Between the EU and NATO: Hungary’s Strategic Culture

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Abstract:

Hungary’s experiences as a member of both the EU and NATO on the matters of relations with Russia, border security, and military structuring reveal that EU and NATO security agendas are not always complimentary. By assessing Hungary’s choices in security cooperation, it becomes clear that ideational factors heavily influence and sometimes override Hungary’s rational interests. While any Europeanisation of Hungary’s security culture is minimal at best, Hungary’s participation in EUBAM and FRONTEX could lead to further security integration. On matters of military deployments, capabilities structuring, and defense spending, Hungary overwhelming favors NATO’s needs, even while recognizing that its stated security needs are best addressed through EU security cooperation, thus revealing the dominant influence of strategic culture.

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction ................................................................. 5
2. Conceptual Framework .................................................. 6
   2.1. Research Questions ............................................... 6
   2.2. Methodology ....................................................... 7
3. Literature Review ........................................................ 10
   3.1. Neorealism .......................................................... 10
   3.2. Europeanisation ................................................... 11
   3.3. Strategic Culture .................................................. 14
4. European Security ....................................................... 22
   4.1. Toward a European Strategic Culture? ......................... 23
   4.2. NATO ............................................................... 28
5. Hungary Between the EU and NATO .................................. 33
   5.1. Strategic documents analysis .................................... 33
      5.1.1. The Documents .............................................. 35
      5.1.2. Russia ....................................................... 39
      5.1.3. Conceptualizing borders ................................... 40
      5.1.4. capabilities structuring ................................... 43
   5.2. Policy analysis ..................................................... 47
      5.2.1. Russia: energy security .................................... 49
      5.2.2. Seeking internal security .................................. 51
      5.2.3. Capabilities: maintaining the guarantee ................ 56
6. Conclusions .............................................................. 61
   6.1. Theoretical Implications ....................................... 62

Appendices ................................................................. 64
Bibliography ............................................................... 73
List of Graphs & Tables
Figure 1: Key Strategic Elements..............................................................................38
Figure 2: % of Hungarian deployments in NATO and EU missions 2007-2008.........70
Figure 3: Hungarian Defence Spending 2000-2009.................................................71
Figure 4: EU/ESDP Missions as of December 2008.................................................72
Table 1: Strategic Culture Comparison....................................................................47
Table 2: Europeanisation of Hungarian Security Policy.........................................51
Table 3: Hungarian Security Priorities.....................................................................56
Table 4: Frequency of Key Words referenced within strategic documents.............65

List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>EDCI</td>
<td>European Defence Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political Security Committee (EU)</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (United States)</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Like other post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary finds itself transitioning from security dependency within the US-dominated NATO alliance following the end of the Cold War to contributing to increasingly integrated security cooperation within the European Union. It is not obvious that these two endeavors are complimentary; indeed, much evidence suggests they may in fact be contradictory. The EU and NATO share many member states and represent some of the most advanced economic and military powers in the world. The two entities share Western political values; yet, on certain issues, the EU and NATO project different conceptions of security’s means and aims. The US-dominated NATO alliance has reinvented itself following the end of the Cold War and sought to expand its scope of operations, while maintaining a primarily traditional military approach to security. The European Union has embarked on the quest to become the first civilian super power, but it has also been awakened to its own inadequacies in hard power capacity vis-à-vis the United States and has sought to strengthen its ability to use military force rapidly, effectively and autonomously. When the agendas of these two European security entities are seeking to enlist the participation of the same member states, the possibility for both cooperation and conflict exists. In the case of Hungary it becomes apparent that limited resources of manpower and finances sometimes force member states to make a choice in terms of security cooperation.

Hungary, a middle sized country in central Europe which has had a troubled past with Russia, has cooperated extensively with the United States and has benefited from its integration into the European Union. Hungary’s experience offers a well positioned case study from which to examine whether or not the EU is fulfilling its goal of integrating member states’ security
agendas and procuring support for its ESDP missions. Or whether the United States, through NATO continues to shape Hungarian security and defense policies within the EU’s very territory. Even if primarily interested in the national response of Hungary to ESDP, it is a futile exercise to consider the EU’s importance to Hungarian security and defence policies without also considering the dynamic interaction and influences of NATO. This is especially true because Hungary’s involvement in NATO appears to be both illustrative and constitutive of Hungarian strategic culture, which shapes its national response to EU security initiatives.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 Research Questions

This paper attempts to explore both the rhetoric and policies of Hungarian security and defence cooperation within the EU and NATO. Hungary’s official strategy and rhetoric give near equal importance to both the EU and NATO. In terms of security language, Hungary appears to be heavily oriented towards the EU and Hungarian public opinion is overwhelmingly in support of more integrated European security structures. Nevertheless, Hungary’s choice of missions, troop deployments, defence spending, and capabilities structuring all indicate that NATO is undeniably Hungary’s first and foremost priority in the field of security and defence cooperation. While participation in ESDP operations remains minimal, Hungary’s contributions to EUBAM and FRONTEX indicate that Hungary increasingly sees the EU as the framework for addressing the external aspects of its internal security.

The success of the EU at securing the cooperation of central and eastern European countries (CEES) within CSDP will be a crucial aspect of whether the EU will be able to act as its own security actor. Is EU and NATO membership contradictory or congruent in the field of
security? If potentially contradictory, as events in 2003 suggest, then in the long run, dual member states will at some point be forced to choose its predominant allegiance. This research speaks to the effectiveness and sustainability of European security integration; the future of NATO’s and the United States’ role in European security; the compatibility of EU and NATO cooperative security agendas; as well as the potential Europeanization of Hungary’s security policies. The key research questions of this paper are:

1) Which is more likely to explain Hungary’s choices in security cooperation within ESDP and NATO, rational assessments of threats and stated national security priorities or non-material factors?

2) What can be concluded about the compatibility of ESDP, NATO security cooperation from this analysis?

2.2 Methodology

No matter how long we hammer away with rationalist hammers, there are times when without the nail of cultural insight, we cannot hope to pierce the seemingly opaque non-quantifiable influencers on security actors’ strategic preferences. Capabilities as well as internal and external political pressures must also be accounted for when considering the role of strategic cultural in determining the agenda and outcomes. But it is clear that at times states behave irrationally in direct contradiction to rational choice-based predicted outcomes. As will be discussed in a later section, Hungary maintains an unwavering commitment to NATO military cooperation even when its stated strategic goals would suggest that more EU civilian-focused security cooperation would be most applicable. This paper will attempt to contribute to the broader research theme of strategic culture and national responses to EU security initiatives
through an investigative empirical analysis of Hungary’s security and defense cooperation within both the ESDP and NATO, with emphasis on trends in cooperation between 1999 and 2008.

Because behavior is an integral part of what constitutes and informs strategic culture’s means, it is necessary to explore behavior’s relationship to strategic ideas and discourse. Alastair Johnston rightly observes that it is pointless to analyze “images, perceptions, worldviews, doctrines, norms, and other ideational variables unless this is part of a broader research program that links these to the behavior of individuals, groups, organizations, states and systems. This does not mean we should expect to find a clear attitude-behavior relationship.”1 In the words of Stuart Poore, moving away from empirical “universal strategic idioms and towards cultural and strategic relativist approaches” allows for research that investigates “how the formative experiences of the state and its evolving cultural characteristics shape strategic interests.”2

Strategic Culture is helpful in determining what is preferred out of the vast array of what is possible. Strategic culture “indicates but does not determine what is expected of an actor, what the alternatives are or what courses of action are deemed possible.”3 In the absence of an agreed upon definition of strategic culture, this paper builds upon Jack Snyder’s original understanding of strategic culture defined as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.”4 Strategic behavior is thus considered a fundamental element of a security actor’s observable strategic culture.5 Additionally, because strategic cultures are the result of a path dependent

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1 Johnston (1998), 171.
2 Stuart Poore in Glenn (2004), 45.
3 Toje (2008), 15.
4 Snyder (1977), 8.
5 With a mind to future research, this paper seeks to move beyond the state-centric definition of strategic culture in order to embrace a definition that could explore the strategic culture of non-state actors, specifically NATO and
process, it is essential to look at historical trends and experiences. Combining these elements, strategic culture is understood to be a consensus on the function of force in the exercise of power and in pursuit of security goals; a consensus that is reflected both across time and among actors in reference to both strategic discourse and security policy behavior. This consensus is both informed and influenced by defining historical experiences and trends; the discourse(s) surrounding the formulation of security policy; and, finally, the actual strategic behavior. Put simply, strategic culture is an intervening ideational factor in determining state behavior.

This analysis will attempt to look at military cooperation, border management, and relations with Russia in an attempt to determine whether Hungary’s policies are best explained by a capabilities-focused theory (neo-realism) or by a constructivist strategic culture approach. In addition to a general grasp of the relevant history, geography, values and national culture, the following objects of analysis should be studied. Keeping in mind that their value in strategic cultural analysis is dependent on their coherence and consistency across time:

- **Political rhetoric/discourse** including speeches, publications, legislation, resolutions, committee hearings, policy discussions and general education material;
- **Interviews** of key decision makers in the security making processes and execution including government officials, security strategists, military officers, diplomats on the giving side; and their counterparts, recipients, enemies and victims on the receiving side;
- **Budgetary allocations** for defense, intelligence and police spending in relation to public diplomacy, economic aid and other forms of “soft power;”
- **Actual foreign and security policies** including acts of war, treaties, bilateral and multilateral agreements, sanctions, *inter alia*; and
- **Deep analysis of security documents** including strategic documents, orders, descriptions of training regimens, diaries, memoirs, and situation briefings.

The bulk of the analysis will attempt to examine both the words and the actions of Hungary’s security cooperation. In regards to words, this analysis will focus on examining
strategic documents because their adoption involves a close and intimate involvement with strategic language and with security vocabulary. This language-dominated process often occurs at both the technocratic and political level involving discussion and often compromise. Pernille Rieker has noted that the “surest sign of identity change and socialization is the development of a new vocabulary in terms of which the identity can then be publically articulated.”6 In addition to the language of security, this analysis will focus on the policy actions of Hungary, including defense spending, troop deployments, and capabilities structuring. Reference will be made to additional primary and secondary materials for illustrative purposes. The documents and other data are supplemented throughout by personal interviews conducted between November 2008 and May 2009 with EU, NATO, and Hungarian security officials. The interviews ranged from ambassador’s offices to clerk’s desks and allowed them both to inform and to evaluate many of the assumptions and conclusions contained in this paper.

CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Neorealism

Realism has traditionally assumed that material considerations and rational self interest are the most important determinants of a state’s behavior. Additionally, realism has further asserted that states are motivated primarily by a desire to maximize their relative power vis-à-vis other states. As a result of changes in the nature of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970’s, the theory neorealism was articulated in order to offer a

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conceptual explanation that more closely corresponded with reality. Nevertheless, neorealism’s focus was on international structures, which assigned very little importance to the uniqueness of state actors. Indeed, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz claimed that to look for “causes at the individual or national level” was reductionism. In essence, Waltz’ neorealism is characterized by a paradigmatic proscription of multiple levels of analysis in explaining the behavior of states. Hans Morenthau’s contribution to realist thinking was to consider the importance of human actors in determined states’ behavior which he viewed as guided by a distinctly rational human nature; “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.”

At its conceptual core, the rationalist determinism that characterizes neorealism has made it a conspicuously limited theory when rationality empirically fails to govern states’ actions. According to Alastair Johnston, constructivism “poses a significant challenge to structural realist claims about the sources and characteristics of state behavior by rooting strategic choice in deeply historical, formative ideational legacies.” It is important to note, however, that many constructivist approaches “readily acknowledg[e] material reality as a prerequisite for social reality.” The following section will briefly glance at the Europeanization approach, followed by an overview of strategic culture which will serve as the dominant conceptual frame of the analysis contained thereafter.

### 3.2 Europeanisation

This comparative analysis of NATO, EU, and Hungarian strategic documents could be considered as part of a broader security research theme (including Europeanization), which seeks

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7 Waltz (1979), 18.
8 Morgenthau (1978), 5.
10 Giegerich (2006), 34.
to explore the influence of EU security integration and cooperation on changes in national security identity. This is an important area of research because, as Bastian Giegerich has noted, there is a “lack of scholarship on the national responses to ESDP and the impact of this initiative on national security and defence policies.”

