Familialism, Welfare State Regimes and Women’s Access to Paid Work: A Comparative Analysis between Hungary and Turkey

By

Tuğba Yumaklı

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Abstract
The main objective of this work is to dig up the interplay between welfare state regimes and their possible implications for women’s access to paid work. Relying on the argument that the type of welfare state regimes arises as an intervening variable in shaping women’s opportunities and prospects in the labor market, it assumes that the state can affect women’s economic activity level through deliberate policy interventions, whatever other social, economic or cultural factors affecting their participation in the labor force are. In this work, I concentrate on two countries with two very different welfare state regimes, which both are problematic in terms of women’s participation in the work force. Therefore, I will try to find a common mechanism by extracting the possible familialistic and gender-biased dimensions of social policies in Hungary and Turkey. To analyze the direction of these social policies, I will use Sigrid Leitner’s typology of “varieties of familialism” focusing on the concept of defamilialization. However, by adding social security systems to this theoretical framework, I will adopt a broader perspective which will help to take the country specific conditions into account. The application of the theory to my case studies shows that Turkey can be labeled under a gendered implicit familialism model, whereas Hungary fits to a gendered optional familialism model. Thus, the work concludes that neither of the two states pursues a social policy path encouraging women’s access to paid work.
Acknowledgement

This thesis would not be realized without the presence of several people and I would like dedicate this page to them.

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Anıl Duman. Her endless understanding and patience made the thesis writing process much more convenient for me than I thought it would be. Her insight provided me the necessary tools to sharpen my analysis and intellectual abilities.

My friends in CEU who have made this year an unforgettable period in my life with their companion also deserve a warm appreciation. They have helped me with every issue and problem, without them life would be much harder.

Also I would like to thank many times to my family who has always had a deep faith in me even when I did not have the tiniest piece of trust and faith in me.

And lastly, I would like to thank Özgür, the co-pilot of my thesis writing process. I would like to thank him many times for keeping my spirit high and freshening my hopes all the time with his endless support.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bağ – Kur</td>
<td>Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Other Self-Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Retirement Fund (Emekli Sandığı)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GYED</td>
<td>Childcare benefit (Gyermekgondozasi dij)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GYES</td>
<td>Childcare allowance (Gyermekgondozasi segely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GYET</td>
<td>Childraising support (Gyermeknevelési támogatás)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGK</td>
<td>Social Security Institution (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHÇEK</td>
<td>Social Services and Child Protection Agency (Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYDGM</td>
<td>Cooperation and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü)</td>
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Introduction

It is not an unknown fact that labor markets and welfare state regimes cannot be considered isolated from each other; rather the former is a complementary of the latter. This work is an attempt to examine this interplay between labor markets and welfare states by focusing on the social policies establishing the welfare state regime and possible implications of these social policies for women’s access to paid work. Concentrating on two countries with two very different welfare state regimes, Hungary and Turkey, which are both problematic in the area of female participation to the work force, I will try to find a common mechanism by extracting the explicitly and implicitly familialistic and gender-biased dimensions of social policies in both countries. It is argued in this thesis that these dimensions have the potential to shape women’s employment prospects and decisions.

Increasing the involvement of women in the labor force has become one of the priorities of the long run strategy of the EU. The EU has given critical importance both to make full use of its labor potential to face the challenges of an ageing population and rising global competition, and to promote gender equality by contributing to women’s social cohesion.¹ On the other hand, although the EU has set a concrete target specific for women, to increase the female employment rate to 60%, already in 2010 in Lisbon Strategy, this level could still not be achieved by 12 Member States². Low percentages in new members are the biggest reason behind this failure.³ Among them however one country, Hungary, comes forward with its 50.2% employment rate (Figure 3).⁴

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² These member states are; Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovak Republic, Spain, Poland, Romania
⁴ Only Malta has a lower female employment rate than Hungary, ibid.
Hungary, as an EU Member State, face the challenge of a distinctly low female labor force participation rate (42.5%) compared to the EU average of 49.7%.\textsuperscript{5} Perhaps more importantly, it continuously had the lowest percentage among ten post-communist, new EU Member States since the 1980s.\textsuperscript{6} Although Hungary’s decreasing trend since the 1980s in this areas is reversed beginning from 1998, nonetheless this positive turn resulted only in a 4% increase in the female labor force participation. This low performance resulted in a female activity level that is the lowest among the EU Member States with the exception of Malta and Italy. Turkey, on the other hand, as a candidate country of the EU, is increasing its efforts to catch up a higher level based on the reasons of gender equality as well as economic reasons. However, its labor force participation rate is dramatically low (24%), and more importantly, it has been decreasing since the 1980s as the case in Hungary, albeit because of different reasons. These facts, along with the general trend both at the EU and OECD level towards an increase in the female labor force participation rate, demonstrate the existence of a problematic situation in Hungary and Turkey in terms of women’s access to paid work, which makes it an appealing topic to research. However, women’s labor force participation is a complex issue since it may result due to different combinations of economic, cultural and social factors. This is why a complete evaluation of the problem necessitates a multidimensional approach taking all these factors into account. In line with this, numerous studies, which will be evaluated in the next chapter in more detail, were written focusing on the possible different factors affecting women’s employment decisions in Turkey and Hungary. Nevertheless, this work will concentrate on one aspect of the issue, which is the interaction between welfare state regimes and women’s access to paid work, because this aspect comes forward as an intervening variable, whatever the other factors in these countries are.

\textsuperscript{5} Refer to World Bank database on labor and social protection for relevant datas; <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/labor-and-social-protection> (accessed 31.05.2011)

\textsuperscript{6} These ten countries are, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Romania.
Welfare state regimes are important in the sense that deliberate policy intervention by the state in social policies can play an important role in changing attitudes and institutional arrangements characterizing labor markets.\(^7\) Thus, apart from other factors depending on economic, social and cultural conditions in a certain country, the state can change the balance of the trade-off between home and work for women by challenging the costs of working as well as the existing patriarchal attitudes through “women-friendly” social policies, as stated by Esping-Andersen.\(^8\) Because of the significant capacity of the states on this matter, it is worth evaluating the gender dimension of social policies in the two countries which constitute my case studies, Hungary and Turkey. In line with this fact, my research will question, which aspects of these two welfare state regimes, which have very different social, economic, cultural and historical backgrounds, may have been influential in preventing women’s access to paid work.

In analyzing the significance of the direction of social policies, I will use Sigrid Leitner’s categorization named “varieties of capitalism”, which is based on the defamilialization concept developed by Esping-Andersen, and examines the familialistic and gender aspects of social policies in a comparative way.\(^9\) Since this concept enables to see the role of the family in welfare by reflecting to what degree social risks are absorbed by the family, instead of giving a whether-or-not answer; it provides the flexibility which is necessary to research such a multidimensional area that is affected by social, economic and cultural factors. Furthermore, Leitner’s approach also exposes the “hidden” as well as “obvious” gender bias in family policies and their possible implications for women’s access to paid work. However, by adding social security systems to my analysis as well, I will broaden the framework of the concept, because I argue that the state can affect the interplay between state, market and family also through social security systems in an indirect way and cause the

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family pillar and especially women in this pillar to take more responsibility for welfare provision. In this way, a wider variety of social policies than the existing analyses on family policies will be examined, and this will help to take the country specific conditions into account, seeing that especially the gender-bias in the social security system of Turkey plays an important role in terms of my research topic.

Regarding the social policies in Hungary and Turkey, more emphasis will be given to familialism and gender dimensions. Thus, the path each country follows to shape the welfare mix will be examined, rather than making a one-to-one comparison at the policy level. While this will help to make a more country-specific analysis, the theoretical framework that I will use will provide a unique and analytical perspective to assess the social policies in Hungary and Turkey in terms of women’s possible employment options and opportunities. This work will contribute especially to the analysis of the familialism and gender dimensions of Turkish welfare state regime, which has not been scrutinized in the light of these concepts in a comprehensive way before, albeit there were some studies on Hungary labeling it under some categorizations of familialism. My analysis will also go beyond the existing literature on Hungary, because I will not only look at the familialistic policies, but also the degree of gender bias in them in line with Leitner’s two steps approach. Another contribution of this work relies on its comparative structure, which compares two cases that are usually addressed in different clusters in the existing literature. While comparative analyses on Hungary from similar approaches are concentrated in the studies on Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey is categorized with Southern European countries in various studies, albeit studies on the welfare state regime model of Turkey are much more limited than those on Hungary. Thus, the work will have the opportunity to analyze two very different welfare regimes ending in similar results in terms of women’s options and opportunities between home and work.

To solve the puzzle, my comparative analysis between Hungary and Turkey will focus on the current policies, but it will also give place to the historical process, since the decreasing
trend in female labor force participation seems to cover a long period since the 1980s. Small number of the case studies will help to approach the two countries in a multidimensional and deliberative way. Of course, addressing two complex units as case studies necessitates an interpretive, Weberian strategy, in order to analyze the intervening variables - the welfare state regimes in the two countries - based on a theoretical framework. Extracting the elements of the theory from my cases, I will try to find a “common mechanism” in both countries by assuming that this common mechanism has caused similar results in both of them, a low female economic activity rate. On the other hand, I will also include empirical elements in my analysis which can help to assess the cases themselves compared to other countries and to explore the possible intervening variables within the cases. For this purpose, I will use primary sources consisting of simple descriptive statistics extracted from the databases of international institutions such as EUROSTAT, OECD Family Database and World Bank which provide a wide variety of sources for both countries.

In that context, the quantitative analysis part will find place in Chapter 2, followed by the review of the relevant literature in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 will discuss the theoretical framework which will be a broadened version of Leitner’s typology based on the familialism concept. Chapter 4 will describe a brief history of social policies in two parts, a country in each, focusing on the current social policies at the end. The last and perhaps the most important part of this work, Chapter 5, will consist of the application of the theoretical framework to the social policies in Turkey and Hungary with the aim to gain insight into the possible interactions between welfare state regimes and women’s economic activity.

