SECURITY IS WHAT THE STATE MAKES OF IT: THE GREECE – MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE

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Abstract

The main purpose of this thesis is to answer the question as to why the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far. By drawing on the literature on the security dilemma and the Copenhagen school of securitization, I will argue, firstly, that the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far because it is a case of an intertwined interstate and societal security dilemma, involving both territorial and societal integrity as reference objects of security. In addition to that, I argue that these security dilemmas are the result of securitising moves by politicians, official security experts, civil society actors and media organisations in Greece and Macedonia. These respective moves were accepted by the Greek and by the Macedonian population because of a number of discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions, notably historical conditions, and demographic conditions.
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Introduction

The name Macedonia in the last two decades is the most controversial political issue discussed in Macedonia and Greece. Historically, the name Macedonia is related to the ancient Kingdom of Macedon from Pella, a city near today’s Thessaloniki in Greece. The most famous leaders of the Macedon dynasty were Philip II and his successor Alexander the Great, who reigned in the fourth century B.C.

Today, 2 500 years later, the name Macedonia still exists, in a regional and national sense. Geographical Macedonia constitutes the territory of today’s Republic of Macedonia, the northern part of Greece (the province Macedonia), and some parts of Bulgaria and Albania. As a geographic and ethnographic entity Macedonia stopped to exist after World War I, with the Bucharest Treaty in 1913, when Macedonia was divided among Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia.\footnote{Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 44.} With the division of the territory, the population was divided as well, that the population recognized itself as Macedonians.

However, the name ‘Macedonia’ became problematic when Vardar Macedonia, the part of geographical Macedonia, which was under the Serbian rule, became the Socialistic Republic of Macedonia as one of the sixth Republics of the Yugoslav Federation. Hence, the name Macedonia became part of the political realm after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of an independent Republic of Macedonia in 1991. Recognition and integration of the newborn Republic of Macedonia were obstructed by its neighbor Greece, as a reason of the name ‘Macedonia’. Greece asked from the Republic of Macedonia to change its name.
The name of the Republic is identical with Greek Northern Province ‘Macedonia’ due to which Greece accused the Republic for using the name for an irredentist reason. Greek understanding of the name ‘Macedonia’ is equivalent to the Hellenic nation. They consider that the ancient Macedonian Kingdom is an integrative and unquestionable part of Greek history. The Greek claim is that the Republic of Macedonia use that name just for political reasons, to falsify history, and to have a territorial pretention towards Greece.

The Macedonian position, on the other hand, is that ‘Macedonia’ and Macedonian are the names with which the population has identified itself for centuries. Changing the name of the Macedonian state is interpreted as involving changing the name of the nation and language. Therefore, Greece’s demand of the Macedonian government to change the country’s name is seen by the Macedonians as an offensive action that threatens the societal identity and thus the survival of the Macedonian nation.

The attempt of the International Community to address the Macedonian – Greek disagreement brought the temporary reference, the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM), which was used for the Macedonian accession to the United Nations family. Furthermore, an Interim Accord (1995) was signed by both countries, where Macedonia and Greece agreed to talk and find a common acceptable solution about the differences over the name of the Republic under the UN auspices. Both sides made some concession, Macedonia removed the “Vergina Sun” flag, a symbol considered to belong to the ancient Macedonian dynasty, and Greece removed the trade embargo which was imposed on Macedonia in 1994. However, little has been done in increasing the trust between the both societies. Each action by the Macedonian side, to

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3 Ibid.
protect and reinforce the Macedonian identity is considered as provocation by Greece, and as a result of that, the Greek reaction is a strong international diplomacy and using its position in the International organizations where Macedonia wants to become a member. Greece vetoed the Macedonian membership in NATO and frozen the beginning of the negotiation process for membership in the European Union.

Today, twenty years after Macedonian independence, the name issue is not resolved yet. There were different proposals by the UN mediator M. Nimitz for a new name of the country, such as North Macedonia, Upper Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Macedonia, Republika Makedonija, but none of those proposals were accepted by Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. The main purpose of this thesis is to answer the question as to why the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far. There is immense literature written on the so called “Macedonian Question” and on the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece. A significant contribution to this literature is considered the work of Loring Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (1995), Anastassia Karakasidou *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood* (1997), Victor Rudometof *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question* (2002), that gives a deep analysis of the origin of the Macedonian-Greek conflict.

However, the Macedonian-Greek dispute has not been analyzed through the security dilemma-securitization approach. To this end, I draw on the literature on the security dilemma and the Copenhagen school of securitization. The main contribution of the thesis to the literature is empirical. I will argue, firstly, that the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far because it is a case of an intertwined interstate and societal security dilemma, involving both territorial and societal integrity as reference objects of security. Second, I will argue that
these security dilemmas are the result of securitising moves by politicians, official security experts, civil society actors and media organisations in Greece and Macedonia. These respective moves were accepted by the Greek and by the Macedonian population because of a number of discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions, notably historical conditions, and demographic conditions.

The present thesis will consist of three chapters. In the first chapter, I will define the main concepts on which the analytical framework will be based, namely security dilemma and its relation with the ethnic conflict, social constructivism, securitization theory, and constructivist approach to the societal security dilemma. Then, in two separate chapters dedicated to Greece and Macedonia, respectively, I will apply a theoretical framework which combines the theory of securitization and the societal security dilemma concept in order to provide a constructivist perspective in analyzing and understanding the Greek-Macedonian name dispute. For this purpose, the analysis will focus mainly on the discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions which led to Greece’s and Macedonia’s securitizations and the societal security dilemmas with regard to the name dispute between the two countries in order to provide an answer to the study’s research question as to why the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far. I will conclude by summarizing my findings with regard to the research question of this thesis. The empirics of the present analysis will be drawn from secondary sources.
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

The research question of the present thesis, namely why the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far, will be analyzed through the lenses of the theory of securitization and the constructivist concept of the societal security dilemma in order to demonstrate how securitizations trigger and maintain security dilemmas. In this chapter, I will present the theoretical framework of the thesis. Through applying a constructive „securitization-security dilemma” approach, I will analyze the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia. Firstly, I will define the security dilemma concept, and its use in inter- (and intrastate level), then I will define the concepts of social constructivism, securitization and societal security dilemma.

1. The Security Dilemma: Structural and Cognitive Approaches

The Security Dilemma concept was introduced in the International Relations literature for the first time by the American scholar John H. Herz in his article “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” (1950). He argues that in this anarchical world “where groups live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity” has appeared the so called “security dilemma”.\(^4\) Because we do not know the intention of our neighbor, and if we take into consideration that \textit{homo homini lupus} is a “fundamental fact of the social life”, as Herz points out in his article, we constantly live in uncertainty and fear to be attacked or dominated by other groups.\(^5\) In a situation where we do not have a higher authority to ensure our state security, we are obliged to strive for our own security and to increase our power in order to defend ourselves.

\(^5\) Ibid.
from that attack.\textsuperscript{6} However, that strive “to acquire more and more power” makes our neighbor insecure and provoke them to increase their power as well, and like that we are entering in a “vicious circle of security and a power accumulation is on”.\textsuperscript{7}

Another theorist of the security dilemma or as he preferred to call it “irreducible dilemma” is the English historian Herbert Butterfield. Similarly to Herz, Butterfield believes that uncertainty is the reason for the appearance of the security dilemma. He writes:

In the peculiar characteristic of the situation that I am describing […] that you yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you cannot enter into the other man’s counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous. For you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety and it is never possible for you to release or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have.\textsuperscript{8}

That uncertainty, fear and misunderstanding about the intentions of both sides could lead to an unintentional conflict. He writes:

The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminal who might be out to deliberate harm to the world. It could be produced between two powers both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort.\textsuperscript{9}

Butterfield in these lines gives emphasis to the paradox or the ‘tragedy’ of the security dilemma, where two status quo powers enter in a conflict without the intention of doing so.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{8} Herbert Butterfield, \textit{History and Human Relations} (London: Collins, 1951), 21.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 19-20.
However, Tang in his article “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis” (2009) writes that there is a contradiction in Butterfield’s definition. Butterfield’s propositions of uncertainty, unintentionally and the tragedy of the security dilemma are not compatible with his ascription of “the ultimate source of security dilemma to the universal sin of humanity.”\textsuperscript{10} Tang argues that due to the “universal sin of humanity” we are biologically predetermined to harm or to be evil; therefore “there is no real uncertainty about each other’s intentions.”\textsuperscript{11} Tang points out that this contradiction is resolved with Herz’s and Jervis’s “ultimate source of the security dilemma”, the anarchy of international politics.\textsuperscript{12}

Robert Jervis is another prominent scholar of the security dilemma. His contribution to the theory is linked with the intentionality of the adversaries, whether are aggressive or only security seekers. In his book, \textit{Perception and Misperception in the International Politics} (1976), he distinguishes “deterrence” and a “spiral model” of the security dilemma. In the deterrence model one of the sides is perceived as an aggressor, and the other side, in order to protect itself, should deter. According to Wheeler and Booth (1992:31), this situation is categorized as a security problem rather than a security dilemma. On the other hand, the origin of the spiral model is in the anarchy in international relations, where there is no authority or sovereign to guaranty the security of the states.\textsuperscript{13} Living in that kind of world, the states are responsible for their own security and power where the role of the decision makers is crucial in defining and interpreting the driving motive of the other state.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
As Jervis argues, in the spiral model the decision makers are concerned about “the most impossible threats.”\(^{15}\) The fear and uncertainty drive the state to increase its security, but that action of self-protection at the same time threatens the other states because if one state sees the procurement of armament as security, the “adversary will see it as encirclement”.\(^{16}\)

