The Republican State, Fraternity, and the Woman Question: The Performative Practice in Rousseau's Political Vision(s)

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Gender Studies

In partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts in Gender Studies

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Budapest, Hungary
2011
Abstract

In this thesis I want to analyze the notions of fraternity, citizenship and the republican state in Rousseau’s political philosophy from the perspective of theory of performativity. In the first chapter, I will read Rousseau’s *Social Contract* to demonstrate that the republican state in Rousseau’s philosophy can be seen as performativity at work since the state is (re-)produced through participation of citizens in the political life. In the second chapter, I will analyze Rousseau’s specific visions of republican citizenship which he proposes in projects of festivals, balls for marriageable youth and his memory of the dance in the end of the *Letter to M. d’Alembert*. My aim is to show that the notion of fraternity is foundational for Rousseau’s vision of republican social order and illuminate his ideas of the place of women in this order. As I will argue, in Rousseau’s vision women are not excluded from the participation in the political life, but are included in a very specific manner to support patriarchy. Finally, I will discuss possible implications of the model of woman’s inclusion in Rousseau’s concept of citizenship for feminist political theory.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor Prof. Eszter Timar and my second reader Prof. Anna Loutfi for the intellectual and emotional support, which they gave me in the process of work on this thesis. Their opinion on my ideas, comments on my drafts, literature suggestions and the readiness to discuss complicated academic and scholarly issues were of great help for me. I am also thankful to Maria Temmes, Francisca Cettl, Arpita Das and Jutka Beko for the advice in the various stages of the writing process. I need to express my gratitude to my mother for her moral (and not only) contributions without which I would not be able to finish this project. And, last but not least, I want to say thank you to all my friends, the names of whom I will not list here, because it always creates the risk to forget and to insult someone, for keeping me in motion and periodically reminding that there is a life outside of this thesis.
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Introduction

In this thesis, I want to discuss the question of woman’s participation in social and political order. In so doing, I want to analyze the ideas about constitution of the republican state, fraternity, and citizenship which were proposed in political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By using his *Social Contract* and *Letter to M. d’Alembert* as examples, I want to demonstrate the role that women play in Rousseau’s vision of civil society-

My interest in Rousseau’s political philosophy has to do with the fact that Rousseau’s views on the so-called women’s question were quite paradoxical. On the one hand, he can be seen as a misogynist, the man who hated women and considered them to be the reason for decay of his contemporary society. For instance, in the *Letter to M. d’Alembert* Rousseau points out the corrupting influence that women had on men in social life.\(^1\) Rousseau’s ideas of womanhood can be seen as conservative and backward. In his treatise on education *Emile* but also in *Letter to M. d’Alembert* he argued that women should return to home and domesticity and use their power over the masculine sex not to corrupt, but to support men.\(^2\) On the other hand, precisely the fact that Rousseau accepted that women have power over men, and they only need to exercise their power properly may suggest that his views on women’s question were not purely misogynist.

What makes Rousseau’s ideas on gender order especially interesting for me is that they can hardly be distinguished from his ideas on social order. After all, for him women had a corrupted influence on men in Paris- the capital of pre-revolutionary France, while the ideal of proper gender order was his native Geneva- a small republic in the midst of European kingdoms and empires. The fact that Rousseau associated the corrupted gender order with monarchy, and ideal

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gender order with republics, can suggest that there is a link between ideas of sex and society in
his philosophy.

I am, of course, not the first writer who highlights the connection between Rousseau’s ideas
of sexual and political. Indeed, the feminism criticism of Rousseau has a long history. One of the
goals of feminist critics was to illuminate the distinction that Rousseau’s has made between the
public realm as the domain of men, and the private realm as the domain of women. The first
feminist critic of Rousseau was probably Mary Wollstonecraft who, in “A Vindication of the
Rights of Woman” pointed out that Rousseau’s insistence on women’s subordination and
confinement to home contradicted his own ideas on equality. In the 20th century, the critique
made by Wollstonecraft was developed by feminist political philosopher Susan Moller Okin.
Okin saw Rousseau’s ideas of women’s subordination to men, in general, and his insistence on
childbearing as the natural function for women, in particular, as an incontestable proof of
Rousseau’s sexism.

However, not all feminist authors have seen Rousseau’s juxtaposition of the public sphere as
a domain of men, and the private sphere as a domain of women, in a negative light. For instance,
Jean Bethke Elshtain used Rousseau’s emphasis on reproductive role of women as a support for
her theory of maternal citizenship. In her attempt to reverse the dichotomy between the public
and the private in Western political philosophy, the dichotomy the existence of which justified

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3 See, Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Rutland, Vermont, J.M. Dent, 1992),
particularly, pp. 86-102.

4 Susan Moller Okin, “Rousseau and the Modern Patriarchal Tradition,” in Women in Western Political Thought

5 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Politics and Social Transformation: Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx on the Public and the
University Press, 1993), 147-197.
the exclusion of women from political sphere, Elshtain suggested the new, feminist vision of citizenship which, in her opinion, should be based on values of warmth and motherly care which Rousseau has associated with women.\(^6\)

In his critique of Elshtain’s approach, Paul Thomas points out that the concept of citizenship which is based on maternal values has little chances to become a model for gender equality and women’s participation in the political sphere, because in Rousseau’s philosophy womanhood and private sphere, have a subordinate position to values of men and the public. Thomas claims that the private realm in the philosophy of Rousseau exists only for the support of the public:

However much we stress the elements of recognition, acknowledgment, and mutuality that surely are involved in this picture, we cannot avoid the basic proposition that one of Rousseau's "realms," the private and domestic is there for the sake of the other, the public and political. The relationship between the two is complementary without being truly reciprocal because the direct exercise of political power is not shared. Women prepare men, and not themselves, for one of the most valuable manifestations of what it means to be human.\(^7\) (italics in the original)

Kathleen B. Jones supports Thomas’ view that women as a part of private sphere take in Rousseau’s philosophy a subordinate position to men as a part of the public. By talking about Rousseau's ideas of citizenship, Jones argues that in his political theory women played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, “for Rousseau, the female body becomes the symbol of all that is dangerous to political order if not properly contained.”\(^8\) On the other hand, “paradoxically, Rousseau makes domesticated female sexuality the cement of the social order.”\(^9\) The means to

\(^6\) Ibid.


\(^9\) Ibid.
solve the dilemma between status of woman as both a threat to, and potential source of support for constitution of the state, was to separate men and women into different domains or spheres of activity. As Jones puts it out, “the only way to ensure political order was to segregate the sexes and educate them to their appropriate aims, taking care that the passionate aims of women were not allowed to hold sway in public space.”

In other words, in order for men to achieve the equal status and benefits of citizenship, women who are a natural threat to their status, have to be excluded from public life.

In the ongoing feminist debates about the role and the place of women in patriarchal society I will side with Thomas’ and Jones’s argument that in Rousseau’s vision of civil society the role and position of women is to support the male patriarchal order. However, contrary to Jones’ views, I want to argue that women are not excluded from Rousseau’s vision of patriarchal order; they are included, yet in a particular manner. As my analysis of Rousseau’s *Social Contract* and *Letter to M. d’Alembert* will show, the manner of this inclusion has to do precisely with the role that women play as a source of support for men and patriarchy.

The fact that women participate in Rousseau’s vision of social and political life, may be important for the discussion about the role and place that women take in contemporary civil society. Rousseau was, after all, a representative of civic republicanism- the branch of political philosophy, according to which citizenship’ status is dependent upon individual’s participation in the political life. By defining civic republican model of citizenship in its opposition to the liberal notion of citizenship, feminist political theorist Judith Squires points out that “there is a long-standing debate about how best to define citizenship, arising from whether one understands membership of a community as a status or an activity: whether one possesses citizenship rights

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10 Ibid.
(the liberal perspective) or participates in citizenship responsibilities (the civic republican, and latterly the communitarian, perspective.”

Thus, the civic republican model of citizenship stresses out the need for an individual to participate in the political life to achieve a citizenship status. In opposition to the liberal model, in which citizenship is *possessed*, in civic republican agenda citizenship needs to be realized or performed. If we juxtapose the assumption that women are not excluded from, but participate in Rousseau’s vision of social and political order with the fact that Rousseau linked his notion of citizenship with participation in this order, can we come to the conclusion that for Rousseau women were entitled to equal citizenship?

Indeed, the fact that civic republicanism points out the need for the individual to participate in political processes opens up an interesting dimension for theorizing Rousseau’s political philosophy. If the citizenship in Rousseau’s philosophy is not given to the individual per se, but needs to be realized or performed, can we theorize Rousseau’s understanding of citizenship and political order as performative? If we do, what new insights into the nature of the political can such theorizing offer? And, finally, how can we define the place of women in the political sphere as a performative practice?

In this thesis, I am going to offer my answers on these questions. By talking about Rousseau’s political philosophy as performative in Chapter 1, I will introduce the concept of performativity as it was proposed by Judith Butler as well as the notion of citationality which comes from Jacques Derrida. I want to draw parallels between Butler’s vision of gender order and Rousseau’s conceptualization of social order by analyzing Rousseau’s vision of the state and body politic which he proposed in *Social Contract*. I will argue that the existence of these parallels allows us to see Rousseau’s concept of civil society as performativity at work.

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In Chapter 2, I want to analyze Rousseau’s specific projects of the republican state—his visions of festivals, balls for marriageable youth and his childish memory of the dance which he proposed in the end of his *Letter to M. d’Alembert*. I will discuss the possibility of reading the *Letter* which has traditionally been seen as a piece of anti-theatrical criticism as a political text. As I will suggest, the *Letter* can be seen as a piece of political philosophy because there Rousseau proposed his vision of the utopian republican order By referring to the works of Jacques Derrida, Eszter Timar, Carole Pateman and others I want to show that the union of equal male individuals which has been known in history of Western philosophy as fraternity was foundational for this order By reading Rousseau’s memory of the dance and his vision of balls for marriageable youth I will discuss the role of women in Rousseau’s vision of fraternity. I want to argue that women, far from being excluded from the political, play a crucial role in the (re-)production and maintenance of Rousseau’s vision of republican citizenship. Finally, in the end of my thesis I will discuss the implications of women’s participation in Rousseau’s concept of citizenship for feminist political theory.
Chapter 1. Rousseau’s vision of social contract as performativity at work.

In this chapter, I want to argue that the concept of citizenship in political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau can be interpreted as performative one. In arguing so, I am going to analyze one of the most important political writings of Rousseau, namely, his Social Contract. With the reference to the existing theoretical literature I want to demonstrate that in Rousseau’s Social Contract, which represents philosophy of civic republicanism, citizenship is not seen as naturally given but is in the need for realization through participation of the individual in the political process. I will argue, therefore, that the fact that the individual’s citizenship is not granted, or inherited, but needs to be realized or “performed”, allows us to read Rousseau’s notion of citizenship as “performative.”

In the first section of this chapter, I am going to analyze the concept of performativity as it was proposed by Judith Butler. I want to draw a particular attention to one of the most important aspect of this concept- the idea of iterability, or citationality that comes from the work of Jacques Derrida. Then, in the second section, I will focus on Rousseau’s Social Contract with the aim to show that his ideas of political organization of the state can be seen as performativity at work.

