982) 33, 37 cites in the context of RD theory a number of studies which theoretically warn against the assumption of a strong link between attitude and behavior, as well as a number of experimental research which actually showed a discrepancy between attitude and behavior.

stemming from relative deprivation contributes to, though not solely explains, political violence.\textsuperscript{47} Here uncertainty in the use of concepts does not go unnoticed, and some would claim e.g. that frustration-aggression is distinct from relative deprivation.\textsuperscript{48} There are critics who think frustration is a loose concept,\textsuperscript{49} while others consider relative deprivation vague.\textsuperscript{50} Overall, however, authors tend to agree that RD (which might underlie frustration, or the other way around) is an attitudinal state which potentially translates into action, and it is especially fraternalistic RD that might induce people to collective action.\textsuperscript{51} This appears to be in harmony with psychology of intergroup relations.

There has been some testing of the theory, with strongly varying results. Crawford and Naditch, for example, found higher level of support of militant action by more relatively deprived Black residents in Detroit after riots than by less relatively deprived Black residents.\textsuperscript{52} This study, just as many others, however, was based on a post-hoc method, and for that reason might be inadequate. There has only been one field study to my knowledge which tried to test relative deprivation, and within it, specifically Gurr’s theory of RD and political violence, in a protest crowd itself. Newton, Mann, and Geary conducted a research in a South Australian farmers’ crowd protesting against meat workers’ trade union’s blockade of sheep export.\textsuperscript{53} It did confirm the claim that the people who demonstrated were relatively deprived, though only to 70 \%. Meanwhile, interestingly, it did not confirm that RD was the basis of violent behavior, or that RD increased the probability of militant action. Previous

\textsuperscript{47} Id.
\textsuperscript{48} DONALD M. TAYLOR, FATHALI M. MOGHADDAM, THEORIES OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Greenwood Publishing Group 2nd ed. 1994), at 124-26.
\textsuperscript{49} E.g. HOGG & VAUGHAN supra note 21 at 370.
\textsuperscript{50} GURNEY & TIERNEY supra note 45 at 34 et seq.
\textsuperscript{51} KLANDERMANS supra note 39 at 18, referring to Brenda Major, \textit{From Social Inequality to Personal Entitlement: The Role of Social Comparisons, Legitimacy Appraisals, and Group Membership}, 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 293 (1994).
studies showed a weak correlation between RD and militancy, but studies were conducted either after or before a protest event. This could have caused under- or overestimation of one’s militant stance, and is probably not a reliable evidence for the relation between RD and militancy. Thus, Newton and co-workers went directly into the protest crowd while the demonstration was ongoing, and asked demonstrators about their dissatisfaction and collective action proposed by them in case the current issue remained unresolved. Out of those relatively deprived, fairly equal portions of demonstrators advocated legal process (28 %), withholding of sheep (26 %), and more militant action (28 %), this latter including breaking the picket line of the workers, or use of firearms. Among those who were not relatively deprived, 33 % would take legal steps, 15 % would withhold sheep, and a comparatively high 37 % would be more militant in case the issue remained unresolved. Thus, if anything, the study suggests that RD does not affect, or even decreases militancy.

A recent study compared RD (measured in differences in wage expectations and actual wages for Blacks compared to Whites’ actual wages) and civil rights protests and disturbances using statistical data between 1960 and 1970. Thus, though the research was conducted post hoc, it included neither retro-, nor prospective evaluation by demonstrators. Only such occurrences were included in the sample which involved some violence or property destruction. The authors argued that the 1960’s civil rights disorders were a revolution of rising expectations, meaning that the formal success of Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act and similar achievements raised Blacks’ expectations towards equality. As they got bitterly disappointed in that rising expectation, they started to protest much more

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54 See Clark McPhail, Civil Disorder Participation. A Critical Examination of Recent Research, 36 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 1058 (1971).
55 See the overview of Newton et al., supra note 53 at 386.
56 18 % suggested ‘other’ action, Newton et al., supra note 53 at 392.
57 I could not find any empirical (experimental, archival or observational) study on relative deprivation and protest activities published between 1982 and 2005, neither on Wiley, nor on Project MUSE.
intensely than in the 1940’s when the expectations had not been raised that “high”. The research was consistent with earlier findings which showed more intense militancy in areas where the improvement of condition of Blacks were greatest, and with the Kerner report prepared at the request of President Lyndon Johnson.\textsuperscript{59}

Later theories contradict or at least complement RD theory by pointing to organizational and institutional resources which are not automatically available for groups in the most severe relative deprivation (resource mobilization theory, see below). Or, it is hard to overlook the significantly higher participatory rate of elite groups in social movements, especially in the “New Social Movements”. A classic case is probably the woman (suffragette) movement which was based on middle- and upper-class women, who, however, were still deprived of suffrage in relation to their male counterparts.\textsuperscript{60} If not an elite, then some organizational and institutional base must elevate the grievances of the margins to the center-stage. RD might be the necessary motivation, but certainly not the only condition for a demonstration to come about.

Again other studies suggest that the strongest incentive for protest action is the belief in the success of the demonstration.\textsuperscript{61} Here the problem arises that success of a demonstration is the classic case of self-fulfilling prophecy since the more people believe in the success, the more will participate, but the more people participate at a demonstration, the more likely its success is. Thus, belief in success is not the incentive, but the incentive is what brings about belief in success. What is \textit{that} incentive exactly, however, is not answered, or, cannot be answered at a general level. Some authors thus argue that belief in success is socially constructed,\textsuperscript{62} but it is not so easy to detect what that social construction consists of, or, in which circumstances it

\textsuperscript{59} Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968.
\textsuperscript{60} See Elisabeth S. Clemens, Organizational Repertoires 187- 201 in \textit{THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT READER, CASES AND CONCEPTS} (Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper eds., Blackwell Readers in Sociology, Blackwell, 2003) at 189.
\textsuperscript{61} KLANDERMANS, supra note 39 at 28.
\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 28.
occurs. Dieter Rucht captures the problem similarly, but in somewhat less ‘social construction’ terms which I found revealingly simple:63

It also emerges [from empirical data] that the objective development of problems, but also the subjective perception of problems by the people do not have a direct impact on protest behavior. This finding is theoretically plausible. Many studies have shown that the absolute degree of oppression and disadvantage bears little relation to the extent and intensity of protests. Much more important is in preparing the ground for protests is the relative deprivation, that is, the perception of current or expected problems by comparison with the past, and/or in relation to other groups. However, even the perception of serious problems is not enough to instigate a collective protest. In addition, social networks, mobilizing groups, a belief that the protest will be noticed, and perhaps even the prospect of success, must be present in order for a latent protest to be transformed into an active one.

Thus, neither the absolute, nor the relative deprivation alone suffices, but it seems that several other factors, among them institutional and organizational ones, and a belief or hope that the demonstration will be successful, influence whether a demonstration takes place at all. Next I turn to organizational and institutional circumstances which promote protest activity, including demonstrations, to take place. With this step, the area of social psychology is left and we go into sociology for a while. Later I will turn to what happens at a demonstration, and there I will again examine psychological research.

2.3. Resources and opportunities: the importance of structure and organization

2.3.1. Neither the disadvantaged, nor the deprived: the organizationally empowered

That organization matters, has been first influentially argued by McCarthy and Zald64 who explicitly state that social movement activities may or may not be based on the grievances of

63 Dieter Rucht, On the Sociology of Protest Marches in THE STREET AS STAGE supra note 2, 49-57 at 53.
the participants. As RD theory could not be empirically proven since findings were inconclusive, or even falsifying, they looked for another mechanism which might explain social movement activities. But the argument that organization matters was not only directed against RD theory. McCarthy and Zald built on, but also criticized Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action which is worth mentioning at least in brief. Olson applied economic theory to collective action, which is in principle applicable to demonstrations. He argued that it is not only governmental organizations that produce public goods, but also private organizations, such as labor unions, and, arguably for our purposes, social movements. I.e. the civil rights movement created (or strived to create) the public good of equality for all Black people, the suffragette movement secured suffrage for also those women who never participated in any march, and showed the example for future vulnerable or discriminated groups, and so on. However, public goods are such that once created, they benefit every member of the group. If so, Olson argues, individuals do not have an incentive to join in the endeavors of improving the situation of the group, but will rather free-ride and wait until the change benefitting them happens as a result of the effort of others. As collective action is almost impossible because of the free-rider problem, resources have to be secured by compulsion: just as for public security, resources have to be acquired through compulsory taxation. That’s why he advocates e.g. compulsory union membership provided we generally agree that union activities are beneficial. Applied to our case, where there cannot be such compulsion (apart from the general taxation to finance the security of the protestors), people would rather stay home and leave others to go to the streets in their interest. Though theoretically neat, Olson’s collective


action theory has been somewhat implausible in light of the waves of collective protests and movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s.\textsuperscript{66}

McCarthy and Zald in reaction argued that though the free-rider problem is certainly existent, resource mobilization by social movement actors is a phenomenon which counters the incentives to free-ride. They distinguished between social movement (SM) and the various social movement organizations (SMOs) which are the organized part of SM, social movement industry (SMI) which includes all the SMOs with broadly similar goals, and social movement sector (SMS), which covers the whole of the social movement activity in a society. They emphasize that social movements differ in the degree of professionalization (classical SMOs only draw resources from people who would be directly benefitted by goal accomplishment, while professional SMOs rely to a great extent on non-beneficiary constituents). SMOs might both compete and cooperate with each other, and might compete with potential counter-movements, which organize themselves in opposition of an original movement, and so on. SMOs in the same SM actually compete more with each other than with a counter-SMO since the resource pool is largely identical for one social movement, while it is to a large extent different for an SMO and its counter-SMO. The SM sector as a whole competes with other sectors for support – and SM actors do much advertising because the product has to be marketed as any other product.

Introduction of expressions like movement entrepreneurs, movement industry, or movement sector meant to indicate that actors in social movements are not that different from market actors. On the other hand, there is significant showing that those movements have the most resources which are able to attract a large number of so-called conscience constituents, i.e. supporters who do not personally benefit from the accomplishment of the movement’s goal.

The claim that social movements may not be based upon the grievances of presumed beneficiaries is thus complemented by the fact that an important portion of support, especially by more efficient social movements, is provided by conscience constituents. Committed individuals with free time and skills, or “Maecenas” are needed. Wealthier societies will see more social movement activity, because there will be more resources which can be (discretionally) freed for such activities without risking other, more basic needs to remain unsatisfied. Similarly, in a single society, wealthier individuals and organizations will be more active, as those who control largest share of discretionary resources are the ones who mostly feel discontent concerning their circumstances.67

2.3.2. Political opportunity structures: external conditions

Social movements scholars have conducted much research on the external conditions of movement activity, or, public claim-making in general. They have found that the intensity of movement activities depends on a set of features of the regime in which the particular movement operate, usually termed 'political opportunity structures’ (POS). These external conditions, if I take the longest list in the POS literature, include:68

   a. the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime
   b. the regime’s openness to new actors
   c. instability of current political alignments
   d. availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers
   e. the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making
   f. decisive changes in items a to e.

The more a regime has of the qualities in points a. to f., the more the claim-making activity of social movements will be successful. Thus, one can expect that there are more assemblies and demonstrations in societies where there are more independent centers of power, or which are more open to new actors, in which political alignments are more instable, and so on. As we

67 MCCARTHY & ZALD, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements supra note 64.
68 MCADAM, TARROW & TILLY supra note 66 at 4.
see from point e., not surprisingly, the legal environment is also among the factors: the more repression, the less protest activity – so is the theory at least. Qualitatively, there is more *peaceful* protest in less repressive regimes. Violent protest, however, is more frequent in repressive regimes than in democracies, because democracy also contains social movement activity, especially violent one.

The problem with the political opportunity literature is – maybe not surprisingly – the same as with the literature on relative deprivation, or many other concepts used in the fields touching upon my topic. Political opportunity means different things for different authors, thus the concept remains vague and loose, at the same time risking ‘of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment.’ A particular problem with political opportunity theory is the potential for confusing causes and consequences. Or, what might seem to be a change in political opportunity for one author might be seen as the result of social movement activity by another.

The relation between political opportunity and protest activities were examined in several studies. The usual assumption is – as mentioned above – that an increase in political opportunity results in more protest or social movement activity. This intuitive assertion is not clearly validated empirically. Meyer and Minkoff were the ones who undertook to clean up the literature, and their article is of particular use for my purposes. They identified three areas of confusion. First, a differentiation should be made between changes in the general political context and changes in issue or constituency-specific factors. For example, it is

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69 Alec Campbell, *This is not Your Father’s War. The Changing Organization of Militarism and Social Movements*, in *Political Power and Social Theory* (Diane E. Davis ed., Elsevier 2007) 171 at 174 *et seq* with many further references.


72 Id. at 1461 *et seq.*
well established\textsuperscript{73} that the decline of lynchings in the US led to increased potential for collective mobilization of African-Americans. However, it is clear that the decline of lynchings did not have any impact on let’s say the women’s movement. Or, government effort aiming at reducing discrimination against women will not open up more opportunity for the environmentalist movement, and so on. Secondly, the difference between opportunities for social mobilization and opportunities for policy change should be also made clear. Some studies showed increased mobilization after a positive change in policy while others showed that mobilization was a reaction to an increasingly hostile policy environment. For example, Costain’s study on the women’s movement and McAdam’s study on Black mobilization found that processes inside and outside the political system roughly moved in concert producing a synergistic effect. To the contrary, antinuclear, antiabortion, proabortion, or environmentalist mobilization in the US increased in times when the government turned hostile to the cause.\textsuperscript{74} What is more, “policy” itself is not homogeneous either and different sorts of policy – like formal recognition or de facto advantages – have different impact on different movements.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, Meyer and Minkoff point to the differences of the object of study: some scholars deal with riots, some with demonstrations, others with interest group formation or organized movement activity, and so on. To include all this under the category of “mobilization” not surprisingly results in diverging outcomes.\textsuperscript{76} A polity which is open to one kind of “mobilization” might obviously be closed for others.

In the light of these more nuanced considerations, Meyer and Minkoff systematically reexamined the corpus of Black mobilization literature, a very well researched area of American social movements. They found that issue-specific variables were largely more

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{73} DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930–1970 (Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press, 1982).
\textsuperscript{75} MEYER & MINKOFF, supra note 71 at 1462.
\textsuperscript{76} MEYER & MINKOFF, supra note 71 at 1463.
\end{footnotesize}
important factors in civil rights protests than the question of how open was the political environment in general.\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, structural and symbolic changes do not always relate to activism. For instance, prior movement gains and Black representation in Congress led to decreased activism, while if the president’s attitude was generally more positive on civil rights than protest increased, just as protest rate correlated with media coverage.\textsuperscript{78} These results could be explained by a curvilinear relationship\textsuperscript{79} of openness and protest, i.e. protest increases when there is an opening in a particular segment of political opportunity structure, and decreases when institutional politics opens up like in the case of congressional representation of Blacks.

3. Conditions on the spot: from deindividuation to staged performance

In this part, I will discuss theories and empirical descriptions from both psychology and sociology in order to account for what actually goes on on an assembly or demonstration. I have deliberately grouped the discussion in two subchapters which apparently are irreconcilable: deindividuation and strategies of contention. These both are catchwords of a significant strain of psychology and social movement studies; which at the same time translate readily into two contradicting, but widely implied suspicions against a strong right to freedom of assembly: ‘irrationality of the crowd’ and ‘strategic – as opposed to communicative – rationality of the demonstration’. The first of these claims appears largely unjustified, the second largely justified in view of the results of this inquiry.

3.1. Claim of deindividuation: theory and experiments

3.1.1. From deindividuation to social identity

\textsuperscript{77} Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 71 at 1475.
\textsuperscript{78} Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 71 at 1475.
\textsuperscript{79} Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978 as cited by Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 71 at 1475.
That group, especially mass, “deindividuates” has been the single most widespread idea related to crowds, protests, and riots. The phenomenon is clear: everybody can recall media scenes of shouting, fighting, looting crowds, bunch of people burning cars, throwing pieces of pavement, or, even worse, attacking, lynching others – or even just marching in an apparently otherworldly awe for the Führer. The explanation is varying, somewhat speculative and experimentally poorly validated. The main claim is that being in a mass affects the psyche of the individual in a way that the individual has an increased tendency to anti-normative behavior. Le Bon’s theory, as we have seen, even supposes a suspension of the individual mind, and its substitution by a group mind, shared by each member of the group. Later theories dispensed with such mechanical views, and did not claim that the individual psyche stops working in the crowd, but they did claim that it experiences significant modification. In Freud’s crowd psychology, the modification consists of the establishment of vertical and horizontal libidinal ties among the leader and members of the group which are otherwise non-existent, though these ties get established as the natural resurrection of the original horde situation.

Deindividuation as an expression has come into use when theories of group mind and psychoanalytic theories lost their appeal in favor of experimental social psychology. For Festinger et al., writing in the 1950’s, deindividuation is a state where individuals “are not seen or paid attention to as individuals”, and “under conditions where the member is not individuated in the group, there is likely to occur for the member a reduction of inner restraints against doing various things”\(^\text{80}\). Thus, in their view, there is no such a thing as group mind, and nor is it the leader and surrounding libidinal ties which are to be blamed for deindividuation. Instead, it is the loss of individuality as a result of anonymity and unaccountability which releases the person from adherence to social norms. A related theory

was elaborated by Zimbardo, who claimed that several circumstances can lead to deindividuation, such as “anonymity, loss of individual responsibility, arousal, sensory overload” (e.g. loud music), novel, unexpected situations, or even drugs and alcohol. The deindividuated behavior is described by him as “behavior in violation of established norms of appropriateness.” Diener, in turn, further refined the theory by focusing on the process of how a deindividuated psychological state can come about, and he suggests that the main point is decreased self-awareness. I.e. in Diener’s view, conscious behavior is prevented, or undermined in case the person cannot pay attention to himself, because some external circumstance draws the attention away, causing the loss of capacity to monitor behavior as fully as under normal circumstances. While internal standards stop restraining behavior, external, environmental “cues” take over, hence the impulsiveness and irrationality of the crowd. This is called reduced self-awareness theory. Prentice-Dunn and Rogers further differentiated the model, distinguishing public self-awareness from private self-awareness. Public self-awareness is reduced by so-called “accountability cues”, e.g. anonymity and diffusion of responsibility, but such reduction does not effectuate a change in psychological state. Private self-awareness, on the other hand, is decreased if the person is distracted and is not able to focus on him- or herself (music, exciting games, etc.). It is only the latter one, reduction of private self-awareness that causes a different, deindividuated psychological state. What is common in reduced private and public self-awareness is only that both can cause antinormative behavior, or, more precisely, that there is correlation between reduced self-awareness and antinormative behavior.

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From the fifties on, a series of experiments testing the deindividuation construct followed of which I highlight some influential examples. These experiments and empirical studies indicate – though not meant for that in the first place – at the same time the potential and the limits of experimentally reproducing the demonstration situation as well.

In these experiments it was found e.g. that people placed in a dimly lit room and dressed in uniform laboratory coats used more negative language about their parents. Similarly, people dressed in laboratory coats used more obscene language while discussing erotic literature than in the control condition. Trick-or-treating children were keener on stealing and cheating when unidentified in contrast with those whose names and address had been inquired, the proportion of stealing being 80 % compared with 8 % in the identified group. Zimbardo found that female students gave twice as long electric shocks to confederates not responding correctly in an alleged learning task if dressed in cloaks and hoods reminiscent of the Ku-Klux Clan than in the control group. A simulated prison experiment, also conducted by Zimbardo at Stanford, had to be terminated after 7 days instead of the planned 2 weeks, because deindividuated “prison guards” inflicted serious harm upon “prisoners”, both groups wearing uniform.

However, other experiments brought different results. Zimbardo himself found that Belgian soldiers gave lesser shocks when dressed in cloaks and hoods than in their normal (military) outfit. Johnson and Dawning in a classic study did not find increased aggression by subjects wearing the Ku-Klux-Clan outfit, while subjects dressed as “nurses” actually shocked


much shorter than individuals (in the control condition).\textsuperscript{86} Several other experiments did not show unequivocal support for deindividuation theory, and especially unsupported seems to be that antinormative behavior associated with deindividuation would be caused by a reduction in private self-awareness.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, some authors suggest a rather different theoretical framework. That would explain deindividuation phenomena by reference to group norms which make group identity salient in the particular situation, and \textit{a switch from norms related to personal identity to situational norms related to group or social identity}. This is called the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE),\textsuperscript{88} and is in line with what I called earlier the social psychology of intergroup relations, within it, social identity – or self-categorization – theory. This theory explains the varying results of the experiments by salient norms and accompanying salient group identity which are prevalent in the particular context. For example, subjects dressed as nurses were less aggressive than subjects who were not dressed up because the situational norm, the salient group identity – being a nurse – dictates kind and caring behavior. Also, in Zimbardo’s experiment, Belgian soldiers shocked less when dressed in cloaks and hoods than in their military uniform because military uniform transfers a more aggressive group identity than being anonymous – according to the SIDE theory.

Postmes and Spears undertook a meta-analysis of 60 empirical studies dealing with deindividuation to test the validity of the different deindividuation models, and the SIDE model. Overall, in the analyzed studies “a small effect of deindividuation manipulations on


antinormative behavior” could be shown, and effects were extremely heterogeneous. Only manipulations of anonymity to the outgroup (but not to the ingroup!) and the reduction of perceived public self-awareness resulted in consistent antinormative effects. Thus, it seems that it is not an altered psychological state, but rather a belief in reduced accountability which induces antinormative behavior. Secondly, groups tended to be more antinormative than individuals if manipulated, but effects were small and variable. The group size, however, did have “a small, but consistent effect” among antinormative groups more antinormative were those which were bigger. Interestingly, the duration of manipulations did not have an effect on antinormative behavior, just as any gender difference could not be established. The most important finding was a “very strong relation with the situational norm.” I.e. if “antinormative behavior” means a violation of general social norms as it is assumed in deindividuation theory, then antinormative behavior occurred most consistently when the situation called for a particular norm contrary to the general social norm. When, however, deindividuation manipulation elicited a situational norm which is coincident with a general social norm, the behavior was not antinormative in deindividuated persons. For example, Ku-Klux Clan members and prison guards are supposedly aggressive, but prisoners are supposedly passive, nurses are supposedly nice, children supposedly should not fear too much punishment for taking one candy more than told at Halloween.

In addition, the results of the meta-analysis questioned that deindividuation manipulation would decrease self-control. Subjects reacted differently if the reason for the expected task (electric shocks, e.g.) was explained to them, i.e. when they were given a justification, than in cases where such justification was not provided. It means they made an evaluation of the situation, and evaluation even included what is socially desirable, expected, and acted accordingly. Thus, self-regulation is not eliminated by “deindividuation manipulations.” This

89 Id. at 198.
90 Id.
91 Id.
finding is in line with what Stanley Milgram found in relation to obedience to authority, just as with general studies on conformity, adherence to group (sharpening) norms in crowds, group polarization, and so on. In this light, Le Bon even can be seen more sympathetic to the human race: in his theory, it is the group’s effect which causes the “regression”, and the individual is just gripped with. Social identity theory, though emphasizes that often crowds do not behave as mindlessly and destructively as Le Bon might suggest, but also keeps the responsibility with the individual: if self-regulation, evaluation is possible than it is also possible to deviate from the dictates of the group identity – whatever rare such “resistance” factually might be, it is psychologically possible according to social identity theory.

3.1.2. False consensus about social identity

Social identity theory is superior to other mentioned theories because it is able to explain in most cases why some demonstrations turn out to be disorderly or violent towards police or counterdemonstrators, while others are decent, and disciplined. It rightly points to the importance of social identity which is in line with experimental evidence just as with a realistic view about each person’s complex identities. Nonetheless, one still has a sense that it does not cover all crowds, because it downplays too much the sometimes undeniable irrational destruction which some crowds do display, and where no discernible norm or reason seems to rein the field. Stephen Vider examines from this perspective the 1999 Woodstock riot, where a portion of the concertgoers simply burned down the site with no apparent reason. Neither adhered the rioters to a situational norm, nor was a salient group identity identifiable among them, even after a careful examination of press material, interviews, and so on. Some of the participants would explain the riot, for example, by the reason that this generation had to make its own Woodstock, others mentioned that they were bored in

92 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY. AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (Taylor & Francis, 1974).
everyday life, while again others that the prices for food and water were too high at the concert site, and that served as a reason for rioting. In this latter case, applying social identity (or self-categorization, i.e. SCT) theory, vendors would be the first target of violence which they weren’t, and fellow concertgoers’ tents, and other objects, like ATMs and speaker towers would have been spared by the rioters. As actually the opposite happened, Vider claims, social identity theory fails to fully explain the riot. He suggests modifying SCT by including other considerations among which the so-called false consensus effect is the most relevant for my discussion about the psychological state of the protestors.

‘False consensus effect’ as a more or less verified general psychological concept relies on the empirical observation that people have a tendency to attribute their own views to the rest of society. Applied to the specific case of crowd situation, the theory predicts that in some cases at least people act in concert not necessarily because they share a single ideology or situational norm, but because they believe others act in the same way as they do because their motives are the same. In other words, there might be a process of misattribution among the protestors, when each of them imputes his or her own reason or motive to the other protestors. False consensus unifies the conduct of the protestors, which appears (and not only to the outside world, but to each of the participants) as if they all observed and followed the same norm. In the case of the Woodstock ’99 riot, while each of the rioters gave different explanations, each of them explained the motive in first person plural, apparently attributing their own reason to the rest of the protestors. 95

False consensus theory does not discredit social identity theory, since the distinction between ingroup and outgroup, and the perception of a shared group identity is necessary for a (false)

consensus to come about. 96 But it does refine it by signaling that the outward conduct is not necessarily the objective imprint of the inner disposition of the crowd members, in this sense, the “intellectual” message is not unequivocal, even if it seems so. However, the discrepancy might not be as big as it might seem from the Woodstock 99’ analysis by Vider. Presumably, different crowds differ in the extent to which the consensus is false, ranging from an ideal complete coincidence between the subjectively perceived and objectively existing unity to complete divergence where each protestor believes in a different group norm. As there cannot be found any large-scale empirical research on the frequency and range of false consensus specifically in the case of assemblies, I find it sufficient to hypothesize that at most demonstrations false consensus is insignificant, but where it is significant, it creates problems for the legal approach. In particular, the chance for false consensus is bigger at spontaneous demonstrations than at planned assemblies, as in case of planned assemblies the organizers will make the message clear, which diminishes the chances of the rest of the participants for “self-cheating”. However, the more the organizers lose control over the crowd, the more chance there will be for false consensus, diverging from the original message of the demonstration. Secondly, the bigger the number of the participants, the bigger is the chance for false consensus, but even for awareness about the lack of consensus, as it is often observable already by the diverging conduct. Furthermore, at protest assemblies, false consensus as to the target of the protest is unlikely, however, its chance is all the more bigger as to the reason for the protest, and as to the suggested solutions, if there are any. Finally, violent and destructive assemblies – as the Woodstock 99’ study testifies – might have the highest rate of false consensus as to the reasons of the riot. That false consensus effect plays a significant role in sport sites aggression, has been shown in two studies related to hockey game spectators, though both were based on self-reported likelihood, and not on actual

96 Vider, supra note 93 at 150 et seq.
measurement of aggressive acts on the spot.\textsuperscript{97} Still, the conclusion seems at least plausible that those who would escalate a tense situation into a violent one, might disproportionately think that others want to do the same.

3.2. Strategies of contention

3.2.1. Form: strategic, symbolic and theatrical performance

Resource mobilization theory and the idea of a political opportunity structure both imply the importance of strategy in social movements. It already requires a strategy to gather resources – time, money, people – which would make possible the very beginnings of a social movement at all, also to maintain and enlarge resources, and mobilized constituencies in order for the movement not to decline or die out. Apart these general concerns, resource mobilization theory does not so much deal with the concrete strategies social movements employ to make claims visible and audible, and to persuade people and government about the righteousness of their claims. The exercise of the right to assembly is clearly an element of the strategy of \textit{contentious politics}.\textsuperscript{98} There is a significant body of research which focuses on episodes of contention, and thereby tries to analyze \textit{mechanisms and processes} which bring about political change. It is a viewpoint differing from resource mobilization, or collective action \textit{à la} Olson, let alone any sort of crowd psychology. It was Charles Tilly followed by researchers like Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam and others, who shifted the focus from resources to central political processes in the history of a polity, and to explain from \textit{that} perspective social movement activities, among them, street protests and demonstrations. It was also Tilly, to my knowledge, who popularized the idea that demonstrations are best interpreted in the language of the \textit{theatre}, an idea which particularly strikes me as being the


\textsuperscript{98} \textsc{Charles Tilly} \& \textsc{Sidney Tarrow}, \textit{Contentious Politics} (2006, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers).
opposite of market-like analogies (Olson, Zald, etc.). Demonstration is part of what Tilly calls the *repertoire* of a movement, i.e. the means and performances used to achieve the goal on the concrete public scene, which can be described as analogous to a theatre stage. A social movement, in turn, is characterized not only by a (i) repertoire, but also by (ii) *campaign*, i.e. “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities”\(^{99}\), and (iii) “participants’ concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them *WUNC displays*).”\(^{100}\) To the ‘repertoire’ belongs not only the public march, demonstration, procession, sit-in, vigil, etc., i.e. what for the constitutional discourse is “assembly”, but also a wide range of other activities, like: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, petition drives, statements to and in public media, pamphleteering.\(^{101}\) Such complexity is confirmed by law: association and petition rights are closely related to freedom of assembly.

Peaceful assembly, however, has not been historically dominant until full-fledged social movements emerged, with “modular tactics” which could be transferred through time and place to different causes. That did not happen until roughly the 19th century, but the exact time of emergence is unclear. As Tilly puts it: “We face a classic half full-half empty question. Somewhere between the Manchester petition of 1787 and the 1833 parliamentary banning of slavery in the British Empire, the full panoply of campaign, repertoire, and WUNC displays came together.”\(^{102}\) Then he goes on to differentiate between the time when (i) antislavery met all the tests for a genuine social movement, and (ii) when the political form presented by antislavery became available for other sorts of claims. Assemblies as a political form – first of all outdoor political meetings and demonstrations – developed as part of the larger context of social movements. This does not mean that there are (or even were exceptionally) no

\(^{99}\) TILLY *supra* note 2 at 3.

\(^{100}\) Id. at 4.

\(^{101}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{102}\) Id. at 33.
assemblies without a whole movement. It is just that the form of demonstration was provided by a more complex social process, and, later, the form as a ‘modular tactic’ gets to be used by people who do not find themselves in the middle of a movement. In any case, today demonstrations are platforms for the WUNC displays, i.e. demonstrators would want to show worthiness, unity and commitment, and they also strive to be or appear as many as possible.

Social movements developed a so-called strong repertoire according to Tilly, i.e. the analogy with the theatre stage should not only mean simple dramatization of claim-making, but a much more disciplined order which still gives place to improvisation: “[o]nce we look closely at collective making of claims, we see that particular instances improvise on shared scripts.”  

Social movement activities, including meetings, demonstrations, and street protests display in a historically partly predetermined setting: one demonstration contains the next one, but also makes it more meaningful. Practice gives meaning to the performance, and demonstration is one such performance which would not have had meaning let’s say in the 16th century, but which is a naturally available script to improvise on in the 20th and the 21st. Public assembly, especially demonstration is not only part of the performance or repertoire of a movement, but it is also in itself evidently a symbolic and theatrical event in many regards. Articles on public protest can be found in journals on theatre and dance studies. Baz Kershaw – a theatre professor writing on political and radical theatre – considers different protests employ different dramaturgies, quite literally. Some assemblies appear more an oratorium than an opera, others more a literary reading than a drama event, while again others use their own invented symbols to express a grievance or reenact some commemorated event, in sometimes quite carnivalistic or ritualistic ways (recall again Elias Canetti’s many examples).

A mouth taped shut conveys the protest against speech regulations more directly than a long explanation nobody would listen to. What could better express the grief of the mothers of the

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disappeared and blame the responsible than marching in muted silence. What is more apt to make you think about what it means to be a homeless than a call to sleep outside at night. The expressive force of mockery, humorous provocation or dramatized threat – e.g. burning of effigies – is also well documented from the middle ages on. Today what would be left of a pride parade without the extraordinary clothes and abundance of colours, dance, and music? And, yes, what expresses more precisely the message of Nazism than a military march with swastikas? Less dramatically, the choice of clothing has always played a role in demonstrations and assemblies.\textsuperscript{105} Part of this is a tactic to appear mainstream or decent, a point to which will be discussed next.

\textit{3.2.2. Substance: worth, unity, number, and commitment or the questionable assertion of popular sovereignty}

Tilly claims in particular that protest and demonstration have a tendency to appear dignified, unified, committed, and, last but not least, consisting of numerous participants. There is ample evidence to support the intuition that demonstrators show unity, that they will try to portray themselves more numerous than they really are, and they show resolution and commitment to their cause.

\textbf{Worth: normal, virtuous or strong?}

The striving for worthiness might mean very different values depending on the context. At least three sorts of worthiness at assemblies even if they often occur simultaneously: (i) normalcy, mainstream; (ii) virtue, some extraordinary commitment or sacrifice; and (iii) strength. Probably the American civil rights movement is closest to worth as normalcy, as the marches in general, and the huge Washington march in particular has been “orchestrated to appeal to mainstream white sensibilities about proper behavior in pursuit of legitimate

goals.” Suffragette marches were more a combination of worth as mainstream and as virtue, as they have been especially planned to raise support for the cause by portraying purity, innocence, even vulnerability (young girls, white clothes, flowers, no tools). It remains unclear whether the emphasized, stylized portrayal of mainstream perception of “the Female” served to secure a sufficient number of participants from among more moderate women’s circles, or, to appease opponents of female suffrage by symbolically denouncing any claim for radicalization (and prevent violent attacks by appeal to norms of chivalry maybe), or quite to the contrary, it meant a radical (re-)feminization of the public space and was therefore a substantive and novel political message. It is of course probable that onlookers’ interpretations included all the mentioned varieties. There is indication that street rallies and marches were considered a failure by the suffragist movement’s leaders in the United States, maybe the women on the street simply did not prove decent enough. In a similar vein, it seems doubtless that the anti-Vietnam war movement’s strong counter-cultural elements – aggrandized by the press – induced hostility toward the movement though at the time the war itself was already considered a “mistake” by a majority of the American population. In Germany and England, normalization and rationalization were observed with regard to the Easter marches of the 1960s. So far mentioned examples suggest that the closer a demonstration is to norms of public decency, the greater sympathy it will find on the part of the general public. Hence, one can make the general proposition that assemblies,

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106 Marisa Chappell, Jenny Hutchinson & Brian Ward, “Dress modestly, neatly ... as if you were going to church”: Respectability, Class and Gender in the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Early Civil Rights Movement in GENDER IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Peter Ling & Sharon Monteith eds., NY, 1999) at 70.
108 After the March 3, 1913 March on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington ended in more or less severe attacks on the marching women by onlookers, the suffragists gave up further plans for large scale demonstrations, and continued the struggle by directly petitioning the government. Id. at 116.
109 Simon Hall, Marching on Washington, The Civil Rights and the Anti-War Movements of the 1960s in THE STREET AS STAGE supra note 2 at 226, with further references.
especially demonstrations will adhere to general norms of public conduct at the statistical level, because that helps gaining support. This does not necessarily mean “cooptation”, but a tool to “redefine …political opponent as illegitimate public sphere participants – dangerously irrational, selfish, greedy and lust-ridden”.\textsuperscript{111} Two apparent exceptions shall be discussed shortly, (i) exclusivist rallies, like those performed by the Nazi or the Ku-Klux-Klan, and (ii) parades deviating from general norms which by their very nature border on entertainment like the Pride and Love Parades.

(i) Law always deals with a single demonstration, though each march and protest form part and parcel of larger social processes, and is a reaction to a background status quo. This might result in very different constellations. A well-researched area, the Nazi marches of the 1920’s testifies to this problem. Consider this description of the Italian fascist and German SA marches:\textsuperscript{112}

In general, the violence perpetrated by fighting corps of both [fascist and SA] types was – apart from its physical aspect – a type of ostentatious display, which, by means of body language and gestures, clothing and other visual political symbols, gait and sound, expressed their offensive style of action in the political arena of the public streets. In addition to its practical impact, it had symbolic functions, such as the external display of the invincibility of the ‘militia of the nation’, and the strengthening of the groups’ internal ties, identity, and dynamism. The fascist rowdies represented a sort of anti-public against the social masses in the political arena of the street, and fought with them for a monopoly of the public streets. Physical aspects played as large a part as the fight for symbols, because the street was regarded as the place where the rites and ceremonies of the holy nation were celebrated. In the view of the fascists, the socialists had desecrated this site with all their demonstrations, and therefore had to be combated with all available means.

This quote tells a lot about the context of an assembly: it might be as much a reaction to the social status quo, real or perceived power structure, injustices, etc. as it might be a reaction to

\textsuperscript{111} Madeleine Hurd, \textit{Class, Masculinity, Manners and Mores: Public Space and Public Sphere in Nineteenth Century Europe}, 24 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY 75 (2000) 76.

\textsuperscript{112} Sven Reichardt, Fascist Marches in Italy and Germany: \textit{Squadre} and SA before the Seizure of Power in THE STREET AS STAGE supra note 2 at 184.
the occupation of public space by other, rival movements which are equally marginal. Hence the long term demonstration-counter-demonstration wave observable so many times between the fringe groups of society. It also seems that the fascists sought support not in a simple sense of the term: please, support us since we are better or worthier of support. Rather, or, also, they created – or operated in – a symbolic sphere where it was assumed, and reinforced through innumeros re-presentations that the stronger will get the popular support. Demonstrations are especially suitable for creating an appearance of support which otherwise does not exist. A small number of very determined, very violent but disciplined people represent a much larger number as they in reality are. Thus, fascist marches also conform to the Tillyan expectations about displays of unity, number, and commitment.

They apparently did not, however, conform to general social norms of decency and worthiness. It might appear that those marches indeed aimed exactly to create new norms of public decency, or acceptable public behavior. It is extraordinary, because, unavoidably, demonstrations display in the same limited public sphere as other public “communication”, and their audience is the average, or, a mass audience with its rather rigid mediocre norms. Rarely if ever does it happen, as it might appear to have happened in the case of violent Nazi marches, that the “demonstration” *itself shapes norms of public interaction.*

In spite of this, I argue that on the basis of social movement history, it is more plausible to impute the success of the Nazi marches to other circumstances, in lack of which the marches would not in themselves have been politically triumphant. In particular, the notorious weakness of the Weimar era’s law enforcement which tolerated if not approved scenarios of public violence and intimidation, especially if coming from the political right; deeply rooted authoritarian traditions; and widespread anti-Semitism which made Jews easy scapegoats for all the postwar social and economic problems – all contributed to the rising popularity of violent

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113 See, e.g., with regard to the workers’ movement a more two-way process described by HURD *supra* note 111.
Nazi ideology.\textsuperscript{114} In addition, and maybe most importantly, Weimar Germany’s capacity to control violence was seriously impelled. The Versailles treaty obliged Germany to reduce its armed and police forces to a significant degree. It is well known, though rarely mentioned in social movements and protest studies that in reaction German authorities started to tolerate unofficial, paramilitary organizations. By the end of the Weimar era, police force was basically overwhelmed by and inferior in capacity to paramilitary groups originally formed across the political spectrum, but from which the Nazi (SA) became strongest.\textsuperscript{115} If on a demonstration or a march participants are armed, meet with counterdemonstrators armed or unarmed, and police does not have the capacity to disarm them, then violence is quite likely to occur, as it is clearly explained by intergroup psychology. This circumstance seems to me to certainly contribute to the fact that the Weimar regime was not able to maintain the distinction between freedom of assembly, on the one hand, and civil war and pogrom on the other, and that it has finally fallen prey to Nazi power and intimidation. Therefore, it is not the march and the demonstration themselves, but these (and many more) other factors are to be blamed for the failure of the Weimar constitution and the Nazi takeover.

(ii) As to the pride, love, and similar parades which actually aim at promoting a lifestyle which deviates from the everyday lifestyle of the majority, the situation is somewhat different. Often, in the examined Western countries the parade takes up a celebratory character: as if people asserted their freedom to be different at least on some days of the year, and in the case of pride parade, to celebrate that ‘our society does not oppress sexual minorities’. This can be conceived clearly as a contemporary heir of the Roman Saturnalia which Moscovici found so wise in the Roman Empire. The difference, if any, favors our age: there is regularly no


\textsuperscript{115} See in more details JAMES M. DIEHL, \textit{PARAMILITARY POLITICS IN WEIMAR GERMANY} (1977, Bloomington, Indiana University Press), and also the review by Francis Ludwig Carsten, 94 \textit{THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW} 150 (1979) of same book pointing out errors but in effect reinforcing the argument of the text above.
destruction to limb or property at either pride or love parades in mature democracies I deal with in this thesis (which confirms Tilly’s claim that democracy contains assemblies). In such cases, the deviance from general norms of conduct is simply not a problem, as basically everybody finds it to be exactly the purpose of the parade. (However, it has to be noted that the modern Saturnalia proper, i.e. the Love Parade is not considered an exercise of freedom of assembly in Germany, exactly because the German Federal Constitutional Court [GFCC] disagrees with Moscovici as to the function of such a parade.) The picture is by far not so favorable if one moves from the Western world to Eastern Europe where pride parades risk turning not into a Saturnalia, but into serious attacks against the demonstrators by counter-protestors, or are simply banned by state authorities. Here pride parades remain political demonstrations for equal rights on the part of a minority, way more akin to the Civil Rights marches than to the Saturnalia. Naturally, the pride parade cannot be moderate or appealing to general norms of decency as civil rights marches were, because the point is exactly to vindicate difference and otherness in the public space.

Unity, number and commitment: asserting popular sovereignty

As mentioned above, the least questionable part of Tilly’s historical process description is the claim that assemblies are showing unity, number and commitment. The strive for unity might be misleading as especially by the false consensus effect, just as numbers are always portrayed higher than actually present, though many more sympathizers stay home. Tilly’s main implication is that assemblies, especially demonstrations display these features because they claim to be the People, or, at the very least, claim to represent in some genuine and original way the People, the Sovereign, “assert popular sovereignty”. Sometimes it is explicit, but rarely as much as in the ‘Wir sind das Volk’ or Monday demonstrations in the GDR. On the other extreme, exclusivist rallies equally claim that they are the People – that is exactly the

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116 KLANDERMANS, supra note 39, 15-34, in particular at 22 claims on the largest demonstration the Netherlands had ever witnessed only five percent of sympathizers participated.
main point of their assembly, to exclude others, to expropriate the concept of the People for themselves. In between, i.e. in neither self-assertive (by which I mean assemblies where everybody who is not the state is invited, and welcomed, or, is a target to persuade, like in the cases of anarchist assemblies), nor exclusivist demonstrations, the assertion of sovereignty is manifest in claiming belonging to the People, the paradigmatic cases being the Suffragette and the Civil Rights movements. The LGBT and contemporary women’s movement also can be interpreted from an internal viewpoint as claiming equal belonging to the community, though here the external standpoint does not confirm a direct link to popular sovereignty as there is no claim of deprivation of political or participatory rights but only of other rights, whose recognition is still important for achieving a status of equal worth in a polity. Michael Hamilton assesses this function of assemblies in a nuanced way within a framework of inclusive constitutionalism:

When constituted power is exclusive, and when particular groups remain absent from the publicly represented ‘We’, then the struggle to be included – to expand relations of recognition – can be seen as a seizing of constituent power. Both ‘pluralism’ and ‘social cohesion’ are the animating principles of inclusive constitutionalism, and a viable ‘We’ is the outworking of it. Herein lies the importance of freedom of assembly…

Assemblies thus represent the absent, the excluded parts of the ‘People’, and freedom of assembly facilitates the ongoing construction of it, it is part of the politics of identity. The limits of freedom of assembly in turn mirror the resistance of the law (or courts) to such reconstruction of the People. Tilly appears to make the claim that every social movement is an assertion of popular sovereignty. Certainly the mentioned ones – though in very different senses – can be taken as such. However, there are quite a few gatherings of people which for the law (and the

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118 See also in his other book, CHARLES TILLY, REGIMES AND REPERTOIRES (University of Chicago Press, 2006) 182.
observer) appear as assembly, even if per se they do not have any relation to popular sovereignty even in the broadest – perhaps too broad – sense, which includes uses such as pure public festivity, religious processions, animal rights or environmental protests and so on. In such cases there might still be public claim-making, but that can exhaust itself in a request of policy change or simply toleration on the part of the state.

3.3. Expressive topography and shrinking public places

A final strain in social sciences reflects on a no less important characteristic of public assemblies: i.e. that they take place in public; their very essence is to make use of common spaces. Timothy Zick points out that the “proximity and physicality of expression” makes it hard to ignore, being set in a public place also “amplifies the speakers’ message”. Often the place itself has “symbolic power and meaning”, and thus contributes to the message semantically as well. Place is not simply passive and fungible, but expressive, constructed and shaped by people occupying them in the present and in the past. Mass media also likely covers public assemblies as they take place, thus broadening the potential audience – albeit often at the price of selective representation and distortion of the original message.

To approach the same issue from another angle, bodies taking up space in public can be understood as “articulate matter”, as one commentator applying dance theory to public protest argued.

120 Id.
121 Id.
These assertions, though commonplace in social sciences, are rarely taken into account by courts as will be explained in this thesis. This is all the more a deficiency as public place available for protests, meetings, and demonstrations has dramatically shrunk in recent decades due to sociological changes (shopping malls taking over previously public places, gated communities in the suburbs, virtualization of communication, etc.) quite apart from judicial approaches.

3.4. Expressive chronography – the importance of timing

Though expressive chronography is my application of Timothy Zick’s (and possibly, others’) expressive topography notion, it needs not much effort to realize that not only place, but time as well might convey meaning, in two senses. Easiest is to grasp commemorative events or events specifically staged on days of rememberance or national holidays. On such days, the timing actually contributes to the meaning of the event, thus fringe groups understandably see in them an avenue to recognition or confrontation and an occasion to raise claims. Secondly, – and this is an empirical claim, but more emphasized by courts than by social scientists as I found – timing is of essence for assemblies in more direct ways as well. It means something different to protest against the Iraq war before and after it started, to demonstrate at parliament while the Chinese president is received or after he left, before a particular law is voted or afterwards, while a demonstration of a hostile or rival group is ongoing or only afterwards.

In short, demonstration is theatre, a symbolic reenactment, carefully set in place and time. Certainly it is strategic also, but not more than a theatre play, an opera, Hundertwasser or Dalí. Or, for that matter, the speech of a politician, the most sacred object of freedom of speech. Some prefer to read Shakespeare, but most prefer to see it – partly because that is also reenactment. As the circle is full, there is no way to claim that what has acquired a meaning in
social interaction somehow does not convey it. (Except if you are Justice Black, sitting on a
Supreme Court, playing on a special stage in a special drama.)
4. Preliminary conclusion: Propositions derived from the empirical sciences

Preliminarily, the following propositions can be derived on the basis of the “empirical” sciences’ research on assemblies and demonstrations.

1. Groups tend to polarize; polarization is increased by intra-group discussion, and is not reduced by simple contact with the out-group.

2. It is not the objectively disadvantaged who go to the street, but the more resourceful among the relatively deprived.

3. It is not the most relatively deprived who are the most militant at a demonstration.

4. Whether the demonstration comes about at all depends also on the power structure, thus organizers of demonstrations will seek powerful allies and supporters.

5. Demonstrators develop their own set of norms, before, during, and possibly, after the assembly. These norms might deviate from general social norms, but are nonetheless comprehensible, rational rules of conduct.

6. Deindividuation has not been proven with regard to public assemblies and other crowd phenomena, but there is a clear possibility for false consensus to come about, i.e. demonstrators might attribute their own belief as to the purpose and norm of the gathering to other participants without any basis.

7. Public assemblies are exposed to very strong normalization and mainstreaming incentives, as that contributes to the acceptance of their cause significantly.

8. Public assemblies are expressions of strength. The showing of strength is often false, but sometimes true as many more supporters usually stay home.

9. Public assemblies assert popular sovereignty in many different senses, though not always, because sometimes they aim only at a small policy change.

10. Public assemblies are more akin to theatrical performance than to reasoned argument, similarly to much of social, cultural, political or religious life.

11. Social movements developed their own set of tools which convey political meaning, as public assembly, including demonstration as a political form emerged historically due to experimentation and also change in external conditions, like increased capacity for crowd control, but also increasing responsiveness of the political system to popular demands with the coming of “democracy”.

12. Public assemblies generate and convey meaning by making use of the semantic potential of symbols, places, and times.

These propositions will be once again revisited in the final conclusion, in light of the following discussion on the legal and judicial nature of freedom of assembly.
B. THE LEGAL MODEL OF GATHERING: GENERAL FEATURES OF FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

After having tried to clarify general characteristics of assemblies as understood by empirical sciences, the next step is to do the same with regard to the legal characteristics. In this part, my aim is to highlight only the main features of the legal approach to assemblies, their origin, conceptions, legal status, and rationales for their legal protection.

1. Historical roots of freedom of assembly

An attempt to uncover the historical roots of the right to freedom of assembly encounters a double conceptual difficulty. At the intuitive level simply too many phenomena of social life seem to be related to assembly, but too few of them have been in the past conceived as anything requiring or meriting legal protection, let alone fundamental rights protection. Social movement literature shows there was no practice of demonstrations before the 19th century, though other types of “assemblies” of course existed. Characteristically, “tumultuous petitioning” (above ten petitioners) was made illegal in 1649 in England, reaffirmed in a 1661 act, which was repealed only in 1986. How does one interpret this and other forms of aversion towards freedom of assembly in the early – and as the English case testifies, not so early – periods of modern Western history? One reading certainly coincides with my general claim that for both lawmakers and judges the most familiar case for expression and the generation of political meaning is reasoned argument, especially in its written form, hence an overall suspicion against assemblies, especially the non-deliberative ones.

A much more critical reading of the history of the early legal approach to assemblies consists of portraying it as a reaction of the cowardly, oppressive elite, a means to keep power over the

125 TILLY supra note 2 at 33.
majority. However, there are too many exceptions to advance any such generalization. For instance, along those lines how would one interpret the half-legitimate, often violent control by local “youth abbeys” over marriages throughout Europe, manifested clearly in assemblies. In any case, in earlier eras much more prone to open and legitimate violence in interpersonal relations, assemblies like festivities or popular protests were necessarily also occasions of mob violence, often even regularized and ritualized violence, also because of the lack of a state monopoly on violence. In addition, the function of popular protest early on has been essentially conservative, or reactionary to innovation by central authorities, and such violent conservative riots were often led by local elites. Still, more psychological approaches which see masses and prophesize an “age of the crowd” have emerged from the late 19th century onward, and came to dominate the field well into the 1960s. That is, the emergence of the practice of demonstration as part of peaceful social movement repertoire coincided with the view of crowds as irrational and dangerous masses, confusing even more the question of whether there was no right because there was no social practice or whether there was no social practice because there was no right. Let us now see how law historically reacted to both these changing practices and sometimes counterintuitive beliefs historically, first in the English and American past, and then on the European continent.

The literature and case law both often view freedom of assembly as related to the right to petition. However, I only found a clear legal-historical connection between petition and assembly in the United States. There, assembly, as will be shown, is indeed historically related to the right to petition, understood to be a right of the Englishmen, and in this sense claimed by American settlers against the Crown and the English Parliament. The right to petition itself however underwent several ups and downs during the history of England. One author traces its first appearance back to as early as somewhere between 959 and 963, i.e. to

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127 For an excellent analysis see JULIUS R. RUFF, VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chapter on Ritual group violence, especially 160-163.
128 RUFF, supra note 127 at 184-188.
the so-called Andover Code. In the relevant part of the Andover Code, Edgar the Peaceful stated:

2. And no one is to apply to the king in any suit, unless he may not be entitled to right or cannot obtain justice at home. 2.1. If that law is too severe, he is then to apply to the king for alleviation.

This or similar versions of a right of petitioning for redress reoccurs in several royal charters, and then was famously reinforced in the 1215 Magna Charta. The difference between the early charters and the Charta is significant. The early charters are all written by the monarch, and it seems, they were adhered to only as long as it was convenient for the monarch. Smith cites the prologue to the Laws of Canute which also entailed a guarantee of petition as typical for the early understanding: “This is the ordinance in which King Canute determined with the advice of his councilors, for the praise of God and for his own royal dignity and benefit…”

At this time thus the aim of granting some sort of a right to petition was not in the interest of the petitioner, but for the praise of God and for the dignity and benefit of the King. These aims might be intended to mean something like objective truth of justice, which in the medieval understanding would necessarily overlap with the “interests” of the people: still, a petition “right” based on these criteria could be easily turned into a clause of discretion.

Later on, the Magna Charta used somewhat stronger (and tiresome) language, and, with time, and through various detours, the right to petition developed into a proper common law right. At the same time, petitions became the most important form of broadening parliament’s power vis-à-vis the monarch. This is a significant change not only in the history of “democracy”, but because it shows again a potential inherent in the right to petition which

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131 Whitelock supra note 130 at 419 as cited by SMITH supra note 129 at 14.

132 See § 61 Magna Charta, available e.g. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/mcarta.asp.

133 Cf. Smith’s analysis of the history of petition after the Magna Charta. At times, kings would deny any obligation on their part not to ignore or at least not to punish petitioners, while at other times, petitioners, in or through Parliament would claim ‘ancient liberties’ while indeed creating new ones. SMITH, supra note 129 at 17-30.
can be found also in freedom of assembly. In a certain sense and incrementally over the centuries, the petition as a form has turned into substance: the right to complain has transformed into power to change the law.

A similar pattern works in the colonial context, where the renunciation of representation is the end of English sovereignty, since that sovereignty rests on representation instead of infallibility, and in both cases the result is the overcoming of a previous regime, and the creation of new rights. In the English case, the right to petition significantly contributed to the development of representative government, while in the U.S. case much later, the perceived violation of the right to petition supported the legitimacy of the revolution, and, as a by-product, freedom of assembly started to regularly appear in post-revolution state constitutions, as I will try to show next.

During colonial times, the Molasses Act of 1733 provoked the first petition coming from the American colonies. Sir John Barnard, speaking on behalf of Rhode Island, the petitioning colony, made a claim that the colonists have claim to an even stronger right to petitioning. He said 134:

> the people of every part of Great Britain have a representative in the House who is to take care of their particular interests as well as of the general interest of the nation... but the people who are the petitioners ... have no particular representatives in this House, therefore, they have no other way of apply or of offering their reasons to this, but in the way of being heard at the bar of the House by their agent here in England

Settlers regularly claimed the right of petition as a right of British subjects. 135 Some petitions, like that against the Stamp Act, were finally successful, while others, notably against the Townshend Act, invoked repression. Repression went so far that several colonial legislatures,

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135 See e.g. the Stamp Act Congress’s resolution to the Declaration of Rights and Grievances of October 19, 1765: “That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies, to petition the king or either house of parliament.” DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Zachariah Chafee ed., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951-52, Preliminary edition) at 149 as cited in SMITH supra note 129 at 64.
which supported Massachusetts’s initial protest against the Townshend Act, were dissolved by the Governors.\textsuperscript{136} The situation radicalized further in that the Virginia House of Burgesses proclaimed that solely it had the right to impose taxes in Virginia. Along with that proclamation, however, the House felt necessary once again to confirm the right to petition: “….it is the undoubted privilege of the inhabitants of this colony, to petition their sovereign for redress of grievances; and that it is lawful and expedient to procure the concurrence of his majesty’s other colonies in dutiful addresses, praying royal interposition in favour of the violated rights of America.”\textsuperscript{137} Later, at the First Continental Congress “the good people of the several colonies” declared\textsuperscript{138}

That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North-America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the following RIGHTS:

… Resolved, N.C.D. 8. That they have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are illegal.

Here the right to assembly appears already as a natural precondition of the right to petition, a development clearly missing from the English law. Afterwards, similarly worded guarantees were enshrined in several state constitutions. In each of those cases there was a conjunction of assembly and petition. For example, the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 and the Vermont constitutions of both 1777 and 1786 all proclaimed “[t]hat the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance. Interestingly, the 1776 North Carolina constitution omitted exactly the reference to address, petition or

\textsuperscript{136} SMITH supra note 129 at 63.
\textsuperscript{137} CHAFFEE, supra note 135 at 150 as cited in SMITH supra note 129 at 64.
\textsuperscript{138} Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, October 14, 1774, available at the Avalon Project http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp.
remonstrance, i.e. the oldest right.\textsuperscript{139} As to the federal constitution, during the debate, representative Mr. Sedgwick opposed the inclusion of freedom of assembly as being superfluous next to freedom of speech,\textsuperscript{140} because freedom of speech self-evidently includes freedom of assembly. After a very short debate, this motion was rejected, and the assembly clause was included in the federal constitution. There was basically no debate on it, because the debate was dominated by a serious motion to include a right of the people to instruct their representatives. Importantly, James Madison, who was keen on determining the proper number of legislative assemblies,\textsuperscript{141} did not raise any objection in relation to the right of the \textit{people} peaceably to assemble.

In any case, by the time of the revolution and especially the drafting of the constitution, petition and assembly had become intertwined in the minds of the colonial people. Remarkably, the right peaceably to assemble was a new right, not one of the rights of the Englishmen, and it was never included in any of the “several charters or compacts”. The colonists thereby claimed a right the English in England never had as a right. What happened was an incremental change in meaning, whereby petition started to include assembly, to consult for the common good. Note that the texts are unclear about whether the people are entitled to assemble in order to consult for the common good and to petition or whether these are separate rights.

In England, the right to petition has clearly not implied a right to assembly in either of the above senses – that is, neither in the sense of presenting or consulting on a petition in assembly nor as logically following from the right to petition as a separate right to assembly.

The mentioned ban on tumultuous petitioning remained in force from 1649 till 1986, in itself

\textsuperscript{139} A very similar provision became part of the Alabama constitution of 1819, available at the Avalon Project http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ala1819.asp.
\textsuperscript{140} Annals of Debates of Congress, August 14, 1789, 759 et seq., available http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=001/llac001.db&recNum=381
\textsuperscript{141} See, e.g. “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” James Madison, Jr. 55, in JOHN JAY, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, \textsc{The Federalist on the New Constitution}, Written in 1788 (Hallowell, Masters, Smith & Co. 1852) at 256.
disproof of recognition of a right to assembly at least in the sense of a right continuously flowing from a right to petition. The common law breach of the peace has traditionally been “breathtakingly broad, bewilderingly imprecise in scope”142, providing police with such powers related to assemblies which also defeated any claim as to the existence of a “right”. Dicey also famously proclaimed, “it can hardly be said that our constitution knows of such a thing as any specific right of public meeting” and “[t]he right of assembling is nothing more than a result of the view taken by the Courts as to individual liberty of person and individual liberty of speech.”143 Interestingly, in UK legal history, recent decades have seen an extraordinary mushrooming of legislative restrictions on freedom of assembly from public order laws to terrorism and antisocial behaviour legislation; even harassment provisions are applied to restrict protest – while this is the first time that arguably something of a right to freedom of assembly in the UK is emerging due to the ECHR and section 6 of the Human Rights Act. The UK history also shows that having a right does not necessarily imply less restriction on its exercise than during the times when it was only a liberty.

In Germany and France, there was not any proper right to petition, let alone assemble, until well into the 19th or even 20th century constitutions. Neither does a historical connection seem to have existed between petition and assembly, unlike in the United States. Some authors in Germany mention the so-called aristocratic privilege of self-assembly of the estates in the medieval Holy German Empire as a particular appearance of freedom of assembly, without “the moment of generalization”, i.e. a privilege which was to be later extended to the whole society.144 Others mention the right to petition, but without further concretization, so it most probably refers to the right to petition as it evolved in England.

Freedom of assembly itself started to emerge in the early 19th century in Germany, after the feudal regime of capriciously revocable permits had faded away.\footnote{Cf. „Versammlungen und Vereine sind an eine jederzeit widerrufliche landesherrliche Genehmigung gebunden, politische Vereinigungen aber und alle geheimen Gesellschaften sind unter allen Umständen strafbare Vergehen.“ (Assemblies and unions are bound to a permit which the feudal landlord can revoke at any time, while political associations and every secret society are under any circumstances criminalized.) Otto von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, Bd. 1. (1868), 873 as cited by DEPENHEUER, supra note 144 at Rn. 16.} Already an 1802 treatise reports that an assembly can be banned for reasons of public safety and order, but the ban cannot be imposed arbitrarily and at the whim of the police. What is more, already at this time the author emphasizes that only prior notice can be required, not request for permission.\footnote{GÜNTHER HEINRICH VON BERG, HANDBUCH DES TEUTSCHEN POLICEYRECHTS, Erster Theil, 2. Aufl. 1802, at 244 as cited by DEPENHEUER, supra note 144 at Rn. 18.} Later on, however, German states which adopted a constitution in the early constitutionalist era between 1814 and 1824 did not include freedom of assembly in their basic document. They thought freedom of assembly was necessary in a state where there was no representation of the citizens, but it did not fit a representative state structure.\footnote{Roellecke, Versammlungsfreiheit in GÖRRES-STAAATSLEXIKON as cited by DEPENHEUER, supra note 144 at Rn. 19.} As we see this is quite the opposite of what underlies English and especially American constitutional history: there it is exactly the representative government which has to guarantee freedom of assembly, as an independent right or in conjunction with the right to petition. This opposition mirrors the partly still existing tension between German and US courts with regard to the value protected by freedom of assembly, to be discussed below under democracy-related values.

Soon after 1815, the rest of the German states that kept the feudal constitution (re)turned to authoritarian government, which was repressive of freedom of assembly and association. The German Confederation (Deutscher Bund, 1815-1866) adopted in 1819 the Karlsbader Resolutions, which targeted – among other liberties – secret or not authorized alliances, especially fraternities which were traditionally politically active at German universities.\footnote{§ 3 des Bundes-Universitätsgesetzes vom 20 September 1819, cited after DEPENHEUER, supra note 144 at Rn. 19.} Still, the repressive legal environment could not prevent 30,000 people from gathering at
Hambach between 27 and 30 May 1832 – under the guise of a popular feast – but in reality to discuss political reforms and the state of liberties.\textsuperscript{149} It provoked a reaction from the German Confederation, which not only banned any political unions, but introduced permit requirements for every such festivity which is “as to the time and place neither usual nor allowed.” Even on permitted popular assemblies, “addresses or suggestions for resolutions should incur an enhanced penalty.”\textsuperscript{150}

In France, significantly, the Declaration of 1789 does not include freedom of assembly at all. The Constitution of 1791 guaranteed “as natural and civil rights … the liberty of the citizens to assemble peacefully and without arms, in accordance with the laws of police.”\textsuperscript{151} Article 7 of the declaration of rights included in the Montagnard constitution of June 24, 1793 (which never was applied) repeated this same formulation.\textsuperscript{152} Most of the revolutionaries, so explains Duguit, were suspicious of any collective right or any right of a group because of the dangers partial loyalties represent for national unity and the general will, the latter being derivable only from individual wills.\textsuperscript{153} The few proclamations of freedom of assembly in the mentioned documents during the Revolution are considered not more than “paying lip service” by a French law professor today.\textsuperscript{154} However, later French history illustrates the ambivalence of classic liberalism and freedom of assembly, too, in that Benjamin Constant did not include it in the 1815 additional act to the constitutions of the Empire,\textsuperscript{155} which he drafted for Napoleon and which was approved by five million people in a plebiscite.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{149} For an analysis, see Pia Nordblom, Resistance, Protest, and Demonstrations in Early Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Hambach Festival of 1832 in \textit{THE STREET AS STAGE} supra note 2 at 61-83.
\textsuperscript{150} § 3 des Bundes-Universitätsgesetzes vom 20 September 1819, cited after DEPENHEUER, supra note 144 at Rn. 19.
\textsuperscript{153} Duguit as cited by PIERRE-HENRI PRÉLOT, DROIT DES LIBERTÉS FONDAMENTALES (Hachette, 2nd ed. 2010), 289.
\textsuperscript{154} PRÉLOT, supra note 153 at 289.
\textsuperscript{156} ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS (Yale University Press, 2011) FN 10 to page 249, 359.
Freedom of assembly was not mentioned in constitutional documents until the second republican constitution of 1848 which in Art. 8 guaranteed freedom of peaceful assembly within the limits of rights of others and public safety. In an unexpected turn worthy of further examination, this article protects first freedom of association, then freedom of peaceful and unarmed assembly, then petition and then freedom of manifestation of thoughts by press or in other ways, and then prohibits censorship of the press. This order of guarantees is actually the opposite of what is in general the standard order in human rights documents (opinion, press, petition, assembly, association). In any case, all these documents were rebutted later, and none of them serves as point of reference in contemporary constitutional discourse either. Freedom of manifestation (more or less, freedom of demonstration) has since 1995 been interpreted as part of freedom of expression of opinions and ideas in the 1789 Declaration, while freedom of meeting (réunion) is a legislatively granted right from 1881, but has not been elevated to constitutional status. What is the overall picture that emerges from this short look at historical predecessors of the right to assembly? Much remained uncertain, as if to confirm my claim about the neglected nature of freedom of assembly not only by courts and comparative lawyers, but by legal historians alike. I have not been able to verify exactly why the American colonists started to think petition is intertwined with assembly as a right, while clearly their English peers did not, apart from the fact that the Crown had repressed violently the assemblies of the settlers many times. It seems most likely that this very fact, this experience, and not a legally perceived relationship, preceded the inclusion of an assembly right before the right to petition in the many documents of the evolving American system. It also remained unexplained in any

157 Article 8. - Les citoyens ont le droit de s'associer, de s'assembler paisiblement et sans armes, de pétitionner, de manifester leurs pensées par la voie de la presse ou autrement. - L'exercice de ces droits n'a pour limites que les droits ou la liberté d'autrui et la sécurité publique. - La presse ne peut, en aucun cas, être soumise à la censure. http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1848-ii-republique.5106.html

158 Décision n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995, Loi d'orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité.

159 Law of 30 June 1881.
serious detail why Madison actually did not have a single word of caution with regard to assemblies of people as compared to assemblies of representatives, if not simply because he was preoccupied with preventing the introduction of bound mandate of representatives – certainly a vital question.

France’s very inconsistent history testifies to great aversion on the part of both Rousseauists and later liberals to a right of assembly. A right to assembly allegedly both prevents the realization of the general will because it fragments it, and poses a danger to individual liberty, a strange coincidence.\textsuperscript{160} According to some early German views, there is no need for freedom of assembly if there is a representative government. This link might have been seen similarly by those during the debate on the First Amendment, who would have struck out the reference to the right of assembly, but would have included a right of the people to instruct their representatives. Thus, freedom of assembly might appear superfluous in a system of “bound mandate”, which, as mentioned, Madison in turn might have feared significantly more than the right to peaceful assembly. All these contingencies and inconsistencies of the legal history of freedom of assembly left their mark on the conceptions of freedom of assembly, which will be discussed next.

2. Meeting, marching or speaking: conceptions of assembly and its relation to the right to free speech and expression

2.1. United Kingdom: stationary and moving assemblies

In the United Kingdom, the law traditionally has not granted a right to freedom of assembly; therefore, the conceptions of assembly are to be understood from the laws regulating public order. The act which currently controls a large segment of freedom of assembly in the UK is

\textsuperscript{160} A similar suspicion was manifest in early French and German liberalism with regard to freedom of association. See GÁBOR HALMAI, AZ EGYESÜLÉS SZABADSÁGA, AZ EGYESÜLÉSI JOG TÖRTÉNETE [FREE DOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION] (Atlantisz, Budapest, 1990) 28-31.
the 1986 Public Order Act (POA). POA was born out of a perceived need to provide stronger power to the police in cases of assembly in reaction to the 1984-1985 miners’ strike, one of the country’s most serious events of public disorder in the twentieth century. The 1986 act still governs the law of freedom of assembly in England, although quite a few additional laws have been adopted specially targeting terrorism and “anti-social behavior”. The 1994 Criminal Justice and Police Order Act (CJPOA) inserted the notion of trespassory assembly as sections 14A-14C in the 1986 Act. One of the most important recent modifications has been section 57 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act of 2003, which reduced the number of participants required in an assembly before the police may impose conditions from 20 to 2 (!). Thus, for purposes of restriction, one can safely assume that already an assembly of two is an assembly in English law.

Otherwise, the public order law of the UK with regard to assemblies has not been monolithic. Historically, the so-called right to passage divided the law related to assemblies into two identifiable classes: processions and stationary meetings. Throughout the nineteenth century the right to passage preferred processions to meetings, according to one commentator because of sympathy towards the Salvation Army which marched, and because of hostility towards the socialist movement which regularly held mass street meetings.161 Nevertheless, the law was considerably changed when confronting the Fascist marches in the first half of the twentieth century. The 1936 POA, largely targeting the Mosleyan movement, authorized the police to ban processions in a given area if an officer is of the opinion that imposing conditions is not sufficient to prevent serious public disorder. This, however, did not mean that the legal schemes for dealing with processions and meetings were integrated. The possible theoretical unlawfulness of any kind of stationary meeting have endured well into the 1980’s. A 1987

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case, *Hirst and Agu*\textsuperscript{162} first recognized that a non-moving demonstration is not necessarily an unlawful use of the street (though this interpretation is still quite far from acknowledging a fundamental right of assembly). Yet even recent amendments to the 1986 POA preserved the traditional duality of processions and stationary meetings not only in a formal sense, but also in the sense of some substantive differences.

### 2.2. France: réunion and manifestation

In France, two, or, rather, three kinds of assemblies [*rassemblements*] are differentiated. An assembly might be a *manifestation*, a *réunion*, or an *attroupement*. One element of the definition of these concepts seems to be the place where people assemble; others are the aim, the organization, and the modality. None of these elements is completely clear.

As to the place, one thing is clear: a *manifestation*, which is closest in meaning to demonstration in English, is an assembly on the public route [*voie publique*]. The concept of public route, however, is also slightly unclear, *voie* normally meaning road, and not necessarily including, for example, square. It is not included in the definition if *manifestation* means only moving or also stationary assemblies; therefore, it is likely that both forms are included, even though most stationary assemblies would take place on a square, and not on the road. Certainly, in contrast, a *réunion* is a stationary assembly.

An assembly might be a *réunion* which means meeting, more however in the static than in the active sense, somewhat like reunion in English (if the French mean the act of gathering or coming together, they use *rencontre*). That’s why for example the usual translation of assembly into French as *reunion* causes some confusion. Some would allege that the ECHR\textsuperscript{163} and the American jurisprudence place *manifestation* in the category of réunion, clearly

\textsuperscript{162} Hirst and Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, 85 Crim. App. R. 143 (Q.B. 1987).

\textsuperscript{163} For example Alain Boyer argues that „the silence of the European convention of human rights did not prevent the European Court of Human Rights to consecrate, on the basis of Article 11, i.e. freedom of assembly (réunion), the freedom of demonstration (manifestation)”’. Alain Boyer, *La liberté de manifestation en droit constitutionnel français*, 44 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 675 (2001) 684.
misunderstanding that ‘assembly’ as a matter of linguistic convention can both be a meeting and a demonstration (let alone the text of the First Amendment which actually speaks about “the right of the people peaceably to assemble”). Others, however, albeit a minority, use the word réunion so that it presumably includes both meeting and demonstration.

According to the classic definition of the commissaire du gouvernement Michel in his conclusions to the famous Benjamin judgment of the Conseil d’État of May 19, 1933:

“All a réunion constitutes a momentary grouping of persons formed in order to listen to exposition of ideas or opinions, in order to consult for the protection of interests.”

The comma implies that the two aims are disjunctive, alternative.

Bernard Stirn would understand réunion to be “un groupement de caractère momentané, organisé en vue d’un objet déterminé”. That means that he does not find it necessary to specify the aims of listening to exposition of ideas or opinions or consulting for the protection of interests as stated in the conclusions of Michel to the Benjamin judgment.

According to the Court of Cassation, a passing meeting (rencontre) of persons who do not have between themselves any relationship (engagement) is not a réunion. That’s why it denied the quality of réunion to the faithfuls’ gathering, who, leaving the mass, stayed to listen to an improvised speech of a delegate. Also, the Conseil d’État affirmed that the meeting (rencontre – i.e. again in the active and not planned sense) of consumers in a café is not a réunion. The commissaire du gouvernement Corneille defined réunion in his conclusions to this case as an assembly concerted or organized for the defense of common ideas or

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164 This seems to be the stance taken by Léon Duguit: LÉON DUGUIT, TRAÎTÉ DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, VOLUME 5, LES LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES, (2nd ed. 1925, Fontemoing-Boccard, Paris) § 29. La liberté de réunion.
166 19 mai 1933 - Benjamin - Recueil Lebon, 541.
167 “La réunion constitue un groupement momentané de personnes formé en vue d’entendre l’exposé d’idées ou d’opinions, en vue de se concerter pour la défense d’intérêts.”
169 Cass., 14 mars 1903, du Halgouët.
interests.\textsuperscript{170} This early formulation of the Delmotte case was extended in the \textit{Benjamin} case also to include listening to exposition of ideas or opinions, with the apparent implication that a literary lecture would fall within the scope of \textit{réunion}. In the \textit{Benjamin} judgment a literary lecture (\textit{conférence}) was considered to be not a (mere) \textit{spectacle}, but \textit{rather} a \textit{réunion}. The commissaire du gouvernement argued that since there was a chance that someone from the audience would react to what the speaker was saying, a discussion might develop, and that is why the lecture is closer to a \textit{réunion} than to a mere spectacle.\textsuperscript{171} Still, although both are different from a spectacle, there should be some difference between \textit{réunion} and \textit{manifestation}. Again, more according to common sense than to any specific legal or judicial definition, a \textit{réunion} is convened in order to listen to a speaker, who might be the only person expressing his opinion, without the others necessarily sharing it, while on the other hand, \textit{manifestation} is about conveying a message to the outside world, i.e. all the demonstrators’ opinions are expressed by participating physically at the \textit{manifestation}.\textsuperscript{172} In the words of Bernard Stirn, \textit{manifestation} presents a dual quality by being organized on the public route and by having an aim of expressing a collective \textit{sentiment}.\textsuperscript{173} The line is in my view blurred, since there can be – and usually is – one or more speakers at the \textit{manifestation}, who might react to each other, with different views, and, also, demonstrators might express differing views, or it might not be possible to differentiate between demonstrators and audience. In the same vein, it is well possible that at a \textit{réunion} more people express opinions, same or different, or discuss some proposition. While Alain Boyer would paint a picture of the participants of the \textit{réunions} as passive, Colliard and Letteron would differentiate \textit{réunions} and \textit{manifestations} from the \textit{spectacle}, where the spectators are passively observing the

\textsuperscript{170} CÉ, 6 août 1915, Delmotte.  
\textsuperscript{171} Dalloz Périodique, 1933, 3, 64.  
\textsuperscript{172} Boyer, \textit{supra} note 163 at 685.  
\textsuperscript{173} STIRN \textit{supra} note 168 at § 37.
“actors”. Therefore, they would claim that the underlying criterion of réunion is that it is about expressing and exchanging views. It is hard to deny that the novelty of the Benjamin judgment – or, more precisely, of the conclusions of the commissaire du gouvernement – was that the mere possibility of exchange of ideas, or communication between speaker and listener, changes a spectacle into a réunion. The difference between réunion and manifestation lies therefore not so much in the fact that the people at the réunion are not necessarily expressing or exchanging their views. At least linguistic convention rather imposes delineation from membership: the dividing line is who is considered to be part of a réunion or a manifestation. Réunion is conceptualized as a gathering of those who speak and those who listen, meaning that both the speaker and the audience belong to the réunion. A manifestation, to the contrary, is conceptualized to include only those who demonstrate, and not their audience or spectators. That leads one to the affirmation of a common goal or issue which ties together the group. At the réunion, the non-speakers are listening and might speak, there is no non-interested person affected. At the manifestation, to the contrary, the common goal will include addressing outsiders who might be interested, disinterested, disturbed or delighted by the manifestation. There is no outsider at the réunion, while the whole point of the manifestation is to interpellate others who do not participate at the demonstration itself, but possibly might join it. The relevance of the distinction is that réunions on public road are flatly prohibited in French law, even though it seems that the authority remains free to authorize the usage of the public route for a réunion. This led some commentators to define réunion as not taking place on the public route, a move which shows very clearly the loi-directed thinking of French jurists. Jean Morange would for example distinguish réunion and manifestation by the sole

175 Article 6 of the law of 30 June 1881, reaffirmed by the decree-law of 23 October 1935.
176 CÉ, 3 mai 1974, Mutuelle Nationale des étudiants de France, N° 83702, Recueil Lebon.
criterion that *manifestation* takes place on the public route. However, to my mind, it is rather a decision of the legislator which precludes *réunions* on public roads, and not a question of linguistic convention. Otherwise, it would have been neither necessary, nor sensible for the legislator to prohibit *réunions* on public road. On the other hand, French law is definitely not elaborate enough to have made clear whether for the purposes of constitutional protection, the scope of freedom of assembly includes “réunions sur la voie publique” or not. If so, the legislative prohibition of *réunions* on the public route could theoretically be examined for conformity with the constitution. If not, *réunion* in the sense of the constitution would be limited to *réunions* not on the public route. However, the question itself is moot, so far at least, since neither the Conseil Constitutionnel nor the Conseil d’État has granted in any sense fundamental rights protection or analogous protection to the liberté de la réunion. The legal sources of liberté de réunion are the same as the legal sources of prohibiting réunions on the public route.

Still, *réunions* enjoy definitely more protection than *manifestations*, for example, there is no notification requirement in the case of *réunions*. Furthermore, French law differentiates private from public *réunions*. Public *réunions* are those which are open to the public in the sense that participants are not invited by name. Private *réunions* are not regulated at all. Manifestations on the public route are perceived to be more dangerous to public order than réunions. Nonetheless, as réunions are prohibited on the public route, it seems that the legislator deems *réunions on the public route* (i) the most dangerous or obstructive, followed by *manifestations* (ii), then *public réunions not on public route* (iii) – which are then réunions taking place in closed areas or in buildings, owned by the state or by private entities to which people are not invited by name, but everybody is free to join – and, lastly, *private réunions* (iv)

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177 JEAN MORANGE, MANUEL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES (Presses Universitaires de France, 2007) at 196, before § 140.
178 COLLIARD & LETTERON supra note 174 at 498.
179 COLLIARD & LETTERON supra note 174 at 499.
to which people are invited by name are perceived to be the least dangerous or otherwise in need of regulation.

On the other hand, as the line between manifestation and réunion is extremely blurred if not non-existent, it is highly unlikely that the categorization, together with the ban of réunions on public route, is really enforced. Suppose an announcement has been posted on a billboard on the street about an upcoming réunion of the teachers of lycée X to discuss the new educational reform plans. As the public réunion is by definition something to which everybody can come, it is within the concept of the (public) réunion that the organizers advertise it in order to inform strangers about the event. According to French law, this event cannot happen on public road, unless it can be perceived as a manifestation. As probably there would be some audience, outsiders, etc., who would come out of curiosity to observe the discussion, this might turn it into a manifestation according to the approaches sketched above. What renders a public réunion into a manifestation, ultimately is the presence and reaction of outsiders. For example: probably, public gardens which are fenced and have opening hours, like that of the Jardin des Tuileries, are not a public route, thus, public réunion can be held there, what is more, without prior notice. However, depending on who comes, the gathering may easily become a manifestation in the sense that it is about addressing outsiders and not “discussing an issue among us”. What is more, who is supposed to bear responsibility if the réunion “transgresses” and becomes a manifestation in the sense that people leave the garden, and, let’s say, start blocking the traffic on the Concorde square?

Most probably, whenever one wants to organize any sort of gathering on the public route, one will qualify it as manifestation and then one will notify the police (or préfet) about the event. Presumably, however, if someone wishes to avoid the duty of notification, he or she will claim that the event is a réunion and the place is not a public route. A route – voie – would

\[180\] It is possible that lower level park regulations actually preclude reunions without prior notice, or else, etc., but my point is to show the logic of the legislative framework.
conceivably be a way on which there is traffic, i.e. streets in any case, but also squares insofar as there are crossroads or crossing traffic. As I can see it, exclusively pedestrian places would not necessarily qualify as voie publique, therefore, a square might be either a voie publique or not, or even some parts of a square might be voie publique while other parts are not.

In effect, it is likely that the difference between ‘réunion’ and ‘manifestation’ cannot be maintained solely with reference to the modality of the assembly, its dialogical as opposed to monolithically expressive nature, but also relates to the destination of the place used. This is therefore similar to the German approach discussed below.181

Finally, French law traditionally has distinguished the concept of “attroupements”. Attroupements, in the formulation of the criminal law are assemblies which are capable (susceptible) of disturbing public order. It is therefore again an improper concept in the sense that it is just spelling out the limits of legal assemblies. Stirn would claim that attroupements are – apart from the tendency to disturb public order – unorganized as well.182 It is, I would say, a rather common sensical intuition that disorderly assemblies are unorganized, since disorderly and unorganized seem close in meaning. However, in this case, law is counterintuitive: there is nothing about organization in the legal definition of attroupement in Art. 431-1 Code penal, and from experience in other jurisdictions it is clear that spontaneous demonstrations can easily be orderly and peaceful.