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1. Literature Review

Even a brief review of the literature in the areas of welfare state policies and female employment seems to be sufficient to grasp the highly multidimensional and extensive range of the subject. Especially the increase in women’s labor force participation throughout the world since the 1970s has naturally resulted in the extension of the literature on female employment. While feminization of work, an important stream of the literature, had in general focused on the post-Fordist production and outsourcing and subcontracting activities at the global level\textsuperscript{11}, the fact that it has not been a smooth process brought with itself many critical approaches, comprehending a wide range of topics such as cultural factors, gender pay gap, gender segregation in sectors, gender inequality in labor conditions, discrimination in work place and education, and last but not least, the gender dimension of welfare states. Concerning the specific cases of Hungary and Turkey on the other hand, different aspects of the problem come forward as a matter of their very different social, economic and cultural factors.

First, in regard to Turkey, researchers often addressed urbanization and the consequent decrease in agricultural employment as the main reason of the decreasing female employment rates. These studies claim that the unpaid female rural workers become discouraged workers after migrating to the urban areas.\textsuperscript{12} However, recent studies show that female labor force participation also decreased in rural areas, and more importantly, non-migrant women are even less likely to participate in the work force than migrant women, which proves the fact that the problem should and cannot be reduced to its urbanization aspect.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, the low education level of women comes forward in the literature among the factors influencing


women’s employment as well as wages.\textsuperscript{14} However, although estimations find a positive correlation between education and employment rates as expected, the decreasing participation of educated women in the work force over their life cycles has necessitated other approaches to be adopted. In this respect, the studies on socio-cultural factors\textsuperscript{15} or those which bring work and social policy together deserve special attention.\textsuperscript{16} More specifically, according to Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, studies solely focusing on one factor of employment by ignoring the deliberative attempts of the state for reconciliation between family and work are not very convincing, because the social policies in effect have the potential to challenge patriarchal attitudes as well as other obstacles limiting women’s access to paid work. However, they can also function vice versa, if the state does not make the necessary interventions through social policies, although it can manipulate the labor market so that women can be absorbed by it, or affect women’s labor force participations positively by changing the trade-off between house and work in favor of working.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, their approach is in parallel with Esping-Andersen’s view on the crucial importance of women-friendly social policies in terms of women’s economic activity, as discussed in the introduction part. Namely, there are some studies providing a deliberative attempt to examine the gender dimension of social policies in Turkey, although they do not establish an explicit link between social policies and the labor market or


\textsuperscript{15} G"{u}l"{u}y "{S}"{e}nese and Semsa ""{O}zar, “Determinants of Female (non) Participation in the Urban Labour Force in Turkey,” \textit{METU Studies in Development} 25, no. 4 (1998), 312.


\textsuperscript{17} Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, “Structural Change,” 530
use Leitner’s typology.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, several studies were written categorizing Turkish welfare state regime as a Southern European model.\textsuperscript{19}

Regarding the interaction between social policies and the labor market however, dissatisfied with the “gender blindness” of Esping-Andersen’s pioneering work focused on the decommodification of labor\textsuperscript{20}, researchers have found a strong correlation between the character of the welfare state and gender inequalities.\textsuperscript{21} Taking these criticisms into account, Esping-Andersen’s following works emphasized the necessity of defamilialization of social policies and of a “new gender contract”.\textsuperscript{22} In his work, he argues that the standard patriarchal attitudes both reflect and influence the level of female employment through family policies as elaborated in the introduction part of this paper.\textsuperscript{23} In that context, many comparative studies assert that deliberate policy intervention by the state can play an important role in changing attitudes and institutional arrangements characterizing labor markets and welfare regimes.\textsuperscript{24} Among them, many studies based their analyses on the concepts of familialism and defamilialization,\textsuperscript{25} but only few of them went beyond a bipolar approach by talking about varieties of familialism and creating categorizations.\textsuperscript{26}

Fortunately, contrary to the literature on Turkey, there are a wide range of studies on Hungary adopting the welfare state regime as a factor of the gender inequality in the labor


\textsuperscript{20} Esping-Andersen, “The Three Worlds,”


\textsuperscript{22} Esping-Andersen, “Social Foundations;”

\textsuperscript{23} Gosta Esping-Andersen, Why we need a new welfare state, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).


market. Even though the disappearance of some jobs after the transition process seems to be effective, the effect of the ideological backlash and child care along with labor market regulations are the main determinants according to many studies. According to Szikra for instance, patriarchal relations that have remained untouched despite communism have both a direct and indirect effect in this regard, since they also play a role in shaping of the welfare state regime in the country. In addition, there are various sources which analyze social policies in Hungary from a familialism perspective, in addition to other sources which mostly focus on the care function of the family. The studies which tried to label Hungary under a model did not however agree upon a certain category, which varies from a “comprehensive supportive” to a “limited optional familialism”, or even to a liberal model. Thus, a review of the literature shows that the debate on the social policies in Hungary provide more similar perspectives to that of this work compared to the studies in Turkey, both in regard to the content and theoretical framework. However, this research will add more to this debate by looking at the gender dimension in addition to the familialistic of the social policies in Hungary and furthermore, the existing literature will be reexamined critically in the context of the paper. Nevertheless, before a comprehensive interpretative analysis, it is useful to look at empirical data in order to see the significance of the two cases compared to other countries, or explore possible relationships between social policies and female economic


30 Szelewa and Polakowski, “Who Cares?”

31 Haney, “Welfare Reform,”
activity, but since the aim of the work is rather a critical interpretive analysis, only a brief information on the topic will be given place in the data analysis part in the next chapter.
2. Data Analysis on Reconciliation of Family and Work

As already mentioned in the introduction part, Hungary has a significantly low female activity rate compared to the EU average, but more importantly, it faces the same faith among the post-communist new Member States as well. Despite the general decreasing trend of female labor force participation in the aftermath of the collapse of communism in these countries, Hungary has consistently shown a lower performance than the other countries which are usually compared with Hungary in the literature. The low performance of Hungary in this area can obviously be seen on Figure 1, which includes the female labor force participation rates in the Visegrad countries since the 1980s (Figure 2). Accordingly, although its decreasing trend since the 1980s reversed beginning from 1998 like many other post-communist countries, this positive turn obtained only a 4% increase in the female labor force participation, which is still one of the lowest female activity rates in the EU (Figure 3).

**Figure 1: Female labor force participation rate in Visegrad countries, 1980-2009**

![Graph showing female labor force participation rates in Visegrad countries, 1980-2009](source: World Bank)

On the other hand, Turkey’s female activity level seems like a much more exceptional case compared to the EU countries with its dramatically low rate of 24% (Table 1). More interestingly, despite its decreasing trend such as in the case of Hungary, a review of the past data indicates that its position

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32 Activity and labor force participation have been used in this work interchangeably.
among Southern European countries, which is the group in that Turkey is usually clustered in the literature in terms of its welfare regime, was not the same at the beginning of the 1980s. While the female activity rate was even above that of Spain and very close to Greece, one can see a clear diverging trend throughout this process. This process led to a level which is almost 8% lower than the second lowest rate in the EU (Malta). Adding Hungary to this framework, one can claim that both Hungary and Turkey have remarkable trends in terms of the access of women to the labor market, the latter at the most extreme level. The situations of these countries thus result in female activity rates which are among the lowest in the EU, as seen on Figure 3. This situation necessitates a closer look at the data focusing on a certain aspect of the issue: family status.

Figure 2 Female activity rate in selected Mediterranean Countries, 1980-2009

Source: World Bank

Table 1: Female Labor Force Participation Rate in Hungary and Turkey, 1980-2009

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>49,6</td>
<td>49,1</td>
<td>48,7</td>
<td>48,3</td>
<td>47,9</td>
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<td>44,6</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>24,4</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>25,1</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>
The next data will thus be focused on the maternal employment rate\textsuperscript{33} in the two countries, since maternal employment rates are usually a significant factor pulling down the average female activity rate\textsuperscript{34}. This may also help to see the potential link between family policies and employment in Hungary and Turkey for which purpose OECD Family Database that provides a wide range of sources will be used. Figure 4 compares the female employment rates (25-49 age cohort) with the maternal employment rates among the OECD countries. The gap between the two implies a negative correlation between having children and female

\textsuperscript{33} Employment rate of only mothers.

employment, even though not a causal relationship. Accordingly, Turkey has the lowest maternal employment rate among all the countries, while the rate in Hungary is also extremely low. It has the lowest maternal employment after Turkey, Malta and Mexico. Furthermore, although the same gap can be seen almost in every OECD country except Sweden and Norway, the gap in Hungary is relatively high compared to other countries, which can be seen more explicitly on Table 2. According to this table including the data on EU countries and Turkey, the difference between women with and without children is highest in Hungary after the Czech Republic. The employment rate of mothers in Hungary is almost as much as 48% lower than the employment rate of women without children. Thus, this extreme gap has a dramatic role in pulling down the female employment rate of Hungary, whereas the case in Turkey is more about a general low female employment rather than resulting from an extreme gap between mothers and non-mothers.

**Figure 4: Maternal employment rates compared to female employment rates, 2008**

Source: OECD Family Database
### Table 2: Female employment difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th></th>
<th>Difference</th>
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<td>With Children</td>
<td>Without Children</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>83,6</td>
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<td>-29,4</td>
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<td>57,4</td>
<td>81,5</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>-24,1</td>
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Source: Eurostat

The second figure (Figure 2) focuses on another aspect of the family status: Maternal employment rate by number of children. The data again confirms that the family status may have a crucial effect on the female employment rate in Hungary and Turkey, which have the lowest employment levels among mothers with more than three children with the exception of Malta that is between them. In other words, women in the two countries with more than three children seem to be the women with the least employment levels among all OECD countries with the exception of Malta. Furthermore, the situation of women with one or two children does not seem more promising than the previous case. In addition to the fact that Turkey has...
the lowest rate in all the three categories, also the rates of Hungarian women with one or two children do not get any better.\footnote{The only exception is that Hungarian women with two children have slightly higher employment rates compared to those in Italy.}

**Figure 5: Maternal employment rates by number of children under 15, 2008**

![Maternal employment rates by number of children under 15, 2008](image)

Source: OECD Family Database

Lastly, the data on maternal employment rates by age of youngest children (Figure 3) demonstrates that the level for women whose youngest child is under the age of three is lowest in Hungary. While surprisingly this rate is even lower than that of Turkey, also women with children between the ages of 3-5 in Hungary are women with the least employment level among their European counterparts along with Malta, Italy and Turkey. Nevertheless, despite Turkish mothers’ employment levels are the lowest almost in all the three categories, the employment level of Hungarian women with children between the ages of 6-15 is relatively high.
Put together, the above figures and data clearly demonstrate the significance of the female employment problem in Hungary and Turkey. At least for these two cases, they imply a negative correlation between employment and having children, even though this does not necessarily show a causal relationship. In this regard, Figure 5 and 6 demonstrate the significance of having children even more specifically. According to the data, one can say that in Hungary the gap between mothers and non-mothers play a much bigger role than in the case of Turkey, while in the latter case low female participation rate is rather a general phenomenon among women with a narrower gap between different family status, and the common explanations for this low level were mentioned in the previous chapter. However, it is obvious that the significance and effect of the family status in terms of women’s access to paid work should be evaluated more, which will be made in this work based on Leitner’s typology and Esping-Andersen’s conceptualizations. For this purpose, the next chapter will
discuss the theoretical framework which will provide the necessary approach for the
following interpretive comparative analysis.
3. Theoretical Debate

Due to the importance of the gender-bias in social policies in terms of women’s labor force participation decisions, a theoretical framework, which enables to see the explicit as well as implicit interventions of the state in this area through social policies, will be used in this work. Along this line, Sigrid Leitner’s categorization of “varieties of familialism”\textsuperscript{36} that is based on Esping-Andersen’s defamilialization concept will be applied to the case studies on the social policies of Turkey and Hungary.

