Encountering the Wahhabi Movement in Bosnia: The Benefits of Social Network Analysis in Intelligence Management and Police Harmonization

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Abstract

The potential terrorist threats of religious extremist groups present a real danger to internal security not just to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), but also to the wider European region. The recent terrorist acts and the evident presence of radical ideology propaganda on the Internet raised many novel security related concerns among the country’s public and authorities. This thesis addresses the security risks associated with the religious extremist Wahhabi movement in the country and provides a concrete set of recommendations. Its findings are drawn from qualitative research analysis, from the relevant literature, media reports, official documents and semi-structured interviews. It applies the policy learning and diffusion framework by taking the United States (US) as an example for counter-terrorist and intelligence efforts. Further, the domestic institutional security setup of BiH is examined. The analysis indicates the lack of necessary expertise within multifaceted law enforcement structure. In BiH, harmonizing the police force remains a priority for achieving an effective counter-terrorist policy design. The application of Social Network Analysis (SNA) is positioned as a method that could be used to complement this process and allow for better understanding of the Wahhabi network structure and information exchange. The US experience is used for explaining the process of intelligence collection from open sources, i.e. Internet and print media. However, it was revealed that various methods of government surveillance have negative implications to individual privacy. Intercepting communication bears multiple legal and ethical considerations. Due to this fact, the protection of an individual’s right to individual privacy is emphasized.

Keywords: Wahhabism, Terrorism, Intelligence, Social Network Analysis, Privacy, Security, Bosnia and Herzegovina
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The Intelligence Analysts Training Manual of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard, London) bears:

“Analysis is the key to the successful use of information: it transforms raw data into intelligence. It is the fourth of five stages in the intelligence process: collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and dissemination. Without the ability to perform effective and useful analysis, the intelligence process is reduced to a simple storage and retrieval system for effectively unrelated data” (as quoted in Sparrow, 1991).
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dayton Peace Accords</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Social Network Analysis</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>TWRA</td>
<td>Third World Relief Agency</td>
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<td>SIPA</td>
<td>State Investigation and Protection Agency</td>
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<td>OSA</td>
<td>Intelligence Security Agency</td>
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<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of BiH</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

On October 28th 2011, 23-year-old Mevlid Jasarevic opened fire at the US Embassy in Sarajevo, injuring one security guard. The eyewitnesses and media reported Jasarevic’s physical appearance signaled he was a member of the extreme Islamic Wahabbi movement (Hopkins and Hadzovic, 2011). One year earlier, a car bomb exploded in front of a police station in the central Bosnian town of Bugojno, killing one police officer and wounding six others. Media revelations indicated that the suspect was a member of the same radical Islamic movement (BBC, 2010). The local authorities condemned both attacks, marking them as terrorist acts. According to the law enforcement agencies and scholars at the Department for Security Studies of Sarajevo Faculty of Criminology, both attacks were premeditated with an aim to halt the Euro-Atlantic and, at the time, visa liberalization process (Zukovic, 2010).

In its numerous struggles to transition into a prosperous and democratic society, it seems as though Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is held hostage by Wahhabi legacy from the wartime era. Wahhabism aim is to influence classical understandings of Islam with heretical and ultraconservative interpretation of its doctrine. The Wahhabi movement’s presence in BiH dates back to the 1992-95 conflict, in which there was an influx of veteran mujahedeen and Islamic aid agencies from the Middle East, who came to defend the poorly armed Bosnian Muslims from their aggressors (Schlesinger, 2011). Many were awarded citizenship and stayed in BiH after the war ended. However, their role has changed. Now, they aim to destabilize the country by changing the very liberal Bosnian Islam tradition and influencing it with Wahhabism ideology. The aforementioned incidents draw attention to BiH’s growing Wahhabi issues and underscore the problem of Muslim extremism in the Balkans, which threatens the overall state of internal security, local governments, as well as international interests (Schlesinger, 2011).
Even though BiH has one of the most secularized Muslim populations in the world (Antunez, 2008) political instability, economic downturn, and fewer opportunities make the Bosnian youth population an easy target for Wahhabi recruitment and indoctrination. A number of studies suggest that the physical European facade of Bosnian and Serb Muslims makes them perfect for the execution of terrorist attacks across the Western world. Their less suspicious appearance is often referred to in official papers as the “white al-Qaeda,” casting a shadow to what European governments thought was a far away threat. Thus, there is an evident security risk of young and highly susceptible Bosniak¹ Wahhabi followers being the next executors of terrorist attacks against the state of BiH and elsewhere.

There is evidence that links the involvement of many of the mujahedeen that fought on the Bosniak side during the 1992-95 conflicts with the global jihadi movements, such as al-Qaeda, and with several terrorist attacks worldwide, i.e. 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid bombings (Azinovic, 2010). In numerous instances, citizens of Bosnian origin were involved in plotting and executing terrorist attacks abroad (Azinovic, 2010). These incidents, as well as the obvious Internet propaganda of Wahhabi groups, raised many security concerns among the local people and the international community regarding the growing Islamic fundamentalism in BiH (Karabegovic, 2010).

Despite the public clamor, the official domestic response in BiH remains weak and severely supported by deep divisions along ethnic lines. Various political weaknesses and coordination issues from the complex administrative bureaucracy inherited from the Dayton Peace Accords² (DPA) prevent an effective domestic response. The Wahhabi movement

¹ The Bosniaks or Bosniacs (Bosnian: Bosnjak, pl: Bosnjaci) are a South Slavic ethnic group, living mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a smaller minority present in Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. Bosniaks are typically characterized by their historic tie to the Bosnian historical region, traditional adherence to Islam since the 15th and 16th centuries, common culture and language. In the English-speaking world, Bosniaks are also referred to as Bosnian Muslims or simply Bosnians (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnians)
² Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995 ended the Bosnian war and established the current constitutional setup (Source: www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380)
presents a dangerous reality, capable of jeopardizing the overall state of security and negatively affecting the country’s aspiration to integrate in Euro-Atlantic structures.

The western and domestic intelligence forces, domestic media, and scholars have tackled associated security risks of religious extremism. Most of the literature discusses the historical evolution of Islam in the region, but Wahhabism in the Balkan context remains an underrepresented topic. Specifically, the BiH authorities do not address the aspects related to growing Internet radicalism.

1.1. Methodology

The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to contribute to the current research by providing an in-depth analysis of the origins of Wahhabism and its relation to the jihadi movement. Second, it will examine possible solutions in the forms of techniques and policy options for effectively dealing with such a novel security threat. This will be done by using a qualitative approach, through the collection and analysis of data from the available literature, official documents, media and, semi-structured personal interviews.

Hence, the thesis’s central research question states: How can the State of BiH effectively address growing security concerns stemming from the religious extremism in the country?

