Strategies of Desecuritization

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Abstract

An important school within the field of security studies, the Copenhagen School takes a discursive approach to understanding how security is constructed. Their theory of securitization aims at explaining how issues become securitized, or taken out of the sphere of normal, deliberative politics, into the realm of emergency politics and extraordinary measures. Seeing security as doing more harm than good, the Copenhagen School prefers desecuritization, the lack of a language of emergency measures or existential threats. Theories of desecuritization have conceptualized strategies for desecuritizing migrant identity in Europe and national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper looks to analyze and evaluate these desecuritization strategies for new cases: deeply divided, post-conflict societies.

The argument made here is that existing desecuritization strategies cannot be applied outside of a liberal democratic context. As such, a new strategy is provided: structural desecuritization through the implementation of power sharing mechanisms. By introducing the literature on power sharing as a guide to desecuritizing ethnic identity in post-conflict states, this paper aims at reconceptualizing existing strategies, pointing out the assumptions that inhibit their broader salience. The case of post-Dayton Bosnia is offered as an example of how structure and institutions can work to desecuritize ethnic tensions, that is, to bring ethnic relations back into the sphere of normal politics.
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Introduction

“Those who sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither.” – Benjamin Franklin

In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the field of security studies has been inundated with new ways of thinking about international security. Dominant paradigms have been challenged by academics unsatisfied with existing concepts, looking to explain security in a transformed world. Primarily, they sought to move security studies beyond theories that recognized only military threats as challenges to state security. One leading approach to conceptualizing security is that of the Copenhagen School (CS) and their theory of securitization.

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have written the bulk of the work of the CS, and like many other recent schools of security studies, they aim at widening and deepening the concept of security to accommodate it to a new, post-Cold War global political order. Securitization theory radically breaks from traditional realist and neorealist principles in that it adopts a social constructivist to understanding security. Unlike these earlier traditions, securitization theory conceptualizes security as discursively established, dismissing outright the notion of objective threats. The CS also breaks from the realist and neorealist traditions in introducing the concept of “society” alongside the state as an object that can be threatened and is worthy of analysis.

Securitization theory aims at understanding how issues become securitized, focusing on the role of speech in the framing of threats. In this framework, the role of the security analyst is not to discover the objective reality of threats “out there,” but rather to understand how security dynamics are discursively established. In understanding threats as subjectively constructed, the CS disavows the analyst’s capacity to show what is and is not a threat; but this does not mean they see all securitizations as equally legitimate. Instead, they maintain that by seeing all threats as subjective, they restrict actors’ ability to legitimize harmful policies based on the threatening nature of an issue.
For the CS, securitization – the elevation of an issue to that of threat – means removing an issue from the realm of normal politics and placing it into the realm of extraordinary measures. Because they conceptualize threats as existentially threatening, securitizing an issue allows actors to rise above the norms that would normally bind them in order to eliminate the existential threat. Consequently, the CS view of securitization is generally a negative one, as it allows actors to justify all sorts of policies in order to deal with a discursively constructed threat. They argue that the aim should be desecuritization, moving issues “out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere.”

Unfortunately, despite a preference for it, the CS leaves the concept of desecuritization largely un-theorized.

Most of the existing literature on desecuritization has dealt with the securitization of immigration in Europe with the purpose of developing desecuritization strategies that can reverse this trend. Branching off from this, some scholars have proposed that the particular strategies for removing immigration policy from the security sphere may not be possible or desirable in the case of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Desecuritization strategies outside of these two contexts have been largely un-explored.

Securitization of migrants in Europe has led to a robust debate on the merits of approaching immigration policy from a security perspective. This literature has explored the reasons for securitizing migration policy, as well as strategizing ways to desecuritize this issue. Primarily, these strategies have stressed the need to re-assert democratic principles in the face of un-democratic policies that come with the securitization of migrants. Another strand of literature has dealt with desecuritization of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, offering strategies that do not require minorities to reject their distinct identities in favor of civic, non-ethnic or other “more acceptable” ones. This latter scholarship offers a particular understanding of securitization that

might be helpful in theorizing desecuritization strategies for as of yet unexplored cases: deeply divided, post conflict states.

In countries throughout the globe, mass violence and civil war has left states divided along ethnic lines. From Nigeria to India to Bosnia and Northern Ireland, ethnic identity is framed in the language of security; but for the CS and other scholars working on desecuritization, this is unmapped territory. This is exceptionally problematic if one considers that these are places where representing otherness as existentially threatening has resulted in the deaths of millions. Focusing on the specific situation in Bosnia, I hope to theorize possible desecuritization strategies for deeply divided, post-conflict states, simultaneously demonstrating the limitations of broadly applying the same theory to different cases. The purpose is not to create an overarching theory of desecuritization – a perhaps unnecessary and undesirable endeavor – but rather to begin a conversation about desecuritization in uncharted waters.

Bosnia is an important case for two reasons. First, as one of the earliest and largest nation-building efforts by the international community in the 20th century, it has been viewed as a model for structuring other post-conflict ethnically divided states. The lessons learned in Bosnia have been applied to Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo among others, and will undoubtedly continue to shape how the world approaches similarly divided states. Secondly, as a rigidly designed consociational democracy, Bosnia demonstrates the possibilities of institutional solutions to securitized identity, as well as the limits.

To say that institutions have desecuritized ethnic identity does not mean that liberal democracy has prevailed or that identity is not spoken about in a language of security. As will be argued, desecuritization does not have to mean that there is no language of security, but rather that security issues are discussed within the realm of normal, deliberative politics. Such an understanding of desecuritization has been largely overlooked in the literature, which usually sees desecuritization
as bringing an issue into a realm of a-security, where it is not even spoken about in a language of security. In Bosnia, ethnic identity is still heavily politicized and often spoken about in a language of security, but this is all within the established political framework within the realm of normal politics. This is not an ideal situation, but desecuritization does not have to mean restoration of ideal liberal democratic politics, only normal politics; for Bosnia, nationalist politics is normal politics.

The argument made here progresses in three parts. The first chapter is an overview of the CS approach to security and securitization/desecuritization, as well as important critiques that challenge some assumptions, methods and assertions made. I then look at some of the strategies that have been suggested for desecuritizing identity, specifically migrant and minority identity. This will naturally lead into the theoretical and practical possibilities for desecuritization in divided states, the bulk of chapter two. An important part of this chapter is an examination of theories of power-sharing in divided states, focusing on consociational theory in particular. By understanding how these normative theories have conceptualized security and identity, I hope to ground the theoretical proposals made here in solid empirics.

Lastly, the third chapter will be an analysis of how power-sharing institutions have desecuritized identity in post-war Bosnia while simultaneously hindering further democratization. This case is not meant illustrate one way or another the validity of the CS approach to security, but rather to elucidate the implications of this sort of approach to security and the theoretical limits of desecuritization in the existing literature. Ultimately, this paper seeks to engage with the debate on security and power-sharing to expand the conversation on desecuritization. The proposition I make is that the existing literature is largely unsuited for theorizing desecuritization in deeply divided, post-conflict states, warranting an investigation of possible institutional solutions offered by scholars outside of security studies.
1. Security, Securitization, and Desecuritization

Browsing through literature in international relations, one would quickly grasp a reoccurring premise: **security is a fundamentally contested concept**. This has become more evident in recent decades with the proliferation of postmodernist, constructivist, postcolonialist, feminist, and other “critical” studies of security. Classifying such epistemologically and ontologically different approaches together in one excessively broad category is analytically unhelpful, but it does uncover a common thread. All these different ways of thinking about security have arisen out of a profound dissatisfaction with the realist and neorealist schools that dominated international relations for much of the 20th century.

Defined in this way, the CS can also be characterized as critical security studies, but this is not an entirely accurate label. What then is the CS understanding of security? Before addressing desecuritization strategies, it is crucial to clarify the CS’s particular take on security and to introduce their theory of securitization. Understanding securitization is fundamental in developing and building upon existing desecuritization strategies.

1.1 Security and securitization

The CS stands somewhere in between two vastly different perceptions of security, having one foot in traditional realism/neorealism and the other in a tradition of peace studies and social constructivism.\(^2\) Though securitization theory proceeds from a social constructivist understanding of threats, the CS methodology is fairly objectivist, as they choose methodological collectivism over analysis at the individual level. Additionally, unlike some other “non-traditional” schools of security studies – critical and feminist security studies, for example, – they refrain from establishing an

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emancipatory ideal. In other words, the CS does not define what security is, but rather chooses to focus on understanding how “security” is constructed and what speaking “security” does.

How is security constructed? The CS view is that security is established through discourse, or more specifically, through a speech act by a securitizing actor. It is the act of naming an existential threat that legitimizes actors to take extraordinary measures and to break the rules that normally bind them. Theoretically, any actor can speak on behalf of a referent in a securitizing move; practically, however, securitizations are carried out by the traditional elites. Furthermore, securitizations may fail if, for example, the securitizing agent fails to convince the relevant audience that an issue is existentially threatening, or if the referent is deemed to be not worthy of being saved. Security rests “among the subjects,” [emphasis in original] suggesting that securitization is ultimately a negotiated process.