Three pillars of welfare, state, market and family, or more specifically, the combination of what they provide, are likely to determine the welfare of individuals at the micro-level. In this line, the logic of any welfare system becomes only clear by examining the interplay of public and private provision of welfare. As Esping-Andersen mentions, “it is the interplay that defines the overall distributional structure, the relation social rights and private contracts, inequalities of class, gender, or status, and, in the final analysis, defines welfare-state regimes”.\textsuperscript{37} An obvious example of this interplay can be found in welfare states which rely on a traditional male-breadwinner model and where the family pillar tends to be stronger in providing the welfare of the individual compared to others. However, at the macro-level, the result of the interplay between state, market and family that results in a male-breadwinner model becomes a more complex one, because this interplay also has the potential to shape the labor market as well as other markets. This potential relationship between welfare state regimes and the labor market is described by Esping-Andersen as follows:

“… a traditional male bread-winner family will have less demand for private or public social services than a two-career household. But, when families service themselves, the market is directly affected because there will be less labor supply and fewer service outlets. In turn, if the state provides cheap daycare, both families and the market will change: there will be fewer housewives, more labor force participation, and a new


\textsuperscript{37} Esping – Andersen, “Three Worlds of Welfare States,” 139.
demand multiplier caused by double-earner households’ greater propensity to purchase services.38

Thus, according to this view, social policy and the labor are mutually interdependent institutions. If one exemplifies this interdependence, social policies become a major agent of labor-market clearing through ways such as easing the exit of women with family programs; facilitating female labor-supply by providing necessary social services; helping people in reconciling their role as economic producers, social citizens, and family members.39 Thus, from a gender perspective, how welfare is distributed through social policies and if social risks are absorbed through family is an important question that affects both supply and demand decisions of individuals.

In the present paper however, more emphasis will be given to the “familialism” dimension of the welfare state regimes in Turkey and Hungary in the context of family policies and social security systems. By focusing on social security systems as well, I will go beyond Leitner’s analysis in which she uses her categorization on familialism mostly to interpret family policies. I argue that the state can affect the interplay between state, market and family also through social security systems in an indirect way and cause the family pillar to take more responsibility for welfare provision. An explanation of the social policies in Hungary and Turkey by broadening the perspective of the concept will expose the “hidden” as well as “obvious” gender bias in these policies and their possible implications for women’s labor market decisions. In this way, a wider variety of social policies will have been evaluated than Leitner’s categorization along with Esping-Andersen’s analysis on defamilialization provides us, albeit the specific focus of the implications of the social security system will be on Turkey since Hungary has a more individualized rather than dependency based social security system. Thus, considering the social policies in Hungary and Turkey, more emphasis will be given to the policies with a strong gender dimension in each country.

38 Esping – Andersen, “Social Foundations,” 36
39 ibid., 149
Thus, the path each country follows to shape the welfare mix will be examined, rather than making a one-to-one comparison at the policy level. For this purpose, it is necessary to focus on the concept of familialism in greater detail before describing Leitner’s varieties of familialism.

Esping-Andersen uses familialism to show to what degree the family plays a role in absorbing social risks, whereas in the case of de-familialization the state instead of the family provides protection. More specifically, in a familialistic system the family must carry the principal responsibility for individual’s welfare. On the contrary, in a de-familializing system, policies are designed to diminish individual’s welfare dependence on the family. This means, familialist policies are designed such that they intervene only when the family fails. For that reason, it is expected that family policies in a familialist model either are passive and undeveloped or explicitly assigns the responsibility to the family. Hence, the fact that a system is familialist affects at the same time the degree of women’s economic independence, because in a familialistic model they are usually the primary care taker of the family. This leads us to the conclusion that family policies cannot be isolated from women’s employment status.

It is however not easy to measure the degree of the effect of family policies on female employment which is affected by many social, economic and cultural factors. While there are some studies which show almost a perfect linear relationship between unpaid hours of work and female employment, studies that focus more on the causes of the amount of unpaid work in an interpretive way, such as the ones mentioned in Chapter 1, seem to provide a broader perspective. In that context, looking at some empirical data, Esping-Andersen argues that mothers’ employment prospects would be served by defamilializing policies since they

40 ibid, p.40.
have the potential to decrease the amount of unpaid work.\textsuperscript{42} In short, according to him, the primary indicator of the degree of familial welfare responsibilities is the time spent on domestic unpaid obligations. Therefore, the question of which policies allow the reduction of women’s unpaid domestic hours gains importance.

Esping-Andersen asserts that four kinds of indicators can present the degree of defamilializing: public family service expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the availability of public child care, home-help services for the elderly, the combined value of cash benefits and tax reductions. In the absence of these measures he talks about a familialistic model. As will be explained below, this model can further be strengthened by paid or unpaid maternal leaves according to Leitner, because this means that the family is encouraged to undertake as much responsibility as possible for the care function. However, Esping-Andersen’s last indicator, the combined value of cash benefits and tax reductions, creates ambiguity, because the burden on family is diminished only if the transfers consisting of cash benefits and tax reductions can bear the cost of the market price. Even so, although public subsidies may decrease the burden of the private care, usually their amount is not high enough to compensate it. In addition, their positive effect can decrease, if the tax system penalizes wives’ employment in form of a heavy marginal tax for the second-earner. Also Leitner questions the defamilializing effect of family allowances and tax reductions claiming that market driven care provision through them is a class-biased issue and cannot be considered as defamilializing for every income level. Taking these points into account, this work will adopt Leitner’s approach to this last indicator along with the others, as will be explained below in more detail.

Sigrid Leitner elaborates Esping-Andersen’s familialism approach by using a two-steps analysis which consists of the categorization of varieties of familialism and of their gendered and degendered variants.\textsuperscript{43} Specifically, policies which actively aim at strengthening the

\textsuperscript{42} Esping - Andersen, “Social Foundations,” 62
\textsuperscript{43} Leitner, “Varieties of familialism,”
family in its caring function can be distinguished by the degree of time rights (parental leave, care leave), direct and indirect transfers for caring (cash benefits, tax reductions), and social rights attached to care giving (individual pension rights, rights in other social security schemes). As seen, Leitner sees family allowances and tax reductions as instruments of familialism, while Esping-Andersen includes them in defamilializing policies. Leitner’s approach thus differs from the latter in the respect that the support for the caring function of the family only through direct public provision of services should determine the degree of defamilialization in a certain policy area. In this line, policies such as public provision of childcare, public subsidies given directly for private care provisions, and other social care services aim to relieve family from its responsibilities; can be referred to as de-familializing policies. Considering these differentiations, she defines four types of policy models according to the provision of care function: defamilializing, implicit familialistic, explicit familialistic and optional familialistic. These variants are described by Leitner as follows:

“The explicit familialism not only strengthens the family in caring for children, the handicapped and the elderly through familialistic policies. It also lacks the provision of any alternative to family care. This lack in public and market driven care provision together with strong familialization explicitly enforces the caring function of the family…. Within the optional familialism services as well as supportive care policies are provided. Thus, the caring family is strengthened but is also given the option to be (partly) unburdened from caring responsibilities…. The implicit familialism neither offers de-familialization nor actively supports the caring function of the family through any kind of familialistic policy. Nevertheless, the family will be the primary caretaker in these welfare regimes since there are no alternatives at hand. Nevertheless, the family will be the primary caretaker…. Finally, de-familialism would be characterized by strong de-familialization due to the state or market provision of care services and weak familialization.”

\[44\] ibid., 358
The second step of Leitner’s approach relies on the fact that the different variants of familialism can differ among or within themselves according to their dimension of gender inequality. According to Leitner, there is a gendered model of familialism that is connected to the male breadwinner/female homemaker ideology and a degendered model that can provide gender equality in the field of family care. Regarding the degree of gender sensitivity within each type of familialism, it is possible to say that implicit familialism and defamilialization do not directly intervene in gender relations. Nevertheless, the former affects gender equality negatively, since it confirms the status quo of gendered care provision; while the latter weakens breadwinner type of models by providing appropriate conditions for gender equality in the labor market. By contrast, optional familialism and explicit familialism directly regulate

\[45 \text{ ibid., 354}\]
gender relations, because the family’s care function they support is usually fulfilled by women. However, it should not be forgotten that optional familialism is a rather special case, because it also supports formal care arrangements, and thus, provides women with an option rather than obligation. Lastly, Leitner draws attention to the fact that both explicit and optional familialism have theoretically the possibility to create a gender-unbiased form of familialism. However, because of the existing gender norms such as the explicit assignment of family care to women, devaluation of family care compared to employment, and exclusion of different family care arrangements (homosexual, unmarried couples), and these two types of familialisms are usually gender-biased. On the other hand, the exceptional cases in which familialistic policies do not assign different functions because of biological sex differences, protect financial independence of the care taker, provide choices to move between family care and employment, and provide comparable benefits for different family care arrangements should be considered as cases of de-gendered familialism. Therefore, in order to evaluate the second step of Leitner’s approach, one needs to look at the frequency of shared parenting and child care options in families and the amount and length of parental benefits more deeply, and not to forget the effect of the existing gender norms in different cultures.

