Searching for an Imperial Ideology: the Concept of Nationality in the Works of Count Uvarov and the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment, 1833-1849

By
Dmitry Mordvinov

Submitted to
Central European University
History Department

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Alexei Miller
Second Reader: Professor Alfred Rieber

Budapest, Hungary
2011
Statement of Copyright

Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.
Abstract

The present study explores the concept of Nationality, which was created by Count Uvarov, the Minister for Public Enlightenment in Russia from 1833 to 1849. This concept formed the crucial part of the doctrine of Official Nationality, which served as the state ideology in the late Russian Empire. The author assesses various approaches taken to interpret and historicise the concept and the Minister himself.

The author investigates the uses to which the concept of nationality was put in the governmental periodical publication, *The Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment*, and the writings of its author, Count Uvarov, and traces the developments that the concept has undergone from the initial stage in the issues of the Journal in the 1830s to 1840s. Furthermore, the author explores the implications of the concept, ranging from Russia's attitude towards Europe and the possibilities of a Russian *Sonderweg* to the problems of Russification in various imperial lands. The author asserts that while certain traits of the idea of nationality had undergone a process of solidification, it was the main unchanged characteristic of nationality, namely, its amorphousness, that enabled it to survive until the end of the Russian Empire.
Acknowledgements

The present work would have been impossible without the help and direction of my supervisor, Professor Alexei Miller, whose suggestions for improvement guided this study from its inception to its completion. I am also greatly indebted to my second reader, Professor Alfred Rieber, whose informed commentary made me discover various important dimensions of the researched problem. I also wish to express my gratitude to all CEU Faculty who have read this manuscript in parts or as a whole and have suggested ways in which the work could be perfected.

My deepest thanks should go to my dear friends in St. Petersburg, Evgeny Manzhurin and Elena Golod, without whose help and support my research in the archives would have been literally impossible. Last but not least, I wish to express my indebtedness to my family and friends, without whose support this work would never have materialised.
# Table of Contents

Introduction. Uvarov the Administrator, Uvarov the Ideologist: his Image in Selected Contemporary Historiography and Approaches to Recovering his Intentions ........................................ 1

The Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment in its context ........................................ 16

Chapter 1. Theoretical Approaches to the Question of Nationality .............................................. 20

  Begriffsgeschichte and Cambridge school of intellectual history ............................................. 21
  Official nationalism .................................................................................................................... 30
  Weltanschauungen .................................................................................................................... 34
  Ideology .................................................................................................................................... 37

Chapter 2. A Direct Discourse from the Government to the People: a Rationale for the Journal ........................................................................................................................................... 46

Chapter 3. The Concept of Nationality in the Journal in the 1830s ............................................. 57

  Nationality in literature: the theory ............................................................................................ 58
  History: the role of the nations .................................................................................................... 65
  Linguistics: musings on the Russian language .......................................................................... 73
  Law: political and national ........................................................................................................ 74
  Philosophy: the reflective nationality ...................................................................................... 76

Chapter 4. Uvarov in 1843. Nationality as the Driving Force of Reforms ..................................... 80

Chapter 5. The Concept of Nationality in the Journal in 1840s .................................................... 97

  A rejected view of nationality: an unsuccessful attempt to influence the debate ................. 107

Chapter 6. Instead of an Epilogue: Uvarov's Fall from Power .................................................... 115

Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 119

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 124
Introduction. Uvarov the Administrator, Uvarov the Ideologist: his Image in Selected Contemporary Historiography and Approaches to Recovering his Intentions

The present research deals with the concept of nationality (narodnost’), which was, as a matter of fact, the key element of the famous formula of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.” The formula, which later came to be known as the doctrine of Official Nationality, was introduced by the Minister for Public Enlightenment Count Uvarov. A novelty for its own time, the concept of nationality was not clearly defined then and has remained subject of scholarly debate and interpretation ever since. It seems that famous words that Augustine uttered about the nature of time – “if no one asks me, I know what it is, if I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know”\(^1\) – can be readily applied for the concept of nationality. The present work undertakes to offer a contribution in the understanding of this intriguing concept, using sources that stem directly from the author of the idea, Count Uvarov, or from publications close to him, most importantly, the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment. Let us proceed by firstly looking at the figure of the imperial ideologue who stood behind the formula's introduction.

Count Sergei Uvarov is, without any doubt, one of the most interesting, important and, perhaps, misunderstood characters in Nicholaevan Russia. His achievements are enormous, his personal traits of character questionable, his deep beliefs and convictions obscure, his motivating thoughts not readily understandable. There is often an air of incredulity toward his sincerity in scholarship – sometimes hidden, sometimes overt, and yet he was the one who had to quit his government post twice, paying the price for his convictions. Famous Russian historian Sergei Soloviev famously claimed that in the person of Uvarov, “abilities of the heart never resonated with the abilities of mind [...] when you

talked to him, his brilliant conversation was mirrored by his pride and vainglory,” and more famously and more uncompromisingly still, he asserted that Uvarov “came up with [...] Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality: Orthodoxy being a godless, not believing in Christ even in the Protestant fashion, Autocracy being a liberal, and Nationality not having read a single Russian book in his whole life and writing only in French or German.” While this statement will not withstand analytical scrutiny, it definitely serves to indicate the extent of complexity of Uvarov's character.

Let us proceed from looking at the factual material. Sergei Uvarov was born in 1786 and died in 1855, the same year that Nicholas I, the tsar with whose name his own became deeply associated. His academic and administrative career was relatively fast, although bumpy. Having received (a norm of the day) home education from a certain French abbot, Uvarov started to climb the diplomatic ladder. The years from 1806 to 1810 saw Uvarov at various posts at Russian embassies both in Vienna and in Paris. This was an experience that to a very large extent formed Uvarov the person: both in the sense of acquaintances, friends and (perceived) teachers he acquired there – ranging from Goethe to Stein to Madame de Stael. On these missions Uvarov drank deeply from the wellspring of European culture; above all, Uvarov had always remained a truly European Renaissance man.

He was for some time involved with the Arzamas literary circle (and for the rest of his life he was keen on organising meetings and disputations), but it soon became evident that his

---


3 Although having preserved warm feelings towards his first teacher, Uvarov was later perplexed as to why “fugitives,” who were fleeing from the atrocities of the French revolution, “were all of a sudden entrusted with the upbringing of the whole high society in Russia.” Quoted in Maksim Shevchenko, “Sergei Semenovich Uvarov,” in Rossiiskii konservatory [Russian conservatives] (Moscow: Russkiy Mir, 1997), 96. Curiously (and perhaps ironically), the pattern would re-appear in the twentieth century: the children of the Spanish civil war, who were transported to the Soviet Union in significant numbers, had nothing they could do except to teach Spanish, which was often the only thing they knew. The boom in Spanish language teaching in the Soviet Union evident in the second half of the 20th century is explained by this fact.
career was not meant to be literary, but rather scholarly and administrative. As early as 1811 he was made a honorary member of Imperial St.Petersburg Academy of Science (its name varied over time), and he became its president in 1818. He was the supervisor of St. Petersburg educational district from 1810 until 1822.

However, his personal scientific career is of minor interest for the purposes of this work. True, Uvarov always saw himself not lastly as a scholar: having spent some eight years studying Classics. Uvarov became a kind of European luminary on the issue; many remarked on his outstanding scholarly abilities; his diplomas, certificates of recognition and the like number more than a hundred.⁴

However, what matters more is his administrative path. He became deputy minister for Public Enlightenment (the term of the day for contemporary ministries of education) in 1832 and minister in 1833. He left the post that only in 1849, thus becoming one of the longest serving ministers of the Empire.

Count Uvarov started with significant reforms right away. He is justly regarded as one of the most important ministers to have brought the most to the educational system (especially in the field of school system and curricula), and yet he was even more important as an imperial official. He, as was mentioned above, created the famous tripartite formula of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality," which would be the governing principle of late imperial Russian polity (or, in any case, at least its most prominent banner). The formula, later labelled "Official Nationality" by A. N. Pypin,⁵ proved to be a conundrum: as time passed, it became more and more evident that it was not immediately clear what exactly was meant by words glued together. While the meaning of concepts of Orthodoxy and Autocracy was more or less

---

⁴ Ibid., 98.
clear (although Uvarov's argumentation for their usage is more complicated than it seems from the first glance), the concept of nationality is a riddle indeed, and a one prone to misunderstandings.

It is possible to think about Count Uvarov in two ways, which are distinct and yet overlap. Firstly, it is possible to understand Uvarov as an apt statesman, a reformer who elevated education and science in the Russian Empire to the new heights. It is also possible to view him as an ideologist of the empire, a man responsible for the creation of a totally new system of relationship between the tsar, his Empire and his subjects. These two approaches do not need to be strictly separated (obviously enough, they were present in a single person), and yet scholars at times have chosen to put more or less emphasis on this or that side of the Minister.

Let us perform, in a manner of preliminary analysis of scholarly literature on the problem, a comparison of two – sometimes converging, sometimes diverging – such views on Uvarov and his program: Maksim Shevchenko's already mentioned contribution to a Russian-language collection dedicated to Russian conservatives from the late eighteenth to early twentieth century, and Andrey Zorin's interpretation of Uvarov's formula.

Shevchenko mainly sees Uvarov as a statesman, and his narrative is a Bildungsroman of an administrator. Building his case on Uvarov's diaries from the 1806-1810 period, Shevchenko argues that the Minister was relatively soon disillusioned by the perceived lack of finesse in the European peoples (he quotes Uvarov as writing “panem et circenses (bread and games) - this is the common cry of all the so-called civilised peoples”). Moreover, he

7 Andrey Zorin, “Zavetaniia traida [The sacred triad],” in Kormia dvuglavogo orla: literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII - pervoi treti XIX veka [Feeding the two-headed eagle: literature and state ideology in Russia in the last third of the XVIII - the first third of the XIX centuries] (Moscow: NLO, 2001), 337-374.
argues that Uvarov's early reception of Romanticism implied a perceived break in the cultural development of European peoples, which would later explain his policies specifically devised for the Russian soil, for instance, Uvarov's insistence that although the education of new generations should be European in spirit, they still had to “know the Russian better and in Russian.”

Indeed, there is much to be said in favour of this approach. Uvarov's claim for administrative prominence started as early as 1810 with his Projet d' une Académie Asiatique. This was a project of an institution that should have been dealing with Oriental Studies of every kind. The project was welcomed by Goethe and noticed by Count Alexei Razumovsky, brother of Uvarov's Viennese superior and at the time Minister of Public Enlightenment. In 1811 Uvarov married the daughter of the minister (significantly older than he was, although he apparently was a faithful and loyal husband), and, unsurprisingly, soon became the superintendent of St. Petersburg educational district. This was a real test for Uvarov, since the district of Imperial capital was in almost every sense the most important in the whole Empire.

In this capacity he reformed (and largely created anew) the old Main Pedagogical Institute into St. Petersburg University, having established there teaching of Eastern languages and literatures (which thrives to this day), reformed the curricula of many levels of education. It is clear that he already possessed a kind of synoptic ideological vision in doing these reforms. For instance, he insisted on the importance of history as a formative subject to be mastered by citizens and society at large: “in public education teaching of history is a state affair […] history forms citizens who know their rights and responsibilities, judges who know the value of justice, soldiers dying for their Fatherland, able nobles, kind and stern tsars.”

9 “Luchshe znalo Russkoie i po-Russki.” Quoted in Ibid., 107.
He wanted to see Russia an integrated part of the European concert: according to him, Russia was “the youngest son in a numerous European family.”

Shevchenko is keen on seeing, and justifiably so, Uvarov's first tenure under Alexander I (the period to which pertains his famous speech of 1818 in the solemn meeting of the Main Pedagogical Institute; the one for which, according to witty Grech, he would have later imprisoned himself) as the liberal one followed by a conservative turn. Soon the liberal tsar Alexander gave way to the theosophic Alexander and the rise of the dual Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Enlightenment, with Alexander Golitsyn, once a freethinker turned Christian mystic, at its head and infamous Magnitsky as its prominent member. An imminent conflict led to Uvarov's resignation in July 1821. This opposition, as Uvarov would later claim, turned out to be beneficial: the future emperor Nicholas allegedly took his side.

However, the tumultuous events of the 1825-1830 changed Uvarov profoundly. As he saw the situation, once again the intellectually perverted heirs of the French revolution were at play, and once again the divine right of the kings was shattered. Early 1830s saw Bourbon's fall from power in France, as well as the Polish rebellion, effectively negating the possibilities of liberal and frictionless incorporation of the Polish territory and elites into the imperial body politic. This is, of course, not to mention the Decembrist uprising that marked the ominous start of Nicholas’ reign.

Uvarov's aim – and most probably a sincere one – was to avert or at least to postpone the European developments that he regarded as harmful in the Russian Empire: “It is important to prolong [Russia's] youth and in the meanwhile to educate her. Here's my

---

12 Quoted in Ibid., 100.
13 This lecture, being very explicit, is all too often taken as the most clear exposition of Uvarov's ideas or, indeed, ideology (this is the approach Cynthia Whittaker takes in her “The Ideology of Sergei Uvarov: An Interpretive Essay,” Russian Review 37, no. 2 (April 1978): 158-176.) While there is certainly some validity to this interpretation, it has to be always taken only with caution: Uvarov's views, as well as the circumstances in which he had to work, changed drastically during his second tenure. 
political system [...] If I can put Russia fifty years away from what theories say awaits her, than I will have fulfilled my obligations and will die peacefully.”

Shevchenko's portrait of Uvarov depicts, first and foremost, Uvarov the administrator, the reformer of educational system on the imperial scale. He is keen on psychological explanations, and Uvarov's proverbial ambitiousness (bordering on the level of vainglory) all too often serves for Shevchenko as a moving cause of Uvarov's reforms: “exceptional ambitiousness awakened in him not only exceptional vanity, but also initiative, decisiveness and commitment of a statesman.”

Dealing with the tripartite formula, Maksim Shevchenko introduces one more document into the mainstream circulation: Uvarov's report directly to Nicholas from November 19, 1833. This is an important achievement: interpreting the famous formula has always been a daunting task for historians, not lastly because of the scarcity of the available sources that address the problem directly.

In this document Uvarov explains his vision of modernising the Empire while preserving its essence. In his own words, “How do we create a system of public education in accordance with our ways and not foreign to European spirit? How are we to approach European Enlightenment, European ideas, without which we can no longer live, but which, if not taken care of properly, threaten us with imminent death?” The answer given in the document is a somewhat more elaborate exposition of the Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality triad. Without paying much attention to the fact that Uvarov does not mention Orthodoxy specifically and refers only to “the belief of the ancestors,” Shevchenko claims, that, according to Uvarov, “Orthodoxy is the most basic and important [feature] for Russia.” This

15 Quoted in Ibid., 105.
16 Ibid., 98.
17 All too many rely on two texts penned by Uvarov: his revision report of the Moscow educational district of 1832 and the jubilee report “Ten years of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment, 1833-1843.”
19 Ibid.
seems to be an exaggeration: although “the belief of the ancestors” in Russian conditions happened to be Orthodoxy, if it had been, for instance, Lutheranism, Uvarov would have defended the latter: it was not the particular belief system that was important, but the mere fact of keeping tradition of the belief system, and having one in first place. Nor was it, perhaps, the most important feature: it was a precondition of stability and at the same time of development, but not their inner core. Autocracy, according to Uvarov, “is the main condition of political existence of Russia.” Shevchenko leaves otherwise a very telling Uvarov's statement without a comment: “the Russian colossus stands on autocracy as on the cornerstone; a hand touching the base makes the whole state shake. This truth is felt by countless number of Russians; they feel it fully […] This truth should be present and developed in Public Education.” Apparently, Shevchenko holds this quote to imply the overarching importance of autocracy as the basis of Russian society; however, this, being true in itself, ignores an important contradiction inherent in the statement: Uvarov on the one hand emphasises the very fragility of the Russian state and, on the other hand, stresses the idea that this fragility should be frankly admitted (as it is already understood by a vast amount of Russian citizens) and employed as a guiding principle of education.

Shevchenko grasps the essential problem with the concept of nationality when he says that “the concept of nationality was left rather ambiguous. Apparently, Uvarov never strove to set its boundaries of meaning precisely.” Shevchenko does not have much more to say about this element, and this silence is telling: it shows how really complicated a definition or at least a description are for this concept. Shevchenko argues that the way to approach it lies in

---

20 Quoted in Ibid.
21 Quoted in Ibid.
22 Alexei Miller has made a similar point. “Another question is more difficult to answer: what, from Uvarov’s point of view, did he need to do first of all in order to change the unstable, ‘fragile’ state of the Empire (which he called a colossus—it seems he barely resisted adding ‘with feet of clay’)?” Miller, “Official nationality”? A Reassessment of Count Sergei Uvarov’s Triad in the Context of Nationalism Politics,” 142.
the field of practice, which seems to be a viable approach. However, in Shevchenko's main source Uvarov himself never describes practical measures at all, claiming that such an exposition would become an elaborate book, something that is not his intention.24

One clue to the practice of nationality is to be found in the activities that the Count performed to foster education and science, and in particular in connection with journalism. Indeed, creating quality journalism in Russia was one of Uvarov's long-term aims during his tenure as minister, and he took this task more than seriously. Not only did he create (better put, re-established) his own Journal of The Ministry of Public Enlightenment,25 he also helped establish Moskvitianin, a literary journal edited by Mikhail Pogodin. (As an aside, it has to be said that Shevchenko makes a factual mistake regarding the Journal: he claims that the editor from the inception was Alexander Nikitenko,26 while in fact it was Konstantin Serbinovitch.27 Nikitenko only became editor in 1856.)28 Uvarov was hoping that Moskvitianin would provide another example of the kind of journalism the Empire needed: he proudly presented the first issue to the tsar and defended the whole enterprise afterwards. However, Pogodin did not stand up to the task of editing the journal: alienating important writers, he could not even secure a steady reading base, and the circulation plummeted sharply.29 The Telegraf affair30 brings to mind a more problematic journal enterprise that happened during Uvarov's tenure and was an important milestone in his career.

The forties signalled the new troubled period for Uvarov, and towards the end of the decade his power grew less and less significant. He had earned many enemies in the

24 Ibid., 107.
25 Hereafter simply the Journal.
27 Collection 1661, bundle 1, item 245, p. 2-3 (1833), RGIA.
28 The Journal, issue 89, part 1, p. 40 (1856).
30 See Richard Tempest, “Madman or Criminal: Government Attitudes to Petr Chaadaev in 1836,” Slavic Review 43, no. 2 (Summer 1984): 281-287, (accessed March 16, 2010). This affair, as well as other events that eventually led to Uvarov's resignation, is also discussed in brief in the last chapter of this study.
government, and an argument with field marshal Paskevitch – then the Polish governor general who used to intrude into the affairs of the Warsaw educational district, and an imprudent remark that followed and was heard by Paskevitch and Nicholas I made his position in the eyes of the emperor even shakier.\(^\text{31}\)

The 1847-49 period proved to be fatal for Uvarov. In the late 1847, the affair of the so-called “Society of St. Cyril and Methodius” broke out.\(^\text{32}\) The revolutions that were happening in the European countries brought back the old fears of unrest in the Russian Empire. Indeed, it seemed that the same process was at play: the year 1849 saw the “uncovering” of the circle of Butashevich-Petashevsky. Orlov, the head of the Third Section, reported that Sovremennik and Otechestveny Zapiski, the leading Russian publications of the time, contained dangerous materials. An investigative commission was formed, and the censure of the ministry was found deficient.\(^\text{33}\)

All this combined was a direct blow to Uvarov, and a very strong one. He tried to defend his actions and his censors and later tried to accommodate to ensuing complications, but in vain. When he was finally struck by paralysis, he resigned. While retired (although he kept some other posts), Uvarov wrote memoirs, which can be viewed as another important source (although, perhaps, the most biased, as all the memoirs inevitably tend to be) on his ideas. For instance, there he wrote that “the principle to which I constantly adhered was to struggle for development of the political through the development of the moral and through the intellectual conviction that the civil emancipation can come only from intellectual emancipation, which will unite in mutual solidarity the power of the country and the power of the government; this [was my] principle, which functions slowly – almost in silence, without

\(^{31}\) Shevchenko, “Sergei Semenovich Uvarov,” 119-120.
\(^{33}\) Shevchenko, “Sergei Semenovich Uvarov,” 123.
the masses knowing. And also the slogan, with which my innermost convictions concur”\textsuperscript{34} (meaning Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.) From the same memoirs it is evident that Uvarov took pride in the people towards whom he extended his protection. Thus, he told Granovsky, one of the most popular professors of the time, in a letter dating from 1950 that “if my ruling of the ministry had not had any other results, then I would consider giving you and some of your contemporaries the chair an important personal achievement.”\textsuperscript{35}

While Shevchenko analyses Uvarov mainly in terms of the latter being first and foremost an imperial minister and a conservative reformer, Andrey Zorin, by way of contrast, views Uvarov as primarily an imperial ideologue. Zorin calls Uvarov's policies “a new phase of active ideological construction,”\textsuperscript{36} and he seems to be right in doing so. Zorin presents a convincing case for the need of a substantial ideological re-orientation for the monarchy: the interventionist thrust of the Holy Alliance was apparently all but extinguished, and the Polish uprising made the monarch look more attentively to the internal challenges to the monarchy. The tsar sensed the need to change something in the way the polity was operating, and clearly needed an ideological basis that would underscore new policies. Uvarov, in Zorin's view, provided precisely that.

Zorin's main source on peculiarities of Uvarov's ideology – as fas as those can be ascertained – is Count's report to Nicholas I, entitled “On some general principles that could be used as guidance for ruling the Ministry for Public Enlightenment,” made publicly available by Maksim Shevchenko.\textsuperscript{37} The report was submitted to Nicholas I on November 19, 1933; however, the original French draft, located at the main Uvarov's archival collections at

\begin{footnotes}
\item[34] Quoted in Ibid., 130.
\item[35] Quoted in Ibid.
\item[36] Andrey Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla: literatura i gosudarstvennaiia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII - pervoi treti XIX veka [Feeding the two-headed eagle: literature and state ideology in Russia in the last third of the XVIII - the first third of the XIX centuries] (Moscow: NLO, 2001), 339.
\end{footnotes}
OPI GIM, is dated by March 1932, and it contains the first mentioning of the triad.

Uvarov indeed was thinking big and planning on the large scale, as is evident from the document. Uvarov discarded the ideological proceedings of the monarchy under Alexander I as “administrative Saint-Simonism,” pointing to utopian grandeur of Alexander's plans. It is clear that in so describing the previous rule (in which he played a considerable part) Uvarov was pointing in a radically different direction, and, what is more important, he was hinting at an overarching ideological construction, not a one-time policy.

The only person mentioned in the document is François Guizot, a major political figure in France from 1830 until 1848 (and also serving as a minister of education from 1832 to 1837), and this mentioning is crucial for understanding Uvarov's intentions and ideological views (Guizot's translated works would significantly appear in the first issues of the Journal). Guizot would start his journal Annales de l'éducation in 1811, the year when Uvarov first entered the Ministry for Public Enlightenment. In 1816 Guizot published an influential treatise, Du gouvernement représentatif et de l'etat actuel de la France, in which he expressed his views on the matters of representative government. This work would resonate with Uvarov's own ideas, not least because of its emphasis on the role of educational institutions in guiding a nation's development. The ideological affinities between the two

---

38 Collection 17, bundle 1, item 98, 16-22, OPI GIM.
39 Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla, 343.
40 Ibid., 344-345.
41 And also the originator of the famous quote “not to be a republican at twenty is proof of want of heart; to be one at thirty is proof of want of head,” which was reworked countless times and attributed to scores of people. Interestingly, the “republican” part was changed at will according to one's political stance. Clemenceau, for instance, had a “socialist.” Fred Shapiro, ed., The Yale book of quotations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 327.
42 Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla, 347.
also had career consequences: both were dismissed from their posts due to too liberal a stance in 1821. In 1828 Guizot would publish his lecture course *Histoire de la civilisation en Europe*, and two years later *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, in which he put forth his views concerning the development of human civilisation; the first issue of the *Journal* would contain Guizot's introductory lecture to his *Histoire de la civilisation en Europe*.

However, Uvarov's treatment of Guizot's terminology is instructive. The main Guizot's term, *civilisation*, is translated both as a “civilisation” (*tsivilizatsiia*) and with an ambiguous formula of *grazhdanskoе obrazovanie*, which would, as Zigmunt Bauman pointed out, bear more semblances to German concept of *Bildung*, towards which Uvarov was more than sympathetic.\(^{44}\) In what was for Guizot a single development, Uvarov found a worthy and a condemnable side: he heavily criticised the “civilisation” in his memorandum, which would come to be associated with aspects of European culture unworthy or harmful to Russia.