A securitizing move is made more likely by the presence of felicitous facilitating conditions in three categories:

1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, 2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor – that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and 3) features of the alleged threat that either facilitate or impede securitization [emphasis add].

The emphasis on authority is significant in that it posits that securitization can only be carried out by coercive and persuasive power, institutional or other. While the CS admits that power relations between subjects inevitably play a role in a securitizing move, they claim that such power is “never absolute,” emphasizing that no one is theoretically excluded from challenging a securitization.

6 Ibid., 33.
7 Ibid., 31.
Nevertheless, they do not elaborate on how security could be vocalized or challenged by those without power or authority.

What sort of “extraordinary measures” and “emergency politics” does securitization legitimize? The CS does not elaborate much, arguing that a securitization reveals itself once a relevant audience has accepted that an issue must be dealt with outside of “rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.” In other words, securitizations have distinctive consequence, depending on what constitutes “normal” politics there. It is not enough to have only extraordinary measures or only the presence of existential threats, but the combination of “existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.”

What may be extraordinary measures in one place could be perfectly normal in another. I will return to this topic later when discussing what sort of politics desecuritization seeks to (re)establish.

A number of scholars have criticized the CS’s emphasis on the discursive element in securitization theory. What most of these critiques have in common is that they view the emphasis on speech as problematic in cases where the ability to speak is constricted, or where securitization occurs without a speech act. Exploring this matter comprehensively is outside the scope of this paper, but some arguments are worth noting as they offer important insight into developing desecuritization.

Writing on the securitization of migration in the US and the EU, Didier Bigo criticizes the CS’s privileging of securitizing actors’ institutional power to speak security. Noting that the portrayal of immigrants as criminals and threats to the state persists in spite of extensive evidence to the contrary, he argues that the framing of migration as a security issue is a result of the waning influence and legitimacy of security professionals after the Cold War. By framing immigrants as threats to the internal peace and homogeneity of the state, security professionals reiterate the

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8 Ibid., 25.
necessity of their privileged position as bearers of special knowledge and power. Bigo’s criticism of
the CS’s conceptualization of security is that it reaffirms security professionals’ and other traditional
elites’ positions as legitimate possessors of knowledge and the power to name threats. By describing
security as a process of persuasion and coercion between elites and audience, the CS fails to
challenge traditional structures of power that deny security to those who are not authorized to speak
security. Though the CS explicitly denies the objective nature of threats, they do so implicitly by
accepting the security professionals’ truths about security and the “framing of a different domain of
security beyond the political.”

Another critique of the discursive element in securitization is offered by Lene Hansen, who
reconsiders the implications of security conceptualized as speech act. She argues that by defining
security as an illocutionary performance done by authorized actors, securitization is an inaccessible
apparatus for those who are unauthorized to speak security. Hansen’s analysis is of women in
Pakistan who are victims of rape and sexual violence, arguing that they are silenced in the CS’s
discursive understanding of security. They are unable to securitize against the threat of sexual
violence because vocalizing that they were the survivors of rape or sexual assault would expose them
to the practice of honor killings. She concludes that this exposes two “blind spots” in the CS
understanding of securitization, where 1) securitization is difficult or impossible “in situations where
the possibilities of speaking security are constrained” [emphasis added] and 2) the CS ensures that
gender is incapable of becoming a referent object.

Claire Wilkinson also challenges the conceptualization of securitization as a speech act,
making the case that securitization can be achieved in other ways as well. She contends that the

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10 Ibid., 73.
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 demonstrates how a securitization can be achieved without a speech act but rather through physical acts like mass mobilization and protest. In the face of an existential threat to all people of Kyrgyzstan, numerous different tribal, ethnic, and patronage groups mobilized against the dictatorship of Askar Akaev, ultimately ousting him and introducing new elections. Wilkinson’s biggest contention is with “the constitution of agency proposed by securitization,” which she believes is a symptom of the Westphalian straitjacket that limits the CS’s ability to theorize outside out a Euro-centric frame.

Introducing critiques of securitization theory’s emphasis on the discursive quality of security demonstrates that securitization-as-speech act can be problematic. Though it provides an important re-thinking of traditional paradigms, this conceptualization can be limiting for those wishing to mobilize the power of security for a particular issue, or in demonstrating a securitization that has occurred without a speech act. Wilkinson’s reference to a Westphalian straitjacket is also interesting in that it suggests securitization theory makes certain assumptions that hinder its explanatory power outside of a specific context. Consequently, it is possible that desecuritization is restricted by certain assumptions as well. Specifically, if conceptualizing securitization as speech act has its limits, it is plausible that desecuritization might also be possible outside of a discursive construction. Before I turn to this more directly, I provide a review of the relevant literature on desecuritization.

1.2 Desecuritization

Securitization establishes a logic by which authorized actors can escape the normal realm of deliberative politics – whatever they may be – and embrace a state of exceptionalism of expedient decision-making in order to deal with a perceived existential threat. Security is a realm outside of politics and the usual laws and norms that bind actors’ decisions. Consequently, the CS has a

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13 Ibid., 22.
negative conception of security: the logic of security might be unavoidable, but it certainly should not be stretched to engulf a wide range of issues. Their position on this last point is worth quoting at length:

“Basically, security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific ‘threats’ to a prepolitical immediacy. In some cases securitization of issues is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor. Because of its prioritizing imperative, securitization also has tactical attractions — for example, as a way to obtain sufficient attention for environmental problems. But desecuritization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as ‘threats against which we have countermeasures’ but to move them out of this threat-defense sequences and into the ordinary public sphere” [emphasis added].

What more does the CS have to say about desecuritization strategies? Unfortunately, not much. There is clearly a preference for “routine procedures” and “ordinary politics,” but as was mentioned earlier, the subjective nature of “normal” politics means this is a deliberately unspecified concept. The explicit suggestion is clearly that debate and contestation are preferable to emergency politics, but it is unclear whether this means democracy. As will be argued later on, this vagueness in what constitutes normal politics is very problematic when ethnic politics is normal politics and identities have become institutionally securitized. Before I make this argument, however, it is necessary to look over desecuritization literature more broadly.

Ole Waever theorizes three strategies of desecuritization: not speaking about an issue as a threat at all, managing a securitization so that it does not spiral, and moving the securitized issue back into normal politics. In subsequent literature, desecuritization has generally become associated with this last strategy. Before turning to the third strategy, however, the first two deserve additional scrutiny.

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In discussing the emergence of the European “non-war community,” Waever defines three different phases in inter-European relations: insecurity (1940s and 1950s), security (1960s), desecuritization (1970s to mid-1980s), and finally, re-securitization in the 1990s.\(^{16}\) Because he defines the period of desecuritization in Europe as one of a-security – where “the very question of what kind of security arrangement one relied on became absurd”\(^{17}\) – it is difficult to see how management of a securitization (so does it does not “generate security dilemmas and other vicious spirals”)\(^ {18}\) can be seen as a desecuritization. This last point is crucial for conceptualizing desecuritization in deeply divided, post-conflict states and I will return to it later. Not speaking about an issue as a security threat in the first place is also an interesting desecuritization strategy, as it implies a lack of an initial securitization. This point does not need further elaboration, suffice to say that it demonstrates Waever’s – and by extension the CS’s – pessimism about the possibilities of desecuritizing securitized issues, especially if they are issues regarding societal security.\(^ {19}\)

Having discussed the first two strategies of desecuritization, I move now to the literature that generally views desecuritization through the lens of the third strategy: moving issues back into the realm of normal politics. How can this be achieved? First, the literature suggests that there is not one general strategy for this. Depending on the nature of the securitized issue, some strategies will undoubtedly work better than others will. Second, desecuritization strategies aiming at the restoration of normal politics do not seem to share the same idea about what constitutes normal politics. Consequently, they do not follow the CS in viewing “normal” politics as subjective, but rather posit normative ideas on what these politics should be.


\(^ {17}\) Ibid., 86.


\(^ {19}\) Ibid., 254.
Approaches that perceive desecuritization as the restoration of normal politics can be grouped into four categories: deconstructivist, emancipatory, reconstructivist, and management. The first two have been advanced as potential desecuritization strategies primarily in the case of securitized immigration policy; the latter two have been suggested for desecuritizing national minorities. This paper seeks to build on the last strategy, that of managing ethnic identities. Before this can be done, however, an analysis of the other strategies is necessary to contextualize the argument made here.

