Turkey’s Road to Europe
Discursive Structures and Enlargement Politics

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU using constructivist theory. EU enlargement in general, and the special case of Turkey’s bid for membership in particular, are in many ways considered hard to analyze using traditional theories from European integration studies. By taking a radical constructivist approach and thereby using a uniform method when analyzing both ideational factors (such as values, norms and rules) and material factors (such as economic and political power) the issue is described to be far more complex than is usually claimed. The discourse analysis shows that the Turkey case connects to three dominating discourses in Europe, of which two suggest that Turkey is more or less not an eligible future member of the EU. The third discourse indicates that only minor changes in the identity of Turkey as seen from the EU perspective would render the country an applicant that would no longer be stalled in its aspirations to join the EU. Moreover, the third discourse in fact reveals significant possibilities that Turkey is starting to become portrayed as an asset instead of a liability for the EU.

Key words: Turkey, EU enlargement, constructivism, discourse analysis
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1. Introduction

Turkey’s accession process to the EU is arguably one of the most problematic ones in the history of EU enlargement. For many centuries has Turkey (in the shape of the Ottoman empire) had the role as Europe’s Other, and has thereby been part of laying the foundation to a European identity. At the same time, though, has Turkey in many ways shown an interest in getting closer to the West and in fact becoming accepted as such—membership in organizations such as the OECD, the Council of Europe and NATO is a good indications of this. Along these lines, Turkey’s position can be seen as both part of and different from Europe, and due to the increasing importance of Turkey in the world arena in many different respects, the complicated case of Turkey’s accession process to the EU becomes even more interesting to study.

Purpose, background and research question

This thesis addresses the case of the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU, which can be seen as a specific case of the larger phenomenon EU enlargement. Arguably, EU enlargement is connected to political, economic, societal, cultural, religious and ethical issues. Many different types of analysis have aimed at understanding different aspects of EU enlargement by focusing on one or many of these issues, generating quite different conclusions. The reason for this is simply that EU enlargement is a loose concept in the sense that one enlargement round bears only little resemblance to other ones, and that thereby assumptions about the “nature of EU enlargement” often prove to be wrong. At
the same time, deciding to analyze the different instances of EU accession as completely separate cases seems an even worse choice; in order to understand the specific case, it has to be understood in a bigger context, thereby putting it in relation to the more general case. Hence, there is a need for a theory in order to understand EU enlargement. Since the problem seems to be located in how to use the different types of issues in order to understand the phenomenon, two main strategies appear as possible. First, EU enlargement could be understood as related to European integration, and therefore connected in relevant ways to how the study of European integration has been treated. This basically means that major theories and methodologies tailored for European integration studies are “imported” to the field of EU enlargement studies, and are more or less assumed to be able to produce descriptions and explanations there too. Second, EU enlargement is considered a separate case that can only be analyzed using analytical tools suited for the particularities of the specific phenomenon. EU enlargement studies are therefore considered related to European integration studies, but not as a subcategory of it. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the case of Turkey’s EU accession process in the light of the second strategy. Turkey’s accession process could therefore be considered a case of the distinct field of EU enlargement rather than the wider field of European integration studies.

A central problem in EU enlargement studies is that, in line with what is stated above, many different kinds of issues seem important to consider. To the extent EU enlargement studies bears a resemblance to European integration studies, the debate over what aspects to focus on in analyzing European integration has a long history. The two most influential theoretical perspectives in the study of European integration have been the intergovernmental approach, originally developed by Stanley Hoffman and later further
developed by Andrew Moravcsik,\textsuperscript{1} and the supranational approach (particularly neofunctionalism), originally developed by David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas and continued by Philippe C. Schmitter, Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet, and in later years also by Arne Niemann.\textsuperscript{2} Both of these perspectives typically focus on material factors such as economic and political power, typically producing analyses that display the results in quantity rather than quality terms. Even if these perspectives are not strictly using only material factors but tend to include some ideational elements into the theory (such as how Andrew Moravcsik’s theory Liberal Intergovernmentalism endogenizes its analysis of how the member states’ national preferences develop), neither the intergovernmental nor the supranational approach places any real focus on ideational factors such as values, rules and norms. There are therefore good arguments for building on another approach when analyzing EU enlargement.

By emphasizing that ideas matter for understanding politics, constructivism has been used in international relations theory by e.g. Emanuel Adler, Nicholas Onuf, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Alexander Wendt as an alternative to former rationalist perspectives since the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{3} In the 1990s constructivism was imported to European integration studies by e.g. Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez, Thomas Risse and Jeffrey T. Checkel.\textsuperscript{4} The complexity of the EU, where different types of actors are present at many different levels, and where values, rules and norms are constantly referred to when justifying policies and actions, called for a theoretical perspective that had the analytical tools to include both material and ideational factors in the analyses. The success of using con-

\textsuperscript{1} See e.g. Moravcsik 1998.
\textsuperscript{2} See e.g. Niemann and Schmitter 2009. Due to the many similarities between neofunctionalism and constructivism, the theories of David Mitrany (1975) Ernst B. Haas (1964) and Philippe C. Schmitter (1971) can be used as a backdrop for understanding how political decisions taken at the supranational level can seriously decrease the power of governments.
\textsuperscript{3} See e.g. Adler 1997; Onuf 1989; Ruggie 1998; Kratochwil 1989; and Wendt 1992.
structivism for studying European integration suggests that it might be of value also for the study of EU enlargement. Concerning EU enlargement, Frank Schimmelfennig has done a number of studies combining rationalist and constructivist approaches. Ulrich Sedelmeier has similarly studied EU enlargement from this perspective, but focused more on substantive EU politics. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have also done important research on the topic together. These studies of EU enlargement building on constructivism are, however, of a pragmatic kind: ideas are seen to matter, but only as one independent variable alongside the “traditional” material ones. In other words: ideas matter, but their importance is on Schimmelfennig’s and Sedelmeier’s accounts not emphasized. Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener have made important contributions in this field in the way that it differs a little from Schimmelfennig’s and Sedelmeier’s approaches by seeing enlargement largely as a speech act. Relatedly, Helene Sjursen has studied EU enlargement and how decisions in this context are dependent on processes of justification.

It is clear that European integration nowadays is a well-established field of study for constructivists. Constructivist thought has, though, to a much lesser degree been applied to EU enlargement. Even though Turkey as a case has been studied using constructivist ideas it has been neglected in many respects.

Following this, this thesis will use constructivist theory to analyze the case of Turkey’s accession to the EU. The main research question is: How can the accession of Turkey to the EU be understood in constructivist terms? The purpose is thus primarily to highlight how different factors tend to influence the accession process in the case of Turkey, and

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5 See e.g. Schimmelfennig 2001 and 2008.
6 Sedelmeier 2002.
7 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002.
8 See e.g. Fierke and Wiener 1999.
9 Sjursen 2002, 2006; see also Sjursen and Smith 2004.
10 Frank Schimmelfennig’s (2009) uses constructivist ideas to study the Turkey case, but is, like his previous studies of e.g. the eastern enlargement based on a rationalist foundation.
to show how a constructivist analysis illuminates aspects of EU enlargement that other perspectives are incapable of. A secondary purpose is to provide an estimate of how the Turkey accession process can be related to the more general case of EU enlargement, and whether there are any elements in the Turkey case that are not case specific.
2. Theoretical and methodological framework

Political action is understood using two basic concepts: agency and structure. Agency focuses on the actor and implicitly assumes that the reason for acting in a certain way is more or less exogenous to the political system; in other words, agency refers to how actors can act freely. Structure, instead, refers to the system of limitations to act freely that necessarily arises in the interaction between different actors. A basic constructivist assumption is that agency and structure are co-constitutive in the way that they are mutually dependent on the other.\footnote{Risse 2004, p. 161.} Thereby occupying an ontological middle position that claims that neither agency nor structure can be collapsed into the other, constructivism comes in many shapes. What clearly separates constructivism from rationalist approaches is that agency is not understood only in relation to a structure in terms of material factors, but ideational ones as well, which means that even ideas, such as values and norms, enable and constrain agency. The conventional version of constructivism only uses ideational factors as a supplementary variable in a framework that otherwise completely uses material factors. One example of such conventional constructivism applied to EU studies is Frank Schimmelfennig’s analysis of the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004, according to which the EU was “rhetorically entrapped” to make good on the promise to let the central and eastern European states join.\footnote{Schimmelfennig 2001.} Interpretative or radical constructivism places even more emphasis on ideas, and therefore requires studying discourse.\footnote{Here I am using Jeffrey T. Checkel’s labels “conventional”, “interpretative” and “radical” in order define different versions of constructivism. See Checkel 2006, p. 4.}
ample of this is Thomas Diez’s analysis of European integration that uses a constructivist account to study how changes in European governance have occurred across time.\textsuperscript{14}

The ontological assumptions constructivism makes give rise to an important epistemological consequence that is important: material factors have to be interpreted in order to have any meaning. In other words, the relevant aspects of the world are “constructed” in the sense that people’s perceptions and actions together make up the discourses through which reality is given meaning. Material factors do not therefore have any intrinsic value or meaning. This is not to deny that there is a material reality, but only to claim that materiality does not entail any political actions in and by itself. The more radical constructivism employed in this thesis therefore implies a view of discourses that renders the importance of—even the meaning of—material factors dependent on context and thereby interpretation. Discourse is thus seen as the dimension “in which meaning is structured.”\textsuperscript{15} In other words, by taking ideational factors seriously, both material and ideational factors have to be studied through analyzing discourses.\textsuperscript{16}

**Connecting the theory to the Turkey case**

Political action is according to a constructivist understanding the result of what actors are able to do in a context where the dominating discourse sets up constraints on action. Especially regarding important political actions that are going to have important consequences for many people, acting according to the rules in the dominating discourse is very important. In Ole Wæver's words, “overall policy must hold a definite relationship to discursive structures, because it is always necessary for policy makers to be able to argue

\textsuperscript{14} Diez 2001.
\textsuperscript{15} Wæver 1998, p. 108.
‘where this takes us.” 17 Regardless of what policies are suggested by European politicians regarding Turkey’s bid for membership, these policies must in a relevant way relate to the dominating discourse.