That a demonstration or réunion should be driven by a common goal is understood self-evidently and not put out explicitly anywhere in decisions. That’s why, as mentioned above183 a passing meeting (‘rencontre’) of persons who do not have among themselves any relationship (‘engagement’) is not a réunion. Accordingly, the Cassation Court denied the quality of réunion to the faithfuls’ gathering, who, leaving the mass, stayed to listen to an improvised speech of a delegate. What is more, the common goal is not simply a common

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181 *Infra* text accompanying notes 208--235.
182 STIRN *supra* note 168 at § 37.
183 Judgment du Halgouët, *supra* note 169 and accompanying text.
goal of the theatre-goers to enjoy the performance, but implies some sort of active interest.\textsuperscript{184}

As we have seen in the Benjamin judgment,\textsuperscript{185} the possibility of a dialogue between speaker and listener renders a mere spectacle into a réunion. One could then argue, as for example, Colliard & Letteron do, that the common goal present both at any manifestation and réunion is to exchange ideas or defend interests, i.e. the Benjamin conclusions are extended to manifestations as well.\textsuperscript{186}

However, Alain Boyer points out a difference between réunions and manifestations with regard to the common goal. He is saying that the people at the réunion come together in order to listen to a message, while people in the manifestation are expressing a message by their presence. Therefore, he is only willing to accept that there might be in both cases expression of opinion, however, in the réunion the only necessary element of freedom of expression the participants are exercising is “freedom to be informed”, and the speaker exercises freedom of speech. On the contrary, at the manifestation, the demonstrators (all in one, and one-by-one) express an opinion. Therefore, he thinks it is justified and necessary to attach freedom of demonstration to freedom of expression, and not to freedom of réunion\textsuperscript{187}. To express an opinion is a necessary common goal of the demonstrators; and Boyer would specify the goal as being addressing the government, or public opinion.\textsuperscript{188}

Léon Duguit derives freedom of réunion from freedom of opinion in a way that gives a possibility to define réunion from its function. Freedom of opinion in Duguit’s view implies the freedom to manifest, to communicate one’s thoughts to others, and, consequently, “the liberty to convoke réunions of men where these thoughts will be exposed publicly.”\textsuperscript{189}

Therefore, freedom of opinion implies freedom of reunion (which, in my reading, by Duguit

\textsuperscript{184} COLLIARD \& LETTERON \textit{supra} note 173 at 493.
\textsuperscript{185} Judgment Benjamin, \textit{supra} note 166 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{186} COLLIARD \& LETTERON \textit{supra} note 173 at 493.
\textsuperscript{187} BOYER \textit{supra} note 163 at 685.
\textsuperscript{188} Id.
\textsuperscript{189} DUGUIT \textit{supra} note 164 at 339.
covers both meetings and demonstrations). Further on, he makes clear that this approach to réunion neither excludes, nor necessitates the possibility of debate or contradictory statements on the réunion, the point is to present an opinion or a report.

2.3. United States: expressivity discounted by “forum” and “action”

In the United States, contrary to the approach taken in the UK or France, little attention is paid to the possible different forms a gathering might take as long as they are expressive. That is, for the purposes of First Amendment protection, currently there is no initial difference between an indoor or outdoor meeting, just as between a stationary or moving assembly (procession). There used to be a difference approximately until the end of the 19th century between assemblies on parks and streets, and the moving assemblies. Indoor meetings (the clear case of reunion in the French understanding) are also covered by the First Amendment. Whether out- or indoor, however, the extent and the manner of the protection will depend on the kind of “forum” to which access is sought. Government property and private property naturally enjoy different status, but more interestingly, within government property there has evolved a complicated classification in the ‘public forum’ jurisprudence. After a long history of twists and changing emphasis on which Robert Post’s 1987 article\textsuperscript{190} is the seminal analysis, the public forum doctrine classifies government-owned places in three categories. First, most highly protected is the public forum, i.e. streets, parks which were “time out of mind, immemorially held in public trust for purposes of assembly, assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”\textsuperscript{191} On such “quintessential public forums”\textsuperscript{192} general First Amendment standards apply; basically compelling state interest needs to be shown for content-based (see Part II. A and especially B.), and some legitimate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{190} Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: the History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
\item \textsuperscript{191} First mention Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 515, 516 (1939).
\item \textsuperscript{192} Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983).
\end{itemize}
interest for content-neutral restrictions (see Part II. C.), the required link between the two is
strongly varying. Secondly, there is the limited public forum, government property which was
opened up for communication by the government. Here it is quite unclear what sort of
standard applies. Robert Post actually thought already in 1987 the limited public forum is
dead. The Perry decision claims that as long as the state keeps the forum generally open, the
same standards apply as on the traditional public forum. Decisions discussed in more detail
under TMP Place restrictions\textsuperscript{193} prove Post’s point, \textit{e.g.} a publicly accessible military base can
discriminate on the basis of content, i.e. it belongs to the third, rather than to the second
category. The third category consists of “[p]ublic property which is not, by tradition or
designation, a forum for public communication.”\textsuperscript{194} On such nonpublic forums the state, in
addition to TMP restrictions, “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.”\textsuperscript{195}
How these three – or, in effect – two standards operate in practice will be hopefully also
visible in the thesis, even though it is structured not along the lines of the U.S. public forum
doctrine, but along the line of prior restraint-substance-modality restrictions, more common to
the other jurisdictions.

What sort of “assemblies” – though again, the expression ‘assembly’ is basically never used
– are worthy of First Amendment protection is also delineated by the speech plus theory, i.e.
expressivity does not matter if it is done by “action”. Speech plus is not a full-fledged doctrine,
but the Supreme Court, especially Justice Hugo Black, found it often useful to differentiate
elements of assembly into “speech” and “conduct” or “action”, and to accord lesser protection
to the latter ones. Justice Black’s view about conduct being unprotected expresses perhaps
most clearly the judicial aversion or ignorance towards how meaning is generated on

\textsuperscript{193} See \textit{infra} text accompanying notes 1125-1234.
\textsuperscript{194} 460 U.S. 46.
\textsuperscript{195} 460 U.S. 46.
assemblies as analyzed in social movement studies, even though Justice Black clearly was a champion of free speech, exactly because he meant anything what is speech should be absolutely protected. The symbolic speech doctrine, discussed below under TMP restrictions, only slightly mitigates the rigor of the speech-action dichotomy. In a classic speech plus reasoning, in Cox v. New Hampshire from 1941, the Supreme Court accepted the fact finding of the state court according to which the gathering “was a march in formation, and its advertising and informatory purpose did not make it otherwise. . . . It is immaterial that its tactics were few and simple. It is enough that it proceeded in an ordered and close file as a collective body of persons on the city streets.” That it was a march in formation, resulted in the applicability of a statute requiring special permit for parades even on sidewalks, and, thus, in conviction of otherwise peaceful Jehovah’s witnesses who were moving in four-five single line groups and holding up signs. Thus, the qualification of their activities as march actually worsened their legal status, which would have been otherwise just that of the simple passersby or shopper on the sidewalks. As Edwin Baker pointed out, the only legally relevant difference between the conduct of the 88 Jehovah’s Witnesses gathering at the intersections on a street of Manchester, New Hampshire, and the other hourly 26 000 passersby who crossed the intersection was that the Witnesses engaged in First Amendment activity, they were “marching in formation.” Certainly, that a group shows its unity by formation (which was in this case a very modest formation, the reader should not have the image of Hitlerian militant marches in her mind) renders the group expressive. The Court does not say explicitly that the formation rendered the parade under the protection of the First Amendment, however. The Court only stresses that the permit requirement is not aimed at the expressive content. It accepted the state supreme court’s interpretation that the statute “prescribed ‘no measures for

controlling or suppressing the publication on the highways of facts and opinions, either by speech or by writing'; that communication ‘by the distribution of literature or by the display of placards and signs’ was in no respect regulated by the statute; that the regulation with respect to parades and processions was applicable only ‘to organized formations of persons using the highways’, and that ‘the defendants, separately, or collectively in groups not constituting a parade or procession,’ were ‘under no contemplation of the Act’,” and the Act only served to secure public convenience in the use of the streets.\(^{199}\) Thus, the Court considered the permit (and fee) requirement attached basically to “formation” as not burdening the expressive aspects of the activity. It remains unclear and even incomprehensible what the justices then think why the Witnesses were building the formation, if not for expressive purposes. Rather, it would seem that the formation is clearly part of the expression, just as Charles Tilly would claim, it is one of the WUNC (Worth, Unity, Numbers and Commitment) displays which contributes to the unity of the group.\(^{200}\) However, this view was reinforced in a 1965 case where it was “emphatically rejected”\(^{201}\) that

the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.

It appears therefore that the USSC attempts to make a distinction between what is considered physical, external or maybe what takes up a space, and what is considered “the message”.

2.4. ECHR: no significant difference between speech and assembly

The European Court of Human Rights has not yet defined the notion of assembly, unlike that of its twin-right in Article 11, association, which has an autonomous meaning under the

\(^{199}\) 312 U. S. 575 et seq.
\(^{200}\) TILLY supra note 2 at 4.
\(^{201}\) Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965), see also the discussion infra text accompanying notes 878-879.
Convention. Nonetheless, “freedom of assembly covers both private meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares as well as static meetings and public processions;” in addition, it can be exercised by individuals and those organizing the assembly. Most probably, however, it does not cover ad hoc, accidental gathering of people without a purpose, or for purely social purposes.

Protests and direct actions where the assembly (number of participants) element might lack will be covered by the freedom of expression right of Art. 10, while Art. 11 is normally considered lex specialis to Art. 10. Apart from that, the Court does not bother to minutiously delimit what makes an assembly an assembly under Art. 11, for example, by requiring a certain number of people to be present, though national jurisdictions in Europe often engage in a number game in that regard.

This flexible or less reflected conceptual approach does not have such negative consequences as the supersession of assembly by speech elsewhere for two main reasons. More importantly, the ECHR does not – at least so far – apply any modality doctrine which would allow for more restriction on the “form” of expression than on the “content”. Secondly, the limits of the two rights in Art. 10 (2) and Art. 11 (2) are essentially the same in the area of the potential application of both Art. 10 and 11, even if the formulation is different.

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205 The Commission e.g. noted that “[t]here is, […] no indication in the […] case-law that freedom of assembly is intended to guarantee a right to pass and re-pass in public places, or to assemble for purely social purposes anywhere one wishes. Freedom of association, too, has been described as a right for individuals to associate ‘in order to attain various ends.’” Anderson and Nine Others v. United Kingdom, Application no. 33689/96., Decision on the admissibility of 27 October 1997, 25 EHRR CD 172.
207 Art. 10 (2): The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Art. 11 (2): No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than
2.5. Germany

2.5.1. Narrow, enlarged or wide notion of assembly

In and about the jurisprudence of the GFCC, there has always been quite an intense debate as to the notion of assembly (Versammlung). The text itself says that (Art. 8 I of the German Basic Law, “GG” in the following) “every German has the right without notice or permission, peacefully and without arms, to assemble.” Art. 8 II GG: “For assemblies under the open sky, this right can be restricted by law or on the basis of a law.” Thus, on the first sight, it seems that Art. 8 I protects the act of assembling, just as the text of the First Amendment might suggest, except that it is not the right of the people, but of the individual German citizen. In other respects, however, the German debate employs similar terms to what the French lawyers are arguing. Literature and jurisprudence agree that the accidental, passing gathering of people is not an assembly protected by the constitution, similarly to France and the other countries where the issue is less explicit. Thus, there should be some common goal which connects the participants together, and the goal should also be actively common, not that of the theatre-goers. What that goal might be, however, is heavily debated, and even the GFCC seems to change sides on the issue. According to the ‘narrow’ notion of assembly, the goal must be about collective formation and expression of opinion in public matters.  

The ‘enlarged’ notion of assembly includes not only communication about public matters, but private ones as well, while the ‘wide’ notion dispenses with the goal of collective formation

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such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.

208 E.g. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Kommentar zu Art. 8 in Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik (AK-GG) (Erhard Denninger, Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Hans-Peter Schneider, & Ekkehard Stein eds., Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 2001), Rn. 15 et seq.


210 Roman Herzog, Kommentar zu Art. 8 in Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz (Roman Herzog, Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig eds., München, Beck, 2005), Wolfram Höfling, Kommentar zu Art. 8 in GG –GRUNDEGESETZ
and expression of opinion or will, i.e. the goal is irrelevant as long as there is an inner connection among the participants who strive to achieve a common goal, be what it is.

The implications of the different notions are significant. In the first case, freedom of assembly only covers political assemblies, i.e. in a sense is reduced to a sort of political right. Such an approach is overinclusive, because it links assembly too closely to exercise of public power; but also underinclusive because it leaves out wide segments of activity worthy of protection. Proponents of this narrow understanding argue with historical interpretation, which, however, seems to have only a rather weak ground. It has been shown that historical documents (notably the 1848 constitution of Paulskirche, the Prussian constitution of 31 January 1850, or even the Bavarian statute of 26 February, 1850) have not typically limited freedom of assembly to questions of political or public matters, though later courts started to interpret “assembly” in a narrow way, including only political assemblies. In the second case, i.e. when an assembly has to have a goal of collective formation and expression of opinion or will on public or private matters, the value attached to freedom of assembly is the value of communicative freedom as a social value. It is only in the last case, applying a wide notion of assembly, that individual personality as a value comes to the fore, and where not only expression, but also any kind of (common) activity is protected. Therefore, it is only in this last instance that the assembly seen protected because of the potential for “personality development” of the participants. Here German literature, and, partly, the court stress that at the assembly the person unfolds her personality in the group, the assembly is “personality unfolding in group form” whereby the element of expression might be incidental, but not the rationale for the constitutional protection.


Recently, a partly similar, but in my view also importantly different notion of assembly has been put forward in the later editions of the Maunz-Dürig commentary by Depenheuer. He argues that freedom of assembly protects the act of assembling for whatever purpose, but it does not protect anything else, especially it does not protect expression, communication, use of the street, noise, etc. This view has been understood to advocate the wide understanding of assembly by some. \(^{213}\)

I think what is gained in scope by the dispensation with a common goal, is lost by the exclusion of anything else than assembling itself. Thus I do not consider Depenheuer arguing for a wide scope, it is rather a kind of literary interpretation akin to that of Justice Black on the USSC, except of course that Black applies it to speech, and Depenheuer to assembly. The German court itself has been reluctant to conclusively decide the issue for many years. In the seminal 1985 case (Brokdorf), the Court could be understood to accept the wide notion. \(^{214}\)

However, in the so-called Sitting blockade III decision from 2001, it describes an assembly as “a local gathering of several persons for the purpose of common discussion or demonstration which aims at participating in the public formation of opinion.” \(^{215}\)

It remains disputed if the court thereby embraces the enlarged or the narrow understanding of assembly, since public opinion can be formed in private just as public, “political” matters. I agree with those authors, who emphasize the futility of the distinction of public and private matters in this particular regard, \(^{216}\) because it necessarily enables the state to become the censor about what belongs to which category. To illustrate the problem Schulze-Fielitz mentions a North-Rhine-Westphalia judgment in which inline-skaters’ city run was not considered an assembly even though the inline-skaters wanted to raise the issue of

\(^{213}\) DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211 at 35, FN 11.

\(^{214}\) BODO PIEROTH, BERNHARD SCHLINK, STAATSRECHT II. GRUNDRECHTE (27th ed., C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 2007) Rz. 693.


\(^{216}\) DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211 at 37, Rn. 12.
recognizing inline-skates as vehicles for the purposes of street traffic,\textsuperscript{217} i.e. a rather public matter. Nonetheless, the GFCC appears to slide with ordinary courts in denying constitutional protection to “solely entertaining” street events, as in the Love Parade decision, though that was only a denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, and not a full judgment on the substance of the question.\textsuperscript{218} Here we see a drawback of the “judicial democratization” of freedom of assembly,\textsuperscript{219} and the limits of functionalist interpretation of basic rights which easily turns “values” to be protected into “limits” to be enforced: if freedom of assembly serves democratic self-governance, then \textit{a contrario} assemblies which do not fulfill this purpose will be denied constitutional protection. On the other hand, the text (Art. 8 GG) itself clearly refers to two types of assemblies: in one category belong assemblies which take place “under the free sky”, which is interpreted to mean assemblies which are not delimited (by wall, fence, etc.) from the side. Such open air spaces would be the streets, squares, parks, and many more, most recently also other “places of communication”, like airports.\textsuperscript{220} In the other category belongs every other assembly, i.e. which is surrounded by wall or fence. The at least partial overlap with French law is apparent: the first places would be largely voie publique, while the latter are not voie publique (there cannot be traffic). Nonetheless, what is considered \textit{unter freiem Himmel} in German law, might eventually not qualify as voie publique in French law, if there is no crossing traffic. As Art. 8 GG stipulates in paragraph I that freedom of assembly cannot be subject to prior notice or authorization, and para II only allows limits by law for assemblies under the free sky, it might appear that assemblies similar to réunions cannot be made restricted in any way, and it also might appear that prior notice or authorization is not meant by the “limit by law” (Gesetzesvorbehalt) in para. II. However, this

\textsuperscript{217} OVG Nordrhein-Westphalen, NVwZ 2001, 1316 as cited by SCHULZE-FIELITZ, \textit{supra} note 210, Rn. 27, FN 107 at 897.

\textsuperscript{218} BVerfG, 1 BvQ 28/01 vom 12.7.2001, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 28), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/qk20010712_1bvq002801.html

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{See} under Democracy related values, \textit{infra} text accompanying notes 259-279.

\textsuperscript{220} BVerfG, 1 BvR 699/06 vom 22.2.2011, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 128), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110222_1bvr069906.html
clear division of the constitutional text has been interpreted away by systematic interpretation. Firstly, the modalities [Art und Weise] of any sort of assembly belong under Art. 8, while the content of any sort of assembly belongs under Art. 5 I, right to freedom of opinion. What this means in more detail will be discussed under the next heading on demonstration and the relation between freedom of assembly and freedom of opinion. Secondly, prior notice was found constitutional in cases of assemblies under the free sky, as it will be discussed below under prior restraint.

2.5.2. Demonstration and the relation between freedom of assembly and freedom of opinion

Another debate with regard to conceptualities of freedom of assembly revolves around demonstration, an ever more important and sometimes troublesome phenomenon of civil society in Germany. Demonstration is not a legal term; it is not mentioned in either the Basic law or in the Law on Assemblies and Processions. Thus, whether it is protected by any constitutional right, depends on interpretation of both the particular right and also the nature of demonstration. Candidates from the Basic Law are freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and general freedom of action and personality right in Art. 2 I, and even the principle of democracy as enshrined in Art. 20 (and entrenched in the eternity clause of Art. 79 III). Some would deny any claim to constitutional protection, at least when it comes to “large demos”, saying that the gathering and going to the place of the demonstration itself is protected by Art. 8, freedom of assembly, but nothing else. Still, the majority of the authors confirm the constitutional protection of demonstrations, some conceptualizing it as an aspect of freedom of assembly, others as a comprehensive category

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222 BVerfGE 82, 236 (1990), 258, BVerfGE 90, 241, 246 (1994).
223 See infra text accompanying notes 358--362.
224 Hans A. Stöcker, Das Grundrecht auf Demonstrationsfreiheit – eine ochlokratische Fehlinterpretation, DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG (DöV) 1983, 993.
under which falls freedom of assembly, while again others consider it a combination of freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly. Roman Herzog famously attached freedom of demonstration to Art. 2. I, i.e. the general personality right including general freedom of action. In this understanding, the point of demonstration is “personality unfolding in group form”. Thereby he established a connection to human dignity, deemphasizing (though not downplaying) the political importance of Article 8, and highlighting participation at a demonstration as a human need of the individual among increasing risks of isolation. 225

Most authors locate freedom of demonstration partly in Art. 5 (freedom of opinion), and partly in Art. 8, freedom of assembly. This is the doctrine of complementary delimitation (komplementäre Verschränkung), according to which demonstration as substance, as message is protected by Art. 5, while the modalities (arriving, gathering, standing, marching, dispersing, but as it will be apparent, many more) fall under the scope of Art. 8. 226 In this understanding, freedom of demonstration is a medium of freedom of opinion; it is the instrument for collectively expressing opinions. The one single real event ‘demonstration’ is covered in its partial aspects by two different basic rights. 227 This approach has been almost consistently also employed or at least implied in the jurisprudence of the GFCC, 228 in spite that it has not remained without strong critique. Critics claim that freedom of demonstration is a distinct (even if not distinctly enumerated) basic right, because the expression of opinion of the collectivity is qualitatively different from either the individual speaker or the discussing group. The bodily, direct presence of several persons at the same time and place makes demonstration specific. Being together, same time, same place, conveys a stance, an

225 HERZOG supra note 210 at Rn. 10-16 zu Art. 8.
226 KUNIG supra note 209 at Rz. 37 zu Art. 8, SCHWÄBLE supra note 212 at 59, KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDFÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, (20th ed., Heidelberg 1995) Rz. 404, and many more as cited by DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rz. 28 zu § 1, FN 49 at 43.
227 Hofmann, BayVBl, 1987, 131, as cited by DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rz. 28 zu § 1, footnote 52 at 43.
228 BVerfGE 69, 315, 343, 345 (Brokdorf, 1985); BVerfGE 82, 236, 258; BVerfG, 1 BvR 2150/08 vom 4.11.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 110), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20091104_1bvr215008.html (Rudolf Heß memorial march, § 96).
expression itself. This is very much an aspect the GFCC itself stresses in the *Brokdorf* decision, but only in par with the modality theory mentioned above. The debate, theoretical as it might sound, is by far not without practical implications. In case demonstration falls within Art. 8, it can be limited differently than if it falls under Art. 5. Art. 8 only allows for limitations with regard to assemblies under the free sky, i.e. outdoors, but for those the text itself only requires a statute, there are no specific limits mentioned. Art. 5 II, however, lists as limits general laws, protection of personal honor, and youth protection, and Art. 5 I prohibits censorship.

The *Holocaust denial* decision informs also about the view of the GFCC between Art. 5 and Art. 8, more to the point of relation between expression and assembly, and not the question of demonstration addressed more in *Brokdorf*. There the Court interpreted a condition of no Holocaust denial imposed on a closed indoor meeting as a restriction to be judged by standards of Art. 5 II. It explained that as the contested condition itself refers to “certain expressions, which the organizer is supposed neither to mouth, nor to tolerate,” its constitutionality depends on whether the expressions themselves “are permitted or not.” An expression which cannot be constitutionally prohibited, cannot form the basis for an imposition of condition for the purposes of the assembly law, either, or so the Court goes.

Why is it not possible that e.g. constitutionally proscribable expressions are in fact not proscribed in the law on assembly, or, the right to assembly, as a right “without limits” in this (indoor meeting) case, prevails over the limits of freedom of opinion? This situation is known as Grundrechtkonkurrenz in German legal scholarship, and it is not settled which right should

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229 BVerfGE 69, 315, 344, see also below the different meanings of the value of expression. Somewhat surprisingly, Dietel, Gintzel and Kniesel do not appear to be aware of this part of the Brokdorf decision, and impute this idea solely to scholars in DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rz. 29 zu § 1, at 44.


231 BVerfGE 90, 241, 250.
be then applicable in general, i.e. the one with the more, or with the less limits.\textsuperscript{232} From the general basic rights friendliness of the Basic Law, the less limits alternative would follow, and this view generally is shared by the majority of German scholars.\textsuperscript{233} The GFCC has not settled the question in general. If sticking with scholarly majority view then in the case of competing “opinion” and “assembly” (at least as to indoor meetings) rights certainly the right to assembly should apply, as that has less limits. However, the GFCC takes that the assembly guarantee is about the modality, and the substantive guarantee is freedom of opinion. In the Holocaust denial case, the Court has thus explained that the prohibition does not violate Art. 8 I GG even if the right to assembly in closed places is not subject to limits in Art. 8 II. Simply the Court argues that expressions which can be constitutionally prohibited under Art. 5 II are not protected by Art. 8 either.\textsuperscript{234} This in effect results in the confirmation of the theory, rejected by scholars, that the right with more limits is applicable when two rights are competing, especially if one accepts – on the basis of sociology (but even simple semantics or any basic study of communication) – that the split into content and modality is artificial, and false. On the other hand, when it comes to open air meetings and demonstrations, Art. 5 II’s general law requirement imposes at first look a higher justificatory burden on the state than the simple “condition of limit by law” (einfaches Gesetzesvorbehalt) in Art. 8 II. Thus, for demonstrations, after all, it might be actually that the Court has chosen the right with the less limit. The third sitting blockade decision sheds maybe better light to what the GFCC means by content versus modality. There the constitutionality of duress (Nötigung) as applied to sitting blocades was measured not on Art. 5, but on Art. 8, because the conviction has not attached to the “expression, but to the action of blockade aiming at raising attention,”\textsuperscript{235} as if to say the restriction was content-neutral. At the end of the day, however, the problem of the

\textsuperscript{233} Id.
\textsuperscript{234} BVerfGE 90, 241, 249 (1994).
\textsuperscript{235} BVerfGE 104, 92, 103 (2001).
applicable limits is somewhat diminished by rights doctrines developed by the Court, equally applicable to all basic rights. The doctrine of proportionality, including e.g. the doctrine of practical reconciliation [*praktische Konkordanz*] which aims at such a solution which accords the maximum possible space to each of the conflicting rights, or the precept of balancing in the particular case [*Einzelabwägung*], or the theory of objective value order of the Basic Law, or even the doctrines of general freedom of action and of inherent constitutional limits homogenize to a great extent the way basic rights can be restricted. This means that irrespective of whether something (worthy of constitutional protection) is considered opinion or assembly, if that something is in conflict with let’s say the right to personal honor of another or with some common interests like public safety, then the balance will be struck theoretically more or less at the same point. The Court just might need to find some new argument why e.g. in our case also the freedom of demonstration is worthy of constitutional protection, not only freedom of opinion – just as it did in the famous *Brokdorf* decision.\(^{236}\) In any case, though limits on expression of opinion and limits on assembly appear quite different in the text of the Basic Law, at the end of the day, they are so merged in the jurisprudence by both the content-modality distinction and general basic rights theories that standards often appear close to identical.

### 2.6. Comparison of the conceptions of assembly and the relation to freedom of expression in general

The mentioned generalizing or homogenizing tendency of the German jurisprudence is in sharp contrast especially with the American, where very different tests apply to speech and speech plus. This is all the more puzzling because both the US and the German court maintain the division between content and form, one in the split between content-based and content-

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\(^{236}\) Of course, those critical of such value balancing would always find such a homogenization of basic rights doctrines simply a leeway for arbitrary (or momentaneous) judicial preference, masquerading as systemic coherence or teleological interpretation.
neutral restrictions, the other by splitting the scope of the applicable rights into modality and content or substance. The solution to the puzzle lies exactly in this difference. The USSC derives the applicable test partly from the nature of the restriction (content-neutrality) and partly from the place of the activity (public forum doctrine) and partly from the nature of the activity (speech or speech plus), where at some point in time (though quite implicitly) these three inquiries got almost completely merged in the case law, which I hope to show throughout the thesis. Meanwhile the German court deals first with the scope of the rights, and thereafter applies a proportionality test of the restrictions by a unified theory on permissible limits, where, however, again the importance of the value in the particular case plays a decisive role, always weighed against competing (conflicting) values in the particular setting. Both the German and the US approach diverge significantly from the fragmented English understanding on both free speech and public order law within which is located – at least traditionally – assembly, except for the curious right to passage. The ECHR, where it does not actually matter much if something is decided under Art. 10 or Art. 11, maybe true to its nature as international court, because this way it can accommodate the certainly even more diverse concepts of member states’s domestic law than it is apparent in this thesis. In France, conceptual unclarities clearly relate to the very distinct nature of rights doctrines in French law (if there are any at all, and we should not instead speak of the doctrine of loi), and to historical contingency where réunion was protected by proportionality standards for long, but manifestation was – much later – accorded constitutional protection or else it would not have had any. This question of “ranking” or status of freedom of assembly and its subcategories in the different jurisdictions will be discussed next.
3. Fundamental right, or “mere” common law liberty

Freedom of assembly has different status in the examined jurisdictions, it is not necessarily a constitutional or basic right, but might be a statutory right or just a liberty. In the United Kingdom, originally, freedom of assembly has not been recognized as a fundamental right. It is arguably not truly recognized as such today either, since the Human Rights Act (HRA in the following) does not allow a prevalence of freedom of assembly over explicit, contrary statutory provision which cannot be interpreted in conformity with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). It seems that freedom of assembly has been protected only as a liberty, a „mere negative liberty”. A liberty in this interpretation has meant only that individuals are free to do what is not prohibited, insofar and only as long as it is not prohibited. 237 By exercising a liberty, one does not commit an unlawful act. In the terminology of Hohfeld, freedom of assembly has been only a privilege. This has two important consequences. First, liberty can easily be taken away, by legislation or even by common law. Secondly, as liberty does not amount to a claim-right, there is confusion about the positive or negative nature of liberty. Some contemporary legal commentators suggest that liberty is not enforceable as opposed to a positive right in the European Convention on Human Rights or even a fundamental right in the U.S. Bill of Rights. It seems to me, however, that liberty differs from those two, otherwise different conceptions of rights not in its enforceability, but in its rank. This rank, on the other hand, follows not even simply from the nature of liberty, but from the constitutional system of the United Kingdom. Parliamentary sovereignty, to put it simply, easily trumps liberties in England while rights in the ECHR and in the U.S. Constitution are supposed to form limits on governmental (including legislative) powers. Liberties are not “constitutional” or “human” rights in England because their nature is

237 Cf. also RICHARD STONE, TEXTBOOK ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford University Press, 5th ed. 2004) at 343.
determined by their relatively low ranking in the hierarchy of norms. It is especially
dangerous – it appears to me – to mistake liberties for negative rights as opposed to positive
rights in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Negative right means a claim-right for non-interference
on the part of the state, like freedom of speech in the U.S. Positive right means a duty of the
state to provide protection for the individual against some harm, or, in a loose sense, a duty of
service provided by the state to the people. Under the ECHR, freedom of assembly is both a
negative and a positive right meaning that people have a right to assembly free from undue
interference, while the state is obliged to take positive measures to facilitate the exercise of
the negative right, e.g. by protecting the demonstrators from violent attacks, or to investigate
cases where a violation of the negative right has apparently occurred.
In any case, in England, freedom of assembly traditionally has been only part of the general
liberty of citizens which could be restricted by law. As an important decision has put it, which
was later cited by Dicey: “English law does not recognize any special right of public meeting
for political or other purposes. The right of assembly … is nothing more than a view taken by
the Court of the individual liberty of the subject.” 238 The only limit to that power of
regulation was some sort of reasonableness. 239 This approach has had particularly disturbing
consequences on freedom of assembly from a constitutional point of view. Freedom of
assembly concerns are almost completely substituted by public order concerns. In most of the
casebooks on civil liberties, there is a chapter about public order law, and not on freedom of
assembly. The textbooks, of course, only reflect the state of the law in the field. In the United
Kingdom there are currently in force a number of statutes entitled as Public Order Act,
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, Crime and Disorder Act, Anti-social Behaviour Act,
and the like, all with a focus on preventing disturbances, and neither with a focus on securing
a fundamental right. There is, accordingly, no single statute which would even allude to the

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238 Cf. *Duncan v. Jones* [1936] 1 KB 218
239 Cf. *Nagy v. Weston* [1965] 1 All ER 78.
right of assembly. The tendency is also clear: the statutes enacted later in time all enhance the powers of the police, all criminalize some previously lawful behavior, and in most of the cases widen the scope of police discretion in handling protests. Freedom of assembly ranks also lower than some other rights or freedoms in UK law. Certainly, the tradition to protect rights in the criminal procedure is much stronger embedded, though this is one area where recent anti-terrorism legislation might render moot even centuries long legal truisms. Recently, some media freedom cases also suggest a tendency on behalf of the House of Lords to declare the existence of a common law ‘constitutional right’ in the realm of freedom of expression. This is certainly not the case with freedom of assembly, not even after the coming into force of the Human Rights Act.

Unlike in Britain, that freedom of assembly is a fundamental right was never questioned in the United States. In Hague v. CIO the Supreme Court summarized earlier statement on the right to free assembly:

…it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States which the [Fourteenth – O.S.] Amendment protects.

…In the Slaughter-House Cases it was said, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 79:
"The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."

In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552-553, the court said:
"The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting

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for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.”

No expression of a contrary view has ever been voiced by this court.

(emphasis added – O.S.)

The concurring justices found even broader the constitutional protection accorded to freedom of assembly, as they considered it is made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the somewhat declined Privileges and Immunities Clause, as the lead opinion of the plurality judgment would claim. The main difference between lead and concurrence is the subject of the right, not so much the fundamentality, though. The Privileges and Immunities Clause only extends to citizens while the Due Process Clause to anybody coming within the jurisdiction of the United States. Nowadays one can safely maintain that in the United States the latter view prevails with regard to the fundamental right to free assembly, even if courts basically never talk of assembly, only about expression.

In Germany, the Basic Law itself only grants freedom of assembly to citizens of the German Federal Republic. This, on the one hand, clearly does not hinder the recognition of freedom of assembly as a fundamental or basic right, which thus similarly to the United States, enjoys highest rank among the possible rights and entitlements in the German legal order.\(^{242}\) What is more, freedom of assembly according to the text of Article 8 GG is unlimited except in cases of assemblies under the open sky. This ostentatious illimitability, however, is significantly reduced in the interpretation of the GFCC, as for such rights, the Court introduced the concept of inherent limitations, i.e. limits flowing from other constitutional rights are acceptable even on seemingly unlimited rights. In an opposite trend, another textual limit is interpreted away, too, which had the effect of broadening basic rights protection. In general, Art. 2 I of the Basic Law protects general freedom of action as a human right, under which also non-citizens’ freedom of assembly can be subsumed. Secondly, the federal assembly law – and

\(^{242}\) This does not mean there might not be differences among basic rights themselves: dignity is considered unlimitable (inviolable is the term in the Basic Law), while freedom of opinion also enjoys a very high status, maybe second to dignity – if such hierarchizations make at all sense in the ad hoc balancing of the German Constitutional Court.
also Länder legislation adopted after the federalism reform\textsuperscript{243} – also grants freedom of assembly to everyone, as only this would be in accordance with the ECHR.\textsuperscript{244} It is unrealistic that any Land will in the future restrict the right to citizens. In any case, in the German constitutional order, freedom of assembly is safely engrained as a basic human right.

In France, as noted above, the freedom of manifestation has been attached to Article 11 of the Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen du 1789 (Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 1789, in the following “DDHC”) by the Constitutional Council,\textsuperscript{245} and that way it has a constitutional rank. Freedom of reunion is “only” statutorily granted, even if that protection is more extensive as there is no prior restraint, and since the Benjamin decision the administrative court examines strictly whether the interference was proportionate. I have to stress that the statutory nature of the guarantee of freedom of réunion does not appear to bother French lawyers, quite to the contrary, they certainly prefer the legislative guarantee over a “constitutional”guarantee proclaimed by the CC. Jean Morange in comparing countries of Common Law and countries of “legislative law”, i.e. France, explains that the value of the first is its unity and flexibility, while of the second is predictability and clarity,\textsuperscript{246} not considering that laws are also in need of interpretation, let alone that laws themselves might be substantively objectionable, unconstitutional or violating “human rights.” Still, historically, freedom of reunion is granted in a law from 1881 (which could always become interpreted by the CC as belonging to the fundamental principles recognized in the laws of the Republic, and thus get constitutional value), but the freedom of manifestation has only been regulated in 1935 in a so-called decree-law, an act issued by the executive but having legislative value.

\textsuperscript{243} A note: the federalism reform (Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes vom 28. August 2006 (BGBl. I S. 2034) has transferred the competence on assemblies to the Länder, but that does not render the federal assembly law in itself moot, because each Land can decide whether to adopt a partially or completely new assembly law, or stay partially or completely under the Federal Assembly Law. In any case, the Länder are bound to observe constitutional jurisprudence of the GFCC. As this thesis deals with the constitutional content of the right to free assembly, I shall not examine separately the various legislative measures which already had been enacted by the various Länder, only if affected by the GFCC.

\textsuperscript{244} D\textsc{ietel}, G\textsc{intzel} & K\textsc{niesel}. \textit{supra} note 211, Rn. 63 zu § 1, 47.

\textsuperscript{245} D\textsc{écision} n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995, Loi d’orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité.

\textsuperscript{246} J\textsc{ean} M\textsc{orange}, \textsc{La Liberté d’expression} (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2009) at 74.
Finally, again Morange explains that the liberté de réunion has been traditionally understood as more precious than freedom of demonstration because it appeared “more intellectual”, and, thus, more worthy of protection in line with the Enlightenment basis of French law. The “idealist” definition given by the commissaire du gouvernement Michel to freedom of réunion in Benjamin also is a reflection of this approach according to Morange. Thus, all in all, this shows it is not useful to transpose on French law the categories of ranking in discussing of freedom of demonstration and meeting. Despite the fact that hierarchy of norms is in general integral part of French doctrine (scholarship), it is not really applied to a particular right. The fact that freedom of demonstration was granted higher status first in 1995, testifies at once both to the general later emergence of the form of demonstration (as explained by social movement studies), and to the late constitutionalization of the French legal system. A last enigmatic feature of French law is, or used to be, that organizers and participants have a different status. Traditionally, it was understood that organizers did not have a constitutionally protected right to either réunion or manifestation, while to participate at a demonstration was fully protected activity. Strange as it might sound that is what could be found in the literature. Courts and authorities nowadays however do not appear to bother with that, and so will I not either any further.

This quick look at the status or “rank” of freedom of assembly in the different jurisdictions allows a few preliminary conclusions. Freedom of assembly’s status as a fundamental constitutional right is not self-evident all over the compared jurisdictions, though the hesitating ones – UK and France – are members to the ECHR, and thus, to varying degree, but acknowledge that it is a “human” right. However, maybe more importantly, the issue of ranking does not by far give a conclusive answer to the extent to which “assembly” is

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247 MORANGE, id. at 63.
248 MORANGE, id. at 63.
249 Id.
protected. The French, after all, manifest all the time, and it would be hard to deny that there is quite a lively culture of assembly events in the UK as well. There might be in important regards lesser burdens on freedom of assembly in these countries than in others, even if the high status is not recognized at all. A good example is the lack of prior restraint on stationary meetings in the UK. Lack of a higher constitutional status does not necessarily result in lesser assembly activity. However it might very well influence – i.e. limit in a selective way – the sorts of assemblies which take place by relieving authorities and courts from exercising the rigorous or more transparent review a constitutional right at stake normally induces. This (dis)advantage of not dealing with a fundamental right gets very apparent in some of the judgments of the House of Lords, and less apparent in the extremely short French decisions (where brevity, however, is often itself a sign of underrationalization of what is at stake). This latter feature of the French and English approach also necessarily impacts upon how much the arguments (or rationales) for the protection of freedom of assembly have been detailed and developed to sophistication in case law, to which now I turn.

4. Contemporary rationales for constitutional and human rights protection of freedom of assembly

After having discussed legal antecedents, concepts and ranking of freedom of assembly, it is now time to attempt some more abstract, but still judicially focused analysis of what is the sense of protecting assemblies according to the courts. This will follow in the next several pages, so that it could be brought into some relation with the findings of the first chapter, i.e. what empirical studies tell about the use and sense of assemblies.

Courts bring about several, shorter or longer explanations when they decide a case in which a party claims a violation of his or her right to assembly or protest. In the following I will examine those explanations, or, judicial rationales one by one, since it sheds light on a few problems related to the adjudication of assembly claims.
Rationales of the courts for protection of assemblies and protests can be classified into three main categories, (i) expression-related, (ii) democracy-related, and, (iii) liberty-related values.251

4.1. Expression-related values, or the judicial link between expression and assembly

There is an apparently obvious link between freedom of assembly and expression. Still, courts differ in their perception of the more precise relation of the two as I showed above in relation to rights. The French CC frames freedom of demonstration as collective expression of ideas and opinions, while freedom of meeting, réunion is more about exchange of ideas and opinions. What ideas and opinions mean in this regard is not clarified further, thus we can assume that it does refer to any kind of message, in any case, the question is not even asked. The German court also stresses collective expression, however, there the focus is shifted from the message to the person expressing the message. The demonstrator, in the German understanding, “displays his personality in a direct way”, demonstrators “take up a position in the real sense of those words ['Stellung nehmen' – O.S.] and testify to their point of view”.252 Thereby, the Court draws the attention to the physical, bodily nature of assemblies and demonstrations. In that way, the value to be protected is the person’s willingness or desire to show support for a point of view by her body. It is not “speech” coming from the brain and the mouth, neither opinions or ideas, but the human body as it stands in front of the public what is worthy of constitutional protection. It is impossible not to notice that the German court eventually discards, or at least significantly weakens the importance of the collective aspects of assembly and demonstration with this focus on each of the protestors’ body taking

251 Of course, these categories are rather artificial, and in reality, expression, liberty and democracy obviously intermingle, but still this perspective yields some clarity in the otherwise slightly obscure judge-conducted theorizations on freedom of assembly.
a stance, filling up a concrete place. On the other hand, the focus on physically taking a stand also values the act of taking a stand more than the individual message, and in this sense it emphasizes material, quantitative aspects of demonstrations, and a specific feature compared to an argumentative essay which I think is otherwise the paradigmatic view of the object protected by freedom of expression. The German court in this regard very clearly sees a specificity of public assemblies, but note how strange that the quantitative or bodily aspects of a demonstration are still integrated into an expression rationale, and not understood as the self-standing characteristic of assemblies. Apparently, the Court takes “expression of personality” as the general category within which fall something like “intellectual” expression on the one hand, and “bodily” expression, on the other.

At the Strasbourg level, the relation between expression and assembly is rather simple, or certainly not overtheorized: even though assemblies are covered by the autonomous right of Art. 11 which is lex specialis in relation to Art. 10, cases arising under that article shall also be read in the light of Art. 10. As the Court explains: “the protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11.” As one of the functions of Art. 11 is to safeguard freedom of expression, Art. 10 doctrines are also applicable. This has – theoretically – a particular relevance in cases of political protest: as according to the Strasbourg jurisprudence political speech, or, public debate related to issues of public interest enjoy a strong protection, the same should apply to political protests.

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254 Id. at § 37 and Galstyan v. Armenia, § 96, Application no. 26986/03, Judgment of 15 November 2007.
255 One may wonder what else – besides the protection of expression of personal opinions – might be the objective of Article 11. The fact that it is left open by the Court, does not, in itself, lend support to the relation of freedom of assembly and constituent power.
256 Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1), Application no. 11662/85, Judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, § 58: “[F]reedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention.”
257 Cf. “The protection of opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of freedom of assembly and association enshrined in Article 11. […] In this connection it must be borne in mind that there is
As mentioned, in the United States, freedom (or the right) of assembly is – but for a very few, mainly early cases – missing from the dictionary of the Supreme Court, which either simply talks about the First Amendment, or freedom of speech or sometimes expression in cases related to assemblies. Thus, the value of the demonstrations and protests are in general considered to be the same as that of free speech. One dissent at the Supreme Court argued that speech by conduct can actually convey a message more precisely than if told in words. In the sleeping tent (demonstration for the homeless) case Justice Marshall – joined by Justice Brennan – quoted Judge Edwards from the D.C. circuit:258

> By using sleep as an integral part of their mode of protest, respondents “can express with their bodies the poignancy of their plight. They can physically demonstrate the neglect from which they suffer with an articulateness even Dickens could not match.”

This point of view, rejected by the majority, rightly emphasizes an important and valuable feature of demonstrations which is lacking in other “forms of speech”: that re-enactment and concrete, even theatrical display are not only more apt to induce empathy and emotions, but also more precisely express, because more directly re-present and demonstrate a particular issue, draws attention to a situation of crisis in our common life, and makes it comprehensible. This – as social movements studies affirm – has always been a characteristic potential of protest and demonstration, and in my view this potential deserves principled recognition in law as well. However, too often this potential is ignored by law, even constitutional and human rights law because of a forced doctrinal split into content and modality, and a satisfaction with requiring state neutrality only as to content. Such is the case in the US and Germany, while in other jurisdictions the argumentation is not even transparent enough to clarify the court’s view in this regard. Therefore, strangely, even though freedom of assembly little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest.” Öllinger v. Austria, Application no. 76900/01, Judgment of 29 June 2006, § 38.

is often protected in the language of freedom of expression in courts, de facto this reference to
expression does not necessarily benefit the demonstrator. Non-intellectual, physical, material,
including ritualistic or theatrical moments of assemblies get read out from the enhanced
constitutional protection by denying them the quality of “expression”. In other words, the
protection accorded to assemblies also mirrors what counts as expression in the eyes of judges:
the paradigmatic case clearly is the argumentative essay, with rationally supported facts and
conclusions, i.e. what a scholarly or judicial piece is supposed to be. Reading the decisions on
assembly by having in mind argumentative essay as the ideal type of expression explains
many of the apparent inconsistencies, and deliberately weakened jurisprudential standards,
which are then unsurprisingly inadequate to protect the potential of assemblies described in
social movement studies. That the examined countries still see ongoing a wide range of
assembly events clearly distinct from an argumentative essay is due not to the judicial
guarantees of freedom of assembly, but rather to underenforcement of assembly restrictions
by rational policing, and the efforts to appear “mainstream” on the part of quite a lot of
demonstrators, as also described in social movement studies.

Another significant stream of cases reflects on restrictions – formally either content-neutral or
even not – where law is actively and deliberately used to fight against specific representations
or re-enactments which are perceived as a threat to the authority of the state or even to the
identity of the constitutional subject.\textsuperscript{259} This is all the more strange because – a point crystal
clearly demonstrated in the American flag desecration controversy – if something is thus not
expression, then why is it so important for the state? If it is expression, however, then similar
type of such symbolic (which is always physical, always “modality” and never only the
substantial argument) expressions also ought to get the high protection the state aspires to get
with regard to its own symbols. The symbolic speech of the state certainly should not be

\textsuperscript{259} Which one of the two is actually at play is very hard to decide, and there is much room for personal
evaluations, and very little for unquestionable scholarly argumentation. See especially the parts on dignity, infra
text accompanying notes 753-814 and manner restrictions infra text accompanying notes 899-922 and 925-949.
legally more protected than the symbolic speech of others. More complicated is the question of uniform as symbolic speech as a uniformed demonstration, especially march, might appear to deny or challenge the monopoly of force of the state. This is certainly a stronger claim than any type of state honor (i.e. expressive) argument, and I tend to agree that challenging state monopoly on the use of force is à la Hobbes simply irreconcilable with how state and society (for lack of a better possibility, together) operate. Unfortunately, what counts as “challenge” will depend on the strength (and support) of the state at hand, including the police’s “riot control” capacity, but also general acceptance of the state in society. The more people trust the state, the less need there is to restrict challenges by uniformed military-like marches, and the other way around, of course, at the potential price of even more significant drop in citizens’ trust towards the state. I do not see any categorical rule applicable here.

4.2. Democracy-related values: constituent power, direct democracy, check on representative democracy, on majoritarianism and on the powerful elite

Most widespread, and most problematic, democracy-related values are even more diverse in the interpretation of different courts than expression-related values, mostly for reasons of the inconsistent use of the concept of democracy or self-government (to which now I partly join temporarily).

4.2.1. “Inherent in the form of republican government”

According to the USSC, freedom of assembly is inherent in the republican form of government. In DeJonge v. Oregon, the Court cites an early case, U.S. v. Cruikshank, saying that “[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a
redress of grievances.” Republican form of government in general US understanding means representative democracy (i.e. in the Madisonian sense), i.e. where citizens supposed to be able to freely assemble so they can discuss public issues in the expectation that that discussion will influence governmental decisions. Cruikshank however also refers to the federal government, and that in turn makes the inherency quote quite ambiguous, at least for the contemporary reader. Cruikshank namely was decided still before incorporation, i.e. before the Bill of Rights came to be applied to the states, and that is the main motivating force behind the argument from inherency. Thus there cannot be too much read into this – though much quoted – early case, if not only by saying that since it is cited later over and over again, it acquired a new meaning independent of incorporation.

4.2.2. “A moment of original, untamed, direct democracy”

According to the German court’s most famous sentence on the nature of the right in question, the exercise of freedom of assembly, especially demonstration, is a “moment [a piece, literally] of original, untamed, direct democracy” which prevents the operation of politics to “petrify into the routine” of daily business. This view, so close to Carl Schmitt’s acclamation idea, is false in every, but for the most metaphorical sense. The exercise of freedom of assembly is neither original, nor untamed, nor direct, nor democracy, at least in nowadays’ legal and political systems. First of all, assemblies are not exercising public power, and rightly so, as they do not possess any legitimation for it. Assemblies are anything but untamed (ungebändingt), as law, German law included, imposes so many limits on the exercise of this right that for some might appear to be not a right at all. It is not direct as it is not an exercise of legitimate public power, and because never is the People present at a demonstration, not

even the majority, or any significant number compared to the entire polity. Admittedly, the people present in the demonstration might be so numerous that it challenges the authority of the state, and it overwhelms police to incapacitation. In that sense, assemblies are able to gain power, de facto power, to ruin and destroy, but this is hardly what the GFCC (and Hesse, the originator of the quote) meant. I cannot interpret this – often repeated – reference in Brokdorf else than a romantic metaphor, with close to zero effective meaning. Similarly, the idea hinted in Brokdorf that freedom of demonstration is especially important in the Bundesrepublik because representative governments such as that instituted by the Basic Law only allow for referenda in limited cases, and therefore freedom of assembly plays a more important role, is equally half-baked. Representative systems limit referenda because of (justified or unjustified) fear that people can be manipulated or they are otherwise less apt than a fewer number of elected representatives within a system of separation or at least division of powers to decide on questions involved in governance. If so, assemblies (especially demonstrations), however, certainly provide even less a forum to decide on any of such issues than referenda, certainly can be manipulated equally if not more, and are prone equally or more to irrationality and emotionalisation. The German experience which mandated the constitutionally entrenched suspicion against referenda is essentially the same with regard to marches during the NS era. Thus it is neither logical in theory, nor historically justified to consider assemblies (and certainly not demonstrations) as a kind of benign functional substitute for referenda. If referenda are dangerous, assemblies are even more so. The function of referendum and assembly is also quite different, defeating any claims for substitution. People decide on a referendum while not decide on an assembly.

4.2.3. “Formation of political will and opinion in a representative democracy” – stabilizing role?
What really makes an assembly important from the viewpoint of democracy is actually the other rationale the German court stresses in this regard: assemblies contribute to the “formation of political will and opinion in a representative democracy”\textsuperscript{262}, they provide a channel for expressing discontent with the course the government takes, and thus constitute “a necessary condition of a political early warning system”.\textsuperscript{263} Formation of political opinion refers to public opinion in my view, while contribution to formation of political will includes also exerting some pressure on actual decisionmaking processes, but no decisionmaking itself. Even if we suppose that the elected government actually realizes the political program for which it was elected, freedom of assembly serves as a tool of the (any) minority in general, of those whose interests are either never or temporarily not taken into account by majoritarian mechanisms. This rationale is actually the opposite of the previous one: assemblies are perceived to be eminently indirectly related to public power, exerting a mediating function from the people to government. I even think the two rationales are irreconcilable, as the one presupposes, the other denies a functioning, legitimate representative system.

Note how much the German court is aware of the double dual nature of assemblies, expressing and forming opinion and will, even if the Court overall or at least in rhetoric fails – see the direct democracy argument just discussed – to keep the conceptualization of will formation within the bounds of representative government.

That the indirect, mediating rationale is to prevail despite all the high tone of “untamed, direct democracy”, is supported by a further assertion in Brokdorf: that assemblies play a stabilizing\textsuperscript{264} role in a representative democracy by functioning as the above mentioned “necessary condition of a political early warning system.”\textsuperscript{265} However, for assemblies to be considered stabilizing, a minimally responsive representative government is presupposed, and,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[262] BVerfGE 69, 315, 347.
\item[263] BVerfGE 69, 315, 347.
\item[264] BVerfGE 69, 315, 348.
\item[265] BVerfGE 69, 315, 348, the quote as translated by http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german.case.php?id=656
\end{footnotes}
also, only those assemblies can be stabilizing which do not aim at destabilization. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, assemblies might just as well be destabilizing, for better or worse. A best light reading of these lines of the Brokdorf decision thus in my view requires government to consider the opinions (and will) expressed and formed on assemblies, even if government decides not to bow to the pressure exerted. To exert pressure is certainly considered legitimate because of the duality of opinion and will. On the other hand, – as will be shown later in the parts related to the scope and limits of the right – the Court in final evaluation endorses potentially subversive and/or coercive assemblies to a much lesser extent than it might seem from the general contemplations in Brokdorf.

4.2.4. “Essential to the poorly financed causes of little people”

A slightly different application of the democracy-enhancing rationale is famously formulated by Justice Black in striking down a ban on door-to-door leafleting since such means of communication are “essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.”\(^{266}\) In the US no specific application of the little people argument to freedom of assembly in a strict sense (i.e. not door-to-door leafleting) can be found in the decisions, but as leafleting is part of the activities typically accompanying assemblies, the decision is highly relevant. The German Court in Brokdorf acknowledges in general terms that influencing the political process is easier for big associations, financially strong sponsors, or mass media, and that’s why freedom of assembly is especially important for ordinary citizens and civil society organizations that otherwise lack access to media or the potential to influence political processes.\(^{267}\)

\(^{266}\) Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) 146.

\(^{267}\) BVerfGE 69, 315, 346.
4.2.5. Self-governance and democracy arguments in free speech jurisprudence applied to assemblies

A final democracy-related rationale emerges actually from considering the relation between expression and assembly from an angle different from the one applied above as to the relation of assembly and expression. Famously, general free speech doctrine of especially, but not exclusively the USSC relies strongly on a so-called self-government or democratic theory rationale for the protection of speech, which then is applicable to assemblies as well if they are considered expressive. It is not possible to consider various interpretations of the self-governance speech theory of the USSC, interpretations vary strongly from Alexander Meiklejohn to Robert Post to Cass Sunstein and many more, all operating within the assumption that speech, especially on matters political is essential to foster and maintain a liberal democracy, and thus deserves special, enhanced legal protection. US political speech doctrine is well-known for explicitly furthering a conscious (and “fearless”) citizenry, transplanting Millian and Miltonian truth seeking arguments into constitutional jurisprudence. Holmes’ Gitlow dissent also clearly underlies the idea that public speech should be able to translate into political action should the “dominant forces of the country” so decide, as it is “the only meaning of free speech.”

268 See supra B.2., text accompanying notes 162–236.


274 Id.
Indeed many great free speech decisions based on one or the other democratic speech theory actually involved assemblies, even if that does not merit any legal recognition in the judgment itself. Justice Brandeis has written the famous Whitney concurrence\textsuperscript{275} to an assembly case, and most of the clear and present danger dissents of Holmes are about assemblies, only the regulations discussed were clearly content-based, and often aimed at “associational speech”.

*Brandenburg* decades later which solidified the case law related to incitement was about a Klu-Klux-Klan assembly. Justice Brandeis in *Whitney* is exceptional because he articulates a positive or affirmative principle; the ideal of civil courage which since then underlies much of First Amendment jurisprudence, as Vincent Blasi\textsuperscript{276} has shown. But also is the concurrence remarkable as it does refer to assembly next to speech, a rare case. Clearly, Justice Brandeis understood assemblies as deliberative meetings where reasoned argument might prevail, a view somewhat inapplicable to demonstrations. On the other hand, mass hysteria according to him originates not from people assembling, but from government as manifest in the paranoia of the Red Scare.\textsuperscript{277} Thus, I still think Justice Brandeis would apply a very similar reasoning to demonstrations as well, because demonstrations are even more clearly practices of civil courage, and are the essential occasions to prevent falling into public “inertia.”

As discussed above (the relation between expression and assembly),\textsuperscript{278} the ECHR also strongly endorses a democratic rationale of Art. 10 which then gets applied to assemblies as well.

The Conseil Constitutionnel has not elaborated on this issue, but the collectivization of Arts. 10 and 11 of the individualistic DDHC in the decision constitutionalizing freedom of demonstration is certainly in line with an (untheorized or unspoken) democracy rationale of


\textsuperscript{276} Id.

\textsuperscript{277} See Blasi supra note 275 at 386 with reference to Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 269 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-83 (1920) (Brandeis J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{278} See supra B.2., text accompanying notes 202-207.
the mediating sort. Indeed this would be not surprising as the Conseil has rejected Le Chapelier traditions in relation to associations much earlier. Thus, – as a lesser danger – it is logical to also cease considering assemblies as obstacles to and confounders of the full expression of the general will in the loi. It might be all the more so as there is no mentioning whatsoever of the sovereign in decisions relating to demonstration or réunions. Any parallel to the German idea of similarity with referenda is excluded also because of the jurisprudence of the Council to de Gaulle’s constitution amending (and violating) referendum which was found to be indeed the original, untamed, direct voice of the sovereign.

In sum, democracy rationales proposed by the courts differ from each other. A large number of rationales consider assemblies as providing a mediating platform between the people (minority, majority, the non-powerful ordinary citizens, etc.) and government, or in other words, public opinion and governmental decisionmaking, including lawmaking. It varies from court to court or even case to case if assembly is considered important for self-government because it provides means for the poor, those lacking access to media or more because assemblies are occasions for deliberation or because they signal discontent to government, etc. Not exactly in these words, but the formation argument of the German court clearly emphasizes the agenda setting function of assemblies, too, and might also refer to the potential of assemblies to provide a boiling pot for emerging political forces. The reverse, self-government theory of speech actually first characterizes something as speech, and then explains its high protection by its instrumentality to further self-governance.

At the other end of the spectrum there is only the idea of the untamed direct democracy mentioned in Brokdorf, the opposite of the representative, mediating rationales.


4.3. The value of liberty

Finally, freedom of assembly protects liberty, or furthers liberty in again a few senses. As explained above, for Dicey and the classic UK understanding, freedom of assembly was not a right, only a liberty, meaning it could be restricted by reasonable laws, regulations or common law. The value protected is the unspecified liberty of the subjects, which – as exigencies require – can be limited in rational and formal ways (by law especially). In the German understanding, freedom of assembly is a Freiheitsrecht, naturally securing a state-free zone for private initiatives, but this “freedom right” is a claim right obliging the state not to interfere with its free exercise. Positive state obligations flowing from freedom of assembly do not contradict the nature of Freiheitsrecht. At least in theory the negative aspect of a freedom right has priority over the positive aspect as the Court regularly stresses that basic rights are first of all Abwehrrechte, rights to avert state interference within a sphere of freedom. Clearly, Roman Herzog’s idea about freedom of assembly providing a space for personality unfolding in group form is closely related to both liberty and dignity, as it is the case also with the general personality right in German doctrine. In French legal scholarship, freedom of assembly is discussed under the heading liberté publique, a traditional concept in complete flux since the 1990’s. Liberté publique is translated as civil liberty and as bürgerliche Freiheit in scholarly articles of the field. Liberté fondamentale, the newer concept is translated as fundamental right by some, but it still obviously keeps its liberty-centered function. It seems that with the passage from liberté publique to liberté fondamentale

281 See only Lüth, BVerfGE 7, 198, 204 (1958): „Ohne Zweifel sind die Grundrechte in erster Linie dazu bestimmt, die Freiheitsphäre des einzelnen vor Eingriffen der öffentlichen Gewalt zu sichern; sie sind Abwehrrechte des Bürgers gegen den Staat.“ „With no doubt, basic rights are first of all defined to secure a sphere of freedom of the individual against interferences by the public power, they are rights of the citizen against the state to avert interference.” That’s why e.g. the idea that demonstrators are obliged to cooperate with police because that’s how they can promote their own freedom of assembly earned so much critique.

282 See, e.g., the following articles in Jus Politicum (Revue de droit politique), in French, German, and English versions here http://www.juspoliticum.com/+libertes-publiques+.html?lang=en
or droits de l’homme in legal teaching, and partially in positive law, the French are moving in the direction of German, American or ECHR understanding of rights. This very interesting – and evolving – question however belongs to another discussion.

283 See the liberté réfééré procedure introduced in 2000, Article L. 521-2 of the Code de justice administrative says: “if the judge of réféérés receives a request justified by urgency, he can order any measure necessary to protect a fundamental freedom if a public law legal person [i.e. public authority – O.S.] has, in exercising its powers, inflicted a grave and manifestly illegal attack on that freedom.” (« saisi d’une demande en ce sens justifiée par l’urgence, le juge des réféérés peut ordonner toutes mesures nécessaires à la sauvegarde d’une liberté fondamentale à laquelle une personne morale de droit public (...) aurait porté, dans l’exercice d’un de ses pouvoirs, une atteinte grave et manifestement illégale... ».)

PART II. ZOOMING THROUGH EXCLUSION: LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO FREE ASSEMBLY

After having sketched the general features of the empirical and legal model of assembly, I need to have a closer look of what actually is covered by the right to freedom of assembly. The model-approach basically is only able to discover self-perceptions, generally shared beliefs and assumptions about assemblies, their functions, importance, and dangers. What follows is a more detailed exposition of the contours of the right itself. The contours necessarily emerge by delimitation in a constitutional democracy, i.e. what is not considered a limit, is considered free. What makes out a right can be actually better understood by understanding what its limits are. Freedom of assembly is a right with many-many limits, diverging in genre and severity. One characteristic is that unlike many other rights, freedom of assembly is subject to prior limits or restraints (A.). Secondly, freedom of assembly is largely subject to the same substantive limits as freedom of speech, since courts merge the two rights (B.). Finally, but uniquely, freedom of assembly is especially affected by so-called modal limits, i.e. restrictions on the time, manner, and place or modality of the assembly (C.).
A. IT’S JUST PRACTICAL: PRIOR RESTRAINTS, EXEMPTIONS AND BARGAIN

1. PRIOR RESTRAINT IN GENERAL

Freedom of assembly is the right where prior restraints abound. The duty to notify or even apply for a permit is a common feature of national jurisdictions. Advance notice and permit might give occasion even to a prior ban of an assembly, and it is a regular option for the police to impose some conditions on route, date, duration, appearance, or even content of the message. Some legal orders like the German establish a duty to cooperate with police before the assembly takes place, again others might require high permit fees or insurance. These have an effect of either completely preventing the assembly or changing its message one way or the other.

Traditionally, prior restraint referred to censorship of press products. It is in this area where the special dangers of prior restraint were reflected by philosophers, lawyers, and writers. Censorship in England has been introduced in a 16th century law requiring royal permission for every press product. John Milton brings about several reasons in his 1644 pamphlet Areopagitica against a newly reintroduced censorship of press products in the midst of the revolution. According to Milton, censorship is bad because truth will win on the long run if let be in free encounter with falseness, and no book should be eliminated in advance because

as good almost kill a man as kill a good book: who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye.

285 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA. A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).

286 “[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play on the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”
Blackstone writes in his Commentaries:\(^{287}\):

The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.

Though sometimes similar in argument, another famous proponent of free speech, John Stuart Mill in the 19th century intended to provide arguments for a much freer press and speech in general than Milton.\(^{288}\) Milton, just as Blackstone, can be distinguished from John Stuart Mill in that the previous ones would consider traditional ex post facto restrictions acceptable, even desirable, their main concern being the abolition of prior restraint.

Closer to our time, Thomas Emerson reasoned that prior restraint is more inhibiting than subsequent punishment as it is: \(^{289}\)

- likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range of expression;
- it shuts off communication before it takes place;
- suppression by a stroke of a pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a criminal process;
- the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process;
- the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism;
- the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship shows.

Martin Redish takes up only some of Emerson’s reasons arguing that administrative prior restraints “authorize abridgment of expression prior to a full and fair determination of the constitutionally protected nature of the expression by an independent judicial forum”, but thinks that no other basis “exists on which to disfavor prior restraints as compared to subsequent punishment schemes.”\(^{290}\) Redish therefore finds that prior restraints imposed by the judiciary in a procedure accompanied by a fair and full hearing should be considered less

problematic than administrative prior restraints and judicial prior restraint issued in a procedure with lacking guarantees, as the evil of prior restraint lies in the lack of due process. Blackstone also did not mean by “prior restraint” a restriction on speech which “a fair and impartial trial shall be adjudged of a pernicious tendency.”

In my view even judicially supervised prior restraint is more pernicious than judicially supervised posterior restraint, though certainly Blackstone and Redish are right in claiming that administrative restraint is always more pernicious to liberty than restraints found justified in a fair and impartial trial. In the case of freedom of assembly, both of these distinctions are relevant, because most often prior restraints are of an administrative kind, and often courts are not accorded prompt and substantive review powers, and even if they formally are, they might feel unfit for reviewing questions deemed “policing”.

Freedom of assembly differs significantly from the press, thus the question arises to what extent the aforementioned dangers of censorship apply to permit and/or advance notice of assemblies, and the resulting possibilities of prior ban and conditions. Censorship of press products, as argued by Milton, hinders the “discovery of truth”, and equals the “destruction of reason.” This argument clearly applies to freedom of ‘assembly as meeting’, or what the French call reunion, where there is a discussion of ideas. It applies way less to demonstrations and protests where there is no discussion, and the point is to “take a stance” and show support or exert political pressure. However, as demonstration is also communication, is also a meaning-producing act as I hope to have shown earlier, thus, it can also contribute to the discovery of truth. Even if some “truth” is rather “discovered” alone, its distribution or effective dissemination to a larger audience is necessary in a democracy where “truth” translates into law only if supported by a certain number of people, or representatives of the


people. This is a function fulfilled by assemblies, including demonstrations. Furthermore, if one accepts that comprehension is not a solely intellectual and sterile undertaking, i.e. not only argumentative essays but also symbolic appeals or staged performances contribute to it, then assemblies fulfill a function to which prior restraint is harmful even in cases where there is no intention or hope to translate the message into law. As explained above, in my view it is not that an assembly does not produce and convey meaning (and, in this sense, “truth”), though – at most – it might be that an assembly is potentially more immediately dangerous than a scholarly or newspaper article.

Emerson’s concerns are also largely valid in relation to freedom of assembly: the possibility of prior ban administered by an authority within the executive power runs the risk of being overbroad, inflicted without proper investigation, thus either intentionally or accidentally in error, as the protestors did not have the chance to actually behave lawfully. Also, administrative discretion inherent in issuing permits and accepting or denying notifications might be exercised arbitrarily, i.e. favoring demonstrators promoting a mainstream or government-endorsed view while disadvantaging less mainstream views and groups. The argument from public appraisal and criticism of Emerson applies in modified form to freedom of assembly: again, as to meetings, discussion there actually facilitates the very fact of public appraisal and criticism, and secondly, as to demonstrations, they often serve to put an issue to the agenda of public discourse at all.

On the other hand, concededly, assemblies might be more immediately dangerous than argumentative essays, the paradigmatic press product. As John Stuart Mill’s example goes:293

An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard.

293 MILL, supra note 288, 53.
Already the bodily presence of several persons enhances the potential for violence as violence needs bodies (except in the sense used by Catherine MacKinnon), while with a newspaper article one first has to read it, think it over, and go around and “attack the corn-dealer”. Certainly these barriers are partly not present at all on assemblies in front of the house of the corn-dealer. Thus, Mill is right, even if social movement studies often describe soberness and deliberate moderation on assemblies. Still, Mill does not say, quite to the contrary, that assemblies in front of the house of the corn-dealer can be banned in advance. The most he would accept maybe is that a condition might be imposed on the organizer not to say that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, because that would amount to incitement too close to actual harm. Still, the text itself only speaks about punishment, which is inflicted necessarily only after the incriminated sentences had been uttered in a concrete situation.

In the following, jurisprudence on advance notice and permit will be discussed first, continued by the issue of possible prior bans and prior imposition of conditions on assemblies as those presuppose the awareness of authorities about an upcoming event, allegedly secured by the advance notice or permit requirement. Finally, the question of exemptions from prior restraint (in effect notice and permit) will be discussed, to emphasize also a curious resemblance of legal treatment of tradition and spontaneity.

2. ADVANCE NOTICE OR PERMIT

2.1. USSC: proprietary theory, fight against vagueness and the turn to content-neutrality

2.1.1. Governmental property versus vagueness

“Permit requirements were unheard of through most of the nineteenth century” as a student of legal history of the right to assembly in the US testifies.294 When they were introduced,

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however, courts largely upheld them. The first paradigmatic decision on permit to access public parks and streets comes from Justice Holmes while still sitting at the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, i.e. the *Davis* case from 1895.\(^{295}\) Holmes’ argument upholding the permit was essentially that the owner of public property (the state or, by delegation, the city) is in a similar situation as a private owner to completely control uses of the property, thus, it also can limit the uses which it allows (the greater power includes the lesser).\(^{296}\) The Supreme Court of the United States basically approved of this view in the case\(^{297}\), which is commonly called “the proprietary theory” of public fora. The analogy with private property is fallacious for several reasons. Streets and parks are not owned by private persons (or, if private persons own similarly looking parcels of land, they are not considered to be streets and parks), and their function is public use, for the benefit of the user, and not for the owner. Also, at the constitutional level, it can be argued that the law cannot confer property rights to the government in the same vein as to private persons, since the rationale of protecting property is the protection against governmental intrusion.\(^{298}\) Furthermore, the ordinance in question in the *Davis* case authorized the mayor to deny permit at his fancy. Both Justice Holmes and the USSC explained this unlimited discretion again with reference to the proprietary theory: as the greater power includes the lesser, the power to absolutely ban public speaking includes the power to allow use of public places under whatever conditions (i.e. depending on a discretionary decision of the mayor) the legislative finds fit. As Abernathy points out, the

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\(^{295}\) Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) An ordinance prohibited (different kinds of) public addresses in or upon any kinds of public grounds without first acquiring a permit form the mayor.\(^{296}\) For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the public use to certain purposes. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, (1895) per Justice Holmes.\(^{297}\) Davis v. Com. of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731 (1897).\(^{298}\) M. Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association, (2nd ed. University of South Carolina Press, 1981) 111.
simplistic formula of ‘the greater power includes the lesser’ ignores the dangers inherent in unlimited legislative delegation.\textsuperscript{299}

The proprietary theory of public places came under attack only 42 years later at the U.S Supreme Court, in \textit{Hague v. CIO}.\textsuperscript{300} The lower courts found in favor of the labor demonstrators, and affirmed that their right of passage (not assembly!)\textsuperscript{301} upon the streets and access to the parks of the city and other rights (e.g. to a hearing, etc.) were violated. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Roberts famously modified the Holmesian proprietary theory, nonetheless without having truly rebutted its fundamental assumptions. He wrote that even though public property, streets and parks have been – for time immemorial – held in trust for the use of the public for purposes of assembly and public discussion.\textsuperscript{302} The \textit{Davis} and \textit{Hague} cases have been subject to considerable scholarly discussion ever since their adoption. I find important to point out that Justice Roberts did not reject the basic rationale of the Davis judgment: he did not question that as a rule places the title of which belongs to the state or municipality, can be controlled by the government as fully as as if it were a private owner. It is just that he replied by his own common law piece to the common law piece picked by

\textsuperscript{299} Id.110 \textit{et seq.}.

\textsuperscript{300} \textit{Hague v. Committee of Industrial Organization}, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). A challenge was brought against a Jersey City ordinance which prescribed that no public assembly can be held without the permit of the director of public safety. Respondents wanted to organize meetings and explain to workingmen the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, and other issues related to the labor activities of the Committee of Industrial Organization. They were denied permit and even ousted from the city by force, and they were also subject to searches, seizures, and criminal persecution. There was no allegation of violence, fraud, disorderliness etc. committed by the respondents, neither any danger of it.

\textsuperscript{301} This reference clearly shows the inherited conceptual tools of the English law. Interestingly, the historical existence of the right to passage and its obvious influence on early American court cases do not seem to register for nowadays otherwise excellent First Amendment scholars, for example Edwin Baker speculates pages long on what could be the reason for the early privileging of parades over street and park meetings in 19th century America, and he can only imagine ideological ones. Basically the same is true of the classic writer of the field, Glenn Abernathy. See \textit{Baker supra} note 198 at 139-142, and \textit{Abernathy, supra} note 298 at 94-98, on whom Baker largely seems to rely, see \textit{Baker, id.}, notes 3, 9 and 13 at 318 and 320.

\textsuperscript{302} The quote is at 307 U. S. 515, 516: „Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”
Justice Holmes: “trust” for the benefit of the public is a catchy analogy, but it clearly stays within the paradigm of common law property rights, as Harry Kalven points out, it only allows for a kind of First Amendment easement on the otherwise absolutely controlled “private” property of the state. The easement idea probably stems from Judge Clark sitting on the trial court, who proposed that a distinction should be made between parks and streets, and as to the use of parks, an easement of assemblage should be included. The Supreme Court overtook this idea but without restricting it to parks, thus, it also applies to streets as well. Thus, for those (maybe all) parks and streets which have been for a long time used for purposes of assembly and public discussion, an exception has been carved out. As the argument is supported by tradition, not by a normative idea, its application can be limited. The Hague judgment did not overrule Davis, for which one reason might be that at the time Davis was decided, First Amendment standards were not incorporated, thus were inapplicable to the states. Technically, however, the court distinguished out Davis, even if in a rather unconvincing way. It said that the ordinance in Davis was different since it not only regulated the right to assembly, but also various other activities, and, unlike the Jersey City ordinance at stake in Hague, it was “a general measure to promote the public convenience in the use of the streets or parks.” Significantly, the Hague trust argument does not mean that the permit system is impermissible, just that there should not be too much discretion in granting it. The ordinance authorized the Director of Public Safety to refuse permit only for the “purpose of


305 "For some quite, in our opinion, illogical reason the American cases do not seem to stress the obvious difference between a street and a park. We are not willing to eliminate the latter. It seems to us that the purpose of most parks is the recreation of the public. … We include in that word recreation an easement of assemblage. … We hold then that a municipality’s proprietary right is subject to an easement of assemblage in such parks as are dedicated to the general recreation of the public.” C.I.O. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 145 (D.C.N.J. 1938) as quoted by ABERNATHY *supra* note 298 at 119.

306 What is more, tradition is not meant to be common law history. It is a metaphoric statement which is supposed to evoke emotional support for the proposition. The high tone of the metaphor, however, does not make up for the lack of a clear constitutional theory.


308 307 U. S. 515.
preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.” The courts did not find any evidence on a danger of riots, disturbances or disorder, and, what is more, found the ordinance unconstitutional on its face. In a similar vein to what I argued above about the difference between prior restraint for violence prevention and for practical reconciliation of competing uses, Justice Roberts explains: 309

[the ordinance] does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent “riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.” It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly “prevent” such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right.

Note that the court would consider “comfort or convenience” a less discretionary standard than prevention of disorder and violence. Thus, I argue, it is to say that comfort or convenience is understood rather narrowly, e.g. when permits for two demonstrations are requested for the same time and place and the like, but this has never been clarified by the Supreme Court. Clearly, Martin Redish would advocate such an interpretation of the First Amendment which restricts administrative (and non-adversarial judicial) decisionmaking to the duties of the “reservationist” who resolves schedule conflicts in favor of the first applicant for a demonstration. 310 That would in effect transform the permit system in a notification system, as it is practiced or at least theoretically strived for elsewhere. Edwin Baker goes even further or rather a fundamentally different way. He suggests that the current, mandatory permit systems should be changed to a voluntary one. However, the US jurisprudence evolved and seems evolving neither in the Redishian nor Bakerian fashion. It quite clearly does not

309 307 U. S. 516.
310 “[T]he clear constitutional preference for a judicial rather than an administrative determination would seem to require the administrators to resort to the judiciary to restrain a proposed demonstration for reasons other than schedule conflicts. Though authorities not given notice of a planned demonstration obviously will have insufficient opportunity to seek a judicial order, most demonstration planners will wish to notify the authorities if only to reserve the exclusive opportunity to parade at their chosen time and place.” REDISH, supra note 290 at 85.
question the acceptability of prior restraint as such, be it judicially or administratively imposed. The question around which the doctrine on prior restraint revolves is not the whether and what, but the how. Through further cases on prior restraints on freedom of assembly and protest, the Court refined the above approach, without clearly rejecting the underlying proprietary theory. There is a strong legal technical jargon which came to be applied in matters of permit system, fees and the like, making the doctrine of prior restraints on assemblies not necessarily clearer or more consistent. The general doctrine of prior restraint was allegedly found applicable to protests and demonstrations, though this does not mean that permit requirements would be per se or even presumptively unconstitutional (unlike in “general” prior restraint doctrine). In *Cox v. New Hampshire*, a case decided just two years after *Hague v. CIO* the Court unanimously upheld the conviction of a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses who assembled peacefully and non-disruptively on the sidewalks (!) without first having obtained a permit, without much theorizing about the point of the permit system. Dicta in *Cox* indicate that the Court finds the permit system something which enhances rather than restricts the rights of citizens in the use of public streets:

Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.

311 “Presently these regulatory devices [i.e. prior restraints] are subject only to the most amorphous of constitutional controls. Although the Supreme Court has favored street protestors with volumes of rhetoric and numerous after-the fact legal victories, it has contributed virtually nothing in the way of concrete standards and procedures that have any impact when constitution is most needed – before and during the demonstration.” Vincent Blasi, *Prior Restraints on Demonstrations*, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482 (1969-1970).

In later cases, the Court explicitly talks about “competing uses of public forums” and there is no indication that freedom of assembly would enjoy a privileged status among uses of the street. At least, however, there remains a significant difference between the language of the US American and the English courts: the US courts do not think that the primary use of the street is passage or transport, etc.

In addition, the doctrine of prior restraint evolved in a curious intermingling with the doctrine on vagueness and overbreadth, sometimes found problematic in the literature. Still, the strongest protection against prior restraint of assembly is offered by vagueness (and, to a lesser extent, overbreadth) jurisprudence. Several decisions reiterate that a licensing statute or ordinance granting “unbridled discretion” to a government official constitutes a prior restraint and “may result in censorship”, that “a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.” For example, in *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, an important case involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, the statute in question prohibited “solicitation of money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the county in which such person or organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council.” The Court found the statute unconstitutional, and spelled out two

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313 *E.g.* Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement 505 U.S. 123 (1992), 129.
317 *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U. S. 296, 301 et seq. (1940). The Witnesses went to a Catholic-populated area of New Haven, solicited books, and, if permitted, played phonograph records (critical of Catholicism, but directly advocating the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses). The listeners were not Witnesses and the solicitors did not have a permit. Jesse Cantwell played a phonograph record to two Catholic men who, “incensed by the contents of the record, wanted to strike Cantwell unless he went away, so he rather left indeed. There was no suggestion that he was personally offensive or entered into any argument with anyone.” 310 U. S. 296, 303, Supreme Court summarizing the fact finding of the lower court.
principles with regard to solicitation on public streets. The first one is that only ministerial authority and not discretion can be constitutionally vested in administrative city officials, and a decision on the religious nature of the solicitation is a discretionary decision. Furthermore, the Court declared applicable a principle established as to prior restraint in general speech and press cases. With reference to *Near v. Minnesota*, the Court affirmed that a "statute authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action." The Supreme Court thus rejected that the wrong of a discretionally imposed prior ban on demonstration can be corrected by later judicial action. As the judicial bench will also rely on the authorizing legal text, it is not possible for them to review whether there was abuse in exercising the discretion. As another USSC decision (on prior restraint related to newsracks, but equally applicable), *Lakewood*, put it, while allowing facial challenge to permit ordinances granting unfettered discretion: “[t]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish ‘as applied’ between a licensor’s legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power.” Apart from this impossibility for the court to review the exercise of discretion, there is another recurring argument against

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318 *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) was about perpetual injunction imposed in an adversarial procedure against a newspaper. The statute applied authorized the court to shut down a newspaper after a malicious, scandalous and defamatory publication unless the statement was either true or published "with good motives and for justifiable ends". That the Court qualified the injunction as prior restraint, instead of invalidating the law for other (chilling effect, vagueness, etc.) reasons, was criticized heavily by some. E.g. *JEFFRIES supra* note 314 at 414 *et seq*. The claim is that the court decided Near on wrong procedural grounds instead of substantive ones, while it still reached the correct result. The wrong procedural grounds, i.e. the qualification of an injunction issued in an adversarial process as impermissible prior restraint, have put the prior restraint doctrine on the wrong track also for the future, which is unfortunate. To be truthful to history, I think one has to add that the reason for the allegedly improper confusion of procedural and substantive concerns might be that the Near court not necessarily had so many other ways to go in 1931, when none of the substantive doctrines of free speech was fully elaborated, let alone supported by a majority of the court yet, and the recourse to the evil of prior restraint might have struck familiar chord, and constituted common denominator among the justices. It is also useful to add that the Near claim that “a statute authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action” takes up a different, far more complex use in later cases. As explained in the main text, in *Cantwell* it is said: the possibility of judicial review of an administrative prior restraint imposed on the basis of a law which grants unbridled discretion does not correct the vice of prior restraint. Thus, though *Near* has been about injunction issued in a “due process”, it also holds for administrative prior restraints, and it does have a relation to vagueness and overbreadth.

319 *Cantwell*, 310 U. S. 306.