1.2.1 Desecuritizing migrants in Europe

Concerned with the logic of security and the introduction of a political realist friend/enemy dichotomy that securitization brings, Jef Huysmans posits a deconstructivist strategy of desecuritization. He argues that the securitization of migrants in Europe is a security drama that, like all security dramas in international relations, recreates a Hobbesian narrative of a war of all against all. In this securitization narrative, the securitized migrant is the Other that has breached the harmonious inner sphere – the mythologized homogenous state – and in doing so, has introduced the possibility of death. Here, death is not only physical death but also the death of the discursively constructed native identity through contact with non-native culture and customs. Most importantly for Huysmans, it is in this portrayal of the migrant as a threatening other that the threatened identity is also constructed:

“in creating threats – disharmony – the units create also their identity. This means that units and their identities are never just given in a security story, but that they develop within the story by the definition of threats.”

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For Huysmans, this securitization story introduces a mutually constitutive friend/enemy dichotomy present in a Schmittian conceptualization of the political community. Furthermore, such a view of the political community is but one choice, one chosen technique that seeks to answer the fundamental question Carl Schmitt’s theory sought to address:

“how to formulate a positive concept of the political which allows value determination in the context of modern societies torn between a formal process of rationalization and an aesthetic, irrational, subjective process of value determination which cannot be a successful counter-force to societal rationalization because of its subjectivism.”

In place of Schmittian political realism, Huysmans offers three different strategies of desecuritization, objectivist, constructivist, and deconstructivist, ultimately settling on the latter as most appropriate.

A deconstructivist desecuritization strategy for desecuritizing migrant identity comes down to a fragmentation, breaking down the “unified cultural alien” category and replacing it with a plethora of shifting identities. Thus, a migrant is not a migrant but “woman, black, worker, mother, etc. – just like the natives are.” Such a fragmentation of identities does carry with it a problem, however, in that if carried to its logical conclusion, it allows no identity. Huysmans recognizes this, and suggests the possibility of a simultaneous identity construction process to go along with identity fragmentation, only to ensure that no one identity becomes dominant. Contemplating how to formulate a political community with values but without a Schmittian logic of exclusion, his response is to define the political sphere “in terms of the complexity and plurality of daily human practices.”

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23 Ibid., 67.
Also reflecting on strategies to desecuritize the migrant identity in the EU, Claudia Aradau offers emancipation – inspired by post-Marxist philosophers Etienne Balibar and Jacques Ranciere – as a possible strategy that can overcome the non-democratic politics present in securitization. She argues that securitization has an implicit Schmittian understanding of politics, where “securitization is not simply a speech act,” but an “enactment of exceptionalism in political life.” Exceptionality can have terrible consequences for personal liberties and democracy, as numerous authors have demonstrated.

In place of the exclusionary and exceptional politics of securitization, Aradau maintains that emancipation can re-start democratic process and introduce a universalist logic of mutual recognition. In line with what the CS might argue, she rejects the Welsh School’s approach that seeks to significantly expand the logic of security, equating security with emancipation. Such an approach cannot mean true emancipation because it perpetuates the same Schmittian logic: some must be made insecure for others to be secure. What Aradau suggests is that in order to reverse the exclusionary logic of security present securitization, there must be “a process of dis-identification, a rupture from the assigned identity and a partaking of a universal principle.”

Andreas Behnke has challenged the idea that dis-identification is the right approach, arguing that it demands exclusion of the “identity of the subaltern, the ‘security have not’s,’ as different” [emphasis in original]. Influenced by the work of David Campbell on US foreign policy and the construction of national identity, he believes that desecuritization theorized as emancipation cannot

29 Ibid., 402.
happen. In order to ensure ontological security, states must continually produce an exclusionary, securitizing logic. Thus, “the price of emancipation…is the elimination of difference” because only by sacrificing their distinct social identity can the threatening other be accepted into the state and dominant community.\textsuperscript{31} What are the implications of this for other securitizations? Turning eastward, I now examine strategies of desecuritization offered for national minorities in CEE.

1.2.2 Desecuritizing national minorities

States in CEE have historically had a difficult time accommodating national minorities, leading to repressive policies and a fear that giving more rights and autonomy will lead to secession.\textsuperscript{32} Consequently, the presence of these minorities has been framed as a security issue. Collective ethnic identities differ in fundamental ways from the migrant identity imposed on immigrants coming into the EU and US in the latter half of the past century, requiring different strategies of desecuritization. Two approaches have been theorized to how the identity of these minorities might be desecuritized: a management approach and a reconstructivist approach.

Paul Roe has argued that there is an inherent “securityness” to the collective identities of national minorities that makes a deconstructivist or emancipatory desecuritization strategy logically impossible. A deconstruction of the national minority’s identity would signify the death of group identity because when speaking about the security of society, the group’s distinct identity is what allows the group to survive. Thus, while states’ survival pins on their sovereignty, a society’s survival is based on its distinct identity.\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, an emancipatory logic that demands dis-identification runs the same risk of stifling the group’s identity. In place of these, Roe recommends a management strategy to desecuritize national minorities.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 67.
Due to the inherent nature of collective ethnic identities like those of Central and East European minorities, Roe argues that the possibilities for desecuritization are limited. Rejecting the idea that desecuritization is impossible entirely, he does note that it might be difficult practically. His answer to the problem of securitized minorities is “management,” or moderate securitization. Ultimately, Roe believes that it is difficult to avoid speaking of minority rights in terms of security, but management can allow for a normalization of relations. What this means practically is a federal solution to institutionalize mechanisms for deliberation that would reduce the necessity for emergency politics.\(^\text{34}\)

One response to Roe’s argument about the inherent “securityness” of minority rights and the necessity of managing identities comes from Matti Jutila, who argues that Roe is deterministically “writing security” into minority rights. Jutila agrees with what he believes is a tautological statement that once a group’s distinctiveness is destroyed, it cease to exist. However, he does not see this inevitably leading to security dilemmas between majorities and minorities. Rather, he supposes that a reconstruction of identity, changing how groups see one another, is a superior desecuritization strategy that does not “write security” into minority rights.\(^\text{35}\) In response, Roe has written that his and Jutila’s approaches are not very different: a reconstructivist approach must be preceded by management strategies. Mechanisms and institutions must be put in place to accommodate different groups’ security concerns; only once this has been done can a reconstruction occur.\(^\text{36}\)

What can be gleaned from the insights on desecuritizing ethnic minorities in CEE? Both authors recognize the uniqueness of ethnic minority identity and correctly reject deconstructivist and emancipatory desecuritization strategies due to the necessity of dis-identification. What are some important gaps and problems with both arguments? For one thing, Roe’s advocacy for a “moderate”

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 292-293.
securitization of ethnic identity is puzzling. If the logic of securitization follows Schmittian political realist lines, as many claim it does, “moderate securitization” is an oxymoron: one is either friend or enemy; there is no room for an intermediate position. Though this at first appears like a fair critique, in the next chapter I will argue that a moderate securitization is indeed theoretically possible.

Jutila’s advocacy for reconstruction is also problematic in that in practical terms, it is difficult to see how this reconstruction could happen. He accepts that securitization is essentially about narratives and that some will inevitably be able to assert particular narratives more effectively than others. If we assume, as the CS and most others do, that those who can speak security are generally the traditional state and societal elites, there seems to be no reason why elites would choose to reconstruct narratives when the securitization of national minorities bestows upon them power and resources they would otherwise not possess. Ultimately, reconstruction may be a theoretically sound strategy of desecuritization but it is practically difficult and maybe even impossible. As Roe correctly argues, what is first needed is management of ethnic divisions.

These are but some of the important questions and strategies to be considered when approaching desecuritization. Both Roe and Jutila offer important insight into a topic few have researched: desecuritizing ethnic minorities. Roe’s insistence on the establishment of federal institutions and mechanisms to manage groups’ security concerns is spot-on. Furthermore, it implicitly recognizes that the primary method of managing ethnic tensions in practice has been the creation of power-sharing structures such as federalism. Jutila’s insights are also useful in further developing possibilities of desecuritization because they emphasize the necessity of shifting discourse. Importantly, however, these arguments deal with national minorities; the dynamics of desecuritization are different in deeply divided, post-conflict states.

In the next chapter, I turn directly to the topic of desecuritizing ethnic identity in divided states. While similar to national minorities in CEE, these cases are different in that they are even
more divided due to the presence of recent mass violence. The insights and critiques reviewed thus far will help elucidate how desecuritization can be theoretically conceptualized and practically executed in such cases. An argument will be made for the necessity of power-sharing institutions that go beyond federalism, creating a specific kind of political community necessary for desecuritization of ethnic identity.
2. Managing ethnic divisions: power sharing as a desecuritization strategy in deeply divided states

How can desecuritization of ethnic identities occur in deeply divided states? Why do we need a separate desecuritization strategy for such cases? What are deeply divided states? These are but some of the questions this chapter will try to answer. This inquiry stems from dissatisfaction with the existing literature’s failure to address the security dynamics in “deeply divided, post-conflict states,” a label I will explain shortly. Proceeding from the previous chapter’s discussion of desecuritization strategies, this chapter further develops the idea of federalism-as-desecuritization or “management of ethnic identities.” If managing ethnic divisions suggests possible institutional solutions for securitized ethnic identities, then it might very well be time for security studies to look elsewhere for insights into theories of desecuritization. The vast literature on international nation building, ethnic conflict management and democratization in political science and peace and conflict studies is a good place to start.