The issue of how to effectively tackle and prevent such security risks will be the focus of this thesis. And, in order to provide an answer to this question the thesis will critically assess the prospects of integrating Social Network Analysis (SNA) in future counter-terrorist dealings in BiH. It will apply the policy learning and diffusion framework by using the United States (US) experience as an example. On the basis of this assumption, the thesis’s first policy option is: Adopting technologically advanced techniques, such as SNA, can contribute to increased information gaining and sharing. This thesis will argue that the application of this method will allow the domestic intelligence agencies to gain more knowledge on Wahhabi networks in BiH. It is important to mention that the SNA method was, and still is,
successfully used by the US intelligence services, as it proved to be an effective way of identifying those suspected of having a central role in the 9/11 attacks. However, mapping covert networks to prevent criminal activity is difficult (Krebs, 2002), as this method raises many concerns with regards to government surveillance, intelligence collection, and individual privacy. In this context the focus will be placed on the collection of intelligence from open sources, i.e. radical Internet web sites and chat forums. It will explore the legal implications to individual privacy from government surveillance programs.

For increasing the effectiveness of domestic authorities, another resolute policy option included in this thesis will emphasize the harmonization of police force structures among all three levels of government, i.e. State-Entity-Cantonal. Hence, it will argue that: Harmonized police structure in BiH leads to a more effective organization of police forces capable of adequately responding to potential security threats. The process of police reform, which began in mid-2000s, was requested by the international community, with the High Representative leading the initiative, prior to commencement of the Stabilization and Association talks with the European Union (EU). However, the political commitment of BiH’s nationalist government and its politicians was not adequate for this process to be fully completed. The country’s police force remained territorially and ethnically fragmented, costly, and as a result, highly ineffective. The national security competencies are still delegated and partly regulated by the territorial units rather than the state’s Ministry of Security (Wisler, 2005). Achieving a more effective system of protection of citizens will be the main criteria for the further analysis of this option.

The following chapter will continue by providing more insight in the Jihadi terrorism phenomenon. It will present the problem background through the historical developments that led to the emergence of the Wahhabi movement. It will reflect on the role of political as well as economic instability factors leading to radicalism, but also the ethnic tensions that fostered
this kind of phenomenon among people in BiH. It aims to provide an answer to the question of whether the religious extremism is an immanent internal threat to security or just an urban myth. Chapter 3 will lead to the further analysis of the wider domestic security institutional setup and policy environment. It will focus on the issue of police jurisdiction, role of judiciary, information gathering as well as those lacking elements within the country’s current administrative and legal structure that makes it ineffective in dealing with security threats. Subsequent two chapters will disuses the policy options for the BiH intelligence and security forces. One will argue the prospects and limitations of SNA in tackling the issue, while the final one will reflect back to the incomplete harmonization of police force structures in BiH. The thesis will conclude with a set of recommendations for the State and Entity level governments’ consideration.
Chapter 2: The Islamic Radical Movement in BiH: A Forgotten Legacy

In order to understand religious extremism in BiH, this chapter will begin by defining key concepts to be dealt with throughout the thesis. It will examine characteristics of the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and its connection to Jihadi terrorism in Europe, as portrayed in the existing literature. Subsequently, the aim of this chapter is to portray the historical developments that led to the emergence of Wahhabism in BiH. It will explore current attitudes towards this radical group and address the issue of its terrorist potentials while drawing from several examples. Most importantly, the chapter will underline internal security threats of existing radical movements on the European continent.

2.1. Understanding Religious Extremism: Jihadi Terrorism

The relationship between religious extremism and terrorism appears to be evident, as many extremists embrace theologies that approve the use of violence and sacrifice in the name of God (Iannaccone and Berman, 2005). Terrorists perceive their victims as enemies and seek for an afterlife reward from their martyrdom (Iannaccone and Berman, 2005). Despite the enormous body of literature that discusses these phenomena, the overall nature and many different aspects of terrorism remain poorly understood (Van de Voorde, 2011). This is primarily because there is no single reliable measurement for gauging the severity of terrorist threats (Pillar, 2011). Terrorist attacks, being one of them, are time dependent and have certain limitations. Every time a large-scale attack occurs it leads to an outburst of security related studies leaving a knowledge gap in between the events. Van de Voorde (2011) analyzed the dynamics in terrorism studies in the past 40 years and argued that RAND

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3 The title was inspired by Sarah Schlesinger’s article Wahhabism: A Forgotten Legacy of the Bosnian War, available at: www.nationalreview.com
Corporation\textsuperscript{4} provided most reliable insights and interpretation of distinctive manifestations of different types and forms of terrorism.

Further, countries and organizations define terrorism differently. This thesis uses the EU definition of terrorism. According to \textit{Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of the Council of the EU}:

\begin{quote}
Terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list comprised largely of serious offences against persons and property which given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (2002).
\end{quote}

Of all the different types of terrorism in Europe, jihadi (\textit{translated: struggle}) terrorism is relatively new (Bakker, 2008). It represents a type of international terrorism that draws on the extreme interpretation of Islam for its rationale and ideology and remains the main focus of Western counterterrorist efforts to this day (Pillar, 2011). Within the context of terrorist movements and its implications to security, one must differentiate internal from external security threats. Until the 9/11 attacks, the threat posed by jihadi terrorism was underestimated, as European intelligence agencies often considered it as a far away threat. The bombings in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and the killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh (2004) changed public perception and state policies regarding international jihadi terrorism. However, these incidents, as well as other successfully prevented terrorist plots across Europe, pointed out an astonishing discovery. The threat of jihadi terrorism was coming from the radicalized members of Muslim communities within Europe itself (Bakker, 2008).

\textsuperscript{4} Cf. http://www.rand.org/topics/terrorism-and-homeland-security.html
In 2005, Rudolph Peters (2011) wrote a report in which he analyzed 60 texts written by van Gogh’s assassin, Mohamed Bouyeri. It was used as an expert document for Bouyeri’s trial but also for constructing a detailed analysis of elements that created this form of extremist Islamism. Peters does not underestimate the relationship of religion with terrorist acts, rather explains its role in creating the boundaries between “us” and “them” in the process of defining the enemy. Religious elements have always played an important role in modern terror due to their overlap with ethnic identities (Rapoport, 2006). In addition to these, equally significant are political events that further contributed to the rise of the fourth wave of terrorism, placing Islam at the core. The three main elements associated with jihadi radicalism and extremism, according to Peters (2008/11), Antunez (2008) and Buijs et al. (2006, as cited in Peters, 2011) include:

- **Global**: The rejection of world order, since “forces of evil” dominate it, primarily the US and its associates.
- **Irredentist**: The feeling that “one’s own” group is under acute threat. This can be interpreted as the fight to redeem what is considered to be a Muslim territory from the non-Muslim occupants.
- **Internal**: The realization of utopia by use of violence in order to defeat the forces of evil. Declaring a jihad against nominally Muslim countries, which they hold to be “sinful” thus legitimate targets.

### 2.2. Wahhabism in Europe: Immanent Threat or an Urban Myth?

There are many ideological links that inspired jihad movements, but the exact influence of Muslim fundamentalism, also known as Wahhabism, was unknown during the growth of the global jihad body literature in the 1980s (Livesey, 2005). According to research from the 1980s, most religious fundamentalists were apolitical at the time but gradually started to change their views during the 1990s, the period in which several wars were fought against Muslim majority populated countries in the world (BiH, Chechnya, Iraq).