When states seek the ability to defend themselves they get too much and too little-too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression: too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.\(^{17}\)

Entering in that circle of arm competition, where each side is trying to accumulate more and more arms in order to increase their own security, in the end is self-defeating because it has the opposite result.\(^{18}\) In this respect Jervis quotes the British foreign secretary before WWI, Lord Grey, who recognized the self-defeating effect in diplomacy from that period:

> The increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent.\(^{19}\)

In a situation when the states do not recognize the real intention of their neighbors, whether they are aggressive or not, the states suppose the worst.\(^{20}\) As a result of the hostile perception of both

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 63-64.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., 64.
\(^{18}\) Ibid. 65.
\(^{20}\)Ibid., 64-65.
sides, the increased fear and insecurity in the end will produce a possibility of conflict or war.\textsuperscript{21} The status quo states in order to protect themselves sometimes they can be aggressive or expansionist, to make the first attack and to weaken their neighbors as they believe that with the first strike they have the advantage over their adversary.\textsuperscript{22}

Furthermore, Jervis gives a psychological explanation to the spiral security dilemma. He argues that when the decision makers make their assumptions about their neighbor’s intentions, they take in consideration the first developed image about them, if the image is hostile then each ambiguous action by its neighbors would be interpreted as hostile one despite the fact that the behavior of the others perhaps is “neutral or friendly”, but that is ignored because, as Jervis argues “people perceive what they expect to be present.”\textsuperscript{23} The action of the security seeker state to increase its weapons provokes a reaction of the others to increase their security, which is perceived as a hostile action, but none of the states take into consideration their own behavior, how their own actions are interpreted by their neighbors.\textsuperscript{24} The incapability of the decision makers to comprehend that their own behavior can be understood as a threat for their adversary and the lack of sensitiveness for the actions of the others gives an explanation of conflict development, which might be escaped if only both sides analyzed objectively the nature of the problem.\textsuperscript{25} However, Jervis argues that the core argument for the existence of the security dilemma is not the misunderstanding of the adversary’s hostility, but as a consequence of anarchy in international politics.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 67. \\
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 68. \\
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 75. \\
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 76.
\end{flushright}
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the concept of security dilemma was primarily applied in the inter-state level conflicts. After the fall of the Communism and the end of the Cold War the concept has been extended from explaining conflicts at the interstate level to intra-state conflicts. In the Macedonian and Greek case, the perceived threats do not come only from outside the country, but the threat is perceived within the country as well. Therefore, in the next section I will go through the literature on the ethnic conflicts and the societal security dilemma.

2. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict

Barry R. Posen is the first author who applies the concept of the security dilemma to ethnic conflict, in particular in the situation when one “group of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security”. This is the case after the dissolution of some regimes for example, the communist regime in the Soviet Union or in Yugoslavia, where different ethnic groups found themselves in charge of their own survival. The collapse of that kind of regimes resembles to a situation of anarchy, where there is no sovereign or authority to guarantee the security of the state.

According to Posen, one of the first issues which should be addressed by the independent states is to analyze their neighbors’ intentions. One of the mechanisms to recognize the neighbor’s intentions is the history. If the independent groups have memories from history, where the other side made offensive military activities, their judgments would be that their neighbor is

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28 Ibid., 27.
29 Ibid., 30.
dangerous.\textsuperscript{30} On the other hand, Posen points out that history lacks of reliability because the historical facts of the newly independent states were possibly rewritten under the previous system which purpose was to impose its power over the variety of ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{31} After the dissolution of those regimes, the ethnic groups start to look for their identity, and more often they take into account their oral history where the ancient rivals are not forgotten, and that history in many cases is used by the politicians in their emotional political speeches with their aim to have the support of the population.\textsuperscript{32}

Furthermore, Posen argues that the country’s military capabilities would be defined by the group cohesion and strong identity, rather than their arms possession, as strong emotions could reinforce the infantry and to have the capability to be offensive.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, the strong group identity could be considered as a danger from the rival group and as a reason of that are undertaken measures for reinforcing their own cohesion as an important element of their defense.\textsuperscript{34} In that process, history could be politicized, and the mass media would transmit stories that contain “unfolding events in terms that magnify the threat to the group. As neighboring groups observe this, they do the same.”\textsuperscript{35}

Another scholar who contributes to the literature of the ethnic security dilemma is Stuart J. Kaufman. He gives two models of ethnic conflicts, a mass and elite led model. The mass led ethnic conflict is bottom-up approach which is characterize with mass hostility where the masses

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 30-31.
\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.
choose their “belligerent leaders”36 who act in a way that produces emotion of fear and hostility which “trigger spontaneous outbreak of violence, activating the security dilemma.”37 The elite-led conflict is a top-down approach initiated by the “belligerent leaders who come in power when the mass hostility is low”. (Kaufman 1996b: 109). With the authority over the media the “belligerent leaders” contribute to the high mass hostility and make available the security dilemma.38 This process distinguishes from the mass-led model by its intentionality, where the aggressive leaders provoke the mass hostility and the security dilemma. (Kaufman 1996a: 158). According to Kaufman, the inter-ethnic security dilemma together with the mass hostility and the belligerent leaders are the preconditions for the emergence of an ethnic conflict.39

Furthermore, Kaufman, using the terminology of Jack Snyder, distinguishes two forms of security dilemma, “structural” and a “perceptional security dilemma”. The structural security dilemma is close to Posen’s claim that the security dilemma is a result of the anarchy which emerges in the existing system where, “each side construes its security needs in a way which makes the other group fear that it is threatened with extinction.”40 The perceptual security dilemma is related to the inability of the statesman to evaluate the level of threat which they pose to their neighbors with their enhancement in the security system and the failure to recognize the threat of the other side. (Kaufman, 1996a: 151).

However, Paul Roe argues that Kaufman’s structural security dilemma “has occurred after the outbreak of violence”, which differentiates from the Butterfieldian approach where the security

39 Ibid., 109.
40 Ibid., 112.
dilemmas “are cause of violence, not the product of it”. Therefore,” the ‘tragedy’ has already occurred: because of the security dilemma two sides have started to fight each other.” And in that case, the situation of apparent threat changes to a situation of a real threat.

More important for this thesis, Roe refocuses “the security dilemma from the fundamental compatibility of ‘goals’ to the fundamental compatibility of ‘security requirements’”. He distinguishes a “tight”, “regular” and “loose” security dilemma. In the ‘tight’ security dilemma the both sides have compatible security requirements, but as a reason of their misperception the countermeasures are grounded on an ‘illusory incompatibility’. In the ‘regular’ security dilemma the both sides are “security seekers”, but with “incompatible security requirements” where for the security of one side is required insecurity for the other, which on the other hand, “is taking the correct course of action.” And the ‘loose’ security dilemma is characterize with power-seekers actors whose actions are focused on expansion rather than on security, and in that circumstances, for some scholars does not represents a security dilemma.

In this thesis, I will use the notion of compatible/incompatible ‘security requirements’ to identify and analyze the interstate and the societal security dilemmas between and within Greece and Macedonia. The notion of societal security dilemma, which has been elaborated primarily by constructivist scholars, will be discussed below. I begin by briefly outlining the main tenets and

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 106.
48 Ibid., 109.
49 Ibid., 110.
criticisms related to constructivism before introducing the societal security dilemma, which, besides the interstate security dilemma, will be the second pillar of my explanation as to why the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia has proven so intractable.

3. Social Constructivism

The social constructivists argue that the social structures are composed by “shared knowledge, material resources, and practices.” They point out that the material resources can give meaning to the human actions only “through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” According to Alexander Wendt “A security dilemma, for example, is a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms.” The Hobbesian situation in which states find themselves is a result of their uncertainty about each other’s intentions and in that condition the states expect the worst, which on the other hand initiate a revisionist behaviour which was not intended by the both sides, and as Wendt argues “what ultimately driving this logic is a collective representation of their condition as Hobbesian”, which in the end represents a “self-fulfilling prophesy, i.e., actors act on the basis of shared expectations, and this tends to reproduce those expectations”. He argues that the security dilemma is a consequence of the human interactions and practices, and not a consequence of the anarchy in the international politics, he writes that the “anarchy is what state makes of it” (Wendt, 1992).

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 269.
53 Ibid., 42.
However, Wendt was criticized (Fierke 1998, Zehfuss 2002) for not emphasizing the importance of the language in the interaction between the actors. Zeifus writes: “Wendt’s actors do not speak. They only signal each other. [...] The problem is that, in order to be able to reflect and interpret, actors have to be capable of using language.”\textsuperscript{54} Similarly Fierke argues that the significance of the language in the interpretation of the material reality cannot be overlooked. She writes: “One can accept the existence of a material reality independent of language, but one cannot say anything meaningful about it [...] without language”\textsuperscript{55} One school which has taken this criticism seriously is the Copenhagen school of securitization.