Building upon Roe’s case for federal solutions to securitized national minorities, this chapter explores other institutional desecuritization strategies in ethnically divided states where federalism may be unfeasible. Specifically, I advocate for the desirability of consociational arrangements in states where violent inter-ethnic conflict has ruptured the existing political landscape. These cases are similar in some ways to states in CEE where national minorities are framed in security discourse but also demonstrate fundamental differences that warrant separate analysis. Understanding the unique security dynamics of post-conflict states divided by ethnic divisions is essential if we seek to avoid further violence and provide for the emergence of democratic politics.

The argument for consociational institutions develops in three ways. First, the parameters for “deeply divided, post-conflict states” will be established. The purpose is not to develop a comprehensive typology but rather to demonstrate why this variety of states is unique and why they
require different desecuritization strategies. Second, there must be further analysis of the established desecuritization strategies, explaining why exactly such strategies are not desirable in post-conflict states. Finally, using a particular understanding of desecuritization – that is, what it entails and what it aims for – I develop a strategy of institutional desecuritization for deeply divided, post-conflict states.

2.1 Deeply divided, post-conflict states

Developing a theory of desecuritization for deeply divided states requires an initial clarification: what are deeply divided states? All states contain societal cleavages based on class, race, religion, ethnicity etc. that influence politics, so what makes a state deeply divided? Understanding this seemingly arbitrary delineation is important to the argument made here because it is exactly the nature of these divisions that warrants a separate desecuritization strategy. Furthermore, the added qualification of “post-conflict” is a further narrowing of the sort of states that may require special desecuritization strategies from the ones in the existing literature.

Deeply divided, post-conflict states are usually states split along ethno-religious lines. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many are also contested states, where one or more groups challenge the very existence of the state in the established form – Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan and Kosovo are but a few examples. Consequently, deeply divided states are home to one or more secessionist movements seeking to establish full sovereignty for their group. With a few important exceptions, academics and policy makers alike have worked to prevent secession, as it can never be a decisive solution in contested states: partition usually only inverts minority/majority positions.37

What is the nature of ethno-religious divisions that plague these contested states? Avoiding a comprehensive review of the literature on nationalism and ethnic identity, two important comments

are necessary. First, this paper rejects a primordial or objectivist view of ethnic or national identity. There is extensive evidence to suggest that these identities are modern, socially constructed, and negotiated; they are not timeless or passed down through bloodlines. Nevertheless, this is not to dismiss nationalism or ethnicity entirely. For example, Clifford Geertz argues that it does not matter whether or not a nation has a particular lineage or history, what matters is that the perception of this connection has great significance for social interaction. This is particularly true in post-conflict states where the violence has been framed in the language of inter-ethnic animosity. Such violence tends to increase individuals’ affinity with their own group and intensify animosity for others. Thus, when considering strategies of desecuritization after mass violence framed in ethnic terms has occurred, dismissing ethnicity entirely – in favor of a common, civic identity, for example – will probably not be an effective strategy.

Second, the labels “deeply divided” and “post-conflict” are designed to accommodate a wide range of states that have largely been ignored by both the CS and other academics working with securitization and desecuritization. The category is meant only to highlight the fact that the implicit assumptions the CS and others make in regards to state structure may not be present outside of a liberal democratic context. Consequently, these assumptions limit some desecuritization strategies that have been offered. Returning to the literature on desecuritization discussed earlier, I now examine more closely the inapplicability of these strategies for deeply divided states.

42 The CS takes a similar approach: recognizing the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, they nevertheless approach ethnic identity as something that is often "solidly sedimented," sometimes becoming a referent object for securitizing actors, see Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. "Slippery? contradictory? sociologically untenable? The Copenhagen schools replies." Review of International Studies 23 (1997): 242-244.
43 for more on CS bias, see Wilkinson, Claire. "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?" 2007.
2.2 Limits of existing strategies for desecuritizing ethnic identity in deeply divided, post-conflict states

The existing theories of desecuritization primarily deal only with two specific cases of securitization: securitized migrants in Europe\(^{44}\), \(^{45}\) and the securitization of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.\(^{46}\), \(^{47}\) Within the CS itself, desecuritization has been written about primarily as a state of a-security that developed in Western Europe and Scandinavia in the latter half of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century.\(^{48}\) An analysis of how this state of a-security came about is largely un-theorized by the CS. Consequently, we are left with the four types of desecuritization discussed in chapter one: deconstruction, emancipation, reconstruction, and management.

Roe offers a valuable account of why the deconstructivist approach to desecuritization, useful for desecuritizing migrants, may not be appropriate for national minorities in CEE. It is not necessary to repeat his argument entirely, suffice to say that unlike migrants, ethnic groups might be much less willing to shed their distinct identities in favor of shifting, fragmented ones.\(^{49}\) In deeply divided states, identities may be even more rigid than in states where conflict with other ethnic groups has not recently occurred. In other words, a deconstructivist strategy for desecuritization, while theoretically sound, would probably be practically impossible to pursue.

An emancipatory strategy runs into a similar problem in that it requires dis-identification from a particular identity. According to Aradau, the key to desecuritizing migrant identity is to enable the securitized migrant to invoke “existing principles already present in a democratic

\(^{44}\) Huysmans, Jef. "Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of "Securitizing” Societal Issues.”
\(^{45}\) Aradau, Claudia. "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation.”
\(^{46}\) Roe, Paul. "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization.”
\(^{47}\) Jutila, Matti. "Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism.”
\(^{48}\) Waever, Ole. "The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders.”
\(^{49}\) Roe, Paul. "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization.”
regime." There are two main problems with this approach. First, as Behnke correctly points out, any political community demanding dis-identification in favor of universal principles inevitably demands homogeneity and assimilation – the price of emancipation. His contention rests on the conflict between emancipatory logic and ontological security. Although a thorough engagement with ontological security is outside the scope of this paper, it does warrant a brief consideration.

Behnke’s critique of emancipatory logic is that it ignores the inherent necessity of difference in constructing a stable political community. Catarina Kinnvall argues that religion and nationalism provide especially powerful sources of ontological security because they are portrayed “as resting on solid ground, as being true, thus creating a sense that the world really is what it appears to be.” In other words, an ethnic identity provides a secure sense of self that is strengthened in times of instability, such as that brought on by globalization – Kinnvall’s argument – or by violence and a rupture with established routines that give people meaning. Ultimately, any desecuritization strategy that necessitates a rupture with such a potentially powerful sense of stability like an ethnic identity might very well be impossible to implement.

Secondly, in advocating for an emancipatory strategy of desecuritization, Aradau seeks not simply the restoration of “normal” politics, but the creation of a particular kind of political arrangement. Consequently, it is obvious that an emancipatory strategy can only work in liberal democracies; states where democracy is not well established or where the political arrangements have been shattered by war and violence cannot easily uphold universal principles. Furthermore, in emphasizing universal principles and dis-identification, Aradau implicitly advocates for the creation

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of a majoritarian democracy. In divided states, this may not be possible, desirable, or even necessary for successful desecuritization.

While it should be clear by now why a deconstructivist or an emancipatory strategy of desecuritization cannot work for deeply divided, post-conflict states, what are the problems with a reconstructivist or management approach to desecuritizing ethnic identity? Both are valid theoretically, but management is more likely to succeed in deeply divided, post-conflict states. On the other hand, even management, posited simply as federalism, might not be enough. What is needed is a deeper, more complex institutional solution. Before exploring this, however, a little more needs to be said on reconstruction and management.

Responding to Jutila’s critique of his management strategy, Roe argues that while applicable, the reconstructivist strategy must be preceded by a managing of minority rights. Considering the case of national minorities in CEE to be particularly entrenched in a securitized logic, he contends that a reconstruction, while necessary and desirable, can only proceed once there has been a period of accommodation for minorities. For this purpose, he proposes the establishment of “cultural and/or political autonomy as part of a federal structure.” These critiques are even more valid in the case of post-conflict states, where the likelihood of shifting narratives about the former enemy is extremely unlikely. Thus, management of some sort must precede reconstruction as a desecuritization strategy. But is political/cultural autonomy in the form of multination federalism the only right solution?

While managing ethnic divisions in dynamics of security (where the minority is discussed in the language of security but within an open, deliberative, and contestable political arrangement) is desirable, it is less clear why management should be limited to federalism. Roe defers to Will Kymlicka on this issue, who argues that desecuritization of minority rights in CEE must be

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55 Ibid., 433.
accompanied by territorial autonomy and the majority group accepting the possibility of secession. Drawing on the Western experience with multiculturalism, Kymlicka concludes that vibrant democracy can only occur once states accept “the possibility (however slim) of a democratically mandated secession” by the minority. But minorities hardly ever occupy only one entirely homogenous territory, and though he notes that the rights and identity of the newly created minority must be protected, Kymlicka does not address the fact that allowing one secession can lead to others (as the example of Serb secessionism post Bosnian and Croatian independence demonstrates). Is it necessary to open the can of worms that is secession through territorial autonomy?

