LANGUAGE POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN: 
AN ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

One of the most persistent Soviet legacies has been the promotion of the Russian language at the expense of other languages. This thesis evaluates the language policy of Kazakhstan from Soviet times to its current implementation. For this purpose it provides a historical background and follows the development and impact of the Soviet and Kazakhstani policies, the challenges of the early independence and the conditions in which the language policy formulation began. It looks at the examples of Baltic States, Ukraine and Finland and their language policies in order to determine the aspects that might be applicable to Kazakhstan. Based on the information and analysis, it provides recommendations on encouraging the learning of Kazakh and avoiding potential conflict.
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INTRODUCTION

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a good illustration of how a great idea can be ruined by a bad policy. Conceived as a classless society, where each person is equal to the other and together they are the rulers and not the ruled, turned into a society with a large nomenklatura, elitist and alienated, entangled in bureaucracy and corruption. A union of free and equal peoples was oppressing national self-identification at home and abroad and at times aggressively promoting another language and culture. The world’s largest country, the Soviet Union was all but homogeneous. It brought together, some against their will, peoples of different origin, culture and history. Some had had a state of their own and had a strong sense of nation, while others were still in the process of forming a nation. These characteristics defined the way these nations reacted and resisted the Soviet policies of assimilation and cultural homogenization. The nations of the Baltic region and the Caucasus resisted most actively and were more vocal of their grievances than the nations of the Russian Autonomous regions and Central Asia, which were incorporated into the Russian Empire very early in their societal development and national consolidation. These peoples found themselves in a situation of deep crisis not only in the social, economic, political spheres, but also in the sphere of national identity. For nomads of Central Asia had no national identity, written language and culture before becoming a part of the Russian Empire, so it had all been formed by first the tsarist government and later the Soviets. However, they were not done for the benefit of the people, but rather for the purpose of reaching the ultimate goal, the creation of a Soviet culture, based almost entirely on the Russian one. The major steps towards this goal were the nationalities and languages policies of the Soviet Union that had changed the ethnic composition of the region and its cultures.

The present thesis focuses on the country that had suffered the most amongst other Central Asian states from these policies, Kazakhstan, due to its historical ties with Russia and the
geographical proximity. Kazakhstan was one of the few former Soviet states that experienced problems with its titular language, Kazakh and making it an official functioning language. The scholars on former Soviet Union tend to focus on ethnic issues, such biculturalism of Latvia and Kazakhstan (Kolstø, “Political construction sites: Nation-building in Russia and the post-Soviet States”, 2000), clan politics and history (Schatz, “Modern Clan Politics”, 2004). Much attention is paid to the politics, administration and Soviet legacy (Jones Luong, “The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence”, 2003), the transition period, its challenges and opportunities (Olcott, “Central Asia’s Second Chance”, 2005), the regional cooperation and security (Olcott, “Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security”, 1996). Research specifically on Kazakhstan tends to focus on history (Olcott, “The Kazakhs”, 1995), oil and gas sector (Olcott, “Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise”, 2002), and the politics of ethnicity (Davé, “Kazakhstan: ethnicity, language and power”, 2007). Little attention is paid, however, to the role of language in the nation-building and stability in the country, the role of the Soviet policies and the way the government tried to reverse this impact. Current publications on language policies have been done by the government itself and its bodies and therefore the topic lacks a different, independent assessment and point of view.

My objective in this thesis is to provide an independent analysis of the language policy, taking into account its development during the Soviet period and after gaining independence, and to look at how it was formulated, how it is being independent and what kind of reaction it caused in the society. Considering the fact that the government of Kazakhstan often refers to other countries and their experience in language policy-making, these cases will be briefly summarized in order to see whether some aspects can be applicable to Kazakhstan and if yes, in what way. These cases are Baltic States, Ukraine and Finland. As the government plans building a model of bilingualism similar to the Finnish one in Kazakhstan, the special focus will be made on this model, whether or not it was correctly understood and what aspects can be applicable to
Kazakhstan. This thesis evaluates the language policy of Kazakhstan and follows its development from Soviet times and its current implementation.

The first chapter will describe the Soviet nationalities and languages policies, the impact they have left on the country and the policies of independent Kazakhstan and whether they were able to solve the problems inherited from the USSR. Chapter two looks at the language policy of Kazakhstan, its framework and components and further describes the public reaction to the policy and the criticism. Chapter three summarizes the experience of Baltic States, Ukraine and Finland and their language policies to see whether or not their aspects can be applicable to Kazakhstan. Chapter four will give recommendations to the government of Kazakhstan, based on the analysis and information provided in previous chapters, in order to strengthen the policy and make it more effective.
CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will provide a historical overview of the policies of the Soviet Union and further in the second part, of the independent Kazakhstan that have shaped the linguistic situation in which the country found itself at the time of the breakup of USSR.

1.1. The Soviet Period

The Soviet Union, the way it was conceived by Lenin in “The State and Revolution” was a union of free republics (Patnaik 2003, 24-25), where the peoples had the right to speak their languages and were united by free will. However, Russian was promoted as a lingua franca in this multinational country, sometimes at the expense of others. Combined with the low level of development of some languages (Kazakh, for example) and a policy of active ethnic mixing and resettlement, resulted in political and social tensions in the member republics, that continued for years after the USSR ceased to exist. This chapter will look, first, at the Soviet nationalities policy, and how it shaped the ethno-national composition of Kazakhstan, and how the promotion of Russian language affected the status of Kazakh and the number of its speakers. As it will be shown, Kazakhstan’s policies and its current situation were shaped by the Soviet policies.

1.1.1. Soviet Nationalities Policy

Being the vast multiethnic country it was, the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union was expressed in its complex administrative system, approach to nationalities and resettlement programs. Together these policies have shaped the way the nations interacted between each other and defined a status for each of them.

First of all, a group of people had to be defined a “nation”. Soviet scientists used a definition developed by Joseph Stalin in his book “Marxism and the National Question”, where he defined a nation as a “historically formed stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological formation, manifested through a common culture” (Roy 2000, 62). In this
way, the language was made an important characteristic of a nation. This link was further strengthened by the decennial census, where nation and language always went together. In the Soviet science, the evolution of the language was not separated from the evolvement of the nation. The stages of this evolution were defined according to those put forward by Marx and Engels (1998, 34-62) in the Communist Manifesto: primitive communism, slave society, feudalism, capitalism and socialism. A territorial unit was assigned according to the stage of development of each respective nation. The union republic (SSR) level was given to the societies at the capitalist stage (Roy 2000, 64), one of which was Kazakhstan, obtaining this status in 1936. The statuses of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), autonomous region (AR) or oblast, national territory (NT) or okrug (2000) were given to societies in from third (feudalism) to fifth (primitive communism) stage, respectively.