**4. The Copenhagen School of Securitization**

The securitization approach developed by the so-called Copenhagen School emphasizes the role of the language in making security. Similarly to the social constructivists, the Copenhagen School argues that the security is intersubjective and socially constructed. The actors representing an issue to the audience as a threat, they start the process of constructing of insecurity or security in the state, whether would be successful or not would depend from the approval of the audience which gives the intersubjective character of the securitization process.

Combining the constructive approach to the security dilemma and the securitization approach I will analyze the dispute between Macedonia and Greece. Therefore, in next section I will discuss the basic characteristic of the Securitization theory.


4.1 What is Securitization Theory?

The term “securitization” was introduced by Ole Waever in “Securitization and Desecuritization” in *On Security* (1995) and then refined in *Security: New Framework of Analysis* (Buzan et al. 1998), where the concept of security was defined as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” In this aspect, the Copenhagen school moves from the more objectivist nature of the security to a more constructive approach. They argue that the “security is a self-referential practice”, one issue becomes a threat not because it is real, but “because the issue is presented as such.” Through ‘speech act’ the securitizing actors present the issue to the public in a way that, “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).” Presenting an issue as a threat for the very survival of the state, the actor calls for a right to use ‘emergency measures’, actions which would “break the normal political rules of the game.”

However, in order the ‘securitization’ to be successful, beside the ‘securitizing actor’ and the particular ‘discourse’, it is necessary the presence of the ‘audience’. In the cases when the audience is convinced that the ‘referent object’ is threatened, then we talk for securitization. If the audience does not respond to the call of the securitizing actors, then, in that case it is considered to be only ‘securitizing move’. Therefore, the audience has a decisive role in the securitization process, a “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the

57 Ibid., 24.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 25.
audience of the security speech act”, which underlines the “intersubjective and socially constructed” character of the securitization.61

Yet, the acceptance of the ‘speech act’ by the audience depends by the internal and external ‘facilitating conditions’. Waever distinguishes three conditions:

(a) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out; (b) the social capital of the enunciator, the securitizing actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this should neither be defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech act; and (c) conditions historically associated with a threat: it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if there are certain objects to refer to which are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves, they never make for necessary securitization, but they are definitely facilitating conditions.62

Securitizing actors, according to the Copenhagen school can be politicians, bureaucrats, the government, and other persons who have some authority in the society.63 In addition, Philippe Bourbeau argues that the media agents can have two roles in the securitization process, as initiators and transmitters of the securitization process. He writes:

Similarly, media agents can in some cases be initiators of the securitizing process (e.g. by making securitizing moves before political agents formulate one, thereby pressing both the government and the audiences to adopt a particular security policy). In other cases, media agents can be transmitting players (e.g. by supporting political agents’ securitizing moves or by voicing and articulating audiences’ security demands).64

61Ibid., 31.
63Buzan et al., 27.
Furthermore, Didier Bigo argues that beside the speech act as a center of the securitization process, it should be taken in consideration the non-discursive practices as well. He writes:

…it is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse.65

In this thesis, the discursive and non-discursive practices, as well as the historical facilitating conditions have a valuable contribution to the securitization process in the Greek and the Macedonian case.

5. The Societal Security Dilemma: A Constructivist Approach

For the first time the ‘societal security’ was introduced by Barry Buzan in People, State and Security (1991) where he distinguishes a five sectors of security, the military, political, economic, environmental and the societal sector, which for a referent object had the state sovereignty.66 The concept of the ‘societal security’ was redefined by the Copenhagen School, Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre in “Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe” (1993) argue that the question of security after the Cold War period is linked with the question of identity. Therefore, they suggested the five sectors of security to be substituted with a duality of ‘state security’ where the referent object is the sovereignty, and the ‘societal security’ where the referent object is the identity.67 The sovereignty is crucial for the

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67 Waever, 1993., p. 25.
survival of the state, and the identity is important for the survival of the society, if the society loses its identity, “we will no longer be able to live as ‘us’.”

Waever argues that societal security is about “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.” Furthermore, he points out that in order to understand the societal security is important “studying the processes whereby a group comes to perceive its identity as threatened, when it starts to act in a security mode on this basis and what behaviors this triggers.”

When one society is threatened in terms of its identity, in that case the society tries to defend itself by strengthening its identity. However, the threat perception is difficult to be assessed, for each society is different, as Buzan argues “real threats may not be accurately seen” and the “perceived threats may not be real, and yet still have real effect.” According to Buzan, when one identity is suppressed and unable to reproduce itself, and when are present the practices of “forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community”, then it is considered that the societal identity is threatened. Yet, Roe argues that the threat perception to the identity is determinate by the security requirements of the society, whether the particular action would be

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69 Ibid., 23.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Buzan, 1993, p. 43.
73 Ibid.
treated as a threat depends on whether it was defined as part of the societal security requirement.

73 He writes:

…my societal security depends on denying you the right to education in your own language. But in other cases such a requirement may not be necessary for societal security: ethnic identity might not be constituted primarily through the maintenance of language but, for example, religion or other cultural practices instead. This would mean that a lack of educational provisions in this respect would not have malign consequences: you are not harming my identity as my societal security requirements have not been defined in this way.74

However, “to suppress an identity may work but equally they may reinforce the intensity with which the group coheres”.75 As a defensive measure of threatened societies, is to reinforce their identity trough, the culture which in that case turns out to be a security policy.76 The language, religion, the celebration of special events and upholding the national, cultural symbols, and dresses are one of the defensive measures of the societal security for the perseverance of the group identity.77 Yet, Paul Roe points out that in situations when the identity is linked to territory then, in that case, the defense would include a military means.78 Moreover, he argues that in that process of defending the identity can initiate changing of the previous one, he writes:

In defending against perceived threats, societal identity is (re)constructed and thus also strengthened. It is this new, revised identity which constitutes the nature of the object around which security processes will take place. This is because societal identity is not relevant as a referent object of security until it is (perceived to be) threatened; until its very existence is (seen to be) brought into question.79

73 Roe, 1999, p. 196
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Waever and Kelstrup, 1993, p. 70.
77 Waever et al. 1993, p. 192.
79 Ibid., 195-196.
Furthermore, Barry Buzan argues that by an analogy of the inter-state security dilemma it is possible to speak about the ‘societal security dilemma’. 80 He writes that:

…that societies can experience processes in which perceptions of ‘the others’ develop into mutually reinforcing ‘enemy-pictures’ leading to the same kind of negative dialects as with the security dilemma between states. Societal security dilemmas might explain why some processes of social conflict seem to acquire a dynamic of their own. 81

A more detailed analysis of the societal security dilemma is provided by Paul Roe in Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma (2005). His main focus is on the intrastate level analyzing the conflicts between the majority and minority groups in Krajina (Croats and Serbs) and in Transylvania (Romanians and Hungarians). Furthermore, analyzing the two cases he uses the ‘tight’, ‘regular’ and ‘loose’ security dilemma where the attention is given to the security requirements of the groups, rather than on their ‘fundamental compatibility of goals’. The societal security dilemma could be explained when one society reinforces its identity i.e. the societal security, the second society feels insecure about its own identity and as a reaction tries to increase its societal security, which, on the other hand, “decreases the first society’s own societal security (weakens its identity)” 82 And, as a consequence of that societal insecurity which leads to the development of an action and reaction dynamic between societies, in the end it can escalate in violence and hostility, “rather than hostilities inaugurating the action–reaction process”. 83 Moreover, in that process of action-reaction, where the identity is defended through the culture, could be a reason for the appearance of ethnic or cultural nationalism, which in the

80 Buzan, 1993, p. 46.
81 Ibid.
most of the cases is difficult to be made a distinction between them or to recognize their real intentions.  

In this thesis, I will argue that both Greece and in Macedonia have encountered severe societal security dilemmas related to their name dispute. The Greeks constructed the independence and name of Macedonia as strengthening the hands of the unrecognized Macedonian minority in Greece and as emboldening them to demand more autonomy and rights, which was defined by the Greeks as a threat to their identity. In Macedonia, Greece’s refusal to recognize their country’s name was interpreted as yet another and as the most dangerous threat to the identity of the ethnic Macedonians, whose societal security was already weakened by Bulgarian and Serbian claims that Macedonia neither had its own language nor its own religion.

Finally, having summarizing the main tenets of the security dilemma, social constructivism, securitization and societal security, defining the theoretical framework of the thesis, the securitization-security dilemma approach, in two separate chapters dedicated to Greece and Macedonia, I will analyze the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece and answer to the question “Why the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far?”