Along this line, in my analysis, I will focus on the family policies mentioned in Leitner’s analysis which also benefits from Esping-Andersen’s interpretation on defamilializing policies. However, when looking at the degrees of gender inequality of different familialism models I will go beyond the policies discussed by Leitner, because in line with the main argument of this work discussed in the introduction part, the state may affect the degree of gender inequality through social security systems as well. This is because social security systems may affect if there is a gendered model of familialism that is connected to the male breadwinner in an implicit way by consolidating the gender roles. For that reason, even a model which fits to the category of implicit familialism at first sight may

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46 ibid., 368
directly intervene in gender relations through social security systems if not through family policies. Thus, I also add a gendered implicit familialism model to Leitner’s framework, which explains the case of Turkey as will be discussed in the last chapter in great detail.

In order to comprehend the indirect effect of the social security systems on the gender dimension of different familialism models, it is necessary to focus more on the male breadwinner model and its opposite case which relies on the concept of “decommodification”. In its broad sense, the male-breadwinner model refers to a male-bias in the set of policies. According to Sainsbury, male breadwinner models, which entitle women to certain rights relying on their “dependent” status, undermine women’s independence more compared to citizenship-based models of social policy. In addition, entitlements based on full-employment and career implicitly favoring the male breadwinner, and this leaves women in a more vulnerable position, since there is no choice left but using social entitlements derivative of their husbands. On the other hand, the potential positive effect of a citizenship-based, rather than employment-based model on female activity in the labor market becomes apparent if one considers the example of Nordic countries, where even single mothers have a high labor force participation rate thanks to generous citizenship-based benefits and child care provisions. Contrary to the male-breadwinner models however, this is achieved through a female-biased welfare state system which is accompanied by a defamilialization and decommodification process for both men and women.

Inspired by Karl Polanyi, Esping-Andersen defines decommodification as a criterion for social rights that shows “the degree to which they permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces.” However, an interpretation of de-commodification as the main and absolute criterion for the quality of social rights may overlook their gender

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48 Esping Andersen, “The Three Worlds,” 50
49 Katherine McFate, Roger Lawson, and William Julius Wilson, Poverty, Inequality and the Future of Social Policy. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995.)
50 Esping Andersen, “The Three Worlds,”
51 ibid., p.3
dimension, since the decommodifying relationship between the labor market and welfare states revolves around the economically independent, commodified labor. More specifically, the presupposition that individuals are already commodified is misleading, because women’s economic role is often non-commodified or at least partially commodified due to the dual burden of employment and family responsibilities. In this sense, the concept of decommodification in its theoretical sense should be inapplicable to women unless welfare states help them become commodified before that. This gives rise to confusion in conservative welfare state models of Continental Europe, which, according to Esping-Andersen’s comparisons, score high on indices of both decommodification and familialism. This is because for a conservative reformer decommodification is desirable as long as it consolidates familial ties and interdependency. It is however necessary to emphasize that there is a crucial difference of the meaning of decommodification in a conservative and in a social democrat regime. Social democrat welfare regimes first enable commodification for female labor through defamilializing policies as a precondition, which provides them later to decommodify women as defamilialization reduces the familial responsibilities. On the other hand, decommodification without defamilialization strengthens the patriarchy and traditional family bonds and strengthens the male-breadwinner in conservative welfare regimes. This whole relationship is stated by Esping-Andersen as follows:

“The concept of de-commodification has relevance only for individuals already fully and irreversibly inserted in the wage relationship. In practice, this means that it increasingly does speak to women, too. Yet, it remains a fact that a large proportion of women (and some men) is institutionally 'pre-commodified'; their welfare derives from being in a family. The functional equivalent of market dependency for many women is family dependency. In other words, female independence necessitates 'de-familializing' welfare obligations.”

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52 Orloff, “Gender,”
53 Esping – Andersen, “The Three Worlds,” 44
54 Esping – Andersen, “Social Foundations,”
55 Esping – Andersen, “The Three Worlds,” 45
In short, conservative welfare policies either reproduce women’s imprisonment in their precommodified status through decommodifying policies or do nothing to lessen the dual burden of employment and family responsibilities. While women in such a male-breadwinner model are discouraged from participating in the labor market, they can easily access these rights due to their entitlement derivative of their working husbands or fathers; but in this case may lose their incentives to gain their own economic independence.\(^{56}\) Social security systems should be evaluated from this perspective, since they have the potential to decommodify women through pension and healthcare insurance schemes in which entitlements are defined according to family status, and thus, intervene in gender relations in a certain familialism model. In other words, social security systems may consolidate the second-earner role of women by emphasizing the dependent, “weak” status of women and create a “gendered” implicit, explicit or optional familialism. It seems therefore useful to evaluate the gender dimension of the familialism models in Turkey and Hungary from this perspective in addition to the evaluation of family policies. The examination of a social security system enabling decommodification of women without defamilializing them will be useful to find out women’s “hidden” pre-commodified status in Turkey and Hungary, if there is one. For this purpose, pension and healthcare systems will be added to my analysis.

In conclusion, Leitner’s categorization based on Esping-Andersen’s familialism approach will be used to evaluate the types of familialism in Hungary and Turkey and the degree of gender bias in these types. Incorporating the social security systems to my analysis will help to determine the degree of gender inequality in both welfare systems in a more complete way. This analysis will provide implications for the possible negative effects of social policies on the female labor force participation in Hungary and Turkey. Along this line, the disclosure of possible familialism and gender dimensions of the family policies and social security systems in these countries will lead this work to the conclusion that in Turkey one can talk about a

\(^{56}\) ibid., p.51
gendered implicit familialism, while Hungary fits better to a gendered optional familialism model, but both models have an orientation towards explicit familialism. For this purpose social policies including maternity and parental leave policies, social assistance schemes designed for care, cash benefits and tax reductions, home-help services and public child care provisions will be discussed in the next chapter, after giving a brief history and summary of social policies in both countries.
4. Social Policies in Turkey and Hungary

4.1 Turkey

Although the roots of the Turkish welfare system lie in the Ottoman era especially thanks to its funds for the military officials, civil servants and orphans that were established under the war conditions, it was developed by and large in the post-World War 2 period. One of the most obvious characteristics of this welfare regime has been its fragmented structure which relied on separate insurance schemes for different occupational categories such as in the case of labor market regulations until the very recent past.\(^{57}\) Second, the system has been complemented by informal mechanisms such as family and kinship, because both the conditions of the labor market, in which self-employment, unpaid family work, and informal employment practices have been very common, and the underdevelopment of the formal welfare system has necessitated this.\(^{58}\)

The family policies of Turkey, which will be the first part of my analysis in the next chapter, date back to the Ottoman Empire period, although they were limited in content at the beginning.\(^{59}\) The first protective measure that contained maternity leaves in addition to detailed restrictions on working conditions, the Law on Public Hygiene, was introduced in 1930 in accordance with the pronatalist discourse of the nation-building process. The law banned pregnant women from working three weeks before and after the delivery and also provided breast-feeding breaks twice a day.\(^{60}\) This was followed by the first Labor Law of the Republic in 1936, which incorporated half paid maternity leave to the existing measures in addition to some provisions regarding the working conditions of women and children, but


\(^{58}\) Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, Poverty and Social Policy in Contemporary Turkey, (İstanbul, Turkey, 2005). Available online at: <http://www.spf.boun.edu.tr/docs/WP-Bugra-Keyder.pdf>

\(^{59}\) Azer Kılıç, “Gender and Social Policy in Turkey: Positive Discrimination or a Second – Class Female Citizenship?” (M.A. thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2006.): 38

they could not be implemented completely. The first institutionalized maternity insurance however came into effect in 1945 for workers and was developed later by the amendments in 1950 and 1964. According to the Law, maternity leave was transformed to a paid leave with an allowance of 70% of the wage. Furthermore, it also provided the uninsured wives of insured men with maternity allowances. For civil servants on the other hand, the first institutionalized maternity benefit that was a 9-weeks paid leave came in 1965 with the Law on Civil Servants. In addition, it provided married civil servants with family allowances.

Looking at the history of family policies in Turkey, its fragmented structure and privileges given to some occupational groups can be immediately seen.

The first reforms that brought with itself considerable changes in the area of family policies were the ones which passed in 2000s in line with the National Programme prepared according to EU directives. First, the reform of the Labor Law in 2003 increased the duration of maternity leaves for workers to sixteen weeks in addition to providing the necessary flexibility to the labor market by regulating new methods such as part-time and temporary jobs, which was followed by the increase for civil servants. Considering the other relevant commitments in the National Programme, the preparation of a draft law on parental leave for both workers and civil servants has considerable importance. The draft law included an unpaid leave of up to twelve months for workers in the year following paid maternity leave and it was non-transferable between spouses, while for civil servants the leave was transferable. However, the draft law dropped from the parliamentary agenda, and in 2011, a different version of the Law came into force. Accordingly, only civil servants have the right to use a transferable parental leave of up to 24 months.

61 Kılıç, “Gender and Social Policy,” p. 90
62 Kılıç, “Gender and Social Policy,” p. 89
64 Kılıç, “Gender, Family and Children,”
Also the social assistance schemes in form of cash benefits in the country deserve attention to see the complete picture of the family policies. Parallel with the increasing social risks in the urbanization process in the post-1980 period, which was accompanied by a retreat from the rural family structure and rural conditions, new social assistance mechanisms were introduced. In that context, the most important step was the establishment of the Cooperation and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü - SYDGM), an umbrella organization that consists of over 900 local foundations and provides the poor with help services. It is possible to talk about the dominance of traditional charity activities led by public-private partnerships with the help of these local foundations, which is referred to as “new welfare governance” by Keyder and Buğra.66 These mostly in-kind aids are done through local Social Assistance and Solidarity Associations and usually target non-employed women, children, the elderly and disabled.

