Feeding The Hand That Bites: Lessons From Counter-Terrorism Dynamics in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

The preference for the use of state violence and force over negotiation and dialogue as a form of counterterrorism was pioneered by Israel, and has reached significant heights since the Global War on Terror began. This is in spite of a range of disadvantages resulting from such a preference. This thesis stems from first the empirics that show that Islamic terror is often, if not always met with force, and from the argument by Harmonie Toros that negotiation shouldn’t be a last resort option. Legitimacy is the focal point of debate in regards to negotiation; does it undermine the legitimacy of the state, and give legitimacy to violence used by sub and non state actors? This thesis looked at the example of Nigeria’s efforts to combat the Islamic sect Boko Haram through the use of violence and argues that the violence used is counterproductive, but is used for the protection of state legitimacy, in order to discredit the Islamists, and to fit with the global counterterrorism paradigm. Against Toros’ argument, I conclude that negotiation would undermine the legitimacy of the state, but this would be the start of a radical emancipation project, moving away from counterterrorism’s currently statist focus and towards a critical acceptance of different forms of violence. The empirical evidence I use to draw my conclusions comes from discourse analysis of media sources, government laws, and academic publications, and positivist evaluations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER ONE – DEFINING THE FIELD OF ANALYSIS ............................................................. 6
  1.1 Orthodox Terrorism Studies and Counterterrorism literature ..................................... 6
  1.1.2 Critical terrorism studies and counter terrorism literature ..................................... 8
  1.2 Force as counter-terrorism ..............................................................................................10
  1.2.1 Negotiation and dialogue as counter-terrorism.....................................................12
  1.3 Theoretical contributions ..............................................................................................14
  1.4 Historical Background: Boko Haram .................................................................................16
  1.4.1 The emergence of violent Islamism ............................................................................17
CHAPTER TWO – COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES .............................................................22
  2.1 Counterterrorism development in Nigeria ....................................................................22
  2.1.2 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011..................................................................24
  2.1.3 Counterterrorism Critiques ......................................................................................25
  2.2 International Counter-Terrorism Norms ......................................................................27
  2.3 Counterterrorism results ..............................................................................................29
  2.3.1 Arrested development? .............................................................................................29
  2.4 Counterterrorism violence ..............................................................................................31
  2.4.1 Significant incidents of counter-terrorism violence ..............................................32
CHAPTER THREE – THE REALITY OF AND REACTIONS TO COUNTER-TERRORISM ..........35
  3.1 A hardened security ..........................................................................................................35
  3.1.2 A better protection for the people ..........................................................................36
  3.2 Belief in the methods ........................................................................................................38
  3.2.1 Opinion polls .............................................................................................................39
  3.2.2 Interpreting mediatic representations of counter-terrorism....................................40
  3.2.3 Thisday ........................................................................................................................41
  3.2.4 The Guardian .............................................................................................................42
  3.2.5 The Daily Trust ..........................................................................................................43
  3.2.6 The Tribune ................................................................................................................45
  3.3 The absence of negotiations ............................................................................................47
  3.3.1 Explaining the absence .............................................................................................51
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................54
Annex 1: Timeline of Boko Haram attacks ..............................................................................60
Annex 2 – Articles used for discourse analysis ........................................................................62
Annex 3 – People/Institutions who have called for dialogue or negotiation with Boko Haram .........................................................................................................................68
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................70
INTRODUCTION

The concept of legitimate violence as belonging to the state only is rooted in the political philosophy of Max Weber who posited that for a state to be, it had to have hold over the legitimate use of physical force\(^1\). This contention of violence as belonging to the state has been the dominant tactic of many governments in their counter-terrorism efforts. This includes today the use of force by the Nigerian government against the group Boko Haram (Boko Haram).

Counter terrorism as a practice includes reactive and proactive methods, short and long term, and those aimed at suppressing violence or rather those aimed at addressing the deeper causes and attempting to explicate the objectives that a group or individuals aspires to. The actual policies can be grouped into four categories: the use of force, intelligence and policing, homeland security, and conciliation and dialogue.

The use of force consists of a full-scale war, a counterinsurgency campaign, “capture or kill” missions, targeted assassinations, destroying bases or places of hiding, or disrupting terrorist activities with military power. Israel has continuously used targeted assassinations as a means to counter Palestinian liberation struggles, the Turkish government mounted arms against the PKK\(^2\), and America against its enemies in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Intelligence and policing includes gathering information, arresting operatives and suspects, as well as psychological and physical operations such as torture, and the disruption of financial support, all used often in the British governments fight against terrorists in the Northern Ireland liberation struggle\(^3\). Homeland security resembles “target hardening” of potential attack targets such as public

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3 Henry McDonald, Revealed: five British spies inside IRA. The Guardian: May 18, 2003: [http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/may/18/uk.northernireland](http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/may/18/uk.northernireland)
transport, airports, government buildings, and popular tourist locations, emergency preparedness, crisis management, legislation, profiling, giving new power to courts, giving new power to police, and amending the judicial rights of suspects, all of which appeared in the Italian government’s fight against the Red Brigade.  

Finally, conciliation and dialogue constitutes non-violent means of countering terrorism, aimed at addressing the “root causes” of terrorism. These range from economic sanctions to diplomatic initiatives, public diplomacy and propaganda campaigns, negotiations, amnesties, an opening up of the political process, development projects, and job creation. This option however, is the least popular amongst governments and mainstream academics as a first choice policy, for reasons that will be explored throughout this thesis.

From Israel to Afghanistan, Iraq to Nigeria, violence has been the preferred mode of counter-terrorism, often standing in direct opposition to dialogue and negotiation. Concern is such for the use of violence that the United Nations has established a Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights and many human rights organisations have complained of the abuses inherent to violence as a form of counter-terrorism. Furthermore, the use of drones by the US government frequent headlines with very little detail given as to exactly who perished in these attacks alongside the suspected terrorist target. I wanted to research why governments use violence, for whom it was used for, and how these policies became dominant in usage.

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4 Tom Parker, Fighting an antaean enemy: how democratic states unintentionally sustain the terrorist movements they oppose, Terrorism and Political Violence, 19 (2007) 164-171

5 Amnesty International’s criticism of extrajudicial assassinations describe them as “an unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by order of a government or with its acquiescence. Extra judicial killings are killings which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy at any level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to arresting them and them and bringing them to justice. These killings take place outside of any judicial framework.” Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End Its Policy of Assassinations, 4 July 2003: 176

Specifically, I noted how violence has been used almost without fail against Islamic terrorist groups\textsuperscript{7}, the most contemporary example of which being in Nigeria. Nigeria has the largest Islamic population in Africa, and remains an incredibly important state throughout the world due to its large wealth of oil\textsuperscript{8}. Colonial legacies left the status of Islam in regards to politics as uncertain and weak, whereas Sharia law had taken precedent over secular frameworks of law before colonial divide and rule tactics.

The importance of Nigeria as a global source of energy inevitably has resulted in a significant international presence in the country; in particular the USA and Britain who both depend on Nigeria for a large part of their oil imports have a significant political and economic presence. It is no coincidence that these countries in particular have been pivotal to the counterterrorism policies of Nigeria and in training their military for specific counterterrorism functions. Thus the international involvement of stakeholders in the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria raised more questions about who counterterrorism policies are enacted for, for what purpose, and why there is no critical reflection upon policies when they have been tried, tested, and failed. With successful amnesties and dialogue having taken place in the Niger Delta with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) I began to question even further why violence is the dominant mode of counter terrorism in Nigeria when clearly successful alternatives are on the table.

This idea was cemented after an interview I conducted with a high level member of the Nigerian embassy to the United Kingdom in December 2011. I asked what the government was doing to counter the threat of Boko Haram to which he responded that “the government is open to negotiation...and the military is attacking the group everyday,

\textsuperscript{7} For example force has been used against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda in Iraq and across the globe, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PLO in Palestine, Lebanon, Israel, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Lashkar-e-Taiba in India, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

attacking severely.” To me these two routes of counter-terrorism seemed contradictory; how could the government be open to dialogue but at the same time be physically attacking suspected terrorists?

I therefore narrowed down all the potential counter-terrorism policies to focus on the use of force, and the use of negotiation as counterterrorism policies. These two policies are chosen for several reasons. First, because violence is the most significant policy used in reaction to Boko Haram, whereas negotiation is continuously ignored. Secondly, because these methods are those most scrutinised in public, political, and academic realms in regards to effectiveness and consequence. Thirdly and finally, these tactics often include the involvement of third parties such as other states, community leaders, regional powers, and international organizations, producing more questions regarding political legitimacy, violence and the state, and who particular policies are being enacted for.

Focusing on the time period between July 2009 and the end of March 2012 because July 2009 is when Boko Haram first turned to violence as its primary tactic, and March 2012, I used a mixed methodology to reach my conclusions. Discourse and content analysis of first and secondary sources as well as my own efforts of positivist research form the breadth of this thesis. Furthermore, I tried to keep academic reflection on the events in Nigeria limited to scholars and academics of a Nigerian origin, as I felt this would grant more authenticity to the analysis at hand, by giving a more accurate perception of the sentiments felt towards the use of violence by Nigerians; the people for whom the counter-terrorism policies are supposed to protect.

The thesis is arranged into three chapters. First, the field of analysis is defined via an efficient and thorough review of the literature available, both covering empirics and theory of different counter-terrorism methods. Within this chapter the contextualization of the formation of Boko Haram is also addressed.
Secondly, I review the legal counter-terrorism structures and policies enacted in Nigeria, focusing on critiques of the chosen methods, and how an international counterterrorism norm is the root of this activity. I then look at what these policies and laws have done to the state, citizens, Boko Haram, and the status of human rights in the country.

The third chapter represents a review of public opinion of Boko Haram and the counter-terrorism efforts of the government, and a deeper discussion of the absence of negotiations, before drawing upon the five key lessons learnt.

Finally, the conclusion leads me to expand on the lessons learnt, and argue that the use of violence by the Nigerian state is counterproductive in protecting the state, its citizens, and reducing the violence. However the government cares little for the disadvantages because of the counterterrorism norm that stipulates responding to Islamic terror with force, ignoring many of the stakeholders involved. Negotiation and dialogue are ignored as options because of the government’s refusal to acknowledge the problem, significance of, and demand for Islamic citizenship and agency within the state. Therefore, any dialogical interaction would be the start of a radical emancipation project which would discredit the state’s failure to govern, and legitimize the use of sub-state violence.
CHAPTER ONE – DEFINING THE FIELD OF ANALYSIS

Literature relating to terrorism constitutes a vast bank, taking influence from security studies, peace and conflict studies, international relations, sociology, criminology, defence studies, and political theory. Since the attacks on the USA in 2001, the amount of literature published has exploded. In the year of 2001 prior to the twin tower attacks, there were just over 100 articles about terrorism published, with this number trebling in 2002, and by 2007 this number amounted to 2,300. More worryingly, according to a survey conducted by Lum et al, out of the 14,006 publications surveyed, only 80 of these focused on evaluation rather than description or speculation. Two separate schools of thought have developed within terrorism studies, and the key authors focusing on counterterrorism methods are discussed below.

1.1 Orthodox Terrorism Studies and Counterterrorism literature

Counterterrorism is the way that governments, and/or international organizations, respond to what they perceive to be terrorism. A huge amount of literature discussing the different types of counterterrorism, and their “effectiveness” exists, with many accounts simply representing theoretically unbiased and apolitical lists of potential options.