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84 Ibid. 73.
Chapter 2: Independent Macedonia, Greek Securitization and the Greek (Societal) Security Dilemma

In the early nineties of the twentieth century the Yugoslavian Federation found itself in a violent and ethnic conflict. In that process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 succeeds to proclaim its independency in a peaceful way. Shortly, after the Macedonian independence in Greece thousands of people went on the street of Thessaloniki to protest against the Macedonian recognition, chanting “Macedonia was, is, and always will be Greek.”85 The newborn state under the name Macedonia, with the new adopted flag, and the constitution provoked a fear and insecurity in Greece. The question is why the Greek society felt that is threatened by the Republic, having the name Macedonia? In the securitization theory we do not try to define the threat, whether is real or not, but rather to study the process how the threat is constructed. The Copenhagen School argues: “Securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful).”86 As an analyst, my goal would be to identify the securitizing actors and to analyze whether their rhetoric and actions “fulfill the security criteria”, or, are they successful in mobilizing support from the audience regarding the referent object, and finally what is the result of the securitization, what kind of effect have on the other units.87

85 Loring Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict*, 30
86 Buzan et al.1998, 32.
87 Ibid., 34.
In this chapter, I will show how the Greek politicians responded to the declaration of Macedonian independence by securitizing Greek societal and territorial security, which implied making the worst case assumptions about Macedonian intentions towards Greece, and thus, triggered the security dilemma. Then, I will show what predisposed Greek politicians to engage in securitization. Finally, I will analyze the discursive and non-discursive conditions that enabled Greek securitization.

2.1 Greek Securitizations, Worst Case Assumptions and their Presuppositions

The newly adopted Macedonian Constitution from 1991 raised an irredentist concern for Greece. The disputed articles of the Macedonian constitution were related to the Macedonian minority rights in the neighboring countries where “the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries” and with the article 3 was stated that “the borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the Constitution.”88 This part of the Macedonian Constitution was ambiguous for Greece and was interpreted as a serious security threat to its territorial integrity.

The Republic of Macedonia in 1992 adopted the “Vergina Sun” as part of her national flag, a symbol from the ancient Macedonian dynasty which was found on the Greek territory in 1977. That move from the Macedonian decision makers was interpreted as a usurpation of the Greek history and stealing of the Greek identity. As in one occasion the Greek historian Evangelos Kofos described, “It is as a robber came into my house and stole my most precious jewels- my history, my culture, my identity.”89 Evangelos Kofos is considered as a specialist on Balkan affairs and for many years he was serving as a Special Councilor in the Greek Ministry for

89Evangelos Kofos quoted in Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 35.
Foreign Affairs. Kofos, from the position of some authority by using a metaphor of a ‘robber’ and ‘precious jewels’, depicted the Macedonian state as a usurper of the Greek identity and a theft of the Greek history and culture, an important part of the Greek identity, which indicates the necessity of protecting the endangered Greek identity. In the securitization theory this practice is known as a speech act, where the securitizing actor depicts an issue as an existential threat to the very survival of the society or the state.\(^9\) However, the securitization in order to be successful should be approved by the audience.

“Who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully?”\(^9\) According to the Copenhagen School a securitizing actor could be someone who has some authority or power in the society, and those are the “political leaders, bureaucracy, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups.”\(^9\)

Therefore, in the next paragraphs I will present the reaction of the Greek politicians initiated by the Macedonian proclamation for independence in 1991, and analyzing the discourse of the politicians and other relevant actors, I will explain the securitization process of Greek identity and territory, which on the other hand triggered the worst case assumptions about Macedonian intention vis-à-vis Greece.

On the fifth September 1991, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonis Samaras stated: “It is useless to recognize a state, when from the governing circles in Skopje, territorial and other pretensions on our country are formulated”\(^9\) (Thessaloniki, weekly). In this speech act it can be clearly observed the formulation of a threat by the securitizing actor, who is here represented by

\(^9\)Buzan et al., 21.
\(^9\) Ibid., 27.
\(^9\) Ibid.
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the authority, which is responsible for handling and coordinating national security issues. This gives credibility to the speech act and thus augments the likelihood of acceptance of the declarations made in this securitizing attempt by the audience. The Foreign Minister explicitly identifies the ‘threat’, the ‘referent object’ and the ‘measures’ which should be taken in order to protect ‘our country’.

Another politician who voiced the security threat is Stelios Papatemelis, Greek parliamentarian, a member of the political party in opposition, PASOK – “We have to send a much stronger warning to Skopje, that their insistence on the name “Macedonia” is for Greece cause for war, which is solely on its responsibility”94 (Makedonia, daily newspaper). The speech act which took place one month after the proclamation of independence by the Republic of Macedonia represents high dissatisfaction of Greece. The securitizing actor represented here by the Greek parliamentarian speaking from the position of authority calls for stronger measures to be undertaken by Greece. By using such strong statement as ‘cause for war’, the securitizing actor presents to people the seriousness of the issue and stresses the bad intentions of Skopje, namely the threat to Greek identity and territory which is posed by Skopje. Solely used the word ‘war’ attracts the attention of people and generates the fear and treat to security of people and state, therefore it is assumed to be the aim of the securitizing actor. Moreover, Papatemelis in his speech attempted to justify any extraordinary measures which Greece would undertake in response to this ‘cause for war’, in addition he declared that whatever will be the response the responsible for this was Macedonia, since it was first to ‘declare war’. It can be concluded that the speech act markedly followed the grammar of security.

94Ibid., 30-31.
In other interview, Andreas Papandreou, the Greek Premier Minister (1993-1996) declared:

The objective [of Greater Macedonia which includes part of Northern Greece] cannot be achieved simply and only, truly, by Skopje, as we call it, but in conjunction with other powers who could, prefer not to name them.95

Papandreou with this statement did not exclude the threat to the territorial integrity of Greece rather reinforce it, referring to other stronger “powers”. Similarly, in other interview Antonis Samaras stated:

This is not a phantom fear but a reality. [...] We are concerned for the future potential combination of forces in this region. There are three expectations -- a Greater Bulgaria, a Greater Albania and a Greater Serbia. And always with Turkey looming in the back.96

Papandreou, the leader of the socialist and Samaras a conservative politician, expressed their concern for possible combinations of powers, Samaras referring to Turkey, the old antagonist of Greece, as a possible supporter of the Macedonian territorial pretensions, presented the Macedonian state as “not a phantom fear but a reality.” Papandreou mentioning the “other powers who could”, evidently pointed to Turkey97, as in one earlier interview he stated: "Skopje could very well be the vehicle of a Turkish conflict, an offensive from the north"98. Moreover, the newspapers from that period were with headlines like: “Turkey sends army for intervention

96Ibid.
97Nikolaos Zahariades, Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions, and Greek Foreign Policy. (New York, Peter Lang, 2005), 148.
in the Balkans.”\textsuperscript{99} The media has an important role in shaping public opinion, and helps to the process of the securitization or in other situation can play not only as a mediator to the securitization, but as a securitizing actor as well.(Bourbeau, 2011).

Antonis Samaras in June 1990, in a memorandum for OSCE Conference writes:

\begin{quote}
the authorities in Skopje . . . fully support . . . the monopolization of the name of Macedonia, . . . and try to claim as their own the Macedonian Alexander the Great, Aristotle, . . . the Greek war of independence, at least the part that took place in Macedonia, . . . the Greek archaeological findings, among which are the symbol of the Macedonian king Philip . . . These initiatives constitute one of the most obvious and intolerable human rights abuses, because they aim to take away the historical and cultural heritage of a people, the Greek people of Macedonia\textsuperscript{100}
\end{quote}

As a Foreign Minister in the early nineties, when Macedonia proclaimed its independence, Antonis Samaras played a major role in mobilizing the Greek population against the north neighbor. Presenting the new Republic as a real threat to the territorial integrity of Greece, and moreover to the Greek identity, he was advocating a hard line over the name issue, and was one of the loudest voices for the non-recognitio\textsuperscript{n} of the Republic of Macedonia as an independent state which will contain the name Macedonia or its derivatives. The Greek securitizing actor’s target, as we can see from the previous statement, was not only the Greek domestic audience, but the focus was on the International community as well. Furthermore, as a non-discursive securitizing move taken by the Greek government is the non-paper pamphlet issued with its purpose to inform the domestic and international audience about the history of Greece,


emphasizing the significance of the Macedonian dynasty in the Greek Byzantine Empire, and as an important part of this pamphlet was the discussion of the Macedonian question, starting from the foundation of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) in 1893, to modern and contemporary issues.\textsuperscript{101} Discussing the Macedonian question, and depicting the VMRO as a terrorist organization which had a territorial aspiration towards Greece, implicitly paints the modern VMRO political party in Macedonia, which was founded on the bases on the old VMRO organization, as a potential threat.