Turkey’s accession process to the EU is in this thesis analyzed according to a very simple model. The possible actions in the relevant sense only concern two main actors: the EU and Turkey. Even though the EU can be broken down to a number of constituent parts (e.g. the member states or the EU institutions), Turkey’s bid for membership concerns first and foremost the relation between the EU as a whole and Turkey, meaning that policies and actions from the different member states’ side will be considered to be officially on behalf of the whole EU. In this way the statements and actions of the member states will importantly be enabled and constrained by the dominating discourses at the EU level, and simply cannot only relate to smaller domestic discourses. The accession process is directly dependent on the policies of the EU, which in turn means that whether Turkey becomes a member or not is a result of how the dominating discourses in the EU are constructed.

In this context, identity is a central concept, since different constructions of the identity of Turkey as seen from the EU’s point of view work as foundations for what policies can be presented. Identity is—as all other concepts—in the current theoretical framework understood as constructed by the process of linking and differentiating concepts to or from each other, thereby establishing their meaning. In other words, political identity is a “discursive and symbolic construction,” 18 and is thereby directly dependent on the way language is highly structured at the same time it is instable. According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, discourses continuously try to fix the meaning of concepts around a closed structure, but “neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possi-

ble.” This understanding of language as both highly structured and inherently instable in connection with how identity is constructed through language means that identity “inherits” the structured and instable characteristic language has. Since structures are dependent on actors continuously reproducing them, actors also continuously change the system through their actions. Identities therefore have to be “performed” continuously in order to exist, which in turn means that when a type of performance normally ascribed a certain identity ceases, the identity associated with it dies as well. Changes in identity are in this way directly connected to changes in discourses.

According to the model described above, images of Turkey’s identity are highly important in determining what the EU’s policy concerning Turkey’s accession process can be. In the normal case, though, there are many different discourses that challenge each other’s interpretations of the world. Although such discourses most of the time overlap to a large degree, they also typically suggest very different policies in controversial cases like Turkey’s bid for EU membership. In order to understand the interplay between competing discourses the theoretical framework for analyzing the case at issue will use Ole Wæver’s model of how discourses are built up by structures with different degrees of so-called “sedimentation.” The basic idea is that political debates can be seen as a way of constantly relating different concepts to each other. In order for an argument to make sense, it has to continuously use concepts that already are part of a dominating discourse. Discourses are, as shown above, always inherently instable due to the constant need for rearticulating the connections between the concepts it is made up of. Some concepts are, however, more stable than others, and this feature is captured by Wæver’s notion of different degrees of sedimentation. Structures that are more deeply embedded in the dis-

19 Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 111.
21 Judith Butler’s concept of “performativity” describes this feature in a convincing way; see Butler 1997.
course are considered more “solidly sedimented.” It is important to note that claiming that one structure is more sedimented than another does not mean it is truer than the other. Rather, more sedimented structures are more taken for granted than less sedimented ones, whereas such less sedimented structures instead tend to be more politicized in the sense that their links to other concepts are less established and tend to be more challenged.

Material and methodology

The scope is limited to only concern the Turkish accession process, to the extent that it is possible study to the relation between the EU and Turkey as a separate issue. Regarding the conceptual as well as practical difficulties this implies, I am aware that the study also will cover questions that exceed this scope regarding both the dimension of geography and time. The scope will, more specifically, be a study of the Turkish accession through examining the European discourses from late 2004 to 2010. This time period is interesting since it covers the entire negotiation process (starting in late 2005), and also since two prominent opponents to Turkish membership in the EU—Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy—assumed office during this period. Moreover, I will study the Turkish side by focusing on the arguments they use to expedite the process, but only to the extent this was a response to the European debate.

In order to study the discourses related to the accession process of Turkey empirical material of different kinds is necessary. This thesis primarily uses two different kinds of sources: newspapers and official EU documents. In order to keep the amount of material at a reasonable level, the scope is limited to three different newspapers: the Financial Times, Le Monde Diplomatique and Der Spiegel. All three newspapers are well estab-

lished and offer a wide variety of views on EU politics. By choosing three newspapers that are based in different countries in the EU (the UK, France and Germany, respectively), the possibility to map the dominant discourses that the EU’s policies related to the Turkey case in a more thorough way increases. Importantly, discourse never consists of only “one statement, one text, one action or one source.” Therefore, the empirical material is not supposed to function as a way of “mapping the British, French or German discourses” but instead to study which more or less coherent discourses can be found regardless of where they seem to originate geographically. Discourses in the EU are reasonably not tied to any certain country or even language. Instead the task of mapping the discourses is to depict different articulations, arguments and values that tend to connect to each other, thereby giving rise to more or less coherent discourses. Moreover, the different newspapers can therefore connect to many different discourses, and are not tied to one or another such discourse.

There are a lot of questions connected to using newspapers as part of the empirical material. The political alignment of the newspapers is the obvious first issue. The question is: in what way, and to what extent, does the (official) political alignment of a newspaper determine the relation between that newspaper and the dominating discourse in the country? The answer is that the exact connection between news media and discourses is impossible to fully determine, due to the constantly changing and thereby indeterminate character of discourses. A more general understanding of the issue is therefore more relevant. Importantly, in order to become and continue to be one of the most influential newspapers, it has to relate to the dominant official discourses in the country in a way that is widely considered reasonable. This connection between an influential newspaper and the dominant discourses is necessary, since the lack of a match between these would mean that the description of the world provided by the newspaper would be perceived as

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24 Hall 2001, p. 72.
distant from that of the general public, which eventually would lead to either the demise of the newspaper, or force the newspaper to adapt to the dominant discourse. Especially the influence and the size, among other things, of the studied newspapers are relevant for understanding their position in (or relation to) the discourses that are studied. A newspaper that is widely recognized as one of the dominant news providers and at the same time is not considered to deviate significantly from generally accepted views can be used as a source for studying the dominating discourses. The same line of reasoning applies to size. The bigger a newspaper is, and if this seems to be a stabile state, the more probable it is to importantly influence the dominant discourse in a country.

Regarding the impact the newspapers have on the decision makers, it should be conceded that even newspapers that appear to be very influential and have a large circulation are not necessarily in a position to direct or control policies in the way they “want.” Arguably such newspapers have an important influence in politics in general, but it is hard to pinpoint when and how this is done. Moreover, it could be the other way around: it could be the case that these newspapers tend to convey views through articles and editorials that mirror the influence society in general—i.e. the dominating discourse—has on the newspaper. The good thing is that regardless of how the “causal arrows” are directed, there is good reason to believe that newspapers that are generally considered influential and have a large circulation also represent the dominating discourse in a relevant way.

According Ole Wæver description of how to study discourses, the method here used is built on two stages: a synchronic and a diachronic analysis. The first step (the synchronic analysis) implies studying the wide array of texts that are here used as the empirical material. This comprises mainly articles from the three newspapers that are related to the topic, but also supplementary background literature concerning topics that usually is not mentioned in the newspapers, such as detailed political or economic data, or the historical background of Turkey and the Ottoman empire. This first step aims at getting
what Wæver calls “as clear an understanding as possible of the inner logic of a particular discourse which is ultimately an analytical construct but justified empirically by a first reading of texts.” The diachronic step, which comes after, simply implies studying the details against the backdrop of what is produced in the diachronic step.

\[\text{Wæver 2009, p. 172.}\]

\[\text{Wæver 2009, p. 172.}\]
3. “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive”

In the western media, the most dominating discourse is what I here have called the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse. The overarching idea is that Turkey is different from Europe, but is generally not understood as posing a threat to Europe’s future existence or in any other tangible way challenge it. Turkey is considered Europe’s Other in the sense that it defines what Europe is (and is not) across a number of important dimensions: history, culture, religion, politics and society. On a general level, the traditional view of the West, described as dynamic, and the Orient, as static and unchanging, is nowadays well known. Implicit in the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse is, in line with this, the understanding of identity as constant and unchanging, which leads to the basic idea that Turkey never really has been European. The discourse seems to frame the Turkish identity in a quite complex way, however, which opens up for possible future change.

Cultural and historical issues

Religion comprises the perhaps most important part of the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse. Throughout the material Turkey is consistently depicted as a Muslim country, but in different degrees. This picture of Turkey as a Muslim country is connected to many different parts of society. One such part that especially highlights the contrast to the European identity is how religious issues are linked to women’s rights. In

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2005 on the International Women’s Day, Der Spiegel reported that “women in Istanbul are fighting against honor killings and forced marriage.”\(^{28}\) The question about women’s rights is also transposed to the closely related debate about the use of headscarves. The AKP’s intention to change the law preventing headscarves being used in state institutions and universities, once passed by the Atatürk regime in the 1920s and generally seen as an important symbol for the formally secular nature of the Turkish state, was in 2008 causing a lot of protests. In the Financial Times it was considered populist of the AKP to put a lot of effort into this question instead of focusing on the problems Turkey has with freedom of expression.\(^{29}\) The question about headscarves played an important role in the French debate too, in two ways. First, in September 2004 a law banning headscarves in French schools came into effect.\(^{30}\) This can reasonably be considered an indication of a French opposition to the influence of Muslim traditions in Europe. Second, of the three newspapers here investigated, the French Le Monde Diplomatique is the one that puts the most emphasis on the headscarves issue. In connection with the general elections in 2007 it reports that “to avoid a confrontation with his own party [Erdogan] chose Gül, a man liked and respected abroad, rather than a figure more appealing to Turkey’s secular elite,” and adds that, “Gül’s wife wears an Islamic headscarf, the covering which the Kemalist hardline want to see banished from public life.”\(^{31}\) Elsewhere Le Monde Diplomatique discusses the headscarf as something that has a European counterpart, but still is essentially alien: “The military chiefs who squirm at the sight of a headscarf in public life are reacting like some US colonel whose daughter’s boyfriend has long hair.”\(^{32}\) The issue over Turkey’s president Abdullah Gül’s “headscarved wife” comes up again in Septem-

\(^{28}\)Der Spiegel, 8 March 2005, “Neo-Nazis: ‘Now They Can Officially Be Called Terrorists.’”


