SOCIALIST “OASIS” IN A CAPITALIST “DESERT”
YUGOSLAV STATE PROPAGANDA FOR ECONOMIC EMIGRANTS IN FR GERMANY
(1966-1975)

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I am analysing the “informational-propagandist” activities undertaken by the Yugoslav state institutions, aimed for Yugoslav workers (Gastarbeiter) who went to FR Germany to work in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I discuss the development of the official institutions for Gastarbeiter-oriented questions, as well as the shift from state’s reliance on self-organised Yugoslav workers’ clubs to a more centralised and state-controlled institutional framework of Cultural-Informational Centres. The political aspects of Yugoslav propaganda are also analysed, most notably the extension of the Party apparatus abroad and use of guest workers in the military propaganda and campaigns against the hostile political emigration. The thesis also deals with the ways in which the cultural events the state organised for emigrants were imbued with patriotic propaganda and the modernising discourse. The analytical framework of transnationalism is employed as a means to explain Yugoslav propaganda in the terms of a sending state extending its institutional sovereignty across its borders, and adapting its policies according to the shifts in internal Yugoslav and external Cold War developments of the time.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJ – Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia]

AW – Arbeiterswohlfahrt [Workers’ Welfare]

Bureau – Savezni biro za poslove zapošljavanja [Federal Bureau for the Employment Affairs]

Coordinating Committee – Koordinacioni komitet za pitanja naših građana na privremenom radu u inostranstvu [Coordinating Committee for the Affairs of Our Citizens Temporarily Working Abroad]

DAMIP – Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva inostranih poslova [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

DGB – Deutsches Gewerkschaftsbund [German Alliance of Trade Unions]

KIC – Kulturno-informativni centar [Cultural-Informational Centre]

NLJ – Novosti iz Jugoslavije [News from Yugoslavia]

SKJ – Savez komunista Jugoslavije [League of Communists of Yugoslavia]

SPC – Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva [Serbian Orthodox Church]

SSINF – Savezni sekretarijat za informacije [Federal Secretariat for Information]

SSJ – Savez sindikata Jugoslavije [Alliance of the Trade Unions of Yugoslavia]

SSRNJ - Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije [Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia]

VUS – Vjesnik u srijedu [Herald on Wednesday]
INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1960s, as a result of the economic reform which ended the policy of full employment, a huge labour migration set off from Yugoslavia, becoming a part of the migration wave from countries of the European south (Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey) to the booming economies of Western Europe (predominantly West Germany, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and France). However, West Germany was by and large the main destination for most Yugoslav job-seekers in this period. The number of Yugoslav guest workers (Gastarbeiter) in FR Germany alone soared from only 2,000 in 1954 to well over 400,000 in 1971 (with some 240,000 new migrants leaving Yugoslavia annually), according to the official data, although the real number was higher, due to illegal and unregistered emigration. In 1973, measures were taken to halt this outflow of people. On the one hand, the oil shock crisis diminished West German need for importing workforce, while on the other hand, the Yugoslav authorities employed a stricter stance towards the export of workforce. Yet, the number of Yugoslav emigrants residing in FR Germany was still steadily increasing in the subsequent years, as relatively few of them decided to return permanently to Yugoslavia and many eventually brought their families abroad.

1 Throughout this thesis, I am going to use terms West Germany, FR Germany and abbreviated form FRG interchangeably. [N.B.]
2 For the terminology used to describe Yugoslav economic emigration, and to distinguish them from political emigrants and permanently moved expatriates, see Chapter 1.1. [N.B.]
This massive migration movement, primarily of rural workers, was a means for Yugoslav authorities to neutralise the emerging problem of unemployment and underdevelopment of rural areas after the 1965 economic reform. Such an outflow of labour was also possible due to the liberalisation of the visa regime with the West in the 1950s and 1960s. The economic importance of the *Gastarbeiter* phenomenon lay in the hard-currency remittances they were sending home (which continued playing a significant role to the present day as well),\(^6\) and the possibility of them investing their capital into the domestic economy upon their return home. Upon realising the immensity and significance of this process for Yugoslavia, the socialist state took over the technical and logistical means to channel migrations, and simultaneously introduced measures concerning the information and propaganda work among workers who moved abroad, in order to maintain their loyalty to the homeland.\(^7\)

Apart from the economic emigrants, a significant number of political emigrants (mostly anti-communist and nationalist) of various political, ideological and ethnic backgrounds had already been enjoying asylum in West Germany. Their anti-Yugoslav actions, often including terrorist attacks, gained momentum in the early 1970s.\(^8\) Therefore, Yugoslav authorities employed various means to curb the anti-state actions of these extremists, and developed propaganda activities aimed to neutralise the potential agitation of these politically active and ideologically opposed (nationalist, right-wing, clericalist) emigrants among the prevalently politically inactive *Gastarbeiter*. One of the main tasks of the state officials was to constantly warn workers of the dangers of associating with the “hostile elements,” who often posed as Yugoslav


\(^7\) Ulf Brünnbauer, “Labour Emigration from the Yugoslav Region from the late 19\(^{th}\) Century until the End of Socialism. Continuities and Changes,” in Ulf Brünnbauer, ed., *Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics. Migrations in the (Post-)Yugoslav Region 19\(^{th}\)-21\(^{st}\) Century*, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 45-46.

\(^8\) Milo Bošković, *Antijugoslovenska fašistička emigracija* [Anti-Yugoslav Fascist Emigration], (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1980), 213.
state officials in order to attract newcomers into their circles. The interaction and distinction between the political and economic emigration came to be one of the most important aspects of Yugoslav foreign policy, while the Yugoslav institutions dealing with guest workers had to fill the institutional vacuum in which the incoming workers were situated by extending their activities and propaganda to FR Germany, lest the hostile emigration seize the chance to influence economic emigrants.

In the beginning, the state relied on the workers’ self-organised Yugoslav clubs, and tried supplying them with selected informational and cultural material with the purpose of maintaining their links to the homeland. However, soon the officials became disappointed with the inefficiency of the clubs, as they “mostly turned into plain taverns.” Thus, starting in 1972, the state-run Informational Centres were founded under the wing of the diplomatic consulates in the biggest West German cities for the matters of propaganda work. This work included: distribution of ideologically “appropriate” press and magazines (such as the federally-endorsed biweekly Novosti iz Jugoslavije (News from Yugoslavia)); organizing trade unions and social service agencies for the welfare questions; financial support to Yugoslav clubs; financing the West German tours of popular Yugoslav singers and folk dance troops, as well as the organisation of other cultural events etc. The pinnacle of such efforts was the arranging of massive national holiday celebrations (Day of the Republic and 1ST May).

In my thesis, I am going to investigate the forms and content of the Yugoslav state institutions’ informational-propagandist policy for the economic emigrants in FR Germany

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during the period 1966-1975. Although this problem has been tackled by previous scholarship on *Gastarbeiter*, there has not been a systematic study of the official state perception of this problem, and more specifically the way it changed and developed in connection to the wider historical processes in Yugoslavia (e.g. reconfiguration of the state, inter-ethnic relations, development of consumerism etc.). On the institutional level, my research will deal with the development of the institutions which took care of propaganda for workers employed abroad. This will include the shift of state reliance from self-organised Yugoslav clubs to state-directed Cultural-Informational Centres, as a sign of the state’s more active involvement in maintaining the connection of emigrants with their homeland.

On the content level, I will pay close attention to the substance of propaganda material, as far as it can be documented through the official state records and representative propaganda items. Through content analysis, I will mark the main political, ideological and cultural concepts present in the state attitude towards the emigrants, and will try to put them into a wider context of intra-Yugoslav developments of the period. This will allow me to outline and explain the change in the state migratory and propaganda policies and activities in the light of the general transformation of Yugoslav system during these turbulent years. On a more general level, through analysis of the interplay between internal and external factors and their effect on creating the state policies, it can be revealed how Yugoslav state extended its ideological and political system to a foreign environment, in order to exercise its sovereignty over its migrated citizens in a transterritorial manner. In this way, the authorities wanted to create a sort of a socialist “oasis” on the West German territory, in which the main ideological principles of Yugoslav self-managing socialism would shape the migrant workers’ everyday practices. Researching these problems can help to understand how the Yugoslav state perceived the migrants workers concerning the temporariness of their stay abroad and their perpetuated
belonging to the Yugoslav ideological, political and cultural system, isolated from their immediate capitalist environment.

I set the temporal scope of my analysis in order to roughly coincide with the first wave of labour migrations from the European South to Western countries (which ended with the 1973 oil shock), while at the same time encompassing important internal crises and reconsolidations of Yugoslav socialist system (most notably the 1971/72 purges in Croatia and Serbia and the constitutional reforms 1971-1974). FR Germany was chosen to be the country of focus because it was the most important destination for Yugoslav Gastarbeiter (more than 50% of Yugoslav migrant workers moved there), and also because it was the country where the problem of political emigration was the most acute for the Yugoslav regime, thus providing a space for an interaction between these two types of emigration. It is not excluded, however, that many of the state policies discussed in this thesis may refer to other countries of immigration as well.

My main source were the official records of the federal state institutions responsible for regulating propaganda activities for economic emigrants, most importantly the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, the Presidency of Yugoslavia, the Federal Committee for Information and the Federal Bureau for the Employment Affairs. Other important sources were the diplomatic reports, analyses and minutes of the Yugoslav diplomatic missions in FR Germany, kept in the Diplomatic Archives in Belgrade. By using these documents, I will reconstruct the main tendencies in Yugoslav policy towards migrants, and the mechanisms through which the propaganda forms and content were shaped, and how they changed during the time period in question. I will also analyse the functioning of the special institutions founded for informational activities among the emigrants through documents of the Yugoslav Informational Centres in FR Germany.
Another very valuable source was the specialised press for *Gastarbeiter*, especially the previously non-analysed magazine *Novosti iz Jugoslavije*, as the only newspaper of such kind which was supported on the federal level, thus revealing the views of the central authority, sometimes colliding with the local interests of federal units. For that reason, at certain points I will also compare the agenda of *Novosti iz Jugoslavije* with the republican-based media, most notably Croatian *Vjesnik u srijedu*. I also had the chance to do an oral history interview with the singer Predrag Gojković about the music tours organised by the Yugoslav state for economic migrants in the West, which revealed many interesting details related to my arguments.

During the last decade, an interest in Yugoslav migrations to the West has increased both in former Yugoslav republics and abroad, involving researchers from various scientific disciplines.\(^1\) The most comprehensive and recent work is Vladimir Ivanović’s monograph on Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* in Germany and Austria, which analyses different political, social and cultural aspects of these migrations, as well as their legacies for (post-)Yugoslav society.\(^2\) Some other authors, such as Predrag Marković and Ondřej Daniel dealt with Yugoslav emigrants as the bearers of change in mass culture.\(^3\) Ulf Brünnbauer and his associates from Südost-Institut in Regensburg have used an interdisciplinary research to analyse migrations from Yugoslavia in a diachronic manner.\(^4\)

However, the previous scholarship has not dealt with the aspect of Yugoslav informational policy towards economic migrants in length, and hence it was not put in the historical context of the developments within Yugoslavia of the time. Besides shedding more light on this sparsely

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\(^1\) For a more detailed survey and discussion on the scholarship on Yugoslav migrations, see Chapter 1.4.
\(^2\) Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišë normalno*.
\(^4\) Ulf Brünnbauer, ed., *Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics*. 
researched aspect of Yugoslav external migrations, I believe my thesis could contribute to the research of the overall mechanisms of Yugoslav state propaganda and its scope, forms and content, by using the example of the *Gastarbeiter*-oriented publications and official instructions. Another “big picture” into which my research could be put as an illustrative detail would be the question of the general Yugoslav-West German relations during this period, especially concerning the simultaneous influence of political émigrés and official Yugoslav institutions on the guest workers and their interaction in the host countries as a transnational practice. As many of the documents I will use were originally created as an official answer to the most acute problems of the emigrants, my work will hopefully offer an additional glimpse into their perceptions of the processes of adaptation and assimilation into their new environment.

In the first chapter, I will explain the main theoretical concepts I am going to use for analysing the propaganda content for emigrants. Firstly, I will examine the terminology behind the category of “economic emigrants” and how the research on this type of migrations relates to diaspora studies, pointing out the similarities and differences between the two groups. I will then turn to putting the Yugoslav state policies towards guest workers in the transnational framework of a sending state extending its institutional and ideological mechanisms across its borders. Lastly, I will explain the peculiarities of a socialist state exporting its “propagandist-informational” activities abroad, and how this affected the character of its propaganda. The extensive literature review will conclude this chapter.

In the second chapter, I will describe the functioning of self-organised Yugoslav workers’ clubs as the main venues of their social life in West Germany. The Yugoslav regime’s attitude towards these clubs varied from approval and subtle support to an implicit rejection in 1970, due to their frequent political inappropriateness and inefficiency as venues for the propagation
of the official state policies. Instead, the state took an active role in organising the workers by founding Cultural-Informational Centres in FR Germany. In this chapter, I am also going to analyse the main media through which the state propaganda was channelled (specialised press, films etc), and how the internal shifts within Yugoslav politics affected the form and content of these media.

In the following chapter, I will focus on the political aspects of Yugoslav propaganda for Gastarbeiter. I will examine the extension of the party apparatus of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which had for its aim encompassing of the Party members working in FR Germany, and the reaction of West German public to such politicisation of emigrants. Then, I will turn to the “military” shift in the state policies in the early 1970s. Due to internal crises and external threats to Yugoslavia’s security, the state started to perceive economic emigrants as a valuable military asset to be used in order to secure Yugoslav position in the Cold War constellation of power. I will also analyse the propaganda techniques used by Yugoslav authorities in order to mobilise Gastarbeiter against the potential influence of hostile political emigration, as well as subduing the influence of certain “reactionary” groups, such as the religious organisations.

Lastly, the music tours organised by the state as an example of an ideologised cultural propaganda shall be discussed in the fourth chapter. In the late 1960s, the most common type of “cultural-entertainment” activities that the state provided to its migrant workers were the major tours of Yugoslav star folk singers, in which all federal units and their cultures were represented. I will analyse how the state used these tours as a propaganda vehicle through careful crafting and censorship of repertoires and choosing the artists according to the system of republican quotas. I will then focus on the change of the state policy in the early 1970s, when self-organised Gastarbeiter amateur troupes were given preference by the state over the
commercialised “mammoth” tours. At the same time, the folk character of these events was questioned, since the state started implementing the cultural policy of “enlightening” the workers residing abroad, as a way of modernising Yugoslav society and ascending working class as a whole to a higher cultural level.
I Diasporic, Transnational, Propagandist – Exporting Yugoslav Propaganda Abroad

The export of the official state-sponsored “informational-propaganda activities” to Yugoslav citizens working in the West in the 1960s and the 1970s represented a multi-faceted phenomenon with several conceptual layers. The fact that propaganda of a socialist state was to be “consumed” by emigrants in the capitalist environment posed a serious challenge to the authorities, and affected the form and content of the propaganda. The basic premise of the Yugoslav regime was that these workers were only temporary migrating, and consequently, should be treated as members of Yugoslav ideological and political system. However, in pursuing their informational policy, the Yugoslav state had to develop appropriate institutional, political and cultural channels for transmitting their propaganda to Gastarbeiter. Therefore, the underlying concepts necessary for analysing the topic of this thesis have to be outlined and put into the context of this research.

Firstly, the category of “economic emigration” itself should be addressed in connection to its perception by the official state institutions, with special reference to the possible application of the recently popularised concept of diaspora communities to the research of Yugoslav guest workers. Secondly, I will explain how the paradigm of transnationalism fits my analysis of Yugoslav state propaganda as a useful theoretical approach, and why this paradigm is valuable for examining and evaluating the state policies towards economic emigration as an extension of institutional mechanisms over state borders. Subsequently, the concept of propaganda should be defined and analysed, with special attention to the specific understanding of propaganda by
Yugoslav socialist authorities, and the implications that exporting propaganda to a capitalist country had on its form and content. Lastly, I am going to discuss the development of the scholarship on migrations from Yugoslavia, from initial empirical works oriented towards social sciences, followed by an ethnocentric trend in light of the Yugoslavia’s dissolution, till the most recent academic focus on the transnational nature of these migrations.

1.1  **Diaspora = Gastarbeiter?**

The concept of diaspora, in its original semantic meaning, referred to the dispersed population of Jewish and Armenian origin, but in the 20th century it has come to define the overarching model of deterritorialised, migrated population which does not live in its country of origin and whose social, political and economic networks for this reason span borders of individual nation states.¹ The usage of this term by social scientists in the last two decades tended to obliterate previously wide-accepted dichotomies, such as those of forced/voluntary or politically/economically motivated migrations, which had been shaping the analytical framework of diaspora studies and migration research in general. Since then, the emphasis in diaspora research has been put on the diaspora members’ strong sense of group identity (ethnic, religious, cultural) and their consciousness of the common country (or to put it more broadly, common territory) of origin, as well as on their permanent dwelling in the host country.²

The main distinguishing factor between diaspora and “ordinary” migrants is that the former’s migration to the new home has been completed and is most often final. Still, the diasporic “collective consciousness” keeps the memory of the common past and “lost”

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homeland alive through numerous social and interpersonal networks as a form of socialisation and processes of constructing the members’ own personal and group identity. These networks should be understood as fields of interaction (operating on several levels, such as personal, kinship, ethnicity, religion etc.) where diaspora members participate and link among themselves across state borders, in order to maintain and perpetuate the peculiar traits of their common heritage and linkages to their perceived “homeland,” as well as their distinction from the “native” communities of the host country. The condition of permanent exile thus causes a tension between integration-minded and assimilatory policies of the host country’s institutions on the one hand, and on the other hand, efforts on behalf of the diaspora networks to maintain and (re)produce their distinct diasporic identity, which would be lost once the assimilation takes place. This tension has been colloquially coined in anthropological terms of liminality as the one between being “neither here nor there” and being “both here and there.”

On the other hand, Gastarbeiter of the 1960s and 1970s, which are in the focus of this thesis, were peculiar because their migrations were derived from the very specific economic needs (building a house or apartment, buying a car or other consumer goods, earning money for education/sustaining family) and social circumstances (low educational level, usually agricultural background, low or no qualifications), and initially were supposed to be only temporary. According to Ivanović, this intention of temporariness forged several crucial features of the Gastarbeiter identity, such as the deliberate unwillingness to integrate into the host society, segregation into “ghettos” with their own compatriots, increased need for

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maintaining links with homeland and being supported by their own government etc.\textsuperscript{6} Besides the widespread colloquial German term \textit{Gastarbeiter}, in this thesis I will also alternately use the terms “economic emigration,” “guest workers” and “labour migrants” with frequent allusions to the official Yugoslav denominator “our workers/citizens on the temporary work/stay abroad.” In the official Yugoslav discourse, these terms were strongly distinguished from the term “emigration,” reserved exclusively for the hostile political émigrés and “expatriates,” defining the permanently moved (and in that sense diasporic), but non-hostile population.

Using this definition of diaspora, it is not \textit{Gastarbeiter}, but Yugoslav post-WWII political (“hostile”) emigration that shares many of the descriptive characteristics of diaspora, with the distinction that their ideal collective “homeland” was not the actual Yugoslav state of the time, which they mostly rejected or detested, but rather the imagined national states or ethnic territories, for whose independence they struggled. Another group which could be included in the diaspora category is the population permanently emigrated, although not necessarily due to its political opposition to socialism or Yugoslav federation. The state referred to this group in the official discourse as “our expatriates” (\textit{naše iseljeništvo}), as distinct from the political émigrés, although their networks too shared many of the features characteristic for diaspora.