320 *City of Lakewood*, 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988)
vagueness: the evil of self-censorship or chilling effect. Lakewood quotes\textsuperscript{321} language from \textit{Thornhill v. Alabama}\textsuperscript{322} which is worth recalling here:

Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of ideas. … The power of the licensor against which John Milton directed his assault by his ‘Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing’ is pernicious not merely by reason of the censure of particular comments, but by the reason of the threat to censure comments on matters of public concern. It is \textit{not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor, but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence} that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion. (emphasis added)

Dissemination of ideas and freedom of discussion are the particular values which are to be protected against fear, against self-imposed restraints, which would otherwise chill speech clearly constitutionally protected. After so many affirmations on narrow and objective standards required for prior restraints on solicitation, canvassing, book selling, labour picketing, solicitation of membership of organization, and so on, the 1969 \textit{Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham}\textsuperscript{323} was – apart from invalidating a completely standardless and arbitrary customary permit system in \textit{Niemotko}\textsuperscript{324} – the first modern case on permits required specifically for assemblies where the Court found invalidity of standards.\textsuperscript{325} \textit{Shuttlesworth}\textsuperscript{321}

\textsuperscript{321} 486 U. S. 757
\textsuperscript{322} Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97. \textit{Thornhill}, on its own, is again a rather easy case, and it is not clearly about prior restraint. Petitioner was saying to one of his co-workers that “they were on strike, and did not want anybody to go up there to work”, in a peaceful manner, without the use of threat or any abuse. He was charged and convicted on the basis of an anti-loitering and anti-picketing statute which flatly prohibited a wide range of communicative acts except if done with a lawful excuse. Its significance lies not so much in the invalidation of the act, but rather in the idea (quoted in the main text) that not only “the sporadic abuse of power of the censor” but “the pervasive threat” of its very existence is what really undermines free speech.
\textsuperscript{324} The 1951 Niemotko v. Maryland was about park meeting permit system, where there was absolutely no standard, however vague, to be applied, and arguably there was even no legal base (no ordinance or regulation, just a sort of custom required permit for public meetings in parks) for the issuance of permits. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
\textsuperscript{325} At least I am not aware of any such case decided since Cox v. New Hampshire gave such a generous approval to permit schemes, and the Court in Shuttlesworth certainly does not cite any case where the ordinance requires a permit specifically for \textit{assembly}, be it march, meeting or otherwise. \textit{See Lovell v. City of Griffin}, 303 U.S., at 452-453, 58 S.Ct., at 669; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S., at 159, 165, 60 S.Ct., at 152; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S., at 419, 422, 63 S.Ct., at 668, 669; Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S., at 602, 62 S.Ct., at 1241, adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S., at 104, 63 S.Ct. 890; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S., at 319, 78 S.Ct., at 280;
involved a march organized by a Black minister, who was earlier “clearly given to understand” 326 that his march would never be allowed in Birmingham. The ordinance prescribing the permit requirement conferred upon the local administrators an absolute power to refuse a parade permit whenever they thought “the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused.” The state Supreme Court in the appellate procedure four years later construed this language so narrowly, that it would pass constitutional muster. Nonetheless, the USSC made clear that such “an extraordinary clairvoyance for anyone to perceive that this language [of the ordinance quoted above] meant what the Supreme Court of Alabama was destined to find that it meant more than four years later,” 327 is not expected by the constitution.

Thus, the Supreme Court clearly rejected that Shuttlesworth should have turned to courts before he goes on with the march. The court thus said a law subjecting the right of free expression in publicly owned places to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards is unconstitutional, and a person faced with such a law may ignore it and exercise his First Amendment rights. Note, however, Justice Harlan’s concurring, who would not dispense with the requirement to apply for permit because a minor official interprets a law in a way which is contrary to the constitution. Rather, he finds problematic the lack of an effective and speedy remedy when facing such an official. 328 Thus, one can say, Harlan’s view is less radical, and might be closer to the view of the ECHR as put forward in Baczkowski. 329 At the same time, Harlan has a point, and this point seems to have been painfully ignored by the Court not so much in Shuttlesworth (the particular facts of which might indeed call for a radical dispensing of the permit application duty), but in later cases.


326 394 U.S. 158.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 161.
329 See infra text accompanying notes 443-444.
The obligation to provide an effective and speedy remedy is conspicuously missing from the U.S. jurisprudence on freedom of assembly. The only case Harlan is able to cite in 1969 is *Freedman v. Maryland*, a movie censorship decision, which prohibits the state from requiring persons to invoke “unduly cumbersome and time-consuming procedures before they may exercise their constitutional right of expression.” *Freedman* also takes into account that judicial remedy, even if formally granted, might come too late and too costly to be meaningful. The Supreme Court, however, which neither before, nor after *Shuttlesworth* has fully accepted that the Freedman rationale applies to freedom of assembly, continues to ignore serious procedural inadequacies in the permit system of the several states. This, together with the rising hegemony of the single focus on content neutrality, is a development which might threaten freedom of speech and assembly to a far greater extent than it seems at the first glance.

Permit fees are the other issue where the USSC limited the discretion available to administrative officials, but at the same time the Court did not question the basic acceptability of the fee paying duty. That it is normal to pay a fee for the use of public place for expressive purposes has again a clear connotation of proprietary theory, an author talks in this regard (without mentioning the proprietary theory) of a false assumption of a two-party business relationship between the speaker and government. It remains unclear what exactly is the cost for which the fee can be exacted, and it is hard to resist the connotation of a “rental fee.” *Cox v. New Hampshire* found the fee requirement as such acceptable, even adjustable fees were constitutional. A fee, which is “not a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident

331 Harlan’s summary in Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 162.
to the administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed, is constitutionally permissible, and the local government should enjoy flexibility in adjusting the fee to the varying circumstances of the particular assembly, as long as it does it in a fair and non-discriminatory way. The Court even noted that the flexible adjustment might “rather conserve than to impair” freedom of assembly.\textsuperscript{336} Cox did not specify the limits of the fee exacting authority. In two cases on advance fees on selling literature rendered shortly after Cox a flat fee not matching the expenses incurred by the government was found unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{337} Then, in 1992, the Supreme Court in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,\textsuperscript{338} struck down an adjustable permit fee regulation.\textsuperscript{339} The ordinance entitled the administrator to adjust the fee so as to meet the cost “incident to the administration of the ordinance and to the maintenance of public order”\textsuperscript{340}, verbatim identical to the interpretation given by the state court in the Cox v. New Hampshire case.\textsuperscript{341} The Georgia ordinance in Forsyth, however, was further construed to allow the county administrator to charge the maximum fee or even no fee at all, or, in any case, less than the cost incident to the administration and maintenance of public order.\textsuperscript{342} This meant the fatal difference compared with Cox, and rendered the ordinance content-based according to the USSC. Since the judgment on how much police force the maintenance of public order would require, is necessarily based on the content of the speech.\textsuperscript{343} Forsyth has not clearly decided whether

\textsuperscript{335} Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), at 577, again quoting the state Supreme Court’s decision.
\textsuperscript{336} Id.
\textsuperscript{339} The regulation at hand was enacted after civil rights demonstrations had been either seriously attacked or disturbed by counterdemonstrations organized by the Nationalist Movement, causing the police in charge of containing the counterdemonstrators unusually high costs, around 700 000 dollars. The ordinance adopted in reaction required every permit applicant to pay in advance a sum not more than $1,000.00 for each day of an assembly.
\textsuperscript{340} Forsyth County, Georgia, v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 126-127.
\textsuperscript{341} Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) 577.
\textsuperscript{342} Id. at 131.
\textsuperscript{343} It remains unclear if it in contemplating costs incident to maintain public order is always content-based, or because anticipation of hostile audience presupposes content assessment. Most often, the content of the speech in this context will be judged with an eye on possible counterdemonstrators, since the costs flowing from a
only nominal fees are permitted, though this was a controversy between the circuits because of a Supreme Court precedent (*Murdock*) invalidating a fee considered a flat tax on door-to-door solicitation of religious literature which can be read as allowing for nominal fees.\(^{344}\)

Instead *Forsyth* said that the respective language in *Murdock* “does not mean that an invalid fee can be saved if it is nominal, or that only nominal charges are constitutionally permissible.” The only discernible principle in *Forsyth* is that anticipated hostile audience reaction cannot result in a higher fee.\(^{345}\)

### 2.1.2. From non-discrimination to content-neutrality: how prior restraint becomes content-neutral injunction

The Supreme Court spelled out in several cases that the administration of permits shall not be discriminatory, i.e. denied for some and granted to others, when the some and the others are basically in the same situation. This is, one might say, an application of the rule of content-neutrality to the context of prior restraint on assemblies, though in the early cases when the Court has not yet developed the content-neutrality principle, the term used is non-

\(^{344}\) In *Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) the Court held that the license fee levied on the distribution – because the Witnesses would ask for very little or even no money in exchange if the person interested did not have money, it is not really a solicitation – of religious literature was a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a fundamental right. The Court also noted that “the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and at home against the abuse of solicitors.” 319 U.S. 105, 113.

\(^{345}\) Note that the Court does not distinguish between fees exacted in anticipation of hostile audience, and fees exacted incident to the maintenance of order for reasons other than hostile audience. Probably, a fee adjusted to the expected size of the applicant demonstration would be considered content-neutral, and a fee adjusted to anticipated disorder by the applicants themselves would have to fulfill the *Brandenburg* criteria of imminent likely lawless action, since, compelling interest in strict scrutiny with regard to prevention of disorder must mean a high probability and immediacy of unlawful action. None of these, however, is indicated in *Forsyth*, what is more, *Forsyth* has not been refined in any later case.
discrimination. Basically in each and every case mentioned so far, the Court was checking if the permit scheme was administrated in a non-discriminatory way.\textsuperscript{346}

In 1983, in accordance with the general trend to systematize speech jurisprudence in the units of content-based and content-neutral restrictions, the Court adopted a new (formulation of the) test applicable to permit schemes. According to \textit{U.S. v. Grace}, “any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication”.\textsuperscript{347} There will be a separate discussion on content-neutral restrictions on assemblies later;\textsuperscript{348} here it suffices to point to two developments. By the end of the Burger court, doctrinal thinking about prior restrictions on assemblies changes from the prior restraint framework to content-neutrality framework. Thinking in terms of content-neutrality still shares with prior restraint thinking a complete lack of reflection, let alone responsiveness to a basic problem Edwin Baker and others remarked 20 years ago: that the permit scheme essentially discriminates against those who want to use the streets for expressive purposes, i.e. uses constitutionally protected – while those who are not expressing any views are free to walk on the streets without need of permit. A parallel development worth mentioning is the conundrum around injunctions which by the beginning of the 1990’s started to interest not only scholars,\textsuperscript{349} but the Court itself. In a series of cases related to confrontational (often, but not always previously violent) antiabortion speech, the Court approved injunctions restricting the right of protest in (limited) buffer zones around health facilities. In the most important case, \textit{Madsen v. Women’s Health Center},\textsuperscript{350} the Court faced the allegation that the injunction was directed against antiabortion speakers, i.e. in

\textsuperscript{346} Cox: “There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than in the fair and non-discriminatory manner which the state court has construed it to require.” \textit{312 U.S. 577}, Shuttlesworth quoting the same at \textit{394 U.S. 147, 156.}\textsuperscript{347} \textit{United States v. Grace}, \textit{461 U.S. 171, 177} (1983).\textsuperscript{348} See \textit{infra} Part II.C. text accompanying notes 856-1235.\textsuperscript{349} See \textit{supra} notes 290 and 318 and accompanying text.\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. 512 U.S. 753} (1994).
effect it was content-based even if the injunction was phrased regardless of the content of the speech, it necessarily had an exclusive impact on one side of the debate. Disputed among the justices was the question whether the injunction at hand was a prior restraint at all. Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court argues in a footnote that the injunction prohibiting expression within a 36-foot buffer zone was not a prior restraint, since it does not limit whether the protestor can speak, only limits the place of the speech. Also, it is not a prior restraint since it does not aim at the content of the speech – as it was the case e.g. in Pentagon Papers – but it is issued because of protestors’ prior unlawful conduct. Justice Scalia in dissent argues that the injunction is clearly a prior restraint,\footnote{\textquote{[A]n injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraint.}} and is clearly content-based. Here what occupies me is less this latter issue, or who was right in the \textit{Madsen} case.\footnote{Some commentators tend to find fault more with J. Scalia than with the majority e.g. Owen Fiss on the exact matter, but one can be sure Martin Redish would also not think injunctions should get a stricter scrutiny than criminal statutes. I personally find persuasive the critique by Scalia about assumed facts on the part of the majority – and that might change the outcome, but certainly would side with the mentioned authors on the question of injunctions as such, and especially would not accept Scalia’s claim that the collateral bar rule of Walker v. Birmingham justifies strict scrutiny.} Rather, I want to point out that both opinions think the issue of prior restraint turns on, or, is at least closely related to whether the injunction was content-neutral or content-based. Clearly, prior restraint arguments have become increasingly infused or even overwhelmed by the content-neutrality principle and the attached variety of tests. The beginnings, however, can be found in early cases urging for limited discretion to ensure fair and nondiscriminatory use of permit schemes and other prior restraints.

A final development related to permits on assemblies came in 2002 in \textit{Thomas v. Chicago Park District}, a unanimous decision.\footnote{\textit{Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist.}, 534 U.S. 316 (2002)} Justice Scalia wrote the very short judgment for the Court, affirming lower courts in upholding the constitutionality of a permit scheme against a facial challenge. The ordinance at hand required a permit for events involving more than fifty persons, and the Park District had altogether 28 days to decide. The ordinance listed thirteen
grounds on which the permit can be denied, among them violation of a previous permit and misrepresentation of facts in the permit request. What might have come as a surprise, the Court declared the procedural safeguards elaborated in *Freedman* are not constitutionally required in case of content-neutral regulations of permits for parks (this was advocated by Justice Harlan in *Shuttlesworth*, see above, though that was a vagueness case in fact). It means most importantly that no prompt judicial review is constitutionally required, or, it is left undecided whether the judicial review is to be commenced or determined promptly. Also, it is of no concern that the park authority has almost a month to proceed. Thus, one might need to ask for a permit months before a planned demonstration with over fifty participants in any of Chicago’s parks and other public property, if one wants to be sure to go on with the demonstration on or around the planned date (i.e. judicial review included). *Thomas v. Chicago Park district* shows the rather distorted nature of so speech protective American law when it comes to freedom of assembly, largely caused by the content neutrality or time, manner and place doctrine. Such an outcome is not possible in Europe since the Baczkowski judgment of the ECHR, as it will be explained below. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that lower courts in the U.S. are often willing to strike down permit schemes with long deadlines and even notification regimes especially when it comes to smaller or single-person demonstrations or performances. If one adds to this that *Thomas* was a facial challenge, it cannot be excluded that in the near future the USSC will refine its stance on prompt issuance of permits and speedy judicial remedy.

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354 *Freedman* 380 U.S. 51 (1965) 58-59 requires that „noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor…..exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film….."[T]he procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license." 355 For a similar view see Robert H. Whorf, *The Dangerous Intersection at “Prior Restraint” and “Time, Place, Manner”: A Comment on Thomas v. Chicago Park District*, 3 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2002). 356 See the discussion in Nathan W. Kellum, *Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, What Permits Are Permitted?* 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381 (2008), especially 405-422, and Edan Burkett, *Coordination or Mere Registration? Single-Speaker Permits in Berger v. City of Seattle*, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 931 (2010).
It is also clear that the press freedom cases can have some application to freedom of assembly, this, however, happens through the wide understanding of the concept of the press, and not through a wide understanding of the ban on prior restraint. In Lovell v. Griffin, the Court spelled out that\textsuperscript{357}

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\text{[t]he liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press, in its historic connotation, comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.}
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That means that ordinances which condition leafleting, handbilling, and similar activities – which often, even typically accompany demonstrations and protests – on a prior permit, are unconstitutional.

2.2. Germany: only notice and strict proportionality

Unlike in the U.S., in Germany, prior restraint has not become a central issue in freedom of assembly, and I would say, neither that of free speech. This is somewhat peculiar regarding strong textual and historical aversion towards prior restraint. The guarantee of freedom of expression of opinion in Art. 5 I spells out the prohibition of censorship, which is understood to cover prior limits solely. Art. 8 I guarantees the right to assemble “without notice or permit”, though para. II allows for statutory limits in case of assemblies under the open sky.

The prohibition of censorship in Art. 5 I did not so far have an application to assemblies and demonstrations, and as to the scholarly literature, there does not seem to be any claims as to the applicability of the prohibition of censorship either.\textsuperscript{358} Art. 8 I GG guarantees the right to assemble without permit or notification, but paragraph II allows for restrictions on the basis of

\textsuperscript{357} Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938).

\textsuperscript{358} Though I heard once Alexander Blankenagel contemplating the possibility of applying Art. 5 I censorship rule against prior bans of Neo-Nazi demonstrations. This has not become the case, so far at least, see the Rudolf Hess memorial march decision of the Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2150/08, 4. 11.2009.
law regarding assemblies under the open sky. It follows first that a permit or notification
regime with regard to indoors assemblies would be clearly unconstitutional, and any
regulation can only aim at concretizing that no arms are brought to the assembly, and it
remains peaceful. As to outdoor assemblies, however, this provision enabled the federal and –
since regulating assemblies became a Länderkompetenz – Land legislation to require prior
notice. The deadline traditionally has been way shorter than – as we have seen – conceivable
in the United States, in the federal law it has been 48 hours. Also, there are strong voices in
the literature claiming that to introduce a permit system for outdoor assemblies would be
contrary to the German constitution. 359

Advance notice of outdoor assemblies, on the other hand, has explicitly been found
constitutional in the seminal Brokdorf decision of the GFCC. Advance notice is required
because outdoor assemblies have external effects which many times necessitate special
advance measures. The notice includes information which enables the authorities to gain
insights as to what measures are to be taken in order to facilitate the undisturbed course of the
assembly, and, on the other hand, as to how to protect interests of third parties and the public
interest, or, how to coordinate the two. 360

While upholding the constitutionality of advance notice, the Court restricted the scope of
constitutionally permissible interpretation of some statutory rules related to it. The federal
assembly law contained discretionary language allowing the official to disperse an unnotified
assembly without any further condition. The Court spelled out that the verb ‘can’ (kann) does
not mean unfettered discretion, dispersal is constitutionally warranted only if it is necessary
for the protection of equally weighty values. Also, the proportionality of the restriction must
be respected. The sole fact of not having notified does not warrant the dispersal of the

359 KUNIG supra note 209, Rn. 27 zu Art. 8. at 592, citing also von Mutius, Jura 1988, 79 [81] and Gusy, vMKS,
Rn. 36
360 BVerfGE 69, 315, 350.
assembly, but it might warrant fine or other smaller sanctions, as I see it. Also, the lack of notice decreases the threshold for intervention not automatically, but because and to the extent it results in a limited range of necessary information for proper policing.

These general principles have been further elaborated with regard to so-called spontaneous and urgent demonstrations where the notice requirement has been constitutionally relaxed by the Court. This will be discussed under exemptions, below. Here it suffices to note that the German approach is internally consistent, even if textually somewhat curious in light of the specific ban on prior notice in the guarantee of freedom of assembly.

2.3. United Kingdom: notice only for processions

A novelty of the 1986 act has been the introduction of the obligation of advance notice in case of public processions. (As mentioned, no such requirement is enacted for stationary meetings.) Advance notice is required in general except if it was not reasonably practicable to give any advance notice. The provision should have intended to exempt spontaneous processions, thus “any” should not be interpreted as imposing undue burden, e.g. a telephone call five minutes before the procession starts. What is reasonably practicable in particular is a question not yet really answered by high courts.

As to the scope, the provision (section 11 POA 1986) applies to all processions which are held “to demonstrate support or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons, to publicise a cause or campaign or to mark or commemorate an event”. There is no duty to notify the police of processions customarily or commonly held, thus logically those commemorating processions which are customarily or commonly held are exempted too.

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361 BVerfGE 69, 315, 315 (headlines) and 350.
362 BVerfGE 69, 315, 350: „Auflösung und Verbot sind aber jedenfalls keine Rechtspflicht der zuständigen Behörde, sondern eine Ermächtigung, von welcher die Behörde angesichts der hohen Bedeutung der Versammlungsfreiheit im allgemeinen nur dann pflichtgemäß Gebrauch machen darf, wenn weitere Voraussetzungen für ein Eingreifen hinzukommen; die fehlende Anmeldung und der damit verbundene Informationsrückstand erleichtern lediglich dieses Eingreifen.”
Presumably, those cases are exempted since the police have been aware of them.\textsuperscript{363} This also shows that the purpose of requirement is really just notifying and not obtaining an authorization from the police. However, as Fenwick observes, the cases where the advance notice makes most sense because the police might wish to impose conditions on the processions, i.e. which might “disrupt the community”, will be exactly the cases which the police will be aware of anyway.\textsuperscript{364} Thus, the notice requirement might be of little use. It requires further research to decide whether its introduction was induced by problems related to processions of which the police were not aware, or, simply by a tendency to make processions more difficult and more controllable. The sole purpose made explicit by the government when introducing the bill, which is, according to D.G.T. Williams, “clear enough”\textsuperscript{365}, is that advance notice “will trigger discussions between the police and the organisers; and that surely must be to the benefit of both.”\textsuperscript{366} In my view it is rather doubtful whether the exercise of a both politically, and “individually” important right should be made dependent on the bargaining skills of the particular demonstrators. The “discussion” is not one between equal partners. Besides, the police exercise discretion in bringing prosecutions in case of unnotified assembly. Discretion might of course result in rigorous enforcement against unpopular marches while being lenient with more conventional ones.

2.4. France: notice only for demonstrations (manifestations)

In France, demonstrations (manifestations) are subject to a notification regime, while réunions (meetings taking place not on a public route) can be held without advance notice. Earlier, the original 1881 law prescribed notification, but that was abolished in 1907, the motivation

\textsuperscript{363} Cf. STONE supra note 237 at 347.
\textsuperscript{364} FENWICK, supra note 240 at 456.
\textsuperscript{366} H.L. Deb., Vol. cols. 814-45, October 30, 1986 as cited by WILLIAMS, id.
behind it being the protest of the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{367} The piece of law currently prescribing advance notice for manifestations is a decree-law of October 23, 1935\textsuperscript{368} supplemented by the 1995 law\textsuperscript{369} which gave the opportunity for the Conseil Constitutionnel to declare freedom of demonstration protected by freedom of expression of opinions and ideas under Article 11 of the DDHC.\textsuperscript{370} The CC itself has not found problematic the requirement of advance notice as such. In legal scholarship, however, the difference between permit and notification is most explicit because it relates to a general view on repression vs. prevention. French would dislike a permit system because it is a preventive type of regulation and as such, it is considered to be the highest danger to liberty. Repressive regimes are favoured over preventive regulation, just as advance declaration is favoured over preventive ban.\textsuperscript{371} If one cannot even exercise a freedom because one is preempted or influenced in it as a default rule, then the freedom at hand is not really a freedom.\textsuperscript{372} Therefore, French lawyers are particularly sensitive to the requirement of advance notice in the case of demonstration. There is a general fear of “glissement vers l’autorisation”, i.e. a slide towards authorization. As there is, however, in the positive law or in the history of French constitutionalism nothing which would prohibit a permit system in the case of demonstration, scholars cannot help but warning against such a possible development of the law. Some claim that already the system (régime) in place has

\textsuperscript{367} DUGUIT \textit{supra} note 164 at 348.
\textsuperscript{368} Décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935 portant réglementation des mesures relatives au renforcement du maintien de l’ordre public. A decree-law was a special type of legislation, issued by the government on the authorization of the parliament. In the given case, the law authorised the government to take measures having the force of law in order to defend the franc, the French money. When in 1950 a court was asked to decide on the legality of the decree-law regulating liberty to demonstrate in order to \textit{defend the franc}, it gave a rather curious reasoning. The Court of Appeals of Bordeaux found the decree-law was in accordance with the enabling law because it was in the general interest, as if everything which is in the general interest is capable of defending the franc. (Cour d’appel de Bordeaux, 18 juillet 1950, Izaute as cited by Boyer \textit{supra} note 163 at 693.) It is almost certain that such an interpretation would be unacceptable under the Fifth Republic, since the limits of delegation of legislative power are much stricter than in previous republics especially if it comes to “fundamental liberties.” See also Marcel-René Tercinet, \textit{La liberté de manifestation en France}, \textit{REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC}, 1979, 1009, 1914.
\textsuperscript{369} Loi n°95-73 du 21 janvier 1995.
\textsuperscript{370} Décision n° 94-352 DC du 18 janvier 1995.
\textsuperscript{371} COLLIARD & LETERON \textit{supra} note 173 at 73-96.
\textsuperscript{372} It is then “the negation of freedom”, see COLLIARD & LETERON \textit{supra} note 173 at 82 (§ 96).
\textsuperscript{373} COLLIARD & LETERON \textit{supra} note 173 at 504 (§ 675-676).
basically become a régime préventif instead of a régime répressif. What makes a system to be based on authorization instead of simple advance notice is the possibility of prior ban at the occasion of the notification. If there is no notification requirement, then there cannot really be a prior restraint, since the authorities do not necessarily know in advance about the upcoming demonstration. The notification has to be submitted between the fifteenth and the third day before the planned date of the demonstration. To hold a demonstration without notification is a delict under the Penal Code (Article 431-9). There is no mention in the positive law about a possible different deadline in specific cases, like that of an “urgent” assembly. The authority – which is not the local authority, but the prefect, the representative of the central government – is obliged to immediately give a receipt (récépissé) which would prove that the organizers did not breach the notification requirement.

Even though there is no notification requirement in the case of réunions, the préfet can authorize that a réunion take place on the public route. In that case, the organizers have to get into contact with the authorities in advance. This is, however, perceived not as a prior restraint, but as an extra possibility, therefore, it is also not subject to special guarantees.

2.5. ECHR: both permit and notice in theory acceptable

In line with the general merge between Art. 10 and Art. 11, the ECHR’s strong presumption against prior restraint under Article 10 applies to prior restraints on assemblies and demonstrations as. This, however, does not invalidate, for example, permit requirements per se, but has made increasingly difficult for a state to prove the necessity of blanket prior bans.

374 For example, Frédéric Dieu, La ‘soupe au porc’ et le juge des référés du Conseil d’État de France: la validité de l’interdiction d’une manifestation discriminatoire du fait de sa nature même, 71 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROITS DE L’HOMME, 885 (2007) 888.
376 Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, Application no. 13585/88, Judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A. 216, 14 EHRKR 153, § 60: “[T]he dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court.”
A notification or even a permit required by national law is as such not an unjustified infringement on freedom of assembly and demonstration, not even if it involves a mandatory permit fee. In Andersson, applicant claimed that a 60 Swedish Krona permit fee to hold a demonstration was in violation of his Article 10 rights (He claimed Article 10 because although originally some people were planning to come to the demonstration, actually it was only applicant who demonstrated.). The Commission held the application manifestly ill-founded. It stated that even if we suppose that the permit on payment was interference, it was necessary for the proper regulation of traffic and to otherwise maintain order in public places. Also, the low amount of the fee made the claim of disproportionate interference implausible. The Convention organs have not deemed the distinction between permit and notification relevant or important, and have not required a number of persons necessary to qualify as an assembly that should be notified. For example, in the K. v. Netherlands case the Commission found manifestly ill-founded the claims that the requirement of prior permission to make a one-person-demonstration by upholding a banner at the Amsterdam railway station was contrary to Article 10. Applicant was protesting against the Netherlands’ candidature for the 1992 Olympic Games by holding a banner on the platform, when she was removed by the authorities. She did not ask for permission, even though Dutch law prohibited, “the display of objects at a railway station without prior permission by the railway authorities in order to prevent disturbance of the order, safety or the good running of operations.” The Commission, in tune with its general weak review in freedom of protest and assembly cases, did not consider fatal that applicant evidently did not pose any danger of ‘disturbance of the order, safety or the good running of operations’. Rather, it emphasized that the applicant was not persecuted, and she was not prevented from protesting at another place. Thereby, the interference was not considered disproportionate.

Oya Ataman v. Turkey\textsuperscript{379} is a more recent case involving protest of human rights advocates against so-called F-type prisons. The applicant took part at an unnotified demonstration which was dispersed by tear gas, and on the occasion of which also 39 demonstrators, among them, the applicant, had been arrested. The Court declared a violation on the ground that the demonstrators, though convened unlawfully, did not pose any danger of disturbance to public order, not even to the regular flow of traffic. When actually requiring some chance of some substantive harm, these Court judgments imply a detour from the Commission’s earlier more dismissive approach. In addition, in Oya Ataman, the ECHR also emphasized the advance notice’s role in facilitating for the police “to enable the assembly to occur”, i.e. the mentioned paternalistic argument logically only implying voluntary notification. More novel is the idea – borrowed from the Venice Commission – that prior notice or permit allows “not to use powers that [the police] may validly have (for instance, of regulating traffic) to obstruct the event.”\textsuperscript{380}

Thus, prior notice is not only an interference, but eventually an important tool in safeguarding or promoting freedom of assembly, and, controlling police themselves.\textsuperscript{381}

Meanwhile, the usefulness, and general admissibility of prior notice and permit systems under the Convention does not imply that a demonstration which had not been notified, or authorized, and, thus, had been even banned, is deprived of Convention protection.

\textsuperscript{379} Oya Ataman v. Turkey, Application no. 74552/01, Judgment of 5 December 2006

\textsuperscript{380} § 16 of the judgment, quoting § 29 of the Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) interpreting the OSCE/ODHIR guidelines on drafting laws on freedom of assembly with regard to the regulation of public meetings, adopted at its 64th plenary session (21-22 October 2005).

\textsuperscript{381} Similarly the USSC recently in Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 US 316 (2002), summarizing the precedents with regard to permit (\textit{per} Justice Scalia): “’[T]he [permit] required is not the kind of prepublication license deemed a denial of liberty since the time of John Milton but a ministerial, police routine for adjusting the rights of citizens so that the opportunity for effective freedom of speech may be preserved.’ Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 403 (1953). Regulations of the use of a public forum that ensure the safety and convenience of the people are not ‘inconsistent with civil liberties but ... [are] one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which [civil liberties] ultimately depend.’ Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941).” Cf. also the German stance to prior notice in BVerfGE 69, 315, 350.
3. PRIOR BAN AND CONDITIONS

In what cases can an assembly be banned in advance is certainly among the most sensitive issues as that prevents the exercise of the right altogether. Jurisdictions are split on the question, the U.S. having no special rule elaborated in jurisprudence, while the U.K. has introduced different threshold criteria for processions on public property, and for meetings on private land (a very broad category in the United Kingdom). In France, general public order fears justify a prior ban if applied proportionately, while in Germany there is a jurisprudentially imposed system of mutual cooperation, with gradually enhancing intervention powers in case of disregard. Conditions are related to ban in the jurisdictions, which still differ about the prerequisites for imposing them. France and Germany are most explicit about the dangers of governmental conditioning, i.e. the problem of changing the message of assemblies by conditions.

3.1. United States: no special doctrinal rules

It follows from the previous discussion under “Advance notice or permit” that in the U.S., constitutionally acceptable grounds for prior ban and conditions include content-neutral ones, basically any (not vaguely defined) significant interest which is unrelated to the suppression of speech, if protected in a way that leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, a criterion not exactly clarified in jurisprudence. Content-based grounds are only permissible if Brandenburg-criteria are fulfilled, i.e. imminence lawless action is likely to occur unless the ban or condition is put in place, see below. Naturally, the several states (and even municipalities) have different rules which could not be traced here, but all of them are controlled by USSC jurisprudence discussed above, which boils down to the doctrine of content neutrality, and the prohibition of unfettered discretion in regulating assemblies in advance. A spectacular example of the potentially mischievous operation of these facially
innocent and well-argued doctrines has been the controversy around a New York City march against the impending Iraq War, where only a stationary assembly instead of a march was allowed, leaving out such important symbolic locations like the UN Headquarters. This has been found constitutional under Ward and Forsyth.\textsuperscript{382}

3.2. United Kingdom: vague conditions, prohibited zone, loose review and the HRA

In UK law, the regime is split into processions and stationary meetings also with regard to bans and conditions. The Public Order Act 1986 authorizes the police to impose conditions on any sort of meetings, and marches, i.e., also on those where there is no obligation of advance notice.\textsuperscript{383} Section 12 of the Act empowers the police – the Chief Officer of Police if considering in advance, or the constable at the scene if decided during the meeting – to impose conditions in a much wider range than it was possible under the 1936 Act.

As to processions, the police officer can impose conditions in one of four cases. The first three are the cases where the officer “reasonably believes” that (i) “serious public disorder”, (ii) “serious damage to property” or (iii) “serious disruption to the life of the community” will be caused by the procession (Section 12 (1) a) POA 1986). The first two are obviously much clearer than the third. Serious disruption to the life of the community as a condition for restriction of rights is extremely vague in numerous respects. For instance, the smaller the community is to be understood, the wider the possibility of imposing conditions: virtually any demonstration will disrupt to some extent the life of a little number of people. The vagueness of the requirement is to some extent diminished by judicial interpretation: in \textit{Reid}\textsuperscript{384} the court stated that the conditions should be strictly interpreted. The fourth case which authorizes imposition of conditions (s. 12 (1) (b) of the 1986 Act) is related to the purpose of the meeting.

\textsuperscript{382} United for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In more detail see SUPLINA supra note 333.


\textsuperscript{384} Reid [1987] Crim. L.R. 702.
If the officer reasonably believes that the purpose of the assembly is the “intimidation of others with a view to compelling them not to do an act they have a right to do or to do an act they have a right not to do”, he or she might impose some condition to avoid such a result. For the imposition of conditions both coercive and intimidatory purpose is required which in the interpretation of the courts seems to be a rather stringent condition. It was determined for instance that shouting and raising arms might cause discomfort, but it does not amount to intimidation. If any of the above four triggers occur, the police officer is entitled to impose any condition which might be necessary for the prevention of the occurrence of the mischief. The conditions can include practically everything (including but not limited to changing the planned route or time) except for banning the whole procession. In *DPP v. Baillie* the Divisional Court affirmed that the effect of overly burdensome conditions might amount to a ban which is unlawful under sections 12 and 14, since a banning power only arises under more severe circumstances according to sections 13 and 14A (see below).

Section 14 authorizes the police to impose conditions on *stationary meetings*. The preconditions for doing so are essentially similar to the section 12 conditions which are valid for processions, i.e. some probability of disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation is required. On the other hand, the conditions which might be imposed on meetings are limited, not “everything what is deemed necessary by the officer” can be imposed, but only directions as to the place, as to the duration, and as to the number of participating persons, i.e. issues which in the German, but depending on the exact wording, in the US understanding as well, would qualify as modality or content-neutral restrictions. The reason for the limited scope of imposable conditions on meetings as opposed to processions has been stated by the White Paper preceding the adoption of the POA: “meetings and assemblies are a more important

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386 The condition also has to be communicated to the demonstrators, i.e. it has to be heard by them, otherwise they will not be liable. Nonetheless, the mentioned widening of the field of applicability of the provision from those assemblies where at least 20 people are present to those where at least 2 compromises severely this apparent moderation of the legislator.
means of exercising freedom of speech than marches.”

Discussion is considered superior to potentially pressuring expression.

Case law on imposition of conditions also dealt with the difference between stationary meetings and processions. In *DPP v. Jones*, a 2002 Divisional Court case there was an animals’ rights demonstration planned at Huntingdon Life Services premises. The police got advance notice, and imposed some conditions, including the route from the place where the demonstrators would disembark to the place of the demonstration proper. Ms. Jones was found to be outside the designated area when trying to get back to the road, and arrested for not complying with the imposed conditions. The court found that under section 14 there is no power for the police to impose conditions as to the route the participants should reach the place of the demonstrations, since, at the most, the *movement* of persons could qualify as a public procession, and thus, it would fall under section 12, which, if at all, could be made conditional only in a different notice. What is more, the going from the disembarkation point to the place of assembly cannot be placed under conditions at all, since Gage J. thinks that the power of imposition of conditions in section 12 refers only to such processions where advance notice is required [28]. As indicated above, this is probably a false interpretation of the POA. Nonetheless, there is much sense in the view of Gage J. that going to an assembly would not normally qualify as a public procession. At the least, there is certainly no inherent necessity of that. Meanwhile, the police are entitled to fix the entrance and exit points of a demonstration under a section 14 notice. The decision can be critized for the almost untenable distinction of processions and stationary meetings. Meetings can easily become processions, and vice versa. Every beginning and every conclusion of a march consists of stationary gathering, while every stationary assembly is preceded by a movement of people, most of the times in groups, to the place. Should the police then really issue a notice under section 14 and another one

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388 DPP v Jones [2002] EWHC 110. This is not the 1999 *DPP v. Jones and Lloyd* case, the famous trespassory assembly case of the House of Lords discussed *infra* text accompanying notes 401-408.
under section 12 if they want to cover the whole event? This would invite claims of disproportionate burdening on a fundamental right,\(^{389}\) and would question the sense of having these two kinds of regulatory regimes in the POA as both should apply in every case. At the same time, the decision should be welcome for at least not widening the already large discretion the police have in imposing conditions. It is always beneficial from the perspective of fundamental right if the police have to justify one by one the steps they take. On the other hand, the court reasonably acknowledged that in case the directions of the notice are severable, there is no need to invalidate the whole notice, if some of the directions turn out to be illegal.\(^{390}\)

A demonstrator incurs liability if he or she knowingly fails to comply with the conditions imposed by the police on a procession or meeting. Organizers cannot be made liable for a breach arising out of circumstances beyond their control, i.e. the organizer is liable for their own conduct, including inciting others to breach the imposed conditions. However, the incitement – just as the conditions – must actually come to the notice of the demonstrator who is incited to act upon it,\(^{391}\) and must contain an element of persuasion;\(^{392}\) otherwise the organizer will not incur liability, both according to earlier case law. A more recent case, \textit{Broadwith}\(^{393}\) dealt with another aspect of liability for breaching the conditions. There were two assemblies notified which were supposed to follow each other. The police issued directions in terms of which the second assembly – which was planned to begin by a procession from Burford Road – shall not begin sooner than 1.30 pm. Mr. Broadwith approached the police standing by the closed part of Burford Road before 1.30, and, upon having been warned more times and even shown the written notice under section 14 of the POA, he insisted on walking to the closed area. Finally, he was arrested for non-complying


\(^{390}\) \textit{Cf.} PARPWORTH \& THOMPSON, supra note 383 at 425.

\(^{391}\) \textit{Krause}, (1902) 18 TLR 238.


with the imposed conditions, and the case arose out of this conflict. The issue was whether the police order imposing conditions only applied to those who participated at the first assembly, since there was no evidence that Mr. Broadwith did, or, it applied to everybody who could be reasonably believed to intend to participate at the 1.30 Burford Road procession. Mr. Broadwith fell within this latter category, or, no evidence was available which would have showed that he participated at the previous assembly. Rose LJ for the court agreed with the police and the lower court that the conditions applied to Mr. Broadwith. Even if the notice could have been drafted slightly more accurately, there is apparently no need to be meticulously precise and clear. Also, the court rejected the objection of Mr. Broadwith that by the time he went to the police he was on his own and, thereby, he was not part of an assembly of 20 or more persons (as the required number for an assembly then was). Plainly enough, the court stated that an assembly always consists of individuals, and there could hardly be any effect of the POA’s assembly provisions if there were no possibility to enforce them towards an individual who just left a group (there was evidence that he was with other people right before being stopped by the police) and who in the apprehension of the police intends to take part at the procession starting in Burford Road. Rose LJ here ignored the possibility of such a situation where someone does not intend to take part at the protest and also did not take part at the preceding protest. Possibly, it was not the case with Mr. Broadwith, nonetheless, the rules on burden of proof and standard of proof as to such questions could have been clarified by the court. (Although, if compared with the USSC’ stance with regard to injunctions around abortion clinics, then the Broadwith decision appears in a better light.)

All in all, it appears from the discussed cases that at least before the 1998/2000 Human Rights Act (HRA) incepting the European Convention of Human Rights has come into force, the UK law had only allowed for review for procedural errors and unreasonableness in cases of conditions imposed by the police on marches and meetings, or, more precisely, the law
certainly had not encouraged a strict review of policing demonstrations. The courts had lacked both the clear power of substantive review, and the willingness to interfere with the exercise of statutorily granted police discretion. As the HRA imposes a duty to interpret UK law in harmony with the ECHR if it is possible, courts are required to read into the police discretion of sections 12 and 14 a duty of proportionality in the fashion of ECHR. Thus, courts are currently entitled to review both as to the substance and to the form the decisions of police officers, the terms of the POA being vague enough to make possible an interpretation conform to the Convention.

As to the banning powers, the regime is split as well. Marches can be banned under the 1986 act under special circumstances. If the Chief Officer of Police reasonably believes that the powers under section 12 (imposing conditions) are not sufficient to prevent the holding of an assembly from resulting in serious public disorder, he or she must apply to the council for issuance of a prohibiting order. The council may make an order as requested or modified with the approval of the Secretary of State. The police officer shall reasonably believe in the occurrence of a serious public disorder, i.e. neither serious damage to property, nor serious disruption to the life of the community is sufficient, unlike in the case of conditions. Secondly, once the officer apprehends such a danger, there is no discretion on the part of the police: the decision is compulsively conferred to a higher level: to the council and the Secretary of State. This reduces certainly to some extent the possibility of arbitrariness and discriminative enforcement. However, compared to the imposition of conditions, the banning order will have an extremely serious effect: it is possible that in a whole area no processions whatsoever might be held for as long as three months which can even be further prolonged. The provision is clearly overbroad: it catches not only those marches which might turn violent or disorderly,
but any kind of processions to take place somewhere, even though the rationale of the banning power is admittedly the prevention of serious disorder. In *Kent v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner* the court refused to quash a banning order under a similar provision of the 1936 Public Order Act. The court declared that the ban could only be quashed if there was no reason whatsoever to impose it, and that the act provided sufficient remedy insofar as it allowed the revocation of the ban. Obviously, there is no possibility to challenge an order just by establishing that one particular procession will not turn violent if a ban is already in effect, but a revocation can only be applied for if the applicant can show that no danger of public disorder exist both in terms of area and time and possible processions. In other words, a banning order shifts the burden of proof in such a way as to render it practically impossible for even unquestionably peaceful demonstrators to march in a given area for a given period of time if they face a hostile police officer. Fenwick mentions that the government rejected the possibility of a more specific banning order regime which would only target the “real” target, i.e. violent marches, because it would allegedly have put too great a burden on the police. The argument is that same marchers could convene then under another name, but with the same violent purpose. Actually, Fenwick proposes a “compromise solution” according to which marches with a similar political message to what was the message of the banned march could also be banned. Nonetheless, I do not quite see why it is too much to expect from the police, council, and Secretary of State to make an individual evaluation in each case, or why police cannot be trusted to form a good case-by-case evaluation, reviewable by courts.

The current system of ban on processions is thus certainly quite restrictive. Even though bans are rather rarely issued, the banning power can be easily used as a strategic weapon in negotiating with the demonstrators. It also seems that in practice there is not much control

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397 Id.
398 Cf. FENWICK id.
on the police. The more discretion the police is statutorily granted, the less will other organs
that have some say in the banning decisions be willing to interfere: the council and Secretary
of State will not risk serious disorder, and the court, as it is obvious from Kent, also will be
reluctant to question the evaluation of the police. 399

As to stationary meetings, the law is less restrictive because it only applies to private land.
The 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act introduced the notion of trespassory
assemblies, or, more precisely, a statutory, more or less comprehensive regulation of
possibilities of banning a meeting on a private land. By amending the Public Order Act, it
established a banning power for meetings parallel to that for processions. The circumstances
which might lead to a ban are the following. The police shall reasonably believe that the
assemblers intend to assemble in a place (to which they have either no or only a limited right
of access) likely without the consent of the owner and this may result in “serious disruption to
the life of the community” [or “in significant damage to the land, building or monument of
historical, architectural, archaeological or scientific importance”] (Section 14A (1) b) i. and ii
POA, as inserted by the Criminal Justice and Police Order Act 1994 “CJPOA”). Thus, though
similar, there are some differences in the two kinds of banning powers. Banning is only
possible with regard to stationary assemblies taking place on private land, the amount of
which however considerably increased in recent decades. 400 Also, banning assemblies is
possible on the condition that they would cause serious disruption to the life of the community
while with marches it is only possible for the prevention of serious public disorder. What a
serious disruption to the life of the community might be is a question for the police officer,
and, on review, for the magistrates’ court to decide. It is certainly much less than danger to
property or life or limb. The regulatory technique is otherwise almost the same: the chief
officer of the police applies to the council of the district for a banning order which with the

399 Cf. STONE, supra note 363 at 350. f.
400 FENWICK, supra note 240 at 464.
consent of the Secretary of State makes such or a modified order. The difference is that the police have discretion in launching the process. The similarity is that the order applies to a designated area (delineated in a radius around a specified point) for a specified period of time, thus again – possibly – catching up such assemblies also which are not likely to cause serious disruption to the community. What is more, the police are entitled to stop any person within five miles around the prohibited place (the specified centre of the radius) who are reasonably thought going to that place. Non-compliance with such a stopping order might result in arrest and fine. (Section 14C) Section 14A was the basis for a banning order in the leading case *DPP v. Jones and Lloyd* (1999, House of Lords)\(^{401}\), which to some extent interpreted the law more favorably to freedom of assembly. The order prohibited demonstrating, or, more precisely, trespassory assemblies within a four miles radius around Stonehenge. Jones and others, however, were assembling on the highway around Stonehenge within the prohibited area, since they wished to protest against the order. The police told them to disperse, and when they failed to comply, defendants have been arrested. It was clear that the protesters were neither violent, nor disorderly, and it was not likely in any case that they would cause any disturbance. The question thus arose whether they had committed a trespassory assembly by assembling peacefully in the area to which a section 14A banning order was in force. More precisely, the issue was whether the right of the public on a highway was in a sense limited that it excluded holding peaceful assemblies there while a section 14A order was in effect. Lord Irvine started his judgment by reviewing precedents which seemed to support two interpretations of the rights related to the highway. Reasonable and usual activity on the highway should not be punished under the first interpretation,\(^{402}\) while only activity which is ancillary to passing and repassing the highway is reasonable under the second.\(^{403}\) Lord Irvine

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\(^{401}\) *DPP v. Jones and Lloyd* [1999] 2 A.C. 240.

\(^{402}\) Lord Esher in *Harrison v. Duke of Rutland* [1893] 1 Q.B. 142, 146 *et seq.*

took the first view for the following reasons. First, he cited Collins L.J. in *Hickman v. Maisey* (1900) according to which the use of highway was given a “reasonable extension” in modern times. Such extensions are allegedly “in accordance with the enlarged notions of people in a country becoming more populous and highly civilised.” That is a kind of general reason given by an at most authoritative (100-year-old case from a lower court) decision that the common law might change with the changes in society. Secondly, the other reason for including other reasonable activities in the scope of legitimate use of the highway was for Lord Irvine the absurdity of the rigid, exclusively right-to-passage view. Only allowing activities incidental to passage would render many common activities unlawful, though “the law should not make unlawful which is commonplace and well accepted”\(^{404}\). I.e. the respect is due to usage and public acceptance, not to a fundamental right, as often happens in English law. The last reason is again a highly technical one: to allow only uses of the highway which are incidental to passage would create discordance between the law of trespass and the law of obstruction.\(^{406}\) Clearly, there is no “right” to freedom of assembly here in the usual sense of the term. It is similarly unnecessary to invoke Art. 11 of the ECHR, because the common law is sufficiently clear.\(^{407}\) The law is simply\(^{408}\) that the public highway is a public place which the public may enjoy for any reasonable purpose, provided the activity in question does not amount to a public or private nuisance and does not obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the primary right of the public to pass and repass: within these qualifications there is a public right of peaceful assembly on the highway.

What is reasonable, is a question to be decided by magistrates’ court on a case-by-case basis, no further instructions can be given in that regard. That means that an assembly, though

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\(^{404}\) In truth, very little activity could accurately be described as „ancillary” to passing along the highway: perhaps stopping to tie one’s shoe lace, consulting a street-map, or pausing to catch one’s breath. But I do not think that such ordinary and usual activities as making a sketch, taking a photograph, handing out leaflets...would qualify.” *DPP v. Jones and LLoyd [1999] 2 A.C. 240, 255 et seq. per Lord Irvine*  
\(^{406}\) Id. at 258 *et seq.*  
\(^{407}\) Id. at 259.  
\(^{408}\) Id. at 257.
amounting neither to nuisance nor to obstruction, nor being unlawful in other respects, still may turn out to be an unreasonable user of the highway if the magistrates deem it, for instance, because it is neither “commonplace”, nor “well-accepted”. The right to passage prevails over other uses of the highway, since it is the primary one. Still, the Lords found the assembly a reasonable user of the highway, a clear step forward.

3.3. France: substantive values as troubles to public order and proportionality

Despite the general aversion and caution towards “preventive regimes”, French jurisprudence – similarly to the German where that aversion is largely absent – does not differentiate between the justifiability standards of prior as opposed to posterior restrictions on freedom of assembly. Therefore, much of what will be discussed next in relation to prior bans and conditions will actually display the substantive values to be explored in Part II.B. under countervailing values. \(^{409}\) I still decided to go on with this framework because the other jurisdictions do show some differences.

A demonstration can be banned if the authority estimates that the planned demonstration is capable of disturbing public order. \(^{410}\) Earlier, this requirement was not checked strictly by courts, the Conseil d’État having found sufficient the reality of a threat to public order. \(^{411}\) Later on, however, the Conseil has brought its jurisprudence in relation to demonstrations in harmony with that of reunions publiques, and basically found Benjamin applicable. The police banned a demonstration against the visiting Chinese president organized by the Tibetan community in France. Courts and Conseil reversed by declaring that if it is possible to secure

\(^{409}\) See especially under the heading 2. The would-be disorderly: judicial doctrines of risk-assessment applied to the right to assembly.

\(^{410}\) Art. 3 Décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935.

public order by measures others, less intrusive than a ban then that’s the way to be chosen.412

Therefore, the police have to evaluate in each case whether the measures planned are
“justified by the necessities of maintaining public order.”413 At the same time, the Conseil
declared that the motivation to avoid troubles in the international relations of France is
impertinent to justify restrictions on a demonstration, as that has to relate directly to public
order. In a similar vein, the Paris Court of Appeals found a ban on a demonstration by police
trade unions based on the “discredit to the position” or public function of the police also void
because of impermissible reason.414

Even though dangers to the integrity of international relations or to reputation of police do not
fall under public order, the concept is quite broad. A more recent case on référé-liberté415, an
extraordinary procedure for the safeguard of fundamental liberties, made clear that the
freedom of demonstration can have its limits in the interest in antidiscrimination. In the
famous “soupe gauloise” or “soupe au cochon” decision416 the Conseil d’État had to decide
whether the ban on food distribution organized by a radical right-wing group (SDF –
Solidarité des Français, SDF is a common acronym for ‘Sans domicile fixe’, i.e. homeless)
with a probable racist animus is violating freedom of assembly. The organizers were
advertising that they were distributing soup with pork – the message being obviously not to
mean it for Jews and Muslims. The police banned, and the organizers went to court claiming a
“grave and manifestly illegal violation” of their fundamental liberty to demonstrate, which has
to be shown in the référé-liberté procedure. The administrative tribunal decided in favor of the
applicants, but the Conseil d’État reversed, relying basically on two major arguments. Firstly,
the Conseil accepted the claim of the police and the minister of interior according to which

413 WACHSMANN id. at 465.
414 Cour administrative d'appel de Paris, 4E CHAMBRE, N° 97PA00133, Inédit au recueil Lebon, lecture du
mardi 7 mars 2000.
415 See art. L. 521-2 Code de justice administrative and supra note 283.
the risks associated with an assembly motivated by discriminatory intent qualify as “troubles to public order” which exclude a grave and manifestly illegal violation. More precisely, the risk stemmed from a possible reaction to what is conceived as a demonstration capable of infringing the dignity of the persons deprived of the offered aid (meaning the food). The Conseil did not make clear whether the reaction disturbing public order was meant to come from those homeless who – being Jews or Muslims – cannot eat pork, or from whomever seeing this kind of undignified happening on the public route. Similarly, it remains unclear whether the Conseil requires any sort of immediacy of a danger, or even some higher probability. The adjective ‘susceptible’, i.e. capable would imply that the sheer possibility is sufficient for justifying a restriction on freedom of demonstration. Frédéric Dieu interpretes ‘susceptible’ here as implying intention on the part of organizers,417 but this might be only because this kind of discrimination can be only intentional. What is more, here the intention seems to be presumed – or, the important factor is what others think about the intention of the organizers. Furthermore, the juge de référé of the Conseil d’État states also that respect for freedom of demonstration does not hinder an authority invested with the power of police to ban an activity if that is the sole measure to prevent troubles to public order (emphasis added). Therefore, the Conseil does not grant unlimited discretion to the police in deciding about the existence of troubles to public order. Quite to the contrary, there seems to be a proportionality review, even if if the Conseil does not put down the ‘exact weighing’ (which is almost a contradictio in adiecto in law anyway) it pursued. If the measure has to be the sole measure which is capable to prevent the troubles to public order, then it seems that the Conseil accepted on its own judgment that the distribution of the pork would have had a consequence of disorder. The human dignity argument is thus not clearly self-standing; it mediates between the pork distribution and the disorderly or violent reaction. In this sense, the ‘pork soup’

417 DIEU, supra note 374 at 895.
decision might imply an argument analogous to ‘fighting words’, nonetheless, this evidently is an infinitely laxer requirement compared to that. Notably, the Conseil left unclarified if the (perceived) infringement of dignity of persons is automatically, in any case, is conducive to troubles to public disorder, or just in the specific case. Also, it is not clear how far discriminatory practices or views per se, where there is no apparent harmdoing, would forfeit assembly rights. The Conseil definitely found proven that the views of the demonstrators were discriminatory, the source for this being the website of the SDF. If one takes the wording seriously, it seems that the perception of (by the way indetermined) others as to the (intention of the organizers of) infringing human dignity is sufficient for the establishment of troubles to public order. Dieu rightly points out that it is embedded in earlier, even if not too early, jurisprudence that the ‘dignity of the person’ is part of the public order,\textsuperscript{418} notably in the (in)famous decision \textit{Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge} in relation to the consensual employment of little people (people living with dwarfism) for the purposes of entertainment.\textsuperscript{419} As the police is entitled and obliged to protect public order, any (perceived and intended) attack on dignity is an attack to public order. It is another question, how to discover the existence of an attack to human dignity in a particular situation, and what the sufficient and necessary means are to counter it.

Secondly, the Conseil also made a very interesting argument when it stated that the administrative tribunal could not uphold without contradiction that the distribution of pork on the public route was organized in a discriminatory manner, while at the same time find a grave and manifestly illegal violation of the fundamental liberty to demonstrate. Thereby, the Conseil basically said that the discriminatory exercice of a fundamental liberty is not protected by the fundamental liberty, since being free from discrimination (by private persons!) is also a fundamental liberty. To put it in a slightly different way: organizing a

\textsuperscript{418} Dieu, \textit{supra} note 374 at 893.
\textsuperscript{419} CÉ, Ass., 27 octobre 1995, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, Recueil, 372; RFDA 1995, conclusions Frydman.
demonstration of discriminatory character is illegal, and, what is more, this illegality is a more serious violation than the interference flowing from the prohibition of the demonstration itself. Nonetheless, as under the référendaire liberté procedure only grave and manifestly illegal violations of fundamental liberties can be persecuted, this decision shall not be deemed decision on the ultimate limits of liberty of demonstration in the concrete sense of the word. As Dieu points out, however, the decision should be taken as delineating the principles to be considered while deciding a case at the level of facts.

In another (ordinary administrative review) decision, the Conseil d’État found that previous intimidating and threatening conduct of anti-abortion protestors invading clinics could serve as basis for prior ban of another demonstration – notified before the Notre Dame, and not explicitly next to the neighboring clinic – even if this previous conduct was not considered in the judgments of lower administrative courts. In the weighing it was also relevant that the demonstration could have been held elsewhere, and no general ban was issued against the association. Previous disorderly conduct of the same association also was found sufficient for an advance ban of another demonstration in front of an abortion clinic by the Administrative Court of Appeals in another proceeding.

Apart from bans, the police have a right to impose conditions when they become aware of the upcoming demonstration, i.e. when the notification is submitted. Nonetheless I could not verify the exact legal source for this power, thus it most probably is the general police power of municipal authorities (police, mayor, or the prefect) as granted in the General code of territorial units.

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420 DIEU, supra note 374 at 889.
421 Id.
424 CHAPITRE II : Police municipale, Code général des collectivités territoriales, Article L2212-1 – Article L2212-10.
As to other prior burdens, there seems to be consensus that it has to be justified under a
*Benjamin* type necessity review, i.e. only those limitations are allowed which are the sole
means for the prevention of troubles to public order. As in other cases, it does not mean a very
high standard of probability of “troubles”, but it does mean some evidence in the hand of the
police which shows that actually some harm perceived serious (disorder or violation of human
dignity) might happen which they cannot handle unless the measure is taken. The main
decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel on prior restraints other than ban is the decision on
videosurveillance and search of vehicles. The law (before promulgation) at hand regulated
several questions related to videosurveillance of public places (more precisely: the public
route and places especially exposed to risks of aggression and theft), a provision of bringing
and wearing arms and objects capable of being used as projectiles at a demonstration, and the
possibility of search for vehicles for the purposes of finding arms or projectiles. The Conseil
found the procedures related to the installation of videosurveillance sufficient to guarantee the
“individual liberty” protected by article 66 of the Constitution, i.e. in this regard it did not
consider if there might be a danger to freedom of demonstration. In finding the system
constitutional, the Conseil imputed importance to the fact that there will be proper and
permanent information on the videosurveillance, i.e it is not secret, but everybody is, in fact,
aware of it. Meanwhile, blatantly, there is no chilling effect consideration present in the
decision in this regard. Apart from the proper information, the Conseil found the
videosurveillance constitutional on procedural grounds (independent commission, right to
remedy, restrictions on the storage of the recorded data, etc.) which are less relevant for my
topic. As to the freedom of demonstration restriction proper, the Conseil held actually very
little. It spelled out in the third considérant related to article 16 of the law that the freedom of
collective expression of ideas and opinions is constitutionally guaranteed, and it is at least

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probable that individual liberty, and, the liberty of movement (liberté d’aller er venir), equally mentioned in the very same sentence are not relevant with regard to the demonstration, but refer in general to the person’s rights when walking on the street. As the Conseil also affirmed that the prevention of attacks to the public order and notably to the security of the persons and goods is similarly of constitutional value, it admitted the legislator’s competence to bring about reconciliation between these two sides. As to the particular legislative piece which authorizes the prefectoral authority to prohibit the bringing and wearing of arms or objects capable of being used as arms, the Conseil attached importance to the following. It weighed heavily that the law only allowed the prohibition in cases where the circumstances made grave troubles to the public order to be feared, and that the prohibition can only be imposed in the 24 hours preceding the demonstration. It also seems that the Conseil integrated a ‘réservé que’ type of interpretation without explicitly saying so with regard to the spatial aspect of the ban.\footnote{Similarly François Luchaire, \textit{La vidéosurveillance et la fouille des voitures devant le Conseil constitutionnel}, 111 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET À L’ÉTRANGER 573 (1995) 583.} It recalled that the authorization of imposition is restricted to the place of the demonstration itself, and its surroundings (aux lieux avoisinants) it, and the entering points of the demonstration, and interpreted this to mean only immediate proximity. Also, the Conseil seems to have instructed lower authorities – and eventually the courts – that the extent of the prohibition shall be limited and proportional to the necessities which the circumstances seem to require. Further, with relation to the similar provision enabling the prohibition of bringing or wearing objects capable of being used as projectil, the Conseil held that the formulation is so general and imprecise that it violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the individual (i.e. here the norm applied is article 66 of the Constitution ‘proper’). Luchaire remarks in this regard that a similar imprecision and generality would have been well discernible also in the case of objects capable of being used as arms, since the Criminal Code (to which the law on videosurveillance gives reference) is quite broad. More precisely, the
second paragraph of article 132-75 of the Criminal Code refers to objects which are used or meant (destined) to be used to kill and hurt by the perpetrator. Article 132-75 was as such referred by the law on videosurveillance, the second paragraph seems therefore also applicable. However, as the law authorizes search of vehicles in every case where the imposition of prohibition is permitted, it would necessarily authorize search of vehicles for objects meant (destined) to be used to kill and hurt. As, this, however, is impossible to tell in advance, thus, according to Luchaire, it should be interpreted in a restrictive way. Either the second paragraph does not count in the application to the prohibition and to the search of vehicles, or, it can only constitute an infraction of the law from the point that it is used or meant (destined) as an arm, meaning only during the demonstration and not in advance.\textsuperscript{427} While Luchaire is quite correct in the desirability of such a (re)interpretation, there might be some doubts whether the prefect or even the courts would follow his suggestions.

As to the authorization of search of vehicles for arms or objects capable of being used as arms and the seizure of these objects, the Conseil took a strict approach. It found that to the extent that such a search and seizure would result in finding infractions and in the persecution of the perpetrators, the power to pursue search and seizure belongs to the judicial (as opposed to the administrative) police powers, controlled by the judiciary, and not by the executive, since the judiciary is supposed to protect individual liberty. As the law authorized the prefectoral authority for such a search and seizure provided that they notify (only) the prosecutors, it is unconstitutional. Again, however, here the value violated is not freedom of collective expression, but the individual liberty, thus, this part of the decision also does not spell out a principle specifically related to demonstrations, but is more of a criminal-procedural argument, which nonetheless reinforces the line between preventive and repressive public order activities. The law which was finally adopted authorizes the prefect to ban the bringing and

\textsuperscript{427} \textsc{Luchaire}, \textit{id.} at 584.
wearing – without a legitimate reason – an object constituting arms in the sense of the Penal Code within a designated area around the place of the planned manifestation if grave troubles to public order are feared. The area cannot be larger than justified by public order necessities.\textsuperscript{428}

The Conseil d’État, the administrative high court also handled down a number of cases related to prior restraints in a similar attitude. For instance, the Conseil d’État did not consider disproportionate the temporary reintroduction of French-Spanish crossborder checks for one day at the occasion of an ETA manifestation planned in Bayonne for the support of ETA members held in prison in France and in Spain, because there was ample evidence of danger of violence.\textsuperscript{429} The demonstration to be held was part of a series of demonstrations, the two preceding ones having turned violent. In the second considerant, the Conseil d’État points out that there were street fights organized by separatists of Spanish citizenship, and that the expected fusion of this group with a French movement made the occurrence of violence again probable. The Conseil accepted that the reintroduced crossborder check might put a burden on the assembly rights of the applicants, because the procedure resulted in long queues and traffic jam, thus, some people who intended could not get to the demonstration. Nonetheless, the Conseil apparently deemed such an indirect prior restraint being proportionate to the danger of violence.

3.4. Germany: graduality of cooperation, conditions and ban

Not a full-fledged prior restraint, but the so-called duty to cooperate on the part of demonstrators and organizers is well understood to impose limit on the freedom of assembly, even more than in the UK since in Germany it has been imposed by the GFCC itself. In the \textit{Brokdorf}-decision, the Court claims that the more the organizer shows cooperative spirit

\textsuperscript{428} Art. 2 bis Décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935.
\textsuperscript{429} CÉ, N° 237649, mercredi 30 juillet 2003.
already at the time of the advance notification, the higher the threshold of permissible state intervention for the protection of public security and order will be. The Court even advises the organizers to make one-sided measures which build trust between them and the police, and that would have the same effect of raising the level of danger where intervention is constitutionally permissible. In addition, the Court apparently invites, if not obliges, participants to take into account “well-proven experiences” of former demonstrations. Unclear remains whether cooperation is an obligation, a Pflicht or just an Obliegenheit, this latter normally meaning non-enforceable duties or burdens. Still, as the Court puts a very clear obligation to learn and adapt to former well-tried experiences on the police, and expects cooperation from the organizers, the conclusion that the Court engages in a very dangerous “Vestaatlichung”, state-ization of a freedom, is well grounded. A constitutionally imposed duty of cooperation transforms freedom of assembly into a curious right to co-form matters of state competence, a rather serious distortion of the function of fundamental rights. The problem is, of course, that true as it might be, this critique certainly remains without response in reality: de facto there will be a bargaining, and the level of “friendliness” or at least “correctness” induced by cooperation certainly will have an effect on the legal evaluation of both the conduct of the police, and that of the demonstrators.

One of the reasons for the acceptability of advance notice is to enable the authorities to impose conditions in case of foreseeable likely direct endangering of public security. Demonstrators have a right to self-determination with regard to date and time of their planned assembly, but practical concordance requires the protection of the rights of others and other substantive constitutional values, like public security as much as possible. Such protection

432 KUNIG supra note 209, Rn. 20 zu Art. 8, at 589.
433 Id.
434 See supra text after and before notes 235-236.
might result in imposing conditions on the timing or the route of the assembly. On one occasion, the Federal Administrative Court found lawful an obligation of would-be demonstrators to report at the police so those likely violent can be prevented in travelling abroad to the G8 summit.

Even mass detention of demonstrators before the G8 summit in Heiligendamm was permissible under German law (complaint rejected without examination by the GFCC), while the ECHR found it violated the Convention. Thus though in theory the threshold is the concrete danger of violent conduct on an upcoming assembly, and previous violence also weighs in the assessment of danger, the concreteness and likeliness can be rather attenuated. Such danger of violation of other substantive values – to be discussed under Part II. B – also might serve as ground justifying conditions, and – if conditions are not suitable – ban. These include commonsensical ones like damage to life, limb or property, then coercion in a reasonably narrow sense, and finally human dignity mediated by “public peace”. A characteristic of German law is the graduality of duties: the more willing the organizer is to cooperate, the higher the threshold for police intervention for first imposing conditions, and if they are not sufficient or suitable, a ban (or dispersal). This is very much in harmony with doctrines of proportionality, balancing, and practical concordance. Graduality is not required, but prohibited in one case: when the condition would change the message of the assembly. In that case, a ban might be constitutional if other criteria are fulfilled, while a condition is unconstitutional, at least in theory.

435 BVerfG, 1 BvR 961/05 vom 6.5.2005, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 30), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20050506_1bvr096105.html
437 Schwabe and M. G. v. Germany, Application nos. 8080/08, 8577/08, Judgment of 1 December 2011.
3.5. ECHR: strong substantive and procedural protection

As mentioned above, a demonstration which was held even though it had been banned or not authorized, is not deprived of Article 11 protection. Since only unpeaceful assemblies fall out of the scope, unlawfully convened assemblies are still protected.

As a default rule, in case of denial of authorization, or, any kind of measure having the effect of prior ban on assembly, the Convention requires that the authorities give proper grounds. The Court exerts substantive review, and it appears now settled that a prior ban cannot be justified unless incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles would otherwise occur with some (unclear) level of probability. In Stankov it is stated:\(^438\)

> Sweeping measures of a preventive nature to suppress freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities, and however illegitimate the demands made may be – do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it. (Emphasis added.)

These two concerns were reaffirmed in Güneri\(^439\), thus it appears settled that a prior ban on substantive grounds can only be justified if either incitement to violence\(^440\) or a rejection of democratic principles would occur on the banned assembly. The required probability is not exactly clear, just as what amounts to “rejection of democratic principles” – secessionist speech according to Stankov\(^441\) does not, while e.g. “seeking the expulsion of others from a given territory on the basis of ethnic origin is a complete negation of democracy.”\(^442\)


\(^{440}\) In Stankov at § 102 the Court reminds of its statement in Incal according to which “the mere fact that a message read out at a commemorative ceremony to a group of people – which already considerably restricted its potential impact on national security, public order or territorial integrity – contained words such as “resistance”, “struggle” and “liberation” did not necessarily mean that it constituted an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an uprising (loc. cit., pp. 1566-67, § 50)”.

\(^{441}\) Reaffirming: United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (No. 2), request to referral to the Grand Chamber pending, Application no. 34960/04, Judgment of 18 October 2011, citing Stankov No. 1. in § 36.

\(^{442}\) Stankov supra note 438 § 100.
Among the recent cases on prior restraint, *Baczkowski v. Poland* ruling is of foremost significance. The judgment is quite unique because the Court managed to overcome rather serious preliminary objections and declare violation of freedom of assembly, the right to effective remedy with respect to assembly, and discrimination in the same regard basically by discussing at length the role of freedom of assembly and demonstration in a democracy as a tool of protecting vulnerable minorities and furthering pluralism. The decision is full of statements of principle, which serve as an answer to the Government’s technical objections. In a maximalist fashion, the Court inversed the Government’s preliminary objections into substantive violations of the Convention. In the case, contrary to *Güneri*, the banned assemblies did take place despite the ban, and the police even protected the demonstrators. Also, the reviewing administrative authority quashed the first instance bans, and even the Constitutional Court – in review for compatibility initiated by the Ombudsman – ruled that some of the provisions the bans were based on were unconstitutional. Still, the ECHR declared a violation of Art. 11 on the ground that the bans were not prescribed by law since they were imposed unlawfully. The case is important in various regards. First is the status of the ‘victim’ as a requirement for standing before the Court. The Government claimed that applicants were not ‘victims’ since they did not suffer any moral or pecuniary damages and the assembly did take place, and no sanction was applied against them. Besides, the Government also claimed that there was no interference into applicants’ rights to freedom of assembly for the same reasons. The Court rejected both of these claims and held the following in § 67:

 [...] [T]he applicants took a risk in holding them given the official ban in force at that time. The assemblies were held *without a presumption of legality*, such a presumption constituting a *vital aspect* of effective and unhindered exercise of the freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. The Court observes that the refusals to give authorisation

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could have had a *chilling effect* on the applicants and other participants in the assemblies. It could also have discouraged other persons from participating in the assemblies on the ground that they did not have official authorisation and that, therefore, no official protection against possible hostile counter-demonstrators would be ensured by the authorities. (Emphases added.)

This quote is highly significant especially if understood in the context of the case. The assemblies at stake were demonstrations organized by Equality Foundation in order to alert the public to the issue of discrimination against minorities and women. The banned assemblies were those which were organized by members of NGOs protecting the rights of various sexual minorities. On the same day, other assemblies were authorized, which basically wished to convey a countermessage (e.g. protest against partnerships, ‘peadophilia’, for ‘Christian values’, etc.). Secondly, there was another preliminary issue raised by the government, namely that of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Government argued that applicants failed to exhaust remedies because they did not submit a constitutional complaint whilst the ECHR ruled in a previous judgment that the Polish constitutional complaint might qualify as an effective remedy under the Convention. The Court rejected this objection basically relying on the importance of timing in the freedom of assembly and expression context. This is one of the occasions when freedom of expression considerations successfully made their way into Art. 11 case law. As the Court did not specify why the dates the assemblies were planned for were of special importance, in essence it ruled that any remedy which cannot be obtained before the planned date of an assembly is ineffective, and, therefore, needs not to be exhausted. What is more, regarding Art. 13, the Court even declared a violation of the right to remedy for basically the same reasons (§ 82 of the judgment):

> [...][S]uch is the nature of democratic debate that the timing of public meetings held in order to voice certain opinions may be crucial for the political and social weight of such a meeting. Hence, the State

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authorities may, in certain circumstances, refuse permission to hold a demonstration, if such a refusal is compatible with the requirements of Article 11 of the Convention, but cannot change the date on which the organisers plan to hold it. If a public assembly is organised after a given social issue loses its relevance or importance in a current social or political debate, the impact of the meeting may be seriously diminished. The freedom of assembly – if prevented from being exercised at a propitious time – can well be rendered meaningless.

It seems therefore to be the state of the law that organizers are the sole masters of the timing of assembly in the sense that if they say that the timing is important, it should be unquestionably considered part of the content of their message, and as such, cannot be restricted. This stands in sharp contrast to the lenient review of the removal of the protester from the Amsterdam Central Station in the Dutch case (K. v. The Netherlands, mentioned above) where the Commission considered the fact that applicant had the possibility to protest at other places (– most probably somewhere where the Olympic delegation, the target of the protest, would not have seen her), as one factor rendering the interference proportionate. Again, one might observe a strengthening of the Convention protection in the last decade, which might be also due to the different degree of restriction in the Dutch case, on the one, and in the Polish one, on the other hand, but it might also result from the increasingly rights protective mood of the Court. In any case, these strong procedural guarantees are a far cry from the lenient standard declared by the USSC in Thomas v. Chicago Park District as discussed above.\textsuperscript{445}

\textsuperscript{445} Supra text accompanying 353-356.
4. EXEMPTIONS, DEROGATIONS FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT

4.1. Traditional processions – content discrimination or a reasonable exemption?

The jurisdictions examined all carve out exceptions from the notification or permit requirement for assemblies traditionally held. The particular formulation and, thus, scope of the exception is naturally diverging from country to country.

In France the decree-law of October 23, 1935 exempted the processions (this time the expression used is “sorties”) conforming to local usage from the advance notice, with having first of all religious processions in mind, and it applies largely to those still today.\(^{446}\)

Nonetheless, within this scope, the interpretation is quite generous as even a seventy year interruption does not prevent a procession to qualify as conforming to local usage.\(^{447}\) Such manifestations are also exempted from the ban of disguising the face.\(^{448}\) Légifrance does not yield any search results which are not about religious processions, thus the conclusion that French legal practice hereby de facto institutes a content-based exemption for religious processions appears inevitable. This, however, seems to raise no controversy in the country, and it is possible also that whenever a group would claim its manifestation should be considered conforming to local usage, courts will accept it.

In German law, there is a more complicated controversy around traditional or religious processions. Art. 17 of the Federal Assembly law\(^{449}\) exempts from the notice requirement (and indeed from ban and conditioning) open air worships, masses, religious processions, funeral and wedding processions and traditional popular festivals. The apparent privilegization of such assemblies over political ones resulted in scholars originally claiming the regulation

\(^{446}\) COLLIARD & LETTERON, supra note 173 at 503.


\(^{448}\) See infra text accompanying notes 1010-1016.

\(^{449}\) On its status see supra note 243.
unconstitutional,

others in need of an interpretation conform to the constitution. Since 2001, however, as the GFCC appeared settled on a narrow (or enlarged) concept of assembly, which in any case restricts the scope of Art. 8 GG to public matters, some of the authors argue that Art. 17 Assembly Law does not even cover assemblies protected by Art. 8 GG. Thus, the regulation does not privilege them: to the contrary, these assemblies are subject to general police law with a wider range of intervention possibilities than it is the case with Art. 8 assemblies. This approach however strikes back on the opposite end: most of these processions certainly should enjoy basic rights protection because of the applicability of freedom of religion, simple freedom of action (with its easier limitability) will not do. It is hard to see why one basic right (freedom of assembly within the narrow notion) and another (freedom of religion) should be subject to different regimes when the activity is actually the same (procession). The problem has thus in my view become moot neither because of the mentioned decision of the GFCC, nor because the regulation of assemblies became a competence of the Länder. Saxony’s new assembly law contains an identical regulation,

while the Bavarian assembly law exempts such assemblies from the ban on disguising the face and of bringing “protective weapons”.

The UK POA section 11 (2) dispenses with the notice requirement for processions commonly or customarily held in the given area, and also funeral processions “organised by a funeral director acting in the normal course of his business.” “Commonly or customarily held”

451 DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, § 17.
452 BVerfGE 104, 92 (2001), see the discussion on the notion of assembly in German law, supra text accompanying notes 208–216.
453 E.g. DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, § 10, 349.
456 Bayerisches Versammlungsgesetz, Vom 22. Juli 2008 (GVBl S. 421), BayRS 2180–4-I, § 16 IV. For the notion of protective weapons and disguising identity, see infra text accompanying notes 997–1009.
includes traditional May Day or Good Friday processions, but the category is not limited to it as the rationale of the exemption is that police are aware anyway. A 2008 House of Lords judgment in Kay on Critical Mass cycle rallies in Central London found that a twelve year practice certainly qualifies as customary, thus the notice requirement does not apply. The Court has not clarified how long a practice below twelve years will suffice, but the case affirms that the exception as applied does not relate to the content of the message, but really to its recurring nature. The House of Lords disagreed with the Divisional Court about whether the route of the procession needs to be known to police in advance in order for the notice to be dispensable. Though Critical Mass does not have a predetermined route, the House of Lords decided that it is still the same procession, i.e. it falls under the exemption.

As to funeral processions, the somewhat meticulous formulation of “organised by a funeral director acting in the normal course of his business” appears to exclude spontaneous, mass funeral processions which normally are political, and might be source of danger and occasion – e.g. in Northern Ireland – of intergroup conflict. However, exactly the regulation regarding Northern Ireland exempts simply “funeral processions” from advance notice, without further specification. This same regulation still contains a hint on the specific history: it does not exempt customarily or commonly held processions from advance notice, though the Secretary of State can regulate in an order those processions which are exempted.

In the U.S. the situation of exemptions for traditional assemblies is unclear. Traditionally, funeral processions were exempted by laws and regulations in some of the states and municipalities. Early state court cases sometimes struck down such regulations for being

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457 Usual examples in UK textbooks on civil liberties, e.g. STONE supra note 237 at 260.
463 E.g., Edwin Baker found 9 of 18 examined regulations containing such exemption, see Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations 78 NW. U.
discriminatory.\textsuperscript{464} However, there not only funeral, but some other processions were also exempted, and the Court has even left open the possibility later to allow for an only funeral procession exemption.\textsuperscript{465} The USSC has not ruled exactly on this issue. Major assembly cases of the USSC, such as \textit{Shuttlesworth} involved ordinances exempting funeral processions, but this was not the main reason for their unconstitutionality. In \textit{Shuttlesworth}, the exception only appears in a footnote, only for the sake of being precise.\textsuperscript{466} Although such regulations is clearly content-based, and thus would fall under strict scrutiny, the widespread practice in state and municipal laws to exempt funeral processions from the permit requirement either indicate that such exemptions would pass strict scrutiny, or that it raises no controversy.

\subsection*{4.2. Spontaneous and “urgent” assemblies}

A demonstration can be unnotified for several reasons. Unnotified demonstrations form a special category in freedom of assembly literature. They are usually perceived to be potentially more dangerous or disturbing; nonetheless, in some sense the worthiest of protection since they are presumably prompted by some important event, and are thus spontaneous, somehow genuine. Also, it often happens that organizers do not give prior notice because they can be sure that the authorities would ban the demonstration unlawfully. Therefore, the leniency which is required in the handling of such assemblies functions as a safety check, or a last-resort built-in guarantee of freedom of assembly. As it can be seen on the example of the \textit{Baczkowski} case, local authorities might well render freedom of assembly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{464} L. Rev. 937 (1983), text accompanying notes 32-34, also citing examples from as early as 1888. An internet search for ‘exemptions from permit requirement for funeral procession’ (without quotation marks) also shows the exemption being widespread all over the U.S.
\item \textsuperscript{466} “It may well be urged that there is something distinctive in a funeral procession. It is not only a work of charity but of necessity as well, that we bury the dead. These occasions are attended by a solemnity all own; and experience has taught us there is, usually at least, little about them to encourage the presence of large bodies of citizens, while there is much to keep in serious and orderly mood those who may take part in them. When the question arises whether such an exception alone, to the general character of an ordinance such as we have before us, would amount to undue discrimination, it may be properly dealt with.” Commonwealth v. Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. 178 (1913) at 3.
\item \textsuperscript{466} Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) 151, FN 1.
\end{itemize}
meaningless by constantly rejecting permit requests or issuing clearly biased bans in the guise of upholding traffic regulations. Even if second instance administration and the courts were eager to quash the first instance ban, but even they could not remedy effectively the once lost opportunity to protest at the right time and right place. In some cases, however, even higher instance authorities or courts are not willing, or are – as a matter of positive law – not able to correct the first instance bias or mistake. If such official conduct can be taken for granted, protestors might wish to risk an unnotified assembly rather than a banned one.

For this, and the proper spontaneous protest situation, the European Court of Human Rights spelled out general principles in the Oya Ataman v. Turkey case, mentioned above, and the Bukta v. Hungary case. In Ataman, the human rights protest of applicants – historically and theoretically at the core of freedom of assembly as essentially political protest, a form of petitioning the government in the interest of the most vulnerable: mal-treated prisoners – had not been notified, and was dispersed within half an hour by tear gas. In the view of the applicant, the dispersal took place in order to prevent the reading out of a press statement protesting against the isolation and possible mal-treatment of prisoners. The Court also did not find evidence that the demonstrators posed a danger to public order, apart from minor disruption to traffic. Meanwhile, the Court was “particularly struck by the authorities’ impatience in seeking to end the demonstration, which was organised under the authority of the Human Rights Association.” As a statement of principle, the Court declared in para. 42: “[W]here demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all substance.”

467 Oya Ataman v. Turkey, supra note 379.
469 For the situation in F-type prisons in Turkey cf. e.g. the Human Rights Watch reports and materials available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/11/turkey123.htm.
470 Oya Ataman v. Turkey, supra note 379 § 34.
Therefore, it concluded that there was a violation of freedom of assembly, since the state failed to show the necessary tolerance in handling an unlawful, but peaceful demonstration. The Court had the opportunity to reiterate and further elaborate on its stance on unnotified assemblies in the 2007 case *Bukta and Others v. Hungary*. The facts of the case are closest to a spontaneous demonstration proper, though, in German terms, it might still qualify only as Eilversammlung, urgent demonstration, and not a spontaneous one.