Ronald Crelinsten’s book “Counterterrorism” represents one of these lists, in which different methods employed by governments to counter terrorism conflicts are uncritically described and analysed based on effectiveness, with effectiveness judged on

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11 Ronald Crelinstein, *Counterterrorism*, Polity, February 2009
minimising terrorist attacks and protecting the state, rather than the ramifications the chosen policies bare on all subjects within a given context such as the deaths of bystanders or the violation of human rights.

This sort of work belongs to the school of “Orthodox Terrorist studies” (OTS), a field whose greatest fallback is its close ties to governments, therefore producing work representative of and for government agendas, tending to neglect certain counter-terrorism methods, and/or legitimising others. As Ted Gurr has posited: “most of the terrorist literature consists of naïve description, speculative commentary, and prescriptions for “dealing with terrorism”12, citing Bruce Hoffman, and Marc Sageman13 as examples of those guilty of this.

The assumptions embedded in the OTS are used to “justify a whole range of things”14, specifically “legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various war(s) on terror”. However, as this thesis will argue, it is not just the interventions in the South on behalf of the North which are intertwined with orthodox approaches to counter-terrorism, but also the policies of the governments in the South themselves who enact forceful counter-terrorist policies in accordance with counter-terrorism norms which have come to fruition via the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Other researchers have engaged in positivist evaluations of counterterrorism policies such as Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler’s “game-theoretic” approach15 to counterterrorism analysis which concludes that the preference for pre-emption and proactive policies such as targeted assassinations or war situations are much

12 Jackson et al, 3
13 See Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, Columbia University Press, 1998, and/or Understanding Terror Networks, Marc Sageman, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004
14 Jackson et al, 60
less productive in terms of benefits to the government when compared with defensive methods such as target-hardening and securing borders. However, this account neglects to consider the possibility of “root cause” approaches or dialogue and focuses only on the security of the state, thereby not bringing the “human” into the picture.

The development of the school of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), founded by Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth, has allowed for an analysis of counter-terrorism policies which go past the point of description or advocacy. In “Terrorism: A critical introduction”, the authors discuss all known methods of counter-terrorism based on history and analysis, making a clear distinction between a pre and a post 9,11 world, both in policy and in academia.

Breen Smyth and co note the poignant change following 9,11 after which terrorism was framed as “evil”, “lacking in a political agenda”, and acting solely based on a “hatred for the west”\(^{16}\). This discourse consequently mirrored real life government reliance on force-based initiatives, and a neglect of dialogue and reform, which in turn they argue, has given rise to questions that academics and policy makers alike need to begin asking; how to find a balance between security and liberty, is violence justified as counter-terrorism, can terrorism ever “end”, and what are the ethical implications of torture for example.

1.1.2 Critical terrorism studies and counter terrorism literature

This is why “a critical analysis of the different impacts on terrorism and counterterrorism on societies in the South”\(^ {17}\) is needed as a research area, conducted by researchers who are disassociated with governments. Thus, critical terrorist scholars


\(^{17}\) Jackson et al, 250
symbolise a new group of scholars, different from the “community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington”\textsuperscript{18}. The new, critical approaches to analysing counterterrorism policies seek to recognise how terrorism is framed, how this framing dictates particular responses, and comprehend whose voices are silenced when responses are put into action.

Toros asks “are there other means to address terrorist violence that decrease rather than increase the physical, psychological, emotional,, social and economic harm caused to humans?\textsuperscript{19}, looking critically at all options available and concluding that dialogue and negotiation must be seen as a serious solution to terrorism. Toros also warns of the uncritical descriptions of counterterrorism in orthodox terrorism academia that “may sustain and reproduce the very power structures that contributed to terrorist violence in the first place?\textsuperscript{20}. The critical terrorism studies literature seeks a deeper evaluation of counter-terrorism policies that take into account not just the political or military cost, but also the human cost.

The theoretical framework to which the school of critical terrorism studies adheres is that of critical theory. Based on the idea of emancipation for individuals through a radical transformation of society in changing how people interact, it seeks a novel sort of security that differs profoundly from traditional frameworks.

Toros\textsuperscript{21}, however, highlighted the poststructuralist rejection of emancipation as an Enlightenment project that is as western centric and militaristic because of its utopian ideals to transform society by any means, even if this is by force. This echoes critical theorist Ken Booth’s critique of “the intellectual hegemony of realism”\textsuperscript{22} which privilege military power and the state over people and communities. Similarly the critical terrorism

\textsuperscript{18} Jackson et al, 114
\textsuperscript{19} Harmonie Toros, Terrorism, talking and transformation: a critical approach, Critical Terrorism Studies, Routledge, 2012, p1
\textsuperscript{20} Toros, p24
\textsuperscript{21} Toros, p 36
\textsuperscript{22} Ken Booth  Security and Emancipation, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), p313
scholars seek to “deconstruct local attitudes towards the role of violence in society and identity-construction”\textsuperscript{23} without “forcing others to be free” within a particular definition.\textsuperscript{24}.

Emancipation as seen through the eyes of the critical terrorism scholars does not amount to a total end to violence, but rather considers the different perspectives of the use of violence and its legitimacy as belonging not just to the state. This is important in the applicability of critical terrorism studies theory to empirics.

\section*{1.2 Force as counter-terrorism}

Using force as a way in which to counter what is perceived as terrorism is one of the contemporary debates on terrorism that dominates literature, both in terms of theory and empirics.

Boaz Ganor defends the use of violence as a method of counter-terrorism because “the severity of modern terrorism and the causalities and damages it causes require the state to do all within its power to defend its citizens, including the use of military measures.”\textsuperscript{25}

Military measures are also embraced by other well known terrorist scholars such as Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson, and Daniel Byman, who, claim that “there are justifiable reasons to employ any means necessary to deal with the threat”.\textsuperscript{26} These authors are representative of those who see the state as the primary referent of security. This sort of literature, similar to those who uncritically advocate military action as one of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{23} Jackson et al, 228 \\
\textsuperscript{24} Jackson et al, 121 \\
\textsuperscript{25} Breen Smyth et al, 35 \\
\textsuperscript{26} Jacskon et al, 73
\end{flushright}
several possible strategies such as Audrey Cronin, Crelinsten’s, and Walter Lacquer for example, serves to legitimise repressive means of political violence as well as support the conception that violence used by the state is legitimate in countering any threat they perceive.

Exemplary of this is the work of Bruce Hoffman who worked for the RAND corporation; a think tank supplying police advice to the US armed forces funded by the American government. In his “Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration”, he advocates a “dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities”. This dual strategy involves understanding building synergy with host-nation forces, and using all capabilities of the American government, political, social, economic, and military. Contributing to the dominant paradigm is the absence of critical engagement with the potential and real ramifications on humans of using force and military power.

Paddy Hillyard, and David Cole, are two academics who have labelled force-based approaches to counterterrorism ineffective and counterproductive, noting how they can damage individuals, human rights, and communities, and the fight against terrorism. Cole for example noted that Britain’s military approach to the Northern Ireland conflict in the 1970s had “only inspired support for the Irish Republican Army and united the Irish Catholic population against the British”. Stephen David’s study of the Israeli state’s use of targeted assassinations as a counterterrorism tactic concludes that

27 Audrey Cronin, How Terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton University Press, 2009 p114-146
29 Bruce Hoffman, A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21: (2009), 359
30 Paddy Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain, Pluto Press, 1993
terrorist attacks actually rise after the use of “targeted assassinations”\textsuperscript{32}. Kaplan et al\textsuperscript{33}, Hafez and Hatfield \textsuperscript{34} also concluded that these attacks by Israel were counter productive.

Furthermore, Yarl Stein\textsuperscript{35} notes that approximately one in three victims of targeted assassinations were innocent bystanders, including family members of suspected terrorists such as children. Not only, have academics noted, do repressive counter terrorism policies kill innocent bystanders, but there may be other negative ramifications such as escalation in attacks due to revenge, a radicalization of moderates, a cutting off of intelligence sources, driving the group further underground, and shutting off any opportunity for negotiation in the future. Thus these sorts of tactics feed and fuel the terrorist dynamic.

Uncritical support of violence within the academic community committed by the state against its citizens is cause for concern, and something this thesis seeks to address by exploring the ramifications of violence used, and seeking to explicate why state violence is still used when it is counter-productive.

### 1.2.1 Negotiation and dialogue as counter-terrorism

Another domain of debate within terrorism studies and analysis is the policy of opening up dialogue with those that have been utilizing violence as a means to achieve objectives. This be could take place openly or behind closed doors, constitute amnesties, negotiations, democratic representation, or meetings in which stakes and interests are put on the table.

\textsuperscript{32} Stephen David, Fatal Choice: Israel's policy of targeted killing , The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 31, 2002
Despite declarations by world leaders such as “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” and advocacy of counter-violence as the “solution” to political violence, the literature on “talking to terrorists” highlights the gains that can be made.

More traditional terrorist scholars advocate the method as a means to be tested when all else has failed, or as Cronin has stated when “there may be no viable alternative to entering talks.” This raises important questions regarding legitimacy and again, the uncritical suggestion of violence as a means to counter a state threat, because they suggest that negotiation can only be considered as a last resort.

The case of Northern Ireland in which dialogue lead to the end of a decades spanning conflict has led Louise Richardson to state: “The clear lesson of the British case is that, moral repugnance notwithstanding, it is best to talk to terrorists.” Despite the optimistic development of traditional terrorism scholars considering talking as a possibility, many still endeavour to frame terrorists as “evil” and frame the talking as though it demonstrates government weakness.

This sort of criticism is raised by others such as Crelinsten’s and Schmid, Wilkinson, and Byman, stating the idea of legitimacy as the primary reason as to which states should not negotiate if they can help it; state violence and ideology is legitimate and talking to those who are challenging the state’s legitimacy weakens the state’s authority.

Toros’ critical approach to talking with terrorists seeks to engage with the critiques that traditional terrorism scholars have raised. She uses critical theory in order to advocate engaging with the social world in which terrorists are acting, moving away from statist theories which focus on the state as the referent point of security. Significant

36 See Daniel Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, Foreign Affairs 85, no.2 2006, 95-111
37 Cronin, 71
39 Schmid and Cronin, Western Responses to Terrorism, Routledge, 1993, 311
40 Wilkinson, 80
within her work is the argument that “Traditional terrorism scholarship has argued that religious terrorism, in particular Islamic terrorism, is more intransigent and less likely to be open to dialogue and accommodation”\textsuperscript{41}. Engaging in interviews with “terrorists” in the Philippines from the group MILF, Toros sought to dispel the negative associations of negotiations and dialogue, particularly in regards to Islamic terrorist groups.

First, she concluded that negotiations do not resemble “concessions” by the government, but rather a process of learning the interests and motivations of each side. It is only through dialogue that the “root causes” of terrorism can begin to be addressed such as de-radicalization programmes, poverty and development programmes, and political reform. Secondly, it gives considerations to those who may see sub state violence as legitimate, and allows the state to question why it doesn’t possess sole legitimacy, and how to stop violence altogether.

Toros’ work represents the most detailed analysis and appraisal of negotiation as a form of better comprehending what we have come to know as terrorism, and her two main arguments set out above, will bare much importance as a theoretical framework to this thesis.