1.1. Butler, Derrida, and the concept of the “performative”

By arguing that performativity is inherent in Rousseau’s notion of citizenship, I want to refer to the notion of performativity as it was proposed by Judith Butler. In her book Bodies That Matter, Butler defines performativity “not as a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the
reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces effects that it names.” As this definition makes clear, Butler wants to deconstruct the dichotomy between causes and effects or between material reality and its discursive representation (or nomination). Butler discusses the issue of materiality of bodies. She criticizes the social constructivist view on dichotomy between sex and gender. According to this view, sex is naturally given, while gender represents a social and historical category. In her critique of sex/gender dichotomy, Butler points out the inconsistencies of the social constructivist view. On the one hand, natural sex precedes socially or historically determined gender. On the other hand, however, the fact that in a societal context we can know about materiality of sex only through the lenses of analytical category of gender means that for us sex as an object of knowledge does not exist separate from gender. For Butler the fact that the social constructivist view on sex/gender dichotomy leads to nullification of sex as an ontological and epistemological category proves that there is a need to give up the sex/gender distinction. Butler points out that neither the materiality of sex precedes the discursive construction of gender, nor does gender nullifies or encompasses all meanings of sex, but rather the materiality of sex as such is being produced in the discourse through repetition of regulatory norms of “heterosexual imperative”. Similar to that, the subject, or “the speaking I” is formed in the process of identification with these regulatory norms.

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13 Ibid., 5.

14 Butler points out that “if gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access to this ‘sex’ except by means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that ‘sex’ becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access.” (Ibid.)

15 Ibid., 1-2.

16 Ibid., 3.
norms enable particular identifications and forbid or disavow the others. According to Butler, identification through which the subject is formed is at the same time always disidentification with those who fail to become subjects. As she points out in this regard, “this exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects’, but who form the constitutive outside of the subject.”

In other words, for Butler identification always means exclusion. And those who are excluded form the “constitutive outside” against which subjects may identify. These identifications, however, do not happen once and forever, they are actually repetitive processes which are bolstered by the fact that the “constitutive outside” always threatens the boundaries of own subjectivity. Thus, these boundaries have to be re-erected or re-constituted over and over again.

Perhaps, the idea of citationality, or iterability of social norms is the most interesting aspect of Butler’s theory of performativity. The notion of citationality comes from French philosopher Jacques Derrida. In his essay “Signature, Event, Context” Derrida wants to deconstruct the idea of writing as a process of communication which requires the existence of the receiver. This notion is shown as inherited in Western metaphysics, for instance, in language philosophy of

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17 By talking about formation of the subject through the process of identification with the set of regulatory norms, Butler refers to psychoanalytical theory. Significantly, in psychoanalysis self-identification and formation of the subject depends on recognition of sexual difference. For instance, in his essay “” Jacques Lacan has argued that the identification of the subject comes during the mirror stage, when the mother holds child before the mirror, and the child recognizes the difference between real self and his ideal image in the mirror. The child also recognizes his difference from the mother who holds him; the difference which lies in the fact that mother does not have a penis—a source of the symbolic power in the society. In the mirror stage the child, therefore, enters the orders of the real, imaginary, and the symbolic. By drawing upon works of structural linguistics, Lacan associates the order of symbolic with language. See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I,” in *Ecrits: A Selectio*, (New York: Norton, 1977), 1-7.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
Emile de Condillac. By critically reading the works of Condillac, Derrida comes to the conclusion that the only condition for writing to retain its function—readability—is its ability to be repeatable, or iterable, that is, the ability to be understood in the absence of both the sender and the receiver:

In order for my “written communication” to retain its function as writing, i.e., its readability, it must remain readable despite the absolute disappearance of any receiver, determined in general. My communication must be repeatable-iterable-in the absolute absence of the receiver or of any empirically determinable collectivity of receivers. Such iterability- (iter, again, probably comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic that ties repetition to alterity) structures the mark of writing itself, no matter what particular type of writing is involved (whether pictographical, hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to cite the old categories). (italics mine)

Thus, according to Derrida, the ability of the sign to be repeatable- its iterability- does not mean that the sign is always repeated, or, in other words, cited, exactly the way it has been cited before. On the contrary, iterability or citationality means that the sign is altered every time it is cited. Alterity of the sign is not an exception, but an integral and necessary part of a citational process: “This citationality, this duplication or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neither an accident nor an anomaly, it is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could not even have a function called ‘normal.’”

Later in “Signature, Event, Context” Derrida comes to the analysis of speech act theory which was proposed by English philosopher John Austin. Derrida observes the distinction that Austin has made between constative and performative utterances, and points out that


\[\text{Ibid., 7.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., 12.}\]
As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the performative does not have its referent (but here that word is certainly no longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation, it effects…

Thus, in Derrida’s understanding of the Austin’s notion of performative speech acts, language, by being used in its performative function, does not represent things or events that exist or happen outside of language, in reality, but it actually produces or transforms these events, and has a direct influence on reality. Moreover, in Austin’s speech acts theory the distinction between language and reality blurs.

By analyzing Austin’s classifications of “serious” and “non-serious” use of language (the example of non-serious use of language would be, for instance, a theatrical performance), “felicitous” speech acts, that is, speech acts that achieve the communicative intention of the speaker who produces it, and “infelicitous” speech acts which fail to achieve this intention, Derrida points out that these classifications are influenced by the classificatory logic of Western science and philosophy, the logic which lies in differentiation between pure and impure phenomena. For Derrida, Austin’s assertion that we cannot examine speech act as felicitous or infelicitous if these speech acts are produced within “non-serious” contexts, means that every speech act can fail to be regarded as such if it is produced within such context. In other words, Derrida demonstrates that the ability of a speech act to fail is a structural precondition of Austin’s speech act theory:

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24 Ibid., 13.
25 Ibid., 15.
Austin’s procedure is rather remarkable and typical of that philosophical tradition with which he would like to have so few ties. It consists in recognizing that the possibility of the negative (in this case, of infelicities) is in fact a structural possibility, that failure is an essential risk of the operations under consideration; then, in a move which is almost immediately simultaneous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it excludes that risk as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing about the linguistic phenomenon being considered. This is all the more curious-and, strictly speaking, untenable-in view of Austin’s ironic denunciation of the “fetishized” opposition: value/fact.  

The fact that the speech act can “fail” to achieve its intention when it is used in a “non-serious” context, makes Derrida suggest that every performative can potentially be altered, or it can be altered when it is used in a different context. The alterity of the speech act is not accidental; rather the ability of the speech act to be altered is what constitutes it as such. Because the ability to be altered is a necessary part of every speech act, there is no speech act that cannot be altered in a citational process, therefore, there are no “pure” or unaltered performatives:

For, ultimately, isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, “non-serious”, citation (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general citationality- or rather, a general iterability- without which there would not even be a “successful” performative? So that- a paradoxical but unavoidable conclusion- a successful performative is necessarily an “impure” performative, to adopt the word advanced later on by Austin when he acknowledges that there is no “pure” performative.

Butler borrows from Derrida his notion of citationality, or iterability. She shows that regulatory norms of sex need to be reiterated or cited in order to get instituted just as writing or speech acts need to be cited in order to fulfill its intentional function and succeed. Just as for Derrida, every

26 Ibid.


speech act always contains a possibility of its failure, which is, actually, a structural precondition of its existence as such, so the possibility of failure is also inherent in regulatory norms of sex. Indeed, for Butler the only fact that those regulatory norms have to be repeated over and over again to remain in effect means that without a repetition these norms will fail. Finally, just as Derrida claims that the possibility of alterity is an integral part of an iterational, or citational process, and there is no speech act which is not altered throughout this process, Butler accentuates that regulatory norms of sex can never be cited or reiterated exactly the way they used to be. Indeed, the fact that regulatory norms of sex do alter in a process of citational means for Butler that re-articulation or deconstruction of “heterosexual imperative,” the existence of which is dependent upon citation of regulatory norms, is always possible. As she points out, “it is the instabilities, the possibilities for rematerialization, opened up by this process that make one domain in which the force of the regulatory law can be turned against itself to spawn rearticulations that call into question the hegemonic force of that very regulatory law.”

1.2. Rousseau’s vision of the state as a performative practice

After introducing Butler’s concept of performativity and Derrida’s notion of citationality in the previous section, I am now going to analyze Rousseau’s political philosophy as performativity at work. As I will show, Rousseau’s notion of the social contract can be interpreted as performative because the social contract comes into and remains in effect through reiteration of particular political practices; just as in Butler’s theory materiality of bodies is

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30 Ibid.
produced or comes to matter through reiteration of regulatory norms of “heterosexual imperative.”

In Book III of Social Contract Rousseau proposes his ideas of the political constitution of the state, the general will and the sovereign authority. He also advocates the direct democracy and criticizes representative form of government and proposes measures that will prevent the government from the usurpation of political power and general will of the people. Rousseau begins the chapter with the juxtaposition of the body of a man and the body politic. On the one hand, he points out the similarities between human and political bodies. These similarities lie in fact that “the body politic, just like the body of a man, begins to die as soon as it is born and carries within itself the causes of its destruction.” In other words, neither the body politic nor the body of a man are eternal, they cannot last forever, the everlasting civil society is as impossible as the man's immortality. However, the death of both the political and the human bodies can be delayed, if they will follow certain regulatory practices, which guarantee the sustainability of the bodies: “But either body can have a constitution that is more or less robust and suited to present it for more or less time.” Rousseau does not believe, however, that the right constitution will guarantee the existence of the body politic forever: “if we want to form a lasting establishment, let us therefore not dream of making it eternal. To succeed one must not attempt the impossible, nor flatter oneself that the work of men can be endowed with a solidity human things do not allow for.” In other words, Rousseau does not believe in the ability of humans to constitute a perfect state. The human beings are not perfect, they are vulnerable to

31 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter, 2.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.
negative emotions, they are corrupted and they will also corrupt the social order which they institute. However, even by acknowledging that men cannot make the impossible they nevertheless should try to achieve as much as they can.

Despite the fact that the body politic is similar to the body of a man, their origin is different. According to Rousseau, humanity has its origins in nature, while the state is not natural, but constructed by humans. Human beings cannot change their nature in order to live longer, but they can organize a state in a way that this social construction will last: “The constitution of man is the work of nature, that of the State is the work of art. It is not within men’s capacity to prolong their life, it is within their capacity to prolong the State’s life as far as possible by giving it the best constitution it can have.” According to Rousseau, the constitution of the state can only be maintained in the process of repetition, reiteration of the laws upon which it is based. The law must be repeated, because it is never made once and forever, it loses its power over time and must be re-constituted over and over again: “Yesterday’s law does not obligate today, but tacit consent is presumed from silence, and the Sovereign is assumed to be constantly confirming the laws which it does not abrogate when it can do so.”

In looking for a perfect model of the state and civil order, Rousseau refers to classical antiquity, in particular, to the times of ancient Sparta and Rome. One might say that the reference to ancient times becomes a citational practice in Rousseau’s philosophy, for he brings particular elements of Spartan and Roman social life to justify his vision of the social contract. While Rousseau criticizes the modern people for their inability to produce the laws that will make the state live forever, he praises “the excellence of the ancient wills,” the excellence which allowed them to constitute laws that reinforce the power of the civil society. “People must believe that

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35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
nothing but the excellence of the ancient wills could have preserved them for so long; if the 
Sovereign had not consistently recognized them as salutary it would have revoked them a 
thousand times over.”