What is also instructive is that Guizot's remarks on the universality of French culture and literature consistently earn editorial criticism, which likely comes from Uvarov himself. Against a universalising *francophonie* Uvarov pits a “German” view of Europe as composed of different national cultures, and it is through this connection that the German romanticism is linked to Uvarov's triad.\(^{45}\) The Germans led the charge against the francophone claim to universality. A particular influence on Uvarov, Friedrich Schlegel, one of the most influential German romantics, published his *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* in 1808. The charge of the work was, as it were, to claim a superiority of Indian culture to the European one. The corollaries were easy to see: it was not necessary for a culture to be autochthonous to European soil proper in order to be superior to another one. It was a way out from the one-sided European (or, rather, French) domination. Uvarov, as Zorin asserts, deeply cherished

\[^{45}\] Ibid., 350-352.
the idea, which possessed political overtones to him from the start: he spread the word about the book and the book itself (a copy was sent to Karamzin) and later oversaw the development of Eastern studies in St. Petersburg. Uvarov would tell Speransky nine years later that promoting Eastern languages would help spread correct notions about Asia and would be “a new source of national politics, which would save us from a premature decrepitude and from European contagion;” Schlegel would express his sympathetic feelings towards the idea (as it has been shown earlier, he was not alone in such an assessment.)

Uvarov's correspondence with Stein, as Zorin asserts, shows Uvarov as almost a German nationalist, longing for the principle of Nationalität to triumph in Germany and Austria. However, the political developments in Europe, culminating in the revolutions of 1830s, made the adherents of the ancien régime turn even more conservative; in this situation Uvarov could only look to Russia with his projects of nation-building. The problem was that Russia lacked the widespread knowledge of Nationalität; however, this was a solvable problem.

Zorin insists, and quite justifiably so, on the idea that ideology, and especially Uvarov's ideology was exempt from the laws of logic: “having defined Orthodoxy and autocracy through nationality, Uvarov now defines nationality through Orthodoxy and autocracy. Formal logic calls this figure a vicious circle, but ideology is constructed according to qualitatively different laws, and a risky rhetorical pirouette becomes the carrier of the whole construction of the new official doctrine.”

While Maxim Shevchenko pointed out that Uvarov, in essence, rephrased the old

47 Quoted in Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla, 353.
48 Ibid., 359.
49 Ibid., 366.
battle call “For the Faith, for the King, for the Fatherland,” Zorin asserts that the re-framing was ideologically essential. Instead of concrete realities and people whose mentioning was meant to lead soldiers into battle abstract ideas came into play, and on the basis of these abstract ideas the new official doctrine should arise.

Zorin convincingly and vividly depicts the conceptual evolution that Uvarov underwent: from his insistence that studying the Orient will ward off the dangerous European ideas in 1810s to the conviction that the youth should be encouraged to study Russia's history and literature, where the source of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and nationality is to be found. The dangers were always the same, the way to salvation was different.

Zorin concludes by stating that the inherent intellectual drama of Uvarov's official nationality was due to the fact that he, having been forced to operate with essentially European concepts and ideas, was forced to ascribe contradictory and paradoxical meanings to them. Uvarov defined Orthodoxy and autocracy as building blocks of nationality, while the nationality proper was meant to undermine, if not to completely abolish, these institutions. Having been caught between the rock of modernising the empire and the hard place of preserving the status quo of the monarchy, Uvarov created the famous formula, which served as the state ideology for perhaps more time than it could do so, making its inherent contradictions more and more salient as decades went by.

It has been shown that one possible approach, taken by Maksim Shevchenko, is to emphasise Uvarov the administrator, and the other one, employed by Andrey Zorin, is to concentrate on Uvarov the ideologist. In light of these two approaches, it seems that the following method dialectically combining them can be proposed: it seems to be possible to recover Uvarov's intentions (including both ideologically-motivated and administrative) by

50 Shevchenko, “Sergei Semenovich Uvarov,” 105.
51 Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla, 372.
52 Ibid., 374.
looking at the documents where he exposed himself both as an ideologue and an administrator, describing mere practices and their ideological underpinnings at the same time. They need not necessarily be directly authored by him: firstly, Uvarov did not author that much. Secondly, the texts he did create by himself were the ones directly intended to extol or defend his positions and actions and were normally addressed to Nicholas I, his superior, and, therefore, required the best of his cunning and persuasion and are thus less clear for distilling his intentions and meanings. Such documents can be found in the archives of the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education* in St.Petersburg. The *Journal* was one of Uvarov's cherished children, and he left (or at least oversaw) instructions and rules that were to govern the editing and publishing of the *Journal*. In these documents we can see both Uvarov the administrator – reforming and creating what he saw fit for the Empire – and Uvarov the ideologist, who provided this or that explanation of his actions and opinions.

*The Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment in its context*

Yet, before examining the contents of the *Journal*, it is important to situate it in its purely journalistic context, at least in brief. Of particular interest to the investigated problem is the role that the periodical press played in the Russian Empire of Nicholas I. It is important to grasp the sway that publications held over populace, or at least, the noble and the educated part of it.

The literary or, as they came to be called, “thick” journals constituted a phenomenon of highest importance in the social, political and cultural life of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. The journals provided venues to discuss burning matters and were, for almost a complete absence of other forms of political action, the most daring form of societal self-reflection.

While the culture of thick journals originated in Russia in the eighteenth century (and
Russian journalism dates even from the seventeenth century, it was the ensuing one that could be dubbed the thick journal century. It would be erroneous to think that subject matter of these publications consisted mostly of politics: the journals were centred around literary production; however, no matter of importance escaped a discussion in the journals – provided, it is, that it still lay within the borders of the admissible.

The intensity of the journal life might be judged from the fact that the period from 1825 to 1835 was dubbed by a researcher “the Journal Wars” (in which Count Uvarov played his part). The same time frame saw a rapid succession of literary genres from classicism to sentimentalism to romanticism, combined with a multitude of forms of production of literary output ranging from patronage to salons to rising professionals of the trade. Only salons and student associations numbered four hundred in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The era also saw a radical change in the journal production, which became commercially viable and thus reader-oriented. The developments of the journal culture from the 1800s to the 1840s are aptly summarised by William Mills Todd as the way from “school archives of pupils' essays” (Viazemsky) to a statement of Belinsky worth quoting in full: “the journal has now swallowed up our entire literature [...] the public doesn't want books, it wants journals, and in the journals they publish whole plays and novels, and each issue [...] weighs forty pounds.”

It seemed all the familiar names of the first half of the nineteenth century were in the journal or at least newspaper trade. Karamzin published *The Messenger of Europe*, Pushkin

---


56 Ibid., 38.
The Contemporary, Delvig (with Pushkin) The Literary Gazette, Polevoi The Moscow Telegraph and so on. Of course, because of the oversupply of titles and a small forming demand for the journals many of them were short-lived. A readership of a thousand and a life span over ten years were certainly a success.\(^5^7\) It was precisely into this booming and yet unformed culture of the thick journals that the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment came.

The periodic press was an important vehicle for the government to communicate certain messages to its subjects. Richard Wortman's analysis conclusively shows how the dynastic and national myth of Nicholas I was spread throughout the Empire with the countless publications relating the imperial stories and disseminating the same Romantic discourses of organic unity of the tsar and the people and almost religious feelings of umilienie and vostorg (tenderness and exaltation), coupled with submission, that were experienced by the people who saw the tsar. For instance, the publications like Severnaya Pchela, Russkii Invalid, and the illustrated journal Russkiy Khudozhestvennyi Listok “brought knowledge about Nicholas's family and court to a broader reading public.” The influence of the printed words was so important that the government started providing financial assistance to Severnaya Pchela.\(^5^8\)

Many researchers describe a notorious rise in literary and journalistic output of the reign of Nicholas I, especially during its second half. As Riasanovsky has it, “Russian culture, literature in particular, blossomed out in new splendour which offered infinitely more to the reader than the trite and vulgar pages of The Northern Bee and The Reader's Library.”\(^5^9\)

\(^5^7\) For instance, The Messenger of Europe could boast with 1200 subscribers and survived for twenty-eight years. Ibid., 37, 48.


\(^5^9\) Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 268. The Northern Bee, published by Bulgarin and Grech, was almost an unofficial organ of the Third Section of the Imperial Chancellery, with all the relevant consequences concerning the style and its materials. The Reader's Library, in many ways a pioneering enterprise, also had a conservative
Moreover, there exists a larger journalistic context for the ideas of Official Nationality *per se*. The doctrine was discussed not only in the main governmental publication, but also in private journals of varying inclinations. For instance, Riasanovsky's choice of periodicals for tracing intellectual development of Official Nationality encompasses eight publications, ranging from the far-Right proto-nationalist *Mayak Sovremennogo Prosveshcheniya i Obrazovannosti* (The Lighthouse of Contemporary Education and Enlightenment), which published literary contributions by and described technical innovation of “simple Russian peasants,” to the already mentioned Bulgarin's and Grech's *Severnaya Pchela* (*The Northern Bee*), to more conservative and yet still “nationalist wing of Official Nationality” found in Pogodin's *Mosvitianin* (*The Muscovite*), which was endorsed by Uvarov, to, finally, Uvarov's own *The Journal of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment.*

---


60 Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia, 1825-1855, 274-275.
Chapter 1. Theoretical Approaches to the Question of Nationality

The principal goal of this study is to understand what “nationality” in famous Count Uvarov’s triad of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” is and what transformations has it undergone during Uvarov’s tenure as the Minister for Public Enlightenment. This task implies that “nationality” should be placed in its historical context: that is, its meaning, significance and policy implications can only be understood when it is properly surrounded by relevant facts and data. “Nationality,” indeed, has to be contextualised, and its contextualisation inevitably means placing it within a relevant theoretical field.

Many theoretical approaches can be used for this task: for instance, of highest value are the Cambridge-style history of ideas, Begriffsgeschichte, history of ideology and Weltanschauungen, theories of “official nationalism” and, finally, history of transfers. Of course, such a task as undertaken in this study can be performed with completely different and yet related sets of theoretical coordinates in mind. These might include (but not be limited to) studies of discourse, as defined in the work of Teun van Dijk, reader-response theory of literary analysis (with its special emphasis on Erwartungshorizont, the horizon of reader's expectations), and Gramsci's theory of organic intellectuals. While the present work is done within the framework of history of ideas, the major approaches described here inform the limits (and limitations) of the employed methodology. Moreover, although these approaches will not be explored in depth, some remarks on their possible application are in


order. Thus, the aim of the present chapter is to circumscribe various theoretical approaches with which the topic of my research can be addressed and to assess their particular utility for the present purposes. The chapter also looks at how these approaches were employed in already existing scholarship on the topic.

**Begriffsgeschichte and Cambridge school of intellectual history**

As “nationality” is, first and foremost, a concept, it seems to be logical to start the theoretical discussion with *Begriffsgeschichte* and Cambridge school of intellectual history. As Reinhart Koselleck points out, “*Begriffsgeschichte* is [...] initially a specialised method for source criticism, taking note as it does of the utilization of terminology relevant to social and political elements, and directing itself in particular to the analysis of central expressions having social or political content.”\(^{64}\) However, its usages, in fact, reach much further than simply a method of source criticism. It was used to criticise, on the one hand, anachronistic transfers of current meanings of concepts to their past usage and, on the other hand, history of ideas (especially in the form as practised, for instance, by Arthur Lovejoy)\(^{65}\) for its proclivity to treat ideas as constants.\(^{66}\)

Reinhart Koselleck made a case for connecting *Begriffsgeschichte*, which is seemingly primarily concerned with texts, with the “outer world.” Koselleck points out that “without common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political field of action.”\(^{67}\) This means that in order to promote a certain political action, one must refer to the existing cultural sphere full of established and challenged meanings and symbols. This field connects the concepts – in the present case, that of nationality – with political action.

---


\(^{66}\) Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History,” 81.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., 76.
Begriffsgeschichte enlightens us on precisely how and when “the semantic struggle for the definition of political or social position” is fought and shows how concepts “no longer serve merely to define given states of affairs, but reach into the future.” It is precisely this outreach that provides the concepts with their power and makes them objects for struggle: to control the definition of the concept would mean, at least on a certain level, to control the future. This theoretical insight helps explain why the battle over the meanings and implications of “nationality” was fought in the nineteenth-century Russia.

Thus, Begriffsgeschichte provides historians with a fundamentally diachronical, changing over time understanding of the concepts we are working with. This is helpful in the present case: many writers more correctly than not would assume that the doctrine of “Official Nationality” was the ideological underpinning of imperial Russia from the moment of its inception until the fall of the monarchy. Some, more given to over-generalising, would even assume that it essentially constituted the ethos of the Romanov Empire even before it was formulated. However, it can be easily shown the the “nature” of the “ideology of autocracy” was radically different in the reigns, for instance, of Nicholas I and Alexander III, although both might have availed themselves of essentially the same slogans and terms. Begriffsgeschichte helps us to trace and pinpoint the difference and change, for it concerns itself with “persistence, change, and novelty,” viewed from a diachronical perspective.

Kosselleck thus sums up one of his central points: “the method of Begriffsgeschichte is a conditio sine qua non of sociohistorical questions.” While taking heed of this dictum, let us explore other approaches to Begriffsgeschichte.

Melvin Richter has done outstanding work in promoting the research programme of

68 Ibid., 80.
69 An example of this approach is a recent book by Peter Waldron, Governing Tsarist Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), esp. 15-34.
70 Kosselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History,” 84.
71 Ibid., 89.
Begriffsgeschichte in the English-speaking world. His numerous articles on the subject were edited and published in an influential book, _The history of political and social concepts: a critical introduction._ Particularly important for the purposes of this work is his chapter entitled “Pocock, Skinner, and Begriffsgeschichte,” which is an elaborated version of his article published in _History and Theory_. The latter contains a telling part of the title that was dropped for some reason in the book: “Reconstructing the history of political languages.” In this chapter Richter provides important points of comparison between the so-called “Cambridge school of intellectual history” and Begriffsgeschichte, which are worth inquiring into here.

Richter points out that, notwithstanding some terminological discrepancies, the concerns of the Cambridge school and Begriffsgeschichte are fundamentally the same: they insist on historical treatment of political thought, paying a special attention to the vocabularies and meanings attached to it used by agents in given contexts (although Pocock claims to work with “discourses” and Skinner with “ideologies.”)

Pocock professes to analyse any kind of public utterance in general “involving an element of theory and carried on in a variety of contexts with which it can be connected in a variety of ways.” This approach, Pocock assumes, enables historians to treat intellectual activity in the way that brings light to the political and social changes it effectuated. It also enables Pocock to spell out the linguistic constraints on the conceptualisation of fields of political meanings and, thus, action. Throughout his work Pocock described various

---

75 Richter, “Pocock, Skinner, and Begriffsgeschichte,” 124.
“languages” (although he gave them at times different names, of which “discourses” seem to be the most recent one), which helped conceptualise important political works of the early modern period. These languages provided, so to speak, shape and constrains for political thought; and conflict between various languages conditioned and guided large political and philosophical movements (for instance, the Scottish Enlightenment, in Pocock's view, was conditioned by the conflict of the language of civic humanism and that of natural jurisprudence.) Writers, Pocock affirms, avail themselves of various political languages available at a given time, and often traces and influences of more than one political language can be found in a single text. However, what precisely Pococks lacks and Begriffsgeschichte can provide is the connections between linguistically-oriented descriptions of political languages and particular social and political agency. By isolating certain key concepts and tracing their developments, Begriffsgeschichte allows us to understand social and political change mediated and partly conditioned by Pocock-style defined political languages.

Skinner's version of intellectual history is more philosophically and linguistically oriented. He claims to base his methodology on J.L. Austin's theory of speech acts. In Skinner's view, any utterances are to be understood from an intentionalist standpoint: every utterance is conditioned by a certain communicative intention, which means that by a given utterance a given set of goals was meant to be achieved. Moreover, utterances do not exist in a void: they are related to pre-existing conventions, which they dialectically modify by accepting, rejecting or ignoring them. As James Tully contends (and Melvin Richter fully agrees), this approach allows Skinner (and presumably anyone following him) to first, recover author's intentions in a given historical context; second, to allow for authorial intentions to weigh at least as much as outside forces and, thirdly, to assess the originality of

77 Richter, “Pocock, Skinner, and Begriffsgeschichte,” 127.
78 Ibid., 128.
79 Ibid., 130.
a given contribution (originality understood as a degree of breaking with the existing convention).\textsuperscript{80}

Skinner also talks about “ideologies,” which are neutral for him. Skinner applies this term to any sets of commonly held principles and ideas translatable into linguistic practices; it is important to keep this in mind for the discussion of “ideology” that would come further.

Richter contends that Skinner's research programme can be enriched and made more precise by the methodology of \textit{Begriffsgeschichte}, which will allow to measure more or less precisely to what extent a given author or a given work succeeded (or failed to do so) in shifting the commonly held linguistic conventions.\textsuperscript{81}

In developing his research methodology, Skinner criticises Arthur Lovejoy's insistence upon writing a history of an idea: “the notion that any fixed 'idea' has persisted is spurious.”\textsuperscript{82} Concepts for Skinner are to be understood in Heideggerian fashion as weapons or in Witgensteinian one as tools;\textsuperscript{83} but they cannot be in the centre of our attention. From this standpoint Skinner once concluded that no authentic history of concepts can ever be done, for “there can only be histories of their uses in argument.”\textsuperscript{84} Do we have to take him at his word here? Hardly so. It seems that while attacking fundamentally ahistorical narratives that neglect agency and explanation,\textsuperscript{85} Skinner is ready to throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. It seems, moreover, that \textit{Begriffsgeschichte} with its insistence on diachronic approach to concepts provides a way out of this perceived stalemate.

Pointing out how methodologies of \textit{Begriffsgeschichte} can inform Pocock and


\textsuperscript{81} Richter, “Pocock, Skinner, and Begriffsgeschichte,” 131-132.


\textsuperscript{83} See his contribution in Pocock, Skinner, and Collini, “What is Intellectual History?”.


\textsuperscript{85} Richter, “Pocock, Skinner, and Begriffsgeschichte,” 135.
Skinner's approaches, Richter asserts that, their (meta)theoretical assumptions notwithstanding, both in their practice are in fact inclined to treat “changes and continuities in their conceptual repertoires,” and both at times overlook the disagreements upon contested meanings of contested concepts;\textsuperscript{86} in both instances the approach of \textit{Begriffsgeschichte} would prove helpful.

At bottom, Richter asserts, the approaches are best understood in a complimentary fashion. There is nothing substantial in the German and Anglophone approaches that would prevent bringing them together or at least closer to each other. Pocock and Skinner, using different techniques, provided an enlightening analysis of functions of political idioms available in given contexts.\textsuperscript{87} They both refuted ahistorical treatment of historical artefacts and strove to elucidate the meanings ascribed to them in given contexts, which in no way contradicts the research agenda of \textit{Begriffsgeschichte}.

It remains to say that Melvin Richter is a partisan in the debates on how history should be written; the last chapter in his book is tellingly called “‘By the sufferance of wise men’: a call for a history of political and social concepts in English.”\textsuperscript{88} Even though the concept of nationality has an unmistakeable German flavour of \textit{Natonalität}, its history in English would benefit from the approaches advocated by Richter.

An interesting and new take on intellectual history and history of ideas comes from philosopher and intellectual historian Mark Bevir, whose major critique of the Cambridge school history of ideas is entitled \textit{The logic of the history of ideas}.\textsuperscript{89} In this work Bevir contends that, although some – “strong” – tenets of the Cambridge school cannot be upheld due to various philosophical and logical considerations, what he calls “weak” intentionalism

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 136.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 137-138.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Richter, The history of political and social concepts: a critical introduction, 143.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Mark Bevir, The logic of the history of ideas (Cambridge U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
\end{footnotes}
can still be employed and justified. In a short piece he contributed to the recent volume *Practicing history: new directions in historical writing after the linguistic turn*, Mark Bevir concisely describes his positive contribution to the field, which is worth exploring.

Mark Bevir contends that the linguistic turn brought to life the situation in which historians realised that they are, so to speak, trapped within the texts (broadly understood), as there is, in Derrida's famous coinage, nothing outside the text. This would imply that historians can never reach out to facts, objects and intentions of the outer world, since they cannot transgress the all-encompassing boundaries of the text. Obviously enough, such a proposition cries out for a solution, for otherwise the practice of history writing would be no different from that of literary analysis (this is not to neglect the fact that the affinities between the two are at times overwhelming).

What Bevir proposes in this situation is a kind of a compromise. He contends that we have to admit that “pure” experiences, reasons and intentions on which to securely ground our knowledge and ideas are unavailable to us. Moreover, the same goes for the theory-ladenness of historical practice: historians addressing texts have at least some prior idea or theory about this text, and for that reason it is impossible to speak of a pristine and unmarred perception of any form of historical data.

How, then, are we able to invoke objects and intentions outside texts? Bevir's answer is a somewhat complicated philosophical one, but it is worth restating. It can be argued that through practices of our everyday life, we populate the world with general classes of physical objects (such as food), objects that acquire significance through inter-subjective agreement

---

91 “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte” in the original, which, for the unusualness of its grammatical structure, can hardly be properly rendered into English – or any other language for that matter. Originally found in Derrida's most influential – and most complicated text, *Of Grammatology*. Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 227.
92 Bevir, “How to be an Intentionalist,” 164.
93 Ibid., 164-165.
(money) and intentional states (hunger). This, however, only proves the reality of “outside-the-text” objects and intentional states in general, and not the presence or absence of, say, a particular intention of a person in a given text.94 However, *ascripting* (as opposed to impossible retrieving) of a certain set of beliefs and intentions to a given actor can be *justified*: historians can appeal to the fact that the proposed set of beliefs best explains or makes most sense of the available evidence.95

Mark Bevir goes on to describe his interpretation of what he calls “procedural individualism, or weak intentionalism” - the idea that “intentional states, notably beliefs, are the general class of object that give meaning to texts.”96 Weak intentionalism, as opposed to the “strong” one, implies that meanings, first of all, are only specific meanings for specific minds of specific individuals. This entails “procedural individualism,” which is a normative principle stating that “when historians claim a text meant such and such, they should be able to specify for whom it did so, whether author or reader.”97 This means that meanings are not to be found inherent in texts but, on the contrary, ascribed to texts by their authors and readers.

Bevir further makes an important distinction between expressed and actual beliefs: “actual beliefs are those individuals hold and act upon. Expressed beliefs are those they want to convey by saying what they do.”98 How do we distinguish between the two, if the text is our prison? Bevir contends that here we have to take account of the holistic nature of historical exercise: we deduce evidence for discrepancies between these two kinds of beliefs from a large set of broadly understood texts.99 Hence, historians deduce the actual beliefs and intentions of a certain actor by justifying the most probable set of actual beliefs as the set that

94 Ibid., 165-166.
95 Ibid., 166.
96 Ibid., 167.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 168.
99 Ibid., 168-169.
makes the most sense of the whole array of texts on the basis of which we perform deductive reasoning.

In short, what makes a meaning historical is the fact that it is ascribed to a certain individual, and not to a text in itself, in the past, and this meaning consists of a set of expressed beliefs, “which might or might not be in accord with the actual beliefs of the individual concerned.”¹⁰⁰ To distinguish between these meanings and ascribe them is what constitutes creative interpretative work of an historian.

These considerations are obviously pertinent to our case at hand. Given that Uvarov was never himself explicit on the subject of nationality, not to speak about a strict definition, which he never gave, he was also heavily constrained in his existing writing by his position and the fact that he was reporting directly to his superior, tsar Nicholas I. This allows us to and pushes us towards a rather critical stance on Uvarov's actual writings – and towards a heavier emphasis on justificatory practices we need to deploy in order to understand the Minister's intentions in promoting “nationality.” Procedural individualism seems to be especially important in this regard, for, as it will be shown, nationality indeed meant different things for different authors. Its meaning was never steady, so to speak: the constant flux of time and change in readers and writers brought new understandings and meanings, which are to be accounted for and never conflated in one, “general” meaning.