Even if territorial autonomy is the best option, why would a majority accept a federal solution? If the securitizing narrative is that the minority represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the nation-state, would they not see a federal solution simply as the first step to secession? Federalism has been a solution to ethnic divisions in places like Belgium and Canada, but one need only look to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia or Russia’s wars in the Caucasus to see the limits of federalism. In the specific case of CEE, however, it is unclear how a federal solution could successfully desecuritize national minorities, as it seems to confirm the majority’s worry that the minority is a threat. Consequently, federalism and political/cultural autonomy may not be enough to desecuritize ethnic identities in CEE; the chances for success are even lower in deeply divided, post-conflict states. Instead, there must be deeper, more complex institutional solutions to securitization of ethnic identity. In particular, there should be incentives for power to be shared, rather than just federalized.

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2.3 Institutional solutions for securitized identities: the case for power sharing

How can desecuritization be achieved institutionally? Roe’s argument on the desirability of federalism for managing ethnic divisions in cases of securitization is a good starting point, but federalism alone may not be enough. Moreover, while territorial federalism might be outwardly rejected by the dominant group due to the increased likeness of secession it is thought to create, power-sharing might be a more suitable option. Before arguing for the suitability of power-sharing as a desecuritization strategy in ethnically divided states, I provide an overview of the concept itself and the larger debate on institutionally managing divided societies.

Power-sharing is a concept developed in political science that describes institutional and electoral structures designed to be more inclusive of deep cleavages in a state where majoritarian democracy is undesirable. No two forms of power-sharing are the same, and may even differ within the state depending on what level of governance one observes. Consociationalism, theorized by Arend Lijphart in his pioneering work *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, is perhaps the most well-known version. According to Lijphart, a consociational democracy contains four main features:

1. Grand coalitions of segmental elites that work together to stabilize the system
2. The possession of mutual vetoes by all factions on vital national interests
3. Segmented autonomy for all groups
4. Proportional representation in the electoral system

A brief discussion of these four elements is needed. Lijphart warns that no one version of any of these elements should be applied across the board, but instead, local conditions should shape what kind of consociationalism a state adopts. Grand coalitions can be comprised of all relevant segments of societies, or they may consist of the largest segments. What is crucial is that as many

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segments of society be included as is possible. Some states will undoubtedly be more inclusive than others: Bosnia is divided between the three biggest groups, to the exclusion of other much smaller minority groups, while Israel’s arrangement excludes Palestinians entirely.

Furthermore, the use of “segmented autonomy” instead of simply territorial autonomy is a nuanced solution to what can often be a complex problem. As discussed earlier, territorial autonomy is often equated with impending secession in cases of securitized minorities, making it an improbable desecuritization strategy. Autonomy can take many other forms, however, and while it might be combined with territorial autonomy in some ways, it is important not to preclude other considerations for autonomy when considering ethnic divisions.

Lijphart conceptualizes consociationalism not as a recipe for how divided states should be structured but rather as a guiding principle on how to make them more democratic. The problem consociationalism seeks to address is the tyranny of the majority. Concerned with the possibility a tyranny of the majority, Lijphart’s contends that while a majoritarian democracy may be suitable for states that are largely homogenous, it is less suitable in states with deep societal cleavages. His argument is not against majoritarian democracy but rather for the implementation of consociational principles where they might help make the political landscape more inclusive. More importantly, the choice may sometimes be for consociational democracy or no democracy at all.

What is the nature of the divisions that consociationalism is supposed to manage? In his early work, Lijphart studied the structures of power-sharing in his native Netherlands, “discovering” consociationalism as a natural bargaining process that comes about in divided states. The divisions in the Netherlands were ideological and religious, while in Belgium and Switzerland the divisions are

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national and linguistic. In Lebanon, the deep societal cleavages are primarily religious, while in Bosnia they are ethnic. Thus, a state may be divided by any sort of cleavages, though religious, linguistic and ethnic tend to be the most common.\footnote{Lijphart, Arend. *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, 2008.}

The foundational principle of consociationalism is the idea that democracy in deeply divided states is better served by power-sharing rather than majoritarian principles. In other words, deep cleavages along ethnic, religious, or other lines should be eased by recognizing these divisions and incorporating them into the political sphere. Consociationalists are political realists who believe that particular collective identities – ethnic, linguistic, national, or religious – are not fixed or primordial but can certainly become fairly durable.\footnote{O’Leary, Brendan. "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments," 8.} Instead of wishing these differences away, consociationalists believe it is preferable to work with the divisions and ensure that political arrangements facilitate inclusion of all groups.

Consequently, one of the major critiques launched at consociationalists is that they reinforce the same divisions they intend to alleviate. Integrationists like Donald L. Horowitz argue that consociations fail at managing societal divisions because they do not allow for crosscutting allegiances on civic or other less divisive principles.\footnote{Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.} Power-sharing arrangements usually mean that group leaders have little incentive to seek support outside of their own faction, possibly resulting in nationalist outbidding and populist rhetoric.\footnote{Norris, Pippa. *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 28.} Instead, integrationists advocate for political arrangements that minimize social divisions and increase incentives for inter-communal cooperation. Like consociationalists, integrationists see ethnic, religious, and similar divisions as a social reality; they are, however, more optimistic about the possibility of transcending these divisions.

An additional critique of consociationalism is that it is undemocratic: according to Lijphart, the source of cooperation in a consociational democracy is the rule of a cartel of elites working
together to stabilize the state. Subsequently, many have disputed the democratic credentials of a theory that necessitates backroom dealings by ethnic entrepreneurs to bring order and stability. In response, consociationalists have argued that nothing in their theory precludes competition and change of power within the different camps, only that political space be reserved for each segment of society. Furthermore, nothing in consociational theory makes the dissolution of societal cleavages impossible.\(^6\) This last point deserves further scrutiny, and I return to it later.

Integrationists and consociationalists approach the problem of divided states in a similar way but disagree on how to implement change. Both schools see societal cleavages as a problem that can be managed by creating incentives for cooperation; what they disagree on is the form of the institutions that are needed. Though their view of the nature of the divisions they study may be constructivist, this point is generally irrelevant, as their research methodology is entirely objectivist and positivist. In fact, the resemblance between the CS understanding of identity and that of consociationalists is striking: neither denies the socially constructed nature of ethnicity but both proceed as if ethnic groups were social facts.

Can the debate between consociationalists and integrationists help in developing strategies of desecuritizing ethnic identity? Undoubtedly, scholars working with desecuritization and those theorizing institutional solutions for divided states have different epistemological and ontological foundations, but this does not mean that they cannot learn from one another. If a federal solution for desecuritization may not be acceptable, might a more complex power-sharing structure be better?

### 2.4 Power-sharing as desecuritization

How might instituting power-sharing arrangements for divided states be conceptualized as a strategy for desecuritization? A few stipulations are required. First, like desecuritization, power-
sharing should not be viewed as one comprehensive approach but rather as a procedural method for restoring normalcy and deliberative processes. Not all issues can desecuritized in the same way and not all states can have the same power-sharing institutions. What works for some may not work for others. What must be the same is a preference for politics over violence, inclusion over exclusion, and deliberative over emergency measures. The kind of politics is also important.

Second, while the discussion on federal solutions is specific to the desecuritization of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, power-sharing might be a desecuritization strategy in many deeply divided, post-conflict states. The aim is not to create a comprehensive theory, however, but rather to expand the institutional argument into another paradigm. Obviously, it would be crucial to discern whether a securitization has in fact occurred. Answering positively would then warrant an investigation into what is the nature of the securitization its effects.

Finally, in states where societal cleavages are deep enough to the point where self-identifying groups see each other as security threats, institutional power-sharing can be an appropriate strategy of desecuritization. Here I am equating deeply divided states with states that frame certain ethnic or national in terms of security. In other words, a successful securitization can create a deeply divided state; but a deeply divided state does not necessarily indicate a successful securitization. This point does not need extensive elaboration; suffice to say, it is safe to assume that deeply divided states can also be sites of securitized ethnic identities. Once it can be concluded that a divided state is also a case of securitized identities, we can proceed with theorizing how power-sharing can be a useful desecuritization strategy.

In order to understand how power-sharing could be seen as a valuable desecuritization strategy, it is important to return to Waever’s differentiation between different states of security. Roe correctly points out that while insecurity and a-security are fairly well understood, an often-overlooked state is that of “security,” in which the language of security is present but it does not lead
to the legitimation of extraordinary measures. He cites the debate and eventual banning of the headscarf in France as an example of this state: French identity was clearly understood to be under threat, but this did not lead to a violent spiraling or legitimation of emergency measures. Therefore, the presence of a language of security does not reveal a securitization: as the CS write,

Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.