\(^{30}\)BBC website, 31 August 2004, “Q&A: Muslim headscarves.”

\(^{31}\)Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2007, “Turkey: torn between God and state.”

\(^{32}\)Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2007, “Turkey: torn between God and state.”
It is clear that Turkey during the AKP rule has developed in a way that makes questioning the Kemalist secular dogmas more accepted. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) were in 2009 described as simply shifting their focus from minor issues like the headscarf to other things in order to gain votes: the increased support for the CHP was “reward for the […] decision to cease attacking the AK party on ‘Islamic lifestyle issues’—whether university women should be able to wear religious headscarves.” It is obvious that the issue had more impact in *Le Monde Diplomatique* than in the other newspapers. As a comparison, *Der Spiegel* did not even mention the word in the articles here examined, and the *Financial Times* brought it up only a few times, but did not emphasize the issue particularly. This fact should probably be understood in the light of the previous French debate about whether to ban the headscarf in French schools, and—relatedly—the fact that France has a comparatively big Muslim population.

It should be conceded that Turkey is not the only possible target for critique of how the connection between religion and woman rights is approached. Most, if not all, EU member states are importantly affected by religious and cultural norms that to a significant extent determine what women are supposed to or not supposed to do. Whether this focuses on particular issues like the headscarf or forced marriages (as Turkey is often associated with) or the housewife ideal (which also the western world is clearly associated with), is from a “neutral” point of view arbitrary. However, the Turkish religious and cultural characteristics are from the EU’s perspective most often considered alien, whereby to the extent such religious and cultural characteristics become noticed in the EU, the Turkish identity as non-European will be strengthened.

The “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse also has important connections the history of the relation between Turkey and the rest of Europe. The material shows that it

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33 *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 2007, “The many battles for Turkey’s soul.”
is often claimed that Turkey has been part of European history. “Turkey has been an integral part [of] the twists and turns of European history for 700 years,” reads the first line of an article in the Financial Times in 2006. References to the Turkish roots in the Ottoman empire are also recurring in the empirical material: Turkey is for instance referred to as “the children of the Ottomans.” Interestingly, references to the Ottoman empire are not especially common in the studied newspapers. This can be understood in two different ways: either there is an insufficient link between what the newspapers represent and what actually forms the image of Turkey as relevant for the question of whether the EU should accept Turkey as a new member state, or Turkey’s Ottoman history simply does not matter very much in determining Turkey’s current identity. The way that the Ottoman history is mentioned also changes depending on context. The role of Turkey in the shaping of European history seems to be articulated differently in Germany, though, indicating how the historical relation between Turkey and the rest of Europe can be interpreted in different ways. In 2005, for instance, it is claimed that “the Turks haven’t been a party of any of the religious or societal movements that have shaped Europe: the renaissance, reformation and enlightenment.” One answer to the question why the Ottoman issue is not treated as very central in the debate can be that referring to the Ottomans works as a double-edged sword: its both good and bad, and thereby simply not regarded as a relevant argument either for or against Turkish membership in the EU.

The Ottoman history is however relevant indirectly: the issue of the massacre on Armenians during the first world war is a highly central issue in the debate, and effectively depicts Turkey as clearly non-European. The Financial Times follows Turkey’s stance on the Armenian question closely throughout the entire period. In 2006 it reports that “Ankara rejected a demand by the European parliament that it recognise the mass killings of

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35Financial Times, 6 November 2006, “European Union needs Turkey.”
36Financial Times, 23 November 2009, “Turkey’s Ottoman mission.”
Armenians during the first world war as genocide,” and that Turkey’s prime minister Erdogan further claimed that “Our position regarding the so-called Armenian genocide is very clear, and nobody should expect us to change it.” The same year, the Financial Times interestingly detaches Turkey from the Armenian massacre by claiming that it was the Ottoman empire and not the republic of Turkey that was behind it. The dominating discourse regarding the Armenian question is nonetheless that Turkey officially has to admit to the massacre being called “genocide”; the point was reiterated in 2007 where it is noticed that also the US Congress considered describing “the first world war massacres of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks as genocide.” The Armenian question is central also in Der Spiegel, and the rhetoric is basically in line with the British one. Der Spiegel does for example describe the Armenia question as something that those “who dared to speak out about the 1915 Armenian killings” were prosecuted for. The perspective in Der Spiegel could however be claimed to differ slightly from that of the Financial Times. In 2005 Turkey is pictured as being insulted by among other issues the Armenian one. One conclusion is that the salience of the Armenian massacre is clearly articulated, but that there are obvious differences between the three studied newspapers. The most conspicuous observation is that Le Monde Diplomatique clearly places less emphasis on the issue. Since my aim is not to delineate the geographical origins of different discourses, nor to determine the quantity of references to a certain event or question, the fact that Le Monde Diplomatique places considerably less emphasis on the Armenian question than the other two newspapers do does not in itself lead to any direct information about the nature of the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse. It suggests, though, that the issue is considered more important in the UK (and to a lesser degree in Germany)

38Financial Times, 5 September 2006, “EU stalls on Cyprus to keep Turkey talks alive.”
39Financial Times, 10 October 2006, “Patronising Turkey is a dangerous game for Europe.”
40Financial Times, 28 October 2007, “Laying memory’s ghost to rest.”
42Der Spiegel, 13 May 2005, “Senate Committee Refuses to Back Bolton.”
than in France, and that its more emphasized role as a nodal point in the discourse as expressed in the Financial Times might be connected to the UK’s more instrumental attitude towards EU membership than is the case in the other two countries, especially regarding France.  

**Overlapping European and Turkish values**

It is clear that the Armenian question has a central position for many different reasons in the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse. From the EU’s perspective, perhaps the most important way is how it is continuously assumed that Turkey has to recognize the Armenian massacre as genocide in order to be granted membership in the EU. The then French president Jacques Chirac made such a demand during a visit to Armenia in 2006, whereby the Financial Times claimed that “he unilaterally created a new condition of EU membership for Turkey.” In other words, even though the formal accession criteria are clearly stated in the so-called “Copenhagen criteria,” by associating the Armenian question with membership in the EU, Chirac indirectly provided Turkey with an image as a country that does not live by the same standards the European countries do, and thereby Othering Turkey. Connected to this event, Olli Rehn, the enlargement commissioner until February 2010, claimed that accepting the label “genocide” of the Armenian massacre is not part of the Copenhagen criteria. Nevertheless, the requirement that Turkey recognize the massacre as “genocide” is nevertheless emphasized throughout the material. The issue has in line with this arguably developed into a more or less explicit requirement in Turkey’s accession process.

43 See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, p. 147
44 Financial Times, 10 October 2006, “Patronising Turkey is a dangerous game for Europe.”
45 Financial Times, 10 October 2006, “Patronising Turkey is a dangerous game for Europe.”
46 See e.g. Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2004, “Turkey: welcome to Europe.”
The Armenian question is also important for the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse in how it continuously gets associated with the issue of freedom of speech: Le Monde Diplomatique discusses in April 2007 how the French law that forbids denying the “Armenian genocide” has consequences for Turkey’s accession to the EU. Der Spiegel makes the same connection, and the freedom of expression is emphasized throughout the studied period. In this context it becomes obvious how this actually gives rise to a French position characterized by double standards: France on the one hand criticizes Turkey for lacking true freedom of expression, and on the other hand itself reduces its own freedom of expression regarding the issue. The issues concerning Armenia and the freedom of expression became linked in a powerful way in 2007 by the murder of the famous Armenian editor Hrant Dink in Istanbul. The Financial Times, first, reacts strongly to the Hrant Dink murder, and connects it to the political climate in Turkey:

What Turkey now needs, especially if it is to remain a credible candidate for membership of the European Union, is a ruthless examination of the poisonous backdrop to this killing. Mr. Dink’s murderer did not emerge from nowhere.

It is of course an open question to what extent the “poisonous backdrop” of the political climate influences a certain person to murder someone for allegedly political reasons, but the articulation of the link between the political climate and Hrant Dink murder clearly is exceptionally strong, rendering the identity of Turkey utterly unsuited for EU membership. The image that is conveyed is that Turkey simply does not share some of the most fundamental values that are associated with the EU, and this is emphasized by the fact

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47 Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2007, “Debate: can we say what we want?”
that this also leads to deadly violence. The same image is by the Financial Times relayed from 2007 and forward, and maintains and emphasizes the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse.\textsuperscript{50}

The same type of argument, albeit in a less accentuated manner, is presented by Der Spiegel and Le Monde Diplomatique. In July 2007, Der Spiegel reports “Turkey has announced it plans to amend the notorious Article 301 which limits freedom of speech” and refers to the law as having been used in the past to prosecute some of those who were discussing the Armenian massacre in a way that “insulted Turkishness.”\textsuperscript{51} Another example is how the issue is brought up once more in 2008, where Der Spiegel calls it a “long-awaited change to a law.”\textsuperscript{52} In line with the other two newspapers, Le Monde Diplomatique also emphasizes the connection between the murder of Hrant Dink and the political climate in Turkey. “When people ask who killed Dink, they don’t mean who pulled the trigger,” writes Le Monde Diplomatique in May 2007.\textsuperscript{53} The issue is still vibrant in 2010, when it is used in an argument for the annulment of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code.\textsuperscript{54}

The discussion over how Turkey lacks true freedom of speech is in many contexts connected to the wider and more elaborated discussion about how Turkey protects other values and rights that are widely considered central to the European identity. The existence of Article 301 is in this way seen as a part of a bigger problem with the Turkish judicial system. Der Spiegel, for instance, quotes Olli Rehn saying that, “We expect freedom of speech for all,” and, “the rights of woman and minorities are protected.”\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps the single most recurring concept of all (thereby creating a very powerful node that

\textsuperscript{50} See e.g. Financial Times, 22 January 2007, “Ask the expert: EU enlargement” and Financial Times, 1 May 2008, “Turkish free speech.”
\textsuperscript{51} Der Spiegel, 7 November 2007, “Ankara to Amend ‘Insulting Turkishness’ Law.”
\textsuperscript{53} Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2007, “Turkey: torn between God and state.”
\textsuperscript{54} Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2010, “Crossing the line.”
\textsuperscript{55} Der Spiegel, 22 April 2008, “EU Wants to Speed up Membership Talks with Turkey.”
in fact connects all of the here investigated discourses) is that of human rights and what is sometimes referred to as “European values.” In a discussion about the appeal the EU has for Turks, it is established that “Europe aspires to human values.” Even in the context of selling weapons, Europe’s position as a power that adheres to “human rights, development, security and stability” is stressed. It is further plausible to claim that this also has consequences for how the image of Turkey is constructed, rendering the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse even more extreme.