The distinction between actual and expressed beliefs is also helpful when applied to understanding of Uvarov and nationality based on the holistic approach to sources. On the one hand we have, generally speaking, the reports that Uvarov sent directly to the tsar, and on the other hand, the materials in the Journal which were subject to editing process (not to mention the fact that their mere appearance on the pages of the Journal constituted a kind of arbitrary, albeit telling, choice in itself). It seems to be reasonable to expect more inclination

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 169.
towards expressed beliefs in the first group of sources and the actual beliefs in the second. However, a caveat needs to be put here: these distinctions between beliefs are normative in character; when applied to real-life sources, they constitute a continuum, not isolated pure phenomena. Therefore, it would be incorrect to ascribe to a certain source in its fullness the quality of expressing purely actual or purely expressed belief; rather, we must look at sources as containing various proportions of both.

**Official nationalism**

Another fruitful approach to our question is offered by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work on nationalism, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. One of the book's vivid chapters is entitled “Official Nationalism and Imperialism” and is concerned with precisely the kind of nationality-oriented thinking that can be applied to the case at hand. In this chapter, Anderson engages in a bird-eye overview of nineteenth-century empires in order to trace how they tried to address nationalism, the new and pressing issue of the time. In so doing, he borrows the concept of “official nationalism” from Hugh Seton-Watson, who pioneered the term in 1977 in his famous work *Nations and states: an enquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism*. The definition he gives to the phenomenon is that of “a doctrine which […] overshadowed, or indeed replaced, the principle of dynastic loyalty as the basis of legitimacy of government.” The main examples on which Seton-Watson builds his case are the Magyarisation of Hungary after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 and Russification of the Russian Empire under Alexander III and Nicholas II. However, as Anderson points out, in so doing Seton-Watson does injustice to other European empires, for all have been caught in the same stream.

103Anderson, Imagined Communities, 86.
Anderson reminds the reader that the ruling dynasties of Romanovs, Habsburgs, Hanoverians and others were presiding over vast multi-ethnic spaces. The administrative needs made the dynasties choose this or that language as the state official, but the European lexicographic revolution subverted this decision: the chosen language was no longer neutral, simply convenient or “inherited.” It was an expression for preference for one ethnolinguistic group and consequently downplayed the importance, factual and symbolic, of others. Thus, a certain language in an empire started to play two roles: “universal-imperial” and “particular-national.” This brought forth a reflexive “realisation,” or, rather, a self-identification with the group in possession of the imperial language: in this fashion, Romanovs discovered that they were Great Russians. This, however, undermined the sacral element of kingship: the tsar was now one of many of the same kind, a Great Russian among others, and thus rather representing them than presiding over them by the force of divine sanction. This process of recognising their own nationality Anderson aptly brands “the 'naturalisations' of Europe’s dynasties.” Thus, official nationalism, the “willed merger of nation and dynastic empire,” as Anderson calls it, develops only as a reaction to national movements which made themselves more and more acutely felt in Europe starting from the 1820s.

Anderson reminds us that Uvarov was not a lone imperial educator figure in the European landscape: he compares the Russian minister with Thomas Babington Macaulay, whose activities included promoting English-style education in India. While the actual value and difficulties in comparison of these educators are not explored in the present study, it seems to be methodologically enlightening to keep in mind the general character of high office promoters of “official nationalism.” The non-European case in point, which is also

104Ibid., 83.
105Ibid., 84-85.
106Ibid., 85.
107Ibid., 86.
108Ibid.
mentioned by Anderson, was Rama VI, Vajiravudh, who, with the aim of introducing Siamese official nationalism, stood Uvarovian formula on its head, inventing the slogan “Chat, Sasana, Kasat” (Nation, Religion, Monarch).^{109}

It has to be noted that Anderson is somewhat imprecise in one crucial aspect of his treatment of Uvarov. He renders “nationality” as “natsionalnost’” in Russian,^{110} while in fact it was “narodnost’.”^{111} The mistake is crucial for, as we shall see, narodnost, and not natsionalnost, was introduced largely due to the desire to keep the term natsia, a nation, away from the political discourse precisely because of its undesirable political undertones, which narod did not possess.^{112} He is also simplistic in understanding the formula: for him, nationality meant essentially Russification, and it is because of this – incorrect, at least for Uvarov himself – premise that he arrives to the conclusion that “for another half-century Czarism resisted Uvarovian enticements. It was not until the reign of Alexander III (1881-94) that Russification became official dynastic policy.”^{113} While that is undoubtedly true with regards to Russification, the issue of “nationality,” and especially in the way that it was understood by Uvarov, requires a more cautious reading.

It has to be stated also that Anderson makes no distinction between “official nationalisms” and imposing domination of a certain ethno-linguistic group. Due to lack of

---


^{110}Anderson, Imagined Communities, 87.


^{112}See Alexei Miller, “Priobretenie neobkhodimoie, no ne vpolne udobnoe: transfer poniatia natsia v Rossiiu (nachalo XVIII - seredina XIX vekov) [a necessary, but not entirely opportune acquisition: the transfer of the concept of nation to Russia (beginning of XVIII - mid-XIX centuries)],” in Imperium inter pares: rol’ transferov v istorii Rossiskoj imperii (1700-1917) [Imperium inter pares: The role of transfers in the history of the Russian Empire (1700-1917), ed. Martin Aust, Ricarda Vulpius, and Alexei Miller (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010).

^{113}Anderson, Imagined Communities, 87.
such a distinction, Anderson lumps the Magyarisation of Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy after 1875 together with Russian, Japanese and Siamese examples. It seems, however, that a peculiar state of Austro-Hungary after the Ausgleich of 1867 put the whole empire into a separate niche. Can Magyarisation promoted in a part of empire be equated with Uvarov’s all-imperial call? Hardly so.

The idea of developing nationalisms in the cores of empires is further developed by Alexei Miller and Stefan Berger.\textsuperscript{114} The authors believe that the empires create nation-states from within: they describe “imaging of imperial cores as national territories.”\textsuperscript{115} They use the term “nationalising empires”\textsuperscript{116} to describe the states caught in this process. The authors contend that “the circle that empires had to square in the nineteenth century was how to keep control over a maximum of territory and population while at the same time accommodating the forces of nationalism and economic and political modernisation in a highly competitive environment.”\textsuperscript{117} Fusing the perspectives offered by Seton-Watson, Anderson and Berger and Miller, it can be argued that, theoretically, “official nationalisms” were precisely such an attempt. Berger and Miller rightly assert that national historical narratives were meant to claim various imperial territories into the imaged “national territory.”\textsuperscript{118} This definitely rings true for the case of Uvarov, who sponsored, protected and promoted certain history textbooks and their authors.\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., 317.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., 318.
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., 319.
\textsuperscript{119}Ustrialov is one of the most important such authors. He was awarded the prize for the best Russian history textbook in 1837 and was singled out for the highest praise in Uvarov’s report of 1843. See Miller, “‘Official nationality’? A Reassessment of Count Sergei Uvarov’s Triad in the Context of Nationalism Politics,” 145. This theme is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
\end{flushleft}
One of the most authoritative scholars of the period, Andrzej Walicki, has explicitly alluded to Weltanschauungen and the work of sociologist Karl Mannheim in his work on thinkers of nineteenth-century Russia. Hence, it is worth exploring this theoretical direction in order to see how it can inform the present essay.

Although Walicki did not direct much of his attention to Uvarov and his ideas, his two major works in Russian intellectual history, *The Slavophile Controversy* and *A History of Russian Thought*, explore the usability of Mannheimian distinctions applied to Russian thinkers. Therefore, it is worth asking whether Walicki’s research programme can be extended to include Count Uvarov.

Walicki starts by stating that his basic research unit is *Weltanschauung*, a social in origin view of the world, which he defines as “the phenomenon of collective consciousness.” *Weltanschauungen* can be characterised by their identifiable homogeneity and structural unity.

Walicki is interesting in his treating of Mannheim’s received legacy. He criticises Mannheim’s “distinction between the ‘delusive’ function of ideology and the ‘debunking’ function of utopia” on the grounds that those are ideal types, and real-life practices show both these functions intertwined. *Weltanschauungen* and utopias are comprehensive, while ideologies are not, asserts Walicki, limiting ideologies to “certain political and social opinions.” Ideologies contain elements of Weltanschauungen, but they need not be total and comprehensive. Utopias, on the other hand, are specific forms of Weltanschauungen, total in

---

123 Ibid., 5.
their nature.\textsuperscript{124}

Walicki further singles out conservatism as a specific historical Weltanschauung, which he defines as “a certain thought-style antagonistic to bourgeois liberalism and the rationalistic-individualistic philosophy of the Enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{125} Walicki identifies Russian Slavophiles as representatives of a classic version of conservative Weltanschauung, namely, conservative romanticism.\textsuperscript{126} In doing so, Walicki insists on the indispensability of placing any ideology under investigation “within a specific development continuum,”\textsuperscript{127} which means relating it to the surrounding context of ideas.

In his enlightening analysis of Slavophiles and Westernisers Walicki makes an important for the present work observation. He stresses that while it has been customary to see those two intellectual currents in an opposition, it is important to understand that the system, in fact, was not bipolar but triangular: both systems had to react to Uvarov's official nationality and the latter had to take account of the two. Moreover, this was the age, Walicki writes, “which defined ideological divisions in terms of attitudes to 'Western values',” thus reminding us of the fourth element of reference.\textsuperscript{128}

Walicki also points to a certain important aspect of the Uvarov's triad. While affirming the conscious opposition to the revolutionary trinity of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” Walicki also notes another important and less visible opposition, namely, to Karamzin's program. While the latter would accept the first two elements of the Minister's formula, the third one, nationality, which implied a more direct relationship of the autocracy to the people, ran contrary to the famous writer's ideals. Karamzin interpreted Montesquieu's concept of “mediation” as implying a claim of nobility to perform precisely the mediating function

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{124}Ibid., 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{125}Ibid., 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{128}Ibid., 63.
\end{itemize}
within the Empire between the tsar and his people, while Uvarov put more emphasis on the role of educated bureaucracy within the state. Walicki sees in Uvarov's nationality as an attempt to secure the Empire against a social evolution by offering societal promotion through education to an enriched spectrum of subjects, ideally, all belonging to a nation. Thus, Walicki interprets Uvarov's state ideology formulated for the regime of Nicholas I as a kind of modernised conservatism, the one which excluded any claim of special privileges of nobility when it came to running the state. To Walicki's mind, nothing illustrates this system of promotion better than the rise of Mikhail Pogodin, a “son of a serf,” who defended autocracy “on the grounds that it was a system in which 'a man of the people has access to the highest state office and a university diploma replaces all privileges'.” Pogodin, who was a supporter of the Official Nationality program, represented the break with the intellectual tradition advocating noble political privileges.

Walicki to a large extent neglects Uvarov in his analysis of the “Official Nationality.” His main sources are writings of Pogodin and Shevyriev. Both names are connected with an influential thick journal The Muscovite (Moskvitianin): the journal was edited by Pogodin with a close collaboration of Shevyriev in 1841-1856. Judging from their contributions, Walicki identifies the key elements of the Official Nationality as interpreting Russia's historical development in terms different from Western histories and therefore “authentic.”

Russia evolution was subject to its own laws, and national writers and scholars were to

---

130To put it more sharply, Uvarov consciously implemented a program of bureaucratisation of the nobility, which Karamzin would never have supported.
131Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, 46.
132Ibid., 47.
understand them.\textsuperscript{134} Coupled with this intellectuals like Pogodin and Shevyriev saw a notorious decline in many aspects of the Western civilisation, most importantly, a spiritual one. It is important to observe two things here: firstly, this is the reason why the doctrine of Official Nationality was erroneously equated with the teachings of Slavophiles. Walicki’s contribution and methodology are important in dispelling this misconception about the nature of the formula (most notably, Plekhanov held such a view).\textsuperscript{135} Secondly, in this respect these writers differed from Uvarov, whose writings would suggest a political crisis of the Western world, but definitely not a cultural one.

\textit{Ideology}

Closely connected to Walicki’s approach are studies of ideology, which can also allow for important insights into Uvarov’s thinking. Zygmunt Bauman was certainly right when he said that, although words have their fate – \textit{habent sua fata verba} – “some words have a fate more bizarre than others. The word “ideology” sets, however, a record which is difficult to beat. Finding a common denominator to the sharply different historical uses of the term […] is a notoriously tall order.”\textsuperscript{136} It is true that due to an almost infinite multitude of meanings that people have ascribed to the notion of ideology, to define the term precisely is an impossible task. However, ideology is real and drives and motivates people and shapes social conventions. What is needed in this situation is to try to find a common denominator which will be helpful for the purposes of the present work. It may well be that some of the productive meanings associated with the concept of ideology will be discarded in the process. However, this seems to be a reasonable price to pay for carving a workable understanding of

\textsuperscript{134}This is a reminiscence of Pogodin the university professor by the future Slavophile Samarin. Nikolai Barsukov, Zhizn i trudy M.P. Pogodina [The life and works of M. P. Pogodin] (St. Petersburg, 1904), vol. 4, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{135}Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, 49-50.
Bauman affirms that the word “ideology,” meaning “sciences of ideas,” was coined towards the end of the eighteenth century by a certain Destutt de Tracy, whose French Institut National was meant, so to speak, to provide consultative functions to the enlightened rulers on how to most rationally organise the society. Ideology was meant to perform watchdog functions on other human activities, for, as Institut's thinkers in full accordance with the Enlightenment spirit contended, everything humans get to know is rationally formed in their minds and become ideas. Thus, ideology was meant to correct any abuses and deviations in human reasoning. However, as Bauman astutely notices, in practical terms this translated into the crucial importance of ideologists who were to become “builders and stewards of an enlightened society.” According to Bauman, the crucial shift came with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who in their – though unpublished at the time of its writing – German Ideology abandoned the meaning of the term 'ideology' as 'science of ideas' in favour of its understanding in the sense of ideas proclaimed by “ideologists,” and the objective became subjective. Moreover, ideologists were accused of incorrectly understanding the means of bringing the Enlightenment societal ideal to life: it was not the ideas that were to be changed, but the human reality “which has given and goes on giving birth to false ideas.”

The concept of ideology resurfaced in the 1920s, and with a meaning quite radically different from what it was supposed to mean etymologically. The growing discrepancy between Enlightenment hopes and ideals and the “rising tide of irrationality” needed to be explained, and the notion of ideology offered an explanation, together with “another legitimation for the changed role claimed by the enlightened elite.” It was Karl Mannheim

---

137 Ibid., 109-110.
138 Ibid., 110.
139 Ibid., 111-112.
140 Ibid., 116.
who would become the prophet of this new understanding of ideology.

Mannheim, as Baumann asserts, elaborated his vision of ideology having been influenced by Lukacs's notion of “false consciousness,” initially created to explain the fact that Western working class did not behave in the way Marx had predicted it would. Thus, according to Lukacs, as proletariat would stay in error if left to its own devices, it needed to be guided by enlighteners. What Mannheim did was to generalise from this principle.

Karl Mannheim, in his seminal work *Ideology and Utopia*, first published in German in 1929 and in English in 1936, provides, as its title suggests, important distinctions between the two. Mannheim points out that the ultimately based in Marx's writing distinction between ideology and social science, where the latter was meant to dispel the former, does not stand scrutiny; everyone is subject to some form of ideological conditioning.

Bauman asserts that what has gained credibility today is the “positive concept of ideology,” one which breaks with its Enlightenment heritage. In this reading, which is highly reminiscent of Geertz's position, “ideology” is a cognitive frame which in itself is a precondition of any cognitive process in the sense that it allows for a possibility of creating meaningful patterns from unconnected pieces of information.

Bauman rightly contends that “all ideologies were born of non-acceptance of the status quo, and above all from disbelief in reality's own capacity for rectification. All ideologies were born as projects to be actively and concertedly implemented – even when they projected the future (which they envisaged) into the past (which they imagined) and

---

141Ibid.
144“The function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful,” “ideologies [...] render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them.” (emphasis mine.) Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a cultural system,” in The interpretation of cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 218-220.
portrayed the novelty as a return, and the reform as a restoration.”145 This elucidation seems especially highly pertinent to Uvarov's case: he was an obvious and conscious reformer, yet he insisted on the quasi-eternal state of affairs which he was merely reaffirming and thus restoring with his formula.

Bauman further concerns himself with the implications that the changes of late modern (or, in his terminology, “liquid modern,” or rather simply postmodern) world brought to the field of ideology. Most notably, he contends that contemporary ideology might be understood as an “ideology without a project,” which is an oxymoron from a classical point of view, and that the ultimate dilemma of the “positively” understood ideology is that there is no dilemma: if there is nothing outside ideologies, than all we can do is calmly describe them, *sine ira et studio.*146 He goes on to ponder whether the future society will be the one of “the end of ideology,” which might be understood as the society that stopped questioning itself.147 The thought is provoking, but it is high time we left Bauman's brilliant analysis and returned to ideology of classical modernity.

A relatively recent book on the subject was published in Russian in 2001 by Andrei Zorin, whose ideas have already been explored in the present study. The book is titles *Feeding the two-headed eagle: literature and state ideology in Russia in the last third of the XVIII - the first third of the XIX centuries.*148 The book is intended, first and foremost, to address the question of ideology of autocracy. Zorin's concerns and sources lie primarily in the field of cultural history, and, more precisely, literature of the era in question; however, his theoretical framework is of interest to the present study. Building his case on the ideas extolled by Karl Mannheim, as well as on post-Mannhemian thinking, Zorin affirms that

146Ibid., 125-126.
147Ibid., 126-127.
148Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla.
ideology is often understood in its opposition to “science,” the role of which is to dispel ideology's pretension on “objectively” interpreting past, present, and future, and unmask it when it tries to present itself as science, art or common sense.149 Moreover, following in Geertz's footsteps, Zorin stresses the idea that rhetorical figures of speech, which are so abundant in ideologically-oriented texts and which have at times been neglected out of a predisposition to treat them simply as tropes that enliven texts, are, in fact, the hard core of ideologies. This proposition is backed by linguists and philosophers, who insist on the primacy of the trope in language and social life.150 Through this broadened understanding of figures of speech, Zorin makes an important for his research agenda theoretical connection: namely, between literature and ideology. But how can this be translated into particular, namely, state ideologies? Zorin answers in the fashion that is already familiar: a state ideology can be viable if there can be found at least a minimal consensus on its basic metaphors.151

Zorin's theoretical apparatus raises a provocative question: can Uvarov's formula be understood as a trope, a metaphor? All things considered, the answer, perhaps, is no, but a caveat needs to be introduced here. It seems to be possible to substitute Zorin's “metaphors” for “concepts,” bringing the whole paradigm of Begriffsgeschichte into play with this substitution. In this light, the analysis of Uvarov's formula would be centred around a consensus – or a lack thereof – of basic concepts of state ideology. Formulated in this way, the research agenda seems to be fully legitimate.

A special place in the string of researchers of the ideology of the Official Nationality doctrine belongs to Nicholas Riasanovsky. His approach to the subject is overarching:

149Ibid., 18.
151Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla, 27.
equating the doctrine of Official Nationality with the pith and marrow of Nicholas's regime, Riasanovsky in his monumental classic *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855*\(^{152}\) talks about Nicholas himself, the men, ideas, home and even foreign policy related to this doctrine, although he acknowledges that “the Russia of Nicholas I was incomparably more complex and richer than Official Nationality.”\(^{153}\)

One of Riasanovsky's main achievements was in pointing out inconsistencies that had existed in scholarship that tried to explain Nicholas's politics in terms of “practical interest” and yet admitted to the extremely doctrinaire nature of the regime and tsar himself. Riasanovsky made ideology the central point of his study, and consistently explained people, deeds and ideas in terms of this ideology. Above all, Nicholas Riasanovsky was, perhaps, the first historian in the English-language scholarship who pointed to the fact that Official Nationality was “far from being mere propaganda or empty talk” and called for a more comprehensive examination of this complex phenomenon.\(^{154}\)

True, Riasanovsky's writing has become somewhat outdated in style and certain pronouncements. It is hardly conceivable that historians would take upon upon themselves a task to judge certain policies in terms of “ridiculousness and stupidity,”\(^{155}\) and, as it has been shown in literature, to identify Official Nationality as “an attempt, for three decades, to freeze growth and impose stagnation”\(^{156}\) would be plainly wrong. However, the great scholar's emphasis on the importance of the ideology of Official Nationality has proven to be a very rich and yielding approach.

Last but not least, a special place in scholarship of the ideology of the period belongs to Richard Wortman, whose monumental two-volume work *Scenarios of Power: Myth and

152Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia, 1825-1855.
153Ibid., vii.
154Ibid., 267.
155Ibid., 268.
156Ibid., 270.
"Ceremony in Russian Monarchy" has become a classic in its field. In this work, the researcher identifies certain discourse scenarios with which the Russian monarchy legitimised its rule. In particular, the reign of Nicholas I inaugurated a new, dynastic scenario. This was conditioned by many factors, in particular, the ongoing process of desacralisation of monarchies, which was logically followed by a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of some. This, in turn, led to the monarchies turning to the idea of the nation in search for a new one.\textsuperscript{157} In a sense, European monarchs became more mortal than they had been before, which could be understood as bringing the equality of the French revolution more admissible to traditional polities.

For Nicholas I, as Wortman claims, the dynasty equalled “historical destinies of the Russian state and the Russian people.”\textsuperscript{158} Wortman, in almost a Freudian turn, finds the source of such a transformation in the imperial family, more precisely, in the role that the dowager empress Maria Fedorovna played in order to introduce this scenario.\textsuperscript{159}

Wortman's methodology allows us to see the reign of Nicholas I as transformative in the history of the Empire, as he transferred the “image of loving husband and caring father”\textsuperscript{160} to the whole nation. The dynastic scenario also introduced a continuity between the reigns as an element to be emphasised (in particular, in ascension manifestos) ever since. The eighteenth-century monarchy, on the other hand, emphasised complete breaks between the reigns.\textsuperscript{161}

Wortman identifies the Decembrist rebellion as the first event that forced Nicholas to fashion his polity and legitimacy as distinctly Russian, or rather, distinct from European ones,

\textsuperscript{157} As it has been shown, Benedict Anderson has also made a similar claim; he is followed in that by Eric Hobsbawm, who dubbed the whole process “a supplementary 'national' foundation.” Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 84.
\textsuperscript{158}Ibid., 1:249.
\textsuperscript{159}Ibid., 1:247-254.
\textsuperscript{160}Ibid., 1:254.
\textsuperscript{161}Ibid., 1:267.
for it was whence all the revolutionary ideas that permeated and corrupted the nobility stemmed. The Russian Empire had to be shown different to the extent that the political revolutionary ideas could have no ground to implant themselves, and yet the other extreme of been seen as anti-European, Asiatic and/or barbarian was also to be avoided. Thus, Nicholas fashioned his triumph over the insurgents as “the triumph of the Russian national spirit.”

Wortman’s analysis validates many of Benedict Anderson’s claims; in particular, it conclusively shows how Nicholas’ coronation was the first “national” one. It was the first one to involve “the people” as an active agent of the procedure, and “the triple bow Nicholas made to the people from the Red Staircase on August 22, 1826, became […] a ceremony fixed in the tsarist repertoire, performed both at the coronation and during subsequent visits to Moscow. It came to be understood as an expression of the Russian national soul, displaying a bond between tsar and people that had existed since Muscovy.” By the end of the nineteenth century, affirms Wortman, the triple bow became to be imagined as “an ancient Russian custom.”

Obviously enough, the “Russian tsar” needed a Russian ideology, which was partly provided by his Minister, Count Uvarov. Wortman makes an important observation to the effect that the conception of Official Nationality sealed the break with the eighteenth-century tradition: while Catherine II insisted in her *Instruction* that Russia is first and foremost a European country, Nicholas’s reign would firstly emphasise Russian distinctiveness, and only later admit selective kinship between Russia and Europe.

Following in Riasanovsky’s footsteps, Wortman defines nationality as “the Russian

---

162Ibid., 1:266.
163Ibid., 1:280.
164Ibid., 1:292.
165 It has to be stated that Wortman is more interested in analysis of works of such exemplars of nationality as church architecture of Constantine Thon, the national anthem, “God Save the Tsar,” and “a national opera” *A Life for the Tsar*, written by Glinka.
166 Wortman, Scenarios of power: myth and ceremony in Russian monarchy. From Peter the Great to the death of Nicholas I, 1:380-381.
people's devotion to the tsar and the incomparable and unique power of that devotion.”¹⁶⁷ The practical offshoot of that was the idea that the unity and overall relationship of the Russian tsar with the Russian people was distinctive from the European one and therefore not subject to the same ills.