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5 Cf. the document available in Dutch at: www.sociosite.org/jihad/peters_rapport.pdf
6 David C. Rapoport, *Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*, 2006
Soon after, Muslim fundamentalists in Europe started to alienate themselves and increasingly embrace jihad against the Western powers. And as Stern (2003 as cited in Peters, 2011) demonstrated, the feelings of alienation and humiliation constitute the primary motivation for contemplating the use of terror. The fundamentalists essentially seek the restoration of the Islamic State through the establishment of radical movements and promotion of ancient Wahhabism and/or Salafism ideology. “These terms have distinct historical roots, but they have been used interchangeably in recent years, especially in the West. Among adherents in general, preference is given to the term Salafiyya over Wahhabism. Wahhabism is considered by some Muslims as the Saudi form of Salafiyya” (Blanchard, 2007).

The Wahhabism movement was started approximately 200 years ago by Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahhab in Saudi Arabia. Bin Abd al-Wahhab forced people to adhere to the very strict and literal interpretation of monotheism (Moussalli, 2009). The ultimate aim of Wahhabis is to free Islamic societies of established cultural practices and liberal interpretation of Islam writings (globalsecurity.org, 2012). However, this preaching was unwelcomed by the very liberal Ottoman Caliphate, which is present in modern day BiH. The Wahhabi followers soon accused it of unbelief, polytheism and apostasy (Moussalli, 2009). Bin Abd al-Wahhab further focused on campaigning the principle of unity among Muslim people through violence and advocating strict adherence to the Islamic law of Sharia. Such movements use terrorism as a method to achieve their various political goals and are still heavily supported by Saudi Arabia (Azinovic, 2010).

According to Bakker (2008), the emergence of such groups in Europe has negated so far the assumption that individuals are being recruited while away from home. Using Sageman’s (2004) methodology Bakker analyzed seventeen different variables within the methodological framework that looks into jihadists’ social background, psychological background, and circumstances of joining the jihad. Focusing on the implications of internal
European security, he compiled a sample of 242 individuals who were involved in 31 cases of jihadi terrorism on the European continent since 2003.\textsuperscript{8} The results indicated that in 80\% of cases, persons were “home-grown” and recruited in their country of residence, and in 17 cases terrorists’ families originated from Europe, either as a convert, child of mixed marriage, or from BiH. His findings also showed that more than half of the individuals belonged to the lower social classes with an average age of 27 years when they joined the movement. Is the \textit{raison d’être} of extremist behavior youth marginalization, unemployment, and exclusion?

Esposito and Mogahed (2007) argue that the “combination of religious fanaticism, poverty and unemployment drive extremism and terrorism.” However, Harrera and Bayat (2010) introduce the Gallup World Poll\textsuperscript{9} research, which was conducted in 35 countries, representing 90\% of the world’s Muslims, that showed in spite of major social issues “neither unemployment nor job status differentiate radicals from moderates, as both approximate to 20\%.” They claim that “analytical links between deprivation and political response, between youth and radicalism, and between youth and religiosity, are extremely complex and a simple conclusion cannot be drawn” (Harrera and Bayat, 2010). Further, high levels of heterogeneity, social affiliation and especially self-recruitment patterns indicate that there is no profile of standard jihadi terrorist, which makes it difficult for governments to create useful policies (Bakker, 2008).

\section*{2.3. The Emergence of Wahhabi Movement in BiH}

In exploring the causes of religious extremism in BiH, one must turn to the beginning of the Balkan crisis. The United Nations imposed arms embargo against the BiH government in 1991 at the time was the West’s greatest contribution to the destruction of BiH (Malcom, 1994). The political and war circumstances led former BiH President Alija Izetbegovic to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8} Sageman based his research on data gathered up to 2003, in light of 9/11 investigations, and on global Salafi network comprising of Maghreb Arabs, Core Arabs, Southeast Asians and Central staff of al-Qaeda with Osama bin Laden on top.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Cf. www.gallup.com/press/104209/who-speaks-islam-what-billion-muslims-really-think.aspx
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
support the arrival of mercenaries from Islamic countries to fight the war along side the poorly armed Bosniak forces. These were former mujahedeen veterans from the Afghan war that were originally from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia and Yemen (Kohlmann in Azinovic, 2010). Their arrival to BiH was facilitated by the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), which was founded in Vienna in 1987 by Elfatih Hassanein, a Sudanese diplomat and close friend of Izetbegovic (Elsasser in Azinovic, 2010). The estimated 350 million US dollars was donated to TWRA by the various Islamic governments for the attainment of armaments for the BiH army.\(^\text{10}\) In 1993, these mercenaries formed a special division called El-Mudjahid, which was integrated into the BiH Army’s 7th Muslim Brigade.

To this day, the arrival of this squad and its role remains at the center of the religious extremism debate. According to the available intelligence reports, foreign secret services supported their influx, while the Hague Tribunal documents reveal their involvement in war crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs and Croats.\(^\text{11}\) In 2001, the State Investigation and Protection Agency of BiH (SIPA) raided several Wahhabi communities. They confiscating tons of propagandist material and apprehended six Algerian men (60 Minutes, FTV, Jan. 2009). They were accused of plotting terrorists attacks against the Western Embassies in Sarajevo, threatening the constitutional order and national security (Voice of America, 2002). Subsequently, they were handed over to the US forces and extradited to Guantanamo prison (Terzic, 2012). Further, the BiH Commission for Revision of Citizenships and Naturalized Citizens revised the citizenship of 1500 people of non-Bosnian origin and 600 of them had no valid link with the country, as they were neither registered residents nor had legitimate citizenship files in the registry (Terzic, 2012).


The DPA in 1995 brought a cease-fire but whatever was left from the El-Mudjahid squad settled in areas of Srednja-Bosna and Zenica-Doboj Canton (Terzic, 2012). The rise of Wahhabism that followed was largely influenced by the different humanitarian organizations from the Islamic countries that channeled aid for the reconstruction of houses and mosques for the purpose of spreading Wahhabi teaching and creating communities that will adhere to the Wahhabism practices and appearance\(^\text{12}\) (Ahmetasevic, 2007). The exact number of Wahhabi followers in BiH is unknown, but the Director of Intelligence Security Agency of BiH (OSA), Almir Dzuvo, estimates there are approximately 3000 (Terzic, 2012). Wahhabi activities intensified at the end of 1990s, as they were directly involved in interfering with the refugee returnee process of Bosnian Croats (read: Catholics) to the towns of Bugojno, Travnik, and Donji Vakuf (60 Minutes, FTV, Feb. 2009). The incidents encompassed brutal killings of politicians, police officers, and civilians with planted explosives in their homes, cars and sacral objects.\(^\text{13}\) In more urban areas, Wahhabi followers have assaulted many young couples whose public display of affection insults their moral code (Kanzleiter, 2007).

All the domestic and international analysis indicates the presence of Wahhabi communities in the country and especially in Gornja Maoca and Bocinja region (Terzic, 2012). These communities do not recognize or adhere to the domestic legislature, and implement special education program for schooling of Wahhabi’s children (Terzic, 2012). Throughout the 2000s, the Wahhabi activities grew in strength as they started to use various media\(^\text{14}\) channels, especially Internet, to promote their stance towards the Western engagement in the wars in the Middle East. Their aims expanded to the recruitment of Bosniak volunteers to either fight in these war zones or participate in other attacks against the

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\(^{12}\) “Men with shaved heads and long beards wearing shin-length pants and women covered from head to foot in long black robes” (Kanzleiter, 2007).

