The Anxious Partisan

A Test of Affective Intelligence Theory in Romania

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Submitted to Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary

(2012)
Abstract

In order to navigate the complicated world of electoral politics, individuals may make use of
cognitive shortcuts. One such heuristic is partisanship. When it comes time to make a choice
at the polls, voters will listen to their party identification in order to choose a candidate. Yet,
for such attachments to develop, voters need time to familiarize themselves with the party
system. Using panel data from the Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009, gathered
before and after the Presidential Elections, I identify three groups of individuals: consistent
partisans, who declare themselves close to the same party both times, inconsistent partisans,
who switch between parties or between partisanship and independence, and nonpartisans,
individuals who declare themselves as independents both times when asked. I go on to test
the theory of Affective Intelligence and find that partisans who are made anxious by a
candidate are less likely to rely on their party identification when making a vote choice, while
anxiety does not appear to have any effect on nonpartisans. Interestingly, the model only
applies to partisans of the main challenger’s party, and not for partisans of the incumbent’s
party.

Key words: party identification, anxiety, Affective Intelligence Theory, Romania
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis supervisors, Professor Zsolt Enyedi and Professor Gabor Toká, Central European University, for their guidance and support. I would also like to thank Assistant Professor Levente Littvay, Central European University, for valuable feedback and encouragements. Special thanks to Assistant Professor Andrei Gheorghită, Lucian Blaga University, Sibiu, for providing data without which this study would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Assistant Professor Cristiano Vezzoni, University of Trento, Italy, and my Academic Writing Instructor Eszter Timár, Center for Academic Writing, Central European University, for useful comments and suggestions. Last but not least, I am extremely thankful to Călin-Vlad Demian for his continuous support.

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Introduction

Party politics may prove rather complicated for the ordinary voter to follow. This possibly will apply even more in the case of post-communist societies, where the electorate has just a short experience with political plurality. Therefore, it is expected that individuals would seek informational shortcuts to help them navigate the arena of electoral politics and in the end make a voting choice (e.g. Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). One such heuristic is party identification. Forming an identity with a particular party should help voters avoid the continuous hassle of getting informed about new political issues and analyze every new candidate running for office. A party label can suggest to the voter what broad policies an actor stands for and can facilitate making a voting choice. Naturally, such a pattern may arise only when the party system is institutionalized enough to allow voters to learn. Evidence suggests that voters in post-communist countries have, indeed, formed a relation with parties similar to what has been defined as party identification (e.g. Rose & Mishler, 1998).

One aspect of voting behaviour that has been until recently neglected in the literature is the impact of emotions. Research in neuroscience, political psychology and cognitive science suggests that emotions influence a wide range of political and customary activities (Burden & Klofstad, 2005; Dumville & Norris, 2011; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Wolak, MacKuen, Keele, Marcus, & Neuman, 2003). In political behaviour, Affective Intelligence Theory (AI) posits that individuals who are made anxious tend to seek out more information and will stop relying on habits when taking a decision (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). When it
comes time to vote, partisans anxious about their party’s candidate may vote for a different candidate. The theory implies that, instead of interfering with rational calculations that voters should be making before casting their vote, affect actually interacts with cognition in facilitating decision-making processes.

One criticism of AI theory is that it assumes an indirect relationship between emotions and choice. According to the theory, anxiety interacts with party identification in determining voting behaviour. Other theories put forward a more intuitive hypothesis. The theory of Affect Transfer, for example posits that emotions are directly connected with candidate evaluations. While parsimony is a desirable quality, it should not be more important than actual explanatory power. In this paper, I test the implications of AI theory on voting behaviour in the context of the 2009 Romanian presidential elections. I also look at other possible explanations.

The literature on party identification in East-Central Europe suffers from inadequate measures of the concept. Researchers of post-communist electoral behaviour seem rather inconsistent when measuring what they define as party identification, using structures that range from ‘party that expresses your views better’ (A. H. Miller & Klobucar, 2000) to ‘party closest to’ (Barnes, McDonough, & Pina, 1985) and even classifying partisans based on the consistency of their vote intention and actual vote (Brader & Tucker, 2001). Failing to use an established wording makes cross-country and over-time comparison rather difficult. Moreover, it is uncertain if these questions actually measure what they are supposed to. A discussion by Weisber (1993) presents different measurements used in the literature and pinpoints their failure to tap into the relevant dimensions of party identification.
No endeavour has yet been made, to the best of my knowledge, to try and better understand the workings of party identification in post-communist countries through emotions. On the one hand, considering that the electorate has little experience with the system, it is plausible that feelings could play an important role in decision making. On the other hand, one can imagine that an electorate unfamiliar with the voting system could be trying to better understand its mechanisms. Therefore, such voters should pay close attention to the campaign settings and, in doing so, rely less on past experience and more on present considerations.

This study strives to improve the understanding of party identification in young democracies. In order to do so, the case of the 2009 presidential elections in Romania was chosen. These elections present an excellent opportunity to study party identification. Because the presidential elections occur in two rounds, with the two leading candidates competing in a round-off, some voters will inevitably have to vote for a second preference if they are to vote at all. Using panel data I can investigate which types of voters maintain an identification with their stated party and who changes their identification along with their vote.

For this study, I use data from the Romanian Presidential Elections Study 2009. The data is a panel survey conducted in the weeks before the first round and right after the second round of the 2009 elections. The major advantage of this study is that it allows for a stringent measurement of party identification. Using panel data I can identify respondents who show a relatively stable identification with a party and distinguish them from individuals who over-enthusiastically regard themselves close to any party that they might vote for at a particular time. Secondly, the exact wording of the question is a reliable measure of party identification. Asking respondents if they are ‘close to a party’ taps into a distinct feeling of closeness,
irrespective of their thoughts on other parties. Lastly, this paper takes an innovative approach to the study of voting behaviour in post-communist societies by incorporating Affective Intelligence Theory in an attempt to better explain the relation between voting and partisanship. In order to check for robustness, I use two distinct conceptualizations of anxiety. First, following Marcus and his colleagues, I consider anxiety caused by a partisan’s same-party candidate. Then, as suggested by Ladd and Lenz (2008), I also define anxiety as a general affect, generated by any of the competing candidates.

In this study I employ a quantitative approach to investigate the nature of partisanship in Romania. I use descriptive statistics to depict the political behaviour of partisans compared to those who do not feel close to a party. In order to examine the influence of anxiety on habitual voting behaviour, I use linear and logistic regression models. Of course, these methods have some limitations. First, observational data does not allow me to determine a clear direction of causality. Second, as is the case whenever data not specifically gathered for one study is used, special attention needs to be given to the items used to measure each important concept. For this study, the concepts of party identification and that of anxiety are of particular concern. As will be elaborated in further chapters, I argue that items from the Romanian Presidential Elections Study are appropriate for testing AI Theory.

My results confirm expectations drawn from previous studies. About 60% of Romanians declare themselves close to a party at one point or another. Of these, almost half can be considered consistent partisans, following their declaring themselves close to the same party over a period of one month, before and after the elections. The rest are individuals that consistently declare themselves independent from any political party. A comparison between
these groups suggests that consistent partisans behave similarly to their European and American counterparts: they are more likely to vote consistently with the same party, be interested in politics, and trust political parties than non-partisans. They also decide on their vote earlier in the campaign and are more likely to actually turn out at the polls. Inconsistent partisans, those who switch preferred parties between election rounds, fall between the two categories above. The three groups are rather similar in terms of how different they consider the candidates to be from each other and regarding the amount of political knowledge they reveal. I also look at campaign dynamics and find that voters whose preferred candidate did not make it into the second round are quite keen on following their candidate’s advice on who they should vote for in the second round. The effect is even stronger for partisans of the losing candidate’s party. Therefore, campaigns do not seem to have a clear effect on changing party identification. There appears to be no relation between the vote cast in the second round and change in party identification, i.e. very few voters actually change their partisan preference in favour of the two main parties whose candidates made it into the second round.

Finally, I turn to testing Affective Intelligence theory and one of its alternatives. While my analyses are not conclusive, they do lean towards the suitability of AI theory. I find some weak support in favour of AI, but only when the model is applied to voting for the challenging candidate. A second test, using a generalized sense of anxiety as the main independent variable, indicates towards the same conclusion. The theory receives greater support when I look at the impact of anxiety on learning behaviour. Anxiety about one’s own candidate and about the whole range of candidates is linked to increased levels of attention to the campaign and more discussion about the elections. I also analyze the direct relationship between voting behaviour and candidate evaluations, on the one hand, and emotions on the other. My results indicate that emotions do have a direct effect on candidate evaluations, but
anxiety only influences assessments of the incumbent, not the challenger. Moreover, emotions have no direct effect on voting behaviour. The surprising result of my study is that partisans seem to behave differently in connection to the incumbent president and the main challenger. While affective intelligence theory helps explain partisan voting for the challenger, a direct theory of emotions seems more appropriate for explaining incumbent voting.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First I give an overview of the literature on party identification, with a particular focus on research done on post-communist parties and investigate how Affective Intelligence theory transforms our understanding of political behaviour. Secondly, I analyze the occurrence of party identification in Romania, using survey panel data from 2009. I take an extensive look at the political behaviour of identifiers and compare them to nonpartisans and inconsistent respondents. Then, I analyze the impact of the electoral campaign on voting behaviour and partisanship. Finally, I incorporate feelings in a model of voting behaviour in an attempt to understand the relation between partisanship and voting.
1. Theoretical considerations
The first chapter gives an overview of the relevant theories on which this study is based. First it present the concept of party identification as it developed in the American context. Secondly, I pay special attention to the tool used to measure party identification and the caveats of not properly measuring the concept. Then I look at the relevant literature on post-communist societies and finally I present Affective Intelligence Theory and strive to explain how the theory can help explain voting behaviour.