It has to be said that in many ways Wortman overstates the degree of perceived incommensurability of the Russian and European polities. To him, Nicholas's reign at the end of the day proved to be something of an exception to Russian dynastic standards, and Alexander II would revert to the more characteristic of the Russian Empire pattern of breaking with the previous reign.¹⁶⁸ His neglect of Uvarov in this respect partly explains this bias: in his analysis Wortman concentrated on the most prominent phenomena depicting the advent of the national in the imperial discourse. However, the other side of the coin – the unity with Europe was also present during the reign of Nicholas I, and it is all the more evident from the writings and deeds of count Uvarov. Nevertheless, Wortman's methodology and acute analysis allow us to see the national elements in the imperial myth and with this to understand the specificity of the concept of nationality.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., 1:381.  
¹⁶⁸Ibid., 1:417.
Chapter 2. A Direct Discourse from the Government to the People: a Rationale for the Journal

The intentions of the Ministry in general and Count Uvarov in particular in re-establishing the Journal can be uncovered on the basis of archival materials. In particular, a document (more precisely, a set of documents kept together) found in the collection of Konstantin Serbinovich, the first editor of the Journal, is very helpful in this respect. It dates from 1833 and is titled “The statute concerning creating the editing office of the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment, announcement about the continuation of the Journal and printed Rules for those collaborating in the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment.”\(^{169}\) It does not bear any particular signature, which allows us to suppose collective authorship in which the Minister himself most probably took part. Let us see what can be uncovered from this text.

The first section is meant to be for internal usage and deals with the minute procedural details of running the Journal. Two people were made responsible for, respectively, official and literary sections of the Journal (more precisely, they received materials sent to their respective parts; the editor was supposed to help with dubious materials of the literary section), and three people were supposed to review French, English and German magazines published abroad and at home. A separate set of reviewers was named to assess books in various fields. A special provision states that “sections 2, 4, 5, 6 are filled with articles submitted by professors or chosen from foreign magazines and newspapers. These are reviewed by the editor who in dubious cases reports to the Minister.” Moreover, the statute

\(^{169}\)“Положение об организации редакции ’Журнал Министерства Народного Просвещения’, объявление о возобновлении журнала и печатные ’Правила для участвующих в трудах ’Журнала Министерства Народного Просвещения’ [The statute concerning creating the editing office of the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment, announcement about the continuation of the Journal and printed ’Rules for those collaborating in the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment’]”, 1833, collection 1661, bundle 1, item 245, RGIA.
reserved the last word for Uvarov, who was to review the last printer's proof before publishing.\textsuperscript{170} These provisions, taken as a whole, can be seen as the key to success of the journal: engaging intellectuals from the outside and yet still under the governmental supervision done by the Minister, the \textit{Journal} was a live forum and could easily invite a dispute and provide answers when they were needed.

The importance of the \textit{Journal} can be seen from the fact that a special provision was written to ensure that out of the best prints the best copy should be submitted directly to the tsar and four to the imperial family (and one copy for the Minister himself).\textsuperscript{171} By this Uvarov clearly meant that his creation was to be the flagman of the Russian periodical print.

There also was financial incentive to contribute to the \textit{Journal}: every article specifically written and submitted to the \textit{Journal}, as well as \textit{ex officio} lectures by full professors published there were to be remunerated, on the basis of the size of a publication, with a generous sum of 50 to 200 roubles, while translations were to be “remunerated at discretion.”\textsuperscript{172}

The Ministry's original plans were grand. The announcement about the continuation of the \textit{Journal} stated that the official goal was to publish one edition every month, starting on January, 1, 1834\textsuperscript{173} (in the end, the \textit{Journal} printed four stable issues per year). Its contents were comprehensive: divided into six sections, the \textit{Journal} covered everything from the highest edicts concerning education and science in the Empire to minute events which had any kind of scientific connection. In particular, the first section, as is evident from its title “actions of Government” printed documents of legal nature coming from the tsar himself (the first subsection) or the Ministry (the second subsection.) The tsar typically signed nomination

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170}Ibid., 2-4.
\item \textsuperscript{171}Ibid., 4.
\item \textsuperscript{172}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{173}Ibid., 5.
\end{itemize}
to high offices, matters related to whole districts and universities, while the ministry concerned itself with matters of lesser importance.

The description of the intended second section, entitled “Humanities, sciences and arts” stated that the materials to be published there were to include “original and translated articles concerning religion, philosophy, law, moral teachings, pedagogy, history, literature, the tongue of the Fatherland (otechestvennogo yazyka) and other knowledge for common benefit (obshepoleznykh znaniy); reviews of history of different sciences and their contemporary state of art.” As it can be seen, this section was available for the broadest possible interpretation, and all the major contributions were submitted precisely to this section. All major contributions to the ideological debates were submitted here, and this is the reason why materials from this section form the main part for analysis undertaken in this work.

The third and the fourth section dealt, respectively, with institution of learning and science in Russia (the third section) and abroad (the fourth section). The fifth section, “history of enlightenment and civic education” was specifically dedicated to “the progress of enlightenment and civic education in developed countries and especially in Russia,” as well as to biographies of people “who excelled in this field.” Finally, the last, sixth section, entitled “news and miscellanea,” was filled with small notes concerning minor scholarly or educative events, publications, gatherings, findings and the like.

The very same document presents the “Rules for those engaging in the work of the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment.” From this interesting section we get to know precisely whom, how and on what grounds the Ministry wanted to engage in such a daring undertaking. The level of entry was high: materials from full university professors and

174 Ibid., 5-6.
175 Ibid., 6.
adjuncts were welcome, and especially so in the second and the fourth sections. The ministry encouraged contributions describing history and current status of various sciences with a special remark on “reviews of its [science's] contemporary status in Europe,” new discoveries and advancements in science. Clarity was an essential quality of an article, “without which a piece could not be published in the Journal.” The articles were to be written “in a contemporary spirit, and, to the extent that circumstances allow, described from all points of view that are being discovered in Europe.” Educators of lower levels were encouraged to send notes about interesting physical phenomena in their localities, found antiquities, news, etc. The items that were not judged fit for the Journal were either sent to other journals or returned to the author for improving.

After briefly mentioning financial matters (for instance, the price for an issue of thirtyroubles in St. Petersburg and thirty-five in every other city of the Empire), the documents moves on to its ideological component. The third section of the document under the title “Concerning the publishing of a journal at the Ministry of Public Enlightenment” starts with stating that, while the Ministry had always been publishing a journal under different names, after laying off of the last editor in 1829 no publication was printed. This, however, was a sour state of affairs, since a necessity for such a publication “cannot be doubted,” as we learn from subsequent lines. The reasons for this are as follows: first of all, since education in general and “mental activity” (umstvennaya deyatelnost’) stemming from the successes of public education, coupled with multiplying trade and political contacts with neighbouring states are booming, for which phenomenon the growing rate of book and journal trade has been a telling indicator, “reading of journals has become a necessity for everybody who does

176It is interesting to note a certain confusion in terms. The original text says “The Journal welcomes full professors and adjunct of universities and higher educational institutions” (the last three words stricken through). While this might be a simple mistake, it can also point to a confusion that arose out of different names for various institutions within the Russian educational system. Ibid.
177Ibid., 6-8.
not want to lag behind contemporaries in acquiring knowledge.”

Such a necessity, obvious for laypeople, was even more burning for the educating class who taught the youth, and especially so for those who performed their educative duties in remote corners of the Empire. Those people “can spend there ten or even twenty years and not only cannot they follow developments of Enlightenment, but even lag behind the level they used to have when they graduated from their educational establishments, and they form judgements on the spirit of the Government and deeds of their superiors only basing themselves on stories of travellers and false rumours.”

Even if these people read journals published by third private parties, they were likely to form erroneous opinions on the basis of articles not stemming directly from the Government. “A direct discourse from the Government to the People,” continues the article, “is more correct and pleasant for the latter.”

A new journal is compared to nothing less than *The Instruction*, a work by Catherine II, which, according to the document, “guided the way of every subject during the whole of [her] reign, firmly established direct relations between subjects and the authority, and both officials and private persons lived their lives according to it.”

Having established the highest continuity possible, the authors state that is clearly is the Ministry for Public Enlightenment that should be entrusted with a similar function, for its message will be directly communicated to the educators, who in turn will influence the youth in the “correct” spirit. A certain hierarchy of loyalty and trustworthiness is established: the infallible Government sends information down to the educators who

178 Ibid., 10.
179 Ibid., 10-11.
180 Ibid., 11.
181 Ibid., 11-12. The text that is evoked here is *The Instruction*, or *Nakaz*, a document that Catherine II penned in 1766-67 which was meant to be a guide for a Legislative Commission whose main task was to replace the outdated law code with a more modern one. This compilation of Montesquieu’s *L'esprit des lois*, ironically, had little practical value: neither a new legal code was created (although the introduction of certain new acts ensued) nor was the text read outside small circles in Moscow. Thus, the comparison is hardly factually correct, although this does not matter from the ideological point of view, which is more important here. See W. Garethjones, “The Spirit of the ‘Nakaz’: Catherine II’s Literary Debt to Montesquieu,” The Slavonic and East European Review 76, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 658-671.
“would not be led astray by outside publications,” who in turn would communicate the message to their pupils “who will always stay under the influence of their teachers.”

The document further defines what kind of “Enlightenment” the Ministry wants to spread in the Russian Empire with the help of the *Journal*: it was not about simply multiplying numbers of reading and thinking public, authors and readers. The correct Enlightenment is meant to “show [to each person] their present duties towards Heaven and their present place on earth, in the civil society.” This would be the Enlightenment that “without arousing the spirit of agitation would guide [the person] towards beneficial actions towards the common good and themselves, at the same time convincing them to be content with their lot.”

The chief task of the Ministry was seen as the need to spread such a version of the Enlightenment, while the “guidance of readers' minds” would be the Ministry's main weapon in performing this task. As is quite evident from this description, Uvarov's program broke away with many of the original tenets of Enlightenment, especially in its French version. However, this merger of the call for work for the common good with the Orthodox acceptance of one's fate and place, together with loyalty to the throne and the existing order can be seen valid as another special case for Enlightenment in a county where almost every enlightening effort came from above. Moreover, we see here an attempt to form a rather feasible compromise between the necessities of the moment, as Uvarov saw them, and the conditions *sine qua non* of autocracy: much of the preamble of the document is written in the spirit that can be characterised as a call to at least head a process that cannot be stopped.

The Ministry defended a proactive position: while the document acknowledges that the censure was also part of Ministry's duties, it also states that the censure “can only prohibit books and not instruct how and what to write.”

182 “Polozhenie ob organizatsii redaktsii...,” 12.
183 Ibid., 12-13.
submission to authority all slowly become shaky due to the workings of “more or less amoral people,” who, on the other hand, “are not lacking intellectual capabilities and who are all the more dangerous because of that.” The document urges to counter these malevolent beings and their “cunningly written articles […] not with persecution, but with convincing powers of reason; to counter a mind darkened with passions with a mind enlightened by the light of Religion, while the might of the highest power, employing a happy combination of mildness with sternness and mercy with justice will crush the strivings of the insolent. For will they ever find trust where people, touched, see on the throne their true Tsar, Father and Friend?”

All the elements of the famous triad are present here, although the triad itself is left unnamed and there is no special mentioning of nationality. However, the nation is present and it is its essential unity with the tsardom, enlightened by religion, which defines the correct enlightenment and is meant to save it from the malevolent and the cunning. Thus, the Journal would spread this specifically understood enlightenment, “dear to heart of every patriot,” and, providing accounts of the supposedly same processes going on in Europe, it would show “where Russia is equal to Europe, what is still left to borrow (for the light of sciences should be common for all nations), and in what […] foreign lands can envy her.” This is one more example of a pro-European stance of Uvarov, framed in words that would be officially acceptable.

A special emphasis is put on the person of the editor, since he is described as crucial for the whole enterprise. This office requires, as the document asserts, “an active person, reliable in thoughts, gifted with good taste and knowing the mother tongue perfectly […] the editor should read much himself and be able to divide the reading in between his subordinates, be in touch with writers and scientists, know how to collect everything

184Ibid., 13-14.
185Ibid., 14-15.
noteworthy and … instantly spot books that breathe with the interest of the times, but use them with caution and prudence.”186 It would be even better if the editor happened to be a writer himself, and preferably a recognisable one. It is clear form these passages that Uvarov expressed a desire to revert the tendency to write and think in foreign languages (mostly French and German), although it is unclear to which extent he himself practised what he preached. At any rate, it is evident that one of the Journal's objectives was to foster the development of scientific publications in Russian language.

In the following discussion about the materials that are to be accepted in the Journal certain points are salient. The way the religion-oriented publications were to be treated yet again confirms the suspicion that Uvarov looked upon religion in an instrumental way and used it accordingly.187 “[It is necessary],” claims the document, “in articles about religion, not entering into dogmatic discourses, to confine oneself to describing general duties of a Christian, feed and warm the heart and fill it with gratitude towards the creator,188 and with love and benevolence towards the humanity.”189 Among other notable provisions meant to boost the importance and competitive advantages of the Journal was the suggestion that the Ministry should use the right to publish acceptable places from prohibited books, not mentioning their titles and authors if needed; this was meant to give it an advantage over private journals.190

As it usually happens, the financial side of the matter was miscalculated, as is evident from later archival materials. Initially the project was supposed to be not only self-repaying

186Ibid., 17.
187See Miller, “‘Official nationality’? A Reassesment of Count Sergei Uvarov’s Triad in the Context of Nationalism Politics,” 141. This is not to remind the reader again about Soloviev's remark to the effect that Uvarov was a complete unbeliever.
188Spelt without a capital letter, which is even more strange in a text where almost every important concept or name is spelt with a capital and sometimes even using spacing and other means of typographic highlighting. A mistake that it might be, it is a telling one.
189“Polozhenie ob organizatsii redaktsii...,” 21.
190Ibid., 22.
but also profitable. As the *Journal* was supposed to replace other non-governmental newspapers and magazines for which educational institutions of all levels were buying a subscription, it was seen as logical to oblige district schools to buy one copy, provincial ones two, lyceums three and universities four. Thus, an overall obligatory circulation of seven hundred copies weighed against the “average magazine price nowadays” of forty roubles per year was supposed to yield 28000 roubles, while the expenses were supposed to be at the level of 10000 roubles. The rest was meant to be redistributed as remuneration: for instance, the first editor was to receive a generous sum of 3000 roubles.

The last passage of the document states, in a way of the last winning argument from the financial point of view, that such an undertaking whose goal is to direct minds and actions of empire's subjects in the correct way should be carried out even if the Government were to spend one or two hundred thousand roubles or even more on it. However, as it was supposed to cost nothing and the utility and necessity of such are project had been supposedly proven beyond any doubt, there was nothing to wait for. A pencil addition (without a signature but presumably from Uvarov himself) states “I understand it that the publishing should start from January, 1, 1834.”191 Which, as a matter of fact, happened: the first issue went out of print in January of that year.

A fairly liberal in spirit and pragmatical picture emerges from this document. Uvarov clearly does not want to rely on restrictive measures and censure but rather wants to guide the progressive development of “Enlightenment” as he sees it. In this, he is utterly practical, his arguments are convincing and a very long life of the *Journal* is the best proof of the correct thinking and planning behind it. What also emerges from this document is Uvarov's acknowledgement of the existing competition in the journal market; his practical side is at his best when he tries to imagine a proper niche for the *Journal*, an enterprise in which he

---

191Ibid., 23-29.
succeeded. Although the readership was not as broad as Uvarov had initially hoped and financial horizons not so bright, Uvarov was correct in essential planning. Thus, this document shows Uvarov from both his sides: the administrative and the ideological. We find here ideological formulations and definitions, ideologically important continuities and ideologically informed goals and at the same time clearly formulated ideas about how to achieve them.

It is possible to add a couple of practical remarks here. It should be stated that managing financial matters (up to the minute details, including buying paper for the Journal) would constitute a large part of the whole enterprise. Publishing a Journal, especially on such a big scale, turned out to be much less profitable activity that the Ministry had supposed. For instance, a document from 1839 entitled “Concerning cutting down the expenses of publishing the Journal” specifically proposes measures to make publishing of the Journal more profitable or at least more economical. The document describes the measures proposed to the Minister by the Department of Public Enlightenment, which the former accepted with only one characteristic exception: Uvarov refused to cut down the volume of issues. However, he agreed to reduce the number of appendices and maps that were printed alongside the Journal, as well as not to pay salary to the people not directly employed in the office but remunerate them according to the amount of their contributions.192

A brief look at another document shows how the copies of the Journal were distributed. In 1840, for instance, one thousand two hundred copies were printed, which were sold for thirty three roubles seventy-one kopecks in silver. Out of these copies a certain amount was distributed free of charge: two copies directly to the tsar and six to the imperial family; one copy went to Uvarov and one hundred and nine to “different persons with the

192“O sokrashchenii izderzhek po izdaniu Zhurnala [Concerning cutting down the expenses of publishing the Journal]”, 1839, collection 742, bundle 1, item 6, RGIA.
Minister's approval.” Provincial public libraries received forty copies, functionaries of the Ministry and workers of the editing office received forty-nine, and sixty-nine were exchanged for other periodical publications. The total number of copies given away gratis was two hundred seventy-six. The rest was sold: six hundred thirty-two were sold to the educational institutions directly related to the Ministry, three commissioners bought (and sold to private persons) thirty-four copies, and one hundred and seven people bought the subscription. At the moment when the document was written a certain bookshop possessed two hundred and one copy and eighteen were lost.193

193“O chisle razoslannykh ekzempliarov Zhurnala za 1840 god i ob upotreblennoi na izdaniie ego bumage [Concerning the number of sent copies of the Journal for the year 1840 and the paper that was used for it],” 1841, collection 742, bundle 1, item 10, RGIA.
Chapter 3. The Concept of Nationality in the Journal in the 1830s

The present chapter aims to look at various answers provided for the nationality question within the framework of public discussion found in the journal culture of the Empire. The assumption behind this choice of material is the following: we may gain a fuller understanding of his programme by examining the materials that were printed under his direct patronage and supervision. Indeed, by examining one sector of ongoing public debate – in this case the governmental one – we will gain a better understanding of a concept that was not static but, on the contrary, a contested one. By exploring the governmental-approved publications we will see what were the encouraged and discouraged components to this concept.

There is another important assumption behind the present chapter. I maintain that the borders of the vague concept of nationality were probed by publications in various fields; therefore, I examine contributions in literary criticism, history, law, linguistics and philosophy in order to understand which particular aspect of nationality they highlighted. I will also try to show that, while the discussions on the theoretical contents of nationality were conducted within the framework of literary criticism, other fields of inquiry used nationality as a justificatory device either for themselves or for the governing regime (or, in fact, both). This process, to my mind, was deeply rooted in and mediated by the reception of German Romanticism on the Russian soil. The contributors made heavy use of the Romantic ideas and terminology, which I will try to bring to light in the present chapter. Let us proceed to an analysis of the theoretical contributions to the debate on the nationality question without further ado.
Nationality in literature: the theory

The fact that the government took the task of promoting its view on nationality seriously is illustrated by the fact the the very first issue featured a number of articles of programmatic character that specifically addressed the question of nationality. The second section of the first issue of the Journal begins with an essay “On nationality in literature,” written by Petr Pletnev, who was the chair of literature in St. Petersburg University. Let us proceed with an analysis of this document.

It is obligatory to mention that it is no surprise that Pletnev occupies himself not with the question of nationality per se, but with its applications, that is, nationality in literature. This is easily explained in the context of Romantic thought. Romanticism as an ideology made it obligatory for a culture – and that is, a national culture, for this was a unit of history for Romantics – to play out its role on the world stage primarily through its national literature, which was to reflect particular features of nation's spirit, customs, ways of life, folk songs and the like. As an aside, one can mention that this was a point where Slavophiles and Westernisers agreed.194

What did Professor of St. Petersburg University (itself a beloved Uvarov's child) Pletnev had to say about nationality in literature in his elaboration read at a ceremonial meeting at that University? First, he had to establish the primacy of literature [slovesnost'] in the field of glorious manifestations of achievements of human spirit. Literature served as a means of transferring the cultural capital from one generation to another.195 Pletnev claimed that something elusive that his contemporaries actually demanded at the time from literature was in fact, nationality, which was to incorporate zillions of things to depict faithfully the

---

“physiognomy of our soul.” Characteristically, he claims that there is something new and “not yet settled” in the sounds of the word to the ears of his contemporaries. In an interesting justificatory move, however, Pletnev goes on to assert that only the word is new, but the idea was known even to the classics, for where, he asks, can there be more nationality, than in the works of ancient Greeks? Pletnev invites his listeners to strip the works of Greek writers from their peculiarities – various circumstances of the writers, that is – and the whole variety of names and titles will disappear, revealing “one whole idea of Ancient Greece,” that is, the idea of Greek nationality. Ex pluribus unum seemed to be Pletnev's idea of nationality in literature: the diversity of nation's writers nevertheless made up a unity, “which can only be explained by the idea of nationality.”

Moreover, the role of literature was greater than it seemed at first: it articulated a nation's collective “spiritual strength” that progressively evolved over time and it was is its real history (“it has been finally proved in our time” claims Pletnev – almost with a sigh of relief). Pletnev's Romantic language manifests itself yet further when he employs the classical Romantic trope of organicism: he asserts that “the organisation of life of the Greeks is a development of organic beauty” (emphasis mine).

What is even more interesting is that Pletnev connects the nationality in Greek literature to the idea that throughout their history, Greeks have gone through all “levels of civicism” [stepeni grazhdanstvennosti]. Everything in their civic polities was grounded in “national spirit” [dukh narodnii]. It was “a moving and final cause of all the institutions, all the heroic deeds, all the monuments of this nation” [natsii]. It seems that for Pletnev the

196 Ibid., 2.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid., 3 and passim.
199 Ibid., 4.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid., 5.
202 Ibid., 6.
terms *narod* and *natsiya* are completely interchangeable and can both refer to a politic and cultural nation.\textsuperscript{203}

The civic nature of nationality is highly manifest in Pletnev's elaboration. Greeks understood, he continued, that there can be no higher purpose for a man on Earth than to become an “excellent citizen.”\textsuperscript{204} However, this civic emphasis had a state-oriented overtone: “to live meant [...] to act with others for the good and glory of the fatherland.”\textsuperscript{205} None was “separated in his soul from the idea of his fatherland, its physical and political state, its laws and institutions, Faith and History, nation's character and its customs”\textsuperscript{206} (capitals in the original). That meant a higher truth for the Greek nation, and that truth spelt nationality.

In order to understand the development of nationality, Pletnev undertakes a historical journey. He starts with the ancient world, and it is here that he makes an interesting move: he goes into great pains to divide the classical world into Greece and Rome and prove that the latter was much less significant than the former. The political context of this move is easily traceable: the Western civilisation, based on the Roman example, was to be downgraded compared to the Eastern one, on whose firmament Muscovy was built. Pletnev's Rome, compared to Greece, seems feeble. The brave and unbending “genius of Romans” became timid when it came to literature. Its forms were borrowed, its “clothes” unfitting, its colours foreign, it ignored interesting aspects of Roman life and replaced it with commonplace. In short, according to Pletnev's diagnosis, the Roman literature lacked nationality.\textsuperscript{207} By borrowing and relegating ideas Rome became inorganic.\textsuperscript{208}

What was the situation with nationality in the Middle Ages, according to Pletnev? The nationality was suppressed by the foreign civicism (Pletnev's usage of the word suggests that

\textsuperscript{203}Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{204}Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{205}Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{206}Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{207}Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{208}Ibid., 11.
he means something very similar to the national feeling coupled with political allegiance) of the Holy Roman Empire. However, when the time was ripe for the national feeling to awaken, it was forsaken by the intellectuals who chose the dead Latin language over their respective national languages, effectively tampering the national feelings.\(^{209}\) This *trahison des clercs* led to a fundamental contradiction in the heart of the Western civilisation: on the one hand, Christianity provided the correct role model of respecting the lawful authorities, pietism and compassion, but on the other hand, the very same societies let ancient laws, systems of ancient theologians and politicians, and, what is more, “the frenzied feelings of half-barbarous republicans” sneak into them.\(^{210}\) The political connotations of this condemnation of the “half-barbarous republicans” seem to be telling. Pletnev does not seem to be troubled by the fact that not only Rome, but Ancient Greece herself praised so much by him can be, historically speaking, ascribed the same status.