In *Bukta*, the applicants held a protest in front of a hotel where the Hungarian Prime Minister participated at a reception given by the Romanian Prime Minister on the occasion of a national holiday which commemorates the 1918 declaration of transfer of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania. The Hungarian Prime Minister made public the day before the event that he intended to participate. Thus, applicants, wishing to protest against the participation of the Hungarian Prime Minister at such an event, did and could not adhere to the three days notice required by the Assembly Act, but held the protest without prior notification. The police dispersed them, relying first of all on the Assembly Act the text of which does not grant discretion to the police if facing an unnotified demonstration, though also mentioning a sharp noise heard which might be a danger for the delegation in the hotel. That every unnotified demonstration is unlawful under the Assembly Act, and will be dissolved, was confirmed on appeal by the domestic courts. Though the Hungarian government tried to argue in Strasbourg that there was a detonation heard and that was the cause of the dissolution, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed this argument, as domestic courts did not rely on it either. Rather, it pointed out that if special circumstances justify an immediate response to a

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471 *Bukta and Others v. Hungary*, *supra* note 468.

472 *See* BVerfGE 85, 69, 75: „Anders als bei Spontanversammlungen ist bei Eilversammlungen allerdings nicht die Anmeldung überhaupt, sondern lediglich die Fristwahrung unmöglich. Daher bedarf es hier keines Verzichts auf die Anmeldung, sondern nur einer der Eigenart der Versammlung Rechnung tragenden Verkürzung der Anmeldefrist.“ (Unlike in the case of spontaneous assemblies, in case of urgent assemblies the notification is not at all, but only the observation of the deadline is impossible. Therefore, in such a case, there is no need to dispose with the notification, rather there is only need to shorten the deadline for notice in a way which accounts for the special nature of the assembly.)
political event in the form of a demonstration, it is disproportionate to disband the ensuing peaceful assembly solely because of the lack of prior notice.\textsuperscript{473}

That means that there is an obligation flowing from the Convention to guarantee the possibility of spontaneous demonstrations. Nonetheless, it is also clear that it does not mean more. Prior notice is not contrary to the Convention, and it cannot be considered redundant unless (i) special circumstances justify an (ii) immediate response to a (iii) political event. If these conditions are fulfilled, the lack of prior notice is not a sufficient reason to disband an otherwise peaceful and orderly assembly.

Recently, the demonstration blocking a central bridge in Budapest for several hours was understood (not decided, as that was not the issue) clearly illegal by the ECHR.\textsuperscript{474} The issue to be decided was the dispersal of a later demonstration – in support of the dispersed bridge blockade, both in protest against election results pronounced two months before – halting vehicular traffic and public transport in and around a main square. The Court found that proportionate, especially as the demonstrators could express their solidarity with the illegal bridge blockade as their demonstration was only dispersed after several hours (§ 42), despite the fact that it seriously disrupted traffic and was not notified. Bukta does not mean that “the absence of prior notification can never be a legitimate basis for crowd dispersal.”\textsuperscript{475} The exact contours of the exemption remain to be clarified, such as the issue of urgent assemblies or ‘Eilversammlungen,’ eventual permissibility of delayed notice requirement, or the proportionality of measures other than dispersal.

Some of those issues are clarified in German law, the apparent origin of the doctrine of spontaneous assembly. According to the GFCC spontaneous demonstrations are those which form instantaneously from an actual occasion.\textsuperscript{476} Literature differentiates between several

\textsuperscript{473} Bukta v. Hungary, supra note 468 at § 36.
\textsuperscript{474} Éva Molnár v. Hungary, Application no. 10346/05, Judgment of 7 October 2008, § 10 and § 41.
\textsuperscript{475} Id. at § 37.
\textsuperscript{476} BVerfGE 69, 315, 348, BVerfGE 85, 69, 75.
sorts of spontaneous assemblies. According to a dominant categorization, spontaneous assemblies in the wider sense include (i) instantaneous; (ii) urgent; and (iii) flash assemblies.\textsuperscript{477} Instantaneous assemblies are spontaneous assemblies in the strict sense, as it is only in their case that the determination of holding an assembly and its realization cannot be separated, but coincide. In case of urgent and flash assemblies, the moments of determination and the demonstration itself are separate, though the assembly follows shortly the determination.\textsuperscript{478} The difference is legally relevant as in case of urgent assemblies, the Court has not dispensed with the duty of notification, just it acknowledged a shortening of the deadline for notification. In case of really spontaneous assemblies, to give notice is impossible for two reasons. First, there are no organizers in case of spontaneous demonstration, so there is no person who can be responsible for notifying the police. Secondly, there is no time anyway, as the decision to hold an assembly and holding it actually coincides. Thus, so to speak, spontaneous (instantaneous) assemblies are exempted because of the factual impossibility of notifying in lack of planning and organizing.

Urgent assemblies are, however, planned and have an organizer, but their goal would be endangered if the organizers adhered to the deadline.\textsuperscript{479} Thus, here the constitutionally acceptable solution is to allow for a shortened deadline for advance notice which should be given in any form (phone, fax, email, etc.)\textsuperscript{480} without delay right after the decision to hold an assembly was made.\textsuperscript{481} Not a spontaneous assembly is an assembly which is meant to surprise, because it was in advance planned by its initiators. What is more, it seems that such demonstrations count even to be malicious, as “pretended spontaneous actions.”\textsuperscript{482} Maliciously unnotified assemblies, however, are to be dispersed, at least according to some

\textsuperscript{477} DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rn. 18 to § 14, at 247.
\textsuperscript{479} Id.
\textsuperscript{478} BVerfGE 85, 69, 74.
\textsuperscript{480} DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rn. 22 to § 14 VersG, at 249.
\textsuperscript{481} BVerfGE 85, 69, 74
\textsuperscript{482} DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rn. 19 to § 14 VersG, at 248.
It is very well possible – and regularly the case with flash mobs, e.g. – that an assembly is not spontaneous in the strict sense, but still would lose its sense if it were notified. At the same time, most such assemblies do not cause any sort of disturbance, and do not require any policing. The surprising intent in itself is neither consequentially nor even symptomatically related to direct dangers to public safety or order as required by the law on assemblies. Therefore, here legislator and courts seem to engage in an obscure moralizing by disapproving “pretension”. In the meantime, I was not able to clearly verify to what extent this interpretation of unnotified flash mobs as malicious assemblies is really applied in practice apart from a single OLG Düsseldorf case.

The French Conseil Constitutionnel has not yet adopted a stance on spontaneous or urgent assemblies. According to the Code pénal, a manifestation held without prior notice is an illegal demonstration, and is punishable by six months imprisonment or a fine. The law which reformed the Code and inserted this crime was adopted in 1992, but it was not submitted for review to the Conseil. Some in the literature would claim that every inorganized demonstration is an attroupement, from which it would follow that the spontaneous demonstration being inorganized, therefore, is an attroupement, and as such illegal. Such a view runs clearly counter to both Oya Ataman and Bukta.

In USSC jurisprudence there is no explicit discussion on spontaneous or urgent assemblies. Shuttlesworth of course exempts from the duty to notify (ask for a permit), if the permit scheme is unconstitutionally vague. Apart from Justice Harlan’s remark in concurring to

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483 DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211 Rn. 122 to § 15 VersG, at 299 refers to OLG Düsseldorf, NSiZ 1984, 514, in this regard affirming.
484 Article 431-9 du Code Pénal
Est puni de six mois d'emprisonnement et de 7 500 euros d'amende le fait :
1° D'avoir organisé une manifestation sur la voie publique n'ayant pas fait l'objet d'une déclaration préalable dans les conditions fixées par la loi ;
2° D'avoir organisé une manifestation sur la voie publique ayant été interdite dans les conditions fixées par la loi ;
3° D'avoir établi une déclaration incomplète ou inexacte de nature à tromper sur l'objet ou les conditions de la manifestation projetée.
485 E.g. STIRN supra note 168 at § 37.
arguments related to spontaneity came up in 2002 in *Watchtower*, where an ordinance requiring permit (basically registration) for door-to-door canvassing was found unconstitutional by the USSC, partly because such a system effectively prevents spontaneous expression. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not elaborated further on this issue, it has not developed a proper doctrine or test. Especially seen in light of *Thomas v. Chicago Park District*, decided the same year, *Watchtower*’s lines emphasizing the importance of spontaneous speech might be inapplicable to demonstrations. Lower courts, including circuits nonetheless sometimes carve out an exception for spontaneous expression, especially in cases of smaller or even one-person demonstrations or performances.

In the United Kingdom, section 11 POA 1986 requires advance notice of processions “unless it is not reasonably practicable to give any advance notice”. This exemption is meant to cover spontaneous and urgent processions, such as that in front of an embassy prompted by the news of execution of a political prisoner within 24 hours, or such as a demonstration for a “pedestrian crossing outside a school after a fatal road accident.” Considering that literature has not indicated any significant controversy related to the interpretation of “reasonably practicable”, the conclusion that UK law is the most generous among the examined jurisdictions with regard to notice and exemptions seems appropriate.

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486 “When an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all.” *Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham*, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J. concurring).
5. INTERIM CONCLUSION ON PRIOR RESTRAINT

All the legal orders I deal with in this thesis claim that notice or permit is necessary for distribution of place, and balancing interests of others, a fairly reasonable motivation. But they also find notice or permit necessary so the police could prepare for securing the event itself, i.e. in a sense the notification is imposed for the benefit of the demonstrators as well. There might be much in this argument, however, from this it only follows that a voluntary notification be introduced, as suggested e.g. by Edwin Baker. Therefore, a mandatory notice or even permit regime necessarily has to rely on arguments from public interest, rather than on paternalistic arguments. In consequence, the mandatory prior restraint on assemblies has to benefit someone else than the demonstrators, for instance, rights of passersby, the “corndealer”, the target of the protest, other (counter-)demonstrators, and so on. Nonetheless, the argument is valid that notice – unlike censorship – is not necessarily an occasion to suppress the assembly, but it might be an occasion for reconciling conflicting interests in using the public place on which many rights, not only that of assembly, and not necessarily that of only one particular assembly can be exercised. Thus, it appears reasonable that for such strictly practical, distributory purposes the notice requirement is acceptable. Beyond that, I am doubtful that principled arguments really exist for the requirement of notice. Most emphatically, enhanced readiness for violence is not more often a companion of assemblies than of a lot of other conduct, and it is especially unlikely that people who wish to be violent would adhere to the notice requirement anyway. In such cases the notice requirement clearly functions as a pretext (an authorization) for preliminary police measures, which are normally possible only by concrete suspicion or with judicial authorization. To what extent the police can constitutionally employ compulsive measures for crime prevention or prevention of disorder is quite unclear. Any such measure necessarily involves a risk assessment, a prediction for something which – if the measure taken is effective – will not materialize. If
that measure is a prior restriction, then the danger might not materialize because its entire context – the assembly itself – has not materialized, or just because it would not have materialized anyway. The seemingly most important concern behind the notice requirement is to prevent degeneration of the assembly into riot. This can happen, but more often than not it does not seem so that advance notice or permit would be able to prevent it, or to prepare the police how to handle it.

Another point is that in terms of prevention of violence, police presence is not necessarily the best solution, as police are exactly the outgroup for the protesters, as often protest is against the state or at least the mainstream. The duty and/or practice to bargain with police before the assembly takes place might certainly help reducing the “outgroupness” of police, but is theoretically problematic, and practically more likely anyway in cases where hostility is minimal (i.e. more mainstream protestor groups).

As to the general view of particular jurisdictions to prior restraint, there are significant variations. In U.S. constitutional law, there is a very strong historical aversion towards prior restraints on the press, and press freedom cases can have some application to freedom of assembly, this, however, happens through the wide understanding of the concept of the press, and not through a wide understanding of the ban on prior restraint, i.e. if you leaflet, you have better chances to be able to hold your demonstration. Ordinances which condition the holding of a march, a demonstration or a meeting in general on a prior permit, are though substantively acceptable. As Redish rightly points out, the area which is most unfortunately hit by the inadequacies of the prior restraint doctrine is the law of demonstrations (together with obscenity),\textsuperscript{491} where administrative prior restraints abound. On other hand, the USSC has for a long time been cautious to decrease the discretion inherent in permit ordinances to a considerable degree. This is not a negligible step from the point of view of fundamental rights:

\textsuperscript{491} REDISH \textit{supra} note 290 at 58.
the Court has regularly struck down ordinances for granting too much discretion, e.g. interpreting the expression “preventing riot” or “religious cause” is in itself too much discretion, and in such cases, the protestor can go ahead with the protest even in the lack of a permit. However, the obligation for the state to provide an effective and speedy remedy is conspicuously missing from the U.S. jurisprudence on freedom of assembly, including prior restraints.

Unlike in the U.S., in Germany, prior restraint has not become a central issue in freedom of assembly, and I would say, neither that of free speech. This is somewhat peculiar regarding strong textual and historical aversion towards prior restraint. Prior restraints on assemblies in German law are not seen as inherently more problematic than any other restraint. A peculiarity of the German regime of prior restraints on assembly is clearly the constitutionalization of the duty to cooperate with police, rightly criticized for actually requiring private persons to “co-form state power”. The German doctrine of spontaneous assemblies is certainly conquering the continent, but hopefully without the calculation whether there was pretension in a flash mob or not.

In the United Kingdom, bad memories of the Star Chamber do not seem to be as lively as in the United States in the argumentation of the courts, but the UK maintains a quite liberal statutory advance notice system in comparison with the other countries. The UK is also – silently – the most liberal with regard to exemptions from the notice requirement (see Kay and the reasonable practicable criterion above), without much theoretical effort.

In France, there is an important theoretical distinction between régimes préventifs and régimes répressifs of public liberties, with a clear preference of regime repressif, i.e. a

492 A specific case though, the prior ban of Neo-Nazi demonstrations gave rise to an important debate in the last decade or so in German jurisprudence and scholarly literature. This latter however revolved around the interpretation of substantive values like dignity and public order, and, finally, in the latest decision of the Constitutional Court, the basis of post-war German constitutionalism itself. Thus, as the issue of banning Nazi demonstrations is not conceptualized at all as a question of prior restraints I will discuss it later under the substantive heading of Dignity as public order infra text accompanying notes 789-814.
subsequent restriction, and this is an issue which is discussed and kept in mind not only with relation to freedom of the press or art, but also with regard to freedom of assembly. The ever manifesting French show this particular sensitivity in scholarship, though not in positive law. The ECHR also employs in general free speech jurisprudence a presumption against the validity of prior restraints. Nonetheless, it accepts advance notice and even prior permit requirements widespread in the Member States without much ado. The explanation of the ECHR is often especially apt to only justify a voluntary notification system, still, it is no wonder that the international court in general accepts the mandatory prior restraints of assemblies just as much as other national courts examined in this thesis. The ECHR has to be merited for a sensible application of the spontaneous demonstration doctrine, though to introduce the concept of urgent, but still notifiable assemblies is suggested.
B. COUNTERVAILING VALUES TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY: LIMITS WRIT LARGE

This chapter undertakes an analysis from the substantive point of view: which are the values – framed as public interests or individual rights – which might justify restriction on freedom of assembly in each of the examined jurisdictions. These will be called “limits” in line with standard constitutional and human rights law discourse. Very often the claimed limit is public order, or prevention of disorder, rights of others, which are on the one hand too vague to actually help analysis, and often mean completely different things in the different jurisdictions. That’s why I have opted for de- and reconstructing these concepts, and for discussing it under headings which within a liberal tradition can be safely considered superior to freedom of assembly. Protection against violence, coercion, and damage to property – all in a narrow sense – were my initial intuitive (or Lockean) countervailing values against which to analyse legal restrictions on the right to assembly. In each of the cases, the initial subcategories needed to be substantially realigned in order not to distort jurisprudence to an extent that would actually incapacitate analysis instead of providing a structure facilitating it. The reason for this lies not only in the fact that Lockean theory has never been a description of legal life, but also in the nature of comparing so many different legal orders. The result of this realigning process is visible at the final structure of discussion: prevention of violence had to be supplemented by that of public disorder and crime prevention, and coercion proved too minimal a concept for comprehending the concerns apparently caused by direct and other disruptive action so typical of assemblies. Furthermore, a limit called ‘dignity’ as it turns out has become part of public order or peace in two of the jurisdictions, mandating separate discussion. On the contrary, property concerns turned out to be channeled either into prevention of violence or are conceived as meriting limits on the place of an assembly, thus will be conceptualized not as a substantive, but as a modal limit. Despite all these necessary
changes in the initial structure, I decided to essentially preserve it – or preserving in modifying it – in order to be able to show the differences jurisdictions display if looked at from the angle of the most concrete, most tangible, most obvious harm to the lesser and more sublime or even vague concerns.\textsuperscript{493} Two focal points will be adhered to throughout: the substantiality of the protected interest, and the required probability of it being actually harmed ‘by the assembly’. Most of the case law discussed next will be about \textit{assemblies}, though a decisive portion of them will be about \textit{freedom} of speech or expression, applied and/or applicable to assemblies. This part thus also evidences in detail the fact of transposition of speech doctrines to assemblies in the sociological sense, while the distortion caused by that transposition will be most explicit in the next chapter (Part II. C.) about limits on modalities.

\textsuperscript{493} Being fully aware how hard, but necessary it would be to actually find a proper ethical grounding for the distinction between valid and invalid claims as to what counts as “harm”. \textit{See} Michael Hamilton, \textit{Freedom of assembly, consequential harms and the rule of law: liberty-limiting principles in the context of transition,} 27 O.J.L.S. 75 (2007). The following inquiry aims only to map what counts as “harm” in the different jurisdictions.
FROM VIOLENCE TO PUBLIC DISORDER TO CRIME PREVENTION

1. The peacefulness requirement: a determinant of scope or a limit

No constitution or human rights instrument protects the right to unpeaceful assembly. There is always a restriction, – mostly already included in the concept and scope of the right – of peacefulness. Criminal codes through time and place regularly punish armed participation at a demonstration, i.e. even legally possessed arms cannot be taken to an assembly. The assumption is apparently that an assembly should be about expression and not about threat or violence. Of course, quite a few assemblies are about violence, threat, or coercion in one way or the other, and they are still protected by the constitution. It is a fiction of the law that the would-be Skokie marches, or the Neonazi rallies in Germany are not about violence. In some sense, the sit-ins and mass protests organized by MLK Jr. were equally about violence. Some of them were occasions of civil disobedience, and most of them could count very well on the violent reaction of the Southern racists. This was actually the strategy of the civil rights movement: to shock the conscience of the nation by forcing the racists to manifest their violence openly. Hidden forms of violence which pervaded the South well into the postwar period were not perceived as violence until the civil rights protesters provoked open violence.\textsuperscript{494} To what extent “provocation” is condemned or confirmed by constitutional jurisprudence, will be explored later, the doctrines most relevant are “heckler’s veto” and “fighting words.” The peacefulness requirement only aims at preventing the most violent, the most threatening, and the most coercive assemblies, or, one is tempted to say, openly displayed or openly attempted violence. The general problem posed by violence for law, or, the other way round, the problem posed by law for violence cannot be resolved here. Clearly, demonstrations are sites of confrontation and often in the sense of challenging state authority.

\textsuperscript{494} For a good analysis of the tactics and the reactions to the Civil Rights protests see James A. Colaiaco, \textit{Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Paradox of Nonviolent Direct Action}, 47 PHYLON 16 (1986).
There is arguably an imbalance already in the prohibition of arms at an assembly, since the police does dispose of some arms (though rather tools for crowd control and dispersal), but this imbalance is only the usual Hobbesian imbalance flowing from the state monopoly on violence, which I do not intend to question or theorize, just to note here.

The most interesting exception in this regard is the U.S. where weapons are not eo ipso banned at public assemblies. What counts as unpeaceful is otherwise also diverging among the jurisdictions, just as the concrete notion of violence and its watered down pair concept of public order prevailing over freedom of assembly.

1.1. Germany: peaceful and without arms

The German Basic Law defines the scope of freedom of assembly as “peaceable and without arms”.495 Peaceful or peaceable is according to commentators an assembly which does not take a “violent or subversive” turn.496 The language stems from the federal law on assemblies and processions, which allows for preliminary ban in case there is evidence that the organizer or his or her supporters strive for a violent or subversive course.497 Especially the adjective “subversive” [aufrührerisch] sounds rather vague and problematic from a constitutional point of view, and there is no echoing parlance by the GFCC to this effect. Instead, in the Court’s formulation these are “acts of a certain dangerosity, such as aggressive excesses against persons or things or other violent acts [Gewalttätigkeiten]” that turn the assembly unpeaceful, thus it requires some intensity and concreteness. By distinguishing different sorts (or degrees?) of coercion, the Court emphasizes that “not already an obstruction [Behinderung] of

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495 GG Art. 8 I: „friedlich und ohne Waffen”
third persons” deprives the assembly of its peaceful nature. Passive resistance, some level of implied coercion does therefore not in itself deprive the conduct of constitutional protection. The prohibition on bringing arms to an assembly includes weapons in the technical sense of the word, and in this case it is irrelevant why the demonstrator brings it to the assembly. Other dangerous tools which are capable of taking life of another are also constitutionally prohibited from assemblies, though it is unclear whether non-traditional arms fall under the ban on arms or unpeacefulness. The literature is virtually unanimous that gas masks, helmets, and similar protective covers (which in German are casually called protective weapons, “Schutzwaffen”) do not fall under the ban on arms, though their wearing can be constitutionally restricted for other reasons if the requirements of proportionality are respected.

More interesting is probably the clear stance the scholarly literature takes on individual responsibility at a demonstration. The general view is that the assembly remains “peaceful”, thus, protected, even if there are unpeaceful, violent “elements” present, as long as the violence of the individual troublemakers is not supported by the solidarity of the majority who are not thus supposed to become either active or silent accomplices. The organizer is especially required to disavow violence, though the exact moment where the organizer’s omission is already beyond the limit, is disputed. All in all, police are allowed to intervene first only against individual troublemakers whose conduct is thus outside the scope of freedom of assembly. If such an intervention fails or is insufficient, then the police can only

498 BVerfGE 104, 92, 106 (Sitzblockaden III, 2001). However, a long, ideologically and doctrinally complex debate revolved around obstruction of third persons, which will be covered below, under Nötigung in Germany, text accompanying notes 670-687. Here it has to be borne in mind that though every peaceful assembly falls under the scope of freedom of assembly in Germany, it does not mean that the assembly itself cannot be constitutionally restricted if restrictions are justified under the triple test of basic right limitation (proportionality in brief). In this sense, German constitutional interpretation often displays a tendency to allow a wide scope of protection in the first step, including as wide range of conducts as conceivable under the basic right, even if the restrictions imposed by the legislator are easily justified in the second phase of review, i.e. justifiability of limitations. That is how the broad understanding of peaceful is regarded in its proper context.

499 Cf. HERZOG supra note 210 at Rn. 66 and HÖFLING supra note 210 at Rn. 36.

500 See also infra under Part II. C. Manner restrictions, 2.2. Masks, text accompanying notes 997-1009.

501 HOFFMANN-RIEM supra note 208 at Rn. 28 is somewhat more stringent than KUNIG supra note 209 at Rn. 24.
take measures against the assembly itself if the conditions under Art. 8 II GG, are fulfilled, i.e. the intervention would have to pass constitutional muster, including the proportionality test.\textsuperscript{502}

1.2. United States: no ban on guns

The First Amendment also only guarantees the right of the people peaceably to assemble. What peaceably exactly means has not been the subject of extensive Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is in a sense the result of the dogmatic structure of constitutional law in the United States. Unlike in the ECHR or Germany, the American understanding does not differentiate between scope of the right and permissible limitations on the right which would then in the particular case allow for restriction. Rather, traditionally at least, the American jurisprudence is more categorical: either something is protected or unprotected. Thus, it does not need to differentiate between unpeaceful assembly and for other reasons unprotected assembly. The kind of very obvious or inherent limits to freedom of assembly which are comparable to other jurisdictions’ peaceability criteria can be seen in such quotes as \textit{e.g.} the following in \textit{Cantwell v. Connecticut}:\textsuperscript{503}

\begin{quote}
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot, or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.
\end{quote}

A significant difference in the U.S. compared to other jurisdictions is the lack of explicit, general ban on carrying guns and weapons to a demonstration. This does not mean that various gun control laws may not affect the legality of bringing arms to a demonstration, but certainly the federal constitution does not restrict it as such. The passivity of police in handling demonstrations of visibly and openly armed persons also testify to a general view

\textsuperscript{502} BVerfGE 69, 315, 360 \textit{et seq.}, HERZOG, supra note 210 at Rn. 117, SCHULZE-FIELITZ, supra note 210 at Rn. 110.

that this is constitutionally protected. Even in cases where permit for assembly is required, bringing guns to a demonstration will not by far result in denying the permit for grounds of unpeacefulness.\textsuperscript{504} The Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the issue of carrying guns to a protest or demonstration yet, but the 2008 case \textit{D.C. v. Heller}\textsuperscript{505} spelling out the constitutional right to keep and bear arms probably points also in the same direction as the intensifying practice of the open-carry movement to bring guns to demonstrations and protests. There does not so far seem to be any concern that guns in the mass might be significantly more dangerous than elsewhere, let alone how wearing a gun to a demonstration might efficiently silence counter-speech. I do think, however, that whatever might be the merits of a constitutional principle of possible armed self-defense against the government, it certainly should not apply to speakers of opposite view, or to other addressees or targets of a demonstration. In this regard, however, the U.S. Supreme Court might have a precedent, as \textit{Virginia v. Black}\textsuperscript{506} allows for restriction of speech which aims at intimidation as falling under the category of true threat. A case-by-case approach, intervening only in cases of intimidating “gun wearing” would probably be the most consistent with the rest of the free speech doctrine.

\textbf{1.3. United Kingdom: not a thematized separate question}

Unlike in Germany and under the ECHR, in the UK the question of peacefulness does not arise separately as a preliminary question. As we have seen, the POA 1986 allows for banning in cases of apprehension of serious public disorder, serious public disorder is thus certainly


the antithesis of “peaceful”. Different forms of mob or street violence (riot, affray, destruction of property, other ordinary violent crimes, etc.), as criminalized in many provisions of statutory and common law are also clearly beyond any claim to freedom of assembly, just as in the other jurisdictions. Apart from this, English law shows an increasingly alarming spectrum of other criminal or administrative provisions threatening freedom of assembly in anti-terrorist, anti-harassment and on anti-social behaviour legislation. These latter ones will be dealt with in the relevant sections in the following pages, at least to the extent they were interpreted by higher courts. David Mead’s rich 2010 book on the new law of peaceful protest, as in so many other respects, is recommended for the many details – dangers and challenges – involved in these provisions. This thesis aspires to keep repetitions to a minimum, instead providing a broader comparative aspect.

1.4. France: attroupement

Definitely, in France, both manifestation and réunion are only protected in their peaceful version. The peacefulness as criterion figured in a few early constitutional documents which, however, did not make a lasting impact on French constitutionalism. Hubrecht claims that among all the notions surrounding the law of demonstration, the notion of attroupement is defined with most exaction, thus he even suggests deriving the notion of manifestation from (the negation of) attroupement. As an attroupement is an assembly of individuals with arms or capable (susceptible) of troubling the public peace, it is certainly true that an assembly is supposed to be peaceful. Wearing guns at a manifestation or réunion publique is punished


508 The Constitution of 1791 affirms in title I, § 2 that the „Constitution guarantees as natural and civil rights … the liberty of the citizens to assemble peacefully and without arms, in accordance with the laws of police.” This formula was repeated in a declaration of rights before the montagnard constitution of June 24, 1793. After that, liberty of réunion was not mentioned in constitutional documents until the 1848 constitution whose article 8 guaranteed again freedom of peaceful assembly within the limits of rights of others and public security. However, all these documents were rebutted later, and none of them serves as point of reference in contemporary constitutional discourse either. See also supra text accompanying notes 151-158.

509 HUBRECHT supra note 250 at 186.
with three years imprisonment or 45000 euros fine according to Article 431-10 of the Criminal Code, a rather serious punishment. The Conseil Constitutionnel affirmed the constitutionality of a law enabling the prefectoral authority to prohibit the bringing or wearing of arms and objects capable of being used as arms to and at a demonstration, but struck down a provision – basically on overbreadth or rule of law grounds – which would enable the imposition of a similar ban with regard to objects capable of being used as projectiles.\(^{510}\)

**1.5. ECHR: systematic, intentional violence**

Art. 11, similarly to other national and international instruments, protects only the freedom of peaceful assembly. The ECHR exerts substantive review in this regard, at least the *Stankov*\(^{511}\) decision testifies to such an approach. In the case, the Bulgarian government argued that the ban on demonstrations organized by the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden is not an interference since the planned demonstrations would not have been of a peaceful nature. The ECHR reiterated that Art. 11 only protects peaceful assemblies, but the peaceful character is only foregone if the organizers and participants have violent intentions. On the facts of the case the Government could not reasonably conclude that the planned demonstrations would be unpeaceful. The *Stankov* decision is one of the examples of substantive review which appears to stand in contradiction to several earlier inadmissibility decisions handed down by the Commission. *Chappell*\(^{512}\) and *Pendragon*\(^{513}\), for example, both included complete blanket bans around Stonehenge for the period around midsummer solstice. The Commission did not find it problematic that the cause of danger of disturbance concededly lied outside the sphere of action of the applicants. Therefore, their right to freedom of assembly (and religion) was interfered with without any fault on their part. Remarkably, the Commission did not adhere to

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\(^{510}\) CC, decision n° 94-352 DC du janvier 18 1995.

\(^{511}\) *Stankov* supra note 438.

\(^{512}\) *Chappell* v. United Kingdom, Application no. 12587/86, Decision on the admissibility of 14 July 1987.

\(^{513}\) *Pendragon* v. United Kingdom, Application no. 31416/96, Decision on the admissibility of 19 October 1998.
the relevant dicta of Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’\textsuperscript{514}, according to which states are required to take reasonable measures to prevent that the violent behavior of others threaten an in itself peaceful assembly. The Chappell-Pendragon line of inadmissibility seems also conflict with earlier decisions of the Commission itself: in a 1980 case, CARAF\textsuperscript{515} it stated that

The possibility of violent counter-demonstrations or the possibility of extremists with violent intentions, not members of the organising association, joining the demonstration cannot as such take away that right. Even if there is a real risk of a public procession resulting in disorder by developments outside the control of those organizing it, such procession for this reason alone does not fall out of the scope of Article 11 (1) of the Convention.

In this case, a planned antifascist procession was caught up by the general ban on processions in a certain area of London. The Commission accepted the ban as justified because earlier protests by the National Front resulted in serious damage to persons and property which even large contingents of police force could not prevent. Here therefore the peaceful antifascists were restricted in their assembly rights because of previously unpeaceful others. Unlike in Chappell and Pendragon, the application was not found outside the scope of Article 11.

That such an application would be manifestly ill-founded today is unlikely also because of the Ezelin\textsuperscript{516} jurisprudence: the Court requires that a person be punished only if he himself committed some reprehensible act, since reaffirmed \textit{e.g.} in Galstyan v. Armenia.\textsuperscript{517} Also Ziliberberg v. Moldova is a case at hand which involved a demonstration gradually turning violent, but where there was no indication that applicant participated at violence, and still he got fined for participating. The Court emphasized that\textsuperscript{518}

\begin{quote}
    an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour.
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{514} Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v. Austria, Application no. 10126/82, Judgment of 21 June 1988.
\textsuperscript{515} Christians against Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom, \textit{supra} note 204.
\textsuperscript{516} Ezelin v. France, \textit{supra} note 253.
\textsuperscript{517} Galstyan v. Armenia \textit{supra} note 254.
\textsuperscript{518} Ziliberberg v. Moldova, Application no. 61821/00, Admissibility decision of 4 May 2004.
\end{flushright}
How sporadic is sporadic is of course open to interpretation, and one should not be rushing to conclude *e.g.* that only such demonstrations can be dispersed where each and every participant is violent.

It is not quite clear whether an assembly loses Art. 11 protection only if the organizers and participants have violent intentions, or maybe also in other cases of probable violence. However, under *Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’*\textsuperscript{519} the possibility of violent counter-demonstrations is not a reason to ban the demonstration. “[T]he authorities have a duty to take appropriate measures with regard to lawful demonstrations for in order to ensure their peaceful conduct and the safety of all citizens.”\textsuperscript{520} It is also settled case law that an unlawful situation does not justify an infringement of freedom of assembly,\textsuperscript{521} certainly there is then no possibility to interpret unpeacefulness as simple unlawfulness.

2. The would-be disorderly: judicial doctrines of risk-assessment applied to the right to assembly

The following discussion will include some of the most important decisions on freedom of speech or opinion, even though they were actually delivered in the context of an assembly. They are therefore not only interesting for me to show the differences among jurisdictions, but also the similarity of merging speech and assembly even in cases where the plurality of the participants is crucial. The following discussion could be structured in different ways; I have chosen a division according to the source of the perceived threat because that suits every jurisdiction at least in part. Accordingly, first the judicial handling of demonstrators as perpetrators or (more commonly) instigators will be examined, and then I will turn to doctrines related to hostile audience and counter-demonstration.

### 2.1. Differently dangerous demonstrators

\textsuperscript{519} Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v. Austria, *supra* note 514.

\textsuperscript{520} Oya Ataman v. Turkey, *supra* note 379 at § 35.

2.1.1. United States: imminence, likelihood

In the United States, after half a century of hesitation which cannot be dealt with on these pages,\(^{522}\) the U.S. Supreme Court “finalized” its doctrine applicable to speech which intends or risks a harmful consequence in the 1969 case *Brandenburg v. Ohio.\(^{523}\) The per curiam opinion held that First Amendment protects speech unless it incites to imminent lawless action which is very likely to occur, and claimed that this is a reformulation of the clear and present danger test as elaborated by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. The concurring Justices Douglas and Black dismissed the clear and present danger test, and advocated a distinction between speech and overt acts.\(^{524}\) Brandenburg was the leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, convicted under Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute on the basis of films shot at a Ku Klux Klan “organizers’ meeting”. The films showed hooded figures with firearms, burning a large cross, making derogatory remarks of Blacks and Jews. Speeches in the footings included sentences like: \(^{525}\)

> We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken…. We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi….Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.

The USSC reversed Brandenburg’s conviction, stating that “[t]he Constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing


\(^{524}\) 395 U.S. 444, 456.

\(^{525}\) 395 U.S. 444, 446 et seq.
imminent lawless action or is likely to incite or produce such action.”\textsuperscript{526} Later cases made clear that imminence and intent must both be present, e.g. in \textit{Hess v. Indiana} the Court reversed a conviction because the evidence failed to show that the “words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.”\textsuperscript{527} In this case, Hess was arrested during an antiwar demonstration on a college campus for loudly stating, “We’ll take the fucking street later (or again).” According to the USSC, the statement could be understood at best as “counsel for present moderation”; at worst, as “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time”, i.e. intent might have been present, but not immediacy of danger. Also, as Hess – though facing the crowd – was not addressing a particular group or a particular person, the utterance cannot be taken as advocacy of action proper.\textsuperscript{528} It appears impossible to find a case ever where the Brandenburg criteria have been considered fulfilled by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{529}

Less on the incitement side, but more on the distinction between violence and protected speech, the Court developed in \textit{NAACP v. Claiborne}\textsuperscript{530} a doctrine of individual liability. In the case, a boycott of white merchants was proclaimed in order to further civil rights causes. The boycott was accompanied by speeches and nonviolent picketing, but there were sporadic acts and threats of violence. The white merchants sued the NAACP and the boycott’s main organizer, Charles Evers for lost income for the period of the boycott, 1966-1972. The Supreme Court rejected lower courts’ various arguments for liability, and stated that nonviolent elements of the boycott are fully protected. A person cannot be held responsible for being a member of the body organizing the boycott; civil liability arises only in case personal participation in violence or threat of violence is proven.

\textsuperscript{526} 395 U.S. 444, 447.
\textsuperscript{527} Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
\textsuperscript{528} 414 U.S. 105, 107-109.
\textsuperscript{529} None of the 54 USSC cases including reference to Brandenburg in Westlaw is such.
\textsuperscript{530} NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 102 (1982).
Finally, jurisprudence is unclear about whether previous violence might be a ground for limiting freedom of assembly of the same group. In Kunz v. New York,\textsuperscript{531} a prior restraint case quashed on grounds of overly broad official discretion, dicta clearly indicates that previous violence cannot form the basis of prior restraint. However, in an earlier labor picketing case\textsuperscript{532} Justice Jackson found that a large-scale industrial conflict, where violence is neither episodic, nor isolated, does provide sufficient ground for preliminary injunction on future assemblies. The abortion clinic protest cases decided decades later (and post-Brandenburg) also appear to accept injunctions for reasons of previous violent conduct, even injunctions applicable to people who were not enjoined.\textsuperscript{533}

\textbf{2.1.2. Germany: direct endangerment, but low probability standard}

In Germany, the threshold for intervention is thematized, but is less elaborated than in the US. The GFCC has spelled out some principles, though the ultimate yardsticks remain proportionality and deciding each case on its particular circumstances. The \textit{Brokdorf} decision dealt also with the powers of prior ban and dissolution as authorized by the federal assembly law. These dispositions allow for restriction in case circumstances suggest that public safety or order is directly endangered by the assembly or procession. In the interpretation developed in police law, public safety means protection of such central legal values (Rechtsgüter) as life, health, freedom, honor, property or estates of the individual, integrity of the legal order or of state institutions. For an endangerment of public security, there need to occur a danger of a criminally proscribed offense against any of these values.\textsuperscript{535} Public order, on the other hand, equals to the whole of unwritten norms whose observance is –

\textsuperscript{532} Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
\textsuperscript{533} See supra text accompanying notes 350-352, and infra text accompanying notes 1142-1150.
\textsuperscript{534} BVerfGE 69, 315.
\textsuperscript{535} BVerfGE 69, 315, 352, with reference to DREWS, WACKE, VOGEL, MARTENS, GEFAHRENABWEHR (8th. ed., 1977, Vol. 2, 177 et seq. and 130 et seq.).
according to prevailing social and ethical considerations – indispensable for the ordered living together of humans within the confines of a territory.536 This interpretation has been narrowed down by the GFCC in two ways. Firstly, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, a ban or dissolution is only constitutional if the less intrusive means of imposing conditions has already been tried and exhausted.537 In addition, not only the discretion as to the means, but also the decisional discretion of the authority is limited: not any sort of interest might justify a restriction on the right to freedom of assembly. Burdens flowing from the characteristic of assemblies as mass phenomena which cannot be eliminated without endangering the aim of the particular assembly itself are to be tolerated by third persons.538 Secondly, ban or dissolution is only allowed in case public security or order is directly, immediately endangered. Thus, the requirement is stricter than in general police law. It necessitates in every case a probability assessment which should be based on facts, circumstances and other details, not on mere suspicion or assumptions.539 However, the GFCC expressly left the details to the ordinary courts, implying that anything more concrete would already intrude upon their competences. Ordinary courts would normally check whether the police offered sufficiently precise factual evidence which would suggest that public order or security would be endangered.540 Nonetheless, this is not the end of the story. Instead of more concrete tests, Brokdorf includes a long contemplation on constitutional requirements flowing not so much from the duty to protect the exercise of the right, but procedural and organizational guarantees which should facilitate exercising freedom of assembly. Brokdorf, as mentioned already,541 imposes the obligation on both the police and demonstrators to adhere to so called tradited expectations,

536 BVerfGE 69, 315, 352.
537 BVerfGE 69, 315, 353.
538 Id.
539 BVerfGE 69, 315, 353 et seq.
540 See, e.g., VGH Mannheim, Urteil vom 28.08.1986 - 1 S 3241/85, NVwZ 1987, 237 (confirming the unlawfulness of a police ban of a meeting where David Irving was going to talk for unsubstantiated allegations that a counter-demonstration would result in disturbances).
541 See supra text accompanying notes 430-433.
like cooperative and moderate behavior, timely dialogue which presumably helps prevent or calm down potential tensions. This in relation to prevention of violence means that the more cooperative the organizers were, the higher the threshold for potential police intervention lies.\footnote{BVerfGE 69, 315, 356 \textit{et seq.}} As it is visible from these formulations, the standards pronounced in \textit{Brokdorf} are very principled, but abstract, and they faithfully mirror all the relativities (or flexibilities, if you like) of proportionality. In relation to \textit{mass} demonstration though, the decision offers some examples which would constitutionally occasion police intervention, \textit{e.g.} when a demonstrator commits violent acts during the demonstration, or approves someone else doing so. This part of the decision states that a prior ban is justified if it is predicted by a high probability that the organizer or their supporter intend to commit violent acts, or at least approve of such conduct.\footnote{BVerfGE 69, 315, 360 – in case of such prognosis, the assembly will qualify as unpeaceful, thus completely deprived of constitutional protection.} This observation, it seems to me, necessitates a soft reading of the directness or immediacy requirement mentioned earlier in the decision, because it only requires probability of intent of committing or of intent of approving, not also a probability of actual violence occurring. This differentiates the German approach from the US American as pronounced in \textit{Brandenburg}. Nonetheless, one has to bear in mind the very different underlying facts of the mentioned cases. Neither in \textit{Brandenburg} or \textit{Hess} was there any violence, while in \textit{Brokdorf} it was considered relevant that in previous such demonstrations acts of violence did occur. In this regard, the \textit{Brokdorf} situation is closer to \textit{NAACP v. Claiborne}, as sporadic violence occurred in both cases. However, they are still hardly comparable as in \textit{Claiborne} it was a boycott which lasted years, while in \textit{Brokdorf} it was a 50 000 strong demonstration. Also, the courts in both cases were asked to decide on completely different issues: in \textit{Brokdorf} the issue was the constitutionality of the prior ban and dissolution powers, in \textit{Claiborne} liability for damages resulting from the boycott.
Later decisions of the GFCC also have not clarified very minutiously the level of risk necessary for restrictions to be justified. An appearance of “readiness to violence” or a “provocation to create a climate of violent demonstration” were found to be sufficient for restriction at least if coupled with violations of “fundamental social and ethical views conforming to the Basic Law”, i.e. a constitutionally strengthened concept of public order.\footnote{544 More on this see infra 1. Special days of the year: the notion of public order in Germany, text accompanying notes 856-864.}

Also, the Court found constitutional the ban on uniforms expressing common political attitude as they are capable to excite “suggestive-militant effects in the direction of intimidating, uniform militancy.”\footnote{545 More on this see infra text accompanying notes 976-990 and 997-1009.}

On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional provisions of the new Bavarian assembly law which would make organizers liable to pay an administrative fine (Bußgeld) if they fail to take “appropriate measures” to “prevent” or “stop” (verhindern) “violent acts” (Gewalttätigkeiten, an expression by the way used by the GFCC itself) arising “out of the assembly” (aus der Versammlung heraus) for rule of law considerations analogous to vagueness.\footnote{546 BVerfG, 1 BvR 2492/08 vom 17.2.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 139), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20090217_1bvr249208.html, Rn. 122.}

The Court equally struck down the provisions rendering a fine for “participating at an assembly in a way which contributes to the fact that the assembly appears from the outside to be of paramilitary nature or otherwise communicating readiness to violence, and thereby an intimidatory effect arises.”\footnote{547 Art. 7 (2), sanctioned by a fine by art. 21 nr. 7.}

Only the provisions for the fines, not the prohibitions themselves were struck down for prudential and practical reasons, even though the constitutional objection of indeterminacy, unpreciseness or vagueness clearly relate to the substantive prohibitory rules, not to the provisions on the fines.

A G8 protest case, where German courts affirmed a 6-day preventive detention of would-be demonstrators, reached the ECHR very recently which decided that it violated both Art. 5 and
Art. 11. This is a case showing strong parallels to Laporte\textsuperscript{548} in the UK, and seen in that light calls the rights-protective reputation of German law seriously into question. The GFCC denied intermediary measures, and then also summarily declined to examine the complaints on their merit.\textsuperscript{549} Art. 11 was involved in two regards, the demonstrators were prevented in upholding banners with the inscription “Free the prisoners”, and were prevented in actually going to the place of the demonstration. Characteristic of German law – not so much thematized in German assembly literature – is the possibility of mass detention for preventive purposes. Those “prisoners” whose liberation was at stake on the banners were a 1112 would-be demonstrators, whose detention went before courts in 628 cases, out of which only 113 were found lawful ex post facto.\textsuperscript{550} There was some violence at protests on the occasion of previous G8 summits, and also there was to be on the one which could not be attended by applicants. One of the applicants was previously convicted for disturbing rail traffic at the occasion of anti-nuclear protests. German authorities in the present case claimed the banners would have realized incitement to prisoner liberation (this latter one a crime), while applicants claimed they addressed the government, not other demonstrators, to free the detained. One applicant refused to identify himself, and later was fined 200 euros. Charges of incitement to crime were later dropped for reasons of insignificance. Still German courts considered their 6-day detention was lawful, the GFCC also apparently finding public safety was directly endangered by them.

Thus, though the notions of public safety and public order are considerably narrowed in German law, courts, including the GFCC are actually satisfied with a probability standard much lower than constitutional in the US, or, as it will be visible below, permissible in UK or ECHR law.

\textsuperscript{548} See infra text accompanying notes 556-564.
\textsuperscript{549} 2 BvR 538/08 and 2 BvR 164/08 – neither available on either the homepage of the GFCC or in Beck-online – as cited by Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, supra note 437 at § 36.
\textsuperscript{550} Id. § 10.
2.1.3. United Kingdom: unclarity as to imminence

In relation to prevention of violence and disorder, cases related to the common law concept of *breach of the peace* are most characteristic of the judicial approach, traditionally oscillating between a very weak and a more rigorous standard. Two central cases involved conviction not for breach of the peace itself (which is not an offence in English law), but for obstructing an officer in executing his duties related to prevention of breach of the peace. In the 1882 case *Beatty v. Gillbanks*\(^{551}\) Salvation Army members were charged with unlawful and tumultuous assembly to the disturbance of the peace as Skeleton Army members were accompanying their marches shouting and disorderly. The Divisional Court ruled the disorder was not “the natural consequence of their [i.e. the Salvation Army’s] acts”,\(^ {552}\) as it came from the rival group. In contrast, a weak review was applied in the 1936 *Duncan v. Jones*\(^ {553}\) case related to a speech to be held in front of a training site for unemployed. The Court accepted the police officer’s apprehension of breach of the peace based on a disorder a year before as reasonable, not requiring any weighing of actual probability of ensuing disorder, neither providing any clarification as to what counts as disorder.

Breach of the peace since *R v Howell* (1981) is understood to occur when “harm is actually done or likely to be done to a person or, in his presence, his property or is put in fear of being harmed through an assault, affray, riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance.”\(^ {554}\) In *Steel v. UK* the ECHR accepted this notion put forward in *Howell* fulfilled the requirement of

\(^{551}\) Beatty v. Gillbanks 9 QBD 308 (1882).

\(^{552}\) Note the similarity with the early US speech test, “bad tendency”, which was later abdicated for the more speech protective clear and present danger, and now Brandenburg.

\(^{553}\) Duncan v. Jones (1936) 1 KB 218. A member of the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement wanted to stand upon a box to deliver a speech in front of an unemployed training site when she was asked by police to hold the meeting elsewhere. When she refused, she was arrested for unlawful and willful obstruction of an officer in executing his duty. There was no incitement or otherwise sign or probability of a breach of the peace alleged, though the previous year a speech by same person was followed by some disorder. The Divisional Court has explicitly found the right of public meeting and assembly inapplicable. It also accepted that a breach of the peace was reasonably apprehended by the officer because of the disorder in the previous year, and that the offense was realized when obstructing the officer in taking measures – i.e. the order of relocation – in reaction to such an apprehension.

“lawful” for Art. 5 purposes,\textsuperscript{555} thus it also satisfies the prescribed by law requirement in Art. 11 (2). More recently, a 2006 House of Lords judgment in \textit{Laporte}\textsuperscript{556} on breach of the peace examined the concept for its compatibility with Strasbourg jurisprudence in other respects, shedding light to the mechanisms of the Human Rights Act, while also clarifies to a considerable extent the tensions between freedom of assembly and public ‘peace’ in English law. What is probably the most peculiar feature of the concept of peace is the duty – though imperfect, i.e. not directly sanctioned per se – of the general public, of every citizen to uphold the “Queen’s peace” and, if necessary, to assist the police in maintaining it (i.e. preventing a breach of the peace). The case involved a demonstration planned by anti-war protesters at a RAF base also used by the US Air Force at Fairford in Gloucestershire. Ms Laporte intended to attend the demonstration against the war in Iraq, and thus started in a coach organized for this purpose from London to Fairford. However, as the Fairford police officer, Mr. Lambert learned also from intelligence sources that members of a violent anti-war group, the so-called „Wombles” might be present in the coaches, he ordered the three coaches to be stopped and searched at a lay-by at Lechlade, some miles away from Fairford (Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act authorizes such a stop and search). The police found some objects and instruments (masks, shields, etc.) in the coaches which were rather inconsistent with the purpose of a peaceful demonstration, these instruments were seized. The police also discovered eight members of Wombles among the 120 passengers, though unable to verify the identity of some other persons who like Ms. Laporte – perfectly lawfully – failed to identify themselves. Mr. Lambert instructed the police at Lechlade to turn back the coaches to London and not to allow the passengers to get off from the vehicles. Thus, it happened that Ms. Laporte, together with hundred-something other persons were not only prevented from attending the meeting but also forced to stay in the coaches until they again reached London.


\textsuperscript{556} R (on the application of Laporte) (FC) (Original Appellant and Cross-respondent) v. Chief Constable of Gloucestershire (Original Respondent and Cross-appellant) [2006] UKHL 55.
i.e. for several hours altogether. Certainly, Mr. Lambert did not apprehend an imminent danger of breach of the peace, he himself made it clear, that was the reason why he did not order to arrest anyone at Lechlade. Still, he believed that there might be some disturbance if the coaches arrive at Fairford, thus, he ordered sending back as a measure short of arrest.

The Lords all considered that there was no power to send the coaches back, and, thus, the measure adopted by the police did not have a basis in law, i.e. it was not prescribed by law for the purposes of the ECHR. Also, they similarly agree that the premature and indiscriminate measure was in any event an unjustified, because disproportionate infringement of the right to freedom of speech and assembly. The correct interpretation of the common law is that there has been no power to apply measures short of arrest against persons if there is no imminent danger of breach of the peace, though they had differences in evaluating the precedents.557

According to Lord Bingham, Howell is instructive about the legal concept of a breach of the peace. For the Court of Appeal in Howell, and, for Lord Bingham in Laporte, the essence of the concept was to be found in „violence or threatened violence” (§ 27). „It is for this breach of the peace when done in his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without warrant.”558 Nonetheless, Lord Bingham observes, that a „breach of the peace is not, as such, a criminal offence, but founds an application to bind over.” According to Lord Brown (§ 111), however, this latter statement of Lord Bingham refers to the „concept of a breach of the peace” in the sense that the breach itself possibly would come from another than the person to be bound over. The leading authority on the measures to be adopted in case of a breach of the peace is Lord Diplock’s ruling in Albert v Lavin.559 In that case, which was later applied in numerous other cases, Lord Diplock stated

“that every citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears to be about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking or threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him against his will. At common law this is not only the right of every citizen, it is also his duty, although, except in the case of a citizen who is a constable, it is a duty of imperfect obligation.”

Lord Bingham (§ 29), however, himself formulated a rule in Laporte which is more clear, and it was repeated by Lord Brown (§ 110):

“Every constable, and also every citizen, enjoys the power and is subject to the duty to seek to prevent, by arrest or other action short of arrest, any breach of the peace occurring in his presence, or any breach of the peace which (having occurred) is likely to be renewed, or any breach of the peace which is about to occur.”

There is quite an agreement, therefore, that there is no way to prevent a breach of the peace except if it is either (i) actual, or, (ii) already happened and likely to be renewed, or, is (iii) about to occur. That means in the particular case that there is no power to apply against Ms. Laporte and others a measure even short of arrest since no breach of the peace was even about to occur. In other words, the police or citizens are neither entitled nor obliged to take reasonable steps to prevent a breach of the peace „from becoming to occur” as Lord Brown quite aptly formulated in § 115. In other words, the test is not simple reasonableness even in common law, even without regard to the Convention, but a stricter one.

There is, however, some disagreement as to the question of imminence on the ground of another earlier case, Moss v. McLachlan. In Moss, brought about in the midst of the miners’ strike, the police prevented a group of striking miners to picket places where or in the near of which some miners (apparently in opposition to the strike) worked. The court considered the situation as one in which a breach of the peace was imminent, therefore found the preventive action taken by the police reasonable. In the present case, the Lords differed on why they

560 Moss v McLachlan [1985] IRLR 76.
considered imminence was not fulfilled compared to the Moss situation. Lord Bingham is of the opinion that the facts of the present case differed so much that though Moss is good law, finds no application in the Laporte case – in Moss there was an imminent breach of the peace, in Laporte there was none. Lord Rodger, however, would have accepted that there was an imminent breach of the peace already at Lechlade, had the police, i.e. Mr. Lambert, been of that opinion (as he was not). This might indicate a willingness to defer to police discretion as to the existence of imminence. Lord Mance, to the contrary, considered that even in the circumstances of Moss there was no imminent breach of the peace, thus, it was wrongly decided. Obviously, he would require more concrete and clear evidence.

As the Lords do not agree on the threshold of imminence, the significance of the Laporte ruling from the viewpoint of freedom of assembly is considerably reduced: the holding might be quite narrow. Imminence which was defined as “about to happen” (§§ 49, 100) “going to happen in the near future” (§ 67) in Laporte, was understood as “likely to happen” in 2011 by the Divisional Court, quite a different question.\textsuperscript{561}

As to the broader constitutional significance of the decision in Laporte, i.e. “the constitutional shift” theory advocated by Sedley LJ in the Divisional Court in Redmond-Bate v DPP\textsuperscript{562} as the correct approach after entering into force of the HRA, has been repeatedly affirmed by the Lords in Laporte. Nonetheless, some statements in Laporte draw attention to the caution the Lords exercise toward parliamentary sovereignty, as it is in harmony with their HRA mandate to interpret the law in conformity with the ECHR only as long as it is possible, i.e. no statute can be invalidated if it is contrary to the Convention. Thus, for instance, Lord Brown explicitly maintained the possibility that primary legislation can confer a power to the police “to prevent entirely innocent citizens from taking part in demonstrations already afoot” (§ 132), though this seems to conflict with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. What is more, Lord

\textsuperscript{561} R. (on the application of Moos) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 957 (Admin) § 56.

\textsuperscript{562} Redmond-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions (1999) 163 JP 789.
Rodger even emphasizes that the common law goes further than ECHR jurisprudence as of today in making in this or that way responsible persons acting entirely lawfully if a breach of the peace is imminent. The ECHR affirmed the conformity with the Convention of a police power to arrest a protestor if the target of the protest (a disrupted grouse hunter) might react violently in Steel v. UK. However, Lord Rodger (§ 78) considers that in common law such a power, or, even a duty, exists also in a situation where the demonstrators’ “lawful and proper conduct” would naturally result in violent reaction not on the part of the targeted audience, but by third parties. The judgment as a whole leaves open whether this is a power to which resort can be made only in an ultimate case, or, it flows rather easily from the duty of every citizen to preserve the peace unbroken.

UK courts – and by now the ECHR – decided another type of police measure, kettling or cordonning under breach of the peace law. Austin et al., a much criticized decision involved a 7 hours cordon at Oxford Circus catching up several thousands, including applicants, a protestor at a 2001 May Day anti-capitalist demonstration and three bystanders. Austin, the demonstrator was throughout peaceful, Saxby, another applicant of the case, was on a business trip in London that day, had no intention to demonstrate. House of Lords – to simplify a complicated decision – found there was no deprivation of liberty, as that was neither police’s motive nor purpose, and circumstances mandated that the cordon was necessary, applying a circumstancial, balancing standard already at the scope phase – according to scholars hitherto unknown – under Art. 5 ECHR under the HRA, thus finding there was no deprivation of liberty (the Court of Appeal found Art. 11 inapplicable as well, a finding questionable in light of Ezelin and other decisions emphasizing that disordeliness of

563 Steel v. UK supra note 555, §§ 58-61.
others does not preempt a peaceful protestor to rely on Art. 11).\textsuperscript{567} This was upheld by the ECHR, as will be discussed later.

2.1.4. France: proportionality unclarified

The French approach has not been made concrete in too many high court decisions, perfectly consistently with the general outlook of the legal system. The main source of legal “precedent” is the Benjamin judgment in this regard, too. The reasons for intervention are the same: if the officer apprehends troubles to public order then he or she can take proportional measures. The concept of public order is understood in quite an abstract sense which includes also human dignity, for instance. Therefore, the French allow for intervention way before any risk of violence had been assessed, and there is no calculus of probability prescribed by higher courts, let alone Conseil d’Etat or Conseil Constitutionnel. However, as Benjamin is a strict administrative proportionality requirement, there can be cases of reversal of police measures if courts find that the measure went beyond what was commanded by the situation. Also, in case there is no violation of dignity, trouble to public order must mean some disorder, violence, intimidation or threat, and then that must be assessed properly, where overreaction of police can be considered disproportionate.\textsuperscript{568} French jurisprudence is not explicitly split according to the standard of justifiable limits between prior and posterior restraint, despite the aversion towards “preventive regimes.” Thus, much what has been found as to prior ban and conditions displays these same substantive values – public order, including human dignity, previous intimidation or threats by an association etc. – and procedural standard (proportionality), just from another angle, still useful here for the sake of comparison. French cases which reached the ECHR provide some room for additional speculation. In Ezelin,\textsuperscript{569}

\textsuperscript{567} The point is also made by FENWICK supra note 566 at 744 \textit{et seq.}

\textsuperscript{568} See especially supra text \textit{preceding} note 414.

\textsuperscript{569} Ezelin v. France, \textit{supra} note 253.
posterior disciplinary sanction of a lawyer peacefully participating at an originally peaceful demonstration which turned somewhat violent was considered legal by French courts while impermissible by the ECHR. In *Cisse*, French courts found the evacuation of a church – occupied by protesters and hunger strikers with the consent of church authorities – was lawful as it was not an assembly and threatened public order for reasons of deteriorating sanitary and health conditions, but also because some of the barriers erected blocked traffic. Thus, all these might qualify as components of public order,\textsuperscript{570} and French courts do not differentiate more closely their relations to each other, or the importance of any of these components. This less concrete, less scrutinizing approach might result of the fact that the occupiers already spent in the church two months, and the measure at hand was not a prior, “preventive” measure, but a repressive one, just as in *Ezelin* the demonstration actually turned unpeaceful, and that’s what French authorities understood compelled the disciplinary sanction. In both of these cases tangible harm, even if averted out of partially paternalistic or reprimanded for sheer “reputational” reasons, has indeed occurred.

\textbf{2.1.5. ECHR: disorder concept in flux, probability unclarified}

As to the ECHR, a good starting point is that freedom of expression jurisprudence is applicable also as to the protection of annoying or offensive assemblies. The Court reiterated several times, recently in *Öllinger v. Austria*, para. 36,\textsuperscript{571} that:

\[\text{[Freedom of assembly]} \text{ also extends to a demonstration that may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote […] If every probability of tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a demonstration was to}\]

\textsuperscript{570} See the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal of 23 January 1997 as cited by Cisse v. France, *supra* note 521 at § 17.

warrant its prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing views. However, it is less clear where a danger starts which would justify intervention, just as the exact content of that danger. In the mentioned Steel v. UK the ECHR actually has accepted a concept of breach of the peace by omitting any immediacy or imminence requirement,\(^{572}\) i.e. it basically lowered the threshold of national law, certainly then positioning the European standard below the English. Earlier, the Commission regularly rubber-stamped government allegations on public disorder without requiring any standard of probability, in one case basing inadmissibility on that ground when it was not even thought so by domestic police.\(^{573}\)

Unhindered flow of traffic (in a pedestrian area!),\(^{574}\) or avoiding excessive noise\(^{575}\) exemplify the breadth of the traditional interpretation of prevention of disorder. The Court used to take a similar stance, e.g. in Cisse the forcible evacuation of a church occupied by protestors with the consent of religious authorities was considered a measure pursuing the legitimate aim of preventing disorder.\(^{576}\) Steel v. UK, though an Art. 5. case, found the arrest of a protestor lawful who – in protest against a grouse shoot – “walked in front of a person who was armed with a gun, thus preventing him from firing”, as such behaviour “might provoke others to violence.”\(^{577}\)

Prevention of disorder is often referred to instead of prevention of crime, another mentioned limit in Art. 11 (2), without any discussion on the difference.\(^{578}\) In Ziliberberg (2004) the application under Art. 11 was found inadmissible for the simple reason that the criminal provision relied on by the government claimed to protect public order.\(^{579}\) Thereby the Court avoids taking stance both on the serious issue of defining the limits of a fundamental right out

\(^{572}\) Similarly MEAD supra note 507 at 361.
\(^{574}\) GS v Austria, Application no. 14923/89, Decision on admissibility of 30 November 1992.
\(^{575}\) S. v. Austria, Application no.13812/88, Decision on admissibility of of 3 December 1990.
\(^{576}\) Cisse v. France, supra note 521 at § 46.
\(^{577}\) Steel v. UK supra note 555, § 60.
\(^{578}\) Also MEAD supra note 507 at 90.
\(^{579}\) Ziliberberg v. Moldova supra note 518.
of a criminal law, and on estimation of any danger. Necessarily, this stance also prevents actually reviewing whether the measure taken was capable of furthering the legitimate aim. In *Ezelin v. France*,\(^5\) posterior disciplinary sanction, imposed *after* the assembly was long over, was considered furthering the legitimate aim of *prevention* of disorder. The problems created by the constant practice of accepting whatever governmental allegations about the pursued legitimate aim were curiously side-stepped in *Alekseyev*, the recent Moscow gay pride case, where the Court has explicitly not decided on the issue whether there was a legitimate aim, by finding that the ban was in any case disproportionate.\(^5\)

In *Oya Ataman* (2006), the dispersal of an unnotified demonstration was found – though in pursuance of the legitimate aim of prevention of disorder – unjustified, as “there [was] no evidence to suggest that the group in question represented a danger to public order, apart from possibly disrupting traffic”.\(^5\) Also, since Oya Ataman, it reoccurs in assembly jurisprudence that “where demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence, it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 is not to be deprived of all substance.”\(^5\)

Soon after, in *Bukta*,\(^5\) the ECHR has not accepted that the sound of a detonation might be sufficient reason to disperse an unnotified (spontaneous or urgent) demonstration, though largely because national courts have not relied on this argument, and not because ECHR found such a danger to be vague or immaterial. In *Patyi (No. 1)* – where a 20-strong demonstration on a five-meter-wide pavement was banned in advance – the ECHR first nominally accepted that the measure “pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and

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\(^5\) Oya Ataman v. Turkey, *supra* note 379 at § 41.

\(^5\) Id. § 42.

\(^5\) Ironically, though, the Government has not claimed prevention of disorder, but protection of rights of others as legitimate aim, still the Court took that also prevention of disorder was pursued. See *Bukta v. Hungary*, Application no. 25691/04, Judgment of 17 July 2007, § 28 and § 30.
protecting the rights of others,” but found it was unnecessary for absence of any showing of potential disruption.\textsuperscript{585} This does not mean however that any intensity of potential disruption would surely justify restrictions, because the Court – at least lately – regularly emphasizes that a certain amount of disruption inheres in basically every assembly. Especially in a number of Turkish and other Eastern European cases the Court would go as far as to review substantially if there was any danger to public order, and delineates simple disruption from disorder. \textit{Stankov} as discussed above\textsuperscript{586} uses especially strong language, when arguing for the permissibility of even secessionist speech (expression, characteristically, either solely or in pair with assembly), the Court basically rules that a prior ban is only permissible if \textit{incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles} would occur. As discussed above under the heading ‘Prior ban and conditions’, what amounts to rejection of democratic principles is not exactly clarified, but it does include for instance advocating ethnic segregation, but not advocating secession. In any case, these two, for an international court relatively narrow \textit{Stankov}-criteria might not be the only ones justifying restrictions \textit{other than prior bans}. If one compares the concept of disorder with the strong language in \textit{Stankov}, the contrast might be explicable by an untheorized perceived difference between prior ban and other sanctions.

ECHR proportionality jurisprudence is in general especially marked by consideration of the severity of the imposed sanction, thus it is possible that \textit{e.g.} an administrative sanction might be permissible while criminal punishment for the same deeds which led to the administrative sanction is not. Seeing the danger in such an approach, sporadically, especially lately the Court is keen on emphasizing that a mild sanction does not make an interference otherwise not ‘necessary in a democratic society’ justified.\textsuperscript{587} Dispersal, especially violent or speedy

\textsuperscript{585} Patyi v. Hungary, Application no. 5529/05, Judgment of 7 October 2008, §§ 41-43.
\textsuperscript{586} See \textit{supra} under 3. Prior ban and conditions. 3.5. ECHR: strong substantive and procedural protection, text accompanying notes 438–442.
\textsuperscript{587} Ezelin, Galstyan, Vajnai, Csáncics and Kuznetsov might be examples of the latter approach, while earlier Commission inadmissibility decisions, and Ziliberberg and Lucas for the former. See in more detail with further references MEAD \textit{supra} note 507 at 105.
dispersal by the police is another issue where ECHR appears to have strengthened the protection: lack of prior notice is not sufficient to justify dispersion (Bukta), and forceful or even violent dispersion of a peaceful but unlawful assembly is also regularly held disproportionate since the mid-2000s. Oya Ataman and Balçik both found no reason for the speedy dispersal of unnotified but peaceful assemblies, within half an hour after the start.\footnote{Oya Ataman v. Turkey, supra note 379 at § 41, Balcík v. Turkey, Application no. 25/02, Judgment of 29 November 2007, §§ 50-53.} In Aldemir (No. 2.) v. Turkey\footnote{Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey, Application nos. 32124/02, 32126/02, 32129/02, 32132/02, 32133/02, 32137/02 and 32138/02, Judgment of 18 December 2007.}, an unnotified trade union meeting in an area where it was not permitted to demonstrate was dispersed by tear gas and truncheons. Initially the meeting was peaceful, though blocking Atatürk Avenue, where demonstrators attempted to walk to the Prime minister’s residence. Police warned demonstrators that at the place the meeting is unlawful, and when they failed to leave, police forcibly dispersed them. During the course of the dispersal, some protestors became violent, several police officers and protestors ended up injured. The ECHR found police intervention “caused tensions to rise, followed by clashes”, and thus was disproportionate. From the formulation “there is no evidence to suggest that the group in question initially presented a serious danger to public order”\footnote{Id. at § 45.} one could conclude that a serious danger to public order is at minimum required for a dispersal to be found justified. Though seriousness is certainly below a Brandenburg-type imminence, but it still shows an increased willingness to actually require some probability of harm. Vajnai’s requirement of a “clear, pressing and specific social need” (§ 51) might be also referred here to the same effect, at least in the context of political protests, where “the containment of a mere speculative danger, as a preventive measure for the protection of democracy, cannot be seen as a ‘pressing social need’” (§ 55). As to prevention of crime, Schwabe v. Germany, the preventive detention case confirms the Vajnai approach. ECHR found the offence feared to be committed was not “sufficiently concrete and specific”, as domestic courts diverged about it.
Also, the banners could be understood to request authorities, and not fellow citizens to free prisoners by force (referring to Vajnai on symbols with multiple meanings). The 6 days detention imposed on this basis, instead of e.g. seizing the banners, was found not necessary to prevent the offence – understood thus at most a negligent incitement to violence by the ECHR – to occur.\textsuperscript{591} Austin v. UK,\textsuperscript{592} the discussed kettling case turned out contrary at Strasbourg than the preventive detention, the ECHR basically sliding with the House of Lords decision discussed above, which was (and the ECHR majority decision already is) considered inconsistent with earlier case law.\textsuperscript{593} Especially criticized is that the ECHR added “context” to the threshold considerations which engage Art. 5, i.e. whether there was a deprivation of liberty at all.\textsuperscript{594} Strictly an Art. 5 decision on which there certainly will be much more comment to come, from my focus here it perhaps shows ECHR more restrained with regard to actual crowd control than to longer run preventive efforts.\textsuperscript{595} There clearly were disturbances in London that day, and some of the protesters in and outside the cordon were clearly intent on causing disorder. A similar approach perhaps is found in the Giuliani and Gaggio case\textsuperscript{596} – much cited in Austin v. UK – which found the shooting and killing of protestors on the violent Genoa G8 protest proportionate under Art. 5. What distinguishes these cases from the others discussed is actual disorder taking place on the spot or its close proximity.

As to what else than serious danger of disorder can found dispersal and other sanctioning powers, certainly the Stankov-conditions justifying advance ban, i.e. incitement to violence

\textsuperscript{591} Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, supra note 437 at §§ 77-78 and §§ 115-118.
\textsuperscript{592} Austin and others v. UK, Applications nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09 [GC] Judgment of 15 March 2012.
\textsuperscript{595} Or, feels more threatened by UK resistance and a general attack on the Court, see David Mead, The Right To Protest Contained By Strasbourg: An Analysis of Austin v. UK & The Constitutional Pluralist Issues it Throws Up at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/03/16/david-mead-the-right-to-protest-contained-by-strasbourg-an-analysis-of-austin-v-uk-the-constitutional-pluralist-issues-it-throws-up/.
\textsuperscript{596} Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], Application no. 23458/02, Judgment of 24 March 2011.
and rejection of democratic principles are equally applicable. Vajnai explicitly adds or includes in this list actual totalitarian propaganda (§ 56), a level of harm significantly below the American standard, but still possibly higher than some European standards. 597

2.2. Hostile audience, counterdemonstration

The following inquiry aims to unveil the different emphases on different aspects of reactive violence by the jurisdictions. I will not discuss jurisdictions separately, especially that the previous subchapter provides the general background country by country, but this time issue-like. In the United States, the jurisprudence related to the questions in the current subtitle abounds, while elsewhere it is less in the focus. I first discuss the fighting words doctrine as that is particular to the USSC, and then continue with the other, doctrinally more commonly shared themes.

2.2.1. Fighting words

Fighting words means speech which “by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 598 This has been part of the early list of low value speech, excluded from First Amendment protection in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). Chaplinsky distributed Jehovah’s Witnesses literature in the streets of Rochester, while denouncing all religions as “rackets”. Citizens complained to the city marshal, who said that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, but warned Chaplinsky about the crowd’s beginning unrest. Later, a police officer led Chaplinsky away from the scene. On the way to the police station

597 A follow-up case of Vajnai, Frantanoló affirmed as “already established” that “for the interference to be justified, the Government must show that wearing the red star exclusively means identification with totalitarian ideas” (§ 27), and it is problematic – with (Cf.) reference to Vajnai – that domestic courts have not discussed whether there has been any “intimidation”, an expression actually not showing up in Vajnai (§ 27). Nonetheless, it is not quite sure that this relatively restrictive interpretation will remain the standard as in Frantanoló a request for referral to the Grand Chamber is pending. Frantanoló v. Hungary, Application no. 29459/10, Judgment of 3 November 2011, Request for referral to the Grand Chamber pending.

they have met the city marshal who was hurrying to the scene as he was informed that a riot was unfolding. It was at this point of crossing each other’s way when Chaplinsky told the city marshal he was a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist”. These latter two utterances were the only issue the Court decided on, accepting that they are not protected by the First Amendment. “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.”\textsuperscript{599} Fighting words are deprived of constitutional protection if a “man of common intelligence” who is addressed in the concrete situation understood them as being an injury or would react to them violently. As can be seen from this formulation, the fighting words doctrine originally set a lower standard than (the later accepted) \textit{Brandenburg}-test in two regards. The first condition does not explain what speech inflicts injury in itself, and from the second one, tendency to incite immediate breach of the peace, it is clear that the first was not meant to be about violent reaction. Secondly, what the average person might consider fighting words, the actual person might not, i.e. actual harm is not necessary. Therefore, some authors argue that the fighting words doctrine is incorrect.\textsuperscript{600} In my view, however, the Supreme Court later on has narrowed down the doctrine basically to the \textit{Brandenburg} standard. Already in 1949, in \textit{Terminiello v. Chicago} the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on a jury instruction saying that “breach of the peace consists of any misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum”, and that the “misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.”\textsuperscript{601} The Court has not reached the question whether Terminiello’s speech – in a meeting which occasioned a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{601} Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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turbulent protest of one thousand persons outside the building – indeed constituted fighting words, but struck down the lower decisions for reasons of overbreadth of the instruction. In *Street v. New York*\(^{602}\), the early flag burning case, the Court invalidated a conviction on the basis that the First Amendment protects uttering whatever derogatory opinion on the American flag; holding thus that such speech does not constitute fighting words.\(^{603}\) Here the Court already only quoted from *Chaplinsky* that “fighting words” are those which are “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace,”\(^{604}\) i.e. it left out the reference for speech “inflicting injury in itself.”

Probably the most important case, bringing fighting words and advocacy to near-equal footing is *Cohen v. California* from 1971. Cohen was observed in a courthouse wearing a jacket which said “Fuck the draft” as a protest against the Vietnam War, and convicted for “behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace.”\(^{605}\) The Supreme Court reversed, stating *inter alia* that the jacket inscription did not constituted fighting words “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”\(^{606}\) Note the narrowing language compared with *Chaplinsky*. Also, Justice Harlan made clear that Cohen’s communication is not fighting words because obviously it was not directed against the person of the hearer. In a following decision *Gooding v. Wilson*\(^{607}\) the Supreme Court read conjunctively the infliction of injury and/or incitement to an immediate breach of the peace conditions as apparently stated disjunctively in *Chaplinsky*. In *Gooding*, a state law banning “opprobrious words or abusive language” was found to be unconstitutional, because it did not require the probability of immediate violent reaction, neither in the text of

\(^{603}\) Note that the holding appears limited to words, not to the act of burning the flag, and even so the majority opinion is accompanied by strong dissents from Justices Warren, Black, White, and Fortas.
\(^{606}\) Id. at 20.
the statute, nor as applied. Also on overbreadth grounds, the Court invalidated a statute in *Lewis v. City of New Orleans*[^608] which criminalized as breach of the peace “to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to a police officer while in actual performance of his duties”[^609] irrespective of whether in the instant case Lewis’ speech indeed consisted of fighting words.[^610] All in all, the fighting words doctrine requires a personal insult which is likely to lead to immediate violent reaction. Thus, it basically applies the same threshold as to the harmfulness of the speech as the *Brandenburg* test. The difference is that the *Brandenburg* test takes into account the actual audience’s reaction, while the standard of *Chaplinsky* on the man of common intelligence has not been modified. Similarly to *Brandenburg*, there was no Supreme Court case (except for *Chaplinsky*) which had found that the criteria of fighting words had been fulfilled. In this regard, it might not be too far to conclude that fighting words are extremely hard to regulate in a manner that the Supreme Court would not find overbroad, vague, or content-discriminatory.

### 2.2.2. Heckler’s veto and heckler’s speech

Heckler’s veto refers to a situation when the speaker – typically at a demonstration – is prevented from talking, conveying his or her message by another person or persons, the heckler(s) by extreme noise or other disorderly or violent conduct or threat of it. What counts as heckler’s veto is not obvious, I think the best way is to define it narrowly, for example, throwing eggs shall not in itself considered heckler’s veto. I will only deal with heckler’s veto in relation to the right of assembly and protest, but will not specifically discuss the status of

[^609]: Id. at 132.
[^610]: A later important decision, R.A.V. v. *City of St. Paul* invalidated a statute on grounds of content neutrality, again irrespective of whether the actual speech – burning a cross on African-American neighbor’s yard – might be proscribable under the fighting words doctrine. R.A.V. as such does not question the validity of the fighting words doctrine. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), see infra text accompanying notes 838-839 and 892-894.
heckler’s veto in public schools which became an intense, highly controversial subject of much of American jurisprudence and writing.\textsuperscript{611}

Harry Kalven who popularized the term ‘heckler’s veto’, describes the harm done in this way: “If the police can silence the speaker, the law in effect acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being hostile enough, get the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.”\textsuperscript{612} Two main concerns, however, complicate the picture. First, though it seems quite clear that government is there to protect the speaker from heckler’s veto, it is also quite clear that there might be cases when disruption and violence cannot be prevented or stopped in any other way than by both restricting the speaker and the heckler at least for the moment. Freedom of assembly is especially an area where it is well imaginable that a heckler causes violence which endangers the speaker and/or the audience, and police do not have any other possibility than to remove (also) the speaker from the scene, disperse the meeting, etc.

Secondly, a more principled concern is the extent of the free speech rights of the hecklers themselves.

In the United States, \textit{Feiner} is the first decision on heckler’s veto, largely rewritten, but never overruled in later jurisprudence. Feiner held a speech in front of a “mixed”, i.e. both Black and White crowd, making derogatory statements of several public figures, and urging the Blacks to “rise up in arms and fight for equal rights.”\textsuperscript{613} The crowd reacted with some excitement, there was some shoving and pushing, and milling, and one member of the audience threatened with violence if the police did not step in. Thus, the police approached Feiner, and tried to persuade him to stop talking and help breaking up the crowd. When he ignored these requests, he got arrested, and later convicted for breach of the peace. The


\textsuperscript{612} \textbf{HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT} (Ohion State University Press, 1965) 140.

Supreme Court upheld his conviction, by applying the “clear and present danger” test. The Court accepted lower courts’ factual findings that indeed there was a danger of erupting violence in the crowd unless the police intervened. As Chief Justice Vinson, apparently unaware of any possible problem has put it: “Petitioner was thus neither arrested nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it was the reaction which it actually engendered.”614 Justice Black, in a famous dissent both does not see from the record that the danger of erupting violence was really clear and present, and, more importantly, criticizes the majority for putting the consequences on the speaker, instead of, evidently, arresting the one who threatened violence, if really this is the way to prevent violence. This is a quite straightforward argumentation, which now, especially since Brandenburg can be taken to be accepted by the USSC. Nonetheless, Justice Black in Feiner hints that there might be cases when the police cannot but restrict also lawful speech for the protection of the speaker and others. He says: “The police of course have power to prevent breaches of the peace. But if, in the name of preserving order, they ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him.”615 It is thus implied, that when, but only when, every other means fail, interference with “lawful speaking” might be constitutional. Edwards v. South Carolina616 is a classic civil rights protest case where 187 peaceful protestors were arrested and convicted for breach of the peace after not obeying an order to disperse. The dispersal order was made while 300 onlookers were watching, some of them recognized by the officer as potential troublemakers, but none threatened violence. When police ordered the dispersal, protesters started singing religious and patriotic songs while stamping their feet and clapping their hands.617 The USSC reversed, saying the record only shows “that the opinions which they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to

614 340 U.S. 315, 319 et seq.
615 340 U.S. 315, 326. (Black, J., dissenting).
617 327 U.S. 229, 233.
the views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection." In the concrete case, there was “ample” police protection on the scene according to the testimony of a police officer, thus the Court again did not have opportunity to specify what the limits of constitutionally mandated police protection are in case of a hostile audience. In *Gregory v. Chicago*\(^{619}\), a case decided the same year as *Brandenburg*, the Court reversed the conviction for disorderly conduct of peaceful civil rights demonstrators who disobeyed dispersal orders issued because onlookers behaved unruly, and police feared they were not able to prevent impending civil disorder. The Justices agreed that unruliness of onlookers is not a proper ground for restricting the right to assembly, but resolved the case on overbreadth grounds,\(^{620}\) and again did not specify the extent of the obligation of the police to first deal with the hostile audience. In a more recent case, *Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement*, the Supreme Court held that the reaction of listeners is not a content-neutral basis for regulation of speech.\(^{621}\) In the case, a county ordinance on use of public property vested discretion in the county administrator to impose a fee “incident to the ordinance’s administration and to the maintenance of public order.”\(^{622}\) The Nationalist Movement was imposed a $100 fee for a demonstration organized against the Martin Luther King Jr. federal holiday. The Supreme Court held the ordinance facially invalid because its administration implied taking into consideration the audience’s reaction to a demonstration, which necessarily includes content inquiry. Again this decision solidifies the principle that the burdens stemming from a heckler’s veto cannot be imposed on the speaker. The stretch of the principle is not qualified by the Supreme Court, though quite some district court decisions can

\(^{618}\) 327 U.S. 229, 237.
\(^{620}\) The jury was instructed to consider only whether demonstrators made “improper noise” or a “diversion tending to a breach of the peace,” or “collect[ed] in bodies or crowds for unlawful purposes, or for any purpose, to the annoyance or disturbance of other persons.” *Gregory v. Chicago*, 394 U.S. 111, 122 (Black, J., concurring).
\(^{622}\) Id. at 123.
be cited to the effect that police/local government are liable in civil suit for not protecting
demonstrators against hostile audiences. 623

USSC cases dealt much less with the possible free speech protection granted to hecklers,
onlookers, though the question itself has been on the table for quite a while. 624 Numerous 19th
century lower court cases can be found on Westlaw interpreting limits to “disturbance to
assemblages”, 625 of course, not necessarily with a constitutional focus. In re Kay 626, a 1970
case ended at the California Supreme Court was about clapping and shouting 5-10 minutes
during the speech of a Congressman candidate. The clapping and shouting did not stop the
speaker in finishing his speech, and later he even testified that he was not disturbed by the
protest. Still, a few testimonies pointed that around the protestors the speech of the candidate
could not have been heard clearly, though you could walk away to other parts of the park
where it could. The Supreme Court of California held that the state can constitutionally
proscribe hecklers’ or counter-speakers’ conduct only if it “substantially impaired the conduct
of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or
of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man
should have known.” 627 This, what might be called, ‘substantial impairment test’ has never
been tested at the USSC, neither anything else on speech rights of hecklers. Justice Douglas
would have granted certiorari in a case where there was a non-disruptive protest against

623 See, e.g., Dunlap v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp. 1295, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252
F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D. Ala. 1966), Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1975) as cited by
Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler's Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 1305,
1310 (2007).
624 For a relatively early commentary see Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly
625 A custom digest search performed in Westlaw on August 18, 2010 for citing references to 133
DISTURBANCE OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLAGE 133k1 k. Nature and elements of offenses brought up a 1682
lines long document with case references, earliest being Bell ads. Graham, 1 Nott & McC. 278, S.C.Const., 1818
which held that disturbing a religious assembly, during worship is indictable.
627 In re Kay 1 Cal.3d 930, 943.
Richard Nixon’s talk at a religious meeting, and the organizer of the protest was convicted for disturbing a religious meeting.  