On the other hand, concerning the interchangeability between the concept of diaspora and \textit{Gastarbeiter}, it can be inferred that Yugoslav economic emigrants would became a part of the diaspora once they decided to permanently stay in their new country.\textsuperscript{7} Yet, labour migrants could and often did turn into permanent expatriates despite originally intending to return home, which makes a clear distinction between these categories even more problematic and


\textsuperscript{7} Marija Krstić, “Dijaspora i radnici na privremenom radu u inostranstvu: osnovni pojmovi” [Diaspora and workers on temporary stay abroad: basic concepts], \textit{Etnoantropološki problemi}, VI, vol. 2 (2011), 312.
ambiguous. It can even be implied that by creating their own social networks, *Gastarbeiter* facilitated further migration of their relatives, friends and neighbours from the home country, thus enhancing their “diasporic social capital,” which in turn perpetuated the cycle of mobility.\(^8\)

The question of the “second generation,” the guest workers’ children brought along or born abroad, and their position in this conceptual relation poses another important problem, which will not be discussed here.\(^9\) However, a descriptive notion that can be considered as the common trait of temporary *Gastarbeiter* and permanently moved diasporic communities is their distinction from the “native” societies of the old and new home alike, due to their connections to both environments.\(^10\)

The pro-Yugoslav socialist mobilisation and homogenisation were at the core of the state policies for maintaining links with the population migrating abroad for work. Hence, the Yugoslav authorities exploited this very aspect in order to maintain guest workers’ ties to the homeland, and to eventually persuade them to return, instead of becoming “expatriates.” Accordingly, while the concept of diaspora can be useful to describe some of the notions of the *Gastarbeiter* self-organising activities and group identification, the official perception of them by the Yugoslav state put a strong emphasis on the temporary character of their migration, thus distinguishing them from the diasporic communities. This distinction was sustained by the official signifier by which this group of population was labeled by the state. “Our workers on temporary work abroad” was an effective phrase charged with meaning and revealing of the

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\(^9\) For more on the definition of the “second generation” of migrants, see Milena Davidović, *Deca stranih radnika. Druga generacija jugoslovenskih ekonomskih emigranata u zemljama Zapadne Evrope* [Children of Foreign Workers. The Second Generation of Yugoslav Economic Emigrants in the countries of Western Europe], (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 1999), 17-22.

state’s perception of economic emigrants on several levels. At the same time, it effectively accentuated the *Gastarbeiter* state loyalty, class belonging and long-term perspective of returning home.¹¹

### 1.2 Yugoslav Gastarbeiter as Transnational Communities

In the early 1990s, the new paradigm of transnationalism was introduced into migration research by Nina Glick Schiller. Generally speaking, the concept of transnationalism and transmigration views migration as a circulatory mobility, contrary to previous scholarship, which viewed them mostly in a linear one-way pattern of push (for emigration) and pull factors (for immigration).¹² This new paradigm relied heavily on the concept of “networking,” which perceived migrants as “continually participating in the maintenance of old social networks or the construction of new ones,” thus defying the clear-cut borders between the “old” and “new” home.¹³ Transmigrants and their relation to their “two homes” started being analysed not in static diachronic terms of integration and assimilation, but rather as the dynamic, circulatory and synchronic participation in political, economic and cultural activities both in their places of origin and the migratory destination.¹⁴ The transnational turn has also led to further reconfiguring of the diaspora research in social sciences, because the deterritorialised character of these communities made them transnational, yet the diasporic “uprootedness” from the homeland made them more connected to their “new” home, unlike some other types of migrant

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communities. Nevertheless, transnationalism became a useful analytical tool in migration research, used to explicate issues ranging from salary remittances and summer vacations in the home country to double citizenship and voting rights of migrants.

The researchers focused on the new dichotomy of “sending” and “receiving” states, strongly emphasising the active role of states, now understood as important actors shaping their strategies of controlling, influencing and channeling the population mobility across and within their borders. It has convincingly been argued that the transnational paradigm can successfully be applied to the analysis of the sending states’ strategies towards its emigrants, the causation of migrations in domestic policy as well as implications for diplomatic affairs and national identity construction. Thus, the transnational approach opened several new levels of analysis to social scientists. Migrations in general came to be seen as a practice of nation-states extending their sovereignty across their borders in order to ameliorate the disruption of their demographic integrity. In this way, migration research became politically significant for states experiencing population mobility.

The demographic component had important implications in this new approach. By that, I mean the consequences of migrations which were perceived as negative for the stability and proportional development of the involved countries’ age, gender, educational and ethnic structure. The group most likely to emigrate is usually young men, although this variable is also relative. Hence, depending on individual cases, a large outflow (or for that matter influx as well) of a young population, a labour force with a certain level of education or qualification, or

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15 Bruneau, “Diasporas, Transnational Spaces and Communities,” 43-44.
17 Ibid., 146-148.
members of specific ethnic group could disrupt the affected countries’ domestic structure and power relations among the domestic groups.18

In the research on Yugoslav official propaganda aimed at the economic emigration in the West, the framework of transnationalism can be useful in several aspects. The very principle of such propaganda implies that the state producing it is extending its informational activities and institutions across its borders, in a way “following” its citizens who went abroad for work and keeping them as a part of Yugoslav informational and institutional system, although they were physically outside of the Yugoslav state’s area of jurisdiction. The information-propaganda activities aimed at the Gastarbeiter population had to be specially designed and adapted to a different political, social and cultural environment in which they were received. It was a specific situation, where workers residing in a capitalist democratic country were to be approached as a part of a socialist system in which they were not living anymore, but with which they were still expected to maintain links. Yugoslav propaganda had to coexist and compete not only with the propaganda and informational system of the host country, but also with the influence of the hostile anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist political emigration.

Another important aspect of the state’s propaganda policy was the maintenance of equilibrium between the emigrants’ republican and national identification and allegiance (as well as the legal jurisdiction of respective republics over “their own” workers) on the one hand, and on the other hand, the pan-Yugoslav identity by which the state tried to ensure their loyalty towards the common state and to represent the country before Western eyes. This tension led to a paradoxical situation in which the goals of the official organs and publications, whose duty was to foster manifestations of Yugoslav patriotism as the chief identifier of Yugoslavs living abroad, often conflicted with the perceived sovereignty of migrants’ ethnic or republican

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18 Waterbury, “Bridging the Divide,” 138-140.
identity. An interesting corroboration of this entanglement of Yugoslav constitutional configuration and mobility of its ex-territorial populations is that economic emigrants were often called “the seventh republic,”\(^\text{19}\) testifying to the Yugoslav authorities’ intention to consider the economic emigrants as a part of Yugoslav social, political and economic system, despite their geographic alienation.

Thus, the Yugoslav policy towards *Gastarbeiter* can be more accurately described as being *transterritorial*, meaning that the state was exercising its power and sovereignty on the territory of another state, which in turn had as a consequence that this power structure was contested from multiple external and competing sources (host country’s institutions, hostile émigrés already living abroad etc). To come back to the previously mentioned metaphor of the tension between “here” and “there,” the Yugoslav state used its propaganda policies to maintain the image of *Gastarbeiter* as still being “here” (that is, in Yugoslavia), although in reality, as their stay abroad steadily lingered on, they were slowly drifting away to being only “there” (in this case, FR Germany).

### 1.3 Conceptualising Propaganda and its Export

The concept of propaganda, peculiar to the modern societies of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, had a special role in the functioning of socialist countries, Yugoslavia included. Moreover, the Western works on socialist propaganda are often filled with a moralising discourse that emphasised the “truth vs. lie” aspect, thus thwarting the effort at the broader understanding of its mechanisms. More successful were the attempts at describing this term or some of its features, which helped outline some of the most prominent propagandist techniques employed

by various regimes during the 20th century. The most crucial distinction for this study, however, is the one between “propaganda of agitation,” usually targeted against certain object of “hatred” (government, rebels, state enemies etc) and “propaganda of integration” which aims at “stabilising the social body, at unifying and reinforcing it.”

Although the former type can be discerned in the Yugoslav state’s campaigns to mobilise *Gastarbeiter* against hostile emigration or against Italy in 1974, especially interesting is the latter concept for understanding the ways in which the group cohesion of Yugoslavs working in the capitalist West was maintained by Yugoslav institutions, fostering their allegiance to the Yugoslav socialist ideology.

The notions of “truth” and “lie,” often invoked by Western scholars when talking about socialist propaganda, should be taken with caution when researching Yugoslav informational-propagandist activities. According to Jacques Ellul, every propagandist tries to rely on factuality and rational statements, in order to entice emotional responses and preferred irrational behaviour in “propagandees” (those who are being exposed to propaganda). Thus, propaganda should not be understood as a “web of tall tales,” but as a rhetorical technique for encouraging a desirable interpretation and irrational response to otherwise rational statements of truthful facts.

The Yugoslav state documents also show that there was no premeditated and deliberate twisting of truth in order to misinform or deceive the target audience. Quite to the contrary, the state perceived the role of the Yugoslav propagandist apparatus as ensuring that the most “truthful” pieces of information be broadcasted to the public. However, the “premeditated” aspect of the state policies is represented in “correct” and “logical” interpretations of these pieces of information, as opposed to competing propagandas (of West German authorities, anti-

22 Ibid., 85-87.
Yugoslav political emigration etc), which by default were suspected to consciously delude and mislead in order to pursue some hidden agendas.23

The propaganda used in Yugoslav informational strategy for emigrants was referred to in the official sources as “informational-propagandist activities” (informativno-propagandna delatnost). The state decisions about the information/propaganda were usually channeled from the very top (Presidency of Yugoslavia) through relevant state bodies, such as the special commissions of the Federal Committee of Information, Federal Bureau of Employment, and the Foreign Affairs Secretariat and diplomatic missions. However, the special Coordinating Committee of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People had the role of coordinating activities of these institutions, as well as of channeling the common federal policy to republican bodies.

In the media field, policies were executed through “officially endorsed” or “specialised” media. Contrary to the general developments in Yugoslav self-managing media system, where most of the media was operating under the conditions of “semi-market” profit-making, the media aimed specifically for Gastarbeiter enjoyed greater support (and control) by the state, including (but not bound to) financing, distribution, preparation and supervision of the content, resulting in both explicit and implicit upholding of the official state actions and perceptions. For that matter, both concrete actions performed by the state bodies (such as the initiative for state sponsored events or institutional decisions) and the speech-acts in the Skinnerian sense24 (e.g. content of the “officially endorsed” media) can be considered as being indispensible parts of this propaganda strategy.

The notion of propaganda “permeating” the everyday life of *Gastarbeiter*, present in the documents concerning the state policies, should be taken seriously and examined from several aspects. Besides the official propaganda aim to maintain the links between economic emigrants and the home state, the more concealed layers of interpretation cannot be overlooked. I will show how the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, by extending its institutions and personnel abroad, tried to politicise the economic nature of guest workers’ stay abroad, and actively involve them in the ideological training and indoctrination. On the other hand, even the cultural activities the state organised for *Gastarbeiter* (i.e. music tours) were pregnant with ideological symbols and reflected the internal reconsolidation and power balance between the federal and republican-based centres of authority. Thus, the state tried to influence Yugoslav citizens working abroad by acting not only through media or in the political field, but also through projecting its ideological aims to the cultural sphere of migrants’ lives. It can be connected to what Ellul called “sociological propaganda,” which, unlike “political propaganda,” is inseminated in a more subtle way in areas other than politics, but exactly for these reasons, serves to prepare the ground for a more direct and politicised propaganda content.²⁵

What made Yugoslav propaganda distinct from those of other socialist countries was the peculiar Yugoslav position between the two blocs. Thus, although the form and content of propaganda were socialist in their character, and thus shared common features with the countries of the Eastern bloc, Yugoslav policy of “open borders” to the West and infiltration of Western influences made Yugoslav informational policy more susceptible to combining different ideological concepts and agitation techniques. With exporting propaganda to its citizens residing in the Western territory, the Yugoslav regime found itself in an even more

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specific situation. They were exporting socialist propaganda, aimed at workers who were raised and educated in a socialist spirit, yet at the time were living in a distinctly different system, in which propagandas stemming from other sources were present as well. I will show in succeeding chapters how Yugoslav authorities renegotiated their propaganda policies in accordance with the West German circumstances, as well as with internal developments within Yugoslav federation itself.

Therefore, the concept of propaganda I will use in my work will encompass the institutional mechanisms, media content and actual measures employed by the state with the purpose of presenting the *Gastarbeiter* with the predefined picture of the “desired” reality and its “correct” interpretation. I will observe this “reality” as being selectively constructed in accordance with the Yugoslav state interests, socialist self-managing conviction and nonaligned worldview, with the aim of producing the consciously ideologised “picture of the world” which was supposed to be consumed by labour migrant target audience. As this “molding of reality” for economic emigrants was done according to the domestic state interests and circumstances, the change and evolution in the propaganda policies followed closely the domestic “mold” of developments, although these policies could not escape the events and processes taking place abroad either. This interplay between internal and external factors can also be seen in the origins and development of the scientific study on migrations in Yugoslavia.

### 1.4 Scholarship on Yugoslav Economic Migrations – Between Trans- and Methodological Nationalism

During the 1970s, the Yugoslav state and academia alike became aware of the fact that “temporary migrations abroad,” which involved one fifth of the working population of the country, were losing their temporary character and affecting Yugoslav society and economy in
multiple ways. This fact initiated a surge in migration scholarship, commenced in the early 1970s by the Zagreb-bound Centre for the Research on Migrations, which was the first in Yugoslavia to publish scientific periodicals dealing with this problem, *Topics in Migration* and *Discussions on Migrations*.26 The most valuable works published by this Centre were written by Ivo Baučić and Franjo Letić.27 However, these studies, although irreplaceable for their statistical and factual wealth, dealt with migrations mostly from the sociological and demographic point of view, without trying to historicise this process. In the 1980s, some scholars, like Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Vjeran Katunarić, focused on small case studies to investigate changes brought about by migrations to everyday life of migrant families, while Vladimir Grečić and Mirjana Morokvašić dealt with the economic aspect of remittances and gender relations among migrants.28

The historical research on migrations (especially the notion of diaspora, which became one of the keywords in the political and everyday discourse during the nationalist turmoil in Yugoslav republics) has significantly taken off in the 1990s, but it has unfortunately often been thwarted by the general ethnocentric turn in post-Yugoslav historiography, and the emotionally charged legacy of the breakup of the common Yugoslav state. The phenomena pertaining to this topic were thus enclosed by the borders of respective Yugoslav republics, and some of the works were openly used for nationalist claims by scientists biased towards their own ethnic background, or by the newly created states which strived to receive political legitimisation and

27 Ivo Baučić, ed., *Migracije i socijalno-ekonomski razvoj* [Migrations and the Social-economic Development], (Zagreb: Centar za istraživanje migracija, 1974); Franjo Letić, *Informiranje i informisanost vanjskih migranata iz SR Hrvatske o zbivanjima u domovini* [How are Migrant Workers from the Croatia Informed about the Events in Their Home Country], (Zagreb: Centar za istraživanja migracija, 1977).
economic support from their respective “diaspora.”29 This approach can be considered equivalent to what social scientists call “methodological nationalism.” What is meant by this is the essentialisation of the ethnic/state borders as the valid demarcation lines for conceptualising and researching social phenomena.30 While narrowing of the geographical scope of research is certainly a necessary prerequisite for any viable study in social sciences and humanities, focusing on nation-states as units of analysis bears the danger of constructing artificial particularisation between common phenomena, which in reality span national borders.31

To apply the theoretical deconstruction of methodological nationalism to the case of Yugoslav economic migrations during socialism, this process had a distinctly pan-Yugoslav character. The Yugoslav workforce migrated from all republics and provinces (yet, it has to be pointed out that the regional differences in the emigrants’ number and national/social structure were not insignificant). Although republics were allowed to implement and plan their own propaganda activities among the emigrants coming from their own territory, the central organs had the first say in outlining the main policies and modes of action. Thus, to neglect the common denominators in Gastarbeiter-oriented propaganda stemming from the federal institutions would lead to the artificial essentialisation of republican policies, whereas the broader context could not be discerned. On the other hand, I am aware that by concentrating solely on Yugoslav case I fall into trap of extracting it from its south-European context of which it was an integral part (together with Greek, Turkish and Iberian labour migrants), and thus commit the same mistake of methodological nationalism. However, besides the obvious inevitability of having to narrow down this research to a feasible scope, I also believe that

31 Ibid.
Yugoslav policy towards emigration was in many ways unique, due to the socialist and multiethnic character of this state.

In the last decade, the scholarship on Yugoslav migrations took several interesting directions, most importantly by greater inclusion of historians in the field and application of the transnational approach. The most comprehensive effort in Serbia, which successfully avoided the ethnocentric trend, has been done by Vladimir Ivanović. He published an admirable monograph on Yugoslav Gastarbeiter in Germany and Austria, extensively analysing this phenomenon from aspects of diplomatic relations, economic needs and cultural change.32 There are also other authors, such as Predrag Marković or Ivana Dobrivojević, who dealt with the cultural legacy of Yugoslav emigrants and the state policy of employing workforce abroad respectively,33 or Petar Dragišić, who published on clubs of Yugoslav workers abroad.34 In Croatia, Jasna Čapo Žmegač applied oral history methods on researching the Bavarian Gastarbeiter communities, while Marjan Drnovšek wrote a historical survey of emigration from Slovenia.35 There has also been a considerable effort in other scientific disciplines to deal with the phenomenon of migrations, such as the work of sociologist Milena Davidović Primorac on the second generation of emigrants,36 or articles by anthropologists Marija Krstić and Dragana

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32 Ivanović, Geburtstag pišuš normalno.
35 Marjan Drnovšek, ed., Historical and Cultural Perspectives on Slovenian Migration, (Ljubljana: Institute for Slovenian Emigration Studies, 2007).
36 Milena Davidović, Deca stranih radnika.; Milena Davidović Primorac, ed., Kulturni identitet mladih jugoslovenskih migranata u Francuskoj [Cultural Identity of Young Yugoslav Emigrants in France], (Belgrade/Paris, 1986).

Outside Yugoslavia, the first researchers who became interested in Yugoslav labour migrations were Nikola Haberl Othmar and William Zimmerman with their valuable works on this topic.\footnote{Othmar Nikola Haberl. *Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien*. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1978).; Zimmerman, *Open Borders*.} Recently, there has been a significant effort in Germany by Ulf Brünnbauer and his associates to research Yugoslav emigration in a multidisciplinary way, and to provide a diachronic perspective of migrations as a *longue durée* process.\footnote{Brünnbauer, ed., *Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics*.} American journalist Paul Hockenos has researched the impact of the diaspora resources on domestic Yugoslav politics and the breakup of the federation, while the Czech political scientist Ondřej Daniel introduced the notion of *Gastarbeiter* as a pop culture phenomenon.\footnote{Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling. Exile Patriotism and Balkan Wars*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).; Daniel, Ondřej, “Gastarbajteri. Rethinking Yugoslav Economic Migrations Towards the European North-West through Transnationalism and Popular Culture,” in Ellis, Steven G., Klusakova, Lud’a ed., *Imagining Frontiers, Contesting Identities*, (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2007), 277-302.} Janine Dahinden offered an interesting approach to Yugoslav migrant networks, through the lenses of transnationalism,
coming to surprising results about the ambivalent attitude of ex-Yugoslav emigrants as transnationals concerning the remitting of their money to the homeland.\textsuperscript{43}

This thesis is in many ways complementing comprehensive research on Yugoslav state policies towards emigrants which has been done in the last ten years. However, I will focus more closely on the sparsely researched field of the state propaganda for guest workers, trying to give a historical meaning and wider context to it by using the transnationalism paradigm. One of the basic premises will be that the Yugoslav state tried through its propaganda policies to prevent potential “alienation” of “temporary” \textit{Gastarbeiter} into permanently moved diaspora communities. Therefore, I am going to trace the extension of institutional mechanisms and ideological concepts of the Yugoslav socialist state into foreign territory, having the aim of keeping its migrated population within the confines of the Yugoslav system. In the next chapter, I will outline the institutional framework of Yugoslav workers’ organisations in FR Germany, as well as the main features of the informational and cultural materials through which the state policies were propagated.

II Exporting the Self-Management – Venues and Media of 

Gastarbeiter-Oriented Propaganda

Before I turn to the analysis of the content and historical context of Yugoslav “propagandist-informational activities” for economic emigration, their institutional framework needs to be explained. One of the primary prerequisites for any propaganda to function, according to Ellul, is that individuals are “more or less intensely involved in social currents.”¹ The Yugoslav Coordinating Committee for the Affairs of Our Workers Abroad became well aware of this necessity by 1971, when it concluded that “informing was inseparable from organising,” and that “we need to have a mass gathered in one place, should we wish to inform them.”² This is why the state had to create a clear policy towards the modes of workers’ (self-)organising in order to disseminate the officially approved and ideologically “correct” information.

In this chapter, I will follow the development of the clubs in which Yugoslav workers in FR Germany assembled, and delineate the Yugoslav state’s attitude towards these modes of group gathering, concerning the prospects for propaganda activities these clubs could offer. Although the regime at first remained faithful to its ideology of self-management, applying it to the formation of self-organised Yugoslav Gastarbeiter clubs, the state soon realised it had to participate more actively and to coordinate and control the self-organising more closely. This was done by establishing the Cultural-Informational Centres as venues where the officially endorsed propaganda material could be distributed and consumed.