Pernille Rieker’s model, composed of five phases of socialization (prevailing traditions; engaging in new discourse; instrumental change; persuasion; and institutionalization), seeks to overcome a divide between “rational institutionalism” and “sociological institutionalism” while at the same time firmly placing elite actors into the process. The process begins as elites seek to overcome a misfit in norms between the relevant international actor and their own state. The elite state actors then engage in rhetoric drawing them into substantive discourse and “argumentative self-entrapment.” This is followed by “instrumental adaptation” of norms as allowed by domestic considerations. The process is completed with the legal “institutionalization” of the external norm characterized by “learning” and “acceptance,” albeit focused at the elite level. Rieker provides well-tailored empirical support for her model by exploring the socialization of select Nordic countries’ security policies.

Trine Flockhart offers a more dynamic model which conceives of both state elites and the national population as fundamental constitutive components of the socialization process. While offering Social Identity Theory (SIT) as “social constructivism’s theory of the agent,” Flockhart utilizes SIT to argue that constant self-othering processes lead to a desired “significant we” on behalf of the socialized state which is both informed by and responds to the relevant international socializing entity whose norms that state eventually adopts. The model contains three filters (“self” and “other” categorizations; political structures and processes; and political

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13 Flockhart (2006), 92.
culture and participation traditions) and allows for four potential scenarios (socialization at the elite or mass level, at both, or at neither). In its top-down configuration, socialization passes through the three filters and takes place at the state elite level, characterized by institutionalization of the socializing agent’s norms, and among the national population who internalize, adopt, or conform to the institutionalized norms. This final stage includes an element of “taken-for-grantedness” which implies real socialization at both the state and mass levels.\textsuperscript{14}

While Flockhart offers a model of socialization applicable to the full spectrum of policy issues, Rieker justifies her elite-focused analysis of socialized actors by virtue of her specialized consideration of security policy – a policy domain ill-suited for mass awareness and understanding. Rieker sees the socialization of security policy as “principally” an “elite and not a mass phenomenon;”\textsuperscript{15} thus it would seem that the mass level justifiably falls outside the scope of Rieker’s model.

Rieker goes beyond restricting her level of analysis to the elite level, to completely disregarding the conceptual importance of mass socialization within the total socialization process: “If the comprehensive security approach is also institutionalized in the national security policies of the Nordic countries, then socialization is achieved.”\textsuperscript{16} This theoretical disregard of popular socialization seems unjustifiable. Even though the institutionalization of certain norms within the national laws or accepted policy practices of a state does indeed indicate a very deep level of socialization, it is perhaps premature to declare socialization complete when the transformation experienced by the elites has yet to take place at the popular level. Flockhart points out that “even following successful norm adoption at the state level, the norm transfer process may not be internalized at the nation level, which would be indicated by persistent

\textsuperscript{14} Flockhart (2006), 98.
\textsuperscript{15} Rieker (2006), 55.
\textsuperscript{16} Rieker (2006), 61.
failure in a significant proportion of the population to conform with the institutionalized norm set.”\textsuperscript{17} This consideration is especially pertinent for democratic societies where the institutionalized norms could be altered almost overnight. For these reasons, Flockhart argues that the “nation/people level cannot be ignored,” not least because “it is clear from Development Studies that this is where the real challenge of norm diffusion lies.”\textsuperscript{18}

Flockhart’s inclusion of the masses in her robust and dynamic model is necessary, not merely because the popular level may originate the adoption of norms within a state and influence elites, but because the deepest level of elite-driven socialization may be said to occur when it has transformed not only the nation’s elites and laws, but also the nation itself.

### 3.3 Strategic Culture

George Kennan attempted to grasp the cultural elements of Soviet strategic behavior in 1951, for he had hit upon the conceptual obviation concerning the relationship among culture, ideas, and behavior. For Kennan, “the political personality of Soviet power [was] the product of ideology and circumstances….which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet, the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.”\textsuperscript{19} Kennan wrote that “ideology is a product and not a determinant of social and political reality…. [Its] bearing is on coloration of background, on form of expression, and on method of execution, rather than on basic aims.”\textsuperscript{20} According to Ken Booth, it is impossible to consider the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Flockhart (2006), 93.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Flockhart (2006), 108-109.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Kennan (1985), 107.
\item \textsuperscript{20} George Kennan quoted in Gaddis (1982), 33.
\end{itemize}
security decision-making process independently from the influence of culture, primarily because past events have a profound effect on such processes.\textsuperscript{21} As obvious as the existence of a relationship between ideas and strategic behavior may be, articulating that relationship in an analytically useful manner is anything but obvious.

In the absence of easily identifiable and quantifiable objects of analysis, the temptation to impose artificial dichotomizations and definitions must be avoided. Strategic culture cannot offer to solve the security dilemma, test Huntington’s clash of civilizations, or predict behavioral outcomes based on ideational causes. Strategic culture can, however, provide a fuller picture of security policy making processes and outcomes and offer greater understanding in terms of security actors’ preferences regarding strategic means employed in pursuit of politically determined goals. In terms of behavior, it provides understanding as to what is actually done out of the vast array of what could be done. Despite a respectable amount of scholarship on the topic, there is no consensus on the definition of strategic culture, let alone its applicability and relevance. Nevertheless, the disparate strands of thought on strategic culture hold one key element in common – they reject the idea that states (or perhaps other actors too) rationally respond to external stimuli in a mechanistic or predictable manner. Instead, strategic culture contends that historical and ideational variables are essential to more fully understanding strategic outcomes: Capabilities without context offer an incomplete picture.

In 1977, years after Kennan published his observations of Soviet culture, Jack Snyder first introduced the concept of “strategic culture” to security studies. He was attempting to explain differences between Soviet unilateral and American cooperative approaches to “damage limitation” in “intra-war deterrence” strategies. The key, he wrote, was to “look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a [consistent and] unique ‘strategic culture’”:

\textsuperscript{21} Booth (1990).
Neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, preconception-free game theorists, Soviet and American doctrines have developed in different organizational, historical, and political contexts, and in response to different situational and technological constraints. As a result, the Soviets and Americans have asked somewhat different questions about the use of nuclear weapons and have developed answers that differ in significant respects.\(^{22}\)

With the same relative military capabilities, circumstances and opportunities, the US and the USSR were developing different strategies that could not be explained by rationalist assumptions. The question was not one of opportunity, capability, or geography. It was a question of differing desires concerning the means to provide for their defense.

Snyder’s seminal article in 1977 sparked a wave of research termed by Alastair Johnston the “first generation” of strategic culture scholarship. First generation scholars believed that culture was a secondary or auxiliary explanation to be considered in the absence of satisfactory understanding from traditional technological capabilities analyses. Culture was thus an explanation of last resort. The discourse of the so-called “second generation” struck a decidedly more critical note and largely focused on the role of elites in decision making processes, especially when there was a disconnect between perceived disingenuous strategic discourse and elite-driven strategic behavior. Alastair Iain Johnston’s noteworthy article “Thinking about Strategic Culture” (1995) falls within his self-termed “third generation” of scholarship characterized mainly by a discontent with existing research and a shared desire for greater coherence and applicability of strategic culture as an analytical tool. The diverse perspectives contained in Peter Katzenstein’s *The Culture of National Security* (1996) are indicative of the “third generation’s” eclectic approach. Johnston’s article could largely be seen as a proposed

\(^{22}\) Snyder (1977), v.
guide to the emerging body of scholarship and as a remedy to the deficiencies of previous generations’ conceptualization of strategic culture.

Johnston criticized “first generation” scholars’ all-encompassing, tautological conception of culture which intertwines ideas and behavior and which leads to a theory that is unfalsifiable and therefore fundamentally unhelpful at explaining what culture does. According to Johnston, strategic culture is in need of a theory “that is falsifiable, or at least distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables” and that can “provide decision-makers with a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions about behavior.”

Even critics of Johnston’s approach agree that previous scholarship has been “insufficiently critical of the friction that intervenes between cultural preferences and behavior.” Johnston addressed the “frustrating level of vagueness about culture’s relationship to choice, that is, about what it is that culture does in a behavioral sense.” He started with the assumption that culture does not affect all behavior, in order to allow the “conceptual space” for determining what and how it does affect some behavior. Johnston appears less concerned with how strategic culture sets the “agenda” or imposes a “rough order” on the priorities; rather he is focused on how culture determines strategic choice. The formulation of this positivist methodological framework is central to his pursuit in order to empirically establish “ideational” cause and its strategic behavioral effect.

Johnston’s dichotomization of ideas and behavior in order to provide the conceptual space for empirical analysis is a point of great contention for those who consider “strategic culture [as] the world of mind, feeling, and habit in behaviour.” For Colin Gray, a “first generation” scholar and Johnston’s most vocal critic, “the methodologically appalling truth [is] that there can be no such conceptual space, because all strategic behaviour is affected by human

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24 Gray (1999), 50.
25 Johnston (1995), 44.
beings who cannot help but be cultural agents.”26 Gray does regard strategic culture as a “zone of ideas, but ideas about strategic matters have to derive from intellectual and emotional interaction with experience, widely understood and however gathered and processed.”27 Gray’s understanding of culture as “a word-concept”28 would not allow culture to serve as the independent variable upon which Johnston would base his positivist empiricism. While Gray acknowledges that “from the perspective of methodological rigour it is hard to fault [Johnston],” the “problem is that we cannot understand strategic behaviour by that method, be it ever so rigorous. Strategic culture is not only ‘out there,’ also it is within us; we, our institutions, and our behavior, are the context.”29

At its core, the dispute between the “first” and “third” generations is the difference between a positivist social science approach and a more relativistic post-positivist outlook. This dispute centers on the role of behavior within the concept of strategic culture. Is behavior the effect of “ideational” causes or is behavior a requisite component of strategic culture so defined which sometimes fulfills the role of independent variable and sometimes serves as the dependent variable itself? Strategic culture which prima facie seemed so obvious and useful a concept during first generational scholarship, has proven a tediously complex conceptual web to disentangle. After thirty years of starts and stops in the discourse, we are no closer to reaching an academic consensus on this central contention.

Culture must be understood as a process that is affected in no small part by the self-reinforcing or modifying forces of decisions and actors who are themselves in no small part influenced by that culture. Despite Johnston’s worthy attempt to provide greater analytical tools

26 Gray (1999), 59.
27 Gray (1999), 60.
28 Gray (1999), 54.
29 Gray (1999), 53.
whereby scholars may understand and explain the affects of culture on strategy, it is unhelpful to operationalize a term at the expense of expunging its core meaning. Culture is an intricate and multifarious process with frustratingly complex inputs and outputs, but its influence on strategic means are no less real for that. Because cultural variables are difficult to identity and operationalize, “for positivist social scientists seeking observable, quantifiable data, culture appears unattractive as an analytical tool.”

Strategic culture is both a “shaping context for” and “a constituent of” strategic behavior. Strategic culture is both a “shaping context for” and “a constituent of” strategic behavior.

If the ideational independent variable of strategic culture cannot be used to explain and predict strategic behavior, then just what exactly can strategic culture do? What value does it add, other than coloring the discussion with historical tidbits and cultural curiosities? According to Ann Swindler, culture is the “tool kit” from which actors can choose their course of action. Culture, thus, helps determine the means not necessarily the ends of strategic policy. Strategic culture “indicates but does not determine what is expected of an actor, what the alternatives are or what courses of action are deemed possible.”

Colin Gray and Ken Booth have noted that strategic cultural variables offer “discerning tendencies not rigid determinants.” This paper accepts the conclusion that strategic culture does not “cause” anything in a positivist sense, as Johnston was so eager to prove. Strategic culture surrounds, limits, enables and informs the security discourse and the chosen strategic means for achieving otherwise determined objectives. Strategic culture is essentially a consensus of strategic preferences over time and possessing discernable influence over strategic behavior, other variables allowing. Culture, thus, must be considered as a variable along with capabilities, geography, circumstances and international

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30 Poore (2003), 283.
31 Gray (1999), 50.
32 Swindler (1986).
33 Toje (2008), 15.
34 Quoted in Glenn (2004), 48.
structures; yet, as Stuart Poore argues, “non-cultural or material variables can have no meaning outside of the cultures that condition them.”