Not only do ancient laws provide a strong example for political 
constitution of the civil society, but actually, with every repetition of the laws they only become 
stronger and stronger: “That is why the laws, far from growing weaker, constantly acquire new 
force in every well-constituted State...” Thus, by every repetition the ancient laws which are 
good by themselves, (re-)acquire their power. In other words, not only does the constitution of 
the law provide the basis for their performance, but it is also through the performance that the 
laws (re-)institute themselves.

For Rousseau laws not only provide the basis for the constitution of the state, but they also are 
the source of power for the Sovereign. “The Sovereign, having no other force than the legislative 
power, acts only by means of the laws, and the laws being nothing but authentic acts of the 
general will, the Sovereign can act only when the people is assembled.” Thus, Rousseau points 
out that the power of the Sovereign does not exist per se, rather it comes from and is realized 
only through the performative practice of the lawmaking.

The power of the Sovereign is realized through people’s participation in assemblies. 
Rousseau’s project of assemblies is, therefore, a means for people to participate in the political 
life of the state. The assemblies provide the space within which the laws of the state can be 
constituted and re-constituted. Once again, however, Rousseau points out that it is not sufficient 
to assemble once and forever constitute the state; rather, the people need to assemble to re- 
constitute the laws over and over again to make sure that they remain in effect:

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 110.
It is not enough for the people assembled to have once settled the constitution of the State by giving sanction to a body of laws: it is not enough for it to have established a perpetual Government or to have provided once and for all for the election of magistrates. In addition to extraordinary assemblies which may be required by unforeseen circumstances, there must be fixed and periodic assemblies which nothing can abolish or prorogue, so that on the appointed day the people is legitimately summoned by law, without need of any further formal convocation.\(^41\)

Thus, the function of assemblies is to re-constitute the laws. The legitimacy of these assemblies’ lies in fact that they are “summoned by law.”\(^42\) Hence, the law here in Rousseau’s model of state is both the cause and the effect of the assembly, both the representation of, but also a formative basis, a ground, a constitutive force of the general will of the citizens.

The assemblies are held to (re-) institute the law or to (re-)confirm the general will of the citizens. For Rousseau, the fact that individual citizens share the general will constitutes citizens as a Sovereign body. To become Sovereign, the general will of the citizens should be single and indestructible. This is only possible when individuals are equal one to another: “…and the person of the last Citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate…”\(^43\) In Rousseau’s vision people can be equal only when they do not have any private interests, which are different from, and stand above, public ones. The prevalence of private over public interests leads to the fact that citizens refuse to participate in assemblies and delegate to the representatives their right on political participation, which in Rousseau’s civic republican vision of the state, is also the duty which the citizens need to fulfill to become such. Thus, Rousseau links the transition from the direct democracy to representative form of government to the fact that the private interests in the minds of citizens become prevalent over the ideas of public or common good: “it is the hustle and bustle of commerce and the arts, it is the avid interest in gain, it is softness and love of

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 111.
\(^{42}\) Ibid.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 112.
comforts that change personal services into money.”\textsuperscript{44} The prevalence of private over public interests, the delegation of the right and duty to participate in political life to someone else means the destruction of the Sovereign authority and the general will and eventually leads to the collapse of the state: “As soon as public service ceases to be the Citizens’ principal business, and they prefer to serve with their purse rather than with their person, the State is already close to ruin.”\textsuperscript{45} The survival of the state is, therefore, dependent on the participation of the people in public activities: “The better constituted the State, the more public business takes precedence over private business in the minds of Citizens.”\textsuperscript{46}

According to Rousseau, the citizens who delegate their rights and duties to representatives cease to be free. As he points out in his critique of English representative system, “The English people think it is free; it is greatly mistaken, it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing.”\textsuperscript{47} ... According to Rousseau, the existence of people as political beings and free equal individuals depends on their direct participation in the political life, and the man is produced as the citizen through his participation in the politics as a performative practice, people, as soon as they retire from the public to the private, stop being citizens and lose their individual freedom. The loss of freedom is equal for Rousseau to the loss of subjectivity and (at least, political) death: “Be that as it may, the instant a People gives itself Representatives, it ceases to be free; it ceases to be.”\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 115. I will refer to the civic republican view that in order to become citizens, individuals must participate in the political process when I will discuss the woman’s role in Rousseau’s vision of the dance and balls for marriageable youth, and its implications for feminist political theory, in section 3 and 4 of Chapter 2.
Rousseau’s insistence on the indestructible character of the general will leads him to his ideas about separation of power. For Rousseau, the strict separation of executive and legislative power is a way to maintain the sovereignty of the people and prevent the collapse of the civil democratic state. In other words, it is necessary to save body politic from failure:

If it were possible for the Sovereign, considered as such, to have the executive power, right and fact that would be so utterly confounded that one could no longer tell what is law and what is not, and the body politic thus denatured would soon fall prey to the violence against which it was instituted.49

By criticizing the views on institutional government as a form of the social contract “between the People and the chiefs it gives itself; a contract stipulating for the two parties the conditions under which the one obligated itself to command, and the other to obey,”50 Rousseau points out that this form of agreement cannot be regarded as a social contract for two reasons. First, the hierarchical division between the Sovereign and its superior contradicts the rules of the social contract. As I pointed out above, according to Rousseau, the Sovereign authority cannot be divided or delegated to someone else, every modification of the sovereign authority leads to its destruction. When people delegate their sovereignty to someone else, they give up their individual freedom: “First, the supreme authority can no more be modified than it can be alienated, to limit it is to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory for the Sovereign to give itself a superior; to obligate oneself to obey a master is to return to one’s full freedom.”51


50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.
Second reason why, in my opinion, Rousseau does not consider the monarchy, or the institutional Government, to be a form of social contract, is because “this contract of the people with specific persons,”52 (italics mine) in which people install masters to command them, is “a particular act.”53 If we refer back to Butler’s definition of performativity, which I cited above (p. 7-8), we can see this “particular act” as “a single and deliberate act,”54 which, in Butler’s terms, is different from performativity as “the reiterative and citational practice”55 because this act cannot be repeated and therefore, cannot constitute the “regulatory norms”56 of sex which are produced in the performative practice. Similar to Butler’s understanding of a deliberate act Rousseau’s “particular act”57 of delegation of the Sovereign authority to “specific persons”58 does not have any constitutive force for the state because it cannot be repeated, or reiterated, by the People in assemblies, for, as I pointed out above, the reiteration of laws in the assemblies is what constitutes Rousseau’s vision of the state as a performative practice: “Moreover, it is clear that this contract of the people with specific persons would be a particular act. From which it follows that this contract could not be a law or an act of sovereignty, and that consequently it would be illegitimate.”59

By claiming that “a particular act”60 cannot be “a law or an act of sovereignty,”61 Rousseau, therefore, in my opinion, implies that any law or act of sovereignty, in order to become legitimate, must be reiterated, or (re-)confirmed by the citizens’ body in assemblies.

52 Ibid., 117.
53 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
By looking at Rousseau’s ideas of the political constitution of the state through Derrida’s and Butler’s lenses, we may see many possible connections between Rousseau’s thoughts and the concepts of citationality and performativity. Just as Butler has argued that discursive production of the bodies, or subjectivity, should follow particular iterational norms, to which she referred as “heterosexual imperative,” so does Rousseau also claim that the constitution of the state should follow the rules of the social contract in order for the state to be legitimate and to last longer. Butler has argued, moreover, that reiteration of social norms can never be completed in a way it has been done before. Indeed, as Derrida’s use of the term “iterability”, which I analyzed above, suggests, the repetition or citation of regulatory norms always contains possibilities for their alteration. For Butler, the fact that regulatory norms of sex can always be altered means that the existing gender order can be changed, and the fact that the change of gender and social order is always possible, lies in the core of her vision of progressive politics. Rousseau also acknowledges that the social change is, in principle, inevitable, but, unlike Butler, who is optimistic about that, he sees the alteration of constitution of the state as the state’s inevitable failure. Thus, Rousseau’s belief that once social norms are not repeated the way they used to be, the state, the constitution of which is based on (re-) production of these norms, will fall. Rousseau’s idea that the state is doomed to fall characterizes telos of his philosophy and his overall cultural pessimism.

Moreover, Rousseau’s belief that the slight alteration of the social norms is dangerous for the state and body politic, pushes him to insist that these norms need to be strictly followed. In order


63 Butler articulates her desire for political change, for instance, in the following quote, which is also meant as a critique for identity politics: “…the mobilization of the categories of sex within political discourse will be haunted in some ways by the very instabilities that the categories effectively produce and foreclose. Although the political discourses that mobilize identity categories tend to cultivate identifications in the service of a political goal, it may be that the persistence of disidentification is equally crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation.” (Ibid., 4; italics in the original).
for the state to live on, social norms must be repeated exactly the way they used to be. By using Derrida’s words, Rousseau wants to break up “the logic that ties repetition to alterity.”⁶⁴ Hence, Rousseau’s focus on the notion of general will as stable and indestructible, and his particular desire to constitute a vision of social order which will be as safe from destruction as possible. As I have shown, for Rousseau the state is safe from destruction only when the laws that constitute it, are (re-)iterated over and over again by citizens as sovereign authority during the performative practice of assemblies. In turn, in order for this sovereign authority to be able to (re-)constitute the state, it must be indestructible. The indestructibility of the sovereign authority can be achieved when the citizens who participate in performative practice of assemblies are absolutely equal to and completely not different from each other.

In the following chapter I am going to refer to the works of Jacques Derrida, Eszter Timar, Carole Pateman and others to demonstrate that the ideal of free and equal individuals, who are not distinguishable from one another, lies in the core of Rousseau’s vision of civic and social order. By doing so, I will illuminate Rousseau’s there specific visions of the performative practice, which constitutes citizens and the state. I will also draw the particular attention to the role and place that women take in Rousseau’s visions of citizenship.

Chapter 2. Rousseau’s specific visions of republican social order in *Letter to M. d’Alembert*

In the previous chapter of my thesis, I have demonstrated that in his *Social Contract* Rousseau envisioned the democratic state as a performative practice by means of which the state is constituted. I have also tried to show that as the performative practice, the state comes into being only through participation of the citizens in regularly assemblies. The participation of the people in the assemblies is meant to reconstitute the general will which is the source of political power in Rousseau’s democratic state. Only through citizens’ participation the democratic state and the general will of the people are constituted and remain indestructible. However, as I was trying to suggest by referring to works of Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida, the notion of the general will as indestructible always contains possibilities for its destruction which defines Rousseau’s cultural pessimism and *telos* of his philosophy. Hence, according to Rousseau, the citizens need to assemble regularly to (re-)constitute the state and (re-)form the general will, that is, to save the state from (self-) destruction.

In this chapter, I want to draw attention to Rousseau’s specific visions of the concept of citizenship. I will analyze his visions of festivals, balls for marriageable youth and his childhood’s memory of the dance between men, all of which he mentioned in the end of *Letter to M. d’Alembert*, as illuminating his ideas about republican political order. By bringing into light Rousseau’s visions of festivals, balls and the dance, I want to demonstrate that for him citizenship was also a performative practice, by means of which male citizens are constituted with the help of women who play in the performative practice of citizenship a role of support for
men. My analysis will lead me to the discussion about possible implications of Rousseau’s vision of citizenship for feminist political theory in the following chapter.