However, not everything was doomed. In the midst of European writers appeared some who, using the Ancient Greece as their role model, but not blindly copying her themes and attitudes, started to sing their fatherlands, their nature, their national civicism. These writers, in short, were striving to re-create the lost nationality in their literatures,\(^{211}\) which was equal to fulfilling the destiny ordained for their nations by the Providence: “the awakening of the feeling of nationality returns citizens on the road that is predestined for their intellectual activities by the Providence.”\(^{212}\)

Pletnev, as a true Romantic, has a special scorn for cosmopolitanism. This is how he describes the advent of the dangerous idea: “calculation overwhelmed feeling […] prophets of Cosmopolitanism came […] ready to dress the whole humankind in their colourless clothes,

---

210Ibid., 14.
211Ibid., 16.
212Ibid., 17-18.
to exchange a concert of languages for the sounds of a single string and convert heart into a cold stone.” 213 The only Universe worth living for was, for Pletnev, a Romantic Universe where the nations played their divine-written parts.

The role of the Russian Empire in between the contemporary European states was, of course, exceptional. Many nations depended on her intellectual achievements 214 (it is worth remembering that it was two years until the publication of famous Chaadaev’s *First Philosophical Letter*, which would attempt to smash rhetoric glorifying Russian achievements into pieces). Only Russia amidst other Christian nations was to retain her own tongue in the time when other European languages were scorned by “conceited educatedness.” 215 Pletnev asserts that while in the West the mind and the language were divorced, in the Russian lands they were “citizens of one and the same state.” 216 Again, Russian case was special because Russia did not mindlessly borrow foreign laws: only her own needs would create necessary laws, and her military victories strengthened her civicism. All that was reflected in her ancient literature. Not a single unhappy events of many, claimed Pletnev, was able to extinguish a unique Russian thought [Russkaia duma], which was reflected in this or that work of art.

From his general observations on the history of the world, its nations and their literatures, Pletnev goes on to reflect on specifically Russian situation. Peter the Great – a figure that will constantly be discussed in the context of nationality – is credited with cultivating sciences that were supposed to promote the advancement of society and a national

---

213 Ibid., 17.
214 Ibid., 18.
215 Ibid. It can be noted as a linguistic aside that, technically speaking, the comparison was hardly correct, for the Old Church Slavonic language, to which Pletnev is referring, was Southern Slavonic and much closer to the Bulgarian of the time (in fact, it is called as Old Bulgarian by some), than to its Eastern Old Russian counterpart. However, the argument was a powerful and frequent one. Nevertheless, Pletnev was probably right in assuming that this language – although bookish and not “national” - was closer to Old Russian than Latin was to new Romance languages. Cf. Boris Osipov, *Osnovy slavianskogo yazykoznaniya* [Introduction to Slavic philology] (Omsk: Omskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 2004).
literature, but, to Pletnev's dismay, only Lomonosov emerged from the era. With the introduction of education in foreign languages the society was divided into three groups: classics-lovers, unable to understand the call of their civic nation, the most inhabited group of imitators of French writers, and those for whom the feeling of nationality provided inspiration for understanding Russian everyday life [byt]. “The nationality must be awakening when a person perceives his civic duty as the most important aspect of his life,” Pletnev asserted.  

Catherine II was the champion of nationality: she was the first to ask for putting together the chronicles and other materials for compiling Russian history.

Marrying the military and the literary, Pletnev asks: “What Suvorov would not name Derzhavin his brother in fame? Here, here are the giants whose spiritual works equal the idea of the Russian people.” In the same vein Fonvizin gets credited for resurrecting nationality in Russian literature.

The language of Pletnev becomes more and more generation-based as the time of his narrative goes by. The seeds planted under Catherine II gave fruit under Alexander I in the writings of Karamzin and Krylov. The choice of these two is significant in itself. Karamzin in his twelve-volume magnum opus History of the Russian State revolutionised history writing in Russia and his work was the first one which was unusually widely read, while Krylov entered history as a man who retold La Fontaine's fables (who, in turn, re-told Aesop's fables to the French) for the Russians in a very Russified manner. For Pletnev, these two were heralds of nationality.

“With the understanding of our history the very nationality will be understood as well,” Pletnev claimed.  

217 Ibid., 24.  
219 Ibid., 30.

63
the fatherland, its law, its literature, in a word, everything leading to a civic state of man, should always be in our hearts.” Pletnev's concluding sentence is infused with nationalistic fervour: “there had previously been no such directive, with which with such a unity and such a self-neglect would everybody unite, as we unite according to our Leader's [Vozhdia] role in the promised land of true educatedness,” which meant education in the spirit of nationality.

Several topics emerge from an analysis of Pletnev's elaboration. The Romantic language makes itself highly evident. Apart from the aforementioned examples, unity seems to be another central topic in Pletnev's elaboration. It is a prerequisite condition for nationality to appear, and it is an idea that stands behind a good state. It is also not hard to deduce that, while speaking of Ancient Greece, Pletnev clearly had the Russian Empire in mind. He even asserts in a passing remark that “the so-called classical world has become in a sense our own music, because whatever sounds in it, all brought joy to our childhood.”

Pletnev offers no further comment on this metaphor, but it is possible to argue that he meant more than a simple allusion to Greek myths and stories that children are told: this pregnant metaphor inevitably leads one to think that Pletnev tried to ground the civilisation of the Russian Empire in that of the Greeks. Being informed by them in childhood, it was destined to outgrow and outshine them when grown-up. While it can be argued that Pletnev did not want to go that far in his address, the interpretation seems compelling and it would be no wonder that many in his audience felt that way. By using the authority of the classics he strove to show that the ideal political and civic situation in his idealised image of Ancient Greece was to be translated into the contemporary Russian Empire with the use of this wonderfully malleable concept of nationality.

220 Ibid.
221 Ibid., 8.
**History: the role of the nations**

The second piece in the second section of the masthead edition of the *Journal* is given to Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), a Moscow State University graduate, whose speech “On the world history” was given on the occasion of assuming professorship at the same University. In his powerful oration nations [*narody*] play a prominent role. Pogodin tells the audience that he takes the university position upon himself with a great fear, for “all the ages, all the nations […] menacingly ask me in all the tongues of Babel: do you understand us?”

It is illuminating to note that no plain individual rose from his or her grave to demand an answer from Pogodin, but nations did, because they were something that mattered in history, indeed, made history itself. In a piece from Pogodin's textbook, entitled “A piece from Russian history,” which was published in the *Journal* in order, as Pogodin claimed, to get a feedback from his more experienced peers, this Romantic interpretation of history readily manifests itself. The description of earliest Slavic tribes states that they were not “battle-minded in their souls, but some were sterner than the others due to various previous circumstances.”

Everything, to Pogodin's mind, was driven in history by one organic cause. All states arose due to the same cause, even the mere existence of humankind proved, in a logically disastrous argument, the teleological purpose of its existence. However, some distinctions were apparent. The West European states arose from “the marriage between the conquerors and the conquered,” while East European states (“that is, Slavic,” Pogodin remarks) – were governed by “another law” which permitted their loss of political sovereignty. Russia, however, was not only was spared from the fate of her Slavonic brothers, but “her head rises

---

225 Ibid., 35.
226 Ibid.
above not only them, but above all her Western and Asiatic counterparts. Would not that be a contradiction, asks Pogodin, and immediately answers: no, for Russia stands in between West and East and absorbs everything that comes to her. The foreigners that came to her were not conquerors and came without weapons. This statement is, obviously, historically very dubious, if not outright wrong, but that is not important, for the importance of it lies in the fact that this point of view was a re-statement (and a recreation at the same time) of the official governmental position: Russian Empire was great precisely because it successfully borrowed from the East and the West alike, her will never subjugated by anybody.

Pogodin asserts that human history is guided by laws, as well as the physical universe is. These laws, or, rather, the Law, are the faithful to Romantic thinking laws of the development of human spirit. Thus, the most important question that history as a science should address was, for Pogodin, the question of how necessity, stemming from the general law of human spirit, and freedom existed together. History was supposed to show how, on the one hand, human actions were proximately caused by their free will, and, on the other hand, establish the ultimate causality in the divine-ordained laws of necessity that were, in fact, at play manifesting themselves in human affairs. In no case history should be dogmatic or a closed affair. History, Pogodin stressed, is “the youngest science,” and as such should put more emphasis on the search than on the acquired knowledge. Moreover, this search was ultimately the search of manifestations of God's glory.

Pogodin closing statements can serve as an epitome of the Romantic spirit of his oration in praise of history. His metaphorical description of a historian's craft brings to mind Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog. Pogodin's vision is highly

227Ibid., 36.
228Ibid., 40-41.
229Ibid., 42.
230Ibid., 43.
231 Which seems to have stuck with historians forever: not only has it become the classic image of Romanticism in the broadest possible sense, but it also seems to appear and re-appear in history books: the
reminiscent of the picture: “nothing can be compared to the pleasure that you will get when, having gone up the mountains and having purified your feelings and risen with the spirit, you will have discourse with the chosen of the earth … you will contemplate the limitless way of [human] advancement... That is when you will know, or, better [said], feel History”232 (italics and the capital H in the original). It is impossible, claimed Pogodin, for any book, professor or university to give a better understanding of history than one can have in one's own soul.

The Romantic language used by Pogodin is by no means a coincidence. It connected the nation-oriented historical narrative with a Romantic interpretation of this narrative. Thus, for a Russian historian there was no other way to understand, teach and learn Russian and world history apart from the irrationally felt nationality-based way. The organic whole of the edifice of human history was only intelligible for a national historian, who was not only to know, but to feel history. In this exposition we find an example of an instrumental and justificatory use of nationality: it served as something that created history and at the same time provided a key to understanding it.

It is illuminating to see how the whole discourse on the problem of nationality translated into the general recommendations for the teaching process. The very first issue of the Journal published one such recommendation, entitled “A plan for teaching world history,”233 written by none other than Nikolai Gogol, who served a short time as a history professor at St. Petersburg University. Let us examine this document.

The plan established that the aim of teaching world history was not in retelling a heap of unconnected facts; rather, it was meant to convey the evolution of humanity from its earliest stages to the present state achieved through the works of its spirit. The unit of most recent example is John Lewis Gaddis' *The Landscape of History*, published in 2004, which not only features a reproduction of the painting on the cover, but devotes some space to it in various parts of is book, noting as well that the painting has served as a cover for another historical publication.  


67
measurement for this history, was, predictably, a nation, and a world history was supposed to create “one harmonious whole [...] a whole poem”\textsuperscript{234} composed of nations' deeds. Events that had no significance for the world at large had no right to enter this history. A nation should be depicted with its most salient features.\textsuperscript{235} Geography was to be put to use as well, but a metaphysical role was to be ascribed to it: it should illuminate in what ways a particular geographic position influenced a particular nation and its character.

An illuminating remark is made while describing a correct mode of teaching history. A professor should be so entertaining and interesting in his ways of presenting the material, that not a single student should be able to be mentally led away by distracting thoughts (if that happened, the teacher was to blame). For if that was not the case and a professor was boring and his speech dry, his students would be naturally inclined to contradict him in thought and in action. If that happened, “then the most sacred words in his mouth, that is, being devoted to Religion and tied to Fatherland and the Autocrat will be transformed for them [for students] into worthless opinions.”\textsuperscript{236} The values to be inculcated are seen here in plain light (the plan went on to say that unfortunately it is not a rare case that the disastrous consequences of such nihilist attitudes are seen).

How, then, history should be taught curriculum-wise? First, a bird-eye view introduction should be given to the whole edifice of the world history. Than the Eastern cradle of humanity should be depicted stressing patriarchal monarchies and religions that were false and incomprehensible for simple people (apart from the Jewish religion that knew the true God). The young nations lost their peculiarities and their nationality itself due to an intense contact with their peers, and it was time to leave them in the discussion. The attention should be then turned to Greece, which was the cradle of European civilisation, and, in

\textsuperscript{234}Ibid., 189.
\textsuperscript{235}Ibid., 191.
\textsuperscript{236}Ibid., 194.
particular, to her “enlightenment” and to the deeds of Alexander the Great, who “conceived of a Great Deed: to unite the East with Europe and to spread Greek enlightenment everywhere.”\textsuperscript{237} The emphasis on such an interpretation of Alexander the Great is telling in itself: one almost inevitably thought of the contemporary Russian Empire; this is another example of a state-oriented justificatory usage of nationality. However, this led to Hellenism with its “melting pot” of ancient nations: thus, nationality was lost again – and it was time to look at Rome. Having conquered the whole world, the Rome brought upon itself a plague that has already become so familiar to the listeners of this course in world history: “Everything is mixed again. Everyone becomes a Roman and [there is] not a single true Roman!”\textsuperscript{238} Asian peoples awaken and one nation displaces another, and that yet another one, while the European cosmopolitan edifice lies in stagnation.

The story of Middle Ages is to a large extent a story of a constant battle and a flux, driven by the monks and the Pope on the one hand and the Knights on the other. The middle class and trade arises and Americas are discovered; the Pope's unjust rule is crushed by Luther. After the religious wars nations again become intermingled and confused – and consequently, a new stage of history begins, the stage of the nation state. Napoleon usurps it, and that is where the Russian Empire comes to the fore: it is with her help that the nations and states of Europe are restored. The enlightenment spreads further and further, and Christianity is seen in every corner of the world.

In such a presentation of world history the last act was supposed to be played with the Russian Empire in the main role. The presentation of the world history at a glance should be followed by a more detailed description of every nation and every state, and the course should be closed by a repetition of the studied material. The geographical specificity that

\textsuperscript{237}Ibid., 197.  
\textsuperscript{238}Ibid., 198.
played, to Gogol's mind, a crucial role in the fate of the peoples inhabiting certain geographical areas, should be also assigned a certain amount of time. Incidentally, it was in Europe that nations were the most important, most stable and most developed. For comparison, Asia witnessed multiple rises and falls of nations and was chiefly important because of the advent of Islam, in Africa, in contrast to Europe, the human mind was dead, and in America everything, including nations and religion, was still in flux, so there was not much to say about it. Only after this presentation can a traditionally chronologically organised history be examined. Every century possessed its spirit and distinctive features as well, and this features were – true to the general spirit of this elaboration – created and best illustrated by a certain nation that achieved the most during this century.²³⁹

In concluding remarks Nikolai Gogol asserts that his exposition of the world history was meant to “educate the hearts of the youth [...] make them meek, obedient, noble, necessary and useful helpers of the Great Monarch, that neither in happiness nor in grief they would they betray their duty, their Faith, their noble honour and their oath – to be true to their Fatherland and Monarch.”²⁴⁰

Thus, history, understood in terms of the nation, was to inculcate these values in Empire's servants. Serving as building blocks for history, nations were to be preserved: for the lesson of such a presentation was that as soon as a nation lost its uniqueness, it was wiped out from history. The implications of that were that young students were to preserve their nationality in a most appropriate fashion, that is, by being true to their religion, nation and monarch. Here again we see how nations are transformed from a simple unit of history into something that justifies the political and social status quo in the Empire.

Another historical text of similar leanings was featured in the seventeenth issue of the

²³⁹Ibid., 208.
²⁴⁰Ibid., 209.
Journal from 1838. Entitled “On historical significance of Russia,” it was a discourse which was held in the University of Derpt (today Tartu, Estonia) on the occasion of the namesake of the Empress by the local professor Mikhail Rozberg.

After saying necessary pleasantries concerning the Empress herself, the discourse started by evoking again that Russia should be treated not like any other state, but as a specific part of the world in itself.241 Everything, from the Russian lands to her seas to her language to her people – and, of course, Russian war-time victories, – contributed to Russian greatness. Such a great state could not exist without a divinely-ordained purpose, which was in the destiny to end the eternal quarrel between the East and the West. This fight was a fight of spirits, the Western and the Eastern.242

To prove this thesis, Rozberg permits himself a historical aside. History, according to his exposition, could not predict future, but one law, or rather a general rule, made itself evident, and that rule was of growing power of the Northern world.243 Before Russia had entered Europe, the whole world history saw a constant fight between the European and Asian civilisation. After ages of fighting, a parity arose between the fighting fractions, and it was Russia's decision to join the ranks of Europe that changed the balance to her side. Rozberg also notes that two forces were at play that secured Europe's victory: the force of arms and the force of enlightenment,244 which were, in fact, something that Russia was, to his mind, specifically proud of.

It is interesting to note that Rozberg's translator (who might as well be himself)245 is at a loss when trying to render in Russian seemingly innocuous French world civilisation, for which the translator clumsily gives obrazovanie (literally, a formation or a foundation). This

242Ibid., 3.
243Ibid.
244Ibid., 10.
245The lecture was given in French.
repeats the pattern of dealing with civilisation that was seen at work in Uvarov's treatment of Guizot's writings.

Describing the role Russia played in the “magnificent drama of history,” Rozberg uses Romantic language of organicism: humanity was a harmonious whole, and every nation was an organ that was necessary for that whole. For instance, in the contemporary world, France was responsible for social life, Germany for science, England for trade and industry. In general, Europe's nations were development-oriented [postupatel'nye] and their governments inert, in Asia peoples were inert and governments patriarchal. Russia was different from both: her government was a progressive force guiding and improving her people. Thus, Russia was patriarchal and yet developing. This unity of European and Asian features contributed to Russia's glory and power, and her military successes, primarily over Napoleon and the Ottomans, proved the point. Rozberg concluded by saying that Russia's future lay in a “truly national education of younger generations,” and asserted that the measures that the government had undertaken to strengthen the education were to be praised.

It seems that Rozberg's main point was that since Russian glory and power were already firmly established on the battlefield, the only thing to be missing for the completion of the magic formula that would permit Russia to finally play its Providence-ordained role was to educate the nation so that it would be able to finish the act of unification of the West and the East on the mental level – which was, in fact, her role in the organic whole of humanity.

---

247 It is interesting to note a common element of justificatory paradigms in the early Journal: Russian intellectuals did not claim the ontological superiority of their civilisation compared to any other; they, on the contrary, glorified the achievements of both the “European” and the “Asian” spirits only to claim that Russia was the only true heir and successor of those, and her mission was to elaborate these achievements in the spirit of their unification.
Linguistics: musings on the Russian language

A case for an applied usage of nationality can be found in the field of linguistics as well. The seventeenth issue of the Journal also featured an intriguing essay entitled “On the Russian language,” written in Russian by a certain monk Ioann Mogilevsky from Polish Przemyśl. The essay was then translated to Polish and published in Lvov in 1829 in the journal Csasopis Naukowy. It seeks to establish a correct relationship between Polish, Ukrainian dialects (which the author calls Southern Russian) and Russian proper.

The monk asserts that since Russians [Rus’] were the main branch of the Slavic tribes, were one nation in the past and possessed one language, it was impossible to name it otherwise than Russian, and that dividing it into Russian proper, Belorussian and Small Russian (meaning Ukrainian) was incorrect.²⁴⁹ A language was a nation's glory, although it could exist apart from the political existence of nation. The author goes into history to show that even in Russian lands belonging to Poland Russian was not only a national, but even a governmental and overall prestigious language.²⁵⁰ If the language of the books was concerned, than the terms Small Russian language and White Russian language did not even make sense: they simply meant Russian language.²⁵¹

The Southern Russian language, which the author equated with the terms Small Russian and White Russian (Belorussian), was a distinct branch of Slavic languages, and was not a derivate from Polish.²⁵² The latter, on the other hand, was indebted to Russian language for its purity, richness and even style.²⁵³

One of the main Mogilevsky's points is that political realities do not harm the language and the nation: for example, Russians were a nation completely different from

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 22.
²⁵¹ Ibid., 31.
²⁵² Ibid., 34.
²⁵³ Ibid., 36.
Poles, and so incorporating them into the Polish state could not take away their nationality, nor could it alter it – that, for Mogilevsky, did not even require a proof.\textsuperscript{254} Thus, every nation possessed an almost immutable language and with that language, the name, which was not to be confused or altered. In the end, claimed the author, it should become completely apparent that there was no need for inventing new names for what was, in fact, Russian language belonging to Russian people.\textsuperscript{255}

The exact linguistic arguments of the monk – sometimes reasonable, sometimes laughable – should not distract us here. What is important is that this essay, which was deemed important enough to be published in the \textit{Journal}, established yet another ground for nationality: that of language.

\textbf{Law: political and national}

We can find the exposition of the official ideology applied to the studying of law in the fourth issue of the \textit{Journal}, in the article dealing with the limits of studying and teaching political and national law.\textsuperscript{256} First, article tells the reader that the only true and correct law is grounded in religion, without which the whole idea of justice becomes meaningless\textsuperscript{257} (something that the Slavophiles would later re-iterate). Justice in the form of the law and the law that shines in the monarchical power were the pillars of humanity. The article goes on to try to discredit the social contract theory, for the reason that it was obviously not grounded in religion. The political progress of a nation could only be measured assuming the divine-ordained criteria.\textsuperscript{258} Thus, if a nation were to develop, it could only do so in the religious framework. Here again we see a justificatory paradigm grounding “enlightenment” and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., 41.
\item Ibid., 43.
\item Vasili Androssov, \textit{“O predelakh, v koikh dolzhny byt’ izuchaemy i prepodavaemy prava politicheskoe i narodnoe [On the limits in which political and national law should be studied and taught],” The Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment, no. 4 (1834): 367-386.}
\item Ibid., 369-370.
\item Ibid., 373.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
progress in religion (which meant Orthodoxy in the Russian Empire). The author insisted that “it should be admitted that a civil society is an organic body, a live tool in the hands of the Providence.” Seen in this light, the political law was meant to explain that the autocratic power was the basis of the (divinely-ordained) state, since the central dogma of the political law was that there can be no other power than from God. The whole spirit of the exposition is that of justifying an already existing governmental structure.

In the same vein, a teacher of law should strengthen the moral component of his students' souls, which consisted in “a high opinion of their fatherland, Government, nationality.” This education will infuse the Government with a strong faith in the people's strength, and the subjects with a boundless loyalty to the Monarchic power. It will create “Peter on the throne and Minins within the people.”

However, this belonged to a rigorous scientific study of the political law. The second part of the argument tried to define and demarcate a truly national law, as opposed to the political one. When dealing with the national law, the standards of rigorousness could be slightly lowered, for the unit of analysis was no longer civil individuality but the national one. The national law was again grounded in the doctrines of Christ. It could find its normative basis in a nation's customs, among other things, and it sought to legally ground different international relations. The gist of Androssov's argument here is that, while some Western scholars, criticised by him, neglect the importance of the national law and even sneer at it, it should, in fact, provide the basis for everyday international relations and it could be assumed, Androssov told his readers, that the Holy Alliance was built upon this vision of law. Thus, a new law grounded in nationality could provide a basis for politics; this kind of

259 Ibid., 373-374.  
260 Ibid., 379.  
261 Ibid., 383.  
262 Ibid., 381.
law should be studied, taught and applied.

**Philosophy: the reflective nationality**

The fifth issue of the *Journal* from 1835 includes an essay under the title “On the progress of education in Russia and on the role philosophy should play in it,” which originally was a discourse pronounced in French by a professor of St. Petersburg University Adam Fisher. The essay starts with the familiar claim that Russia possesses a distinctive character without parallel and therefore her ways were different – even in education. Russian education, in contrast to the European one, stemmed from the Government, and the successes of this effort to educate the Russian people were proven by political greatness of Russia.263

Fisher goes on to expose the detractors of these educative efforts who claim that it is not “national,” and the nation [*narod*] rejects state education as something superficial and European. This was simply untrue, Fisher claimed, and the imperial subjects received education with zeal and gratefulness. However, these same detractors claimed that philosophy was not needed in a correct version of Russian education, and Fisher set it as his goal to prove that philosophy was crucial in preventing the evils of “false education” [*lzheobrazovanie*], which plagued with an increasing severity the communal body of the “ageing Europe.”264

Fisher establishes a genealogy of educational achievement in the Russian Empire, starting with Peter I who was the first to conceive of a true education for the nation.265 Peter made Russia Europe's apprentice, and she proved to be a miraculous prodigy. Since then, Russian monarchs were always true to the spirit of civil education and enlightenment for the

264Ibid., 31.
265Ibid., 34.
This education rested upon Faith and Law, which were united by upbringing – something similar to German Bildung, that played such an important role in the Romantic movement. The history of upbringing in Russia was painful and very dangerous for the national spirit, for young Russians, not having state-organised educational institutions, were taught at home by foreign tutors and thus had to be “first German-ised, and then French-ised.” Thus, the public and the private education should be reconciled, and that is why the status of the private tutors had to be elevated so that Russians would not be ashamed of this position. As soon as the upbringing will be as Russian as the Orthodoxy and Russian law, the harmonious and organic existence of the Empire would be secured.