Moreover, in 1992, a special booklet on the ancient Macedonian dynasty was distributed to each school in the country, for every student to be informed about its Macedonian cultural heritage.\textsuperscript{102} Another action undertaken by the Greek government is issuing a 100 drachma coin with the profile of Alexander the Great on one side and on the revers was depicted the symbol of the Vergina Sun. Yet, the Airport of Thessaloniki was renamed to Macedonia, and renaming the port in Kavala as Port of Philip II, as well as the facades of the new buildings in Greek Macedonia were with ancient Macedonian motives adapted from the ancient Macedonian tombs.\textsuperscript{103} Another element of the materialization of the Macedonian cultural heritage is the erection of a statue of Philip II, the father of Alexander the Great, in Thessaloniki.\textsuperscript{104} Also, the Greek state has issued a postal stamp illustrated with the archeologist Andronikos and the ‘Vergina Sun’ symbol. Andronikos is the archeologist who discovered the symbol and the tomb of Philip II in 1977, and since that moment the Hellenicity of Macedonia was popularized and he became a symbol of it, for example, the media reports and articles for the name dispute with the Republic of Macedonia.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101}Zahariadis, \textit{Essence of Political Manipulations}, 74.
\item \textsuperscript{102}Yannis Hamilakis, \textit{The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archeology and National Imagination in Greece} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 162.
\item \textsuperscript{103}Karakasidou, \textit{Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood}, (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 229.
\item \textsuperscript{104}Hamilakis, 158.
\end{itemize}
very often were accompanied with the picture of Andronikos and the “Vergina Sun” symbol.\textsuperscript{105}

As a columnist in one newspaper, regarding the Macedonian state, Andronikos stated:

\begin{quote}
After they baptized their state Macedonia and its inhabitants Macedonians, they thought it very simple and expedient to appropriate the history of this people who lived in northern Greece 2500 years ago, when the Slavic people they themselves originate from, were still in the remotest Asian steppes.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

Andronikos, similarly to the historian Kofos, presents its neighbor as the ‘other’ who wants to ‘appropriate’ the Greek ‘history’, that the name ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonians’ do not belong to them because they are ‘Slavs’ different than the ‘Greeks’ ones, the only entitled people to claim the Macedonian heritage. The voices of the historian and the archeologist, two respected personages from the Greek society, legitimate and credible actors to talk about the ‘history’ contributes to the securitization process to be more successful.

The institutional practices and measures leaded by the Greek government, as involving institutions, as the educational system with a special created booklet on the Macedonian dynasty, educate the young pupils for the Macedonian cultural heritage, and in the same time materializing the culture, through the monuments, coins linked to myths and symbols, contributes to construct, strengthen and maintain the Macedonian cultural identity in Greece, and on the other hand, these practices shape the intersubjective understandings and feeling of insecurity.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., 161.
However, the threat perception of the identity is determinate by the security requirements of the society, whether the particular action would be treated as a threat depends on whether it was defined as part of the societal security requirement.\textsuperscript{107} The presented security speeches of securitizing actors, beside the ‘territory’ they address the ‘identity’ as well. Important elements of the Greek identity are considered the Orthodox Christianity, the Greek language and in particular the Greek “exclusive and privilege relation with the antiquity” and the “ideological purity”.\textsuperscript{108} Drawing their lineage from the ancient Hellenes till the present day, the Greek identity became “timeless” and unique, as the popular saying “we have always been Greeks”.\textsuperscript{109} For example, the citizenship law until 2010 was based on \textit{jus sanguinis} reserved only for the ethnic Greeks and according to the statistics Greece is composed by 98% of Orthodox Greeks which represents the country as one of the most homogeneous place in the ethnic mixed Balkan.\textsuperscript{110} Anything that threatens these elements is considered a threat to Greek societal identity.

The announcement of the Macedonian independency under the name Macedonia, an identical name with the name of the ancient Macedonian dynasty, threatened the Greek exclusivity over the Ancient Macedonian heritage. The Macedonian ancient dynasty belonging to the Classical past was considered to be part of the Hellenic heritage and the essence of the Greek cultural identity. A part of the Greek public consciousness became after the discovery of the tomb of Philip II in 1977, and in particular with the publicity of the Macedonian issue in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{108}John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, \textit{Modern Greece: A History since 1821} (United Kingdom, John Willey and Sons 2010), 99.
\textsuperscript{111}Hamilakis, 133.
Since the discovery in Vergina reached an international popularity, in 1988 the Greek government brought a decision to rename the district of ‘Northern Greece’ into ‘Macedonia’, as we know it today.

Furthermore, the voices for existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece were interpreted as a threat not only for the territorial integrity of Greece, but as well as for the identity of the Greek people and the ‘Greekness’ of Macedonia. The claim that there is another identity apart the Greek one goes against the idea of homogeneity of the Greek state. The Greek self-perception of a unique and superior culture, an old civilization which was an inspiration to many Europeans contributed to the Greek anxiety over the name of the Republic of Macedonia. The name Macedonia became an inseparable part of the Greek identity, as the popular parole of that time “our name is our soul”\textsuperscript{112}, and nobody can have that name except the Greeks.

2.2 Discursive and non-discursive conditions in Greece facilitating securitizing Macedonian independence and name

An important part form the securitization process, according to the Copenhagen school, is the facilitating conditions. Thierry Balzacq argues, “when the concept ‘security’ is used, it forces the audience to ‘look around’ in order to identify the conditions (the presumed threats) that justify its articulation.”\textsuperscript{113} The history is considered to be a contextual facilitating factor, which means that the historical experience between the Greeks and the Macedonians has great influence on the process of securitization in Greece and latter in Macedonia. The next paragraphs are devoted to the historical circumstances on the territory of geographical Macedonia.

\textsuperscript{112}Hamilakis, 132.
2.2.1 Ethnographic change in Greek Macedonia and assimilation policy

The antagonistic relationship between Macedonian and Greece could be traced in the very beginning of the creation of the Greek state. The very concept of the Greek state was founded on the glory of the ancient Hellenes and the Christian Orthodoxy of the Byzantine Empire. That understanding of the Greek identity led to the “Megali Idea”, a project for national unification which included irredentist claims to the entire territory of the previous Byzantine Empire, the regions of Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Asia Minor, Crete, Cyprus and Constantinople. The Orthodox Greek-speaking population living in that territory was considered as part of the “imagined community” which justified their cause of national unification. The end of the “Megali Idea” is considered to be with the termination of the Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922), although the Greek territorial borders were fixed in 1947 with the incorporation of the Dodecanese islands.

The territory of the Southern part of Macedonia was integrated to the Greek State after the end of the Balkan Wars with the decision of the Bucharest treaty in 1913. The other two parts of the geographical territory of Macedonia were incorporated by the Bulgarian and the Serbian state. After the incorporation, the next step of Greece was to impose its power over the region and to create a homogeneous compact nation. Yet, that attempt of Greece was problematic as the local population was composed by heterogeneous ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. According to the statistic from the pre Balkan war period, the majority of the inhabitants in Ottoman

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\[\text{\textsuperscript{114}}\text{Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “Imagined communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkan”}\]

Macedonia were the Slav speaking population. However, that ethnographic picture of Greek Macedonia in the next period was drastically changed.

In the period from 1919-1923, the territory of modern Greece was exposed to a sizable influx of population from Bulgaria and Asia Minor. More than 1.2 million of Greeks from Asia Minor were exchanged with 390,000 Muslims from Greece.\footnote{Hugh Poulton, *Who are the Macedonians?* (London: C.Hurst&Co.Publishers, 1995), 86.} The identity of the refugees was defined by their religious belonging. The majority of Asia Minor refugees did not speak the Greek language, and as a result of that in the first years after their installment the Turkish language became a *lingua franca* in the interaction with the local population in Greek Macedonia, a place which was considered as a refugee quarter with the intention to foster the Greek presence in the northern part of the country.\footnote{Anastasia Karakasidou, “Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece: the Slavo-Macedonian ‘non-minority’ in Minority in Greece: Aspect of Plural Society”, ed. Richard Glogg (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 132.} Today it could be said that the mainstream population living in Northern Greece can find their ancestries in Asia Minor.

The Slav inhabitants in Greek Macedonia did not have a Greek national consciousness and as a consequence of that, the Greek government pursued a number of assimilatory policies from which the education was the core element of their Hellenization project. All previous Slav schools in the territory of Macedonia established by the Bulgarian Exarchs and the Serbian church or by the village communities were closed, which was more than five hundred primary schools.\footnote{Poulton, 89.} The assimilation of the Slav population was especially intensive and repressive during the Metaxas regime when the Slav language was prohibited to be spoken even at home, and the adults were obliged to visit a night school to learn the Greek language and in order to
give a Greek appearance of their houses they were compelled to paint them in white and blue, the
colors of the Greek flag.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, public gatherings where the Macedonians could express
their Macedonian national feelings were forbidden and punished, and numbers of Macedonians
were sent into prison just for speaking the Macedonian language.\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore, the Slav names
of the local population were changed into Greek ones, and the names of the villages and the
towns and other places were replaced with Greek ones.\textsuperscript{120}
The incorporation of the Macedonian territory to Greece was seen as part of the Greek national
unification, a land which belonged to the ancient Hellenes. The exchange of population with
Bulgaria and Turkey, and the assimilatory policies of the Greek government which goal was to
build a compact Greek nation, made the Greeks identity to prevail in Greek Macedonia. The
memories of changing of population, are still present in the minds of the Greeks, and always are
“associated with immense pain and suffering by the Greek people.”\textsuperscript{121} Those elements of the
Greek history could be considered as a facilitating condition to the securitization process in
Greece.