Based on this understanding of securitization, Roe goes on to argue that the management strategy of desecuritizing national minorities in CEE might still leave the issue of re-securitization on the table, but this is the best we can hope for in this situation. Without managing first, however, there can be no reconstruction.

But what sort of desecuritization strategy is management? How can it be understood as part of the established CS models of desecuritization? This answer requires two additional commentaries. First, desecuritization should be understood as a process, one that must be continually reproduced. Second, the aim of desecuritization does not have to be a-security, as Aradau and Huysmans have understood it but can also aim for security. Returning to the conditions for securitization will allow for a better understanding of how desecuritization can be viewed as a process.

Facilitating conditions are “the conditions under which the speech act works” and essentially determine how likely a securitizing move is to succeed. Internal facilitating conditions are those that demand the securitizing actor follows the established rules and procedures of speech act, while the external conditions stipulate who is more likely to succeed in securitizing and what sort of things are

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69 Aradau, Claudia. "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation."
more likely to be accepted as threatening. Thus, though the CS argues that the discursive nature of security combined with the subjective character of threats means that any issue can be securitized – widening the security agenda – in actuality, facilitating conditions limit what can convincingly be argued as a security threat.

Furthermore, facilitating conditions – like the authority or social condition of the securitizer or “features of the alleged threat” – are inherently variable and shifting. Consequently, a securitizing actor must correctly interpret all these fluctuating conditions and intervene at exactly the right moment in order to have the speech act accepted. If a speech act leads to a securitization, then it would seem that the facilitating conditions that were meant to prevent such a move failed; such an understanding reduces securitization to a moment. Increasingly, however, this conceptualization has come under attack as inaccurate in explaining securitization. Consequently, desecuritization should not be understood as a moment either. Rather, it is a process that alters the facilitating conditions for a speech act to prevent and hinder the logic of securitizations.

Understanding facilitating conditions is crucial for conceptualizing the implementation of power-sharing arrangements as a desecuritization strategy. By limiting the ability of a securitizing actor to persuade an audience about the threatening nature of an issue, threats can be desecuritized. In the case of deeply divided societies, implementing power-sharing structures guarantees a voice to all groups, ensuring that one dominant narrative will be much harder to establish by a securitizing actor. If securitization is the elevation of threats above the realm of normal deliberative politics, institutionally mandating that all groups be given the same authority to counter securitizing moves against them could be a very effective desecuritization strategy. In other words, an institutional

desecuritizing process creates a structure of desecuritization that constrains actors’ ability to convincingly speak security. Finally, in order to conceptualize how an institutional structure can be seen as a possible desecuritization strategy, we must understand what the aim of desecuritization should be: what is the nature of the politics it aims to restore?

Concerned with a “democratic deficit” in the CS theory of securitization, Aradau claims desecuritization should be thought of as “the democratic challenge to the non-democratic politics of securitization” and must “be inscribed institutionally...to create a different relation from the one of enmity, a relation which is not rooted in the exclusionary logic of security” [emphasis added]. She advocates an emancipatory model of desecuritization, whereby those who are constructed as threatening claim for themselves the already-established universal principles of the state, shedding their securitized identity and embracing that of equal citizen. Roe and Jutila correctly dismiss this strategy for desecuritizing national minorities, as it means the death of the distinctive minority identity and thus the group itself. Another issue with the emancipation argument is that while Aradau claims it is a strategy for restoring democratic politics, she implicitly views democracy as majoritarian democracy.

2.5 What kind of politics?

What sort of democratic politics can desecuritization restore? Citing Michael Saward, Aradau gives us one broad idea of what kind of democracy emancipation (re)establishes: 1) political equality and fairness, 2) policy stemming from popular power, and 3) transparency and the possibility of public scrutiny. She goes on to link emancipation with this broad notion of democracy, believing that emancipation can disrupt “the exclusionary logic of security” and simultaneously establish “a

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76 Aradau, Claudia. "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation."
77 Ibid., 401-402.
78 Ibid., 392.
new relationality with the other.” However, none of this can occur without dis-identification, which as Behnke correctly recognizes, means, “the price of emancipation…is the elimination of difference.” Consequently, Aradau’s image of democracy cannot be one of power-sharing or consociation and cannot apply in a state divided along ethnic or national lines.

The kind of democracy that Aradau advocates might even be a facilitating condition for (re)securitization in deeply divided states. For example, it is not difficult to imagine the following scenario. In a country deeply divided along ethnic lines, the largest group attempts to redefine the state as a centralized territory with a majoritarian political system, suppressing all forms of nationalism and advocating a non-ethnic, civic identity. Subsequently, their language, customs and culture are made the norm, while all others are suppressed. Referendums challenging any of these norms are allowed in this hypothetical state, but they are easily defeated because the majoritarian character of the state means the group that makes up just over 50% of the population can govern alone. In such a country, it would be very difficult not to see a group securitize their identity vis-à-vis the dominant group, or vice versa.

While this is an extreme example and no such state could be called a democracy, it illustrates how majority rule can theoretically be simultaneously democratic and undemocratic. In practice, divided states institute language rights, cultural rights etc. and may create incentives for elites to seek support from other groups. Andrew Reynolds calls this approach integrative majoritarianism, – associated with Horowitz – where majoritarian structures prevail but contain centripetal forces that encourage elites to be moderate and inclusive. Nonetheless, this theoretically reasonable idea is

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79 Ibid., 401.
near impossible to implement and most states today contain some form of power-sharing; purely majoritarian states are quite rare.\textsuperscript{82}

Aradau claims that desecuritization involves deciding what sort of politics we want, and her answer, though uncertain, seems to preclude power-sharing democracy based on the necessity of dis-identification. Inevitably, the kind of politics we want in a divided state are those that allow for all the broad qualities associated with democracy – freedom, transparency, accountability, inclusivity, and so on – but do not demand dis-identification along universalist principles. Consociational democracy allows for all the individual freedoms commonly associated with democracy but more importantly, it concedes that sometimes, individuals may feel the need to politicize a collective identity. The key is to establish structures that allow \textit{politicization} in order to prevent or end \textit{securitization} of ethnic identities. Thus, the kind of politics that desecuritization aims for must be a form of democracy that is acceptable to all groups, while protecting basic individual liberties and the rule of law.

The question of politics is crucial in theorizing strategies of desecuritization in deeply divided, post-conflict states. It has been argued that some established desecuritization theories are limited in that they view desecuritization as the restoration of liberal democratic politics. Such an understanding of desecuritization may be valid in liberal democracies that have securitized migrant identity, but cannot be helpful outside of this context. Consequently, desecuritization is equated with democratization, meaning that without the latter, it is not possible to speak about desecuritization. By returning to Waever’s three states of security, – security, insecurity, and a-security –, we see that this conceptualization of desecuritization privileges only one end state of desecuritization: a state of a-security. As Roe has correctly pointed out, however, desecuritization may also result in a state of

security: the presence of a language of security but without a turn to emergency measures and extraordinary politics.

In the following chapter, I analyze the political landscape of postwar Bosnia in order to demonstrate how an institutional structure of desecuritization might effectively lead to a state of security without escalation into emergency measures. Bosnia presents a case where elites interact in a system where they are severely restricted in their ability to securitize ethnic identity. This is not so much due to the presence of impediments to securitization – although these exist as well – but more so because the highly decentralized state greatly empowers ethnic elites, giving them an incentive to preserve the existing arrangements.

This decentralized system has been a double-edged sword: while ethnic identity remains desecuritized and the possibility of renewed conflict is low, the country is crippled by nationalist rhetoric. Nationalist politicians are generally unwilling to pursue reforms that would challenge their privileged positions, meaning that passing the necessary reforms for EU accession has proven extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that desecuritization need not aim at restoring liberal democratic politics; in deeply divided, post-conflict states like Bosnia, any kind of politics is better than no politics and violence.
3. Institutional desecuritization in post-Dayton Bosnia

The war in Bosnia ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords (Dayton) and the establishment of highly decentralized state consisting of two entities, one predominately Serb and the other split between Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats. Today, Bosnia is a case of moderate securitization: ethnic identity is still a securitized issue, but it is dealt with in the sphere of normal politics. Structural desecuritization was achieved through the implementation of consociational democracy. While this has entrenched nationalist politics, the country is stable and democratizing at a sluggish but steady pace.

How has Bosnia progressed from bloody inter-ethnic warfare to a stable, albeit still divided, democracy in a relatively short period? Previous chapters have discussed various strategies of desecuritizing ethnic identity, settling on a managing, institutional solution based on inter-ethnic power sharing. This chapter will examine how Dayton established a political arrangement that successfully desecuritized ethnic identity in Bosnia, creating the possibility of deliberation and democratic. A procedural element was introduced that eased ethnic tensions to a manageable level.