2.1 *Letter to M. d’Alembert* as a political manifestation of Rousseau’s ideas of (anti-)theatricality

In the beginning of the chapter, I want to discuss Rousseau’s *Letter to M. d’Alembert* as a piece of political philosophy. As I want to show, the fact that the *Letter* has been seen as Rousseau’s criticism of theatre should not undermine the political importance of this work; rather, the *Letter* can be regarded as politically important exactly by virtue of it being a piece of modern art criticism, for domains of art and politics in modernity are inseparable. By arguing so, I will consider the meaning of modern art, in general, and in a particular relation to Rousseau’s work.

In the *Letter*, Rousseau responds on the project of French Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert to erect theater in Geneva, which the latter proposed in his article for *Encyclopédie*, with the general critique of theatre as institution which corrupts the people’s mores and leads to the downfall of the state. However, recently many scholars have seen *Letter* less as an aesthetic work with which Rousseau has contributed to the Western philosophical

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65 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Letter to M. d’Alembert*, 4-5. Here, in the beginning of his *Letter*, Rousseau cites the passage from d’Alembert’s article that draws his critical attention.

66 The analysis of Rousseau’s critique of theatricality is beyond the scope of this project. For detailed analysis of *Letter to M. d’Alembert*, see, for instance, David Marshall, “Rousseau and the State of Theater,” in *The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), 135-177. Marshall treats *Letter* as a crucial text for understanding of Rousseau’s moral and political philosophy: “As a book about theater, the *Lettre* examines the conditions of projection, identification, and sympathy; it asks what it means to take the part of someone, to put oneself in someone else’s place, to imagine that a story is about oneself.” (Ibid.: 136).
discourse of anti-theatricality, and more as a political text where Rousseau has represented his opinion on social and political relations. As David Marshall puts it,

...the question of whether a ‘theatre de comedie’ should be established in Geneva provides an occasion for Rousseau to reflect on the character of spectacles- which include but by no means are limited to dramatic representations performed by actors on a stage. Rousseau is concerned not just with how Geneva should govern its spectacles but with how spectacles govern our lives: how we are affected by the theatrical relations enacted outside as well as inside the playhouse by people who face each other as actors and spectators.

Marshall’s definition suggests that it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between “inside” and “outside” playhouse, that is, between theater as a form of art and the real life. According to Marshall’s reading of Rousseau, theatricality is not limited to theatre, but encompasses all spheres of the society. Thus, Rousseau’s Letter can be read not only specifically as a piece of theater criticism but also as a manifestation of his social and political theory.

Indeed, the fact that the Letter is irreducible to the criticism of theater as an art form, might be a sign of political importance of this work. Letter to M. d. Alembert can be regarded as a piece of “modern” art criticism exactly because Rousseau does not draw a distinction between theatricality within and outside of the theater life. In her book Revolutionary Acts: Theater, Democracy, and the French Revolution, Susan Maslan refers to art historian T. J. Clark when she argues that theater as a form of modern art is unthinkable without the social and historical

67 For the discussion of a role and place of Letter in the anti-theatrical tradition, see Marshall, 135. In his first footnote, Marshall lists large literature concerning Rousseau’s critique of theatre.

68 Ibid., 135-136.

69 Here I use term “modern” in its contemporary sense- as a reference to historical period which begins with the Enlightenment and French revolution. Rousseau’s usage of the term was, of course, different- for him “modern” was his contemporary feudal French society which post-revolutionary thinkers would call ancien regime.
context in which it emerged. According to Clark and Maslan, the modern art, the emergence of which they date back to the times of French revolution, is impossible to think of outside the realm of reality, it places itself in the context of historical events, “that art is made up of its present and its presence.” The modern artist, is, if we borrow Charles Baudelaire’s term, “the painter of modern life,” who becomes conscious of the role that the art plays in the society. The artist does no longer wish to understand the works of art as lying somewhere outside history; rather, (s)he wants to situate art as the creative practice within the historical context. As T.J. Clark points out, politics “is the form, par excellence of that contingency which makes modernism what it is. That is why those who wish modernism had never happened…resist to the death the idea that art, at many of its highest moments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, took the stuff of politics for its material, and did not transmute it.”


71 Ibid., 6.


73 Cited in Maslan, Revolutionary Acts, 6. The definition of modern art given here is, of course, not outside the scope of the critique. By claiming that modern art is the art which is conscious about its historical role, or, in the words of Maslan, the art that “descends into the muck of history” (Ibid., 5-6), Clark, therefore, tends to identify modernism in art with the vision of progressive politics. The vision of modern art as artistic avant-garde (the word comes from the jargon of French revolutionary army) has become a commonplace in art history. This definition of “modernism” in art historical discourse is certainly in conflict with the understanding of modernity in social sciences. In the latter it refers rather to the historical period after French and industrial revolutions, the period in which capitalist economy has developed, and the Enlightenment ideas of the rational thought together with revolutionary principles liberte, egalite, fraternite have triumphed. This discourse of social sciences does not explicitly qualifies “politically progressive.” Hence the tension that can rise, for instance, in relation to Brecht’s “modernist” critique of “modern” bourgeois theatre (see below) might have its reasons in the different meanings of “modernity” here: from the point of view of social sciences, bourgeois theatre was “modern” because it existed in the time of capitalism, while from the point of view of aesthetics Brecht’s critique was a piece of “modern” art criticism because he promoted progressive political ideas- to overcome the separation of theatre from social life. The same can be said about Rousseau. Indeed, as the literature on Letter to M. d’Alembert, the references to which I have shown, demonstrates the theatre Rousseau criticizes was the same theatre that was an object of Brecht’s critique, that is, theatre as an art form which has little connection to reality. As I will argue below, Rousseau, similar to Brecht, wanted to overcome this separation. Thus, I call Rousseau’s Letter a piece of modern art criticism rather from art historical point of view. However, and I hope it will be clear throughout my thesis, I am quite critical about the
If we consider the definition of “modern” art given here, we might acknowledge that Rousseau’s *Letter to M. d’Alembert*, in which his author neglected the difference between theatre as a form of art and society, between theatricality inside and outside the playhouse, was a piece of modern art criticism. One of the first canonical examples of modern art was Jacques-Louis David’s *Death of Marat* - the painting which portrayed the death of the great French revolutionary. David’s *Marat* undoubtedly was a revolutionary painting which reflected the issues of contemporary political interest. Similar to that, Rousseau’s treatise on theatre in which the distinction between aesthetic and social has also blurred, can be seen as a part of revolutionary tradition which was brought by or appeared shortly before the French revolution.

By talking about French revolutionary theater, Maslan points out that during the revolution, theater as an artistic practice have been thought as a part of contemporary history, as well:

many, if not most, revolutionary playwrights expressed the belief that artistic creation was deeply bound up with the history-making events in which they found themselves and in which they participated. They envisioned a new, central role for theater in the formation of the nation and of its citizens. Several argued explicitly that the revolution freed them to make art out of the contemporary world and that only such art could attain importance.75

Maslan points out that revolutionary discourse on theater was influenced by discourse on anti-theatricality, which “was at the heart of a new revolutionary dramatic aesthetic.”76 She claims that in opposition to theatrical effects as “a debased, shallow form of the theater that sought to

\[\text{definition of “progressive” politics which lies behind art historians’ definitions of modernism- for the reason that this so-called “progressive” politics is constituted by means of exclusion.}\]

74 Ibid., 5.
75 Ibid., 11.
76 Ibid., 4.
mystify and manipulate its audience.”77 “dramatic effects…served to move and to touch spectators and, in so doing, to make them moral beings, and to encourage them to enter into a true community with each other.”78 (italics mine).

Revolutionary theater thinkers who wanted to use theatre to form the new citizen of the republic, by arguing against theatre of ancien regime, followed anti-theatrical views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Marshall suggests that the goal of Rousseau’s anti-theatrical project was, indeed, not to liquidate theater altogether, but rather to introduce a new kind of theater which is worthy of the democratic state and will constitute new citizens for the republic.79 I would add that by criticizing the division between his contemporary pre-revolutionary theater and real life, which, according to him, led to alienation of the individual from the self in theater, Rousseau proposed his visions of the proper theater- the festivals, balls for marriageable balls and dances in which individual does not forget or abandon himself, but will play his natural social role- that of the citizen. Thus, as we shall see, Rousseau’s so-called anti-theatrical project was theatrical through and through.

By criticizing theater, Rousseau wants to reassure his readers that he is not against entertainment per se. Instead of discredited and corrupted theater, Rousseau proposes a kind of entertainment which is worthy of republic and its citizens:

What? Ought there to be no entertainments in a republic? On the contrary, there ought to be many. It is in their bosom that they are seen to flourish with a truly festive air. To what peoples is it more fitting to assemble often and form among themselves sweet bonds of pleasure and joy than to those who have so many reasons to like one another and remain forever united? We

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Marshall points out that “Rousseau’s antitheatrical polemic does indeed end by advocating spectacles” (Marshall, “Rousseau and The State of Theater,” 158). Spectacles that Rousseau advocates are “public fetes as the proper spectacles for a republic” (Ibid.)
already have many of these public festivals; let us have even more; I will be only the more charmed for it." (italics mine)

The kind of entertainment that Rousseau proposes, despite being defined in opposition to theater, is, nevertheless, very similar to it. Just as in the theater, people in the festival are divided into actors and spectators. As the quote above makes clear, Rousseau claims the role of spectator for himself. He wants the festivals to be organized for his own pleasure. He wants to be charmed and entertained by festivals just as theatergoers want to be entertained by plays. By claiming that festivals should bring him pleasure, Rousseau the political theorist takes the role of the spectator in the theater.

In Rousseau’s vision, people’s festivals must be held not “in a gloomy cavern,” where people are kept “fearful and immobile in silence and in action,” but “in the open air, under the sky, that you ought to gather and give yourselves to the sweet sentiments of your happiness.” People should use festivals not to hide their feelings, not to pretend to be who they are not or substitute real life for the theatrical imaginary, but to expose and show their real selves, and, in so doing, become merged into the collective of fellow republican citizens, become a part of performative practice which constitutes republican subjects:

Let your pleasures not be effeminate or mercenary: let nothing that has an odor of constraint and selfishness poison them: let them be free and generous like you are, let the sun illuminate your innocent entertainments: you will constitute one yourselves, the worthiest it can illuminate. (italics mine)

80 Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert, 125.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 125-126.
The festival is, therefore, seen as a performative practice, by means of which citizens are constituted as free and autonomous individuals, and in which they simultaneously can show themselves off, that is, become actors in Rousseau’s republican theater. In this theater he would be the only classical spectator; for all others, the roles of actors and spectators become merged: “Do better yet; let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves, make them actors themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united.”85 Thus, for Rousseau actors and spectators should become inseparable, in fact; become one, for the purpose of the unity of the state: just as the general will is indestructible, the body of citizenship must be single and indiscriminate.