\textbf{2.2.2 The Greek Civil War and the Macedonian minority}

The assimilatory and repressive policies Greece over the Macedonian population contributed to
the revival of Macedonian nationalism and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(VMRO), the ultimate goal of which was independent and united Macedonia, which became one
of the basic principles of the ‘leftist nationalism’ of the Comintern and the Balkan Communists,
as the only political party that recognized a separate Macedonian identity.\textsuperscript{122} The majority of the Macedonian population joined the communist parties in Serbia and in Greece. The Greek Communist party recognized distinguished Macedonian population, with its own history, language, culture and territory, and distributed the newspaper ‘Rizospastis’, where the Macedonians could express their identity by writing in Macedonian or in Greek language.\textsuperscript{123} Turning point of the Greek-Macedonian relations is in 1944, when the Serbian part of Macedonian (Vardar Macedonia) with the decision of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the People's Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) became the People’s Republic of Macedonia, as one of the sixth Republics of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, later renamed Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One of Tito’s ambitions was the reunification of the divided Macedonia and possibly creation of South Yugoslav federation. He stated:

\begin{quote}
We [Yugoslav] shall fight against the revisionist who denies the Macedonian people the right to unification…the Macedonian people not only in Vardar Macedonia (Yugoslavia) but also in Pirin (Bulgaria) and Aegean Macedonia (Greece) [should] be given the right to decide their own fate.\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

The Macedonians from Greek Macedonia founded the National Liberation Front (NOF), with their ultimate aim for self-determination and liberation. NOF was in a close collaboration with the Greek Communist Party (KKE) in their fight against the regime in Greece. The Greek Civil War (1946-1948) finished with the defeat of the Communists, who were imprisoned or expelled from Greece. The Macedonians who supported the Communist during the Civil War were expatriated without the right to return. Another group of Macedonians emigrated mainly to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122] Rososs, 132.
\item[123] Ibid., 144.
\item[124] Kondis et al., p.55.
\end{footnotes}
Canada and Australia and today they represent one of the influential Macedonian diasporas communities. The Macedonians who stayed in Greece continued to undergo the Greek policies of Hellenization. The Macedonian participation to the Greek Civil War, depicted the Macedonian minority in Greece as ‘traitors’, and any expression of the Macedonian identity was not welcomed by the Greek authorities, which I will be described in the next paragraphs.

2.2.3 The Macedonian minority in Greece

The long tradition of the Greek authorities to suppress the local Macedonian identity using various assimilatory policies, such as prohibition to maintain a distinct Macedonian culture, tradition and language, shaped the national consciousness of the local population in northern Greece, and today, many of the local Macedonians do not speak the Macedonian language, and they have developed a Greek national consciousness (Karakasidou, 2007). Macedonians who retained their Macedonian identity in 1994 formed the political party “Rainbow”. The formation of a political party that advocates the recognition of a Macedonian minority in Greece is not welcomed by the Greek nationalists. The Macedonian human rights activists in Greece and members of “Rainbow” are blamed for being “Skopian agents”, who promote a separatist idea with an ultimate goal to separate Greek Macedonia from the Greek state and to unite with the neighboring “Skopia”. The Macedonian activists are constantly surveyed by the Greek secret service and undergo harassment and intimidation for their initiatives to voice a distinct Macedonian identity, language and culture from the Greek one. Moreover, in 1990, the attempt of the ethnic Macedonians from Greece to register a cultural association “Home of Macedonian Culture” in Florina was dismissed by the Greek court with the explanation that the purpose of

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that cultural organization is to campaign for the presence of a Macedonian minority in Greece, which is considered to be against the Greek law.\textsuperscript{126} Furthermore, the statement of two Macedonian activists given during an interview that they are Macedonians and acknowledged the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greek Macedonia, was the reason for them to be imprisoned and charged for “spreading a false information about the non-Greekness of Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{127}

The memories of the Greek Civil War are still present in the minds of the Greek people, where the ethnic Macedonians in Greece are reflected as national betrayals who tried to detach Greek Macedonia from Greece. The recognition of a separate Macedonian minority in Greece is presented to be a “Trojan Horse”, a danger that could open the doors for the Macedonian irredentism and claims for the territory and the population. The Greek Premier Minister Mitzotakis declared:

\begin{quote}
From the beginning, I approached the Skopje question in its true dimension…What preoccupied me…was not the name of this state.….The problem was to (avoid of creation of)…a second minority issue in the region of the Western Macedonia…For me the ultimate target has always been for the Republic (of Macedonia) to declare that there is no Slavo-Macedonian minority in Greece and to agree through international treaties that it will cease any irredentist propaganda against the Greek State…This was the centerpiece of the Athens-Skopje dispute.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{127}Human Watch/Helsinki (1994), 24-25.
\end{flushright}
In the words of Mitsotakis, the Macedonian minority issue was the major concern for Greece. The Greek government was not ready to deal with one more minority issue in the country, and if only the Macedonian government signed the nonexistence of its minority in Greece, the problem could be resolved. The Greek securitizing actors presenting the Macedonian issues as a security threat in their speech acts or practices, referring to the previous experience, and suffering of the Greek people make their speech acts to be more credible in the eyes of the audience, and the make the securitization process to be successful.

Macedonian independence and name sparked a strong public protest in Greece and abroad among the Greek diasporas. Huge demonstrations took place in the Capital of Greek Macedonia, Thessaloniki in 1992 and 1994, when close to one million people went on the streets to protest against the Republic of Macedonia, having the slogan “Macedonia is Greek”. In the United States a protest sponsored by the Hellenic-American council drew around 20 000 people to Washington, D.C. In addition to that, in Greece, private companies carried out campaigns aiming at proving the “Greekness” of Macedonia. Again in Greece, songs, pamphlets and stickers declaring “Macedonia is Greek” were disseminated.

As the analysis above shows, the Macedonian independence and name, coupled with the outlined above discursive and non-discursive conditions drove Greece to make worse case assumptions and enter in a security dilemma in which Macedonia was seen to threaten the territorial integrity and societal security of Greece. The framing of Macedonian independence as a security issue by

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130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
the Greek statesmen and strong opposition among the Greeks against the Macedonian name allowed securitization measures to take place. As a consequence, the Greek securitization measures regarding the Macedonian name and independence drove Macedonia to perceive Greece as threatening its societal security, which produced a further facilitating factor for Macedonia to securitize its societal identity, which in turn contributed to maintaining and reinforcing the security dilemma between Greece and Macedonia.
Chapter 3: Greece’s Denial of Macedonia’s Name, Macedonian Securitization and Societal Security Dilemma

In September 8, 1991, the citizens of Macedonia in a referendum expressed their determination to live in a sovereign and the independent Republic of Macedonia. Yet that determination was challenged by some of the Macedonian neighbours. Macedonia surrounded by the ‘four wolves’, who in one or another time in history had aspirations towards the territory and population of Macedonia, just contributed to the fear and insecurity in the country. In this chapter I will explain how the Macedonian politicians reacted to the Greek denial of Macedonia’s name and independence securitizing the Macedonian societal security which on the other hand contributed to the development of the worst-case assumptions about the Greek intentions towards the Macedonian state and nation. Second, I will show what predisposed the Macedonian politicians to engage in securitization, and finally I will analyse the discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions that enabled the Macedonian securitization.

3.1 Macedonia’s Securitizations, Worst-Case Assumptions and their Presuppositions

On 27 June 1992, the European Community (EC) adopted the Lisbon Declaration where is stated: “it expresses its readiness to recognize that republic within its existing borders […] under a name which does not include the term Macedonia.”132 Macedonia’s southern neighbor Greece, a member of the EC, opposed the recognition of the Republic under the name Macedonia. The

name of the Republic is identical with the Greek Northern Province ‘Macedonia’ and Greece accused the Republic of using the name for an irredentist reason. The EC addressed the fears of Greece and placed a condition for the Macedonian recognition, to change the name.

The Lisbon Declaration was accepted with disappointment among the Macedonian politicians. The first Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in his Memoirs (2001) writes:

> With this [Lisbon] declaration the basic rights, feelings and integrity of our peaceful people were violated…No one has the right to decide the name of a country. Our final answer is-no! We remain the Republic of Macedonia.\(^{133}\)

The non-recognition of the Macedonian statehood was not expected by the Macedonian politicians and in general by the Macedonian citizens. Prior the Lisbon Declaration, the EC’s Arbitration Commission gave its opinion that Macedonia fulfils the required conditions for recognition and that “the name of the state does not imply any territorial claims.”\(^{134}\) The Macedonian political elite interpreted the Lisbon Declaration as an act of injustice made towards the Macedonian people who in a peaceful way had succeeded to separate from the Yugoslav Federation, a decision which could jeopardize their own security and “deprive them of a normal life”.\(^{135}\) The disappointment of the ‘Lisbon Declaration’ among the Macedonian politicians, led to a surge of patriotism in defense of the Macedonian name.\(^{136}\) The Macedonian Parliament categorically rejected the Declaration, and adopted the new Macedonian flag, with the ancient Macedonian symbol on it, the “Sun of Vergina” emblem which was found on the Greek territory in 1977. The adoption of the Vergina Sun flag, on the other hand, worsened the already sensitive

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\(^{133}\) Quoted in Zahariadis, *Essence of Political Manipulation*, 119.


\(^{135}\) Ibid., 209.

relation with Greece. That decision at the same time represented a facilitating condition to the Greek securitization of its societal and state security. In a memorandum addressed to the head of the United Nation, Greece expressed its concern about the Macedonian intention using a symbol and name which are part of the identity of another nation.