Elizabeth Kier’s work on political organizational culture addresses a related issue. Kier focuses on political military subcultures to explain preference choices between offensive or defensive military strategies. She considers that although both Britain and France “shared the same objective interest for the same context: reducing the military threat posed by Germany,” their chosen strategic means employed during the interwar period were remarkably dissimilar. Going beyond external rationalist considerations, she emphasizes the importance of power distributions within society and the importance of historical experiences in determining strategic preferences. She states that “functional and structural analyses cannot adequately explain choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines.” Rather a state’s dominant subculture constrains behavior “by establishing what is ‘natural’ and mak[ing] other patterns of behavior unimaginable.”

Kier states that her “organizational culture is not the primordial notion sometimes found in analyses of strategic culture; the military’s organizational culture is not equivalent to the national character.” Rather, “the organizational culture is the intervening variable between domestic constraints and military doctrine.” Kier’s “political organizational culture” cannot be considered strategic culture as defined in this paper as her work does not address a similar means-ends dichotomy, but rather a political, military dichotomy where each appears to have influence over both political and strategic means and ends. Reconceived in the terms set forth in

35 Poore (2003), 282.
36 Kier (1996), 214.
39 Kier (1996), 203.
40 Kier (1996), 204.
this paper, however, Kier’s political organizational subculture could be considered one of the competing components contributing to a consensual strategic culture as the milieu from which an organizational subculture may be discerned. The concept of military organizational influence on overall strategy would, however, be only one part of the multifarious inputs and outputs comprising strategic culture among both civilian and military players. Further, this input, set within the differentiation between political identity and strategic culture, would be limited strictly to the choice of strategic means and the surrounding discourse.

Of course, it can be argued that some overlap exists between political ends and strategic means, such as when a state embraces imperial expansion as both its end goal and its strategic means. But it cannot be denied that even every empire has had a specific political identity and culture that was often juxtaposed to its enemies. The Barbarians threatened Roman civilization, the infidels threatened Ottoman Islam; even British, French and Spanish empires were forged in the crucible of their strong Protestant or Catholic identity. Indeed, for the warring empire states of Europe, their strategic means were often strikingly similar. Thus, imperial expansion was not an end result in itself, but merely a very aggressive and militarist approach to protecting and advancing its political identity and goals. Military strategy serves political objectives.

In a sense, this approach harkens back to Clausewitz’s original observation that war is a continuation of politics by other means. This paper observes that a security actor’s strategy, including perceptions regarding the function of force in the projection or maintenance of power, is primarily the means used in pursuit of politically determined ends. A means focused definition of strategic culture necessitates a definition that encompasses action, i.e. strategic behavior. Behavior is a crucial element of strategic culture, because chosen strategic means both exhibit and inform an actor’s dominant strategic culture. In terms of strategic culture’s analytical
applicability, behavior is a requisite component of what the analyst must look for and compare across time and among actors.

The findings indicate that it is Hungary’s strategic culture that determines national responses to ESDP and other EU security initiatives. Importantly, Hungary’s strategic culture is both reflected in and heavily influenced by its NATO membership. Hungary has too often picked the losing side in its historic conflicts and seems to have learned to be overly cautious about upsetting its place in a strong military alliance. In order to understand Hungary’s relationship to either NATO or the EU, it is necessary to first recognize the distinctive character of both as well as the current shape of NATO-EU relations.

CHAPTER 4 – EUROPEAN SECURITY

The idea of a European military is not new. As early as 1950, Paul Reynaud and Winston Churchill called for a European army. Differences in strategic approaches and obstacles to speedy European integration, however, caused the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) with France’s refusal to ratify in 1954. Instead, NATO became the method of providing European security without official cooperation with the European Community; until 2001, there was no formal link of cooperation between the EC/EU and NATO. During this time the remnants of the Western European Union (WEU) served as the main tool of coordination and communication between NATO and the EU. This changed with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy in 2001 and the subsequent agreement

41 Beloff (1963), 63.
on the Berlin Plus arrangements. These agreements allowed for sharing of capabilities and some intelligence for EU military operations and reflected “the gradual emergence within European institutions of a stronger, more integrated European political identity, and the conviction of many EU members that Europe must develop the capacity to act militarily in appropriate circumstances where NATO is not engaged militarily.” Such cooperation would have been unlikely without the eventual establishment of the ESDP, which provided a solidly European security component with which NATO and the US could work.

4.1 Toward a European Strategic Culture?

Former President of the European Commission (1958-67), Walter Hallstein, once advised: “Don’t waste time talking about defence, In the first place we don’t understand it. In the second place we’ll all disagree.” For Americans, Europeans’ lack of motivation and consensus on their own security looked a lot like unreliability. In the face of European inaction and lack of capabilities, the US took charge. Still in the 1970s and ‘80s, Henry Kissinger considered it a problem that “arrangements concerning [Europeans’] vital interest are being negotiated without them.” He blamed European “irresponsibility” for encouraging American unilateralism. During the Reagan administration, America’s role became one of unabashed primacy. During this time and in response to events such as US deployment of Pershing cruise missiles in 1983, Europeans began to openly criticize American use of military power. Nevertheless, official European consensus never objected too strongly. Not least because American dominance in the region

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43 Walter Hallstein quoted in Asle Toje (2008), 25.
44 Toje (2008), 30.
“took the sting out of European geopolitics”\textsuperscript{45} and allowed the EU the opportunity to evolve into the largely civilian power it is today.

The events surrounding the end of the Cold War during 1989-1991 had great consequences for the developing role of the EU as a security actor in Europe. First of all, it is clear that, although recognizing the role of the US, the end of the Cold War including the “radical changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s did have authentically European roots.”\textsuperscript{46} In the aftermath, the EU experienced a boost in its soft power as a result of its reconstruction and stabilization efforts such as the Phare programme which may be considered an EU Marshall Plan. The regional power of the EU was also greatly enhanced by the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join the EU as a means of “guaranteeing economic and social reconstruction and thus also as a way of enhancing the security...of the new or newly liberated regimes.”\textsuperscript{47} Thus, the Western-oriented states of Central and Eastern Europe became a primary concern for the EC/EU, first as part of the “near neighborhood” and later as part of the EU proper. Increasingly, “if there was a burden to be borne in the ‘new Europe,’ the EU seemed to be an obvious if not the obvious candidate to bear it.”\textsuperscript{48} It is clear that the enlargement of the EU into Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere since 1990 “created a basically new power structure in Europe,” but one “in which the EU and the US remain[ed] implicated.”\textsuperscript{49}

During the Balkins crises of the 1990s, the EU realized that it lacked the ability to back up the human rights and democratic values it espoused and was unable to prevent deadly conflict even in its own neighborhood. It became apparent that the economic and cultural power of the EU needed to be backed up by more traditional military force; thus, the necessary political will

\textsuperscript{45} Toje (2008), 25.  
\textsuperscript{46} McGuire (2008), 203.  
\textsuperscript{47} McGuire (2008), 203.  
\textsuperscript{48} McGuire (2008), 206.  
\textsuperscript{49} McGuire (2008), 206-208.
began to finally form and drive European security integration. The institutional origins of the ESDP were the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established by the Maastrict Treaty in 1992. The additional impetus towards military capabilities was also seen with the WEU Petersburg tasks incorporated in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The Franco-British Summit at Saint Malo in 1998 was a step forward in Europe’s security integration. France and the United Kingdom called on Europe to develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to the international crises.”

Europe’s answer was the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which would replace the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO.

In 1999, the EU Council meeting at Cologne assumed the competencies of the Western European Union (WEU) to the CFSP and ESDP. While in 2001 at the Laeken Summit the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was adopted enabling coordination of military personnel and hardware capabilities. Through this path dependent process, Europeans have acted on their new found belief “that in today’s security environment one cannot be a civilian power unless one is willing to militarily underwrite the values one syndicates.”

This emergent EU commitment was apparent in the discourse surrounding Kosovo in 1999. In defending EU involvement in Kosovo, Vaclav Havel described European intervention as protecting a “transnational moral order.” Unfortunately, the EU’s contribution in Kosovo was less than effective. During the buildup of hostilities and throughout the conflict, the EU “issued no fewer than 22 declarations, decisions and join actions within the CFSP framework” in an effort to end the conflict. This period was a test case for the ESDP which had largely been established during

50 Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense (St. Malo, December 1998)
the very similar Bosnian conflict a few years earlier. Ultimately, EU actions were incapable of either preventing or ending the conflict, largely because of their overwhelming reluctance to use force in practice. With sluggish EU action, Europeans invited the US to engage in Kosovo. The US quickly employed coercive diplomacy with the promise of military enforcement, which led to an eventual settlement after an intense bombing campaign against Milosevic’s forces.

Kosovo should have been, in the words of Jacques Poos, “the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States” to enforce security on the European continent. Unfortunately, lack of political consensus, inefficient institutional capacity, and insufficient military capabilities proved that the EU ultimately lacks the ability to project its power. The experience in Kosovo prompted calls for reform of the ESDP many of which are reflected in the proposed reforms of the Lisbon Treaty. The US has begun to focus on fighting terrorism, to diminish its troop presence in Europe, and to shift its priority from the European continent to the Middle East and Asia. This trend has continued to spur European commitment to enhance EU security capabilities. The 2003 dispute over Iraq further bolstered Europeans’ desire for a more autonomous security structure and provided the incentive to articulate a European Security Strategy.\(^{53}\)

The greatest success of EU foreign policy since 1990 could well be considered the EU’s acquisition of military and defense capabilities, thereby enabling the EU to possess a credible use of force. This newly acquired EU security capability is largely represented within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It is in this regard that the emergence of ESDP is transforming the EU into a truly global actor capable of pursuing common EU foreign policies.

The EU has, however, been unsuccessful at enlisting the security cooperation of all member states, a number of whom still prefer to pray in the house of NATO rather than invest in building up the EU’s own diplomatic capabilities. This is a problem in terms of both credibility

\(^{53}\) For a fuller discussion of the ESS see Appendix III.
and workability for the EU. Indeed, “any government that witnessed how the EU addressed the Kosovo or Iraq questions would think twice about leaving the EU to manage an urgent crisis single-handedly.”\textsuperscript{54} While the ESDP has great potential, in its current state, the EU is mainly a police power, not a military power. According to the European Parliament this is an unacceptable position; “without a military dimension the EU is like a barking dog without teeth.”\textsuperscript{55}

On 11 December 2008, Javier Solana released his yearlong assessment of the success of the 2003 European Security Strategy. The Presidency’s Conclusions following the December 2007 European Council’s meeting called for the Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana and his secretariat to examine the implementation of the 2003 ESS. The two documents are very different in both their style and substance, indicating that they were perhaps drafted by different people, but also because they represent different spots in the continuum of European strategic development. Even the language used in the titles of the two documents signal a shift in EU strategic attitude. Whereas in 2003 the EU planned for a “Secure Europe in a Better World,” the 2008 report’s title settled for the congruent but slightly humbler task of “Providing Security in a Changing World.” The 2008 report’s title emphasizes the ongoing nature of “doing” security and signals the complexity of a world with problems that appear as moving targets on the EU’s security agenda. Solana’s report is less normative and instead more specific and realistic in its strategic goals and suggested implementation mechanisms, than the 2003 ESS. This is undoubtedly also affected by the fact that (instead of grand ideas being agreed on by heads of government in response to highly politicized events surrounding the Iraq War in 2003) the 2008 report is a bureaucratic assessment of realities of EU capabilities and decision making possibilities and limitations.

\textsuperscript{54} Toje (2008), 145.  
The divides in strategic approach to the role of the US in Europe among EU member states continues to exist, as was made evident during the US’s plans for installing a missile defense shield base in the Czech Republic and Poland in 2008. The strategic divide on external action was also highlighted by the 2008 Georgian War and the ongoing discourse over European dependency on Russian gas. While the broad normative aims and security related goals included in the 2003 ESS have certainly not been achieved, the EU has launched twenty ESDP missions since 2003. These missions represent successful member state security cooperation under an EU banner in pursuit of commonly held goals and have played important roles in pre- and post-conflict stabilisation. In the Georgian crisis, the EU was highly visible in the negotiations and appeared better placed than the US to mediate between the two parties. As the rifts within Europe appear to consistently fall along the Europeanists and Transatlanticists camps, it is likely that the most significant strategic “other” for the EU remains the US, which also happens to be its most natural partner in “providing security in a changing world.”