Among the new, means-tested social assistance mechanisms, “Back to the Family” programme, “Conditional Cash Transfers” and a recent law introduced on the care of the disabled and elderly require special emphasis in the context of my analysis. The former aims to send children who are cared by the Social Services and Children Protection Agency back to their families by providing monetary assistance for them in return.67 However, if this is not possible, the program prefers adoption over institutional care. (Yazıcı, 2007).68 The latter, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT), which is funded by the World Bank and has been implemented in various developing countries since the 1990s, has a similar function, and also its distribution is conducted by the SYDGM. In line with the targets of the programme, the transfers are given to mothers on condition that children will benefit from basic health and education services. Finally, through a last component of these social assistance schemes,

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67 Kılıç, “Gender, Family and Children,”
which was introduced in February 2007, the government changed the face of disabled care in Turkey. They issued a new law that promotes prioritization of home-based care of disabled and elderly people in need of care, instead of developing the state led institutional care. The new article allows the care of a disabled or elderly person at home, through a cash payment equal to the official monthly minimum wage. With the law, the number of the disabled people cared at home showed an enormous increase. Finally, it should be mentioned that the number of care facilities in Turkey is very limited, and more importantly, the biggest share of care centers for both children and the elderly is composed of private institutions.

Another policy area that will be evaluated in this work in addition to family policies is the social security system. By dating back to the 19th century, when various retirement funds were established for military and civil state officials, it constitutes one of the oldest pillars of Turkish social policies. Under the conditions of the First World War, the orphan funds, which had been established for both orphans and widows in the 19th century, were extended in line with the militarist and nationalist discourses to ensure social solidarity and mobilization. In the Republican period, the retirement funds for military and civil officials remained in existence under various schemes, until the Law on Retirement Fund (ES) that brought them together was introduced in 1949. In addition, the retirement funds that were concerning only military and civil officials by then were extended in 1949 with the establishment of the Old Age Insurance. In the post World War two era the development of social policies accelerated along with the adoption of the social state principle by Constitution of 1961. The insurance schemes for workers were brought together in 1964 with the Law on Social Security Organization (SSK – Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu). Thus, it composed a two-pillar structure along with the Retirement Fund (ES – Emekli Sandığı), to whom a third pillar called the

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71 Kılıç, “Gender and Social Policy,” 40

72 Nadir Özbek, Cumhuriyet Türkiye’inde Sosyal Güvenlik ve Sosyal Politikalar, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2006)

73 Kılıç, “The Gender Dimension,”
Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Other Self-Employed (Bağ-Kur) was added in 1971. This three-pillar structure remained in existence until the last reform in 2008 which gathered them under the roof of one institution, the Social Security Institution (SGK – Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu). In short, the fragmented structure and privileges seen in family policies are also a part of the social security system of Turkey, which gives the privileges mostly to women and the disabled instead of some occupational groups in this case.

Finally, especially in the last decade, there have been various amendments in the social security system in Turkey referring the fiscal crisis of the system due to the high ratio of dependents to contributors and IMF conditionality. Along this line, the first reform that increased the minimum retirement age to 58 for women and 60 for men realized in 1999. The second reform was passed in 2008 after long lasting negotiations, although it was on the agenda since the 1990s.\footnote{Sinem Adar, “Turkey: Reform in Social Policy,” \textit{European Journal of Social Policy} 17, no. 2 (2007): 167-168.} This reform consisted of three parts: all social security schemes, SSK, ES and Bağ-Kur were brought together under one institution to reduce the current inequalities between workers, civil servants and the self-employed; a universal healthcare is planned to be introduced; and the pension schemes are planned to be reformed by 2048.\footnote{Duyulmus, “Tackling Low Female,”} Thus, the practice of repayment of premiums and severance to women in the case of termination of work due to marriage, which is a part of the current system, will continue until the same year.

Apart from the direct effects of these amendments on all citizens, the social security system in Turkey has a gender dimension as well resulting from its existing gender-differentiated structure. The gender dimension of the social security system and family policies in Turkey will be discussed in the next chapter, which will begin with the categorization of Turkey within Leitner’s familialism models and continue with the evaluation of the degree of gender inequality in this model.
The roots of the Hungarian welfare system rely on the Bismarckian principles of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. These roots include the introduction of maternity leaves as early as 1884 and the creation of the first public kindergartens in 1891. Kindergartens served nationalist and industrialization aims in the multi-ethnic Hungarian Kingdom as a part of public education. While the legacy of the Empire may thus partly explain Hungary’s relatively extensive public childcare provision compared to the other post-communist countries; in the aftermath of the First World War, or in other words, after the country gained its independence, maternity policies gained importance due to the fear of the “disappearance of the nation”. In this period, in addition to the extension of childcare provisions for the continuity of industrial growth in the 1930s, an ethnicity-based family allowance paid each month to families who rear children and a paid maternity leave were introduced to strengthen the nation-building process.

In the post-World War 2 period, in order to compensate the population and economic loss caused by the War, maternity leave, family allowances and childcare provisions continued along with restrictive legislations on abortion. Because of the importance of women’s labor force participation in the communist system, social policies tried to encourage women to balance family and paid work, while they did not show a commitment to transform men’s role within the domestic division of labor. After the 1956 Revolution in Hungary, a “hidden contract” between the state and its citizens resulted in the extension of social rights which brought with itself the extension of paid maternity leaves, while fathers could take parental leave only after 1985. This represented a slight turn away from the

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76 Szikra, “Eastern European Faces,”
77 ibid. p. 87
80 Szikra, “Eastern European Faces,”
earlier policies that had focused on creating incentives for women’s employment. In this respect, it is possible to claim that the communist state did not challenge the gendered division of labor and limited the quality of women’s labor force participation by increasing their dual burden. It should not be neglected however that the post-communist Hungary has inherited a very generous system of family policies including universal maternity benefits, long parental leaves and relatively extensive public childcare services.

In the post-communist period, the generosity of the system continued, although it was accompanied by a process in which the gap between men’s and women’s inactivity rates has widened, and the real value of state spending on social welfare showed a decrease. Additionally, as a response to the growing unemployment, an explicit maternalist discourse gained ground to encourage women’s exit from the labor market. After the establishment of the democratic regime the access to flat-rate maternity benefits and family allowances became universal. Although this was followed by a short period of means-testing programs between 1994 and 1998 through the Bokros plan, Hungary was returned to universal family and parental benefits in 1998 by a centrist conservative party, FIDESZ, under the slogans of maternalism mostly voiced by middle class women, albeit they did not call for policies in line with a permanent exit from the labor market. Among the current universal benefits, family allowances along with tax reductions still constitute an important pillar of the system.

The second important family policy pillar, maternity leave along with parental leave, is also very developed in opposition to that of Turkey. The maternity leave in Hungary consists of a paid leave of 24 weeks, whereas the parental leave that consists of a three-pillar structure can extend up to 2 years. The first tier (GYES) of the system that was introduced in 1967 as the first paid leave in Europe is a universal flat-rate maternity benefit paid until

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81 Fodor et. al, “Family policies and gender,” 480
82 Haney, “Welfare Reform,”
83 Szikra, “Eastern European Faces,” 89
85 Christy and Fodor, “From Public to Private; “
child’s third birthday, while a second type of support (GYET) that came into force in 1993 contributes to the income of families with three or more children.\textsuperscript{86} A third, insurance-based type of parental leave (GYED), which was added to the existing scheme with GYES in 1985, is tied to past income contrary to the first two types. This implies that middle-class parents usually choose this third type of parental benefit calculated as 70\% of their relatively higher wages.\textsuperscript{87}

A third important pillar of the family policies in Hungary, the provision of public care services, has a historical base in Hungary as mentioned above. The system consists of two types of centers: crèches for children under 3 and kindergartens for children at the age of 3-6. In line with its legacy, the enrollment rates in kindergartens for children at the age of 3-6 have remained at a quite high level in the post-communist period (above 80\%). Moreover, only 10 percent of them are cared in private childcare centers. However, the enrollment rates in crèches have never been high (13\% in 1989) and decreased further in the post-communist period (10\%).\textsuperscript{88}

In conclusion, the family policies in Hungary seem historically much more generous and centralized than those of Turkey. Both the familialism and gender dimension of these policies will be discussed in the next chapter in great detail by using Leitner’s two-steps approach following the analysis on Turkey.

\textsuperscript{87} Szelewa, “Three faces of familialism,”
\textsuperscript{88} Fodor, “Hungary,”
5. Familialism and the Gender Dimension of Social Policies

The first dimension of my analysis will be based on the degree of familialism in each country, which will be used to label the country under one of Leitner’s categories. By adding a second dimension to my analysis in parallel with Leitner’s framework, if the model is a gendered or degendered variant, I will try to go beyond a simple familialism approach in order to see how different social policies facilitate access to the labor market in an explicit or implicit way. Thus, the analysis will provide a different perspective to assess the instruments the state uses among the familialistic and defamilializing social policies, and its role and position in regard to the problem of female access to commodification through defamilializing, degendered social policies.

5.1 Turkey

As seen in Chapter 4, both family policies and the social security system relying on separate insurance schemes for different occupational categories have had a fragmented structure throughout the history of Turkey. What is common in these categories however has been the existence of a family model in which men were the principal breadwinners and women were responsible for domestic work including child care. In order to analyze the male-breadwinner model in Turkey more deeply and decide to which one of Leitner’s varieties of familialism the country belongs to, family policies in the country will be examined in the first part of my analysis. For this purpose, pursuing Leitner’s approach, the possible familialistic and defamilializing policies in the country will be examined by looking at the policies in the areas of maternity and parental leaves; cash benefits and tax reductions; and public care provisions.

The first policies that will be examined in our analysis, maternity and parental leave policies are included by Leitner in familialistic policies, since they enable parents to suspend
their labor market participation in order to care for their children.\textsuperscript{89} Despite the extension of maternity leave from twelve to sixteen weeks with the amendment of the Labor Law in 2003, Turkey can still be considered among the countries with a short duration of maternity leave. Moreover, while in Turkey maternity leave benefits correspond to 66 percent of the average salary received in the previous year of the leave, in most of the OECD countries this percentage is above that amount.\textsuperscript{90} Nevertheless, the extension of the duration of the maternal leave, which came with the Labor Law in 2003 along with other labor regulations such as the ones on part-time and temporary methods of working, appears to be a step towards the reconciliation of work and family life.