Consequently, the Macedonian accession to the United Nation was not under the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia”. The international community was very cautious in approaching the issue. Taking into consideration the importance of the Macedonian recognition and at the same time concerned about the reaction of Greece, the UN Security Council proposed a composed and temporary reference for Macedonia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) which would be used in the UN until the moment when an agreement would be reached between Macedonian and Greece. As a reason of the flag dispute, “Macedonia was only member without a flag flying outside U.N. headquarters in New York,” The ‘sun’ is considered to be a traditional symbol of the Macedonian people, a sign which could be found on the wall of different churches on the territory of Macedonia. The Vergina Sun symbol was used mainly by the Macedonian diaspora in Australia, one of the loudest voices for the modern Macedonian connection with the ancient Macedonians and Alexander the Great. However, the official Macedonian narrative goes back in the late nineteenth century in 1893 with the foundation of the Internal Revolutionary Macedonia Organization (VMRO), the Ilinden Uprising in 1903 and ten days Macedonian independence in Krushevo, the so-called Krushevo Republic.

The role of the VMRO was significant for the expression of the Macedonian identity and the revolutionary struggle for free and independent Macedonia.

In contrast to the other Balkan people the Macedonian national awakening and the revolutionary movement, occurred latter as a reason of the propaganda war of the neighboring states (Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia) which strived for the “hearts and minds” of the Macedonian people and affected the development of Macedonian national consciousness.\textsuperscript{140} Since that period the Macedonian people feel a necessity to show its distinctiveness from the other neighboring identities. For that reason the Macedonian independent state in 1991 was based on the nation-state model, a state for the Macedonian nation. The name of the state is identical with the name of the nation and the language what they speak is Macedonian. The Greek demand of Macedonia to change its name, by the Macedonian politicians was interpreted and presented as changing the name of the nation. The very identity of the Macedonian people is based on the name ‘Macedonia’.

In 1992, the Macedonian Primer Minister Branko Crvenkovski (1992-1998) in an interview stated: “the very moment we give up our name ... the question will arise: if you're not Macedonians, then what are you?”\textsuperscript{141} The Macedonian politicians framed the new situation as a threat to the Macedonian societal identity. The securitizing actors presented to the Macedonian audience that changing the name of the country would mean losing the identity of the Macedonian people. Thus, for the very survival of the Macedonian nation it is necessary the name of the state to be “Macedonia”. The present discourse among the Macedonian politicians, in particular, was emphasized after the Macedonian accession to the UN under the provisional

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\textsuperscript{141} Quoted in Thurow R, "Nouvelle Macedonia Pits Greeks, Slavs in Moniker Muddle", \textit{Wall Street Journal}, 19 November 1992
\end{flushright}
name FYROM. The Macedonian political parties in opposition largely used the name issue in their public speeches in the parliamentary elections’ campaign in 1994, where they described the Macedonians as “nameless” people and they called to defend the name Macedonia.142

The political rhetoric of ‘existential threat’ to the Macedonian identity since 1992 is constantly repeated and shared by the large political and intellectual elite in Macedonia, which on the other hand could explain why the name dispute has been intractable so far. In the next paragraphs, I will present some of the speech acts made by the Macedonian authorities and intellectuals.

Blagoj Handzhiski, the Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-1998) stated:

I think the knowledge that our name, which we had for centuries, is connected with our identity – is ripening and nobody, has the right to demand changes of the constitutional name of the country.143

In this statement, it is very clear expressed the connection between the name of the country and the identity of the people. Talking about the constitution he refers to the Macedonian right for self-determination. The Macedonian political elite since the beginning of the name dispute addressed the issue through the legal perspective, the right of the Macedonian people to choose its name. Similarly, Boris Trajkovski, the president of the Republic of Macedonia (1999-2004) confirmed the Macedonian sensitiveness over the name: “Our name is the identity of the nation, the most sensitive national issue of all, it is a question of pride and dignity and a precondition for

our existence and development.” Presenting the name as “the most sensitive national issue of all” reveals the uneasiness to resolve the dispute between Macedonia and Greece. The attempt of the UN mediator of the name dispute Mathieu Nimitz to facilitate finding a common acceptable name for both of the countries, in 2002 gave a proposal for the name of the Republic as: “Upper Macedonia” and “Republika Makedonija”. The Macedonian Foreign Minister Slobodan Casule (2001-2002) commented:

To begin with, it is wholly unacceptable that our name should remain untranslated, and that we should be listed under “R” as Republika Makedonija. What is even worse is the requirement that we relinquish our cultural and historical past […] We continue to hold the position that we do not accept the name “Upper Macedonia”, we insist on the name “Republic of Macedonia” with the possible addition of the word Skopje, which we will talk about.145

This statement was reinforced by the opinion of the Macedonian Academy of Science and Art (MANU), a respected institution in Macedonia. In a Memorial devoted to the name dispute with Greece, the Academy declared: “Acceptance of the ‘Upper Macedonian’ proposal would mean depriving a people that has lived in Macedonia for centuries of its national character. [It would mean] the negation of the Macedonian identity”146 The opinion of the Academy does not differ from the other securitizing actors in Macedonia. The name ‘Macedonia’ is presented as an important element of Macedonian identity, it is required for the ‘very existence of the Macedonian nation’.

145 Quoted and translated in Tziampiris, 245.
146 Memorial of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts Relating to the Dispute about the Name of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, June 30, 2002 quoted in Tziampiris, 247.
The name dispute between Macedonia and Greece was intensified in particular the period prior to the Macedonian application for membership in the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) in 2008. Greece, similarly to the Macedonian accession to the UN, made its arguments and vetoed the Macedonian accession to NATO. Prior the NATO Summit in Bucharest Ilinka Mitreva, the Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002-2006) stated:

> The change of the name would mean once and for all accepting a philosophy of defeat which has been our destiny forever - denial of our nation, language, history. Accepting a change of the name means renouncing our right to exist.\(^{147}\)

Mitreva refers to the wider context of the name dispute. Talking about the ‘destiny’ she recalls the past, the history of the Macedonian people, when in one or in another time, the existence of the Macedonians was denied by its neighboring countries. Therefore, changing the name would mean, as she points out, a ‘self-defeat’ of the Macedonians, accepting the thesis that there is no “Macedonian nation” and “language” is to refute the history and suffering of the Macedonian people.

In 2008, after the Macedonian non-invitation for membership to NATO, as a reason of the Greek opposition over the Macedonian name, the Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki (2006-2011) stated: “NATO failure to extend membership invitation to Macedonia, based not on what the country has done but due to what we are - and we are Macedonians and our country is the Republic of Macedonia, which will be our name for good”\(^{148}\). This statement confirms the injustice made towards the Macedonian people, the words “due to what we are” are strong and


influential, which contribute to the feeling of insecurity over the Macedonian identity in the country. In addition, by the same token, Greece vetoed the beginning of the negotiation process for membership to the European Union (EU) in 2009 which is in power till the present day. The condition is Macedonia to change the name.

The Macedonian Primer Minister Nikola Gruevski, who came to power in 2006, on the critics addressed to him for missing an historical chance for NATO membership and the start of the negotiation process with the EU, responded:”[…] this chance is erasing itself from the map of nations and erasing own identity.”149 The NATO and EU blockades by Greece were the turning point of Macedonian identity politics. After the NATO summit, the Macedonian government starts projects and policies with the aim to strengthen the Macedonian identity. “Skopje 2014”, a grandiose project containing nation-building elements, as erecting monuments of Macedonian revolutionist and another significant personage from the history who contributed to the Macedonian nation and state. Moreover, a number of administrative buildings, museum and theater are constructed in a Neo-Classical style, for which some analyst called the project “Antiquisation”.150 Furthermore, a 22m statue of Alexander the Great, which official name is “Warrior on a Horse” was erected in the main square of Skopje and in the same location was placed a Triumphal Arc with Macedonian motives on it, starting from the Antiquity till the present day. For the first time in the history of Independent Macedonia, the Antiquity was emphasized as part of the cultural heritage of the Macedonian people. In 2006, the Airport in Skopje was renamed “Alexander the Great – Airport”151, and the main highway from Skopje to

Thessaloniki was named “Alexander the Macedon”, and the stadium of Skopje as Philip II. Moreover, the funds allocated for the archeological findings on the territory of Macedonia were increased.\textsuperscript{152} The first archeologist in Macedonia, the director of the Bureau for the Protection of Cultural Heritage of Macedonia, Pasko Kuzman in one interview stated: “Macedonia can only defend its name, if it proves that the Macedonian nation has Classical Antique and not Slavic roots.”\textsuperscript{153}

Republic of Macedonia echoed the Greek politics of materializing the history through monuments connected to myths and symbols, which on the other hand contributed to the insecurity over the Macedonian identity in the country. The constant repeating of the securitizing moves, by the politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals using the words of “right to exist”, “denial”, “relinquish our past”, “pride”, ‘dignity’, “identity”, “our name”, “erasing ourselves”, the authorities in the country just reinforce and maintain the worst-case assumptions of the Macedonian population for losing its identity. Changing the name of the country became identical with changing the name of the nation, thus losing their identity. The security requirement of the country is constructed in a way that the name of the state should stay the ‘Republic of Macedonia’, and any demand of neighboring Greece for changing the name was interpreted as threatening the Macedonian societal security. By framing the Macedonia-Greek dispute as threat to the societal security constitute the security dilemma and the worst case assumptions. Greece’s denial of the name of the Macedonian state and the related to that Greek securitization of Macedonia’s name were perceived by Macedonia as threatening its societal integrity and thus pushed Macedonia to securitize its societal identity by strengthening it. In relation to that, discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions, inter-subjectively

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
constructed throughout the history of the Greek-Macedonian relations, contributed to Macedonia’s securitization of its societal integrity and shaped a societal security dilemma for Macedonia. These facilitating conditions aimed to strengthen the perceived threat to the Macedonian identity will be discussed in a greater length below.