4.2 NATO

When the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing NATO, was signed in 1949, it contained no substance predicting or guaranteeing US primacy in the transatlantic framework. On the contrary, it was the hope of many of the signatories – especially many American lawmakers – that the European pillar would be as strong and active in providing for European security as the American pillar. In this sense, Frédéric Mérand is unrealistic in assuming that there have been fundamental conflicts in NATO “since its very beginning” on the strategic goals and power

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56 See Appendix VIII.
structure of the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{58} Unfortunately the absence of military capabilities on behalf of the European states led to a situation where the US became the primary bearer of military responsibility and, consequently, the prime decision maker in strategic policy. This trend was furthered along by such factors as France’s withdrawing from NATO’s military structure in 1966 which enabled (or forced) the US to shoulder more of the burden. In short, the fact of US primacy in the transatlantic security framework has been inevitable not optional. This is beginning to change with the emergence of enhanced EU security capabilities, as the EU is already an important security actor and is rapidly becoming a multilateral military actor. The emergence of EU security and defence structures, however, occurred without substantive contact or dialogue with NATO. This has resulted in a failure to agree on a cooperative strategic framework which could facilitate a complementary process of security cooperation and avoid competition especially among states who are members of both the EU and NATO.

Both in its origins and operations, NATO is about security cooperation and has served as the most relevant institutional link between the US and Europe since World War II. Surprisingly, there was no formal link of cooperation between the EC/EU and NATO until 2001. During this time the remnants of the Western European Union (WEU) served as the main tool of coordination and communication between the EU and NATO. This changed with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy in 2001 and the subsequent agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements. These agreements allowed for select sharing of capabilities and intelligence for EU military operations and reflected “the gradual emergence within European institutions of a stronger, more integrated European political identity, and the conviction of many EU members that Europe must develop the capacity to act

\textsuperscript{58} Mérand (2008), 65.
militarily in appropriate circumstances where NATO is not engaged militarily.”\textsuperscript{59} Such cooperation would have been unlikely without the eventual establishment of the ESDP, which provided a solidly European security component with which NATO and the US could work.

The possibility for meaningful cooperation between the EU and NATO was soon hindered by a growing perception of strategic differences between the US and the EU, which became most apparent during the transatlantic row over the Iraq War in 2003. The dispute divided Europe as evidenced by the “Letter of the Eight” in which several EU members, including Hungary, expressed solidarity with the US over French and German opposition to the US invasion.\textsuperscript{60} An action which prompted French President Chirac to declare that certain Central and Eastern European states had “missed a great opportunity to shut up” and elicited US Vice President Cheney’s distinction between “old” and “new” Europe.\textsuperscript{61} The rift convinced some that the ESDP should develop separately from the US-led NATO alliance. In 2005, then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s made his opinion known that NATO was “no longer the primary venue where trans-Atlantic partners consult on and coordinate strategic ideas” and suggested that ESDP replace NATO.\textsuperscript{62}

The Iraq rift notwithstanding, the evolution of EU military and security structures and capabilities should have been viewed as strengthening the European pillar of the transatlantic alliance. The strength of US influence in the world has been its ability to adjust to circumstances and lead when necessary. The necessity of asymmetrical US primacy in the transatlantic alliance is no longer needed. Happily the current situation is what the US hoped for in the immediate aftermath of WWII. For the first time since 1949, the possibility of more equitable burden

\textsuperscript{59} NATO/OTAN. Handbook (2006), 243.
\textsuperscript{60} Cottey (2007), 84.
\textsuperscript{61} Cottey (2007), 84.
\textsuperscript{62} Der Spiegel International. “Schröder’s Security Conference Blooper,” Available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,341713,00.html.
sharing and strategic input has been made possible within the transatlantic alliance. The EU however, failed to convince Washington that ESDP was a complement to transatlantic cooperation and a fulfillment of a “Europe whole and free,” long hoped for by the US. Instead the EU engaged in a discourse of diverging interests, emphasizing the EU’s normative and soft power superiority to traditional American hard power. While never officially declaring that the EU no longer needed NATO (i.e. the United States), there was no successful effort to harmonize differences in a strategic framework for security cooperation. While the EU could have done more on this matter, fault favors neither side of the Atlantic.

Crucially, however, it is not only institutional inadequacies that contribute to misunderstanding and lack of EU-NATO cooperation. Much depends on the EU itself. Along these lines, French Minister of Defense Hervé Morin has called for a more harmonious relationship between ESDP and NATO.63

Meaningful EU-NATO transatlantic dialogue and real cooperation especially on security matters will depend on consensus within the EU. The European Council on Foreign Relations has recently pointed out that “one of the main reasons that it is difficult to have proper transatlantic discussions is that Europeans themselves seem unable to have real strategic discussions on issues such as Russia, China, the Middle East or European defence. Europe may not be divided between old and new parts, but it is divided nonetheless.”64 Perhaps one of the most divisive issues within the EU is the role of the emerging security structures vis-à-vis the existing structure of NATO.

The EU’s acquisition of military capabilities has allowed the EU to emerge on the world scene as a fully functioning security actor. Thus, in the field of diplomacy, Europe now has a

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64 Korski, et al., 2.
phone number. The voice that answers, however, still represents an EU which is less than the sum of its parts. This reality is partly due to the institutional structure of the EU; it is not immediately clear if the phone rings in the CFSP High Representative’s office or at the current sitting Presidency’s home capital. Upon ratification, the Lisbon Treaty will clarify this ambiguity, *inter alia*, by clearly establishing the double-hatted High Representative for foreign affairs. Other than solidification of the CFSP and impending reforms contained with the Lisbon Treaty, it would appear that the most important matters affecting the EU’s diplomatic coherence and efficacy hinge upon the unpredictable element of political will among the member states. Nevertheless, the integrated security and defence cooperation represented within ESDP ensures that EU diplomacy possesses the full spectrum of foreign policy options.

The EU has emerged from a Common Market to a global security actor; with its newly acquired comprehensive diplomatic toolbox, the EU is better positioned than ever to pursue the EU’s interests around the world. This reality has moved the EU into security domains that were previously reserved exclusively for NATO. As a consequence CFSP/ESDP has become a *challenge* to NATO’s monopoly as the provider for European security.”

It is clear that the enlargement of the EU into Central and Eastern Europe since 1990 “created a basically new power structure in Europe,” but one “in which the EU *and* the US remain[ed] implicated.” What remains unclear are the realities of security cooperation for states who are members of both the EU and NATO on issues where the there is conflict between the individual state’s obligations. Hungary is one such country.

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CHAPTER 5 – HUNGARY BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO

Within the broad security domain, three particular areas which offer insight into Hungary’s security choices are: military cooperation; border management and police activities; and relations with Russia. The below analyses focus on both the language and policies of security cooperation within these three areas.

5.1 Strategic documents analysis

This section contrasts Hungary’s 2004 Security Strategy with both the EU’s 2003 Security Strategy and NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept in order to gain some insight into whose language Hungary is speaking in terms of conceptualizing security, perceiving threats and prioritizing strategic means. The results are mixed. While Hungary’s military policy continues to be heavily influenced by NATO strategy, in the area of internal, external security and border management, the EU appears to be guiding Hungarian strategy.

The most obvious question may be: why analyze security strategies to explore the effects of EU security thinking on national security identities? The adoption of official grand strategic documents is an important part of national security identity, primarily because it involves a close and intimate involvement with strategic language and with security vocabulary. This language-dominated process often occurs at both the technocratic and political level involving discussion and often compromise. Pernille Rieker has noted that the “surest sign of identity change and socialization is the development of a new vocabulary in terms of which the identity can then be
publically articulated." Security strategies are worthy objects of analysis, not least because they represent a consensus or at least compromise on acceptable strategic goals and approaches.

Importantly, this comparison is not of several national security strategies, but an analysis of one, Hungary’s, national security strategy compared with the current strategic documents of the EU and NATO, in both of which Hungary has full membership. By comparing the documents and determining which strategic language and security conceptualization Hungary has adopted on certain issues, one can infer something about the success of the EU at influencing Hungary’s official strategic language. The logic being that if the 2004 Hungarian Security Strategy resembles the 1999 NATO Strategic concept more than it reflects the 2003 European Security Strategy, it can be reasonably concluded that NATO’s strategic language continues to influence Hungarian official strategic language to a greater degree than does the EU. The methodology utilized herein is primarily limited to a comparative document analysis of the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the 2003 European Security Strategy and key Hungarian strategic documents from 1993-2004. Reference will also be made to other primary sources and secondary materials for illustrative purposes. In order to manageably compare the documents, three issues have been identified as significant indicators whereby points of convergence and disagreement among the documents as well as the development of Hungarian strategy over time may be discerned. The issues are 1) perceptions of Russia (and Ukraine); 2) conceptualizing of multidimensional (internal/external) security; and 3) military capabilities structuring (traditional vs flexible conflict management).

68 While limited to the official rhetoric of strategic documents, this analysis provides a very useful starting point from which to analyze Hungarian security policy in relation to the EU and NATO; if there is a disconnect between Hungarian strategic security language and security policy (as evidence suggests may be the case), then the question remains: why?
This section is followed by a brief introduction of the documents constituting the analysis. The subsequent three sections correspond with the three indicator issues and will serve as focal points of the comparative analysis. Each section will compare perspectives both across the documents and through Hungary’s strategic history, as represented by the 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2004 strategic documents. Of analytical necessity, this paper assumes certain characteristics of both NATO’s and the EU’s strategic ethos, which will be identified in regard to each issue by locating the principle position represented by the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2003 European Security Strategy. On each issue, the relevant position of Hungary’s strategic texts since 1993 will be provided as a background and comparing with Hungary’s 2004 Security Strategy. Themes gleaned from the comparative analysis will be supplemented by select policy considerations. Finally, concluding comments will be offered with a mind to future developments of Hungarian, EU, and NATO strategies.69

5.1.1 The Documents

1999 NATO Strategic Concept: The North Atlantic Treaty, establishing NATO, was signed in 1949 and articulated the fundamentals of post-WWII security. Following the end of the Cold War, the treaty lost some of its strategic relevance and was updated by the 1991 Strategic Concept. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept was replaced by the 1999 Strategic Concept which now represents the most up-to-date and relevant NATO strategic document in terms of informing the policies and influencing the strategies of its member states.70

69 Although aware of current events, international conflicts, as well as certain policy successes and failures occurring simultaneous to the drafting and adoption of the various strategic documents compared herein, space limitations of this paper prevent explicit mention of any, but the most relevant non-textual considerations.

70 Yost (2005), 21-27.
The 2003 European Security Strategy: The EU does not yet possess a clearly identifiable strategic ethos: the divides in strategic approach to the role of the US in Europe among EU member states continue to exist. Nevertheless, the 2003 ESS represents the EU’s first and, so far, only attempt at a “strategic document covering in effect the whole of EU foreign policy, across the pillars, from aid and trade, to diplomacy and the military.” Far from irrelevant, the ESS is “omnipresent in EU discourse” and is “one of the most spread and read EU documents among the general public.” Although the 2003 ESS is largely representative of the Council Secretariat’s contributions, it was modified by the member states and represents a consensus position on EU security strategy. While it may not be considered a strategy in militarily operational terms, it definitely articulates several uniquely EU approaches to security and sets forth broad strategic goals guiding the EU’s emerging common foreign, security and defence policies. The ESS is relevant because it does articulate a uniquely comprehensive conceptualization of security and embraces a wide variety of means to ensure security. Additionally, the ESS represents the possibility for more robust, integrated security cooperation: crucial to this possibility is the national adaptation of European strategic concepts by EU member states.


71 Biscop (2008), 1.
72 Ibid., 2.
Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary”\textsuperscript{75} which combined security and defence while incorporating many of NATO’s strategic principles. In 2002 the first national strategy, as such, was adopted ("Security on the threshold of the new millennium: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary").\textsuperscript{76} As the result of domestic political party shifts, however, the 2002 version was soon replaced by the 2004 version\textsuperscript{77} ("The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary\textsuperscript{78}). Both the 2002 and 2004 versions reflect decidedly more EU positions on such matters as comprehensive security and border management, but remain NATO centered in their military strategy. The formulation of Hungary’s 2004 National Security Strategy was the result of contributions from and compromises by the Parliament, the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The 2004 Hungarian Security Strategy is the most comprehensive and the current legally standing national strategy. For these reasons, it serves as the principle Hungarian strategic text in the following analysis.