Indeed, festivals play for formation of citizens the same function as assemblies play for the formation of the state: they constitute it, body politic as well as human body. Just as the assemblies, festivals form the citizen body which is as single and indestructible as general will: “all the societies constitute but one, all become common to all. It is almost a matter of indifference of which table one seats oneself.”86

The fact that festivals serve to form new citizens of the state brings light into structural similarity between Rousseau’s vision and the forming concept of modern art. As a form of modern art, Rousseau’s festival is a part of social life, and it serves the high purpose to form new citizens of the republican state. Far from being an anti-theatrical project, Rousseau’s festival is a theater in itself: a theater in which citizens are actors who perform their real selves, and Rousseau, the political theorist, is a spectator. The play of which Rousseau is a spectator and in which citizens are actors, takes place not outside, but inside the context of social life. Thus,

85 Ibid., 126.
86 Ibid., 127.
Rousseau’s “anti-theatrical” project is similar to projects of French revolutionary theatre critics who struggled to overcome the distinction between theater and reality. 87

2.2 Citizenship, friendship and fraternity

In the previous section I have argued that Rousseau’s *Letter to M. d’Alembert* can be seen not merely as his critique of theatricality, but also as his proposal of the new theater which is worthy of republics and its citizens. I have shown that Rousseau’s project of festivals, in which citizens participate as both actors and spectators, being constituted by means of this participation, with Rousseau, the political theorist, maintaining his role as a classical spectator, was his alternative to the theatre of *ancien regime*. In this section, I want to demonstrate that Rousseau’s vision of the festival represented the ideals of friendship and brotherhood which are inherited in Western philosophical and political tradition. In so doing, I am going to show structural similarities between Rousseau’s vision of citizenship and Michel de Montaigne’s views on friendship. Moreover, by referring to works of Jacques Derrida, Eszter Timar, and Carole Pateman, I am going to show how discourse of friendship served as a basis for formation of the idea of

87 If we agree that Rousseau’s *Letter to M. d’Alembert* was not merely a critique of theatre, but also a proposal for a new, republican form of theatricality, in which theater is a part of society and is served to constitute new members of this society, then we must acknowledge that his ideas of theater were not much different from those of d’Alembert, who eventually proposed to erect theater in Geneva to educate the citizens: “In this way Geneva would have theatre and morals [manners], and would enjoy the advantages of both; the theatrical performances would form the taste of the citizens and would give them a fineness of tact, a delicacy of sentiment, which is very difficult to acquire without the help of theatrical performances…” (Ibid., 4) The difference between D’Alembert’s and Rousseau’s theatrical projects, however, lies in fact that the latter, being deeply dissatisfied with French pre-revolutionary theater, did not believe that it could be reformed. Similar to that, by comparing Rousseau’s and Brecht’s critique of theatricality, Marshall points out that “unlike Brecht, however, Rousseau is not interested in reforming or radicalizing the theater. The only theater Rousseau can imagine stands condemned for the failure of sympathy it institutionalizes. All it can teach (aside from the dissimulation and self-display exhibited by those who show themselves to the eyes of the world) is the false sympathy that allows people to think they have no role to play in the scenes and dramas around them.” (Marshall, “Rousseau and the State of Theater,” 144). However, as Marshall, I and others have suggested, Rousseau proposes the vision of theatre, in which no false sympathy rules, people play only the roles taken from their real lives, and, as I shall show later, the distinction between actors and spectators blurs (with the figure of Jean-Jacques Rousseau mutating from spectator to co-actor, as well). The fact that Rousseau’s anti-theatrical criticism in the end develops into the alternative project of theater may be seen as a paradox of his philosophy.
fraternity, which, in turn, lies at the core of the concept of citizenship. Then, in the following section, I will analyze the concept of fraternal citizenship in its application to Rousseau’s work.

I pointed out in the previous section that in Rousseau’s project of festivals as a kind of theatricality which is worthy of republics and its citizens ideas of equality play an important role. The citizens who participate in theatrical practice of festivals, are equal, the difference between the actor and the spectator disappears, in festivals they become merged so that the two are indistinguishable from one another. The blurring of the self and the other so that the other can be recognized in the self, the notion of equality between individuals link Rousseau’s vision of festival with the Western discourse on friendship, as it was manifested, for instance, in the work of early modern French philosopher Michel de Montaigne. In his essay “On Friendship”, Montaigne defines friendship as an ideal social relation that stands beyond all private interests and obligations of the individual: “For, in general, all associations that are forged and nourished by pleasure or profit, by public or private needs, are the less beautiful and noble, and the less friendships, in so far as they mix into friendship another cause and object and reward than friendship itself.”88 According to Montaigne, friendship as a social bond between men is superior not only to mercantile interests but also to natural familial relations. Unlike friendship, familial relations are based upon inequality of family members, the reason for this inequality lies in natural order: “friendship feeds on communication, which cannot exist between them [children and fathers], because of their too great inequality, and might perhaps interfere with the duties of nature.”89 Unlike family bonds, which rely upon “duties of nature,”890 friendship is a social


89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.
relation which is (re-)produced by speech acts of communication between friends: “friendship feeds on communication.”\(^{91}\) While familial relations are based on inequality between family members, friendship is a union of two equal human beings who become inseparable, merged into each other, in fulfillment of Aristotelian principle “one soul in two bodies”\(^{92}\):

In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again. If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: *Because it was he, because it was I.* \(^{93}\) (italics mine)

Furthermore, Montaigne distinguishes friendship as an equal union of two human beings from other forms of unequal relations, such as heterosexual marriage and same-sex romance. For Montaigne, in the marriage the energy of love is instable, “it is an impetuous and fickle flame, undulating and variable, a fever flame, subject to fits and lulls, that holds us only by one corner.”\(^ {94}\) In contrast to this unstable feeling, “in friendship it is a general and universal warmth, moderate and even, besides, a constant and settled warmth, all gentleness and smoothness, with nothing bitter and stinging about it.”\(^ {95}\) Thus, the risk of marriage for Montaigne lies in the fact that relationships between men and women are too impulsive and their love is vulnerable to change, so it cannot form the basis for stable social relations; whereas friendship creates the feeling of “moderate and even, besides, a constant and settled warmth”\(^ {96}\) which supports human beings emotionally. As we may see, Montaigne advocates friendship in the same manner as Rousseau advocates assemblies and festivals. The claims for stability and iterability lie at the core of Montaigne’s project of friendship just as they are foundational for Rousseau’s visions of

\(^{91}\) Ibid.
\(^{92}\) Ibid., 141.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., 139.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., 137.
\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
theater in republics. (For more about Rousseau’s idea of assemblies and his notion of festivals, see Chapter 1 and the first section of this chapter, respectively).

Montaigne also distinguishes friendship from the “Greek love,” that is, sexual relations between men. According to him, male same-sex romance cannot be equated to friendship because of the inequality of partners: “Since it involved, moreover, according to their practice, such a necessary disparity in age and such a difference in the lovers’ functions, it did not correspond closely enough with the perfect union and harmony we require here.”97 Moreover, “Greek love” love cannot be compared to friendship because it presupposes the love for the body rather than the unity of souls:

…that this first frenzy which the son of Venus inspired in the lover’s heart at the sight of the flower of tender youth, in which they ‘allow all the insolent and passionate acts that immoderate ardor can produce, was simply founded on external beauty, the false image of corporeal generation. For it could not be founded on the spirit, the signs of which were still hidden, which was only at its birth and before the age of budding.98

However, the major reason for Montaigne’s dismissal of “Greek love” is moral one: “And that other, licentious Greek love is justly abhorred by our morality.”99 Can the fact that Montaigne’s condemnation of homosexual relations is based mainly on moral reasons, which apparently do not hark back to some ideas of nature, but are human conventions, serve as a proof that his distinction between friendship and homosexuality is instable?100

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97 Ibid., 138.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 This instability might be demonstrated by Montaigne’s reference to the love story between Achilles and Patroclus, as it was written by the poet Aeschylus. Montaigne points out that the Greeks were critical about this story because it did not fit into the canons of representation of same-sex relations. As Montaigne claims, these relations, which involved discrepancy in age between the lover and the loved one, might have been close to the true friendship in the case of the loved one. Unlike the lover who appreciated in his partner physical beauty, partly because, as the quote above suggests, the beauty of the soul has not yet developed, the loved one loved his partner for his spiritual beauty, since the physical beauty of the older lover had apparently long faded away. However, in the case of Aeschylus’ portrayal of same-sex relationships the role of the lover was taken by Achilles, “who was in the
The Aristotelian idea “one soul in two bodies” that for Montaigne served as a basis for his concept of friendship, has also been operative in the discourse of fraternity or brotherhood. The structural similarity between discourses on friendship and brotherhood can be explained by the fact that ideas of fraternity came to symbolize the republican civic order, and there was, therefore, an apparent need to justify the existence of this order by referring to the idea of “nature” in the form of natural bonds between brothers. The idea of fraternity as the basis of social and political order was developed by Jacques Derrida in his book *The Politics of Friendship*. In particular, in the chapter called “Oath, Conjuration, Fraternization,” Derrida argues that the phenomenon of fraternity is not based on the natural relations between brothers; rather, it represents a social bond the meaning of which is produced in the discourse by means of reference to natural relations. In his imaginary dialogue with Carl Schmitt, Derrida asks:

To find the brother, the unfindable brother who is never found in an experience of perception, should you not start from memory injunction, and thus from some oath? Do you not think, dear friend, that the brother is always a brother of alliance, a *brother in law* or an adoptive brother, a *foster brother*? Here Derrida argues that the brother is always a political being, “a brother of alliance…a *brother in law* or an adoptive brother, a *foster brother*”. Brother as a political being does not exist in nature: to find the brother (however impossible it would be), one should start with “some oath”. In other words, brotherhood is a performative practice, it is discursively produced

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102 Ibid.

103 Ibid
through the act of making an oath. One might call this performative practice the discourse of fraternization. As Eszter Timar points out in her reading of Derrida, “fraternization is the discursive process of rendering a social institution as if it were reflecting a presocial state, in this case, the isogonic, ‘natural’ connection between citizens, i.e., their brotherhood.”

By talking about fraternity, Derrida refers to Aristotle’s *Lysis* to make the distinction between ‘oikeon’ and ‘homoion’: between the familiar and the proper, on the one hand, and homogenous, and the like, on the other. The “homogenous, and the like” is what defines the domain of fraternity or friendship. The fact that “homogenous, and the like”, ‘homoion,’ stands in opposition to “the familiar and the proper,” ‘oikeon,’ can make us think that the notions of fraternity or friendship as forms of social bonds between men have been formed in opposition to values of family and domesticity. As Eszter Timar points out in relation to Derrida’s critique of Montaigne, “…friendship as a true and noble affective relationship is only possible outside the sphere of domesticity and between men. True familiarity and domesticity seem to be mutually exclusive: and the noblest form of intimacy is proper to a public institution, or rather, it is foundational institution of the public.” (italics mine)

The idea of fraternity as a “foundational institution of the public” and, therefore, not only social, but also a political structure, is supported by feminist political theorist Carole Pateman. In her essay “Fraternal Social Contract” Pateman illuminates the connection between the idea of fraternity and organization of social order. Pateman introduces the notion of fraternal social

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104 Eszter Timar, “Queer Citizens: The Structural Similarity Between the Post-Revolutionary Citizen and the Figure of the Homosexual” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 2009), 150.


107 Ibid.
contract as a modern form of patriarchy, in which the authority of fathers over sons is, at least, partially replaced by authority of husbands over wives. According to Pateman, brothers have signed fraternal social contract in order to gain control over women’s bodies. Pateman analyzes Freud’s account of the murder of the primal father by his sons as a grounding myth of fraternal social contract. She points out that

Freud’s story of the patricide is important because he makes explicit what the classic tales of theoretical murder have obscure: the motive for the brothers: collective act is not merely to claim their natural liberty and right of self-government, but to gain access to women...the patricide eliminates the father’s political right, and also his exclusive sexual right. The brothers inherit his patriarchal, masculine right and share the women among themselves. No man can be a primal father ever again, but by setting up rules that give all men equal access to women they exercise the ‘original’ political right of dominion over women that was once the prerogative of the father. (italics in the original)

As Pateman’s reading of the patricide makes clear, in the framework of fraternal social contract women stand for the prize for brothers. As the prize or the motive for the murder of the father, women are the binding element in the social organization of fraternity. Women are not among parties who signed the fraternal social contract, but they define its rules.