\(^{13}\) 60 Minutes reported that from 1996 to 1999 returnees Fabijan Babic, Pero and Luka Jezercic and Ivica Domic as well as three police officers Perica Bilic, Ante Valjan, Vlado Stojak lost their lives. Further, the explosive device planted in the shopping center FIS Travnik killed one security guard Zvonko Barbic.

\(^{14}\) Cf. Magazine SAFF, also available at: www.saff.ba; www.bosnjaci.net; www.putvijernika.com
West in Europe. In 2004, the Spanish court in the Madrid train bombings trial mentioned involvement of BiH and members of El-Mudjahid over 300 times.\footnote{Cf. Esad Hecimic, El-Mudzahid je bio Al-Kai’dina jedinica u BiH, BH Dani 2005; Mudzahedin po glavi Bosnjaka, BH Dani 2005}

Direct involvement of BiH citizens in terrorist attacks contributed to the creation of the term “white al-Qaeda,” which refers to their façade and their ability to blend in the Western environment better than non-Europeans (Zimonjic, 2011). The aforementioned events and the fact that many El-Mudjahid members were also linked to al-Qaeda and/or Osama bin Laden placed BiH on the map of being a potential source of terrorist recruitment and training (Azinovic, 2010). The US Senate’s final report on 9/11 investigation proves this claim.\footnote{Cf. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States, 2004: available at: www.9-11commission.gov; the related media report is available at: www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-04-14-bosnian-madrid_x.htm} The political implication of these events is also great as it negatively affects the country’s image, state of security, and prospects for the Euro-Atlantic integration processes. However, according to the public opinion poll conducted by Prism Research from 2007, 70% of two million Bosniaks living in the country reject Wahhabism while 13% support it (Ahmetasevic, 2007).
Chapter 3: The Institutional Setup: Domestic Security and Intelligence Policy Environment

Religious extremism is not only a social problem, but also becoming a political problem for BiH. Authorities’ response to the security threats stemming from religious extremism was not always adequate and mostly delivered under severe pressure from the international community. Understanding why this is so is the main aim of the following sections, which will critically examine the country’s institutional setup as well as the policies intended for effective detection and prevention of potential terrorist activities. This chapter will identify key institutions and legal frameworks that regulate matters from the collection of intelligence through surveillance and inter-agency cooperation. Finally, this chapter will identify those lacking elements and/or areas, which are in need of further improvement.

3.1. Landscape of Security Authorities in BiH

The war in BiH created deep territorial and ethnic divisions in the country. These were further institutionalized in the 1995 DPA and reflected in the overall domestic administrative body. The current governmental setup comprises of the triple-power-sharing system (Soberg, 2008). The State government represents the highest level of authority and it is comprised of the BiH Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency. The country is administratively divided into two Entities: decentralized Federation of BiH (FBiH) and centralized Republika Srpska (RS). FBiH is further allotted into 10 Cantonal governments. There are total of 142 units of self-governance in both entities. District Brcko, in northeastern part of BiH, is self-administrative unit under international community's supervision (see picture 1, appendices 1 and 2). However, DPA’s constitutional and institutional setup was not envisaged to sustain the fully functioning democratic state, as

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17 Brcko had a very important geopolitical position in BiH during peace negotiation process. Today it borders with both Entities of BiH and Sava river with Croatia.
it was a product of many political compromises during wartime (Soberg, 2008). In order to portray the complexity of the country’s security sector apparatus, the following paragraphs will examine the authorities in charge of adopting and enforcing the legislation from a top-down approach.

In this sense, the Ministry of Security and the Court of BiH are given executive and judicial powers to deal with all matters related to national security and terrorism.\(^{18}\) These institutions were formed between 2002-04 in an effort to influence the constitutional setup of the country from within and strengthen the BiH Council of Ministers’ competencies. The transfer of jurisdiction to State-level institutions would, in turn, make the entities obsolete, which would decrease the size and the cost of public administration. Further, the more efficient public administration is EU conditionality for future accession talks.

\(^{18}\) Cf. www.vijecomistara.gov.ba/o_vijecu_ministara/?id=1752
In addition to its complicated structure and extensive legal framework, the institutional setup is costly. Remuneration costs in the public administration of all three levels of BiH government use 30% of the State budget expenditures (biznis.ba, 2012). Some estimates indicate that when operational and other costs are combined, this percentage rises above 60% a year.¹⁹ These costs are not being reduced because the public administration is constantly expanding. Instead of internal restructuring, special agencies are being created to

¹⁹ The Presidency of BiH recently adopted the budget for 2012 which amounts to 485,727,287 EUR (starmo.ba, 2012).
deal with corruption, border control, immigration and, police coordination. The appointment of the heads of these institutions as well as civil servants is conducted on the basis of ethnicity, often referred to as proportional representation, instead of one’s competencies and/or qualifications. So far, the Ministry of Security and the Council of Ministers of BiH have established the number of bodies that are tasked to deal with specific security aspects.

This thesis is concerned with the following:

**State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) is:**
“an operatively independent administrative organization whose competencies are within jurisdiction of the Court of BiH and include prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal offences (money laundering, organized crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, and other), physical and technical protection of VIPs and buildings, protection of endangered and threatened witnesses as well as other duties falling within its competencies and as prescribed by the Law” (sipa.gov.ba, 2012).

**Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA) is:**
“responsible for collecting, analyzing and distributing intelligence information with an aim to protect the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH, while respecting the Constitution, European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Main Freedoms and International Contractual Agreements which the country signed or joined to” (osa-oba.gov.ba, 2012).

### 3.1.1. The Issue of Territorial Fragmentation of the Police Forces

The war and subsequent peace agreement initially left BiH with *de facto* three police forces; Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb, each one having its own area of jurisdiction (ICG Report, 2005). The Bosniak and Bosnian Croat police forces nominally merged into the FBiH structures, while the RS police force refused to reform or integrate with those of other ethnic groups (ICG Report, 2005, see picture 2, consult appendix 1). Further, the Constitution and individual laws from all levels prevent the police from crossing into the territory of the other entity, causing efforts to launch an investigation or operations either from FBiH or RS in each other’s jurisdiction legally impossible (ICG Report, 2005). This has serious implications on the aptitude for information sharing, coordination of activities, and facilitating the operations conducted by SIPA and/or OSA.
Currently, there are two Ministries of Interior at the entity level. In 2005, the former High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, and Presiding of the Police Reform Committee, Wilfred Martens, failed to reach an agreement with the government at the time to place the police structure under the Ministry of Security (Prlenda, 2004). The evident presence of the Wahhabi movement in both entities further fuels the political debate over which authority has jurisdiction to deal with radical groups. The structural dispersion of police forces affects its’ operational mechanisms for effective cooperation among different units and undermines the coherence, interoperability, and financial viability (Prlenda, 2004). To successfully combat all types of security threats that emerged as a result of the country’s transitioning process; such as, terrorism, corruption and organized crime, the integral police structure is absolutely necessary (Ahmetovic, 2012).