3.2 Discursive and Non-Discursive Conditions Facilitating the Securitization of Macedonia’s Name

Since the Macedonian Enlightenment in the late nineteen century, the Macedonian identity was contested and claimed by the neighbouring countries. With the Macedonian independence in 1991 these old conflicts and claims were revived. In the early 1990s, the Serbian nationalists already proclaimed Macedonia as “Southern Serbia” or “Vardar Banovina”, names with which the Republic was named in the past period under the Serbian rule, which on the other hand increased the feeling of insecurity in the non-recognized country. That policy was abandoned in 1996, when Yugoslavia officially recognized the Macedonian independency under its constitutional name. The only disagreement which persists until present is the non-recognition of the Macedonian autocephaly by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

On the other hand, the first country which recognized the Macedonian statehood was Bulgaria, but a distinct Macedonian nation and language remain unrecognized, as they are considered to be Bulgarian. On one occasion the Bulgarian President from 1992 Zhelyo Zhelev stated:

We have a common history, a common language, a common religion. . . . For the vast majority of Bulgarians, and for our historians, the idea has therefore arisen that Macedonia is not a nation in its own right. But politically, we cannot allow ourselves to impose a national identity on the

\[^{154}\text{Mirchev, 204.}\]
Macedonians. They have the right to choose for themselves—that is the most essential democratic right of the individual.\textsuperscript{155}

With these words, the Bulgarian President expressed the official position of Bulgaria towards the Macedonian nation. The Bulgarians see the Macedonians as part of their nation, and the language is considered to be a Bulgarian dialect. The both of the countries have common historical personages, who are considered Bulgarians in Bulgaria and Macedonians in Macedonia. According to the Bulgarian scholars, the Bulgarian identity in Macedonia started to fade in 1920 and in particular with the creation of the Yugoslavian Federation, the present Macedonians are considered to be creation of Tito’s propaganda.\textsuperscript{156}

On the other hand, the Macedonians see themselves as a separate nation with a separated language. Moreover, they claim that there is a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria in particular in the territory of Pirin Macedonia, the part which was given to Bulgaria in 1913 with the Buckhurst Treaty. That claim is denied by the Bulgarian authorities. The Bulgarian attitude towards Macedonia, making no difference between the Bulgarian and Macedonian nation, since the very beginning of the Macedonian independence, contributed to the insecurity of the Macedonians for their already contested identity by their neighbour Greece.

The Greek definition of the Macedonian nation has a similar position with Bulgaria. The former Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis declared:

Let me explain the problem as Greeks see it. When Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia changed the name of his country’s southern province in 1944 from Vardar Banovina to the Social Republic of Macedonia, he did it to stir up disorder in northern Greece in order to communize the area and to


gain an outlet to the Aegean Sea for his country [...] Greeks believed that when Yugoslavia dissolved and FYROM declared its independence in 1991, its leaders would recognize our sensitivity to its use of a name it adopted during the Communist era and change it, as the Soviet Union did, to make a clean break with its past.\footnote{Dora Bakoyannis, The View from Athens, The New York Times, March 31, 2008 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/opinion/31htdbakoy.1.11552267.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=dora%20bakoyannis&sst=cse (accessed 10 May 2012)}

In other words, Greece does not recognize the Macedonian nation and the self-identification of the Macedonian people. The Greek politicians or the general public in Greece prefer to call their north neighbours “Skopjians”, or to describe the state as a non-stable “formation”, and when they refer to their language, it is often defined as a “dialect” or according to the Greek linguist Babaniotis, the Macedonian language is an “artificial construction”.\footnote{Takis Michas, Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milošević’s Serbia, (Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 44.} Therefore, the Greek decision makers, in order to preserve the homogeneity and uniqueness of the state, deny the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece. Moreover, Greece with the not recognizing of the Macedonian independence, go one step further contesting a separate Macedonian nation and language outside the Greek border as well. If there is no Macedonian nation, then the Republic cannot have the name Macedonia, a name which is considered to be part of the Greek identity more than “tree millennia”.\footnote{Dora Bakoyannis, The New York Times, March 31, 2008.} Therefore the Republic should change the name and to “break up with the past as the Soviet Union did.”\footnote{Ibid.}

On the other hand, as part of the Macedonian collective memory, is the suffering of the Macedonian people during the propaganda war of the neighbouring countries starting with the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1860, when a number of Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek schools were open on the territory of Macedonia which aim was to cultivate the local identity as
their own. That competition over the territory and population of Macedonia leaded to two Balkan wars and division of Macedonia in three parts in 1913. With the division of Macedonia, the Macedonian people were divided too, who undergone a harsh assimilatory policy by the new rulers. The Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece, till the present day are not recognized as a minority group.

The assimilatory policies of Greece, in particular under the Metaxas regime, when the Macedonians were imprisoned or expatriated as a reason of speaking in their mother tongue, which in turn pushed the Macedonian minority to take the side of the Greek Communist during the Greek Civil War and fought against the Greek government. The Civil War will end in 1949 with the defeat of the Communist, and their imprisoning or expulsion from Greece. Many Macedonians left Greece and never returned as they were proclaimed as a danger to the national security of Greece. A painful story from the Civil War is the exodus of 28 000 Communist children (refugee children), sending them in the other Communist countries, the majority of the children were Macedonians, with their expatriation they lost the right to return to their homeland, to have their citizenship in Greece or to take their property which was confiscated by the government.

As the Copenhagen School argues that, history is one of the facilitating conditions for a successful securitization. Indeed, as the analysis above shows, the historical experience between Greece and Macedonia includes events and measures which triggered securitizations, which in turn strengthened the worst-case assumptions of the two states about each other’s intentions, each of them seeing the other as a potential threat to its societal and territorial integrity. According to the theory of securitization, this historical experience provided non-discursive facilitating condition for Macedonia’s securitization of the Macedonian identity.
However, as the Copenhagen School argues, presenting to the audience an issue as an existential threat and referring to historical facilitating conditions to further strengthen the credibility of a worst-case assumption represents just a call for securitizing the issue in question. Yet, given the inter-subjective nature of the securitization, as noted by the Copenhagen School, a given issue can be successfully securitized only when the call for its securitization receives the approval of the audience. In 1992, a large number of Macedonians under the slogans “Yes, Republic of Macedonia, Yes” went on the streets of Skopje, Melbourne, Toronto and in other diasporas community canters around the world to protest against the Europeans Community’s (EC) decision for non-recognition of Macedonian statehood. Furthermore, a poll published preceding NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, shows that 82.5% of the citizens in Macedonia were against changing the name of the country as a condition for the NATO membership.\(^{161}\)

Moreover, in October 2011, a number of letters in defending of the Macedonian identity were sent to the EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule, as a reaction of omitting the adjective ‘Macedonian’ in the EC’s progress report for 2011. Students, intellectuals, sport figures, popular personalities are one of the group protestors who have sent a letter to the Commissioner Fule. Macedonia’s basketball team in their letter writes: "We are deeply offended by the latest EC actions which deny our Macedonian identity. That is a shameful putdown of us."\(^{162}\) This reaction of the Macedonian society speaks for the present feeling of insecurity for the Macedonian identity.

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Therefore, a conclusion can be made based on the discussion above that all three conditions (discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions and approval of the audience) were fulfilled for the successful securitization of the perceived threats to Macedonia’s identity and territorial integrity in relation to the Greek-Macedonia “name dispute” security dilemma are in place. This in turn resulted in the adoption of defensive measures aimed to strengthen the Macedonian identity, and securing the name of the Republic of Macedonia.
Conclusion

As the analysis above shows, both Greece and Macedonia have encountered severe societal security dilemmas related to their name dispute. Greeks define their territorial security requirements in such a way that the use of the ancient name Macedonia by current Macedonians constitutes a threat to their territorial and societal integrity and thus Greece asks the Macedonian government to change the country’s name, as the name Macedonia is perceived by Greece as strengthening the hands of the unrecognised Macedonian minority in Greece and as emboldening them to demand more autonomy and rights, which is perceived by the Greeks as a threat to their identity and territorial integrity. In Macedonia, Greece’s refusal to recognize their country’s name was interpreted as yet another and as the most dangerous threat to the identity of the Slav majority, whose societal security was already weakened by Bulgarian and Serbian claims that Macedonia neither had its own language, nor its own religion. This is seen by the ethnic Macedonians as an offensive action that threatens the societal identity and even the territorial integrity, and thus the survival, of Macedonia.

Therefore, in terms of this study’s research question as to why the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has proven intractable so far, I would argue that this is because i) the intertwined interstate and societal security dilemma, involving both territorial and societal integrity as reference objects of security; and ii) these security dilemmas are the result of securitising moves by politicians, official security experts, and media organisations in Greece and Macedonia, which moves were accepted by the Greek and by the Macedonian population because of a number of discursive and non-discursive facilitating conditions, among which historical conditions, and demographic conditions.
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