In my view, in cases where the heckler does not make impossible for the primary speaker to convey his or her message, heckler’s speech should also be constitutionally protected. All the more so if the primary speaker is a politician, or is backed by the state in one way or another, e.g. as in Reynolds the speaker who was “heckled” was Richard Nixon, or In re Kay where the town has invited to a celebration the candidate of one party, but not the other. Nobody has a right to speak and be spared from (nonviolent) reactions. Parallel to this, of course, if the heckler makes impossible for the primary speaker to convey his or her message then that would mean that one’s right to speech is privileged against another’s. Rightly understood, in my view, it is only for this “absolute silencing” situations where the Supreme Court has developed the principle of “no heckler’s veto” as described above.

In Germany, the question arises as to who counts as participator and who as heckler. The Court stated that not only sympathizers, but also those with opposing views are constitutionally entitled to participate at a demonstration, and exercise criticism. However, there is no right to participate at a demonstration with the sole purpose to coercively prevent or hinder it. This latter case is then the closest to heckler’s veto. In a case where a party called “Republicans” held a public meeting in a restaurant in Freiburg, people, who tried to enter the meeting while shouting “This old Nazi S… masked as Republican should be interdicted here” or, “Let us inside, and then the assembly is over”, etc., were lawfully prevented from accessing the place. A piquanterie of the case – that the incriminated sentences were only said after the police had already closed the entry to the assembly – was not considered problematic by the Court because the issue was not the police blocking the

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631 BVerfGE 84, 203, NJW 1991, 2694 et seq.
entry, but the police’s prohibition of petitioner from entering the meeting which was issued after petitioner had shouted the mentioned phrases. The GFCC rejected that behavior aiming to prevent an assembly would be at all covered by the scope of the right; only other rights and the prohibition of arbitrariness of official behavior apply. The Court reasoned that constitutionally protected participation necessitates a willingness to accept the assembly as it is, and to limit the pursuit of diverging goals to communicative means only. Those who seek intentionally to hinder an assembly cannot rely on Art. 8 GG even if they are numerous.\textsuperscript{632}

Unclarified remained the extent to which communicative means can be used for disturbance, i.e. the difference between criticism, protest and disturbance. The logic of the mentioned decision would probably suggest that the decisive element is intent: if the person shouts in order to be heard, then he is a participant, if he shouts in order to make impossible for the primary speaker to be heard, he is a disturber, a “heckler”. Similarly to the US jurisprudence, German courts also have come to the conclusion that one cannot be burdened for other’s hostile speech. Thus, in a case where the demonstration’s location was changed because a counter-demonstration was to be expected, the added administrative costs could not constitutionally be imposed on the organizers of the primary demonstration.\textsuperscript{633}

The ECHR has not specifically dealt with heckler’s speech cases, only sporadic references to heckler-like situations were discussed. \textit{Chorherr v. Austria} involved a military parade where applicants went in with placard to protest against Austria’s acquisition of interceptor fighter planes. Questionable is whether this can be qualified as heckler’s veto, as the pacifists interfered with the view of a few parade-watchers only slightly, and if they moved away, they could see fully. The ECHR nonetheless accepted that Austrian authorities acted within the Convention when removing the pacifists from the scene and sanctioning them. The restriction fell within the margin of appreciation, and was considered non-excessive to the potential

\textsuperscript{632} Id.
\textsuperscript{633} Urteil vom 16.05.2006, Az.: 7 A 10017/06.OVG Koblenz.
disturbances Mr Chorherr “must have realised”, and also because the measures were imposed “to prevent breaches of the peace and not to frustrate the expression of an opinion.”\textsuperscript{634} This very deferential decision has not relied on the idea that Mr. Chorherr allegedly blocked the view of the public, this way “heckling” the participation in an assembly.

The more recent \textit{Vajnai v. Hungary} is the only decision where the expression heckler’s veto comes up at all at the ECHR.\textsuperscript{635}

\begin{quote}
R\textit{estrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feeling--real or imaginary--cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs recognised in a democratic society, since that society must remain reasonable in its judgement. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler's veto.}
\end{quote}

Here the hecklers are the “public” whose feelings – in the case towards the mere display of the red star – got recognized in the Criminal Code, thereby sanctioning irrationality. This also might point in the direction that heckling is what goes beyond the frames of rationality, probably rational discourse in the sense that it shuts down other’s rational contribution to an ongoing debate without engaging it. This quote, taken together with more recent ECHR jurisprudence with regard to counter-demonstrations, and to disorder in general discussed above,\textsuperscript{636} might soon develop into a full-fledged heckler’s veto theory of the Court with similar overtones as in the U.S. or Germany, but of course this is only a prediction.

\subsection*{2.2.3. Counter-demonstration}

I employ the notion of counter-demonstration – as distinguished from heckling which can be the performance of a single individual – to cover situations where two opposing groups are present next to each other, both wishing to communicate their own message. Normally, the counter-demonstration refers to the group which came to protest the primary demonstration or

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{634} Chorherr v. Austria, Application no. 13308/87, judgment of 25 August 1993, §§ 31-32.
\textsuperscript{636} \textit{Supra} text accompanying notes 571-597.
\end{footnotes}
primary event. Though some claim counter-demonstration to be organized, I see no reason to exclude the frequent case of spontaneous counterdemonstrations from the discussion. Counter-demonstrations are often assumed to be first of all a source of tensions, and this assumption is more or less validated by empirical studies also discussed in this thesis. Still, courts do accord protection to counterdemonstrations, too, and, in my view, rightly so. The following discussion will concentrate on two separate issues which nonetheless often intermingle: (i) whether there is a right to counter-demonstration; and (ii) how the risk of erupting violence as a potential result of clashing demonstrators and counter-demonstrators is handled by the courts.

2.2.3.1. United States

The USSC has – similarly to speech protection of heckling – not explicitly stated the constitutional right of counterdemonstration. Nonetheless, under any principled assessment of American jurisprudence, counterdemonstration should be as protected as the primary demonstration or event. All the rationales of protection apply equally to counter-demonstrators, just as the principle of content neutrality, the duty of the police to protect the unpopular speaker, the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth etc. are equally valid. As to the anticipation of violence, the Skokie controversy could have offered the most famous example of constitutional risk-taking in situations of clashing groups; nonetheless, the courts for procedural reasons avoided (probably had to avoid) exactly this issue. In a sequence of denied permit applications, $350,000 permit fees, and court proceedings the Village of Skokie tried to prevent the National Socialist Party of America from rallying in full Nazi paraphernalia wearing swastika in a mostly Jewish neighborhood of a Chicago suburb, where also Holocaust-survivors lived. There was ample evidence that various Jewish and other anti-

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638 For a detailed description see O’Neill & Vasvari, supra note 637 at 100-113.
Nazi organizations have planned a twelve- to fifteen-thousand strong counter-demonstration. People testified that they would be extremely hurt by the Nazi march, one witness claiming that though he did not intend to use violence, he was not sure if he could control himself. *Opinion* of the mayor – formed after discussion with leaders of community and religious group – that bloodshed would occur if the march took place had also been introduced. Thus, the Village of Skokie sought to enjoin the Nazi marchers from wearing and displaying the Nazi symbols, and other material which “incites or promotes hatred” against religious or ethnic groups, clearly a European sort of argument which would already restrict incitement to hatred, not first to violence. Injunction was granted, and appellate courts were unwilling to stay the injunction pending appeal on the merits. This refusal of a stay was reversed by a divided USSC. On remand, the Illinois appellate court modified the injunction so as only to enjoin displaying the swastika. The appellate court held that a march cannot be prevented though “there was and is a virtual certainty that thousands of irate Jewish citizens would physically attack the defendants.” Underlying precedents were hostile audience cases discussed above from *Terminiello* to *Edwards* and *Gregory*. As there was no suit against or initiated by the organizations wishing to protest the Nazi march, there is no decision on the issue whether the “virtual certainty of violence” arising from their (the counterdemonstrators’) presence would deprive them of right to assembly. Further in the Nazi suit, the Illinois Supreme Court held also the rest of the injunction invalid under symbolic conduct doctrine. Meanwhile, a parallel suit was launched as the Village had enacted ordinances requiring an extraordinary permit fee, banning military uniforms and incitement to hatred against religious

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and ethnic groups on public assembly. The 7th Circuit struck down the ordinances, and the USSC denied certiorari. Circuit Judge Pell found that the case is not governed by Brandenburg v. Ohio because the Village – despite that it “introduced evidence in the district court tending to prove that some individuals, at least, might have difficulty restraining their reactions to the Nazi demonstration,” before the Circuit does not rely on a possibility of responsive violence. Compare this with the “virtual certainty” evidence in the injunction proceedings. Thus, the 7th Circuit has not reached the question of protection of counter-speech either. The Supreme Court mentioned “counter-demonstration” in one single decision, and even there it is just an example. Lower courts have dealt with the protection granted to counter-demonstration, and some accept that counter-demonstration can be segregated from the demonstration, as “time, manner and place” restriction. In one case, though, the Ohio Supreme Court very clearly upheld the right to simultaneous counterdemonstration as applied to a Jewish organization and Ku-Klux Klan demonstrating in front of John Demjanjuk’s house. The limits of the right to counterdemonstration are not certainly clarified by this holding though as there was clearly no probability of violence either on the present enjoined demonstrations or in the past on the part of the particular Ohio branch of the KKK. Both sides of the would-be demonstrators testified that they could contain themselves if the other side does not incite violence. This testimony was fully accepted by the Ohio Supreme Court. That court thus relies on the principle that Brandenburg applies without alteration to

646 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203.
647 The rest of the reasoning relies on symbolic speech and captive audience doctrines which will be discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 876-898.
649 E.g. Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ku Klux Klan rally on courthouse steps and contemporaneous counter-demonstration), Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987) (Catholic gays organization’s demonstration in front of St. Patrick Cathedral in New York during the Gay Parade was separated temporally from anti-gay Catholic groups’ demonstration at the same place. Nonetheless, both demonstrations were allowed to proceed simultaneously with the Gay Parade.)
650 City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 76 Ohio St.3d 304, 667 N.E.2d 942 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996) (Ku-Klux Klan and Jewish organization demonstrating simultaneously in front of John Demjanjuk’s house).
651 Id. at 307-309.
simultaneous demonstrations of diametrically opposed groups, i.e. without intent, imminence and likelihood proven, restrictions are deemed unjustified. I think this is quite a consistent application of the general principles of First Amendment jurisprudence of the federal Supreme Court.

### 2.2.3.2. Germany

Germany’s twentieth century has been manifestly full with both violent and peaceful counter-demonstrations. Ever since the Weimar era, opposing groups from the political far right and the left have been in constant clash. The reunification of Germany has brought a new wave of Neo-Nazi marches especially in the Eastern Länder which again drew a sometimes violent reaction from the center or far left circles of German civil society. Unlike for instance in the U.S., the protection accorded to counter-demonstration is an ever present, hotly debated topic. The principles of the German constitutional jurisprudence look pretty straightforward. As there is a right to participate critically or even opposing at a demonstration, there is clearly a right to counter-demonstration. The dividing line between critical participation and counterdemonstration remain disputed. As already mentioned with regard to heckler’s veto, there is no right to participate at a demonstration with the sole purpose to coercively prevent or hinder it. There is no right to prevent a demonstration, but there always is a right to organize a counterdemonstration, adhering to the regular notice requirement, duty to organize...

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652 See e.g. the August 2010 scandal surrounding the decision of the Hannover administrative court allowing for Neo-Nazi “Mourning March” – commemorating the mistreatment of detainees in the interrogation center of the British occupation forces in Bad Nenndorf between 1945-1947 – while banning the counterdemonstration organized by the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB). Neonazi-Demo erlaubt - Gegendemo verboten, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 13.08.2010. http://www.mz-web.de/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ksta/page&atype=ksArtikel&aid=1281678346714, Gericht erlaubt Neonazi-Demo - Gegendemo verboten, Stern, 12.08.2010, http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/gericht-erlaubt-neonazi-demo-gegendemo-verboten-1592720.html. In legal terms, the significance is maybe best characterized in comparing the results of the Westlaw search (one Supreme Court case mentioning counter-demonstration, 54 documents altogether, including articles and jurisprudence) with that of Beck online search for Gegendemonstration which shows 300 results, out of which 186 is case law, while the rest is article, commentary, note, etc.


cooperate and so on. Clearly, police are obliged to protect demonstrators against violent counterdemonstrators,\footnote{BVerfG-K NJW 2000, 3053, 3056; NVwZ 2006, 1049.} and here it should not be of relevance which group counts as counter and which as primary. As a default, a demonstration cannot be restricted because of a counterdemonstration, but “if it is sufficiently likely that the authority– because of fulfilling paramount state duties and eventually despite involving additional external police force – is not capable to protect the notified assembly”,\footnote{BVerfG: Grenzen des polizeilichen Schutzes friedlicher Versammlungen, NVwZ 2006, 1049, also BVerfG, 1 BvQ 14/06 vom 10.5.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 16), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/qk20060510_1bvq001406.html} then restrictions on the duly notified primary assembly might be possible, and to countergo restrictions might give rise to liability in police law (so-called Nichtstörerhaftung in case of Polizeinotstand, policing emergency). German police law also knows another concept, “Zweckveranlasser”, meaning someone who occasions a law breaking even though she herself is not behaving unlawfully. The GFCC has left open the applicability of this concept to (opposing) assemblies, but in any case strongly limited its potential scope: beyond the sheer content of the message (i.e. Neo-Nazis and their counter-demonstrators expressing opposing views and even maybe wishing the outgroup to become violent) it requires specific accompanying elements of provocation.\footnote{BVerfG, 1 BvQ 24/00 vom 1.9.2000, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 20), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/qk20000901_1bvq002400.html at § 18.}

2.2.3.3. United Kingdom

In the UK, the issue of counterdemonstration has not merited specific legal regulation or has not become object of specific judicial doctrines. Nonetheless, the very characteristic British regulation of protest starting in the 1936 Public Order Act actually was essentially shaped by an instance of clashes between a march and a massive countermarch. In the so-called Battle of Cable Street, a Fascist (Mosleyan) march was prevented by counterprotestors to walk through a Jewish neighborhood as planned. Police tried to protect the Fascists – who themselves became disorderly – but finally gave up. English collective memory appears to proudly
cherish the event as one where people stood up against fascism and anti-Semitism, and there is no reason to doubt it.\textsuperscript{658} Legally however it has not unequivocally reinforced the protection accorded to assemblies, as the 1936 POA introduced not only the ban on uniforms, but also the possibility of banning processions in a given area for three months long (renewable) – and that made possible that basically no processions took place in inner London for years before the Second World War.\textsuperscript{659} Thus it might well be that banning orders are used to prevent clashes between opposing groups, within the general framework, and thus no separate discussion arises.

\textbf{2.2.3.4. France}

In the mentioned Association SOS Tout Petits decision on ban of anti-abortion demonstration in front of Notre Dame, next to a hospital, the CÉ also found that the Administrative Tribunal lawfully disregarded the objection that “the risk of counterdemonstration could not justify the ban as it has not materialized, because it referred to a circumstance posterior to the decision.”\textsuperscript{660} With regard to another ban of protest of same association in front of an abortion clinic, the Administrative Court of Appeal affirmed that the sole fact of a counterdemonstration does not justify a prior ban, but previous violence of demonstrators can, provided that it does not amount to a general ban on demonstrations by the association.\textsuperscript{661} Another ban was found lawful because previously at the same place, an assembly organized by the same association “gave occasion [donné lieu aux affrontements violents – note that it is


\textsuperscript{661} The reasoning is so sparse that it does not allow for verifying exactly what previous disorder looked like. Wikipedia describes several waves of incidents through a decade of forcible entrance into hospitals performing abortions, ensuing criminal convictions and even the introduction of a new crime. http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandos_anti-IVG.
unclear who actually was violent] to violent clashes during which several persons were injured”, and the ban was not simply based on the fear of a potential counterdemonstration. This is the closest to a substantive review to be found on Légifrance on contre-manifestation. Though French courts do not theorize much on counterdemonstration, it appears de facto protected and in principle two opposing demonstrations are to be freely held parallel, and police are obliged to protect against possible violence, from whichever side it might come. Nonetheless, there is no anti-heckler’s veto principle pronounced so far in jurisprudence, neither is the extent of police protection clarified minutiously.

2.2.3.5. ECHR

ECHR jurisprudence on counterdemonstration shows a similar trend as seen above in general with regard to disorder and probability. Earlier, challenges to blanket bans were found inadmissible, intergroup tensions and previous violence justifying a general ban. Stankov broke with this general caution towards interethnic and separatist contexts, while other cases closer to counterdemonstration proper have also redefined the jurisprudence. Plattform Ärzte für das Leben – again about events of an antiabortion organization and counterdemonstrations – though ostentatiously about Art. 13, has in effect affirmed a right to counterdemonstration, and the obligation of police to accommodate and protect both opposing events. In Öllinger, Austrian authorities banned a protest demonstration against Comradeship IV, an organization mainly of former SS-members commemorating the death of SS soldiers in WW2 on All Saints’ Day at the Salzburg Municipal Cemetery. The

\[\text{\footnotesize 662 Cour administrative d'appel de Paris, N° 01PA02401, Inédit au recueil Lebon lecture du jeudi 12 mai 2005.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 663 Three out of the four hits on légifrance 'contre-manifestation' relate to SOS Tout Petits. The fourth one is a decision in référe liberté, where the Conseil found the École Normale Supérieure could lawfully prevent – disallow – a series of assembly events during a so-called "Israeli Apartheid Week", properly balancing liberté de reunion with that of prevention of troubles to public order and of counterdemonstrations. Clearly here the institutional setting was relevant, just as the École’s willingness to offer room for discussions on the Middle East, while keeping out political events from the building. Conseil d'État, N° 347171, lecture du lundi 7 mars 2011, Publié au recueil Lebon, considérant 5.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 664 Rai, supra note 573, Rassemblement Jurassien, supra note 204, and CARAF supra note 204.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 665 Stankov supra note 438.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 666 Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v. Austria, supra note 514.}\]
commemoration counted as popular celebration and as such was exempted from the authorization requirement.667 Domestic authorities partly argued that the ban was necessary to protect Comradeship IV’s event, while at the ECHR the government mainly relied on the justification that Öllinger’s protest would disturb cemetery-goers other than Comradeship IV, and thus the restriction served their rights. As the Constitutional Court already added, even freedom of religion of others was involved. Austrian courts also accepted as sufficiently weighty the prevention of disturbances as in previous years there have been protest against Comradeship IV’s commemoration, and those protests have caused “considerable nuisance” to other cemetery-goers on this important religious holiday.668 As the Government at the ECHR argued in § 29:

the authorities had also been able to rely on experiences from previous years in which assemblies like the one planned by the applicant had annoyed visitors, had led to heated discussions and had required police intervention.

Though the Government conceded that not any chance of disturbance suffices to restrict freedom of assembly, it maintained that to allow and protect both events (a commemoration and a counterdemonstration) would require such policing which on its own would disturb “the peace required for a cemetery on All Saints’ Day.” (§ 31) The ECHR did not accept these arguments. Clearly Austrian law privileged one demonstration over the other, both by the exception for “public celebration”, an awkward label for an SS commemoration, and consequently also by the sheer acceptance that the SS commemoration would be happening anyway, and it was only Öllinger’s protest which could have been prevented. ECHR faults Austria for not taking into account that Öllinger was an MP who wanted to protest against the commemoration taking place, i.e. his would have been core political speech. Also, the ECHR noted that there was no previous violence, neither would have been the protest noisy or in

667 To its merit the Constitutional Court expressed doubts about this, nonetheless, it upheld the ban for reasons mentioned in the main text.
668 Öllinger v. Austria, supra note 257, §§ 18-20.
other ways directed against cemetery-goers’ beliefs. Citing Stankov, Öllinger affirmed: “If every probability of tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a demonstration was to warrant its prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing views.” (§ 36). Thus, rights of cemeterygoers, Comradeship IV and Öllinger should all be accorded proper weight in the balance, because especially positive obligations require so.

3. Interim conclusion as to peacefulness, prevention of violence and disorder

The jurisdictions examined in this thesis differ in the notion of disorder, i.e. what amounts at all to a state of affairs which is so imperative to prevent or eliminate that freedom of assembly should bow. Secondly, the jurisdictions also differ in the degree of probability of the occurrence of that state of affairs which might justify intervention into freedom of assembly. An important principle is that of individual responsibility. At a minimum, no legal (civil or criminal, or even disciplinary) responsibility can arise unless one personally participated in or supported violent acts. A harder question is when an assembly can be dispersed or kettled for anticipation of disorder. Here the jurisdictions are not very consistent, and thus probably the judgment of police is taking over, and review might be limited.

More or less settled appears that there is no right to heckle while there is a right to counterdemonstration in every examined jurisdiction. UK is the only country where the issue of counterdemonstration is not clearly thematized, and might be hidden by the practice of general banning orders (by the way a clearly content-neutral mode of regulation). The extent of the protection granted in case of potential clashes is much less settled. German law explicitly concedes that there might not be enough police force at disposal, and this justifies even prior ban. US courts, especially lower courts might actually go as far as to accept the
first part of the German view (not always possible to prevent violence), but that would not mean the demonstrations cannot constitutionally take place. This is the exact opposite of German thinking; perhaps because the figure of positive obligations is absent in US law, or because German law is more focused on averting danger. In France, the very few cases available spell out that a demonstration cannot be banned solely because of the risks inherent in a counterdemonstration, but previous violent clashes, where the source of the violence is unclarified, might justify even a prior ban, but certainly conditions. The ECHR probably would not go beyond the German approach, but might find UK and French blanket- and quasi-blanket bans disproportionate.
FROM COERCION TO DIRECT ACTION TO DISRUPTION

In relation to freedom of assembly, coercion-related concerns have always enjoyed a salient status. As I tried to show in the first part, both early psychology and legal history have assumed that assembling people tend to become mobs. Picketing, for a long time, was considered intolerable coercion, and so-called direct action protests still raise this question. The doctrine of captive audience also pops up from time to time in relation to marches and rallies. One of post-war Germany’s most spectacular identity struggles has been fought for decades within the legal framework of coercion or duress (Nötigung), about which Peter Quint wrote a whole monography the detail and quality of which certainly is not possible to reproduce here. In the US, courts have issued injunctions and affirmed restricted “protest zones” next to abortion clinics pursuing interests akin to prevention of coercion. Other types of zoning, in and around parliaments, courts, prisons, and military areas might be justified with reference to preventing coercing the state which would undermine the anyway weak legitimacy chain of representation. In this chapter I will examine those situations where the state intervenes in order to prevent protestors in coercing others, non-state actors, individuals, companies, and so on. Zoning proper (state buildings, cemeteries, and residential areas) will be examined under time, manner and place restrictions, partly because of the difference between coercing your fellow and the state, partly because these restrictions are typically framed as TMPs. It has to be noted that much of what follows could be reinterpreted – and accordingly vastly supplemented – from the broader angle of civil disobedience, an undertaking painfully given up for reasons of limited space.

669 PETER E. QUINT, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE GERMAN COURTS. THE PERSHING MISSILE PROTESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008).
1. Nötigung in Germany

In Germany there has been a long debate about the constitutionality of sit-down demonstrations or sitting blockades. The issue arose out of protests against nuclear missiles, stationed in Germany by the US during the cold war era. Reaching through two decades, three diverging decisions of the GFCC were handed down regarding a criminal offense for which demonstrators were usually prosecuted. According to § 240 I Criminal Code, coercion (Nötigung) is realized if someone illegally coerces another to an act, a default or an omission by way of force or threat with a palpable harm (mit einem empfindlichen Übel). § 240 II defines illegal by stating that illegal is the act if it the use of force or the threat by the harm is considered ‘reprehensible’, an expression which had replaced its Nazi-era variant: ‘contrary to the healthy feelings of the people’ (gesundes Volksempfinden). Ordinary courts, including the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) gradually developed an interpretation of force which revolves not so much around the perpetrator’s actions as on the psychological state of the victim – as the purpose of the criminalization is understood to be the protection of freedom of will. Accordingly, force need not be a “direct exertion of bodily forces”, rather it suffices if the perpetrator actuates “even with only little bodily effort a psychologically determined process” in the victim.\footnote{Laepple decision of the Federal Court of Justice, BGHSt. 23, 46, 54 as cited by BVerfGE 92, 1, 15. [der Täter “nur mit geringem körperlichen Kraftaufwand einen psychisch determinierten Prozeß” beim Opfer in Lauf setzt.]} As applied to demonstrations, this meant that the mere presence of the demonstrator at a place which another wanted to occupy or cross amounted to coercion if the presence of the demonstrator psychologically inhibited the other to realize his or her will. In its first decision on Nötigung\footnote{See BVerfGE 73, 206 (Sitzblockaden I, 1986)} (1986), the GFCC split four-to-four on several issues, but was unanimous on the question of vagueness. The notion of force in paragraph I is not unconstitutionally vague; thus it does not violate art. 103 II of the Basic Law, i.e. the principle of ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’, which includes a strong requirement for...
foreseeability and legal certainty. Furthermore, the criterion of reprehensibility in § 240 II is not unduly vague either, though granting discretion to the interpreting court, it does so in a way that restricts the application of paragraph I.\textsuperscript{672} A vague limitation on a not vague determination of criminal conduct is not unconstitutional; or at least this seems to be the reasoning of the first sit-down blockade case of the GFCC. Apart from stating the constitutionality of the text of the statute itself,\textsuperscript{673} the Court was unable to agree on the constitutionality of its application. Four judges accepted the wide understanding of force (where psychological inhibition is enough as long as there is physical presence), while four other judges rejected it as violating the prohibition of analogy in criminal law, included in the same Art. 103 II GG. Also, the Court found that the scope of Art. 8 GG extends to sit-down blockades; however, administrative or even criminal sanction is justifiable under Art. 8. II. In particular, as the sit-down blockade’s purpose is to obstruct third persons, and the obstruction is not only the incidental by-product as with any demonstration, the conduct is proscribable.\textsuperscript{674}

As to reprehensibility, the Court made clear that it serves as a corrective, i.e. in the constitution conform interpretation the scope of actions under § 240 I is wider than under § 240 II, at least in cases of psychological coercive effects.\textsuperscript{675}

In the second (1995) decision, in reverse, the majority found the “immaterialization” of the notion of force unconstitutionally vague thus violating the principle of nullum crimen.\textsuperscript{676} The BGH attempted to restrict the interpretation of force by requiring that it be of significant weight in order to qualify as “reprehensible”. According to the GFCC this created more uncertainty than it resolved, because the notion of weight or significance of inhibition of will is not less vague than the notion of inhibition of will.\textsuperscript{677} There was a strong dissent arguing

\textsuperscript{672} BVerfGE 73, 206, 238 et seq.
\textsuperscript{673} BVerfGE 73, 206, 234 et seq.
\textsuperscript{674} BVerfGE 73, 206, 250.
\textsuperscript{675} BVerfGE 73, 206, 238 et seq.
\textsuperscript{676} BVerfGE 92, 1, 15-16.
\textsuperscript{677} Id. at 16.
firstly that to block a road by one’s body does indeed amount to physical force, as the body is a physical object, physically obstructing the way. Secondly, the interpretation of the ordinary courts was foreseeable as it has been followed by the courts for more than hundred years. In the lead opinion there is no reply to the dissent’s argument that the human body as a physical object does actually hinder the movement of the car, and any sort of psychological inhibition is only the consequence of the physical obstruction, i.e. it is dependent on it. If there is no demonstrator sitting on the road, the drivers would not think they might kill the demonstrator unless they stop. Thus, the dissent apparently means that the interpretation is not extensive as the courts require the use of physical force, thus it is not “immaterialized”. On the other hand, the dissent does not react to the main argument of the majority about vagueness and inconsistent judicial understanding of the notion of force through time and through different crimes. The question to my mind is which is more relevant: the difference between bodily effort and its effects as the majority sees it, or the dependency of the effects on the bodily effort as the dissent emphasizes it. The majority could be read to imply that sitting on a road cannot be criminalized, because the demonstrator is obviously weaker than the car, so the demonstrator does not coerce the driver. Note though that the majority explicitly dismisses attempts to differentiate as to the weight of the pressure. The dissent explicitly finds the demonstrator’s body on the road as an object which needs to be countered by physical effort, so the demonstrator is coercive. Both opinions reflect a categorical thinking, where either there is or there is no coercion. Meanwhile it is clear both that in reality there is no clear-cut boundary, and that in criminal law there ought to be one. A way out of this has come in the third decision to sitting blockades in 2001. Here the GFCC maintains that solely psychological coercion (psychologischer Zwang) does not amount to force (Gewalt). Nonetheless, in case the psychological coercive effect (Zwangswirkung) results from

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678 BVerfGE 92, 1, 21-22.
679 BVerfGE 92, 1, 23-24.
680 It is actually the fourth, but normally qualified as third in German literature.
arranging a physical obstacle or impediment, it amounts to force.\(^{681}\) Such is the case when protestors chain themselves by locks and metal chains to the entrance gates of a nuclear waste facility, as the chaining is the physical obstacle,\(^{682}\) going beyond a simple psychological pressure present in case the protestors would only be standing there freely. More easily then, to park different vehicles on both lanes and the side-lane of a highway, making it impossible without risk of self-injury to drive through it, is a physical obstacle resulting in psychological force.\(^{683}\) Still, according to the GFCC, the scope of Art. 8 GG extends to such “forcible” actions as long as their aim is participation in formation of opinion and raising attention to public matters, and not „the coercive or otherwise self-helplike [probably more as vigilantes] assertion [Durchsetzung: assertion or implementation] of own claims.”\(^{684}\) Thus, ordinary courts have to decide whether an event (sitting blockade or blockade of the highway in these cases) aims to raise attention and participate in the formation of opinion on public matters, or rather aims at “enforcing [or extorting – Erzwingen]”\(^{685}\) one’s own [one is tempted to read it as individual, or, even, ‘private’] plans, preferences, wishes.\(^{686}\) This latter one does not fall under Art. 8. But this is still not the end of the story: forcible actions with the aim of raising awareness to a public issue are though covered by the scope of Art. 8, an intervention still might be justified, if it fulfills requirements of proportionality. During this latter balancing exercise, the significance of contribution to debate on public matters must be assessed against the burden imposed on others by the action, and also in light of the potential sanction. This happens by interpreting the criterion of reprehensibility (recall, that makes the conduct unlawful according to § 240 II Criminal Code) in a way conform to the constitution, where it

\(^{682}\) BVerfGE 104, 92, 102.
\(^{683}\) BVerfGE 104, 92, 103.
\(^{684}\) BVerfGE 104, 92, 105.
\(^{685}\) BVerfGE 104, 92, 105.
\(^{686}\) Quint notes in this regard that the distinction mirrors that of Dworkin between persuasive and non-persuasive forms of civil disobedience. QUINT supra note 669 at 254 referring to Ronald Dworkin, Civil Disobedience and Nuclear Protest in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985) 109.
e.g. might matter if the public issue at hand also affects those burdened by the action. (In the concrete cases, the convictions finally were not unsettled by the GFCC.)

This new compromise concept of Nötigung has not remained without critique: as a commentary argues, the physical force is hypothetical: the forcing effect comes not from the impossibility to physically get through the blockade, but from the “(ab)use of the principle of solidarity” which – clearly psychically and not physically – disapproves getting through by driving over others.\(^{687}\) Certainly the GFCC tries here to accommodate the BGH’s broader understanding of coercion after the scandal the 1995 second GFCC decision evoked.\(^{688}\) In the end of the day, direct action without using any tools – chains, cars, etc. – does not qualify as coercion, and even those which do might be so important for debate on public matters that a restriction cannot be justified.

### 2. UK: disruption, obstruction and many more

In the UK there are so many common law and statutory provisions which aim to avert direct action, disruption or obstruction, from harassment laws, to anti-social behaviour to aggravated trespass and further to anti-terrorism legislation and so on, clearly impossible to discuss each of them in detail.\(^{689}\) Thus, I will aim to just clarify where English draws the line between permissible pressure and impermissible coercion on the example of aggravated trespass and obstruction of the highway, as the two being characteristic of the English approach.

Aggravated trespass\(^{690}\) is a complex offense requiring (i) trespass on land and doing there

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\(^{687}\) Arndt Sinn, Gewaltbegriff - quo vadis? NJW 2002, 1024 et seq.

\(^{688}\) See Quint’s very thorough account on this, including in the discussion the Tucholsky and Crucifix decisions, handed down the same year, and read together with the sitting blockade decision by conservative or more statist currents of German intelligentsia. QUINT supra note 669, 184-202 and 203-250.

\(^{689}\) Mead spends 70 pages only on direct action, see MEAD supra note 507 at 237-310.

\(^{690}\) Section 68 of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA), as amended by section 59 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act (ASBA) 2003, criminalizes the so-called aggravated trespass. Originally, it applied only to activities taking place in the open air until the ASBA cancelled the reference to open air from the provisions. It is an arrestable offense (s. 68, para. 4), nonetheless arrest can only be made in case the police reasonably suspects that the person is committing the trespass, i.e. there is no preventive power of arrest, unlike e.g. by breach of the peace. Aggravated trespass is committed by anyone who “trespasses on land and, in relation
anything (ii) intended to have (iii) intimidating, obstructing or disrupting effect on a (iv) lawful activity in which others are engaged or are about to engage. It was originally meant against hunt saboteurs, but also applied to anti-war demonstrators. 691 The already quite broad provision (e.g. simple disruption) is not interpreted narrowly by courts. 692 Pre-HRA Winder v. DPP 693 dealt with a hunting ‘sabotage’ where appellants were running after the hunt, but where it was proven that by running they did not intend to disrupt the hunt. The court found sufficient that the protesters originally intended to disrupt the hunt, and they would have intended concretely disrupt the hunt had they had the opportunity to get closer to the hunt. This was prevented by the police arresting them. Thus, for the court, though they did not intend to disrupt at the point when they were running and caught, but they were already “intending to intend” to disrupt in the future. Being a (i) trespasser with an (ii) intention of disrupting and (iii) doing an act towards that end were sufficient, if proven, to establish liability under section 68 CJPOA, aggravated trespass. For the court, the intention could be a general one, a future one, and in the present case, running was “more than a merely preparatory act” to disruption, thus it was close enough to the offense in the “wide interpretation” of the court. The “more than mere preparation” is the statutory test for attempts. 694 Its application is problematic as there is no liability for attempt in the case of summary offenses like aggravated trespass, unless liability is specifically provided for in the criminalizing statute. 695 The CJPOA does not provide for criminalizing the attempt of


692 FENWICK, supra note 240 at 484.


694 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1).

695 Cf. Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(4) as referred to by FENWICK, supra note 240 at 484.
aggravated trespass. Despite, the court in *Winder v. DPP* in effect criminalized an act where the most important element of an attempt, namely, actual specific intent was lacking. In other words, even if the attempt of aggravated trespass incurred liability under the CJPOA, there would be no way to punish the appellants since usually there is no attempt in lack of intent. The court, however, using the statutory test for attempts, made appellants liable for committing the offense itself. This remarkable legal legerdemain is facilitated mostly by deference to the Magistrate’s fact finding as to the remoteness or, more precisely, the sufficient connection between running and disrupting. General intention suffices, thus, and most probably, if general intention to disrupt etc. is established, then even mere presence will qualify to be an act towards the end of disruption.696 *Winder* also renders basically moot the next section, empowering police to remove a person who – according to the reasonable apprehension of the officer – “is committing, has committed or intends to commit the offence of aggravated trespass on land.” The judgment leaves no room for a phase where the person is only intending to commit aggravated trespass, i.e. where he or she is intending to intend to disrupt, obstruct, or intimidate, which is exactly the case in section 69.697

In *Capon v. DPP*,698 foxhunt protesters who trespassed to a land where a fox was chased into a hole were prosecuted. The protestors planned to observe and record the digging out of the fox with a video recorder in order to see if any separate crimes were committed. They were entirely peaceful and they intended to avoid disruption of the hunt. Nonetheless, the police officer arrested them following a rather ambiguous conversation.699 The officer told them to leace and threatened arrest for aggravated trespass. As the protesters knew that the trespass requires an intention to disrupt, they remained completely peaceful and stated their intention

696 Kevin Kerrigan, *Freedom of Movement, Case comment to Winder and Other v. DPP*, 1 J. CIV. LIB. 256 (1996) at 257.
697 Id. at 258.
not to disrupt. As they tried to figure out why the police want to arrest them, or where could be the legal problem in their conduct, they have been arrested. In the later proceedings the police consistently referred to section 69, and there was no say about aggravated trespass (section 68) any longer. The court, unfortunately, did not consider this to be a major flaw. The court of course realized that the appellants neither intended nor committed an offense under section 68, nonetheless, affirmed that the officer could reasonably believe they are intending to commit aggravated trespass, thus, he was entitled to remove, and, if failing, to arrest them under section 69. It is to be emphasized that section 69 (3) (power to arrest) only applies if a person knows a direction under subsection (1) above has been given which applies to him. In the Capon case it is quite apparent that the protestors did not know that a direction under s. 69 was given to them since the officer threatened to arrest them for aggravated trespass (s. 68 – i.e., no direction under s. 69 was given) which they knew they did not commit; that’s why they repeatedly explained their non-disruptive intention. Section 69 and the decision in Capon is a plain realization of the fears of Phil Scraton and others before the introduction of the POA 1985 which applies a regulatory technique similar to the 1994 CJPOA. Scholars have early prophesized that by penalizing not only the harmful act, but the resistance to a police officer falsely apprehending the danger of the harm, the government will effectively circumvent judicial review. This is one instance which clearly shows the vulnerability of reasonableness standard coupled with police discretion. More recent aggravated trespass cases dealing with anti-war protestors show similar tendencies, nonetheless the reasoning of the defendants are usually much weaker. There has been a considerable stream of protest and civil disobedience in the months preceding the outbreak of the Iraq war. Quite a few protestors were charged with aggravated trespass (s. 68 CJPOA) for entering a military base by putting a hole in the perimeter fence, chaining

themselves to gates, and for criminal damage (s. 1 Criminal Damage Act 1971) for proper
destruction of fuel tankers and bombers. Defendants mainly argued that they have a defense
because they intended to disrupt an unlawful activity, namely, the Iraq war, to their mind a
crime of aggression. The House of Lords jointly decided in R. v. Jones et al., [2006] UKHL
16, that appellants cannot rely on the defense that they wanted to prevent the commission of a
crime of aggression, and that’s why they committed aggravated trespass and criminal damage.
The disrupters and those who damaged military objects claimed that their conduct fits within
section 68 (2) CJPOA (prevention of offense by trespassing on land where unlawful activity is
going on and disrupting etc. that activity), and section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967 (reasonable
use of force for the prevention of crime), respectively. Perhaps to no surprise, the House of
Lords was unwilling to rule that the defense under section 3 is applicable to this international
law crime.701 The court only marginally dealt with the aspect of the case that it was about a
protest, even on a core political matter. Lord Bingham pointed out that as hindering the
military activities of the government can ground charges of treason in some cases, it would be
“strange if the same conduct could be both a crime and a defence” [31]. This argument, while
evident, is still formulated in an unsatisfactory manner: the question is, of course, how to
discover the boundary where the right to protest ends and treason begins. Here, again, it
would have been useful to consider the differences between disruption (or, as we have seen,
“reasonable” belief of a police officer about the (general) intention to disrupt an activity) and

701 The Lords unanimously rejected that the defenses in section 68 (2) CJPOA and section 3 Criminal Act 1967
would include prevention of crime of aggression. Among the arguments most important was the argument from
democracy, or, parliamentary sovereignty, according to which new criminal offenses can only be made by those
representing the people, i.e. the parliament, and it is neither for judges (since a unanimous House of Lords
decision in 1973, Knoller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions [1973]
AC 435.) nor for the executive. Secondly, there is the usual argument for judicial restraint in case of prerogative
power in foreign policy [30]. This self-restraint is connected with a particular factor of discomfort: courts shall
not adjudicate on crime of aggression since this would involve a judgment on the state itself of which the courts
form part [65]. Though this argument is mostly destroyed by previous precedent, and, by a general trend of
making individuals responsible for crimes under international law, Lord Bingham did not engage in any further
discussion, just stated the problem of “discomfort” as a self-evident necessity. The inconsistency of such a stance
with previous precedent is explained in Clive Walker, Defence: Appellants Protesting Against War in Iraq –
Defendants Committing Offences of Damage or Aggravated Trespass at Military Bases, Crim. L.R. 2007, JAN,
66, 69.
active destruction of property, since it is doubtful that the first could ever ground charges of treason. Lord Hoffmann was the only Lord who devoted some attention to the assembly or expression aspects of the case [§§ 69-94]. Lord Hoffmann conceptualizes the issues within the framework of self-help and use of force, no mention of protest and passive disruption occurs in the whole opinion. He first examined the due interpretation of self-help and use of force. [§§ 70-88] The prosecution argued that even if the crime of aggression were a crime in domestic law and the defendants honestly believed the UK was about to commit it, this would not justify their actions for the purposes of section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, which says that reasonable force can be used in order to prevent crime or facilitate the arrest of an offender. Again, the rather different defenses to different offenses were all dealt with uniformly as if there were no difference between intention to disrupt, and active damaging. That’s why the reasoning is fixated on section 3 of the Criminal Law Act and not on the underlying provision: section 68 (2) of the CJPOA. Drawing on a Court of Appeal precedent, Lord Hoffmann was willing to accept that in the construction of section 3 of the 1967 Act defense, the belief as to the existence of a crime being about to be committed should only be honest, but not necessarily reasonable. However, according to Lord Hoffmann, this does not mean that the defendant can use force which he deems reasonable though objectively it is unreasonable. Translated to the facts of the case this would mean: since defendants honestly believed that the UK is about to commit the crime of aggression, there is no need to examine whether this belief of theirs was reasonable or not. Nonetheless, it needs to be examined further if the force they used was reasonable in the light of objective standards.

The crucial question, …., is whether one judges the reasonableness of the defendant's actions as if he was the sheriff in a Western, the only law man in town, or whether it should be judged in its actual social setting, in a democratic society with its own appointed agents for the enforcement of the law. (§ 74) Lord Hoffmann even cites Max Weber in support of the view that the state claims monopoly of the legitimate use of force and individuals can only use force to the extent the state permits
it [76]. He even cites the famous passage on the state of nature from the *Leviathan* [77]. Certainly, there is not much to object to such an argument in relation to active destruction of property of military forces, but aggravated trespass might need to be handled differently. After having envisioned the disasters of returning into a Hobbesian state of nature, Lord Hoffmann moves on to draw the conclusion about use of force not in the interests of the acting person, but in the interest of the community. If self-help is already limited in case of imminent personal danger, then its use is even more circumscribed for the save of the community. Note this is the opposite of what the German court argued in relation to sitting blockades. One commentator put it this way: “public policies are for public forums or officials to settle”702, in the words of Lord Hoffman in § 83:

> The right of the citizen to use force on his own initiative is even more circumscribed when he is not defending his own person or property but simply wishes to see the law enforced in the interests of the community at large. The law will not tolerate vigilantes. If the citizen cannot get the courts to order the law enforcement authorities to act … then he must use democratic methods to persuade the government or legislature to intervene.

What is meant by “force”, and, “democratic methods”, however, have to be defined within the legal system. There is some room for the use of force; there are some cases when people are entitled to resort to force, a fortiori to protest. What form that protest might take should not be disposed of by an across-the-board Hobbesian reference, but is a question which requires further consideration. In the present case, it is obvious from the opinions of the Lords that the first recommended remedy, i.e. judicial way is moot, since courts are simply not willing to interfere with questions of legality of warfare. The Lords, inclusively Lord Hoffmann, just in the same judgment made quite an effort to prove that they are not willing. The argument in § 83 appears almost hypocritical if read in connection with further paragraphs of the judgment. Under the part on “Civil disobedience” Lord Hoffmann condemns in strong terms the new

702 Id. at 68.
phenomenon ‘litigation as continuation of protest’, in a way somewhat irreconcilable with his previous view about the role of courts. As to the democratic process, it can react quite belatedly, just as we might observe in relation to the Iraq war. In every other jurisdiction the protestors would have argued that that’s what they actually tried to do: to influence the democratic process; in accordance with the prime function of the right to protest and assembly. The Lords have not had any thought on freedom of assembly or even expression in general, and missed the opportunity of delineating more thoroughly disruption that has to be tolerated as exercise of freedom of expression, and force which might not be.

English courts so far do not see a reason to differentiate permissible from impermissible disruption. The broadening of aggravated trespass in *Winder* and *Capon* might even diminish the progress brought about by *Jones and Lloyd*703 – the trespassory assembly case declaring that assembly might be a reasonable user of the highway – because the unlawfulness of “more than mere preparation” via aggravated trespass then turns the assembly into an unreasonable use of the highway.704

The other provision applied to direct action protestors which gave rise to a jurisprudence showing the characteristics of English law in operation is obstruction of the highway. Here again protestors can go unpunished only if they show they somehow fit within the exceptions of the norm: a clash frozen halfway between a privilege and a right. The norm, Section 137 of the 1980 Highways Act – similarly to previous statutes – reads: “if a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he shall be guilty of an offence.” Lawful authority means for example a permission for holding a market, etc., while lawful excuse is more vague, thus it was the main object of litigation related to freedom of assembly. Most important appears to be *Hirst and Agu*705 from 1986.

Hirst and Agu were animal rights activists, participating at a protest in front of a shop selling

703 See *supra* text accompanying notes 401-408.
704 Similarly MEAD *supra* note 507 at 261.
furs. The protesters gathered in groups, handed out leaflets, held banners, etc. They were charged by willful obstruction of the highway, convicted, and their appeal dismissed by the Crown Court. The Crown Court’s main reason was that their use of the highway was unreasonable, thus, lacking lawful excuse, since it was not incidental to the right to passage. The Divisional Court, on appeal, rejected the incidental-to-passage reasoning, and held relying on *Nagy v. Weston*, 706 that the correct approach was the following:

1. whether there was an obstruction of the highway, which included any occupation, unless *de minimis*, of part of a road thus interfering with people having the use of the whole road;
2. whether the obstruction was wilful in the sense of deliberate; and
3. whether the obstruction was without lawful authority or excuse, which covered activities otherwise lawful in themselves which might or might not be reasonable depending on all the circumstances.

Magistrates’ court is required to check, and, more importantly, the prosecution to prove, whether a deliberate obstruction – with regard to its time, place, purpose and actuality/potentiality – amounted to an unreasonable use of the highway. The activity of which the obstruction consists should be inherently lawful. Thus, *Hirst and Agu* makes clear that protest and assembly which “obstruct” the free passage might still be reasonable in all the circumstances if it is otherwise lawful. Otton J. remarked in dicta that freedom of protest on issues of public concern should be given the recognition it deserves.

In *Stephen Birch v. DPP* 707 the Divisional Court had to examine whether *sitting on a road* as part of a demonstration has a lawful excuse. 708 The sitting caused traffic blockage, obstructing also vehicles unrelated to the business going on the protested premises. Mr. Birch upon being

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706 Nagy v. Weston, [1965] 1 All E.R. 78. In *Nagy*, the defendant was parking a van in a bus stop with a purpose of selling hot dogs, and was charged and convicted. The Divisional Court upheld the conviction, though it stated that “excuse and reasonableness were really the same and, while there must always be proof of unreasonable user of the highway, such user was a question of fact in each case, depending upon all the circumstances including the length of time the obstruction continued, the place where it occurred, the purpose for which it was done, and whether it amounted to an actual obstruction.”


708 Mr. Birch participated at a demonstration in front of the premises of SARP UK, near a busy main road. Together with other demonstrators he sat down on the road in order to obstruct the access of vehicles to the SARP premises.
asked by a police officer in vain to move since he was causing an obstruction was arrested for wilful obstruction of the highway. The Divisional Court distinguished out the facts from *Hirst and Agu*, and stated that handing out leaflets (the case in *Hirst and Agu*) is lawful while lying down in the road so as to obstruct the highway, is not on its face, a lawful activity [8]. This seems to be the main argument; others are not really present in the reasoning. Unfortunately, this is a circular reasoning: lying down in the road is only made unlawful by section 137 Highways Act if other conditions are also fulfilled. Among those other conditions the “otherwise” unlawfulness is explicitly stated in *Hirst and Agu*. The court in *Birch v. DPP* apparently mistakes the result for the ground of the result. Thereby, the court does not feel forced to engage in serious discussion of the argument of defendant, according to which protest and assembly can be reasonable lawful excuse. By rejecting that argument on its surface, the court has unfortunately ample material to cite from the trespassory assembly case of the House of Lords, *DPP v. Jones and LLoyd*. In *Birch* the weaknesses of *Jones* have become obvious: the primary right is traveling; the assembly cannot in any way obstruct that right. The other escape the court finds from dealing with the assembly aspect is again a recurring tool in UK jurisprudence. Just like in the recent 2006 House of Lords case on aggravated trespass, *R. v. Jones et al.*, (see above), the court in *Birch* also tends to blur two defenses: it applies the same reasoning to *lawful excuse* in case of obstruction of the highway on the one hand, and, to the logically more demanding *general defense for use of force* in case of prevention of (serious and imminent) crime, on the other.

In each of these cases UK law is structured in a way which disadvantages protest and demonstration, and only allows for accommodating that in the form of specifically justified exceptions in a given case. Thus, the level of criminalized (often only potential) disruption

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[709] See supra, text accompanying notes 401-408.  
[710] See supra, text accompanying notes 691-702.
and obstruction, and, within my categories, the threshold of what counts as impermissible coercion is in result quite low in UK law.

3. USSC: inconsistence masked by content-neutrality

Cases touching upon coercive expression by the USSC can usefully studied in three groups. A bulk of the relevant jurisprudence relates to labor picketing, another one to civil rights movement and Black-White tensions, and a third one to abortion clinic protests. The three topics are also three time periods, and social movement literature would roughly affirm that relevant jurisprudence came out coinciding with or right after the heyday of each topical movement. Labor protests and picket cases started to come to courts in the 19th century, but it was only in the first decades of the 20th century that picketing came to be seen as coercion by most courts and commentators. It took till 1940 for the USSC to find in Thornhill v. Alabama that picketing is protected by the First Amendment, and even after this decision literature and courts remained divided on the issue. It seems quite clear that after all the Supreme Court more or less settled on (i) rejecting that picketing as such amounts to coercion, but on (ii) recognizing that specific circumstances can amount to it, and for those cases the legislator has the power to regulate undisturbed by the First Amendment. In more recent decades the picketing-coercion issue took another turn related to the so-called secondary

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picketing. Secondary picketing means that the employees picket not their own employer, but another who is in contractual relationship with their employer. There has been a wave of legislation restricting secondary picketing which gave rise to considerable litigation. The Supreme Court decided that statutory text prohibiting secondary protests that would “threaten, coerce, or restrain” any person is vague and not specific enough.715
As to the civil rights movement, interestingly, sit-in cases are not so much shaping the law as one would expect, probably because the demonstrators were either completely peaceful or they deliberately engaged in civil disobedience. Characteristically of the handling of the sit-in cases is Barr v. City of Columbia. A restaurant served Blacks also to take out food, but disallowed them to sit at the lunch counter. When they refused to leave, got arrested, and convicted for breach of the peace. The USSC reversed for lack of evidence: as demonstrators were entirely peaceful, quiet and polite, and “the only evidence … is a suggestion that petitioners’ mere presence seated at the counter might possibly have tended to move onlookers to commit acts of violence.”716 Note however, that three justices would have upheld trespass conviction for the same act,717 as in so many other cases pointing out the difficulties in finding “state action”, thus the equal protection clause applicable to “privately owned places of public accommodation”.718 The idea that sit-in might be “coercion” has not even come up, they were considered a property-discrimination clash, but disposed of on procedural and other grounds. Indeed, sit-in demonstrations in courts were not even conceptualized as

717 Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice WHITE join, dissenting from the reversal of the trespass convictions. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 151 et seq.
involving the First Amendment, let alone freedom of assembly. In effect, it was implied that sit-ins are as such illegal; nonetheless, only mild sanctions were found acceptable. 719

As to leafleting and coercion – just as in the UK in Hirst and Agu – however, there was an important case in the sixties: in Keefe 720 leaflets were distributed against a real estate broker who apparently persuaded White people to sell their flats in neighborhoods which he managed to portray as becoming “Black.” The Court does not make clear if it accepts lower court’s characterization of the leaflets as having a coercive impact, but it makes a generous speech protective statement 721:

The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent’s conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, the famous boycott case reaching USSC in 1982 only is also a case in point. There the boycott of white, pro-segregationist merchants, supervised by civil rights activists was considered constitutionally protected. The Court, however, relied more on the substance of the boycott (to realize constitutionally mandated equality) than on questions of coercion. “[A] nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself” 722 cannot be restricted. The Court reminded that though fragmented acts of violence and threats of violence occurred, this was no sound basis to impose liability for all damages and losses occurred. A contrario, damages and losses proximately resulting from violence, intimidation and coercion could be constitutionally awarded. The Court did not have the occasion to clearly state what counts as coercion, because it found proven that (a significant parcel of)

721 402 U.S. 419.
damages were awarded for constitutionally protected activity.\footnote{An earlier case, Meadowmoor was distinguished out by saying that there violence was pervasive. To that decision Justice Black attached a dissent, opining that the injunction was overbroad because it not only restrained violent acts, but e.g. also expressing agreement with the views of those enjoined. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).} In any case, the possibility for regulating coercive expression was left open in these cases; but the strong language in both \textit{Keefe} and \textit{Claiborne Hardware} suggests that the threshold for intervention is quite high. Another, but rarely applied doctrine in U.S. law would be captive audience. To recall, in the landmark \textit{Skokie} case from the end of the seventies, the 7th Circuit\footnote{Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978).} struck down a Village of \textit{Skokie Racial Slur Ordinance} which made it a misdemeanor to promote or incite racial or religious hatred. Skokie intended to apply the ordinance to a Nazi march with swastikas and in military uniform planned by the National Socialist Party of America in a mostly Jewish neighborhood with Holocaust survivors. The USSC denied certiorari.\footnote{Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).} Circuit Judge Pell's reasoning relied mostly on the content-discriminatory nature of the ordinance and the lack of clear and present danger in the sense of \textit{Brandenburg v. Ohio}. The alleged infliction of psychic trauma, on the other hand, is insufficient to prohibit speech since there is no way to distinguish in principle such a harm from speech that is highly protected under the First Amendment, namely speech which “invite[s] dispute ... induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”\footnote{Collin, 578 F.2d at 1206, citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).} Offensiveness – including thus infliction of psychic trauma – is not a reason for restricting speech but rather a reason to protect it. Skokie also argued that the planned march would invade residents' privacy, thus the march would produce a regulable captive audience situation.\footnote{The referred cases are Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Rowan v. Post Office Department 397 U.S. 728 (1970), Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).} Judge Pell responded that there need be no captive audience since residents can avoid the Village Hall for the thirty minutes of the march if they wish. \textit{Skokie} thus seems to stand for the doctrinal stance that if one can avert his eyes from viewing a message, then he is not captive, and the
speaker can rely on the First Amendment. Earlier cases also support this stance, and it has been strongly reinforced recently in *Snyder v. Phelps*, in which a father of a soldier killed in Iraq could not claim torts against Westboro church picketing during the funeral as it was 1000 feet away out of sight of the mourners, even assuming that the protest was tortious.\footnote{Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011), more on the circumstances and the arguments see infra text accompanying notes 1125-1130.}

An example of the situation when the eye cannot be averted came in *Virginia v. Black* (2003),\footnote{Virginia v. Black, *supra* note 506 and infra text accompanying notes 895-898.} a good contrast to *Skokie* to emphasize delineation between coercion and free speech. In this case the Court accepted that cross-burning can be prosecuted if committed with the intent to intimidate, as an instance of *true threat*.

Captivity was found – unlike in *Snyder* – sufficiently severe to justify restriction in *Frisby v. Schultz*, where the USSC upheld that offensive and disturbing picketing focused on a “captive” *home* audience can be restricted.\footnote{Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), 484-488.} This decision is among the first relating to the abortion protest controversy, which radically changed the legal environment of protest in the US. The main cases on protest next to abortion clinics (not to doctor’s homes as in *Frisby*) is *Madsen*,\footnote{Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).} *Schenck*,\footnote{Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).} and *Hill*,\footnote{Hill v. Colorado, 503 U.S. 703 (2000).} discussed also above under prior restraint\footnote{See *supra* text accompanying notes 350-352.} and below under place restrictions.\footnote{See infra text accompanying notes 1141-1148.} In these strongly criticized cases the USSC upheld restrictions on protest and counseling activities in 36 and 15 feet buffer zones around clinics and restrictions on noise as content-neutral, a view really hard to share at closer look.\footnote{For a discussion see infra text accompanying notes 1141-1148, or from the many critical voices e.g. Timothy Zick, *Property, Place, and Public Discourse*, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173 (2006), Darrin Alan Hostetler, *Face-to-Face with the First Amendment: Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network and the Right to “Approach and Offer” in Abortion Clinic Protests*, 50 STAN. L. REV. 179 (1997).} Captive audience was referred to as justifying the noise restrictions,\footnote{Madsen, 512 U.S. 767 et seq.} in my view in harmony with general First Amendment logic. The abortion protest jurisprudence is more suprising in the aspect that it
allows to restrict speech way more than obstruction, intimidation, or threat, in a quintessential forum (public street), simply entering an area. As to the content-neutrality, Justice Scalia in *Madsen* quotes the judge who issued the injunction making very clear that the injunction should apply – indeed it was applied – to persons who are not aware of the injunction, who have come to the area the first time, as they are acting “in concert” with organizations (cited in the injunction, like the violent Operation Rescue) in case they express an anti-abortion view. All in all, the relatively consistent and generous jurisprudence towards sit-ins and coercive speech clearly breaks in the abortion protest cases, hardly masked by allegations of content-neutrality. A similar, or even worse trend might be in the make with regard to “animal rights” or environmental protests, facilitated by this jurisprudence.

4. France: pressure inherent in strike

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738 “At an April 12, 1993, hearing before the trial judge who issued the injunction, the following exchanges occurred: Mr. Lacy: “I was wondering how we can—why we were arrested and confined as being in concert with these people that we don’t know, when other people weren’t, that were in that same buffer zone, and it was kind of selective as to who was picked and who was arrested and who was obtained for the same buffer zone in the same public injunction.” The Court: “Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on the other side of the issue [abortion-rights supporters] were also in the area. If you are referring to them, the Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side of the issue, because the word in concert with means in concert with those who had taken a certain position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic. If you are saying that is the selective basis that the pro-choice were not arrested when pro-life was arrested, that’s the basis of that selection....” Tr. 104–105 (Appearance Hearings Held Before Judge McGregor, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Seminole County, Florida (emphasis added)). And: John Doe No. 16: “This was the first time that I was in this area myself and I had not attempted to block an entrance to a clinic in that town or anywhere else in the State of Florida in the last year or ever. "I also understand that the reason why I was arrested was because I acted in concert with those who were demonstrating pro-life. I guess the question that I’m asking is were the beliefs in ideologies of the people that were present, were those taken into consideration when we were arrested? 


French law accords strong protection to the right to strike, a consideration of a certain importance to the relation between freedom of assembly (in the broad sense) and “coercion”. Though the right to strike is the right of the salaried, and “political strikes” are explicitly not included in the concept of strike, the limits of the right to strike probably would equally if not even more strictly apply to demonstrations, or any direct action type protest. The Conseil Constitutionnel specifically accepted that to prevent or disturb rail traffic by a positive action, going beyond sheer stoppage of work, like putting an object on the railroad is not protected by the right to strike. The positive action outside constitutional protection would thus presumably include e.g. lying down on the rails, or other similar, nonviolent action where the body itself is obstructing some lawful activity. Though I have not found any detailed theorization on the question, this seems to be somewhat below the German standard. Besides, the right to strike includes picketing, but the Penal code prohibits interference with the freedom of work by concerted and menacing behaviour, including blocking the entrance, but strictly only against co-workers. A classic form of direct action, blockade of the highway has come before the ECHR. In that case, French courts – though not all of them – found that halting the traffic by halting the vehicles was unlawful, while driving at a very low speed (10 km/hr) appears still within the right to strike (more precisely, within industrial action as voted by the trade union).

741 § 7 of the Preamble to the Constitution 1946, incorporated in the block of constitutionality by Décision n° 71-44 DC du 16 juillet 1971, affirmed specifically as to the right to strike by 79-105 DC du 25 juillet 1979 by the Constitutional Council.
743 81-127 DC des 19 et 20 janvier 1981, considérants 20-21, in effect limiting the interpretation by excluding the proscribability of disturbance and prevention of railroad traffic by simple stoppage of work.
744 Article 431-1 Code Pénal. This same provision prohibits also the interference with freedom of demonstration.
746 Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, Audience publique du mercredi 23 avril 2003, N° de pourvoi: 02-84375, Publié au bulletin.
747 Barraco c. France, Requête n° 31684/05, arrêt de 5 mars 2009., §§ 12-17.
5. ECHR: no violation

The Commission declared the German anti-missile sit-down cases inadmissible in earlier cases,\(^{748}\) embracing some sort of a speech-action theory in emphasizing that

the applicant had not been punished for her participation in any demonstration as such, but for particular behaviour in the course of the demonstration, namely the blocking of a public road, thereby causing more obstruction than would normally arise from the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly.

This argument is still cited by the Court.\(^{749}\) Thus, though some level of disruption (e.g. to traffic) has to be tolerated according to the ECHR, as discussed above, but purposeful blocking, especially for several hours, is certainly not required to be tolerated under Art. 11. Recently, the demonstration blocking a central bridge in Budapest for several hours was understood (not decided, as that was not the issue) clearly illegal by the ECHR.\(^{750}\) The issue to be decided was the dispersal of a later demonstration – in support of the dispersed bridge blockade – halting vehicular traffic and public transport in and around a main square. The Court found that proportionate, especially as the demonstrators could express their solidarity with the illegal bridge blockade as their demonstration was only dispersed after several hours (§ 42), despite the fact that it seriously disrupted traffic and was not notified. In a more recent case, a suspended jail and fine was found not violating Art. 11 for at least sporadically blocking and entirely slowing down a French highway for five hours, causing traffic jam for ten hours. In *Barraco* the fact that the applicant has several times halted his vehicle was the main consideration to find that the burden caused “went beyond the simple disruption


\(^{749}\) Barraco c. France, Requête n° 31684/05, arrêt de 5 mars 2009., § 46: “le requérant n’a pas été condamné pour avoir participé à la manifestation du 25 novembre 2002 en tant que telle, mais en raison d’un comportement précis adopté lors de la manifestation, à savoir le blocage d’une autoroute, causant par là-même une obstruction plus importante que n’en comporte généralement l’exercice du droit de réunion pacifique. (voir G. c. Allemagne n° 13079/87, décision de la Commission du 6 mars 1989, DR 60, p. 256).”

\(^{750}\) Éva Molnár v. Hungary, Application no. 10346/05, judgment of 7 October 2008, § 10 and 41.
occasioned by every demonstration on the public route.”

Thus, it is left open to what extent slowing down, but not halting, vehicular traffic would be protected under the Convention. The Court in both the Hungarian and the French case emphasizes the relevance of police tolerating the disturbance for several hours.

Sometimes not even actual blockade is required for the permissibility of restrictions. In a 2003 case, removal (dispersal probably), a four-hour detention and a 150 GBP fine were found proportionate restrictions in a case where the applicant demonstrated at the entrance at a naval base in protest against the UK retaining a nuclear marine. Testimonies diverged about whether there was any vehicular traffic blocked by applicant, the arresting officer saying there was none. Still, the ECHR declared it inadmissible. Thus, the actual threshold for proscribable direct action protests under the ECHR might be quite low.

6. Interim conclusion as to coercion

ECHR’s cautious stance might well be due to the fact that European states – certainly the ones examined here – also are not clear and consistent about where coercion starts and freedom of assembly ends, but provide a very fragmented picture. The German compromise appears though quite clear, it is anything but principled. The USSC, at least in the last few decades, does not fare any better either, protecting interests way below coercion or intimidation, even obstruction. This must mean at the same time that my focus on coercion is inadequate to the structure – if there is any – of law in this field. But what else should make out human rights law than an effort to find the boundary between freedom and coercion? Some would say it is dignity; thus that is where I now turn.

Barraco c. France, Requête n° 31684/05, arrêt de 5 mars 2009. § 47: “Cette obstruction complète du trafic va manifestement au-delà de la simple gêne occasionnée par toute manifestation sur la voie publique.”

Lucas v. UK, Application no. 39013/02, inadmissibility decision of 18 March 2003.
DIGNITY AS PUBLIC ORDER – FROM THE INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITY TO GROUP LIBEL TO STATE HONOR

To what extent an assembly – intuitively, but by far not exclusively, rather a demonstration – is capable of violating human dignity is a very abstract question, nonetheless a question some courts aspire to answer. The concept of dignity, especially in law, is very controversial, but still better than e.g. public order. Without first trying to give a definition on my own, I take the following as a critical inquiry on whether the protection of human dignity can form a reasonable, tangible basis for restricting assembly and protest rights.

1. Dignity and its substitute “public peace” in German law

As it is well known, the German Basic law recognizes as its highest (and inviolable) value human dignity in its very first article, and makes respect for and protection of it the duty of all state organs. It is unconditionally protected, cannot even be waived, and cannot be limited, i.e. every interference with the scope of human dignity is in itself a violation. There is thus no possibility to find a balance or compromise whenever human dignity is at stake. Human dignity is the most frequent among so-called verfassungsimmanenten Schranken, i.e. constitutional limits not named as such in the provision of a particular basic right. For example, the seemingly illimitable assemblies which are not under the open sky still are subject to the limit of human dignity. Human dignity is also the ultimate candidate to anchor the protective duty of the state and the radiating indirect horizontal effect of other basic rights – both can be used to constitutionalize the interest that is counterbalanced against freedom of

assembly. What is more, human dignity itself appears to be directly binding even among private persons, in horizontal relations\textsuperscript{754} but even if not, the highly respected German Civil Code has in any case been transposing to private law most of what would follow from the direct effect of Art. 1 I,\textsuperscript{755} especially in relation to expressive activities. Thus, rightly or wrongly, human dignity can pose a “real threat” to freedom of assembly from various angles. It is useful to follow the court’s division of dignity arguments in German law into those related to either assertions of facts or expression of opinions. This latter involves an evaluation, taking a stance, a value judgment, and as such it enjoys definitely more protection than factual statements which are either true or false, and no personal stance is seen in their utterance, i.e. factual assertions are not so close to an individual’s personality as are opinions. I will start out the discussion with factual statements, and then continue with opinions. The most important decision regarding a factual statement’s potential to violate dignity is still the Holocaust denial decision from 1994,\textsuperscript{756} where the Court found a prior ban justified by a future likely violation by human dignity. The occasion was a meeting (i.e. not an open-air assembly) on the “blackmailability” of German politicians, organized by the Bavarian branch of the National-democratic (sic!) Party of Germany (NPD) in Munich. David Irving was also invited as a speaker, and it was likely that Holocaust denial would occur. The local authority in Munich imposed a condition on the organizer to guarantee that no denial of the Holocaust would happen at the meeting, or in such a case to dissolve the meeting. The imposition of the condition was meant as a less restrictive means than outright ban, because the law allows for prior ban if the commission of criminal acts is to be expected with high probability. Denying the Holocaust involved the crimes of incitement of the people (§ 130 StGB, Volksverhetzung), defamation (§ 185 StGB, Beleidigung), and disparagement of the memory of the dead (§ 189, StGB, Verunglimpfung des Andenkens Verstorbener) in the interpretation of ordinary courts.

\textsuperscript{754} KUNIG, \textit{id.} Rn. 27 zu Art. 1.
\textsuperscript{755} Id.
\textsuperscript{756} BVerfGE 90, 241 (1994).
The main issue before the GFCC was whether that interpretation is constitutional, or, more precisely, whether denying the Holocaust is outside the protection of the constitution. First, the Court had to decide which right is applicable here at all. As explained above,\footnote{See under Demonstration and the relation between freedom of assembly and freedom of opinion, supra text accompanying notes 230-236.} as is typically the fate of freedom of assembly, the Court distinguished Art. 8 out, and relied solely on freedom of opinion. That this really is a strained view of the constitution is intensified by the fact that Art. 5 does not appear to protect factual statements, and what is more, it is interpreted not to really cover them, unless they form the basis of an opinion. If that is not enough, before the Holocaust denial decision, factual statements proven false were considered clearly outside the scope of Art. 5 because,\footnote{BVerfG (3. Kammer des 1. Senats), Beschuß vom 09-06-1992 - 1 BvR 824/90, BVerfG: Strafrechtliche Bewertung der Leugnung der Judenvernichtung, NJW 1993, 916.} so the Court thought, false factual assertions cannot form the basis of opinions. However, the Holocaust denial decision says that though such lies on their own are not protected, when they are “inextricably connected to opinions”,\footnote{BVerfGE 90, 241, 253: Verbinden sie sich untrennbar mit Meinungen, so kommt ihnen zwar der Schutz von Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG zugute, doch wiegt ein Eingriff von vornherein weniger schwer als im Fall nicht erwiesener unwahrer Tatsachenangaben.} Art. 5 I will cover the expression. While Holocaust denial – as knowingly proven false factual statement – is in itself outside constitutional protection as many commentators emphasize,\footnote{E.g. GISO HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, NEONAZISTISCHE VERSAMMLUNGEN, GRUNDECHTSSCHUTZ UND GRENZEN, (Shaker, 2005) at 31 et seq with further notes.} I think it is unrealistic for it ever to happen without being connected to opinions. In any case, the imposition of the condition interfered with an exercise of a constitutional right in the Munich meeting with David Irving. The interference is however justified because denying the Holocaust would violate the dignity of Jews living in Germany, especially of survivors of the Holocaust or their descendents. It violates their dignity, because, as the BGH stated and GFCC quotes with affirmation:\footnote{BVerfGE 90, 241, 251 et seq., (Engl. translation) in the web site of The University of Texas School of Law, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/ (copyright Professor B. S. Markesinis).}

“The historical fact that human beings were separated in accordance with the descent criteria of the so-called Nuremberg laws and were...
robbed of their individuality with the objective of their extermination gives to the Jews living in the Federal Republic a special personal relationship to their fellow citizens; in this relationship the past is still present today. It is part of their personal self-image that they are seen as attached to a group of persons marked out by their fate, against which group there exists a special moral responsibility on the part of everyone else and which is a part of their dignity. Respect for this personal self-image is for each of them really one of the guarantees against a repetition of such discrimination and a basic condition for their life in the Federal Republic. Whoever seeks to deny those events denies to each of them individually this personal worth to which they have a claim. For those affected, this means the continuation of discrimination against the group of human beings to which he belongs, and with it against his own person” (BGHZ 75, 160 [162 f.]).

Some might find the suggestion that the Shoah (the decision only talks about persecution of Jews) is part of the identity of Jews living in Germany somewhat stigmatising, but I take that there has been an overwhelming political – or moral even – consensus in Germany that mandates such a label. After all, I could not find any critique of this identity denial theory, neither asking how courts are entitled to such construction, nor actually about why only Jews living in Germany appear to be the victims. Doctrinally, to limit the circle of defamable persons is important from both a criminal law and a constitutional law viewpoint. In criminal law, for a defamation charge to stand, there needs to be a particular, clearly definable circle of persons. Women, Christians, etc. would surely not be sufficient. The GFCC in the Tucholsky or Soldiers are murderers ruling – of which there will be more discussion below – made also clear that though a certain concept of group libel is not inconceivable under the Basic Law, it is not any vague or general group about which a negative statement can form the basis of restriction on expression.

The Holocaust denial case left some doubts about whether it relies on the personal honor clause in Art. 5 II, which would mean that the dignity rationale is a value argument underpinning the personal honor restriction, or it takes the dignity right of Art. 1 I as a

762 Valerius, BeckOK StGB § 185, Rn 8-10.1, in BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR StGB (von Heintschel-Heinegg ed., 15th ed. 2011) with references to several decisions of the BGH and other courts.
763 BVerfGE 93, 266 (1995).
separate restriction inherent in the constitution. The question is important because of content neutrality issues. The prohibition of Holocaust denial is clearly a viewpoint-based restriction. Art. 5 II lists as limits of the right first “general laws”, and thus the question arises as to whether laws protecting personal honor are to be general laws as well. This question was not unequivocally decided in my view until the 2009 Wunsiedel-Rudolf Hess march decision, which clarified that protection of personal honor can only be pursued in general laws.\textsuperscript{764} The requirement of a general law was already included in the Weimar constitution, and the GFCC still appears to combine the somewhat conflicting scholarly views of the time. General law is thus first a law which is not a \textit{Sonderrecht} against freedom of opinion, i.e. it does not differentiate between opinions “solely because of their intellectual direction”;\textsuperscript{765} secondly, a general law regulates “regardless of a specific opinion”\textsuperscript{766} and thirdly, the social good protected by the general law is one which ranks higher than freedom of opinion.\textsuperscript{767} All these three appear in the \textit{Lüth} decision of the GFCC in one sentence divided by commas,\textsuperscript{768} complemented by the so-called interdependency or mutual reaction doctrine [\textit{Wechselwirkungslehre}] which prescribes that the limit of “general law” itself is to be interpreted in the light of the significance of the right to freedom of opinion, and, secondly, by the imperative of ad hoc balancing, i.e. a fine-tuning of restrictions according to the particular facts of the case.\textsuperscript{769} Thus, one can take the Holocaust denial case as saying either that the limit on freedom of opinion is the higher-ranking human dignity, or that in terms of the \textit{Wechselwirkungslehre}, the value of the expression of a statement made with knowledge of its falsehood is so little that it cannot exert a significant countereffect on the limit of personal honor itself.

\textsuperscript{764} BVerfGE 124, 300, 326 (2009) - Rudolf Heß Gedenkfeier or Wunsiedel.
\textsuperscript{766} Rothenbücher, VVDStRL 4, 20 (1928) as quoted by WENDT, id.
\textsuperscript{767} Smend, VVDStRL 4, 52 (1928) as quoted by WENDT, id.
\textsuperscript{768} BVerfGE 7, 198, 209 \textit{et seq}. (1958).
\textsuperscript{769} BVerfGE 7, 198, 208 (1958).
What is sure is that the Holocaust denial decision of the GFCC decided the constitutionality of Holocaust denial as defamation, subsumed under § 185 of the German Penal Code, an offense against the person, not against public order. The GFCC explicitly declined to address the rest of the grounds on which the condition was based (including § 130, incitement of the people). However, the legislature after the decision of the GFCC added a new offense, § 130 III, to the Penal Code, penalizing approval, denial or belittlement of the genocide committed under the Nazi rule if it is committed in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace. Note that § 130 III does not refer to human dignity, and the crime is placed among offenses against public order. The GFCC has not scrutinized § 130 III, i.e. the Holocaust denial provision, but again everybody appears to take it for constitutional. Thus I read the whole situation in this way: expressing approval, denial or belittlement of the genocide committed under Nazi rule is in itself a violation of human dignity or personal honor of Jews living in Germany, and thus, no other condition is constitutionally required. That the legislature included the requirement that the manner of the expression be also capable of disturbing the public peace is fully within its power, as the provision is thus a less extensive restriction than would be constitutionally permissible.

Denying the Holocaust is however not the only way dignity arguments find their way into discussions on assemblies and demonstrations, but as I said above, value judgments and opinions can also sometimes amount to a violation of dignity, or personal honor. Earlier case

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770 Verbrechensbekämpfungsgesetz v. 28. 10. 1994. A commentator explains that the new provision was added – redundantly, as Holocaust denial has been subsumed (and prosecutable without private motion) under defamation since 1985 – after the Federal High Court (the BGH) has overturned a decision because the lower court erred in classifying an incident of Holocaust denial under incitement of the people by callumious agitation instead of defamation. See Günter Bertram, *Der Rechtsstaat und seine Volksverhetzungs-Novelle*, NJW 2005, 1476, 1476 and FN 4. Still I think it is fair to be noted that the clear benefit of the provision of incitement of people over defamation is the more severe sanction, but also that there is no defense of proof, i.e. the deniers cannot abuse the court system to actually further promote their agenda.

771 Cf. also the BGH’s decision affirming the condemnation of an Australian for putting online in Australia material denying the Holocaust. BGHSt 46, 212 - Volksverhetzung im Internet. The issue was only whether public peace can be disturbed via internet. The Court declared that the internet posting posed a “threat suitable to disturb severely the thriving coexistence of Jews and other population groups and to prejudice their reliance on legal certainty.” (my translation) BGHSt 46, 212, 220.
law would be applicable for instance against symbolic displays at assemblies which aim at *vilification* [Schmähkritik] of a particular person. For instance, a placard showing a person – even a politician – as a copulating pig would be violating human dignity for its “bestial” nature and “depersonalization”. However, this does not go as far as to prohibit calling a politician a “coerced democrat” and a “strongman” whom some Germans admire just as they embraced the Führer. In a different political setting, an NPD election campaign placard with the slogan “Stop the Polish invasion!” displaying two crows extending a leg towards Euro banknotes was found constitutionally proscribable as a violation of dignity, it appears, again because of the equation of humans with animals. In contrast, the Court considered the slogan “Send foreigners back home – for a German Augsburg worth living in” (*Aktion Ausländer-rückführung – Für ein lebenswertes deutsches Augsburg*) as not violating human dignity. The slogan could not only be interpreted as expressing an opinion of the worthlessness of foreigners because a city with foreigners is not worth living in. Rather, the sentence can – and then constitutionally is required to – be understood also as part of a more general agenda of creating a German city worth living in. Though even understood this way, foreigners are certainly portrayed as a problem, but they are not denied their right to life and equal worth in the community, or so the Court says. The Court was criticized for reconstructing the meaning this way (as very often happens), but praised for keeping the scope of „killer argument” human dignity narrow.

Another aspect of the problem of statements disparaging groups is the definition of a group. The most important case in this regard remains the already mentioned *Tucholsky* or *Soldiers*

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See BVerfGE 75, 369 (Political Satire case).

See BVerfGE 82, 272 (1990) (Stern-Strauss or Zwangsdemokrat).

BVerfG (1. Kammer des Ersten Senats), Beschluss vom 4. 2. 2010 - 1 BvR 369/04 u.a., NJW 2010, 2193.

See the many references in Kirsten Teubel, *Deutung einer Äußerung - willkürliche Rechtsanwendung?*, NJW 2005, 3245.

See e.g. Friedhelm Hufen, Meinungsfreiheit für rechtsextremistische Parolen? – Verfassungswidrige Verurteilung wegen Volksverhetzung, JuS 2011, 88, 90.
are murderers cases\textsuperscript{777}, related and joined cases about different persons claiming at different occasions in pamphlets, on armbands and banners, in a newspaper, etc. that soldiers are murderers or trained or potential murderers.\textsuperscript{778} The Senate judgment found the expressions protected by Art. 5, but maintained both the fact/opinion distinction and the possibility of group rights prevailing over expression, and, in contrast to the Holocaust Denial case, it earned less agreement among the German judiciary and academia.\textsuperscript{779} Having remanded the case because ordinary courts did not accord sufficient weight to freedom of expression in the balance, it did not strike down the norm itself, Art. 185 of the Criminal Code which criminalizes Beleidigung (insult, libel, defamation) – \textit{e.g.} for vagueness. Also, the Court expressly approved the applicability of libel provisions to defamation against state authorities, because “without a minimum social acceptance, state institutions cannot carry out their duties.”\textsuperscript{780} This protection however does not go as far as to shield institutions from public criticism,\textsuperscript{781} which is “especially guaranteed” by Art. 5. The Court emphasizes the importance of ad hoc balancing, fine-tuned to the interests at stake in the given case, but there are a few yardsticks. Human dignity always prevails over freedom of opinion, and the weighing also must ensure that due weight is given to human dignity as the underlying, ultimate value for every fundamental right and the whole constitutional system. Further, the Court says freedom


\textsuperscript{778} The discussion of the Tucholsky rulings draws on, Orsolya Salát, Interpretative Approaches to Freedom of Expression in Germany, the United States and Canada: The Impact of Free Speech Theories on Adjudication, (unpublished LL.M thesis, Central European University, 2006) 68-71.


\textsuperscript{780} BVerfGE 93, 266, 290.

\textsuperscript{781} E.g. the GFCC overturned a condemnation for disparagement of the state when a person in strong words recalled the 1980 Oktoberfest attacks (13 deaths and 200 injuries), intimating that the criminals were a Nazi group, and the state deliberately omitted prosecution because of still existing sympathies with Nazism, BVerfG, 1 BvR 287/93 vom 29.7.1998, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 52), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk19980729_1bvr028793.html.
of opinion also has to yield to honor protection in the case of vilifying insults or formal
defamation (e.g. the case with the copulating pigs), which nevertheless has to be interpreted
quite narrowly, and has almost no applicability in discourse which essentially affects the
public. Thirdly, the Court recites the obligation to assign an objective meaning to the
utterance, taking into account the context in which it was made. As to the “Soldiers are
murderers” statements, the Court emphasizes the difficulty of line-drawing between violation
of the personal honor of members of a collective on the one hand, and legitimate and highly
protected criticism of social institutions, like the military, on the other. Therefore, it is not
enough that the defamatory statement refer to an identifiable group, but it is also necessary
that the group be “conceivable,” i.e. not so large that the defamation cannot be seen as
directed at an individual member of the group. The mentioned examples of a group unsuitable
to be victims of libel are Catholics, Protestants, trade-union members and women. This much
is an affirmation of the criminal law jurisprudence of the BGH.