However, all domestic, as well foreign, attempts to influence the internal police structure failed. The RS Ministry of Interior chose to retain its high degree of centralization, organized in five regional civil protection offices and local police units stationed across the cities in this entity. The Federation has ten additional Cantonal Ministries of Interior that bear the responsibility of performing all police related activities and promoting inter-cantonal-entity cooperation (glasometar.ba, 2012). In total, there are thirteen Ministries of Interior, seventeen various police agencies, and over twenty thousand members of staff (enter.ba, 2012) dealing with matters of terrorism, money laundering, arms trafficking, cyber security etc. Further, the non-harmonized legal framework and insufficient information exchange among the different authority levels present a challenge in the ineffective prevention of the spreading of the radical ideology that could lead to terrorists’ plotting and recruiting.
3.1.2. The Information Gathering Policies and Role of Judiciary

There are a number of important laws and legal provisions that allow the BiH intelligence agencies to collect information, fostering the prevention and reduction of risks to security. The country does not possess ‘information gathering’ laws per se, as these competencies are included in the founding laws of security and intelligence agencies, OSA and SIPA. The Law on OSA (2004) specifically entrusts OSA to fully use its available resources for the detection of terrorist related risks. They are further required to share acquired information on the existence of radical groups, terrorism financing, and recruitment with SIPA, security agencies abroad, and the general public. OSA reports directly to the Presidency of BiH, Council of Ministers, and the Parliamentary Committee for Agency’s
Oversight. However, its director is able to authorize surveillance activities for the purposes of collection, classification, and distribution of intelligence without the prior authorization of the aforementioned supervisors (Law on OSA, 2004).

OSA monitors all publicly available sources of information, requests its delivery from domestic institutions, systematically conducts covert physical surveillance of potential terrorist suspects and/or activities (Seremet, 2012). For these activities the prior Court of BiH approval is not needed (Seremet, 2012). Further measures of surveillance, including those at non-public places, searches of fixed and movable assets as well as monitoring of electronic media, require the approval of a BiH judge (Seremet, 2012). The search warrant must justify the type of communication to be surveilled, technology to be used in the process, and specify the person being under investigation. In this context, it is remarkable that the country does not have any Internet related policies that regulate aspects of cyber space outside child pornography and Internet access, such as, religious radical web sites, and online hate speech (Seremet, 2012). Interestingly, during its investigations, the Agency is required to use “non-intrusive” technologies and conduct it activities in accordance with the country’s Constitution and the Human Rights Conventions.

On the other side of the security spectrum there is SIPA. On the basis of OSA’s intelligence and the Court of BiH’s competencies, SIPA conducts police activities and apprehends those suspected for terrorism and organized crime (Law on SIPA, 2004). This institution is directly involved in providing evidence for trial purposes to the State Prosecutor and Court of BiH. SIPA places a high emphasis on combating terrorism and related financial crimes that might occur from terrorist financing, for which it has set up a special division within its Criminal Investigation Department (sipa.gov.ba, 2012). SIPA’s division for financial crimes is in charge of implementing the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Activities Financing (2009). This legislation requires all financial institutions in
the country to comply with its provisions, establish compliance departments, and allow SIPA to investigate every client transactions exceeding 15,000 EUR.

According to the law, all thirteen Ministries of Interior in the country are required to cooperate with SIPA and OSA on the prevention of criminal offences, which includes reporting on manifestations of religious extremism. The Law on Police Coordination and Supporting Agencies (2008) defines this cooperation and also refers to institutions involved in enhancing the overall capacities of police personnel in tackling security issues. SIPA also frequently uses the Freedom of Information Act (2000) in its operations in order to avoid potential objections or uncooperative behavior of any of the three ethnic government representations to provide information needed for investigatory processes. Ironically, the Law on SIPA does not mention the Convention on Human Rights in its articles but emphasizes the Data Protection Act (2006), which guarantees high standards of acquired data handling and storing. It is an integral part of conduct of all the security intelligence agencies and police forces in the country as they all share one central database.

3.3. The Lacking Elements: Intelligence on Radical Networks and Police Coordination

Despite the existence of laws and organizations committed to combating threats from religious extremism, these movements’ activities seem to flourish. As previously mentioned, just one year after the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism in BiH (2010) was adopted, a Wahhabi attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo. This event confirms the inexistence of coordination and information exchange among the different police forces that country’s media were extensively reporting on (Terzic, 2012). The official reports confirm that the central database was lacking crucial up to date information that could have prevented this attack from occurring and further contributing to the deterioration of the country’s image as well as the Euro-Atlantic progress.
On several occasions OSA raised the issues of lack of expertise and asked for additional legal provisions that would allow it to inspect potential suspects on the basis of their appearance (Terzic, 2012). Indeed, Article 83 of the Law on OSA (2004) states “It is forbidden to collect information on persons on the grounds of their national or racial background, religious beliefs, sexual behavior or political orientation, membership in a certain movement or organization not prescribed by the Law.” Further, the integral part of the DPA is the Convention on Human Rights and Main Freedoms, does not allow much creativity to policy makers when drafting laws.

SIPA and OSA are relatively new agencies and one must understand that they are not fully equipped with the necessary technology and personnel capabilities to confront all the potential terrorist threats in the country (Delic, 2012). Foreign governments so far had a key role in providing the trainings and equipment for SIPA, OSA, and Border Police staff (Delic, 2012). The transfer of knowledge was mostly delivered in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and/or under the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. More than 26,000 law enforcement officials benefited from the initiatives of democratic policing techniques (justice.gov, 2012), border security, and protection of information and communication technologies from cyber attacks (msb.gov.ba, 2012).

However, less attention was devoted to techniques for the application of network analysis methods that would allow the security forces to gain more accurate knowledge on covert activities of dark networks, their actors, and mutual links (Delic, 2012). In addition to the lack of expertise on social network analysis, the absence of police coordination is an issue. The information is either not shared or purely lost among different levels of authorities. This leads to the crucial policy issues that must be resolved before the international community

terminates its further engagement in domestic political doings (ICG Report, 2005). In order to achieve functionality and the elimination of potential security risks, efficient police reform is of utmost importance for BiH’s security (ICG Report, 2005). Better police coordination as well as the prospects of applying SNA in intelligence efforts to learn more about religious extremist networks will be the subject of the subsequent sections.
Chapter 4: The Prospects of Social Network Analysis in Intelligence Management

The reason religious extremist groups are getting stronger is partly due to the digital age. The ability to distribute radical content freely via Internet websites, discussion forums, and social networks has replaced the traditional methods of ideology diffusion and recruitment. The BiH authorities, being aware of several active radical websites and Wahhabi communities in the country,\(^ {21}\) are unable to predict terrorist threats. This is due to the lack of necessary expertise, institutional fragmentation and the fact that such websites’ servers are located outside of domestic jurisdiction.\(^ {22}\) The purpose of the following chapter is to portray the benefits of the application of SNA in the field of counter-terrorism as learned from the US experience. It will provide an overview of intelligence collection methods for the purpose of detection and prevention of terrorist activities. Also, the chapter will discuss limitations to open source intelligence and SNA. Finally, it will focus on the negative implications of government intrusion to individual privacy of citizens.