It is without doubt clear that the EU is often associated with well-known values such as human rights, respect for minorities and solidarity. The EU’s official motto “unity in diversity” can also be seen as an example of how the EU builds its identity by reference to a set of values that are supposed to be universalistic and inclusive. A straightforward example is of course presented in the enlargement criteria as decided at the Copenhagen summit in 1993. Democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities are determined necessary to fully embrace in order for a country to become a member of the EU. These values that are officially stated by the EU, along with a number of other values, can arguably be stated as European values through the way the EU has a habit of continuously associating itself with them. This is also highly reflected in the newspapers. The EU is for instance commonly seen as a peacekeeper in Europe and a way of avoiding ethnic conflict. A very common description of the EU is also how it spreads stability, prosperity and individual rights. The exact formulation of the EU’s relation to such values, and even the exact set of values that it adheres to, is unclear. For the construction of the Turkish identity, however, the exact formulation seems

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56 Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2005, “The dark grey cloud of Europe.”
to be only of secondary importance. Due to the centrality of such values regarding building the identity of the EU, the importance of such values in constructing the identity of Turkey seems to be dependent on the contrast between how the EU and Turkey live up to these values. The relation between the EU and Turkey in this regard is also characterized by the EU’s hegemonic position— the EU is implicitly considered the standard by which adherence to “European values” can be measured, and leaves Turkey in a position where it never can surpass the “original.” The constant verdicts passed by the Commission claiming that Turkey does not still fulfill the Copenhagen criteria regarding political rights therefore stresses a type of Otherness that by the EU has been established as one of the most important ones. The “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse does in this way portray Turkey as a country that is different from the EU to the extent that it becomes not only inappropriate but also ethically impossible for the EU to accept it as a member state.

**Rationalist arguments**

The above articulations can be understood as the EU trying to protect its culture and European way of life: in short, its “European values.” There is, however, one final part of the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse that is constructed by articulations about how the EU needs to protect more tangible values, mainly of the economic kind. An important picture of Turkey was gaining ground during the start of Turkey’s negotiation process, which happened to roughly coincide with the accession of ten central and eastern European countries in May 2004. By increasing the number of member states from 15 to 25 the EU underwent major changes administratively as well as economically, which caused major criticisms both from politicians and the public. What comprises the core of these articulations of how Turkey is framed as economically inappropriate to be-
come an EU member is the fear of Turks “stealing” European jobs. In May 2005 the Financial Times writes that “many French voters expressed fears about central European workers with low wages taking French workers’ jobs and factories moving from France to eastern Europe.” 61 In June the same year, the Financial Times describes how Dominique de Villepin, at the time the French prime minister, claimed that the EU needed a “period of reflection” about future enlargements, and it is clear that he has Turkey as an economic threat in mind. 62 One of the key terms is the “Polish plumber,” who is seen as a symbol for low-wage workers stealing western European jobs. 63 The dispersion and the centrality of the idea is underlined by the fact that the exact same wording is used by for instance Le Monde Diplomatique during the same period: “the media began to run scare stories about a mythical Polish plumber poised to come west and undercut honest French workers.” 64 The same “Polish plumber” appears in Der Spiegel during the same period. 65 The Financial Times, too, highlights the issue, and connects it to the will of the population: “as long as Turkish membership raises the prospect of mass emigration to the rest of the EU, it will be impossible to sell it to western European voters.” 66 Throughout the period the potential problems of accepting a country as poor and big as Turkey functions as a backdrop for the debate about further enlargement and European integration in general.

The wide-spread fear of the “Polish plumber” should also be seen as part of the bigger issue of how globalization affects the EU countries, and what the EU’s responsibility should be in this regard. The Financial Times in 2006 reports that “National governments may be in a mess; their citizens deeply fearful of globalization,” and that, “Electorates across Europe do want their governments to do more to shield them from the

63 See e.g. Financial Times, 7 April 2005, “Inside Brussels: Turning point for EU enlargement.”
64 Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2005, “Malevolent fantasy of Islam.”
65 Der Spiegel, 2 June 2005, “Europe's Existential Crisis.”
66 Financial Times, 23 August 2010, “End the hypocrisy and talk Turkey.”
insecurities of the age." During Nicolas Sarkozy’s first year as French president, he clearly emphasized the EU’s role concerning globalization. It is then reported that “he wants Europe to provide more ‘protection’ against the effects of globalisation.” In 2009 Der Spiegel conveys how the importance of the economic function is again stressed, implying that Turkey might pose problems for the rest of the EU. Turkey can in this way be seen as potentially having a big influence—good or bad—for the EU economy.

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4. “Turkey as the Radical Other”

A clearly prominent discourse in the debate about Turkey’s bid for EU membership is the narrative of “Turkey as the Radical Other.” Much of this discourse is built on the same foundation as the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse, with some important differences that give rise to quite a different view of Turkey. The underlying idea is that Turkey is fundamentally different from Europe and the EU, and this not only is unlikely to change, but that it is in fact impossible to change this, since Turkey is defined as that which Europe is not. In this way Turkey is not only different, but its anti-thesis that is radically different from Europe.

Religion and the “clash of civilizations” argument

When Abdullah Gül, at the time Turkey’s foreign minister, in 2006 met his European counterparts in Luxembourg, it started with a working lunch. As Gül is a “devout Muslim” and was currently fasting, the meeting was in the Financial Times considered a “stark reminder of the divide” between the EU and Turkey.70 The Financial Times also continuously describes Turkey as “big, poor and Muslim,” thereby implicitly establishing the difference between Europe and Turkey.71

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70 Financial Times, 7 November 2006, “Turkey’s long journey west is in jeopardy.”
71 Financial Times, 4 September 2007, “Europe’s funk over its neighbours.” See also e.g. Financial Times, 30 June 2005, “Nervousness about EU enlargement,” 16 May 2010, “Turks delight in showing strengths to EU,” and 30 July 2010, “Why Turkey sits outside the tent.”
It has also on various occasions been claimed that the EU is a “Christian club.” The expression was also used in an interview the Financial Times did with Olli Rehn, at that time the enlargement commissioner. Rehn denied that the EU is a Christian club, but the need to deny it indicates that the idea is widely spread. In the newspapers here studied, the expression is not directly used but is more or less implicit. The description of Turkey as Muslim is very common and serves as a backdrop for other discussions rather than as an issue in itself. Since the chosen newspapers are media primarily for the well-educated Europeans, it is reasonable to assume that clearly superficial arguments such as those relying on religious differences between Europe and Turkey cannot be used. Nevertheless the newspapers all implicitly affirm the picture of Europe as building on a Judeo-Christian foundation and Turkey as building on a Muslim one. The prominence of the view that Europe is Christian and Turkey is Muslim and that there is a deep rift between these is clearly manifested by a statement of Herman van Rompuy, then minister of state in Belgium. “The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey,” he claimed in December 2004, continuing, “Turkey is not part of Europe and will never be part of Europe.” The mere fact that a person having made such a statement later is elected the first president of the European Council reveals the existence of a discourse according to which Turkey is not only widely seen as different from Europe, but also in fact a threat to its central values.

The difference between the EU and Turkey can also be perceived in terms that only indirectly assume the religious differences. Samuel Huntington’s famous idea about a “clash of civilizations” is a concept that appears central to the European debates, and can be claimed to form a central node in the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse.

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72 The expression is e.g. used by the BBC website, 8 November 2002, “Turkey entry ‘would destroy EU.’”
74 Financial Times, 19 November 2009, “Van Rompuy against Turkish membership.”
underlying idea that people identify primarily with a certain cultural group, which can be “tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nationals, and [...] civilizations,” forms the underlying differences between peoples.\textsuperscript{75} Le Monde Diplomatique in November 2004 discusses how the Muslim world by Europeans sometimes is understood as being “fossilised in fundamental opposition to the West,” and is in this way connected also to the idea about a clash of civilizations.\textsuperscript{76} The same picture can be found in Der Spiegel: the accession process and the negotiations are thought to mean “a loss of identity” for Turkey and this “shows how far apart Turkey and Europe really are.”\textsuperscript{77} In 2005, Turkey is depicted as a country that is turning more and more religiously extreme. Der Spiegel conveys the claims the Wall Street Journal made: “Old leftist dogmatism and a new tendency towards Islamism have erupted into an intense anti-Americanism that may even exceed the amount of hate for America seen in Arab countries,” and continues, “Turkey is becoming narrow-minded and paranoiac.”\textsuperscript{78} One of the most conspicuous examples of how the difference between the EU and Turkey (which can be understood in terms of belonging to different civilizations) turns into an idea of a radical difference with violence as a result is the series of cartoons showing the prophet Muhammad as a Muslim terrorist published initially by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in February 2006. Turkey’s implicit Muslim identity is therefore indirectly associated with the violence the cartoons gave rise to. This implicit association can be illustrated by how Le Monde Diplomatique in April 2007 discusses the lack of freedom of expression, “blasphemy laws” and the impact of religion connected to the Muhammad cartoon case, and how this has emphasized the difference between democratic and religious values.\textsuperscript{79} The way that terrorism, especially connected to al-Qaeda, has increased in Turkey in later years further em-

\textsuperscript{75} Huntington 1996, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{76} Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2005, “Malevolent fantasy of Islam.”
\textsuperscript{77} Der Spiegel, 4 May 2005, “A New Addition to the Anti-Semitic Dictionary.”
\textsuperscript{78} Der Spiegel, 25 February 2005, “A Marriage Gone Sour.”
\textsuperscript{79} Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2007, “Debate: can we say what we want?”
phasizes how Turkey’s Muslim character creates an image of Turkey as radically different, and also potentially a threat, to Europe. According to Le Monde Diplomatique in October 2008, al-Qaeda “has increased its influence in Turkey” and that most of these Turkish terrorists “go to Waziristan, receive their training, briefly take part in the fighting against Nato forces in Afghanistan, then return home to Europe.”