² Arhiv Jugoslavije (Henceforth: AJ), fond 142/II (Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije), fascikla S-455, Materijali sa sastanka Koordinacionog odbora za probleme naših radnika u inostrasntvu, as of 27th May 1971, 90.
I will then outline the main media through which the Yugoslav propaganda was channeled. These media included specialised press, film journals, ideologically appropriate artistic material (books, films, educational material) and similar. I will show how the content of this media was strictly controlled, censored and evaluated on ideological grounds, thus filtering only “positive” and “progressive” information and interpretation to be distributed to Gastarbeiter, so that the potential destabilising effects of the internal crises within the Yugoslav system be neutralised in their presentation to economic emigrants.

2.1 Yugoslav Clubs in FR Germany – Between Self-Management and “Tavernisation”

As the number of Yugoslav workers moving to FR Germany skyrocketed in the second half of the 1960s, the question of their organising on the territory of that country became one of the most important aspects of Yugoslav policy towards external migrants. This issue was especially sensitive because of political emigrants already living in FRG, who saw the influx of young Yugoslavs to their environment as a chance to “rejuvenate” their ranks and expand their influence on the general Yugoslav population. As the political émigrés had already developed a well-organised web of their associations, clubs and taverns, they “lured” Gastarbeiter there in order to recruit and persuade them to denounce their Yugoslav citizenship.3 Some more militant political émigrés, however, did not want to meddle with uneducated workers raised in a socialist spirit, but tried exerting pressure on them.4 Besides blatant physical violence and verbal threats, more perfidious means were used too, according to apprehensive state reports. Such was the example of a tavern owner, a former SS soldier, who allegedly got workers drunk

3 Milo Bošković, Antiyugoslovenska fašistička emigracija [Anti-Yugoslav fascist emigration], (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1980), 158-160.
and then “dispatched” them to local police.\(^5\) Apart from the hostile emigration, the idleness and lack of places where poorly integrated migrants could spend their free time often resulted in their alcoholism and gambling problems, or the notorious “hanging around” at the local train stations, a habit which increased the weariness of the native population towards guest workers and their cultural “otherness.” The fact that other countries of emigration, like Italy or Turkey, had already been organising their workers on a large scale, made this issue also a question of prestige for the Yugoslav regime.\(^6\)

The solution to this problem was seen in the organisation of Yugoslav workers’ clubs, which would be the meeting point for *Gastarbeiter* living in the same area, and where the Yugoslav authorities could send informational and propaganda material. The experiment with the state organising these clubs was abandoned after the dissolution of one such club in Paris in 1965, due to workers’ lack of interest.\(^7\) Instead, in the spirit of self-management, it was left to workers to self-organise, usually with the aid of their German employers, while the Yugoslav institutions, usually the Federal Secretariat of Information [SSINF]\(^8\) and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People [SSRNJ],\(^9\) would provide a meager financial support and send appropriate materials (books, films, press, state insignia etc). By 1971, the number of clubs in FR Germany was over 60,\(^10\) while by 1978 this number jumped to 191 in this country alone.\(^11\)

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\(^7\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. S-455, Materijali sa sastanka Koordinacionog odbora za probleme naših radnika u inostranstvu, as 27th May 1971, 63.

\(^8\) Savezni sekretarijat za informacije, henceforth: SSINF.

\(^9\) Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije, henceforth: SSRNJ.


Particularly popular were sport associations founded by Yugoslav workers (over 200 in 1978). The clubs were supposed to be pan-Yugoslav in character, without a discriminatory attitude towards any Yugoslav nationality. Even their names often symbolised the “brotherhood and unity” ideology. According to the report of the Centre for the Research Migrations from Zagreb, 34% of clubs were named after “unity-related” concepts (for example Unity, Youth, Liberation, Yugoslavia, Partisan, Brotherhood, Homeland, Freedom, Concordia), while 17.4% bore a name of some Yugoslav politician, scientist or artist (such as Veljko Vlahović or Nikola Tesla).

Yugoslav companies were involved in sponsoring clubs’ activities, and in return they could promote and sell their products on the clubs’ premises. However, this practice also had commercialising results, undesired by Yugoslav authorities, because companies often competed for endorsing clubs, or even pressured workers to fulfill the “norms” of selling a certain number of products in a limited time period. Clubs were also used by the authorities to recruit workers to sign up for a loan to the Yugoslav state for various investments (building Zagreb-Split highway, rebuilding Banja Luka after the 1969 earthquake). Moreover, when discussing the allotment of financial support, the Coordinating Committee of SSRNJ often ranked clubs according to the amount of loan money they had collected.

The functioning of Yugoslav clubs was supported to a significant degree by the West German side too. Employers often provided and furnished premises for clubs, as it was in their interest as well that their workers do not engage in “dubious” activities such as drinking or

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12 Dragišić, “Klubovi jugoslovenskih radnika,” 129.; For more on Yugoslav guest workers sport activities in FRG and Austria, see also Ivanović, Geburtstag pišeš normalno, 247-250.
13 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, dok. 141.
gambling. The West German workers’ welfare association [AW],\(^\text{16}\) tried to support clubs extensively, and also employed social workers and counselors who were supposed to take care of workers’ everyday problems. Although Yugoslav authorities cooperated closely with AW, and generally preferred such an organisation as a partner rather than various clerical welfare associations, they did not want to insist too much on the welfare aspect of AW, lest workers get an impression they were treated as “social cases.”\(^\text{17}\) Also, the Yugoslav authorities were wary of AW’s intentions to “organise” Yugoslav workers, which would, in their opinion, tarnish their potential to “self-organise.”\(^\text{18}\) This represented one of the paradoxes of self-management, as the Yugoslav state did exactly the same things as AW, but their “organising” was considered to be part of workers’ self-organising activities.

Another important partner was the German Association of Trade Unions [DGB].\(^\text{19}\) They provided help for functioning of Yugoslav clubs and also organised cultural events and concerts, together with the Yugoslav Alliance of Trade Unions [SSJ].\(^\text{20}\) However, the fact that the institutional framework of Yugoslavia was much more politicised than that of FRG caused a conflict between the two partners. The DGB protested to the SSJ that SSRNJ officials, as the representatives of a political institution, were not allowed to meddle with Gastarbeiter questions on the FRG territory, and that such breach of law compromised both trade unions before the eyes of the West German conservative circles.\(^\text{21}\) However, the SSRNJ continued to play an important role in the organisation of Gastarbeiter-oriented informational-propagandist activities, thus giving them a markedly political character.

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\(^\text{16}\) *Arbeiterswohlfahrt*, henceforth: AW.
\(^\text{17}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 474, dok. 3368.
\(^\text{19}\) *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, henceforth: DGB.
\(^\text{20}\) Savez sindikata Jugoslavije, henceforth: SSJ.
One of the downsides of letting workers self-organise was that they often founded nationality-oriented clubs. This was particularly common for Slovenes and Macedonians. One of the paradigmatic cases of mono-national clubs was the Slovene club *Triglav* in Munich. The pan-Yugoslav club from that city, as well as the Yugoslav consul in Munich, frequently wrote to the SSRNJ, accusing *Triglav* of chauvinism and barring the entrance of other nationalities.\(^{22}\)

The leaders of this club also irritated other pan-Yugoslav clubs by speaking Slovene on the coordinating meetings of Yugoslav clubs.\(^{23}\) When these clubs complained to SSRNJ about the narrow nationalism of Slovenes, *Triglav* struck back with accusations of unitarism and centralism, claiming that “the constitution is the same back home and here,” enabling them “not to drown” their national identity in Yugoslavism.\(^{24}\) The situation was further complicated when prominent Slovenian politicians, including the Yugoslav consul in Zurich, defended *Triglav*, claiming that “pre-Brioni unitarist” forces still dwelled in consulates, “pointing their finger” at any expression of ethnic identity of small nations.\(^{25}\)

Such practice sparked fierce discussions and conflicts within the Coordinating Committee in 1971. Slovene officials sternly and publicly defended the right of small Yugoslav nations to represent their culture separately from the Yugoslav context, especially due to linguistic differences from hegemonic Serbo-Croatian.\(^{26}\) The representative from Vojvodina claimed that just as in pan-Yugoslav clubs one nation would usually prevail, in the mono-national ones other nationalities could enter too\(^ {27}\) (a positive example was the Macedonian club *Goce Delcev*).\(^ {28}\)

\(^{22}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 491, dok. 2706.
\(^{23}\) Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva inostranih poslova (DAMIP), Politička arhiva (PA), Savezna Republika Nemačka (SRN), fascikla 1975-101, dokument 2/450977.
\(^{24}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 485, unclassified.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., 52-53.
\(^{28}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 712, dok. 1718.
Serbian and Croatian politicians were against such particularism, because it could lead to nationalist excesses, using also the argument that German trade unions would not bother financing eight different clubs of various Yugoslav nationalities.\(^{29}\) Due to the multi-ethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina, their officials were most opposed, because they feared that Serbs and Croats from Bosnia would then join clubs of their co-nationals, leaving Bosnian clubs only to Moslems, which would in return be joined by the Moslem population from Serbia and Macedonia, thus complicating the whole situation even more.\(^{30}\)

However, it was decided that the practice of creating mono-national clubs need not be prohibited, as long as the leaders of those clubs were reliable persons (it was hinted they should be “our people,” possibly Party members, or even infiltrated state agents),\(^{31}\) and the workers from other republics would not be estranged. However, this principle was applied in practice only to “small” nations, mostly Macedonians or Slovenes, also due to their linguistic peculiarity. Croatian clubs were not officially supported for fear of their ominous resemblance to political émigrés’ clubs, while Serbian-only clubs could rekindle memories of interwar Serbian hegemonic tendencies. Thus, the national identity and gathering of guest workers belonging to the two biggest nations always had to be put in the pan-Yugoslav context.

Nevertheless, self-organised clubs proved to be insufficient and inappropriate venues for spreading official state propaganda among workers. Despite the state’s open advice to clubs to stop serving alcoholic beverages on their premises,\(^{32}\) they often turned into simple taverns and places where *Gastarbeiter* would gather only for drinking.\(^{33}\) Such “tavernisation” of clubs made them highly unsuitable for propagating patriotic ideals and official state policies. Furthermore,

\(^{30}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 479, unclassified. 
\(^{31}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 491, dok. 2706. 
\(^{32}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 8/47781. 
even for drinking purposes, very few workers visited these clubs, and those who did, did so usually once a month. Yugo

34 Yugoslavia’s decentralised nature posed a big problem in coordination between federal units. Thus, clubs often demanded money from all eight republican SSRNJ conferences, sometimes even threatening that, in case the addressed conference did not contribute, workers from that respective republic would be kicked out from the club.35 The diplomatic missions, on the other hand, were overwhelmed with their own bureaucratic work and could not take on themselves the task of playing more than a supportive role in workers’ self-organisation.36 Therefore, the Yugoslav state needed to find a more suitable institutional venue to attract more emigrants and be logistically better equipped for pursuing propagandist activities.37

The hint at the possible solution was the opening of West German Informational Centres in Belgrade and Zagreb. The first initiative from the West German side came even before the establishment of diplomatic relations, but the definite agreement between the two countries was signed in Bonn in July 1969, while the two Centres began their work a year later.38 According to the agreement, Yugoslavia was also entitled to open its own centres in two West German cities of their choice.39 Yugoslav officials extensively inquired about similar Italian institutions in FRG, trying to model their own centres along the same model40 (with the difference that they planned to devote less attention to “history” and more to “workers’ practical matters”).41 The tasks of these future institutions were divided into three groups: informational-propagandist,
cultural-entertainment and social-political. The effect of this initiative was to “extend the connection to the homeland” through “lessening the feeling of abandonment,” because, according to Yugoslav authorities, “strengthening national identification would lead to a more solid ideological integration,” as “the propaganda of every country is in the service of politics.”

Immediately thereafter, the Foreign Affairs Secretariat asked the Federal Executive Council to undertake measures to open a Yugoslav centre in Stuttgart, as it had one of the biggest agglomerations of Yugoslavs, and the Gastarbeiter club there was run poorly. The Federal Committee for Information [SSINF] proposed that the centre be opened in Hamburg, as it was situated further away from Yugoslavia, and also due to its “leftist orientation.” Despite the initial plan to open two centres in Stuttgart and Munich, the Federal Executive Council opted for Stuttgart and Cologne, in order to cover as much FRG territory as possible. The Cultural-Informational Centre [KIC] in Stuttgart was officially opened on Republic Day in November 1972, while the KIC in Cologne started operating in April 1973.

A very important aspect of the newly founded KIC was whether they were to function under the wings of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat or the SSINF. The first option would represent the so-called “classic” diplomacy, while the second was considered to be the “new” (“pseudo”) diplomacy, aiming to represent the country to a foreign public, rather than to diplomats. However, this dilemma also had significance concerning the notion of “transnationalism from above,” because the possibility of internal-oriented ministry (SSINF) being in charge of KIC on

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42 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-82, dok. 4/456609.
43 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-168, dok. 10/432599.
44 Henceforth: SSINF.
45 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1970-130, dok. 9/445433.
46 Kulturno-informativni centar, henceforth: KIC.
47 Ivanović, Geburtstag pišeš normalno, 255-256.
48 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-82, dok. 3/415608.
a foreign territory would mean that Yugoslav institutions extended their jurisdiction across their borders and outside regular diplomatic channels in a transterritorial manner. Eventually, the Federal Executive Council decided that KIC would operate under the diplomatic jurisdiction, as most of the Gastarbeiter-related issues were the job of the Foreign Affairs sector, and the daily coordination with consulates was the most convenient option. However, part of the jurisdiction was also delegated to special commissions founded under the wing of SSINF for communication with the Centres. Thus, the “middle ground” was chosen, placing the KIC between diplomatic bodies and transterritorial institutions of the internal type.49

The KIC, due to their geographical location, were easy to reach for the clubs’ leaders, and had a good coordination both with diplomatic missions and Yugoslav institutions back home. They could now also engage those workers who for various reasons did not visit clubs in their activities and informational web. That meant that the “mass” the Yugoslav regime wished to inform grew bigger, and was concentrated in relatively few places under the direct control of the state. However, the workers’ clubs did not cease to exist. Quite to the contrary, now they had the official state body to which they could turn with requests for financial or other kind of support. In many ways, they complemented the actions of KIC and continued to play a significant, although more informal, role in Yugoslav propaganda actions, as they were dispersed across the whole country and had a more “local” character.

2.2 Propaganda Media

The SSINF was in charge of distributing and allotting the informational and cultural material to Yugoslav clubs, consulates and KIC (after they started working in 1972). The Coordinating Committee, together with KIC and diplomatic missions, was receiving the requests for certain

49 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1970-130, dok. 9/438193.
items in respective areas of FRG, and would then compile lists, according to which the allotted money or propaganda material was sent. These materials included specialised publications for *Gastarbeiter*, feature and documentary films and series, books (usually the literature that was most popular on the Yugoslav market) and political brochures. In this section, I am going to focus on the specialised press, especially the differences between the federal and republican-based newspapers, and on the state control of film material distributed to emigrants.

The periodical press, according to the Coordinating Committee’s yearly plans, was the most efficient and most easily disseminated medium through which the guest workers could be informed and politically influenced. The Federal Executive Council, similarly, argued that “this kind of press must have a decisive influence on them [economic emigrants], considering the efforts of political emigration to form its lairs among them and present itself as the interpreter of their wishes and needs.” Although the regime sent considerable amounts of domestic editions of the most popular Yugoslav newspapers to *Gastarbeiter* clubs and diplomatic missions, the authorities of various republics deemed it more effective to launch specialised publications whose target readership would be the economic emigration. Slovenia started publishing *Večer* already in 1965 (with a special edition for FR Germany from 1970), the Croatian *Vjesnik u srijedu* [*VUS*] newspaper introduced its special addition for guest workers in late 1971 (it was the most popular of all specialised publications, with 35-40,000 copies per issue), while the Bosnian *Oslobodenje* newspaper started their own publication in

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51 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, Informacija o ostvarivanju zaključaka SIV o informisanju naših radnika na privremenom radu u inostranstvu sa prijedlogom mjera.
52 As of 1976, 70,000 copies of Yugoslav newspapers were exported daily, which amounted to 23-25 million copies annually (AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, Informacija o ostvarivanju zaključaka SIV o informisanju naših radnika na privremenom radu u inostranstvu sa prijedlogom mjera).
However, as this thesis deals with the official propaganda policy of the federation rather than its constituents, the bi-weekly *Novosti iz Jugoslavije* [*NIJ*] is of special interest, as it was the only federally-subsidized specialised newspaper for economic emigrants.

*NIJ* started being published in October 1966, under the auspices of the Federal Bureau for the Employment Affairs, which was the publication’s prime founder and distributor. Among the eight most urgent tasks of the Bureau in their yearly plans was the promotion of the magazine among the workers abroad, and collecting as many subscriptions as possible. For this purpose, the readers’ active participation was requested, with a financial reward of 20% of the collected subscriptions’ worth. Already in late 1967, a separate newspaper agency *Novosti iz Jugoslavije* was founded, devoted solely to the affairs of the magazine. However, although in the administrative sense the two institutions were separated, the Bureau continued to be the prime financial supporter of *NIJ*. The title of the magazine was changed to *YU Novosti* in 1970, in order to better describe to potential readership that the content was not supposed to deal solely with events within the homeland, but with every kind of information that was relevant to Gastarbeiter. The interest of the authorities in supporting the magazine could be seen in the fact that simultaneously, the number of pages tripled (from 16 to 48), without raising the price (2 new dinars / 200 old dinars).

Still, as the federal jurisdiction was growing weaker due to the country’s decentralisation, *NIJ* was constantly experiencing financial problems. Its distribution never exceeded 25,000 copies, with around 13,000 exported to FRG (although the real readership was probably much bigger, considering that one copy was read by several people), and the republics had to

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54 The Federal Bureau for the Employment Affairs was founded only a year before (1965), in order to deal with the issues of employing workers abroad, as well as solving employment problems in the country. Henceforth: Bureau.
contribute financially to its maintenance. This sparked a huge debate in 1970 within the committees dealing with the informational work for emigrants whether there was a need for a federal newspaper, which would thus enjoy a “privileged” position compared to the republican issues. Slovenian and Croatian officials especially were not keen on financing NIJ, as complaints about their alleged under-representation in the content often came from these republics. Language debates were also frequent (although NIJ was the only specialised publication which published texts in all Yugoslav languages, including separate pages in Albanian and Hungarian). The politicians who lobbied for the bigger autonomy of republics argued that it would be in the spirit of self-management and decentralisation if republican and local press took precedence in informing Gastarbeiter. It can be suspected that the republican authorities saw the federal insistence on keeping NIJ as the pan-Yugoslav publication as an ominous remnant of the pre-1966 centralism.

The example of the conflict between the federal and republican interests is the case of informing about the 1971/1972 upsurge of the nationalist “Mass movement” (MASPOK) in Croatia and the new “liberal” elite in Serbia. It shows how propaganda of some republics started “dangerously” diverging from the common federal line, thus thwarting the aim of maintaining Gastarbeiter loyalty to their homeland. The Gastarbeiter edition of VUS, as a publication directly supported from the republican budget of Croatia from 1971, strongly espoused the reformist views of the Croatian party officials, led by Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Mika Tripalo, who insisted that the national question (of Croats) “could not be separate from our revolution.” Particularly controversial was the inclusion of Bosnia within the column

which described the most significant events of Croatian history. At the same time, VUS editors strongly attacked the federation-backed NIJ for allegedly “promoting unitarism” and “linguistic bias.”

NIJ, on the other hand, never espoused the views of the reformists, keeping its strong pan-Yugoslav discourse. The discussions on the constitutional reform were mentioned at moments as positive steps, but only through the statements of the federal institutions and Tito, and not through official bodies of any of the republics. In light of the 1971/1972 purges, editors deemed it necessary to familiarise the Gastarbeiter with all the tribulations from which their countrymen were saved by Tito’s “wise and timely decisions.” Purges of Croatian “chauvinists” were represented as “resignations;” while the removal of Serbian “technocratic etatists” was described as “injecting fresh Marxist blood,” and any questioning of such interpretation was prevented by the remark “To see something else in it means not to see the truth. Intentionally or not.” Workers abroad were supposed to maintain the legacy of this “victory of progressive forces” by not segregating themselves along national lines. After such turn of events, VUS could only ask for “atonement” from the Croatian Committee for Information in January 1972, offering in return “according cadre changes,” which resulted in completely changed reporting on the legacy of the purged reformists.