4.1. The Application of Network Analysis in Counter-Terrorism: The US Experience

The emergence of global jihadi networks such as al-Qaeda as well as attacks in New York City, London, and Madrid signaled a need for a new approach to counter-terrorism strategy design. The increasing usage of Internet allowed terrorists to exchange information, procure financing, network, and recruit much easily than before (Conway, 2006). The changing nature of security issues caused governments to adopt new means of intelligence

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\(^ {21}\) The Strategy of BiH for Prevention and Fight Against Terrorism from 2010 acknowledges the active use of Internet technologies by religiously extremist groups in the country, however there are no exact indicators for the gravity of this problem.

\(^ {22}\) Mostly websites with radical content are hosted at servers located in the US where they enjoy strong protection of the Freedom of Expression provisions of the First Amendment of the US Bill of Rights.
collection and analysis to combat terrorist threats. Due to the aforementioned, many researchers started to debate the relevance of applying SNA in counter-terrorist efforts.

The importance of SNA has been recognized much before 9/11 and primarily by the US government (Adler, 2007). The most relevant contribution made to the literature on the potentials of SNA in understanding dark transnational networks was made by Valdis Krebs in 2001. He was able to map the network surrounding the 9/11 attacks solely from using the information from already available public sources. This breakthrough inspired the US military and intelligence agencies to strongly incorporate the use of network-based analysis in its counter-terrorist operations.

However, networks, especially those of a dangerous nature, are usually non-hierarchical, disorganized, and designed to impede detection (Adler, 2007). This covertness makes it difficult for counter-terrorism intelligence analysts to identify patterns and draw inferences about the structure, objectives, and relationships among different network actors (Adler, 2007). Krebs (2001) notes, “analyzing networks after an event is fairly easy for prosecution purposes but mapping covert networks to prevent criminal activity is much more difficult.” For this reason the collection of intelligence is of crucial importance for understanding the behavior and evolution of terrorist networks.

The process of information gathering in the US is done primarily through communication interception. The collection is conducted by the Open Source Intelligence Center23 of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Domestic Communications Assistance Center and the National Security Agency (NSA). Their job is to scan the Internet and traditional media for public information (Baehr, 2012). A large portion of their analysis comes from social networking websites (Baehr, 2012). FBI is tasked to develop new electronic surveillance technologies for intercepting Internet, wireless and

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VoIP communications (McCullagh, 2012). NSA is currently constructing the largest data collection center in the US (Bamford, 2012).

This indicates that SNA as tool is futile unless it is complemented with proper data. It is just one method that can be applied in understanding terrorist networks structure. It cannot be solely used to uncover terrorist threats, but can provide a framework for aggregating, filtering, visualizing, and assessing intelligence data to support the prevention process (Adler, 2007). As mentioned, the possession of intelligence is of utmost importance, however the availability of massive amount of data can lead to misleading information. Watts’ “small world” hypothesis and Milgram’s “six degrees of separation” prove that everyone in the world is somehow connected, potentially even with a terrorist whom was never met.  

So, what do intelligence analysts do to make sense out large quantities of data?

They first start by identifying a suspect and “spider-web” outwards by looking into everyone that the suspect contacts (Keefe, 2006). They create a list of names and use computer programs to detect links among different contacts (Keefe, 2006). This is followed by the Barabasi’s method\(^\text{25}\) of mapping major clusters in networks that have large number of connections with everyone else (Keefe, 2006). Ultimately, this leads to identification of strong and weak ties among the network participants and the flows of information (Ressler, 2006 and Keefe, 2006). After the actors in central and peripheral positions in the network are discovered, a more targeted surveillance may commence.

All programs for mining large volumes of data for hidden connections and interception of worldwide communication underline the need for intelligence that can lead to an accurate understanding of the terrorist networks dynamics.  


\(^{26}\) Some of the examples include: Information Awareness Office’s *Total Information Awareness Program*, US Army’s *Able Danger*, NSA’s *Special Access Program*
organizations are well suited for study through SNA lenses because they consist of networks that form around a specific ideology (Ressler, 2006) such as Wahhabism in the case of BiH.

4.1.1. Intelligence Collection from Open Sources

The surveillance of extremist content on public platforms such as web sites, chat and discussion forums are crucial in today’s global efforts in encountering terrorist threats. Since 9/11, there has been a lot of research and development in this field. Particular contributions were made by the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center and the Carnegie Mellon University’s Networks and Terrorism Division. Both Centers focus on analyzing online activities and use SNA to construct social network maps and organization structures of potentially dangerous networks (Ressler, 2006). Their efforts are aimed at shaping a covert network thorough predictive modeling techniques when little information is known (Ressler, 2006).

Screening the Internet and other public sources of information to collect intelligence on extremist and hate groups becomes a regular activity of the US’ anti-terrorism efforts. The “hate speech” posts on the Internet became relevant to intelligence analysts for the detection of covert activities. Due to the freedom and convenience of publishing content online communication platforms provide an ideal environment for radical groups to promote their ideologies (Yang and Tobun, 2007) and quickly mobilize.

There are several practical approaches for information extraction from open sources all of which must come prior to SNA application. Yang and Tobun (2007) suggest the framework for supporting query-dependent exploration and analysis in relevant weblog sub-communities. They propose developing a crawler that would harvest social relationships form

27 Cf. Robert L. Popp and John Yen, Emergent Information Technologies and Enabling Policies for Counter-Terrorism, 2006
28 Cf. http://ai.arizona.edu/research/terror/
29 A weblog is a web site where entries are made in diary style, maintained by its sole author – a blogger, and displayed in a reverse chronological order (Yang and Tobun, 2007).
weblog communities on specific topics (see picture 3). They focus on four main components: weblog discovery and collection, weblog analysis, user interface and interactive information visualization as well as application.

*Picture 3. Weblog Detection, Analysis and Application Framework*

![Diagram](source: Yang and Tobun, 2007)

Another model that goes beyond just analyzing weblogs was developed by set of practitioners, Weinstein, Campbell, Delaney and O’Leary (2009). Their work on Counter-Terror Social Network Analysis and Intent Recognition framework highlights the importance of developing automated tools for detecting and tracking the dynamically changing terrorist networks as well as recognizing capability and intent of the networks (see picture 4). They focus on modeling terrorist groups and their intents based on multimedia data.
4.1.2. The Key Drawbacks of Open Source Intelligence and SNA

There are three main limitations of open source intelligence collection in counter-terrorism and SNA: interpreting large quantities of data and intruding on individual privacy from intercepting communication. It is also important to mention that if information on terrorist activities is not available in open sources, it does not mean that such does not exist.

SNA as a tool does not provide any information as to why people wish to join radical terrorist movements in the first place (Ressler, 2006). It also does not provide an insight into how terrorist networks recruit participants (Ressler, 2006). As terrorist organizations are not always organized in network structure, SNA represents only one tool that assists in
understanding terrorist network composition (Ressler, 2006). Terrorist experts are still needed to provide context for addressing the underlying root causes of terrorism (Ressler, 2006). However, SNA can provide valuable indications that can be used for network destabilization and prevention of terrorist threats.