\textsuperscript{77} Póti (2005), 21.
Figure 1:
Key Strategic Elements

1999 NATO Strategic Concept

NATO
- Military aggression (long term)
- Nuclear deterrence

EU
- Poverty reduction
- Economic development programs

NATO and EU
- Interestingly, NATO and the EU share no common strategic threat, priority or means which Hungary does not also share.

EU, NATO, and Hungary
- Terrorism, transnational crime and drug trafficking
- WMDs
- Instability/stability
- Energy security
- Dialogue and diplomacy
- Economic cooperation
- Military alliance

NATO and Hungary
- Russia; Ukraine
- Conventional military deterrence

Hungary
- Russia
- Minority rights of Hungarians abroad

EU and Hungary
- State failure
- Environmental threats
- Integrated border management

2004 Hungarian Security Strategy

2003 European Security Strategy

Red = Identified Threats
Blue = Strategic Priorities
Green = Preferred Means
5.1.2 Russia, Partner or Threat?

In 1993, Hungary recognized that “most of the risk factors stem from economic underdevelopment of our region, problems of shifting to market economy, problems unsolved for decades, the psychological heritage of dictatorship, the developmental problems of new democracies, the underdeveloped nature of bilateral relations in our region, conflicts between countries in the region, the unresolved problems of ethnic and religious minorities and all kinds of political, economic, and social instabilities thus created.”\(^{79}\) While Hungary’s 1993 and 1998 documents do not explicitly mention Russia or Ukraine, the 2002 Strategy states unequivocally that “two countries are of primary importance from the post-Soviet region concerning Hungary’s security: Russia and Ukraine.”\(^{80}\) It is not immediately clear within the document if these countries are seen primarily as sources of threat or a means of stability and security.

NATO’s 1999 strategy views “a strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia” as “essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”\(^{81}\) and that both Russia and Ukraine are “key factors of stability and security.”\(^{82}\) The ESS does not mention Ukraine specifically, but declares: “We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity.”\(^{83}\) Hungary’s 2004 Strategy is exceedingly clear that it views Russia as both a threat and as a possible instrument of stability through its cooperation with the West. “The dangers emanating from [Russia’s] internal instability have

\(^{79}\) “Ezzel kapcsolatban a legtöbb veszélyforrás régióink gazdasági elmaradottságából, a piacgazdaságra való áttérés nehézségeiből, évszázados megoldatlan problémákból, a diktatúrák pszichikai örökségéből, az újonnan létrejött demokratikus társadalmak fejlődési problémáiból, a térség országai közötti kapcsolatok kezdetleges állapotából, a nemzetek közötti konfliktusokból, a nemzeti, etnikai és vallási kisebbségek rendezetlen helyzetéből és a mindezekkel szoros összefüggésben lévő politikai, társadalmi instabilitásból ered.” Republic of Hungary (11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY Határozat), Art. 3.3. [Translations throughout are provided by Anna Stumpf].

\(^{80}\) “A Szovjetunió felbomlását követően létrejött utódállamok közül Magyarország biztonságára elsősorban két állam van jelentős hatással: Oroszország és Ukrajna.” Republic of Hungary (2144/2002. (V. 6.) Korm. Határozat), Art. 2.2.4

\(^{81}\) NATO (1999), Art 36.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., Art 37.

\(^{83}\) EU (2003), 14.
decreased, but have not yet completely disappeared.”

Ukraine, on the other hand, is considered within the document as a means of security through cooperation. “Hungary also supports the maintenance of Ukraine’s stability and its democratic transformation as well as its rapprochement to the structures of Euro-Atlantic integration by all the means available.”

Hungary’s 2004 Strategy also mentions for the first time “energy security,” which is not present in the 1993, 1998 or 2002 docs. It is not difficult to see the document’s suggested connection between Russia and Hungary’s energy concerns. Hungary’s position on Russia in this document stands in contrast to both the 1999 NATO and 2003 EU documents, both of which emphasize Russia’s role as a partner in stability, but not describing Russia itself as a source of instability. The 2004 Strategy also enunciates a more critical position towards Russia than in previous strategic documents.

5.1.3 Conceptualizing Borders: linking internal and external security

In a forward looking manner, the 1993 Basic Security Principles of Hungary declared that “beyond the traditional elements of security, the complex factors constituting Hungarian security (such as political, economic, military, environmental, humanitarian and human rights) now also expand to new ones such as international organized crime, immigration, and refugee problems which all have a direct effect on the internal security of our country.” This acknowledgment was similar to the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept which mentioned the interaction between the

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84 Republic of Hungary (2073/2004. (III. 31.) Korm. Határozat), Art 2.2.3.
85 Ibid., Art 3.2.3.
86 “Ezen veszélyforrásokkal összefüggésben a magyar biztonság komplex tényezői a klasszikus elemek mellett - így a politikai, gazdasági, katonai, környezeti, humanitárius- ember jogi - olyan újakkal egészültek ki, mint a nemzetközi szervezett bűnözés, immigráció, menekültprobléma. Ezek közvetlen kihatással vannak az ország belső biztonságára is.” Republic of Hungary (11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY Határozat), Art. 3.3.
internal and external dimensions of state security; yet, which did not suggest how this multi-dimensional threat may be tackled and certainly did not provide the framework or instruments for security cooperation in this area. This is not surprising given that NATO is a military alliance focused on conventional defense. Hungary’s 2002 Strategy reaffirms that “new, formerly internal security matters are now part of national security policy, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.” The 2002 Strategy also points out that in the realm of border cooperation, “conforming to institutional and legal requirements of EU norms puts an additional burden on Hungarian authorities” including “providing technical and human resources” as well as “improving the share of information and cooperation.” This particular passage has a distinctly unwilling tone and indicates a fundamental skepticism that Hungary’s internal security can be efficiently provided for in cooperation with the EU.

The 2003 ESS identifies the internal threats of “cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons,” including the “activities of criminal gangs” which “can have links with terrorism,” as having an “important external dimension.” In this world of “increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked,” the ESS advocates the importance of “borders” as a means of more intelligently managing the externally linked dimensions of internal security. Thus the ESS provides an actionable linking of internal and external security, meaning that not only is the new multi-dimensionality of threats identified, but new solutions are suggested. Ursula Schroeder notes that the 2003 ESS’s targeting

87 “Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.” NATO (1999), Art 24.
89 Republic of Hungary (2144/2002. (V. 6.) Korm. Határozat), 2.2.7
90 EU (2003), 4.
91 Ibid., 1.
of “transnational terrorism and organized crime, as well as instability and conflicts caused by failing and weak statehood” allows for a more “comprehensive,” human security based approach to serve as the reigning value of an emerging EU strategy. Interestingly, Hungary’s 1998 Strategic Principles had earlier articulated this very theme, but in connection with Hungarian minorities living in neighboring states as a result of the Trianon treaty of 1920: “Human rights and more specifically the situation of ethnic minorities cannot be regarded as exclusively the domestic issues of any one country.” For Hungary, therefore, in a limited manner, human security was already providing a link between external and internal security, with borders as a secondary consideration.

By 2004, Hungary had officially recognized in its Security Strategy the importance of integrated border cooperation at both the European and international levels. The document highlights again that “the blurring of the borderline between external and internal risk factors” necessitates new approaches to security and that practically this means contributing to the “EU’s internal security and its external relations.”

“The changing set of tasks of the Hungarian Border Guards, the increased protection of the EU’s external borders as well as the development of the controlling system of internal borders also require a transformation of the organisational structure and a linkage to be established between the border protection and law enforcement activities. It is in our basic interest for the future

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92 Schroeder (2009), 2.
95 Ibid., Art 3.3.1.
external borders not only to serve our own national security, but the security of the entire European Union."\textsuperscript{96}

The border cooperation with the EU is to include “preventive and intelligence activities alike."\textsuperscript{97} Hungary has implemented this understanding partly through Hungary’s participation in FRONTEX, which provides the framework within the EU for comprehensive border management which addresses the external dimension of internal security. In 2007, Hungary participated in FRONTEX’s Five Borders project aimed at stemming illegal immigration from Ukraine into the EU in which Hungary played the most active role of the five countries involved.\textsuperscript{98} Compared to earlier documents, Hungary’s 2004 Security Strategy demonstrates a decisive shift in thinking regarding the role of borders in combating the multidimensional threat of illegal migration, transnational crime and drug trafficking as well as indicating an emerging belief in the efficacy of integrated cooperation with the EU to provide internal security. On this issue of security, Hungary has adopted a strategic position which is significantly more reflective of the EU position.

\textbf{5.1.4 Military Capabilities Structuring: traditional force vs. conflict management}

Writing in 2005, Berenskoetter utilized a comparative analysis of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and drew out the points of commonality and divergence in European and American strategy. Berenskoetter identified crucial differences in tactics suggested by the two documents, such as the structural means of European security cooperation; the EU’s strategy was civilian focused, in contrast with

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[96] Ibid., Art 4.
\item[97] Ibid., Art 4.
\item[98] Details available at \url{http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati/art22.html}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the transatlantic emphasis on traditional military force. This observation is borne out in the strategies presently under consideration. The ESS declares that the EU “could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities” while at the same time understanding NATO as merely “enhancing the operational capability of the EU.” In order for the EU to build interoperable civilian-military capacity it would be necessary “to transform [EU member states’] militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats.” In a more traditionalist vein, the heavily US-influenced 1999 NATO strategy has the overarching military goal of “terminat[ing] war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence.” As of 1999, rather than reinventing its strategy or restructuring its forces, NATO intended to contribute “to the management of crises through military operations,” traditionally conceived.

With a mind to territorial integrity and political security, in 1993, Hungary considered it a fact that “no European institution can by itself guarantee European security” and thus Hungary was dependent on US protection through NATO. In terms of security matters, therefore, NATO was the dominant influence: “the structure of Hungary’s military, its troop levels, the number of reserve forces, and its weapon structure will be shaped – in consultation with NATO – by the potential real threat factors, the defence necessities of the country, our NATO responsibilities as well as our financial and economic resources.” In 2002, NATO continued to

99 Berenskoetter (2005), 84.
100 EU (2003), 11.
101 Berenskoetter (2005), 84.
102 EU (2003), 12.
103 NATO (1999), Art 49.
105 „A Magyar Köztársaság fegyveres erőinek szervezeti és hadrendi struktúráját, létszámát, belső állományarányait, fegyverzetét és felszerelését a várható reális veszélytényezőknek, az ország védelmi
be “the prime guarantor of Hungary’s security.” In order to guarantee this security, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept included the declaration that all “NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence.” Where NATO members did not possess the capabilities to contribute, they were expected to acquire them; the goal of which Hungary has incorporated into its 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2004 strategic documents: “Hungary needs to possess the military capabilities required for the collective defence of Hungary within the framework of NATO, and for the collective defence of its allies.” This translates into a goal of “develop[ing] an armed force that is new in the sense of operational philosophy, able to fulfill the commitments made to NATO.”