Roy (2000, 66) further argues that the logic of territorial division was not based on nationalities and languages only, but had its political reasons and served to limit the possibilities of solidarity movements, for example to curb pan-Turkism through rooting Turkic peoples in nation-states and emphasizing their different ethnogenesis and languages. The switch of Turkic languages to Cyrillic script in 1940s further solidified these differences and cut the Soviet Turkic peoples off from ethnically close peoples and Diasporas abroad. The borders between the Soviet republics were drawn in a way that always left a part of an ethnic group a minority in the other (Roy 2000, 68-69).

As the first of the Central Asian states to join the Russian Empire, Kazakhstan suffered the most from the tsarist policies of land acquisition, the building of fortresses and the Russian military presence in the country. These policies accompanied the resettlement of non-indigenous peoples - Khazanov (1995, 157) reports that 1.5 million newcomers arrived in Kazakhstan during this time. Forced sedenterization and the difficulties of switching to new lifestyle, unsuccessful revolutions caused decrease in the ethnic Kazakh population from 91.4% in 1850 to 58.5% in 1926 (Khazanov 1995, 158). The forced collectivization policy to 1930s took from 1.5 to 2
million lives of ethnic Kazakhs (1995). Hence, by 1939 the number of Russians began to exceed that of Kazakhs (1995). The industrialization of 1940s, the WWII, the Virgin Lands campaign of 1950s further solidified the demographic supremacy of all the other nations as a whole, and especially Russians, over Kazakhs. Khazanov reports that by 1962 the share of Kazakhs in the population of Kazakhstan was 29%.

These resettlement policies were actively opposed by the national intelligentsia, resulting in their purge (Roy 2000, 101-102). This loss of highly educated intellectuals literally beheaded the Kazakhs as a nation, and made the Soviet government promote the new elite, thus bringing to power poorly educated members of society (2000, 102). Roy (2000, 108) points out that this new elite consisted of ethnic Kazakhs and mostly Russians from elsewhere; the latter only temporarily holding offices. Only Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians and Jews, according to Roy had a chance to serve in another republic, while the others could only make a career within their national republic. Roy reports that, Soviet Turkic nations were prominent only in diplomatic missions to Third World Muslim countries and unrepresented in other high level positions. For example, they constituted only 3.06% of Soviet army officers, while being 16.5% of the total population of the country (2000, 156).

The Korenizatsya policy changed the situation in favor of the titular nation, causing much resentment among other peoples. This policy made the ethnic Kazakhs prominent in cultural and political spheres (Kolstø 2000, 89), and allowed them to occupy major positions within their own republic, while Russians were largely excluded from administration. However, due to education being offered exclusively in Russian (higher education almost entirely, as well as the best quality schooling) and it being better in big cities than elsewhere, ethnic Russians, as an overwhelmingly urban group, were overrepresented in the high skilled, technical positions (2000), as well as in the industrial workforce in general. Everett-Heath (2003, 183) reports that in 1987 only 21% of the industrial workforce in Kazakhstan were Kazakhs. Kazakhs made up only 20.8% of the urban population in 1979 (2003), remaining overwhelmingly rural and thus experiencing difficulties in
accessing quality education and finding well-paid jobs. This created a misbalance in the society, making Russians urban, highly educated, technical elite but keeping them away from political power and making some Kazakhs political leaders, while not providing the others with opportunities to urbanize and improve the quality of living. That is one of the reasons why, as Roy (2000, 156) contends, the Russians never felt the need to learn the local language in any republic, which later, when they become independent states, became a problem for the new governments.

1.1.2. Soviet Languages Policy

At the time of becoming a part of Russian Empire, Kazakhs were not formed as a nation, divided into zhuzes (hordes or clans). Kazakhs were nomads, and the culture was predominantly oral and had an especially developed vocabulary in connection with the nomadic lifestyle. However, the Russian lifestyle was different; it was urbanizing, sedentary and had a codified written language, which had adopted a vocabulary that meets the needs of modern world. As soon as Central Asia became part of the Russian Empire, the languages were switched from Arabic script to Latin and then to Cyrillic by the 1940s (Patnaik 2003, 37), Russian was made mandatory in schools from 1930s (Patnaik 2003, 38). Although from 1959 it became voluntary, parents of all nationalities tried to sign their children up to Russian-language schools. One of the reasons was that, as Khazanov reports (1995, 159), not less than 700 Kazakh schools were closed. In the 1970s and 80s, 32% of Kazakh school children and those of other ethnic groups studied in Russian language schools, according to Davé (2007, 64). And by 1989, according to Khazanov (1995, 159) over 2 million school children attended Kazakh-language schools, while a little less than 1 million attended those in Kazakh. Another reason was that higher education was still offered almost exclusively in Russian, and there was no requirement for learning Kazakh (Davé 2007, 64). There were only few higher education institutions that offered a university degree in Kazakh, and according to Khazanov (1995, 249) only 13.6% of students studied there in 1990.
Unless they spoke very good Russian, they had little chances of a better life in one of the major cities afterwards.

This Russification effect happened even though the Constitution of the USSR does not mention it as “official language”. The Soviet Union was founded on several principles, the first being the equality between its peoples, so the country had no official language, second the right of every nation to use its own language, third right to education in his/her national language and access to cultural materials in this language (Comrie 1981, 22). Despite all of this and the idea of internationalism, friendship of peoples and various policies promoting national cultures, the actually implemented policies had quite the opposite effect. Besides the small number of schools teaching in Kazakh, and making it mandatory subject in the schools, there were not many qualified teachers and textbooks, and the number of hours per week was a minimum. Davé (2007, 64) argues that in this way the Soviet government kept the commitment to promotion and preservation of different languages, while formally making fluency in them impossible.

Thus, Russian became the “high culture”, the urban, the modern, the one everyone aspired to be part of, while Kazakh became the kitchen language, preserved in rural areas, where because of lack of quality education people remained poor and could hope only for low-paid and low skill jobs. Urban Kazakhs, 26.5% of whole urban population of the country in 1989 (as opposed to 77.4% Russians) were predominantly Russophone.

As a consequence of promotion of Russian and its domination, the ethnic Russians felt no need to learn other languages. Masanov (2002, 2) reports that the level of bilingualism was 40% among Kazakhs, Belarusians and Latvians which are higher than anywhere else in the USSR and a result of the high numbers of ethnic Russians living there, while the level among Russians was only 3.1%. A census in Kazakhstan in 1989 revealed a level as low as 0.8% (2002).
The first language law was passed in 1989 in Kazakh SSR and together with other legal documents elevated the status of Kazakh. This step is seen as the beginning of de-Russification of Kazakhstan and was met with caution by the Russophone majority of the population.

1.2. Independent Kazakhstan

As Kazakhstan became independent without a previous experience of statehood, it had to face a number of challenges. Apart of the economic decline, there was a risk of secession of the North, complex ethnic and linguistic makeup, which created, as Olcott (2002) put it, the challenge of creating Kazakhstanis.