The conflict between the western world and the Muslim world is also highlighted by descriptions of how the “Western alliance [is] engaged in the fight against Islamic terrorism.” Continuously terrorism is implicitly linked to Islam, and never to any other religion. Even though none of the three newspapers explicitly stress a connection between terrorism and Islam, it is obvious that there is an important link between these two concepts. The “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse therefore contains the narrative “Turkey as an existential threat to Europe” in a very apparent way.

The question about religion can be traced to a more concrete level as well. The AKP, which has been the ruling party in Turkey since November 2002, appears to differ significantly from former Turkish political parties in many ways. A clear indication of this is how the party not only got reelected in 2007, but in fact also increased its share of the vote—a highly unusual event in Turkey. The AKP is officially a center-right party that also is moderately Islamist. There are, however, certain groups inside as well as outside of Turkey that believe the AKP has a hidden Islamist agenda more extreme than the official one. In September 2007 Le Monde Diplomatique describes how protestors “accused Gül and Erdogan of having an Islamist agenda to change Turkish society and subvert their way of life” and that “as the AKP gets stronger, it will force women into the hijab and institute Islamic law.” The same line of thought is touched on, again in Le Monde Diplomatique, in 2010, where it is claimed that “some still believe the Justice and Develop-
ment (AK) party and its so-called hidden Islamist agenda is estranging" Turkey from the EU. In Turkey the fears some groups had of the AKP became very obvious: in 2007, the secular CHP decided to boycott the elections, hoping to thereby prevent the AKP from winning a second time. In 2008 Turkey’s highest court agreed to investigate whether the AKP could be banned. In Der Spiegel the occasion was depicted as: “the court’s decision escalates a long-standing feud between the conservative Islamic AKP and a powerful secular elite.”

The impact of history

History has a special role to play when analyzing how religion matters in the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse. In important ways, Turkey can be seen as the heir to the Ottoman empire that fell as an effect of the first world war. The Ottoman empire was during several centuries much more developed than the western European states regarding science, culture and political stability. During this time, the peoples in the Balkans sometimes actually preferred Ottoman rule to the rule of the western empires due to their tolerance to religions other than the dominating one (which in the Ottoman case was Islam). What the significance of this historical fact is for the modern European discourses about Turkey is not clear-cut, however. One alternative would simply be that history only influences today’s discourses to the extent that the events are part of the commonly shared knowledge about the issue, which in this case is very little. Such a way of interpreting the impact of history is looking only at the shallow levels of the discourses, which thereby focuses on the quantitative model of how discourses change and

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83 Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2010, “Turkey: what axis shift?”
84 Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2007, “The many battles for Turkey’s soul.”
85 Der Spiegel, 31 March 2008, “Top Court to Consider Ban on Ruling Party.”
86 See e.g. Robins 1996, p. 69.
87 Karlsson 2007, p. 46.
interact with each other. The impact could also be understood in a way that instead goes
deeper and focuses on the more sedimeted layers of the discourse. According to such
an understanding history can be—and often is—important even though it does not at
first glance appear to be. Such an understanding would downplay the importance of
quantity to the benefit of centrality of some concepts over others.

History is also interesting in another respect. Due to the Ottoman domination in
southeastern Europe during several centuries until the first world war, Turkey has had a
great impact on European history in different ways. In the “Turkey as the Radical Other”
discourse, the image of the Turks as violent, ferocious and evil are common.\footnote{See e.g. Yilmaz 2009, pp. 86-90; Said 1978, pp. 59-60; Karlsson 2007, p. 20.}
To a lesser degree, this image is used in European newspapers as well. The most prominent example
of this is how Le Monde Diplomatique quotes Frits Bolkestein, then an EU commis-sioner, claiming that “if Turkey becomes an EU member “the liberation of Vienna in
1683 will have been in vain.”\footnote{Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2004, “Turkey: welcome to Europe.”}
Turkey and Greece are also framed as “historical ene-mies,” clearly relating to e.g. Turkey’s Ottoman past.\footnote{Financial Times, 15 October 2006, “How the Cyprus problem is again a snag for Europe.”}
In short, the empirical material
clearly suggests that historical arguments are important, but not in the same way other
arguments are. Direct references to the Ottoman empire exist, but are not abundant. In-
stead, the concept of history is used more as a framework according to which other argu-
ments make sense; describing Greece as Turkey’s historical enemy exemplifies this.

Rationalist arguments: politics and economics

Of the arguments that do not directly invoke values but instead use more classical ration-
alist factors, the image of Turkey as a so-called “deep state” also makes it seem like a po-
tential threat to the EU, albeit in a less tangible way than the clearly existential threat
Turkey is imagined to be using the “religious differences” and “clash of civilizations” narratives. In the western media here studied, Turkey is often depicted as a state that is only a democracy on the surface, so that when the ruling party does not act according to the “true, hidden elite,” it will be forced to step down in one way or another. Turkey has had military coups three times since the republic was founded in 1923. In 1960, 1971 and 1980 the military stepped in and ousted the then present governments, and in 1997 the government resigned as a result of the imminent threat of another coup. In the light of this, Der Spiegel’s description of “a shadowy gang accused of plotting to bring down Turkey’s moderate Islamist governing party,” and Le Monde Diplomatique’s depiction of how “the elected government was going in a direction that the ‘deep state’ didn’t approve” are examples that suggest how Turkey’s democracy differs from the kind that the EU supports. In the same article, a connection is also made to the murder of Hrant Dink:

To return to Hrant Dink, there is another explanation for his death […] ; that the ultra-right in Turkey has become a collection of ideologically committed cells more inspired by a sense of malaise than ordered by any rogue intelligence officer in green-tinted glasses. An al-Qaida-like quality of diffusion is implied.

Turkey is in this way depicted as a country where clearly undemocratic and violent forces are in power, making the label “democracy” seem unsuitable for Turkey. The image of Turkey as a country where democracy is not really institutionalized, and where the army and a hidden establishment are the real rulers, is to a high degree present in the Financial Times as well. In May 2007, the relation between the AKP and the army is portrayed as a

91 Faucompret and Konings, 2008, pp. 11-16.
“face-off” and suggests that Turkey runs the risk of having another coup.\textsuperscript{95} The conflict between the army that “has dominated Turkish political life for the best part of a century” and the AKP is once again made obvious by how the secularists, “backed by the military […] abhor the AKP as an Islamist threat.”\textsuperscript{96}

The rationalist arguments suggesting that Turkey is a threat to the EU are also present in more concrete ways. Economic issues take an important role in the discussions. In the Financial Times in June 2007, the development in the EU is described as moving towards mercantilism and protectionism, clearly marking the borders to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{97} The message that is conveyed is that Turkey, consistently described as a big and poor country, would become a great burden for the present member states. A direct effect would of course be the restructuring of different cohesion funds and other redistributive functions of the EU. With a GDP per capita roughly at the level of the current EU’s poorest countries,\textsuperscript{98} including Turkey would simply significantly increase the size of the worst-off group of member states. Turkey’s size also works as an implicit premise regarding the political structure of the EU’s institutions. Under the Lisbon treaty, the voting power in the most important decision bodies in the EU—the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the European Parliament— is in many issues determined by letting the more populous countries’ votes weigh more.\textsuperscript{99} Turkey, with a population of around 74 million people, would therefore become the second largest country in the EU if it would become a member, thereby giving it slightly less voting

\textsuperscript{95} Financial Times, 29 May 2007, “France gives Turkish EU hopes reprieve.”
\textsuperscript{96} Financial Times, 19 March 2008, “Does the EU care about Turkish democracy?”
\textsuperscript{97} Financial Times, 26 June 2007, “Paris balks at eurozone Turkey.”
\textsuperscript{98} In 2010 all three countries had a GDP per capita between $6,300 (Bulgaria) and $10,400 (Turkey), which is significantly less than the EU average. As a comparison, currently the poorest euro-zone country is Portugal, with a GDP per capita of $21,600. See the International Monetary Fund’s website at http://www.imf.org.
\textsuperscript{99} In the Council of Ministers and the European Council the use of qualified majority voting has this effect, whereas in the European Parliament more populous countries simply are allotted more seats; the effect in both cases is that more populous countries generally have greater say in decisions.
power than Germany, but more than for example France, Italy and the UK. Interestingly, this consequence of Turkish membership does not appear in the newspapers here studied even though it definitely has an impact on the current member states' considerations regarding Turkey's bid for membership.
Alongside the two most prominent discourses regarding Turkey’s identity as understood by the EU—the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” and the “Turkey as the Radical Other”—there is a third discourse that also can be seen as dominating although it significantly differs from the two first ones. It is the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse, and seen from this perspective Turkey is still Europe’s Other in some respects, but the discourse is infused by the conviction that Turkey is undergoing important change and is importantly characterized by the rapprochement to western Europe. Like the other discourses, the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse spans over several different (but connected) fields. The articulations are characterized by a higher level of complexity, and suggest a more dynamic view of Turkey, which allows for outcomes that are significantly different from the ones suggested by discourses that stress the Otherness of Turkey as a static condition.