Extracting of relevant information from large data sets is not an easy task because complex data modeling tools must be utilized. Operating sophisticated information technology for information filtering and networks visualization requires high level of human expertise (cia.gov, 2012). This implies that data modelers need to take into account all of the behavioral and contextual issues that affect network structure (Ressler, 2006). To make sense of large data sets it is necessary to incorporate in the analysis all the factors that could affect terrorism (Ressler, 2006).

The controversy around Internet surveillance, especially spying on citizens in order to thwart terrorist attacks, is a prevalent issue in the US (Baehr, 2012). Interception of communication has serious implications to individual privacy (Baehr, 2012). However, the surveillance of a vast number of people is argued to be less intrusive than traditional wiretapping and somewhat explains the use of network-based analysis in anti-terrorist dealings (Keefe, 2006). In order to acquire more accurate intelligence, the US authorities adopted a set of surveillance laws\textsuperscript{30} that allow for more strategic monitoring of citizens. Such allocation of power already caused many repercussions to individual privacy of citizens. This government intrusion might not be always justified as it can be used for purposes other than national security.

\textsuperscript{30} Due to the 9/11 circumstances the US has adopted the number of laws that facilitate the collection of more information from greater number of sources. These include: USA Patriot Act which was enacted by the US Congress soon after the 9/11, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Electronic Communication Privacy Act and the National Security Letter (CRS Report for Congress, March 2010).
4.2. Respecting the Fundamental Right to Privacy

State legislators are constantly rebalancing national security interests with those of fundamental rights to individual privacy (cmcs.ceu.hu, 2012). There are many risks associated with communication surveillance as it can be used beyond the national security matters and for various political interests. The central question to this debate is how much power should the state have in breaching individual privacy for the purpose of detecting terrorist threats?

Covert activities are usually discovered in four different ways of communication surveillance and interception (Irion, 2012):

- Targeted surveillance of a particular individual for which a state intelligence agency must obtain a court warrant
- Deliberate monitoring of groups of suspected individuals
- Strategic monitoring of no concrete suspects but the population at large primarily through computer programs that screen communication for particular keywords
- Monitoring of already publicly available information provided by the users online

Protection of privacy means assuring appropriate flows of personal information online as well as offline (Nissenbaum, 2011). In order to ensure the individual right to “electronic” privacy there are number of international protocols that regulate and guarantee rights to private life and correspondence. Primarily, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12, states,

“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks” (Article 12).

Hence, the state legislators must recognize the existence of universal human rights standards and ensure protection of privacy at all times.

In this context, the European Declaration of Human Rights (ECHR) clearly provides individuals with a right to be free of unlawful searches. Article 8 states the right to one’s “private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Article 8). The notions of “private life” and “correspondence” refer to communication over telephone, facsimile, and
Internet (Irion, 2012). However, these rights are “subject to certain restrictions” because the Convention justifies the communication surveillance as long as it is in accordance “with national legislation and necessary for maintaining democracy” (Article 8).

The decisions on “strategic monitoring” of the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg\(^ {31} \) recognize “a fairly wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security” (ECHR, Irion 2012). Also, the Court’s decisions address the issue of the balance of power between “the interests of the State to protect its national security and secret surveillance” by “prescribing minimum legal safeguards to be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power” (ECHR, Irion 2012). In addition to avoiding the negative risks that surveillance programs might have on the state of democracy, “the Court must be satisfied with existence of adequate and effective guarantees against abuse” (ECHR, Irion 2012).

Similar jurisprudence applies to the protection of human rights and freedoms in the Americas.\(^ {32} \) And in order to ensure exposure of unintended consequences of surveillance practices to domestic and international governance regimes, an OpenNet Initiative was established (opennet.net, 2012). This initiative is a collaborative partnership of three institutions: the Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto, the Berkman Center for Internet and Society of the Harvard University, and SecDev group from Ottawa (opennet.net, 2012). Their mutual aim is to inform public policy and advocacy work in this area as well as to investigate and analyze all the repercussions of Internet filtering and surveillance programs (opennet.net, 2012).

\(^ {31} \) Cf. Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 582430/00. June 29, 2006; and Liberty and Others v. UK, no. 54934/00. October 1, 2008.

4.3. The Implications for BiH

The fact that the Internet is used to spread hatred and instigate violence was never more obvious than in today’s current social and political life in BiH (Music, 2011). Blocking, filtering, and removing content remains a problem for policy makers because offensive content is usually hosted outside of the jurisdiction in which it is considered illegal (Music, 2011). As internet policy in BiH is still in its early stages of development, there are no existing laws that regulate online surveillance. The current legislative frameworks allow for free and open access to Internet.

The domestic intelligence agencies must recognize the potential in online hate speech. As the US experience shows, collecting of intelligence from open sources can be beneficial for learning about radical movements’ emergence and behavior. The application of SNA to this data will ultimately allow BiH authorities to gain a better understanding of how radical Wahhabi networks diffuse their ideology. It will help them visualize the information necessary for predicting potential security breaches.

The national strategies and/or policies for counter-terrorism and communication surveillance must not impede the fundamental right to individual privacy. This is of particular importance considering the facts that BiH is a co-signer of the ECHR and a member of the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an integral part of the country’s constitution. In the process of policymaking the legislators need to be aware of the aforementioned international protocols that BiH adheres to.
Chapter 5: Harmonization of Police Force Structures

The state’s current structure of complex, non-harmonized legal frameworks between cantons and entities is ineffective in managing all of the risks stemming from religious extremist groups in the country. They prevent the police forces from cooperating and exchanging information among the police units on the territory of both entities. In order for BiH to fully address security threats in the country, police reform is a key policy change. It even remains one of the EU’s conditions for further accession talks. The aim of this chapter is to argue all of the benefits that this reform will have on the overall state of internal security.

This policy option addresses the weak institutional setup of law enforcement agencies in BiH, as explained in the previous chapters. It suggests that all thirteen police forces in the country should be placed under the single oversight of the Ministry of Security. Arguably, the completion of the police harmonization process will lead to:

- **Better cooperation with the state security bodies**

  Reforming the police force must begin with the harmonization of the police legal frameworks on the entity and cantonal level (Budimlic, 2012). The legal frameworks are important to address because they specify jurisdictions and the roles of each Ministry of Interior at all levels of authority. A more harmonized legal framework will result in enhanced operational support to the State efforts towards counter-terrorism activities (Budimlic, 2012). Subsequently, a more centralized police force structure will contribute to more effective information exchange and refine the cooperation with the State security authorities such as OSA and SIPA.
• **A more effective system of the protection of citizens**

The need for thorough police reform is also reflected in the following four aspects: normative, organizational, human resources and material (Budimlic, 2012). Upgrading these four areas will result in increased police efficacy in protecting the citizens from potential terrorist threats. The emphasis here is placed on developing the professional capacities of police personnel (Budimlic, 2012). Achieving a more effective system of protection requires additional resources. The police reform would allow for a better allocation of resources form the State budget and in favor of the aforementioned advancements. The system of monitoring and early warning would ultimately improve with the restructure process.