The question of Kazakh language and its status in relation to Russian became one of the most important parts of the new life of the young republic. Kazakhs felt that they had at last gotten their homeland, their own ethnic state and that everything should reflect their culture and traditions. While Russians and the Russian-speaking population in general favored the official status for Russian language and even some sort of integration with Russia. This created tensions, which contributed to the uncertainty due to the economic recession that hit Kazakhstan.

This chapter will discuss the challenges and threats that Kazakhstan faced during its early independence and what kind of nationalities and languages policies it chose to implement.

1.2.1. Early independence: challenges and threats

The Soviet nationalities policy not only made Kazakhs a minority in their own republic with 39.7% of population, while Russians had almost the same share with 37.8% and other nations 22.5% (Smith 1996, 501) but made North Kazakhstan predominantly Russian, leaving the South mostly Kazakh. Northern Kazakhstan was 49.8% Russian and 29.6% Kazakh, while South Kazakhstan was 67.8% Kazakh and only 8.2% Russian (Olcott 2002, 248). This created a risk of secession of the northern part of Kazakhstan and its annexation to Russia, which was called for by the prominent Russian author Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. The only president of Kazakhstan to
Nursultan Nazarbayev, due to his personal charisma and leadership, has earned support among both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs by carefully balancing their interests (Everett-Heath 2003, 188). He has nevertheless made it clear that any attempt to threaten the territorial integrity of the republic will cause bloodshed, thus anticipating potential secessionist trends in any part of the country, but specifically in Northern Kazakhstan (2003). This approach has so far been successful. However, no leader is eternal and therefore for the country to survive when he goes, the issue needs to be addressed with a well-planned policy.

As the country gained independence in 1991, the law passed in 1989 making Kazakh the only official language, retained legal power. Demonstrations took place in 1992 by Slavs in North and East Kazakhstan demanding equal status for Russian (Everett-Heath 2003, 187). The status of “language of interethnic communication” was given to Russian in 1996 amendment to the article 7.2 of the Constitution (Everett-Heath, 2003, 187), which made it de facto equal, while still avoiding calling it “official” like Kazakh.

The early independence period saw an outflow of different nationalities, majority of whom left for other CIS countries. The migration was due to economic decline, as the country was trying to build an independent market-oriented economy and due to the fear of representatives of non-titular nations of the possible nationalism. As a result, the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan changed dramatically. According to the results of 2009 census, Kazakhs comprised 63.6%, a 1.5 times rise in last two decades, Russians 23.3%, a decline by almost the same rate over the same period (Suleimenova 2010, 31). The biggest decline was seen among Germans, their population decreased to less than a fifth, number of Belarusians and Ukrainians fell by 2.5 times over 20 years (2010). The increase in the population of ethnic Kazakhs was due to the outmigration of other nationalities, as well as a policy of “Nurly Köş” (“Happy Resettlement”), which brought 183,000 people from Mongolia, China, Turkey, Uzbekistan, etc. in the period from 1991-2000 (Suleimenova 2010, 37). Similarly to the Soviet administrative reform that greatly influenced the ethnic composition of the republics; the
government of Kazakhstan made changes to the administrative-territorial division of the country. The capital was moved northward, to the city of Aqmola, later renamed Astana. The oblasts were re-arranged, so that the predominantly “Russian” ones are joined with the predominantly “Kazakh” (Masanov 2010, 57). In this way the risk of separatism in the North was reduced, and allowed the country to avoid ethnic-based conflicts.

1.2.2. The language issue

The stipulation of the official status of Kazakh in the Constitution solved one of the problems of the language. Previously, as non-official, it had no chances of competing with Russian and the policy promoting it. Despite the compromise that “language of interethnic communication” status of Russian was, Kazakh remained the only language referred to as “official”. The proponents of Kazakh as the only state language argued that it is not developed and strong enough to compete with Russian, and therefore, needs legal and constitutional support (Davé 2007, 100). As Davé reports, a general opinion among officials and citizens was that it would be better and more likely for Kazakh first to become a state language, and then seek to become a language of interethnic communication.

After the adoption of the main Language Law in 1989, the Decree on Education was adopted in 1992, and reaffirmed the status and set a deadline of 1995 for switching all state and official communication to Kazakh (Davé 2007, 100-101). However, in April 1995, the deadline was postponed until 2010 (Davé 2007, 101), and then even further. Thus, despite the efforts and the political will, the government was not able to meet its own deadlines. Davé emphasizes that by making Russian a language in which people of different ethnic background communicate, Kazakh was deprived of this status and there are no incentives for Russian-speakers to learn it. It may or may not be the case; however, the deadlines of switching to Kazakh are still being postponed, and for many Russian is still a more comfortable language. The government is aware of this fact, though, and announced the development of the ways to change the situation.
Nevertheless, today the level of “Russification” remains high, especially among urban dwellers of all nationalities. However, with the new repatriation policy, the ethnic composition has changed and made Kazakhs a more significant majority, with 800,774 persons arriving by 2009 (Suleimenova 2010, 41) Kazakhs constituted 75.1% of population according to the 2009 Census (Suleimenova 2010, 14). The repatriation policy targeted the ethnic Kazakhs living mainly in China, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, but also in Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Turkey, etc. These communities have preserved Kazakh through communication within their groups; however, their language is not the “high” Kazakh that the government tries to promote. In the case of those from China, Mongolia and Turkey, they speak almost no Russian, which made it very difficult for them to look for jobs and adapt to the new life in Kazakhstan. Those coming from other CIS countries usually were in no better position either, since coming predominantly from rural areas, they had a very poor command of Russian due to the poor quality of education in where they came from. A study by Suleimenova (2010, 230) shows that fluency in Kazakh is on average 93.8% among rural and 75.8% among city inhabitants, while level of Russian competency is the opposite – 91.1% among urban and 76.9% among rural people. However, as Suleimenova (2010, 41) rightly pointed out, this fluency is not in literary Kazakh, which is preferable, but in daily language; moreover, with the language questions becoming a “hot” topic, many claimed to be fluent, while in fact being less proficient.