\textbf{1.3 Theoretical contributions}

The primary theoretical contribution that this thesis seeks to add to the field is one which centres on African case studies. This is partly in response to the editors of Terrorism and Political Violence who, according to Schmid, are always:

“..confronted with an abundance of submissions regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland while there was an absolute shortage of good-quality submissions from Africa or on African terrorist groups”\textsuperscript{42}.

\textsuperscript{41} Toros, 7
\textsuperscript{42} The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Edi Alex P. Schmid, Routledge, 2011, 467
However, it also seeks to contribute to Critical Terrorism Studies literature by critically evaluating the use of force by the Nigerian government, and consider the perspectives of different stake-holders involved in order to look to emancipatory practices and seek “an acceptable level of violence”. It aims to research who is being discredited by what methods, how state violence functions militarily, ideologically, and politically to disparage certain ideologies, causes, classes, or notions of citizenship.

Thirdly, this thesis will endeavour to find a balance between orthodox and critical terrorism scholars, seeking neither to totally detract from a statist focus, nor to look to the state as the main referent of security. This is because many terrorist struggles are concerned with citizenship and therefore need the concept of the state to be dominant in their struggle; it is from the state that they will seek their demands, or it is the state itself that they will seek to overturn.

Through the case study used, it will be identified how violence belongs to the different people, and its legitimacy may not belong just to the state, but to a range of actors who use it for powerful reasons.

For the purpose of this thesis, the term “Islamists” will be used in reference to those Muslims who are rallying for a stronger involvement of Islam in institutional politics in Nigeria, most significantly, for the application of Sharia, and the establishment of Islamic educational systems. The term is used to cover those who share the same objectives as Boko Haram, however it does not stipulate that all Islamists support the use of violence as a means to achieve these objectives.

The term terrorism is defined as “a conspirational practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral constraints, targeting mainly

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43 British politician Mo Mowlam during the Northern Ireland conflict used the term “acceptable level of violence” to explain that violence would always be a part of society and human life, but counterterrorism is about reducing it as much as possible without being idealist.
civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.” These theories set the framework around which to begin to analyse the counter-terrorism policies of the Nigerian government. However the final section of this chapter draws upon the important historical background of the conflict.

1.4 Historical Background: Boko Haram

The phrase **Boko Haram** is a Hausa saying translated into English as “western education is forbidden”. The name implies hostility to the remnants of British colonial rule which left a secularist legacy for all state institutions and structures in Nigeria from 1960 onwards.

This hostility has expressed itself in the Salafi Jihadist group Boko Haram’s objectives for Sharia law, the end of corruption\(^4\), and what they see as discrimination against Muslims. These beliefs and objectives are expressed more explicitly by spokesman Sani Umar as

"Boko Haram doesn’t mean Western Education is a sin, but Western civilization is forbidden...we are not opposed to formal education coming from the West...but belief in supremacy of Islamic culture...distrust for Western Ways of life: constitutional provision as it relates to the rights and privileges of women, the idea of homosexuality, lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants..."

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\(^4\) Ibid, 86

\(^5\) The issue of corruption within Nigeria is pervasive and is almost synonymous with the word “Nigeria”. Specifics into police corruption, named as the most corrupt institution in Nigeria Survey and Corruption Survey Study, Final Report (June 2003) *Institute for Development Research*, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria (IDR, ABU) Zaria, will be discussed in the chapter corresponding to the state’s use of militancy and the police as counter-terrorism. However, important to note is some contextualisation of the corruption that pollutes society, contributing to ever growing disillusionment with the Nigerian state, and the high incidence of poverty spread across the country. The explosive mixture of political, economic and social factors, namely a lack of state funding for salaries, provision of employment, the oil “curse”, poor education facilities, and poverty contribute to the motives for taking part in acts of corruption.
multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer, and alcohol….”

Their tactics for these objectives have evolved from rebelling against motorist rules by refusing to wear motorcycle helmets to mass bombing of international targets such as the UN, drive by shootings, kidnapping, suicide bombing, targeted assassinations and bombing of state targets such as the police, army, or state senators.

The trajectory of the demand for Islamic agency within the Nigerian state is deep rooted and precedes colonial rule. In fact, with a country split almost equally by Christians and Muslims, the push for Sharia law, as well as the constant dislike of corruption is not a novel development. Boko Haram is not a surprising consequence of the denouement of the battle for Islamic agency in an impoverished and corrupt north as the next section will show.

1.4.1 The emergence of violent Islamism

The north of Nigeria has been predominantly Muslim in terms of population beginning as early as the 10th or 11th centuries. Conflict over Islamic identity, agency, and polity came about as visitors to the region showed more amazement with “non-Muslim habits”. By the 18th century these habits, or innovations, known as Bida’, were put into question by Shehu Uthman, also known as Dan Fodio and his followers. Fodio declared a Jihad against the Hausa of Nigeria against their “innovations”. However when the Sokoto Caliphate disbanded to the British in 1904, and when the British finally allowed for Nigerian independence in 1960 “the purificationist movement of Dan Fodio became just a cherished memory”.

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47 Ibid, 3
48 Ibid, 4
Thus the demand and popularity for strict interpretations of Islam and its application to the state have deep rooted historical foundations, and have constantly been a cause and source of conflict and contestation between the state, society, and religious social movements. This conflict and contestation has seemingly allowed for a radicalization in theology and ideology; Fodio for example supported the education of women, but Boko Haram does not, demonstrating the way in which the Islamic movements radicalized as their agency became minimised.

Some Muslims saw independence as a possible opportunity for the implementation of Sharia law in the North, with Ahmudu Bello constituting a new charismatic leader carrying forth the Sharia cause. However the British rule had meant the proselytizing of Christianity and the rising number of converted Christians. The divide and rule tactics of the British resulted in a divided Islamic community in the north.

Traditional Sufi elites, modernist Tijaniyya, and more radical groups such as the Yan Izala led by Abubakar Gummi mirrored the activities of Fodio in suppressing innovations, thus dividing the Muslim community further, and alienating the Christians and Igbos in the north. The Yan Tastines following Muhammad Marwa emerged from the momentum of the 1979 Iranian revolution, funded by Saudi and Kuwaiti donors and contributed to religious riots in Maitasine in 1980, and again in 1990. Despite the death of Marwa in 1980, the Yan Tastine “continued to have an active presence into the 1980s and 1990s” and thus the fight for Islamic polity continued. With an abundance of “emboldened reformist Muslims who considered the implementation of Shai’ah law a way to confront Nigeria’s political economic and social ills”, the struggle was only to continue.

50 Cook, 6
51 Ibid,
The 1979 revolution also coincided with the 1979 Nigerian Constitution in which Shari’ah courts “gained state level appellate status”\textsuperscript{52}, thus representing positive developments from the perspective of the Islamists. However, things became more polemic when dictator Sani Abacha died in 1998, resulting in the election of the Christian Southerner Olusegen Obasanjo in 1999, which contributed to the necessity of the Islamists to fight harder for their cause due to the lack of space which Obasanjo gave for Islamic agency.

Successes came in 1999 and 2000, when twelve northern states declared Sharia law as customary for all Muslims, giving small victories to those who had carried on the Wahhabi-Salafi ideologist legacy of Dan Fodio. However, divisions persisted and a lack of satisfaction with the implementation and thoroughness of the legal structure were felt by many as documented in Conerly Casey’s case study. Shari’ah enforcers known as hisbah singled out “bad” Muslims as Karfira\textsuperscript{53}(nonbelievers), and led “routine violence” against those identified as enemies of the state. It was within this context of constant contestation, divisions, struggles for charismatic, political, social, and community power and leadership from which Boko Haram emerged.

The difference between Boko Haram and the groups preceding it is its widespread use of violence and targeting not only of Muslims, but also of non-Muslims, Christians, state agents, and international actors. It has increased the legitimacy and support for the Islamic cause through its populist objectives of the end of corruption, and its contempt for the Nigerian government and its preference in providing for international companies and individuals over governance for its citizens. A brief overview of the development of its objectives, tactics, and structure is necessary before proceeding to the next chapter

\textsuperscript{52} Casey, 70
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 77
Jama’at ahl al-sunna li-da’wa wa-i-jihad or Boko Haram was established by Muhammed Yusuf, probably in 2002, when he founded a mosque and a Church in the northern state of Maiduguri. There is still not an overwhelming amount of information known about Yusuf, in a similar vein to the mythical statue of Osama Bin Laden in the 1980s, Yusuf is known as a rich pious Salafist who looked up to Fodio and Marwa, taking his theology from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Tamiyya and Sudan’s Hasan al-Turabi.\textsuperscript{54}

Boko Haram exploded onto the national news after clashes with the police in 2009 following a dispute over the wearing of motorcycle helmets led to the death of 800 of its members and the apparent extrajudicial killing of Yusuf in police custody.

After laying low for a year, it attacked a prison in Bauchi on 21\textsuperscript{st} September 2010, freeing 700 prisoners. David Cook estimates its membership at this point to be between 5000-8000 members.\textsuperscript{55}

Its tactics developed into political assassinations, intimidation, assassinations of Muslim clerics, drive by shootings, kidnappings, suicide bombing, guerrilla warfare, bank robberies, attacks on churches, attacks on Muslims, attacks on universities, attacks on newspapers headquarters, and finally on international targets, most notably the UN. Recently, these include a 2011 Christmas day bomb attack on churches and gatherings, and a January 2012 coordinated bomb and gun attack on Kano killing over 180 citizens. However a more comprehensive timeline is contained in the appendix.

Its followers are not limited to the poor, unemployed, or radical ideologists, but include university members, and politicians.\textsuperscript{56} The way in which Boko Haram has not only developed into an internationally recognised terrorist organisation, but has also

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid
\textsuperscript{55} Cook 12
managed to reach its tentacles into the government\(^7\) demonstrate the seriousness of the necessity for effective “counter terrorism policies”, as well as the complexity associated with the situation.

CHAPTER TWO – COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES

Understanding the government response to Boko Haram requires a comprehensive overview and analysis of the current counter-terrorism legal and political structures in place. The framework within which the Nigerian state operates should theoretically stipulate and explain its behaviour. However even a brief glance at the trajectory of counter-terrorism laws and policies begin to make evident the stakeholders for whom these laws and policies are made; the government and its international interests, namely the USA and other political interests.

2.1 Counterterrorism development in Nigeria

The explicit disapproval of and commitment to fight against terrorism has been part of Nigeria’s international identity since its civilian government came to the fore in 1999, as demonstrated through its ratification of the 1999 convention on the Prevention and Combating on Terrorism as part of the Organization of African Unity. However its subsequent efforts following 9/11, such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission EFCC Establishment Act 2004, which defined, prohibited, and proscribed punishment for terrorism, was “criticized as inadequate” in accordance with UNSCR 1373 according to Nigerian legalist Freedom C Onuoha. However, three events changed the political and security environment within which international and national demands for reform were heard and implemented; the failed Nigerian Christmas day

underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who tried to blow up an American plane, the 2010 prison escape, and the 2011 bomb attack on the UN Headquarters in Abuja. These incidents “called the effectiveness of the state into question”\(^{60}\), and embarrassed Nigeria as a state that could not secure itself nor its citizens.