1.1 Theories of Party Identification
Party identification has proved popular in explaining voting behaviour in the American context. With the extension of voting rights to African-Americans in the 1950s and 1960s, political scientists observed a realignment of political attachments of Southern whites. Traditionally Democratic supporters, they slowly began to abandon the party in favour of the more conservative Republican Party. Nevertheless, the concept has often been used to describe the relationship between parties and their electorate in other democracies. The traditional concept of party identification encompasses two crucial aspects: individuals are supposed to have an attachment to a certain group and this affect is stable across a long period of time. In their classic work, The American Voter, Cambell and his colleagues defined partisanship as “a psychological identification which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support” (1980, p. 121). The second aspect is straightforward. Party identification should not be substantively affected by short-term political events, and any macro-changes in partisanship should become evident over a number of years. The form of attachment that party identification is supposed to tap into, on the other hand, has been the topic of much debate. It is still unclear what particular form survey questions should take. Nevertheless, the traditional concept does place
emphasis on the affective component of party identification, comparing it to religion (Campbell, et al., 1980, p. 245).

The theory of party identification, while receiving praise at first, was soon criticized after the decline in the number of actual partisans during the 1970s (Abramson, 1976). The major alternative came from the revisionist school of thought. Fiorina (1981) redefined party identification as an inherently political concept. The emphasis moved from early socialization to a running-tally version of party identification. In Fiorina’s model, party identification represented a summary of past and current evaluations of parties. Voters would keep count of the experience they had had with each party and base their partisanship in this evaluation. The concept becomes much more linked to a rational theory of voting behaviour, comprising both retrospective and prospective voting. Yet, as Holmberg (2007) accurately notices, the debate is rather misconceived. The party identification that the revisionists refer to is a whole different concept from what the Michigan school had in mind. The latter is an affective concept, embedded in citizens’ habits, whereas the former is a cognitive concept. Both concepts form reasonable theories of voting behaviour on their own, but they do represent just that, different theories. They do not refer to the same concept, even if it is identically named. For the purpose of this study, I am interested in the traditional concept of party identification, which labels an affective attachment towards a political party.

### 1.2 Measuring Party Identification

Because of the peculiar meaning of party identification, much attention is needed when formulating questions which inquire about partisanship. Such questions must allow the respondent to self-identify with a particular group (i.e. partisan of a party) and it must allow
multiple identifications. Furthermore, it must tap into a long-lasting identification, if such an attachment exists. Questions must distinguish party identification from related behaviour, such as voting or assessments of parties and their leaders.

In the American context, the most widely used battery of questions to measure party identification is the traditional NES questions, on which *The American Voter* is based (1980):

“Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what?”

Supporters of the two parties are then asked: “Do you consider yourself to be a strong Democrat/Republican or not so strong Democrat/Republican?”

Independents are asked: “Do you consider yourself to be closer to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither?”

The strength of the questions is that they capture both a self-acknowledged belonging to a group and a psychological closeness. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that the dimension that these questions capture is quite stable over time. Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002), looking at the presumed realignment of white Southerners in the 1950s, show that the change in partisanship in the US can be distinguished over a matter of decades. But the questions have their shortcomings. The 7-point scale that is used to measure attachment to the parties is constructed under the assumption that partisanship is a unidimensional concept, ranging from a maximum attachment to Democrats to a maximum attachment to Republicans, with Independents equally distant from both parties. This problem may be of a lesser concern for the American political context, where it seems that feelings towards the two main parties can be placed on a single scale (Green, et al., 2002, p. 172). Nevertheless, the issue of multiple
party identities may require further attention in multiparty systems where research suggests that as much as 1 in 10 persons display multiple identities (Schmitt, 2002). Green et al. find the same percentages in Italy in 1992 (2002, p. 175).

A second popular question that has been used in US is the Gallup version, which asks respondents: “In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?” While the question does reveal a self-identification, the wording does not suggest a long-term affiliation. Indeed, the measure proves to be much more volatile than the traditional Michigan version and much more susceptible to short-term political events (Abramson & Ostrom, 1994). Another common measure is the feeling thermometer, where respondents are asked to rate the parties on a 101-point scale. The upside is the fact that it measures affect towards each party in the party system. On the other hand, it fails to capture a sense of belonging to a group, which is inherent to party identification (Green, et al., 2002).

Bartle (2003) studies the effects of different wordings in depth and discovers a larger number of British non-identifiers when respondents are reminded that identification is not equivalent to voting habits. Through a focus group, the author shows how sensitive the meaning of the questions can be to slightly different formulations. Participants in the focus groups seemed particularly bothered when they were not offered the possibility to identify with a minor party or not to identify at all with a party (see also Burden & Klofstad, 2005).

Proponents of the party identification model suggest that the apparent volatility of partisanship is a cause of question ordering (Bartle, 2003). Presumably, because voters are
first asked about their voting habits or intentions, they are inclined to name the same party in the following question about party identification, driven by a tendency to be consistent. McAllister and Wattenberg (1995) test this claim on British and American respondents. They discover that the order of the questions has almost no effect on the revealed partisanship. I believe that there is no reason to suspect that the results of my study would be biased by the order of the survey questions. While the partisanship question does come after the batteries inquiring about voting behaviour, there are a large number of questions related to values and political attitudes in between the two, so that the respondent has enough time to cognitively distance herself from party politics.

One of the crucial elements of partisanship is its relative stability in time (Campbell, et al., 1980). Nevertheless, panel data is rarely used (a notable exception is the work of Brader & Tucker, 2001). Instead, such studies use single-wave surveys to determine the occurrence of partisanship. This method has obvious drawbacks. Respondents may be inclined to present themselves as identifying with their current party of choice, even when this is an election-specific voting choice and not a long-standing closeness to a party. The consequences of this bias in reporting party preferences is an inflated number of partisans and the inability to differentiate between voting choice and party identification.

The Romanian Presidential Election Study, which I use for my analyses, inquires about party identification by asking respondents whether they feel close to any political party or block of parties. Weisberg (1983) finds that the party closeness item has the same powerful relationship with the underlying concept of party identification as the traditional Michigan scale. Moreover, reviewing several measures of party identification, he concludes that the
closeness scale is suitable in multiparty systems (Weisberg, 1993). Barnes, Jennings, Inglehart and Farah (1988) also report high correlations between the closeness measure and the traditional ANES measure of party identification. The measure has also been successfully used to measure party identification in Ireland by Marsh (2006), in Germany by Finkel and Opp (1991) and across European countries by Lachat (2008). Appropriately for this study, the question taps into the affective component of party identification, as it asks whether respondents “feel close” to a political party. Weisberg and Haseke (1999) find that, while party identification contains both a cognitive and an affective element, the affective component is stronger.

As the focus of this study is the electorate in a post-communist country, special attention needs to be given to the possibility of overestimating the amount of partisanship. Fortunately, the question used in the Romanian Electoral Study is what Sinnott (1998) calls an absolute question, and not a relative one: it asks whether respondents feel ‘close to’ any party, instead of ‘closer to’. This formulation should result in fewer identifiers as found by Sinnott (1998) in a comparison of Western European countries using different translations of the Eurobarometer. This is to be expected, as the ‘closer’ phrasing does not necessarily imply a real attachment, but merely that the respondent holds the named party in greater esteem than other parties. Green and Schickler (1993) draw attention to the inadequacy of only measuring affect and ignoring self-identification when assessing partisanship. They argue that such questions should make use of phrases like “think of yourself”, “call yourself”, “place yourself” or “regard yourself”. Instead, I believe that the simple question of whether one feels close to a party, while it does not completely bypass the problem, is a reasonable solution, especially if one takes into account the awkwardness of a self-identifying phrase in the Romanian language.
1.3 Emergence of Partisanship in New Democracies

Amidst the literature concerned with the development of party systems and the emergence of sophisticated voters in post-communist countries, some evidence suggests that individuals are becoming attached to parties. Miller and Klobucar (2000) argue that half of the electorate in Russia and Ukraine could be described as identifiers in the late 1990s. These figures may be misleading, as the question they used for self-identification inquires about a party that best represents the respondent’s views. A subsequent question determined how close respondents were to that party, but the first part is still problematic. It is possible for voters to recognize their views in a party’s platform without feeling attached to that party. Nevertheless, these partisans appear to behave similarly to their counterparts in more stable democracies: they are more likely to vote, to influence others’ electoral choices and to rank their parties higher than others. Brader and Tucker (2001) also find that 54% of the Russian electorate is composed of what they call loyal voters – who do not frequently change their voting preferences over a four year period, between 1993 and 1996. Similarly, these voters rank their parties highest on feeling thermometers in 90% of the cases. Barnes, McDonough and Pina (1985) look at a survey panel from Spain, gathered in 1978, 1980 and 1984. They identify 16% of Spanish voters as consistently naming the same party as their close one in consecutive waves, after merely years of democratic experience (Franco had died in 1975).

Looking at four new democracies in Central Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia), Rose and Mishler (1998) estimate that no more than 40% of the electorate identifies with a party. They construct a typology to give a clearer picture of the relation between parties and individuals in these states. ‘Negative partisans’, who comprise more than
half of their sample, have no positive party identification, but can name a party that they would never vote for. ‘Closed partisans’ hold both positive and negative identifications, with 25% being defined as such. A few individuals (5%) are defined as ‘open partisans’, as they have only positive identifications. Lastly, ‘apathetic electors’ appear to be less interested in politics and hold neither positive nor negative identifications.