One of the reasons for this, as well as one of the major problems Kazakh language is facing today is the fact that it is not developed enough to compete with Russian, and increasingly, English. Despite the establishment of the National Academy during Soviet period and investments in it after becoming independent, the language still lacks words to reflect the everyday life, and they have to be translated from other languages, made-up or borrowed. For decades, Russian was used to talk about the politics, economy, and science, while Kazakh “home” language. Thus, Kazakh language was not developed and had no chance to gradually adapt to the new way of life of Kazakhs.
Besides the linguistic side, there was a social and psychological one – many Kazakhs, especially urban, had developed a feeling of shame for speaking a “backward rural language” Kazakh was considered to be during the Soviet period. They were mocked when using it in public and gradually the language was being spoken only “in kitchens”. The uncertainty is a result of the “language shift” or “Russification” that occurred among Kazakhs during the Soviet time. Despite it being highly criticized and at time exaggerated by the Kazakh nationalists, as Davé (2007, 105) emphasizes, this phenomenon among Kazakhs is maximum two generations old, and can be reversed.
CHAPTER 2: LANGUAGE POLICY

The language policy is a fundamental part of the set of governmental policies that aim to reverse the Russification among Kazakhs and promote the language among other nationalities. Sometimes this is referred to as “Kazakhization”, which is getting more and more negative connotation in the media. The next chapter will look at these policies and their aspects and focus on the language policy. In the second part of the chapter, the public reaction and criticism of the policies will be discussed and analyzed.

2.1. Kazakhization

The language policy of Kazakhstan, aimed at promotion of Kazakh language has been formulated and is being implemented in connection with a set of other policies, which some scholars called “Kazakhization”. Although denied on the official level, many authors such as Karin and Chebotarev (2002) contend that it is actually taking place. “Kazakhization” means gaining the attention and influence to the ethnic Kazakhs in all spheres of life of the country, in some way, compensating for the lack thereof during the Soviet period and sometimes at the expense of discrimination against other nationalities. Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 2) argue that the cultures and the spiritual life of the other peoples of Kazakhstan are “under assault”, because of the promotion by the government of the Kazakh historical figures, leaders, poets, etc. Karin and Chebotarev argue that despite the establishment of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan as a consultative body, not enough attention is being paid to the cultures of the peoples in the country. The names of the streets, cities and towns have been changed to Kazakh, the state symbols, sculptures, state holidays are all based on mythology and culture of Kazakhs (2002, 6). History and literature have been revised and the “blank spots” filled with the stories of glorious leaders, and heroes of Kazakhs popularized.
The Constitution of Kazakhstan pledges respect for pluralism and cultures of other ethnicities living in Kazakhstan and guarantees no discrimination. In the absence of the official state ideology, Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 3) argue that since the ethnic Kazakhs are now the group in power, the political system reflects their traditional values. With the increase of the numbers of Kazakhs in the administration, tribalism became an important characteristic. As the Russians and other peoples left the country in large numbers, the urban population diminished, and there was an inflow of migrants from rural areas. Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 13) argue that the new nomenklatura consists of these migrants from rural areas, and the political elite is Kazakh-dominated, with a share of 80% to 90%. They continue stating that the elite is a closed group, and one criteria for entrance is the family ties (2002, 14).

This might well be true, however, the authors seem to forget that the closedness of the political elite and the benefits that connections of some sort bring to those who have them is not simply a part of the Kazakh culture. It was a state of affairs in the Soviet Union, with the emergence of “blat”, “zemlyachestvo” and “kumovstvo”. In Central Asia it met with a local tradition of strong ties with the family and relatives (considered “distant” in the West) and became nepotism. Here we have a problem of persistence of the nomadic mentality among Kazakhs, which is partly allowed for by the slow development and modernization of the language, lack of modern culture in Kazakh and significant ruralization. These and many other issues were identified and addressed by the Ministry of Culture (MCRK) in its 2010 publication on language policy. The MCRK (2010, 102-103) acknowledges the imbalance between the high social development of the Kazakh language achieved during the independence period and the failure to make it a frequently used and functioning language and emphasizes the need to separate the language question and the interethnic relations and suggests that a significant number of Russian-speakers speaking Kazakh is a way to do so. The Ministry suggests that if during the Soviet period the Kazakh and Russian speaking parts of the population existed in parallel to each other, now that the country is independent and the Language Policy is being implemented, these
two parts “meet” more often and that the Russian-speaking population is “rather psychologically unprepared” for this (2010, 102).

2.2. The framework of the language policy

The government’s first move was to establish a legal framework in order to have a foundation for the further policies. The following subchapter will outline this development.

The promotion of Kazakh language started with a series of legislative acts that caused the adoption of a number of programs and plans. The official status of Kazakh as state language was first established with the Law of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on the Languages in the Kazakh SSR, adopted in 1989. The law brought three important changes. The first is the introduction of the language into the previously “Russian-only” spheres – office communications, services, trade, etc. Second, making Kazakh a language of administration (Article 1) and third, introducing Kazakh as a mandatory language in schools and other education institutions (Articles 18-20). Articles 22-24 make Kazakh equal to Russian in science and culture and promote the language through mass media. Even though the law was not really enforced by the Soviet government, its role remains significant, as it changed the legal status and established ground for subsequent legislative acts within the framework of independent Kazakhstan.

The first Constitution of independent Kazakhstan, adopted in 1993, made Kazakh and Russian unequal by making the former the official state language and the latter the language of interethnic communication. However, in response to protests and disapproval, especially from ethnic Russians in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country, the new Constitution of 1995 gave Russian an equal status in administration and public affairs, while still maintaining the statuses of the languages as stipulated in the Constitution of 1993 (Karin and Chebotarev 2002, 17).

Having established a legislative framework, the government has adopted a number of plans, resolutions and decisions. One of the first, adopted in 1992, set a deadline of 1995 to
switch all the state affairs and communication to Kazakh language. This deadline was not met and has been postponed several times. This decision had a side effect – it left almost no Russians and Russian-speakers in many state organs (Karin and Chebotarev 2002, 17). Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 17-18) argue that the language was one of the major causes of the large scale out migration of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers from Kazakhstan, citing a sociological survey conducted in 1998 that showed that every sixth person leaving the country did so because of the language policy.

The government reacted in 1994 when the president admitted that the requirement to learn Kazakh by 1996 was challenging for Kazakhs as well, and emphasized the equal status of Kazakh and Russian (Karin and Chebotarev 2002, 18). The Conception of the Language Policy adopted in 1996 outlines a strategy for Kazakh in order for it to become a language of interethnic communication and promises to preserve the social functions of Russian (Conception 1996, chapter 2; MCRK 2010, 213). Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 18-19) report that the government was planning to approve a list of professions for which the knowledge of Kazakh would be required and argue that this caused another flow of emigration of more than 200,000 Russians in 1997. However probably forseeing the social disapproval that it might cause, the government did not approve the list and left the requirement only for the civil servants (MCRK 2010, 225).

The adoption of the new Language Law in 1997 continued to strengthen the position of Kazakh. Article 4 defines learning Kazakh as a “duty of every citizen”, and lays the responsibility to develop the language, strengthen its authority and create necessary conditions for learning it, as well as supporting the Kazakh diasporas in their studies on the government. An interesting feature of this law is the specification of the role of Kazakh and Russian languages in various spheres, for example Article 13 maintains that both are equal in court proceedings, part one of the Article 18 pledges to support all the languages of the Republic in mass media, while the second part fixes the total amount of information in Kazakh as not less than the total amount in
all other languages (see Language Law 1997). The adoption of the laws created a legal basis for the following policies.