Particularly hurtful for the Nigerian government was the diplomatic move by the US government to put Nigeria as a “Country of Interest” on the US Terror Watch list in 2010, a list which includes Algeria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen. This sort of international framing as a country which harbours terrorists could be harmful to its economic stability; Nigeria may be seen as unstable, dangerous, or insecure by potential investors on whom the Nigerian economy relies, thus diminishing its economic security, and plunging it into worse poverty than it already experiences.

Finally, occurring in 2010, the prison escape in which 721 prisoners in Bauchi state prison were freed demonstrated a complete lack of control over the terrorist organization and the state’s security. Onuoha lamented the total “intelligence failure”\(^{61}\) on all fronts, including failure to prevent the attack, secure the prison, and integrate information from several intelligence agencies. Whilst this incident may not have shaken the political perspective of America, domestically, it gave food for thought to those who had doubted the state’s capacity to secure and protect.

The 2009 Christmas day bombing, the 2010 prison escape, and the 2011 attack on the UN culminated in the 2011 anti-terrorism law, which has served as a vehicle of suppression of human rights, religion, and association, and a means of which to deepen and widen the powers of the state security apparatus.

\(^{60}\) Ibid

2.1.2 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011

Allowing for an extension of a huge range of extended judicial, police, military, political, intelligence powers, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011, covered the funding, meeting, information sharing, extradition, special investigation and prosecution, associating with, revocation of licences for charities, vessels and aircraft information/operations, penalties, definitions\(^{62}\), of terrorism.

An example of these extended powers includes that:

“A Security Intelligence Officer may enter and search any place, person, or vehicle without a warrant if he has reason to suspect that an offense is being committed and there is evidence of a commission of an offense under the bill”\(^{63}\)

And

“A Senior Security Officer has the authority to order the detention of a terrorism suspect for 48 hours without access to anyone, including his/her attorney”\(^{64}\)

And finally,

“The bill gives law enforcement officers immunity from civil or criminal liability for the use of force "as may be necessary for any purpose" that results in injury or death to any person or damage or loss to any property”\(^{65}\)

The bill constitutes much greater power for the government in not only collecting intelligence, but enforcing its will, using violence, and removing itself from the processes of accountability. The law provides for a vast spectrum of actions that may

\(^{62}\) The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Section 23

\(^{63}\) Ibid Section 23

\(^{64}\) Ibid Section 26

\(^{65}\) Ibid Section 10
result in the conviction or death of civilians, without necessity of justification except based on “suspicion” by an agent of the state.

### 2.1.3 Counterterrorism Critiques

Criticisms raised against the legislation take three themes; its reactive rather than proactive nature, its lack of attention to human rights, and its extension of state powers. First, Nigerian Lawyer Vera Ekundayo commented in newspaper The Punch\(^{66}\) of its “reactive” rather than “proactive” framework, as did security expert Dr Ona Ekhomu\(^{67}\), and Professor Onuoha\(^{68}\) who criticised the necessity for an “institutionalised approach rather than the episodic and reactive” response encapsulated within the new law. Unchenna Awom\(^{69}\) writing for allafrica.com also criticised the lack of “root causes” and prevention methods used.

Secondly, the law was critiqued on the way in which human rights as a concern was omitted from the bill, especially Awom who noted that “The Act is also seen to be silent on the responsibility of government to protect Nigerians”. Onuoha advocated a multi level strategy that would take into account all elements of concern such as security institution reform and human rights.

Finally, the significant extension of state power and suppression of citizen power was argued against. As Awom states, there have been “sweeping powers given to law

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\(^{67}\) Remmy Nweke, Nigeria: FG Advised to change counter-terrorism strategy,. 30 December 2011, [ALLAFRICA.COM](http://allafrica.com/stories/201112300512.html)

\(^{68}\) Freedom C. Onuoha, Nigeria’s vulnerability to terrorism: the imperative of a counter religious extremist and terrorism (CONREST) strategy, Special report two, *University for Peace and Conflict Monitor*, February 2011, [http://www.monitor.uppeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=772](http://www.monitor.uppeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=772)

enforcement agencies to more or less do as they please in the course of enforcing the provisions of the Act.\textsuperscript{70}

The extension of these powers, the wide ranging spectrum of acts which can be designated as terrorism including inadvertently financing a \textit{potential} terrorist, meeting with a radicalized individual, or adhering to objectives similar to that of a known terrorist group constitutes state repression of citizenship. For example, speaking out in favour of Sharia if it is done in such a way that a law enforcement officer believes is sympathetic to the objectives of Boko Haram may result in detention, imprisonment, torture or even death. The law acts to sufficiently call for monotonous citizenship identity, and builds a wall against challenging state ideology and sense of citizenship. This disavowal of identity and citizenship through the means of the terrorist labels is feeding the hand of Boko Haram by contributing to the image of a corrupt government with poor governance capacity; if the government cannot cope with a security threat via means other than repression of its citizens, all the better for the group challenging its legitimacy.

Furthermore, the strict laws against association will thoroughly hinder efforts of informal dialogue between local imams, community leaders, and Boko Haram members in attempts of de-radicalization or negotiation, because if a well respected imam cannot speak to a Boko Haram member without fear of being subject to state interrogation or monitoring, then it will shy away from such informal counter-terrorist pathways. The law has set the instruments for repression of contestation of government ideology and citizenship models. This action belongs to a global paradigm of international counter-terrorism norms which prioritise the use of force, state violence, and a lack of concern for human rights as the way to win the GWOT.

\textsuperscript{70} idem
2.2 International Counter-Terrorism Norms

Norms are “historically contingent and shared understandings about appropriate behaviour and practices”\(^7^1\), and specifically we are concerned here with the international counter-terrorism norms that have prevailed especially since the commencement of GWOT. The director of Human Rights Watch Kenneth Roth has argued that

“as the leader of the campaign against terrorism and the sole superpower, Washington’s conduct sets the dominant tone of the counterterrorism effort. That tone has been generally hostile to the limits imposed by international human rights and humanitarian law…

The many governments around the world who have seized on their own “war against terrorism” to violate basic rights shows how dangerously contagious this exceptionalism can be.”\(^7^2\)

Since 9/11, the US has successfully persuaded a variety of international political actors to join its counter-terrorism strategy, including the UN, NATO, and other states, both in the “West” and in the “South”. The US PATRIOT act of October 26\(^{th}\) 2001, extended the powers of intelligence agencies and officers and diminished the civil rights of citizens regarding travel, information dissemination, association, detention, and privacy. This sort of power extension and right diminution was mirrored in the UK Counter Terrorism Bill of 2008, and in countries around the world.

It is no wonder then that the Nigerian government had no qualms about extending state powers, especially when fear of criticism by influential actors is non existent. Even so, there was extended pressure to pass such thematic legislation from the UN, whose UNSCR 1373 “imposes a wide range of legal, financial, police and cooperation measures”\(^7^3\) which is binding on all member states. The international norms

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and obligations were deepened by UNSCR 1625 in 2004, which further calls upon Member States to adopt measures to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts, to prevent such conduct and to deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is”. Furthermore, the executive director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate for the United Nations noted that “The Counter-Terrorism Committee recognizes that it does not, strictly speaking, have a human rights monitoring role under the mandate conferred by resolution 1373 (2001).”

Therefore, the lack of necessary commitment to human rights protection on behalf of the Nigerian state permits it to enact terror laws and policies as it wishes, especially when adhering to the force paradigm modelled by the USA. This empirical example contributes to the arguments made by the Critical terrorism scholars who sought to research the impact of northern intervention in the south.

The government has been receiving counter-terrorism lessons from other states via military training by USA, Britain, Pakistan, France, Israel and Italy. Not only is Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policy and legal framework influenced by the counter-terrorism norms set by the USA, but it is also receiving military training from its allies in order to replicate the actions by the allies in GWOT. The US has successfully achieved its objectives to “commonize terrorism as a global security challenge requiring common but serious counter-measures”, diminishing the necessity of protecting human rights.

The following sections will demonstrate the ramifications of the policies used by the Nigerian government, looking at different perspectives, and attempting to draw upon

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74 Ibid
77 Onuoha and Sampson 2011
the lessons learnt theoretically and empirically from the dynamics of the counter terrorism struggles.

2.3 Counterterrorism results

The policy and legislation that granted such an extension of powers to the state should have produced a significant rise in the number of those arrested, put on trial, an increase in intelligence, and a decline of attacks. With such an increase in both power to arrest, harm, investigate, detain, and even kill suspects, as well as training from the leading counter-terrorism forces in the world, it would be expected that intelligence and arrest at the least would be on the increase.

2.3.1 Arrested development?

No concise information is available from publicly released Nigerian government sources as to the precise number of Boko Haram suspects arrested, detained, put on trial, or charged. I therefore produced an approximate figure from my own research, cross checking and correlating newspaper reports both from Nigeria and from “Western” sources such as the BBC, Nigerian and American government statements, NGO reports, and academic publications. I traced the numbers from July 2009 after the conflict between security forces and Boko Haram in which 700 suspected Boko Haram members died, and the end of March 2011.

My research showed that in this 21 month period, 1495 suspects were arrested by security forces. Between 2009 and the August prison break of 2010, 726 suspects were arrested, including 600 people from the Darul Islam community in the north. Following
the prison break, on the 14\textsuperscript{th} November 2010, security forces stated that many prisoners had returned to prison, and they had over 150 suspects in custody\textsuperscript{78}. My research showed that until July next year, they arrested another 97 suspects.

The new legislation granting security forces and the state extended powers resulted in another 494 arrests until the end of March 2012. Thus the difference between before security forces were granted new powers and after, does not amount to much significance in terms of number of suspects arrested. Furthermore, the amount of trials and convicted individuals have been few and far between. There has been a well documented trial of a high profile politician said to have helped Boko Haram\textsuperscript{79}, the conviction of its spokesman to a three year prison sentence\textsuperscript{80}, and the ongoing trial of 6 suspects who have appealed on the basis that they confessed to terrorism “under duress”\textsuperscript{81}. Therefore in terms of bringing about “justice” to Nigeria and attacks, the new legislation and policy framework has produced many results. Correlating my timeline of Boko Haram attacks before and after the legislation, there has been no significant reduction in the number of attacks. In fact, the intensity of attacks increased after the new legislation, especially the use of suicide bombing such as the June 2011 bombing of police HQ in Abuja, the August 2011 attack on the UN, and the January attacks on Kano.

What my research also showed, was the way in which the police and security forces were using their powers to “parade”\textsuperscript{82} suspects around, arrest children\textsuperscript{83}, “molest”\textsuperscript{84}.

\textsuperscript{78} Suspected Islamists kill soldier in northern Nigeria: police, 14 November 2010, Radio Netherlands online,


people in their day to day activities, and fail to disclose the names or locations of
suspects, instead describing them as “classified”. The legitimacy of these actions cannot
be challenged because they are enshrined in counter terrorism legislation, lending to the
argument that aggressive counter terrorism policies are put in place in order to de-
legitimise the challenging discourse of the sub-state groups, in this case, Boko Haram.

Lastly, this research shows that international norms in GWOT particularly in the
way the US government has behaved in regards to Guantanamo Bay, and the use of
torture, permits similar securitising moves on behalf of other governments. The next
section documents in more detail specific occasions of violence by the Nigerian
government under the rubric of counterterrorism.