As previous research shows, there are reasons to suspect that the electorate of post-communist parties is becoming increasingly sophisticated. In tandem with the institutionalization of party systems, the voters appear to be familiarizing themselves with their electoral options and are developing steady preferences. Yet, the main drawback of these studies is that they lack a precise measure of party identification. While the proxies used do reveal a certain affect voters have towards parties, it is far from clear how close these sentiments are to the notion of party identification under study. A more rigorous assessment of partisan attachment is undertaken by Enyedi and Todosijevic (2009) who use the second module of the CSES surveys. Asking respondents whether they feel close to any party reveals that Eastern European electors did develop an attachment to parties in their political system. Moreover, it seems that East European partisans are quite similar to their Western counterparts.

1.4 Affective Intelligence Theory

The traditional understanding of emotions is that they are to be separated from rationality. Emotions stand in the way of calm examination of a given situation, triggering irrational behaviours (Babad & Yacobos, 1993; Marcus, 2002). Yet, developments in neuroscience and psychology suggest that emotions play an irreplaceable role in managing everyday
experiences (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010). Emotions have been shown to have an active role in information seeking behaviours (Wolak, et al., 2003), in predictions (Dumville & Norris, 2011), voting (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993), risk assessment (Huddy, et al., 2007) and partisanship (Burden & Klofstad, 2005). Instead of a think-first-and-feel-second order of managing information, recent research suggests that emotions may be antecedent to actual processing of information by the brain. The study of emotions in decision-making processes is of particular interest once researchers have understood that affect and cognition do not work one against the other, but are distinct dimensions that together help individuals to make evaluations and take decisions (Zajonc & Markus, 1982). Evidence that the cognitive and affective components interact is growing: an array of works by Isen and co-authors report a positive relationship between positive affect and problem-solving abilities (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Isen, 2001; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen & Simmonds, 1987) and Miller (2011) discusses the enhancive effect political sophistication has on experiencing emotions. Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000) argue that it is the affective systems, those managing emotions, which also direct individuals’ reactions to new situations and their tendency to rely on habits in familiar situations. Marcus (2002) explains that emotional systems hold more information about one’s surrounding environment than the conscious. Therefore, emotions are the first to intervene when a new situation arises or continue to coordinate one’s actions. In charge of these responses are the disposition system and the surveillance system, both found in the limbic region of the brain (Marcus, 2002; Marcus, et al., 2000; Wolak, et al., 2003).

Marcus (2002) explains that the disposition system is the one that guides learned behaviours by continuously gathering feedback and establishing whether a particular activity can continue. It uses emotional markers to assess the failure or success of each activity as it is
being performed. The disposition system guides such activities as writing or riding a bike, which, after being learned, become embedded in the procedural memory. Such behaviours can be performed without attention from the conscious and without occupying resources that the brain needs for other activities. The surveillance system, on the other hand, is connected to the associative memory. It scans the environment for any new element or threat and decides whether special attention is required to deal with any novelty or whether familiar habits are sufficient. The surveillance system does not intervene, but draws attention to the brain that the current plan of action must be stopped and another plan needs to be created to deal with the new situation\(^1\).

One-dimensional understandings of emotions have given way to circumplex, two-dimensional models of emotional responses. Marcus (1988) distinguishes between mastery or positive emotionality and threat/negative emotionality and finds that each dimension has discernable effects on vote. Marcus and MacKuen (1993) discriminate between anxiety and enthusiasm as distinct emotional responses to emotional candidates. Other studies discover yet more emotional dimensions within the familiar positive and negative factors. Lerner, Fischhoff and Small (2006) find different effects for anger and sadness in the post-9/11 context. Affective Intelligence Theory places particular emphasis on anxiety, as opposed to anger. Based on the roles of the emotional systems, the theory of affective intelligence predicts that voters will rely on their habits to make political decisions when they do not sense any novelty in the political environment (MacKuen, et al., 2010; Marcus, et al., 2000). When faced with a political decision, individuals will process the information in two steps: first, the surveillance system scans the environment to detect any threatening or unfamiliar

\(^{1}\) The surveillance system should not be confused with the fight-or-flight system, which intervenes before the information of the danger is received by the brain, to ensure survival of the individual e.g. removing one’s hand from a hot object.
element. For example, in an electoral campaign, if an extreme party which the voter deeply dislikes appears to have chances of winning, it could be perceived as a threatening element and determine the voter to pay more attention to the campaign. If such a situation does not arise and it appears to be ‘politics as usual’, the voter will rely on his political habits, if she has them. The second step consists of continuing with the familiar plan of action or modifying one’s actions. Therefore, in an election that appears to hold nothing out of the ordinary, a partisan will rely on his partisan attachments to make a voting decision.

Marcus and his colleagues apply the theory of affective intelligence to the political realm, hypothesizing that any anxiety caused by a political event will determine voters to abandon their previous habits and attentively consider the situation (Marcus, et al., 2000). They find that, indeed, anxiety proves to be a strong intervening factor between partisanship and one’s perception of political issues. Specifically, supporters of the incumbent president’s party are much more likely to have a negative view on the state of the economy if they are made anxious by the president’s actions, while supporters of the opposition are just weakly influenced by how they see the president. Moreover, anxiety about the challenger does not appear to have any effect on economic perceptions.

Marcus and MacKeun (1993) conclude that anxiety motivates voters to pay more attention to the campaign settings and cease relying on their political habits for a voting decision. More recently, MacKuen et al. (2010) conducted an experiment, presenting subjects with newspaper articles on policy proposals that were meant to generate feelings of anxiety, anger or reassurance. Their findings support previous research. They find that, when confronted with a policy proposal that makes them anxious, individuals are more open to new
information. They not only seek more information, but also listen to the arguments of the opposing side. Moreover, such individuals are more likely to accept a compromise, as opposed to individuals who find the proposal to tally to their own views. Interestingly, anger has the opposite effect: individuals that are angered by the news story are less likely to accept a compromise or seek more information about the issue. This supports the Affective Intelligence Theory, as anger would not be caused by a surprising element and the surveillance system would not intervene. Presumably, a proposal that the individual does not agree with but made by someone who would be expected to support that particular type of policy would not be expected to produce any surprise. When there is no new or surprising element in the environment, the surveillance system would have no reason to react.

As seen, recent research suggests that emotions do have a role in dealing with politics. They can guide behaviour without requiring the citizen to pay too much attention when it is not necessary. Rational theories of electoral behaviour require the voters to assess each party or candidate, to compare their track records or programs and to reach a well thought conclusion as to which party will maximize their utility. While there is no real expectation that citizens will go through all these steps when deciding how to vote, such theories do create a gloomy picture when considering how little voters actually know about the political system. If voters fail to name even the most important characters on the political arena, how are they supposed to make a half-decent decision during elections? Cognitive heuristics help explain how voters can limit their cost and still take reasonable decisions (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Lupia, 1994). They do not need to know what every candidate stands for as long as they know which party supports each candidate and where the party usually stands on important issues. Or it may be sufficient to know what ones’ neighbour or family members will vote to help make a decision. The Theory of Affective Intelligence goes a long way in explaining exactly which
mechanisms voters employ in which situations. When they perceive no new factor in the political setting, it is rational for them to rely on older habits that have proved helpful in the past. They need not examine every element of a campaign to make a decision if there appears to be no major difference between the parties running in the present election from the ones running in the previous one. Then voters can feel comfortable relying on past behaviours, such as party identification. The situation should change when, for example, a voter’s preferred party nominates an atypical candidate, someone who by their nature would not be expected to be supported by that party. Whether the voter likes or dislikes this candidate, she is motivated to pay more attention to the campaign as a new element, a possible threat, appears (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Al Model

Affective Intelligence Theory also shows that emotions and reason do not necessarily collide. Through emotional systems, individuals can more efficiently manage their resources. The surveillance system draws attention whenever there is a possible threat in the environment.
When no such element that causes anxiety is perceived, the individual may continue her current plan of action, set in her procedural memory. Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson (2010) identify what they call an “affective tipping point”, a moment where the negative information encountered by an individual is enough so as to cause anxiety and determine her to reconsider her initial choice.

The theory, through, is not uncontroversial. Ladd and Lenz (2008) argue that emotions explain voting behaviour through a much simpler mechanism. They suggest, instead, that there is a direct relation between candidate evaluations and emotions. Appraisal Theory and Affect Transfer Theory suggest that emotions are linked to evaluations of events or individuals (Roseman & Smith, 2001), though disagree on the direction of causality. The authors replicate the analyses of Marcus and MacKuen (1993) and Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000) and find little support for Affective Intelligence theory. They claim that the initial findings are an artefact of the unusual way in which anxiety was coded, as only anxiety towards the candidate of one’s own party was considered. Marcus, MacKuen and Neuman (2011) respond by pointing out that political habit theoretically refers to one’s own party. There is no need, in their view, to consider feelings towards the other candidate because what matters when making a voting decision is first and foremost how one feels about the candidate of their own party. Only if there is something about an individual’s own party’s candidate that makes her anxious should she consider not relying on her party identification.

A second objection of the authors refers to the multi-dimensional model of emotions used by Marcus and his colleagues. Ladd and Lenz (2008) suggest that anxiety and enthusiasm are only two sides of the same coin. They claim that anxiety about one’s own candidate is conceptually equivalent to enthusiasm about the opposing candidate, in accordance with a single-dimensional model of positive-negative affect. While some theories of political
behaviour depend on a connection between positive and negative emotions (Troyer & Robinson, 2006), research suggests that the two dimensions are in fact independent of one another, with individuals holding both positive and negative emotions towards an object (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982).