### 2.2.1. State Programs on Languages

Since 1998 the development and planning of the language policy of Kazakhstan has been outlined in a document called a State Program on Languages. The first, the State Program for Implementation and Development of Languages was adopted in 1998. The preamble of the document mentions the creation of the basis for gradual shift from Russian to Kazakh in official state affairs, thus admitting the previous failure in meeting its own deadlines and enforcing the Law on Languages (1997). The Program outlines nine tasks to be implemented until 2000: (1) creation of the normative legal foundation in the language sphere; (2) support the implementation of the Law on Languages (1997) with the necessary materials and human resources; (3) enlargement of the sphere of usage of languages, especially Kazakh in the society, conducting research on the current issues in linguistics; (4) improve the quality of instruction of languages of the Republic, development of education programs and techniques; (5) enforcement of the Article 18 of the Law on Languages (1997); (6) facilitation of the shift of state affairs and communication to Kazakh; (7) improving the Kazakh alphabet, orthography and terminology; (8) continuing work on toponymy and standardization; (9) developing measures for encouragement to learn Kazakh. The Program further gives a table with deadlines and responsible state body (see Program 1998-2000).

Little data has published on the progress of this program. However, the increase in the role of Kazakh cannot be unnoticed. School textbooks have been developed and are being published, and gradually replaced the old Soviet and Russian ones. Many streets and cities were renamed – an action that resonated in the society, as they reflected the Kazakh culture predominantly. Many non-Kazakhs found them discriminatory (Karin and Chebotarev 2002).
The second State Program on the Functioning and the Development of Languages was adopted in 2001, for the period until 2010. The Program’s only concrete indicators were the development of the KASTEST language proficiency assessment system and support for the movie screening and translation in Kazakh, while the others were as vague as “scientific support for onomastic work” (see the Program 2001-2010). Due to the absence of deadlines and more concrete information, the two indicators mentioned can or cannot be considered as achieved. Recently movies are being professionally translated and dubbed in Kazakh and shown in theatres, there is a clear progress in the quality of translation and the number of movies shown. The Program gave no specific deadline for the development KAZTEST to be finished, either. It was under development on the basis of TOEFL since 2006 and a special Department was established within the National Center of State Education Standards and Testing, under the Ministry of Education and Science. The test resembles TOEFL in its structure and components and differentiates between six levels of proficiency – from elementary to advanced (see the Program 2001-2010).

Currently, the efforts of the government are being made within the framework of the third State Program of Development and Functioning of Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan in years 2011-2020, which divided the Program into three periods – 2011-2013, 2014-2016 and 2017-2020. The program indicators are impressive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>By 2014</th>
<th>By 2017</th>
<th>By 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of adult population speaking Kazakh</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of school graduates with B1 level of Kazakh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of information in mass media in Kazakh</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of standardized terminological fund of Kazakh language</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of adult population speaking Russian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of nationalities studying their native language at their national associations</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population speaking English</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population speaking Kazakh, Russian and English</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table illustrates several important aspects that characterize the language policy of Kazakhstan: first of all, despite the demands of the Kazakh nationalist groups and complaints by Russian nationalists, proficiency in Russian language is to be preserved and promoted; second, the attention to learning English shows that the government is aware of the difficulty for a language like Kazakh to compete with a global language and the promotion of learning English without harm to level of Kazakh and Russian; third, creating the conditions for ethnic minorities to study in their national language will increase the overall cultural and educational level of the society.

The government pledged financial support for the first stage of the Program of 130 mln USD, and it is designed to be implemented together with the major education reform planned to be completed by 2020 – the same deadline as in the Program 2011-2020.

**Education**

The State Program on Development of Education 2011-2020 plans to reach the goals of the language proficiency through, among others: increasing the share of the highly qualified teachers to 55%; providing all children from 3 to 6 years of age with preschool education; further development of the curriculum for all levels of education and introduction of information and interactive technologies.

Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 49) argue that the status of Kazakh had been steadily rising in the sphere of education. With the increase in the number of Kazakh schools, the number of those in Russian is decreasing. The importance of a high quality of instruction in schools cannot be underestimated. A social survey conducted by the Ministry of Culture of Kazakhstan, showed that 52,9% of persons between 16 and 29 years of age and from 51,4% to 47,4% of adults from 30 to over 60, that speak at least one language apart from their native, said that the good instruction at school helped them the most (MCRK 2010, 187). These figures were higher than
for the other factors that might have helped – instruction at the university, marrying a person of another nationality, and, most importantly, the Law on Languages (MCRK 2010, 189).

**Mass media**

According to the Law on Languages (1997) and the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting (2012), the total broadcasting time in Kazakh should not be less than that in all other languages combined. Despite this strong legal backing, the Ministry of Communications and Information acknowledged that only 10% of television and 5.9% of print media is in Kazakh (TengriNews Feb. 23 and Mar. 09 2011).

However, the Law on Languages (1997) provides legal protection of the language and holds the physical and legal persons responsible for the violation of the law. And with the increasing attention to the matter, tighter control on implementation is expected.

**State Affairs**

In 2005 the Central Election Committee made fluency in Kazakh a requirement for presidential candidates and caused a wave of criticism. Many argue that this resolution is used to keep the political opponents of the president out of politics. As the language became a requirement for the civil servants of all ranks, the government claims that at present 67% of paperwork is in Kazakh (see Program 2011-2020) and plans a further increase to meet the target 100%.

**Culture**

As mentioned in Program 2011-2020, the level of language culture among Kazakh speakers remains relatively low. The Program intends to increase it through the cultural events, concerts, and support to the cinema, theater and literature. For instance, the amendment to article 28-4 point 3 the Law on Culture, all the movies shown in cinemas of Kazakhstan have to be professionally dubbed in Kazakh.
The language policy affects all the aspects of the life in Kazakhstan, and for this reason became a topic for heated debates among politicians, experts, public figures and, even more so, among ordinary people. It has been harshly criticized by a number of both foreign and domestic experts and scholars. The following section will look at the public response and criticism of the policy.

2.3. Response and criticism

One might assume that the Kazakhs are happy that their language and culture are being promoted and invested in. However, studies such as Karin and Chebotarev (2002) show that the public reaction to the policies varies greatly and some strong criticism has been voiced.

Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 21) argue that the language policy of Kazakhstan involves adoption of one document after the other, without taking actual steps to implement it. Moreover, they argue that the policy is being abused to discriminate against non-Kazakhs. They cite a social survey that showed that Kazakhs constituted 80% of administrative and science staff, about half in the health care and services, more than half in the arts. Karin and Chebotarev attribute the implementation of some points of the Law on Languages (1997) and the Program 1998-2000 raise the status of Kazakh at the expense of Russian – the reduction in total broadcasting time in Russian, reduction of the number of hours of instruction of Russian at schools, wide scale renaming of the administrative units, changing the signs, etc. However it should be noted here that the reduction of the broadcasting time in Russian is an inevitable consequence of the increase of that in Kazakh, as the time is limited.

Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 22) also criticize the implementation of the policy as being done in the form of harsh administrative measures, aimed at forcing Russians to leave. They cite research by the Association of Sociologists and Political Scientists conducted in mid-2000 that showed that the “total kazakhization” of the government, nationalities and language policy, growing economic inequality, among others are causing interethnic tensions in the society. The
survey revealed difference in opinions between different nationalities – every fifth Kazakh agrees with the current language statuses, while every eighth that Kazak should be the only language, Russians and representatives of other nationalities believe that there should be two official languages. The main message of these results is that the policy failed to produce a single reaction from all citizens. And hence it added to the existing cultural differences, which it was supposed to decrease.

2.3.1. Nationalist groups and intellectuals

The language policy and the issue in general received attention from all the communities in Kazakhstan. The most vocal representatives of the two “major groups” are the nationalists and moderate experts. While there is no specific Kazakh nationalist movement, the one of the most active one of the Russian diaspora is “Lad”. Both nationalist groups tend to “paint it black” and exaggerate the outcomes. In a 2002 letter to the speaker of Russian Duma, G. Seleznev, one the leading figures of “Lad”, Navozov, expressed his concern over the disunity of the Russian people, complained that Russians are “nobody” in Central Asia and “second class citizens” in Kazakhstan, and swore loyalty to Russia. Navozov also criticized the citizenship law of Russia and called for granting another citizenship to ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan since they did not chose to emigrate, and were forced into the situation. He finished the letter saying that many are “scared and desperate” of their future, meaning one outside Russia.

A series of amendments to the legal acts on language passed in 2011 caused an especially heated debate. These amendments involved making the language a requirement for judges, requiring the state organs to respond to the questions of citizens in Kazakh, while the non-state organs can respond in Kazakh or in the language of inquiry, making it possible to defend a dissertation or thesis in Kazakh or Russian, requiring the legal entities to be named in Kazakh and the foreign and joint entities’ names should be transliterated in Kazakh and if needed in Russian, etc. (see the Law on Amendments and Additions 2011). “Lad” supposes that there is a
strong anti-Russian lobby within the government of Kazakhstan (Kramarenko 2011) and that this is one of the reasons the laws that they describe as harsh and discriminatory, are passed. The chairman of “Lad”, Kramarenko (2011), refers to the Kazakh nationalists as “national-isolationists”, blames them for radicalization of the “language question” and argues that its main goal is to assimilate the Russians and break the historical and cultural ties between the communities. He argues that the constitutional rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking citizens are being violated and that it might result in a Russian “exodus”.

However, these groups are not as homogenous as they might seem. Natsuko Oka conducted a survey in 2002 among five groups of people: Kazakh and Russian nationalists, intellectuals of Kazakh, Russian and other ethnic groups. The results present an interesting picture of the current social situation in Kazakhstan. Nationalists of the two ethnic groups disagree on their evaluation of the aims of the government’s nationality and language policies – the Russians think that the aim is to build a monoethnic state, while Kazakhs think that a multiethnic state is being built (2002, 7 and 11). The Russian nationalists tend to believe they are being forcibly assimilated and driven out and suggest that it would be impossible to do so to everyone (2002, 11). Kazakh nationalists express the hope that the decrease in non–Kazakh population will contribute to the establishment of a monoethnic Kazakh state and welcome the repatriation of Kazakhs from abroad (2002, 7). Russian nationalists believe that Kazakh language is not developed enough to prevail in the society and propose two official languages (2002, 11). The Kazakh group agrees with this, however, they want the language to develop to create a more homogenous society and blame non-Kazakhs for disrespect to Kazakh culture, traditions and language (2002, 7).

The intellectuals of both groups have varied opinions. Among Kazakhs, for instance, some think that the state should be multiethnic, while others insist of privileged position of Kazakhs (2002, 15). Kazakh intellectuals share opinion on several topics with the Russian intellectuals and even nationalists, - there was a consensus on the impossibility of building a
monoethnic state, and some thought Russian should become official state language (2002). Others, however, disagreed and proposed to maintain the current state of affairs. The Kazakh intellectuals, similarly to nationalists, tend to view the repatriation policy as a right one; however, many still criticized the lack of support from the side of the government to the oralmans (2002).

A very important finding Oka (2002) made in her study is that the views of the Russian intellectuals do not differ significantly from those of Russian nationalists. They also tend to view the policy negatively, and some even suppose that the government does it in order to squeeze out the non-Kazakhs (2002, 24). They all agreed that the Kazakhs are monopolizing the state, that it is unfair and done on purpose (2002, 24). Oka (2002) reports that many in this group warned of the heightening of the ethnic tensions and even expressed desire for a territorial autonomy (2002, 25). The answers of the intellectuals of other ethnic groups were close to those of Russians (2002, 30-33).

2.3.2. The general public

A study by Masanov (2002, 58-69) reveals an interesting social phenomenon. Russians are more critical of the government policies, feel more cautious and many are ready to leave if and when the opportunity arises. Moreover, he reports a sense of civilizational and racial superiority of Russians over “Asiatics” and the rejection of the policy of their assimilation, which is perhaps a major reason for their leave, as well as the difficulty to adapt to the new reality (2002, 54-55).

Kazakhs, according to Masanov (2002, 62) are more optimistic about the economic and social situation after the break-up of the USSR, they feel less discriminated and more in favor of the government. He explains that Kazakhs might feel that the government is “their own” because of the high proportion of ethnic Kazakhs there and low level of urbanization and individualism as compared to Russians – 62% of Kazakhs were rural in 1989, while 77% of Russians were urban. Fifteen times more Kazakhs than Russians feel that Kazakhs should be privileged;
Russians express more desire for respect for right of other nationalities and some sort of integration with Russia (2002, 64-65). He also notes (2002, 64) that Russians tend to exaggerate the role that the law making Russian an official language would play, and feel five times less than Kazakhs “at home” in Kazakhstan, coming from the sense of alienation and even disdain to the independence of Kazakhstan as a result of collapse of the USSR. Moreover, every fifth Russian thinks that Kazakhs “desire to get rid of them” and they are twice more likely to regard negatively the active resettlement of Kazakhs from rural areas to the urban, motivating it with the rise in crime rates (Masanov 2002, 68)
CHAPTER 3: LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The strong link between language, nation and a territory is not a Soviet phenomenon, despite the constant emphasis on their interconnectedness. Language had been a cornerstone of nation-building in many parts of the world, and was seen by leaders as a way to stabilize the country through ethnic and linguistic homogenization. They sought to do so with the policies that promoted a single language, referred to as a “common language” by the sociolinguists (Rannut 1999, 102). Some scholars (Stewart 1968, 541 as cited in Rannut 1999, 102) claim that there is no conflict in a situation when different languages are used for different things by different people or when these languages are used by different people for same things. The conflict occurs when these different “competitive” languages are to be used by same people in same situations.