In regard to parental leave, the preparation of a draft law on parental leave in 2005 both for workers and civil servants has considerable importance. While the draft law included generous rights for parents such as an unpaid, non-transferable leave of up to twelve months for workers and a transferable one for civil servants, it dropped from the parliamentary agenda as mentioned in the previous chapter. This implies a continuing lack of policies in the area of parental leave. Although in 2011 a different version of the Law came into force, it was much more limited in content than the former draft, because it introduces a right of parental leave only for civil servants. Furthermore, this twenty four months leave is transferable between parents, which will perpetuate the inequality between the care functions of mothers and fathers due to the existing gender roles. In light of these amendments, perhaps it is possible to say that there is an orientation towards more familialistic policies, but since the parental leave can be used only by civil servants at the moment, it cannot go beyond being a social right only for a certain occupational group. Adding also the short duration of the maternity leave in the country to this, one can claim that the familialistic policies have remained limited in this area. However, the fact that there is an orientation towards longer parental leaves deserves

\textsuperscript{89} Leitner, “Varieties of Familialism,” 360
\textsuperscript{90} Refer to Appendix 1.
attention. On the other hand, considering that the existing implementation for civil servants is unpaid and transferable between parents, it has a tendency to develop to a gendered variant of familialism, because it does not challenge the existing gender roles and devalues family care in relation to employment, which are two necessities for a degendered model according to Leitner.\textsuperscript{91} Thus, even if the policy area is evolving to a model with longer parental leaves, this may lead to a gendered variant of explicit familialism due to the dominance of the assumed gender roles in Turkey and the underrating of care work. The results of a Eurobarometer survey conducted in EU Member States which can be examined on Figure 7 and 8 exemplify how critical these two determinants can be in terms of the encouragement of fathers to take parental leave.

\textbf{Figure 7: Reasons for men not having taken or not thinking of taking parental leave, EU-15 (%)}

![Reasons for men not having taken or not thinking of taking parental leave, EU-15 (\%)](image)

Note: "And what do you think are the main reasons that would discourage fathers to take parental leave?" - Question only asked to men over 18 years of age and not retired.


\textsuperscript{91} Leitner, “Varieties of Familialism,” 367
Figure 8: Factors encouraging fathers to take parental leave, EU-15 (%)


Another important policy area according to Leitner’s theoretical framework is transfers given to the family as a support for its care function. Nonetheless, it is hard to say that Turkey has a regular family allowance and tax reduction policy. Rather, it provides only civil servants with family allowances, whereas there is no tax reduction policy for families at all.\(^{92}\) For that reason, while it is possible to say that there is not a general familialistic policy in the area in this sense, means-tested social assistance programmes such as CCT’s, “Back to the Family” and cash benefits in return of care for the elderly and disabled that were described in the previous chapter deserve attention.

Both “Back to the Family” transfers and CCT’s, which reward parents for fulfilling their care function instead of providing public child care, have a familialistic touch, since they create a tendency towards the replacement of institutional care by family care.\(^{93}\) This is why, although there is not a regular familialistic policy in form of transfers in the sense that Leitner includes to his framework, one can claim that the new, relatively regular, needs-based social assistance schemes have a familialistic dimension. The gendered implications of these

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\(^{92}\) Grütjen “The Turkish Welfare Regime,” 117.

\(^{93}\) Yazıcı, “Social Work,”
programmes, however, make the issue more complex. In accordance with the needs-based rather than citizenship-based character of the transfers, especially women who are not expected to participate in the labor market are targeted. The payment of transfers directly to mothers may affect their empowerment within the household positively, but the fact that also the responsibility to realize the principal conditions in return for transfers is given to mothers consolidates the traditional gendered division of labor for care work. In addition to child transfers, the provision of families with cash benefits in return of care for their own disabled and elderly relatives turned the new law on this area into a new source of income for family members, among whom usually women fulfill the care function. This tendency in social assistances can lead to a feminization process of social assistances. In short, although there is not a remarkable familialistic policy in form of cash benefits and tax reductions, the recent programmes can be seen as remarks of an orientation towards a gendered variant of explicit familialism in the absence of defamilializing measures, as was in the case of maternity and parental leaves.

A third important pillar of social policies in Turkey, which is referred by Leitner to as a de-familializing policy, is the public provision of care. Although public care provisions do not directly intervene in gender relations, since they relieve the family from care provision and provide other options for family care takers, they constitute a strong set for a defamilializing model. They may include both public provision of childcare and home-help services for the elderly and disabled. Nevertheless, it is hard to see strong commitments of Turkey in this area, although the lack of public childcare provisions seems a very strong factor affecting women’s labor force participation decision even in the high-skilled labor category. For the low-skilled women on the other hand, it becomes a much more important factor because of the high opportunity cost of working in this case (Figure 9).

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94 Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, “Structural Change,”
95 Kılıç, “Gender, Family and Children,” 173.
96 Buğra and Keyder, “Poverty and Social Policy,”
97 Leitner, “Varieties of Familialism” 366
public care services has a crucial importance also in terms of other factors undermining female labor force participation in Turkey, since the lack of access to public care leaves these other problematic areas unchallenged.

**Figure 9: Life events and female labor force participation in Turkey (age cohort 20-65)**

Source: Aran et. al, 2009.

Despite the importance of public care provisions however, a research study in the area shows that public provision of daily childcare in Turkey is at a very low level, and almost non-existent for the age group between 0-3. More importantly, even among private care services, the quality and dispersion of the existing care institutions demonstrate a high level of inequality between regions.\(^98\) Taking these factors into account, the very low enrollment rate of children in crèches and kindergartens in Turkey does not seem surprising (Figure 10). Furthermore, as long as childcare services are not financed by the state itself, the access to childcare services is likely to remain limited, in addition to the fact that even private childcare

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provisions are not enough in some, especially poor regions in quantity and quality. This implies a welfare system from which defamilializing policies have been excluded as well.

Figure 10: Average enrollment rate of children aged three to five years of age in pre-school educational programmes, 2008

![Figure 10: Average enrollment rate of children aged three to five years of age in pre-school educational programmes, 2008](image)

Source: OECD Family Database

Taking all three pillars of family policies discussed above into account, Turkey can be categorized under the implicit familialistic model. This is because familialistic policies are not regular and very significant in the country, although recently there is an orientation towards some familialistic but means-tested social assistance schemes in return of care. Adding the lack of access to public care services to these conditions, it becomes apparent that Turkey fits to an implicit familialistic model. However, it is necessary to remember that according to Leitner the implicit familialism does not directly intervene in gender relations. Due to the absence of family policies which can be examined according to their degree of gender-bias in this model, he does not develop a gendered version of implicit familialism. Nevertheless, by adding another social policy area, the social security system, to the framework of his analysis, I argue that it is possible to assess the degree of gender inequality in an implicit familialistic model as well. Specifically, a social security system based on a male-breadwinner model can

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ERG, *Eğitim İzleme Raporu 2007* (İstanbul: Eğitim Reformu Girişimi, 2008)
implicitly intervene in gender relations by decommodifying women based on their “dependent” status and by consolidating their second-earner or care taker roles, as was described in Chapter 3. Thus, according to my analysis, a gendered implicit familialism model is theoretically possible, which will further be elaborated below in the context of the social security system in Turkey.

Gender-differentiated treatment in the policies of survivor benefits and healthcare, which take dependency as basis for entitlements, has always been one of the significant characteristics of the social security system of Turkey. More specifically, both survivor and health insurance provide benefits relying on the recipients’ “dependent” status as spouse, children or parents of the insured person. The difference between men and women among these groups derives from the assumption that women are dependent on the male-headed family or marriage for their livelihood.\textsuperscript{100} This assumption brings with itself different criteria for the entitlement of men and women as recipients.

It is better to analyze the details of survivor and health insurances under two separate titles, since they differ in some respects from each other. Survivor benefits in Turkey have included benefits such as pensions, marriage bonuses and healthcare. Specifically, non-employed daughters are allowed to receive them until they marry, whereas sons cannot be entitled to these benefits after 18, 20 or 25 years of age depending on their education status. However, the case of sons has an exception; disabled sons are entitled to the benefit regardless of their age or marital status. On the other hand, disabled daughters did not have such an exception before the recent reform in 2003, the Law on social security organization and General Health Insurance. Since then, the disability gives the right to receive survivor benefits also to daughters regardless of their marital status\textsuperscript{101}. Furthermore, through marriage allowances girls had been encouraged to get marry, but the reform in 2003 extended this

\textsuperscript{100} Kılıç, “Gender and Social Policy,” 47
\textsuperscript{101} ibid., 49
benefit also to sons, although it did not end the gender-specific treatment for orphans in the area of survivor pensions completely. There was a similar gender-specific treatment for the widowed spouses as well. Accordingly, widows have been entitled to pensions provided that they do not get marry, while widowers did not have this right before a series of amendments lasting from the 1980s to 2008. An equal treatment process for survivor spouses began with the extension of survivor benefits to widowers in the 1980s and culminated in 2008 with the abolition of marriage allowances for both sexes.\(^{102}\)

It is possible to see a similar gender-specific treatment also in the healthcare system. As the system entitles healthcare benefits to the dependents of insured persons, the entitlement criteria for dependency play an important role in this area such as in the case of survivor pensions. Similarly to the former case, until the very recent amendments, daughters of the insured person had been entitled to health insurance depending only on their marital and employment status, while for sons there were age limits or criteria such as disability and destitution. Also, husbands could not be entitled to the health benefits of their insured wives, although wives were insured automatically. Furthermore, in case of a divorce or unemployment, widows and daughters could be re-entitled to these benefits. Nevertheless, parallel to the changes in the survivor pensions between the 1980s and 2008, the gender-specific conditions for the spouses ended through various amendments in three insurance schemes, while the different treatment for daughters and sons ended with the Law on Social Security Organization and General Health Insurance of 2006, which defines all the dependents according to gender-neutral criteria.\(^{103}\) In short, the reform cancelled the lifelong dependent status of daughters in terms of health.\(^{104}\) However, it should not be forgotten that this change in favor of a more gender-neutral treatment concerns only the dependent

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\(^{102}\) Kılıç, “Gender, Family and Children,” 170

\(^{103}\) Refer to Article 4 of the Law. [http://www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/c71ae3004e2b80d1b683beb00c7ce123/5510.pdf?MOD=AJPERES]

\(^{104}\) Refer to Articles 3 and 61 of the Law. [http://www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/c71ae3004e2b80d1b683beb00c7ce123/5510.pdf?MOD=AJPERES]
daughters of the insured persons, as the survivor daughters can still benefit from the healthcare benefits in addition to pensions regardless of their age.