The recent discussion in *Political Psychology* (Brader, 2011; Ladd & Lenz, 2011; Marcus, et al., 2011) moves the debate on Affective Intelligence Theory forward by showing where the theory is vulnerable. Whether considering only anxiety over one’s own candidate or the opposing candidate is debated by the two sides. Some evidence suggests that is should not matter what object generates anxiety (Way & Masters, 1996, for example, use images of snakes, skulls and babies to generate emotions in their study of political attitudes). The question of how to conceptualize anxiety is still open for discussion and in this study I use two different conceptualizations in an attempt to provide an answer. I look both at the effects of anxiety caused by an individual’s in-party candidate and at a broader definition of anxiety, caused by a wider range of candidates competing in the elections at hand.

### 1.5 Expectations

The first part of my study consists of a descriptive analysis of party identification in Romania. Using two waves of a panel study conducted in the weeks before the first round of the presidential elections in 2009 and in the weeks following the second round I identify two types of identifiers: consistent partisans, who did not change their preferred parties between rounds and inconsistent partisans, who gave different answers when asked which party they felt close to in the two waves. These types are consistent with the mover-stayer model of partisanship which combines the Michigan and revisionist definitions of partisanship. The
theory predicts that some identifiers will be unmoved. Over the years, taking into consideration measurement error, these partisans will report being close to the same party over and over again. Movers, on the other hand, are bound to switch from identifying with a particular party to being independents, although they will rarely switch camps between parties (Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2001).

Panel data spanning decades confirm that the mover-stayer model better explains the dynamics of partisan change than models that simply assume a Michigan type of partisans or revisionist type. Clarke and McCutcheon (2009) find a mix of stable and flexible partisans in America, Britain and Canada. The same results are reported by Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto (2011) who look at German partisans over a period of 24 years. While the data used in this study does not allow me to test the theory, I expect to find groups that at least resemble the two types of partisans reported by the mover-stayer model and a third group of stable independents. So as not to claim too much from the data, I will use a different terminology in characterizing the three types of individuals. I do not wish to imply that my data allows the testing of the mover-stayer model or that the individuals that I identify fit the description of partisans in the aforementioned model. Therefore, I call the three groups identified consistent partisans, inconsistent partisans and nonpartisans. I expect the former two groups to behave in different manners and have different political attitudes. Moreover, they should also be different from individuals who consistently claim to not be close to any party. Particularly, consistent partisans should behave more in accordance with theories of party identification, in that they should be more likely to vote, be more interested in politics, more knowledgeable about political issues, trust political parties more and believe that candidates are more distinct, as compared to nonpartisans. Inconsistent partisans, on the other hand, should fall somewhere between the two extremes.
The last part of my study deals especially with understanding how emotions influence electoral decision-making. So far, the literature on party identification has developed along two main schools of thoughts: while some argue for the traditional sociological model of party identification, the revisionist school takes an approach more closely related to theories of rational choice. However, while each model works fine in particular circumstances, neither one is comprehensive. Each model is suitable for a certain type of citizens, while being inappropriate for another type. My research attempts to bring together the two schools of thought and proposes a unifying approach, by introducing a selection mechanism among the models.

The implications of affective intelligence for party identification are rather straightforward. A voter that has an enduring party identification should make a voting decision based on this identification when an election appears to be familiar, i.e. with no new parties or candidates out of the ordinary. On the other hand, if the voter’s surveillance system detects a new element, she should become more eager to get informed about the election and the candidates. This does not necessarily imply that the individual will abandon the party she feels close to at the polls. Instead, it means that party identification will not be the main mechanism for coming to a decision about who to vote for. The model proposed by Fiorina (1981) plays a role in the theory of affective intelligence. As voters become less reliant on their partisan feelings, they should gather more information about the parties or candidates and act more according to the new information encountered and less based on their voting habits. In other words, they should be more similar to the voter identified by the revisionist school. Yet, as discussed above, this model is distinct from that of party identification.
I propose that, if Affective Intelligence Theory accurately describes the role of emotions in electoral behaviour, voters that do not reveal signs of anxiety should behave according to their party identification. In other words, for those low on anxiety, party id should be a strong predictor of vote. On the other hand, partisans who declare themselves anxious about their own party’s candidate or about any candidate in the race should show a decreased reliance on party identification in their decision-making process. In other words, anxiety and party identification should interact negatively in their effect on vote choice. For voters who do not consider themselves close to the candidates’ parties I do not expect anxiety to have a significant role on vote choice. Since these individuals do not have any voting habits to rely on, there is no mechanism in Affective Intelligence Theory that would predict any change in these individuals’ behaviours. Alternatively, if a more accurate portrayal of voting behaviour is characterized by Ladd and Lenz’s Affect Transfer Theory (2008) I expect to find a direct link between emotions and candidate evaluations. In this case, presumably voters who are made anxious about a candidate will abandon him at the polls irrespective of their party identification or lack thereof. Moreover, emotional reactions towards candidates should be classified along a negative-positive dimension, with anger and anxiety having negative effects on candidate evaluations and hope and pride positively affecting respondents’ evaluations of the candidates.

The study of emotions should prove especially fruitful in the context of an electorate with a medium experience with electoral democracy. Arguably, Romanian voters have had some time to familiarize themselves with the electoral process. The rules of presidential elections have remained unchanged since the early 1990s and the dynamics of politics are relatively
stable. Electoral volatility decreased in the first decade of democracy below the average of the region and the effective number of electoral parties stabilized at 5.1 by the year 2000 (Bielasiak, 2002). Given the relatively high degree of party system institutionalization, there is reason to suspect that the Romanian electorate may have formed attachments to political parties, attachments that resemble those found in more experienced democracies. Yet politics, even more so in East-Central Europe, are emotion-ridden. The complexities of policy making may prove even more challenging in a country where some half of the electorate regularly abstains from voting ("Central Electoral Bureau,"). Therefore, the elections of Romania could represent an ideal case to study the way in which emotions and political habits interact and influence voting behaviour.

Furthermore, Affective Intelligence Theory has so far been tested almost exclusively on American electorates. Notable exceptions are Rosema (2007) and Capelos (2007) who successfully tested the theory on Dutch voters and Kiss and Hobolt (2011) who look at British voters. Multiparty systems should reveal with even more success the interaction of emotions and habit considering the greater pallet of choices voters face at any election. Whereas in two-party systems voters made anxious by their party’s candidate have only one other electoral choice, if they are to vote at all, in European multiparty systems the potential for voters to actually abandon their parties’ candidates at the polls is even greater. Therefore, if anxiety decreases the impact of party identification on electoral choice, this should be more apparent in multiparty systems.
2. Data and Methodology

The data used for this study was gathered as part of the Romanian Electoral Studies program. During the 2009 campaign for the presidential elections, a three-wave survey was conducted (Figure 2). The first wave was conducted before the first round of the elections, between 10th and 20th November 2009, with the first round of the elections taking place on 22nd of November. Respondents were selected randomly from electoral lists, with a response rate of 48% (73% of eligible contacted persons). Of the initial 1504 participants, 1403 were also administered the third survey, a response rate of 93%. The data for the third wave was collected after the second round of the elections, between 7th and 15th December, 2009, almost a month after the first wave. The second round of elections was held on December 6th. All interviews were conducted in person, at the respondents’ residence. Between the two rounds of the elections another round of interviews was conducted. For this study though, only the first and third waves were used. Questions regarding closeness to a party were not available in the intermediary wave. All variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1.

Figure 2. Data Gathering
Party Identification

Respondents were asked “Do you feel close to a political organization?” in the first survey and “Would you say that you feel close to a political organization?” in the third one. Further, those who responded affirmatively were asked to identify the party that they felt close to. Based on these questions, respondents were classified as consistent partisans, inconsistent partisans or nonpartisans. **Consistent partisans** are those that responded as feeling close to a party in both waves and identified the same party as the one they felt close to both times. **Inconsistent partisans** are those that changed their answers from one wave to another. Either they switched between feeling and not feeling close to a party or they nominated different parties in the two surveys. Finally, **nonpartisans** are those respondents who said they did not felt close to a party in both waves.

Respondents were further asked several questions regarding their political behaviour and attitudes in general and pertaining to the current electoral campaign. All variables were recoded so that categories range from 0 to 1. The first set of questions was present in the first wave, before the first round of the presidential elections.

*Interest in politics.*

How interested are you in politics? (0. not at all, 1. a little, 2. quite a bit, 3. very)

*Political knowledge.*

Respondents were asked to indicate whether five items regarding the institution of the presidency were true or not. Based on their answers, I created a five point index indicating how many times individuals gave a correct response. The five items were:
The president of Romania is elected for a 4 year term.

An individual can be president of Romania only for 2 mandates.

According to the constitution, the members of the government are elected by the president.

One of the attributes of the president is to represent Romania in foreign relations.

In specific conditions the president has the right to dissolve the parliament.

*Turnout intention.*

In the first round of the presidential elections, will you surely go to vote, probably go to vote, probably won’t go to vote, surely won’t go to vote?

1. will surely go vote 2. will probably go vote 3. probably won’t go 4. surely won’t go

*General voting intention.*

Open-ended question: If next Sunday parliamentary elections were organized, the candidate of which party would you vote for?

*Trust in political parties.*

On a scale from 0 to 10, please tell me how much you trust the following institutions. 0 means you don’t trust that institution at all, and 10 means you have full trust. If you don’t know enough about an institution, tell me and I will skip to the next one: political parties in Romania.