What role would philosophy have to play in this vision? Philosophy, whose beginning was Reason and whose end the Unconditional (i.e., the divine), was meant to bring reflexivity to the questioning mind of individuals and nations. Fisher then focuses on psychology (then understood as a sub-field of philosophy) and establishes that it is “physics of the spirit,” and since it is the spirit that engenders every other science and art, it should all the more be studied within the domain of philosophy. Psychology was also crucial in providing the necessary techniques for educating proper subjects and therefore reforming the nation; indeed, psychology even provided a key for understanding human history, for it described the levers that operated the nations.

However, philosophy was to a large extent neglected. The reasons for neglect and

---

266Ibid., 37.
268Fisher, “O khode obrazovaniia v Rossii i ob uchastii, kakoe dolzhna prinimat’ v nem filosofia [On the progress of education in Russia and on the role philosophy should play in it],” 40.
269Ibid., 43.
270Ibid., 49-50.
271Ibid., 53-54.
272Ibid., 57-58.
governmental suspicion towards philosophy were, to Fisher's mind, numerous (and justifiable), but one deserves separate treatment. Under the name of philosophy destructive revolutionary events took place in the XVIII century that tried to shatter the whole established world order. Here Fisher refers in most derogatory terms to the advent of secularism, atheism and republicanism. However, this, he claimed, was not philosophy but its inverse, and it was because of these events that the Russian government was rightly suspicious of philosophical courses in universities. However, the true philosophy was in charge of inculcating Christian values and obedience to the monarch, the fatherland and its laws. This was to be the spirit of the national enlightenment, and that was the mission of the university – to educate not only scientists, but firmly believing Christians and devoted to their Monarch citizens. Thus, philosophy was to guide the education of the nation – in the spirit of nationality.

Certain things are salient from this analysis of materials found in the *Journal* of the 1830s. Nationality was first and foremost conceived of in the larger Romantic context, its usage was mediated by the Romantic language and Romantic concepts of *Bildung*, organism and national uniqueness. Nationality permeated the discourse on various aspects that were of interest to the state and society ranging from literature to law. The most theoretically informative discussions of nationality were to be found in the discourses on literature, while other disciplines made use of nationality in justificatory sense. Thus, nationality was used both as an interpretative strategy (for history and law) and as a normative that organised the life in the Empire and explained the actions of the government.

Also, certain common features emerge in relationship to nationality in every context that it is used, and especially so when it is used to refer to the historical mission of the Russian Empire. Nationality, being a function from a nation's uniqueness, was supposed to be

273Ibid., 65.
the driving force of history and a key to its understanding. When the Russian Empire was concerned, the justificatory strategy was used that stated Russian status as a heir of the ideas of nationality found in Ancient Greece. Russian nationality was shown as, on the one hand, a distinctively unique entity while, on the other hand, having learned the crucial lessons from both East and West. In general, Russia's national destiny was to bridge the gap between the West and the East, for the Russian distinctive nationality took the best from both.

In the final remarks, it remains to say that it was perhaps precisely due to its characteristic conceptual ambiguity that nationality could enjoy such a wide range of usage options. Being vague, it could be used both to explain and to justify, to describe and to demand – and such a polyvalent concept is a rare creation in politics. Thus, it is small wonder that it indeed became the “alpha and omega” of the era of Nicholas I.

After the initial boom in the Journal publications that dealt with the question of nationality, the amount of such articles diminished. As a place for the important concept was secured in the official public space, other actors started to champion it in various ways. The importance of such outside-the-Journal publications was high in their own day and with the scholars of posterity. Suffice it to say that a such renowned researchers of the Russian history as Riasanovsky to Walicki preferred to deal with expositions of Official Nationality found in Pogodin's Moskvitianin or Nadezdin's publications. This can be readily understandable: these articles at times were clearer and sometimes even more daring. At any rate, Moskvitianin, which enjoyed Uvarov's approval, seems to be a safe choice. However, let us proceed by examining the usage of the concept of nationality in Uvarov's self-assessment as Minister.
Chapter 4. Uvarov in 1843. Nationality as the Driving Force of Reforms

One of the most important, if not the most important, texts that Uvarov ever composed was his report that was submitted directly to Nicholas I in 1843. It is an analysis of ten years that Uvarov spent in office as the Minister for Public Enlightenment. It is straightforwardly titled “Ten years of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment 1833-1843,” and its 1864 edition bears the subtitle “A note submitted to the Tsar Emperor Nikolay Pavlovich by the Minister for Public Enlightenment Count Uvarov in 1843 and returned with an inscription made by the very hand of His Majesty 'I read it with pleasure'.” This document, which has not escaped the attention of most Uvarov scholars, can show how Uvarov fit his achievements and actions into the framework of the ideology he had himself formulated.

First and foremost, Uvarov stresses the idea that education by its very nature is a project whose results take a very long time to come about. For this reason, claims the Minister, continuity of the process is very important. It is important to note that Uvarov not only had to defend what he had already achieved, even more important was that the course for Enlightenment that he set forth would be continued in the same way.

Remembering the day when he had assumed office – November 19, 1933 – Uvarov reminds the emperor that Europe was troubled by a “societal tempest,” a time when the institutions of society and religion were falling down. This all the more demanded that “the Fatherland be strengthened on the firm grounds on which prosperity, might and life of the nation [naroda] are built; that the principles that make for a distinguishable character of

---

275Ibid., 2.
Russia and belong only to her be found; that what remains from our nationality be united into one sacred whole and the anchor of our salvation be based on them." 276 Here Uvarov reaffirms the privacy of nationality, that he had to strive for, in his words, since the very first day that he assumed the office. Of course, this is not exactly true, as is evident from the analysis of the programmatic document that re-establishes the publishing of the *Journal* that was undertaken before. The document does not even mention nationality, although admittedly it is very close to it in spirit.

Without directly mentioning his triad, Uvarov recaps its main tenets. As is expectable, firstly Uvarov affirms the primacy of religion, which “was looked upon by a Russian as the key to public and family happiness. Without love towards the belief of the ancestors, both the nation and a private person shall perish.” 277 It has been noted in literature that “the belief of the ancestors” does not automatically equal Orthodoxy, 278 however, the *Ten Years* later on talk about the Orthodoxy, from the principles of which no Russian could ever detract a single one. Autocracy is the main condition of the political existence of Russia. These are “two national principles [*natsional'nyie nachala*],” alongside which nationality, the third one, operates. Uvarov admits that “the question of nationality does not possess the same unanimity [*edinstvo*] as the previous one, but they both stem from the same source and are intertwined on each page of the history of Russian Kingdom.” 279 Uvarov is hesitant to give a straightforward definition yet again; however, he states that the complications arising from the advent of the new term stem from a need to agree “old and new notions.” Nationality, moreover, can be understood as an intellectual process or continuity, “it does not require immovability in ideas.” 280 This is a highly telling passage: in effect, Uvarov sanctions the

276Ibid.
277Ibid., 3.
278Miller, “‘Official nationality’? A Reassesment of Count Sergei Uvarov’s Triad in the Context of Nationalism Politics,” 141.
279Uvarov, Desiatiletie Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya..., 3.
280Ibid.
continuity of interpretations of nationality, he seals its forever elusive nature. Nationality is seen as an attempt to preserve essential parts of the national character amid the necessary change. Uvarov equates in a double metaphor the change the state should undergo with time— as, in turn, every living organism should— with the change in interpretations. Yet the essential still has to stay the same, and nationality was to provide this ever-changing stability.

These were the principles, claims Uvarov, that it had been necessary to cherish that “our education was in harmony with our order of things and yet was not foreign to European spirit.” Uvarov finishes his introduction stating that he understood his task as Minister as “educating the present and future generations in the united spirit of these three principles.”

Uvarov opens the first section of the report proper with a description of what he had done immediately after assuming the post. His actions betray a good administrator: the first action he took was to advise all the subordinates about his plans and ordering of a thorough inspection of the imperial educational institutions. Everything was to be assessed, starting from the education proper ending with physical conditions of buildings. Then, Uvarov effectuated a new and more logical division of the Empire into educational districts, which was meant to boost the efficiency of their work. His next measure was to reform the middle and low levels of the educational system. Gymnasia and other institutions of this level were increasingly dependent on universities, whose professors were detracted from their normal occupation of teaching and doing research by administrative task coming from these lower establishments. Consequently, the new Statute concerning ruling over educational districts put a stop to this dependency. Uvarov eliminated unnecessary levels of government, gymnasium became controlled directly by their trustees and the faculty of universities were given more time to dedicate to their usual activities. Other measures concerning this

281Ibid., 4.
282Ibid., 5-6.
educational level were directed mainly to increasing the prestige of these establishments. As we have seen, Uvarov made the proliferation of state-sponsored and state-controlled education instead of home tutoring his goal, and this required promotion of lower educational institutions. To this effect Uvarov made career promotion of graduates easier and appointment of high officials in the field of education subject to more rigorous competition.  

Uvarov advocated distinctions in educational programs between different estates. “A system of public education can only then be called correctly established,” claimed the Minister, when “it creates a possibility for everyone to acquire such an education that would be in accordance to their way of life and a future calling in the civil society.” Uvarov catered for interests of noble families: cities of the empire could boast with separate educational institutions for the “well-born.” It is hard to say whether this separation was something that Uvarov initially wanted, response to the unwillingness of the children of the privileged to study alongside the children of common folk, or both. At any rate, at the time of Uvarov's writing, the number of such noble educational institutions was forty-six, and they were financially sustained by the nobility.

Those who could not support themselves financially were obliged to serve for six years in gubernias where they received education which was paid for from the state budget. Those whose education was paid by the nobility were obliged to serve after their University studies if they chose to pursue them and were still dependent on the noble money. With this measure Uvarov the administrator assured that gubernias were equally provided with an incentive to educate their young inhabitants, pay for their education and at the end of the day to provide them with educated administrative staff, which always was a coveted resource.

---

283 Ibid., 6-7.
284 Ibid., 8.
285 Ibid., 8-9.
286 Ibid., 9-10.
287 This is not to say that Uvarov fully succeeded. As a recent study has shown, the myth of the over-abundance of bureaucrats in the Russian Empire – a favourite theme in the Russian literature of the nineteenth century –
The term of service was eight years for the ever suspicious and problematic Western Provinces (a decision to this effect was made in 1838).\textsuperscript{288} There special boarding houses were to be built for those who could not afford living by their own means. It is reasonable to see the thinking behind that: the loyalty ensured by financially supporting the students during the time when they needed money most and providing them with education would be paid back when they would be employed for such a long term in state offices there.

Uvarov provided opportunities for education of all the levels (except the University) for children of other estates, while children of honorary citizens could enter universities as well. Even the serfs could receive an education, although only in local educational establishments of lowest levels. Further education for them was only possible if their master would free them.\textsuperscript{289}

Uvarov codified the curricula, having as one of his guiding principles a view of what and why should be taught to a particular estate and, moreover, to a particular province. Uvarov knew how to maintain the balance between codifying educational standards within the Empire and taking into account local specificity. His gaze was especially attentively directed towards the Western lands, where separate rules concerning educational promotion were in action; Siberia, which for its vastness and relatively poorly developed infrastructure required special treatment and Caucasian lands. The promotional procedure was highly detailed: for instance, best Siberian graduates were to be sent to Kazan University (to return after their graduation to their gubernias), while best Caucasian pupils were dispatched to Kharkov.\textsuperscript{290}

A special section of the report was devoted to a description of measures Uvarov...
undertook to curb private education, which was dangerous because it was hard to control and it might fall in the hands of people who “either do not possess knowledge and moral qualities necessary for such an important deed or do not know how or do not want to act in the spirit approved by the Government for the goals that are set by it.”\textsuperscript{291} The situation was all the more problematic in the eyes of Uvarov since private education seemed to have taken hold especially firmly in the highest echelons of the imperial society, who preferred foreigners as teachers for their children. The problem was addressed with both a carrot and a stick: while the possibilities for education of noble children in state-controlled institutions rose, the number of private establishments was limited: for instance, an edict as early as November, 4, 1833 cut down the number of private boarding schools in Moscow and St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{292} Moreover, special inspectors were given the task to assess these schools; their educational programs were divided into three levels that corresponded to the imperial-wide division between parochial schools, district schools and gymnasia.

Private tutors who provided home-based education were a more complicated problem to deal with. What Uvarov did was to try offering them benefits and rights of the state service (the edict from July, 1, 1834),\textsuperscript{293} while at the same time providing strict regulations for their work. In particular, the Minister established formal examinations and assessing of the “moral character” of the candidate. By the time of the report altogether 4483 certificates permitting private teaching were issued.\textsuperscript{294} The foreigners “residing in Russia without credible evidence of their trustworthiness” were denied the right to teach.\textsuperscript{295} However, Uvarov does not say anything as to how this provision was to be ensured. “It is time,” says the Minister, “to enforce in private homes a truly domestic (otechestvennyi, meaning belonging to the

\textsuperscript{291}Ibid., 14.  
\textsuperscript{292}Ibid., 15.  
\textsuperscript{293}Ibid., 16.  
\textsuperscript{294}Ibid., 104.  
\textsuperscript{295}Ibid., 17.
Fatherland) education and replace with it an education that was acquired in a foreign spirit from the people alien to our beliefs, laws and customs. Here, again, we see an emphasis on the local imperial traditions.

As it is reasonable to expect, a substantial part of his text Uvarov devotes to reforms in the university system. Universities were to provide a fundamental education with the view of producing statesmen capable of solving the tasks the Government and the realities of the societal life will pose them. The Minister claims that he had had two principle motives in reforming the university system. Firstly, the quality of education was to be elevated: only “a prolonged and constant work” would earn a diploma for the students; with this measure only those who were ready would be promoted into the state apparatus. Secondly, Uvarov had to fight, as usual, with the “wrong private home education provided by the foreigners,” which was the norm for the children of nobility. The passion for the “foreign (inozemnomu) education, glittering from the outside but lacking the fundamentals and a true spirit of science” was to be curbed, and another, “national, independent” (narodnoe, samostoiatel'noe) education was to be fostered among the children of nobility and in universities in general.

It is interesting to note that in the report Uvarov talks about the phenomena of a “national education” and the like as if they were self-evident or even present before he assumed the post. However, it is definitely not the case and, moreover, it is worth remembering that Uvarov at any rate wanted the Russian education be at least akin to its European counterpart. However, this terminology is important in carving out an imperial educational identity.

Uvarov's reforms were bold and broad: the University education was divided into three departments: philosophy, jurisprudence and medicine, while the number of chairs

296 Ibid.
297 Ibid., 18.
within these departments grew. The new structure was first implemented in Moscow and St. Petersburg Universities in 1836, and a year later Kharkov and Kazan Universities followed suit. The same 1837 saw the introduction of comprehensive university examinations. Special provisions from 1834 enabled state functionaries to attend courses at universities, as well as medical courses were open for those who wanted to broaden their medical knowledge.298

Defending his stance on the necessity of classical education with its emphasis on learning the Greek language, Uvarov states that not only this is the best way to promote “intellectual development,” but also this is necessary for grounding “the newest Russian education more firmly and deeply on the ancient learning of the nation (natsii) from which Russia had received her holy creed and first steps in enlightenment.”299 However, Uvarov recognised the all the more burning need for catering for industrial and agricultural developments, and a relatively lengthy part of his report is devoted to describing the measures that he took in order to fill this niche, ranging from creating special chairs in agriculture in universities to holding public lectures in many cities of the empire.

A special case is made for Oriental studies, Uvarov’s old cause. The necessity to promote studying Asian languages, literature and cultures is substantiated primarily on the political and ideological grounds. Russia was, as the spirit of Orientalism would have it, “destined by her fate” to study her Asian subjects. Arab, Turkish and Farsi were learned at the Oriental chairs, while students of theology in Derpt were able to learn Syriac. Uvarov especially singled out Kazan as a place where the Orient met the Occident and where it was most logical to develop Oriental studies. While European scholarly orientalism possessed only a “cabinet” quality, Russia was destined to bring to Europe live knowledge about these parts or the world, as well as gradually bring European enlightenment and sciences to the

298Ibid., 18-19.
299Ibid., 20.
Asian inhabitants. Thus, Kazan could boast with the broadest possibilities for Oriental studies: there a student could learn Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, Tatar, Chinese, Mongolian, Sanskrit and Armenian philology. The Oriental successes were singled out for the Emperor: “Half-barbarous sons of Mongolian steppes are giving a welcoming reception to the seeds of enlightenment. One of the Buriats from trans-Baikalia, having graduated from a gymnasium, is now pursuing his studies in a university. We can hope that after graduating and having entered service in his motherland this young man will have a most useful influence on his compatriots; his example will not be left without imitation.”

An important political consequence of all this was a greater glory for Russia, for it was there where Mongolian language, not known to enlightened Europe before, was brought to scientific light. In Uvarov's words: “foreign scholars, who only recently accused Russia, in private and in public, of neglect of substantial studying of the Orient … now as one man and with astonishment sing praises to achievements of the Russian government and scientists of Russia in this respect made in such a short time and with such an evident success.”

Uvarov provided financial security to teachers of all levels, as he saw a burning necessity to fill openings in the developing educational system. A more secure promotion and benefits for those not working in the inner core of the Empire were also provided. However, the special praise was reserved for the Main Pedagogical Institute, whose aim was nothing less than “creating a new independent scholarly estate, that would be independent in pursuing intellectual activities of foreign (chuzhikh) systems or examples.” By 1843 the total number of graduates was two hundred and thirty. A section of the Institute provided the teachers of Russian to be dispatched to Ostsee gubernias. Another university that especially prepared

300 Ibid., 23-24.
301 Ibid., 25.
302 Ibid., 27.
303 Ibid.
students for future professorships was the Professorial Institute of the Derpt University, whose graduates were sent to “the best universities of Europe” to polish their education. It might seem ironic that such was the procedure the rationale for which was to reduce dependency on foreign professors; however, this was a logical consequence of trying to be at the same time together with Europe and distinct from her. Moreover, the initiative did not last long: only two classes had graduated.\textsuperscript{304} However, the practice of sending young scholars to distinguished European universities continued and played, in Uvarov's view of the situation, a crucial role: they were “a continuous and live thread, connecting home education with development of sciences in Europe; it constantly keeps the Russian educated estate and Russian universities at the level of knowledge of the nations that had at some time had overtaken us on the road of enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{305}

Uvarov formulates the first main task of his tenure – stemming from Nicholas himself, according to the Minister – in this words: “reform and coordinate all the existing educational institutions and bring them to one principle, which would be the most important of it, which would, on the one hand, grow from the very grassroots of our life,\textsuperscript{306} and on the other hand keep pace with development of sciences and enlightenment in Europe.” At the same time, as Uvarov reminds, it was also necessary to bring not only children of middle estates into the public educational system, but also children of the nobility, whose education, as we saw, “was given by foreign teachers in a milieu of home prejudices.”\textsuperscript{307} Both goals, according to Uvarov, were achieved: Russian university system became coherent and could adequately respond to demands of time and the Government. A person entering a reformed university would characteristically see there “Russian professors of the younger generation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{304}Ibid., 31.
\item \textsuperscript{305}Ibid., 32.
\item \textsuperscript{306}In the original: “Vozrastala by iz samykh osnovanii nashego byta.”
\item \textsuperscript{307}Uvarov, Desiatiletie Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya..., 32.
\end{itemize}

89
who are not inferior in any respect to the best foreign professors, with only that difference that a natural feeling of affection to everything national (*narodnomu*) fosters a noble connections between them and their students not seen before.**308** A telling remark adds that not only had not a single one of the young professors given any cause to doubt their loyalty to the Government, but “those who are more talented are at the same time more honourable in their Russian feeling and purity of opinions.”**309**

A very telling remark follows Uvarov's discussion of the dangers that poses private home-based education left in the hands of foreigners. As a control after them was a really problematic measure to implement, Uvarov, as mentioned above, tried to make them state servants with all the benefits and restrictions – and, most importantly, controllability – that ensued. However, as he himself acknowledged, this was only a partial and indirect solution. The full one lay in using “natural Russians” (*prirodnykh russikh*) in educating process. As he writes in the *Ten Years*, “the Government had […] called for […] the natural Russians, who, for their firmly established notions, are accustomed to prefer the service to the state over any other. They are no longer afraid of the helpless old age […] for their pensions a special capital is formed, which is constantly growing.”**310** It is indicative to see the mentioning of the “natural Russians” here: it shows that the document is written exactly in the time of the slow transition from the linguistic and cultural understanding of Russianness to an ethnic one. Note that here there is no mentioning of language abilities or mother tongue; on the contrary, the collective image of a “natural Russian” is ascribed the quality of preferring the state service, from which there is not a long way to stating that therefore, he is a better citizen of the Empire.

---

308Ibid., 33.
309“Kto iz nich otlichnee po talantu, tot i zamechatelnee po chuvstvu russkomu i po neporocnosti mnenii.” 
**Ibid.**
310Ibid., 16.
Uvarov believes that it is necessary to devote special attention to particular educational challenges he had to address. In particular, the Western Gubernias receive a detailed treatment. Uvarov acknowledged existing rivalries and feelings of enmity between Polish lands within the Empire and the imagined Russian rest, which were specifically manifest at the level of “hatred of one language to another, the Roman church towards the Orthodoxy, Western civilisation to the Eastern.” Note the stunning changing of roles. When talking about “enlightened” Europe, Russia is seen as a specific and peculiar part of the West, dominating its internal Orient. Moreover, we find no evidence for “hatred” or “enmity.” Russia and Europe are best seen as both pursuing a path towards enlightenment. However, Poland here can be seen as a wicked West. The solution for this conundrum was seen to be in the form of a merger of both cultures “with a necessary preponderance of the Russian [element; *s nadlezhashchim perevesom russkogo]*.” Thus Poland was to see a development of the “Russian nationality based on its true principles.” Here it is obvious that nationality is not understood in ethnic terms, rather it is seen as a cultural merger that was supposed to bring coherence (and peace) to the Empire.

Characteristically, Uvarov equates learning the Russian languages with the “common state good,” which perfectly well illustrates and once more proves Benedict Anderson's argument concerning official nationalisms. However, we should not forget that teaching of the Polish language was at the same time stopped in 1836.

A special role in this process was to be played by a newly established St. Vladimir University in Kiev (it is worth remembering that both the Warsaw and Vilno Universities were closed in the aftermath of the Polish Uprising, as well as the Volhynian lyceum). The

312 *Ibid*.
stated aim of this university was to “level the characteristic differences of Polish and Russian youth,” and in particular “to suppress the thought [of the young Poles] of a particular nationality (*chastnoi narodnosti*), to bring it closer to Russian notions and mores, to transmit the common spirit of the Russian nation to it.”\(^{315}\) Here nationality is seen playing a double role: a “particular” Polish nationality would signify cultural differences that would warrant claims for political sovereignty. The cultural had a direct connection to the political, and imperial coherence demanded (at least, in Uvarov's mind) that cultural differences be played down. Different nations could exist within the Empire, but different nationalities could not.

The difference in treating the Poles and Ostsee Germans in the Empire is exemplary. While Poles were rebels and thus actions taken against them was to be swift and harsh, Germans were loyal to the throne and thus only deluded in their reluctance to be Russified. The Baltic Germans “could not understand the Russia of Nicholas I.”\(^{316}\) Their widespread illusion was that their “nationality was German.”\(^{317}\) However, this illusion was not to be tackled immediately and decisively: while the Ostsee society was divided by a class conflict, in Uvarov's description, and while the population generally was loyal to the Empire what was needed was a slow but steady promotion of the Russian language and culture.

Among other things achieved strictly in scientific practices, Uvarov singled out the imminent modernisation of history writing. The Minister affirms the primacy of Karamzin's writings for the moment, but future historians had to “broaden their horizon of observation and enter the depths unknown to Karamzin.” A “new view on [historical] subjects was in order,” which was to ensure a “rebirth” of historical writing in Russia. As it has been already pointed out, Uvarov's version of the “future historian”\(^{318}\) who was to achieve this glorious

\(^{315}\)Ibid., 39.
\(^{316}\)Ibid., 50.
\(^{317}\)“Mysl', chto ikh mnimaia natsional'nost' est' natsional'nost' germanskiiia, sil'no ukorenillas' mezdu nimi.” Ibid., 51.
\(^{318}\)Ibid., 94.
mission, was Nikolai Ustrialov. His *Russian History* textbook receives a special mentioning in the report to the tsar.\textsuperscript{319} The subject, as we learn from the Minister's exposition, was taught in a dull manner, and generally held views were outdated. “Everywhere” there was a need for a textbook that would, firstly, attract youngsters to the subject, and secondly, “safely” explain the historical road to the present state of affairs in the correct way. The book was such a success that it was introduced everywhere, including private educational establishments. Especially important and beneficial was its introduction in the Western Gubernias: it brought closer the minds and showed, using “a string of indisputable facts, that Western Russia (*Rus‘*), and especially so Lithuania, had been a […] part of the Russian state.”\textsuperscript{320}

Noting the obvious difficulties facing any censor, Uvarov states that his Ministry's overall performance in this regard was good. After the incident with Chaadaev, which Uvarov ascribes to “an inborn obstinacy of periodical publications,” no large-scale measures were necessary. Nationality was to be thanked for this, since “from the time that in our writers the thought of nationality […] was born again, the most part of foreign ideas, especially political ones, lost their appeal.”\textsuperscript{321} Here Uvarov equates nationality with “the thought of intellectual self-dependency,” which “had gained ground in the course of last ten years.” A proof for that was the rise in number of works originally written in Russia, weighed against the number of translated works. In 1832 there had been published 632 original and 134 translated works, while ten years latter the correspondent numbers were 757 and 36. While it has to be noted that a reduction in numbers of translations in itself can be indicative of many things (most evidently, of a decline in relative censorial ease and demand for translations), the rise in original publications seems to be proving Uvarov's assessment of the situation. At any rate, the change in balance was consistent with the nationality policy understood as increasing

\textsuperscript{319}Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{320}Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{321}Ibid., 96.
intellectual self-dependency, as proclaimed by Uvarov.