In 2001, the Hungarian government agreed to buy 14 Gripen fighter jets from the Swedish Saab AB manufacturer at a cost of €823 million. At the time, the US and NATO were supporting the Czech and Hungarian acquisitions of Gripen fighter jets to be used in Alliance operations. The original contract was revised by the Hungarian government in 2003, around the time that the EU was stressing the importance of interoperability capabilities in EU missions. The EU requested that Hungary consider acquiring helicopters instead of fighter jets, as helicopters were deemed better suited to civilian mission support as well as strategic troop deployment. Hungary decided to go with its NATO obligations, after all it was NATO which...
guaranteed their security. On 22 December 2009, the 14 Hungarian Gripens became active at Kecskemét airbase.\textsuperscript{113} It is obvious from the strategies and if Hungary’s decision to acquire Gripen fighter jets was taken in order to fulfill its role in external military cooperation. Not least because of the fact that by the time a Gripen takes off from Hungarian territory and reaches cruising altitude, it is already outside of Hungarian airspace.\textsuperscript{114}

The choice to invest in fighter jets as opposed to flexible operational helicopters illustrates the overwhelming influence of NATO strategic thinking on Hungarian security and defense policies, indicating that Hungary’s strategic rhetoric regarding NATO is a policy reality. Most recently, Hungary has decided to extend its commitment in Afghanistan for another year and plans to increase its troop presence from 300 to 400.\textsuperscript{115} The 2004 Hungarian Strategy acknowledges that due to its membership in the EU, “Hungary has to prepare for an increasing and permanent involvement in the fields of crisis management and peacekeeping;”\textsuperscript{116} yet, it is likely to take time for this acknowledgement to turn into a strategic priority and even longer to be implemented into security and defence policies that favors military integration with the EU over NATO.

\begin{flushleft}helicopter deployment. The simulation coincides with the development of an EU “Helicopter Tactics Programme” (HTP) to provide an ongoing framework for enhanced helicopter in ESDP operations, which will become operational in 2010. GAP 2009 simulation exercises were held in the Alps of southeast France in order to train in “mountainous terrain.” Details available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=458.\textsuperscript{113} László Szűcs. “The Airspace Of Hungary Is Already Guarded By Gripens” (Hungarian Ministry of Defence, 4 March 2009), available at: http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/194/14104/gripens_guarding.html.\textsuperscript{114} According to a Hungarian military officer.\textsuperscript{115} “Hungary to Extend Afghan Mission for One Year” (Napló Online: 4 March 2009). Available at: http://www.naplo-online.hu/news_in_english/20090304_hungary_extend_afghan_mission.\textsuperscript{116} Republic of Hungary (2073/2004. (III. 31.) Korm. Határozat), Art 4.\end{flushleft}
Table 1: Strategic Culture Comparison (emphasis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Strategic Culture</th>
<th>ESDP</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities Structuring</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Projection</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instruments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferred Arena of Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanism</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticism</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Word used to describe Security Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“European”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Atlantic” or “Transatlantic”</td>
<td>“Euro-Atlantic”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Beyond the Language: Hungarian Security Policies

The development of Hungary’s strategic thinking on security and defense since 1993, and in relation to both NATO and the EU, indicates that Hungary still views its military cooperation with NATO as the fundamental guarantor of its national security. In the field of military cooperation, Hungary has only strengthened its NATO dominated thinking on capabilities structuring which greatly influences Hungarian defence spending and force structuring. In relation to the EU, Hungary’s perception of the EU as a relevant security actor has increased with each redrafting of Hungary’s official strategic documents. While the 1998 document did not mention the EU once among its priorities or means of providing security, the 2004 document indicates that the EU has become a major instrument of securing Hungary’s security.117 In the conceptualization of border security as the space connecting the threats of internal and external security and in cooperation with the EU in integrated border management, one may see within the Hungarian strategic documents a concrete path demonstrating the EU’s growing influence on Hungarian security thought. For historical reasons and due to its location, Hungary is likely to

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117 EU mentioned five times in 1998 Strategy; 10 times in 2002 Strategy and 71 times in the longer 2004 strategy. (see Figure in Appendix II for frequency of other key words among the texts.)
continue to view both Russia and Ukraine as strategic priorities, but may through successes in integrated border management cooperation come to view Russia less as a source of threat. In short, Hungary is strategically multi-lingual; speaking the strategic language of NATO, the EU and Hungary. The vocabulary and framing of strategic documents is only one aspect of the entire gambit of a nation’s strategic culture and security policy which also reveal much about responses to external pressures and shifts in security thinking.

With a mind to territorial integrity and political security following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary considered it a fact that “no European institution can by itself guarantee European security” and thus Hungary was dependent on US protection through NATO.118 When formally accepting NATO membership at a ceremony in Independence, Missouri in 1999, then Hungarian minister of Foreign Affairs declared that “a historic choice had been made” because “We, Hungarians, made this decision on our own, free from any outside interference. We applied for joining NATO, the largest network of security that history has ever known. Yet, the decision was not only about security. NATO accession is also about returning to Hungary to her natural habitat…Hungary has come home, we are back in the family.”119

Immediately, the United States spent over $60 million to help Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland restructure their militaries and adapt to NATO standards. Hungary expressed its conviction that their new alliance with the US through NATO was the guarantor of Hungary’s place in the West. In 2009, at the 10 year anniversary of Hungary’s admission to NATO, the Hungarian president reaffirmed this sentiment: “becoming a NATO member was part of our

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118 “Európában ma egyetlen állam, intézmény sem képes egyedül, önmaga a biztonságot szavatolni, vagy azt mások rovására garantálni.” Republic of Hungary (1993 (11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY Határozat), Art 3.2. [Translations throughout are provided by Anna Stumpf].
return to the European and Euro-Atlantic community, where we had belonged to before
communism.”\textsuperscript{120} Yet, even in 1999 it was apparent that Hungary’s principle security concerns
would be focused on making the states of central and southeastern Europe “stable, democratic,
prosperous and secure” including the preservation of Hungarian minorities in neighboring
countries.\textsuperscript{121}

Since Hungary’s security concerns are regional and “do not require the direct
involvement of the United States,”\textsuperscript{122} it would seem that Hungary might prefer to look to the EU
for security cooperation especially as the EU began to assume a more robust role in political and
military affairs. Indeed, it has been noted that “in theory, Hungary would be the best candidate to
take a marked pro-EU-integrationist foreign policy stance” vis-à-vis NATO.\textsuperscript{123} Upon officially
joining the EU on 1 May 2004, Hungary had already been a NATO member for five years, but
had only recently become an active member. Despite regionally focused security interests and a
receptivity to European integration in the military domain through ESDP, Hungary has
consistently demonstrated that in any conflict between ESDP and NATO, Hungary chooses
NATO.

5.2.1 Avoiding Russian Influence

After the recent confrontation between Russia and Europe over the cut-off of gas supplies
through Ukraine,\textsuperscript{124} Hungary’s mistrust of Russia has renewed its efforts to reduce its
dependency on Russian natural gas. Currently 70-80% of Hungary’s natural gas comes from

\textsuperscript{120} Message from László Sólyom, President of the Republic of Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Parliament, 12 March
2009).
\textsuperscript{121} János Martonyi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary (Independence, MO: 12 March 1999).
\textsuperscript{122} Póti and Tálas (2004), 44.
\textsuperscript{123} Póti and Tálas (2004), 44.
\textsuperscript{124} Lynn Berry And Maria Danilova, “Russia stops all gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine (Real Clear Markets, 7
January 2009).
Russia. The EU backed Nabucco pipeline, which planned to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas sources, was backed by Hungary early on, but uncertainty over the future of Nabucco created ambivalence on the part of Hungary toward the project. The situation was worsened by the persistent efforts of Russia to undermine the project, including its Blue Stream and South Stream pipelines. Hungary’s has decided to balance its options by placating both sides.\textsuperscript{125} This ambiguity in the end depends on the hard guarantee of NATO to discourage Russia from using energy as a tool of intimidation. It also reveals a lack of confidence in the EU’s ability to either succeed in constructing Nabucco or standing up to Russia in the event of an energy showdown.

In regards to Ukraine, Hungary is seeking to cement a buffer zone between its borders and Russia. This is a related issue, but separate from Hungary’s concern to stem the flow of illicit immigrants and goods from Ukraine into Hungary. Hungary believes that Ukraine as a security buffer zone with Russia will be stronger if it joins the EU, since overt Russian activity and power playing would be less possible in an EU member state.\textsuperscript{126} Thus, Hungary would appear to adopt EU policy on the matter of Ukraine, although this position is also in keeping with NATO’s position as well.

\textsuperscript{125} Matthew Brunwasser and Judy Dempsey, “Russia signs deal to bring natural gas pipeline through Bulgaria” (New York Times, 18 January 2008); and “Hungary-Russia Gas Deal to gas deal to hurt EU-backed Nabucco” (\textit{Earth Times}, 27 February 2008).

\textsuperscript{126} See David Miliband, “Ukraine, Russia and European Stability (The Guardian, 29 August 2008).
Table 2: Europeanisation of Hungarian Security Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>EU Position</th>
<th>Hungarian Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach towards Russia</strong>&lt;br&gt;(attitudinal, non-policy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Russia a Threat?</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Ukraine become EU/NATO member?</td>
<td>YES (eventually)</td>
<td>YES (as soon as possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become more Active in ESDP operations.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce role of US/NATO in European Security?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integrated Border Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary for domestic security?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2 Seeking Internal Security: Hungary within the EU

In 2004, 82% of Hungary’s adult population supported the “development of an independent, unified and articulate European defence policy,” making it one of the most supportive of EU member states. Support remained at 81% in 2007.\(^{127}\) As of 2008, Hungarians supported development in ESDP more than any other EU project.\(^{128}\) The public opinion polls may be misleading, however, as there is very little knowledge regarding the practicalities of ESDP. Amusingly, the section of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Ministry website entitled “Hungary’s participation in EU Security and Defence Policy” contains no reference to Hungary’s participation in ESDP, but instead offers suggestions on future EU-NATO cooperation.\(^{129}\) A similar scarcity of practical ESDP information is available on the Hungarian Ministry of Defence’s website. Unfortunately this may point towards a larger issue – that is that the

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\(^{127}\) [http://books.google.com/books?id=3jp8W_aX0gYC&pg=RA1-PA121&lpg=RA1-PA121&dq=hungarian+nato+esdp&source=bl&ots=YPPNJJsvTh&sig=WHlhQxW0oQoQo5LmFG1-TKirlqfgw&hl=en&ei=0sLZSeO4DcKD_Qb4vLzRDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9#PRA1-PA120,M1](http://books.google.com/books?id=3jp8W_aX0gYC&pg=RA1-PA121&lpg=RA1-PA121&dq=hungarian+nato+esdp&source=bl&ots=YPPNJJsvTh&sig=WHlhQxW0oQoQo5LmFG1-TKirlqfgw&hl=en&ei=0sLZSeO4DcKD_Qb4vLzRDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9#PRA1-PA120,M1)


“Hungarian political and academic community, by and large, has little knowledge of this [ESDP] endeavor.”

While Hungary’s strategic documents also indicate a belief in the desirability of EU security and defence, in terms of actual policies, the simple fact is that there is much more to be said about NATO than EU cooperation. Hungary has agreed to participate in an EU Battle Group with Slovenia and Italy; yet, this venture represents no tangible activity thus far. Hungary has deployed 158 troops under the EU banner to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of EUFOR Althea, but Hungarian troop deployments to NATO operations increasingly dwarf Hungarian contributions to EU missions. Significantly, Hungarian participation in EU security endeavors can be linked to the strategic priority that Hungary places on stability in its region in addition to an increasing Hungarian awareness of the external aspects of internal security. Hungarian cooperation in EUBAM and FRONTEX provide examples of growing security cooperation within the EU, albeit outside of ESDP; such security cooperation may lead to further Hungarian involvement in ESDP missions abroad.

The EU has identified “cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons,” including the “activities of criminal gangs” which “can have links with terrorism,” as having an “important external dimension.” In this world of “increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked,” the EU advocates “borders” as a means of more intelligently managing the externally linked dimensions of internal

130 Póti and Tálas (2004), 45.
133 See Figures 2 and 3 in Appendices VI and VII.
134 EU (2003), 4.
security. The EU further provides the actionable linking of internal and external security, through the policy instrument of integrated border management. Ursula Schroeder has noted that the 2003 ESS’s targeting of “transnational terrorism and organized crime, as well as instability and conflicts caused by failing and weak statehood” allows for a more “comprehensive,” human security based approach to serve as the reigning value of an emerging EU strategy.

Interestingly, Hungary’s 1998 Strategic Principles had earlier articulated this very theme, but in connection with Hungarian minorities living in neighboring states as a result of the Trianon Treaty of 1920: “Human rights and more specifically the situation of ethnic minorities cannot be regarded as exclusively the domestic issues of any one country.” For Hungary, therefore, in a limited manner, human security was already providing a link between external and internal security, with borders as a secondary consideration. Transferring this conceptual creativity into policy was more difficult. Hungary’s 2002 Security Strategy noted that in the realm of border cooperation, “conforming to institutional and legal requirements of EU norms puts an additional burden on Hungarian authorities” including “providing technical and human resources” as well as “improving the share of information and cooperation.” This particular passage’s distinctly unwilling tone indicates a fundamental skepticism that Hungary’s internal security can be efficiently provided for in cooperation with the EU.