*Economy prospects*
Asked for each candidate and ‘other’: If [candidate/other] wins the November presidential elections, do you think that Romania’s economy will be much better, better, about the same, worse or much worse? 1. Much better 2. Better 3. About the same 4. Worse 5. Much worse.

Feeling Thermometers

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “I don’t like him at all” and 10 “I like him very much”, how much do you like [candidate]?

Ideology

Regarding a diversity of political issues, people talk of “left” and “right”. What is your position? Please indicate your position using any number from the interval 0-10. On this scale, where 0 is “left” and 10 is “right”, what number best describes your position?

Feelings.

For each candidate and for an unspecified ‘other candidate’, respondents were asked: Did [candidate/other] ever made you feel ANGER / HOPE / FEAR / PRIDE? 1. Yes, very often 2. yes, often 3. yes, rarely 4. yes, very rarely 5. No

The actual question used to tap into respondents’ level of anxiety might be of some concern. In fact, the word used is ‘fear’, and not ‘anxiety’. Clinical studies show that fear and anxiety are distinct concepts, with fear being associated more closely to specific stimuli than anxiety (Davis, 1992) and sometimes having different consequences (Rhudi & Meagher, 2000). Nevertheless, the two have overall similar symptoms (Davis, 1992). Moreover, one must also take into consideration the complexities of the language used in the surveys. Anxiety is a rather uncommon word in Romanian and it would pose difficulties to the respondents. If one of the aims of surveys is to present respondents with standard questionnaires and with as few interventions from the interviewers as possible (Saris & Gallhofer, 2007), the simplicity of
the language must be an important factor. Therefore, using the word fear instead of anxiety should be a reasonable alternative.

The next questions were presented in the third survey, administered after the elections were over.

*Actual turnout.*

Many people did not vote in the presidential election of the 22 of November 2009, while others did vote. Did you vote in these elections?

*Actual vote choice.*

What candidate did you vote for in the first round of the presidential elections?

*Perceived differences between candidates.*

In the electoral campaign that just ended, the differences between candidates were rather big or small or not at all? 1. rather big 2. small 3. none at all

*Followed campaign.*

During the electoral campaign for presidential elections, how often did you:

- follow a program on TV related to the elections?
- read information related to the elections in a newspaper?
- listen to shows about the elections on the radio?
- talk with your friends or family about the elections?
- accessed a web page related to the elections?
I begin with an investigation the nature of partisans in Romania by using descriptive statistics. In order to test the hypotheses related to AI theory, I use binary logistic regression. Two models are tested, one including the interaction term between partisanship and anxiety and one without the interaction term. Each model is tested on two candidates, the incumbent president and his main challenger. The dependent variable is vote for that candidate, coded as a dichotomous variable: respondents were coded 1 if they voted for a candidate and 0 if they did not. Party identification in this case measures identification with the party of the candidate in each model. Then the models are replicated using another measure of anxiety, general anxiety. I also test a direct relationship between emotions on the one hand, and voting intentions and feeling thermometers on the other. For this purpose I will use binary logistic regression and linear regression.
3. Analysis

The analysis will consist of three major parts. First, I look at some general characteristics of Romanian partisans. I classify respondents according to their party identification in three categories: consistent partisans, inconsistent ones and non-partisans, and then compare them according to voting behaviour, party affiliation and other politically relevant traits. Second, I look at campaign dynamics and how they may have influenced voting behaviour between the two rounds of the elections. The last part consists of a test of Affective Intelligence Theory and an alternative model, proposed by Ladd and Lenz (2008).

3.1 Partisan Characteristics

In this part, I present some characteristics of Romanian partisans. After an overview of the amount of partisans, I look at their party affiliations and compare the main groups I find in terms of electoral behaviour and some relevant political variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Absolute Frequencies</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent partisans</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>28.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent partisans</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>33.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonpartisans</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>37.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009

Table 1 shows that more than 60% of the sample considers itself close to a political party at one point or another. Of these, nearly half fits the definition of consistent partisan. The remaining 37.75% consistently declare themselves nonpartisans. Compared with other

2 Number not identical to sample size due to missing cases on at least one of the questions
studies, the figure may seem low. Rose and Mishler (1998) find that in 1995, 41% of Romanians considered themselves close to a party. Using data from the Post-Communist Public Study II, Rudi (2006) reports similar findings, with 40.4% identifiers in 1998. Data from the 1996 module of CSES shows some 44.4% partisans in Romania (Enyedi & Todosijevc, 2009). But these studies may overestimate the amount of identifiers, because they use data gathered at a single point in time. While they capture the affective dimension of party identification, they ignore that some of these partisans may only be reporting short-term attachments. Studies that do take into account the temporal dimension usually investigate the consistency of voting (Brader & Tucker, 2001). Other studies of new democracies use a poor measure of party identification: Miller and Klobucar (2000) find more than 50% of Russians and Ukrainians can name “a party that best represents their views”, Barnes, McDonough and Pina (1985) inquire about the party that respondents “feel closest to” in newly democratic Spain, while Colton (2000) reports that between one third and a half of Russians name a party as “their party” in late 1990s. The lower figures of partisans that I identify can be accounted by the fact that the measure used not only requires individuals to self-identify as close to a party, but also eliminates very unstable attachments. More likely, the cause of the high instability is the young age of Romanian democracy and the inexperience of voters with the political system. It is worth considering that, even over a one month period, half of partisans change their responses, either by naming another party as the one they feel close to, or by changing between identifying with a party and being non-partisans.

All in all, the results reported in this study confirm the presence of partisans in Romania comparable in relative numbers with other post-communist countries. Moreover, looking at the percentage of consistent partisans, we find a rather optimistic picture.
Table 2. Consistent partisans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Share of partisans</th>
<th>% of voters who are consistent partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democratic Party</td>
<td>49.36%</td>
<td>37.3% (148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>26.28%</td>
<td>25.9% (81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
<td>14.10%</td>
<td>19.6% (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union of Hungarians</td>
<td>6.73%</td>
<td>36.5% (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Romania Party</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
<td>12.2% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Generation Party</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>15% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Party</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Numbers in parentheses represent raw figures.

The distribution of consistent partisans reveals that the strongest party from this perspective is the Social-Democratic Party (Table 2). Half of those classified as consistent partisans are supporters of the Social Democrats. The results are to be expected in view of the fact that left-wing parties in Europe have traditionally been characterized by organizational cohesion, admittedly with a downwards trend (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). The Liberal Democrats come a distant second with 14%. The Social Democrats also benefit greatest from their core supporters when it comes to votes: 37% of their voters consider themselves close to the party. The large number of partisans could explain the party’s constant level of support over the last years. Their share of votes in parliamentary elections has remained around 35% since the 2000 elections. As expected, the Democratic Union of Hungarians also benefits from their loyal supporters. 36.5% of its voters are also stable partisans of the party. Of course, considering the ethnic nature of the party, it is plausible that identifying with the party does not only entail a political identification, but also an ethnic one.
Of those classified as inconsistent partisans, some 40% only identified themselves as close to a party in the 3rd wave of the survey, while 33% went from considering themselves partisans to nonpartisans. The rest switched between parties, with most of them becoming supporters of the parties whose’ candidates had made it into the second round of the presidential elections. These two parties, the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Social Democrats, gained between them the support of 46% inconsistent partisans.

Table 3. Effect of partisanship on vote consistency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consistent partisans</th>
<th>Inconsistent</th>
<th>Nonpartisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s chi square</td>
<td>1236.156***</td>
<td>1138.062***</td>
<td>720.071***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>.843</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phi</td>
<td>2.065</td>
<td>1.935</td>
<td>1.609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Consistency in voting. Chi-square (general vote intention X presidential vote intention)

Based on well established literature, I would expect partisanship to be strongly correlated with vote stability (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, & Nevitte, 2001; Campbell, et al., 1980; Green, et al., 2002; Weisberg, 1983). Some simple chi-square tests were performed, on general vote intention (for parties) and vote intention in the presidential elections. Table 3 reveals that consistent partisans are also more consistent in their vote choices than inconsistent ones, who are in turn more consistent than nonpartisans. Cramer’s V shows that effect is stronger for consistent partisans than inconsistent ones and even stronger than for nonpartisans.

The idea that these three groups are indeed different from each other is strengthened by further analyses. Table 4 reveals that, indeed, consistent partisans behave differently than
inconsistent ones and even more so compared to nonpartisans. Consistent partisans are more interested in politics than inconsistent ones which, in turn, are more interested than nonpartisans, these results being in conformity with previous studies (Kirkpatrick, 1970; Wolak, 2009). Objective political knowledge is less differentiating. There seems to be no difference between consistent and inconsistent partisans with respect to the amount of knowledge they posses, but nonpartisans are systematically less well informed than both groups, as also found by Rudi (2006).