Before turning to Bosnia’s institutional solution to securitized ethnic relations, a brief evaluation of the conditions of securitization and subsequent conflict is warranted. After this, the circumstances for desecuritization will be analyzed, elaborating specifically on the political situation in Bosnia today. Specifically, I show how two instances of potential re-securitization were effectively handled through the existing framework, that is, through normal politics. The purpose here is to demonstrate that desecuritization does not need lofty goals of re-instating a liberal democracy: an imperfect political community is better than no politics at all. Bosnia today is far from being a vibrant, consolidated democracy, but ethnic identity has been desecuritized by consociational arrangements, creating the possibility of further democratization that could not have been possible right after the war.
3.1 From insecurity to security: the success of the Dayton Accords

Upon witnessing the images of destruction, ethnic cleansing, and violence on a scale unseen in Europe for over forty years, few people in the world believed Bosnia could rise from the ashes as a democratic multi-ethnic state. Many still doubt whether it can ever again be the cosmopolitan, tolerant “Switzerland of the Balkans”, which it was represented as during the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. Furthermore, it was doubtful that the Dayton treaty would actually bring lasting peace, as all parties were pressured to sign it. Yet in the nearly twenty years since it was signed, peace has prevailed and most importantly, few people see war as a way of solving political problems.

The main political issue that divided Bosnia in the early 1990s remains unresolved today: the structure and identity of a Bosnian state. With the declaration of independence in early 1992, the country became divided between Bosnian Serbs on one side and Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks on the other. Most Serbs did not want to separate from Yugoslavia and boycotted the independence referendum. Swept up by nationalist propaganda, Bosnian Serbs came to believe that an independent Bosnia was a threat to their very identity. In Serb media outlets, Croats were portrayed as genocidal fascists bent on exterminating Serbs, while the Bosniaks were represented as radical fundamentalists wanting to re-establish Islamic rule over the Serbs.

It is unclear to what extent people believed these accounts, but what is clear is that many felt existentially threatened as a people. In response to the declaration of independence, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) intervened in Bosnia under the premise of protecting the peace while in actuality supporting the secessionist policies of the newly declared Bosnian Serb Republic on the territory of Bosnia. Bosnian Croats initially fought alongside the Bosniaks, but subsequently established their own secessionist state of Herceg-Bosna with support from Franjo Mearsheimer, John J., and Robert A. Pape. "The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia." *The New Republic*, June 14, 1993

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Tudjman’s regime in neighboring Croatia. A comprehensive review of the war in Bosnia is unnecessary, it is important only to demonstrate that Serbs and Croats saw an independent, unitary Bosnia as a threat to their identity. The campaigns of ethnic cleansing against them led to Bosniaks viewing their own identity as existentially threatened as well; they saw a unitary, multiethnic Bosnia as the only guarantee of their survival as a people.

At the height of the war, survival for the Croats and the Serbs of Bosnia meant having their own state or being part of Croatia and Serbia respectively, while Bosniaks wanted a strong centralized state. Why did all sides then agree to a treaty where they would not only have to share a decentralized state, but where the return of refugees – the reversal of all ethnic cleansing that had occurred – was proclaimed to be one of the most important goals? How did the presence of other ethnicities, arguably one of the causes of war, become an entirely acceptable outcome? While the pressure put on the local leaders to reach a deal at Dayton was important, the lasting success of the agreement has been the unique, decentralized consociational government that has made the re-securitization of ethnic identity difficult. By institutionalizing ethnic politics at all levels of government, the Dayton agreement has made convincing any group of the necessity of elevating ethnic issues above politics extremely difficult. Before turning directly to the proposition that structural desecuritization has proven to be a useful strategy in Bosnia, more must be said about the political structure itself.

### 3.2 Consociational democracy in Bosnia

When Dayton was signed, it created what would become one of the world’s most decentralized states. Decision-making takes place on four levels: state, canon, entity and municipal; most of the power rests in the municipal governments and the entities, the latter of which are

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84 For a review of the war, as well as its immediate causes, see Little, Alan, and Laura Silber. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation.* London: Penguin, 1997.
charged with providing all necessary funds for the state level. The entities are perhaps the most important level, as they broadly represent the wartime arrangements: the Serbs reside primarily in the autonomous Republika Srpska (RS), while the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH) is split between Bosniaks and Croats. The electoral rules are complex and differ at each level, containing both majoritarian and consociational elements. Finally, reserved seats and proportional representation rules ensure that groups are represented even in places where they are not the majority.\textsuperscript{85}

Dayton created a state that was just centralized enough to be considered a singular state and decentralized enough to ease Serb and Croat fears of subjugation under Bosniak majority rule. There is both territorial and political autonomy, and power sharing is enshrined in every level of government. Crucially, each group was given a veto rights over legislation they perceived to be against their “vital national interests,” a move that has been critiqued for being necessary but poorly implemented.\textsuperscript{86} The veto was implemented in order to guarantee that no law is passed without consensus among the three groups, but the vagueness of “vital national interests” has led to elites using the veto power in a wide array of cases.\textsuperscript{87}

The ability for all groups to exercise veto power on almost any issue regarding ethnic interests has been a curse and a blessing. In terms of democratization, it has meant that nationalist politicians can be fully uncompromising, knowing full well that they can polarize their constituency by demonstrating how another group wants to dominate them. Consequently, the pace of reform towards EU accession has been painfully slow, as the use of the veto naturally leads to maintaining


the state quo. On the other hand, the possession of an institutionally guaranteed and vaguely defined veto has meant that no law can be passed which would threaten the nationalist interests of any group. Consequently, securitizing an issue is an unnecessary option, as the existing structure makes it possible to deal with any existential threat through normal politics.

In spite of rampant nationalist rhetoric, political deadlock, and persistent ethnic divisions, the ethnic issue in Bosnia remains desecuritized. The consociational framework created by Dayton has drastically limited the ability of actors to securitize the ethnic issue. Breaking free from this structure would not only be highly de-stabilizing, it would be extremely difficult to justify politically, as ethnic identity is heavily protected through various mechanisms like the veto discussed above. Furthermore, elites have strong incentives to work within the current structure rather than attempt a securitizing move and lose legitimacy if it fails. This structurally produced desecuritization is most visible in elites’ unwillingness to try to cross beyond the threshold of established rules, even in times of political crisis.

### 3.3 Institutional desecuritization in times of crisis

Since 1995, Bosnia has faced numerous crises that have threatened peace and stability. Until 2004, the presence of 60,000 NATO troops did much to guarantee concord between the three groups, ensuring that any crisis could effectively be contained before it spun out of control. Perhaps the best example is when NATO troops stormed the offices of the *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica’s* (HDZ) financial supporters and the OHR dismissed many of its leaders, ending a dispute that nearly tore apart the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Since 2004, however, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) has

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88 Ibid., 918.
been replaced by a much smaller EU-led force (EUFOR) of only 1,200 troops stationed today.\textsuperscript{90} It could be argued that the early political crises Bosnia faced were in large part mitigated by the sizeable presence of foreign troops. Later crises, on the other hand, were averted by the structure of desecuritization.

The period following the failure of constitutional reform in 2006 was marked by an increase in political deadlock, rising nationalist rhetoric, and a general decline in Bosnia’s progress towards democratization and EU accession.\textsuperscript{91} Possibility of armed conflict again seemed plausible, albeit unlikely.\textsuperscript{92} In this period, two major crises related to the 2010 elections arose. First, the 2010 elections resulted in a strong victory for the Socijaldemokratska Partija (SDP), who formed a government in the FBiH without the inclusion of the two biggest Croat parties, the HDZ and the HDZ-1990. As a result, the two HDZ parties protested the government, calling it illegal because it was formed without real representation for the Bosnian Croats (the SDP had formed a coalition with minor Croat parties, who had less than 10\% of the Croat vote). Bosnia’s central election committee quickly ruled against the SDP, deeming the government illegal; more than a year passed before Bosnia had a government, the sides unable to compromise on a workable coalition.\textsuperscript{93}

A second crisis arose shortly after the 2010 elections when Milorad Dodik, President of the RS, suggested that he might call for a referendum on Bosnia’s state-level judiciary. Citing the fact that the state courts prosecute Serbs more than others, Dodik claimed that the courts were biased and not working in the interest of the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{94} Such a referendum would have called into question the authority of the OHR and the legitimacy of the state itself, while simultaneously setting


} In the end, Dodik backed down from calling for the referendum, and the SDP was able to form a government with the other main ethnic parties. Unquestionably, international pressure helped in deflecting both crises; but the willingness of elites to work \textit{within} the existing structure – rather than to step outside of it – was instrumental in preventing securitization over these very important issues.

Although he makes his contempt for Bosnia very clear and often suggests the possibility of its dissolution, no politician in Bosnia today benefits more from the Dayton framework than Milorad Dodik. Independence for the RS, though a popular idea, is not in Dodik’s interest. His influence and authority is greatest with the current arrangement, where he has greatly consolidated his hold on power and demands the attention of top-level European diplomats like Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.\footnote{Parish, Matthew. "Bosnia: Dodik Agrees to Drop Disputed Referendum."} In effect, Dayton has given the Bosnian Serb leadership what three years of warfare could never achieve: autonomy and international legitimacy.