2.4 Counterterrorism violence

In the same vein with the number of those arrested, the number of those killed
by the state is not officially available, nor is there an approximated figure provided by
newspaper sources. Again, I cross checked newspaper reports from several sources with
government statements, and human rights reports to reach my own approximate figure
of how many potential suspects and bystanders have been killed by the security forces
since 2009. The figures include those killed in “gun fight” between suspected Boko
Haram and the security forces.

Including the 700 killed in 2009, the total numbers to 1147, although the total is
probably far larger considering the amount of unexplained “disappearances”. Boko
Haram since 2009 has killed approximately just under 1000 people. This figure was

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83 Nigeria: Alleged rifle smuggler for sect arrested, November 10 2010, Ken5.com,
84 MARYAM AHMADU-SUKA, Nigeria: Soldiers Arrest Suspected Boko Haram Members in Kaduna,
85 Nigeria: Boko Haram Scare Grounds Abuja, 5 JULY 2011, The Vanguard,
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/boko-haram-bomb-scare-grounds-abuja-airport-road/
calculated by adding the number of people killed by Boko Haram since the end of January 2012, to the figure released by Human Rights Watch of 935 on the 24th January 2012. However similar to the figures above, the figure may be far higher as there have been attacks not owned up to by the group.

2.4.1 Significant incidents of counter-terrorism violence

How the government has used violence and force as its primary mode of counter-terrorism is demonstrated in a three fold fashion; the 2009 killing of 700 people in Maiduguri, the extrajudicial killing of the founder of Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf in police custody, and the state of emergency declared at the start of January 2012.

First, on the 26th July 2009, over 700 people were killed after police intercepted a funeral parade and suspected Boko Haram members returned fire. Three days of fighting ensued, including shelling of potential Boko Haram houses and the killing of “unarmed captives”. Arguably this set a precedent for the use of force against Boko Haram. The mosque and school founded by Yusuf was also stormed, raising questions about the respect or lack of for Islamic institutions on behalf of the government.

Secondly, the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf which was said to take place following his capture have demonstrated the mind set in which the government and its security forces are operating of killing as many members as possible, the more significant the better. In spite of the change of government between 2009 and 2011 which may have stipulated a change in policy or at least in accountability, the new legislation has served to increase the power of the state and the lack of necessity in accounting for deaths.

Thirdly, the state of emergency declared in several northern states by the Nigerian government on the 31st December 2011 demonstrated a lack of control felt by the government in its capacity to provide security without resorting to extraordinary measures in spite of its over reliance on force and violence already. An interview by the British Guardian newspaper of an anonymous source from the Nigerian security services noted that:

“When we receive intelligence that Boko Haram members are in a particular location, we usually arrive on the scene spraying bullets. Innocent people die but that happens all the time in Nigeria and we are under a lot of pressure from our superiors to deliver results.”89

This is particularly telling for five reasons, all of which point in the direction of a statist approach to counter-terrorism taken on behalf of the government. First, it insinuates that intelligence is being received, and that the forces don’t seek to challenge the source or validity of the intelligence, rather they act on it immediately. Secondly, it demonstrates the openly violent approach in addressing terrorist suspects. Thirdly, it confirms that “innocent people” are killed via this tactic. Fourthly, it suggests that the death of innocent people is part and parcel of Nigeria’s political culture90. Finally and perhaps most telling, is rather than suggest there are military or strategic motivations for the arbitrary spraying of bullets, the source suggests instead that pressure from above to deliver results, probably referring to bodies alive and dead, gives cause to the security forces to behave as they do.

Violence by the security forces lends legitimacy to Boko Haram’s arguments that the Nigerian government is ineffective, corrupt, and executes poor governance. Na’eem

89 Remi Adekoya, Nigeria’s Islamists have the government dancing to their tune. 4 January 2012. The Guardian
90 By political culture, I refer to the culture of meting out political conflicts via violence as a norm.
Jeenah of the Africa and Middle East Centre when questioned about the state of emergency said “the problem is that I fear what the state of emergency will do is feed into the very same grievances that have helped to win sympathy for Boko Haram…one of the major grievances is the heavy-handed attitude of the security forces, the army, and the police. Now we are giving them even more powers than they have had”91.

These securitizing moves by the government demonstrate its state centric perspective to combating terrorism, and the disregard for the civilian ramifications of the use of force. Rather, acting within a globally accepted war paradigm of fighting those who raise challenges to the legitimacy of the state and the concepts of citizenship permit disavowal of other concerns. The next chapter will look at whether state violence has led to increased security for the state and/or its citizens.

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CHAPTER THREE – THE REALITY OF AND REACTIONS TO COUNTER-TERRORISM

To what extent has the violence and death of suspected Boko Haram members been useful in increasing security? There are several different ways to look at this; whether the use of violence and the extended powers has led to a reduction in attacks, whether the actions have led to a better relationship between state and society, and the nature of public discourse regarding the use of violence and negotiations.

3.1 A hardened security

First, looking to the timeline of serious activities by Boko Haram, the only period in which they ceased to commit violence was in the year following the 2009 Maiduguri attack. It was considered that the state had crushed the group with military force, in which case demonstrating that the most effective way to eliminate the threat of terrorism is to eliminate potential operatives of a group physically, and with force. Lessons from GWOT, Israel, and Turkey for example demonstrate that this is not the case. Interestingly, what all these examples have in common is that the governmental protagonists are taking up arms against different forms of political Islam; as terrorism, Islamic government, or rebellion.

Boko Haram returned with a vengeance in the September 2010 prison attacks. Their violence continued throughout the year with large scale attacks in Jos in December, killing over 80, and army barracks in Abuja on New Years Eve. The initial hope that the military crackdown, physical elimination of members, and decapitation of the group would emancipate the state from the sense of insecurity dissipated with the new pattern of attacks.
Following the February 2011 legislation extending the powers of the state, attacks continued and grew in significance in terms of targets and tactics used. In June 2011 Boko Haram conducted the first suicide bombing in Nigeria bombing a police HQ, and the UN HQ in August. The violence continued into December in which approximately 166 people are killed. Despite the declared state of emergency on the 31st December 2011, January 2012 proved to be even more bloody in nature, with several attacks on churches, mosques, assassinations of high profile politicians or religious figures who speak out against Boko Haram, culminating in a day of violence on January 20th in which over 180 people were killed by the group in Kano including many policemen and civil servants.

It is evident that the use of violence by the state, newly extended powers, and the involvement of international forces in the form of counter-terrorism training did not serve to increase the security of the state. In fact, it can be inferred that security was reduced as a consequence. However, David Cook in a policy paper written for an institution associated with the US government noted that even though “probably for Nigeria, the only solution at present..is to utilize force..it should be recognized that extrajudicial force..has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram”92 If even governmental advisers note the disadvantages of using force against terrorists, then for what function do governments continue to use them?

3.1.2 A better protection for the people

The second way at which to look at what the state violence does is look to whether the people of the state are protected by the state from violence and death. With the extrajudicial killings of suspects and innocent people, the state’s actions have, at first

92 Cook, p23
glance, not increased security of the citizens. On a larger scale, the governance and security failures as noted above, have not led to a safer Nigeria because Boko Haram has continued to increase its attacks.

In fact, most studies note a pervasive sense of insecurity felt on behalf of the citizens particularly in the north, and particularly of Muslim profile. There have been extensive calls for a reduction in the military presence and activities in the north especially as “significant numbers of people have fled the area”93. There is a severe lack of confidence in the government according to security expert Dr Ona Okhomu94, and Amnesty International has raised serious allegations against the Joint Military Task Force of government for its killing of women and children.95

A 2009 report by Amnesty international called “Killing at will: Extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings by the police in Nigeria” even prior to the 2011 law brought to attention Police Force Order 237 which permits officers to shoot suspects and detainees who attempt to escape or avoid arrest, saying that “in practice, it lets people get away with murder”96. With three out of 10 respondents saying the police is not helpful97, estimates of extrajudicial killing by the police between 2003 and 2008 put at 301498, the security apparatus of the state is not providing security to society the citizens of Nigeria. This lack of security is mirrored in the October 2010 poll by Gallup associated organization NOI polls who asked 1058 people across the country via telephone, “how safe do you feel?”. The results showed that 64% felt unsafe or very

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96 Killing at will: Extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings by the police in Nigeria, Amnesty International, 2009, p2
97 Ibid. 6
98 Ibid. 21
unsafe, and only 20% felt safe or very safe. Adding to this demonstration of public insecurity was the result that 75% of people do not have confidence in Nigeria’s security services."^{99}

Therefore, with a pervasive sense of insecurity running through the veins of Nigeria’s population, for whom are the violent policies enacted? It must be asked why the dominant response to Boko Haram has been the use of state violence, when other options are available. However, it is worth researching whether, in spite of the heavy handed approach of the Nigerian government and the death and displacement of thousands of citizens, people actually support the violence used against Boko Haram. Understanding “public opinion” is essential in deciphering for whom the counter-terrorism policies are enacted for, and the reasons for which the Nigerian government would persevere with the use of force above all else, despite its negative consequences.

### 3.2 Belief in the methods

In attempting to infer the mood of the “public” reflecting the government’s counter-terrorism policies, a dual strategy will be adopted; looking at opinion polls, and discourse analysis of newspaper commentary from five/six different newspapers. The opinion of the public is sought in order to decipher whether the securitizing moves have resulted in a better sense of security on behalf of the public, whether the public views the state’s violence as legitimate, and to what extent, if any, the public sympathise or empathise with the objectives of Boko Haram; most significantly the call for Sharia law, Islamic education, and a disdain for corruption and poor governance.

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^{99} NOI polls, 64% of Nigerians Do Not Feel Safe, Lack Faith in Security Services, October 2010, http://www.noi-polls.net/Poll-Results/october-2010-security-poll.html
3.2.1 Opinion polls

In order to try to assess the impact of the counter-terrorism policies, what the use of force by the state does in terms of security perception on behalf of “society”, opinion polls are a useful source of information. However it must be noted that in a country with a high rate of poverty particularly in the north, the capacity of poll conductors to contact many constituents by phone will be minimal, and therefore the poll results may not really serve a huge purpose in producing an accurate reflection of opinion. This is especially true when it is considered that most Boko Haram attacks affect citizens in the north.

NOI polls conducted via telephone a poll in February 2011 in which respondents were asked what they believed the government response to Boko Haram should be; 44% said employ military force, 33% said dialogue, and 3.8% said grant them Amnesty.\(^{100}\) In terms of confidence in the Federal Government’s ability to provide security for Nigeria\(^ {101}\), 52% were confident or very confident, and 35% disagreed, or strongly disagreed.

Thus although the confidence in the government’s security providing capacity was not overwhelming, the dominant preference of response was still for military employment, although the close following preference of dialogue demonstrates the division between pacification and bellicosity within the country’s opinion.

Sharia as a topic was also raised with results showing that 64% of residents in the northeast believe that Sharia should be a source of law\(^ {102}\), but not the only one. The inclusion of this topic demonstrates that NOI polls and citizens alike are giving thought

\(^{100}\) NOI Polls, Press Release: Interaction with the West- Northern Nigerians differ with Boko Haram February 2012. p3
\(^{101}\) Ibid, 2
\(^{102}\) Ibid, 3
to the objectives of Boko Haram, and are not merely dismissing the violence as random.
By asking questions regarding security, the government’s tactics to deal with Boko
Haram, and then Sharia, NOI polls is implicitly inquiring into the levels of sympathy for
the movement’s objectives.