Trust in political parties follows the same expected pattern, with trust increasing as one moves from being a nonpartisan to an inconsistent partisan and to a consistent one. Surprisingly, there appears to be no differences between these groups as to how big they perceived the differences between candidates to be. We would expect to find that partisans see more differences between candidates than nonpartisans. In the literature an effect of voting behaviour on comparative evaluations of candidates is identified (Beasley & Joslyn, 2001; Mullainathan & Washington, 2007), but no such effect of party identification is found here. While the differences are in the expected direction, they fail to reach an acceptable level of significance. Voting behaviour shows a similar pattern as presented above and conforms to existing literature (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1997; Garry, 2007; A. H. Miller & Klobucar, 2000; Weisberg, 1983). Generally, partisans decide earlier in the campaign who they will vote for and they are more likely to actually vote. The actual mean differences between the three analyzed groups reveal that they are indeed separate categories of individuals, with
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consistent</th>
<th>Inconsistent</th>
<th>Nonpartisans</th>
<th>Consistent-Inconsistent</th>
<th>Inconsistent-Nonpartisan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>.4677</td>
<td>.3117</td>
<td>.2497</td>
<td>.1499*</td>
<td>.0680*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.6795</td>
<td>.6513</td>
<td>.5758</td>
<td>.0281</td>
<td>.0755*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in political parties</td>
<td>.4558</td>
<td>.3871</td>
<td>.3305</td>
<td>.0687*</td>
<td>.0566*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived differences between candidates</td>
<td>.5924</td>
<td>.5824</td>
<td>.5669</td>
<td>.0100</td>
<td>.0154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout intention</td>
<td>.9646</td>
<td>.9289</td>
<td>.8279</td>
<td>.3570</td>
<td>.1009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual turnout</td>
<td>.9600</td>
<td>.8774</td>
<td>.8191</td>
<td>.0825*</td>
<td>.0582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Entries in the first three columns are means with standard deviations in brackets. The fourth and fifth columns are t-test mean differences.

* p<.05
inconsistent partisans oscillating between consistent partisans and nonpartisans, but generally behaving as a distinct group.

These results also reinforce my expectation that the closeness item does measure party identification, seeing as consistent partisans seem to behave like the party identifiers defined in the literature. A comparison of the groups on socio-economic variables reveals little disparities, with mean differences not reaching statistical significance or not being substantively significant (not shown here). Worth mentioning is that consistent partisans appear to have higher incomes than inconsistent ones (mean difference = .1119, p=.021, two-tailed).

I also look at differences in candidate evaluations. Similar with previous finding in other contexts (Blais, et al., 2001; Brader & Tucker, 2001; Clarke & Stewart, 1987; Green, et al., 2002; A. H. Miller & Klobucar, 2000) partisans systematically rank the candidate of their party higher than other candidates. Computing the difference between the score of one’s own candidate and the mean score of the other two major candidates gives a mean score of .14\(^3\). This means that, on average, voters rate their candidates .14 points higher than other candidates.

### 3.2 Campaign Effects

Next, I look at the campaign dynamics. I examine the shift in votes between the two rounds among those respondents who cast votes both times. I am especially interested in the

\(^3\) Candidate scores are extracted from factor analysis rotated factors, based on 9 Likert-scales tapping candidate images. All variables have communalities higher than .6 on their respective actor
behaviour of voters of the second runner-up, whose preferred candidate failed to make it into the second round. The presidential elections were contested by twelve candidates, but only three of them tallied vote shares that go into double digits. The incumbent, Traian Basescu, was supported by the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL). His main challenger, Mircea Geoana, was nominated by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Crin Antonescu was running on behalf of the National Liberal Party (PNL). Crin Antonescu, who came in third in the first round of the elections, subsequently endorsed one of the two main candidates, the challenger Mircea Geoana. I consider the role party identification has on cue following and also how the campaign influences partisanship.

Table 5. Vote change between rounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round I vote</th>
<th>Round II Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traian Basescu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traian Basescu (PDL)</td>
<td>92% (227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mircea Geoana (PSD)</td>
<td>10% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crin Antonescu (PNL)</td>
<td>24% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>45% (116)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Row percentages add to 100. Differences account for missing data or voters in the first round who did not vote in the second.

Voting patterns between the two rounds show striking stability for the two candidates who made it to the second round (Table 5). Around 90% of voters of the incumbent president and the main contender maintained their vote choice. The choices made by voters of other parties reflect the dynamics of the electoral campaign in the weeks before the run-off. The National Liberal Party had made an informal agreement with the Social Democrats to support their candidate. Therefore, Crin Antonescu advised his supports to cast their vote for Mircea Geoana in the second round (Boamfa, 2011). As a result, most of the individuals who had previously voted for him, 75%, switched their vote to Mircea Geoana. The large amount of
voters who followed his advice is rather surprising, considering that, ideologically, Liberals in Romania are closer to the Liberal Democrats than to the Social Democrats (EuropeanElectionDatabase). Moreover, the Social-Democratic Party is considered the successor party of the Communist Party, and its symbolic leader, Ion Iliescu, is a former communist activist. Also, there is no history of alliance between the Liberals and the Social-Democrats, while the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democratic Party successfully ran as a coalition in the 2004 general elections, which admittedly ended in mid-term with the dissolution of the partnership. Perhaps party identification plays a role in explaining the large number of liberal voters who chose to support Mircea Geoana.

Among voters of Crin Antonescu there seems to be a positive relation between being a PNL partisan and following its leader’s advice (Table 6), although the Chi-square test falls short of statistical significance, probably due to the small number of cases (Pearson’s chi-square = 7.261, df=3, p=.064). The results suggest that voters can still make use of partisanship as a cue when they do not have the option of voting for their party’s candidate. In this case, they choose to follow that candidate’s advice and vote for the challenger. While it would be instructive to analyze the effect of anxiety on PNL partisans’ voting behaviour, unfortunately the small number of cases does not allow me to do so.

Table 6. PNL voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round II vote</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNL partisans</td>
<td>Non-PNL partisans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traian Basescu</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
<td>29% (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mircea Geoana</td>
<td>92% (33)</td>
<td>69% (72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Entries represent percentages of respondents who voted with the candidate supported by PNL in the first round, distributed according to their partisan status and their vote in the second round of the elections.
Does changing one’s vote create a change in partisanship? To determine this, I look at individuals who switched their vote between rounds, for one reason or another. Some decided to vote only in the second round, while others stayed at home in the run-off. Moreover, some voters were forced to switch between parties as their first candidate of choice did not make it into the run-off. In total 513 people from the sample reported different voting options in the two waves of the survey. Of these, only 87 people switched their partisan preferences to the two main parties, whose candidates ran in the second round of the election. There is no reason to suspect that changing one’s vote determines a change in partisanship.

3.3 Testing Affective Intelligence Theory

The next part of the analysis consists of a direct test of Affective Intelligence Theory. For the purpose of the following analyses I only consider consistent partisans as having a party identification and regard inconsistent partisans to be non-identifiers. I In order to test the hypotheses proposed, I use binary logistic regression. Two models are tested, one including the interaction term between partisanship and anxiety and one without the interaction term. Each model is tested on two candidates, the incumbent president and his main challenger. The dependent variable is vote for that candidate in the first round, coded as a dichotomous variable: respondents were coded 1 if they voted for a candidate and 0 if they did not. I use vote in the first round and not the second one because in the first round of the elections, with more competing candidates, voters have more possibilities to defect. As explained before, the effect of anxiety on vote choice may be underestimated since respondents may very well stop relying on party identification and still end up voting for the candidate supported by the party they feel close to. It is likely that this will occur more often in the second round, where only two options are available. Therefore, so not to underestimate the impact of anxiety, I choose
to look at the first round of the election where the effect of anxiety on habitual behaviour would be more noticeable.

Following Marcus et al. (2011) and Ladd and Lenz (2008) I include in the model, besides the variables of interest, also variables that could stand as proxies for policy preference and candidate personal qualities. In order to assess respondents’ opinion of the candidates in terms of policies, I use their predictions as whether the state of the economy will improve or deteriorate if the candidate is elected president. As a proxy for candidates’ qualities, I use 11-point feeling thermometers. The survey also includes a battery on candidate qualities, but it could not be used due to missing data. Later the models are replicated using another measure of anxiety, general anxiety. If the theory holds, we should observe that the interaction term between party identification and anxiety has a negative effect on voting for the candidate. This hypothesis is tested using two definitions of anxiety. First, I will consider only anxiety caused by the candidate supported by the party the respondent feels close to. Later, I will also test the theory using a general measure of anxiety, defined as the maximum level of anxiety caused by any of the candidates. As an alternative to AIT, I also look at the direct impact emotions have on voting behaviour.

Table 7 reports two logistic regression models, each for the two main contenders. Along with the odds ratios usually reported for logistic regression due to their intuitive interpretation, I also include the y-standardized coefficients, as they allow me to compare coefficients across models\(^4\) (Mare & Wonship, 1984). Before interpreting the results, it should be noted that the

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\(^4\) Y-standardized coefficients were estimated in STATA using the listcoef command from Long and Freese’s toolbox spost 9
models only include the variables ‘anxiety’ in interaction with party identification, following the example of Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus, 2002; Marcus, et al., 2000). While normally all constitutive terms of an interaction should be included, Brambor and Clark (2005) demonstrate that under some conditions variables may be excluded. Particularly, a variable may be omitted if the variable it is interacted with has a ‘natural zero’ and if the effect of the former on the dependent variable is actually null. In this case, partisanship does in fact have a natural zero, since not being a partisan of a particular party does imply the natural absence of that characteristic. Second, a fully specified model reveals that anxiety has a main effect that is indistinguishable from zero on the dependent variable, vote, for both the incumbent and the challenger. Moreover, Kiss and Hobolt (2011), in an experiment on British voters, also find no main effects of emotions on partisan vote. Therefore, I feel comfortable in only including the variable ‘anxiety’ in interaction with party identification.

Overall, the models fare rather well. For the incumbent, model 1 predicts 87.1% of the cases correctly, and for model 2 the figure increases to 87.9%. For the challenger, model 1 predicts 84.6% of the cases correctly, and model 2 predicts 84.5%, a slight decrease. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test does not reach statistical significance for any of the models, indicating a good model fit. Including the interaction term improves the models, as can be seen from the decrease in AIC (from 646.20 to 595.96 for the incumbent and from 661.64 to 617.49 for the challenger). A quick overview of the results reveals that partisanship has a strong positive effect on vote (Model 1). Being consistently close to the president’s party, for example, increases the chances of voting for him by 21 times, whereas closeness to the social-democratic party increases the chances to vote for the challenger by almost 12 time. Believing that the candidate will highly improve the economic conditions of the country also has a very large impact on vote, whereas the candidate’s personal qualities (summarised
through a 11-point feeling thermometer) has just a moderate effect, which is only significant in the model applied to the incumbent. Yet, the effect is in the expected direction, with more positive reviews of the candidate improving the chances of voting for him.