In Soviet Union there was a situation when a titular language was used “at home” and Russian at work and in public by the titular nation and Russian used for both by ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking nationalities. In this way the titular languages remained oppressed; Russification went on, however there was no conflict. As the USSR disappeared and the union republics strengthened the statuses of their languages and nations, the situation became prone to conflict. Despite the allegations of “revenge” of the titular nationalities for their discrimination, none of them went the “violent” way. Most of the Soviet republics, and especially Kazakhstan, found themselves in a situation where the ethnic makeup of their countries was very heterogeneous, Russification was as times, massive and the languages, not having the official status, were pushed back. Kazakhstan, due to its situation, was one of the few countries that upheld a high status of Russian language. Here the question is, do you call all the citizens of the country “one people”? This is what the government tries to reach, the collective identity. But then the country is in a situation of conflict, because it requires “Kazakhstani” to use “competitive” Kazakh and Russian languages for same things – in public, at work, in state affairs,
in mass media, etc. If you separate the identities, and call the people according to their ethnic origin, the Kazakhs and the Russians, the linguistic conflict may be avoided, but the country will have to face another, potentially more serious, the ethnic divide. Both conflicts can threaten the very existence of Kazakhstan as a state. However, the more alarming signal is the confusion and reluctance of the government to choose one goal and pursue it by all legal means.

3.1. International Experience

The government of Kazakhstan in its various publications and announcements discusses the experiences of other countries. For example, it has pointed out the success of Ukraine and Baltic States, especially Latvia and their language policies. The Ministry of Culture, the main responsible body for the implementation of the language policy of Kazakhstan, announced the language planning and functioning model similar to that of Finland. The rest of this chapter will briefly examine these countries and their language policies, pointing out the differences and similarities and further summarize the lessons for Kazakhstan to learn.

3.1.1. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

Anyone who studied the Soviet Union will notice the resistance of the Baltic States to the Soviet policies, their strong nationalism. All three countries consider the Soviet period an occupation and “restored” their independence after USSR ceased to exist. Latvia and Estonia, the two countries with large Russian minorities – 34% and 30%, while the titular nationalities constituted 52% and 61.5% respectively in 1989 (Järve 2003, 77), took a rather radical approach and restricted the citizenship to those who had this status in 1940 and their descendants, thus “cutting off” the migrants during Soviet times (Ozolins 1999, 248). Since Lithuania had a much smaller share of minorities, it decided to grant citizenship to all residents. The idea of making language a requirement for granting citizenship was voiced in Kazakhstan as well. In 2011 the “Ak Zhol” party put forward such a suggestion as a way to achieve the goal of 90% of population speaking Kazakh by 2020 (Zakon.kz 2011). However, this proposal had not been
brought up again, most probably due to the expected backlash and a reaction from Moscow if it is considered for adoption.

The approach seems to have worked in Baltic States, however. Ozolins (1999, 252) argues that all three states have seen a period of stable growth, internal peace and increased command in titular languages. Laitin (1996, as cited in Ozolins 1999, 252) argues that the language policy of Estonia had been successful due to the high status of Estonian in the country and its economic growth, as compared to Russia at the time. And therefore, he argues that the Russian-speakers are motivated to learn Estonian and it will eventually become the language of interethnic communication. A similar situation can be seen in Kazakhstan, which, due to its natural resource endowment, has experienced significant growth. The public service became more attractive with a number of bonuses, and since the Kazakh language is a requirement for entering the service, it had been a motivation for both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs to learn. The government of Kazakhstan had recently started implementation of the ambitious industrialization plan, which is expected to boost the economy. In case of its success, it can together with the high status of Kazakh and a language policy, increase the share of Kazakh-speaking population.

Even without the external pressure, the adoption of such a citizenship policy would be catastrophic for Kazakhstan. The Soviet policies in Central Asia had an opposite effect from the Baltic States. In Kazakhstan the Russians were the privileged, highly skilled professional elite and the only way for other nationalities to enter this group was to become “Russified”. Thus, majority of highly educated Kazakhs today are far better proficient in Russian that in Kazakh and making language a requirement for citizenship would leave them out, together with educated individuals of other nationalities, resulting in a significant decrease in the intellectual and cultural level of the society.
3.1.2. Ukraine

Ukraine, similarly to Kazakhstan, experienced a high level of Russification, which was facilitated by the fact that Ukrainian and Russian languages are similar, the nations share historical ties and are both Slavic (Stepanenko 2003, 119). Ukrainian language had become a major factor of the consolidation of Ukrainians as a nation different from Russians, and making the latter an official language would allow it to take over (2003, 120). Nevertheless, the proponents of the official status of Russian argue that Ukrainian, just like Kazakh, is not developed enough to be used instead of it and Russians are not an ethnic minority, but a nation that had lived in this country for generations (2003, 121). In fact, the Russians live rather concentrated in the East of Ukraine, making it Russophone, while the West tends to be “nationalist” and Ukrainian-speaking. In Kazakhstan, we can see similar situation – the North is much Russianized, while South is dominated by Kazakhs. And despite the harsher legal framework (Russian is legally a minority language, see Stepanenko 2003) Ukraine is not seeing a more significant progress than Kazakhstan: in 1998-9 only an average of 65% of all school children studied in Ukrainian and about a half of periodicals are printed in Russian (Stepanenko 2003, 125 and 127). Ukraine is, therefore, clearly in the same situation Kazakhstan is at the moment, and unfortunately not experiencing an improvement. Hence, Ukraine cannot serve as a positive example and a “role model” for Kazakhstan and arguing for it signals lack of knowledge of the situation in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

3.1.3. Finland

The main reason for the attractiveness of the Finnish model is that its direct transfer would be ideal for Kazakhstan. However, the uniqueness of the history of Finnish and Swedish languages in Finland makes it almost impossible. A former part of Sweden and later Russian Empire, Finland for its independence in the early XX century and has been officially bilingual since. Despite the small number of speakers (approximately 5.5%), Swedish language enjoys high
status and governmental support. The development of the languages and their statuses were similar to those of Kazakh and Russian. Before Finland became independent, Swedish and Finnish were both official, after independence Finnish came to dominate (see Buchberger 2002). Both languages, as well as a number of other smaller languages are all regulated by the Research Institute for the Languages of Finland.