The GFCC adds that

in the case of accusations addressed to large collectivities, it is mostly
not individual misbehavior or individual traits of group members that
are concerned, but the unworthiness of the collectivity and of its social
function from the point of view of the speaker.

Note that at the same time it also implies that group libel can be asserted in case of vilification
or formal defamation. This, however, will be a rather rare case, since it requires personal
insult pushing the issue of discussion completely to the background. This might occur
especially if the disparaging assertions relate to “ethnic, racial, physical or mental
characteristics from which thus the inferiority of a group supposedly derives”. This thought
clearly underlies the Polish invasion and other cases which I discussed before the Tucholsky
rulings.

782 BVerfGE 93, 266, 300.
783 Id. at 304.
The German court thus very clearly sees the problem that dignity arguments might spill-over to discussions of matters of public interest or core political speech, but instead of directly declaring that public persons and collectivities do not have much personality rights, or that the state has protectable honor in any sense – as the USSC basically declared – it tries to find a more sophisticated distinction between public matters and attacks against a person. I am somewhat hesitant of whether that is possible, but clearly here one faces a perimeter issue, as some would claim in the U.S. such statements are controlled by general social norms of decency, while in Germany they are controlled by law. Also, it is remarkable that the German court explicitly upholds the honor of state institutions as a possible interest worthy of protection. One might speculate that the German court fears leaving the state unable to protect itself against subversion, or even perhaps expresses some sort of militant-democratic fears. Similarly to the stance of the GFCC on flag disparagement, here also a possibility is left open for even worse times, when law might need to be used more openly for holding together the state itself. This is both very unprincipled and risks being misused, also because the Basic Law provides other means for militant democracy, but still I see no other reason why the Court would explicitly stress the “defamability” of state institutions. Note also that the Court explicitly reconstructs the contested expression as referring to soldiers of the world, and not only to soldiers of the Bundeswehr – the latter would be conceivable enough to be protected against defamation, notwithstanding the fact that the army is a state institution par excellence, and there is no world military. The Tucholsky rulings also suffer from an artificial reconstruction of whether “soldiers are murderers” is a factual statement or an opinion. I think it clearly is both (as basically most controversial statements are), but the GFCC struggles to explain that the murder is not meant in the way criminal law understands it, and also, that it cannot be a factual statement, as everybody knows that the Bundeswehr (i.e. the post-WWII

784 See infra text accompanying notes 925-949.
785 BVerfGE 93, 266, 302.
786 BVerfGE 93, 266, 306.
West-German army banned from actively participating in armed hostilities) has not killed anyone.\textsuperscript{787} Clearly, this in no way excludes the meaning that soldiers – on occasion\textsuperscript{788} – necessarily (would) kill as that is the nature of the job, a factual statement.

In any case, the jurisprudence discussed so far is by far not the end of the story between expression and dignity-like arguments in Germany. Or, one might say, because many considered the reach of the dignity argument to be seriously restricted by the GFCC, other types of arguments were brought up, first by other courts, and most recently, in the Hess memorial march decision, by the GFCC itself. A long controversy between the OVG North Rhine-Westphalia and the GFCC resulted from the OVG NRW’s sheer refusal to bend to the GFCC with regard to Neo-Nazi demonstrations. The OVG stubbornly held that Neo-Nazi demonstrations as such are either not protected by the constitution at all, or can be constitutionally banned.\textsuperscript{789} The OVG NRW claimed that the constitution includes such inherent limits as would prohibit ex ante the promotion of National Socialism and thus permit a prior ban on Neo-Nazi marches. These limits include not only human dignity, but also structural principles\textsuperscript{790} of democracy, federalism, and the rule of law, the right to resist (all these permanently entrenched by the eternity clause of Art. 79 III). Further, the de-Nazification provision of Art. 139, and Art. 26 I \textsuperscript{791} proclaims that actions capable of disturbing and intended to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples, in particular the waging of a war of aggression, are unconstitutional. All these limits were rejected by the


\textsuperscript{788} Georgios Gounalakis, „Soldaten sind Mörder“, NJW 1996, 481, 485.

\textsuperscript{789} Which one of the two is not clear even to an author who wrote a whole doctoral dissertation on this subject: HELLHAMMER-HAWIG, supra note 862 at 48 et seq.

\textsuperscript{790} Art 20 I talks about the federal state (Bundesstaat), not exactly federalism, as implied by the OVG.

\textsuperscript{791} Art. 26 (1) Handlungen, die geeignet sind und in der Absicht vorgenommen werden, das friedliche Zusammenleben der Völker zu stören, insbesondere die Führung eines Angriffskrieges vorzubereiten, sind verfassungswidrig. Sie sind unter Strafe zu stellen.
Federal Constitutional Court in several decisions, and in this sense the controversy is only politically interesting. Two ramifications which might relate to it still need to be noted. The first one is the federalism reform which transferred the competence to regulate freedom of assembly to the Länder in Germany, and second, the Hess memorial march decision of the GFCC from 2009.

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The federalism reform from 2006 resulted in the possibility for each Land to adopt a fully new regulation on assemblies, or a partial one where the Federal Assembly Law remains valid in the unaffected provisions, or not to adopt any Land law at all. In this latter case, the Federal Assembly Law remains effective in its entirety. A few Länder had already introduced regulations of both sorts, and the Federal Constitutional Court has even already decided on the constitutionality of the Bavarian assembly law. Most of the changes relate in one way or another to extreme right wing activities, which have been on the rise ever since German reunification especially, but by far not exclusively, in the Eastern Länder. Legislative reactions can be understood as attempts to find new ways of fighting “extremism”. The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence has been thus presumably found to be of little help not only by the OVG NRW.

In anticipation of Neo-Nazi marches around the Brandenburg Gate and the Holocaust Memorial for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II for Germany on May 8, 2005, a new paragraph IV on incitement of others was added to § 130 of the criminal code. The new

792 But see the interesting jurisprudence on Holocaust Memorial Day under I. Special days of the year: the notion of public order in Germany, infra text accompanying notes 856-864.
793 For an overview see Johannes Lux, Die Bekämpfung rechtsextremistischer Versammlungen nach der Föderalismusreform, LKV 2009, 491.
794 BVerfG, Beschl. v. 17. 2. 2009 – 1 BvR 2492/08, NVwZ 2009, 441, see also supra text accompanying notes 546 – 547. For an overview of the Bavarian law see Khwaja Mares Askaryar: Das bayerische Versammlungsgesetz – Überblick über wesentliche Änderungen gegenüber dem Bundesversammlungsgesetz, KommJur 2009, Heft 4, 126
provision renders punishable by a fine or up to three years of imprisonment anybody who publicly or in an assembly disturbs the public peace by approving, glorifying or justifying the tyrannical and despotic National-Socialist rule [nazionalsozialistische Gewalt- und Willkürherrschaft] in a way which violates the dignity of the victims.\footnote{New para. 4 to Art. 130. Abs. 4 eingef., bish. Abs. 4 und 5 werden Abs. 5 und 6 und geänd. mWv 1. 4. 2005 durch G v. 24. 3. 2005 (BGBI. I S. 969)} The Constitutional Court has found the provision constitutional, albeit not on grounds of dignity, despite the fact that the text itself includes the requirement of violation of human dignity. The occasion for the Court’s judgment was a series of banned marches in memory of Rudolf Heß in Wunsiedel with mottos like “He chose honour over freedom”. The prior bans were based on the likelihood that criminal offenses under Art. 130 IV would occur, which then can be prevented by applying Art. 15 of the Assembly Law. The Constitutional Court issued preliminary decisions not to suspend the ban on the marches before substantive review. The decision on the merits came out in 2009, after the applicant had eventually died. The Court decided the case for reasons of general constitutional significance despite the death of the applicant, and I think quite rightly so, as it found a whole new basis for dealing with recurring shadows of the past.

The Court found that the provision is in none of the above senses a general law, and, thus it cannot be justified under Art. 5 II. It also made clear that the personal honor as limit to freedom of opinion can only be interpreted in connection with the requirement of a general law. It then follows that human dignity can also only be protected by general laws according to Art. 5 II.\footnote{BVerfGE 124, 300, 326.} In the discussion of what counts as general law, the Court introduces – or reaffirms as it claims\footnote{BVerfGE 124, 300, 324, referring to BVerfGE 47, 198 (232).} – a version of content-neutrality where viewpoint discrimination is not permitted. Laws which refer to the content of an expression of an opinion have to be phrased in a sufficiently abstract and open way to be capable of subsuming different
ideological views on the subject,\textsuperscript{798} in order to qualify as general laws. I think this more or less coincides with the differentiation in U.S. law between subject-matter restriction and viewpoint-based restriction. Clearly then Art. 130 IV does not qualify as a general law under Art. 5 II, as it only penalizes glorification of the National-Socialist tyranny.\textsuperscript{799} That would explain why it is to no avail that the provision also requires a violation of human dignity, the highest value in German constitutional law. Human dignity thus does not authorize \textit{Sonderrecht} (at least in cases of opinion, as opposed to false factual statements), which is, I think, a normatively correct clarification by the Constitutional Court. In this regard, it still has to be noted that the Court in the last part of the opinion basically reads the element of a violation of human dignity out of the statute. Possibly, this serves twin purposes – not only to avoid overburdening authorities with the duty to repeatedly prove that the very stringent requirement is fulfilled (as the Court finds the restriction constitutionally justified for other reasons), but also to avoid dangerously watering down the concept of human dignity.\textsuperscript{800}

If not human dignity, then what would justify such a non-general, viewpoint-discriminatory law, which clearly also goes against the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of political conviction spelled out in Art. 3 GG? The Court explains that the \textit{Unrecht} and horrors of National-Socialist rule brought over Europe and large parts of the world “elude general categories”, and the creation of the FRG is to be understood as a counter-draft (\textit{Gegenentwurf}) to that. Therefore, in Art. 5 GG inheres an exception from the requirement of general law for provisions which aim at preventing a propagandistic affirmation of the National-Socialist tyranny between 1933 and 1945.\textsuperscript{801} It is as though the Court finds that the uniqueness of the “radical evil” of the NS regime is not graspable under the general rules of reason. More

\textsuperscript{798} BVerfGE 124, 300, 324.

\textsuperscript{799} It remained unclear to me if the viewpoint discriminatory nature lies in the glorification element or in the fact that it is only nationalsocialist tyranny which is in focus, not e.g. communist tyranny or any totalitarian regime as well. Common sense dictates either both, or the latter, as no effort to criminalize denigration of nationalsocialist rule is on the horizon of rational lawmakers.

\textsuperscript{800} The technique applied is a textual distinction between human dignity in Art. 1 GG and dignity of the victims in Art. 130 IV StGB, a somewhat surprising differentiation. BVerfGE 124, 300, 344.

\textsuperscript{801} BVerfGE 124, 300, 327.
pragmatically, it adds that “the advocacy of this rule in Germany is an attack on the identity of the polity with a potential to threaten the peace inside. To this extent it [the advocacy] is incomparable with other expressions of opinion, and last but not least is capable of causing profound disquiet also abroad.”

Still, it does not mean that the GG would contain a general fundamental principle against National-Socialism. The militant democracy provisions of the GG first kick in when an “active fighting-aggressive stance against the free democratic basic order” is taken. Consequently also in the realm of freedom of opinion, a merely intellectual endorsement will not suffice, but the violation of a concrete legal value (Rechtsgutverletzung) or a recognizable endangering situation is necessary for expression to be restrictable.

This is true even for the current exception of propagandistic affirmation of NS rule from 1933-1945, and thus, even though the requirement of general law is suspended, the law and its application still have to pass the normal proportionality review, i.e the regulation has to be capable and necessary of achieving a legitimate aim, and the restriction has to be necessary to the aim pursued, and proportionately balanced with freedom of opinion.

Art. 130 IV StGB protects the legitimate aim of public peace, which is however to be interpreted narrowly. Public peace is too broadly conceived if it is to grant protection “against subjective disquiet of the citizens resulting from confrontation of provocative opinions and ideologies”, and it is intended to preserve only “social and ethical views considered fundamental.”

Note that the similarly defined public order is not accepted to justify content restrictions, only modalities according to a different strain of case law. Disquiet caused by the content of an opinion is the “other side of freedom of opinion”, and its protection would

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802 BVerfGE 124, 300, 329.
803 Art. 9 II, 18, 21 II. (criminal associations, abuse and forfeiture of rights, party ban)
804 BVerfGE 124, 300, 329.
805 BVerfGE 124, 300, 333.
806 See under 1. Special days of the year: the notion of public order in Germany, infra text accompanying notes 856-864.
eliminate the “principle of freedom itself.”  

Public peace however can be constitutionally interpreted to mean only the prevention of “unpeacefulness.” Those opinions whose “content is recognizably animates toward acts endangering legal values [rechtsgutgefährdende Handlungen], i.e. they are a transition to aggression and breach of law”, are a violation of public peace. The preservation of public peace refers to the external effects of expressions of opinion, e.g. by emotionalized appeals which evoke in the addressed audience “a willingness to act” or which “reduce inhibitions” or “intimidate any third party directly”, or so the Court asserts with illustrations.  

Art. 130 IV properly (geeignet) protects public peace when it criminalizes the approval, glorification etc. not of ideas, but of the historically concrete National-Socialist tyranny, with its real crimes (which are singular in history, and whose inhumanity [Menschenverachtung] is not to be outdone). Approval, glorification and justification are intense enough to typically result in a danger to public peace. The Court goes on to find the restriction both necessary (no less intrusive means) and proportionate in the narrow sense, meaning it realizes a “careful balance” between freedom of opinion and public peace, and especially that the restriction does not penalize pure expression of right wing radicalism or ideas related to National-Socialism. The Court similarly upheld as constitutional the application of Art. 130 IV to the present case of a memorial march for Rudolf Heß, the “substitute of the Führer”, who was co-responsible for the massive human rights violations of the regime; thus, the glorification of his person is a glorification of the historical National-Socialist tyranny.  

The decision was mildly criticized for the tension between the justification of the provision as non-general law, and the rejection of the existence of an anti-National Socialist founding

807 BVerfGE 124, 300, 333.  
808 BVerfGE 124, 300, 334.  
809 BVerfGE 124, 300, 336.  
810 BVerfGE 124, 300, 337 et seq.  
811 Thus, it was correct for the Federal Administrative Court to conclude that a march in his memory would realize approval of the nationalsocialist tyranny. It raises neither questions under Art. 5, Art. 8, or under Art. 103 II, the nullum crimen sine lege guarantee. BVerfGE 124, 300, 342 and 345.
principle. Another author argues that finding a new “inherent constitutional limit”, outside Art. 5 II, is both doctrinally and politically wrong. Also, the difference, if any, between the stance of the OVG NRW and the GFCC appears to be blurred after the Wunsiedel decision, even though the GFCC explicitly refers to the OVG NRW as being in error. The OVG NRW would exclude from constitutional protection the expression of a commitment to National Socialism, while the GFCC appears to carve out an exception “only” for positive evaluation of the historical National Socialist tyranny, provided that it threatens to violate legal values covered by the concept of a narrowly understood public peace. Time will tell if in practice the purported or alleged narrowness of public peace indeed makes a difference, or if expressing a commitment to National Socialism necessarily requires (will be interpreted to require) intimidation, emotional appeal, transition to aggression, or any such allegedly concrete violation of public peace. These questions will sort themselves out in time.

Long-term questions are raised though by the juridification of the claim that there are facts which go beyond generalizable categories of human comprehension. If human dignity is already an activist concept worth keeping narrow, then this overcompensates in the other direction – law is taking over in an area where law’s logic is said not to operate. How can legal coercion be based on an argument out of incomprehension or inconceivability? Can the radical evil be consistently countered by a violation of the categorical imperative? At the practical level, the GFCC clearly tries to narrow the scope of Art. 130 IV. But is there really a difference between advocating National Socialist principles and advocating them with reference to the historically realized practice of National Socialism? A balance so strenuously


814 Similarly VOLKMANN, supra note 812 at 419 and PAYANDEH supra note 812 at 940.
sought here appears to be sought just for the sake of balance, so that it can be said that there is yet a more intrusive means, i.e. also banning the simple distribution of ideas, and if there is a more intrusive means, then the present solution is one where there is no less intrusive means.

2. France: dignity as public order and officially declared truth

In France, free speech in general is even more restricted than in Germany, and those restrictions equally apply to assemblies. For lack of a human rights conscious case law, it is very hard to decipher what constitutional value justifies the far-going and very diverse restrictions, which cannot all be described in this thesis. In any case, an illustrative example is the remarkable combination of human dignity and public order as grounds of justification (where public order is the legitimate aim, and the proportionality of the restriction is enhanced because it protects human dignity). At least, this mixed argument appears both in a well-documented decision of the Conseil d’État, discussed below, and, independently, in a scholarly analysis contrasting French and American perspectives on Holocaust denial and officially declared truth.

Defamation on the basis of race or religion was criminalized in France in 1939, suspended by the Vichy regime, and then reinstated in 1946. Since 1972, provocation to discrimination, hatred, or violence against another person for reason of their origin, belonging or non-belonging to an ethnic, national, racial or religious group, has been punishable under the law on the press, for the same reason as defamation. In addition to public prosecutor and/or victim, the minister of justice and non-governmental organizations are also entitled to initiate proceedings. Also, the defense of truth was abolished with regard to such defamation.

817 Loi no 72-546 du 1er juillet 1972 relative à la lutte contre le racisme, available http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19720702&numTexte=&pageDebut=06803&pageFin=
prominently, the loi Gayssot from 1990 penalizes “any racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic act” and “any discrimination based on someone's belonging or not belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a religion”, and makes it a crime to “contest or call into question the existence of one or several crimes against humanity as defined in Article 6 of the statutory regulations of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the August 8, 1945 London Agreement, and involving crimes committed either by members of an organization declared criminal pursuant to Article 9 of the regulations or by a person convicted for such crimes by a French court or an international court.”

“Public abuse”, “incitement to racial hatred”, “praising war crimes”, “trivializing crimes against humanity” etc. are all criminalized in French law, and sentences are normally accompanied by quite heavy criminal fines.

French prosecutors often appear to use these provisions against political opponents of the government. For instance, two leaders of the extreme right wing party Front National have already been convicted under the Gayssot law, and Jean-Marie Le Pen was also sentenced for other crimes such as “public abuse”, “incitement to racial hatred”, “praising war crimes”, etc. These provisions could not give rise to any constitutional litigation (as the QPC procedure was not set up yet, and preliminary review was not initiated by either MPs or government, even though the loi Gayssot was very much debated among French intelligentsia), but international human rights forums like the Human Rights Committee (Faurisson) and the ECHR (Garaudy, Le Pen, Gollnisch in a different case than discussed...
below) found no violation of their right to freedom of opinion or even research (with Gollnisch and Faurisson). At the ECHR, most of these cases are declared inadmissible, relying often on Art. 17 ECHR (abuse of rights), or just simply manifest ill-foundedness. The Cour de Cassation, in 2010, decided, – for lack of a serious question of constitutionality (!) – not to submit to the Constitutional Council a newer case involving loi Gayssot in its very first decisions handed out in the QPC procedure. In a one-paragraph reasoning (half of which is the description of the delict), the highest French court sitting in civil and criminal matters simply declares that the law refers to texts regularly introduced to French law, is clear and precise, and thus is not in conflict with constitutional principles of freedom of expression and opinion.821 Thus, there was absolutely no discussion in any sense of constitutional or human rights, no discussion of means and ends, proportionality, etc. What is more, any future assessment would be blocked as QPC may be initiated only once on any given provision.

This is all the more troubling because of the following. While some of the convictions under the loi Gayssot were handed down in clear cases of denying the existence of death camps or gas chambers,822 other statements hardly can be qualified as denial. Gollnisch, the second

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821 Arrêt n° 12008 du 7 mai 2010 (09-80.774) - Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité - Cour de cassation. This is the reasoning: “la question posée ne présente pas un caractère sérieux dans la mesure où l’incrimination critiquée se réfère à des textes régulièrement introduits en droit interne, définissant de façon claire et précise l’infraction de contestation de l’existence d’un ou plusieurs crimes contre l’humanité tels qu’ils sont définis par l’article 6 du statut du tribunal militaire international annexé à l’accord de Londres du 8 août 1945 et qui ont été commis soit par des membres d’une organisation déclarée criminelle en application de l’article 9 dudit statut, soit par une personne reconnue coupable de tels crimes par une juridiction française ou internationale, infraction dont la répression, dès lors, ne porte pas atteinte aux principes constitutionnels de liberté d’expression et d’opinion

most important figure in the Front National at the time, and a professor the University of Lyon, was sentenced under the Loi Gayssot because (i) he claimed another professor of history was, though respectable, not impartial in preparing a report on racism and Holocaust denial at the University of Lyon as he was Jewish (a statement which in general falls under discrimination in French law), and (ii) because of a – later withdrawn – statement that the number of persons killed in the Holocaust should be an issue left for historians to freely discuss. This latter remark was the main catalyst of the controversy. He explicitly said he did not deny the existence of deaths in gas chambers. He received a three-month suspended sentence, was fined 5000 euros, and was ordered to pay 55,000 euros in damages and also for the publication of the decision in newspapers. However, finally the Cour de Cassation annulled the sentence, a move apparently unexpected in the so predictable French legal system where the judge is merely the mouthpiece of the law. In the light of this annulment in 2009, it is really surprising that a year or so later this very same Court blocked the way to constitutional review in QPC. Lower courts themselves showed they were willing to construct a “contestation of crimes against humanity” from statements explicitly “denying” denying those crimes, on the one hand, and other statements which are critical of the law’s reach in declaring an official truth, on the other. Still, the Cour de Cassation found the law was clear and precise and not in need of constitutional check.

A less questionable, but still characteristic conviction under the loi Gayssot relates to Le Pen’s so-called “detail” remark. He said that in books on World War II, the Holocaust takes up a few pages and gas chambers a few lines, and “that’s what one calls a detail”. Disgusting as it might be, he did not deny the existence of either the Holocaust or the gas chambers, nor even

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823 See Weaver et al. supra note 816 at 499-504.
825 See Weaver et al., supra note 816 for a total lack of a possibility of reversal.
said they were understandable or explicable events (no justification). Still, his words can be interpreted – and I suppose were meant to be – a belittlement (Verharmlosen – trivialization), i.e. something German law would also find reprehensible, though that is exactly where I am not sure if it is in line with the constitutional reasoning of the Holocaust Denial case. It is one thing to deny a part of one’s identity, and another to say it was a small element during the war, the latter being clearly an opinion. In any case, these are of no concern to French courts, and it is not so easy to unequivocally establish what is.

As most of the decisions are not publicly available, and the ones that are have very sparse reasoning, here I turn to scholars (who also often rely on the press, even in cases where the decision was not ordered to appear in the press). Scholars think that such far-going restrictions are necessary firstly to protect the dignity of the victims, and secondly because of public order fears – a clear heckler’s veto, as the French normally start disruptive protests when public persons, especially university professors, are saying such kinds of things. Finally, restrictions like the loi Gayssot are said to be necessary to prevent French people from forgetting the Holocaust, and that fear is increasingly justified as survivors are aging and passing away. Human dignity seems strongest here, or it is closest to what can be conceived of as a right of another person in terms of the general limit in Article 4 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. Bertrand de Lamy contemplates the refusal of the Cour de Cassation to transfer the loi Gayssot to the Conseil Constitutionnel and notes that human dignity is also embedded in the preamble to the 1946 constitution. Public order also clearly acts as a limit to freedom of opinion in Art. 10. Most problematic is certainly the legally enforced official history in the third explanation. This is, however, widely practiced in

826 WEAVER ET AL., supra note 816 at 508.
827 Id.
828 WEAVER ET AL., supra note 816 at 509.
829 Bertrand de Lamy, QPC: refus de transmission, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE 2011 p. 178. The preamble to the 1946 constitution, referred to in the preamble to 1958 constitution, and thus having constitutional value: “Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui ont tenté d’asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ou de croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés.”
France through *lois mémorielles*, largely without normative content apart from the Gayssot law\(^{830}\) and might in any way be in harmony with the strong role of the state in framing the proper “consciousness of the French” as has been visible e.g. in the Islamic veil debate, and lately in the burqa controversies.\(^{831}\)

The Conseil d’État also makes use of the first two arguments, although it combines human dignity and public order in such a way that the latter includes the former. This kind of combination has been accepted in French law since the dwarf throwing (exact translation of the French *lancer de nains*)\(^{832}\) decision in which it was declared that one cannot waive their human dignity, because it is part of public order, and even if one freely, in all liberty, wants to be the thrown person in a show of that kind, it is necessary and proportionate for the local authority to prohibit it because of troubles to public order.\(^{833}\) In relation to freedom of demonstration, the Conseil d’État held that it can have its limits in the interest in antidiscrimination and human dignity, this latter being part of ‘public order’. Recall that in the famous “soupe gauloise” or “soupe au cochon” decision\(^{834}\) the Conseil d’État decided that the ban on food distribution organized by an extreme right-wing group (SDF – Solidarité des Français, SDF is otherwise a common acronym for ‘Sans domicile fixe’, i.e. homeless) with a

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\(^{830}\) Loi n°83-550 du 30 juin 1983 relative à la commémoration de l’abolition de l’esclavage, loi n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés. i.e. the law on colonisation, Loi n°2001-70 du 29 janvier 2001 relative à la reconnaissance du génocide arménien de 1915, devoid of any normativity. The planned law criminalising denying the Armenian genocide was quashed as unconstitutional. Décision n° 2012-647 DC du 28 février 2012, but that does not affect the validity of the Gayssot law.

\(^{831}\) For my view that laïcité starts overpouring to the private sphere in a way not true to its traditions see below Part II.C. MANNER, infra text accompanying notes 1010-1024.


\(^{833}\) The reasoning is basically these two paragraphs: Considérant qu’il appartient à l’autorité investie du pouvoir de police municipale de prendre toute mesure pour prévenir une atteinte à l’ordre public ; que le respect de la dignité de la personne humaine est une des composantes de l’ordre public ; que l’autorité investie du pouvoir de police municipale peut, même en l’absence de circonstances locales particulières, interdire une attraction qui porte atteinte au respect de la dignité de la personne humaine ; Considérant que l’attraction de "lancer de nain" consistant à faire lancer un nain par des spectateurs conduit à utiliser comme un projectile une personne affectée d’un handicap physique et présentée comme telle ; que, par son objet même, une telle attraction porte atteinte à la dignité de la personne humaine ; que l’autorité investie du pouvoir de police municipale pouvait, dès lors, l’interdire même en l’absence de circonstances locales particulières et alors même que des mesures de protection avaient été prises pour assurer la sécurité de la personne en cause et que celle-ci se prêtait librement à cette exhibition, contre rémunération.

probable racist animus does not violate freedom of assembly.\textsuperscript{835} As both the Gallic soup case and the numerous memorial laws testify, the threshold for speech to violate human dignity and equality is both lower in France and has a wider application to groups than in Germany. In addition, the Conseil d’État is not preoccupied at all with the problematic of horizontal application of human rights, since it includes human dignity and antidiscrimination in the concept of public order without any further ado. The reference to public order appears to “etatize” or “verticalize” the balancing, but it is nonetheless a fiat of will to say that public order includes this kind of protection against offensive speech, even without any further showing that actual disturbances to public order would otherwise occur. The lack of any showing of material harm contrasts nicely with the U.S. American approach, to which I now turn.

3. United States, UK and ECHR

In the First Amendment jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, dignity does not have such a privileged status as in Germany or France, or, to be precise, dignity does not figure as a legal value in relation to speech, especially political speech in public assemblies. In comparisons of U.S. and German free speech law, it is a well-known assertion – basically the only one, reiterated and restudied ad nauseum – that all the above-mentioned German cases which rely on dignity would fall under \textit{New York Times v. Sullivan} or \textit{Hustler v. Falwell}, including Holocaust denial or bestializing depiction of politicians or public persons, or claiming that soldiers are murderers, or offering Gallic soup (or, let’s say, steak) to the homeless. Campus hate speech codes are a special, and extremely controversial, field of regulation whose analysis goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Situations similar to those conceived as involving speech-dignity clashes elsewhere are partly conceived under the

\textsuperscript{835} See the discussion \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 416--421.
fighting words doctrine, but largely are not seen at all as situations giving rise to restrictions on speech. Regarding the proscribability of group libel, the USSC’s jurisprudence consists of at most two cases, one of them likely obsolete. After the Second World War, the Court upheld a kind of group libel statute in an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter. In Beauharnais v. Illinois\(^{836}\) (1952) there was a call for “Whites to unite” in order to stop murder, rape etc. committed by Blacks against Whites and similar allegations. The statute as construed by state courts allegedly only limited fighting words, but not completely in the sense of Chaplinsky. The most important characteristic of the Chaplinsky doctrine, i.e. the direct personal attack against an individual, was notably missing. The USSC, in a five-to-four decision, nonetheless upheld Beauharnais’s conviction under the group libel statute. Justice Frankfurter’s opinion stresses both the need for deference to the legislature in questions of scientific evidence about harmful effects of racial hatred and the need to protect both individuals and groups against libel. The relevance of the ruling is questionable, since both Brandenburg v. Ohio\(^{837}\) and the Skokie cases\(^{838}\) rely on opposite premises and resulted in opposite outcomes. Though Beauharnais was never overruled, its relevance seems to have eroded.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul\(^{839}\) from 1992 is the next case where the USSC struck down a group libel or hate speech statute, albeit on content neutrality grounds which I will then examine under MANNER of the expression.\(^{840}\) Here it suffices to emphasize the very characteristic feature of First Amendment doctrine, whose default reflex leads it to discuss cross burning as fighting words, i.e. in terms of reaction of the target of the cross burning, and with absolutely no hint of human dignity. In Virginia v. Black, the cross-burning case from 2003, the question

\(^{837}\) Part II. B. 2. The would-be disorderly: judicial doctrines of risk-assessment applied to the right to assembly 2.2.3. Counter-demonstration 2.2.3.1. United States, supra text accompanying notes 522-529.
of “intimidation” arose, which was largely translated by the Court as true threat.\textsuperscript{841} Again, human dignity just does not figure in the discussion at all, clearly because it is considered so vague, devoid of any requirement of material harm that no justified restriction on the right to free speech can be constitutionally based upon it.

In the United Kingdom, dignity does not shape the law on protest either. Though free speech law in general is more restrictive than in the US, – \textit{e.g.} stirring up racial and religious\textsuperscript{842} hatred have been criminalized, not only incitement to unlawful action – the UK keeps its focus on consequential harm, certainly not below European average. However, another provision, section 5 POA proscribes the use of “threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior likely causing harassment, alarm, or distress”, which is often applied to situations where German or French law would operate with the mixture of dignity and public order/peace.

\textit{Hammond v DPP}\textsuperscript{843} involved an evangelical Christian holding a sign inscripted with “Stop immorality”, “Stop Homosexuality” and “Stop Lesbianism”. The message was unwelcome by the audience who then threw mud and poured water on Hammond. Hammond’s conviction was affirmed by the Divisional Court, which sought to test whether the expression was “legitimate”, and finding it was not.\textsuperscript{844} \textit{Norwood v. DPP}\textsuperscript{845} was about a BNP politician displaying a poster from his own window stating that “Islam out of Britain” and “Protect the British people” next to a photo of 9/11 twin towers in flame, and a crescent and star surrounded by a prohibition sign. Art. 10 was found to be overstepped as the display was not an intemperate criticism of the tenets of Islam, but an “insulting attack” on its followers. Again, Norwood was supposed to prove that his conviction was unreasonable or

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{841} Virginia v. Black, \textit{supra} note 506, text accompanying note 729 and \textit{infra} text accompanying notes 895-898.
\textsuperscript{842} For an argument that the new offense introduced in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is redundant see Ivan Hare, \textit{Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred}, P.L. 2006, Aut, 521-538.
\textsuperscript{843} Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin).
\textsuperscript{844} For more discussion see MEAD \textit{supra} note 507 at 226-227.
\textsuperscript{845} Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin).
\end{footnotes}
disproportionate, an undertaking which remained unsuccessful. In these cases remarkably deprived of any sense of the human rights approach, the audience (the “victim” of insult) suffices to be a hypothetical onlooker.\footnote{For more discussion see MEAD supra note 507 at 224-229.} In Hammond no concern of heckler’s veto played a role either, and hostile audience reaction was rather seen as confirmation of the insulting character of Hammond’s speech.

In Abdul v DPP\footnote{Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin); [2011] Crim. L.R. 553.} protestors against soldiers returning home shouted “burn in hell”, “rapists”, “baby killers” and “terrorists”, and were convicted under section 6 POA, just as Hammond and Norwood were. These utterances constituted “a very clear threat to public order” according to the Court (§ 52 i), despite the fact that neither arrest, nor any other police measure was taken at the demonstration, but only later, after having watched a film shotage of the event.\footnote{For more detailed comment see Alex Bailin, Criminalising free speech? CRIM. L.R. 2011, 9, 705-711} In light of Norwood, Hammond and Abdul, without relying on a specific interest or value of human dignity, UK law restricts hostile expression related to group identity to a greater extent than German, and perhaps even French law.

In the jurisprudence of the ECHR, dignity does not figure as an important concept either, which is partly due to the fact the Convention does not contain a right to human dignity. This does not mean that dignity-like interests are not very much protected in other areas of the jurisprudence, especially under article 8, sometimes in conjunction with article 14. Nonetheless, quite clearly, the cases argued under dignity and public order-public peace in Germany and France would largely be inadmissible under the ECHR, for reasons of article 17,\footnote{On Holocaust denial see Garaudy v. France, Application no. 65381/01, Inadmissibility decision 24 June 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-I.} prohibition of abuse of rights, or for simply being unfounded. E.g. the request of Solidarité des Francais, the organization distributing the pork soup was declared
inadmissible.\textsuperscript{850} Norwood was also declared inadmissible.\textsuperscript{851} Lehideux et Isorni is however a case which shows that the ECHR accords greater protection to offensive speech than France. In that case, representatives of an association cultivating the memory of Maréchal Pétain were found guilty of apology of the crimes of the collaboration, a criminal offense. Applicant endorsed the so-called double game theory by praising Pétain as “supremely skilful”, while condemned “Nazi atrocities and persecutions” or “German omnipotence and barbarism”.\textsuperscript{852} The ECHR found violation of Art. 10 as there occurred no Holocaust denial, and applicants’ statements are rather to be interpreted as part of an ongoing debate in history and historical identity of the French, considering also that the prosecution withdrew from the proceedings.

4. Interim conclusion on dignity

Dignity-type arguments arise especially in Germany and France, in relation to the Holocaust, Jews, people of color, immigrants, and so on. Therefore, dignity in law acts like a buffer between different groups, it basically functions as protecting social identity, as a perimeter. That’s why in some jurisdictions, dignity appears to mingle with public order, also a dubious concept of at times identity, at times authoritarian, and again other times militant democracy overtones. German legal language here focuses on the individual, while in French law the focus on discrimination might signal a more collective identity-based approach.

On the basis of this chapter, it might appear that those countries which do not use dignity as limit to assembly or expression grant higher protection to it. I will try to show it is not exactly true in the last part, especially as in the US content-neutrality doctrines limit assemblies more

\textsuperscript{850} “…un rassemblement en vue de la distribution sur la voie publique d’aliments contenant du porc, vu son message clairement discriminatoire et attentatoire aux convictions des personnes privées du secours proposé, risquait de causer des troubles à l’ordre public que seule son interdiction pouvait éviter.” Association Solidarité des Francais c. France, n° 26787/07, décision de 16 juin 2011 (irrecevable).

\textsuperscript{851} Norwood v. UK, Application no. 23131/03, Decision on the admissibility of 16 November 2004.

than dignity in Germany. But before that I quickly sketch another possible limit, property, explaining also why most of the potential issues are discussed elsewhere in the thesis.

**PROTECTION OF PROPERTY: THINGS OR PLACES**

The exercise of freedom of assembly ought not to cause damage to property – this would be the instinctive view. Freedom of assembly is about gathering in certain public places, while property is about disposing of, using etc. certain things, so the two generally should never even coincide. True, looting or destruction (arson especially) might be just as expressive as the 9/11 attacks and the collapse of the Twin Towers, but this does not mean any court or legislator would ever want to consider it an exercise of a basic right. Such an activity not only is a violation of the rights of others, thereby justifying its restriction, but is rather simply outside the scope of the right itself as unpeaceful. Similarly, all kinds of purported material damage to others’ property are not protected by the right to free assembly anywhere. These core or classic instances of property protection might thus amount to a limit to free assembly, either as doctrinal limits if the scope of assembly is very broad (e.g. as one of the legal goods protected under public safety in German law), or as being outside the scope as unpeacefulness. Apart from these common-sense, in law apparently unproblematic cases, there are a few borderline situations which involve property rights, but where in my view, the property aspect is minor compared to other aspects. Thus, I discuss these situations elsewhere in the thesis.

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853 In opposition to Moscovici’s suggestion, see above, any organizer of contemporary Saturnalia is self-conscious enough to do everything to prevent damage to property, just as law is clearly on the side of no destruction of “material values”. Might not ultimately be correct, but this mediocre way is so much embedded in our culture and law, that there is not much sense in trying to delegitimize it. Also, it is generally perceived that experience showed that allowing free reign for destruction is simply too dangerous, way beyond the destruction of shopwindows and cars.
854 *Supra* text accompanying notes 534-535.
The practice of direct action protests, discussed above, even if often countered by legislation strengthening property protection, is concerned more with the avoidance of coercion, and less with free enjoyment of property; thus, I discussed it above. Other activities sometimes conceived as trespassing by law include intrusion on publicly owned places, e.g. military facilities. Therefore, such issues are either discussed as direct action (i.e. coercion), or as a particular place restriction.\footnote{Infra text accompanying notes 1124-1234.} Firstly, there is a very significant difference between places owned by the state, which are in public hand, and fully privately owned places. The main reason for this difference is that the state does not have fundamental rights, and a second reason is the functionality of publicly owned places, and their importance for the common (political) life of the polity. Furthermore, it remains to be properly theorized, researched, experimented and deliberated to what extent private property which is open (in effect, built to be open) to the public should be also opened up for the exercise of fundamental rights such as freedom of assembly. While I admit that there does not seem to be any neat solution so far on the horizon in this regard, I wish to emphasize that 19th century or even Roman law concepts of property cannot be of much help here. The extended areas of the shopping mall or the airport have not always existed and cannot then be understood, explained and judged according to concepts which were adopted in view of tiny, individual retail shops, or let’s suppose, horse or railway stations. The marketplace used to take place on public property. I am not sure, however, that these kinds of concerns can be accommodated by theories of social binding of property, a doctrine which would then stay within established constitutional property framework (at least in German law). That would require for instance saying – by analogy to the \textit{Mitbestimmungsurteil} of the GFCC – that the shopping mall or the airport should be operated for the benefit of the consumers and the benefit of the consumers includes exercise of fundamental rights. This would be all the more artificial (or even authoritarian) as
the consumers want to be left to shop in peace and most probably consider protestors a 
nuisance.

These are the reasons why I discuss the problems of “private public places” under place 
restrictions below, and not under the rubric of property right as a substantive value.

In the instances which clearly are classic property violations, such as looting, of course, 
freedom of assembly should not be applicable, and there does not seem to be any controversy 
arising in relation to it. Other cases of intruding or disturbing the enjoyment of private 
property include controversies related to abortion clinics and protests around residences. 
Nonetheless, the first is rather a question of coercion and privacy flowing from the 
specificities of the place, while the latter is clearly a privacy – and not a property – interest, 
again bound to the functionality of the space in question, i.e. the home.

The following, last chapter approaches the limits of freedom of assembly not from the 
perspective of what counts as substantive counterweight. The question asked is how courts 
react to restrictions on those aspects which distance assemblies clearly from the paradigmatic 
object of free speech, i.e. the argumentative essay. These aspects relate to the use of the 
semantic potential of time and place, and modes and means (“manner”) of assemblies in 
generating the message.
C. THE CONTENT WITH FORM IN SO-CALLED MODAL LIMITS: SMALL LIMITS LOOMING LARGE

As it was shown in the first part, sociology reaffirms very clearly that also groups of people – protestors and demonstrators – make use of nonverbal expressive tools, like visual symbols, chants, noises, dance, walking in formation, and many more. Specific places and specific dates or even times of the day are picked because they mean something. In “performances” of protests which have more a repertoire than a scientific method of argumentation, form and modality evidently matter. What follows is a discussion of how constitutional and human rights law treats these aspects of assemblies in a structure echoing a familiar categorization of US law: time, manner, and place restrictions.

TIME

1. Special days of the year: the notion of public order in Germany

Germany is the prime example where assemblies may not take place on special days of the year if additional conditions are fulfilled. The Constitutional Court has accepted a postponing condition imposed on a Neo-Nazi march which was scheduled for the 27th of January which is the Holocaust Memorial Day in Germany. The justification accepted was that an extreme right wing march on that very day would disturb public order, i.e. a concept normally less adequate for restricting basic rights than its related concept of public safety since Brokdorf. Public order includes those “unwritten rules that the currently predominate social and ethical views consider must be followed as an indispensable condition of an ordered human coexistence within a particular territory.” As such, it is not normally sufficient to justify a ban on an assembly. In the present case, however, the Court found that it is possible to rely on

856 Brokdorf, BVerfGE 69, 315, 352.
public order considerations if the restriction resulting is only a delay by one day of the planned demonstration. Such delays are constitutional as “public order is affected if a particular day has such an unequivocal meaning in society with a significant symbolic force and the planned march would attack upon that very meaning in a way which at the same time significantly violates fundamental social or ethical views.” Such is the case with an “extreme right wing” march on the day of remembrance of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp on January 27, 1945, proclaimed the official day of remembrance to the victims of National Socialism. The decision, however, did not discuss in detail competing interests of the speaker, as the organizer of the march explicitly claimed he was not aware of the day’s significance, and on his own also “booked” the next day, January 28th, when it became likely that the march would not be allowed to go on on the 27th. Thus, the Court declared that the organizer did not show “an interest in need of particular protection” to march exactly on the 27th of January. Furthermore, the case went to the Constitutional Court for preliminary suspension of the ban (“condition”), and this “urgent” procedure only allows for correcting the most obvious mistakes committed by ordinary courts and authorities. Thus, significantly, in the procedure before the GFCC the argument was not raised and discussed that the date should be available for “protest” exactly because the date means something. Still, the GFCC would probably find a “delaying condition” constitutional even if the very purpose of a march would be (explicitly) to protest Holocaust Memorial Day itself, or any related topic. In another decision the Court even declares that to avert endangering of public order it is possible to restrict freedom of assembly if it is the Art und Weise, i.e. the manner or modality of the realization of an assembly, and not the content which gives rise to concerns.

The Court sketches three examples. Accordingly, it is permissible to restrict “aggressive and provocative conduct of participants which intimidate the citizens, through which demonstrators create a climate of violent demonstration and a climate of potential readiness to violence.”

The next example of more interest to us here is the extreme right wing march on Holocaust Memorial Day, provided in addition that “from the manner and modalities of the realization of the assembly provocations arise which significantly encroach upon the ethical sentiments [sittliches Empfinden – note that the expression employed conspicuously diverges from the usual one in the definition of public order: “grundlegende soziale und ethische Anschauungen”] of citizens.”

Note here that for the German court, the modality of the realization of the assembly is not (solely) the time (i.e. Holocaust Memorial Day), but also the “provocative way” of behavior of the protestors. The same applies, thirdly, so the Court adds, “when a procession in its overall outlook [durch sein Gesamtgepräge] identifies with the rites and symbols of the Nazi tyranny and intimidates other citizens through evocation of the horrors of the past totalitarian and inhumane regime.”

Note how differently the German court treats modality and content-neutrality than its U.S. counterpart. Here the reason for restriction clearly relates to the content of the message of the demonstrators, as only a pro-Nazi viewpoint gives rise to the need for restriction. Still, if the restriction only affects the time of the demonstration, then it is still found to be a restriction on modality, and thus, there is no need to defend it on the basis of Art. 5 II, i.e. no requirement of a general law is foreseen. However, the Court goes further, and declares that the next question is proportionality of official reaction, i.e. if possible, only a condition should be imposed, but if that is not enough to avert the danger, then a ban might also be constitutional.

860 NJW 2004, 2816.
861 NJW 2004, 2816.
In general it appears from the complicated jurisprudence\textsuperscript{862} of the Court that public order can be the basis for restrictions on modalities, but not on the content of the expression, be it on an assembly or anything else.\textsuperscript{863} Content can only be restricted if public safety, understood to include substantive legal values, is directly endangered. In this case, necessarily, also a ban might be constitutional,\textsuperscript{864} and it is even preferred (mandated) over imposing a condition on content, as the state is forbidden from forcibly changing the substantive message. In the case of modalities, however, imposition of condition will regularly be a less restrictive means if public order is endangered, and as the limit is public order, not the substantive public security, there is no need to examine if the law restricting freedom of assembly is a general one in the sense of Art. 5 II GG.

In a decision from 2005 the German court also found permissible a rerouting of a far right demonstration away from both the Holocaust Memorial and the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on the day of the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of capitulation of Germany. This decision, discussed in detail below,\textsuperscript{865} was however not decided on public order grounds but partly on human dignity, and partly on balancing competing rights of the youth organization of the Nationalist Party and of the general public who wanted to attend a government-organized commemorative event at the Brandenburg Gate. Still, the special date played a role in the whole scheme, and the Court also found the date weighty as an argument in favor of restricting the rights of the young Nationalists, even though they were the first to notify the authorities about the planned march.

\textsuperscript{862} To get a general sense of the conundrum around public order see Ulrich Battis & Klaus Joachim Grigoleit, Rechtsextremistische Demonstrationen und öffentliche Ordnung – Roma locuta? NJW 2004, 3459. It is partly overridden by the decision related to the Rudolf Hess memorial marches, discussed supra text accompanying notes 795-814.

\textsuperscript{863} HELLMACHER-HAWIG, supra note 862 at 29.

\textsuperscript{864} See HELLMACHER-HAWIG, supra note 862 at 29 and 135-156.

\textsuperscript{865} Infra text accompanying notes 1223-1228.
2. Duration, time limit, frequency

An important question for the demonstrators might be how long and how often they are constitutionally entitled to demonstrate. From a theoretical point of view, the answer partly depends on the rationale of the protection of the right to assembly. If assemblies (demonstrations) are simply about expression, then the first and only time might suffice, and it would not need to take a longer time than what is sufficient to express the message. After all, we are all sensible persons and understand the message already the first time, with no need for repetition. However, if assemblies are also or foremost about thematizing a new issue, “raising awareness”, setting an agenda or exerting political pressure, then they might need to take longer and might occur repeatedly, even if the message is the same every time. How long and how frequently though are not questions answerable in the abstract. Maybe then it is no wonder that not too many high court cases have dealt with this question. A basic rights-friendly approach would probably require that as a default demonstrators can stay as long as and as often as they wish, but the protection decreases with the increasing burdens or externalities such an enduring or repeating demonstration puts on the normal daily life of the community. In practice, the boundary is probably determined through negotiation between police and demonstrators, and it will depend on the particular circumstances of a locality, with all it brings about in relation to non-mainstream groups. Very few points seem clear. Obstructive demonstrations, if they are tolerated at all, \(^{866}\) will not be tolerated too long or too often.

As to frequency, in general, all over the jurisdictions, previous unlawful action is ground for denying permits, or imposing conditions, or issuing injunctions. In this latter regard, recall the controversy in the U.S. about abortion protests, and especially who is bound by the injunction. In the United Kingdom, harassment provisions are applied to prevent repetition of protest

\(^{866}\) See Part II.B. FROM COERCION TO DIRECT ACTION TO DISRUPTION supra text accompanying notes 669-752.
events, well below the threshold of obstruction, even well below causing alarm or distress. Injunctions may be issued – and increasingly often are issued – against protests directed at unidentified persons who belong to “loosely formed unincorporated organisations” such as campaign groups in the United Kingdom as well.

On the other hand, recurring yearly single cause demonstrations are common events all over the countries, some of them, like religious or other traditional processions, regularly exempted even from the notification requirement. On its own, the recurring nature is not a problem anywhere.

As to duration, there is again likely a practical negotiation between police and demonstrators, depending also on the quality of the place where the demonstration is to be held. As to demonstrations or marches on roads and streets, certainly traffic rerouting is unlikely mandated by human rights for a significant period of time. The famous Schmidberger decision of the ECJ is beyond the scope of this thesis but it has to be noted that to allow for a 30-hour complete closure of the Brenner Pass, a vital transportation route in Europe, for an environmental demonstration is certainly among the most extreme, and most unlikely scenarios to happen under the jurisdictions examined in this thesis. Also, it appears to me, that the ECJ would not (even cannot) go as far as to mandate such a restriction on the free movement of goods in order to protect freedom of assembly, thus the EU countries examined in this thesis have a certain national discretion in this regard.

Parks are arguably different, where there is no traffic; thus, demonstrators can stay longer, as they cause less of a hassle for others. As will be shown below under manner restrictions on appearances and aesthetics, the USSC rejected the proposition that the First Amendment

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867 MEAD supra note 507 at 276.
868 Supra Part II.A. 4. Exemptions, derogations from the notification requirement, text accompanying notes 446-488.
869 Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck (Austria)), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000CJ0112:EN:HTML
protects a demonstration for homeless people to continue through the night on the National Mall and Lafayette Park in D.C.\textsuperscript{870} It is all the more ironic, and clearly shows the distortions of content neutrality and public forum doctrines, that the Occupy Wall Street protesters (i.e. a demonstration which had not as its purpose to specifically point out the plight of the homeless by the expressive activity of sleeping) could camp and sleep in Zucotti Park in New York for almost two months, only because Zucotti Park is privately owned. As I am writing these lines, the demonstrators are finally being removed by police for reasons of sanitary and safety hazards, and some possible criminal activity like drug use. If there really is – as probably is – a sanitary hazard, unaverted but caused by the demonstrators themselves, then at some point the state must step in, and two months appear a generous deal, especially given that residents were also complaining, even staging a protest at the City Hall themselves against the passivity of police in handling the situation in Zucotti Park.\textsuperscript{871} Demonstrators will allegedly be allowed to return after the park has been cleaned up, but they will not be allowed to start camping again. This question of course entirely depends on the private owner of the park, and certainly no court would find unconstitutional a limitation on demonstration which is way below the one found constitutional in the homeless sleeping tent case by the USSC for publicly owned parks.

After having discussed jurisprudence on time-related restriction, restrictions on the manner, i.e. use of symbols, uniforms, masks, noise, and aesthetic aspects of assemblies will be discussed, before turning to restrictions on place in the last chapter.


MANNER

Acceptable regulation on the “manner of an assembly” refers to three main issues: first and most famously the question of symbolic speech, inherently related to the above discussed relation of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly; secondly, the noise made either intentionally or necessarily by the demonstrations; and finally, the litter and other aesthetic harm which is created on such occasions.

1. Banned and protected symbols

Symbols at an assembly come in many varieties. Social movement history testifies that symbols play a probably more important role than anything else in making an efficient protest event. Symbols induce unity and a sense of strength, but they also convey the message in a compact form. They can be worn on clothes, brought with, drawn or printed on placards, and so on. What is more, not only material objects can bear or become symbols. Symbol also is marching in formation, special gestures, or dancing a special dance, or the various uses of fire, itself a symbol of growing multiplicity. Symbols, valuable as they are to the protesters, often seem threatening to the authorities or the general public exactly because of their powerful unifying capacity. Also, symbols may hurt more than words as the recognition of the symbol immediately recalls a range of associations. Moreover, symbols are simplifying and

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872 See Part I.B.
873 Of course, chanting and singing are also symbolic, just as seeking symbolic places. I have grouped these other TMPs under different headings because the justification for restricting them are different.
far more apt to stir emotions than reasoned argument.\(^{875}\) Finally, there is a competition between symbols of protesting groups and state symbols, best exemplified by the flag desecration cases.

Therefore, it comes at least as no surprise that courts tend to grant less protection to so-called symbolic speech than to the “default” category of reasoned argument. The USSC’s symbolic speech doctrine is a case in point where a court explicitly says so, while in the other jurisdictions the constitutionality of serious limitations, or selective outright bans on symbols at demonstrations are often not even questioned in and by courts.

Various symbols, though widespread in the practice of demonstrations everywhere, have attracted a differing amount of legislative and judicial attention in the different countries. These differences will be taken into account in the following discussion.

### 1.1. Symbolic speech in the U.S: fire, draft-card, flags, swastikas and crosses

Symbols have always been in use at assemblies, but until the middle of the 20\(^{th}\) century theoretical questions of symbolic speech had not come to the forefront of debate. The 1931 decision *Stromberg v. California* for instance is about a ban on displaying the red flag, i.e. a symbol, although the decision does not revolve around what speech protection symbols should enjoy. The statute in *Stromberg* proscribed displaying a red flag in a public place or in a meeting place\(^{876}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government,} \\
\text{or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action, or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.}
\end{align*}
\]

In this case, however, the question was not to what extent waving the red flag is expression, but whether displaying the red flag with any of the proscribed *meanings* is constitutionally

\(^{875}\) Cf. Justice Jackson’s statement: “Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality is a short-cut from mind to mind.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).

\(^{876}\) *Stromberg v. California* 283 U.S. 359 (1931), 361.
protected. Thus, the Court had to deal not with the symbolic conduct part of the expression, but exactly with the content part (opposition to organized government, stimulus to anarchistic action, or propaganda of sedition). As such, it found that the latter two (incitement or solicitation kind) categories are proscribable, but the state cannot prohibit using the red flag as symbol of opposition to organized government. The line is very thin in this pre-“clear and present danger”, and of course pre-Brandenburg case, but it is nonetheless between stating a view (opposition to organized government) and incitement to action. Thus, in Stromberg, the Court has not yet questioned whether speech by symbolic conduct is speech, nor indicated that it would be worthy of less protection.\textsuperscript{877}

The symbolic speech doctrine has its origins proper in a later dispute over what counts as speech and what is conduct, unprotected by the First Amendment. Justice Black was the most prominent representative of the view that speech should be afforded absolute protection while conduct (or action) zero.\textsuperscript{878} The court itself on many occasions made clear that though not subscribing to a rigid speech-action theory, it maintains a difference in the protection afforded to pure speech and “speech plus.” In Cox v. Louisiana I, the Court per Justice Goldberg stated what later came to be cited many times:\textsuperscript{879}

\begin{quote}
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech. ...it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.
\end{quote}

Note the remarkable lack of any reference to the right of the people peaceably to assemble with regard to marching and picketing. In the classic symbolic speech decision in 1968, in

\textsuperscript{877} It obviously could not have done so, as the statute at hand itself was based on the assumption that displaying the red flag was speech.
\textsuperscript{878} See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969), 609 \textit{et seq.} (Justice Black, dissenting.).
\textsuperscript{879} Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
the Warren Court upheld criminal conviction for burning the draft card in opposition to the Vietnam War.\footnote{United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).} According to the newly enacted four-step standard,\footnote{391 U.S. 377.} government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Then the Court went on to find that the registration system was certainly within governmental power and was useful in many regards, fulfilling substantial governmental interest. Jurisprudentially, the decisive point is that proscription of destroying the draft card is an incidental regulation on speech, and incidental regulation is subjected to less stringent constitutional requirements. Justice Harlan adds in concurring that O’Brien had many other ways to convey his message than by burning the draft card, and \textit{a contrario}, if a message can only be conveyed in a way which violates an “incidental” regulation, then that would be found an unconstitutional burden. Clearly, the majority and the concurring do not find important that to burn the draft card is certainly among the most effective and powerful ways of protesting against the war. Neither does it bother the court that in effect it imposes its own view on how to communicate a specific message.

Already in the next year, in \textit{Tinker} the Court did not rely on \textit{O’Brien}. It found that wearing an armband for the purpose of expressing opposition to the Vietnam War is “the type of symbolic act” protected by the First Amendment, and “closely akin to ‘pure speech.’”\footnote{Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).} It was high school students who got suspended wearing the armband after the school board adopted such a policy in reaction to the rumors that some students were going to wear it. It therefore is different from \textit{O’Brien} as the regulation was not incidentally burdening speech,
but aimed at preventing disruption resulting from speech feared by authorities. In distinguishing from other scenarios, the Court noted that the case at hand “does not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech.’” *Tinker* does not cite *O’Brien*, and does not analyze the question of symbolic expression any further than the declaration that wearing a black armband is closely akin to pure speech. The only focus is the potential for disruption, which was found to be without any merit. As such, *Tinker* properly favors free expression and affirms the commonplace that symbolic conduct has meaning and should be constitutionally protected along the same lines as any other expression.

*Tinker*, however, does not affect the precedential status of *O’Brien*, not overturned to this day. *O’Brien* has been cited in the flag-burning, flag-desecration and flag misuse controversy, in circumstances which involve state symbolism even more markedly than *O’Brien*. In a series of cases, the American flag was either burned, wore on trousers, or modified by affixation. In *Street v. New York*, appellant burned his own American flag in reaction to the news that James Meredith, a civil rights leader was killed by a sniper. He said on the street corner next to the burning flag that “We don’t need no damn flag”… “[I]f they let that happen to Meredith.” He got a suspended sentence under a flag desecration statute. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, but did not decide on the issue whether burning a flag is an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. The four dissents attached to the Court’s opinion are more interesting as they do not avoid the issue of whether flag burning amounts to protected speech. Among the dissents, one can find a whole range of

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884 309 U.S. 508.
887 Because the majority found the conviction could have been at least partly based on not what he did to the flag, but what he said about it. This is an uncommon way of seeing the lower court’s judgment, as the issue was phrased as related to burning the flag unanimously in the Court of Appeals. The majority was sharply criticized for this avoidance of the issue by the dissenters.
reasons focusing on the flag, on the fire, and on the difference between speech and action which purport to deny that flag burning is protected. Justice Black thinks flag-burning as conduct is outside First Amendment protection, Justice Fortas argues that the applicable statute is a general law which serves safety and undisturbed traffic, while Chief Justice Warren and Justice White in separate dissents strangely take for evident that flag desecration can be constitutionally criminalized.

In *Spence v. Washington*, the Court faced a similar challenge, but again declined to decide the real issue. Spence was not burning a flag, but affixing on it a peace symbol in protest to the invasion of Cambodia, and the Kent State killing of four protesters by the police. This was found violating a flag misuse statute. The Supreme Court reversed and found the statute *as applied* unconstitutional. The per curiam decision found *O'Brien* inapplicable, as it took the statute be directly related to expression. Assuming *arguendo* that the state might have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the flag, it found that there was no evidence that anybody would have taken Spence’s modified flag to be endorsed by government.

The assumption part of the *Spence* decision was brought again to the Court in *Texas v. Johnson*, the penultimate case in the saga of flag desecration. Johnson burnt a flag in protest against the Reagan administration, and was convicted for “damaging the flag … in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.” The difference between this and the previous statutes is thus that here the (likely) reaction of the onlookers was the turning point. Whether one feels offended by the burning of a flag, however, can only be a result of communication of an idea. A flag burning by itself – for instance, as a result of a natural catastrophe – does not offend any reasonable person. The interest of the state of preserving national unity in the symbol of the flag is thus an interest not unrelated to expression. Therefore, *O'Brien* does not apply. As the protection of the flag’s

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integrity is even a content-based restriction, it should be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. In this light, the issue turns into the state’s interest to prescribe what shall be orthodox or to protect the society against offensive ideas; and neither of these is a legitimate concern. In reaction, the Flag Protection Act was enacted which criminalized any person who “knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon” a United States flag, except conduct related to the disposal of a “worn or soiled” flag.\footnote{United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).} Government argued that unlike the statute in Johnson, this text aims only to protect the physical integrity of the flag, independent of any expressive conduct and without regard to onlookers’ reaction. Again Justice Brennan delivered the decision of the Court. \textit{U.S. v. Eichman} invalidated the act because government could not show that the interest in protecting the flag’s integrity is unrelated to suppression of expression. The interest in preserving the flag as a symbol for national ideals is implicated only “when a person’s treatment of the flag communicates [a] message”\footnote{496 U.S. 316.} inconsistent with the ideals. \textit{O’Brien} thus does not apply, and under \textit{Johnson} there is no uncertainty as to the unconstitutionality. The Flag Protection Act entails not only content-based, but even viewpoint-based discrimination, to use a later, but more precise doctrinal language.

As to symbolic conduct, it is worth recalling the \textit{Skokie controversy} and the \textit{R.A.V.} and \textit{Virginia v. Black} cases. In \textit{Skokie} the would-be demonstrators wanted to march in full Nazi paraphernalia, wearing the swastika. In both \textit{R.A.V.}\footnote{R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).} and \textit{Virginia v. Black}, a cross was burnt. Injunctions in \textit{Skokie} against the march and the wearing of the swastika were found unconstitutional for failure to fulfill \textit{Brandenburg} criteria.

As to the facts in \textit{R.A.V.}, the defendant burned a cross on a Black family’s lawn and was convicted under a Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibits display of a symbol which one knows or has reason to know “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” Although the Supreme Court of Minnesota claimed to have narrowed the scope of the ordinance to fighting words, it disregarded the fact that anger, alarm and resentment are not sufficient evils under the Chaplinsky doctrine (concurring opinion by Justice White). Nevertheless, the majority did not reach this issue, deciding the case on content-neutrality grounds. The novelty of the reasoning is that even low value speech cannot be regulated on the basis of content unless one of the following criteria is met. Firstly, “the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable”, or, secondly, the state is concerned only about the “secondary effects” of the speech, or a “particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech” is “swept up incidentally within the reach” of the legislation, or, finally, “the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”

Assuming arguendo that the ordinance as applied only prohibited fighting words, Scalia J. finds that none of the four possibilities applies. Rather, the legislation is impermissibly content-based insofar as it prosecutes fighting words only on the basis of race, gender, or religion and impermissibly viewpoint-discriminatory since it punishes fighting words based on intolerance but not those advocating tolerance in line with the state’s commitment to equality.

As Justice Scalia’s example goes, using aspersions upon a person’s mother in support of racial, religious etc. tolerance would not be covered by the statute. The legislation is impermissibly content-based insofar as it prosecutes fighting words only on the basis of race, gender, or religion and impermissibly viewpoint-discriminatory since it punishes fighting words based on intolerance but not those advocating tolerance in line with the state’s commitment to equality. The most radical implication of the R.A.V. majority is that even within low value categories strict scrutiny applies. Therefore, R.A.V. is decided on content-neutrality grounds,

893 Id. at 388-390.
and not so much on symbolic speech grounds. Nonetheless, the underlying assumption is that symbols can amount to fighting words, but that symbols are only regulable if they actually constitute fighting words.\textsuperscript{894} In \textit{Virginia v. Black}\textsuperscript{895} the Court faced a very similar challenge. There was also cross-burning, and a statute which made it a crime “for any person ... , with the intent of intimidating any person or group ... , to burn ... a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place,” and specifies that “[a]ny such burning ... shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.” The Court found in favor of the cross-burners because the prima facie evidence provision was unconstitutional. Apart from that, however, it accepted that cross-burning can be prosecuted if committed with the intent to intimidate. The evidence provision is unconstitutional because it takes away the very reason why the felony itself is constitutional. The majority of the Justices agreed on the proscribability of cross-burning as an instance of true threat if made with an intent to intimidate. (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas also found constitutional the evidence provision, though they had also differences.) True threats are low value speech, therefore constitutionally regulable if one of the \textit{R.A.V.} criteria is met. In this case, according to the majority of the Justices, ban on cross-burning with an intent to intimidate falls under the first criterion. The basis for the ban “consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,” because cross-burning is a particularly virulent expression of intimidation. The dissenters and literature maintain that the ruling is inconsistent with \textit{R.A.V.} and earlier doctrine.\textsuperscript{896} It is easy to show that the statute is viewpoint-discriminatory, just like the ordinance in \textit{R.A.V}. “One could argue that cross burning is the most potent arrow in the white supremacist’s quiver. Those who wish to deliver a message of racial harmony are extremely unlikely to use cross burning as their mode of communication. Consequently, when

\textsuperscript{894} On the fighting words doctrine see \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 598—610.

\textsuperscript{895} \textit{Virginia v. Black}, \textit{supra} note 506.

the state regulates cross burning, it is undoubtedly handicapping one side of the debate.” As Justice Souter points out, for such cases the Court applies strict scrutiny, and, since the state has failed to show a compelling interest in opting for such viewpoint-discrimination instead of a content-neutral statute proscribing any kind of intimidation, the statute is unconstitutional. Justice Souter’s main concern is that under a statute banning a particular symbol it is most likely that prosecutors and courts would find an intent to intimidate, though exactly that would be the question to be proven, basically independent of whether intimidation results from using a symbol or just plain words.

1.2. Banned signs in Germany and France

1.2.1. Germany: militant democracy

Symbols in general are protected speech under the Basic Law, covered by Art. 5 on freedom of expression of opinion. This includes the protection of symbols on demonstrations. There is no doctrinal disadvantagement of symbolic speech or conduct as it is observable in the US doctrine. Nonetheless, many more symbols cannot be displayed in Germany than in the US. All the grand symbolic conduct cases, except for O’Brien, of course, would very likely turn out the other way around in Germany. The reasons and structure of the argument are very different, though common ground is that the simple dislike of the content of the message is not enough to restrict it. German doctrine also tries to uphold the principle of content neutrality, but there is a near universal consensus among legislators and courts that more important values can justify restrictions on the free use of some symbols if the restriction does not in itself target the idea which is expressed by the symbol. This criterion is accepted to be fulfilled if the banned symbol happens to be that of a constitutionally banned organization.

897 CHARLES, supra note 896 at 607.
898 See 583 U.S. 387 (per Justice Souter, partly concurring and partly dissenting).
899 BVerwGE 72, 183.
The central norm – as luckily in German law often there is one – is Art. 86a of the German criminal code. It prohibits and punishes by up to three years imprisonment *inter alia* the distribution and public use of symbols (rather: signs) of banned parties and organizations and their substitute organizations.\textsuperscript{900} Banned organizations are those which have been or are being banned under the Basic Law’s militant democracy\textsuperscript{901} clauses,\textsuperscript{902} but also those which were banned right after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{903} The overwhelming majority of banned organizations are Nazi, neo-Nazi, or other extreme right wing organizations,\textsuperscript{904} the GFCC banned a Nazi (Socialist Reich Party)\textsuperscript{905} and a Communist party.\textsuperscript{906} Symbols according to s. 86a Criminal Code include, in particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting, and also symbols which are so similar to the banned ones that they can be mistaken for them. As interpreted, a photo or Abbildung of Hitler is also a symbol for the purposes of section 86a,\textsuperscript{907} but not that of Rudolf Hess who became a symbol of the extreme right wing only after 1945.\textsuperscript{908} As it can be seen, the prohibition on symbols on a demonstration is not specific; but is regulated by the general laws realizing militant democracy in Germany, not

\textsuperscript{900} Substitute organization can be a party or an association of which it is incontestably (*unanfechtbar*), i.e. at the final stage of review, established that it is a substitute for the banned one. Section 86 StGB. (Criminal Code).

\textsuperscript{901} For the concept see Karl Loewenstein, *Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I*, 31 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 417 (1937), and Id., *Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights II*, 31 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 638 (1937). For recent theoretical and comparative discussions see the contributions in András Sajó (ed.), *MILITANT DEMOCRACY* (Eleven, Utrecht, 2004), on the German approach most recently see Markus Thiel, *Germany in THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES*, 109- 146, (Markus Thiel ed., Ashgate, 2009)

\textsuperscript{902} Art. 9 (2) allows, in effect, requires banning associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding. Under Art. 21 (2), parties which by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be banned by the Constitutional Court. (Translation of the text is from Andreas Stegbauer, *The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols According to Section 86a of the German Criminal Code*, 8 German Law Journal 173 (2007) 177 at note 14.)


\textsuperscript{904} Though FDJ-Westdeutschland, the West-German branch of the GDR’s only legal (and basically state-maintained) youth movement was also banned.

\textsuperscript{905} BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952).

\textsuperscript{906} BVerfGE 5, 85 (1956) (KPD-judgment).

\textsuperscript{907} BGH MDR 1965, 923; OLG München NSIZ 2007, 97 as cited by Ellbogen, 86a StGB, Rn. 2 in BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR STGB (von Heintschel-Heinegg ed., 15th ed. 2011).

\textsuperscript{908} OLG Rostock NSIZ 2002, 320; Bartels/Kollorz NSIZ 2002, 298 as cited by ELLBOGEN, 86a StGB, Rn. 2 in BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR STGB (von Heintschel-Heinegg ed., 15th ed. 2011) ELLBOGEN id. claims that speeches of Hitler also are punishable under s. 86a, e.g. if displayed in the form of ringtone of a cell phone.
only in the political arena, but in general. The aim of s. 86a is interpreted to avert “social
habituation” to symbols which might induce the revival of the banned organizations. In the
interpretation of the Supreme Court (BGH, the highest ordinary court for civil and criminal
matters) the aim is also the maintenance of political peace. As the BGH put it:

Thus, the aim of the criminal provision has to be understood not only as preventing a revival of the banned organizations or of their anti-
constitutional endeavors, to which the prohibited sign symbolically refers. The provision also serves to preserve the political peace
because it avoids even the appearance of such a revival. It also prevents foreign or domestic observers of political events in the
Federal Republic of Germany from assuming that behaviour opposed to the constitution and the rule of law, as symbolized by the sign, is
tolerated in German politics.

Political peace in this quote more or less seems to cover a reputational interest of the
Bundesrepublik itself, as it has been a regular concern in relation to extreme right wing
activities in Germany ever since the end of the Second World War. The GFCC does not refer
to political peace in this regard, but only to the prevention of revival of banned organizations
and their endeavors. Rather, it states that the rationale of section 86a Criminal Code is to ban
such symbols from the entirety of political life in Germany, and in effect to institute a
“communicative taboo”. That’s why the will behind displaying the symbols is irrelevant,
or at least that seems to be the view of the GFCC. Critical uses of symbols thus can also be

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909 Consistently, there is an exception clause in paragraph III covering the use of such symbols in art,
scholarship, research and teaching. (For uncertainties in interpreting the limits of this so-called social adequacy
clause, see ELLBOGEN, 86a StGB, Rn. 12 in BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR STGB (von Heintschel-Heinegg
ed., 15th ed. 2011), and Fischer StGB § 86a Rn 22, as cited by ELLBOGEN id.)
910 Bundesgerichtshof: Verwenden des "Hitlergrußes" aus Protest gegen Polizeiaktion, Urteil vom 18.10.1972;
Az.: 3 StR 17/71, BGHSt. 25, 30, 33. STEGBAUER, supra note 902 referred the author to this case.
911 „Als Schutzzweck der Strafvorschrift ist dabei im einzelnen nicht nur die Abwehr einer Wiederbelebung der
verbotenen Organisation oder der von ihr verfolgten verfassungsfeindlichen Bestrebungen, auf die das
Kennzeichen symbolhaft hinweist, zu verstehen. Die Vorschrift dient auch der Wahrung des politischen Friedens
dadurch, dass jeglicher Anschein einer solchen Wiederbelebung sowie der Eindruck bei in- und ausländischen
Beobachtern des politischen Geschehens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vermieden wird, in ihr gehe es eine
rechtstaatswidrige innenpolitischer Entwicklung, die dadurch gekennzeichnet sei, dass verfassungsfeindliche
Bestrebungen der durch das Kennzeichen angezeigten Richtung geduldet würden.“ Id.
912 BVerfG, 1 BvR 150/03 vom 1.6.2006, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 26),
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20060601_1bvr015003.html, Abs.-Nr. 18.
punished constitutionally. The BGH appears settled in the opposite direction, exemplifying a rare case where the ordinary court grants more freedom than the GFCC would require. The BGH has since 1972 consistently remanded cases of conviction when the symbol is used “clearly and unequivocally in a manner hostile” to the ideology behind the symbol. Besides, satirical uses of banned symbols might fall under freedom of art and thus cannot be proscribed according to the GFCC either.

As to the substitute similarity requirement, the GFCC has decided despite scholarly views to the contrary that the slogan ‘Ruhm und Ehre der Waffen-SS’ [fame and honor of the Waffen-SS] is so dissimilar to the ‘Blut und Ehre’-slogan [blood and honor] of the Hitlerjugend that it cannot be constitutionally prohibited. Newly invented slogans which were never used by a banned organization are within constitutional protection of free speech. That also includes using ‘Blood and Honour’ as a slogan in English, because it was in this form never used by the Hitlerjugend.

This cursory discussion already shows that the condition of previously banned organization is though content-based, at least is quite rigid, and many would claim even dysfunctional and alien to the challenges of real life. As to viewpoint-discrimination, to use the US terminology, the BGH took a stance distinguishing hostile and sympathetic uses. This,

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913 BVerfG NJW 2006, 3050, 3052.
914 At least when there is clear and unequivocal hostile tendency against the ideology referred to by the symbol. BGH, Urteil vom 15. 3. 2007 – NJW 2007, 1602 (reversing a conviction for selling articles displaying e.g. the swastika in clearly Nazi hostile manner for punks, a left-wing subculture).
915 I do not mean to imply that according to the Constitutional Court the constitution prescribes, instead of allows, the prohibition of critical uses of these symbols.
916 BVerfGE 82, 1, mocking Hitler T-shirt. This ruling is consistent with BVerfGE 77, 240, reversing a conviction for using an emblem of FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend, the only recognized youth organization in the GDR whose West-German branch was banned in the FRG), on placards advertising the staging of a Brecht play, Herrnburger Bericht.
917 E.g. before the decision of the GFCC: Jan Steinmetz, „Ruhm und Ehre der Waffen-SS” - Verwechselbares Kennzeichen i.S. des § 86a II 2 StGB?, NSyZ 2002, 118., and after the decision came out Andreas Horsch, Das BVerfG, die Ähnlichkeit i. S. des § 86a II 2 StGB oder: Zeit für die Entdeckung der Lebenswirklichkeit, JR 2008, 99.
919 BGHSt 54, 61. The ruling does not affect possible illegality on other grounds, among them, as displaying the symbol not of the Hitlerjugend but of Blood and Honour, a Neo-Nazi organization banned in Germany. The case is still pending though.
920 See, e.g. HORSCH, supra note 917.
however, does not prevent lower courts in recurrently sticking to the idea that section 86a cuts in both ways, an interpretation the GFCC also would not mind. This is indeed a serious question to which I do not see any principled answer, because the underlying approach is contradictory. More precisely, the ambiguity of delineating banned symbols very clearly expose the vulnerability of content-based restrictions which are justified by abstract and mediated dangers of revival of a horrible past, and law’s inadequacy of dealing with such dangers.

### 1.2.2. France: symbols and garment of organizations or persons responsible for crimes against humanity

In French law it is a contravention (a least serious offense in the penal regime, next to crimes and delicts) to wear or display in public uniforms, insignia or symbols reminding of those of organizations or persons responsible for crimes against humanity. The article refers to organizations banned and persons convicted, i.e. the scope in this regard is reasonably narrow, and similar to that in Germany. Exception is granted for films, spectacles (theatre performances) or exhibitions evocating history. “In public” is understood broadly. (Public includes even the internet as this article has been the basis of the famous Licra c. Yahoo! controversy between French and U.S. courts of no interest to us here apart from the

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921 To their benefit it has to be noted that the BGH also held this view, though back in 1970. See BGHSt. 23, 267, NJW 1970, 1693.

922 Section 86a is a so-called abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt, criminalizing a “conduct typically capable of bringing a dangerous situation into existence, even if in any given case the subject of protection is not actually exposed to the danger concerned.” STEGBAUER, supra note 902 at 175, citing Troendle and Fischer, § 13 Rn. 9 in STRAFGESETZBUCH (53rd ed., München, 2006). This, as must be obvious by now, is very far from even the loosest US standard as exemplified by Virginia v. Black, supra note 506. (As to the distantly possibly relevant Beauharnais, see supra text accompanying note 836, I share the view of those who claim it is not good law anymore, being aware that it was not formally overruled.)

923 Art. R. 645-1 of the Code Pénal. French law widely employs an editorial technique compiling both legislative and regulatory level norms in one document, called code. (Though the concept is different from the original, rigorous and systematizing understanding of code as in the Napoleonic codes, or in the civil or criminal code in Germany, etc.) This is the case with the penal code, whose first part is the legislative part, including crimes and delicts, and the second part is the reglementary, including contraventions. The R. in the numbering of the article shows that the provision belongs to the reglementary part, i.e. it is a contravention.

commonplace that it very well displayed the unbridgeable gap between the First Amendment and the French understanding of free speech.) There is no controversy in France parallel to that discussed in Germany about the interpretation of “rappelant”, i.e. what counts as a similar symbol, uniform, etc. Of course, the lack of awareness or sensitivity in this regard does not exempt French law from the problems inherent in such a regulation, as discussed with regard to analogous German law in the previous pages.

1.3. Flag disparagement in Germany and France

1.3.1. Germany: oscillation between militant democracy and authority of the state

In contrast to the US, the federal flag in Germany has not been an object of veneration, at least since World War II.\footnote{See in English Ute Krüdewagen, Political Symbols In Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag Desecration Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 679 (2002).} Still, according to section 90a (Disparagement of the State and its symbols)\footnote{As translated in the web site of The University of Texas School of Law, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics_centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=632, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.} of the Criminal Code

(1) A person who publicly, in an assembly, or through the dissemination of writings
1. insults or maliciously disparages the Federal Republic of Germany, one of its regional states, or its constitutional order or
2. disparages the colours, the flag, the coat of arms or the anthem of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its regional states shall be punished by a term of imprisonment up to 3 years or with a fine.

(2)-(3) omitted

This again is a potentially endangering offense,\footnote{Jan Steinmetz, StGB § 90 a Verunglimpfung des Staates und seiner Symbole Rn. 2 in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH, Vol. 2/2 (Wolfgang Joecks & Klaus Miebach eds., Beck, München, 2005), for the concept see supra note 922.} as one commentator noted, a doubly mediated endangering-endangering.\footnote{„Gefährdungs-Gefährdungsdelikt”: see Herwig Roggemann, Von Bären, Löwen und Adlern - zur Reichweite der §§ 90 a und b StGB. Meinungs- und Kunstfreiheit im gesamtdeutschen Verfassungs- und Strafrecht.- Verfassungskonforme Einschränkung oder Streichung der §§ 90 a und 90 b? JURISTENZEITUNG 1992, 934, 938. (Though at that point it is about section 90 b, entitled anticonstitutional disparagement of constitutional organs [like legislative organ, government or constitutional court or its member in this capacity]).} As the state does not have dignity, the protected object
must be derived from something more particularly embedded in the constitution. The GFCC had the occasion to examine this provision’s compatibility with the Basic Law in the so-called *Federal flag decision* from 1990. However, in the case it relied on freedom of art, and not on freedom of expression or assembly, as the flag was portrayed disparagingly on the back cover of a book. Thus, the result – reversing the conviction – is not automatically applicable to a demonstrator. Rather, it seems the Court made an exception solely because freedom of art was at stake. Notably, it accepted that the provision itself is constitutional. The constitutional value served by the provision is explained in the following way:

> The purpose of these symbols is to appeal to the citizens’ sense of state [Staatsgefühl in original, translated as ‘sense of civic responsibility’ by the Institute of Transnational Law] ...As a free state, the Federal Republic relies rather on the identification of its citizens with the basic values represented by the flag. The values protected in this sense are represented by the state colours, stipulated in art.22 GG. They stand for the free democratic constitutional structure. ... The flag serves as an important integration device through the leading state goals it embodies; its disparagement can thus impair the necessary authority of the state. From this, it also follows that state symbols only enjoy constitutional protection in so far as they represent what fundamentally characterizes the Federal Republic.

Compared with the language of the U.S. decisions, the striking difference is that maintenance and promotion of the authority of the state is a constitutional value, a value rooted in the Basic Law, a stance the USSC ultimately dismissed in *Texas v. Johnson* and *Eichman*. However, most commentators interpret the aim of art. 90a being more the protection of free democratic

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929 Freedom of art is guaranteed in art. 5 III of the Basic Law. Its specificity is that there is no mention of possibility of restricting freedom of art (similarly to the guarantee of indoor assemblies). Nonetheless, the Court interpreted this and similar (so-called vorbehaltslose) provisions as still underlying limits inherent in the constitution [verfassungsimmanente Schranken] itself. Thus, for example, in the *Mephisto* case it ruled that post-mortem dignity protection overrides (at least temporarily) freedom of art. BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971).

930 BVerfGE 81, 278 (1990). In the ordinary courts, a producer of a pacifist book (Laßt mich bloß in Frieden – Just leave me in peace) was held responsible for a collage, where one part displayed a flag while another part a urinating men’s torso, put next to each other in a way that the urine was pouring upon the federal flag. (Unfortunately only the front page is available on this anarcho-syndicalist webpage: http://zuchthaus.free.de/syndikat-a/?p=productsMore&iProduct=1353&sName=an-Venske,-Ney,-Merian,-Umneck-%28Hg.%29-La%2Bdf-mich-blo%2Bdf-in-Frieden).