If AI holds, the interaction term between partisanship and anxiety should have a negative effect on vote. As Table 7 reveals, the evidence is limited, although in the expected direction. Both for the incumbent and the challenger, anxiety about the candidate supported by the party one feels close to weakens voters’ reliance on partisanship. Yet in neither case do the negative coefficients reach a traditional level of significance. The insignificance of the results does not come as a great surprise since only a very limited number of people declare having been made to feel afraid of their own candidate. In total, only 12.2% of consistent partisans (38 individuals) report anxiety about their own candidate. 10.7% of partisans of the Social Democratic Party report some anxiety about Mircea Geoana and 19% of Liberal Democratic partisans are at least somewhat anxious about President Traian Basescu.

For a more intuitive interpretation, Figure 3 displays the change in predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent as a function of anxiety caused by the president. For the partisans of the incumbent’s party the probability of voting for the president decreases from 92% to 75% as the level of anxiety caused by the president increases from ‘not at all’ to ‘very often’. On the other hand, in the case of non-partisans, the increase in level of anxiety leaves the probability of voting for the president virtually unchanged, at about 1%. Figure 4 shows the same patterns for the main challenger. Partisans of Mircea Geoana’s party who are not made anxious by the candidate have a probability of 88% of voting for him, while those who are
### Table 7. Indirect Effect of Anxiety on Vote Choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Incumbent</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Challenger</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>21.759*</td>
<td>1.0398*</td>
<td>24.752*</td>
<td>1.0849*</td>
<td>11.841*</td>
<td>.8333*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety Own</td>
<td>.773</td>
<td>-.0872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>1929.272*</td>
<td>2.5539*</td>
<td>1768.224*</td>
<td>2.5281*</td>
<td>2525.212*</td>
<td>2.6416*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Thermometer</td>
<td>1.961*</td>
<td>.2273*</td>
<td>2.099*</td>
<td>.2507*</td>
<td>1.693†</td>
<td>.1775†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>.553</td>
<td>.555</td>
<td></td>
<td>.561</td>
<td>.564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>646.20</td>
<td>595.96</td>
<td></td>
<td>661.64</td>
<td>617.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* significant at .05 level;
† significant at .10 level;
very anxious about the candidate experience a drop in probabilities to 64%. Non-partisans again are not influenced by the increase in anxiety. Their probabilities of voting for the challenger are steady at above 1%. In both cases, the decrease in vote probability for partisans is not quite linear, but the intermediary differences are not significant.

Figure 3. Probability of voting for incumbent as a function of anxiety
Marcus and MacKuen (1993) claim that anxiety, while decreasing reliance on partisanship, should increase the effect of personal characteristics of the candidates. My analysis suggests no such connection. When anxiety about one’s own candidate is interacted with the feelings thermometer, the variable is not significant and it does not improve the model fit (Table 8). I also look at anxiety as an individual characteristic. I compare partisans’ and non-partisans’ levels of anxiety and find that the two groups do not differ in terms of the anxiety caused by the candidates (t-test not significant).
Table 8. Effect of anxiety of the relationship between candidates’ qualities and vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Challenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>22.692</td>
<td>13.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>1761.523</td>
<td>2623.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Thermometer</td>
<td>1.879†</td>
<td>1.558†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>.823†</td>
<td>.281†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Thermometer X Anxiety</td>
<td>6.158†</td>
<td>2.427†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Cell entries represent logistic regression odds ratios. All variables are significant at .05 level; † non-significant.

The next step is to assess the direct effect of emotions. I look at the impact of emotions on both vote choice and on candidates’ individual evaluations.

Table 9. Direct/Indirect Effect of Emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote Intention (Logistic regression)</th>
<th>Feeling Thermometer (OLS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>Challenger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.799*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.565*</td>
<td>.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>1.259</td>
<td>.902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear/Anxiety</td>
<td>1.766†</td>
<td>.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>1.208</td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>.203*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ | .223 | .333 | .440 | .424 |

Data: Romanian Presidential Elections Study 2009. Entries in column 1 and 2 represent logistic regression odds ratios and in columns 3 and 4 OLS coefficients. * p<.05 † p<.10
As expected, anger has a negative effect on candidate evaluations, while hope and pride are positively correlated with candidate ratings. Anxiety, on the other hand, is only related to incumbent evaluations. Results suggest that anxiety has only a weak effect (with a coefficient of -.057). Ladd and Lenz (2008) argue in favour of a direct relationship between candidate evaluations and emotions, yet the results presented here show only a weak support for their theory. Moreover, they also support a multi-dimensional view of emotions. While hope and pride, both positive emotions, have similar positive effects on candidate evaluations, anger and anxiety do not function as parts of a single negative emotion. Instead, anxiety has a very weak negative effect compared to that of anger and only in the case of the incumbent president. The failure to find a direct relationship between anxiety and vote choice suggests that the relationship is not so simple. Voters do not simply refuse to vote for a candidate that makes them anxious.

Thus far, results seem to support Affective Intelligence, but only weakly. Only anxiety about the challenging candidate determines individuals who identify with his party (the Social-Democratic Party) to rely less on their partisanship. On the other hand, there seems to be no strong direct relation between anxiety and vote or candidate evaluations, as Ladd and Lenz (2008) suggest. Anxiety has, though, a weak effect on incumbent feeling thermometer. But the authors also argue that general anxiety is a better measure for a test of Affective Intelligence. Therefore, I replicate the previous analysis from Table 7 by replacing anxiety about one’s own candidate with general anxiety, conceptualized as the highest value from the items measuring fear towards three major candidates in the race and a generic ‘other’ candidate. I call this general anxiety, but there are limitations to using such a conceptualization. There may be other elements in the electoral competition that make individuals feel anxious and which could have an influence on their decision-making.
processes. It could be that other minor candidates have a great enough impact on the electoral campaign so as to influence the dynamics of elections, or other exogenous elements, like the economy. Unfortunately, the data used in this study does not allow a broader definition of anxiety. Yet, the situation is not that dire. If something is to cause sufficient levels of anxiety to change decision-making patterns, it is expected that candidates that have a decent chance of winning the elections should have that impact.

The results in Table 10 are very similar to those presented previously. Of all consistent partisans, 27.8% (87 individuals) report having felt anxious about any of the candidates in the race. Party identification, economic prospects, and feeling thermometers, have the same impact on the dependent variable as in the previous models. Again, for the incumbent’s partisans, anxiety does not appear to have an influence. Yet, for the challenger, results suggest with a higher certainty that anxiety decreases voters’ dependence on partisanship. The coefficient, though, does not differ much from the previous model in Table 7. Again, I compare partisans and non-partisans in terms of their levels of anxiety, this time using the general conceptualization. Partisans have a mean of .2225 and non-partisans have a slightly lower mean of .2182, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 10. General anxiety model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Challenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>23.420*</td>
<td>1.0398*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship x General Anxiety</td>
<td>1.122</td>
<td>.0390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy Own</td>
<td>1803.475*</td>
<td>2.5539*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Thermometer</td>
<td>.2098*</td>
<td>.2273*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.002*</td>
<td>.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>.555</td>
<td>.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>646.20</td>
<td>628.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Romanian Presidential Election Study 2009. Cell entries represent logistic regression odds ratios and y-standardized coefficients
* significant at .05 level;
† significant at .10 level;
As before, I look at the relationship between the predicted probabilities of voting for the two candidates as determined by the levels of general anxiety reported by respondents. In the case of the incumbent president (Figure 5) partisans of the Liberal Democratic Party, the party supporting him, there is a slight decrease in probability of voting for the president from 92% to 80% as individuals report feeling anxious about any of the candidates very often. For non-partisans, general anxiety does not influence vote propensities. All non-partisans are assigned predicted probabilities of voting for Traian Basescu of about 1.5%, and not higher than 2%. For the main challenger, the results in Figure 6 reveal a stronger relationship between general anxiety and vote in the case of partisans. A respondent who declares herself close to the Social Democratic Party and who is not anxious about any of the candidates has a probability
of voting for the party’s candidate of 87%. If the respondent reports being made anxious about any candidate very often, the chances of voting for the challenger decrease to 79%. For non-partisans, the chances of voting for Mircea Geoana are 1.7% regardless of the levels of anxiety reported.

**Figure 6. Probability of voting for challenger as a function of general anxiety**

![Graph showing probability of voting for challenger as a function of general anxiety.](image)

It appears that the conceptualization of anxiety does not make a great difference for the explanatory power of Affective Intelligence Theory. Overall, the results suggest that, indifferent of the definition of anxiety, AI is better suited to explain breaking with partisan
vote in the case of the challenger, while a direct relation between emotions and candidate evaluations is apparent only in the case of the incumbent.