The “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse constructs the picture of Turkey as different from Europe, but not in a radical or threatening way (as conveyed in the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse) or even as primitive and thereby a liability for the EU (as conveyed in the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse). Instead, the differences between Turkey and the EU countries are acknowledged but understood as possibilities; Turkey’s middle position between the Occident and the Orient is considered as a benign combination of the strengths of both parts.
“European values” and the impact of history

The EU is arguably strongly associated with a certain set of “European values,” and a very high degree of its international interaction is thereby imbued by the presence of such values. Regarding EU enlargement, the so-called “Copenhagen criteria” are among the most important such values, which simply means that applicant countries must live up to certain standards regarding e.g. human rights and the respect for minorities in order to be granted membership. The degree to which a country fulfills these criteria, however, is arguably in the last instance a matter of interpretation. Describing Turkey in relative rather than absolute terms can thus be a way to frame how Turkey in this sense turns more European, which tends to portray Turkey as less different. The Financial Times describes the development in Turkey as an “enormous progress in rule of law, freedom of intellectual activity and the defence of the secular state against illiberal religious fundamentalism.” Le Monde Diplomatique notices among the developments Turkey has done that “No country has ever agreed to sacrifice so many fundamental aspects of its culture in order to affirm its European identity” and that the democratic reforms include “the death penalty has been abolished; juridical tolerance of crimes of honour against women is no longer allowed; a proposed law for criminalising adultery has been abandoned” and that minorities are more respected than before. In its ambitions to bring Turkey into the EU, the AKP also brought about other developments that turned Turkey westwards: women are for instance allowed to work without having their husbands’ permission. Regarding the strictly social or political aspect of how Turkey can be seen as westernizing, Der Spiegel clearly does not cover the issue as much as the Financial Times and Le Monde Diplomatique. Nevertheless, the image of Turkey as a country that

100 Financial Times, 10 October 2006, “Patronising Turkey is a dangerous game for Europe.”
101 Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2004, “Turkey: welcome to Europe.”
102 Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2007, “Can Morocco’s Islamists check al-Qaida?”
sees itself as being (at least partly) European and politically belonging to the western sphere is well established within the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse.

The image of Turkey as undoubtedly (at least partly) European and part of the western sphere can be traced to the time of the Ottoman empire, in two ways. First, in the newspapers here studied, Turkey is sometimes seen as the continuation of the Ottoman empire. As was shown in the characterization of the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse, references to the Ottoman empire are not very common in the newspapers, and have the complicating feature of working as a double-edged sword. The fact that references to the Ottoman empire are not overabundant does not, however, in itself mean that it lacks importance for how the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse is constructed and maintained; the concept can function as a central node in the discourse even though it is not often referred to, provided many other concepts rest on it. Such as role as a backdrop for references to other related concepts can be inferred by the way Turkey is often depicted as the country in-between the Occident and the Orient, as previously mentioned. This in-between role has also taken on the character of Turkey as “defending” Europe. This role as a defender of Europe has lived on in the current debate about Turkish EU membership. In 2009 Abdullah Gül stated that: “During the cold war period Turkey spent its own resources for the defence of Europe. This should be appreciated.” It is also claimed that the history of a large part of Europe cannot be fully understood unless Ottoman archives are studied. This first image of Turkey as European thereby connects to the idea that Turks have been the protectors of Europe in the past.

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104 Financial Times, 23 November 2009, “Turkey’s Ottoman mission.”
The second way that the image of Turkey as traced back to the Ottoman empire can be found in the literature about Turkey. The link between the modern Turkish republic and the Ottoman empire is described as dual in the sense that the Turkish republic can be seen as a result of what was outdated in the Ottoman empire (which is often seen as the reason for its demise) and in this way provides a picture of Turkey as modern, but also as Turkey being in many ways the continuation of the Ottoman empire. Along these lines, the knowledge the Ottoman empire had regarding e.g. management of political institutions was to a high degree transferred to the Turkish republic.\textsuperscript{105} In other ways, especially the way that religion had had a central role in other social institutions, the birth of the Turkish republic meant an important step away from its Ottoman past.\textsuperscript{106} This second image of Turkey as European thereby instead connects to the idea that Europe is modern, and that Turkey strives to be modern in the same way.

**Turkey as a bridge between the Orient and the Occident**

Undoubtedly, the strongest articulation of the role of Turkey as an asset for Europe is the metaphor of Turkey as a bridge, which to some extent is connected to Turkey's Ottoman past. The connection between the Ottoman empire and Europe is, as stated above, described by the Financial Times as important in the way there is 700 years of common history connecting the two.\textsuperscript{107} Turkey is also described as connected to its Ottoman history in the sense it “re-engages with territories once ruled by the sultans” in order to “return Turkey to a place among the leadership of the Muslim world.”\textsuperscript{108} The official position of the US also emphasizes the role of Turkey as a bridge to the Muslim world and the possibility of Turkey working as a role model for other Muslim countries:

\textsuperscript{105} See e.g. Faucompret and Konings 2008, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{106} Narbone and Tocci 2009, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{107} Financial Times, 6 November 2006, “European Union needs Turkey.”
\textsuperscript{108} Financial Times, 23 November 2009, “Turkey's Ottoman mission.”
membership in the EU would “strengthen Turkey’s image as a model of successful democracy within a Muslim nation.”\textsuperscript{109} In this way, it is sometimes explicitly claimed that Turkey has an important function as a bridge especially regarding the religious tensions that exist between the western and the Muslim worlds, and even when this is not spelt out, the image of Turkey as a bridge between the East and the West carry implicit associations to the religious dimension of the role as a bridge. Even though this role is clearly pronounced in the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse and seems to permeate most of the articulations connected to it, the role is at the same time problematized. For instance, Le Monde Diplomatique conveys the view that Turkey might be a role model for other Muslim countries in some ways, but it is at the same time thought that they make “too many concessions on Islam.”\textsuperscript{110}

Even though the question of religion influences many of the discussions about Turkey as a bridge, it also takes on a more concrete and rationalist character. In 2006 the Financial Times describes Turkey as “pivotal to Britain and other European states” in realizing important interests, and that “if Europe wants to promote democracy in the region, Turkey is an indispensable ally.”\textsuperscript{111} In 2008 Turkey responded to criticisms launched by the EU by saying that “it is essential that the EU acts not with a short-sighted perspective but rather focuses on its principle founding philosophy, in other words on peace, stability and attaining the status of a global power.”\textsuperscript{112} The role Turkey gets as a bridge between the East and the West is also put in relation to how it does not get recognition for its position as a military and economic power.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{109}Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2004, “Cyprus: saying no to the future.”
\textsuperscript{110}Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2007, “Can Morocco’s Islamists check al-Qaida?”
\textsuperscript{111}Financial Times, 10 October 2006, “Patronising Turkey is a dangerous game for Europe.”
\textsuperscript{112}Financial Times, 5 November 2008, “Turkey hits back at EU.”
\textsuperscript{113}Financial Times, 30 July 2010, “Why Turkey sits outside the tent.”
Rationalist articulations

Whereas the discussion about Turkey as developing democratically and assuming so-called “European values” is virtually missing in the German newspaper, the link between EU enlargement and geopolitical and economic benefits is emphasized more. The EU is consistently referred to as a market economy, and Der Spiegel conveys the view that that is its primary purpose.\textsuperscript{114} Turkey’s trouble-ridden road to EU membership is also put in relation to what the EU is considered to be: “the world’s most powerful economy.”\textsuperscript{115} In this context, the image of Turkey as a country with high economic growth and an otherwise stabile financial system is important. With the growth Turkey has had since it became an official applicant country, around 9 percent annually, the view of Turkey from a more economic perspective thereby becomes more positive. Der Spiegel also tends to convey a view of Turkey that—by looking only at Turkey’s identity from an economic point of view—is surprisingly positive. In response to the (German) population’s decreasing support for future enlargements of the EU, Der Spiegel claims that studies had refuted two of the common fears about enlargement: that it would mean fewer jobs and decreased economic growth for the old EU countries. The “Polish plumber” problem had, even though it was anticipated to cause major problems in the UK, not been possible to verify statistically, and it is also claimed that “Germany’s [GDP] stands to grow an additional 1 percent a year as a result of the 2004 expansion.”\textsuperscript{116} Even though the stress on economic factors is less obvious, the other newspapers also take notice of Turkey’s economic progress. Le Monde Diplomatique describes for instance how Citibank wanted to invest in Turkey since it is considered “Europe’s last pristine market” and in many

\textsuperscript{114} See e.g. Der Spiegel, 13 May 2005, “Let’s Hear It for the EU … or not.”
\textsuperscript{115} Der Spiegel, 3 November 2006, “Is Ankara Gambling Away its EU Future?”
\textsuperscript{116} Der Spiegel, 14 December 2006, “EU Puts the Brakes on Expansion.”
ways considered suitable for investment.\textsuperscript{117} Turkey’s importance as an economic power becomes clear also in 2008 when Russia was maneuvering its economic sphere of interest into the Muslim world, and Turkey appears to have a central role in this.\textsuperscript{118} The Financial Times treats the significance of Turkey in this respect in much the same way. Turkey is there described as a “vital strategic and economic partner,”\textsuperscript{119} and a country with “good governance” and “strong growth.”\textsuperscript{120} In 2008, the AKP’s influence over Turkey’s economy is described as follows: “Its economic record, including boosting the incomes of the rural poor, speaks for itself.”\textsuperscript{121} The view of Turkey as a present and future asset to Europe is further illustrated by how Alexander Stubb and William Hague, at the time foreign ministers in Finland and the UK, respectively: “A Turkish economy in the EU would create new opportunities for exporters and investors, and link us to markets and energy sources in central Asia and the near east.”\textsuperscript{122} The general trend in western media therefore seems to be recognition of Turkey as an important present as well as future economic power, and it is clear that the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse is heavily influenced by such articulations.