Due to the reasons mentioned before, it is worth to assess the gender dimension of the social security system in Turkey that constitutes an important pillar of the gendered welfare system of the country. In that context, the presumed basis for entitlements of benefits and gender subject-positions has critical importance. An entitlement based on dependence of women to a male breadwinner can be seen as a way of reinforcement of the existing gender norms and relations rather than a positive discrimination mechanism. The criteria for the entitlement of widows and daughters to survivor benefits and healthcare should be evaluated from this perspective. In this sense, particularly three points draw attention. The entitlement of non-working daughters as dependent while there are age limits for sons; the fact that disabled daughters were not paid survivor pensions when they got married while sons were paid; and third, the encouragement of daughters and widows to get married via lump-sum paid marriage allowances until the very recent reforms expose the existence of an implicit assumption of women’s dependence on marriage for their survival. Accordingly, women are not expected to participate in the labor market, and this consolidates their role as the family-care taker and housewife in the society. On the other hand, the breadwinning role after the marriage is explicitly assigned to husbands.

The exposition of a dependent housewife role to women by social security systems seems in accordance with the patriarchal attitude of the country. In this policy area, paternalism and familialism appear to be an obvious part of the system both explicitly in the discourses and implicitly in the policies, as shown by Kılıç in great detail. The system relies on a familialist framework in which men are the principal breadwinners of family and women are dependent on the male-headed family in addition to the paternalist protectionism by the

105 Kılıç, “The Gender Dimension,” 47
Also social security policies taking labor as the basis for entitlements seem to take the gender roles in the family into account. In addition to the entitlement of women to earlier retirement than men due to the burden of their family responsibilities, if female workers get married and decide to leave the job market, their contributions until then can be repaid.\textsuperscript{107}

Although some amendments in the social security system planned in the last decade, which have been described in Chapter 4, may seem as an orientation towards a “universal breadwinner” model, their universal dimension is very limited at the moment. A path towards the individualization of the social security system and the increase of the retirement age will perhaps be more dominant in the future, but without the necessary improvements in the working conditions and labor regulations, it means a commodification process without a defamilialization touch. Therefore, this trend does not seem very promising in terms of gender equality.\textsuperscript{108} It is hard to claim that they can diminish the degree of gender inequality in the system, since they will only cause a deterioration of social rights for decommodification.\textsuperscript{109}

What does the division of duties encoded in the social security system mean in terms of the familialism model in Turkey? Despite the lack of defamilializing or familialistic policies in Turkish welfare system, which causes Turkey to be assessed as an implicit familialism model, one can talk about a gendered variant of implicit familialism in this country. Contrary to Leitner’s definition of implicit familialism, my approach holds the view that also the implicit familialism can intervene in gender relations. This view takes into account the effect of the social security system in Turkey on the consolidation of women’s gender role as “dependents” and family care takers. Thus, adding another social policy area, the social security system, to the already built theoretical framework, I argue that Turkey is a gendered implicit familialism model. The recent social assistance instruments in form of cash benefits

\textsuperscript{106} ibid., p.74  
\textsuperscript{107} ibid., p.495  
\textsuperscript{108} Grütjen, “The Turkish Welfare Regime,” 125  
\textsuperscript{109} Kılıç, “The Gender Dimension,” 88
in return for care, or the orientation towards long, non-transferable, unpaid parental leaves may however the forerunner of a gendered explicit familialism which may come in the future.

5.2 Hungary

In order to analyze the type of familialism in the present day Hungary, on each pillar of family policies will be focused separately as was the analysis on Turkey. First, considering transfers or “indirect transfers for care” as mentioned by Leitner, the family allowance remains the main cash benefit available in the country. However, especially Roma families with many children are disadvantaged because the allowance increases up only until the third child. Furthermore, its real value has been decreasing continuously since the 1990s. Nevertheless, it still can be taken as a strong familialistic policy thanks to its universality.\textsuperscript{110} Another important indirect transfer is the tax reductions for families with children. Contrary to the family allowance, the amount of a tax allowance increases for large families since it is based on the total family income. However, poor families again cannot benefit from this policy, because they do not pay enough tax, which is a necessary condition to deduct all the allowance they deserve from their taxes. Thus, only about 60-70\% of Hungarian families with children can use this allowance in full.\textsuperscript{111} As a result, more than the third of all parents is excluded from the system which remains essentially as a middle-class support.\textsuperscript{112} Nevertheless, both of these indirect transfers, family and tax allowances, compose a familialistic set of policies despite their discriminatory manner towards poor and Roma families.

Considering the “time and social rights” dimensions of the family policies in Hungary, it is possible to say that Hungary has an extensive parental leave policy that consists of three tiers as described in Chapter 5. Accordingly, the first tier (GYES) of the system is a universal flat-rate maternity benefit paid until child’s third birthday, while a second type of support

\textsuperscript{110} Aydeyeva, “Social Policy Reforms,” 9
\textsuperscript{111} Glass and Fodor, “From Public to Private,”
\textsuperscript{112} Fodor et al, “Family Policies and Gender,” 487
(GYET) contributes to the income of families with three or more children. A third type of parental leave (GYED) is based on income and employment contrary to the first two types, which implies that also the parental policy creates an advantage for middle-class parents, who usually choose this third type of parental benefit based on their relatively higher wages. Nevertheless, despite the differential treatment of women by socio-economic status, parental leave policies of Hungary seems comprehensive compared to other European countries.\textsuperscript{113} As a result, the familialistic component of the Hungarian family policy is strengthened even more through its parental leave policy.

The last component of family policies that Leitner focuses on is a defamilializing one, the provision of public childcare services. As mentioned above, the provision of public childcare service has a historical base in Hungary, and the enrollment rates in kindergartens for children at the ages of 3-6 have remained at a quite high level (Figure 10), while the enrollment rates in crèches have never been high and decreased further in the post-communist period (Figure 11). Although this is a very low rate which should be evaluated in terms of the female labor force participation as well, for now, this point will be postponed. What is important in terms of the familialism aspect of the policy is the fact that Hungary scores high in terms of affordability and availability of childcare despite the low rate of children in nurseries.\textsuperscript{114} This implies that Hungarian family policies also have a defamilializing component thanks to the extensive provision of public childcare services.

In light of Leitner’s categorization of familialistic and defamilializing policies, Hungary can be classified as a model of “optional familialism” due to its universal family allowances, three-tier system of paid parental leaves and extensive coverage of public crèches and kindergartens. However, the very low rate of female labor force participation in the country necessitates a more critical analysis of the existing family policies by taking into

\textsuperscript{113} Aydayeva, “Social Policy Reforms,” 12
\textsuperscript{114} Szelewa and Polakowski, “Who Cares?,”
account the gender dimension of this optional familialism model. For this purpose, both the de-familializing component of the family policy, namely public care provisions, and the gender dimension of the familialist policies in parallel with Leitner’s two-steps analysis should be further discussed.

**Figure 11: Average enrolment rate of children aged under three years of age in formal childcare, 2008**

![Average enrolment rate of children aged under three years of age in formal childcare, 2008](image)

Source: OECD Family Database

First, a closer look at the defamilializing childcare policies demonstrates an interesting dimension of these provisions. On one hand, access to kindergarten and crèches are technically available to all children. However, statistics demonstrate that only 8.8% of children between the ages of 0-3 can be enrolled to crèches due to practical reasons such as low capacity or low quality. This causes a discrimination especially against poor and Roma children. The main reason of this inequality of childcare services among the different classes and ethnicities is the decentralized system of public childcare provision. Specifically, the state covers only half of the costs of kindergartens, while local governments and parents are expected to provide the rest of the budget. Since local governments in the economically remote regions of Hungary do not have sufficient resources for the maintenance of

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115 Refer to Appendix 4.

116 OECD Directorate for Employment, Labor and Social Affairs, “OECD Family Database,” OECD, [http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_1,00.html)
kindergartens and to provide high quality childcare, both the quality and access to the preschool institutions in these regions, in most of whom Roma people are overrepresented, are limited. Accordingly, 43% of families with young children live in a settlement where crèches are unavailable. This means, only women in the capital and big cities have a relatively easy access to public nurseries.\footnote{Janneke Plantenga and Chantal Remery, \textit{The provision of childcare services: a comparative review of 30 European countries} (European Commission Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels 2009.)} Another problem is that nurseries and kindergartens usually give priority to mothers with stable employment. In short, an important characteristic of the current Hungarian public childcare provisions is its class and ethnic hierarchies, whose signs are also seen in the family allowance and parental leave policies as discussed above. Thus, the choices are not equally distributed among all strata of society due to their discriminatory framework to the disadvantage of poor, unemployed parents and Roma families.\footnote{Aydeyeva, “Social Policy Reforms,” 3}

Due to the reason elaborated above, despite the availability of childcare provisions, Szikra proposes to refer to the Hungarian system as a “limited optional familialism”.\footnote{Szikra, “Eastern European Faces,” 85} Similarly, Szelewa’s and Polakowski’s study on the extensiveness and quality of childcare confirm that despite the extensiveness of the childcare services in Hungary compared to other East European countries, in the dimension of quality it stays below the cut-off point of 12 pupils until the year of 1997.\footnote{Szelewa and Polakowski, “Who Cares?,”} Accordingly, Hungary fits to a model which is based on generous and universal parental benefits, and extensive but low quality childcare services. This model is clustered by Szelawa and Polakowski under the label of explicit familialism.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, 130} Nevertheless, after that year, Hungary comes closer to a “comprehensive support” model which is similar to Leitner’s category of optional familialism. Platenga and Remery’s study confirms this finding by arguing that Hungary made a strong commitment to increase the availability and quality of childcare in recent years. At the same time, it shows that formal childcare arrangements in Hungary are still not at an enough level compared to other EU
countries and therefore it has been compensated by family arrangements.\textsuperscript{122} This further raises the ambiguity about talking an optional familialism model instead of an explicit familialistic one in the case of Hungary, which has perhaps come closer to an optional familialism type only in the last decade. Since the ambiguous component here is the defamilializing one (public childcare provision), the familialistic aspect of Hungarian family policies as a whole can be stronger than thought by many scholars, and this may change the direction of social policies in terms of women’s access to the labor market. Also the data below confirms the fact that the lack of the defamilializing component, care provisions, plays a big role in low female activity rate.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{Table 4: Main reason for not seeking employment, 2010}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting recall to work (on lay-off)</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own illness or disability</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>3,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other family or personal responsibilities</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>80,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after children or incapacitated adults</td>
<td>51,7</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In education or training</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think no work is available</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>14,0</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat

A second important dimension of the analysis that should be evaluated is the gender dimension of the existing familialistic policies such as parental leave, family allowances and tax benefits. Concerning the first, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Leitner looks at care sharing options and the amount of parental benefits in order to decide if the existing policies are linked to a male breadwinner type of model or not. Despite the fact that the Hungarian policies usually allow for shared parenting in its policies, what is more needed is a punishment of the unequal engagement of parents because of the already existing gender

\textsuperscript{122} Platenga and Remery, “The Provision of,” 32
\textsuperscript{123} Here, the high percentage indicating “other family and personal responsibilities” deserves attention. This shows how consolidated the gender roles in Turkey are so that women see house work and child care as their personal responsibilities. Refer to Appendix 3
norms. This is especially true for Hungary where the gendered division of paid and unpaid labor is conservative in nature as can be observed in a survey in 2002 that shows that more than half of the population in Hungary thinks that “a preschool child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works.” Furthermore, the devaluation of care to paid work through low parental benefits, and wage gaps between women and men are likely to prevent fathers to uptake the leave as seen on Figure 7 and 8 before. Under these conditions, even though parental leave periods are transferable between the parents, they are more likely to be used by women, which is demonstrated by the figure below.

Table 5: Proportion of employed parents with a child under age 1 on leave, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women in maternity or parental leave</th>
<th>Men in parental leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United-Kingdom</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Family Database

124 Leitner, “Varieties of familialism,” p.369
125 Dorottya Szikra and Dorota Szelewa, Do Central and Eastern European countries fit the “Western” picture? The example of family policies in Hungary and Poland. In Welfare States and Gender Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe,” In Continuity and Post-socialist Transformation in the EU Member States ed. Christina Klenner and Simone Leiber (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), 2010), pp.81-117.
Due to the facts mentioned above, the parental leave (2 years), which has a strong familialistic dimension because of its long duration, may have a discouraging effect on the decision of mothers to return to their job after the leave. Although mothers have legally the right to return to their job after parental leave, this option is not very realistic to most women. Studies suggest that long parental leaves prevent women to be rehired by their employers because the state does little to enforce this law in practice, and this creates a sense of insecurity. Thus, long parental leaves may hurt women’s employment prospects in the long run at the expense of short run gains. In the existence of patriarchal values, long parental leaves seems to be linked with a breadwinner type of welfare model, which results in a gendered familialistic model according to Leitner.

A second gender-bias in familialistic policies in Hungary can be found in the policies of family and tax allowances and parental benefits, because they build a family policy system in favor of the interests of the middle-class by leaving the poor and especially Roma women in a disadvantaged position. Concerning family allowances, the Roma families who usually have many children are disadvantaged because the allowance increases up only until the third child, although it still can be taken as a strong familialistic policy thanks to its universality. Contrary to the family allowance, the amount of a tax allowance increases for large families since it is based on the total family income. However, poor families again cannot benefit from this policy, because they do not pay enough tax, which is a necessary condition to deduct all the allowance they deserve from their taxes. Therefore, only about 60-70% of Hungarian families with children can use this allowance in full. As a result, more than the third of all parents is excluded from the system which remains essentially as a middle-class support.

Furthermore, whereas middle-class women receive maternity and parental benefits based on

126 Refer to Appendix 2.
127 Glass and Fodor, “From Public to Private,” 338
128 Leitner, “Varieties of familialism,” 370
130 Glass and Fodor, “From Public to Private,” 339
131 Fodor et al, “Family Policies and Gender,” 487
their previous income through GYED, other women are left with a flat-rate parental leave (GYES and GYED) which is only slightly above the minimum wage. The fact that these families are unable to benefit from the family and tax allowances and maternity benefits as much as middle-class women can do creates an inequality among mothers based on class and ethnicity. For that reason, it is possible to argue that familialistic policies have not the same effect on all strata of the society, because the family care is devalued in relation to employment and the financial dependence of family care takers on a breadwinner increases in poor and Roma families. This situation consolidates the breadwinner type of model. The low amount of allowances and benefits along with the prevailing patriarchal relations may prevent fathers from performing a greater portion of care work in these classes.\textsuperscript{132} This relationship, which is referred by Leitner to as “discrimination due to the devaluation of family care”, may have contributed to the low level female labor force participation rates in Hungary by sustaining and strengthening the patriarchal attitudes in especially poor families.\textsuperscript{133} This is important in the sense that the devaluation of women’s work by the state itself should be considered as one of the reasons of the continuing patriarchal attitudes. Thus, long, underpaid, universal childcare leaves undermine women’s ability to access to paid employment and to achieve full economic independence, which results in a system referred to by Fodor and Glass as public maternalism.\textsuperscript{134}

In conclusion, a critical look at the Hungarian family policies shows that, contrary to the claim of many scholars, Hungary may not fit completely to the optional familialism model due to the practical limitations in its childcare policies. On the contrary, as some authors assert,\textsuperscript{135} it seems to have encouraged the re-familialization of the society with the combination of long parental leaves and lack of access to daycare for children under the age of 3. On the other hand, although in theory an optional familialistic model does not have to be

\textsuperscript{132} Szikra, “Eastern European Faces,” 30
\textsuperscript{133} ibid., 369
\textsuperscript{134} Glass and Fodor, “From Public to Private,”
\textsuperscript{135} Saxonberg and Sirovatka, “Failing Family Policy,”
gender-biased in Leitner’s opinion, an analysis among the familialistic policies in Hungary seems to indicate their strong gendered dimension and reliance on a breadwinner type of model especially for some classes and ethnicities in the society. All these points prove that the welfare system is much more favorable for middle-class mothers, while poor families do not have these much options in practice. In line with this argument, it is expected that the low female employment rate in Hungary is to a large extent affected by the inability of mothers to adapt to the labor market due to the lack of defamilializing or degendered familialistic policies. This situation exposes itself also in another area, in which women with better labor market prospects are likely to have fewer children, since they are not encouraged by defamilializing and degendered social policies. The gendered optional familialism model in Hungary thus results in a “sharp division between Hungarian markets with good labor market prospects and those who are stuck in a stage of ‘inactivity’”.\textsuperscript{136} However, it should not be forgotten that due to the problems in public care provisions it has also a tendency towards explicit familialism.

\textsuperscript{136} Szikra, “Eastern European Faces,” 93
Conclusion

Relying on a broadened theoretical framework, this work has critically examined the social policies in Turkey and Hungary. In the end, it has concluded that the results of this critical analysis show more different tendencies in both models than claimed at first sight. Accordingly, in the case of Turkey it seems appropriate to label the country under the implicit familialism model. However, relying on the gender dimension of the policies, the country exemplifies a gendered implicit familialism due to the structure of its social security system. Furthermore, the tendency in the last decade demonstrated through cash benefits given in return of care, and long and unpaid parental leaves implies that it may evolve to a gendered explicit familialism in the future. This also overlaps with the explicitly conservative discourses of the AKP government.\(^{137}\)

On the other hand, Hungary seems at first sight like it perfectly fits to the category of optional familialism thanks to the generous time, rights, social rights, transfers and public care provisions provided by the state. Nonetheless, a deeper look at the existing familialistic policies exposes the gendered dimension of the model, which may be referred to as a gendered optional familialism. In addition, as discussed by many studies mentioned above, the inaccessibility and low quality of public childcare services especially in relatively poor regions imply the possibility of a gendered explicit familialism instead of an optional one, especially for the period before the developments which came with the EU membership. Thus, the outcome shows that the “optional familialistic” aspect of Hungary may have been exaggerated by those who neglected the low quality of crèches in the country and the low access to them.

In conclusion, this work demonstrates the fact that the welfare state regimes in both countries were not very favorable in terms of women’s access to paid work. This work did however not aim to claim that social policies compose the most important factor affecting

\(^{137}\) Buğra and Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime,”
women’s access to the labor market in Hungary and Turkey. Rather, what it argues is that despite all the other social, economic and cultural factors, social policies which constitute the basis of a welfare state regime arise as an intervening variable. The importance of this argument results from the fact that the state can challenge the other factors by manipulating the social policies and change the faith of women’s economic independence. This result has of course a crucial importance in terms of the current situation in Hungary and Turkey, whose significance was also showed in Chapter 2 through the analysis of empirical data. But more importantly, the same theoretical framework can also be applied to positive as well as problematic cases among other countries. Moreover, the theoretical framework broadened in this work can even further be extended, considering the fact that also deliberate policy interventions in labor market regulations outside of family policies deserve attention since they can implicitly favor a certain role for women. Last but not least, it should not be forgotten that the social policies in effect can be contradictory, as they are dependent on many factors including especially historical and political processes in a country. Therefore, it is not surprising that short run interests conflict with long run strategies in the area of social policies, as can be seen in the case of Turkey whose reforms are affected both by the conservative attitude of the government and the indispensability of the EU accession process.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{138} Kılıç, “Gender, Family and Children,”
Appendix

1) Maternity payment rates: Percentage of the earnings before birth replaced by maternity payment, by earnings level, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>50% of average earnings</th>
<th>100% of average earnings</th>
<th>150% of average earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>51</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Iceland</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
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<td>Italy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Family Database
2) Women returning home after parental leave (%)


3) Children only cared by their parents by age group

Source: Eurostat
4) Enrolment rates of children under age 6 in formal care or early education services, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>0 - 2 years</th>
<th>3 - 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>97.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>55.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37.9</td>
<td>94.1</td>
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<td>92.7</td>
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<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>90.0</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>87.1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>23.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>79.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>56.4</td>
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<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECD-32 average</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>75.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Family Database
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ERG. *Eğitim İzleme Raporu* 2007. İstanbul: Eğitim Reformu Girişimi, 2008 <http://erg.sabanciuniv.edu/sites/erg.sabanciuniv.edu/files/E%C4%B0R%202007.pdf> (accessed 01.06.2011)