In order to tentatively understand the possible mechanisms that may cause this difference in behaviour, I also look at partisans' placement on an 11-point ideological scale. Partisans of the Liberal Democratic Party have a mean position of 7.11, indicating moderate right-wing ideologies, while partisans of the Social Democratic Party place themselves on average at 3.02, indicating a moderate left-wing ideology. Both are in accordance with their respective parties' positions. More interesting though is the fact that, while social-democrats occupy the whole ideological space, liberal democrats tend to cluster together towards the right. Partisans of the Social Democratic Party place themselves from the extreme left-wing to the extreme right-wing (from 0 to 10 on the ideological scale), averaging at 3.02, with a standard deviation of 2.92. Respondents who identify with the Liberal Democratic Party reveal a minimum positioning at 2 on the 11-point scale, which reflects a moderate left-wing ideology, and the standard deviation is lower, at 2.16. Therefore, social democrats appear to be more ideologically dispersed. It is plausible that for them abandoning the candidate proposed by the party they support comes easier. Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, being more ideologically cohesive, would have to move further away on the ideological spectrum in order to find another viable candidate to vote for and therefore find it more difficult to abandon their party even if the candidate makes them feel uneasy. Research suggests that there is a strong link between one’s ideology and vote, perhaps surpassing party identification (Fleury & Lewis-Beck, 1993).
Another important aspect of AI theory is the mechanism through which individuals come to reconsider their choices. Presumably, when individuals become anxious, they pay more attention to the situation at hand, because the surveillance system flags a disturbance in the environment. MacKuen et al. (2010) find that individuals who are made anxious are more likely to seek out new information. Therefore, if AI holds, individuals who are made anxious should be more likely to pay attention to the campaign. I test this hypothesis using simple bivariate correlations. As before, I make use of both conceptualizations of anxiety: caused by one’s in-party candidate and the maximum level of anxiety caused by any of the competing candidates.

Table 11. Relationship between anxiety and following electoral campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Follow campaign</th>
<th>... on TV</th>
<th>... in newspapers</th>
<th>... on radio</th>
<th>Talk with family or friends</th>
<th>Accessed web page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.705)</td>
<td>(.627)</td>
<td>(.519)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.694)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Anxiety</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.648)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.173)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.077)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Again, the data brings support for Affective Intelligence Theory (Table 11). It appears that people made anxious by their own party’s candidate are more likely to follow the campaign in general and somewhat more likely to talk with their friends and families about the elections. General anxiety increases the propensity to follow the campaign on TV, on the radio and on the internet, and also has a positive impact on talking about the elections. These results reflect findings by Huddy et al. (2005). Of course, the direction of causality is still
under question. It may simply be that paying more attention to electoral campaigns makes individuals more worried or that another factor altogether drives both. The survey data used here does not allow for testing the direction of causality. Yet, the results conform to the predictions of Affective Intelligence Theory and provide a possible underlying mechanism for the decision-making process anxious voters go through. They suggest that voters not only simply change their vote when someone makes them feel afraid, but they also get informed. When voters are anxious, they are more likely to seek out information about the campaign, both from outside sources, such as TV programs, and by talking to friends and family. The new information they encounter may determine them to disregard cues from the party they feel close to or may reinforce their propensity to vote for the candidate backed by that party.
4. Discussion

This study set out to describe the nature of partisanship in Romania. I identified three types of individuals. Consistent partisans are those who over the period of one month declared themselves as close to the same political party. They comprise almost one third of the sample analysed. These individuals are more likely to vote with the same party in different types of elections. They are more interested in politics, have higher trust in political parties and are more likely to vote. On the other end of the spectrum, we find nonpartisans, individuals who repeatedly reject any party identification. They represent 37% of the sample. These respondents are less interested in politics, have lower levels of political knowledge, they do not trust political parties, and are less likely to vote. They are also more likely to vote for different parties in different elections. A third category is that of inconsistent partisans, people who change between declaring themselves close to a party at one point and as not close to any party at a different point in time, or report different parties as their close one in the two different interviews. Some 34% of respondents can be defined as inconsistent partisans. While these individuals oscillate between the characteristics of the two other groups, they behave as a distinct category.

I further looked into the characteristics of consistent partisans. Politically, almost half of those declaring themselves close to a political party support the Social Democrats, and they also represent a large part of the party’s voters. Next, the Liberal Democratic Party enjoys the support of 26% of all consistent partisans, followed by the National Liberal Party with 14%. Party identifiers not only support the candidate of their party, but also appear to follow its leaders’ advice. Due to the circumstances of the 2009 presidential elections in Romania, I could analyse the voting patterns of individuals whose preferred candidate did not win a place
in the second round of the elections. Voters of Crin Antonescu, leader of the National Liberal Party, went to the ballot in the second round of the elections facing a choice between two candidates they had not supported previously. The only cue available to them was the active endorsement by Crin Antonescu of the Social Democrat Mircea Geoana. My analysis reveals that voters of the Liberal candidate did in fact follow his advice in the second round. But most importantly, voters who identified with the Liberal Party were even more likely to do so. It appears that, in the absence of partisanship as a clear indicator of an appropriate vote choice, voters will still make use of heuristics, in this case endorsements of their party’s leader.

Then I turned to a comparison of two theories of the role of emotions in decision making processes. Affective Intelligence Theory posits, at its core, that emotions will influence voting behaviour through the interaction of the surveillance and disposition systems. When individuals face familiar circumstances, they will make use of their habits when deciding who to vote for, in this case party identification. Yet, when they are anxious, voters will choose to disregard their habits, consider their alternatives more, get informed and may even decide to abandon their in-party candidate at the polls. The alternative theory considered suggests that emotions affect voting decisions by influencing candidate evaluations. Affect Transfer Theory claims a direct relationship between emotions and candidates’ likeability. My analysis suggests a rather weak, yet consistent, support for a model of voting behaviour consistent with Affective Intelligence. In accordance with established literature (MacKuen, et al., 2010; Marcus, 2002; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Wolak, et al., 2003) partisans that are made anxious by their in-party candidate are less likely to vote for him and more likely to attentively follow the electoral campaign.
Curiously, only partisans of the main challenger, leader of the Social Democratic Party, appear to behave according to the theory. Perhaps the reason for this is that supporters of the president’s party, even if they were anxious about the president, perceived a lack of electoral alternatives. In an election where the atmosphere was of a competition of all-against-the-incumbent, it is possible that Liberal Democratic partisans may have felt a greater need to rally around their party’s candidate and as a result few partisans actually broke ranks come Election Day. Considering that respondents identifying with the Liberal Democratic Party were more ideologically clustered, it is quite reasonable to expect that they had a harder time finding alternatives. Moreover, if individuals vote retrospectively, the elections become a referendum on the incumbent’s performance in office (Ferejohn, 1986). If supporters of the president’s party felt that the incumbent’s track record was good enough, they had even fewer reasons to vote for another candidate. Moreover, an important part of anxiety is uncertainty (Davis, 1992). The fact that the incumbent has a portfolio on which he can be evaluated could possibly reduce the effects of anxiety. Considering that the question refers to previous instances in which the candidate made respondents feel afraid, for the incumbent voters should have an easier time projecting his future performance based on his past record. In the case of the challenger, who had no experience with the presidency, the amount of uncertainty attached to his future performance was greater. This may leave more room for anxiety to influence voting behaviour.

The same results are obtained if I replace anxiety about one’s own candidate with general anxiety, defined as caused by any of the competing candidates. Moreover, individuals that are anxious are more engaged with the campaign, discussing events with friends and following the campaign closer. These results are in line with Affective Intelligence Theory. Evidence in favour of a direct effect of emotions on candidate evaluations is limited. While it appears that
most emotions do influence candidate ratings in the expected direction, anxiety, the variable of interest, does not behave accordingly. Again, the effect of anxiety on feeling thermometers is only significant in the case of one candidate, in this case the incumbent. But the magnitude of the effect is very small compared with the impact of other emotions, about five times smaller.

These results have implications for both voting behaviour literature and affect-based theories. Voters do not reassess their electoral preferences at each election, instead base their decisions on stable relationships formed with parties in their political system. Conversely, they also do not blindly follow instructions from the parties they come to identify with. Voters seem to contrast previous information with current situations. If the candidate nominated by the party they feel close to does not conform to their expectation of how such a candidate should be like, they will gather more information on the situation at hand, the electoral campaign. In the end, voters made anxious by that candidate or by the whole range of candidates may even come to reconsider their vote. This analysis also shows how emotions can influence electoral behaviour in a consistent and predictable way. Anxiety weakens individuals’ propensity to act out of habits.

This paper applies a theory of emotions and voting behaviour to a new context. So far, Affective Intelligence Theory has only been studied in advanced democracies and only a very limited number of those studies were conducted outside of the US. Multiparty systems provide a great opportunity for studying the effect of emotions on habitual voting behaviour. If voters are influenced by emotions in a way congruent with AI theory, these effects should be even more visible in contexts where voters have enough alternatives to choose from. If
they are anxious about the candidate supported by their favourite party, it is more likely that voters will abandon their party if they have sufficient alternatives. Therefore, multiparty systems offer an excellent opportunity to study the interaction between habit and affect.

Future research should go further into the mechanisms underlying Affective Intelligence Theory. So far it is less clear what causes anxiety in the political arena, as opposed to anger, or other negative emotions. And why is it that voters seem to react differently to different political figures? Steenbergen and Ellis (2006) find different reactions to presidents Carter and Clinton. In this paper, I find that anxiety makes partisans of the challenger’s party abandon him at the polls, but it has no effect on partisans of the incumbent’s party. Perhaps the sources of anxiety can also help differentiate between different effects. It would be worth examining if individuals react differently to distinct stimuli. Can different sources cause different types of anxieties? It is obvious that emotions influence individual behaviour in complex ways. Further studies should seek to better understand the interactions between emotions and rationality, borrowing from the neuropsychology and cognitive science literatures. Perhaps if we had a more thorough understanding of emotions we would be less inclined to reject them.
References