Turkey is also mentioned in another way that traditionally is associated with rationalist theory, namely as geopolitically important. Due to its geographical position between Europe on the one side and the Middle East and the Caucasus on the other, Turkey controls a territory that is important in many ways. The importance of this position was underlined in 2003 during the Iraq war when Turkey refused to let the US military to access Iraq from the Turkish border. Abdullah Gül, at the time Turkey’s prime minister, said that:

\textsuperscript{117}\textit{Le Monde diplomatique}, September 2007, “The many battles for Turkey’s soul.”
\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Le Monde diplomatique}, October 2008, “Afghanistan: the neo-Taliban campaign.”
\textsuperscript{119}\textit{Financial Times}, 7 September 2005, “Support for Turkey’s EU membership falling sharply.”
\textsuperscript{121}\textit{Financial Times}, 14 July 2008, “Talking Turkey.”
\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Financial Times}, 8 September 2010, “Turkey can be a boon in Brussels.”
We’ve done all we can to avoid war on Iraq. It will open a Pandora’s box, and we can estimate the damage and the cost of it: Turkey is an essential part of this region.123

Its geopolitical importance is also connected to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Traditionally, Turkey has been one of Israel’s few allies in the Middle Eastern region, but the relation was damaged in two important ways in 2008-2009 and 2010. First, in December 2008, Turkey’s prime minster Erdogan felt humiliated by Israel’s prime minster at the time, Ehud Olmert, “who kept quiet about his intentions regarding Gaza.”124 The underlying expectation from the Turkish side was that Turkey’s increasing influence in the region called for better communication between the two countries. In the summer of 2010, Israel’s assault on the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla,” during which nine Turkish citizens were killed, further worsened Turkish-Israeli relations.125 The reaction in Israel to the growing rift between the two countries was severe; according to Le Monde Diplomatique, “Even far-right commentators agree that severing ties would leave Israel without a strategic ally in the region.”126 In short, Turkey’s geopolitical position is widely understood as important, and is in the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse seen as something that could benefit the EU as a whole since it would border on regions that traditionally are considered unstable, and thereby would have a better possibility to influence it in a constructive and stabilizing way.

123Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2003, “Turkey: post-Islamists in power.”
124Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2009, “Gaza war changes Middle East equation at Israel’s expense.”
125Financial Times, 4 June 2010, “Israel fears rise over deeper isolation.”
6. Interpreting the interplay between the discourses

As has become obvious in the descriptions of the different discourses about Turkey's identity, the meaning of “Turkey” is from the EU’s point of view highly debated. At the same time it functions as the most central concept in the debate. In Thomas Diez’s words, “Turkey” functions as a “discursive nodal point” in this debate. The concept occupies a place in the political debate where its meaning is constantly contested, by being linked to and differentiated from other concepts in an ongoing battle to stabilize its meaning. In the case at issue, the articulations that are being made are hence based in the three studied discourses: “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive”, “Turkey as the Radical Other” and “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing”.

The three discourses that have been illustrated in the three previous chapters are the only ones that reasonably can be claimed to be dominating in the EU. Naturally there are other discourses concerning Turkey’s identity that continuously challenge the three dominating ones, but it is clear that these are neither successful nor stable enough to be serious contenders to the three bigger ones.

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127 See also Diez 2001, p. 16.
128 Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 105.
129 One such discourse that could be expected is that Turkey in fact is European, and that EU membership should only rest on technical questions of adaptability. However, to illustrate such a discourse as a coherent and stable whole proved to be impossible based on the studied material.
Turkey’s identity and the policies of the EU

As claimed above, the power of the discourses is that they provide a set of rules concerning what types of policies count as reasonable in a certain context, and thus enable and constrain what actions can be taken. In the western debate about the Turkish bid for membership in the EU, the three dominating discourses therefore have the potential to determine what policies are available for the EU. The “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse, first, characterizes Turkey as developing, but far from being at the level necessary for membership in the EU. The articulations of Turkey’s identity that build up the core of this discourse are of many different kinds: they range from cultural and historical arguments, that clearly are of a value-based nature, to typically rationalist arguments focused on for example economic issues. An important feature is that Turkey is never really characterized as static and impossible to change, but is still consistently understood as unwanted in the EU. Second, the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse corresponds with the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse in many ways. The impact of cultural differences is following the same logic in both discourses, but the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse provides a more emphasized reading on the differences between Europe and Turkey. In fact, these differences are generally understood as fundamental, and resting on the idea that Turkey belongs to another type of civilization and therefore in many ways potentially is a threat to the EU. This picture of Turkey as a threat in fact ranges across all the parts of the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse. Finally, the third discourse, “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing,” differs from the other two in some important ways. Value-based as well as rationalist arguments are here framed either as Turkey acts according to western values and standards, or as developing in that direction. This discourse does also engage with both value-based and rationalist arguments, and also maintains that Turkey is different, but understands this dif-
ference in terms of assets rather than liabilities. Further, this discourse is characterized by a higher level of complexity than the two others, and therefore admits a view of Turkey as dynamic and changing in a way that the other two do not. Table 1 summarizes how the differences in identity are depicted both regarding the present (the degree of Otherness) and the possible future (temporal identity of "Turkey"), as well as the most likely stance of the EU as a result of how Turkey’s identity is framed (EU responsibility).

Table 1.130

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Identity Degrees of Otherness</th>
<th>Temporal identity of &quot;Turkey&quot;</th>
<th>EU responsibility (policy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey as Oriental and Primitive</td>
<td>Different and slightly looked down on</td>
<td>Capable of change</td>
<td>Postpone or offer “privileged partnership”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey as the Radical Other</td>
<td>Radically different and a possible threat</td>
<td>Incapable of change</td>
<td>Continue trade and keep peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing</td>
<td>Slightly different but promising</td>
<td>Already undergoing change</td>
<td>Negotiate about membership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once the different discourses have been studied, and a further characterization of the different pictures of the Turkish identity they give rise to and which this in turn leads to in terms of policies and actions, the relation between the different discourses has to be studied. In order to do this, the basic nodes that connect these discourses have to be identified and analyzed.

As described in the introductory chapter, previous studies of European integration and EU enlargement building on a constructivist epistemology typically run into the

130 The table is modeled on Lene Hansen’s table of “Historical discourses on ‘the Balkans’”: Hansen 2006, p. 106.
problem of how to weigh ideational against material factors when analyzing a case. By employing a more radical constructivist understanding of EU enlargement according to which all factors—ideational and material—must be interpreted through discourse, weighing their respective importance is instead understood as how the rules set up by the dominating discourse determine policies and thereby enables and constrains behavior. The divide between ideational and material factors is thus rejected since neither is meaningful without the other.\textsuperscript{131} The discursive structure of how different articulations and arguments are linked to and differentiated from each other in this way offers an alternative method of understanding the dynamics of the accession process of Turkey. Put simply, the current theoretical framework offers an alternative method of analysis that helps overcome the analytical troubles that arise as a result of the mixing of ideational and material factors.

A political discourse forms a system that regulates what is considered meaningful, and thereby determines which statements make sense and which do not.\textsuperscript{132} Since the stability of a certain discourse is determined in part by how internally coherent it is (in other words, if it makes sense or not), the strategy for analyzing the different discourses regarding Turkey’s accession process is to look for internal inconsistencies or other signs of possible weaknesses both in the respective discourses, but also in how they relate to each other. However, some articulations and arguments in the discourses here studied are more important than others, and therefore another measure for the relative importance is required. In order to do this, this complicated system of articulations and arguments that make up structures within the discourses are understood as being organized in layers. These layers differ in one important sense: their degree of sedimentation. Deeper layers are more sedimented in the way that they are less prone to be politicized and thereby

\textsuperscript{131} Hansen 2006, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{132} See e.g. Foucault 1972.
changed by policies.\textsuperscript{133} Due to the dynamic structure of discourses where concepts constantly are linked to and differentiated from each other and thereby continuously changing the character of the discourse itself, a layered model provides the needed tool for giving a more detailed understanding of how policies and actions are enabled and constrained. In the following sections, therefore, I analyze the elements of the discourses that in a concrete way are found in more than one such discourse, and analyze the dynamic of the relation between how these are articulated, respectively.

**Basic nodes: religion and civilization**

Religion is a concept that occupies a central position in all three discourses, and therefore functions well as a starting-point in mapping the relation between the different nodes. In all the three discourses, but more clearly so in the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” and the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourses, religion is consistently and noticeably linked to articulations maintaining Turkey as “Muslim,” which in turn is linked to a number of concepts. To begin with, “Muslim” is importantly associated with “women wearing headscarves,” which appears as one of the central issues connected to Turkey’s identity. The headscarves issue in fact leads to a more complicated system of linkages between concepts, due to the French double standard of demanding that Turkey improves its basic human rights, whereas France during the same period limited its own freedom of religion by banning the headscarf in for example schools. The apparent inconsistency that is manifested in debates about the headscarf indicates that arguments resting on this concept are instable. The concept also seems to be highly politicized in the sense that the debate about headscarves does not seem to become settled, and indicates a low degree of sedimentation. The concept is thereby improbable as foundation for any viable EU poli-

\textsuperscript{133} Wæver 1998, p. 111.
cies. Religion does, however, matter in other ways. The “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse implies more far-reaching implications than the other ones do. Implicitly, most of the negative connotations found in the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse that are related to Turkey’s being Muslim are kept, but Turkey is at the same time consistently linked to concepts like “being a threat to Europe”, “hidden agenda” or “fundamentalism”.

The fact that “Turkey” is clearly linked to the concept “Muslim,” which in turn is a concept that is to a high degree taken for granted and not problematized, makes the articulation of Turkey as Muslim one of the most solidly sedimented structures in all of the three dominating discourses. It is simply not really questioned that being Muslim is part of Turkey’s identity. Turkey’s Muslim identity is not in any way challenged as such, but the three discourses link the concept “Muslim” to other concepts that in their turn suggest quite different policies. The claim that the EU is a “Christian club” occupies a central position in all the discourses. The “the EU as a Christian club” concept is clearly less sedimented than claiming Turkey is Muslim, and even though the concept occupies a central position in all the discourses (an illustration of its centrality is how it is strongly connected to and in fact forms the foundation of the concept “European values” which in many ways is the ideological core of the EU), it provides Turkey’s identity as Muslim with different linkages depending on discourse, which in turn clearly forms the foundation for differing policies. In the context of the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse, the EU as a “Christian club” clearly indicates that Turkey is not part of this. The statement of Olli Rehn, then enlargement commissioner, that the EU in fact is not a Christian club can be interpreted as not denying that the EU rests on a Christian foundation but still is open to new members. The discourse’s image of the degree of Otherness Turkey has vis-à-vis the EU as “different and slightly looked down on” and the implicit temporal identity of “Turkey” as “capable of change” entail that claiming that Turkey
will never become an EU member simply does not make sense. The “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” would support the same conclusion, although in a more emphasized manner: the message is simply that Turkey is already undergoing change, and challenging this claim would be considered nonsensical.