109 Ibid., 125. Without arguing against Pateman’s distinction between paternal and fraternal forms of patriarchy, which, as I have shown above, can be seen as a useful analytical tool in the discussion about Rousseau’s vision of citizenship, social and political order, I, nevertheless, remain quite skeptical about her definition on fraternity as a “modern” form of patriarchy. Indeed, as Pateman’s reference to the biblical story of patricide suggests, accounts of fraternal social contract might have been found long before the era we call “modernity.” In the fourth section of this chapter, I want to suggest that paternal and fraternal forms of patriarchy might co-exist in time. Based on the analysis of Rousseau’s vision of balls for marriageable youth I will argue that paternal (and civic) authorities fulfill the function of control over reproduction of fraternal social order, without fathers and mothers (and magistrates) interfering much into affairs of the children.

110 It would be, therefore, a misinterpretation of Pateman’s argument to say that in her account women were completely excluded from “fraternal social contract” and the “modern” notion of citizenship (for my critique of idea that only fraternity constitutes the strictly modern form of patriarchy, see the previous footnote). Indeed, as I will show later (in the fourth section of this chapter), Pateman’s argument was more complex one: elsewhere she has argued that women may be included in the fraternal social contract, but included in their capacities as mothers. (See also Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory, 179)
Indeed, as Montaigne, Derrida, Timar and Pateman have shown, fraternity as a social and political union between men is formed in opposition to women. However, the fact that women are in opposition to “fraternal social contract”111 does not mean that they are excluded from citizenship, which is based upon fraternal bonds. On the contrary, as I am going to demonstrates in the following sections of this chapter based on the analysis of Rousseau’s visions of balls and the dance in *Letter to M. d’Alembert*, women’s presence and their participation in the social organization of fraternity is a necessary element for (re-)production of fraternal political and social order.

2.3. Rousseau’s memory of the dance as the vision of fraternal social order

In the previous section, I wanted to elaborate on the question of structural similarities between Rousseau’s vision of festival and Western philosophical discourse on fraternity and friendship. In particular, with reference to works of Eszter Timar and Carole Pateman, I have pointed out that fraternal bonds between men form a “foundational institution of the public”112 or serve as a basis for “fraternal social contract” from which women are not excluded, but in which they are rather included in a specific manner. In this and the following sections, I will show two ways in which women can be included in Rousseau’s concept of citizenship. In this section, I am going to analyze Rousseau’s memory of the dance in order to demonstrate the role of women as mediators between men in his vision of fraternal social order. In the following section, I am going to write

111 Here and later by using this phrase I refer to Pateman’s concept discussed above.

about women’s role in the reproduction of fraternal citizenship based on my analysis of Rousseau’s vision of balls for marriageable youth.

Rousseau brings in his childish memory of the dance in the end of Letter to M. d’Alembert, to be more specific, in the footnote of the section in which he writes about Lacedaemonian dance. It is significant that Rousseau’s vision of the dance takes a form of memory. Memory, just as the oath of which Derrida has written in The Politics of Friendship, can be seen as a performative practice, or as a speech act. By means of making the speech act of memory, we not only, by using Marcel Proust’s formulation, “remember of the things past,” but we also re-construct the past in our imaginary and bring the past in our imaginary present. Memory can also be creative. In other words, Rousseau’s memory of the dance may not be strictly following the events that happened with him in the childhood, but it may (re-)create these events and (re-)signify them so that they would fit into Rousseau’s present project of fraternity.

What Rousseau “remembers” is “a rather simple entertainment” which he “witnessed” as a child. After the supper, the soldiers of a regiment which was quartered in Rousseau’s hometown began to dance together with their officers, and their wives soon but not immediately joined

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113 I refer here to Proust’s seven-volume novel “Remembrance of Things Past” (or, in a latter translation, “In Search of Lost Time”). In this novel Proust introduces the notion of involuntary memory, that is, the kind of memory, in which the present events evoke unconscious associations with the past. Voluntary memory, on the contrary, would be a conscious effort to evoke the past events. Thus, in the case of involuntary memory, one can speak of free associations, while the voluntary memory can be seen as a performative practice, by means of which we bring the past events into the present, or, by using Derrida’s jargon, “cite” them, for whatever purpose. I, however, remain suspicious about the strict distinction between involuntary and voluntary memory. The structure of the passage in Letter to M. d’Alembert, in which Rousseau evokes his childish memory of the dance between men, does not give any obvious clues if Rousseau’s memory was voluntary or not. Despite the uncleanness about whether he consciously brought in the picture of the dance, or his vision of the dance was a pure association, which came into his mind in the midst of the writing process, Rousseau’s vision quite clearly fits into his conceptualization of fraternal social order and civil society. See Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, New York: Modern Library, 2003.

114 Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert, 135.
them. The spontaneous festival that emerged has lasted until late in the evening, when the wives finally brought their husbands to bed.

Rousseau reconstructs this “a rather simple entertainment”\textsuperscript{115} in a way that it becomes for him yet another vision of public entertainments in the republic:

The regiment of Saint-Gervais had done its exercises, and, according to the custom, they had supped by companies; most of those who formed them gathered after supper in the St. Gervais square and started dancing all together, officers and soldiers, around the fountain, to the basin of which the drummers, the fifers and the torch bearers had mounted. A dance of men, cheered by a long meal, would seem to present nothing interesting to see; however, the harmony of five or six hundred men in uniform, holding one another by the hand and forming a long ribbon which wound around, serpent-like, in cadence and without confusion, with countless turns and returns, countless sorts of figured evolutions, the excellence of the tunes which animated them, the sound of the drums, the glare of the torches, a certain military pomp in the midst of pleasure, all this created a very lively sensation that could not be experienced coldly.\textsuperscript{116}

In this passage Rousseau describes his vision of fraternity- a dance of individuals who, despite differences in rank, are equal to each other, who form a ribbon, follow one another in harmony, “in cadence and without confusion.”\textsuperscript{117} What strikes me, however, in this vision of fraternity, is how close it is to homoeroticism. Men in uniform are in dance together, they hold each other by hand, and there seems to be only one step left to more direct physical action…The possibility of emergence of homoerotic desire only rises because of the fact that there are, originally, no women between men.

Rousseau, it seems to me (consciously or unconsciously, voluntary or involuntary) recognized that in his creative memory of the dance feeling of fraternity becomes too dangerously close to homoeroticism. As we remember from the reading of Montaigne in the previous section, the division between fraternity, or friendship, and what we might now call “homosexuality” is

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
instable, and it is based primarily on moral conventions, thus, it can easily fall, if moral conventions change. The overcome of friendship into homosexuality poses a threat to fraternal social order. As we have seen from Carole Pateman’s reading of fraternal social contract, this contract was “signed” by brothers to gain access to women. However, if brothers fall in love with one another, and are not interested in women as objects of their desire, then there is no need in fraternal social contract. Thus, in order to maintain the fraternal social order, there is a need for Rousseau to include women in his picture of the dance. And women appear here soon—first as spectators, later as actors:

It was late, the women were in bed; all of them got up. Soon the windows were full of female spectators who gave a new zeal to the actors; they could not long confine themselves to their windows and they came down; the wives came to their husbands, the servants brought wine, even the children, awakened by the noise, ran half-clothed amidst their fathers and mothers.

I would suggest that the function of women in Rousseau’s vision of the dance was to mediate between men and not allow their fraternal, or homosocial, feelings the existence of which is necessary for the maintenance of patriarchal social order, to slip into homoeroticism, which is dangerous for it. The term “homosociality” in its distinction from “homosexuality” was analyzed by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in her book *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*. Sedgwick is interested in how women in English literature often do not represent alone-standing literary characters, but are portrayed as figures who mediate between men. As

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118 Another threat that same-sex love relations can pose to fraternal social order is a threat to its reproduction. In the next section, I will discuss reproduction of fraternity as a political form in connection to the women’s role in it.

119 Ibid.

Sedgwick points out, ‘‘homosocial’ is a word occasionally used in history and the social sciences, where it describes social bonds between persons of the same sex; it is a neologism, obviously formed by analogy with ‘homosexual’, and just as obviously meant to be distinguished from ‘homosexual’’. In her introductory chapter, Sedgwick demonstrates that the distinction between homosexuality and homosociality has been historically unstable, and the meanings of gender and sexuality have become merged with the meanings of race, ethnicity, and class. We may conclude from Sedgwick’s analysis that because the distinction between homosociality and homosexuality is vague, but this distinction is needed for patriarchy, it must be (re-)instituted over and over again. Thus, women should continuously participate in the fraternal social order and mediate between men. Woman’s participation in the fraternal social contract is therefore needed to ensure the maintenance and (re-institution) of patriarchal social order. In other words, women not only can, but also must participate in civil society, but their participation must follow particular norms, women must participate in a way that they would not pose a threat to, but would support the patriarchal social order.

I would suggest that the need for women to support, and not to threaten patriarchy is the reason why in Rousseau’s memory of the dance they eventually turn from spectators to actors. As spectators women may gaze at men and women’s gaze can make men to perform even more zealously for them. However, I would say that the situation in which women gaze at men as spectators gaze at actors soon becomes unbearable because women’s gaze at men may threaten the patriarchal social order.

121 Ibid., 1.

122 Ibid., 10-11.
The relations between women, gaze and patriarchy were discussed by feminist film critic Laura Mulvey in her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”. In this essay, which has by now become a canonical text in feminist theory of visual culture, Mulvey points out that in the patriarchal society women represent the image; and men are bearers of the look: “In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly.”

So, for patriarchal social order in Rousseau’s memory of the dance to remain in effect, women must not gaze at men. However, as my reading of Sedgwick has shown, women also cannot retreat into sphere of domesticity, since non-participation of women in the dance may lead to establishment of homoerotic desire between men. The only option which remains available for women is, therefore, to participate in the dance along their husbands. In the end of the dance it is woman’s function to remember men about relationships of patriarchy and bring them back into the sphere of domesticity:

After staying somewhat longer to laugh and chat in the square, they had to part, each withdrawing peaceably with his family; and this is how these lovable and prudent women brought their husbands back home, not in disturbing their pleasures but in going to share them.

Moreover, it looks as women’s participation in the dance also comes to symbolize the “imaginary community” of Genevan people. Indeed, Rousseau himself demonstrates that his

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124 Ibid.


memory of the dance is integrated into the national imaginary. By depicting the dance in which all men, women and children come to participate, Rousseau evokes the words of his father:

“Jean-Jacques,” he said to me, “love your country. Do you see these good Genevans? They are all friends, they are all brothers; joy and concord reign in their midst. You are a Genevan; one day you will see other peoples; but even if you should travel as much as your father, you will not find their likes.”