By 2004, Hungary had officially recognized in its Security Strategy the importance of integrated border cooperation at both the European and international levels. Indicating that “the blurring of the borderline between external and internal risk factors” necessitates new approaches

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135 EU (2003), 4.
136 Schroeder (2009), 2.
to security and that practically this means contributing to the “EU’s internal security and its external relations.”

“The changing set of tasks of the Hungarian Border Guards, the increased protection of the EU’s external borders as well as the development of the controlling system of internal borders also require a transformation of the organisational structure and a linkage to be established between the border protection and law enforcement activities. It is in our basic interest for the future external borders not only to serve our own national security, but the security of the entire European Union.”

The border cooperation with the EU is to include “preventive and intelligence activities alike.”

Hungary has implemented this understanding into action through participation in the EUBAM mission begun in November 2005. EUBAM seeks to provide the framework for integrated border management in order to stem the flow of illegal immigrants, illicit drugs and organized crime. The EUBAM mission has a staff of 200 and is stationed in the Transnistria region along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, a region of particular concern for Hungary as many illegal immigrants into Hungary originate from there. The mission is led by Hungarian Major-General Ferenc Bánfi. Hungary was eager to participate in EUBAM mission in order to address the external sources of its internal security threats. Significantly, Hungary has been less willing to participate in either EUBAM or ESDP missions abroad.

Additionally, Hungary has been active in FRONTEX, which provides the framework within the EU for comprehensive border management which addresses the external dimension of

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142 EUBAM website available at http://www.eubam.org/.
internal security. In 2007, Hungary participated in FRONTEX’s Five Borders project aimed at stemming illegal immigration from Ukraine into the EU in which Hungary played the most active role of the five countries involved.\textsuperscript{143} Hungary’s official security positions as well as Hungarian involvement in EUBAM and FRONTEX demonstrate a decisive shift in thinking regarding the role of borders in combating the multidimensional threat of illegal migration, transnational crime and drug trafficking as well as indicating an emerging belief in the efficacy of integrated cooperation with the EU to provide internal security. On this issue of security, Hungary has adopted strategic position and security policies which are significantly more reflective of the EU position. Hungary’s participation in EUBAM and FRONTEX also indicate that Hungary sees the EU as a significant contributor to its internal security and in ensuring stability in the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Form of Threat</th>
<th>Preferred Means</th>
<th>Strategic Consequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee national security and state sovereignty</td>
<td>Acknowledges no traditional military threat to Hungarian national sovereignty currently exists.</td>
<td>NATO, Article 5</td>
<td>Commitment to NATO military cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure place of belonging in the West (Euro-Atlantic Community)</td>
<td>A strong aspect of current national identity which was originally conceived as the means of preventing Russian influence and coercion following the Cold War.</td>
<td>Committed to structuring its economic system (IMF, EU) and security identity to align with Euro-Atlantic Community</td>
<td>Hungary seeks to promote its national interests through commitment to EU norms, even though it is forced to observe these same norms within Hungary in respect to Roma minority population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect cultural and human rights of Hungarians abroad</td>
<td>Feared discrimination of Hungarian ethnic minorities in Slovakia, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine.</td>
<td>EU Pressure through diplomatic channels to enforce compliance of EU minority rights norms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External sources of Internal Security</td>
<td>Organized crime, illegal immigration, narcotics trade.</td>
<td>EU (Integrated Border Management; EUBAM, FRONTEX)</td>
<td>Represents the only area of Hungarian security policy in which cooperation with is primarily within the EU.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Maintaining the Guarantee: Hungary within NATO

Hungary’s eagerness to cooperate with the United States was apparent during the transatlantic row over the Iraq war in 2003. Hungary was one of the signers of the “Letter of the Eight” expressing solidarity with the US over France and Germany opposition to the US
invasion.\textsuperscript{144} An action which prompted French President Chirac to declare that the Central and Eastern European states had “missed a great opportunity to shut up”\textsuperscript{145} and elicited US Vice President Cheney’s distinction between “old” and “new” Europe. Throughout the ordeal, Hungary remained unwaveringly transatlanticist. Indeed, Hungary’s largest foreign deployment since regaining independence in 1989 was to Iraq as part of the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from August 2003 through March 2005, during which time one Hungarian soldier was killed in action. Currently three Hungarian soldiers remain in Iraq as part of the NATO Training Mission. A possible explanation for Hungary’s Atlanticist approach at the time was that until 2003, Hungary’s meager participation within NATO was the source of much criticism. Indeed, in 2002 there were calls for Hungary to be dismissed from NATO, although no formal mechanism allowed for it.\textsuperscript{146} At the time Hungary was estimated to have fulfilled only 25\% of its NATO obligations\textsuperscript{147} and its military reforms were much slower than either Poland or Czech Republic. Hungary’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP remains well below NATO’s mandated 2\%. The Hungarian defense budget is officially set at 1.7 percent of GDP, but it consistently fails to meet even this level.\textsuperscript{148} Since 2003, however, Hungary’s involvement in NATO has increased significantly.

Even by 1998, NATO had become the dominant influence on Hungary’s security strategy and policies: “the structure of Hungary’s military, its troop levels, the number of reserve forces, and its weapon structure will be shaped – in consultation with NATO – by the potential real threat factors, the defence necessities of the country, our NATO responsibilities as well as our

\textsuperscript{144} Cottey (2007), 84.
\textsuperscript{145} Cottey (2007), 84.
\textsuperscript{147} Póti and Tálas (2004), 44.
\textsuperscript{148} See Figure 3 in Appendix VII.
financial and economic resources.” In 2002, NATO continued to be “the prime guarantor of Hungary’s security.” In order to guarantee this security, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept included the declaration that all “NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence.” Where NATO members did not possess the capabilities to contribute, they were expected to acquire them; the goal of which Hungary has incorporated into its 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2004 strategic documents: “Hungary needs to possess the military capabilities required for the collective defence of Hungary within the framework of NATO, and for the collective defence of its allies.” This translates into a goal of “develop[ing] an armed force that is new in the sense of operational philosophy, able to fulfill the commitments made to NATO”

As part of acquiring the needed capabilities, in 2001 the Hungarian government agreed to buy 14 Gripen fighter jets from the Swedish Saab AB manufacturer at a cost of €823 million. At the time, the US and NATO were supporting the Czech and Hungarian acquisitions of Gripen fighter jets to be used in Alliance operations. The original contract was revised by the Hungarian government in 2003, around the time that the EU was stressing the importance of interoperability capabilities in EU missions. The EU requested that Hungary consider acquiring helicopters instead of fighter jets, as helicopters were deemed better suited for civilian missions support as

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151 NATO (1999), Art 47.
well as strategic troop deployment.\textsuperscript{156} Hungary decided to go with its NATO obligations, after all it was NATO which guaranteed their security. On 22 December 2009, the 14 Hungarian Gripens became active at Kecskemétf airbase.\textsuperscript{157} It is obvious that Hungary’s decision to acquire Gripen fighter jets was taken in order to fulfill its role in external military cooperation. Not least because of the fact that by the time a Gripen takes off from Hungarian territory and reaches cruising altitude, it is already outside of Hungarian airspace.\textsuperscript{158} The choice to invest in fighter jets as opposed to flexible operational helicopters illustrates the overwhelming influence of NATO strategic thinking on Hungarian security and defense policies. According to Asle Toje, the military industry aspect “is sometimes forgotten.”\textsuperscript{159}

Hungary’s enhanced relevance within NATO and policy preferences for NATO over ESDP is further indicated by the fact Hungary will host NATO’s new Central European airbase. In order to meet NATO’s need for strategic airlift capabilities, NATO joined with Sweden and Finland in order to form the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) which has purchased three Boeing C-17 Globemaster III aircrafts to form NATO’s Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW). This capacity will enable NATO to end its reliance on Russian aircraft for its heavy airlift operations.\textsuperscript{160} In the planning state, there developed a diplomatic dispute between the American and European defence industries over the choice of aircraft, with France and Germany favoring Airbus’ new

\textsuperscript{156} In March 2009, the EU emphasis on integrated helicopter capabilities culminated in the first EU “multinational” helicopter exercise sponsored by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in order to enhance the interoperability of helicopter deployment. The simulation coincides with the development of an EU “Helicopter Tactics Programme” (HTP) to provide an ongoing framework for enhanced helicopter in ESDP operations, which will become operational in 2010. GAP 2009 simulation exercises were held in the Alps of southeast France in order to train in “mountainous terrain.” Details available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=458.  
\textsuperscript{158} According to a Hungarian military officer.  
\textsuperscript{159} An advisor to George Herbert Bush remarked that “The aim is to get the new member countries hooked on US technology, so that they won’t buy European hardware further down the road.” Quoted in Toje (2008), 100.  
A400M while the US pushed for Boeing’s more expensive, but more versatile C-17 Globemaster III. Delays in Airbus’ manufacturing as well as predictable industry rivalry (possibly exacerbated by political concerns including France’s and Germany’s hesitance in Afghanistan) led to NATO’s choice of the C-17. Of course, technical reasons were cited including the C-17’s ability to perform NATO’s “strategic, tactical, military and humanitarian missions, as well as brigade airdrops, aeromedical evacuations, and landings and takeoffs from standard runways or austere airfields.”

Although the HAW was originally intended to be housed at Ramstein air base in Germany, an increasingly tense relationship on the issue of purchasing C-17 instead of A400M aircrafts led to the choice of Hungary as an alternative location. Some defence experts have called the choice of Pápa over Ramstein a “pure political move,” but NATO’s head of Air Defense and Airspace Management called the decision practical: “They made the offer and we were looking for a nation that would be willing.” The C-17s are to be registered “under the Hungarian flag” and will be stationed at the Pápa Air Base in northwest Hungary for a duration of thirty years. The first C-17 is expected to arrive at Pápa in July 2009. Hungary’s decision to host the new NATO base is consistent with a pro-Atlanticist policy trend discernable since at least 2003. Most recently, Hungary has decided to extend its commitment in Afghanistan for another year and plans to increase its troop presence from 300 to 400.

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165 “Hungary to Extend Afghan Mission for One Year” (Napló Online: 4 March 2009). Available at: http://www.naplo-online.hu/news_in_english/20090304_hungary_extend_afghan_mission.
It is clear that the majority of Hungarian deployments abroad are military deployments in NATO operations. While Hungary has participated in EU civilian missions, these cannot be considered an essential element of Hungary’s security cooperation. Indeed, recent trends indicate even a decrease of Hungarian cooperation in such civilian ESDP operations. Personal interviews conducted with officials in the EU’s Political Security Committee in Brussels indicate that the main reason for Hungarian participation in ESDP civilian missions was mostly declaratory. One factor for Hungary’s limited cooperation in this area was the underdevelopment of Hungary’s mechanisms for civilian security deployment.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps one of the most salient conclusions of this case study is that countries such as Hungary who participate in security cooperation both within the EU and as members of NATO, are often forced to choose when it comes to security policy, most conspicuously in the allocation of state budgeting and in the deployment of security personnel. After 10 years in NATO and five years in the EU, it is clear that the bulk of Hungary’s security and defense policies are increasingly oriented towards security cooperation within NATO, including force deployments and defense spending. Significantly, there is evidence that Hungary’s military cooperation with NATO has been uncomplimentary to its military cooperation within ESDP. Despite an effort to avoid officially choosing between NATO and EU security structures, Hungary’s allocation of its limited manpower and budget has made the choice apparent. In relation to the EU, Hungary’s further integration into the EU’s security and foreign policy structures is viewed primarily as an instrument of promoting its national interest which is the further stabilization of its neighbors.
Significantly, Hungary’s perception of the EU as a relevant security actor has increased. In the conceptualization of border security as the space connecting the threats of internal and external security and in cooperation with the EU in integrated border management, one may see within Hungarian strategic documents and security policies a concrete path demonstrating the EU’s growing influence.