• **A transparent and depoliticized police force**

The police reform depends on the political agreement of the highly multifaceted BiH governmental environment. The ethnic divisions in the public administration present a great challenge in appointing of qualified staff in the security sector. The police commissioner nomination process is highly politicized and carried in non-transparent way (Budimlic, 2012). The police reform foresees the Ministry of Security bodies to have a central role in monitoring and managing the performance of the police force. Thus, an integrated police force will contribute to a more effective response to security risks stemming from the religious extremism in the country.
Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations

Based on what was discussed so far, there are a number of areas in which the BiH security sector needs improvement. The previous two chapters critically analyzed the possible solutions for addressing BiH institutional weaknesses in counter-terrorism efforts. The US example has been used for examining the potentials of employing advanced techniques for intelligence collection and analysis. The progress of BiH in the process of police reform has been observed. This chapter aims to provide a set of concrete recommendations for the BiH governments at the State and Entity levels, to adopt:

- **Revise State Strategy for Combating Terrorism** - In light of last year’s attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, it is of utmost importance to revise the Strategy of BiH for the Prevention and Fight Against Terrorism from 2010. A detailed assessment of the insofar-achieved objectives needs to be carried through. This will allow State authorities to identify those areas that need additional work.

- **Enhance the Technological Equipment of Law Enforcement Agencies** – Higher investments must be made in the education of police and intelligence personnel. The programs for data mining, filtering, and visualization must be procured. Experts in information and communication technologies (ICT) and terrorism must complement the efforts for detecting and preventing terrorist threats.

- **Conduct Comprehensive Research and Analysis on Wahhabi Movements** – Acknowledging the existence of religious extremist groups in the country is not adequate for counter-terrorist activities. The Wahhabi Movement in BiH remains under researched, hence a more detailed analysis of potential risks stemming from this movement is needed. The issues of ideology diffusion, key messages, and recruitment must be analyzed. This will allow for a better understanding of Wahhabi intents and motives.

- **Improve the Collection of Intelligence** - BiH does not have legal frameworks that are specifically regulating the collection of intelligence from surveillance, monitoring, or other sources. The country’s laws on electronic media still vouch for open and free Internet. And as a signatory of ECHR and DPA, BiH must guarantee the protection of individual human rights at all times. However, radical content from open sources such as Internet web sites and discussion forums, as well as in the print media, can serve as a potential foundation for intelligence collection. For this purpose, BiH security authorities must be better equipped with tools and methods for the collection and analysis of intelligence.
• **Integrate SNA in Counter-Terrorism Operations** - BiH can benefit from the previously discussed ways of the US application of SNA in intelligence management. Better intelligence and tools for visualizing Wahhabi networks in the country will allow for the improved understanding of their evolvement and activities.

• **Improve Information Exchange and Monitoring** – There are more than 17 different agencies in the country dealing with security. There is a lack of accurate and prompt information exchange among them. The interconnectedness of their systems is inefficient. The overall monitoring is difficult as there are many different chains of command in place. There is no unique analytical approach directed towards counter-terrorism. It is of pivotal importance to integrate these systems and place them under the single oversight of the Ministry of Security. The implementation and monitoring systems need to be activated for ensuring the effective security of citizens.

• **Complete the Police Reform Process** – The inability of BiH authorities to effectively combat terrorism comes from the never completed harmonization of police force structures. The country’s political and institutional landscape inherited from the DPA is a building block to the further development of counter-terrorism efforts. This must be changed in such way that will allow for a more effective response from the state regarding security breaches. Multiple actors and many institutions dealing with security contribute to irregular central database updates. This issue also remains to be one of the EU conditions for future accession talks.

• **Improve Cross-Border Cooperation** – As the Wahhabi movement presents the internal security threat, not just for BiH but the wider European region, cooperation and information exchange with other security intelligence agencies is necessary. However, the domestic legal frameworks must ensure that foreign intelligence services do not undermine the legitimacy of the state of BiH.

• **Strengthen the Protection of Individual Privacy of Citizens** – Surveillance from intercepting communication can intrude the privacy of citizens. BiH must ensure to balance the risks associated with the intrusion of the privacy of individuals. In this regard, the procedure to procure the judge’s approval to conduct targeted monitoring must be simplified. The Law on OSA does not entail provisions related to strategic monitoring or possibility to collect the intelligence from open sources. In line with what was already discussed, BiH must adopt or amend the existing laws that regulate surveillance. This is especially crucial in light of occurring terrorist activities by Wahhabi networks in BiH.

• **Secure Better Protection of Government Systems** - The use of Internet by Wahhabi networks to spread their ideology poses a risk to overall cyber security. This especially refers to the government protection systems of classified data and citizens’ personal information. In order to prevent cyber attacks from happening, it is necessary to improve the protection of the government’s critical ICT infrastructure and data storage facilities.

• **Amend the Firearms Possession and Criminal Liability Policies** – State security experts are advocating for the stricter criminal liability policy. The emergence of radical groups and associated terrorist risks must also be addressed through amendments to the firearms possession policy.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis addressed the issue of growing religious extremism in BiH and its negative implications to internal security. It identified the best possible policy options for the BiH government to address the security concerns stemming from the radical Wahhabi movement. It contributed to the current understanding of Wahhabi networks in the domestic context and suggested a set of concrete policy recommendations for the effective encounter of this security threat. In this regard, the thesis researched the benefits as well as the limitations of the SNA’s application in the counter-terrorism field. It also reflected the way it could be complemented with a more integrated police force in BiH.

For devising a possible policy solution, the thesis critically analyzed the US experience in the detection and prevention of potential terrorist threats. It showed that SNA is a useful method in understanding the evolution and behavior of terrorist networks. But in order for SNA to have a preventative function, the intelligence on radical movements is needed in advance. For this purpose, the methods of collecting intelligence from open sources were analyzed. The emphasis here was placed on screening and filtering weblogs and radical online content. Further, several crucial limitations from different types of communication surveillance and monitoring were addressed. These considerations were benchmarked with the guaranteed fundamental human right to privacy and correspondence provided by international conventions.

The involvement of the Wahhabi movement in plotting and executing terrorist attacks in BiH and elsewhere was shown by number of examples. Further analysis identified the unpreparedness of the domestic authorities to effectively encounter terrorist threats. This argument was supported by the institutional weaknesses reflected in the territorial fragmentation of the police force bodies and divisions along ethnic lines. Most importantly, the research revealed that BiH has no expertise or legal frameworks per se that would allow
for a more meaningful and advanced collection of intelligence on radical networks. This implies that the work of security intelligence forces in BiH must be complemented with more advanced technological capacities and an efficient police structure. From the policy learning perspective, the several policy implications were drawn for the BiH government to consider.

However, there are several areas that require further research. Primarily, more work needs to be done in the field of the evolution of Wahhabi networks. There should be more active effort in applying network analysis to understanding what draws people to join radical networks. More quantitative analysis of content from open sources is needed to gain knowledge on the Wahhabi movement. There are plentiful negative implications of Internet radicalism to internal security. BiH authorities must devote more time and resources in addressing all the concerns stemming from the religious extremism. Hence, reforming the police bodies and strengthening intelligence efforts remain the key areas BiH should address.
Appendix 1: The Political Boundaries of BiH

(The Courtesy of the OSCE Mission to BiH and Barovic, Biljana, 2012)
Appendix 2: The Structure of BiH Institutions

Structure of Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina

(The Courtesy of the OSCE Mission to BiH and Barovic, Biljana, 2012)


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