In March 2012 The Guardian newspaper of Nigeria asked its online readers:
“do you think the Federal Government is doing enough to curtail the activities of the
Boko Haram sect?” 90% of respondents answered no. However, in June of 2011,
83.9% of respondents said that they did support call for dialogue with Boko Haram

Thus from an overview of opinion polls by two respected institutions, it is
palpable that in spite of Nigerians not supporting the government’s counter-terrorism
response, believing that more could be done, there is clearly more support for the
military tactics, than dialogic ones. Public opinion however, is not just observed from
polls, but also from discourse analysis of newspaper articles which is represents the next
section.

3.2.2 Interpreting mediatic representations of counter-terrorism

Using four online newspapers archives encompassing readership across the
country, all either privately or independently owned, I underwent a discourse analysis of
68 different articles from July 2009 to April 2012. Although I chose to analyse many
more articles from the Daily Trust as I was using these archives to research and correlate

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103 Do you think the Federal Government is doing enough to curtail the activities of the Boko Haram sect? *The Guardian Nigeria*, 3 March 2012,

104 Do you support the call for dialogue with the Boko Haram sect? *The guardian*, June 2011,
a collection of significant figures and institutions who had called for negotiation, I tried to balance the amount of articles as equally as possible across the four publications.

Looking to critical terrorism studies, I sought to comprehend what realities were deemed as most important by journalists, understanding that “discourse is necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation”. Therefore it was necessary to see what the journalists had included in their pieces, and what can be inferred from their inclusions.

Specifically, I looked for running themes throughout the media pieces; the representation and debate of different counter-terrorism policies, the perception of the state, the legitimacy of the violence used, faith in the security service, objectives of Boko Haram attention to wider issues and “root causes”, and whether the overall tones of the pieces were conciliatory, inflammatory, or theoretically apolitical factual presentations, thereby inferring whether the tactics used by the government had persuaded people of their efficacy.

3.2.3 Thisday

Coverage of Boko Haram and the government response within ThisDay is not restricted to mere description, but engages in debate and contextualization. Many of its opinion pieces regard the state security forces as abusive of rights, lacking in transparency, and inherently corrupt as shown from the article titled “Boko Haram: A million mistakes”, which laments the “billions and billions and billions of naira we allocate to them (the security agencies) each year and the colossal security votes always unaccounted for by the executive – are far too complacent, too incompetent, and too

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105 Jackson et al, 68-69
clueless to protect us”. Philosophising about the basic functions of the state, namely to provide life and security for its citizens, much discussion constitutes criticisms of the security apparatus and behaviour of the state.

Disdain for the security forces interlinks with the discussions of the goals and history of Boko Haram, highlighting the extrajudicial murder of Yusuf as directly causal to the escalation of violence by the group, a pointer which continues in the discourse into 2012.

As regards to dialogue and amnesty, debates on the worth, morality, and plausibility of such a move have been debated in pieces from 2010 to 2012. It can be inferred from the coverage that consideration of the history of Islamic movements within Nigeria and the contextualization of terrorism as a phenomenon within Nigeria is a priority to those disseminating information to its readers. The debate and search for a plausible solution to the crisis that doesn’t result in the deaths of more Nigerians dominates the coverage, with preference leading towards dialogue rather than force and military deployment.

3.2.4 The Guardian

The Guardian’s coverage of the government’s struggle against Boko Haram, similar to ThisDay, discusses the lack of trust held in the security service, the failure of governance, the history and contextualization of the attacks including debating the objectives of Boko Haram, the possibilities of negotiation, and the use of force.

Differences with ThisDay are clear regarding negotiation, as the representations were more focused on the negative aspects of negotiation. Some viewed negotiations as a
surrender of national sovereignty\textsuperscript{107}, whilst other pieces raised the ideas of former president Obasanjo that amnesty could work in the same way it worked in the Niger Delta.\textsuperscript{108} Despite the considerations of negotiation, the use of force by the government was represented as legitimate and productive by several opinion pieces, one of which pointed to Israel, the USA, and Turkey as successful examples of states which have “overcome the irritations of suicide bombings” and dismantled the infrastructures of terrorist groups, proposing that “Nigeria must learn from the experience of these nations.”\textsuperscript{109}

Consideration given to the roots, objectives, and history of Boko Haram, The Guardian still plumps for force as the best way to deal with Boko Haram. Devoid of human rights concerns or the phenomenon of extrajudicial killings as a theme prioritised within representation, The Guardian remains concerned with the efficacy of the state and its capacity to maintain security.

### 3.2.5 The Daily Trust

The most read newspaper in the north, and the paper which had the most coverage regarding Boko Haram between 2009 and 2011, with search results showing at least one article published per day on the group, the Daily Trust’s representation of the conflict was dominated by opinion pieces on peaceful response, and the publication of statements from high profile governmental or societal figures.

Many articles referred to the history of Islam in Nigeria, and the historical bias against Muslims in politics and media, thus demonstrating the concern given to “root


\textsuperscript{109} Between negotiation and capitulation
causes” and what is causing radicalization in Nigeria. The way religion is “used” in politics is also highlighted, much to the detriment of the unity of Nigeria, and furthermore one author draws on the work of Naomi Klein to suggest that there are financial benefactors to this conflict\textsuperscript{110}, notably the Israelis, British, and the Americans, all of whom will gain from arming the Nigerian state especially considering its 10 billion naira security budget constituting 20 percent of the overall budget of the state.

As regards to negotiations, there are almost weekly articles debating the potentiality for negotiations and dialogue, citing those who demand it such as the Borno Elders, and those who are less in favour. Most opinion pieces lend to a more favourable framing of the negotiation and dialogue option, pointing in the direct of the government and the security forces as hindering the dialogue and negotiation process because of the use of force. One stated that “it’s time to end this carnage blamed on the Boko Haram sect\textsuperscript{111}, and another that “the fire for fire approach failed, as we see Boko Haram rising in its profile and sophistication, with the promise of bringing perpetrators to book ringing increasingly hollow by the day!”\textsuperscript{112}

One author framed the mood of Boko Haram as fearful of the distrustful government “how do you expect them to come out for dialogue now that they know the government is only deceiving them!”\textsuperscript{113}. The overall tone used by these authors is one

that can be interpreted as empathetic for Boko Haram, and anger towards the force used by the state in such a way.

Solutions are put forward fast and frequently, with suggestions ranging from poverty eradication programmes, to giving Boko Haram its own geographical polity\textsuperscript{114}. The Daily Trust considers the root causes of utmost important attention and gives much space to these considerations in its representation of the conflict. What causes its representation to stand out is its disdain for the government’s use of violence and the empathetic tone towards Boko Haram, making explicit efforts to humanize its members in the hope that no more Nigerian lives will be lost, quoting the National Publicity Secretary of the Action Congress of Nigeria that “the Boko Haram people are Nigerians first and foremost”\textsuperscript{115}

Its choice of representation refuses to dehumanize Boko Haram, thus contributing to the potential emancipation project and highlighting the different levels of legitimacy that exist within Nigeria.

3.2.6 The Tribune

In a very different vein, The Tribune newspaper which is published in the Southern state of Ibadan adheres to a war framework in which to analyse the counter-terrorism methods of the state. Lending lots of space to the security services to state opinion, justification, and planning for future tactics and events, The Tribune describes Boko Haram as “the dreaded militant Islamic sect” in almost every article analysed. From


this it can be inferred that the publication is attempting to create a sense of fear and insecurity, one that can generally be solved by the security forces.

Historical factors or “root causes” are given no such attention, instead the Tribune chooses to emphasize the potential links the group has to AQIM\footnote{Boko Haram's funding traced to UK, S/Arabia • Sect planned to turn Nigeria into Afghanistan • Arrested kingpin opens up, The Tribune, 13 February 2012, \url{http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/35888-boko-harams-funding-traced-to-uk-sarabia-sect-planned-to-turn-nigeria-into-afghanistan-arrested-kingpin-opens-up}}, and reassure the readers of their safety via statements from members of the JTF\footnote{Boko Haram kills Qaqa's father, friend in Maiduguri • FG detains 5 with Al-Qaeda links over German kidnap, The Tribune, 28 March 2012, \url{http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/38322-boko-haram-kills-qaqas-father-friend-in-maiduguri-fg-detains-5-with-al-qaeda-links-over-german-kidnap}}.

Evidently, the Tribune lies in favour of the use of force as a counter-terrorist measure, representing the situation as a rebellious group of thugs rising up against the legitimate existence of the state and the state’s governing actions.

From this discourse analysis it is evident that a spectrum exists at which one end lies the full support of the state, its security forces, its domain of violence, and at the other lies a preference for dialogue, peace, poverty eradication, and a constant challenge put forth to the legitimacy of the state’s use of force and violence. Palpably The Tribune exists on the state support end, and The Daily Trust on the opposing end. However the two other publications all fall far closer to the Daily Trust in support for negotiation and dialogue over violence, than they do to the Tribune, causing it to be an outlier.

Those who frame the conflict for the people are strongly against the use of violence, if newspaper analysis is to go by. Rather, most advocate the use of dialogue or negotiation as at least one potential form of counter-terrorism that will not lead to more Nigerian deaths. Most seek to comprehend the driving factors behind the conflict, Furthermore, with a large number of people, organizations, and institutions calling for
dialogue\textsuperscript{118} as opposed to violence, it is a puzzle why the Nigerian government, up to the start of April 2012, persevered in its counter-productive use of force as a counter-terrorist policy. It demonstrates that the policies are not made for the Nigerian people.

### 3.3 The absence of negotiations

Many significant figures have come out in favour of engaging in some sort of dialogue with Boko Haram. The difference between dialogue and negotiation being that the former stipulates face to face communication without any promises of progression, whereas the latter insinuates that losses or gains are made to the stake holders involved.

Nevertheless, the differentiation seems to bare little importance in the discourse used by government spokesmen, media, and others in Nigeria who has voiced their opinion.

Looking at the chain of events, it is evident that dialogue could have, and has almost taken place on several occasions. Boko Haram has continuously stated their objectives and terms on engagement. In July 2010 on the first anniversary of the death of Yusuf, Abu Zayd stated that

“the only dialogue in the crisis is as follows; stop abiding by the constitution in our land, and government must be sincere and stop terrorizing Muslims in Maiduguri and parts of the North, then there should be a time limit for ceasing fire to gauge Government commitment in keeping to its promise, which cannot be more than ten years”\textsuperscript{119}

Despite the contention of Toros that orthodox terrorism scholars consider dialogue especially difficult and implausible with religious fundamentalists, the preceding

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{118} See appendix
\textsuperscript{119} Cook: 20}
statement is less religious in theme, more political. They are far more “this-worldly” than presumed Islamic terrorists.

After the Borno prison break Boko Haram gave more conditions for a truce, including releasing detained members, allowing those in exile to return, a reopening of closed mosques, “equity and fair treatment”, and that they should be “allowed to practice our religion according to our belief”\(^\text{120}\). Thus far from demanding a blanket national application of Sharia law, the political and social objectives which Boko Haram preaches are far more nuanced than dominant representations would suggest.