However, Yugoslav newspapers, specialised as well as domestic editions, were not as widespread among workers as the authorities had initially hoped. According to the 1973/1974 survey of the Migration Research Centre in Zagreb, only 33.7% of Gastarbeiter read Yugoslav press regularly (compared to 39.8% in Yugoslavia), while 44.7% were occasional readers

(36.8% for Yugoslav population in general). Although SSINF often emphasised in its instructions that the state had to increase subsidies to the specialised press in order for its price to be lower, only 5.4% of the emigrants named high price as the reason for buying the newspaper infrequently. The most widespread reasons were lack of distribution in their place of residence (22.9%), lack of free time (18.7%) and insufficient literacy (8.1%). Although one copy was usually read by several people, distribution of free newspaper copies to Yugoslav clubs had little effect, as only 4.6% of readers consumed the press that way. This fact testified to the limited popularity of clubs in general among labour migrants. Furthermore, from the minutes of SSINF and Coordinating Committee meetings, it can be seen that a large part of those workers who did buy or subscribe to publications, preferred newspapers and magazines of “lighter and entertaining” character (such as Čik or Sirena) to “serious” newspapers which were politicised.

The SSINF and the Bureau tried to ameliorate the unsatisfactory distribution of the specialised press by sending most popular pieces of Yugoslav literature, as well as the “classics of Marxism,” either as a gift to Yugoslav clubs and KIC, or as mobile libraries. However, although in some places these “moveable” libraries did have success, KIC and consulates frequently complained of their low popularity among mostly uneducated emigrants, who did not have the will and time to devote to reading. Different Yugoslav institutions also published and distributed through the Coordinating Committee special brochures for guest workers, usually with political content. These brochures covered very diverse topics, as some of their titles imply: Entering the Pioneer Alliance, What is Informbureau?, The Constitutional Reform,

64 Franjo Letić, Informiranje i informisanost vanjskih migranata iz SR Hrvatske o zbivanjima u domovini [How are Migrant Workers from the Croatia Informed about the Events in Their Home Country]. (Zagreb: Centar za istraživanja migracija, 1977), 95.; Franjo Letić, Društveni život vanjskih migranata, 185.
65 Letić, Informiranje i informisanost vanjskih migranata, 97.
66 Letić, Društveni život vanjskih migranata, 197.
Investing earnings and savings in Yugoslavia etc. However, the workers, generally uninterested in reading even the popular literature, were even less inclined to delve into ideological material after their long shifts of manual work. Thus, the 1972 brochure *Hrvatska danas* (Croatia Today), which interpreted the decisions of the 21st Session in 1971, proved very unpopular among workers abroad due to its dense and incomprehensible dogmatic vocabulary.

Concerning the film material distributed to *Gastarbeiter*, SSINF founded in 1969 a special commission which chose films to be sent to Yugoslav clubs (and later KIC) abroad. By 1976, this commission had bought 113 feature and 68 documentary films. In that year alone, there were 1,500 film screenings in Yugoslav clubs, seen by 149,000 workers, while KIC Stuttgart screened 120 feature films, 33 cartoons and 206 documentaries for almost 10,000 citizens. In addition, the most popular Yugoslav TV series (*Pozorište u kući, U registraturi, Grlom u jagode, Naše malo misto*) were sent as well. The films were chosen in cooperation with republican commissions, so that the film production from all parts of the country would be represented. Conscious preference was given to the films that “celebrated our contemporary order” and war spectacles, as well as to children films. Thus, five out of seven new films distributed in 1975 were war epics, such as *Sutjeska* and *Užička Republika*. The Presidency of Yugoslavia strictly forbade sending the so-called “black wave” films, or any other films which “could harmfully influence these workers of ours.” The primary selection criterion was “to serve to the development of patriotic feelings among the workers.”

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68 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 711, dok. 52-527/2390.
69 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 479, dok. 014-2366/1.
70 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 723, Jugoslovenski gradani na privremenom radu u SRN, 57.
71 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, unclassified.
73 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, unclassified.
The films sent to *Gastarbeiter* obviously did serve their patriotic purpose, as the Coordinating Committee happily concluded in 1976 that “the basis for a wider social-political, informational and propagandist work among our citizens abroad has been created, whereas the influence of hostile emigration, clerics and foreign media is waning.”\(^7^4\) However, the popular taste of emigrants did not always coincide with the state’s intentions. Thus, it was disapprovingly reported in *NIJ* that in 1972, more people came to the screenings of a “simple-minded” film *I bog stvori kafansku pevačicu* than to the officially celebrated war epic *Sutjeska*.\(^7^5\) Besides feature films and documentaries, ten film newsreels were made annually, featuring the most important “positive” news from Yugoslavia, to be screened before the films.\(^7^6\) However, these newsreels proved to be rather uninteresting to audience, and were sometimes “dangerously” outdated. For instance, the SSINF officials were terrified when they realised that film journals sent to FRG in 1972 contained the footage of Tito sitting next to former Party bigwigs Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Marko Nikezić, who had been already purged from the Party by then.\(^7^7\)

### 2.3 Conclusions

In order to implement its policies of informing *Gastarbeiter* and doing propaganda work among them, the Yugoslav state needed to provide places for their mass gatherings and social interaction through which the propaganda goals could be pursued. Such venues were also necessary due to efforts by the hostile political emigration to attract migrant workers into their own clubs, and because the problem of organising the leisure time of *Gastarbeiter* could potentially affect their work performance and maintaining contact with home. These were the

\(^{74}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, unclassified.  
\(^{75}\) *Novosti iz Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, No. 159, 4\(^{th}\) January 1973, 25.  
\(^{76}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 742, unclassified.  
\(^{77}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1972-91, dok. 21/444830.
reasons for the Yugoslav regime to support Yugoslav workers’ clubs throughout FR Germany in the 1960s. These clubs were not directly organised by the state, but were functioning on workers’ self-initiative, with support from West German employers, trade unions and Yugoslav institutions. They supposedly proved how the Yugoslav self-managing system could be applied to organising workers’ social life abroad. Although most clubs were pan-Yugoslav in character, there was a tendency, especially for smaller Yugoslav nationalities, to set up mono-national clubs. This trend, although never officially opposed by the state, caused fierce discussions within Yugoslav institutions, concerning the chauvinist potential of such venues.

Nevertheless, regardless of the uneasiness about the mono-national clubs, the Yugoslav clubs in general were visited by only a small fraction of workers, who were mostly uninterested or too busy to spend time in such places, which more than often transformed into plain taverns. This is why, in the early 1970s, the Yugoslav regime sought a different form for channeling state propaganda. The answer was in Cultural-Informational Centres, to be opened as a reciprocal measure for West Germany opening such institutions in Yugoslavia. The two Yugoslav Centres were opened in Stuttgart and Cologne in 1972/73, and although they functioned under the wing of diplomatic missions, they were institutionally strongly entwined with domestic Yugoslav institutions. This was the proof of the Yugoslav state’s wish to treat workers abroad as part of the Yugoslav working class, as well as of the regime’s new policy of participating actively in organising emigrants’ free time, thus taking initiative from the “self-organised” clubs.

The specialised press, whose content was specifically chosen and adapted to Gastarbeiter target readership, was the main medium through which the state implemented informational policies. As the notions of decentralisation and delegating more power to republics pervaded the political rhetoric in Yugoslavia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the republics founded
their own newspapers, while the only federally endorsed periodical was the biweekly Novosti iz Jugoslavije. Through the example of the purge of the Croatian and Serbian party officials in 1971/1972, the discrepancy between the federal policies and decentralised nature of the state is revealed. On the one hand, the federal bodies tried to exert their control and uniform informational policy towards emigrants. On the other hand, the centrifugal forces within the republican political elites would not give up their legal prerogatives. This tension would surface in critical moments, such as during the 1971 crisis.

Despite its priority in state support and endorsement, the specialised press was not as successful in disseminating propaganda as the authorities had hoped. Due to a bad distribution network, relatively high price and emigrants’ lack of time and limited interest in reading, the Yugoslav newspapers reached only a meager number of workers abroad. Another problem was that even those Gastarbeiter who did read the press often opted for more entertaining magazines, rather than the politicised daily press. A similar phenomenon could be seen in film distribution for guest workers. Despite all the endeavours by the Federal Committee of Information to send as many “appropriate” films as possible (meaning that politically “damaging” films, such as those of the “black wave,” were banned from distribution network), the popular taste often went against the wishes of the regime, choosing light entertainment and comical relief over epic World War II spectacles and tedious political documentaries and film newsreels.
III Transnationalism From Above - Political Propaganda for
Guest Workers

The Yugoslav state had to adapt the political aspects of its propaganda for guest workers in West Germany to several conditions specific to that country, which made it essentially different to “normal” propaganda. Firstly, SFRY and FRG did not have official diplomatic relations established until 1968. Secondly, West Germany was a capitalist country which employed workers coming from a socialist country, many of whom had been activists in a communist party prior to moving abroad. Finally, since World War II, a large number of political emigrants settled in the FRG, where they undertook propaganda and terrorist actions aimed against the socialist order in Yugoslavia or Yugoslavia as a multinational state. These circumstances required special attention from Yugoslav authorities when they shaped their informational policies for Gastarbeiter in West Germany.

In this chapter I am first going to analyse the efforts of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [SKJ] to expand their party apparatus abroad and influence Yugoslav workers accordingly with the Yugoslav socialist ideology. Then, I will move to the change in the state’s perception of economic emigration as having far-reaching consequences for the potential defense of the country in the Cold War circumstances. Lastly, I will examine the ways in which Yugoslav institutions created campaigns to counter the propaganda of political emigrants in order to curb their potential influence on guest workers and mobilise the “progressive” emigrants against their actions.

1 Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, henceforth: SKJ.
3.1 Extending the Party Apparatus Abroad

In the 1960s, the attitude of the SKJ officials towards the phenomenon of external migrations was rather dismissive, if not outright hostile. This was especially acute on the local level, where party officials often were uneducated and still bearing the ideological legacy of the rigid Soviet-like party discipline, expressed through vehement anti-Western discourse, among other things. These “old-fashioned” commissars, faced with the danger of an outflow of a significant part of party membership to the West, would treat the SKJ members who wished to embark abroad for work as being “unworthy” and “traitorous” to the socialist society that offered free education and welfare to them.² According to the Central Committee’s retrospective critique of this practice in 1973, there were many instances of local politicians explicitly criticising, threatening or even openly preventing their members from leaving the country, either through informal personal pressures or administrative measures. They were even expressing implicit accusations of central authorities that the fact that socialist workers go the capitalist countries in order to find work was a humiliation for the Yugoslav system of social justice and progressive self-management.³

This kind of practice was clearly at odds with the official stance of the central authorities concerning the open borders of Yugoslavia, and the right of every worker to seek a job abroad, should he be unable to find it within the country.⁴ However, except for some mild criticism towards the “old-fashioned” behaviour of local party officials, the central organs of SKJ did not undertake any significant action against it before 1971. At the same time, the party neglected the huge potential of such a numerous membership living abroad for its propaganda activities.

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² Arhiv Jugoslavije (Henceforth: AJ), fond 142/II (Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije), fascikla 482, dokument 2362.
towards the West, as well as the ways in which these members could be used to control and influence the non-member emigrants. A vivid example of such an oblivious attitude of the Party was that, according to the Party reports, there had been no effort to establish even an estimate of the Party members who went abroad before 1971, despite some voices in the Coordinating Committee which asked that one SKJ activist per 100-150 Gastarbeiter be sent abroad to propagate communist ideas.

These were the reasons for the SKJ Presidency to issue a decree on their 18th Council in June 1971 to found the Affiliation for the Activities of SKJ in Connection to the Departure and Temporary Work of Our Workers Abroad [Opunomoćstvo]. According to its founding decree, the main tasks of this body were: training, supporting and counseling of the “professional party workers” sent abroad; regulating the activities of SKJ members employed in the diplomatic missions; ideological-political education of SKJ members abroad; evaluation of the political situation among Yugoslavs working in the West. The Opunomoćstvo was to function through the network of local branches, which usually assembled party members working in the same company, with the exception of the construction workers, who would be grouped by the sites where they were working, regardless of the company employing them. The branches operated under the supervision of povereništva, usually taking care of the members of one region with bigger agglomeration of Yugoslav workers. Each povereništvo had up to three executives, and

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9 Opunomoćstvo za delatnost Saveza komunista u vezi sa odlaskom i privremenim radom naših radnika u inostranstvo, hereafter Opunomoćstvo.
their identity was usually unknown to the local membership.\textsuperscript{10} In FR Germany there were 10 \textit{povereništva}.\textsuperscript{11}

At the same congress, it was decided that the professional party workers would be sent abroad for agitation purposes. These workers served as sort of unhidden agents of the Party among the economic emigrants, and besides pursuing propaganda activities, they would also recruit new members, monitor the discipline among the Party members abroad and maintain connections with Western communist and socialist parties and trade unions.\textsuperscript{12} The first group of professional party workers was dispatched in November 1973. \textit{Opunomoćstvo} chose them according to the republican and national quotas and the proportion of emigrants from different republics. Thus, in the first contingent, five workers were from Croatia, three from Serbia, two from Bosnia and one from each of the remaining republics.\textsuperscript{13}

Judging from the personal profiles of the professional Party workers, much attention was given to the choice of these workers. Their political and moral stance had to be impeccable, lest the Party reputation in the West be tarnished and Yugoslav guest workers alienated from their homeland. World War II veterans had a special advantage, as well as the members who already worked abroad and had good connection to the clubs of Yugoslav \textit{Gastarbeiter}.\textsuperscript{14}

Simultaneously, \textit{Opunomoćstvo} recommended in late 1971 that members of the Party should become more involved into functioning of the clubs in general.\textsuperscript{15} This testified to the strong desire of the Party officials to infiltrate the workers’ clubs and thus prevent any kind of ideological or nationalist wavering, a lesson they learnt from unrests in Croatia earlier that year.

\textsuperscript{11} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 5.51/771, 12.
\textsuperscript{12} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 5.51/771, 15.
\textsuperscript{13} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 0307-127/6, 2.
\textsuperscript{15} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. S-455, as of 7\textsuperscript{th} October 1971, 14.
because the Coordinating Committee noticed at that time certain uproar and nationalist excesses among the Croatian guest workers.\footnote{AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 476, Stenografske beleške sa sastanka Koordinacionog odbora Generalnog sekretarijata SSRNJ, 9\textsuperscript{th} February 1971.} Through its members in the clubs, the Party hoped to channel the political orientation of “passive” workers in the “positive” direction without an explicit Party involvement.\footnote{AJ, f. 591 (Savezni komitet za informacije), fasc. 257, dok. 303/315/1.}

The professional party workers also undertook the registration of all SKJ members temporarily working in the West. From 1971, all members who wanted to work abroad had to first report to the local branch and undergo basic ideological training, usually informal lectures about Marxism and Yugoslav self-management system, preparing them for life in a capitalist society.\footnote{AJ, 142/II, fasc. 476, unclassified.} In 1976, the registration was completed, and the official number was 10,312, not counting the Party members employed at diplomatic institutions. Proportionally, Serbians and Bosnians were most represented, with 3,551 and 2,497 respectively, while there were only 172 members from Montenegro.\footnote{AJ, 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 5.51/771, 7.} Out of 500 trade union activists coming from Yugoslavia, only about 50 were estimated to be Party members.\footnote{AJ, 142/II, fasc. 476, unclassified.} Besides overseeing the appropriate behaviour and political orientation of members living abroad, the professional party workers also had to recruit new members. However, according to the Opunomoćstvo instructions from 1975, some of them had proved too agile in this respect, admitting new members without necessary preliminary checks on their biographies and their family’s political standing. This practice forced Opunomoćstvo to put pressure on the agents to investigate thoroughly the biographies of every candidate for the Party card, even if they were the agents’ own family members.\footnote{AJ, 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 0307-127/6,.18-19.}
surveys among the guest workers, concerning the changes in their ideological orientation during their stay abroad, readiness to defend the homeland, as well as the influence of Western lifestyle and consumer culture on the mindset of a socialist worker.\textsuperscript{22}

Another opportunity for the Party to exert its influence over the guest workers came up with the 1974 constitutional changes. In May 1973, the Federal Secretariat for Information decided to dispatch politically “educated” Party members from all republics to have lecturing tours around Western Europe. They were supposed to inform and “correctly interpret” the content of the new constitution to economic emigrants. The Secretariat considered this measure very important, because “our workers abroad are as interested in the happenings in the country as the ones who live here.”\textsuperscript{23} In the first phase of the plan, in November 1973, 11 teams were sent to different countries, four of which to FR Germany, while the next batch of lecturers followed in early 1974. The lecturing staff was carefully allotted to different West German cities, so that lecturers from certain republic visit the areas where workers from that republic prevailed.\textsuperscript{24} However, the specialised lectures dedicated to constitutional changes were stopped afterwards, due to big costs for renting lecturing halls, and also because West German conservative opposition protested to their authorities for such “Jugoslawisierung” of German public space.\textsuperscript{25} The task of constitutional education was transferred to regular visitations by Yugoslav officials and trade union representatives, thus making it appear more subtle and depoliticised in the eyes of the German public.\textsuperscript{26}

The example of the lectures on the constitutional changes showed that the professional party workers openly operating as paid agitators of a foreign communist party on the territory of a

\textsuperscript{22} AJ, 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 0307-965/1.
\textsuperscript{23} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 487, dok. 2814.
\textsuperscript{24} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc 478, dok. 014/1534/1.
\textsuperscript{25} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 476, unclassified.
\textsuperscript{26} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 476, unclassified.
capitalist country could trigger many problems with the authorities and citizens of the respective host country, as well as with the employers of the Party members. According to the documents from the 1976, it appears that in the beginning of the Party functioning in the FRG, Opunomoćstvo suggested to keep the party work low-profile, or even clandestine, lest the Gastarbeiter bear the consequences of their open association with communist agents. However, such an attitude proved counter-effective, as the private employers became suspicious of secret agitation among their employees. On the other hand, workers themselves were allegedly frightened by the secretive character of agitators’ activities, although many of them were simply “not interested in living the Party lifestyle” while abroad.  

These circumstances initiated a change in the policy of SKJ concerning the work among emigrants, and by 1975, the Party Presidency decreed that agents’ work is to be pursued by strictly legal means, however by using “all legal means available,” depending on the local circumstances of the respective host country. These means in the West German case meant cooperation with DGB trade unions and SPD politicians, while Opunomoćstvo operated under the wing of general consulates. According to the SKJ reports, the members did not experience any significant problems in FR Germany if they openly declared themselves communists.

The Party branches in FR Germany were considered to be natural equivalents to all local affiliations in Yugoslavia, and the state often emphasised that they should receive the same materials as any other Party branch. However, sometimes the form of these materials had to be adapted to the specificities of the capitalist environment in which they were distributed. Such was the case with the brochure Ideological and Political Offensive of SKJ, which was renamed Speeches by Tito, Kardelj and Dolanc, in order not to sound old-fashioned or inappropriate for

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28 Ibid.
Germans, although “our citizens know very well what is being positively meant by that.” The Germans still remained rather suspicious about the activities of a foreign communist party on their territory, and Yugoslav diplomats often faced accusations for sending only the “politically correct workers” to Germany, with numerous infiltrated secret service agents. On the other hand, SKJ remained ambivalent and wary concerning the integration of *Gastarbeiter* into German society, because if their co-nationals became too embedded within the foreign political system, it was feared they would automatically detach from the domestic one.

Besides political means for serving the homeland while in the West, the state saw the chance for exerting its influence abroad also through the trade union system of the host-countries. Emigrants were strongly advised to become members of foreign trade unions, especially the ones which cooperated closely with socialist parties of the respective country. Some of those unions were even using the advertising space of *News from Yugoslavia* [*NIJ*] for their promotion. Special attention was paid to the periods when massive strikes would occur in certain countries. During such times, the Bureau for Employment Affairs avoided sending workers to those areas, because on the one hand, taking part in strikes would tarnish the Yugoslav reputation of being diligent and industrious, and on the other hand, it would be “indecent” for workers from a socialist country to be labeled as strike-breakers. It was especially important to persuade workers to contribute to their union’s activities, and to even have nominees for leadership elections, as this was seen as one of the means for strengthening not only the position of Yugoslav emigrants, but of the whole country as well.