In this passage, in which Rousseau refers to the things past to (re-)constitute his citizenship identity, we can also see his changing role as a political theorist. If in his vision of festivals, about which I have written in the second section of this chapter, he distances himself from the body of citizens and remains the only classical spectator, in this memory of the dance Rousseau is no longer only a spectator (even though in his role as an adult political theorist and creator of the memory, he continues to be a spectator of Geneva’s republican entertainments), he also becomes an actor, or a participant of the events. For little Jean-Jacques the dance becomes a means of his education as a (or the, for it is the same) citizen of Geneva. The goal of the educational practice of the dance is in production of new citizens and thus, in reproduction of fraternal social order. Because the social order needs to be reproduced, children (and young Rousseau is among them), the future of the nation, come to participate in it.

As I have argued in Chapter 1, Rousseau’s vision of citizenship can be seen as a performative practice through participation in which citizens acquire their rights. Thus, the fact that women and children come participate in the dance as a performative practice which has originally been purely for men may lead us to the conclusion that women are included in Rousseau’s vision of citizenship. However, since women participate in the dance to mediate between men, they have a very specific role in the fraternal social order. Women may not be

\[127\] Ibid., 135.
excluded from political participation, but they are included on particular conditions. As wives and citizens they must support, and not resist to, the patriarchy. Moreover, as the fact that women come to dance with their children may highlight, the inclusion of women in Rousseau’s vision of citizenship has to deal with their role in the establishment of national community of Genevan and in the reproduction of this community. By reading Rousseau’s project of balls for marriageable youth in the following section of this chapter, I am going to show that women’s inclusion in the concept of citizenship may, indeed, be based on their reproductive capacities.

2.4 Rousseau’s vision of balls for marriageable youth and reproduction of fraternity

In the previous section of this chapter, I referred to works of Laura Mulvey and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick to argue that women’s role in Rousseau’s project of citizenship, as it was expressed in his childish memory of the dance between men, is to mediate between men and do not allow male homosocial bonds to slip into homoerotic desire. Thus, in Rousseau’s political vision of fraternity, women function as a source of support for patriarchal social order.

In this section, I want to complicate my views on Rousseau’s project of citizenship. By reading his vision of balls for marriageable youth through the lenses of Carole Pateman’s concept of fraternal social contract, I want to demonstrate the apparent tension between her vision of fraternity as a modern form of patriarchy and Rousseau’s emphasis on paternal authority as a guarantee of maintenance and reproduction of republican social order. I will see this tension as a creative one. I am going to demonstrate that fraternal social contract does not exclude other forms of patriarchy, but comes into co-existence with them. Moreover, by referring to the work of Judith Squires, I want to show that women’s status in the civil society is largely
defined through their roles in the reproduction of citizens. In arguing so, I will elaborate on the point I have made in the previous section: that women are not excluded but incorporated in Rousseau’s project of civil society, and the means of their incorporation may also depend on the role that they play in its reproduction.

Rousseau’s project of balls for marriageable youth can be seen, together with his idea of public festivals, and his childish memory of the dance between men, as another vision of theater which is worthy of republics and its citizens (see sections 1 and 3 of this chapter for the discussion on festivals and the dance). Indeed, as David Marshall has pointed out, balls for marriageable youth are the only proposal of public spectacles that Rousseau advocates in clear terms. According to Marshall, Rousseau’s idea of balls as proper spectacles for republic bears all characteristics of theatricality that he condemned in old theater:

Indeed, the ball represented by Rousseau has virtually all of the ingredients of the theater and theatrical society the *Lettre* is supposed to condemn: strictly defined and enforced divisions between actors and spectators, self-concealment caused by exposure before the eyes of the world, self-display, concern with the regard of others and the public, *amour-propre*, adornment, distinction, competition, inequality, performance, applause, a lack of spontaneity and freedom, and the offering of women *en spectacle* and *en montre au public* in order to procure husbands for them.

However, the difference between “bad” theater and “good” balls for Rousseau lies in fact that balls are the kind of entertainment which serves the high purpose: marriage. For Rousseau, marriage is the necessary outcome of relationships between men and women: “Man and woman were formed for one another. God wants them to fulfil their destiny, and certainly the first and holiest of all the bonds of society is marriage. All the false religions combat nature; our, alone,  

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129 Ibid., 161.
which follows and regulates it, proclaims a divine institution of society is marriage.”\textsuperscript{130} Rousseau sees balls for young marriageable persons as a means to strengthen the institution of marriage, which, in his opinion, lies in the core of natural and divine orders of things. In Rousseau’s vision of civil society, the social practice of balls should contribute to (re-)institution of this natural order. If men and women want to find each other for marriage, they should behave in a proper way. This can be ensured through their exposure to the strict control:

But let me be instructed as to where young marriageable persons will have occasion to get a taste for one another and to see one another with more propriety and circumspection than in a gathering where the eyes of the public are constantly open and upon them, forcing them to be reserved, modest, and to watch themselves most carefully? In what way is offended by an agreeable exercise, one that is salutary and the vivacity of young people, which consists in presenting themselves to one another with grace and seemliness, and on which the spectator imposes a gravity out of which they would not dare to step for an instant? Can a more decent way of not deceiving one another, at least as to their persons, be imagined, or one where better permits them to show themselves off, with the charms and the faults which they might possess, to the people whose interest it is to know them well before being obliged to them?”\textsuperscript{131} (italics mine)

In other words, young marriageable persons in balls should become objects of public gaze. The gaze should be powerful enough to discipline the individuals, so that they have no other choice rather than strictly following the regulatory social norms to which they would be unable to resist. The gaze to which young marriageable persons are exposed, belongs to the “public”\textsuperscript{132} which, if we consider the discussion about the notions of general will and fraternity (in Chapter 1 and the second section of this chapter, respectively) represents one entity, in which the individual self and his other are not distinguishable from one another.

\textsuperscript{130} Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert, 128.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
There is, therefore, a similarity between Rousseau’s ideas of balls and assembly. First, both balls and assembly must be repeated in order to reconstitute the norms of gender and social order. Second, both balls and assembly should be open to all (citizens and marriageable youth) without distinction (hence, the ideas of equality). However, between balls and assemblies there is also a distinction. All the citizens participate in assemblies as free, autonomous and equal individuals, and this is through their participation that they (re-)create the general will and (re-)define themselves as citizens. Rousseau’s project of balls is, however, far from being a manifestation of equality. On the contrary, balls have a specific hierarchy. If we consider Marshall’s words cited above (p. 46) we may see this hierarchy as relations between actors and spectators. Young marriageable persons in balls are actors who are subordinate to spectators, that is, “the public.”\textsuperscript{133} If in Rousseau’s idea of assemblies and project of festivals actors and spectators become merged with one another, in balls the roles of actors and spectators remain different. It is significant to mention in this regard that by being subjects to public gaze, young marriageable persons are not included in the members of the public.

Who constitutes the public here? Rousseau is quite explicit about that: the public consists of parents and magistrates - members of civil authority:

I wish that a magistrate, named by the council, would not think it beneath him to preside at these balls. I wish that the fathers and mothers would attend to watch over their children, as witnesses of their grace and their address, of the applause they may have merited, and thus to enjoy the sweetest entertainment \textit{[spectacle]} that can move a paternal heart.\textsuperscript{134}

Thus, the control over the fulfillment of social and gender norms is put in hands of paternal and civic authorities. The fact that a magistrate controls the fulfillment of social norms in a manner

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 129.
similar to that of parents, may serve as a proof that Rousseau’s ideas of social order are mirrored on his ideas of gender order. David Marshall claims that the structural similarity between civic and familial authority means that in Rousseau’s project of balls, the civic authority wants seize the functions of familial authority:

Rousseau claims in the *Emile* that women are enslaved to public opinion but he suggests in the *Lettre a d’Alembert* and elsewhere that most people share this fate. Consequently, if people are governed by public opinion, then the best way to govern them is to control public opinion. According to Rousseau, rather that opposing *amour-propre* and people’s subservience before the eyes of the world, government should seize the apparatus of public opinion.135

Even though I tend to agree that Rousseau’s vision of governance is based on the idea of surveillance of government over its citizens- I am more interested in another aspect of juxtaposition of the familial with the social in Rousseau’s text. Rousseau’s emphasis on hierarchical relations between parents of both sexes and civic authorities as members of the public and spectators, on the one hand, and young marriageable persons as actors in the republican spectacle of balls, on the other, is somehow contradictory to his views on citizenship as the union of equal and autonomous individuals which he expressed in his visions of assemblies and memory of the dance. However, I am not going to say that in his vision of balls for marriageable youth Rousseau gave up his ideas about fraternal social order. What I want to suggest here is that in his project of balls Rousseau envisions the republican social order in which the power of fathers and power of brothers co-exist. The co-existence of brotherly love and paternal authority does not contradict the understanding of fraternity as a basis for social order. The fact that in Pateman’s story of fraternal social contract fathers have lost their exclusive sexual right over women does not mean that they lost sexual right at all, rather, they

had to share it with the brothers. In turn, in Rousseau’s text, fathers did not give up all their authority in favor of children, they remained an authoritative power, but their authoritative functions have been severely limited. Indeed, they now consist only in symbolic control over the existing social order. What the children do within the fraternity, is not a part of the father’s business:

Without altering the authority of fathers, the inclinations of children would be somewhat freer; the first choice would depend somewhat more on their hearts; the agreements of age, temperament, taste, and character would be consulted somewhat more; and less attention would be paid to those of station and fortune which make bad matches when they are satisfied at the expense of the others.

Similar to that, the authority of a magistrate should be used not to constrain young marriageable persons, but to ensure that the latter fulfill necessary regulatory social norms. Apart from control over the fulfillment of social order, magistrates do not interfere into practice of balls:

They attend all gatherings and even the feasts. Their presence does not prevent a decent familiarity among the members of the association; but it maintains everyone in the respect that they ought to have for the laws, morals [manners], and propriety, even in the midst of joy and pleasure. This institution is very fine and forms one of the great bonds which unite the people to their leaders.


137 Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert, 131.