Finally, let us take a look at the statistics of the Ministry which are, indeed, impressive. By 1842, six universities (in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Kharkov, Kiev, Derpt), the Main Pedagogical Institute and the Medical-Surgical Academy were joined by 3 lyceums, 76 gymnasias (there had been 64 in 1832), 46 noble boarding schools (compared to 6 in 1832), 445 district schools (compared to 393), 1067 parochial schools (compared to 552), and 521 private educational establishments (compared to 358). It is evident from these data that the most successful fields of improvement (at any rate, the most developed ones) were enlisting the noble children (note the dramatic rise in boarding schools for them) and primary education, which is evident in almost the double increase in parochial educational institutions. 322 The number of educators and officials employed in the educational process also rose significantly: from 4836 people in 1833 to 6767 in 1842. The same rise was evident in the number of graduates: while 1833 saw 477 students graduate, 1842 witnessed 742; altogether 5723 people received some scholarly degree. The number of University students rose from 2153 in 1832 to 3488 in 1842, while gymnasia and lower levels of the educational system saw the rise from 69246 to 99755 pupils, which with the addition of 66708 people studying in the Warsaw education district gave the number of 169951 people studying in the public institutions of the Ministry altogether (the numbers of students of military schools, seminaries and the like are excluded, for they were not in the Ministry's jurisdiction.) Altogether, the ten years of Uvarov's tenure saw 784 totally new educational establishments created, which corresponded to an increase of 2000 in the number of faculty and of 32 in the number of students. 17 million roubles in banknotes were used for building new facilities, of which 13 million came from nobility in the form of donations; the budget of the Ministry was increased by four million roubles. Finally, seven million Russian books were printed in the

322 Ibid., 103.
Empire, while four and a half million foreign books were imported, and forty scientific expeditions were carried out. 323

The Minister's goal was to destroy oppositions between European and Russian education, and at the same time to free young minds from the dangerous proclivity to blindly imitate all things European. Education had to be accustomed to the national life (narodnyi byt), and only then it could be deemed useful. In the end, the common denominator was the tripartite formula. Uvarov acknowledges that he had to overcome obstacles: he had to combat the elements that he called the liberal, because he insisted on a “full Russian monarchical principle” and the mystical, by which he meant any opposition to Orthodox belief system and traditions. The principle of nationality was also criticised, claimed Uvarov, for it implied that “the Ministry considered Russia to be mature and worthy to walk not behind, but at least on a par with our European nationalities.” 324 As the rhetorical devices presupposes, detractors of the state were wrong, and the chosen system had worked well for the purposes of the Ministry and the Empire, uniting the previously disjointed intellectual forces of the Empire under the banner of the infinite approximation for the “indigenous principles” 325 of nationality.

Certain things emerge from this analysis. Firstly, it is possible to see the Journal and the Ten Years as parallel, as the Journal is a direct discourse from the Government to the people, while Ten Years is a direct discourse from the Minister to the Tsar. Thus a direct, also mediated by the Ministry for Public Enlightenment connection is formed from the tsar to the people.

Moreover, Uvarov's self-presentation in his Ten Years definitely validates Benedict Anderson's interpretation of official nationalism. Uvarov promoted firstly a cultural program

323Ibid., 104-105.
324Ibid., 106-107.
325Ibid., 108.
with an enormous emphasis on Russian language and culture, which gradually projected itself on the sphere of the political.

The emphasis put on learning Russian cannot escape anyone's eye. The Minister went out of his way in promoting Russian in Western and Ostsee gubernias and the Polish kingdom. In particular, in 1841 the Imperial Russian Academy was made a division of Russian language and literature of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. The division, among other things, was entrusted with creating a new comprehensive dictionary of the Russian language. Characteristically, Uvarov tellingly calls the Russian language “a great motor of the Russian nationality.”

Uvarov claimed that underlying all the different measures taken in various parts of the Empire was one general principle, which was to be applied taking into account peculiar historical and cultural properties of particular provinces (most importantly, he thought about Western and Ostsee gubernias). This principle was “to establish domestic education, adequate to the demands of our age, authentic and primarily Russian.”

---

326 Ibid., 77-78.
327 “Velikii dvigatel’ russkoi narodnosti.” Ibid., 46.
328 “Vodvorenie obrazovaniia otechestvennogo, sootvetstvennogo potrebnostiam nashego veka, obrazovania samobytnogo I russkogo po prevoskhodstvu.” Ibid., 48.
Chapter 5. The Concept of Nationality in the *Journal* in 1840s

The 1840s, especially towards the end of the decade, saw a general decline in overall amount of the publications in the second section of the *Journal*. Moreover, the articles published there either dealt mostly with natural sciences or Mediaeval Russian history, not venturing into something more modern and provocative. Ideological publications are scarce and only allowed from trusted personalities. Needless to say, there were no articles dealing with the turbulent European events. However, it is still possible to find programmatic articles that employ ideas of nationality for their purposes. Let us turn to two examples of such articles.

The first one comes from Stepan Shevyriev, a co-editor, with Michael Pogodin, of *Moskvitianin*, a journal endorsed by Uvarov, which extolled the virtues of Official Nationality. Moreover, Shevyriev was the author of the article on Official Nationality that appeared in the very first issue of *Moskvitianin*.329 Finally, he was Uvarov's personal choice for the office of Professor of Russian History and literature at Moscow University.330 The article bears the title “Concerning the relationship of family upbringing to the state upbringing.”331

It is apparent that one of Shevyriev's intentions in writing this article was to move responsibility for the youngsters from universities and schools to families. Universities only create “students or candidates,” but families create “people.” Shevyriev implores parents not to rely solely on teachers and asserts that successes of the latter are fully conditional on the

---

efforts of the former. Thus, the kind of education and upbringing the Russian state needed could only be provided by a close cooperation of families and schools.\textsuperscript{332} It is illuminating to note that one of the direct consequences of this idea would be sharing (if not entirely shifting) the blame for university students who caused trouble to the state: it could be claimed that what they have become was not universities', but parents' fault.

Shevyriev starts by claiming that the question he is about to address is an all-national [\textit{vsenarodnyi}] one, as he formulates it as “how to create in Russia a unified, live, national [\textit{narodnoe}], according to our soil and coming from necessities of our life upbringing?”\textsuperscript{333} Shevyriev celebrates achievements and spreading of education in the Empire, and in particular, its Universities that “glitter with understood greatness of national [\textit{narodnoi}] thought.”\textsuperscript{334} Shevyriev defines upbringing, in a formula reminiscent of Uvarov's own writings, as developing innate, God-given faculties such as is in accordance with a person's destiny within the people and in the state.\textsuperscript{335} Moreover, Shevyriev identifies properties of a specific upbringing “in the Russian sense”: this upbringing should feed a person's body and the soul with food that will “open in them a united humanitarian and Russian principles.”\textsuperscript{336}

The first principle of such an education should be its religious component, although it has to be stated that Shevyriev understands religion in relationship to upbringing in a very liberal fashion, not insisting heavily on the dogmatic side of religion, but using it create a strong moral character in a child.\textsuperscript{337} Moreover, heavenly ordained family preserved its “national life.”\textsuperscript{338}

Among the problems that are hindering the correct development of the Russian state's

\textsuperscript{332}Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{333}Ibid., 1-2.
\textsuperscript{334}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{335}Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{336}“Vospitanie v Russkom smysle dolzhno pitat' telo, dushu i dukh nadlezhashcheiuu pishcheiu dlia raskrytiia v nikh slitnogo chelovecheskogo i Russkogo nachala.” Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{337}Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{338}Ibid., 66.
subjects, Shevyriev identifies “differing opinions” and “differing languages” of the Empire, which, on the one hand, when synthesised correctly, can bring unseen in the world before benefits, but incorrectly applied, “especially in private persons […] threaten us […] with losing our nationality.” The Government solves the problem, according to Shevyriev, by “uniting and concentrating all disagreements.” Given his previous deploring of linguistic disunity, this statement can be seen as an apology for Russification.

Shevyriev manages to turn his ideas about the necessary unity of the family and the government in upbringing children into a critique of the supposedly rotten state of French “revolutionary minds,” and especially that of Rousseau: in criticising his work on education and the nature of man Émile ou de l’éducation, Shevyriev identifies the first mistake of the Frenchman in stating that his Emile is an orphan and is thus deprived of a crucial component in his development. At the end of the day, by killing the “internal” family component of a person Rousseau killed their national character. Thus, a necessary dose of critique towards the French Enlightenment thinking was delivered.

Anti-Western overtones are abundant in this article. For a start, a correct development was possible under the influence of the Eastern Orthodox Church; the West, on the other hand, has forsaken the religious grounding of its systems of upbringing, which constituted one of the gravest failures of Western education. The situation was even more worsened by various Western confrontations involving the state, society and the church, and especially so by the Reformation.

339 Raznomyslie i raznoyazuchie. Ibid., 12.
341 Ibid., 13.
342 In fact, this work became highly influential in France after the revolution and partly served as a basis and inspiration for the post-revolutionary French educational system. See Jean Bloch, Rousseauism and education in eighteenth-century France (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1995).
344 Ibid., 66.
345 Ibid., 71-72.
History is not the only source that points to the superiority of a Russian system of upbringing to the Western one. According to Shevyriev, it is also an “internal feeling that convinces us that we and our kin peoples had always had an advantage in developing the family life.”\textsuperscript{346} Weak and irrational as the argument may seem now, it addressed existing discursive standards and was expected. Moreover, such an advantage of Slavic peoples in the marital realm was a precondition and a sign of an important role to be played by them in the history of mankind.\textsuperscript{347}

The history of education in the Russian lands is instructive. Shevyriev divides it into three periods: during the first one, Russia lived only with her innate, authentic and one nationality, while the second period was a European one, which Shevyriev thought was still ongoing, but coming to an end. The third period, whose coming was imminent, would be called “European Russian [Evropeisko-Russkii]\textsuperscript{348} and would be characterised by returning to the original nationality once again. In this exposition Shevyriev describes Mediaeval Russia as an “embryo of the power of a nation,” the latter being one family.\textsuperscript{349} The European stage of the development of Russian upbringing made it possible that a Russian could be turned into a “Frenchman, German, Englishman, and so on,” which had its benefits, but undermined the “national unity.”\textsuperscript{350} Nicholas's ascension to the throne marked the start of the first period, which was meant to bring Russians back to their Russian roots. Upbringing of every person was now to be carried out in three stages: the familial, the governmental and the final one, which would combine the two. The familial stage consisted, in turn, of three layers of diminishing importance: the religious one, the national one (“warmed by a profound love to everything domestic [otechestvennoe] and a certitude about future great calling for

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{346}{Ibid., 86.}
\footnotetext{347}{Ibid., 89.}
\footnotetext{348}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{349}{Ibid., 92.}
\footnotetext{350}{Ibid., 94.}
\end{footnotes}
Only the last outer layer would be “European.”

Thus, the first layer was to create a Christian, the second a Russian and the third one “an educated European, ready for public life.” Shevyriev devotes a considerable space to answering the question of how the second, national layer was to be built. The most important step was a comprehensive instruction in the Russian language, which was, after all, “a mirror of a Russian person.” Echoing Uvarov’s concerns, Shevyriev asserts that a crucial thing was to bring Russian into noble families, who preferred foreign tongues to the national one.

While the second, governmental stage of upbringing does not raise too many questions for Shevyriev, who sees a necessity of primary education and control imposed by the state sufficient to mould youngsters into desirable shapes, the last stage, when one was supposed to enter a university, is seen as the crucial and the most problematic. Shevyriev reminds parents that universities can occupy and entertain only minds of their students, while life at the same time keeps distracting them with passions. Thus, it is precisely during this crucial stage of development that most of parental love and control is needed, combined with the governmental role in the form of university education, to form a proper son of the Fatherland, ready to serve his country. Summarising his ideas, Shevyriev concludes by stating that upbringing will only become national in Russia when the familial is properly united with the governmental.

What emerges from this article is a heavily “national,” not to say nationalistic, interpretation of the doctrine of Official Nationality. We find here a heavy emphasis on religion and its role in the public and private life, glorification of autocracy and a heavy insistence on the necessity of development of the national element in Russia. While the

351 Ibid., 96.
352 Ibid., 97.
353 Ibid., 99.
354 Ibid., 105.
necessary celebration of Russian imperial diversity is present, Shevyriev, as is evident from his reasoning, would rather prefer uniformity in opinions and tongues. His insistence on learning and further introducing the Russian language was in accordance with Uvarov's own ideas.

Another, a highly programmatic article is, in fact, a speech commemorating the unveiling of a monument to poet and statesman Gavriil Derzhavin, who contributed so much to “the Fatherland, Science and Art,” in Kazan, his native place. It is published in the issue 57 of the Journal in 1848. The speech itself was delivered by a pro-rector of the Kazan University Karl Foigt on August, 23, 1847. Apart from that post, Foigt was a member of the Council of the Minister for Public Enlightenment, and a Kazan University graduate in Eastern languages; in short, Uvarov's intellectual child.

As Kazan was the birthplace of the poet, it was the privilege for the city to speak in the name of “all Russian sons.” Recalling the events of Derzhavin's life, Foigt does not fail to mention that he came from a Tatar family that pledged allegiance to Russia long ago, during the Middle Ages. His story of Derzhavin is, in fact, paralleled by the story of rising educational standards and feelings of nationality in the Empire.

Thus, a newly opened gymnasium was a huge help to the deprived in search of knowledge Derzhavin. However, the director of the gymnasium still could not provide enough, for he was “lacking an authentic [samobytnyi] talent, was constrained by the dominating and badly understood French school.” Here, in the very first sentences, we see

359 Ibid., 5-6.
a call for authenticity in public education and identifying misgivings with the foreign domination. This discursive disposition is characteristic of the Ministerial line on nationality and education and echoes Uvarov’s own concerns and views.

Foigt claims that Derzhavin was “such a full expression of Russia.”360 In particular, his voice was the voice of the people, for “between the life of peoples and lives of their representatives there is a hidden harmony […] voices of peoples within the mankind are clearly heard in their chosen ones.”361 Foigt emphasises the closeness, real and imaginary, of Derzhavin to the common folk, depicting with vivid details his life in the soldiers' barracks. His adult life is depicted in terms of serving the Russian language with translating the foreign works, while his “authentic feelings” rise when he hears about the victories of Catherine II.362 The crucial point in his life comes in 1779, when he breaks with norms of classicism and decides to work “in his own way.” His guiding principles in this new work are, expectedly, “the Faith, civic virtue [grazhdanskaya doblest’] and glory of the Fatherland.”363

In a characteristic move, Foigt dwells on the peculiarities of Russian history while supposedly explaining the contents of Derzhavin's lyrics to his listeners. All the Ministry's articles of faith are there, such as an affirmation of the correct choice of the Eastern Christianity, the necessity of Peter's reforms, which erected “a new building of the Russian life,”364 and a Russian Sonderweg.365 However, Peter's work was only half-done, and it took a woman who was “German by birth, but Russian in her soul”366 to boost construction works. Now a Russian could enjoy a happy unity of “authentic elements of national [narodnoi] life” combined with a “European comfort.”367 We see here another insistence on merging

360“...nashu Rus', kotoroi on [Derzhavin] byl takim polnym vyrazheniem.” Ibid., 8.
361Ibid., 9.
362Ibid., 11.
363Ibid., 14-15.
364Ibid., 16.
365Ibid., 78.
366Ibid., 17.
367Ibid.
autochthonous elements of Russian life with European incrustations. The sheer amount of statements to this effect permits us to understand Official Nationality as a recipe for correctly merging the elements in the imperial pot.

Proceeding to an analysis of Derzhavin's poetry, Foigt identifies central themes in his work. Firstly, it is religion, and religion understood as a counter-measure to “the morbid scepticism of Philosophers, their freethinking philosophising! [umsvojanie]”\textsuperscript{368} Of course, this style is strikingly reminiscent of Uvarov's writings. Admitting that Derzhavin himself did not escape the fashionable intellectual currents of the century, Foigt affirms that soon he was seeing the truth again, and with him the whole society. Foigt does not forget to mention Derzhavin's \textit{Hymn on Chasing the French away from Moscow}, which united Christian and popular motifs. However, in the end this text proves to be an ode to a close “convergence of Russian and Western ideas.”\textsuperscript{369} At any rate, “the sacred Faith, which, […] having sanctified the Russian land, […] protected [Russia] from enslavement by external violence and saved from temptations of dialectics of the West,”\textsuperscript{370} was the first Derzhavin's idea.

The second central theme in Derzhavin's poetry is, predictably, “the life of Russia, […] of her state, society, and private persons,” which the poet describes with outstanding love.\textsuperscript{371} The glory of the fatherland cannot be separated from the glory of the ruling house, and both are ordained by God. Derzhavin's loyalty and submission to the throne are called “specifically Russian [chisto-Russkoyu].”\textsuperscript{372} Derzhavin faithfully depicts victories of the Russian sword and ensuing festivities, Russian in spirit.\textsuperscript{373} The poetry of Derzhavin is, after all, a poetry of and for a “Russian man [Russkii chelovek],”\textsuperscript{374} his soldiers are first and

\textsuperscript{368}Ibid., 31-32.  
\textsuperscript{369}Ibid., 34.  
\textsuperscript{370}Ibid., 53-54.  
\textsuperscript{371}Ibid., 35.  
\textsuperscript{372}Ibid., 36.  
\textsuperscript{373}Ibid., 40.  
\textsuperscript{374}Ibid., 44.  

\pagebreak
foremost Russian soldiers, and his noblemen Russian noblemen. A certain poem of his is described in the following terms: “and these marvellous, romantic sounds […] [became] a national [narodnyi] motto of a common Russian love towards the fatherland.”

All Derzhavin's motifs, in Foigt's analysis, are finally grounded in all the things Russian. Even the theme of beauty finds its final expression only in its Russian form. This ideal Russianness was manifest in Derzhavin, because he, being “a son of the North and the East,” possess all the elements that made the Empire in the correct proportion. “The Russian life,” which was the source of inspiration for Derzhavin, was an eclectic merger of everything: “a boundless diversity of the Nature, conditioned by the geography of Russia, thousands of peoples [plemen], united under one sceptre […] familiarity with the worlds ancient and new, Eastern and Western.” These all were Russian and, therefore, Derzhavin's attributes. These “conditions of the national [narodnyi] caratter” made Derzhavin the poet, who reflected “the whole of the Russian nature, with all the elements dissolved in it […] all the phases and shades of the Russian character […] all the tones of the Russian voice.” This merger is framed in the language of Romantic organicism, which is also not forgotten, but significantly played down when compared to the amount of the organicist metaphors in the early Journal; thus, only when Russia finally succeeded in “merging into one organic body different waves of peoples […] renewed nationality was created.” Foigt even creates a name for this merger, “russizm.”

In his conclusion, Foigt points out that Derzhavin was a “purely Russian” and yet “a worldly” poet, in which he sees no contradiction. The monument to him, symbolising Art,
complemented already existing monuments to the “statesmanship wisdom” and a “sad Muse standing above the late historiographer's bust,” which commemorated science in the Empire. This imperial remembrance was to be doubled in the hearts and memory of the nation, where another monument to Derzhavin stood firmly.

It is interesting to note how, in Foigt's analysis, Derzhvin's religiosity became “truth” and his glorifying the deeds of the Russian monarchy “goodness.” It is also illuminating to note that Foigt's speech, in which the “Russian” part occupies a very prominent place, is delivered in Kazan, and statements describing local loyalties abound as well. Obviously enough, Foigt does not have any kind of ethnic understanding of the concept of “Russian” in mind, but the distance between the cultural and the ethnic had become shorter.

What emerges from this article is a stern affirmation of imperial values. Both Derzhavin's personality and poetry come to be described in terms concordant with Official Nationality. Derzhavin becomes the embodiment of the “national,” which for Foigt means both imperial and cultural. However, as the correct version of nationality became increasingly identified with merging whatever was to be found in the Empire into the melting pot of Russianness, there appeared some who did not want to become merged.

383Foigt refers to the Alexandrian Column found it the Palace Square of St. Petersburg. It was unveiled in 1834 and commemorated the victory over Napoleon, designed and built by Auguste de Montferrand. See Julie Buckler, Mapping St. Petersburg: imperial text and cityshape (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36.

384This is an allusion to the monument to Karamzin, erected in Simbirsk (the writer was born in that gubernia) in 1845, at the unveiling of which Pogodin delivered a speech resembling the one analysed here. See Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia, 1825-1855, 179; Joseph Black, Essays on Karamzin: Russian man-of-letters, political thinker, historian, 1766-1826 (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 155.


386Ibid., 56.

A rejected view of nationality: an unsuccessful attempt to influence the debate

However, it would be erroneous to assume that nationality was left uncontested or that only trusted authors with relatively secure positions undertook to address the issue. On the other hand, there have been attempts to redefine, or at least give additional meanings to the useful concept. An interesting document that tries to do precisely that can be found in the archive of Konstantin Serbinovich, the Journal’s first editor. It is dated from 1841, and it is an article submitted for the publication in the second section of the Journal written by a certain law scholar Nikolai Pecheneg. The article is titled “Concerning the basic principles of life of the Russian state, i.e., Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality in their relation to education,” and it is both a daring and yet seemingly conservative interpretation of the official state doctrine.

The article is interesting in many respects. First of all, it never was published in the Journal: the hardly readable Serbinovich’s pencil on the margins of the first page indicates that there is “no need” in such an article. Yet it is the only one of its kind preserved in the archive of the editor, and there must have been a reason for such caring for posterity. This, however, is only part of the matter. Connected to it – and the part that makes this document so precious a finding – is the analysis presented in the article itself. In it, Pecheneg tries to re-interpret the conventionally conservative doctrine in a more democratic (bordering on republican terms) way. In the best traditions of such a discursive frame, Pecheneg tries to manipulate the linguistic content of the doctrine (and even coins neologisms for his purposes) in order to give a new, unexpected meaning to the formula. The fact that his article never made it into the Journal shows the limits of interpretation that were permitted from the state and its formal and informal institutions. Moreover, the contrast with the published articles

388Nikolai Pecheneg, “Ob osnovnykh nachalakh zhizni Russkogo gosudarstva, t.e. Pravoslavii, Samoderzhavii i Narodnosti v prilozenii ikh k vospitaniyu [Concerning the basic principles of life of the Russian state, i.e., Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality in their relation to education]”, 1841, collection 1661, bundle 1, item 263, RGIA. It is to be noted that the author uses the Russian word vospitanie, which at the time meant both education as we understand the words now and the moral building of a person’s character, an upbringing.
from the 1840s, with their formed views on nationality, show why precisely such a
collection could never have been published. It is a logical, albeit an unintended
consequence of the fact that the doctrine was initially created open to interpretations. This
brought along the ability to mutate, which is an answer to the question of why the formula
was able to survive for so long. However, as we know from hard sciences, there never are
only “correct” mutations: there will always be variants that would have to be dismissed. The
same goes for the texts open for interpretation, and Pecheneg’s article is exactly such an
interpretation. However, let us turn to the article itself.