More revealing is the statement that they are engaging in violence “because government had trampled on our rights as citizens and killed our great leader”\(^\text{121}\). It is stated with clarity that their grievances fall in two categories. First, the lack of sense of affective citizenship, particularly the option to be an Islamic citizen first and foremost is pervasive enough to take up arms. Secondly, it is suggested that the extrajudicial murder of Yusuf has fed the fires of revenge.

Surprisingly, Boko Haram rejected an Amnesty offer by the governor of Borno State Kashim Shettima in 2011.\(^\text{122}\) It was at this point that calls for Sharia came to the fore. Some accounts suggested that Boko Haram a statement written by the group in Hausa said that they refused to dialogue because it didn’t believe in democracy\(^\text{123}\). Although sources who use Hausa as a first language interpreted the statement differently, that Boko Haram “demanded that the application of strict Sharia in the Muslims-dominated states of the North and immediate release of all members of the sect detained


\(^{121}\) Ibid

\(^{122}\) Cook: 18

in Borno and other northern states, must be addressed with immediate effect”, and that it demanded the arrest and trial of those responsible for the deaths of Yusuf.124

The demands stated in the previous year had barely changed, what was more explicit was the implementation of Sharia within the states with a Muslim majority. However, an amnesty at least represents one step in the direction of what Boko Haram wants, so why would Boko Haram reject the offer?

Dominant suggestions are that the government was being dishonest in outreaching its hand, if history is anything to go by. The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), an Ijaw militant group led by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, in 2004 threatened “all-out war”125 against the Nigerian government. Nigerian President Olusegen Obasanjo drew up the conditions of an amnesty for Asari and other militants to which Asari agreed. However less than a year after the amnesty Asari was arrested for crimes committed prior to the amnesty and put in detention. Furthermore, in 1995 the Nigerian government gave the death penalty to Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian environmental activist who was against the use of violence, and all high profile members of the MOSOP group for involvement in the murder of four Ogoni chiefs. Witnesses were bribed, the defendants had no lawyers with which to defend themselves, and human rights groups were appalled by the severe lapse of justice.

Others have stated the fear they have of the state's intentions, showing that disapproval of the statist mode of security taken by the government. For example, the chairman of the Adamawa State chapter of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), Alhaji Umar Duhu, said that the government should be “more genuine” as members are fearful

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or arrest or death if they surrender.\textsuperscript{126} This correlates with a statement by Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Hafiz Ringim, that the police will not negotiate with Boko Haram and security officers must be “patriotic to their fatherland for that is what it takes to be free from guilt, as there is dignity in labour”\textsuperscript{127}

More recently talks in 2012 collapsed, with the Supreme Council For Shari’ah in Nigeria SCSN blaming the government for leaking details of the meetings to the press and creating friction between the different parties, and a sense of insecurity on behalf of Boko Haram members and a journalist who was acting as a mediator.\textsuperscript{128}

In summary, it can be concluded from the history hitherto April 2012, that Boko Haram have demanded three main things that can be broadly described as follows; an apology and accountability for the extrajudicial death of their leader, an overhaul of the way Islam shapes institutions and the way that Muslims are treated, and the release of detained members. Dissecting these demands, coupled with the long list of influential figures who have supported negotiations, why would the government continue to ignore the potentiality for dialogue and negotiation, when the use of force has merely served to feed the hand that bites? The next section discusses three reasons as to why the government shies away from negotiation

\textsuperscript{126} Understanding Nigeria's Boko haram radicals, Integrated Regional information, UNCHR, 18\textsuperscript{th} July 2011

\textsuperscript{127} IG rules out negotiation with Boko Haram, Thisdaylive, 19 Feb 2011, \url{http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ig-rules-out-negotiation-with-boko-haram/86492/}

\textsuperscript{128} FG, Boko Haram talks collapse, Vanguard, March 19 2012, \url{http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/03/fg-boko-haram-talks-collapse/}
3.3.1 Explaining the absence

First, the statist approach best adhered to by orthodox terrorism scholars relies on a heavy handed approach to terrorism because it views terrorism as a parasite within a previously sufficiently functioning social, economic, and political system. Force is the only way which the parasite can be fought in order to enter into a cyclical pattern of stating and restating the government’s legitimate grasp on the use of violence. The Nigerian government has no desire to discredit the state in any means and thus it continues to use force against Boko Haram.

Secondly, the disregard for the legitimacy of Islamic citizenship struggles fall within the international counter-terrorism norms that use force and violence against terrorist groups who have been labelled religious extremists. Negotiating with Islamists above all is a sign of weakness, and could contribute to a decrease in international investment and business that Nigeria relies on. The US and its allies, Turkey, and Israel have set a precedent for using violence against religious extremists. The norm setting behaviour of extra judicial killings and force without accountability stipulate that violence is the only acceptable demonstration that a state is “dealing with” an Islamist terrorism problem. With the Nigerian government working with the key actors of GWOT to build up a strong military inventory and tactics, negotiation would be negative to the international relations of Nigeria.

Finally, engaging in a dialogical process of communication with Boko Haram would be a recognition that there are profound issues within Nigerian state such as the Islamic citizenship struggle, corruption, poor governance, and insecurity created by the police and security services could largely discredit the regime in place. This is because an explicit acceptance of the fissures and dysfunctions of the regime and the functioning of the state discredits the regime, rather than the Islamists who Goodluck’s regime wishes
to discredit, via the use of violence. Negotiations, no matter how little the Islamists as
stake holders were to gain, would legitimize the problematic nature of citizenship within
the Nigerian state, not to mention governance, corruption, and security.

However, dialogue in the Niger Delta lead to successful amnesty programmes
and a diminution of the violence without the state surrendering sovereignty. On June 25
2009, a 60 day unconditional amnesty period for militants in the Niger Delta was
declared\textsuperscript{129}. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes have been put
into place at Non-Violence Transformation Camps, with over 20,000 people having
started the process between 2009-2010\textsuperscript{130}. Many are currently in the “rehabilitation”
mode in which they are undertaking skill acquisition training or education in South
Africa, Malaysia, Russia, Israel, USA, Ghana and others. What makes the process unique
is that it has not involved the United Nations or other international actors, but it is a
completely home grown initiative, run by the government and Nigerian NGOs such as
the Foundation for Ethnic Harmony in Nigeria\textsuperscript{131}. From this it can be inferred that the
culture of amnesty and forgiveness exists and could be applied therefore to Boko Haram.
Following this, an amnesty programme blueprint in terms of institutions, methodology,
and timeline could also be transferable. Notwithstanding the significant differences
between the militants of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram in terms of objectives, the
commonality of a problematic and lacking affective citizenship should demonstrate that
both conflicts could be brought to an end in similar ways. The sense that those taking to
violence as a means of asserting a meaningful existence within the state in accordance

\textsuperscript{129} Historic Dates, Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme website,
http://www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78&Itemid=75
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid,
\textsuperscript{131} Yemi Dedowale, Reinventing Ex-militants, \textit{Thisday Live}, 21 August 2010,
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/reinventing-ex-militants/80616/
with Islam, or control over resources, exists in both contexts, and thus could be addressed in the same way.

Instead the Nigeria state has persevered with the use of force, despite its lack of effectiveness in protecting the state, protecting citizens, and the lack of support coming from many sectors of society, demonstrating that the counter-terrorism policies in place are enacted for the state leaders, and its international friends only.

Five key lessons can be drawn from the government’s response to Boko Haram; the use of force by the state is counter-productive for state security and reducing violence; secondly, the government doesn’t concern itself with the negativities of the policy, as long as it can maintain the façade of order; thirdly, the global counter-terrorism norm of using force is particularly used in response to Islamic state challengers; fourthly, there are many stake-holders in a counter-terrorism dynamic, most of whom are ignored thus deeming the counter-terrorism process largely undemocratic; and lastly, dialogue and negotiation is emancipatory, but not in the way in which Toros has argued. These lessons will be discussed in more detail in the concluding section below.
Conclusion

How governments respond to the phenomena we have come to know as terrorism evolved quickly from simply outlawing it in response to Narodnaya Volya in Russia in the 1880s for example, to improving intelligence in the British case of the IRA, to launching military strikes against suspected terrorists in Israel. The evolution of counter-terrorism tactics has been rapid and secretive at best, leaving little room for accountability, and a severe lack of critical reflection upon the ramifications of the methods.

The morality of counter-terrorism methods has been subject to debate within academic, governmental, and mediatic fields, referencing the use of violence, the legitimacy of dialogue, the importance of human rights, and the significance of state caused deaths as key issues of contention.

Critical terrorism scholars have posited that violence by the state may amount to state terrorism, and therefore counterterrorism through another spectrum can itself be seen as terrorism. Most importantly, when deciding on counter-terrorism methods, states should heed the warnings of history which have shown the negative effects of state violence, and be more benevolent when it concerns human rights. Toros, Breen-Smyth and others have focused on moving away from a statist perspective in which the state, above all, must be secured against terrorist threats.

On the other hand, orthodox terrorism scholars, often connected with governments which they seemingly apolitically write about, such as Byman and Wilkinson remain stubbornly statist in their approach to counter-terrorism, arguing that the state must do all within its means to protect the state, even if this means violence and civilian deaths.
Negotiation, from this perspective, is ultimately weak and can only be used as a last resort. Opposing this argument, Toros in particular as part of the school of critical terrorism scholars, argues for the radical transformation that can come about as part of negotiation. Nevertheless, it is evident that violence is preferred as a counterterrorism method to most governments, adhering to international counter-terrorism norms.

This sort of state led violence is particularly pervasive and constant today in the West African state of Nigeria. A state diversified by its religions, ethnicities, tribes, sects, and political factions, I found it imperative to look more deeply into the counter-terrorism methods used. Specifically I wanted to document the use of force by the state, the effects, the perspectives of people, the different stakeholders involved and the legal framework within which it was supposed to be functioning. Within all this I began to ask the questions for whom are the policies enacted, how are they functioning, what are they doing, and exactly why would negotiation and dialogue as an option be so continuously ignored by the government. Looking at Boko Haram’s objectives, the precarious and problematic state of Islam within Nigeria, and the government’s responses to various developments, I begin to notice a causal link between the demand for Islamic agency and citizenship and the use of violence by the government, and therefore theorised that the use of force is used by the government in a way as to silence the Islamic voice in Nigeria.

However the journey in reaching this conclusion was more than mere speculation. I began in Chapter one by looking at the current literature on counter-terrorism, and then more specifically the use of force, and negotiation and dialogue as options. It was evident how much emphasis is put on force over negotiation in many works, especially when the terrorist protagonist is Islamic in nature and cause. Looking therefore to critical terrorism scholars who sought a deeper analysis of the counter-
terrorism policies, the total effects on all the stakeholders involved, and how tactics function for political purposes, a criterion of analysis began to take shape and a narrowing of options and arguments took shape.

Tracing the development of Islamic agency in Nigeria up to the point of the violence by Boko Haram allowed for a context of how precarious Islam has been as a source of political agency and structure to institutions before and since independence in 1960.