Dodik may express displeasure with the central government and hint at the possibility of secession, but as the past six years have demonstrated, he is unwilling to go the final steps in challenging the established framework. Bosnian Serbs are quite happy with the current autonomy given to them by Dayton; their main qualm is with Bosniak politicians who wish to do away with the entities and institute a majoritarian, centralized state. For example, in the 2006 elections, Haris Silajdzic of the \textit{Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu} (SBiH), a Bosniak nationalist party, ran on a platform of eliminating the entities and centralizing Bosnia. In turn, Dodik was able to gain support by pointing to Silajdzic’s popularity as evidence that Bosniaks threatened Bosnian Serb autonomy.
While the consociational arrangement does generate centrifugal nationalist politics, it also makes securitization difficult and undesirable from a political standpoint. The high level of decentralization afforded to the RS, coupled with the veto on national interests, represent a structural desecuritization that protects Bosnian Serb interests while simultaneously making securitization less likely. A shift in either direction – whether it is greater centralization or outright independence – would destroy this balance and severely hurt Bosnian Serb interests. Significant centralization and the elimination of their entity could lead to them being outvoted and dominated by more numerous Bosniaks, while independence would leave them in a position similar to Transnistria, only with much less viable borders and no significant Russian support. If Bosniaks pushed for centralization and the elimination of entities, however, re-securitization and war could ensue; but the drastic fall in Silajdzic’s popularity and the success of the moderate SDP suggests this will not happen in the near future.97

Bosnia’s decentralization and the creation of the RS ensures that Bosnian Serb politicians will not try to securitize identity issues, as doing so would risk endangering their interests. Croats in Bosnia are in a much more precarious situation, as they share the FBiH with the Bosniaks, who greatly outnumber them. The Croat representative at the state level presidency, Zeljko Komsic, was elected due to large numbers of Bosniaks voting for him, meaning he is not viewed as a legitimate representative of Croat interests by the Croatian nationalist parties.98 Frustration with the current arrangement was exacerbated in the 2010 elections when the SDP formed a coalition government without the two main Croat nationalist parties, effectively excluding a vast majority of the Croat electorate from power. The government coalition was ruled to be in violation of basic power sharing

principles and the Croat nationalist parties condemned their continued exclusion from the center of power, arguing for the necessity of a third Croat entity.99

The political crisis following the 2010 elections had all the right ingredients for a re-securitization of ethnicity in Bosnia and the renewal of armed conflict. Bosnian Serbs under Dodik were fearful as ever of any attempts to dismantle the RS, while Bosnian Croats saw their share of power greatly diminished in the FBiH by the SDP’s unwillingness to include their main parties in its coalition. Furthermore, the international community, suffering its own turmoil due to the economic crisis, seemed unable to convince the leaders to work together. Yet the SDP did eventually form a coalition with the Croat parties (after more than a year of negotiating), and the relatively quick adoption of a new state budget in spring of 2012 suggests that this coalition might even be able to work together to pass necessary reforms.

Why did Bosnia not fall back into warfare and insecurity following the 2010 election crisis? As always, there is more than one possible answer. One important factor is that unlike in the early 1990s, Croatia and Serbia are much less willing to support secessionism in Bosnia, being preoccupied with their own domestic issues. Additionally, even though the EU was struggling with the financial crisis, it is unlikely they would have tolerated the sort of instability that armed conflict brings. Nonetheless, these alone cannot explain the relatively successful resolution of Bosnia’s crisis. In an exemplary consociational manner, Bosnia’s elites compromised on crucial issues when they realized no one would step in to solve their problems. Though far from perfect, the consociational framework provides a basic structure for leaders to settle identity-related political issues without resorting the securitization. Political participation and autonomy are crucial for sustained peace and continuance of procedural politics, and Dayton ensures both of these for all three dominant communities. Nevertheless, it is a fundamentally flawed system that cannot survive

in the long run. For the time being, however, it is better that ethnic divisions are managed in a flawed but peaceful and deliberative way rather than in no way at all. Regrettably, the choice for Bosnia today is not between liberal democracy and nationalist politics, but between nationalist politics or no politics at all.

In many ways, Dayton’s success in desecuritization stems from the highly decentralized state it created. A decentralized state was the only way Serbs and Croats would accept unity with the Bosniaks; guarantees of extensive autonomy eased their fears of being dominated. Furthermore, even a highly decentralized state like the one proposed in Dayton is still a state, with internationally recognized borders and a political structure that encompasses one defined community. Critics note that the effectiveness of the central government is very weak and that real power lies in the homogenous entities and municipalities. This is a valid point, but it fails to appreciate the bigger picture: the question in Bosnia is no longer whether Bosnia should exist but what sort of democracy it should be – a far better position than it was in in 1995. Desecuritization does not necessarily mean democratization, although any desecuritizing move should not prevent the growth of genuine democracy in the future.

I have provided an account of how institutional structures shape actors’ ability and willingness to securitize ethnic identity in Bosnia. Taking into account the high level of decentralization, protection of ethnic interests through mutual vetoes, and some nationalist politicians’ happiness with the status quo, it has been suggested that desecuritization has been achieved institutionally. Furthermore, the persistence of nationalist politics and discussion of ethnic issues does not preclude a state of desecuritization: Bosnia’s Dayton framework, while far from perfect, has indeed desecuritized the ethnic issue because even in times of crisis, ethnic leaders choose to work within the constitutional framework rather than escape it.
Crucially, this does not mean that the Dayton framework allows for a smooth transition towards a functioning democracy. Rather, the current political landscape should be viewed as a necessary transitional step, smoothing over relations, easing tensions, and creating the basis for a common political community that can solve its problems through established rules and norms instead of with violence. Critics of the Dayton system are correct in pointing out its many flaws that hinder democratization and European integration, but perhaps they forget that the war that introduced the term ethnic cleansing into popular discourse is still fresh, even in the minds of young adults. A deeply flawed arrangement, Dayton nevertheless remains the only thing keeping Bosnia together and on the path towards Europe.
Conclusions

In reviewing four leading strategies of desecuritization, this paper has challenged conventional ways of thinking about desecuritization. Particularly, it has suggested that deeply divided, post-conflict societies offer unique challenges to conceptualizing desecuritization strategies. Unlike the liberal democratic context in which much of the existing literature is based in, deeply divided states have very weak democratic institutions or none at all. Consequently, desecuritization in these states cannot mean the restoration of liberal democratic politics, as some have suggested, but rather initiation of any political arrangement that manages to successfully bring the securitized issue out of the realm of emergency measures. In other words, while desecuritization in deeply divided, post-conflict states might not be able to introduce particularly robust democratic politics, its merit should not be judged based on this alone.

This requires conceptualizing a different security arrangement than has been embraced by much of the existing literature on desecuritization: rather than bringing about a-security, desecuritization can also lead to a state of security. If a-security means that the language of security and emergency politics are both non-existent, a state of security indicates that while there is still a discourse of security surrounding a particular issue, it is nevertheless dealt with within the realm of normal politics. In post-conflict states, it might very be the case that society must first go through a transitional state of security before the language of security withers away completely. This was the way in which the European non-war community emerged in the latter half of the 20th century and it might well be the case for many deeply divided, post-conflict states today.

Analyzing how structure and institutions play a role in elevating political crises in Bosnia, this paper has argued that desecuritization can be institutionalized, altering the facilitating conditions for actors to speak security. The possession of mutual vetoes at most levels of government combined with a state structure that benefits entrenched elites, Bosnia is a typical case of a consociational
arrangement, where elites work together to stabilize the system. This arrangement is nevertheless deeply flawed, as the necessary reforms for EU accession are extremely difficult to implement, impeding the country’s European integration. On the other hand, if one considers the position Bosnia was in a mere two decades ago, it is clear that consociational power sharing may have an important role in aiding deeply divided, post-conflict states’ transitions from insecurity to a-security regarding ethnic issues.

What are some points of departure for further research? First, it is clear that the CS’s theories have some limitations outside of a liberal democratic context. In particular, because of the preference for desecuritization, new theories should be constructed to deal with different paradigms the CS has not yet approached. Second, while this paper has suggested that power sharing or consociation might be a useful desecuritization strategy in deeply divided, post-conflict states, it has only looked at one case: Bosnia. One interesting case to consider might be that of Northern Ireland, where inter-communal tensions seem to have greatly faded with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the introduction of power sharing mechanisms. The lessons learned from these explorations could prove to be indispensable in state-building endeavors in the future.

Finally, in developing desecuritization strategies, the field of security studies would do well to consult their colleagues in other fields, who have been confronting similar challenges for decades. Desecuritization strategies comprise only a very small amount of literature in the field of security studies: expanding this literature is a worthwhile endeavor not only for developing a more robust understanding of what security is in international relations, but for the pursuit of peace as well.
Works Cited