30 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva inostranih poslova (Henceforth: DAMIP), Politička arhiva (Henceforth: PA), Savezna Republika Nemačka (Henceforth: SRN), fascikla 1973-81, dokument 5/49456.
31 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-81, dok. 3/44356.
32 *Novosti iz Jugoslavije*, henceforth: *NIJ*.
34 AJ, f. 467 (Savezni biro za poslove zapošljavanja), fasc. 21-III, dok. 64-T - 1317/1.
3.2 “Three Armies Abroad” – Gastarbeiter as a Military Asset

One of the consequences of the ominous 1971/72 crisis in Croatia and Serbia was the tightening of the Party’s control over society, and repudiation of many liberalising experiments of the previous two decades. This uneasy retreat was visible in the attitude towards economic emigrants too. Although the freedom of travel was not abolished in any way, the SKJ, with Tito’s full support, initiated a stricter control over who was able to leave the country in order to work abroad. Two specific groups were meant to be prevented from emigration. The first ones were men with unregulated military service, including 300,000 youths who had already gone abroad without having served in the military. The press and SKJ officials called them “our three armies abroad.” These “armies” were repeatedly called upon to “pay back their debt to the homeland.” Their evasion of military service was seen as a great threat to the security of Yugoslavia, in the atmosphere of the ever-tense Cold War relations and revived national antagonisms within the federation. The second group to be kept under control was skilled and educated workers. Tito himself admitted the mistake of “paying too much attention to piling up remittances, while the worthy men and women left the country […] Now everyone who had a job back home, and goes abroad, would have to answer to the League, to their people, to their state.” At the same time, the late-1973 oil-shock and its repercussions on the Western economies diminished the need for importing a workforce from Southern Europe. This setback provided the Yugoslav state a perfect justification for tightening the country’s emigration laws in order to protect the domestic economy’s needs and improve the country’s security prospects.

36 “Domovina i odbrana,” Novosti iz Jugoslavije, Belgrade, no. 214, 13th February 1975, 16,
Although even high-ranking politicians had to admit that migrations of rural people (at least those who were not wanted by military authorities) were relieving the domestic economy of the burden of unemployed proletariat, it was clear to the Party leaders that the exodus of experts had to be stopped immediately.  

According to the 1973 Law on Basic Conditions for the Temporary Employment and Protection of Yugoslav Citizens Working Abroad, it was not possible for people who had a proper job or job offer in Yugoslavia to leave for work abroad, while some professions were completely barred from foreign job offers. At the same time, the coordination of job offers from abroad was completely centralised, with the Federal Bureau of Employment as the main decision-maker. However, much more dramatic were the concerns of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of SKJ about the military potential of the labour migrants, in light of the internal instabilities within Yugoslavia, as well as the shifts in the bipolar diplomacy in the early 1970s.

The Presidencies of SFRY and SKJ discussed in early 1973 the possibilities of NATO invading the country, and the prospects of economic emigrants joining the fight for the homeland. According to their data, by 1971, 511,000 potential recruits (expressed in military units as 850 battalions or 40-50 divisions) had migrated to the West, out of which 300,000 to FRG alone. The situation was especially alarming in Croatia, where every seventh military reservist was working abroad, causing some of the units to be disbanded. According to the calculations of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, even in the most ideal situation, only 50-60% of this manpower would succeed in reaching Yugoslavia in time to defend it from the aggression, which would mean that ten trains would have to constantly transport soldiers for

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38 Ivanović, Geburtstag pišeš normalno, 76.
39 Ibid., 79-81.
40 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 014-2331/1.
35 days, disregarding the possibility of transit countries blocking the passage. It was concluded that it was essential that all emigrants should have undergone the mandatory military training before moving abroad, in order to be able to “threaten the aggressors on the domestic front.”

These worries of the Yugoslav regime also stirred concerns in some West German media about the masses of potential socialist soldiers “trapped” on the territory of a capitalist country. Such was the March 1974 article in Die Welt about the “possibility of three armies lining up on the Bavarian-Austrian border,” “as if it was not enough that we have hundreds of thousands of workers from a communist country on our soil?”

On the other hand, due to the danger of espionage and keeping Gastarbeiter recruits away from Yugoslavia, it was decreed that reserve officers, people who had not fulfilled the military duty and all those who “knew certain secrets” were to be barred from migrating, which in turn required them being offered good jobs in Yugoslavia. Also, according to the newly drafted Law on Military Duty, diplomatic consulates could not extend residence permits for longer than 10 years to Yugoslav citizens who had not fulfilled their military service. Even the double citizenship could not release the reservists of this obligation, and for the first time the list of male children who went abroad with their migrant parents was compiled. Simultaneously, the new Law on Amnesty proclaimed that all emigrants who signed the statement that they would regulate their duty within a year’s time would be released from all legal sanctions.

That these measures did not bear much fruit in practice could be seen from the June 1975 minutes of the meeting of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Although the migratory movement had subsided in the wake of the 1973 oil shock and Western tightening of immigration procedures,

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42 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 014-2331/1.
43 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1974-107a, dok. 1/412125.
45 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 711, dok. 0330-5215/1.
46 Ibid.
the return rate of emigrants, especially those with military duty to be completed, was still much lower than expected or planned. Some regions of the country remained completely emptied of reservists, especially rural areas of Croatia and western parts of Bosnia and Macedonia. The Presidency concluded that their efforts to use administrative measures to get male emigrants back to Yugoslavia to fulfill their duty were unsuccessful, as the emigrants would not sacrifice their jobs abroad for doing military service.\footnote{AJ, f. 803, fasc. 27, Sednica Predsedništva SFRJ, 24\textsuperscript{th} June 1975.}

Besides losing their jobs, emigrants expressed concerns to Yugoslav authorities about the financial security of their families while they would serve in the military, appealing for material rewards, similar to what the West German government was giving to its recruits.\footnote{DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1975-103, dok. 5/432546.} At the same time, resistance to service in Yugoslav army was met from Gastarbeiters’ children who came of age while in FR Germany, as can be seen in complaints sent to the diplomatic missions in the FRG. The most common reasons for young reservists refusing to serve in the military were that they did not speak Serbo-Croatian properly and were detached from their Yugoslav roots.\footnote{DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1975-100, dok. 4/416196.}

Due to all these obstacles, the policy concerning the military service of economic emigrants had to be revised in 1975. The emphasis shifted to more subtle ways of preparing the Gastarbeiter for the potential military threat to their homeland. Propaganda films, publications and other materials were to be sent to Yugoslav clubs, Cultural-Informational Centres and consulates for education purposes. However, the material costs of these materials were quite significant, so even a year later, the publishing house Narodna armija had not yet sent its publications to Yugoslav clubs abroad.\footnote{AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 707, unclassified, as of 26\textsuperscript{th} July 1976.} At the same time, the Presidency claimed that agents of state security had successfully infiltrated the biggest clubs, in order to keep kindling the
patriotic spirit among workers and help them “self-protect.” These measures, however, were to be undertaken only through legal channels and according to the laws of the respective host-country.\footnote{AJ, f. 803, fasc. 27, Sednica Predsedništva SFRJ, 24\textsuperscript{th} June 1975.} It is indeed questionable, though, how “smuggling” secret service agents into workers’ clubs could be considered a legal measure, but still, the state’s switch to a more propaganda-oriented approach to military education of emigrants could be discerned.

An interesting example of how \textit{Gastarbeiter} could be mobilised in practice through official propaganda was the so-called “war-mongering campaign” of the spring of 1974, when NATO performed small-scale military maneuvers in northern Italy, close to the Slovenian border. Yugoslav propagandists, especially \textit{NIJ}, used this relatively harmless and small-sized military exercise to create a huge turmoil among the guest workers. Paranoia among the citizens living abroad was stimulated by blatant military calls of the magazine, stating that “we know how to die, but we also know how to win.”\footnote{Novosti iz Jugoslavije, Belgrade, No. 192, 11\textsuperscript{th} April 1974, 1.} A special brochure entitled \textit{Koje su pobude Italije? (What Are Italy’s Intentions?)} was distributed among the guest workers at the exhibition of Yugoslav literature in Cologne in March 1974,\footnote{DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1974-107a, dok. 8/420961.} whereas \textit{Gastarbeiter} from Dalmatia were reported to have shown an especially keen interest in lectures held by Yugoslav consuls on this topic.\footnote{DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1974-109, dok. 12/419779.}

This campaign obviously hit a chord in a part of economic emigration, as aggressive letters sent to \textit{NIJ} show. A group of \textit{Gastarbeiter} assembled at 4 AM, upon the first news on the maneuvers, and allegedly, in only 12 minutes four trucks of men were ready to go and invade Italy. A flood of support letters swarmed Yugoslavia, and they kept being published in \textit{NIJ} for several months. Some of them were written in overtly emotional, confusing and almost comical fashion, like the one that made it to the headline in \textit{NIJ}, written by Mehmed Delić from Kengen
to Tito: “You can count on us as if we were in the homeland, we ain’t a lost army as some like to call us, may they not offend our wounds, we are seething with anger like red peppers.”

There were even instances where this diplomatic incident strained the relationship between Italian and Yugoslav fellow guest workers, such as the case of Yugoslavs beating up one Italian who provoked them when they defiantly sang songs about Tito in front of Italians. However, these kinds of conflicts were considered damaging for the socialist reputation of Yugoslavia, and the officials appealed through press and meetings in Yugoslav clubs to workers’ solidarity, claiming that the Italian government does not represent the true will of Italian people, unlike the Yugoslav authorities. This curious case could be understood as a sort of experiment on behalf of the Yugoslav regime, whose aim was to test the potential readiness of economic emigrants to stand in defense of their socialist homeland, as well as the ways in which the state-supported propaganda channels could be used for this purpose.

### 3.3 Propaganda against Political Emigrants

One of the most urgent issues of Yugoslav propagandists was to curtail the possible influence of “hostile” emigrants over *Gastarbeiter*. The Yugoslav regime considered various political, military and social groups who emigrated from the country in the wake of the end of the World War II as “political emigration” (comprising of collaborationists, monarchists, anti-communists, bourgeoisie etc). According to the data of Yugoslav counter-intelligence, by the late 1960s there were over 230,000 political emigrants in the West, out of which 11,751 Croats, 4,888 Serbs and 882 “others” were deemed as “extremists,” most of them living in

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56 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1974-109, dok. 12/419779.
FRG. However, only 1% of these émigrés was regarded as “likely to perform terrorist and subversive attacks.” The Yugoslav state consequently devoted much attention to its own propaganda among the workers, mobilising them within “progressive” Yugoslav-oriented clubs with patriotic activities and spreading negative stereotypes and rumours about any kind of political opposition abroad. Still, in this negative campaign, differentiation among the “enemies of the state” had to be made, most notably in the example of church organisations operating on the territory of West Germany.

The attitude of Yugoslav authorities towards the activities of churches in FRG was ambivalent, ranging from ideological rejection in principle to differentiation between more and less “acceptable” religious organisations and activists in practice. The belated involvement of Yugoslav institutions in regulating and responding to Gastarbeiter-related questions until the early 1970s created an institutional vacuum, where religious welfare associations, most notably the Catholic Caritas, could insert themselves as the protectors of emigrants’ interests. Yugoslav consuls noted wearily in the late 1960s that Caritas officials (in the official discourse called dušobrižnici [soul-tenders], often with a sarcastic connotation) would start exerting their influence already at the train stations in Germany, waiting for the newcomers and offering their services. Not only was the idea that a religious organisation could prove more helpful and influential to socialist workers than their own state unpleasant to Yugoslav institutions, but they were dissatisfied with the Catholic Church’s focus on Croatian and Slovene workers, which

59 Cvjetković, “Politička represija,” 610-611.
61 AJ, f. 467 (Savezni biro za poslove zapošljavanja), fasc. 21, dok. 57-T, 880/1-66.
divided Yugoslavs along religious and national lines. In addition, many Caritas workers were known to be collaborating with Croatian political émigrés in various ways, i.e. several Catholic priests were editors of the magazine Kroacija, led by the well-known Croatian nationalist Branko Jelić. The activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church [SPC] were not deemed by the Yugoslav authorities as damaging to Yugoslav interests, yet the officials frequently complained about Orthodox priests attending nationalist celebrations organised by political émigrés.

The authorities employed various means to subdue the influence of churches on their emigrants. After developing their own institutional mechanism for emigrants’ welfare questions, they partially took over the workers’ welfare from organisations like Caritas. Although Caritas, due to its financial and organisational power, remained an unavoidable partner to the Yugoslav state, official preference was given to “progressive” German partners, such as Arbeiterwohlfahrt. Another big problem for Yugoslav officials and workers alike was the German legal provision of the church tax (Kirchensteuer), which had to be paid by all workers who did not officially register themselves as atheists. Workers often complained that their religion-minded employers forced them to register as believers, while the Lutheran church took the opportunity of obtaining the tax from Orthodox workers in the areas where the Serbian church did not have its priests. For these reasons, in 1970, the Yugoslav Military Mission in West Berlin undertook the task of issuing non-denominational statements to Gastarbeiter, while

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64 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1971-103, dok. 7/45283.
65 Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva, henceforth: SPC.
66 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 7/423822.
67 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1971-104, dok. 7/46747.
the workers who wished to emigrate from Yugoslavia were encouraged to have the “correct” statements issued already before arriving in FRG.\(^6^9\)

Around 1974, some Yugoslav officials became involved in another ideological campaign, this time against the obligation that Yugoslav children studying in West Germany have to attend religious education (Religionsunterricht). Especially vigilant in this campaign was the Yugoslav consul in Frankfurt am Main, who urged the teacher of “national subjects”\(^7^0\) to set the schedule of his classes in such a way that Yugoslav children would have to skip catechism. He also tried to obtain from the school principle the list of children enrolled into religious classes, so that he could put pressure on their parents to sign them out. German parents, as well as the local Croatian centres run by political emigrants, harshly protested to local school authorities because of such an intervention, labeling it as a “communist infiltration into German educational system.” Still, the West German authorities did not intervene at such interference of Yugoslav diplomats in the school curriculum for Yugoslav children studying in FRG.\(^7^1\) The Foreign Affairs Secretariat’s report on this case also revealed the preference of Yugoslav authorities to send atheist teachers for Gastarbeiter children, because “a socialist teacher simply cannot have a religious component, for then he would not understand socialist principles.”\(^7^2\)

Apart from open confrontation, the Yugoslav state also used the divide et impera strategy when dealing with religious organisations in FRG. Although, as a secular socialist country, Yugoslavia did not officially endorse any religion nor encourage religious identification of its citizens, officials frequently issued directives to Yugoslav institutions dealing with economic emigrants that they should differentiate between believers and priests loyal to the state and

\(^{6^9}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 483, unclassified.
\(^{7^0}\) “National curriculum” was the group of school subjects for children of Gastarbeiter related to their homeland, including native language, history and geography. [N.B.]
\(^{7^1}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1974-109, dok. 14/461719.
\(^{7^2}\) Ibid.
Some denominations were considered more “friendly” than others, and contacts were kept with such churches in order to use them for stabilising the state’s influence over emigrants, as shown through the example of schisms within the SPC.

In the late 1960s, before Yugoslav clubs spread to all parts of FRG, Macedonian workers were allowed to organise through branches of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (which unilaterally separated itself from the SPC in 1967), as this church was considered to be a “patriotic” one, as a bulwark against the greater-Serbian nationalism. The Greek Catholic community of Yugoslavs living in FRG enjoyed a similar “privileged” position, and was sometimes even visited by Yugoslav consuls. However, the “official” SPC was also favoured by the state in comparison to another “schismatic” branch, the North American diocese led by virulent anticommunist bishop Dionisije, who proclaimed itself autocephalous from “communist-infiltrated” SPC in 1963. Thus, the SPC bishops appealed to Yugoslav consuls to “pay special attention” to potential anti-Yugoslav activities during Dionisije’s visit to FRG in 1969. In return for such “favours,” the Yugoslav Military Mission helped opening of the SPC temple in West Berlin. It can be seen that the Yugoslav state tried to balance between various conflicting religions and attempted to distinguish among them in order to neutralise the influence of those deemed especially “hostile.”

Yugoslav authorities tried extensively to mobilise guest workers to defend (“self-protect”) themselves, meaning that through constant propaganda Gastarbeiter would “realise” that political émigrés are their enemies as well, and would thus develop their own initiatives against their influence. In the late 1960s, the Yugoslav embassy in Bonn reported to the Foreign Affairs

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75 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1970-134, dok. 5/432424.
76 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 1/441975 and 1/442931.
77 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 1/442820.
Secretariat disappointedly that although workers are generally “holding on with dignity,” they often relent to pressures, or are “afraid to express their positive attitude,” merely striving to “earn as much money as possible, without defending their country.” Such a passive resistance was to be changed through increased infiltration of SKJ members among Gastarbeiter, as well as by a constant media campaign against all types of political emigrants. From state reports, it appears that the Yugoslav embassy in Bonn had its special undercover agents who attended meetings and celebrations of “hostile” emigrants, and reported regularly and extensively on their activities, as well as on the people who visited those meetings. These undercover agents also tried to influence “neutral” emigrants to take part in officially endorsed Yugoslav clubs.

In some cases, such as in a Heim in Oberhausen in 1968, Yugoslav consulate employed special “bodyguards” (possibly agents too) to protect residents and “chase away” encroaching ustaša recruiters.

Surely the gravest consequence of émigré terrorist attacks was the human toll, which in the period 1945-1977 equaled 72 dead and 232 wounded, as a result of 210 separate terrorist actions. According to Bošković, the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood alone caused 53 deaths in their attacks. However, the Yugoslav security also resorted to espionage actions and severe reprisals against the proven and alleged terrorists. The result was that 42 émigrés were murdered, while 16 were wounded in “unsolved” cases (Glamočak reports larger numbers, as

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78 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 7/423822.
79 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1972-92, dok. 5/435146.
80 Ibid.
81 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1968-168, dok. 8/436628.
82 Cvetković, “Politička represija,” 632.
83 Milo Bošković, Anti-jugoslovenska fašistička emigracija [Anti-Yugoslav fascist emigration], (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1980), 213.
84 Jandrić, Represivne mjere komunističkog režima, 336.
many as 87 Croatian and 6-7 Serbian emigrants murdered). The murders of Croatian emigrants in the West were usually depicted in the Yugoslav press as “shady underworld showdowns” of petty criminals, having nothing to do with them being the prime state enemies. On the other hand, nationalist exiles portrayed these murders as premeditated purges of “freedom fighters” by a vicious totalitarian regime. In 1970, they even tried to deceive the public by forging an alleged agreement between governments of SFRY and FRG that Yugoslav agents could perform assassinations of émigrés, yet this forgery was very soon debunked by the Foreign ministries of both countries.

The “totalitarian” discourse on Tito’s regime actually found some echo in the Western public, which was wary of the “Wild West-like” murders on their territory. The suspicion of West German public concerning the true nature of these “showdowns” was not helped by a reckless interview statement of a Croatian parliamentary official Đuka Matošić in 1969 that “fight against anti-Yugoslav forces is being fought outside Yugoslav borders too.” Despite the official denunciation of this statement as taken out of context (Matošić supposedly meant cooperation with foreign secret services, which, according to the files of the Diplomatic

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85 Marina Glamočak, *Koncepcije Velike Hrvatske i Velike Srbije u političkoj emigraciji* [Concepts of Great Croatia and Great Serbia among political emigration], (Užice: Kulturno-prosvjetna zajednica Užice, 1997), 124.
88 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1971-103, dok. 7/42379.
90 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 3/443970.
Archives, was practically non-existent in this period),\(^{91}\) the conservative part of the West German media was not convinced.\(^{92}\)

The mobilisation campaigns sometimes had embarrassing results for Yugoslav officials. Thus, groups of more “patriotically” inclined workers would openly appeal to Yugoslav consuls to let them “deal by themselves” with political emigrants, “and in return Yugoslavia should not take us to court.”\(^{93}\) On another occasion, the Yugoslav Military Mission in West Berlin had problems with Allied authorities because a group of workers openly announced to the West German police that they would execute all hostile émigrés. The Mission tried to hush up this incident as a consequence of selling alcohol on the premises of the Yugoslav club, at the same time also testifying to workers’ alleged desperation before émigré provocations, “outrageously ignored” by the West German authorities.\(^{94}\) During the World Cup matches in Munich in 1974, émigrés’ attempt to wave with their own flags on the Olympic Stadium was thwarted by ready Gastarbeiter who “drowned” them with dozens of Yugoslav flags with a five-pointed star.\(^{95}\)

Some of the means used to put pressure on the FRG government to deal with anti-Yugoslav activities of nationalist emigrants were economic pressure, as well as taking advantage of the diplomatic situation of the time. Thus, Yugoslav banks and companies were instructed by the Foreign Ministry to “blackmail” their West German partners with termination of contract in case they would put their ads in a newspaper financed by “dubious” elements.\(^{96}\) On the other hand, Yugoslav institutions used the growing panic in FRG concerning the terrorist attacks of the Baader-Meinhof gang, or the assassination of the FRG ambassador in Guatemala, drawing a

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\(^{91}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1969-169, dok. 7/423822.
\(^{92}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1970-132, dok. 3/47643.
\(^{94}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1970-132, dok. 1/412160 and 1/412583.
\(^{95}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1975-100, dok. 4/410017.
\(^{96}\) DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1971-103, dok. 7/41463.
parallel between those murderous assaults and the terrorist actions by Croatian émigrés. For that purpose, even a documentary Šta je to terorizam? (What is Terrorism?) was distributed to Yugoslav clubs in the late 1970s, in order to exert pressure on FRG police to expand their definition of terrorism from being “left-wing, Palestinian and Arab,” to also include that of “right-wing fascist” groups.