931 BVerfGE 81, 278, 293 et seq.

basic order than authority of state. Or, to be fair, these two intermingle, just as can be seen from the above quote. The German court also explicitly adds that “the protection of symbols must not lead to an immunization of the state against criticism and even against disapproval.”  

However, as state authority and freedom of art are both protected by the constitution, there is a conflict which can only be resolved by (ad hoc) balancing, the more ad hoc, the more “fine-tuned” according to the particular circumstances of the case, the better. The GFCC appears to exercise rather rigorous review whether ordinary courts normally mandated to execute this balancing process have properly done so. In another decision decided on freedom of art grounds, the GFCC basically applied the same approach. In the case a left-wing demonstration was organized where a song “Deutschland muss sterben, damit wir leben können” [Germany has to die so we can live] was sung. The song included the following verse, whose reference to the flag’s colors served as the basis for conviction:

Black are the heavens, and the Earth is red,  
And gold the hands of those bastard fat cats,  
But the German eagle will crash down dead,  
For, Germany, we carry you to your graveyard bed.  
(transl. Joseph Windsor)

The GFCC found flaw in the application of law by the ordinary courts because they did not classify the song as protected by freedom of art. After a long discussion of what counts as art which should not be of interest to us, it found that the song was not more radical, and critical-bitter than one of Heinrich Heine, and also otherwise it fulfilled criteria of art. In a way, the

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934 BVerfGE 18, 85, 92; BVerfGE 85, 248, 257 et seq, BVerfGE 93, 266, 296.

935 Environmentalist, antifascist, anti-multinational companies, antimilitarist. See the text of the song: BVerfG, 1 BvR 581/00 vom 3.11.2000, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 33), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20001103_1bvr058100.html

936 BVerfG, 1 BvR 581/00 vom 3.11.2000, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 33), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20001103_1bvr058100.html

937 Schwarz ist der Himmel und rot ist die Erde,  
stolz [richtig: gold] sind die Hände jener Bonzenschweine,  
doch der Bundesadler stürzt bald ab,  
denn Deutschland, wir tragen Dich zu Grab.
Court found that the song continued the tradition – so familiar in Central (and Eastern) Europe – of visioning the doom of country and death of nation.\(^{938}\) Also, the refrain line is a reference to a fight fought via memorials between those venerating the first (and possible second) world wars and those who perceive them in a very different light.\(^{939}\) After stating these analogies, the Court remanded the case, but made unusual, but important dicta. As the lower court has not properly recognized the core message of the song, the GFCC does not find it necessary to decide whether the lower court misstated the limits of freedom of art by songs used as “Kampfmittel”, warfare agent. It stated, however, that endangerment of the integrity (Bestand) of constitutional democracy can justify restriction on freedom of art. Nonetheless, it found doubtful whether a three-minute song, already apparently known to the 50 people listening to it, would realize it.\(^{940}\) This is clearly a weakening of the abstractness of danger as normally understood in German criminal law, certainly a welcome development from the point of view of constitutional rights. (It is though still a far shot from simply finding, as the USSC did, after all, that flag disparagement was flat-out protected speech.)

Finally in 2008, the Court had to explicitly address the issue of freedom of speech (not freedom of art) and flag disparagement. In the so-called \textit{Schwarz-Rot-Senf} case a speaker at a right wing demonstration referred to the black-red-golden colored federal flag as black-red-mustard.\(^{941}\) He was convicted for disparaging the flag. Ordinary courts have not mentioned or

\(^{938}\) „Der künstlerische Anspruch des Liedes und die daraus resultierenden Anforderungen an eine diesem Anspruch gerecht werdende Interpretation werden durch ein - ungleich bedeutenderes - literarisches Vorbild verdeutlicht, das sowohl formal als auch im Ansatz und in der Metaphorik weitgehende Ähnlichkeit aufweist. In einem 1844 erschienenen Gedicht formuliert Heinrich Heine eine kaum weniger radikale und bittere Kritik an den Zeitumständen, und auch er sieht sein Vaterland dem Untergang geweiht.“ BVerfG, 1 BvR 581/00 vom 3.11.2000, Absatz-Nr. 23, \url{http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20001103_1bvr058100.html}

\(^{939}\) Id. at § 30.

\(^{940}\) Id. at § 31.

\(^{941}\) BVerfG (1. Kammer des Ersten Senats), Beschluss vom 15. 9. 2008 - 1 BvR 1565/05. Extract from the speech: „No, comrades, we do so simply because for us the fate of our German fatherland matters. We have all been born into this community of life and destiny. We can not as easily unsubscribe. We can not get a document on which there is - well, well, we are not Congolese or Siberians, no, we are now even German. From birth on. The question is - are we as Germans assholes who can be canned here by this system? Or will we stand by our flag? And by that I do not mean the black, red and mustard. Under these circumstances. Oh, sorry, black, red and gold, could I possibly be so misinterpreted. We stand by our flag. We're in this deep dark night of Germany. But just as on 12.21 the nights start getting shorter and the days are longer, and just as after the deepest and darke
weighed the value of freedom of expression of opinion in their judgments. That this was going to be found problematic by the GFCC comes to no surprise. Free speech notably also belongs to the fundamentals of the free democratic constitutional/basic order, now clearly a ruling concept in interpreting flag disparagement cases, as it facilitates constant intellectual interaction so necessary in a democratic state.\textsuperscript{942} Thus, as one commentator put it, “the reputation of the state and the right to criticize it stand in a relationship of tension that needs to be resolved in the individual case by way of practical concordance.”\textsuperscript{943} As such a resolution was not attempted by ordinary courts, it was clear that the application of law is deemed to fail constitutional muster.

However, the GFCC went further than simply remanding by stating that the ordinary court has to examine how free speech concerns counterbalance values promoted by section 90a of the Criminal Code. In a last paragraph the GFCC engaged in an unusual contemplation about what result the weighing should lead to. It recognized – also citing sources from 1929, 1925/26 and 1997 as evidence – that Schwarz-Rot-Senf was a reference to the Weimar Republic where “right wing extremists” protested against the liberal republican state with this labelling of the flag. Still, in the Court’s view it is not evident that this historical reference is still “present in the consciousness of the population”, and thus it would be comprehended in this way in the particular situation. But even if this historical reference is judged relevant and lively, it has to be thoroughly examined if to call the Golden color in the flag mustard means in the concrete situation a “sensitive vilification or a particular contempt capable of hollowing out and of undermining the respect of the citizens for the integrity of the rule of law

\textsuperscript{942} See, e.g., BVerfGE 7, 198, 208 (Lüth).

\textsuperscript{943} Valerius, 90a StGB, Rn. 13 in BECK'SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR StGB (von Heintschel-Heinegg ed., 15th ed. 2011).
democracy in the Federal Republic,“ language recalling the ‘Germany has to die’ decision discussed above. This last paragraph hardly can be interpreted other than as a kind suggestion to the ordinary court of “no punishment”. All in all, the argumentation seems twisted. The Court on the one hand sticks to the constitutionality of section 90a, not even discussing it on rule of law grounds, but then does not let a rather clearly disparaging message be punished. To this it adds up that the GFCC employs two type of audience as measure of the endangerment necessary by so-called “expression delicts”. First it refers to the “average audience”, then in the mentioned last paragraph to the “population”, apparently apolitical and historically ignorant. (Recall, that with such potentially endangering crimes this audience is anyway a “virtual construct.”) However, even if one assumes that no historical connection to Weimar would be typically established in the hearers, the “objective sense” of the message was clear in the context, as one critique correctly points out. It is very hard, even for a very ignorant listener, to understand the speech in question, according to which birthright Germans “not Congolese or Siberians” hail “our German Reich” as not being ‘contemptuous’ for the rule of law democracy. The Court would have been consistent either striking down the norm itself or not questioning the clear meaning of the mustard message. Maybe future constitutional jurisprudence would tip the scale one or the other way, and I would certainly prefer the former. Till then, upholding constitutionality of a norm in effect dissuaded ever to apply is simply a twisted undertaking which invites police, administration, and ordinary courts to honestly not quite capture it.

944 BVerfG (1. Kammer des Ersten Senats), Beschluss vom 15. 9. 2008 - 1 BvR 1565/05, Absatz-Nr. 16.
945 Somewhat similarly to US overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, uncertainty of criminal provisions might amount to violating art. 103 II of the GG, as hinted by a commentator, Mareike Preisner, „Schwarz-Rot-Senf“ – Aufregung angebracht?, NJW 2009, 897, 898.
946 Preisner’s expressions, id.
947 STEGBAUER supra note 900 at 178.
948 PREISNER, supra note 945 at 898.
949 The translated extract of the speech is reproduced supra note 941.
1.3.2. France: outrage as a criminal delict and contravention

If the GFCC goes into a curious undertaking saving the cabbage and the goat, then the French Conseil Constitutionnel is simply deferring to legislative judgment, though it is true that the original legislative ban was more limited than the German law. In France the ban to outrage the flag was introduced in a 2003 law\textsuperscript{950} as a delict,\textsuperscript{951} and rendered punishable by up to 7500 euros to outrage the flag or the national anthem during a demonstration \textit{organized or regulated by public authorities}. Demonstrations regulated by public authorities, as explained by the travaux preparatoires, and cited by the CC,\textsuperscript{952} are sports, recreational or cultural events where security and health regulations necessarily apply for reason of the number of participants. The CC\textsuperscript{953} found the law constitutional, by referring to the constitutional provisions on both freedom of opinion, and on the flag and the anthem. Nonetheless, it emphasized that from the scope of application are excluded intellectual works (art and scholarship), expressions uttered in private circles and demonstrations not organized or regulated by authorities. In a 2005 case, during a street theatre festival a 25 year old climbed to the façade of the Mayor’s office in Aurillac, tore down the flag and threw it on the gathering few hundreds people. Then he ignited, and waved it until complete combustion. The delinquent told that he destroyed the flag out of protest against the government, as a symbol of the actual government, in a festive ambience, and did not mean to destroy the symbol of the nation, and he regrets his deed. The Riom Court of Appeals found he committed outrage of

\textsuperscript{950} Art. 113 of Loi n°2003-239 du 18 mars 2003 - art. 113 JORF 19 mars 2003 inserting article 433-5-1 in the criminal code, legislative part.

\textsuperscript{951} A (penal) delict is a middle serious criminal act between crimes and contraventions, the most and least serious offenses. Contraventions are defined by the regulatory power, i.e. by decree in Conseil d’État, see Art. 34 of the Constitution of 1958, but the punishments for the different classes of contraventions are determined by law, by the Parliament. The regulatory power is entitled to decide into which class a contravention should fall.


the flag, but considering his active repentance, only a moderate fine was inflicted.\textsuperscript{954} This is a case which fell under a demonstration organized and regulated by public authorities, as the CA emphasized. The webpage only displays the festival from 2010 and among the partners it mentions as logistical supporter the city of Aurillac.\textsuperscript{955} It is not possible to discern from the decision whether anyone claimed in court that the festival was actually an artistic one, which seems to be taken out of the scope of the ban at least by the CC. (Though it also is not completely clear if the CC meant that artistic performances where authorities do need to provide organizational or logistical support for this reason get back under the ban. Or, maybe, the CC would start distinguishing art, or, “œuvres de l'esprit”\textsuperscript{956}, from cultural events.) Also it is true that the person actually committing the outrage of the flag was not an artist, and the delict was not part of an art performance. From all this I take that French authorities and courts understand the ban as aiming at separating the presence of the state, be in the form of local authorities, or high dignitaries, from the presence of degrading treatment of the flag, in a logic somewhat similar to how laicité separates state and religion. Unfortunately, however, there is – so far at least – too little jurisprudence to properly test this understanding of mine.

Furthermore, and that might seem to undermine this previous speculation, the outrage ban was broadened in 2010. The topic became once again hot in spring 2010, when a photograph showing a man wiping his back side by the tricolour was widely circulated in French media.\textsuperscript{957} The government reacted by enacting a contravention of fifth class (most serious among the regulatory offenses),\textsuperscript{958} banning to do the following with the flag if committed with the intent to outrage the flag and in conditions capable of troubling public order:

\begin{itemize}
  \item http://www.aurillac.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157&Itemid=318&lang=fr
  \item Décision n° 2003-467 DC du 13 mars 2003 at considérant 104.
  \item The photo can still be found e.g. at http://vuparmwa.over-blog.com/article-juridiquement-on-peut-encoreprendre-des-mauvaises-photos-49103318.html.
\end{itemize}
1- to destroy, to deteriorate or use it in a degrading manner, in a public place or a place open to the public
2- and for the persecutor of the mentioned acts, even if they occurred in private, to distribute or make distribute the recording of pictures related to the commission of those acts.

Légifrance search does not yield any results, though there has been at least one case when the new article was applied. In December 2010 a young Algerien has broken and threw towards a man a pole of a flag in a hall of a prefecture out of anger about slow, inadequate and at times, insulting or degrading public service. Possibly, there was no appeal against the decision of the Tribunal correctionnel de Nice, the first instance court, where he was convicted to 750 euros (suspended) \textit{and also to a citizenship training at his own cost}. A stage de citoyenneté is a proper mandatory course, where the convict gets familiarized with republican values of tolerance, and of respect of dignity of the human person, a sanction introduced in 2004, and also inflictable for wearing a burqa and other, apparently “un-French” conduct.

The differences between the delict examined by the CC and the new contravention are important, though both can be considered more of a symbolic, than of a real repressive nature for reason of relatively loose sanctions. Some would argue the new contravention is unconstitutional because it takes away a factor which the CC considered important when examining the proportionality of the delict. Notably, the contravention bans to outrage the flag in public, and public is really understood broadly. This means that the French government moved from the rationale of separating state and degrading the flag to exclude degrading the flag from the entirety of public life, real or virtual. It will be seen later whether and how interpretation might narrow this very wide scope of the text. As “troubles to public order”


traditionally is understood very broadly in French law, in this regard I do not anticipate much restrictive interpretation. It is still possible though, that higher courts, or even the CC in QPC proceeding will declare the incompatibility of the new contravention with liberty of expression relying on the previous decision on the delictual form of outraging the flag.

1.4. Banned signs and flag desecration in the UK

Interestingly, the UK has no ban on any symbols, neither does it accord (in any of the jurisdictions) legal protection against desecration of any of the official flags and other state symbols. This seemingly liberal approach is compromised though by the ban on uniforms, discussed below, which is interpreted very broadly, and would e.g. certainly prevent wearing the swastika by more persons on a demonstration. Thus, I would say, what is truly exceptional about the UK is only that flag desecration is in not explicitly regulated. However, the Public Order Act’s section 5 entitled ‘Harassment, alarm or distress’ has found application to flag desecration. In *Percy v DPP*\(^{961}\) an anti-proliferation protester daubed “Stop Star Wars” across a US flag and waved it in front of a US Air Force base in England, then threw it to the road in front of a US vehicle and tramped on it. She was convicted by the District Judge under section 5 POA for using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior likely causing harassment, alarm, or distress. The District Judge found there was a pressing social need “to prevent denigration of objects of veneration and symbolic importance for one cultural group”\(^{962}\). The Divisional Court accepted this as legitimate aim, despite the irony of according a status to the US flag in the UK that would be unconstitutional in the US. However, it found the criminal punishment disproportionate for failing to consider relevant other factors, such as whether\(^{963}\)

\[\text{the behaviour went beyond legitimate protest; that the behaviour had not formed a part of an open expression of opinion on a matter of}\]

\[^{961}\text{Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125.}\]
\[^{962}\text{Id. H14 (6).}\]
\[^{963}\text{H16 (8).}\]
public interest, but had become disproportionate and unreasonable; that an accused knew full well the likely effect of their conduct upon witnesses; that the accused deliberately chose to desecrate the national flag of those witnesses, a symbol of very considerable importance to many, particularly those who were in the armed forces; the fact that an accused targeted such people, for whom it became a very personal matter; the fact that an accused was well aware of the likely effect of their conduct; the fact that an accused's use of a flag had nothing, in effect, to do with conveying a message or expression of opinion; that it amounted to a gratuitous and calculated insult, which a number of people at whom it was directed found deeply distressing.

These “factors” are totally unable to provide guidelines on how to interpret section 5 in harmony with the HRA, some of them being part of the offence itself, others conclusions rather then premises, \(^{964}\) all in all, clearly not an identifiable standard.

1.5. ECHR: the red star case(s)

The ECHR’s closest case at hand is clearly Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), where the Hungarian criminal code’s provision\(^ {965}\) related to totalitarian symbols was found applied in violation of Art. 10. The applicant was a prominent member of the Workers’ Party which operates legally, but never reaches the threshold to get to parliament. He wore the red star on a demonstration, where he was a speaker. Vajnai was convicted on the basis of section 269/B of the Criminal Code prohibiting the “dissemination, public use or exhibition of signs of totalitarian regimes, including swastika, an SS-badge, an arrow-cross, a symbol of the sickle and hammer or a red star, or a symbol depicting any of them.”\(^ {966}\) The provision was upheld by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in an abstract norm control proceeding, in a decision much criticized as being inconsistent with previous case law on freedom of expression. The ECHR found the conviction a disproportionate interference with the right to free speech. In its reasoning,

\(^{964}\) Andrew Geddis, *Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace?* - “Insulting” expression and section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, PUBLIC LAW 2004, Win, 853, 861.

\(^{965}\) On the tormented and problematic history of its adoption see GÁBOR HALMAI, A VÉLEMÉNYSZABADSÁG HATÁRAI [LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF OPINION] (Atlantisz, Budapest, 1994) 258-260.

\(^{966}\) As translated in § 15 of Vajnai v. Hungary, 33629/06, Second Section, Judgment of July 8, 2008.
Court emphasized that restrictions on political speech need to be examined with utmost care, that blanket bans are especially suspicious as they might overreach to speech which cannot be legitimately restricted. Most crucially, the Court found the red star had multiple meanings, among them it is the symbol of the international workers’ movement, and it was not established (nor claimed) that Vajnai advocated totalitarianism or defiance of rule of law. Also, the Court noted that the party was not banned in Hungary, the demonstration was lawful, and that no actual or even remote disorder triggered by the display of the red star was ever reported. In a way, the Court applied U.S. doctrines of overbreadth, and chilling effect, and hinted that the showing of some actual danger is required for restrictions on political speech to pass the test of the Convention. Apart from these similarities with American doctrines, the emphasis on the lawfulness of the party might imply that a German or French type ban, not blanket, but strictly linked to banned organizations, would get a more lenient treatment on the part of the Court. Although even then it would need to be shown that the red star is displayed in a particular case in sympathy with a banned party, and, of course, the party ban would also need to pass human rights standards. In relation to this, tabooisation arguments of German courts are necessarily absent, too. As to militant democracy, the Court noted the basically insignificant support the party enjoyed in Hungary, and the assurances the Republic of Hungary has provided to victims of Communism. In a unique paragraph, the Court stated that “dictates of public feeling – real or imaginary –” do not authorize the state to restrict human rights, as “society must remain reasonable in its judgement” for to count as democratic.  

I take the Vajnai judgment turn on the multiplicity of meanings of the red star, from which arises the need to examine every case of display carefully in its context, as context decides which meaning is salient in the particular instance. However, as every symbol has multiple meanings, it seems to me that from Vajnai it should follow that in every case a contextual

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967 Vajnai v. Hungary, § 57.
examination is necessary, and in every case it needs to be shown that the use of a particular symbol either amounts to totalitarian propaganda (as the Court seems to accept in both § 25 and § 56), or creates an actual danger of disorder. It is a question left open how other concerns, e.g. dignity of the victims, might or might not figure as an important factor in the equation. The categorization of victims’ concerns as “irrational fears”, “sentiments” and “feelings” might in effect imply a rejection of dignity claims. It is a question, too, how the Vajnai arguments would apply to the display of the swastika, and other Nazi symbols. I think the default should be the same, i.e. to check the context in which the symbol is displayed. However, it would be a rare scenario where e.g. a swastika is displayed without identification with totalitarianism.968 All in all, the watermark is the one U.S. jurisprudence also was struggling with: whether to draw a line between advocacy of ideology and advocacy of actions, and probably adding to the latter one some probability requirement. As long as that line is not clearly drawn, ECHR jurisprudence would be exposed to the ambiguities of content-based restriction just as much as German is. That the issue be soon clarified is unlikely also because a follow-up case involving conviction for displaying the red star, Frantanoló v. Hungary is pending for admission at the Grand Chamber.969

2. Uniforms and masks

2.1. Uniforms

Wearing uniforms are, under conditions, expressly prohibited on demonstrations in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and they are clearly allowed in the United States in light of the symbolic speech and content neutrality doctrines. The ECHR has not discussed the issue so far.

968 But consider Hindu movement in Germany to stop criminalizing use of the swastika, reasoning that they are entitled to use it as they were before Nazism appropriated it and provided it with a hateful meaning. Under the Vajnai logic, I think they would be free to display the swastika.

969 Frantanoló v. Hungary, Application no. 29459/10, Judgment of 3 November 2011, Request for referral to the Grand Chamber pending.
2.1.1. United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, section 1 of 1936 POA proscribes the wearing of uniforms associated with political organizations while section 2 proscribes paramilitary organizations. The new powers were mostly enacted in order to enable the police to handle properly the violence provoked by the Fascist movement in Britain. According to section 1

any person who in any public place or at any public meeting wears uniform signifying his association with any political organisation or with the promotion of any political object shall be guilty of an offence.

The chief officer of police, with the consent of the Secretary of State might permit the wearing of a uniform on any ceremonial, anniversary, or other special occasion, if the occasion will not be likely to involve risk of public disorder. Apparently, the legislator chose the more restrictive way of regulation. From a human rights perspective, the rule would be the permissibility of wearing uniforms, and only in the likelihood of public disorder a ban could have been introduced. As logically this must have been the rule before the 1936 act came into force (at a time when e.g. only common law breach of the peace powers were available), there must have been a serious fear of “radicalization” resulting from the Nazi paramilitary marches of the 1930’s. The question which is left unclear by such across-the-board prohibition remains, of course, whether there would have been a real radicalization of the UK population at large without this and other, more restrictive rules and practices, for instance that “[t]here was, in fact, an almost continuous ban on processions in London from 1937 until after World War II.”

There is no legal definition of what counts as uniform, but there is one case which rendered the notion of uniform a little bit more concrete. In *O’Moran v. DPP* the demonstrators wore black berets, dark glasses and dark clothes, somewhat similar to IRA uniform. According to Lord Widgery, even the wearing of the beret in itself would amount to

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971 *O’Moran v. DPP* [1975] QB 864.
a “uniform” in the sense of section 1 of the act, if wore by a number of persons appearing together, since it shows their association. The minimum criterion he established for “wearing a uniform” was that it must be an article of cloth, thus, for instance badges do not qualify. It might well be, but it is not necessary that the article had been used in the past as a uniform by an organization. But simply wearing a uniform, e.g. a beret by a number of persons could also qualify if it indicates their association with each other, and if they “by their conduct indicate that that beret associates them with other activity of a political character.” Apart from that, one has to look at all circumstances. That might give rise to arbitrary selection of those against whom the ban is enforced, but the low number of cases might also suggest that British police are not making use of this discretionary power.\textsuperscript{972} It is quite probable that its application would not survive an HRA/ECHR challenge after Vajnai.

In addition to the Public Order Act, a ban on uniform might come from the unexpected source of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 13 introduced a new offence for wearing uniform of a proscribed organization, where proscribed appears to include organizations proscribed before the law entered into force as well. Also, being a member is not necessary as wearing an item of clothing or displaying an article in a way arousing reasonable suspicion that the person is a member of such an organization suffices. The law is thus the worst example of guilt by association, in fact, even guilt by non-association or ghost-association, and it lacks absolutely any showing of material harm. As to the application, so far the High Court of Justiciary of Scotland in \textit{Rankin v Murray}\textsuperscript{973} found the provision applicable to someone \textit{wearing a ring} (!) with the inscription UVF, a common abbreviation for Ulster Volunteer Force, a proscribed organization. Absurd as it may sound, the Court affirmed in a clear textualist fashion that even if the ring was received as a gift, \textit{i.e.} indeed the beholder is not a member of the proscribed

\textsuperscript{972} Similarly MEAD supra note 507 at 214.
\textsuperscript{973} Rankin v Murray (2004) SLT 1164, see Andrew LOTHIAN, \textit{Time, gentlemen? Latest criminal cases, including sentencing discounts; non-disclosure by Crown; support for proscribed organisations; circumstantial prof; road traffic}, 1 Aug 04, theJournal online, The members’ magazine of the Law Society of Scotland, http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/49-8/1000140.aspx (last visited May, 24, 2011.)
organization, the provision still applies, as what matters is the objectively reasonable suspicion which already flows from the wearing itself. The Court also rejected a kind of seriousness standard, which would not construe the provision as including foolish or out-of-bravado displays. This led David Mead to a must-quote remark that “woe betide Mr and Mrs Anderson giving their daughter Isobel Rachel a coming-of-age bracelet engraved with her initials.” Another commentator contemplates what might then happen to “deluded youths” wearing swastikas on T-shirt as a “post-modern iconic statement” or even “in a kind of New Age way” referring to oriental mysticism, unlikely recognized by police officers. Note the remarkable homogeneous treatment of two issues wholly distinct, at least if viewed from the standpoint of German and ECHR law.

2.1.2. Germany

In Germany, the ban on uniforms is two-folded. First, there is a ban of wearing uniforms of banned organizations in public, as discussed above. This ban also includes symbols such as buttons or parts of uniforms as explained. Apart from this, the old federal assembly law has banned wearing “in public or in an assembly uniforms, parts of uniforms or similar pieces of clothes as expression of a general political attitude” [Gesinnung]. This latter provision has found application both to the extreme right and to a significant extent the left, anti-nuclear protestors, the Autonoms, etc. a famous image being the “Schwarzer Block.” Some claim the law overreaches as it not only regulates uniforms on assemblies, but generally in public. The GFCC never ruled on this problem of overreach. The ban itself was found unproblematic by the GFCC in a 1982 decision, whose reasoning will be put out here in short.

974 MEAD supra note 507 at 217.
975 LOTHIAN supra note 973.
976 Supra text accompanying notes 899 — 922.
977 Art. 3 VersG. For the status of the federal assembly law after the federalism reform, see supra note 243.
978 E.g. DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, I-5, 19.
979 BVerfG, 27.04.1982 - 1 BvR 1138/81, NJW 1982, 1803. (I’m not a donkey)
Starting point is that freedom of expression and assembly protect pictorial and suggestive collective manifestations of opinion. However, uniforms expressing common political attitude are capable not only to reinforce the outer effect of collective expressions, but to excite “suggestive-militant effects in the direction of intimidating, uniform militancy.” This militancy inherently encroaches upon the “free battle of opinion”, and therefore, the constitution does not prevent the legislator to inhibit from the outset the public wearing of uniforms, including forms which are meant to evade this restriction. Such “Umgehungsformen” are in particular civilian clothes which look essentially unitary and display references to historically known militant groupings in a recognizable fashion, especially if their wearing is accompanied by other such references, such as marching in formation or other militant conduct. The more visible the similarity [Gleichartigkeit] to uniforms, the more relevance the assembly law’s ban has even when members of groups show up in a seemingly scattered way.

In spite of this decision, much unclarity remained or even might have occurred following this judgment. Clear seems to be that those who regularly wear uniforms, e.g. soldiers, are not allowed wearing it on political demonstrations. Inversely, however, wearing a Bundeswehr-uniform (available freely in commerce) during a sports training does not fall under the ban, if the common political attitude is not apparent for the audience. City of Konstanz’ prosecutor’s office considered blue-yellow anoraks at an election campaign by members of the FDP outside the uniform ban, basically reciting the GFCC’s grounds word by word. The Osnabrück prosecutor’s office, in a widely read decision recently found that wearing plastic strikewests did not qualify as uniform because the demonstrators’ ordinary clothes

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980 Id.
981 Id. Not exact, but close translation of the main paragraph of the decision.
983 BGH, Urteil vom 29.11.1983 - 5 StR 811/83, NSiZ 1984, 123.
984 StA Konstanz, Verfügung vom 23.02.1984 - 11 Js 16/84. DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, 140 refer in this regard to LG Konstanz, MDR 1984, 692 – i.e. to a court decision which I could not find.
were visible under the west. It did not qualify as similar piece of cloth either because its single-use character prevented it from being perceived as an ordinary cloth. Thirdly, the office distinguished the trade union strike related to a collective agreement as not being a political strike. A commentary of the assembly law similarly claims that uniformed officers participating at a demonstration furthering “professional” interests do not fall under the ban for lack of common “political attitude”.986

From these instances it appears that the accepted scope of the uniform ban is quite narrow at least compared to the text.

Firstly, the 1982 GFCC decision is understood to have narrowed the scope of the uniform ban to “mass suggestive” and militant uses. What those LeBonian terms mean are naturally left to evaluation in the particular case. For OLG Koblenz, the reason for the ban is that uniform symbolizes organized violence, and this court understands the GFCC by narrowing the applicability of the ban to such occasions.987 The new Bavarian assembly law – whose different provisions were found preliminarily unconstitutional988 – only bans intimidatory uniforms,989 an even narrower term, which on its face might even satisfy US standards. Recall in addition that the GFCC argued that militancy hinders free battle of opinion – in a different way of saying that you should fight on the level of reasoned argument and not by physical threats. Still, I have an understanding that if the GFCC had wanted to restrict limitation of uniform bans to intimidation and threat, it would have clearly said so. Ordinary courts and policing authorities appear reasonably cautious though when interpreting the grounds for a

986 DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, § 3 Rn. 13, 141.
988 The GFCC in a preliminary expedited proceeding rendered inapplicable several important provisions of the law: BVerfG, Beschl. v. 17. 2. 2009 – 1 BvR 2492/08, NVwZ 2009, 441, and this „injunction” was extended by a further six months in a decision from August 4, 2009. The Bavarian lawmaker has changed the law, thus it might happen that the GFCC will not deliver a final decision. (Law from 4.22. 2010, GVBl S. 190, entered into force on 6.1.2010.) The law modified art. 7 on militancy ban (which was not affected by the GFCC), but it maintained the condition of intimidation relevant for my purposes above.
ban. Secondly, what counts as common political attitude is also in two ways limited. On the one hand, it has to be comprehended as such by the public, the audience, similarly to what was discussed above in relation to “expression delicts” in the criminal code. On the other hand, “political” itself is narrowed down, for instance, it is doubtful on the basis of the above examples if there is any labor strike which counts as “political”.

2.1.3. France

French law does not have a demonstration specific ban on uniforms. It does have the mentioned ban on symbols and garment of organizations or persons responsible for crimes against humanity, but apparently there is no belief that uniforms automatically enhance the potential for violence or militancy, as it is in the U.K. and Germany. The other general dress code, the recent burqa ban could be conceived as a ban on uniform clothing, but the law itself only mentions concealing the face, thus I will discuss it shortly under masks.

As to the flipside, in an interesting contrast to German law, French law prohibits wearing the uniform for reservists on any political or syndical event or demonstration. Recall that German courts try to limit political as not meaning labor strikes. Here in France the idea is that the military uniform is the symbol of state, which should be outside or elevated over any debate of a certain intensity of interests.

2.2. Masks

Masks can be removed by police in the UK, and are banned under conditions in Germany and France. The US, strangely enough, has not produced a coherent jurisprudence on the issue of

\[990\] See above supra text accompanying notes 899—949.
\[991\] See supra text accompanying notes 923—924.
\[992\] Port de l'uniforme (Arrêté du 14 décembre 2007) Art 1er. II. b., Art. 4. II. b.
masks, and the Supreme Court does not appear to be willing to take a case. The ECHR has not faced the issue of masks yet.

2.2.1. United Kingdom

In the UK, Art. 60 AA CJPOA has authorized the police to “require any person to remove any item which the constable reasonably believes that person is wearing wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his identity.” The next paragraph authorizes the constable to seize such items. Those powers are quite often used, just as demonstrators often tend to wear masks, helmets, scarves and similar clothes to disguise their identity. Nonetheless, none of the cases I found deal explicitly with possible problems inherent in prohibiting masks. In *Laporte*993 there was such a seizure under section 60AA, because the police found some masks. However, the House of Lords judgment only mentions the removal and seizure of disguises among the facts, and pursued no further, normative examination in that regard. In *Austin*,994 still the Queen’s Bench Division, made reference to *Laporte*, again without challenging the order for removal and seizure, and in neither case made any of the judges any thoughts related to it. In *Broadwith*,995 the fact that the person wore a mask strengthened the court’s accepting that he could be reasonably believed to be a demonstrator. Nobody questioned the adequacy of such a conclusion. Therefore, there seems to be no legal controversy around the power of removal or its application. What was settled by the Divisional Court is only that guarantees surrounding stop and search powers are not applicable to the mask removal power, thus *e.g.* the constable requiring removing the mask does not need to tell their name and station, etc.. Consequently, the person denying the removal is not exempted by the fact that the police officer did not identify themselves.996

993 See *supra* text accompanying notes 556-562.
994 *Austin v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner* [2005] EWHC 480 QBD.
2.2.2. Germany

Art. 17a of the German federal assembly law prohibits bringing so-called Schutzwaffen to public events and to hide identity. Schutzwaffen or “protective weapons” are protective covers, gas masks, helmets or similar devices capable of averting law enforcement activities of authorities. Art. 17a para. 2 also prohibits any makeup, design or appearance [Aufmachung] capable of, and, according to the circumstances, designed to prevent the identification of the participant or the would-be participant on her way to the assembly. Same applies to objects brought for the same use and with the same intent. Exemption can be granted if there is no reason to fear an endangerment of public security or order. Art. 27 of the assembly law orders punishment of up to one year or fine for violating art. 17a, or, in a curious parallel, bringing weapons to a public event. It shows the legislative finds masks and helmets all in all just as dangerous or undesirable as arms. This connection supports the view shared by constitutional lawyers that both the uniform and the masking ban are the concretizations of the peacefulness requirement, as if these bans were not limits, but are inherent to the substance of the right [Grundrechtsausgestaltung]. I cannot subscribe to this view even if I accept that unpeaceful assemblies are out of the scope of constitutional protection. To claim, however, that non-wearing of masks and uniforms is evidently as necessary to maintain peace as not being violent, is just to spare authorities from providing evidence on an empirical question. Available data, including social psychology by far does not unequivocally suggest such a stance. Sometimes, there might be an increased readiness for violence for reasons of a bigger chance of not being caught, but deindividuation studies show that such a correlation is not necessary. Clearly, the exempted categories, and the possibility to lift the ban in

997 Assemblies under the open sky, processions, and other public events.
998 Also exempted are traditional assemblies which are exempted from advance notice requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 449-456.
999 E.g. DEPENHEUER, supra note 144 at Rn. 144., DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, § 17a Rn. 1, 353.
1000 See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
particular cases show that the legislator itself knows not every masked demonstration turns violent. Art. 17a was first introduced in 1985 after several occasions of masked violence. Before that, the police was entitled to impose the condition of not wearing masks if it found necessary to prevent endangerment of public order and security. Basically the legislator decided to shift “the burden of proof”, and since 1985 the rule has been the ban, the immunity the exception. This would not be in itself problematic. However, the norm finally accepted only authorizes, and not obliges the authority to lift the ban in case there is no danger to public order and security, an anyway too broad concept. Such a discretion granted is unfounded.

These severe concerns are well registered by German legal scholarship. Some thus maintain that the ban is unconstitutional. Others suggest an interpretation which is consistent with constitutional principles, which thus considerably narrows the scope of the ban. For instance, there should not be discretion in lifting the ban in case there is no reason to fear unpeaceful activities (and not simply danger to public order and security). Also, for exercising freedom of art and of non-verbal expression an exception should be carved out. Hoffmann-Riem explains that participants must be able to bring protective objects if they only want to protect themselves from militant counterdemonstrators.

Courts also interpret the bans restrictively, though they do not go as far as Hoffmann-Riem. Brokdorf is relevant as there the GFCC reinforced the general principle that administrative discretion is always limited by fundamental rights, thus theoretically the wearing of masks and bringing “protective weapons” is allowed every case there is no risk to public order. For instance, the GFCC found that wearing animal masks on a protest entitled “Patenting of life” in front of the European Patent Office in Munich cannot be subjected to the condition that

1001 E.g. HOFFMANN-RIEM supra note 208 at Rn. 27.
1002 DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, § 17a Rn. 4-10, 354-357.
1003 HOFFMANN-RIEM supra note 208 at Rn. 25.
1004 BVerfGE 69, 315, 345.
“protesters wearing masks identify themselves at the request of the police” as there was no showing of direct danger to public order or safety. What counts as protective weapon or similar device capable of being used as such appears reasonably limited, e.g. a gumshield as more capable of preventing accident than averting an attack was found outside the ban. A Hannover court, in line with earlier decisions, found that there must be a proven intent to not being identified by law enforcement authorities, hiding faces from counterdemonstrators or the political opponents photographing the protestors does not fall under the ban on masks.

In a similar vein, it has been found that wearing sports gloves, reinforced by glass sand by the knuckles are though capable of being used as a protective weapon, but specific intent to use them that way is needed for it to fall under the ban. Thus, intent to evade law enforcement is necessary in both wearing mask and having protective weapons (or, at least, objects capable of being used as such), otherwise there is no criminal responsibility. This does not mean inversely that law enforcement must be lawful, as even unlawful law enforcement must not be averted by protective weapons. Such use can only be exempted on the basis of general criminal norms of self-defense.

2.2.3. France

In France, recent years has brought governmental hostility towards hiding faces in public to the surface. In the last two years two bans both relevant to assemblies have been adopted.

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1006 LG Cottbus, Beschuß vom 22. 12. 2006 - 24 jug Qs 61/06.
1007 LG Hannover, Urteil vom 20.01.2009 - 62c 69/08, (left-wing protestor hiding her face from photographing right-wing onlookers), reference found in Tronje Döhmer’s online Leitsatzkommentar at http://www.leitsatzkommentar.de/VersammlungsG.htm, but the decision is not available on Beck-online. In effect an identical ruling was brought about earlier by AG Rotenburg (Wümme), Urteil vom 12. 7. 2005 - 7 Cs 523 Js 2354/04 (9/05).
1008 OLG Dresden, Beschluss vom 17.06.2008 - 1 Ss 401/08.
1009 OLG Hamm, Urteil vom 22.10.1997 - 2 Ss 735/97, NSZ-RR 1998, 87, reference found in Tronje Döhmer’s online Leitsatzkommentar at http://www.leitsatzkommentar.de/VersammlungsG.htm, but the decision available on Beck-online.
First has been a 2009 decree on the illegal covering of face on public demonstrations, the second has been the (in)famous burqa ban.

The 2009 decree was adopted in the aftermath of the April NATO summit protests where ultra leftist groups in the tradition of Black Block destroyed banks and industrial spots in Strasbourg. The decree inserted in the criminal code a fifth class (most serious) misdemeanor or contravention, an administrative offense, punishable by up to 1500 euros fine (3000 for recidivism). Art. R. 645-14 prohibits voluntarily hiding one’s face in order not to be identified on or in the immediate proximity of a demonstration on the public route in circumstances giving rise to fear of attacks to public order. Para. 3 allows for exemptions in case of assemblies conforming to local usage and when the covering of the face is justified by a legitimate reason. The first one – conforming to local usage – probably refers to religious processions, as the same formulation is applied in the 1935 decree law exempting such processions from the notification requirement. The Conseil d’État rejected a challenge to this contravention, as the applicant has not proven a grave and manifestly illegal violation of a fundamental liberty, as it is required in the référe-liberté procedure. The decree was strongly criticized, even by police as being a grotesque and inapplicable measure. The main police union thinks they would be obliged to go in the middle of demonstrating mass, basically a provocation, enhancing the chances of clashes.

1010 Décret n° 2009-724 du 19 juin 2009 relatif à l'incrimination de dissimulation illicite du visage à l'occasion de manifestations sur la voie publique, JORF n°0141 du 20 juin 2009 page 10067, texte n° 29, NOR: IOCD0909694D.
1011 See supra text accompanying notes 446-448.
1013 On the référe-liberté see supra note 283.
It was for some time unclear whether the provision ought to be understood as imposing a ban in every case, or only in circumstances giving rise to risk of public order, and this latter element of the sentence refers to the cases where someone needs to be identified, i.e. opening the possibility for identification. This interpretation would mean that on assemblies conforming to local usage a mask can be worn even if the circumstances give rise to fear to public order.

The provision went once again to the Conseil d’Etat in 2011 in a challenge of excess of power, initiated by several national level general and specialized unions like that of high schools and attorneys. The CÉ found the regulation both constitutional and conform to the European human rights convention, emphasizing the precise definition of the scope of the ban, the existence of such ban in other countries, and judicial supervision as a safeguard. Most importantly, the CÉ explained that the provision does not target masked demonstrators as long as their masking does not aim at preventing identification by police forces in a context where their conduct constitute a threat to public order that their identification could prevent.  

This is quite a narrow reading of the text, but of course, it does not explain in any ways when exactly a threat to public order exists. Also somehow unrealistic seems to me the process of explaining police that actually one is not wearing the mask for avoiding identification. Theoretically, however, after this decision of the CÉ, one can always argue that there is no threat to public order in the actual circumstances, thus, masks can be worn without hindrance. What that exactly means, will be tested in practice. As mentioned, police appear quite reluctant to strictly enforce the law in any case.

1016 Conseil d'État N° 329477, Mentionné au tables du recueil Lebon, 10ème et 9ème sous-sections réunies, lecture du mercredi 23 février 2011. The decision is not available in Légifrance, but only on the website of the Conseil d’Etat.
The other ban, which clearly has been in the lime light in and outside France, has been enacted as law in 2010. Art. 1 states that “nobody shall, in public, to wear a garment destined to conceal the face.” Art. 3 sanctions the violation by a fine for second class misdemeanours, i.e. wearing the burqa “in the public space” is considered less serious than hiding face at a demonstration, in my view, certainly rightly so. Among the possible sanctions is a citizenship training [stage de citoyenneté] where the delinquent gets familiarized with republican values of tolerance, and of respect of dignity of the human person, a sanction introduced in 2004. Public space [espace public] includes “streets, places open to the public, or affected by a public service” (Art. 2. I LOI n° 2010-1192). Exempted is the garment if “prescribed or authorized by law or regulation, or if it is justified by health or professional reasons, or if it is worn in the context of sports training, or artistic or traditional feasts or such demonstrations” (Art. 2. II LOI n° 2010-1192). The same law also criminalized “forcing another person or persons by threat, violence, or duress, abuse of authority or power, to conceal the face, for reason of their sex.” This is a proper crime, with serious punishment. Again, it is not difficult to see that it is rightly more severely sanctioned than the voluntary wearing (for whose general ban I simply fail to see any legitimate reason).

The Conseil Constitutionnel examined the law in preliminary review proceedings and found it constitutional, though it made a constitutional reservation in interpretation. Notably, it imposed that it would be unconstitutional if the ban on concealing the face would restrict exercice of freedom of religion “in places of worship open to the public”. The Conseil thereby

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1018 Art. 131.16, 8° Code Pénal, referred to in Art. 3 of the “burqa law”.
1020 Article 225-4-10 Code Pénal: “Le fait pour toute personne d'imposer à une ou plusieurs autres personnes de dissimuler leur visage par menace, violence, contrainte, abus d'autorité ou abus de pouvoir, en raison de leur sexe, est puni d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 30 000 € d'amende. Lorsque le fait est commis au préjudice d'un mineur, les peines sont portées à deux ans d'emprisonnement et à 60 000 € d'amende.”
carved out an exception, but otherwise found the legislator realized a not manifestly disproportionate reconciliation of public order on the one, and constitutionally protected rights on the other hand (considérant 5). The CC thinks the legislator by adopting the general ban has only “generalized and completed” rules so far reserved for punctual situations of protecting public order, and the Conseil seems to accept that “women concealing their face – voluntarily or not – are placed in a situation of exclusion and inferiority manifestly incompatible with constitutional principles of liberty and equality” (considérant 4, emphasis added). The burqa ban has been discussed worldwide in both journalistic and scholarly writings, and earned quite some critique in terms of freedom of religion. It can also be strongly critized from the point of view of freedom of assembly, as such a ban also deprives burqa wearing women from their right to assembly. In one case, there were arrests on a demonstration against the burqa ban, the demonstration was dispersed, and at least one person in niqab was interrogated by police, however, not on the basis of the dissimulation provision, but for lack of prior notice. For these cases I would argue that the ban on masks on demonstration is lex specialis, and thus carves out an exception from the burqa ban in cases where it is worn on a demonstration for legitimate reasons, e.g. to protest against the burqa ban itself, or against religious discrimination, or even for any reason unrelated to the burqa, because the individual cannot be made to choose between exercising her freedom of assembly or freedom of religion. As the CC takes to accept that wearing a burqa in public is per se a threat to public order, the CÉ’s above interpretation on protest masks does not help; so one would have to rely on the exceptions, most easily that of legitimate reason. It only adds to the confusion that the Conseil d’Etat earlier had also given a (strictly confidential) advisory

La décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 2010-613 DC du 7 octobre 2010, JORF n°0237 du 12 octobre 2010 page 18345, NOR : CSCL1025794S.


opinion on “the general ban of the integral veil” in which it expressed serious doubts about compatibility with constitution and convention.\textsuperscript{1024} The CÉ’s principled opposition to a full ban though does not imply a resistance to the CC’s deferential decision.

2.2.4. United States

In the U.S., there is a strong tradition of valuing anonymous speech, which goes back to the experiences of the colonial or even English periode. As the Supreme Court noted:\textsuperscript{1025}

> Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.

The Supreme Court has struck down laws requiring the divulgence of membership lists of NAACP\textsuperscript{1026}, or the law mandating that on every handbill names and addresses of the sponsors be displayed,\textsuperscript{1027} or another one requiring identification for door-to-door canvassing.\textsuperscript{1028} However, this line of jurisprudence is not necessarily applicable to wearing masks at a demonstration. The USSC has never decided on exactly this issue, just issued denials of certiorari. As there appear to be some arguments – discussed in relation to other jurisdictions like enhanced dangerosity, adverting law enforcement – for distinguishing anonymous speech from anonymous (especially crowd) protest, the USSC’s opinion would be useful. Also, we know in \textit{Brandenburg v. Ohio} a meeting in hoods was found constitutionally protected, though the main thrust of the decision was quite unrelated to this issue. There have been attempts to ban masks on demonstrations in the U.S. as well. A Georgia Anti-Mask statute was found constitutional by the state supreme court, but it never went to the federal level. As

\textsuperscript{1024} See only the press reports on it: Le Conseil d'Etat contesteait une interdiction totale du voile LEMONDE.FR avec AFP et Reuters | 14.05.10, Cécilia Gabizon, Burqa : l'interdiction générale écarter par le Conseil d'Etat, Le Figaro, 26/03/2010.
\textsuperscript{1025} Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
\textsuperscript{1026} NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
\textsuperscript{1028} Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
the Georgia Supreme Court is of the view that the Georgian Constitution protects speech more broadly than the federal constitution,\footnote{1029} it is worth looking closer at their arguments allowing for the ban on masks. The Anti-Mask statute\footnote{1030} was adopted in 1951 in reaction to several occasions of lynchings and other violent “vigilante” events mostly carried out by the Ku Klux Klan. The current application of the law was also related to a KKK member, who went to streets wearing KKK regalia, including the hood with mask concealing the face. The applicable test was \textit{O’Brien}, and the Georgia Supreme Court found that the statute, regulating conduct including both speech- and nonspeech elements, furthered substantial government interest unrelated to speech, no more burdensome than necessary, for the following reasons. Concealing the face is “an effective means of committing crimes of violence and intimidation”, as it hinders law enforcement, and “calms the criminal’s inward cowardly fear.”\footnote{1031} In an impressive passage, the Court adds:\footnote{1032}

\begin{quote}
A nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the human heart. But, remove the mask, and the nightmarish form is reduced to its true dimensions. The face betrays not only identity, but also human frailty.
\end{quote}

The ban was to prevent not only threat, intimidation or violence, and apprehension of criminals, but also “restore confidence in law enforcement by removing any possible illusion of government complicity with masked vigilantes.”\footnote{1033} This latter can be quite an important, but not obvious concern not only in the US before the civil rights movement, but also in every society where police regularly mistreats discernible social groups. These are rightly said to constitute substantial or even compelling government interests, quite independently of whether – as the Georgian court claims – it also counts as the affirmative constitutional duty of the state. As to claims of content discrimination and overbreadth, the Court replied by a

\footnotesize{\begin{footnotes}
\item[1030] The “Anti-Mask Act,” OCGA § 16-11-38.
\item[1031] Id. by quoting M. Abram & A. Miller, “How to Stop Violence! Intimidation! In Your Community” (August 15, 1949).
\item[1032] 260 Ga. 669, 671-672.
\item[1033] Id. at 672.
\end{footnotes}}
narrow construction of the (in my view, clearly content-neutral) statute to cases where the mask worn is perceived intimidatory or threatening by a reasonable person, though I think the concurring is right in requiring also actual intent.\(^ {1034}\) This is a kind of reasoning clearly similar to *Virginia v. Black*, the 2003 USSC cross burning case, but in the Georgia case without the problems Justice Souter raised stemming from a ban on particular symbols. To wear a mask as intimidation in my view is different from cross burning as intimidation because mask really helps evading law enforcement. Thus, I disagree with dissenting justice Smith who believes the statute is content-based and *Brandenburg* should apply.\(^ {1035}\) Even so, however, the dissenting justice might be right that in the particular case, circumstances indicate that the KKK member wore the mask out of protest against the anti-mask statute, not for intimidation, thus his conviction shall not stand.

A more striking decision is of the Second Circuit from 2004 dealing with New York state’s anti-mask statute. This statute was enacted in 1845 in response to attacks on police by disguised farmers; and goes as follows:\(^ {1036}\)

A person is guilty of loitering when he:

Being masked or in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire or facial alteration, loiters, remains or congregates in a public place with other persons so masked or disguised, or knowingly permits or aids persons so masked or disguised to congregate in a public place; except that such conduct is not unlawful when it occurs in connection with a masquerade party or like entertainment ....

The district court found the provision unconstitutional,\(^ {1037}\) but the Second Circuit\(^ {1038}\) reversed. The USSC denied certiorari.\(^ {1039}\) At issue has been a KKK related organization, the Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, which was denied a permit to demonstrate in front of a courthouse in masks. Circuit Judge Cabranes found that the “mask does not

\(^{1034}\) Id. at 677, Justice Hunt, concurring.

\(^{1035}\) Id. at 677 et seq., Presiding Justice Smith, dissenting.


communicate any message that the robe and hood do not. The expressive force of the mask is, therefore, redundant.” With this, the Court dispensed of any apparent need to examine free speech doctrines, be they of anonymous speech or symbolic conduct, and spelled out flatly that mask wearing does not fall under the First Amendment. As a critic notes, the precedent referred to – a case which held that the operator of a place of prostitution could not rely on the First Amendment against the closure of his business simply because the premises were also used as a bookstore\textsuperscript{1040} – is clearly inapplicable as the burden on wearing masks is certainly not an incidental burden on expressive activity, as it was in the prostitution-bookstore parallel. The reasoning is all the more surprising as in this case some Knights actually experienced violence in a previous, non-masked gathering at the same place,\textsuperscript{1041} and this circumstance cries, if not for the application, then at least the discussion of anonymous speech precedents mentioned above. Strange as it might appear, the Supreme Court did not find necessary or useful to review this decision. Basically the same argumentation in a 1992 Virginia case was also not reviewed by the USSC.\textsuperscript{1042}

All in all, from the six federal and eighteen state cases ever decided related to wearing masks in public,\textsuperscript{1043} no clear pattern emerges. More or less certain appears that overbreadth and vagueness concerns figure in this area as well,\textsuperscript{1044} especially post-WW2 cases, when the current speech doctrine was gradually taking hold. However, parallel to this, lower courts sometimes stick to a rigid speech-conduct doctrine – of a kind never approved by the Supreme


\textsuperscript{1041} Id. at 2778.


\textsuperscript{1043} Thomas R. Trenkner, \textit{Validity and construction of state statute or ordinance prohibiting picketing, parading, demonstrating, or appearing in public while masked or disguised}, 2 A.L.R.4TH 1241 (originally published 1980, weekly update from 12 March 2011).

Court itself –, which even leads to non-application of the rather permissive *O’Brien* test either. Again other courts would find that the American Knights of the KKK wore the mask for expressive reasons, – among them, to preserve anonymity for fear of retaliation – and thus strict scrutiny (not simply *O’Brien*) applies. I think such a view is correct, especially if there is indication that the “Knights” experienced threats, violence, etc. in the past for reasons of their views.\(^{1045}\) To put the burden of proof on the speaker in this regard completely\(^ {1046}\) appears though to me dubious.

In my view, as always, much depends on the circumstances. Masks can be worn both out of fear of being intimidated, just as with the purpose of intimidating others.

3. Noise

Public assemblies make noise. Part of the noise is essential to the activity itself, to convey some message normally requires some sound, most naturally the sound of speaking. In addition, assemblies are typically accompanied by music, chants, clapping, shouting slogans, etc. Even at small or middle-sized events sound amplification might be needed to reach audience and passersby. Thereby, assemblies can cause quite an auditional nuisance. One man’s noise, however, is another’s music, to paraphrase Justice Harlan.\(^ {1047}\) Sound level regulations are part of general law in every country, and rightly so. Equally obvious is that sound is integral to the exercise of the right to assembly. In the following, I will discuss those few cases where courts had to face a choice between tranquillity and protest.

Two famous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, both shaping general free speech doctrine, have to be discussed first in this relation. *Kovacs v. Cooper*\(^ {1048}\) is a 1949 case, involving a city ordinance prohibiting the use of sound amplifiers attached to vehicles. Kovács was emitting

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\(^{1045}\) American Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, Ind., 50 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 1999).

\(^{1046}\) People v. Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725 (City Crim. Ct. 2001).

\(^{1047}\) “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) majority opinion by Justice Harlan in the „Fuck the draft!” case.

\(^{1048}\) Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
music and statements related to a labor dispute from a soundtruck on a street. He was found violating the ordinance for employing sound amplifier emitting “loud or raucous noise” “on or upon the public streets, alleys or thoroughfares”. The Supreme Court affirmed conviction by a lead opinion joined by three judges, two concurring, and four dissents. The Court distinguished Saia v. New York, a prior restraint case where the Chief of Police had total discretion in granting advance permission for dissemination of “news and matters of public concern and athletic activities.” The ordinance applied to Kovacs involved neither prior restraint, nor discretionary powers, and “loud and raucous” – though certainly not exact – can be interpreted reasonably clearly. More indicative is perhaps how the Court distinguishes another case where an ordinance prohibiting handbillers or pamphleteers summoning the homeowners to their doors was found unconstitutional. As the Kovacs lead opinion put it:

The Court never intimated that the visitor could insert a foot in the door and insist on a hearing… The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. …In his home or on the street, he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loudspeakers except through the protection of the municipality.

The harshness of this equalization of the street to the home is striking, just as the unusually speculative intimation that actually Kovacs used the sound truck because this way he could save money:

[T]hat more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without cost from some zealous supporter, is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open. [emphasis added]

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1049 The message itself was not reported in the litigation.
1051 336 U. S. 86 et seq.
1052 336 U. S. 88 et seq.
I would rarely think such a thing, but it is very hard not to see a strong elitist-conservative stance in the majority reasoning.

The strong separate dissents by Justices Murphy, Black, and Rutledge (and even concurring Justice Jackson, but from the opposite angle) fault the Court for disregarding that as interpreted by state courts, Kovacs was convicted for using sound amplification as such – not for emitting loud and raucous noise by sound truck, as the text of the ordinance would suggest. The lead opinion cursorily states that “[w]e cannot believe that rights of free speech compel a municipality to allow such mechanical voice amplification on any of its streets” while elsewhere it appears only to decide on the use of emitting loud and raucous sounds by amplification on public streets. In the meantime, the two concurring necessary for the majority find a flat ban on sound amplification in streets and parks constitutional. Apart or maybe inherent to this cacophony, it remains equally doubtful what test – if any – the Court is applying. Maybe the beginnings of the TMP thinking can be found in references to “hours and place,” even if the quote is taken from Saia, the mentioned case decided under a whole different philosophy I think.

The other central precedent is Ward v. Rock against Racism from 1989 relying on the new test currently applicable to TMP restrictions in general. The dispute was about a New York City Central Park regulation which made it mandatory for performers in the band shell to use city-provided sound amplification, administered by the city’s technician who would thus also control volume levels and sound mix in order to avoid volume problems. The Court found the regulation constitutional relying on Clark according to the majority, and modifying it according to the dissent. In any case, the regulation was deemed content-neutral as it was

1053 336 U.S. 87.
1054 Justice Black even argues that the lead opinion affirmed the conviction on grounds on which Kovacs was neither charged nor tried, thereby the Supreme Court itself violated due process. 336 U.S. 99. Justice Rutledge notes that „[i]n effect, Kovacs stands convicted, but of what it is impossible to tell, because the majority upholding the conviction do not agree upon what constituted the crime.” 336 U.S. 105.
1057 Supra note 870, see also infra text accompanying notes 1090-1097
justified without reference to the content of the speech, certainly a correct statement. As such, the content-neutral test should be applied which only requires a substantial (as opposed to compelling) government interest, which in the present case is double: to protect citizens from unwelcome noise, and to provide sufficient sound amplification for those who wish to listen to the music, i.e. the audience on the concert ground. \(^{1058}\) Note the somewhat strange argument – especially from a Court not normally favoring positive rights – that one and the same regulation is at once a restriction on speech and a promotion of listeners’ speech interests. Still, the Court found the restriction was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, especially also because it did not have “a substantial deleterious effect on the ability of bandshell performers to achieve the quality of sound they desired.”\(^{1059}\)

Finally, the guidelines also left open “ample alternative channels of communication”, thus it met the third step of the content-neutral restrictions test. In this regard, the Court emphasized that the regulation did not restrict speech at any particular time or place. The fact that the regulation might reduce the number of the audience as people far away would not hear the concert, was found irrelevant because RAR did not show that “remaining avenues of communication [were] inadequate”\(^{1060}\).

Dissenting Justice Marshall thinks the regulation fails the narrow tailoring requirement, and it is an impermissible prior restraint.\(^{1061}\) As the majority defers to governmental determination as to volume levels, I subscribe to the view that it is not narrow tailoring. Instead of total control over volume level and sound mix, it would have been equally effective but less intrusive to ban excessive noise itself.\(^{1062}\) For the majority, it was enough to ascertain that the city technician tried to compromise and fulfill the wishes of the performers, including the

\(^{1058}\) 491 U.S. 791 et seq.

\(^{1059}\) 491 U.S. 801.

\(^{1060}\) 491 U.S. 802.

\(^{1061}\) For reasons of the discretion granted in the Guidelines. The majority thinks there is no impermissible prior restraint because the regulation does not authorize suppression of speech in advance of actual expression, and practice has limited the discretion to a significant degree. At 491 U.S. 795, incl. Footnote 5.

\(^{1062}\) 491 U.S. 807, Justice Marshall, dissenting.
concern to reach the audience on the concert ground. The dissent points out in reply that then why not simply maximizing permissible decibel level, and what is the need for the city equipment and technician at all? The majority contents itself that the Guidelines exclude taking into consideration what content of speech is to be delivered. In reply, one could say, it is one thing to proclaim an obligation, and another is to institute mechanisms which ensure eo ipso the realization of that obligation. Especially problematic here that there is no judicial supervision – the Supreme Court renounced it. This difference in approach between majority and dissent shows exactly the weakness of the content neutrality test but also the somewhat hidden esoterics of general tests: the majority claims the applicable test is not one of least intrusive means, while the dissent thinks in any case, narrow tailoring was not fulfilled. The prongs of narrow tailoring and least intrusive means are in effect merged.\footnote{A commentator thinks the narrow tailoring was in effect abolished Carney R. Shegerian, \textit{A Sign of The Times: The United States Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place and Manner Restrictions}, 25 \textit{Loy. L.A. L. Rev.} 453 (1992).}

Germany is the other jurisdiction where the issue of noise and freedom of assembly figures prominently. Significantly, general noise regulations are as a rule not applicable to those assemblies where sound amplification is necessary for conveying the message,\footnote{{\sc{Dietel, Gintzel \& Knieisel}} supra note 211, § 15 Rn. 10, 265.} the idea being that the means of exercising a basic right is protected by the right.\footnote{Id. by referring to BVerwGE 7, 125, 131, BVerwG, DRiZ 1969, 158, etc.} There is no indication that the test applicable to such means is different from the one applicable in general to the basic right. However, strangely, sound amplification is protected only during the demonstration, and not for its preparation or invitation. These latter ones, I take it, must be covered at least by general freedom of action under Art. 2 II of the Basic Law, with weaker justificatory grounds though. Also, on the opposite side, sound amplification will often be protected by freedom of art, a right not subject to statutory limits, only to inherent constitutional ones. Whether a particular use of sound amplification is related to an ongoing
demonstration, or not, or whether it is part of an art performance, will be ultimately
determined by the authorities, subject to judicial review.\textsuperscript{1066}

As general noise regulations do not apply, the use of loud speakers and similar devices on a
demonstration can only be restricted when criteria in assembly laws for imposing conditions
or ban are met. These, even if not anymore unitary on the entire federal territory, still are
subject to unitary constitutional control. In effect, only those conditions are permissible which
are suitable, necessary and proportionate in case of foreseeable likely direct endangering of
public safety/security, these latter one meaning protection of central legal goods like life, limb,
property, liberty, honour etc. Thus, certainly it is clear that noise endangering health can be
constitutionally restricted. Interestingly, that protection extends to the police, too. Police,
when for instance accompanying a demonstration in order to protect it from counter-
demonstrators, cannot be exposed to too much noise.\textsuperscript{1067} Among lower courts, there is
disagreement about the interests sufficient to justify restrictions on sound levels. One court,
OVG Lüneburg has decided in 2010 related to a music event by the NPD, that not only noise
levels endangering health can be restricted. I am doubtful about the constitutionality of its
reasoning, which nonetheless point to a very typical view about freedom of assembly: the
Lüneburg court namely takes that noise endangering public safety/security can be restricted
(this much of the argument is clearly right in application of the federal assembly law logic),
and public safety includes the whole of the legal system, including thus e.g. federal emissions
protection law. I think this understanding of public safety goes against \textit{Brokdorf} where it was
interpreted only to mean “central legal goods”, not any legal norm. Secondly, in effect the
Lüneburg court makes exercise of assembly, a basic right, dependent on other – lower level –
statutory norms, and, in substance, on lower-ranking, though legitimate interests than basic

\textsuperscript{1066} In general see Wilhelm Kanther, \textit{Zur „Infrastruktur“ von Versammlungen: vom Imbissstand bis zum

\textsuperscript{1067} E.g. OVG Lüneburg, \textit{Beschluss} vom 10. 11. 2010 - 11 LA 298/10, NVwZ-RR 2011, 141.
rights. More consistent is then the US approach confessing that modal restrictions on assembly are judged by a less stringent constitutional standard.

However, the view of OVG Lüneburg is not the homogeneous view of all German courts. OVG Berlin-Brandenburg, e.g., has undertaken a more thorough review related to an anti-Iraq war demonstration. Firstly, it differentiates between inner and outer communication, referring to communication between participants and between participants and audience or would-be audience.\textsuperscript{1068} Both of these types are covered by the right to assembly, and to use loudspeaker to reach participants and would-be audience belongs to the self-determination of the organizer of an assembly.\textsuperscript{1069} In addition, OVG Berlin-Brandenburg also makes clear that police or local authorities cannot legitimately fix the permissible volume level so as passersby can only perceive that some speeches are going on at the assembly, but the volume level needs to be allowed to be high enough for passersby to hear also the content of the speech, as a function of assembly is to turn public attention to an issue. Thirdly, and consequently, the Berlin court does not find any legal norm sufficient to justify restrictions on sound level, but only those interests of traffic participants, passersby, and residents which have a basic rights relevance, though the list is technically only exemplificative.\textsuperscript{1070} A specifically emphasized basic right aspect is the negative right to assembly of passersby, in effect a generalized and theorized captive audience concern, which would protect against coercing another to participate in an assembly or listen to a speech to which one does not want to. In my reading, the threshold for coercion is not set too low: you cannot exclude to hear what the other wants to say, you just can go away, and let be in peace after you have once heard the message. Thus, how loud a particular assembly can become, must be decided considering the circumstances of the case at

\textsuperscript{1068} Note that this distinction reproduces the French concern about differences of manifestation and réunion.
\textsuperscript{1070} „Als potenziell kollidierende Rechtsgüter sind insbesondere die grundrechtlich relevanten Belange der Straßenverkehrsteilnehmer, Lärmschutzbelange von Anwohnern und Passanten sowie das Grundrecht der Passanten und anderer Dritter auf negative Meinungsfreiheit.”

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hand. It appears in any case that the Berlin court would dispute the (later enacted) standard applied by OVG Lüneburg, and requires a thorough examination or balancing of constitutional interests on every side. Clearly, the test is balancing and not categorical, as always in German constitutional law, but it is the normal basic rights standard, not a lowered standard.1071

The ECHR was not overly occupied by the human rights problems of noisy demonstrations, but it did pronounce in Galstyan v. Armenia that a certain amount of noise is unavoidable at a demonstration. Thus Armenia violated Art. 11 by condemning to three days administrative detention someone for “making loud noise” at a demonstration, without e.g. any allegation that the noise would have included obscenity or incitement to violence.1072 The decision is clearly incapable of providing a more detailed view of the Court on this question, because the particular circumstances unequivocally have shown abuse on behalf of the Armenian authorities.

4. Modes and means of protest as aesthetic harm

Similarly to noise, assemblies might create visual nuisance as well, or indeed might well not be in harmony with majority views on beauty or cleanliness of surroundings. There are aesthetic or sanitary regulations interfering especially with leafletting, handbilling, displaying billboards, and similar activities regularly accompanying demonstrations, or being necessary to inform about an upcoming demonstration. Leaflets and handbills are transient media of the protestors, means of expression. Of similar function is the practice of signage, be it on public or private property; and US case law treats it analogously. Still, signage relates only indirectly to freedom of assembly, most importantly as invitation to a demonstration. In its semi-permanent nature signage shares a function with billboards and information desks or

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1071 For the sake of clarity, be it added that US courts might not apply strict scrutiny to these situations also because these are horizontal relations, and US courts do not tend to see rights clashes and conflicts as much as German courts do.

installations. If these (especially any of these) are not available for the organizers of a demonstration, it certainly influences also the exercise of the assembly right. In contrast, the more these means are publicly available, the more the means of demonstration to show grievances or other concerns becomes an option for the most deprived, not only the wealthier relatively or subjectively deprived. If you recall in addition how social movement studies testify to the structure of political opportunities, it becomes clear that the possibility or not of posting to billboards, of signage to the façade of one’s own home or to the (public) utility pole, or of installing temporary information desks on the street might prove crucial in an assembly to come about at all. Material objects put or left behind on streets and parks are different from noise discussed above (and odours) in that the eye can be averted while the ear (and nose) cannot. On the other hand, the “litter” or visual clutter left behind is a damage which stays there unlike the noise which fades away.

4.1. United States

In the U.S. litigation to aesthetic regulation has revolved to a large extent around (commercial) billboard regulations. In the first decades of the twentieth century such regulations were perceived as an attack on property rights, and mostly discouraged by courts. Aesthetics alone was explicitly judged insufficient for restricting property rights. Later, more or less parallel to the demise of Lochner, property rights of the neighbors have also come to the forefront. Finally, in the seminal Berman v. Parker (1954) decision the Supreme Court

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1073 This proposition is questioned in relation to highway billboards especially in the United States, but that is less relevant for assemblies, as they are the par excellence commercial billboards.


1075 Id.
allowed even taking of property for aesthetic reasons.\textsuperscript{1076} In a famous passage, the Court described how wide the deference to police power is in this regard:\textsuperscript{1077}

The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.

The \textit{Berman} rationale has been cited many times to allow for billboard regulations, by 1984 the Supreme Court declared it “well-settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values.”\textsuperscript{1078}

It was only in the middle of the sixties that the First Amendment has gotten to be seen involved. Signs on our surroundings have become seen not only as the legitimate object of police power, but increasingly as expression and communication. Meanwhile, in accordance with their overwhelming use, billboards are considered more within commercial speech, a low (or at least somewhat lower) value speech category in U.S. law developed by around 1980.\textsuperscript{1079}

On this basis, \textit{a contrario}, in 1981 it was decided that non-commercial speech cannot be disadvantaged as opposed to commercial speech. In \textit{Metromedia}\textsuperscript{1080} the Court invalidated a billboard regulation in part for the reason that it allowed onsite commercial billboards, but not noncommercial billboards. Secondly, the regulatory technique of allowing a few exceptions\textsuperscript{1081} for noncommercial signs was found clearly unconstitutional as it favoured

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1077} Id. at 33, opinion of the Court by Justice Douglas (internal citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{1079} The commercial speech jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is somewhat fluid. A specific commercial speech test was first announced in \textit{Central Hudson Gas \\& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n}, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) and stated the following steps: (1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. This test was restated in \textit{Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego}, 453. U.S. 490, 507 (1981), but later cases might have strengthened the test actually. See \textit{Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island}, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), and \textit{United States v. United Foods}, 533 U.S. 405 (2001) and \textit{Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly}, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) not clarifying exactly what test should apply.
\textsuperscript{1081} “A fixed sign may be used to identify any piece of property and its owner. Any piece of property may carry or display religious symbols, commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and organizations, signs carrying news items or telling the time or temperature, signs erected in discharge of any governmental function, or temporary political campaign signs.” Id. at 514.
\end{footnotesize}
some content for public debate while excluded others. *Metromedia* on its own is an easy case, less easy is to figure what follows from it for the topic of this work. Certainly the holding disallows favoring commercial over noncommercial and some sorts of noncommercial over other sorts of noncommercial speech. Thus, whenever a city allows for billboards as exceptions, it cannot do it in a way which would harm persons most relevant here, i.e. organizers of protests, demonstrations, or other sorts of (“noncommercial”) assemblies. However, when a city absolutely, unconditionally bans all billboards, it would be probably constitutional on the basis of *Metromedia*. The Court namely starts out of the assumption that “billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm’.” 1082 Thus, *Metromedia* would allow aesthetics alone to justify suppressing (all kinds of) billboards as means of expression.

Parallel to these developments, aesthetic regulation has always been exposed to challenges of vagueness and overbreadth. 1083 Early on, *Schneider v. State* 1084 (1939) spelled out that a blanket ban on handbilling is unconstitutional, as those who actually litter should be sanctioned and not those who express their views via handbills. Unbridled discretion of the mayor in issuing newsrack permits resulted in unconstitutionality in 1988, as newsracks were considered being included under dissemination of newspapers (thus, ideas). 1085 Basically, the prior nature and the discretion required strict scrutiny notwithstanding that “manner” regulation is normally subject to less strict standards. 1086 For example, in 1984 in *Taxpayers for Vincent* 1087 the Court upheld a ban on posting signs on public property (slogan of a political candidate on utility poles). The decisive argument in the judgment applying a merged *O’Brien*-content neutrality standard seems to be that the ban on signs on public property,

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1082 Id. at 510.
1086 Therefore, newsracks possibly can be banned altogether. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 100 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1996) as cited by CUDE, *supra* note 1083 at 883, note 114.
like the ban on handbilling in *Schneider v. State* leaves open ample alternative modes of communication. That means that a municipality cannot shut down all means of expression, thus *Metromedia* also needs to be read in this light. Nonetheless, in which case there are “no ample alternative means” and what the standard is for comparing “alternatives” appear increasingly opaque, just as the question of the relationship between the substantial interest pursued and the means applied. The following two seminal, but heavily criticized cases helped to clarify the doctrine applicable to “content-neutrally regulated symbolic speech”.

*Heffron v. ISKCON*\(^{1088}\) (1981) was about a 12-day state fair where solicitation of donation, and sale and distribution of literature were only allowed from rented booths. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) asserted the ban would prevent them to practice Sankirtan, a ritual of going to the streets and distributing or selling literature and soliciting donations, claiming infringement of their speech rights (but not accommodation under free exercise). The majority found the rule constitutional, while Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote in partial dissents that the ban on distribution of literature violated free speech for being not narrowly tailored to substantial interests of crowd control or fraud prevention.\(^{1089}\) The test applied by the Court itself sounded the same, but the majority has not taken into account at all that simply distributing leaflets surely does not hinder the flow of people any more than not-prohibited other activities, like people being stopped by a speech or other performance. Thus, the narrow tailoring is certainly not as narrow as understood normally in fundamental rights doctrine.

A probably even more problematic decision related to sleeping in a park as a way of political protest came in 1984. In *Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence*\(^{1090}\) (CCNV) an NGO highlighting the plight of the homeless staged a protest in central Washington D.C. areas, such


\(^{1089}\) Justice Brennan thought solicitation and sale could be restricted to fixed places in order to prevent fraudulent activities, while Justice Blackmun found the exchanging moves involved in solicitation and sales raise special crowd control concerns 452 U.S. 657 (*J. Brennan*), 452 U.S. 665 (*J. Blackmun*).

as the Mall and Lafayette Park, both under the management of the National Park Service. The use of the parks can be regulated by such means as conform to the fundamental purpose of the parks, which is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein . . . in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

According to park regulations, camping was not allowed except in designated areas, which were none in Lafayette Park or the Mall. Camping included sleeping, making preparations to sleep, storing personal belongings, making fire, etc., but also the reasonable appearance of camping, independent of the intent of the participants. CCNV was permitted to install 20 tents in Lafayette Park and 40 tents in the Mall i.e. two symbolic tent cities, and to stage a 24 hour protest, but protestors were not allowed to sleep in the tents. Protestors claimed sleeping was inherent part of the expression, and thus should be allowed. An extremely divided Court of Appeals – the bench included Judges Ginsburg and Scalia, on different sides – ruled in favor of the protestors. The USSC reversed. Justice White “assumed” that the sleeping would be expressive conduct, and relied on O’Brien, but also on Taxpayers for Vincent, and public forum cases, and after all applied a mixture of these tests, as is regular in these cases. The regulation was certainly “content-neutral”, the majority not finding it objectionable that the sleeping ban was actually introduced after the same NGO staged protests elsewhere in national parks. The substantial interest furthered– according to the majority – is “maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition,” clearly an “aesthetic interest.” The majority found the regulation was narrowly tailored to further attractive and intact condition of the parks, dismissing argument of protestors that if a 24 hour vigil is allowed, then the ban on sleeping only incrementally furthers said interest. Justice White replied that the First Amendment does not require the Park Service to allow the 24

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1092 468 U.S. 296.
hours vigil in tents accommodating 150 people in the first place, let alone sleeping. Also, he dismisses the wish of sleeping for being largely only “facilitative” to the demonstration as the organizers wrote in the permit application that without hot meal and sleeping space homeless people likely would not show up. Referring to *Heffron* he maintained that the validity of such regulations is not to be judged “solely by reference to the demonstration at hand”\(^{1093}\), i.e. the sleeping ban is necessary because otherwise several other groups would also want to sleep in core areas, and that would present “difficult problems for the Park Service.”\(^ {1094}\) This appears to be an argument against dissenting Justice Marshall who emphasizes that the First Amendment cannot be abridged in order to avert what he calls “imposter” uses,\(^ {1095}\) in this case sleeping not as expression, but just simply sleeping. Justice Marshall thinks such uses need be prevented by means other than abridging political protest at central sites of American history. That this does not persuade the majority is a consequence of the loosened test applied by Justice White:\(^ {1096}\)

If the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the National Parks are adequately protected, which we think it has, and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out.

This basically reduces the test applicable to manner regulation to a rational basis test, a highly deferential standard. Already in 1987 Geoffrey Stone criticized these standards for being too deferential,\(^ {1097}\) and the critique since then has only intensified. Still, the test remains the same, and, as explained above, in *Ward v. RAR* Justice Kennedy made explicit that “narrowly tailored” does not mean “least intrusive” in the TMP doctrine.\(^ {1098}\) *Clark* and *Ward* were cited in the decision affirming the ban on *marching at all* in New York City against the nearing Iraq

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\(^ {1093}\) 468 U.S. 297.

\(^ {1094}\) Id.


\(^ {1096}\) 468 U.S. 297. (majority opinion)


war in 2003 which thus turned stationary, not being able to march past the UN building, among others, for unsubstantiated fear of a terrorist attack. Clark, though not exactly applicable, was cursorily discussed and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the 2011 funeral protest case, too.

Finally, to add to the aesthetic puzzle, a 1994 case need be referred to which applied the content-neutral test and found a violation, a rare occurrence. In Ladue v. Gilleo, the USSC declared a city ordinance banning residential signs (on private property) unconstitutional by finding that no ample alternative substitutes were available, and intimating that the use of an entire medium was foreclosed. Residential signs are distinct as they provide information about the speaker's identity, “an important component of many attempts to persuade,” as they are cheap and convenient, and as they are especially apt to address the neighbors, an audience “that could not be reached nearly as well by other means.” (Why it is more worthy of protection to reach neighbors than anyone else evades my comprehension.) The Court also stresses that “individual liberty in the home” mandates a special treatment. Ladue thus merges several rationales, and it is not quite clear which one would be self-standing.

Seen in the light of the other TMP decisions, I would think most important was here the distinctiveness of the home, a concern not normally present in relation to freedom of assembly, only as a limit. Still, the Court emphasizes that the case law strongly dismisses

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1101 Margaret Gilleo, a Ladue resident placed on her front lawn in December 1990 a 24- by 36-inch sign printed with the words, “Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now.” The sign was removed by someone and, police, when asked to help, advised Ms Gilleo that such signs violated a city ordinance. Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43 (1994)
1102 Justice O’Connor concurs by contending the ordinance’s list of exceptions renders it content-based, but agrees that even if it were content-neutral, it would be still unconstitutional.
1104 512 U.S. 57.
1105 This seems to be the view of another commentator, Jason R. Burt, Speech Interests Inherent in the Location of Billboards and Signs: A Method for Unweaving the Tangled Web of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 473, 499 et seq.
foreclosure of an entire medium,\textsuperscript{1106} mentioning early cases on distribution of pamphlets and handbills. Therefore, \textit{Ladue} reinforces that activities more relevant for my purposes, i.e. handbilling, distribution of literature and the like on the street are each a separate medium, thus cannot be fully banned even by content-neutral regulations. However, \textit{Ladue} does not affect the loose approach as to what counts as alternative channel or means of communication, as settled in the previously discussed decisions.

To sum up, aesthetic regulations in the United States can often limit freedom of expression and assembly in ways which do not seem justified not only to me, but to American commentators. Vagueness and overbreadth sometimes can be serious limits against references to aesthetics, just as content-based restrictions will not regularly survive constitutional scrutiny. However, if an ordinance is framed and applied in a content-neutral fashion, but for special cases including foreclosure of an entire medium, it has good chances to survive an ever loosening review by the Supreme Court.

\textbf{4.2. Germany}

In Germany the relation of expression and aesthetic regulation came up in the seventies in the issue of littering. About handbill littering a decision of the Federal Administrative Court is of importance.\textsuperscript{1107} The Berlin law on city cleaning required an official preliminary certificate for the distribution of handbills (precisely: Werbemateriel, i.e. advertising material). The Court

\textsuperscript{1106}“Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression. Thus, we have held invalid ordinances that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets within the municipality, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938); handbills on the public streets, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); handbills on the downtown streets, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-149, 63 S.Ct. 862, 864-866, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 152, 60 S.Ct. 146, 152, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), and live entertainment, Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2186, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2503, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (picketing focused upon individual residence is “fundamentally different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in residential areas”). Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.” \textit{Ladue} v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 55.

(and all the lower courts) found the application of the law by police reached over to constitutionally protected expression especially that no exception was granted to handbills with political content. In its reasoning, the Court emphasizes that not only the opinion itself, but also means and forms of its expression are protected by Art. 5 GG. The law clearly interferes with Art. 5, and it is not justified by any grounds listed in Art. 5 II. Aim of the law is solely the prevention of pollution of the streets by castaway paper. The concern in effect is an aesthetic one; the law does not protect e.g. health. Promotion of street cleanliness is not a value at least as important as freedom of expression, thus it cannot serve to justify restrictions on expression. What is more, the prior permit is required only to better prepare the authorities on how to clean the streets afterwards, a fact which belies that the restriction meets compelling needs. The GFCC issued a decision similar to that in relation to handbill distribution in 1991. Applicant, an association founded by members of the Scientology Church distributed handbills against “inhuman treatment” of psychiatric and drug patients in Hamburg pedestrian streets. The district authority prohibited the distribution by arguing that the members have pursued economic activity, which requires a specific prior permission and payment. The OVG (higher administrative court) found the requirement served to ensure a safe and smooth flow of traffic, and thus, though interfered with freedom of opinion, as a general law in the sense of Art. 5 II it was justified. The GFCC found the value of safe and smooth flow of traffic was generally not sufficient to counterbalance a prior restraint on freedom of opinion in the form of a permit. Especially unwarranted appears the claim with regard to pedestrian zones and other streets with low traffic, as it is possible to evade the distributor. In a typical turn, however, the Court finds safe and smooth flow of pedestrian traffic a legitimate aim, but still one which cannot be proportionally pursued by way of a prior permission on the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, it can be more or less safely

1109 The rest of the opinion deals with rule of law issues not relevant for my purposes.
concluded that handbill distribution in Germany cannot be made dependent on prior approval, except maybe where it causes real safety or health hazards (e.g. on a very busy traffic line, or on a highway, etc.). Certainly, again, the applicable constitutional standard is the general proportionality.