Moving on to Chapter Two, I analysed the legal framework through which the Nigerian government operates, showing that the 2011 legislation has allowed for a deepening and widening of state power that is detriment to citizens. Comparisons showed that international norms predated and created this permission to use violence uncritically. However, Chapter Three presented empirics and positivist evaluations of the laws, and the use of force demonstrated the overwhelmingly negative consequences of this force. Discourse analysis of popular media supported these studies, and I began to question why the government showed itself to be so stubborn in refusing to negotiate or enter into dialogue. From these dynamics, I drew five key observations.

First, the use of force by the state is counter-productive, particularly when it counts innocent bystanders as its victims; it creates sympathy for Boko Haram, adds legitimacy to the objectives and motivations of Boko Haram in its concern for corruption and poor governance, radicalizes perhaps moderate members, creates insecurity on behalf of the citizens, and results in human rights abuses that are documented and given attention by groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

Secondly, however, the Nigerian government doesn’t care about these negative ramifications, because it sees the violence it uses as legitimate and the situation at hand as a type of war in which force must be matched with force. The killing of Yusuf has been matched with no apology from the state, perhaps demonstrating that once actions have
been taken, there is no turning back, and certainly no apologies to be made. The state is being challenged by Boko Haram, and state violence is the primary way in which to demonstrate the force and power of the government, and create a façade of a restoration of order. Violence is easier than negotiation or dialogue, which demonstrates an acknowledgement of problems. Furthermore, the state cares little for the negative ramifications of violence because it fits in with the global counter-terrorism norm set by preceding actions of states such as the USA and Israel.

Thirdly, this norm has stipulated force as response particularly when the challenger is of Islamic nature. As a country split evenly between Christians and Muslims, Islamic agency is polemic and a game changer in Nigerian politics. The demand for increased Islamic agency and a more significant Islamic citizenship model is troubling to the state because of its traditionally secular nature. Islamists tend to demand things ranging from radically different form of government, law, education, to new nation states. Counter-terrorism protagonists seek to discredit Islamic agency by resorting to violence in an attempt to physically eliminate the Islamist, and to frame the Islamists in such a way that they are too dangerous to be dealt with through ordinary measures, and violence is a must. Poor governance and corruption can be overshadowed when explicit declarations of state power via violence are dominant. The cry of Radical Islam is an easy and straightforward one to make, and one with which to legitimise the use of state violence, especially within the international community.

Nevertheless, fourthly, there are clearly many stakeholders in a counter-terrorism dynamic, in spite of the statist perception that both orthodox terrorism scholars and governments attempt to make dominant. Not only are governments stakeholders, but so are other states, security forces, the police, the citizens in the state, the supporters of the cause, politicians, Islamists, religious leaders, local community leaders, the media and citizens who the violence directly affects. In spite of the plethora of stake
holders, very few are heard; counter-terrorism remains statist, and above all remains elitist in its production and implementation. There can be very little that is democratic about counter-terrorism.

Finally, entering into dialogue, whether in the form of negotiation or not, is ultimately emancipatory because it recognizes the problems within the society and state at present, and seeks to do something about them. Toros argues that dialogue is the only way for protagonists to learn about the motivations and standpoints of each other. It is only this way that “disassociation in conflict”\textsuperscript{132} in which the violence escalates to such an extent that involved parties continue to dehumanize each other to legitimize the deaths caused, can be avoided.

However, Toros’ contention that negotiation doesn’t shake the foundations of legitimacy in that it legitimizes sub state violence, or shows the legitimacy of the government to be weaker than before, can actually be challenged by this case in hand. In terms of how the Nigerian government wishes to portray itself, as strong, securing, secular, and stable, negotiations are weak in this respect. But because negotiations and dialogue acknowledge both the problems that have led Boko Haram to form and fight in the first place, as well as its objectives and grievances emanating from state violence, it would be radically emancipatory. It would necessitate a radical change of norms within the Nigerian state, stereotypes, strategic culture, and framing and undermine the regime in place. It would also support the legitimacy and importance of violence in Islamic citizenship struggles. Therefore dialogue falls in line with the critical terrorism scholars’ stipulation that emancipation must not be forcing people to be “free within a particular definition”, by taking note of the role of violence in society and identity-construction. Dialogue accepts the use of violence as a means of contesting the state, citizenship, and the state use of violence and is therefore totally radical and emancipatory in nature.

\textsuperscript{132} Toros, p67
I have taken Toros’ notion of dialogue as emancipatory and expanded it to fit the intentions of the critical terrorism scholars in looking at the different perspectives of the legitimacy of violence.

Africa as a region, and Nigeria as a state, is often left out in the world of international relations. Boko Haram as a consequence of disputes throughout Nigerian history concerning the state of Islam, continues to murder citizens, and allow the government to also murder citizens in a tit-for-tat game of cat and mouse, where both state violence and sub-state violence have their own audiences and supporters of violence as legitimate and necessary. What this research has shown is that state violence feeds the hand that bites and contributes to a sense that violence is necessary to maintain security. Entering into dialogue would acknowledge the problematic nature of governance, and of the relationship of Islam to the state in Nigeria and would be radical in its effects. However, it would also be an explicit approval of the use of violence by sub state groups, which would be even more radical and emancipatory in its message. Critical terrorism scholars who seek emancipation as the end of all violence are thoroughly mistaken. Those that seek to deconstruct the different attitudes to violence in different settings and move away from a western-centric attitude to emancipation can take guidance from this thesis. By accepting different perspectives on legitimate forms of violence from sub-state actors, conflicts can transform societies and states via negotiation and dialogue. However for governments to accept this, critical terrorism scholars would have to ironically form close and cosy relationships with governments, perhaps making its primary critique of orthodox terrorism scholars futile.
Annex 1: Timeline of Boko Haram attacks

2002 – Founded by Mohammed Yusuf

2004 – Members took refuge in the Mandara mountains, between Nigeria and Cameroon as they were attacked by Nigerian security forces. 27 members killed, many “disappeared.

2005-2008: Boko Haram concentrated on recruiting new members and shoring up its resources.

2009 July – Umaru Yar’Adua, ordered security agencies to take all necessary action to contain and repel attacks by the extremists. 700 members, relatives, bystanders killed in Maiduguri by security forces. Yusuf given to police and found dead.

July 31 – Police inquest into death called

2010 - September - Hundreds of prisoners, including Boko Haram members freed from Maiduguri prison

September – Boko Haram demand that 175 members still in jail be released

December - Bomb Jos, killing 80 people and blamed for New Year’s Eve attack on Abuja barracks

December 24 - 27: A series of attacks claimed by Boko Haram in the central city of Jos and Maiduguri kill at least 86 and dozens killed in Maiduguri shootings

2011 - January 13: A gun duel between the military and Boko Haram in Maiduguri killed 10 and injured 30 others caught in the crossfire.

February – New Anti-Terrorist Act passed in Nigerian Senate

May – Bombed several states after presidents inauguration

133 Army lays siege to Nigerian ‘Taliban’ in bid to crush rebels – Guardian July 23 2009

134 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501
June – Police HQ bombed in Abuja – first known suicide bomber of Nigeria

July - Government says it will open a negotiation panel to initiate negotiations with BH

August – UN HQ bombed in Abuja – 23 died

August: The government rejects negotiations with Boko Haram.

November - Coordinated bomb and gun attacks in Yobe and Borno states – 150 killed.
Boko Haram says it will not dialogue with the government until all of its members who have been arrested are released.

December 13: A bomb attack on a military checkpoint by Boko Haram and the resulting shooting by soldiers in Maiduguri left 10 dead and 30 injured.

December 22 – Boko Haram bombs throughout Maiduguri killing 20. Four policemen and a civilian are killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police building in Potiskum, Yobe State. Around 100 are killed following multiple bomb and shooting attacks by BH gunmen and ensuing gun battles with troops in the Pompomari outskirts of Damaturu

December 25 - Multiple bomb attacks– 42 killed

2012 - January 1 - President Goodluck Jonathan imposes a state of emergency on 15 local government areas hardest-hit by Boko Haram attacks, in Borno, Yobe and Plateau states. He orders the closure of Nigerian borders in the north

January 6 - Eight worshippers are killed in a shooting attack on a church in Yola. Boko Haram gunmen shoot dead 17 Christian mourners in the town of Mubi in the northeastern state of Adamawa. The victims are friends and relations of one of five people killed in a Boko Haram attack on a hotel the previous day

January 18 - A key suspect in the 2011 Christmas Day bombing in Abuja, which killed more than 40 people, escapes police custody.

January 20 - Boko Haram set Kano ablaze with multiple bomb and shootings, which claimed over 180 lives. The bomb and shootings targeted eight police stations and immigration offices, including a regional police headquarters and the state police headquarters.

January 23 - Federal Government launches counter terrorism projects Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism – I-ACT

February 8 - Boko Haram claims responsibility for Suicide bombing at Kaduna army headquarters
February 16 – Boko Haram stages another prison break in central Nigeria, releasing 119 prisoners

February 20 – March 1 – several schools set ablaze

As a result of the attacks, news reports state that at least 5,000 students are staying home from school

February 26 – Suicide bomber targets church

March 11 – Suicide bomber targets church – at least 10 killed

Annex 2 – Articles used for discourse analysis

1. The Tribune

Boko Haram’s funding traced to UK, S/Arabia •Sect planned to turn Nigeria into Afghanistan •Arrested kingpin opens up, 13 February 2012:

Boko Haram slaughters 6 in Maiduguri •Multiple bomb explosions rock city •Army relocates Division to Gombe •Destroys sect’s settlement in Damaturu •Boko Haram spokesman’s wife, cousin under interrogation, 02 February 2012:

Boko Haram kills Qaqa’s father, friend in Maiduguri •FG detains 5 with Al-Qaeda links over German kidnap, 28 March 2012:

Boko Haram Kills 26 In Adamawa, Gombe •Northerners Attacked In Delta, Many Injured •As 30 Die In Kogi Auto Crash, 07 January 2012:

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Boko Haram: Time for ceasefire, talks. 29 February 2012:  
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Poverty eradication can help to tackle Boko Haram, Shettima. 03 February 2012:  
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Boko Haram: SSS denies unprofessional conduct in suspect handling. Thursday 9
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Before the next terror victims- 2 May 2012,  
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FG should dialogue with Boko Haram – Sen. Gaya. 23 February 2012:
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Use of force will not solve Boko Haram Col. Ali, 08 February 2012:
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Understanding Boko haram key to ending the crisis – Mamman, 7 February 2012:
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Playing dangerous politics with Boko Haram, 07 December 2011:

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Commission to Investigate Killings, 26 December 2011:
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Govt Equal to Boko Haram challenge says Defence Minister, 15 November 2011:

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Annex 3 – People/Institutions who have called for dialogue or negotiation with Boko Haram

A professor of law, Prof. Itse Sagay
Ambassador Gaji Galtimari Committee set up by the Federal Government
Amnesty International
Bola Ahmed Tinubu, national leader of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)
Borno state governor Kashim Shettima
Borno State PDP Stakeholders Forum
Colonel Umar
Former governor of Kaduna State, colonel Hameed Ali
Former governor of the old Kaduna State Balarabe Musa
Former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo
Former Sultan of Sokoto Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki
Human Rights Watch
Jama’atul Izalatul Bid’ah Wa’ikamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS) chairman Sheikh Abdullahi Bala Lau
Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC)
Retired Deputy Inspector General of Police and former Borno State Police Commissioner Uba Bala Ringim
The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)
The seven-man Presidential Committee on the security challenges in the North East headed by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari
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