138 Ibid., 129. There is some similarity between Rousseau’s view on relations between parental and civic authorities, on the one hand, and young marriageable persons as subjects to this authority, on the other, and deistic ideas on relations of God to nature. Just as Rousseau claims that parents and magistrates should only control the fulfillment of social norms without interference into practice of balls, deist philosophers claimed that God created but does not take part in the human affairs. Is it possible to think that Rousseau’s ideas of republican social order, as they are expressed in his vision of balls, were somehow mirrored on the deist ideas concerning relations between God, nature and human beings, with parents and members of civic authorities playing the role of, or replacing, the divine power? I am not prepared to answer this question now; I think it requires a further research.
In Rousseau’s vision, therefore, the ideas of fraternity and parental authority do not contradict each other, rather, fathers and sons work together to maintain and reproduce social and gender order:

...these marriages, less circumscribed by rank, would prevent the emergence of parties, temper excessive inequality, and maintain the body of the people better in the spirit of its constitution; these balls, thus directed, would bring the people together not so much for a public entertainment as for the gathering of a big family, and from the bosom of joy and pleasures would be born the preservation, the concord, and the prosperity of the republic.\(^{139}\)

Indeed, Rousseau attention to the role of parents in his vision of balls might have been caused by his concerns about the reproduction of fraternal social order which he envisioned in his idea of festivals and childish memory of the dance. Significantly enough, women whose role in the reproduction of people’s and citizenship body is not to be denied, play an important part in his project of balls. If in Rousseau’s vision of the dance between men, women first were not in sight and came into picture only later in order to, as I have argued with reference to Sedgwick and Mulvey, mediate between men and not allow their fraternal feelings to slip into homoerotic desire, and thus, maintain the patriarchal social order, in the vision of balls married women from the beginning are a part of the public:

I wish that in general all married women be admitted among the number of the spectators and judges without being permitted to profane conjugal dignity by dancing themselves; for, to what decent purpose could they thus show themselves off in public?\(^{140}\)

The fact that women are a part of paternal authority can highlight the important role that they play in Rousseau’s vision of balls and republican citizenship. Here, women are included in the

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 129.
realm of public and are allowed to gaze at the youth marriageable youth, but they are included in their function as mothers of citizens in order to monitor the (re-)production and (re-) institution of patriarchal social order:

I wish that in the hall there be formed a comfortable and honorable section reserved for the old people of both sexes who, having already given citizens to the country, would now see their grandchildren prepare themselves to become citizens.\textsuperscript{141}

That the social order which “the old people of both sexes”\textsuperscript{142} observe from “a comfortable and honorable section”\textsuperscript{143} remains patriarchal, is demonstrated by Rousseau on the last pages of his \textit{Letter to M. d’Alembert}. Here Rousseau recalls Plutarch’s example of public pastimes in the ancient times. Three generations of republican citizens sing and dance after each other:

…There were, he says, always three dances in as many bands, divided according to the differences in age; and they danced to the singing of each band. That of the old began first, singing the following chapter:

\begin{quote}
\textit{We were once young,} \\
\textit{Valiant and hardy}
\end{quote}

There followed that of the men who sang in their turn, beating their arms in cadence:

\begin{quote}
\textit{We are so now} \\
\textit{ready for all comers}
\end{quote}

and then came the children, who answered them singing with all their force:

\begin{quote}
\textit{And we will soon be so,} \\
\textit{we who will surpass you all.}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
These, Sir, are the entertainments which republics need.\textsuperscript{144} (italics in the original)

This example demonstrates at least two things about Rousseau’s republican imaginary. First, it has an intergenerational character: the republican civic order continues by coming from the father to the son, and so forth. Second, it comes exactly from the father to the son. Women are not among the citizens who are reproduced; but, as I suggested above, they are included as those who reproduce the citizens. I want to claim that the fact that woman’s natural capacities are necessary to the reproduction of citizens and thus, of republican social order is the reason why Rousseau gave them so many honors in his vision of balls. As Judith Squires points out in her critique of feminist concepts of citizenship, by referring to a later article of Carole Pateman:

What is largely overlooked is the fact that women were not only excluded, but also included on the basis of the very same capacities and attributes. (Pateman 1992: 19) Women were incorporated, but differently from men: they were included as mothers. In other words, the power of this masculine citizenship discourse was productive as well as repressive.\textsuperscript{145}

In the end of this thesis, then, I am going to draw some conclusions about how the productive power of Rousseau’s discourse about citizenship can make us think differently about the role and place of women in the future of this concept.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{145} Judith Squires, \textit{Gender in Political Theory}, 179.
Conclusion

As I pointed out in the beginning of this thesis, Rousseau’s ideas of the political order, in general, and his notion of citizenship, in particular, can be seen as performativity at work. By talking about performativity, which is inherent in Rousseau’s understanding of the political, I referred to the work of Judith Butler and drew parallels between Butler’s idea of the gender as “the reiterative and citational practice,”\(^{146}\) which is produced and comes to matter through performance of regulatory norms of “heterosexual imperative,”\(^{147}\) and understanding of the state as a performative practice which is (re-)constituted through assemblies, festivals and balls and which, as I have proved, can be seen in political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

By talking about similarities between Rousseau’s visions of the political order and Butler’s conceptualization of gender, I pointed out some differences between them. Butler, being influenced by Derrida’s concepts of citationality or iterability,\(^{148}\) points out that (re-)iteration of gender norms includes the possibility for their change and, indeed, this possibility constitutes the norms as such. For Butler the fact that regulatory norms of gender can change creates a hope for deconstruction of “heterosexual imperative;”\(^{149}\) the hope which defines her vision of progressive social politics. Rousseau also, in principle, agrees that the constitution of the state is a subject to change, but, unlike Butler, he sees this change in a negative light, as a sign of the

\(^{146}\) Judith Butler, \textit{Bodies That Matter}, 2.

\(^{147}\) Ibid.


\(^{149}\) Judith Butler, \textit{Bodies That Matter}, 2.
state’s inevitable downfall and destruction. (On similarities and differences between Rousseau and Butler’s visions, see Chapter 1).

In his desire to avoid the (self-)destruction of the state and political order, Rousseau insists that regulatory norms through the performance of which the state is constituted, must be strictly followed. The state can be safe from (self-)destruction only when the general will of the citizens which (re-)constitutes it is single and indestructible. This condition of the state’s existence and continuity can be fulfilled if the citizens who (re-)constitute this general will are equal to each other. As I have shown with the reference to works of Jacques Derrida, Eszter Timar, Carole Pateman and others, Rousseau’s vision of the republican state as a community of equal citizens bears structural similarities to the idea of fraternity as the union of two equal male individuals, the idea that has been influential in the history Western philosophy and political thought. The structural similarity between Rousseau’s ideas of citizenship and the discourse on fraternity, means that Rousseau’s vision of social order can be defined as fraternal, as the reading of works of Eszter Timar and Carole Pateman might have also suggested.

However, as I have shown (in the third section of Chapter 2), fraternity or brotherly love, which constitutes Rousseau’s vision of social order, can easily slip into homoerotic desire. Homoerotic desire may be dangerous for fraternal social order since it poses a threat to reproduction of this order. In order for the social order to reproduce, that is, in order for the state to survive, Rousseau needs to bring women in his vision of brotherly love. The function of women in Rousseau’s vision of fraternity is to be mediators between men. To fulfill this function woman must directly participate in the life of the public, as I have demonstrated in sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2. Women’s participation in the public sphere is to mediate between men and support fraternal bonds by policing the border between homosociality and homoerotic desire.
By analyzing Rousseau’s ideas of the constitution of the state in *The Social Contract* and his visions of fraternity that he proposed in *Letter to M. d’Alembert* I have proved my argument that women in Rousseau’s political philosophy are not excluded from the public sphere, as, for instance, Kathleen B. Jones suggested (see my reference on p.3); but, rather, they are included in a particular role. The role that women play in the public sphere is that of support for patriarchal social order. In Rousseau’s vision of citizenship women, therefore, do not form, in Butler’s terms, the “constitutive outside”\(^{150}\) of fraternity, that is, the other against which men as citizens may identify, but, rather, they are the constitutive inside, the binding element which is to cement patriarchy. One might say that women participate in the public sphere by means of “inclusive exclusion.”\(^ {151}\) Women may be included in Rousseau’s project of citizenship, but they are included as second-class citizens whose function is to strengthen the patriarchal regime in which they take a subordinate position and in which they are valued not per se, but for their functions as mediators and for their reproductive capacities.

The assertion that women are included in the Rousseau’s vision of fraternal social order and their inclusion serves as a means of support for this order may present a serious challenge for feminist thinkers of citizenship, public and private sphere. According to Judith Squires, the author of the book *Gender and Political Theory* there exist (roughly) three feminist visions on political order. Liberal feminists struggle for the inclusion of women in citizenship and understand this inclusion as achievement of equality with men. Radical, cultural or maternal feminists want a reversal of patriarchal social order. They want to create a new notion of citizenship which would be based on what they understand as maternal values, such as personal warmth, motherly care, etc. Finally, so-called third-wave feminist want to deconstruct current

\(^{150}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^ {151}\) I owe this term to Eszter Timar.
visions of the political order and build up a vision of the political which is not based on any hierarchies.  

Despite differences between them, all groups of feminist political thinkers might share the view that citizenship should encompass all human beings as political subjects. However, if we assume that the means of this inclusion can be different, and, as my analysis of Rousseau’s political philosophy has suggested, women can be included in citizenship, but included in a subordinate position in a way to support patriarchal social order, we may meet some serious challenges in our attempts to define citizenship as an all-inclusive political practice. Rousseau’s vision of citizenship, as I interpret it, is problematic both for liberal and maternal feminists. From the liberal point of view, women are included in Rousseau’s vision of the political. They are not strictly confined to private sphere and may, indeed, must participate in the social life of community. The inclusion of women is, however, far from their equality to men for which liberal feminists struggle. While for liberal feminist thinkers women and men should have equal positions in political sphere, in Rousseau’s vision of citizenship women are subordinate.  

The mode of woman’s inclusion in Rousseau’s concept of citizenship may also present a challenge for maternal feminists. From the radical feminist point of view, women are included in the public sphere in their functions as wives and mothers, the ones who are responsible for reproduction of social order. But the social order which women are to reproduce is not based on maternal values; but, rather, it remains a strictly patriarchal one.  

If the reading of Rousseau shows us that the realization of liberal feminist and maternal concepts of citizenship may not put an end to women’s discrimination, what is other means to

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152 See, Judith Squires, “Citizenship,” in Gender and Political Theory,(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999), 166-193. Susan Okin and Jean-Bethke Elshtain, to works of whom I referred in the beginning of this thesis, would represent liberal and maternal concepts of citizenship, respectively.
achieve gender equality? Is another feminist concept of the political needed? Or, maybe, what we need is not a theoretical concept, but a careful attention to citizenship as a political practice? In this paper, I mentioned that the political philosophy of Rousseau has been influential for political practice of republican states.\textsuperscript{153} But despite the enormous influence that Rousseau’s political theory might have had, it has never been fully implemented in political practice. Even though the ideology of modern democracies is based on the ideas of common goals and equality of people before the law, which hark back to political agenda of civic republicanism, this ideology is often contradicted by practices of everyday’s life. Both ordinary citizens and politicians seem to care more about their interests than about the interests of society as a whole. Of course, those who push their private interests too much above interests of the public are regularly punished. But it is clear that corruption, social and economic inequality cannot be defeated once and forever, at least within the model of the republican state we live in now.

By using the vocabulary of Butler’s theory of performativity, I might say that regulatory norms of the republican society, the norms that define the ideas of equality and public good can never be completed, despite the fact that the citizens, both in utopian visions and political practice, regularly try to complete them. In other words, the present-day republican social order which is, at least, partly based on the model which was proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, has lacks and open spaces. In Rousseau’s utopian vision of the political women may take a subordinate position, but precisely the fact that his vision of the political is utopian and does not exist in practice the way it is proposed in theory, means, that women may take advantage of the

\textsuperscript{153} In section 1 of Chapter 2 I have suggested, with regard to Rousseau’s anti-theatrical criticism, how his ideas might have been influential for political practice of the French revolution. The literature which considers influence of Rousseau’s on the current political order must be enormous and is hardly summarizable here. From the books that I mentioned in this paper, at least two deal with the topic: Susan Maslan writes about the influence that Rousseau’s anti-theatrical criticism had both on theatre in the times of French revolution and revolutionary politics, while Eszter Timar analyzes how the modern, post-revolutionary concept of the citizen can be juxtaposed with the concepts of the actor and the homosexual.
political participation that Rousseau’s vision guarantees them and use this participation to subvert the norms that constitute patriarchal social order. (The advantages of political participation may, of course, also be used by other subordinate group who participate in the political practice, but rather as second-class citizens). Of course, Rousseau would consider the fact that someone can gain individual or group benefits from imperfectness of social order as a sign of the inevitable failure of this order. But I rather side with Butler and see the imperfectness of republican civil society as what opens up possibilities for social change.
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