Two circumstances were responsible for the relatively insignificant influence of political emigrants over Gastarbeiter. Firstly, the mental gap between typically middle-aged and elderly, urban and educated émigrés who had already spent decades living in the West and mostly young and uneducated rural workers who had been raised in the socialist spirit was too wide to allow any significant success in recruiting new members. Secondly, the more dogmatic émigrés gave a lot of reasons to outrage guest workers with their derogatory discourse, by calling them pasošari (“passporters”) and “welfare cases,” sold by Tito to the West. Also, cases of racketeering, intimidation or outright physical harassment were all but rare, often resulting in death toll of workers (although Yugoslav security tried everything to inflate this paranoia by exaggerating the incidents rate). Still, Yugoslav campaigns against political emigration in FRG represent a peculiar case of the “propaganda war” led on the territory of another state, involving state security infiltration, mobilisation and politicisation of workforce, and playing conflicting religious organisations against each other.

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99 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1972-92, dok. 7/433590.
100 Novosti iz Jugoslavije, Belgrade, No. 69, 16th July 1969, 10-11.
3.4 Conclusions

In order to continue exerting its influence over its workers after they went abroad in search for work, the Yugoslav authorities had to develop transnational modes of operating on the territory of another country. This was a unique case, as Yugoslavia was the only socialist country with borders open to the West, and this policy of open borders opened a leeway for Western influences to spread to Yugoslavia, yet influences ran in the opposite direction too. Although on the one hand, the Yugoslav state deemed it desirable for Gastarbeiter to fully use the advantages of West German social welfare and trade union system, on the other hand, the Yugoslav economic emigration had to be constantly “reminded” of its temporary migrant character. Not only were they supposed to eventually return to their homeland, but according to Yugoslav propaganda, even while living abroad, they were expected to lead lives according to their socialist self-managing background, which made them strikingly distinct from their capitalist environment.

However, these transnational policies were not developed immediately after the masses of Yugoslav workers started thronging to FRG in the mid-1960s. It is visible in the example of SKJ, which undertook tangible actions for keeping contact with its members abroad only after 1971. This change required an intrinsic shift in the ideological perception of migrations of socialist working class to a capitalist country. At first, especially on the lower echelons of the Party hierarchy, the perception of these migrations was rather hostile and suspicious. Heavily contaminated with the anti-Western discourse, it represented a remnant of the times when Yugoslavia used to follow Soviet type hard-line communism. However, after the Party top initiated the radical change in the attitude towards external migrations in 1971, all the benefits of having a communist “oasis” in a capitalist “desert” were to be exploited. This was done by
establishing party affiliations in West German companies which employed Yugoslavs, and special Party workers were supposed to politically educate non-members and keep them aware of the ever-watching Party eye. Of course, these actions were not always welcome by West German conservative circles, especially for justified fears of secret service infiltration into companies and workers’ clubs, or “Yugoslavisation” of the country. Thus, the Party operations abroad had to constantly adapt and balance between their own interests and the legality of their functioning on the territory over which they had no legal “jurisdiction.”

As the country was torn by internal crises in the early 1970s, due to nationalist turbulences and calls for political reforms, Yugoslav authorities became increasingly worried about the defense prospects in case of a civil strife or foreign invasion. The fact that over half a million eligible military reservists “temporarily” lived in the West and that young men increasingly moved abroad without even having undergone their mandatory military training, represented a special concern. These circumstances urged Yugoslav authorities to initiate legal measures in 1973, which restricted the outflow of workforce, especially of military reservists and skilled labour (these measures opportunely coincided with the 1973 oil shock and the subsequent economic recession in the West as well). Although these administrative measures were meant to force male Gastarbeiter to return home to serve their military duty, two years later, a “softer” approach had to be adopted, which consisted in extensive educational military propaganda and agitation, performed again by infiltrated secret service agents. The effects of such an extension of Yugoslav defense mechanism across the country’s borders can best be seen in the Gastarbeiter mobilisation campaign, like the one against Italy in 1974.

Another important aspect of Yugoslav propaganda for economic emigrants was to secure their clear isolation from any potential infiltration or influence by political emigrants, many of whom resorted to violent means in their fight against Tito’s regime. This counter-propaganda
relied on mobilisation of workers against the “hostile” emigration. Through specialised media and constantly spreading fear of terrorist attacks among Gastarbeiter, the workers were soon ready to confront any kind of opposition to socialist Yugoslavia, and these confrontations sometimes caused diplomatic incidents embarrassing for Yugoslav reputation. Internal West German issues, such as the wave of anarchist terrorism of the Red Army Faction, were also used to advance Yugoslav struggle against the hostile émigrés. Although, as a socialist country, Yugoslavia could not officially endorse any kind of religious affiliation, it still had to adapt to West German circumstances and rely on church welfare institutions. However, Yugoslav authorities exploited conflicts between various Yugoslav religious organisations, playing on the card of the “lesser evil,” and thus secured loyalty on behalf of the “positive” priests and believers. The diplomatic representatives also used their influence to circumvent some of the West German institutional features (such as religious education in schools or paying church tax) deemed inappropriate or damaging to Yugoslav ideological tenets. These practices can be interpreted as means for a sending state to keep its citizens within its political and ideological system, even in the host country’s territory.
IV  Song of Brotherhood, Dance of Unity – Propaganda Aspects of the Music Tours of Yugoslav Artists in the West

Providing *Gastarbeiter* with opportunities to spend their leisure time “in desirable ways” was one of the imperatives for Yugoslav authorities as soon as the policy of open borders for the labour force was recognised in the mid-1960s. Besides supporting Yugoslav workers’ clubs as places of social interaction and collective identification of fellow citizens and sending propaganda and informational materials to reinforce the emigrants’ attachment to the homeland, a specific cultural policy had to be created as well. Due to the peculiar conditions of *Gastarbeiters*’ social, educational and demographic structure (mostly rural, uneducated and young workers) and lifestyle (working physically strenuous manual jobs, long shifts and many overtime hours, living in communal *Heim* communities), the cultural content offered to these workers had to be adapted to their needs and expectations.¹ The most immediate answer to these needs was found in tours of Yugoslav music stars and dancing troupes in cities with large agglomerations of Yugoslav workers. As most of the target audience was of rural background, and as the aim of these concerts was to expose emigrants to their native culture, these cultural activities had a strong folk character.

In this chapter, I will first analyse the organisational mechanism of these music events and the ways in which state institutions tried to monopolise the touring market and suppress the commercialisation of these activities. Then, I will turn to the most prominent cases of censorship of the artistic staff and content that was sent to workers abroad, and how it reflected

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the internal ethnic relations between Yugoslav nationalities. Lastly, I will examine these tours as a subtle attempt on behalf of state authorities to emancipate and “enlighten” the working class, as a part of the overarching socialist modernisation efforts.

### 4.1 Unobtrusive and Spontaneous - Concerts as Political Symbols

Singers from Yugoslavia travelled to Western Europe to perform for Yugoslav expatriates already in the 1950s, before the massive influx of labour migrants to those countries. However, those tours were not officially endorsed by the Yugoslav authorities, and were often suspected of an anti-state character, as the audience and tour managers were frequently identified as political émigrés or members of anticomunist forces from World War II. Due to the development of the Yugoslav music scene and a rapid increase in the potential audience which would attend these concerts, arranging the performances abroad presented an opportunity for daring individuals and organisations to “cash in” large amounts of foreign hard currency, as well as to gain influence in émigré associations and Yugoslav guest worker clubs.²

However, the proliferation of small private managers deprived Yugoslav institutions of significant amounts of cash that could potentially be earned if the state had organised these tours. Furthermore, the state may have perceived as degrading for a socialist country to allow so much private initiative regulating the leisure time of socialist workers. But probably the most important fact was that the state could not exercise any control over the political or ideological “appropriateness” of certain managers and performers, as well as over the content of the program, its artistic level, political orientation and presentation to the emigrants. If specially delegated institutions did not have any say in sending artists and monitoring their performance and behaviour abroad, political émigrés and other hostile elements were likely to infiltrate and

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influence the *Gastarbeiter.* In the second half of the 1960s, when hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs thronged towards the West in search for jobs, the question of organising their free time, cultural events included, became an imperative for officials.

The first and most important step in this direction was that the biggest radio stations transferred their music shows to concert stages across Europe. These radio shows were broadcast since the early 1960s to *Gastarbeiter,* featuring the most popular music pieces at the moment in Yugoslavia. The editors of Radio Zagreb first transferred their show to concert stage, commencing the big semestral tour, *Zvuci rodnog kraja* (Sounds of Home) in 1966, as a complement to the same-titled music show. Soon Radio Belgrade followed, with their own tour concept, *Večeras zajedno* (Together Tonight). Besides these two tours, which were considered to be the biggest and most important ones, Radio Sarajevo offered their version, *Sevdah putuje Evropom* (Sevdah traverses Europe), while Radio Skopje organised *Pesma na tatkovinata* (Song of Homeland). Another big tour, organised jointly by radio stations and other sponsors, was the competition *Zlatni glasovi* (Golden Voices), which had an interactive character with audience voting.

Besides these big tours, which always brought artists from all republics of Yugoslavia, numerous smaller ones were organised, with individual singers or smaller bands from a single republic. Folk dancing troupes were also common guests abroad, especially the ones whose repertoire represented the multitude of ethnic traditions of Yugoslavia. The responsibility for coordinating the schedules and contents of all these tours was given to the special Coordinating

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Committee for the Cultural-Entertainment Activities for Our Workers Abroad, founded under the wing of Socialist Alliance of the Working People [SSRNJ].

The concerts organised by radio stations had an established pattern concerning the repertoire and order of performers, and were easier to be monitored by authorities in terms of their content. After an orchestral overture medley of the most popular World War II partisan songs, the first part of the concert was dedicated to folk songs coming from the territory of each Yugoslav republic. The singers from each republic would appear on stage in appropriate national costumes and sing two traditional songs. In the second part of the concert, singers would be dressed in evening gowns and tuxedos, and the repertoire would then go in a more contemporary and anational direction, with well-known Yugoslav schlager and pop hits, three pieces sung by each singer. This part of the performance was less choreographed both in terms of the number of songs each singer sang and in terms of the music genre, as the participating singers came from very different musical backgrounds. However, every song to be performed had to be arranged with the tour directors, and even the breaks between the songs were scripted.

Prior to each singer stepping on stage, the host speaker would make a poetic introduction, describing the history of each republic in socialist revolutionary terms. Thus, the Macedonian people were described as “for a long time claimed by others, and for even longer time denied by others, in order to become free and their own in the people’s revolution,” while Montenegrins were “always attacked, never subdued” and Slovenes “merry and proud, persistent and freedom-loving.” The value of freedom was best shown through the historical struggle of the

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5 Ivanović, Geburtstag pišeš normalno, 265.
6 Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije, henceforth: SSRNJ.
7 Arhiv Jugoslavije (henceforth: AJ), fond 142/II (Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije), fascikla 489, dokument 2725.
8 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 489, dok. 2725.
Bosnian peoples, Croatians stood defiantly among all the powers whose interests collided on their homeland, whereas Serbs were referred to by paraphrasing the poet Oskar Davičo as “the rebel among the nations.”

The smaller tours were usually supported and coordinated by republican Matica institutions. However, when the state put its own institutions in full sway, they tried to decrease the role that Matica played in organising cultural events for guest workers. The official reason for this was that Matica were primarily dedicated to maintaining contacts with expatriates (iseljeništvo), that is, people permanently moved abroad, many of whom did not even have Yugoslav citizenship. On the other hand, economic emigration was seen as only temporary. Thus, the activities created for the permanently emigrated diasporic communities were deemed inappropriate for workers who were supposed to return home after several years, as such blurring of distinction between the two types of emigration would devaluate the Gastarbeiter identification with Yugoslavia. Another, though unofficial, reason for subduing the influence of Matica offices was that they were always suspected of being infiltrated by political émigrés (this was especially acute after the negative experiences with the Croatian Matica in 1971, which stood on the reformist-nationalist side), and were too tied to their native republics. However, neither republican nor federal Coordinating Committees had enough personnel or financial means to establish full control over the organisation of cultural and entertainment activities abroad, so the Matica branches remained an important partner to the state.

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10 Matice iseljenika (literally Bee-mothers of expatriates, henceforth: Matica) were the non-governmental institutions founded in Yugoslav republics in 1951 which dealt with the matters of maintaining connections to people of Yugoslav origin living permanently abroad. [N.B.]
From the very outset, these forms of activities were not seen as merely entertainment events or cultural manifestations. Rather, political and ideological meaning was very explicitly attached. Therefore, the ideological “moment” was considered as one of the crucial elements of these tours, and the aim was to “unobtrusively initiate spontaneous expressions of exaltation and manifestations of attachment to socialism, homeland, unity of our peoples and love towards Tito.”12 Especially important were the events organised for the biggest state holidays, Republic Day (29\textsuperscript{th} November), Youth Day (Tito’s birthday, 25\textsuperscript{th} May), May Day and Women’s Day (8\textsuperscript{th} March).13 According to the reports and plans sent by Yugoslav consulates in FRG, these events were carefully planned for up to six months in advance (in some cases even 13 months in advance), as their success was directly brought in a causation of improving the country’s image and reputation, not only among socialist workers, but among Western audiences as well.

As far as the Western perception of these events was concerned, the most extraordinary element of these manifestations was their peculiar rite-like amalgam of folk traditions embedded into a socialist context.14 West German journalists were regularly invited to these events, in order to counter the negative news coverage on bloody clashes with anti-Yugoslav terrorists.15 However, except journalists, hardly any Germans or non-Yugoslav guest workers were interested in visiting these spectacles,16 while such cases were somewhat more frequent in the atmosphere of small tavern concerts, less pregnant with socialist patriotic rhetoric.17 Detailed reports were made on a regular basis on the effects of the concerts, with precise

15 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 014-1478/1
16 Ivanović, Geburtstag pišeš normalno, 261.
17 Interview with Predrag Gojković, conducted by the author, Belgrade, 19\textsuperscript{th} April 2012
information on the attendance, repertoire and eventual incidents in every city.\textsuperscript{18} In 1975, stricter control was implemented over republican coordinating committees, who now had to report to the federal body about all the offers for touring ensembles before they were officially endorsed. In the words of the federal Coordinating Committee, “every event that could be used for propaganda purposes is to be used.”\textsuperscript{19}

The ensembles or artists interested in touring Western Europe were expected to send their tour offers to the Coordinating Committee, with a precise overview of their costs, artistic program (which had to be pan-Yugoslav, in the sense that the cultures and traditions of all Yugoslav republics had to be represented) and mandatory socialist rhetoric justifying their activity. Then, the Committee would allot the ensembles according to republican quotas and their ideological appropriateness.\textsuperscript{20} In 1970, it was recommended that with every bigger ensemble a journalist be sent along, who would inform about and interpret the main news from Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{21} This agitation activity was implemented only in 1973, with the difference that preference was given to political workers of the Party over journalists, testifying to the open propagandist intentions of the state.\textsuperscript{22} The promotional leaflets of the Alliance of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia and West German \textit{Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund} were given out to all audience members.\textsuperscript{23} In order for these tours to be financially sustainable, Yugoslav companies and banks sponsored them, and in return they got free advertising in the concert venues (for example, the host would advise the audience that they “should definitely have a chat with the representatives of the \textit{Gorenje} factory during the break between the acts”).\textsuperscript{24} Thus, in the eyes

\textsuperscript{18} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 713, dok. 60176.
\textsuperscript{19} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. S-345, Meeting of 5\textsuperscript{th} May 1975.
\textsuperscript{20} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. A-705, dok. 5-52-527/656.
\textsuperscript{21} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 475, unclassified.
\textsuperscript{22} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 485, unclassified.
\textsuperscript{23} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 490, dok. 01-642/1.
\textsuperscript{24} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 489, dok. 2725.
of the tour organisers, the commercial needs conveniently complied with boosting the sales of domestic consumer products.

4.2 Fighting the Commercialisation of Tours

Before Yugoslav state institutions and radio stations involved themselves with organising music events for guest workers in West Germany in the mid 1960s, these activities were a fertile field for various private managers, tavern owners and expatriate associations. Upon taking on themselves the task of creating a parallel network of activities which would entice emigrants to follow the “positive line” towards their homeland, Yugoslav institutions could not leave the field of cultural interaction with economic migrants unregulated. This interaction had to reflect all essential dogmas of Yugoslav socialist society, but also had to be adapted to function properly in a capitalist environment.

In the first years of its activities, the Coordinating Committee for Cultural-Entertainment Activities for Our Citizens on the Temporary Work Abroad, together with republican *Matica* institutions and radio stations, undertook the task of supporting big music tours, numbering up to over 80 touring members. Such tours (radio stations’ tours are typical examples of these large-scale projects) would be organised once or twice a year, and would traverse Western European countries where the largest agglomerations of Yugoslav guest workers lived, stopping in major cities of the respective countries or the biggest industrial centres (e.g. Stuttgart, Munich, West Berlin, Frankfurt am Main etc). The singing ensembles were large, with their own orchestras, and their ethnic structure was supposed to reflect the federal character of Yugoslavia.\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\) *Ivanović, Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, 263.
The concerts were meant to be massive collective gatherings of compatriots, celebrating the common identity and belonging to the Yugoslav idea of which they were an inseparable part, despite the geographical distance. Some of these concerts, especially those organised in honour of the Yugoslav Republic Day and Youth Day, were attended by thousands of Yugoslav workers living abroad (in Vienna up to 12,500 spectators would attend, while Stuttgart could boast with around 4,000 Yugoslavs visiting the Republic Day celebrations).26 These celebrations were carefully prepared in coordination with diplomatic consular representatives in the respective area, while the Federal Secretariat for Information [SSINF]27 would send the necessary paraphernalia for these occasions (pioneer caps and scarves, Yugoslav flags, Tito’s photos etc). All Yugoslav clubs tried to take part in these activities, and they often joined their forces to organise concerts or field trips, while sport tournaments became a tradition in the early 1970s. In order to sustain financial viability of such expensive projects, successful Yugoslav banks and industrial enterprises (such as Jugobanka or Gorenje) sponsored part of the costs. In return, they got free promotion during the concerts themselves, and even sold their products in the venues (in case of banks, like Jugobanka, they recruited new customers for their savings accounts).28 Thus, not only was the cultural unity of Gastarbeiter with their compatriots in homeland affirmed, but they were meant to be part of one and the same economic system and consumer market.

Another problem the state had to solve was that of private managers with dubious reputation. On the one hand, they often caused direct political damage to Yugoslav reputation by their connections to political emigration. Singers were frequently invited to private taverns, which in fact functioned as meeting points for various nationalists, who would then require purportedly

27 Savezni sekretarijat za informacije, henceforth: SSINF.
“unsuspecting” artists to perform inappropriate repertoire. Thus, Predrag Gojković was pressed by political émigrés to sing četnik songs on his tavern gigs, and his refusal led to him being unable to have concerts in many venues whose owners were connected to émigrés.\(^{29}\) On the other hand, even if many managers were politically neutral, they often ran their businesses irresponsibly, without meeting financial obligations such as taxes or fees, and thus hurt the interests of both performers and audiences.\(^{30}\) As the demand for entertainment events increased in the late 1960s, the state’s involvement in this area provided a perfect chance to expand its influence and control over the private sphere of Gastarbeiter lives, while at the same time financial gains for the state were made possible.