6.1 Theoretical Implications

Despite the fact and stated realization that Hungary’s greatest security challenges are best met through the mechanisms of emerging EU security integration, Hungary decides, when forced to choose, to cooperate with NATO. When deciding where to deploy limited manpower, Hungary overwhelmingly chooses NATO missions over ESDP missions. When deciding where to allocate military spending, Hungary chooses to purchase military hardware that is in keeping with NATO operational needs rather than EU civilian operation requirements. The importance of NATO cooperation is deemed by Hungary to be in keeping with its political goals and not necessarily its security goals, indicating that despite financial and capability constraints Hungary is influenced by its ideational commitment to be a valuable member of the transatlantic alliance. This view is greatly influenced by Hungary’s traditional need for military protection against Russia, a view that despite current realities does not go away. Indeed, actions by Russia during the 2009 gas dispute only exacerbated Hungary’s desire to be protected by NATO.

The one area in which Hungary does seem to be increasingly Europeanized is through its cooperation within FRONTEX and EUBAM. Here Hungary has embraced the EU’s understanding of security by extended the zone of stability through civilian and police actions. If Hungary’s relations with Russia become better and Hungary believes that it faces no traditional
military threats, it appears likely that Hungary would intensify its cooperation in EU security mission, including within ESDP. For the time being, however, it would appear that Hungary’s strategic culture, understood as its historical need for hard military protection, influences Hungary to commit itself to NATO cooperation. The irrationality of this policy on certain issues reveals the power of strategic culture on state choices and goes some way to illuminating the security behavior of EU members states in NATO.
Appendices

Appendix I: List of Interviewees

Byrnes, Kate Marie. United States Mission to NATO. Personal interview (Brussels, Belgium: April 20, 2009).


Hunter, Amb. Robert, United States Department of State. Personal interview (Berlin, Germany: November 12, 2008).

Martinson, Col. Jon, United States Department of State. Personal interview (Budapest, Hungary: May 6, 2009).


Torda, Péter. Permanent Representation of Hungary to the European Union. Personal interview (Brussels, Belgium: April 21, 2009). [areas of responsibility: Civilian crisis management (CIVCOM).]


# Appendix II: Strategic Documents Keyword List

**Table 4: Frequency of Key Words referenced within strategic documents**

*While these words are used in various contexts, the frequency of certain words within the documents signify to some degree the level of importance associated with the term, in either a positive, negative or neutral context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key words</th>
<th>1999 NATO Strategic Concept (8,002 words)</th>
<th>2003 European Security Strategy (4,200 words)</th>
<th>2004 Hungarian Security Strategy (10,887 words)</th>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Adjusted per 1000 words</td>
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<tr>
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Appendix III: The European Security Strategy

The launch of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) came at a point when the strategic approaches of the EU and US were most divergent. In order to understand the developments in European strategy since the release of the 2003 ESS, we here look at three analytical articles and two primary sources (the 2003 ESS and Javier Solana’s 2008 report on the implementation of ESS). Catherine Kelleher focuses on the US reaction to the 2003 ESS in order to highlight that the ESS was written in order to address European division not the 2002 NSS, the almost immediate US reservations regarding EU strategic concerns, and the probable incompatibility between EU security integration and the current NATO structure. In arguing that the 2003 ESS was in a sense a response to the 2002 NSS, Felix Berrenskoetter utilizes a comparative textual analysis of the two documents and draws out the points of commonality and divergence in European and American strategy. Finally, Asle Toje argues that the development of European security has progressed to such a point that a lack of capabilities is no longer the primary concern, but rather the EU should focus on overcoming the consensus deficit that prevents the expectations of the EU from being fulfilled. Through these pieces of analysis, and with the release of Javier Solana’s 2008 report on the implementation of ESS, one may discern a movement in EU strategy from grand intentions to play a global role and spread European norms, to more realistic strategic aims of providing security where the EU is capable.

Kelleher (2008)

Although the ESS initially came as a “welcome surprise” to most in Washington, the content of the document coupled with a lack of cooperation with the US in its strategy for Iraq, soon led to antipathy for the ESS by the Bush administration. Kelleher underplays the reactive character of the ESS, arguing that perceptions that the EU was merely responding to American actions and the 2002 NSS were due to “the general hubris of the Bush administration about Washington’s centrality to all events and developments.” Instead, the ESS was concerned with addressing divisions within Europe. In terms of the substance of the documents, Kelleher points out that in the post 9/11 world, while the US’s NSS was focused on military capabilities and force projection to provide security, Europe was concerned with the Eastern Enlargement and engaging the European neighborhood. The US shifted its post 9/11 approach to emphasize the right of preventative or preemptive self-defense signaling that international cooperation and multilateralism had become a tertiary concern. The ESS, on the other hand, committed to acting within the international framework of laws and norms in pursuing its broad objectives. These concerns were viewed by the Bush Administration and many in Washington as weak. It is therefore unsurprising that Robert Kagan’s Mars vs. Venus analogy was considered a worthy explanation of Europe’s disinterest in hard security. According to Kelleher, this view has characterized American approaches to European security.

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166 Kelleher (2008), 150.
167 Kelleher (2008), 139.
Kelleher, however, highlights the fact that when tensions cooled down after the divide over Iraq, commonalities in the essence of both US and EU interests have led to strategic cooperation from military support in Afghanistan to coordinated diplomatic efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear program, to continued complementary efforts at peace building in the Balkans. Additionally since 2003, Kelleher points out that “the traditional “out of area” debate seems long past,” as Europeans recognize the realities of making Europe “secure.”

Berenskoetter (2005)

Felix Berenskoetter also cites Robert Kagan’s simplistic dichotomization between a manly America and a soft Europe, but only as a backdrop against which to present a comparative analysis of the 2002 NSS and the 2003 ESS. Through his comparisons, Berenskoetter identifies the points of commonality and contention and reaches the conclusion that the US document represents a surprisingly “idealistic” approach while the ESS represents a more “realist” view of the world. These different “strategic cultures” presented by the NSS and the ESS point to potential difficulties in strategic cooperation. In terms of specifics, one area of divergence that Berenskoetter notes is in relation to the structural means of European security cooperation. The NSS clearly sees US-led NATO “as the fulcrum of transatlantic and inner-European security.”

In contrast, the ESS sees NATO as only “enhancing the operational capability of the EU.”

Rather than depending on a military alliance, the ESS states that “international cooperation is a necessity” regarding whatever means taken to provide for European security.

The ESS states that “Europe has never been…so secure.” This sentiment stand in stark contrast to the US’s heightened sense of insecurity following 9/11. As a result, the US targeted terrorism as a threat and quite unrealistically embraced the possibility of unilateral action on a global front. The EU, on the other hand, targeted more identifiable threats of regional conflict, state failure and organized crime. The EU, however, significantly limited themselves in terms of tactics by promising to act completely within the UN legal framework(s). These differences presented by Berenskoetter in relation to threat perception and strategic means, in essence, indicate that the ESS represents idealistic means in pursuit of more realistic ends. On the other hand, the NSS contains broad and idealistic goals, but plans to implement more realistic tactics. While Berenskoetter makes no hard predictions regarding future transatlantic cooperation he states that “there are good reasons to assume that the paths they outline will not change direction tomorrow.”

Toje (2008)

Asle Toje expands upon Christopher Hill’s 1993 focus on a “capabilities-expectations gap” in order to prove that EU security capabilities and structures, although nascent, do exist and therefore capabilities alone can no longer explain the ineffectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy. Instead, Toje argues that the EU is “unable to deliver the foreign and security policies expected” due to a “lack of decisionmaking procedures capable of overcoming dissent.”

Toje presents “values” as the EU’s substitute for “national interest” and offers “instrumental rationality” (means/ends) and “intrinsic rationality” (values) as a way of understanding how values can

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168 Kelleher (2008), 159.
169 Berenskoetter (2005), 84.
170 Berenskoetter (2005), 87.
171 Berenskoetter (2005), 86.
172 Berenskoetter (2005), 80.
173 Berenskoetter (2005), 90.
174 Toje (2008), 121.
influence EU foreign policy. He states that “the EU will engage in ‘constructive engagement’ and ‘critical dialogue’ even when these are not the most rational ways to achieve a given objective.”\footnote{Toje (2008), 127.} This is, he suggests, not the best way to act globally because in order to maintain its values, the EU is attracted to situations which fit its pre-chosen tactics. A solution in search of a problem.

The EU definitely intends to be a global player. Indeed, Toje counts the word “global” 22 times in the ESS and twice in the 2010 headline goal, yet “the ESS does not offer even the roughest guideline as to how economic and military tools might be applied in order to exert influence.”\footnote{Toje (2008), 127.} The current system of CSFP/ESDP decision making, including allocation of mission costs and participation in European defence initiatives, does not lend itself to action-taking. Rather, it encourages “disinvestment and free riding,” while at the same time having an “anti-democratic tinge.”\footnote{Toje (2008), 132.} Yet, most import, the current system is ineffective because of its intergovernmental character and unanimity voting procedure. The EU’s intent to be a global actor, Toje argues, has been significantly undermined precisely by its inability to act. Toje’s example is the case of Darfur where the conditions and ideals represented offer a perfect opportunity for an EU style mission, but where no decisive action has been taken due to a lack of consensus on how to address the problem. Significantly, Toje believes that the Lisbon Treaty will not remedy the consensus deficiency because it does not alter the decision making mechanisms significantly enough to overcome the consensus-expectations gap. For Toje, the EU should embrace a more pragmatic institutional decision making procedure that would allow the EU to overcome a lack of consensus on a particular issue.

Appendix IV: Beyond the Strategies

At present, the security strategies of NATO (and US) and Hungary are in a state of revision and the EU has just concluded an assessment on the implementation of the ESS.\footnote{EU (2008).} The dynamics between NATO’s and the EU’s strategies and their relationships to those states who have joint membership (including Hungary) are a crucial consideration for future security cooperation in Europe. Shortly after rejoining NATO’s integrated military command, France called for a new integrated NATO-EU security and defence strategy\footnote{http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/france-unveils-new-security-strategy-eu-focus/article-173463} which is currently being discussed in the preliminary meetings leading to NATO’s 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary Summit at Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009. In Hungary, the Ministry of Defense recently drafted a new Hungarian Security Strategy which is currently being revised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is subject to parliamentary approval.\footnote{Official at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.} The new Hungarian Security Strategy is expected to be released in 2009, but is likely to be delayed due to the current political instability of the Hungarian government.

Appendix V: The EU and NATO – learning each other’s language?

The strategies of both the EU and NATO appear to be converging, as the EU seeks to bolster its traditional military capabilities and with NATO embracing more comprehensive approaches to security – including civilian interoperability. These trends may indicate a joint
learning process; a gradual “Europeanization” of NATO and a “NATO-ization” of the EU. In regards to NATO’s strategic development, a 2008 strategic document outlining NATO strategic values in relation to ISAF operations in Afghanistan reveals that NATO “fully recognizes that threats to our security are no longer limited to opposing state armies or marked by geographic boundaries” and that threats such as “terrorism and the drugs trade do not recognize territorial boundaries.” Furthermore, NATO has embraced several aspects of comprehensive security. The document states that “operational experience, particularly in Afghanistan and Kosovo, demonstrates that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while respecting mandates, autonomy and decisions of all actors.” The Afghan National Development Strategy, which draws heavily on NATO/ISAF approaches, links civilian and military success by stating: “There can be no government without an army, no army without money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without Justice and good Administration.” As part of operationalizing NATO’s evolving understanding, NATO has established the post of Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) who is responsible for liaising with “international organisations engaged in Afghanistan, in particular the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the European Union” in addition to various political actors, representatives of Afghan civil society and representatives of international NGOs.

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181 NATO (2008), undisclosed internal document.
182 Ibid.
184 The Senior Civilian Representative website available at http://www.nato.int/issues/scr_afghanistan/index.html.
Appendix VI:
Figure 2: Percentages of Hungarian deployments in NATO and EU missions 2007-2008

According to MAGYAR HONVÉDSÉG MŰVELETI KÖZPONT, 8 June 2007.
http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok
Appendix VII:
Figure 3: Hungarian Defence Spending 2000-2009


187
Appendix VIII: Figure 4: EU/ESDP Missions as of December 2008

188 ISIS Europe – Chart and table of ESDP and EU missions December 2008 www.isis-europe.org
**Primary Sources**


Scholarly Sources


Toje, Asle. America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain, New York: Routledge, 2008.