There are a number of important differences though. First of all, the Swedish speakers are a small community, and secondly, they are Swedish-speaking Finns, not Swedes. In this way, they don’t have such a strong emotional attachment to the language as they would if they were Swedes. This was also a reason why the elite was willing to learn Finnish when the country became independent (Buchberger 2002, 187-188) and thus the language policy had been successful. The education is provided in both languages on all levels, and Swedish and Finnish are required subjects at schools, thus almost all Swedish speakers are bilingual and many Finns have a good command of Swedish (Buchberger 2002, 189).

3.2. The lessons for Kazakhstan

The model of Finland, due to its specificity can be applied to Russian-speaking Kazakhs only. Despite being Russian-speaking, they are not emotionally linked to the language, the way Russians are. As they are not emotionally linked to Russian language, they are not likely to resist the promotion of the Kazakh language, as the studies of Kazakh intellectuals have shown. Despite using primarily Russian for communication, they are nevertheless attached to Kazakh, identity themselves as Kazakh and are willing to learn given wise policy. The strong identification of the nation with the language established by the Soviet Union had been strengthened by the increased emphasis of the government of Kazakhstan on promotion of Kazakh. The change in ethnic makeup of the country, with Russians losing the demographic superiority and Kazakhs obtaining it, made the positions of the former less firm and strengthened that of the latter. Suleimenova (2010, 130) conducted a series of studies in 2003, 2005 and 2009 among young
Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, asking what was their native language. The results show a sudden decrease in the number of Kazakhs who indicate Kazakh as their native language from 99% in 2003 to 91.4% in 2005, followed by an increase to 96% in 2009 (2010). Interestingly, Russians show a small but nevertheless steady increase in native proficiency in Kazakh from zero in 2003 to 1.8% in 2005 and 2% in 2009 (2010). There were 0.3% in 2003, 1.2% in 2005 and zero in 2009 Kazakhs and no Russians at all that chose both languages as their native (2010). And if in 2003 no one chose “difficult to answer” option, in 2003 it was chosen by 5.2% Kazakhs and 3.6% Russians and in 2009 by 3.3% Kazakhs only (2010).

Despite this small “victory” of the language policy, Suleimenova (2010, 219-221) shows that 97.4% of Russians keep a high competency in Russian (speak, understand, read, write freely), while only 20.4% showed a correspondently high level of Kazakh language. The same study revealed that 55.5% have a low to medium level of Kazakh (2010, 220), which leaves chances for their improvement. A study by Masanov (2002, 58-69) showed that Russians had retained a sense of superiority as a dominant group and alienation from the other nations and cultures that they developed during the Soviet times after the collapse of USSR. However, despite these feelings, the same survey showed that Russians are generally in favor of studying Kazakh – two-thirds as many Russians as Kazakhs support studying Kazakh by Russians and by civil servants, and same numbers of both nationalities favor compulsory instruction of the language. These studies show that there is a feeling of confusion and uncertainty among Kazakhs and Russians, which can be positively used by the government to promote Kazakh, while preserving Russian. This also reveals difference in attitudes towards the language policy and thus, the need for a different approach.

Therefore, the model of Finland needs to be adapted to the realities of Kazakhstan, which means taking into account the different positions and views on language and what constitutes a fair language policy of the ethnic groups and allowing the national symbols to represent the diversity of the country. However, the basic idea of it matches the goal of Kazakhstan’s language
policy, bilingualism – 90% of adult population speaking Russian and 95% speaking Kazakh by 2020 (see State Program on Education 2011-2020).
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

As shown in the previous chapters, none of the models is entirely applicable to Kazakhstan. The Finnish model has the most features that the language policy of Kazakhstan tries to achieve: the effective bilingualism in the population, high quality instruction and government support to both languages. However, there are several challenges that the government needs to solve in order to allow for the success of the language policy. They include the sense of alienation that persists among Russians and leaves them not convinced of the need to learn Kazakh and the need to promote an identity that reflects the ethnic diversity of the country, as the current one is based almost entirely upon the Kazakh culture and causes much resentment. In order to address these issues, it is recommended to:

- Conduct an awareness raising campaign, involving media and National Associations and make publicly available publications to explain in details the policy and its components in order to eliminate the ethnicity-based difference in opinions, revealed in the studies by Oka (2002), Masanov (2002) and Suleimenova (2010);
- Allow an open public discussion in order to have an overview of public opinion and its changes, in order to “keep the finger on the pulse” of the society and avoid tensions;
- Create symbols that reflect the multiethnic nature of Kazakhstan, not only the culture of Kazakhs, which had been the case since independence: the Baiterek monument (Astana) is a tree from early Kazakh mythology, Altyn Adam (Astana) is an armor of the warrior of a tribe that is considered to be one of ancestors of modern Kazakhs;
- As the Ministry of Culture (2010) points out, the best way to promote Kazakh among Russians is to have a group of young bright Russians speaking Kazakh in public. This can only be achieved with a significant improvement in the quality of teaching, which means a closer coordination with the State Program on Education 2011-2020;
• Compromise and “side with” the national movements, such as “Lad”, as they have the power to mobilize the people and can provide invaluable help in overcoming the Soviet legacy and uniting the ethnic groups.

It is also a Soviet legacy that the academic and scientific publications tend to be descriptive and contain no information on impact assessment, implementation and policy analysis. However, the policy studies and analysis are not only a modern invention, but also a necessary part of the policy-making process, and even more so in a situation as complex as the one Kazakhstan is today. Hence, it is recommended to:

• Encourage and stimulate policy studies and research, in order to provide an independent assessment of the policies implemented; this would allow for correction and adjustment when necessary and increases the chances to avoid the conflict;

• Encourage research by the government bodies, as well as independent scholars and think tanks that can provide an unbiased opinion. This will help to overcome the pessimistic view of politics and mistrust in government, inherited from the Soviet times.

Besides being “encouraged” to learn the language, however, the people need to be rewarded and motivated. In 2000, the Prime Minister Tokayev suggested rewarding financially civil servants that submit the paperwork in Kazakh (see Decree #117-p). However, the reward doesn’t need to be financial only, and not exclusive to the civil servants. Living in a stable peaceful country, where you and your children have a future, is a powerful motivation itself. The economic growth brought by the country’s oil reserves was one of the reasons people wanted to stay and learn Kazakh. Hence, the language should be promoted together with economic growth, political stability and interethnic peace. An effective non-discriminatory language policy can be a key element in securing Kazakhstan against potential conflicts.
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Pravitelstvom Podgotovlen Spisok Professyi, Spezialnostei I Dolzhnostei, Dlya Kotoryh Neobhodimo Vladeniye Kazahskim Yazikom [The government has prepared a list of professions, specializations and positions for which knowledge of Kazakh is a requirement].


Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazahstan o Gosudarstvennoi Programme Funzionariovaniya I Razvitiya Yazikov na 2001-2010 gody [Decree of the President of Republic of Kazakhstan on the State Program of Functioning and Development of Languages for years 2001-2010].