The immediate reaction of the authorities was to officially proscribe in 1972 which agencies or institutions were reliable partners in event planning, and to what degree. The most trusted were German trade unions, then Yugoslav or joint companies operating in Germany (Lipmann und Rau, Konzertdirektion Ma-Ma, Volkshochschule and others),\(^{31}\) especially Yugotours from Frankfurt am Main (organised 103 events for over 130,000 spectators in 1971-1973),\(^{32}\) with local partnerships with the municipal authorities following on this “scale” of confidence. Matica institutions were also unavoidable partners in this sphere, although they allegedly tended to cooperate with suspicious managers (especially Croatian Matica during the MASPOK events), while various Croatian centres were denounced as the lairs of hostile emigration, to be

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\(^{31}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 134/73.

\(^{32}\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 491, dok. 2706.
avoided by all means. Thus the “appropriate” channels for financing the concerts were made known to all involved parties who wished to cooperate with official organs.

However, the “blockbuster” tours proved financially unfeasible and ideologically inappropriate. Due to their large costs and logistical difficulties (because of numerous touring staff), they could not be organised more often than twice a year. Furthermore, due to technical and financial demands, these tours visited only the biggest cities in FR Germany or the places where most Yugoslavs were concentrated. Hence, these routes often detoured around places with smaller agglomerations of Yugoslav guest workers, who were thus deprived of having cultural events in their own environment. On the other hand, sending the big names of the music scene abroad included huge performing fees and expensive tickets, which were an additional blow to the emigrants’ living standard. This practice was often criticised by the representatives of Yugoslav clubs, who complained that certain artists and even state institutions tried to accumulate wealth on account of Gastarbeiers’ hard earned German marks. The presence of promoters of Yugoslav industrial products at concerts irritated even some members of the Coordinating Committee, who saw it as an ultimate sign of a capitalist commercialisation of the whole project, the phenomenon they wanted to counter in the first place by organising these events. The acuteness of the problem led to serious discussions even at the meetings of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, which condemned the money-making practices occurring in this sphere.

33 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva inostranih poslova (Henceforth: DAMIP), Politička arhiva (Henceforth: PA), Savezna Republika Nemačka (Henceforth: SRN), fascikla 1973-83, dokument 9/47474.
34 Some singers considered to be among the “cheapest” performers, such as Lola Novaković, charged as much as 55,000 Yugoslav dinars per concert, while the tickets for the events tended to cost even more than 10 German marks. (AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 479, dok. 2369).
Therefore, in 1972/1973, the focus shifted from “big” tour concepts to smaller-sized ones, and the initiative was transferred to Yugoslav clubs and newly founded Cultural-Informational Centres. Although the “mammoth” tours organised by radio stations still survived and attracted thousands of people (however, after the decree by the Coordinating Committee, the tickets could not cost more than ones at other similar events), the state institutions gave preference in their cultural policy to smaller tours, as well as to Gastarbeiter self-organisation in the cultural sphere. The Coordinating Committee and SSINF allotted large sums of money to small ensembles from the country who wished to travel abroad for small or no fees.37 Another target resource were the local initiatives of Yugoslav communities in West German cities aimed at establishing amateur dancing troupes, music bands, sport teams and other leisure activities. Not only did these initiatives require far less money, but they were also perfect examples of workers’ self-management, as applied to the sphere of spare time. Amateur activities of emigrants were proclaimed in official instructions of SSRNJ as an inseparable part of Yugoslav amateurism, 38 as yet another way of keeping them within the system in which they no longer lived.

With the proliferation of all kinds of ensembles interested in touring abroad, a coordinated and uniform calendar of events had to be created. In the first years of their existence, various tours often collided in their schedule and routes. It happened frequently that two officially endorsed tours would perform in the same city on the same night or followed each other closely, thus lowering the attendance on both events.39 Sometimes these collisions resulted in rather harsh arguments, such as the complaint of Radio Zagreb because the tour of Belgrade Estrada was “stealing their profit” by following the tour Zvuci rodnog kraja along their route

38 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 489, dok. 2687.
39 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 014-2335/1.
within only a week time difference,\textsuperscript{40} or when Slovene workers did not attend a dance performance organised by Croatian \textit{Matica} because on the same night a Slovene club was opening.\textsuperscript{41} The inexperienced concert organisers sometimes scheduled concerts during winter or summer holidays, when most of \textit{Gastarbeiter} would travel back to Yugoslavia to spend vacation.\textsuperscript{42}

The scheduling complaints were the reason behind the December 1972 decision that all republican branches of SSRNJ would henceforth submit provisional calendars of the tour offers for ensembles from their territory to the federal Coordinating Committee, so that the federally coordinated calendar is made by the beginning of each year.\textsuperscript{43} This centralisation of planning cultural-entertainment activities helped increasing the attendance and overall success of the events, although it inevitably led to internal bickering among the republics concerning the allotment quotas for their own ensembles.\textsuperscript{44} Nevertheless, Yugoslav authorities still remained helpless before the habit of political émigrés to schedule their own events in such a way that they “divert” potential attendees of state-supported events.\textsuperscript{45} Still, the Yugoslav state became an unavoidable partner in the organisation of these activities, and a large part of the touring market came under its direct logistical and ideological surveillance, as well as financial control.

The coordination and cooperation of Yugoslav state institutions, diplomatic representatives and self-organised workers’ clubs in organising entertainment events for economic emigrants testified to a strong intention of Yugoslav authorities to treat these workers as a part of the Yugoslav system. One of the primary aims of these events was “to bring a piece of homeland into the unknown,” to “make our workers abroad feel like they are home” and that “they have

\textsuperscript{40} DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-81, dok. 5/49611.
\textsuperscript{41} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 489, dok. 2687.
\textsuperscript{42} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 707, dok. 09-55/1-1975.
\textsuperscript{43} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 489, dok. 014-2765/1 and 014/2806/1.
\textsuperscript{44} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. S-344, dok. 3.35/79.
\textsuperscript{45} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 488, dok. 2745.
not been forgotten by us.” Hence, these celebrations were not meant as a form of presenting the Yugoslav system to an external audience who was outside its functioning. They were rather a proof that this audience was, ideologically and mentally speaking, a part of that system, albeit outside of its geographic confines. By this inclusion, the authorities hoped that the eventual return of Gastarbeiter home would become more imminent.

4.3 Songs of Contention – Music Tours as a Mirror of Interethnic Tensions

Apart from technical and logistical issues concerning the organisation of song and dance tours, Yugoslav state institutions paid special attention to content of the shows, as well as to the artistic staff that took part in them. As with many other spheres in socialist Yugoslavia, the entertainment for guest workers in the West had to reflect the federal and multi-ethnic character of the mother-state, and this was achieved through the system of republican quotas for singers. On the other hand, the tour directors, as well as the Yugoslav diplomatic staff who would visit the performances, strictly monitored the repertoire of cultural manifestations for potential nationalist or anticommunist implications. Although one of the primary aims of the tours was to promote the traditional culture of Yugoslav nationalities and thus maintain the sense of emigrants’ belonging to the same collective as their compatriots back home, the content of this culture had to be presented in a socialist packaging. Thus, the dancing ensemble Branko Radičević from Zemun concluded in their report on their tour in the West that “the tour had a deep ideological-political meaning […] and all social-political factors of our society are content with the cultural mission of our troupe.”

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The tour directors chose the singers and dancing troupes which participated in the radio stations’ and Maticas’ tours strictly by the system of republican quotas and reciprocity. In practice, this meant that each of the six republics would send one singer to represent its culture for the Gastarbeiter. Although this system was supposed to promote the unity of Yugoslav nations, at the same time it emphasised their individuality and uniqueness. Thus, when the Coordinating Committee of SSRNJ discussed the possibility to decrease the costs of tours by sending fewer artists who would present the culture from several republics, it was strongly protested by some of its members, because it was not deemed probable that “a Croat could sing a Macedonian song as well as a Macedonian.”48 In this way, the republican borders were increasingly essentialised on a cultural level as well, and different folk traditions were encouraged to be presented to migrants side by side, rather than intermingled.

As for other tours sponsored by federal institutions, it was an imperative for the state that ensembles from all parts of the country be invited to perform. However, this reciprocity was unilateral in the beginning, so it happened that troupes from all six republics would go to FR Germany, but the different regions of that country would host only some of them. This caused dissatisfaction among the Gastarbeiter coming from the republics which did not send ensembles to their place of residence. Only in 1972 was this problem solved by a tighter and more organised planning of tour routes, so that emigrants living in every region of the host countries would be able to see artists from each of the republics.49

The quota system was revised in the beginning of 1973, in wake of the impending constitutional changes which inaugurated a significant increase of autonomy for Serbian provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina. In line with these decentralising decisions, the tour

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49 Ibid.
organisers confined Serbian singers to represent only Serbia Proper, while artists from the provinces were supposed to sing songs from their own regions. As the increased autonomy for the Serbian provinces was grounded on the rights of their non-Serbian nationalities to self-government, it was “self-explanatory” that Kosovar artists participating in these tours should be Albanians, while Vojvodinian representatives were often, although not exclusively, non-Serbs. The first West German tour of a dancing troop Šote from Priština in May 1973 was described as an end to an „incorrect policy” concerning the allotment of touring ensembles for economic emigration. Wherever the pan-Yugoslav structure of touring staff was not possible, it was required that artistic content should reflect the multicultural character of the homeland.

The pan-Yugoslav character of artistic programs was “a must” for big radio stations’ caravans and smaller tours of song and dance ensembles alike. On several occasions, the republican committees examined the repertoire of dancing troupes, and complaints by “discriminated” workers who could not watch dances from their republics were taken very seriously, and regularly discussed at the meetings of the Coordinating Committee. The groups which did not represent all the Yugoslav regions in their program would be reprimanded, and in the most extreme cases, taken off the Coordinating Committee’ support for touring abroad. Sometimes, even the reports from West German press were used to spot the ensembles which strayed from the pan-Yugoslav path, like the article from Mannheim newspaper which noted that Croatian ensemble “peculiarly specialised” in dances from northern republics.

On another extreme, the accusation of the underrepresentation of a certain nation or republic was also used for internal bickering between ensembles and their appeals to the authorities for

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51 Ibid.
52 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 014-1661/1.
financial endorsement. During the discussions on the calendar of performances for 1974, the Kosovar ensembles complained that out of 73 supported ensembles, only one was from Kosovo, while the Slovenian and Vojvodinian ensembles complained that their tours lasted only several days, compared to a 24-day long tour of Radio Zagreb.\footnote{AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. S-344, dok. 3.35/79.} Parameters such as the number of artists paid per tour, fees and length of tour legs were always compared on a national basis in order to lobby for better touring conditions for certain ensembles. The federal institutions thus had to balance between the local interests of republics and the real demand for artists coming from certain areas, which depended on the ethnic structure of \textit{Gastarbeiter} in various parts of FRG.

Although the repertoire of all performers had to be approved by the tour directors prior to the tour, there were still differences in the extent of this control, which testify to the subtle ethnic tensions dwelling under the façade of patriotism. Thus, Radio Belgrade directors were reportedly much stricter towards singers from Serbia than other radio stations, and would not allow them to sing songs which contained lyrics referring to the terms Serbs or Serbia. Furthermore, male singers were not allowed to wear šajkača or šubara (a traditional Serbian peasant cap) on stage, while female singers had to wear five-pointed stars on the ribbons of their national attires.\footnote{Interview with Predrag Gojković, conducted by the author, Belgrade, 19th April 2012.} According to Serbian singer Predrag Gojković,\footnote{Predrag Cune Gojković (b. 1932) is one of the most famous performers of traditional Serbian music, as well of manz other international numbers, who rose to fame in the early 1960s with the hit song \textit{Kafu mi draga ispeci}. He spent the period 1966-1969 in the USA, and during those years, as well as immediately upon his return, he was suspected by the Yugoslav state security to have associated himself with political emigrants and allegedly sang at their meeting points. [N.B.]} these kinds of restrictions concerning the repertoire and stage outfits were not applied to singers coming from other republics. Even more interestingly, other radio stations never exercised this sort of pressure on Serbian singers. Thus, Serbian singers would sometimes find themselves in a
paradoxical situation that on their Radio Zagreb concerts they were permitted to sing songs previously banned by Radio Belgrade, even such controversial pieces as Marš na Drinu (March to the Drina) or Igrale se delije (Heroes Danced), often interpreted as anthems of narrow Serbian patriotism.\textsuperscript{57} Even though this lack of reciprocity in music censorship eventually ignited subtle feelings of injustice among certain singers, it can be implied that such different policies did not enjoy federal backing, but depended solely on the ideological rigidity and attitude of the respective radio station authorities. It is also questionable how much this practice was a consequence of self-censorship of tour directors and ensembles themselves, and how much it was induced from the top.

Nevertheless, the undoubtedly ideological nature of tours for Gastarbeiter is visible in the curious case of another singer with “inappropriate” repertoire and political views, this time coming from Croatia. Vice Vukov was one of the most prominent singing stars of Yugoslav music scene in the 1960s. Yet, at the time of the reformist and nationalist turbulences in Croatia in 1971, he became a target of a relentless media lynch, due to complaints from the attendees of his concerts about the allegedly nationalist excesses in his performances. When these accusations started coming from political sources, he was banished from the SFRY public sphere.\textsuperscript{58} Due to his tarnished reputation, Bosnian Matica refused to send singers from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Radio Zagreb tour in late 1971.\textsuperscript{59} On this same tour, during the concert in Frankfurt am Main, Croatian nationalists chanted “Free Croatia” and cheered only to Vukov.\textsuperscript{60} Despite his official condemnation of such incidents, Vukov was proclaimed an associate of Catholic priests and Croatian political émigrés, causing him to be branded a state enemy by

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Predrag Gojković, conducted by the author, Belgrade, 19\textsuperscript{th} April 2012.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Vjesnik u srijedu}, Zagreb, No. 382, 27\textsuperscript{th} October 1971, 1.
\textsuperscript{60} DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1971-103, dok. 8/440367.
Yugoslav authorities in the aftermath of the 1971 purge of Croatian nationalists. Although he was never legally prosecuted, Vukov’ songs were taken off the air in the whole country, whereas he decided to immigrate to France. During this exile, he had several tours around Western Europe, usually organised by the Catholic Church or Croatian émigré organisations. These tours were sometimes curiously scheduled to coincide with the “official” Yugoslav concerts, which only assured Yugoslav officials that Vukov intentionally wished to distract Croatian Gastarbeiter from attending them.61 The SSRNJ disassociated itself from not only the singer, but form all the managers who organised Vukov’s concerts during the 1971 scandal.62

Yugoslav authorities had informants who diligently attended Vukov’s concerts and reported on the presence of the members of the “hostile” emigration and priests, as well as on Vukov’s behaviour and statements to the audience. Even when Vukov would decline the audience’s requests to sing songs that were deemed nationalist, his words were interpreted in these reports as being “ambiguous” and “well-premeditated provocation against SFY.”63 The ousting of Vukov from the official program also had some embarrassing repercussions for tour organizers, such as during the audience vote for the Zlatni glasovi competition, when apparently Croatian emigrants swarmed the voting tickets with pro-Vukov slogans.64 In 1973, he approached Yugoslav diplomats in FR Germany, claiming that he was actually in conflict with priests who organised his tours because they wanted to use him for their anti-Yugoslav activities, despite him being adamant he could never imagine Croatia anywhere but within Yugoslavia. Vukov then asked the consul to be rehabilitated in the homeland, and in return he would donate his profits to charity and sing at official Yugoslav celebrations. Although the consul assured him

62 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1972-93, dok. 8/439347
63 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-82, dok. 13/421848.
64 DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1972-93, dok. 8/439347
that he could return safely to Yugoslavia, his rehabilitation was cynically regarded as a matter of the “popular taste,” not institutional decisions.\textsuperscript{65} However, by 1975, after several years of being boycotted on the Yugoslav market, interest for him subsided even among the political émigrés. The authorities could then victoriously proclaim that there was no more danger of him influencing the guest workers, as they got already “fed up” with his constant touring around Europe.\textsuperscript{66}

Besides Vukov, the \textit{enfant terrible} of the Yugoslav music scene, some other artists were also severely criticised for allegedly inappropriate demeanour during the \textit{Gastarbeiter} tours. Such was the case of Predrag Živković Tozovac, who was reprimanded for promoting himself as “the king of Serbian music” (both the allusion to monarchy and nationalism were problematic for the authorities) and posing in a royal uniform sitting on a cannon.\textsuperscript{67} Predrag Cune Gojković, who spent three years abroad in the late 1960s, was interrogated on several occasions by the state security upon his return, on his purported connections to political emigrants and performing of nationalist songs. It took him a few years of being cast aside to rebuild his reputation in the country.\textsuperscript{68} In 1973, the Union of Entertainment Workers (Estrada) undertook a large campaign in the press against the singers who “tarnished the honour of Yugoslavia abroad,” and this campaign was strongly supported by all singers who wanted to be disassociated from the allegations of coquetting with political émigrés.\textsuperscript{69} The unofficial rule that was implemented after these scandals was that all the events which were not on the official calendar of SSRNJ

\textsuperscript{65} DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-83, dok. 9/424717.
\textsuperscript{66} DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1975-100, dok. 4/410017.
\textsuperscript{67} “Tozovac na niskom tronu,” \textit{Večernje novosti}, Belgrade, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1973, 9.
\textsuperscript{68} Interview with Predrag Gojković, conducted by the author, Belgrade, 19\textsuperscript{th} April 2012.
were not politically “in line,” and thus participation in them was undesirable, and potentially damaging to the singers’ careers.⁷⁰

### 4.4 Between Nostalgic Entertainment and Modernising Culture

Big song and dance tours, as well as smaller performances by local ensembles and self-organised amateur troupes were all part of what was officially called in the documents of Yugoslav institutions “cultural-entertainment activities for our workers temporarily employed abroad.” However, after several years of dealing with this problem, the “culture” and “entertainment” parts started being more and more distinguished from each other in the institutional discourse, and eventually even juxtaposed as being non-complementary, if not outright mutually exclusive. Apart from the ideological component described above, these music events were also supposed to serve as a cultural mission among the guest workers, and the policy-makers modified the cultural content of Gastarbeiter-oriented activities accordingly, enhancing them with several other types of “enlightenment actions,” aimed at emancipation and education of the working class through culture, which was seen by the Yugoslav cultural ideologists as one of “the main political battlefields.”⁷¹

Music concerts of famous Yugoslav singers and folk dancing troupes were first chosen as a main means to fill emigrants’ leisure time because such mode of entertainment was relatively easy to organise and likely to be consumed by vast masses of guest workers.⁷² Within Yugoslavia itself, folk music remained one of the most popular genres for a long time in many regions of the country, especially among the masses of people who moved from the countryside to towns and cities. These masses were still culturally hardly touched by the wave of

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⁷¹ Stipe Šuvar, *Svijet obmana* [World of Deceit], (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1986), 391.
⁷² DAMIP, PA, SRN, fasc. 1973-81, dok. 5/49611.
urbanisation or advents of more “modern” genres such as schlager music or rock.\textsuperscript{73} Basically every settlement in Yugoslavia could boast plentiful of youth dancing ensembles (kulturno-umetnička društva) specialised in ethnic song and dance, while the culture of “tavern-going” (kafana) offered convenient venues for proliferation of folk singers, many of whom eventually rose to stardom with the expansion of the Yugoslav mass media and the record industry.\textsuperscript{74}

Considering the fact that most of the workers who migrated to the West were actually coming from a rural background\textsuperscript{75} and had a fairly low educational level,\textsuperscript{76} they were prone to be the target audience for the music which celebrated pastoral life and simple values, often with humorous and down-to-earth lyrics.\textsuperscript{77} Such entertainment was all the more appropriate for Gastarbeiter, knowing that most of them worked on hard manual jobs, often overtime, lived in communal Heim ghetto-like communities and faced numerous difficulties in integrating into, or merely interacting with, the host society. The overwhelming popularity of folk tunes among this segment of population can be seen from the typical amount of music hours sent from Yugoslavia for Gastarbeiter-oriented radio shows in FR Germany: 45.5 hours of folk music, 10.5 hours of revolutionary and patriotic songs, and only 9 hours of popular music.\textsuperscript{78}