The GFCC reviewed the question of constitutionality of fees within imposition of conditions on assemblies in 2007.\textsuperscript{1110} It stated that such a fee can only be exacted if conditions of imposing condition on assembly are met; i.e. public safety or order is directly endangered and cannot be averted by milder means. This implies that general street cleaning regulations are only applicable to the extent the constitutional conditions of freedom of assembly are upheld, proportionality requirements apply. Also, the GFCC confirmed individual responsibility in the sense that the organizer cannot be held liable for deeds outside his or her circle of action, thus, in principle cannot be made to pay for the litter and other damages caused by participants. This now seems to be accepted for the situation where authorities would impose the fee as part of a condition on the assembly.\textsuperscript{1111}

Earlier case law of ordinary courts, e.g. two decisions\textsuperscript{1112} of the Federal Administrative Court from 1989 differ(ed) however from the view of the GFCC in relation to imposition of compensation for cleaning the streets after or during the assembly by city services. The administrative high court notably treated street cleaning regulations as generally applicable laws which do not interfere with freedom of assembly, as their regulatory scope is different. Thus, it is not settled yet whether cleaning fees or compensation imposed \textit{not as part of a condition} should also fulfill criteria of direct danger to public order or safety, and individual responsibility. I argue it should, because the interpretation given by the GFCC – though refers

to Art. 15 of the Federal Assembly Law on conditions on assemblies, the interpretation of that very article is rooted in Art. 8 of the GG.\textsuperscript{1113}

A special issue arose in Germany in relation to information desks. In a case which went to the GFCC, four persons installed an information stand on a street in order to distribute political message.\textsuperscript{1114} They have not applied for a special use permit, and thus were fined. The GFCC has not taken the case, reasoning sparsely that the regulation is a justified interference into freedom of expression as long as the fee is not prohibitive, and the discretion not unlimited. The right to freedom of assembly is not even affected, to install information desks is not covered by the right, thus it can be regulated by general laws other than the law on assembly.

4.3. United Kingdom and ECHR

In the U.K., the same section 5 of the POA that was applicable in \textit{Percy v DPP} to “flag desecration” above,\textsuperscript{1115} also was applied to placards and posters. Recall the section criminalizes to cause harassment, distress, or alarm by threatening, abusive, insulting behavior, words, or signs. Conviction for holding a sign inscribed with “Stop immorality”, “Stop Homosexuality” and “Stop Lesbianism” was upheld in \textit{Hammond v DPP}\textsuperscript{1116} as discussed above.\textsuperscript{1117} \textit{Norwood v. DPP}\textsuperscript{1118} was about a BNP politician displaying a poster from his own window stating that “Islam out of Britain” and “Protect the British people” next to a photo of 9/11 twin towers in flame, and a crescent and star surrounded by a prohibition sign. His conviction was upheld on the basis that the display was not an intemperate criticism of the tenets of Islam, but an “insulting attack” on its followers.\textsuperscript{1119} However, these cases do not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1113}Interestingly, a comment on fee paying and freedom of assembly highlighting the difference between constitutional and administrative ultimate courts does not explicitly express a similar stance. Holger Greve & Fabian Quast, \textit{Gebührenerhebung versus Versammlungsfreiheit}, NVwZ 2009, 500.
\item \textsuperscript{1114} BVerfG (Vorprüfungsausschuß), Beschluf vom 22. 12. 1976 - 1 BvR 306/76, BVerfG: Sondernutzungserlaubnis für Informationsstand auf öffentlichen Straßen, NJW 1977, 671.
\item \textsuperscript{1115} See supra text accompanying notes 961-964.
\item \textsuperscript{1116} Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin).
\item \textsuperscript{1117} Supra text accompanying notes 843-844.
\item \textsuperscript{1118} Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin).
\item \textsuperscript{1119} See supra text accompanying notes 845-848.
\end{itemize}
appear to turn on the modes and means employed, neither on directly perceived aesthetic harms, but on the substantial message.

The ECHR, similarly to UK courts, has so far not developed a doctrine of content neutrality in the sense of a lesser standard applicable to modal restrictions, and it has not dealt with such claims raised by governments in any significant decision reflected in the literature. Two decisions on means of protest exemplify this, as there is no discussion on whether the specific means by which the expression is pursued requires the application of lower standards. An (otherwise important) leaflet decision is Incal v. Turkey where a politician of a later dissolved Turkish Kurdish party was jailed for a leaflet protesting against “state terror” towards Kurdish and, partly, Turkish people or proletarians. The Turkish government was unsurprisingly unsuccessful to make believe Commission and Court that to portray a group as suffering discrimination is incitement to violence.1120

However, the Norwood case discussed above in relation to UK was declared inadmissible by the ECHR, finding Art. 17 applicable, as1121

the words and images on the poster amounted to a public expression of attack on all Muslims in the United Kingdom. Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.

This is a very clear content(viewpoint)-discrimination, earlier only applicable with regard to denial of facts, largely as a form of racial hate speech,1122 as was discussed above in relation to dignity.1123 A speculation that the extension comes

1120 According to the Turkish government: “Through its aggressive and provocative language the leaflet in question had been likely to incite citizens of “Kurdish” origin to believe that they suffered from discrimination and that, as victims of a “special war”, they were justified in acting in self-defence against the authorities by setting up “neighbourhood committees”. Incal v. Turkey, Application No. 41/1997/825/1031, Judgment of 9 June 1998, § 44.
1122 See Ian Leigh, Damned if they do, damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the protection of religion from attack, 17 RES PUBLICA 55 (2011) 63.
1123 See supra text accompanying notes 849-852.
in a case related not to verbal, spoken expression, but to largely symbolic one because of a tendency to grant lesser protection to that seems ungrounded, at least so far.
PLACE

Place, similarly to time and manner, has also entertained the imagery of protesters, legislators, and courts. The fundamental cause of this utmost attentiveness is simply the fact that places are full or filled with meaning, and thus act just like a theatrical setting which colours, enriches or reinforces a message, even to the extent of changing the meaning of the place itself. If you manage to change the meaning of a place, you have changed the identity of your people: it is the power of redefining, maybe the one true power one (or more, out of compromise) might ever have. No wonder it is so attractive. In some cases the place has a commemorative meaning, as it reminds of a specific historical event, either because historically it happened there, or because subsequently it became a(n official) memorial site. Such protest-free sites have been widely designated around Europe especially in remembrance of the Shoah, and against Neo-Nazi demonstrations. In other (though sometimes overlapping) cases, the place has meaning because the object of protest or the target of the request made by demonstrators lies there, such as governmental buildings, prisons, courts, residency of a public person, or even abortion clinics. Special cases have arisen in relation to cemeteries, and in the United States even the term „funeral protest“ needed to be coined.

As a flipside, there are not only protest-free zones, but also protest-zones which designate the place for protest in an exclusive way, the most vivid memories of such being probably the speech pens in NYC before the Iraq war or the „caging“ of protestors in national conventions of the main US parties, but even next to diplomatic events of the global world. Restrictions related to special places (or spaces even) are widespread in most of the examined jurisdictions and can be classified in several ways. As all activity covered by freedom of assembly takes up some public space, the whole dissertation could be restructured along the
criterion on restrictions on space. Reasons for preventing the use of specific (or less specific) places by assemblies are also extremely diverging across the jurisdictions. In the following I am sticking to a more or less simply intuitive structure (not denying possible personal biases in its design), putting together residence, cemetery, hospital and other more private-oriented places like airports and malls, then places relating to the state in its public power function, and then memorial sites as sites designated for assemblies, just not the ones banned, and finally the speech pen phenomenon.

1. Private public places: cemetery, hospital, and residence, malls and airports

As to cemeteries, two cases typical of European and U.S. jurisprudence need to be discussed as a good kick-start to sketch general differences related to place regulation. As to the ECHR, recall Öllinger, where Austrian authorities banned a protest demonstration against Comradeship IV, an organization mainly of former SS-members commemorating the death of SS soldiers in WW2 on All Saints’ Day at the Salzburg Municipal Cemetery. The Court rejected that Art. 9 rights of cemetery-goers would prevail over Art. 11 rights of Öllinger, a Green MP protesting against the crimes of the SS. Though the Government tried to argue, the ECHR rejected that the dignity and quiet required in a cemetery absolutely prevents Öllinger in doing so, especially that he and his fellows organized a silent event, without chanting or banners. The ECHR noted that there was no previous violence (only heated discussion at other such occasions), neither would have been the protest noisy or in other ways directed against cemetery-goers’ beliefs. Thus, Art. 9 is possible to be involved in cemetery protest cases, and also being quiet and as we have seen, possibly not using banners, might be a necessary limit to such assemblies.

1124 See supra text accompanying notes 667-Error! Bookmark not defined..
Partly similar concerns, and similar answers have arisen in *Snyder v. Phelps*,\(^ {1125} \) decided in 2011 by the USSC. Phelps is the founder of Westboro Baptist Church which has picketed funerals in the last twenty years, protesting against American tolerance of homosexuality, against the Catholic Church’s pedophile scandals, and similar issues. Basically the congregation appears to believe that God is killing Americans as a punishment for their sins. By 2008, the church, consisting of around 75 members, mostly relatives, managed to irritate so much the American public that the federal government and forty-one states have adopted laws restricting funeral protests.\(^ {1126} \) Snyder is the father of late Matthew Snyder, a soldier killed in Iraq. Westboro conducted a picketing on the day of Matthew Snyder’s funeral. The picketing started 30 minutes before the funeral, and was on a public plot adjacent to a public street at about a 1000 feet distance from the church in which the funeral was held. When Snyder drove to the funeral, he saw the top of the picketers’ banners, but did not get aware about the content of their message until later when he saw a news broadcast on the Westboro protest. Snyder claimed that the Westboro protest caused him intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding\(^ {1127} \) the tortious nature of Westboro’s speech, but nonetheless found that the First Amendment shielded Phelps from tort liability. Most important concerns were the following. The location of the protest was a public land adjacent to a public street, a par excellence traditional public forum, the sort of place on which speech enjoys highest constitutional protection.\(^ {1128} \) Also, speech on public matters, as the Court found Phelps’ to be, is again in the core of First Amendment. Dispositive in deciding if a speech is of private or of public concern is “content, form, and context as revealed by the whole record.”\(^ {1129} \) As the

\(^ {1125} \) *Snyder v. Phelps*. 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011).


\(^ {1127} \) 131 S.Ct. 1214, FN 2.


\(^ {1129} \) 131 S.Ct. 1216, internal citations omitted.
content was clearly of public concern, it did not matter whether – as Snyder tried to argue – the context, i.e. the funeral of his son, was rather private. Even so, the Court by Chief Justice Roberts goes on quoting Clark v. CCNV, such speech of public concern in a traditional public forum can be subject to reasonable time, manner and place regulation, i.e. content-neutral regulation. However, as Phelps’ picket was out of the sight of those in the church, it was not interfering with the funeral itself. Thus, any objections to the protest were clearly content-, even viewpoint-based, and as such, impermissible.\textsuperscript{1130} The captive audience claim also did not stand because of the distance of the protest from the funeral.\textsuperscript{1131} The decision is not as simple as it appears. Justice Breyer added a concurring emphasizing the narrow holding of the Court, and Justice Alito was the only one to dissent. Alito bases his dissent on a broader context; he namely also includes more personally assaultive language by Westboro stated in a press release and online post before and after the picketing itself, and claims these also reinforce the equally personally attacking nature of the banners at the picket itself. Actionable speech should not be immunized just because it is interspersed with protected speech.\textsuperscript{1132} The majority counters that these pre- and post-picketing communications were outside the issue in the case as Snyder did not rely on them. These two perspectives demonstrate vividly how hard choices are necessarily made by lawyers when interpreting what actually was meant by “an expression.” Justice Alito undoubtedly has a point when he emphasizes that unprotected speech of private matter does not get protected just because it is infused with matters of public concern. Also, I tend to agree with him on the point that actually in the case Matthew Snyder’s death was used to create public (including media) attention for Westboro Baptist Church. Death and especially the rituale around it are symbolic moments very well exploitable for expressing political views or promoting one’s interests, as we have just seen on both sides of the Öllinger case. On my part, however, I would still allow for the protest to

\textsuperscript{1130} 131 S.Ct. 1219.
\textsuperscript{1131} 131 S.Ct. 1220. For the captive audience claim see supra text accompanying note 728.
\textsuperscript{1132} 131 S.Ct. 1227., dissenting opinion by Justice Alito.
go ahead as it did, non-interfering with the funeral. Nonetheless, the tortious press release and post-picket online communication should remain actionable independent of the protest, though I doubt the torts would pass constitutional muster, unless a new jurisprudence emerges.\textsuperscript{1133} True, the Snyders were clearly non-public persons, and they should have been able to remain so, I take \textit{Hustler v. Falwell} clearly inapplicable. I think such an approach would not mean that civility (as opposed to intrusion)-based privacy interests, so characteristically and importantly rejected in classic American jurisprudence, would override free speech rights.\textsuperscript{1134} However, the possible torts at hand were not defamatory, not false statements of facts, but offensive or outrageous. Thus, jurisprudence allowing for speech restrictions for reasons of negligent false defamatory statements of private persons, such as \textit{Gertz}\textsuperscript{1135}, does not apply here either. Outrage or feelings of rage or hurt are probably unavoidably categories of speech content which cannot be a basis for restriction for the classic reasons.\textsuperscript{1136}

\textit{Snyder v. Phelps} has been all what the Supreme Court decided specifically to funeral protests. Lower courts seem to agree that (unlike surrounding public streets) the cemetery itself is a non-public forum, and for the protection of mourners, buffer zones might be constitutional if the funeral protest would closely coincide in time with a funeral.\textsuperscript{1137} “Unreasonable” and “interfering” sounds and images might be constitutionally prohibited according to some courts, but a blanket ban is unconstitutional for overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring.\textsuperscript{1138} Also, a \textit{floating} buffer zone within 300 feet of any funeral procession was found unconstitutionally

\textsuperscript{1133} On the difficulty, but necessity of sooner or later creating an applicable constitutional rule separating public and private in such cases see Jeffrey Shulman, \textit{Epic Considerations: The Speech that the Supreme Court Would Not Hear in Snyder v. Phelps}, 2011 \textsc{Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo} 35 (2011).
\textsuperscript{1134} The fear and its implications are very aptly shown (and supported) by \textsc{Wells, supra} note 1126.
\textsuperscript{1136} For more discussion, see \textsc{Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 \textsc{Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo} 300 (2010)}.
\textsuperscript{1137} \textsc{Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Neb. 2010)} as cited by Fern L. Kletter, \textit{Actions by or Against Individuals or Groups Protesting or Picketing at Funerals}, 40 \textsc{A.L.R.6th} 375 (2008) at § 6.5.
\textsuperscript{1138} \textsc{McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006)} as cited by \textsc{1 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 5:11.50, Database updated March 2011}. 

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overbroad in one case. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case where the 8th Circuit found that criminalizing protest activities “in front of or about” funeral locations would likely turned out “not narrowly tailored” or “facially overbroad” on closer inspection. Thus, in sum, it seems that in the U.S. intermediate scrutiny applies to funeral protest restrictions if the regulation is content-neutral, but courts tend to exert a rigorous version of the scrutiny, especially in relation to overbroad statutes. It is not clarified exactly how big a buffer zone is constitutional. It appears to me the logic of the decisions is not simply spatial, but rather visual and aural: funeral-goers can be constitutionally protected against even simply “unreasonable” images and sounds because of their privacy interest in non-intrusion. The problem is that “unreasonable” sounds like a content-based criterion, at least in relation to images. Here again the general approach is that the eyes can be averted, while the ear cannot. I think this approach has a general validity, though there might be cases where extreme visual nuisance might create a captive audience, especially in closed places what one cannot avoid going there.

Abortion clinics have been a similar target of protest outraging some parts of the American nation, and resulted in intense legislation and litigation, but the height of the litigation preceded the funeral protest issue. Therefore, some similarities will be easily recognizable in this – to a large extent – earlier jurisprudence. One difference is, however, that abortion clinics protests have clearly taken place in traditional or quintessential public forums, while funeral protests would sometimes occur on the territory of the cemetery itself. The jurisprudence to abortion clinic protests appears quite settled. The Court in Madsen struck down a 300 foot no approach zone around the clinic and residences of doctors performing

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abortion, a ban on displaying “images observable” from the clinic, and a 36 foot buffer zone on private property to the north and west of the clinic. Meanwhile the Court upheld the injunction as to the 36 foot buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveway, and as to the limited noise regulation as these passed a heightened\textsuperscript{1141} content-neutral test and did not burden more speech than necessary to accomplish the “significant governmental interests in protecting a pregnant woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services, public safety and order, free flow of traffic, property rights, and residential privacy”.\textsuperscript{1142} Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, a second major decision on the abortion protest controversy similarly upheld fixed buffer zone regulation (15 feet from clinic doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances), but struck down so-called floating buffer zones requiring protestors to stay 15 feet from people and vehicles entering and leaving clinics.\textsuperscript{1143} In Hill v. Colorado\textsuperscript{1144}, in a somewhat different fashion, the Court upheld an eight-feet floating buffer zone, i.e. knowingly approaching another person within eight feet, unless such other person consents,\textsuperscript{1145}

for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility

The Court in a much criticized opinion upheld the floating buffer zone, again finding the regulation content-neutral, thus applying a Ward-type loosened test. Critics and dissenters would argue that oral protest, education or counseling are categories of speech, and as such,

\textsuperscript{1141} There has been disagreement among the justices about the applicable standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority claims injunctions are more dangerous to liberty than statutes as they can be selectively issued, thus a somewhat more stringent test is applicable, where no more speech than necessary can be burdened to further a significant governmental interest. Justice Scalia in dissent finds the injunction both not content-neutral and a prior restraint, thus would apply strict scrutiny, while Justice Stevens thinks injunctions pose a lesser risk to free speech than statutes as the former are issued as a consequence, or punishment for prior unlawful action. For an analysis see Tiffany Keast, \textit{Injunction Junction. Enjoining Free Speech after Madsen, Schenck, and Hill}, 12 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 293 et seq. (2004).
\textsuperscript{1142} Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 767 et seq. (1994)
\textsuperscript{1143} Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network Of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
\textsuperscript{1144} Hill v. Colorado, 503 U.S. 703 (2000).
\textsuperscript{1145} 503 U.S. 707.
are content-based. What is more, as pro-choice activists are extremely unlikely to engage into these activities without getting consent next to abortion clinics, the regulation is even viewpoint-based. In any case, referring to the loose Ward test, the majority remains unwilling to look into evidence hinting that the purpose of the regulation was indeed discriminatory against one type of speakers, and was not simply motivated by privacy and health interests of hospitalgoers. That the Supreme Court does not investigate legislative motive in free speech (and all the more so in speech-plus like scenarios) cases, is an unfortunate heritage of *O'Brien*, a self-limitation of the Court not present in free exercise, establishment, or equal protection cases.\footnote{See United States v. O’Brien 391 U.S. 367, 383 et seq., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) as cited by Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. Leblanc, *Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need For an Objective Speech Discrimination Test*, 51 AM. U. L. REV 179, 218, FN 255-258 (2001).} Both Justice Scalia and Kennedy in separate dissents argue that already on its face (banning protest-type attitudes only, not e.g. gratification) is the regulation content-based.\footnote{See Justice Scalia in dissent at 503 U.S. 742 et seq. and Justice Kennedy in dissent at 503 U.S. 766 et seq. or Raskin & Leblanc, id. at 212 et seq.} The majority per Justice Stevens emphasizes that it is only the place what is regulated, and it in effect is only “a minor place restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with unwilling listeners.”\footnote{503 U.S. 723.} I find this labeling quite unsatisfactory as where else can one find targets for anti-abortion speech for the purposes of face-to-face communication than around abortion clinics. Clearly, here place is part of the communication. In addition, it is not in accordance with general First Amendment standards to impose the obligation of getting consent on a speaker. Normally, nobody has a right not to be talked to. Communication, on the other hand, is a dynamic interactive process where actually one can change his or her mind about being willing to listen or not. Part of the communication is to persuade someone to listen to what one says. I find the consent provision wholly vague and ignorant or disregarding of how everyday talking actually happens.
That health interests might justify restrictions on speech has been settled already in *Madsen*, but the very mediated connection between speech and rising stress levels and thereby increased health “risks” is even more distant in *Hill* as it was not based on previous unlawful action. Also, if feelings normally are not justifying restrictions on political speech – as both *Hustler* and *Snyder v. Phelps* apparently affirm – then what indeed lies behind the reference to health needs to be thoroughly checked. That would require a strict scrutiny – an inquiry blocked by the Supreme Court in these cases by claiming content-neutrality. Thus, these cases demonstrate perfectly the way the categorizations as “content-neutral” and “place restriction” effectively prevent any meaningful discussion of countervailing values or interests in the abortion protest context. If abortion protests happened not “in place”, then content-neutrality arguments would have much less teeth. Therefore, the abortion clinics controversy shows in a palpable way how originally speech-protective doctrines can be twisted to deny the right to assembly and protest, upholding regulations which would certainly fail the normal speech tests for at least overbreadth or vagueness, if not simply for illegitimate purpose of integrity of feelings. All this happening when there is clearly a possibility under classic speech doctrines to prevent or punish physical obstruction, violence, coercion, threats, or stalking which certainly have occurred in much of the abortion protest events. If one compares the funeral and the abortion protest jurisprudence, the different outcomes are striking. It remains to be seen how the funeral protests jurisprudence might evolve in the Supreme Court, but so far there is clearly a difference which can only be explained by a special sensitivity shown towards aborting women and doctors. It has to be seen that in the abortion clinics setting real persons are the target, while in the funeral protests cases a dead person is used as the opportunity to spread an ideological message, and thus, health risks cannot be involved per default.
The residential picketing issue is also partly an abortion related issue in the U.S., but the case law originates in a civil rights protest around a mayor’s home who did not support busing of schoolchildren. The Supreme Court in *Carey v. Brown* (1980) struck down a ban on picketing around residences and dwellings because there was a content-based exception for labor picketing.1149 This decision has also spelled out very clearly that “public streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods,” were public fora.1150 The less straightforward 1988 case, *Frisby v. Schultz* arose out of a controversy where anti-abortion advocates picketed the home of a doctor performing abortions. In reaction, an ordinance was enacted banning residential picketing. The ban was judged content-neutral, narrowly construed by the Supreme Court (i.e. against the broad construction of lower courts, a rare move) to only ban focused picketing in front of one residence or dwelling, and not banning marching into residential neighborhoods, or protesting, demonstrating there at large. The significant governmental interest in “residential privacy” was described by the Court in really elevated language, partly stemming from earlier case law, such as the following:1151

“The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Our prior decisions have often remarked on the unique nature of the home, “the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,” and have recognized that “[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.” One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is different. “That we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech . . . does not mean we must be captives everywhere.” Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions.

Later, the Court adds that\textsuperscript{1152}

\[\text{[t]he resident is figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picketing is left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech.}\]

Thus, even though the street in front of a “home” is public forum, the resident in his or her home can become a \textit{captive audience} as a result of the ongoing focused picketing in front of the house. Six years after Frisby, in Madsen, the Court upheld a 300-foot buffer zone around residences of staff of abortion clinics, as mentioned above. What emerges clearly in relation to residential protest in the U.S. is that general protest is protected, but focused picketing can be regulated in content-neutral way if narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest such as tranquility of the home, and – in a somewhat strained meaning – to prevent captive audience. It is worth recalling how German courts struggled with the notion of coercion and the differences between psychological and physical pressure, but also how the famous Skokie controversy appears to conclude to the fact that Skokie residents could just leave their home for the duration of the Nazi march, thus they are not captive audience.

At the ECHR, the closest decision is Patyi v. Hungary (No. 1.), where creditors losing their money as a result of insolvency of a company were not allowed to demonstrate in front of the residence of the prime minister. The police banned a series of demonstrations on different days, sometimes bringing up reasons bordering the ridiculous. Police claimed the five-meter-wide pavement was not enough to harbor the twenty protestors for twenty minutes without disturbing (vehicular) traffic; and no alternative route for the buses was available. In one case, disturbance to traffic was heightened because on All Saints Day a lot of people would go to cemeteries, thus the road had to bear intensified traffic, while later the winter weather prompting intensified traveling to ski resorts around Budapest necessitated allegedly the demonstration to be cancelled. Police also claimed the traffic disturbance rationale applicable

\textsuperscript{1152} 487 U.S. 487.
to Christmas Eve – when buses stop running around 4 p.m. The Court of course has not taken these statements at face value, and found violation, applying the type of scrutiny generally applicable in Convention jurisprudence (some sort of proportionality review). This clarifies that in relation to place restrictions, the ECHR does not apply a loosened test, and in this case, it also has not invoked the deferential doctrine most dangerous to human rights in Europe, i.e. margin of appreciation of the Member States.

Demonstrations in malls have been the other issue where both the USSC and the ECHR have voiced their view. In Marsh v. Alabama (1946), the issue phrased carefully by Justice Black was “whether a State … can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town’s management.” He found that the state lacked that authority, and the First Amendment rights of Jehovah’s witnesses prevail over the state’s interest in protecting property rights. Justice Black believes whether the title of a land belongs to government or to a private person is not decisive, as “the more the owner opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more his rights become circumscribed” by the rights of those who use it. As in the case the company town was basically a functional equivalent of a municipality, First Amendment was found to apply. Marsh v. Alabama, however, is not the end of the story, and though it never was overruled, basically it appears to be in decline or only surviving in exceptionally narrow situations. In Logan Valley (1968) Marsh was applied in an extensive way to labor picketing inside a shopping mall directed against one of the stores, thus equalizing a simple shopping center to a company town. A few years later, in

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1153 To their credit, it has to be added that Hungarian police believed they could not possibly rely on any other ground as the law on assembly only allows for prior ban if the assembly would “seriously jeopardise the undisturbed functioning of democratic institutions and courts or road traffic could not be redirected onto other routes.” For a discussion on the Hungarian situation see Péter Sólyom, The Constitutional Principles of Freedom of Assembly in Hungary, 2008 FUNDAMENTUM 5, 36 (2008).
1156 326 U.S. 506.
1157 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (1968) 391 US 308, 88 S Ct 1601, 20 L Ed 2d 603
the opposite case of *Lloyd v. Tanner*, similar protection was denied to anti-war leafleting, the Court reasoning that the leafleting was unrelated to the shopping center or to any tenant of it, and thus could have been performed as effectively outside the premises of the center as inside. A final blow to a broad interpretation to *Marsh* seems to be *Hudgens* from 1980 where the – extremely diverging – Court clarified that it does not see a private shopping mall as a place where the First Amendment applies. The Supreme Court held, however, that state constitutions could grant more extended speech rights than the federal Bill of Rights, and quite some state courts have interpreted their own documents as granting rights of expression and protest in places private, but open to the public in a way which benefits the owner. On my part, together with very many authors, I see reason for such an extension, especially because “truly” public space is rapidly shrinking, while government still needs to be controlled and criticized. Also I agree with Justice Black’s idea about the voluntary “publicisation” of property for gain, which – quasi in exchange – extends the reach of constitutional protection. Still, it is clear that all this is apparently irreconcilable with the idea of a strict line between public and private, quite fundamental in constitutional law. This problem is registered by state courts which then examine these cases first in terms of state action, a complicated doctrine outside the reach of this thesis. Important to note is however that even if a court finds state action in a given situation, it does not mean that the applicable standard to the speech restriction will be the same as it would be for state-owned public places.

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1158 Lloyd Corp. v Tanner (1972) 407 US 551, 92 S Ct 2219, 33 L Ed 2d 131.
1162 See Union of Needletrades, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852-53; Green Party, 752 A.2d at 325-26 as cited by MULLIGAN, supra note 1160 at 559, FN214.
Appleby v. UK\textsuperscript{1163} is the parallel ECHR decision. In Appleby, the owners of a private shopping center that also functioned as the town center denied a group permission to collect signatures against a local plan to build on a part of the only remaining park area in the vicinity of the town center. The Court first of all denied that some sort of quasi-public forum requirement would flow from the Convention. It also stated that it does not have much relevance that the town center had originally been built by a government owned company, and only later sold to the current private owner. Based on a comparative analysis where the Court considered cases from the United States and Canada, it concluded that there is no emerging consensus that would bestow ‘automatic’ access rights to private property. Nonetheless, the Court was cautious not to exclude all possibility of access rights for the future. In case the bar on access to property would have the effect of preventing any effective exercise of expressive rights, or would destroy the essence of the right, a positive obligation of the state might arise.\textsuperscript{1164} The Court refers to Marsh v. Alabama to demonstrate an example where – if happened in Europe – a positive obligation to grant access rights to private property would be imposed by the Convention.\textsuperscript{1165} However, in the present case, demonstrators had the option to go to the old town centre (frequented by much less people), or employ alternative means of communication like door-to-door canvassing etc.\textsuperscript{1166} The decisive consideration here is basically the same as in U.S. TMP and content-neutrality doctrines: whether or not there are alternatives to the one restricted. The Appleby decision could be reframed in “U.S. legalese” as saying that the property right of the owner is a significant government interest, the restriction on place is minor, thus narrowly tailored to the significant interest, and the restriction left open alternative channels of communication. Dissenting Judge Maruste criticized that the forum is not considered public or quasi-public especially that it went from the public hand to the

\textsuperscript{1163} Appleby and Others v. United Kingdom, Application no. 44306/98, Judgment of 6 May 2003.
\textsuperscript{1164} Id. at § 46.
\textsuperscript{1165} Id. at § 47.
\textsuperscript{1166} Id. at § 48.
private, and that applicants were discriminatorily denied permit which was granted to various other groups, including – significantly – to the local government for statutory consultation purposes. Thus, Judge Maruste could be reframed in U.S. language to claim that the discretion granted to the private owner resulted in content-discrimination. Judge Maruste does not claim that freedom of expression should always prevail over property, but makes this important point:\textsuperscript{1167}

It cannot be the case that through privatisation the public authorities can divest themselves of all responsibility to protect rights and freedoms other than property rights. They still bear responsibility for deciding how the forum created by them is to be used and for ensuring that public interests and individuals’ rights are respected.

This feature of previous public forum could have made the Appleby case an occasion for more analysis of positive obligations or how to resolve the tension between privatization of public spaces and classic vertical effect of human rights. I doubt whether the kind of essence doctrine hinted in the judgement would be a principled reply, as that would discriminate between private owners according to the contingent features of the given vicinity: whether there are other available channels and places for protest is not dependent on the owner of a single shopping mall, except in the case of a company town unlikely in Europe. Critics of the decision advocate reasonable access rights, what the national legislator would be required by positive obligation to secure.\textsuperscript{1168} The ECHR has all in all chosen a solution similar to the U.S. Supreme Court: the Convention does not require the States to grant access rights to private land, except for narrowly understood company town situations where there are no alternative places, but it also did not proclaim an absolute property right which would prevent Member States to legislatively grant such access.

\textsuperscript{1167} Appleby v. U.K, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Maruste.

The German Court, the one could be expected to develop a full-fledged theory on the constitutional evaluation of privatization of public spaces has yet only partially done so. Recently it handed out a decision proclaiming that there is a right to assembly on the Frankfurt Airport, owned by Fraport AG, a joint-stock company. According to the Court, the airport is bound directly by basic rights, basically because the state has a 52% share in the company. Earlier interpretations already clarified that businesses owned (solely) by the state are directly bound by basic rights. The current decision adds to that that undertakings with mixed (private and public) ownership are also directly bound by basic rights if the state has a “controlling influence” in the enterprise. Controlling influence is certainly there if more than half of the shares are publicly owned. The Court declined to discuss the applicability of basic rights below the level of 50% public share.\(^{1169}\) In the present case, the 52% public share, and the controlling influence theory thus enabled the Court to straightforwardly proclaim the prevalence of the subjective right to expression and assembly, without the need to balance it against a countering property right of the airport, under the certainly correct, but here in application a bit strained theory that the state does not have fundamental rights. The Court goes as far as to intimate that those private shareholders who do not like their company getting bound by the constitution, should sell their shares or influence the management to get rid of the controlling state influence.\(^{1170}\) Despite all its apparent radicality, this part of the decision is reasonably moderate, even minimalist, as after all it does not address – even

\(^{1169}\) BVerfG, 1 BvR 699/06 vom 22.2.2011, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 128), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110222_1bvr069906.html, Rn. 53

\(^{1170}\) Id. at 53: „Die Rechte der privaten Anteilseigner erfahren hierdurch keine ungerechtfertigte Einbuße: Ob diese sich an einem öffentlich beherrschten Unternehmen beteiligen oder nicht, liegt in ihrer freien Entscheidung, und auch wenn sich die Mehrheitsverhältnisse erst nachträglich ändern, steht es ihnen - wie bei der Änderung von Mehrheitsverhältnissen sonst - frei, hierauf zu reagieren. Sofern sich Private indes an solchen Unternehmen beteiligen, haben sie an den Chancen und Risiken, die sich aus den Handlungsbedingungen der öffentlichen Hand ergeben, gleichermaßen teil. Ohnehin unberührt bleibt ihre Rechtsstellung als Grundrechtsträger insbesondere des Eigentumsgreundsrechts unmittelbar gegenüber den öffentlichen Anteilseignern oder sonst gegenüber der öffentlichen Gewalt.“
explicitly excludes\textsuperscript{171} – the way more challenging issue of protest rights on (fully, or largely) privately owned public places. Certainly basic rights can have application in such situations in the form of indirect binding force or in the form of protective duty of the state, the parallel German doctrines to state action and positive obligations on their own outside this discussion. How far this application would go for real is explicitly undecided by the GFCC.

A comparable case at the USSC turned out in exactly the opposite way. In a much criticized opinion, the majority of the USSC bluntly declared the (entirely!) publicly owned airports of New York and New Jersey being a non-public forum where only a reasonableness standard applies to restrictions on some expressive activities. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (1992)\textsuperscript{172} the Court faced a Port Authority ban on solicitation and on sale or distribution of literature in the entire area (including publicly accessible parts) of the major New York-New Jersey airports. The divided court managed to issue a majority opinion on the constitutionality of ban on solicitation, and a plurality opinion on the unconstitutionality of the sale or distribution of literature (leafleting basically). Most importantly the majority agreed that the freely accessible terminal areas are non-public fora, and thus only a reasonableness test applies, and solicitation is reasonably banned for disturbance to the proper running of the airport, and of the people minding their own business (somehow the Court seems to take that air travelers have less time and are busier than ground travelers\textsuperscript{173}). Justice Kennedy concurred in the result as to the solicitation while maintaining the airport a public forum, and wrote lead opinion on leafletting, to which Justice O’Connor

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See id. at 56: \textit{"Je nach Gewährleistungsinhalt und Fallgestaltung kann die mittelbare Grundrechtsbindung Privater einer Grundrechtsbindung des Staates vielmehr nahe oder auch gleich kommen. Für den Schutz der Kommunikation kommt das insbesondere dann in Betracht, wenn private Unternehmen die Bereitstellung schon der Rahmenbedingungen öffentlicher Kommunikation selbst übernehmen und damit in Funktionen eintreten, die - wie die Sicherstellung der Post- und Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen - früher dem Staat als Aufgabe der Daseinsvorsorge zugewiesen waren. Wieweit dieses heute in Bezug auf die Versammlungsfreiheit oder die Freiheit der Meinungsausserung auch für materiell private Unternehmen gilt, die einen öffentlichen Verkehr eröffnen und damit Orte der allgemeinen Kommunikation schaffen, \textit{bedarf vorliegend keiner Entscheidung."} (emphasis added).}
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\textsuperscript{172}505 U.S. 684.
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wrote a concurring who thinks airport terminals are non-public fora, still the leafleting ban fails the reasonableness test. Thus, all in all, solicitation can be banned, while leafleting cannot, but it is unclear why, and what tests are applicable. Though the particular case was clearly “speech plus”, the fact that the majority considers a publicly owned airport a non-public forum also extends the easy regulability (i.e. simple reasonableness review) to any sort of assembly. Certainly this is a very surprising result from the USSC – especially if compared with the GFCC – and the fault again lies with undue respect paid to “tradition” in the forum analysis, this time going as far as to pronounce that clearly airports are not public fora as they are a new phenomena. Note, however, that this argument, though lacking any normative explicative power, might actually leave place for later flexible application – though how late remains a question as the decision is from 1992, and till today it was not overruled. The archaic property logic still appears to haunt the public forum doctrine in the US.

In the UK, a planned 8 day long camping demonstration near Heathrow Airport was enjoined for reasons that the camping would likely be accompanied by direct action protests. The Court rejected that a simple direct action would automatically realize harassment, especially that the would-be protestors have not committed harassment in the past. However, there were calls for mass direct actions, clearly aimed at slowing down airport operation. These were found to have “serious and damaging consequences” on the operator and users of the airport, especially as the resulting disruption would increase the risk of a terrorist attack against the users of the airport. The decision to grant the injunction clearly turns on the disruptive aim of the planned assemblies, thus the facts are very different from the facts of the airport cases discussed in relation to the US or Germany. The disruption might seriously hinder not only the lawful business of hundreds of thousands at Heathrow, but also authorities in preventing,

1174 “[G]iven the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having “immemorially . . . time out of mind” been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.” 505 U.S. 680, majority opinion per Chief Justice Rehnquist.
1175 Heathrow Airports Ltd and Bullock v Garman and others [2007] EWHC 1957 (QB) at § 99.
1176 See §§ 8-9.
averting or containing the effects of a potential terrorist act, an argument which takes its bite from the expected mass feature of the protests, widely publicized in UK press. Note this is different from the argument sometimes found in US discourse where the protestors themselves are to be protected from terrorist attacks.\footnote{See e.g. SUPLINA supra note 333.}

With this in all – but the UK airport case – jurisdictions discussed one faces a similar situation: while courts tend to see that privatization of public places results in shrinking possibility for the exercise of assembly right, and thus, they typically would not prevent any “democratic majority” to grant access rights to privately owned open places, courts are at this moment unwilling to create a fundamental right of access on their own. I think it is an acceptable approach from a court in general, and I only see inconsistency in US jurisprudence in this regard. If in one segment, abortion protests, the USSC is willing to loosen First Amendment protection on traditionally speech-friendly parts of public property, i.e. streets and sidewalks, for quite mediated privacy interests, then in the other segment (shopping malls, airports, etc.) it should be willing to strengthen First Amendment protection on private or quasi-private (government-owned, but “managerial”) property where no privacy interests are at stake.

2. Governmental buildings: managerial or authoritarian protection?

Protest around governmental\footnote{Government in this chapter, just as in general in the dissertation is meant to cover all three branches of power, i.e. not only the executive and administration.} buildings (e.g. parliaments, courts, prisons) is often restricted. Sometimes such restriction might be justified by interests in running the government, perhaps a subcategory of what Robert Post influentially meant by the “managerial function”\footnote{It is certainly only a subcategory, Post’s claim and theme are more general. See Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (987).}. Managerial function would first imply that access needs to be secured as government has to run properly, and government work, be it legislative debates, court hearings and deliberations or executive decisionmaking, should not be threatened by mob violence or even only...
disruptive noise. There would be no problem with such restrictions if they really served the undisturbed work of government by preventing extortious or otherwise clearly decapacitating “speech”, substituting rule of law for the rule of street. Nonetheless, government is the last institution in a democracy to be shielded from public criticism, and any prohibitive scheme runs the risk of degenerating into an authoritarian means which isolates the mighty machinery from public scrutiny. Thus, protest restrictions around government buildings would be the best field to analyze the Janus-faced nature of the right to freedom of assembly of being the most important, but at the same time the most dangerous right.

Two countries, Germany and the UK have instituted famous protest restrictions around government buildings, but the stories behind them are strikingly different. The United Kingdom is the easier case as the highly criticized authorization scheme for demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament has been repealed in September 2011. Thus, the most notorious UK place restriction belongs to the past, had lived only six years. Stationary protest meetings can again be held on the streets around Westminster without prior restraint, and processions are subject to the normal regime under the Public Order Act. However, the offence of trespass on a designated site, introduced in the same Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) 2005, remained in force. Sites on Crown land, and on private land of the Queen and her heirs can be designated without any further condition in the law, while any other (i.e. even private) sites can be designated if the Secretary of State finds it appropriate in the interests of national security (section 128 of SOCPA). The site is thus to be designated not by law, but by the Secretary of State in an Order. Indeed there have been several dozens of such sites

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1180 Section 141 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/part/3/enacted. The original provisions, the 2005 SOCPA Sections 132-138 required authorization for demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament which could be granted subject to conditions of place, time, period, noise levels if it served the purpose of preventing (a) hindrance to any person wishing to enter or leave the Palace of Westminster, (b) hindrance to the proper operation of Parliament, (c) serious public disorder, (d) serious damage to property, (e) disruption to the life of the community, (f) security risk in any part of the designated area, (g) risk to the safety of members of the public (including any taking part in the demonstration). For a detailed analysis and critique of the original provisions and related case law see e.g. MEAD supra note 507 at 148-162.

designated so far, including nuclear sites (power stations, but also research sites), all sorts of RAF bases, and a wide range of royal, governmental, and parliamentary sites, thus including basically all important government and Parliament buildings in London.\textsuperscript{1182} Being designated prevents access to the inside of the site, but it does not preclude holding protest events outside, in front of, the site. Therefore, these provisions do not on their own directly hinder protests on adjacent public streets, but create an arrestable offence for those who do not do anything else than put a foot on the designated area, and threaten with imprisonment of up to 51 weeks and level 5 fine, a quite severe punishment for an activity not harming anyone. It is a defence if the person proves that “he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect,” that the site was a designated site. The provision, though might fall into desuetude, is criticized for several reasons.\textsuperscript{1183} First, there is no tangible harm required, simple entrance is enough. If there was some tangible harm, then other offences would come into play, which then makes the offence of trespass on a designated site appear superfluous. Recall \textit{e.g.} that aggravated trespass is committed if the trespasser disrupts or obstructs some activity. The argument from national security, basically prevention of terrorist acts, is not convincing either, as there are ample powers under terrorism legislation to stop someone suspected with being a terrorist. Finally, it also is pointed out rightly in the literature that the mode of designation in Order by the Minister, i.e. not in law, might raise rule of law concerns, but at the same time opens up the possibility for courts to strike it down for incompatibility with the ECHR under the HRA.\textsuperscript{1184} Time will show how police and courts will apply, if at all, and interpret the designated site provisions. There is certainly a way to interpret them only to secure access to and safety of employees of the designated site, which would raise no serious questions of the right to protest or assembly.

\textsuperscript{1183} See MEAD \textit{supra} note 507 at 144-145.
\textsuperscript{1184} Id.
In Germany, so called Bannmeilen have been instituted in 1920 around buildings of representative bodies, to prevent incidents similar to the Weimar Reichstag Bloodbath in which 42 protestors and 20 policemen were killed in a chaotic and mismanaged effort to prevent protestors to enter parliament deliberating a controversial law on works councils. Hitler’s first day as a Reichskanzler saw the law abolished, and later the Ermächtigungsgesetz was adopted among shouts from SA and SS troops “We want the law – or blood and thunder!”.

The Bonn Republic reintroduced such a law, but that became obsolete with the government relocating to Berlin. Art. 16 of the federal assembly law banned open sky assemblies in so-called “pacified districts” or “pacified ban zones” (befriedete Bezirke or befriedete Bannkreise) around legislative organs of the federation and the Länder, and of the GFCC. A 1999 federal law introduced pacified districts around the Bundestag and Bundesrat in Berlin, and around the GFCC in Karlsruhe, the zones being significantly smaller than the previous ones in Bonn. In 2008, basically for reasons of transparency and federalism reform, the 1999 law and the relevant norms of the federal assembly law were incorporated in a single new law on pacified districts. According to the old-new scheme, it is prohibited to demonstrate in these zones, unless authorized by the minister for internal affairs jointly with the president of the respective organ. An authorization could be given when no interference with the activities of the respective bodies, their organs or boards,

1185 DIETEL, GINTZEL & KNIESEL supra note 211, Rn. 11 zu § 16, 337 with reference to Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (probably 1999, Harper & Row), 251 and William L. Shirer, Aufstieg und Fall des Dritten Reiches (n.a.) 195. The same sentence and references (with different page numbers) can be found in Sasha Werner, Das neue Bannmeilengesetz der „Berliner Republik”, NVwZ 2000, 369, 370 and FN17.

1186 See Bannmeilengesetz vom 6. August 1955 (BGBl. I S. 504) http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/text.xav?bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBI&start=%2F%2F%5B%40attr_id%3D%5Dbgb2055_0504.pdf%5D&wc=1&skin=WC


1189 See the reasoning in the bill introduced to the Bundestag, Drucksache 16/9741, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/097/1609741.pdf

including parliamentary fractions is to be expected neither would the free entrance to the buildings blocked. As a rule, on days when Bundestag and Bundesrat are not in session, the authorization is to be granted. The violation of the ban was decriminalized, but remains an administrative offence (fine up to 20,000 euros, § 4). Thus, there is currently a regime of preventive ban subject to the possibility of authorization\textsuperscript{1191} (präventives Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt), a reverse of what normally would be the case with fundamental rights, though with limited discretion on the authorities, or, a claim right to authorization if conditions are fulfilled.\textsuperscript{1192} Strong claims against the necessity of Bannmeilen regulation arise as under general law, police (or other authority) are entitled to impose conditions on the time, manner, and place of an assembly, and even can declare a no-go zone (Platzverweisung) if public safety or even the looser German concept, public order is seriously endangered.\textsuperscript{1193}

Commentators also argue that historically the Bannmeile served purposes either quite irreconcilable with democratic rule of law state or was a reaction to very specific crises of it. In the Middle Ages Bannmeilen served to protect friends and keep outside (of the castle, or of the city) foes,\textsuperscript{1194} while during the Weimar era, the law on Bannmeilen – in itself a constitutional amendment – was adopted as a reaction to a series of emergencies.\textsuperscript{1195} The mentioned Reichstag bloodbath, or the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch attempt, the federal government and the federal president being moved from Berlin to Stuttgart all provide very specific evidences of serious violence and serious physical threats against constitutional institutions. Not only one has a sense that the 1920 Bannmelengesetz introduced in reaction to serious violent events was anyway swept away “by history”, but the current German constitutional state has not in any sense ever faced such clear challenges of its existence or legitimacy. Some

\textsuperscript{1191} For the translation (referenced by SAvL), see the forum discussion on http://dict.leo.org/forum/viewUnsolvedquery.php?idThread=148684&idForum=1&lp=ende&lang=de
\textsuperscript{1192} WERNER supra note 1185 at 369.
\textsuperscript{1193} Hans-Peter Schneider, Frieden statt Bann - Über eine Reform, die nichts kostet, aber auch wenig wert ist, NJW 2000, 263, 264.
\textsuperscript{1194} SCHNEIDER, supra note 1193 at 265.
\textsuperscript{1195} WERNER, supra note 1185 at 370.
certainly would think the high legitimacy of post-WWII German constitutional institutions might be supported by measures similar to the Bannmeilen regulation. Even if so, as Werner points out, the Weimar precedent only aimed at preventing physical intrusion and threats of physical violence, not in some more vague sense the promotion or protection of the representative function of parliament this way, as hinted in the explanation of the bill.\footnote{Id.} Quite to the contrary, assemblies and protests actually ought to be free to influence, even to pressure, though not to extort political decisionmaking in the logic of the \textit{Brokdorf} decision of the GFCC.

Another serious question is the relation of the Bannmeilen scheme to the general notification regime. If one wishes to demonstrate within the Bannmeilen, they both need to notify the police (or authority for assemblies, \textit{Versammlungsbehörde}), and to request authorization by the minister and the president of the respective organ. As Art. 8 I GG grants freedom of assembly without notice or permit, it is highly problematic (disproportionate) to impose both, even if one accepts that notice is constitutional under Art. 8 II. Furthermore, spontaneous demonstrations are clearly disadvantaged by the scheme, and I do not think that recommendations to dispense with the Bannmeilen regulation exactly with regard to spontaneous (unorganized) demonstrations will be followed in legal practice.\footnote{See \textit{WERNER} supra note 1185 at 373.} One of the promoters of the 1999 law, an MP for the Social Democratic Party also takes for granted that spontaneous demonstrations are excluded from the pacified districts.\footnote{Dieter Wiefelspütz, \textit{Das Gesetz über befriedete Bezirke für Verfassungsorgane des Bundes - ein Gesetz, das seinen Zweck erfüllt}, NVWZ 2000, 1016, 1017.} It might help though in police practice that even he acknowledges police’s margin of appreciation (principle of opportunity instead of legality) not to interfere in the Bannkreise when the wrong done by the assembly (Unrechtsgehalt) is insignificant, and a police intervention would risk escalation
rather than achieve formal integrity of law.\textsuperscript{1199} Note again however the language: it is very far from saying that the police is accountable for securing the exercise of a fundamental right, or only intervening when absolutely necessary. Clearly, such an interpretation would render the scheme close to meaningless, or at least redundant, as then the general test for bans would apply. While the existence of the scheme is thus highly problematic, its jurisprudence is ambivalent, courts strictly limiting its scope of application, but within that scope not exercising rigorous review. Generally, the authorization has to be granted not only at session-free times, but also when the target of the protest is not parliament or the GFCC,\textsuperscript{1200} or even the protest is not aiming at the issue currently deliberated by the respective body.\textsuperscript{1201} I think an interpretation conform with the constitution would require a case-by-case risk analysis of whether any planned demonstration would with high probability significantly hinder or extortioningly influence the deliberation inside the buildings even if the topics are the same. In general commentators also require a close examination of same facts,\textsuperscript{1202} but I have not found any clear stance taken on such particular issues, even if the commentator recommends abolition of the scheme. Courts are generally staying within the reverse logic of the law, thus in effect apply a rationality type of loose review. Recently, even freedom of art – recall, the usual suspect for overriding legal incapacitations on freedom of assembly e.g. with regard to flag desecration – was found limited to performances \textit{outside} the pacified district around the Reichstag,\textsuperscript{1203} in a judgment based on warnings of enhanced danger of terrorist (!) acts against Germany. The decision of the Administrative Court of Berlin, as it often happens with

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\textsuperscript{1199} Wiefelspütz, at 1018.
\textsuperscript{1201} Wern for example claims that the authorization cannot be denied if there is „a complete lack of details about the endangerment of the purpose of the protection“ („Hinweise auf eine Gefährdung des Schutzzweckes völlig fehlen“), \textsc{Werner supra} note 1185 at 372. A “complete lack of details” sounds like recommending a very weak rationality test, indeed where the state has not provided any reason for the restriction.
\textsuperscript{1202} VG Berlin: Beschluss vom 20.05.2011 - VG 1 L 174.11, 1 L 174/11, \textsc{NVwZ-RR 2011, 726}.
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terrorism, does not discuss in any substantive way the existence of such a threat, and whether the ban (in the form of condition imposed as to the place) is proportionate to the aim pursued, but applies a kind of “no alternative channel” argumentation, finding that it would be no big deal for the performance to be displayed a few hundred meters away from the Western ramp of the Reichstag.

In the United States, unsurprisingly, there are nowadays no federal laws designating no-protest areas around governmental buildings. This does not mean, however, that it is constitutionally always impermissible to restrict protest around such buildings. Protest around courts, on capitol grounds, prisons, and military bases evoked a significant, though not necessarily doctrinally consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence. In relation to Capitol Grounds, or grounds where state representative bodies have their seats, the jurisprudence is clear: the grounds are traditionally places of assemblies, and as such, there is no cause for special restriction, peaceful assembly on the sidewalks is clearly protected by the First Amendment.  

Dicta from a decision on an antinoise ordinance related to demonstrations around schools seem to imply that even noisy demonstrations must be allowed on such grounds normally open to the public. As to courts, the jurisprudence seems settled that courts need a higher level of isolation and quiet than legislative bodies, but the contours are unclear. In Cox v. Louisiana II (1965) a ban on picketing “near” a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice and impede access was found constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court, though quite divided, appears unified in the understanding that 2000 people protesting

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1204 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), (breach of the peace statute found unconstitutional, see above text accompanying notes 616-618). Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police, 342 F.Supp. 575 (DDC); aff’d mem., 309 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 311, 34 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972) (a complete ban on assemblies on Capitol Grounds found violative of the First and Fifth Amendments).

1205 Cf. this quote from Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) 120 : “We recognize that the ordinance prohibits some picketing that is neither violent nor physically obstructive. Noisy demonstrations that disrupt or are incompatible with normal school activities are obviously within the ordinance’s reach. Such expressive conduct may be constitutionally protected at other places or other times, cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).”

1206 Though application in the present case was reversed for reasons that officials told protestors they were rightfully protesting on the street. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
101 feet away from the courthouse against what they considered an illegal arrest, hoping to persuade the court to dismiss the charges, is an attempt to influence the judicial process, and is not constitutionally protected expression, but conduct regulable for reasons of integrity of law and order. The Supreme Court supported the need for no outside influence or pressure on the courts or any judicial officer because “mob law is the very antithesis of due process”. One could add that protestors’ singing and clapping could be heard inside the building\(^{1207}\) – which necessarily influences the work inside. A compromise solution – with regard to courts only, because of the special needs to protect judicial integrity and due process – would be to disallow not only physically obstructive or clearly threatening, but also noisy (audible from the inside of the building) protests, but still keep with the principle of the “eye can be averted”, and thus allow assemblies for or against some judicial outcome to go on in a distance not interfering with ingress and egress. However, the Court’s argumentation in *Cox* rather implies that restrictions on protests around courts could go further than that, especially that the distance might be bigger than the one that guarantees no noise penetrating inside the building, but no exact criteria are set. In other cases related to protest around courts, the Supreme Court did not address the question of the limits of protests threatening or influencing judicial action any further, but did make clear a few other principles related to protest around courts. In 1968, it held in *Cameron v. Johnson* that picketing in front of a courthouse against racial discrimination in voter registration could be constitutionally banned as the law did not serve to stifle protest, but to ensure unfettered access to municipal buildings to all citizens.\(^{1208}\) The law prohibited “picketing . . . in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any county . . . courthouses. . .” Before the enactment of the statute, protests were allowed to go on with the exception of a barricaded march route, while

\(^{1207}\) See the facts in Justice Clark’s partial dissent and concurring: “The record is replete with evidence that the demonstrators with their singing, cheering, clapping and waving of banners drew the attention of the whole courthouse square as well as the occupants and officials of the court building itself. . .” at 379 U.S. 559, 586.

after the statute entered into force, some pickets were dispersed, some were tolerated, some
protestors were arrested, but no charges brought against them, thus no criminal conviction
issued. The facial challenge at the Supreme Court failed, and I think rightly so with regard of
the text of the statute. It is less obvious however that it was not applied in bad faith to some of
the protestors, but the USSC did not engage in a close examination of this for procedural
reasons (injunctive relief). All in all, the provision is the sort which – if correctly applied –
properly delineates rights of assembly on the one, and proper functioning of government
(even though it was a courthouse, the activity in question was voter registration, but the logic
could equally apply to judicial activity proper) on the other hand. That such a managerial
concern is clearly present, is also shown in U.S. v. Grace, where the USSC annulled a federal
ban on “displaying any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice
any party, organization, or movement”\textsuperscript{1209} on the grounds of the USSC which included public
sidewalks around the building. As public sidewalks are considered “public forum”, and the
sidewalks in question were “indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C.”,
the Court thus applied the rules to public forum, and dispensed any claim of private property
of government. The purpose of the act was the “protection of the building and grounds and of
the persons and property therein, as well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum,”
which is a legitimate purpose. Nonetheless, the Court went on to find that the nexus between
pursuing this interest and a total ban on displaying any signs on the public sidewalks around
the Court is \textit{insufficient}. There was no showing that protestors “in any way obstructed the
sidewalks or access to the building, threatened injury to any person or property, or in any way
interfered with the orderly administration of the building or other parts of the grounds.”\textsuperscript{1210}
I take this list – obstruction of access, injury to person or property, interference with the
administration of the building – supplies those dangers which can be constitutionally averted

\textsuperscript{1210} 461 U.S. 171, 182.
by restrictions on protest. Note that the USSC in Grace does not repeat Cox II concerns about influencing the judicial process, though clearly does not repudiate any of them either. Thus, doctrinally, Cox II remains the closest explanation in that regard.

Apart from (publicly open) capitol grounds and courts, the USSC has ruled on protest restriction with regard to jailhouse grounds and military base. The 1966 Adderley v. Florida\textsuperscript{1211} found a trespass conviction for entering the premises of a county jail for protesting segregation in prisons constitutional. Justice Black, not inconsistently with his general hostility towards “speech plus”, considered the law a general one regulating conduct, which was applied to the protestors without discrimination. Edwards\textsuperscript{1212} was distinguished out inter alia because in Edwards the protest was on South Carolina State Capitol grounds, not on jailhouse grounds, and “traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not.”\textsuperscript{1213} In a similar vein, the USSC found ban on political partisan speeches and prior approval of distribution of literature within the confines of a military base in Greer v. Spock\textsuperscript{1214} constitutional. Regulations granted free civilian access to some unrestricted areas of the base, still the Court has not found the content-based regulation on partisan speech and the discretionary prior restraint on distribution of literature impermissible.

Basically the majority has considered the military’s function as decisive here which clearly excludes there would be a constitutional free speech and assembly right on the premises of the fort. Greer thus rejected that the military base would be a public forum, irrespective of the fact that it was opened up for civilian access, where people sometimes for some purposes would assemble and discuss some issues. What matters are not the particular circumstances of the particular military base, but that in general, traditionally, or in abstract, military

\textsuperscript{1212} See supra text accompanying note 616.
\textsuperscript{1213} 385 U.S. 41.
installations are not meant for First Amendment activity. Without really giving any justification, Greer firmly established – or revived as Robert Post shows – the basic divisions of places for First Amendment activity: “non-public” forums are outside any protection except against “irrational, invidious, or arbitrary” government action. A military base is a nonpublic forum, where there is simply no constitutional right to speech or assembly.

The ECHR recently handed down two decisions related to a blanket ban imposed by police around the Hungarian parliament in effect for months. Nonetheless, as domestic courts found that the order declaring a “security operational zone” was illegal, the ECHR has declared that the order did not have any basis in law, thus there was no need to go into the discussion whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society.

3. Memorial sites: identity fight over collective memory

Memorial sites are places of common remembrance, places of regularly held commemorative assemblies, and, thus, places where other types of assemblies, questioning the commemorated meaning of the site, might want to be restricted by the state. There has not been much legislation, litigation and jurisprudence related to protest on or near memorial sites, except in Germany. This does not mean that such protests do not happen elsewhere. In the United States, for instance, the same Westboro Baptist Church which regularly pickets funerals in order to spread what they call “God’s hate toward homosexuals”, also organizes anti-Jewish events, including protesting at the Holocaust Memorial in D.C. and other cities, but no constitutional concerns arose. In accordance with general free speech law, there is no way in the U.S. – apparently even no serious political will, unlike in the case of the funeral

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1215 See the classic discussion by Robert Post, Between Governance And Management: The History and Theory of The Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713 (1987) 1739-1745.
1216 424 U.S. 840.

In the United Kingdom, apart from the quite different bans on demonstrations around Stonehenge\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 401-408.} and the general possibility of issuing banning orders discussed above,\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 396-408.} there is no specific protection provided to memorials either. When activist Peter Tatchell, an invited guest in the UK Parliament at the 2005 Holocaust Memorial Day started to shout after the ceremony in protest of the planned quota on asylum, he got arrested, but released in two hours.\footnote{See Tatchell Arrested in Holocaust Memorial Day Asylum Protest Protest at Michael Howard’s asylum quota to block refugees. London – 27 January 2005, his own website, http://petertatchell.net/a2/print_versions/419.htm} Further details could not be verified.

In France, in a strange but rights friendly inconsistency with the mushrooming lois mémorielles and negationnism, there are no special laws restricting protest around or on memorial sites, or else there probably would have been some litigation or public discussion on their usefulness. Arguably, however, any imaginable need for such laws is eliminated by the otherwise very many restrictions on expression causing troubles to public order, etc., discussed throughout this thesis.

A specific ban on assemblies around memorial sites has been introduced in Germany in 2005. A second paragraph was added to Art. 15 of the federal assembly law, the article authorizing conditions and bans of assemblies directly endangering public safety and order. The newly added paragraph II states that “in particular” an assembly can be banned or made subject to conditions if the assembly or procession takes place at a location which as a memorial site of “outstanding historical and supra-regional significance” commemorates the victims of
National Socialist violence and tyranny, which treated them in a way violating human dignity. The ban or conditions may only be imposed if at the time of the imposition particular circumstances make it likely that the dignity of the victims would be infringed. The law designates a site around the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin as such a place, and leaves to the Länder to designate such other sites within their borders. The law was adopted to prevent the NPD, the nationalist party to march along the Brandenburg Gate to the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. Thus it is at least strange that the law after all does not limit protest around the Brandenburg Gate, but only around the Holocaust Memorial. The law was criticized for many other reasons as well. Scholars pointed out that if read properly, the law limits the recourse to public order beyond the restrictions read in it by the GFCC, such as the explicitly granted possibility to reschedule Neonazi demonstrations from the Holocaust Memorial Day to another day, or other permissible “manner” restrictions of aggressive and provocative, intimidating conduct leading to a “climate of violence”, whatever that might mean. Maybe most significantly, the law leaves out a large number of favoured Neonazi sites which are not memorial sites, but festive or military sites of the NS Regime, or smaller memorial sites (including less well-known former concentration camps designated as memorial sites) lacking a supra-regional significance.

On its own, the new provision was found constitutional shortly after its adoption by the GFCC in a short Chamber decision rejecting a request for injunctory relief (einstweilige Anordnung

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1223 § 15 II VersG: „(2) Eine Versammlung oder ein Aufzug kann insbesondere verboten oder von bestimmten Auflagen abhängig gemacht werden, wenn 1. die Versammlung oder der Aufzug an einem Ort stattfindet, der als Gedenkstätte von historisch herausragender, überregionaler Bedeutung an die Opfer der menschenunwürdigen Behandlung unter der nationalsozialistischen Gewalt- und Willkürherrschaft erinnert, und 2. nach den zur Zeit des Erlasses der Verfügung konkret feststellbaren Umständen zu besorgen ist, dass durch die Versammlung oder den Aufzug die Würde der Opfer beeinträchtigt wird.“
1225 See supra text accompanying notes 856-865.
to suspend the restrictive condition).\textsuperscript{1228} The youth organization of NPD planned a march entitled “60 years of Liberation Lie – End the guilt cult!” from Alexanderplatz till Brandenburg Gate, passing by next to the Holocaust Memorial. Police imposed a shortened route, which would end before reaching the Holocaust Memorial and would also not get to the Brandenburg Gate. The Court found that such a shortening of the route is permissible because the march obviously would fulfill criteria of Art. 15 II of the assembly law, most importantly the authorities could correctly assume that human dignity of Jewish persons would be violated by such a march along the Holocaust Memorial on the anniversary of the capitulation of Germany. The march – as it can be inferred from its motto – would portray millions of Jewish victims as “object” of a cult (§ 21 of the Chamber Judgment), which in accordance with the usual Kantian approach is a violation of human dignity. In this case, unlike (years later) in relation to the Rudolf Hess Memorial march, the Court thus found the dignity rationale explicitly applicable and fulfilled. Thus the rationale is not public order, neither manner-type ban on provocation, but simply human dignity as a constitutional limit. Consequently, it appears to me the legislator could (but is constitutionally not required to) equally introduce legislation to the effect of banning such marches anywhere else, as the described objectification is realized independent of the time and place of the expression.

As to the portion of the rerouting away from the Brandenburg Gate, the Court has accepted that the Senate of Berlin (the government of the Land Berlin) has primacy in using the place for a commemorative event, called “Day for Democracy”, even if the request was submitted after the NPD youth organization had notified the march. Not because it is initiated by the government who does not have basic rights claim, but because the programme was of general interest, and it was an assembly worthy of basic right protection because of the public who wish to participate in it. Practical concordance thus requires to balance the rights of the public

\textsuperscript{1228} BVerfG, 1 BvR 961/05 vom 6.5.2005, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 30), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20050506_1bvr096105.html
with that of the NPD youth organization. The special character of the date (anniversary of capitulation) and the place as being representative of the whole of the German federal republic and its polity, also weighs in favor of the Day for Democracy, overriding a strict, mechanical application of the principle of temporal priority of the requests. Otherwise such common interest events could always be preempted by special interest groups, reserving a certain place symbolizing the whole of the political community and identity for years in advance.

The GFCC thus had no difficulty declaring that the otherwise constitutionally mandated state neutrality is unaffected by such an arrangement, i.e. by proclaiming which commemoration is the “common” one, of general interest. One wonders how this scheme would fare in the opposite case when the NPD – a lawful party – would be on government in Berlin, and the “democratic” parties would want to organize an assembly protesting against the official commemoration of the capitulation day in the spirit of the NPD. Obviously, that would be much more important to counterbalance, but this decision would actually sanction the priority of the NPD commemoration in such a case. Thus, in my view, it would be more consistent and wise to stay with the luck-directed temporal principle as it does not elevate to the level of common value an event organized by government, and not sacrifice the long-term consistent solution for saving face today. After all, Brandenburg Gate is not even the site of the Parliament or any government building. As a complementary rule a time limit on the submission of advance notice could be introduced, e.g. maximum three months before the planned date of the assembly. If the real reason for suppression of the NPD march in the present case was some sort of militant democracy consideration (a democratic state does not have to give media space for promoting an anti-democratic agenda), then that should have been clearly said and discussed by both the ordinary courts and the GFCC. Also, under general doctrine, the Court could just have said that the entire march could have been even
banned for violation of human dignity, thus the lesser restriction is clearly constitutional. Violation of human dignity normally does not get balanced away in a practical concordance.

4. Designated zones: speech pens, protest cages

A final phenomenon of limits on assemblies virtually “imprisons” protestors in one way or the other. Some techniques like preventive detention and kettling raise the question of right to liberty and security as well, an issue touched upon earlier. But detainment-like restrictions also can arise in the form of specific place restriction: circumscribed “free speech” zones, speech pens (actually cages) designated by authorities for demonstration have increasingly appeared in practice in the US. The issue has become salient at the 2004 Democratic National Convention where would be protestors were relegated more than a block away, in something with “overhead netting, chain-link fence, razor wire and armed guards” which the judge described as follows:

I at first thought, before taking a view (of the protest zone), that the characterization of the space being like a concentration camp was litigation hyperbole. Now I believe it’s an understatement. One cannot conceive of other elements put in place to create a space that is more of an affront to the idea of expression than the designated demonstration zone. Still, in the decision, he upheld the restriction, as did others with similar ones, on content-neutrality grounds, especially if coupled with fear of terrorism. As it must be clear by now,

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1229 Recall the German practice of preventive police detention to avert dangers found violating Art. 5 by the ECHR. Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, supra note 437, but also the Austin case from the UK, where police held inside cordons a few thousand persons, among them peaceful protestors and total bystanders caught up innocently. ECHR has upheld this latter one. Supra text accompanying notes 592-596.
1233 SUPLINA supra note 333.
content neutrality doctrines basically mandate to uphold such restrictions, and nobody (except for scholars) actually wonders when no protestor shows up and takes her place in the cage.1234

**INTERIM CONCLUSION ON RESTRICTIONS ON THE MODALITY**

Content-neutrality is a more or less explicit principle of free expression law in every examined jurisdiction. When applied to freedom of assembly, however, content neutrality often is insufficient to protect the protestor. The reason for this is another principle which first of all affects the exercise of freedom of assembly. An idea deeply engrained in both the US and the German approach is to split “expressive content” and modality of expression or conduct. It is missing from the language of the ECHR, and also not present in the UK or French legal discourse. However, while the fact that the ECHR does not apply a looser test for restrictions on modalities so far is laudible, in France and UK there are so many restrictions on protest anyway that it seems to these countries just do not need this doctrinal trick, they can instead rely on the heavy hammer of substantive restrictions, often not content-neutral at all, but targeting only one type of modality of expression, or even discriminate substantively between view-points.

Modality is the form of expression, in contrast to the substance or message of the expression. Modality includes at the abstract level the questions of when, how, and where an idea is expressed. In free speech law, there is a very legitimate reason to perceive modal limits less harmful to liberty than substantive limits: substantive limits prevent the speaker from saying what they actually want to say, while modal limits only operate as an alteration of the time, place, or manner of saying whatever the speaker intends to say. Logically, for courts then there is less an urge to apply the same rigorous standard of review to modal than to substantive limits. All the more so, as the choice of modalities of the speaker – time, manner,

1234 Zick supra note 119 at 3.
and place – might well conflict with the choice of modalities of other exercises of human rights, or other important interests. Everything happens within the modalities, after all. The legislator (and, by its authorization, local administrators) might seem more equipped to distribute modalities than courts, and more legitimate even.

This above argumentation would indeed be flawless but for one decisive misrepresentation which weighs even heavier when applied to protests and demonstrations. Meaning is not only substance, it is modality, too. Any linguist would find the argument from content versus form/modality wholly unscientific and misrepresentative of how semantics actually works. Most of them would probably claim that what is called by me (and by courts) ‘modal’ or ‘content-neutral’ might convey more meaning than what is called substance or content. In interpersonal psychology and communication studies, nonverbal communication is certainly understood to convey at least as much if not more – and more accurate, reliable – meaning than verbal communication.¹²³⁵

I have undertaken an examination if and how courts cope with this double mandate – to leave enough room for governmental and/or local knowledge in distributing time or place, evaluating aesthetic interests, or interests in tranquility, while at the same time maintaining the expressive value of the modalities of freedom of assembly. Often I found a disadvantaging of assembly – which is not an argumentative essay –, just as clearly content-based restrictions on modalities upheld either with eyes closed, or with dubious reasons.

CONCORDS AND DISCORDS BETWEEN EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION AND LEGAL CONSTRUCTION: A CONCLUSION

In the following I will revisit the propositions derived at the end of the first part, and will contrast each of them with the findings of the previous chapters on law, and then draw some final conclusions.

Proposition No. 1. Groups tend to polarize; polarization is increased by intra-group discussion, and is not reduced by simple contact with the out-group.

Human rights law does not explicitly apply the frame of intergroup theory to assemblies. It does, however, react to the fact of polarization by many tools. The many prior restraints on assemblies are said to facilitate a peaceful co-existence of different groups, and also to help secure the event in case of potential intergroup clashes. German law stands out by the problematic duty to cooperation, and the practice of preventive detention which makes the participation impossible. Bargaining between police and organizers in the forefront of the assembly, however, is inherent in every jurisdiction at least with regard to assemblies under a duty to notify. The UK maintains the freest notification regime, perhaps because for the most serious cases the technique of blanket bans is used. German law appears most risk-taker when granting a right to participation for those with different opinion at the same assembly. Every jurisdiction protects the right to counter-demonstration and obliges police to try everything possible before applying measures also affecting the peaceful demonstrators, except the UK for reasons of the blanket ban technique. French law might also be in overreach here, but it is not clearly verifiable. All in all, constitutional and fundamental rights law hopes to tame psychological incentives to intergroup hostility by relying on police and rational bargaining, ignoring that police are also outgroup.
Proposition No. 2. It is not the objectively disadvantaged who go to the street, but the more resourceful among the relatively deprived.

Proposition No. 3. It is not the most relatively deprived who are the most militant at a demonstration.

Proposition No. 4. Whether the demonstration comes about at all depends also on the power structure, thus organizers of demonstrations will seek powerful allies and supporters.

Constitutional and human rights law and jurisprudence clearly ignore these propositions derived from social movement studies, constantly emphasizing the role of the powerless, the little people, vulnerable minorities etc. in a democracy. But this is perhaps rather a merit than a taint. Were it otherwise, then law would just add one more to the numerous psychological and sociological barriers to collective action.

Proposition No. 5. Demonstrators develop their own set of norms, before, during, and possibly, after the assembly. These norms might deviate from general social norms, but are nonetheless comprehensible, rational rules of conduct.

The reaction of law to these phenomena in my view best described by social identity theory is first of all the principle of content-neutrality. Courts in principle do make serious effort to treat equally any kind of substantive viewpoint, but appear limited in understanding the full panoply of how meaning is generated.

Proposition No. 6. Deindividuation has not been proven with regard to public assemblies and other crowd phenomena, but there is a clear possibility for false consensus to come about, i.e. demonstrators might attribute their own belief as to the purpose and norm of the gathering to other participants without any basis.

Courts examined in this thesis do not explicitly follow strong traditions in legal history which demonize assemblies as mobs and emotionalized homogeneous masses, except when honoring legislative bans on uniforms and organizational symbols. They also acknowledge legislative efforts to strengthen the role of organizers, which might contribute to reducing the chances of false consensus.

Proposition No. 7. Public assemblies are exposed to very strong normalization and mainstreaming incentives, as that contributes to the acceptance of their cause significantly.
Courts tend to praise and privilege assemblies which are mainstream (peaceful, orderly, not too loud, not too littering), thereby themselves being part of the incentives for mainstreaming. On the other hand, courts are willing to grant protection to the most extreme worldviews if they are expressed in a way familiar to them, though some, such as especially the German and the French consider some meanings clearly beyond legal toleration and tabooize them. UK and especially the US courts are more consequentialists, the USSC – as well known – placing the threshold for intervention uniquely high in the Brandenburg standard.

**Proposition No. 8. Public assemblies are expressions of strength. The showing of strength is often false, but sometimes true as many more supporters usually stay home.**

The German court clearly appreciates this feature of assemblies in mapping the rationales for protection (recall the will-opinion duality), and also in the scope phase, explicitly stating that restrictions for the reasons purely of multiplicity, a notional element of assemblies are impermissible. Apart from this, however, courts allow legislators to ban uniforms (except the USSC), the utmost tool in expressing strength, or police to cordon protestors so they do not get too numerous, or changing a march into a stationary assembly, speech pens, protest cages, and many more.

**Proposition No. 9 Public assemblies assert popular sovereignty in many different senses, though not always, because sometimes they aim only at a small policy change.**

The German constitutional court famously agrees to Tilly in this regard when mapping rationales why assemblies are worthy of protection. Other courts do not use this argument, and in my view, rightly so, because it is both false and dangerous. It is one thing to allow people to claim they are the People, and another to actually embrace it as a fact meriting legal recognition. The claim of “We are the People” should be seen – and indeed it is by most courts – as fulfilling a control function on the representative government, naturally imperfect, and always in need of feedback and correction, or assertion of identity. On the other hand, there is a strong controversy relating to state symbols, and symbols of organizations.
previously occupying the state in Germany and France. Recall how the German court oscillates between militant democracy, reinterpreting Staatsgefühl as free democratic basic order, and even freedom of art, while upholding the constitutionality of the norms, but leaving not much space actually to ever apply them. Certainly, French law is not even bothered to ever discover such possible inconsistencies. Meanwhile, UK courts punish desecration of the US flag clearly unpunishable in the country which it represents, actually using a general provision against “harassment, alarm and distress” which would fail not only content-neutrality but also vagueness tests in the US. Thus in effect there is much fear from groups claiming to be the People taking over the State in countries with totalitarian experience. The reductionism inherent in applying doctrines under freedom of speech or even opinion to assemblies also might underlie such a fear (and experience). If assemblies were not seen as “a moment of untamed direct democracy”, but as part of an ongoing dynamic process of construction of the polity, of the ever contested foundational ‘We’ as Hamilton and social identity theory would suggest, then a regression into Schmittian acclamation can be avoided.

Proposition No. 10. Public assemblies are more akin to theatrical performance than to reasoned argument, similarly to much of social, cultural, political or religious life.

Proposition No. 11. Social movements developed their own set of tools which convey political meaning, as public assembly, including demonstration as a political form emerged historically due to experimentation and also change in external conditions, like increased capacity for crowd control, but also increasing responsiveness of the political system to popular demands with the coming of “democracy”.

Proposition No. 12. Public assemblies generate and convey meaning by making use of the semantic potential of symbols, places, and times.

These last three propositions are related in that their counterpoint in rights jurisprudence is clearly the distortion caused by content-neutrality and modality doctrines in the US and German case, while they are largely disregarded elsewhere.

The US Supreme Court certainly went furthest when voluntarily adopting an obligation not to look at the real issue when it comes to assemblies – by relying on content-neutrality as
understood by scholars and judges, i.e. letter and argument. Overall, the results of this study strongly challenge the commonplace that US law so much protects free expression, and provide a much more fragmented and nuanced picture.

The German Constitutional Court makes constant effort to keep shadows of the past controlled without simply suppressing them, and at the same time preserving at least some firmness to the notion of human dignity. The Hess memorial march decision – claiming Nazism is exploding general categories of human thinking, thus its legal treatment can also not be submitted to and scrutinized by rational categories – might be the closest to lawyerly honesty, naturally at the price of severe inconsistency with the carefully balanced architecture of basic rights jurisprudence. German law however is the most incoherent in another regard: the very elevated language about freedom of assembly in the scope phase and the very numerous and often openly viewpoint-discriminatory limits the GFCC allows on assemblies.

The general feature of German law, i.e. the fact that human dignity is used to limit other rights naturally also applies to freedom of assembly. Indeed, there is no one subcategory examined in this thesis, where German law does not allow for restriction, apart from speech pens, a – so far it appears –, uniquely American idea.

UK law regarding assemblies still oscillates between public order protection and granting a fundamental right. Thus, courts often expect the protestor to disprove the legitimacy of a restriction, which in number likely exceeds all the other countries examined here. Albeit in many regards the liberty framework – coupled with an apparently functioning representative government (see, e.g. the withdrawal of prohibition around Parliament, the plan to withdraw ASBOs, or the quite sensible policing visible in the last riots) – proved to be quite liberal, especially with regard to prior restraint, the lethal weapon of blanket bans is always at hand, just as the many-many seemingly unrelated provisions which get applied to protests and demonstrations as well.
French jurisprudence on assemblies proved way too intransparent to base very certain conclusions on it. Clearly it also strongly stays within the expression framework, though this has probably more textual reasons than conceptual ones. The understanding of a droit législatif and accompanying textualism still appears to animate much of the field, despite the – necessarily fragmented, punctual – efforts on the side of the Conseil Constitutionnel and Conseil d’État. The whole system is undergoing fundamental changes in the référé-liberté and the QPC procedures, the fruits of which might be visible in years to come, probably shifting human rights law in the German direction. However, on a more practical basis, looking at the amount of demonstrations, protests, and importantly, strikes constantly going on in France, coupled with a largely reasonable policing, it is very counterintuitive to say that freedom of assembly is so much more limited in France than elsewhere.

The ECHR rubberstamps governmental claims about legitimate aim, but then exerts an increasingly strong review in the proportionality phase, both in terms of procedural and substantive guarantees. Maybe not much more can be expected from an international organ in need to preserve its integrity and acceptance on the part of Member States.

Freedom of assembly doctrine involves various contradictions in itself as well, largely valid in each of the examined jurisdictions. The most general is clearly the high value accorded to it when the court tries to define the scope of the right, and the very wide-ranging limitations allowed in the second or third step of rights review – as if to hide a mystic secret: what is most important is at the same time the most dangerous and fearful. Another contradiction is between some of the values and the limits: for instance, that the German court claims the function of freedom of demonstration is being the main element of a political early warning system on the one hand, and the various, widely available prior restraints on assemblies on the other. A demonstration prohibited in advance or a demonstrator put in jail cannot in any way serve as a signal, as an early alarm that something is going wrong in the political process.
Also, there is a tension in some aspects between the doctrine of minority protection (scope, rationale for freedom of assembly) and the application of the content neutrality and symbolic speech principles to demonstrations, as most of the times such restrictions affect disparately groups diverging from the mainstream in one way or the other.

The empirical “assembly” was seen an object of “freedom of assembly” not very often at all by courts. Freedom of speech and opinion was the first category courts would put assemblies in, and this approach often harms the meaning generating function of assemblies. Here and there, freedom of art popped up as a potential – this time beneficial – surrogate of freedom of assembly. Leafletting protestors are also luckier, because they can get under the protection of freedom of press. It is hard to avoid the impression that activities approved by highly cultured judges receive a favorable treatment here. Freedom of association interestingly does not figure in judicial decisions on public assemblies, though much scholarship (legal teaching material especially) – many law professors – do not even make a difference between freedom of association and freedom of assembly.

It also has to be clearly seen that the construction by courts of a separate category of facially content-neutral or modality restrictions, let alone highly infirm concepts like public order, peace, and the like is not only a reductionist pseudorationalization of street theatre, but at the same time a judicial rationalization of highly or deeply emotionalized legislative (and majoritarian) politics. It results in avoidance of looking into the abyss – if and to the extent it is an abyss – of self-perception of the community, especially into the boundaries of who belongs in and who is out. Courts should not make themselves believe that by this they are not constructing identity. The apparently neutral categories of time, place, and manner, or concepts seemingly unrelated to expression like public peace, public order or dignity are the backdoor through which otherwise (i.e. in freedom of speech or opinion law) allegedly surpassed or defeated fears come back and find their place in legal reasoning, on its own
image an outstandingly rationalized process. It is not to mean that there is necessarily no abyss into which it is better not to look. After all, social psychology and sociology are not able to completely disprove Le Bon, Freud, Canetti or Moscovici. It is just if there be any hope for the “abyss” ever to disappear or shrink at least, honesty, transparency, and certain courage ought to be constantly aspired, otherwise there is no sense in not looking into it. Judges are always most vulnerable to the type of critique exacted throughout these pages, because they are the anointed protagonists at the centerstage of that hopeful performance, institutionally vested with the independence of the scholar and the artist, coupled with the authority of the state.


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