The “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse, however, would not buy into a number of the premises that seem to support the two other discourses’ conclusions. One of the especially strong linkages in this discourse is the connection between religion and history. The image of Turkey is generally seen as more static, and thereby depicting change as something that is close to impossible. Turkey is thus characterized by concepts like “the historical enemy of Greece” and “the siege of Vienna” which both are associated with the religious difference between Europe and Turkey (although it then was the Ottoman empire), and the discourse thus stresses how religious differences are linked to “war” and “hostility” without any real hope for change.

**Basic nodes: values and ideology**

The second basic node that can be found in all of the three European discourses about Turkey’s identity is what is often referred to as “European values.” All three discourses are built around a set of values that in different ways are commonly understood as European. The concept “European values” in this way forms a basic node that forms a strong link to “Europe” and thereby implicitly “the EU” but to a high degree instead is differentiated from “Turkey.”

Perhaps the most central of what is here called “European values” is democracy. The concept “democracy” is arguably a highly sedimented concept that also occupies a central position in all three discourses. Its link to Turkey is, however, articulated differently depending on discourse. The “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” discourse implies
that—also connected to the religion node as analyzed above—Turkey is a democracy, but an immature one. In parallel to how “women’s rights” is differentiated from the concept “Muslim” regarding religion, the same goes for the concept “democracy.” In other words, Turkey’s democracy is thereby considered weak. Another example is how the same discourse tends to depict the AKP as a populist party in the negative sense, further adding to the image of Turkish democracy as being immature and weak. The “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse builds on much the same logic, but highlights the threat Turkey’s imperfect democracy might pose for the EU. Much of the rhetoric revolves around the idea that the AKP has a “hidden agenda” which will prove disastrous for the EU as well as Turkey. Considering the political unrest that has characterized Turkey practically since the birth of the republic, including the three military coups and a high volatility regarding the party system, the concept of “democracy” regarding Turkey is clearly less sedimented than is the case in the EU, which means that as long as the concept is linked to “political unrest” and other pejorative concepts to the degree the empirical material indicates, Turkey will remain the Other from the perspective of the EU.

Even the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse seems to frame Turkey in largely the same way as the other two discourses about the state of its democracy today. The discourse does, however, suggest a supplementary view of Turkey’s democratic identity: the role as a “bridge between the Orient and the Occident.” Turkey is depicted as a successful democracy in the Muslim world, which is supposed to make it suited as a role model for other countries in the region. The idea about Turkey as a role model is especially interesting in the way that it turns a concept (in this case how Turkey is linked to the concept “Muslim”) that often has negative associations in the discourses covering Turkey’s bid for membership in the EU into something that is almost unambiguously positive.
The Armenian question also occupies a position that is part of all three discourses. The way that the former French president Jacques Chirac as it is claimed unilaterally created an accession criterion in addition to the official so-called Copenhagen criteria tailored for Turkey by demanding that the Armenian massacre during the first world war be called a “genocide” is a good illustration of how formal requirements only are valid in a certain context, and that informal ones sometimes become crucial. The demand that Turkey admits to the massacre being labeled “genocide” is simply supported in all three discourses but in slightly different ways. The “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” and “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourses clearly imply that the right thing to do is to call it “genocide,” and that every country that aspires to European values must abide by this demand. Even the “Turkey as the Radical Other” implies this outcome due to the common assumption that in any way trying to mitigate the significance of a alleged genocide is contrary to the (Judeo-Christian) set of values Europe is built on, which are thought to be universal in character.134

Basic nodes: rationalist factors

Turning to the third basic node that can be found in all the discourses, it is evident that the more “classical” type of rationalist elements such as effects on power structures both in the formal political system as well as the economic one occupy a central position in the debate about Turkey’s EU accession process.

The most central of these “rationalist factors” is how the economic system is thought to be affected by the accession of Turkey. Importantly, given the theoretical foundation regarding how to analyze Turkey’s accession process, and what this demands in terms of empirical material and methodology, the “rationalist factors” cannot be analyzed outside

134Financial Times, 19 November 2009, “Van Rompuy against Turkish membership.”
of the discourses here presented; there is simply no “extra-discursive realm” from which any objective answers can be provided.\textsuperscript{135} It is in line with this not the numbers in themselves that are studied,\textsuperscript{136} but what is openly accessible through the material: how these issues relate to other issues, and how the discourses limit the extent of the impact of economic issues on the debates. In other words, it is not the amount of money in itself that is here interesting to study, but the general perception of how that amount of money affects the political discussions. In line with this, the most obvious argument that is part of all the three discourses is the idea that can be called the “Polish plumber”—the idea that Turkey is big and poor, leading to mass emigration from Turkey to the job markets in the affluent Western Europe. The idea actually connects in basically the same way to all the three discourses: the “Polish plumber” is in different degrees considered a problem for the EU to handle, suggesting that the present organization of the EU is not well suited to deal with the problem. The “Polish plumber” scenario is thereby markedly linked to clearly negative concepts, associating Turkey’s identity with bad development for Europe. The “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse provides a possibility to amend this image slightly, though: by countering the link between the concept “Polish plumber” on the one hand, and “stealing jobs” and “bad economic development” on the other, the discourse reveals internal incoherence. As claimed in the theory chapter, all discourses contain by nature necessarily inconsistencies since they continuously link and differentiate concepts to and from other concepts, and therefore are inherently unstable. The role of the “Polish plumber” concept therefore appears to have the unusual characteristic of being quite highly sedimented in the way that it is often

\textsuperscript{135} Hansen 2006, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{136} What is accessible by studying the discourse is not what primarily what the debates refer to, but how the debates are structured. (See e.g. Wæver 1998, p. 107.)
taken for granted that migration of workers from poorer countries is bad for the EU at the same time the issue becomes more and more politicized.\footnote{Changes that take place on more sedimected levels lead to bigger effects.}

Granting Turkey admission to the EU does also connect to economic issues in a positive way. The positive connotations are in different ways connected to the high economic growth Turkey has had during the last decade. Naturally also this issue is considered important in all the three discourses. The concept of “Turkey” is thereby strongly connected with for example the concepts “big market”, “good governance” and “strong growth”. The “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse further emphasizes the links between “Turkey” and the concept “economically beneficial” in the way it is seen as the link between the EU and energy sources and markets further east. Interesting links are also made with the other basic node that regards values and ideology, especially connecting it to the successful rule of the AKP. By linking “the AKP” with the concepts of “good governance” and “boosting the incomes of the rural poor”, it seems arguable that the link between “the AKP”— and thereby also “Turkey”— and “European values” is strengthened. It seems increased economic performance has a lot of connections to other positively charged concepts for Turkey.

Finally, the formal political system in the EU is affected in a way that by the EU is seen as both good and bad. Due to the present organizational structure, Turkish membership would imply that Turkey would have slightly less formal voting power in the most important EU institutions than Germany, but slightly more than France, Italy and the UK. Obviously this would be considered a big challenge, and even a threat, to some of the member states of the EU. Interestingly, the empirical material does not directly support any straightforward conclusions as regards the issue of France losing formal influence in the EU institutions. Whereas the issue definitely is salient and is in the interest of especially France (but naturally many other member states too), there is actually rea-
son for interpreting the lack of discussion in the studied newspapers as an indication of how deeply sedimented that particular concept is; there is not even a point in discussing the issue. Hence, the issue connecting to the organization of the formal political system, “Turkey” is in an important way linked to important negative concepts, especially according to the “Turkey as the Radical Other” discourse, but also the “Turkey as Oriental and Primitive” one. At the same time it should be noted that there are some ways in which Turkey’s admission would be seen as a good thing in this respect. In the way that it is claimed that the UK (and some other smaller member states) in fact would appreciate Turkish membership since it would have a generally diluting effect on the EU,\textsuperscript{138} it seems articulations to that effect would be able to resonate in the “Turkey as Westernizing and Democratizing” discourse.

Concluding remarks

The type of analysis that was used in this thesis aims at describing the different discourses that work as the foundation for which policies are possible to make, and which are not. The first part provides a description and characterization of the dominating discourses, laying out the general framework for what type of statements and arguments can be made intelligible by relating to these discourses. The second part uses the findings from the first part by relating the most salient issues to each other in an attempt to show how the nature of the interaction between these discourses can be described, and to some extent, explained. Ole Wæver’s concept of degrees of sedimentation of discursive structures was used to motivate how certain linkages between these discourses could be assumed to be stronger and some weaker, depending on how deeply sedimented the concepts they link to are in the discourse at issue.

\textsuperscript{138}Grabbe and Hughes 1998, p. 5
The major findings in the specific case of Turkey’s accession process to the EU are two. First, and not especially surprising, is how the concept of “European values” takes a central role in all the discourses and connects to a wide range of concepts from typically political and economic ones to highly value-based ones such as religious issues. The second major finding is how the AKP’s politics have led to good economic performance for Turkey, which is importantly connected to an increasingly improved image of Turkey in the EU. The economic development seems also indirectly linked to concepts that are generally considered positive, in the way it benefited Turkey’s rural poor.

The big advantage of the type of analysis here used is how both ideational and material factors can be analyzed using the same method. The result is of course not the same as if a rationalist type of analysis had been used; instead of getting an answer in terms of e.g. how the military, political or economic strengths of different countries determine the outcome in accession negotiations, the type of constructivism that was here used suggests an answer to how different images of the accession country determine what policies are available to decision makers in the EU, and how different types of issue areas are connected to each other in a way that makes it impossible to focus on only one issue at a time.
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