However, on the one hand, insistence on promoting folk culture soon proved to be insufficient as the main means of organising the spare time of Gastarbeiter, because it excluded other forms of cultural activities, such as arts or literature. On the other hand, it was emphasised

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 72.
\textsuperscript{75} Over 56% of economic emigrants were agricultural workers before embarking abroad, according to the 1971 data, compared to 48% for the whole population of Yugoslavia. Source: Ivo Baučić, \textit{Radnici u inozemstvu prema popisu stanovništva Jugoslavije 1971}. [Yugoslav Workers Abroad According to the 1971 Yugoslav Census], (Zagreb: Institut za geografiju Sveučilišta, 1973), 69.
\textsuperscript{76} In 1971, 38.9% of Gastarbeiter were non-qualified or semi-qualified workers (34.5% on a national level), while 45.6% were qualified or high-qualified (32.2% for whole SFRY) (Baučić, \textit{Radnici u inozemstvu prema popisu stanovništva}, 65).
\textsuperscript{77} Janjetović, “Selo moje lepše od Pariza,” 78.
\textsuperscript{78} AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. A-747, unclassified.
repeatedly on the meetings of the Coordinating Committee, SSINF and Presidency of Yugoslavia that appeasing the rural sensibilities of the majority of emigrants went against the ideological presupposition of Yugoslav communists that sending workers abroad should serve the purpose of developing the country, including the notion of cultural modernisation as well.\(^79\) This is why alternative ways of engaging workers abroad were sought in the beginning of the 1970s. In the Coordinating Committee’s *Social agreement on the organisation of cultural-artistic and entertainment events for the workers abroad*, issued in December 1972 it was stated that “too much attention had been given to the “entertainment” element of guest workers’ activities, while the “culture” part had been unjustifiably neglected.”\(^80\)

There were many signs that such concerns were not ungrounded. The folk part of the concerts was always the most popular one, and it was not uncommon that audience booed off stage the opera stars that came to sing after folk singers Nada Mamula and Nedeljko Bilkić, so that even the host speaker could not calm the enraged spectators.\(^81\) Performances of folk stars such as Silvana Armenulić could attract more people than concerts of the Belgrade and Zagreb philharmonic orchestras combined.\(^82\) Such a penchant for folk music started hurting even the political purpose of these rallies, as could be seen in the poorly visited Day of Youth celebration of 1972, attended by only 80 people. The event was ignored by most of local Yugoslavs because they “were not interested in 30 minutes of Tito-related speeches,” without any dancing spectacle afterwards due to a small venue.\(^83\)

In 1972, the Coordinating Committee concluded that events for guest workers should not cause euphoria [*dert*] and a tavern-like atmosphere, but lead to emigrants’ education and

\(^79\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 479, dok. 2369.
\(^80\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 014-2335/1, Društveni dogovor o organizaciji kulturno-umetničkih i zabavnih priredbi za radnike u inostranstvu, 29\(^{th}\) December 1972.
\(^81\) *Novosti iz Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, No. 210, 19\(^{th}\) December 1974, 15.
\(^82\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 484, dok. 582/4.
\(^83\) AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 723, dok. 527-2519/453.
enlightenment, because “constant feeding [of Gastarbeiter] with folklore would only make them dumber.” The insistence on folk dances and music was also seen as a wrong presentation of Yugoslav culture to Westerners, because “they will also be bored always seeing us playing lutes [tamburamo], as if it were all we knew,” even if top-notch singers were performing, “such as Mišo Kovač, Vice Vukov, Đorđe Marjanović and others.” The external impression of concerts was also important due to frequent stereotyping of Gastarbeiter by German media to be prone to alcoholism, violence and lecherousness. Low artistic quality was blamed not only for spoiling the taste of audiences, but also for causing political damage to the reputation of Yugoslavia. The ideological aspect of the programs had to be “sharpened, even if it went against the taste of a part of the audience.”

Music-wise, genres other than folk were introduced into concert programs. Classical music performers (not only singers, but also instrumentalists, such as contrabass virtuoso Ljupčo Samardžiski) were invited to perform along the folk stars or even have solo concerts for Yugoslav workers abroad. An electric guitar orchestra was brought in 1975 to tour north German towns, playing interesting adaptations of Yugoslav revolutionary and patriotic songs. More dogmatic content was also introduced by patriotic recitals (including even such poets as Mayakovski) and plays by stars of the Yugoslav theatre, revolving around the revolutionary events and brotherhood and unity themes. A peculiar amalgam of folklore and modern “high” culture was created, exemplified by the folk ensemble Oro from Frankfurt am Main, which performed classical music pieces and film scores played with an ethnic touch. Much more

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84 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 479, dok. 2369.
85 Ibid.
86 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 489, dok. 014/2806/1.
90 AJ, f. 142/II, fasc. 481, dok. 2378.
attention and larger funds were dedicated to other forms of culture, such as sponsoring exhibitions of Yugoslav artists, literary evenings and theatre shows. However, compromises with the “bad taste” of emigrants had to be made, in order for “serious” culture to be consumed. For instance, during the break between acts of a theatre performance, folk singers were invited to perform a few popular numbers.⁹¹

It is hard to say how successful these efforts to “cultivate” economic emigrants were. In the popular discourse in Yugoslavia (and in post-Yugoslav countries as well), Gastarbeiter were intrinsically entwined with the stereotypes about rural nœuve riche who competed among themselves in proving their status with lush and kitschy residences and expensive cars.⁹² These stereotypes always tied Gastarbeiter to folk culture of the shallowest kind, as people lost in migration from their poor rural roots into the unknown and alien urban culture of the West.⁹³ However, what can be discerned from the policies of Yugoslav authorities is the clear tendency to carefully subdue the folkloric element of migrants’ cultural activities, and to slowly introduce some more “complex” and “modern” modes of artistic expression to them. This intention could be interpreted as a part of the general strategy of the Yugoslav socialist regime to promote the ascendance of the whole working class up the cultural ladder in order to “transform their work environment, which in itself would become culture, and to overcome the age in which the history was being made behind the people’s backs.”⁹⁴ At the same time, the Yugoslav regime may have tried with this “cultural turn” to weaken the ties of this significant part of the

⁹⁴ Šuvar, Svitjet obmana, 161.
population to their rural past, which was often associated with values not necessarily in accordance with the ruling dogmas of Yugoslav socialism.

4.5 Conclusions

The efforts to keep Yugoslav workers who migrated to FR Germany in contact with their homeland, and maintain their loyalty and “correct” ideological orientation, found their most subtle channel in the “cultural-entertainment activities” organised by the Yugoslav state institutions specially for them. These activities were important to the Yugoslav regime also as a means to fill the vacuum in migrants’ lives that occurred when they moved to a foreign society into which they could not fully integrate, and to extinguish any potential interference of the hostile political emigrants from this vacuum. This meant that an institutional mechanism had to be established in the transterritorial context, with the Coordinating Committee (under the wing of SSRNJ), SSINF, Cultural-Informational Centres and diplomatic representatives cooperating closely, and serving as an officially endorsed alternative to numerous private managers, political émigré and clerical organisations and tavern-owners that operated outside of the Yugoslav state’s control.

In the beginning, the main focus of these activities was on music events, namely song and dance concerts with a strong ethnic flavour. Preference was given to large tour programs, such as Zvuci rodnog kraja or Večeras zajedno, which would bring dozens of performers from all Yugoslav republics on month-long tour legs across Western Europe and would include some of the biggest names of the Yugoslav music scene. These tours were organised along the national key, where traditional culture of every Yugoslav republic would be represented equally through invited performers and appropriate songs, dances and costumes. Emphasis was put on the rural folklore elements, as the majority of Gastarbeiter hailed from the countryside, and it was
considered that this kind of shows would ignite their nostalgia for home and preserve their ethnic and national identity. These large-scale tours, attended by thousands of people, were created as massive rallies celebrating Yugoslav patriotism and exceptional role in the bipolar world, with the multicultural legacy of Yugoslavia being revealed through a mixture of folklore embedded into a socialist revolutionary rhetoric and context.

However, from the early 1970s, the state shifted its priorities to smaller tours of Yugoslav singers and dancing troupes, and much more importantly, supported local initiatives of *Gastarbeiter* themselves to form their own artist groups. The reasons for this change were: the financial burden of expensive “blockbuster” tours, their geographical focus on big cities only, and accusations by workers and state officials that such practices led to commercialisation and profit-hunting not in accordance with a socialist society. Although big spectacles continued to attract thousands of visitors, emphasis was now on self-organised troupes of guest workers, as being one of the prime examples of how Yugoslav self-management principles could work even in a capitalist environment. At the same time, folk-influenced entertainment was to be mingled with more modern and “cultural” elements such as classical music or high arts, in order to bring emigrants’ taste closer to the ideal of urbanised and emancipated working class. Thus, although folklore was used as a means to promote the cultural legacy produced by vast masses of different Yugoslav nationalities, it simultaneously carried a danger of over-emphasising the traditions of one’s own nation, which could lead to nationalist escapades.

Beneath the façade of spontaneous patriotism and impeccable brotherhood and unity, however, inter-republican conflicts and constant fear of nationalist excesses kindled. The state and tour organisers tried to suppress them by exerting strong control over the decisions on who was allowed to represent Yugoslav culture abroad, and with what content. The pan-Yugoslav character of these music manifestations had to be omnipresent, and it was achieved through a
system of national quotas and reciprocity, modified accordingly with the 1970s constitutional changes. Still, certain singers did “sin” occasionally, and were “punished” by being ostracised from tours and the music market in general (like Vice Vukov), while all cooperation with unreliable managers and agencies was terminated. Therefore, the character of music projects had to balance between equal representation of each nation’s uniqueness (thus essentialising republics as cultural units as well) and their unity in Yugoslavism (which again, had to be rid of every centralist connotation). On the other hand, the struggle for maintaining guest workers’ narrow ethnic, as well as broader Yugoslav identity through folkloric symbols had to be combined with the efforts of authorities to elevate the working class towards a “higher” level of culture, seen as an intrinsic part of the socialist path to modernity.
CONCLUSION

The Yugoslav authorities considered the informational-propagandist policy towards economic emigrants as one of the crucial elements of maintaining connections between migrant workers and their homeland. In order for these policies to function among the citizens living outside Yugoslav borders, the appropriate institutional framework had to be extended onto the territory of FR Germany. These institutions were devoted to creating suitable forms and content of the Gastarbeiter-oriented propaganda activities, and adapting them to correspond adequately and timely to the changes within the Yugoslav system during the period 1966-1975. These adaptations in the state policies served to ameliorate potential disruptions that the internal crises within the “native” system could cause in the links between the economic emigrants and the home country, in connection to the prospects for Gastarbeiter returning to Yugoslavia.

The state developed its institutional framework for emigration affairs on several levels. The country’s institutions of highest importance, like the Presidency of Yugoslavia, the Federal Executive Council and the Presidency of the League of Communists, issued the main policy directives. On the lower echelon, special committees for “the affairs of our workers temporarily employed abroad” were created in federal institutions (the Socialist Alliance of Working People, the Committee for Information and the Bureau for the Employment Affairs) and their republican branches. There was also the diplomatic level, consisting of the embassy, general consulates and the Cultural-Informational Centres, with a more “hands-on” approach, as these bodies operated “on the ground” and had the immediate insight into local nuances and circumstances concerning the propaganda activities and the workers’ response to it.
Self-management was one of the key ideological tenets of the “Yugoslav way to socialism,” and was accordingly exported through the work of institutions dealing with economic emigrants. In order for propaganda and informational work to have a satisfactory effect, the state first needed “the mass” of guest workers to be concentrated in certain venues for social interaction. Throughout the 1960s, the state let the workers self-organise into Yugoslav clubs, either by common workplace or residence communities. This self-organisation was supposed to testify that the concept of self-management could be applied even in the circumstances of a radically different social and political environment, such as FR Germany. However, this nominal appeal to workers’ “self-organisation” was as much of a propagandist concept as it was an organisational technique. The Yugoslav state was cautious not to allow West German institutions to “organise” their workers, lest it obstruct their “self-managing” abilities. When the Yugoslav institutions started to play a more active role in “organising” the workers in the 1970s through founding the Yugoslav Cultural-Informational Centres, this increased interference of the state was interpreted as compatible with the practice of self-managing. In order to prevent the Gastarbeiter from turning into a permanently migrated diaspora (expatriates), the state took on itself the “organisational” task more firmly and actively, as a means to exert greater control over emigrants and reinforce the temporary character of their stay abroad.

The interaction between internal and external factors and the way they affected each other was one of the most crucial characteristics of the Yugoslav state’s transterritorial propaganda. Therefore, the early 1970s represented a watershed in the propaganda character. During these years, the configuration of the Yugoslav federation was reexamined and revised in multiple ways. The reformist factions in the Croatian and Serbian party tops, which unleashed the nationalist and centrifugal currents within the society, were purged by 1972, and the federation was further decentralised by 1974. On the external field, the Cold War situation became tenser,
while the 1973 oil shock led to an economic stagnation in the West, ceasing the Western need for importing workforce. Simultaneously, the Yugoslav position in the West was additionally disrupted by the upsurge of the hostile emigration’s terrorist attacks.

This blend of domestic and external causations initiated a reassessment of the state’s attitude towards the economic migrations, and the ways of positing the official stance towards it, in light of the new circumstances. On the one hand, despite the general decentralising trend in the Yugoslav political rhetoric, certain aspects of migration policy were taken over by the federal bodies, such as the control of skilled workers’ outflow, or sidelining the self-organised workers’ clubs by the Cultural-Informational Centres. On the other hand, the fragile position of Yugoslavia in the bipolar world urged the Yugoslav authorities to reconsider economic emigration’s effect on the country’s security system, as weakening its defense potential. For these reasons, the state tried using legal restrictions in 1973 to stop the outflow of military reservists abroad and to force those who had already left to return. However, the response of Gastarbeiter to these measures was mostly negative, whereas the post-1973 recession in the West ended the migration wave. The state had to shift its policy to a propagandist indoctrination of guest workers, successfully tested in the mobilisation campaigns against perceived “enemies,” such as Italy or the “hostile” political emigrants. Hence, the economic and military developments in Europe, as well as internal factors and emigrants’ response to the propaganda actions all influenced the shifts in the Yugoslav state’s perception and attitude towards economic emigrants.

The national question in Yugoslavia shaped the propaganda activities to a great extent. The institutional decision-making was frequently delegated to republican institutions. This fact, besides securing equal representation of all federal units, often caused the lack of coordination, internal bickering among the federal constituents’ bodies and inconsistency in executing the
federal decisions. Some aspects, such as the music tours’ artists and repertoire, were based along the republican quotas and reciprocity, modified according to the reconfiguration of the state, i.e. to include the provinces in 1973/74. Even non-political spheres, like folk music repertoire, often turned into politicised issues and “witch-hunting” of nationalists. Moreover, the existence of mono-national Gastarbeiter clubs caused fierce debates among Yugoslav officials and politicians, who all lobbied for the interests of their respective republic. It could be seen through these discussions that manifestations of national identity of “small” Yugoslav nations were usually interpreted as being non-subversive and in line with the official dogma of “brotherhood and unity,” unlike those of “big” nations, generally suspected of greater-state intentions. On another level, the analysis and comparison of the attitudes of the federal and republican-based specialised press concerning the 1971 events in Croatia, shows the tension between the centralist inclinations of the federal bodies and decentralising forces in republics. Due to the transterritorial character of the Gastarbeiter-oriented propaganda, this tension “spilled” over the Yugoslav borders to involve the migrated population as well.

Nevertheless, the conspicuously politicised nature of the Yugoslav propaganda cannot be disregarded. The overlapping of the Party hierarchy and organs of the state was a common feature for socialist countries, yet this fact posed big challenge to the West German partners dealing with Yugoslav institutions. Despite the generally approving attitude of the FRG regime towards the Yugoslav state’s transnational extension of sovereignty over Yugoslav workers on their territory, many voices of discontent could be heard within the German society, perceiving these practices as an intrusion into West German internal affairs. West German trade unions were also dissatisfied that they had to cooperate with the Socialist Alliance of Working People, which was perceived as an intrinsically political organisation.
Furthermore, the Party tried to extend its apparatus in order to encompass its members working in the FRG, at the same time struggling to maintain their ideological “purity.” State documents show that, despite the nominal opting for “legal” means only, the Party often resorted to infiltrating secret service agents into workers’ clubs to spread the ideologically “positive” tendencies among the Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* population. The politicised nature and ideologisation of cultural events organised for guest workers was rather explicit, being a part of the socialist modernising mission to elevate the cultural level of the working class. The example of counter-propaganda aimed against the “hostile” political emigrants is especially interesting, as it represented a case of a transterritorially led “propaganda war” between the two conflicting national and political ideologies. This war of ideologies was peculiar, as it was “fought” on the territory of a third side, that is FR Germany (suffice to add, a more gory kind of war was fought simultaneously, through assassinations and terrorist attacks). These illuminating examples show how transnational practices were implemented by the state institutions in order to protect their citizens from the potentially damaging influence of the competing propagandas.

However, the economic aspect of propaganda should not be overlooked either. The “self-management” of *Gastarbeiter* dancing troupes, for instance, was supported by the state from financial as much as from ideological reasons. On the other hand, Yugoslav clubs and their activities provided a potentially profitable ground for attracting hard currency loans to the Yugoslav development projects, or bringing profit to Yugoslav companies. Yet, the taboo label of “commercialisation” was attached to any excessive profit-hunting, as shown in the case of big music tours or domestic companies sponsoring the Yugoslav clubs. All these political, economic and cultural layers of the Yugoslav “propaganda export” have to be taken into consideration when trying to understand its mechanisms and underlying ideological messages.
In this thesis, I attempted to tackle some important questions pertaining to two big research topics, namely that of migrations from the Yugoslav region and that of Yugoslav socialist propaganda. It was not the goal of this work to analyse these complex and multi-faceted problems in their entirety. Hence, there is definitely a lot of open space for further research. The economic aspect of Yugoslav propaganda for *Gastarbeiter* could offer a useful insight into the strategies which the regime employed to motivate emigrants to send remittances back home, and invest their money into the domestic economy upon return, thus helping the modernisation and development of their socialist homeland. A further and more discerning comparison of federal policies with republican ones could lead to interesting results concerning the relation between the central governments’ vision of emigration issues and the centrifugal forces and interests of the republican elites. Also, even though this thesis is dealing solely with the state’s perception of the migration and propaganda issues, in no way does it underestimate the importance of the migrants’ response to the official policies and their own perception of the migratory experience, and the ways in which the migrants’ feedback influenced the shifts in the state policy.

The aim of this thesis was to offer an illuminating model of how transnational practices were implemented “from above” by the sending state in emigration policies. In this sense, the West German territory served as a capitalist “desert,” or “laboratory” in which the Yugoslav regime could experiment with its propaganda techniques aimed at tending their own “socialist oasis,” or to paraphrase frequent metaphor used in the state documents and emigrants themselves, “a piece of home in the unknown.” The main principle of this policy was to extend the jurisdiction of state institutions to a foreign territory, in order to encompass “its own” population living there. For ideological and economic reasons, the state did not want these migrants to become a permanently moved “diaspora,” and thus tried to transplant as many of the Yugoslav system’s
features onto the West German soil as the circumstances allowed. This “transplantation” was done by “inserting” the agency of interior-oriented institutions into the official diplomatic channels. Accordingly, the emigrants were supposed to maintain the impression of still being a part of the homeland’s system and subjected to the sending state’s control and sovereignty. The unhidden intention of Yugoslav authorities was to circumvent the geographical distance of *Gastarbeiter* and the potential alienating effects of the competing propagandas (host country, hostile emigration), in order to maintain the priority of emigrants’ “first” home over the new one they found abroad.

Whether this Yugoslav socialist “oasis” proved capable of surviving in the West German capitalist “desert” or it eventually withered due to a hostile “climate,” belongs to another story. Yet, even today the post-Yugoslav states represent countries of emigration, and are facing rather similar challenges of turning the migratory cycle inwards and keeping emigrants within their “native” system. This fact makes the question of the transterritorial emigration-oriented propaganda, in the conditions of an increasingly globalised and “transnational” world in which the significance of state borders is being constantly reexamined, all the more current and worth researching.
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