For the biggest part of it, the article seems to be a contribution of a laymen to the
igorous edifice of official state propaganda. According to Pecheneg, Orthodoxy, Autocracy
and Nationality is an organic development on Russian soil (as we have seen, the Romantic
organicism was part of the admissible interpretation of the formula during the reign of
Nicholas I), and it is a “live logic [sic] of the Russian people [Russkogo naroda],” evident
from the life of this people and “systemically developed” in it.\textsuperscript{389} The formula is claimed to be
superior especially in the field of education, as the “admittedly educated states” do not
employ such a national structure as the main principle of their respective educational systems.
Instead they use “ever-changing, according to the times, guessed systems,”\textsuperscript{390} which are
inferior to the Russian one, because the latter stemmed from the (supposed) understanding of
the nation – a “great” nation, as is all too often emphasised in the article, of which
intellectuals like Uvarov were merely oracles. The Western education was based upon what
the intellectuals had guessed, individually created. The formula “resonated with all the
Russian life, the whole Russian soul,” which embraced “the totality of world’s multitudes and
harmony,” and this was precisely the basis on which to compete, predictably, with Europe.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid.
In his article Pechneg attempts to give definitions to previously undefined concepts. Orthodoxy for these purposes turns out to be “a complete usage of teachings of Christ [...] and overall Christian morals to education.” Religion is portrayed as a *sine qua non* of the life of a nation, as a cause of progress, evident in the history of the Russian state (called for its vastness a “world-state”\(^\text{393}\)), and, indeed, the whole world, which would mean nothing without the Russian state (“the mankind, without the Russian State, is a vague sound without a meaning, a dream without its fulfilment, an idea without a notion”).\(^\text{394}\) Orthodoxy was responsible for, again, purportedly non-violent bringing together of the Slavic tribes into one public union (sic!; *obshestvenyi soyuz*).\(^\text{395}\) Autocracy,\(^\text{396}\) in turn, basing itself on religion, was able to cultivate a unique identity,\(^\text{397}\) a “self-nationality” of the newly created society with nothing less than civil statutes.

It is worth pausing for a moment to investigate the terminology here. In order to convey his message, Pecheneg resorts to a kind of a play on words: while his word for “a unique identity” is *samobytnost’*, he, following its model (from *sam-* meaning “referring to self”), creates the neologism *samonarodnost’*, which is even more complicated to understand and render into English than its prototype *narodnost’* itself. This *samonarodnost’* (self-nationality later) will play a very important role in Pecheneg’s text and is laden with fascinating overtones and shades of meaning, most of which, again, seemingly republican.

Then, as the “young, inexperienced Autocracy” fell victim to the feudal wars, it was “without any doubt” that “in view of lacking common development of Russia (*Rus’*) the

\(^{392}\)Ibid., 3.
\(^{393}\)“Mir-Gosdarstvo.” Ibid.
\(^{394}\)Ibid.
\(^{395}\)Note the use of terminology. As the text moves forward, it becomes more and more republican in spirit.
\(^{396}\)In fact, Pecheneg refers to the Mediaeval times, to the feudal socio-political structure of which no such term can be meaningfully applied.
\(^{397}\)Or uniqueness. The word that is used here is *samobytnost’*, which implies a very wide spectrum of meanings: it means uniqueness and self-dependency in everything from the everyday life to the sphere of the political.
uniqueness (samobytnost') of the parts increased gradually.**398 Again, this passage is indeed another insistence on the popular, national capability of political self-organisation. The rest of the Russian history before the advent of Romanovs is the story of Orthodoxy spiritually fostering the unity of Russia (characteristically, the Time of Troubles with its strong Polish overtones is not even mentioned). “What did we have to do,” exclaims the author, “with the self-directed workings of reason,**399 when Religion was for us a conviction of heart, a matter of consciousness and not a political calculation, when we understood its sainthood with experiences of our lives, got to live with it as our saver, […] and were convinced by it in the events of our own lives, and not by the guessed inventions of reason, the bloody facts?”**400 The opposition here is noteworthy: “guessed inventions of reason,” which we saw earlier associated with Europe, are here connected with “bloody facts,” while “events of our lives” are filled with religion and are presumably not bloody.

Having affirmed the primacy of the heartfelt belief over deductions of reason, Pecheneg goes on to claim that “it is in the unshakeable holy idea of Orthodoxy that the idea of Autocracy is grounded.” Autocracy is then defined, in terms highly reminiscent of Rousseau's thought, as “the total combination of wills and powers into one common will, one power.” The embodiment of this common will is the autocrat. Autocrats are embodiments of wisdom and consideration; “our Monarchs never sought what was not theirs […] understanding the necessity of enlightenment, our Monarchs introduced it carefully, seeing that much is really learnt and not simply taught; and that is why we have not seen in our lands consequences of that deplorable education that […] in its ignorant arrogance strove for destroying the existing order of things.”**401 Moreover, the passage concerning the innovations

---

399“Suemudrstvovanija razuma.”
401Ibid.
is followed by a footnote that says “there are so many rumours now about railways. Everybody is convinced in their usefulness, but the Government, trying to understand the needs of the people and considering all the governmental relations, does not yet see their necessity”.  

This passage is baffling on many accounts. Apart from the evident inconsistency concerning the railways (it was precisely under Nicholas I when they were introduced in Russia) and denial of historic expansion of the Russian state together with the omission of two other emperors named Peter, the passage reads as a cautious praise sung to the rulers who introduced enlightenment and innovation in general, acting as oracles of the “common will.”

This apparent Russian bliss, the author continues, was the result of the fact that “the tsar knew his people and its needs, and the people knew the tsar and his desires.” The unity was an “obvious” matter, since it was organic, as the “feeling of love towards the Monarch is not something artificially cultivated in the Russian soul, but a live part of it which can develop by itself without any regard to the outside circumstances.” Thus, the Ministry again was only the mouthpiece of the common will of the Russian soul, and the introduction of Autocracy as the second element in the triad was the result of Ministry's “deep understanding of Russian life.”

The third element, nationality, is rooted in Autocracy as the latter is rooted in Orthodoxy, according to Pecheneg, whose treatment of nationality is exemplary. Having acknowledged the plurality of opinions concerning the concept of nationality, which in itself

---

403The first one (more of symbolic than strategic value) was built in 1837, connecting the 17 km distance between St. Petersburg and Tsarskoe Selo. Ironically, it was one year after the unsuccessful article that the Department of Railways was created, whose task was to oversee the construction of the first important railway that connected St. Petersburg and Moscow (this project, that started in 1842, was completed in 1951.) By the end of Nicolas' rule, there were 570 miles of railway track in Russia. See Henry Reichman, Railways and revolution : Russia, 1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 16.
404Ibid., 11.
405Ibid., 11.
406Ibid.
is a very telling sign (we should remember that quite some time had already passed since the original introduction of the formula), Pecheneg affirms that the Ministry for Public Enlightenment had solved the issue in the best possible fashion. However, the sentence that follows immediately speaks of *samonarodnost’,* the self-nationality, which is nowhere to be seen in the original triad, but which is crucial for Pecheneg and which he tried previously to equate with “simple” nationality. Talking about them in an evidently interchangeable fashion, Pecheneg defines nationality as follows: “attaching ourselves to the present, we must, following instructions of the Government, to further develop our improvability (*usovershimost’) from our own powers,” while “the Autocrat, as a representative (sic!) of the nation (*naroda*), is at the same time its engine of development. Concentrating in his person all the features of the state, all of its physical and spiritual being (*byta*), acting as head for everybody, he is the one who directs the society to uniqueness (*samobytnosti*), self-nationality. And this is how the idea of Nationality by itself follows from the idea of Autocracy.”

Apparently, this is the crucial passage of the whole article; probably the one that it was written for. Compared to the rest of the text, this passage actually carries a novel meaning to the whole discourse of nationality, and this meaning is quite radical. Almost contrary to what Pecheneg had been stating before, the autocrat is portrayed as a people's representative, whose sole purpose is to guide the society to progress, which is depicted in strikingly republican terms. The goal of this development is self-nationality, which is all too easy to confuse with self-government. Moreover, autocrat's role as an usher (*napravitel’,* the one who shows direction) does not really square with tsar's divine mandate. Given all this, the conclusion of the passage insisting on the seamless flow of ideas from autocracy to nationality seems all the more weak and suspicious.

---

407Ibid.
Pecheneg's conclusion tries to bring together all his threads. Nationality, claims Pecheneg, is an idea that developed satisfactorily only in Russia [na Rusi]. According to him, “everybody is proud of being called a Russian,” and future hopes of Russia lie in cultivating in the young hearts “the seeds of Christian morale, submission to the throne, affection to everything Russian” and in the Orthodox Tsar reigning “for the sake of our self-nationality.”

Indeed, this document poses a number of the most puzzling questions. Why was this article not published? And yet, why did Serbinovich keep the manuscript? Finally, why does it read both as a piece of ardent official propaganda coming from a layperson and at the same time almost as a call for reforms along republican lines? On the one hand, judged by the articles published in the first issue of the Journal, Pecheneg’s contribution seems to be of the same kind, and if it was submitted at the time when the search for the nationality was ongoing and active, it seems very probable that such an article would have been published. However, an analysis of the publications of the adjacent years shows that the Ministry had apparently no intention of stirring the established convention on the meaning of the concept. Out of twelve closest issues of the Journal (for the years 1839, 1840, 1841) there is no single article that deals with the problem of nationality itself. Thus, an attempt to revitalise the debate might have been judged out of time by the editor. However, while this might have been an important factor, I have offered the suggestion that what was wrong with the article was precisely its over-the-top interpretation of the doctrine. While Pecheneg dutifully extolled the virtues of Orthodoxy and Autocracy, it could not escape anyone's eye that the centre of gravity is for him the issue of nationality, which he even reinforces by adding the additional element. The goal of development of societies in the view of this self-nationality, to which the Autocrat only guides them as a representative of a nation could not have been seen as

408 Ibid., 13.
innocent, and it was perhaps this suggestion that made publication impossible. It was all the more impossible when compared to nationality-oriented articles that were published in the *Journal* in the 1840s.

Apart from these considerations, this article presents an interesting case of manoeuvring in the field of discourse. The Cambridge school of intellectual history insists that a text has to refer to certain pre-existing conventions, standards and expectations in order to advance a new idea. It seems that this text offers a textbook example of this: the apparent discrepancies between the amount of standard propaganda and the novel and provocative idea of self-nationality can be explained precisely by it: in order to submit an unexpected contribution and stir the ongoing debate, Pecheneg had to match the expectations, which he definitely tried to do (in the end, unsuccessfully). His mode of arguing his case is highly resemblant of the published contributions, his usage of history and the metaphors he employs (especially the one of organic development) all fit the model of articles that made it past the editor. All these consideration together, it seems, allow us to view Pecheneg's contribution as an attempt to influence the debate on nationality which addressed certain conventions but was too radical to be actually allowed to appear on the pages of the *Journal*. 
Chapter 6. Instead of an Epilogue: Uvarov's Fall from Power

It seems to be logical to finish my account of the fate of nationality in the Empire of Nicholas I with a brief account of Count Uvarov's fall from power, which was brought about by the forces he himself played a major role to set free.

The first major blow to Uvarov's position was the publication in 1836 in the fifteenth issue of *Telescop*, a journal edited by Nadezhdin, of the “First Philosophical letter” by Petr Chaadaev.409 Uvarov, as the Minister overseeing the censure in the Empire, was seen as a direct culprit. The letter, written from the “Necropolis,” left almost no hope for any possibility in the development of the Russian polity and nation in any form. As Richard Tempest aptly put it, “the Letter ... dispraised Russia in her past and present as an exception to the universal laws of humanity, despaired of her future, deplored her Orthodoxy, described her as a pariah among the nations of both East and West, and denied that she possessed a true civilisation.”410 The reaction of the government was proportional to the level of aggressiveness of the letter: Chaadaev was declared mad and was made to promise that he would not publish anything again,411 Nadezhdin banished to exile in the North of Russia until


410Tempest, “Madman or Criminal,” 281.

1838, the censor that permitted the publication was laid off without a pension. Uvarov personally asked for the termination of the journal, calling the article “a veritable crime against national honour.”

After all, as Tempest asserts, Chaadaev's crime was a crime against Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality. Uvarov, whom he calls “the first modern minister of propaganda,” deemed the publication of such an article even more dangerous “at a time when the highest government circles are making every effort to revive the spirit of the people and to extol all that is Russian.” Uvarov even ordered a full-scale investigation into the contents of the Ministry's Journal in order to ensure that its political stand should remain stainless. The trauma from the event ran so deep that Uvarov felt compelled to refer to this incident in his Ten Years, and in a very euphemistic form at that.

However, this was only the first and the mildest warning. Chaadaev's article might have been an implicit attack on nationality (as well as on Orthodoxy and to some extent on Autocracy), but it was not challenging an established imperial order of things. However, the challengers did not take long to appear.

Although the fateful European events of 1848 and 1849 did not spread to the Russian Empire in the form the autocracy dreaded, it was enough to make the rulers nervous. Soon the existence of the so-called Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius (or, alternatively, the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius) was uncovered. It was a relatively harmless and certainly a small group of people based in Kiev. Its ideology, as Whittaker puts it, “blended Cossack romanticism, Christian democracy and republican Pan-Slavism, while

413 Tempest, “Madman or Criminal,” 281-282.
414 Ibid., 283.
415 Ibid., 285.
simultaneously attacking tsarism, serfdom, Great Russian nationalism, and international political order. As a matter of fact, the group only held meetings during 1846 and was almost non-functioning when a student reported on them to the authorities. After the investigations, only ten people were punished, and it was found that the society had no apparent connection with Polish exile in Paris.

A relatively minor incident as it might seem from a first glance, it marked the beginning of the end of Uvarov's career as the Minister for Public Enlightenment. So much about the society could be traced to the Minister's actions: from promoting Slavic studies to the fact that four convicts were students or recent graduates of St. Vladimir University, the creation of which Uvarov oversaw. Taras Shevchenko, who was not, strictly speaking, part of the group, but rather an intellectual influence and who was sent to the military, had been appointed a professor of drawing at St. Vladimir University, while Kostomarov a professor of Russian history. This, together with other similar mishaps, severely compromised Uvarov. A censorial confusion ensued, ending in a de-facto dual system of censorship in the empire; the fate of the universities and even secondary schools seemed threatened.

The next blow came in 1849, when a significantly larger group of the so-called Petrashevtsy (after their intellectual leader, Michael Butashevich-Petrashevski) was discovered. A fraction of the group was clearly interested in overthrowing the autocracy, others dreamt of large-scale reforms. The group had an overall socialist inclinations (their leader was greatly influenced by the ideas of Fourier); Dostoevsky's daughter Liubov even

419 Ibid., 216.
420 Ibid., 226-235.
claimed Russian socialists “descended from the Petrashevtsy.”\textsuperscript{421} Their self-estimation of the number of their sympathisers was five to eight hundred; over two hundred people were arrested during the investigation and released for lack of evidence and many more escaped capture.\textsuperscript{422} Critically, “of the fifty-one members exiled and the twenty-two sentenced to death (a sentence the tsar later commuted), many were university or lycée students or lecturers.”\textsuperscript{423}

Nicholas ordered a sharp reduction in the number of enrolled students, wanting to limit the education only to the noblemen of highest trust. Personal misfortunes sealed Uvarov's fate: his wife died on July 14, 1849 and he suffered a stroke in September.\textsuperscript{424} Although recovering quickly, he resigned on October 20, 1849. Uvarov's successor, a former naval officer Prince Platon Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, kept to the policy of restrictions. Philosophy courses were cancelled in the universities and Slavic studies became discouraged, while Russification intensified, and censorship was at its peak. The Crimean defeat set the stage for reform again, which Uvarov was never able to see, for he died in 1855 seeing only six month of the new reign. It took another complicated figure, much resembling Uvarov, Count Dmitry Tolstoy, who graduated from the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum in 1843 and served as a Minister for Public Enlightenment from 1866 until 1880, to introduce educational reforms in the Uvarovian line, seemingly finishing Uvarov's program with the necessary corrections which were demanded by the changing times.\textsuperscript{425}

\textsuperscript{422}Ibid., 435; see also her larger work The Petrashevtsy: a study of the Russian revolutionaries of 1848 (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press, 1985).
\textsuperscript{423}Whittaker, The origins of modern Russian education : an intellectual biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855, 236.
\textsuperscript{424}Ibid., 237.
\textsuperscript{425}A classic on this important imperial figure is Allen Sinel, The classroom and the chancellery: state educational reform in Russia under Count Dmitry Tolstoi. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
Conclusions

The purpose of the present work has been to analyse the developments of the concept of nationality, the crucial component of the ideology of the Russian Empire of Nicholas I, in close connection to its introducer and the main promoter, Count Sergei Uvarov and the main organ of his Ministry for Public Enlightenment, the Journal. A special attention was paid to ideological underpinnings of creating such a journal. It has also been shown how the concept of nationality was put to use in the first issues of the Journal, when its contents were amorphous and porous and how the 1840s saw a rather solid version of nationality employed in the most ideologically important ideological contributions. Uvarov's self-assessment, viewed through the prism of nationality, was also analysed.

The work has shown that it is possible and has been practised in literature to view the author of Official Nationality as either a statesman and reformer or an ideologue. It is argued that Uvarov is best understood when his reforms are viewed through the prism of his ideology, and this is precisely how Uvarov himself presents his achievements as Minister to Nicholas I in his Ten Years of The Ministry. The work has also shown that a certain caution needs to be exercised when circumscribing relevant sources for analysing Uvarov's ideology; some, as his famous speech in the Pedagogical Institute, cannot be used in order to understand Uvarov of the Nicholaevan Russia. In sum, it has been argued that Uvarov's intentions and actions are best understood combining both approaches. The issue of separation or combination of these aspects of Uvarov's tenure is important for, as it has been shown, different approaches taken in the literature have so far led to different views and depictions of Count, his reforms and his ideology.

The present work has also emphasised the kind of tasks Uvarov was faced with and
how they motivated his actions. Indeed, the Minister had found that there were all too many circles to square. The Empire he had to modernise educationally was very distinct, and, as today's language would have it, multicultural, and yet he had to try to unify it, or at least its elites, under the banner of nationality without alienating them. The Minister's nationality was meant to preserve the essential distinctiveness within the all-imperial inclusiveness.

It is shown that the *Journal* of the Ministry is to be understood in the context of thick journals that were burgeoning in the Empire. Uvarov understood it as his mission that the Ministry should create a role model for all thick journals, which would be the henchman of imperial science and compass of its ideology.

The theoretical chapter of this study has explored various possibilities for analysing the intellectual output that has served as its source base and has traced how these possibilities were employed in the history of scholarship on the question. While the study has been conducted in the tradition of history of ideas, other related methodologies have informed the present analysis. Moreover, by historicising the crucial concepts, such as ideology, a more theoretical insight into the subject matter has been gained. Many theoretical insights coming from the work of Benedict Anderson were crucially important for this work, and his overall structural description of official nationalisms seem to be validated and warranted by the source material of the study.

Dealing with such questions as have been asked in the present study always raises connections with related and complicated problems, threatening with a kind of regression into infinity. Thus, it is always necessary to circumscribe the collateral problems that would inevitable have to be addressed. One such problem is Russia's place between East and West as seen by Uvarov and his contemporaries, the possibility of a Russian *Sonderweg* and, as a particular application of this problem, the version of “Enlightenment” that the Ministry of the
same name was to spread: should it be French, German or a specific national one? As it has been shown on the materials found in the Journal, the overwhelming response indicated the preference for a specific one based on romantically understood German version.

The question of “which Enlightenment” is addressed in the lengthy archival document that was analysed in this study. Describing the methods and goals of the Journal, it sheds new light on Uvarov's intentions. The source shows the Minister as trying to guide the waves of the inevitable Russian Aufklärung and fostering its brand new version, compatible with Orthodoxy and Autocracy. Uvarov understood the necessity to fight for people's minds and his Journal was intended to be the main weapon of the Ministry in this battle. The document also clearly reflects Uvarov as having to find the middle ground between his heartfelt pro-Europeanness and a search for unique national and imperial identity. We also see that, crucially, the concept of “nationality” is not yet employed in the document (although its cognates are, as well as other components of the famous triad), pointing at a certain hesitation in an implementation of a yet undefined and amorphous concept. Yet, as it has been shown, an analysis of later Uvarov's writings, most importantly, the Ten Years, show a much more confident use of the concept which is later depicted as a guiding force for reforms.

An analysis of the early issues of the Journal from the thirties shows how exactly a wide call for defining and putting to use the concept of nationality worked. It has been shown how nationality was understood with the help of the language of Romanticism and, in particular, its metaphor of organicism. It has also been argued that there were various senses in which nationality could be used, most importantly, as a requirement (of literature, education, or personal conduct), as an interpretation (of historical processes) and as a normative (of imperial development). This polyvalence of nationality is seen as its defining characteristic in the Journal publications in the 1830s.
Uvarov's *Ten Years* shows how the Minister defined, viewed and evaluated his work through the prism of nationality. The description of Russification processes found there is seen as strongly proving Benedict Anderson's thesis. Uvarov's achievements in reforming schooling of all levels in the Empire is impressive, and yet more impressive is the ideological framing he ascribes to his reforms and educational ideas. Uvarov's treatment of specific provinces of the Empire shows him as an acute statesman and yet again serves as a proof of the complexity of his task and the tricks nationality had to perform in order to include all imperial nations. Especially illuminating is Uvarov's ideological framing of the war he waged against private education. Building the foundations of a solid educational system in the Empire, Uvarov at the same time cemented the ideological structure that, having preserved the same form of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality had to significantly change during subsequent rulers. The predominantly cultural program that Uvarov promoted could not stay that way forever.

The *Journal* in the 1840s presents a radically different picture compared to the time of its inception. In many issues in a row it is impossible to find an article dealing with ideological matters; most of them are devoted to strict science or Mediaeval history of the Russian Empire. However, in certain cases highly ideological articles by trusted people were still published. What emerges from their analysis is a consolidated view of nationality with certain identifiable features (and yet the term never lost its amorphous character). Nationality was understood as uniqueness of subjects of the Russian empire, yet this uniqueness is a peculiar one: it necessarily shares many features of the European life, against which it has to define itself. Nationality is, furthermore, understood as an answer to the seemingly unsolvable problem of unifying all the imperial diversities. Although European ways still receive some credit, anti-Western feelings are much more tangible in the 1840s than they
have been in the 1830s, signalling a nascent trend. The national, finally, is understood to endorse different levels of loyalty, of which the loyalty to the Orthodox Church, the throne and Russian imperial life are dominant. Lastly, the concept of nationality is used to depict a correct, schoolbook image of an imperial poet and statesman, Gavriil Derzhavin, with which the latter is elevated into the imperial pantheon. With the help of the idea of nationality, Derzhavin, a scion of a Tatar family, characteristically becomes a “purely Russian” poet, who at the same time belongs to the whole world and different civilisations.

The years following the European turmoil of 1848 and 1849 saw an attempted reversal of Uvarov's educational policies. However, his ideology was left in its place and the system he built turned out to be too strong to be easily undone. While it took another long-serving Minister for Public Enlightenment to significantly promote and secure what Uvarov had laid foundations for in the sphere of education, Uvarov's concept of nationality, not least for its inherent capacity for mutation, survived until the very end of the monarchy.
Bibliography

Primary sources

RGIA – Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoriceskii Archiv [Russian State Historical Archive], St. Petersburg.


“O chisle razoslannykh ekzempliarov Zhurnala za 1840 god i ob upotreblennoi na izdanie ego bumage [Concerning the number of sent copies of the Journal for the year 1840 and the paper that was used for it]”, 1841. Collection 742, bundle 1, item 10. RGIA.

“O sokrashchenii izderzhek po izdaniiu Zhurnala [Concerning cutting down the expenses of publishing the Journal]”, 1839. Collection 742, bundle 1, item 6. RGIA.

Pecheneg, Nikolai. “Ob osnovnykh nachalakh zhizni Russkogo gosudarstva, t.e. Pravoslavii, Samoderzhavi i Narodnosti v prilozhenii ikh k vospitaniyu [Concerning the basic principles of life of the Russian state, i.e., Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality in their relation to education]”, 1841. Collection 1661, bundle 1, item 263. RGIA.


“Polozhenie ob organizatsii redaktsii ‘Zhurnala Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya’,”
obyavlenie o vozobnovlenii zhurnala i pechatnye ‘Pravila dlja uchastvuyushchikh v
trudakh ‘Zhurnala Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya’ [The statute concerning
creating the editing office of the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment,
announcement about the continuation of the Journal and printed 'Rules for those
collaborating in the Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment’],” 1833.
Collection 1661, bundle 1, item 245. RGIA.

Rozberg, Mikhail. “Ob istoricheskom znachenii Rossii [On historical significance of
Russia].” The Journal of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment, no. 17 (1838): II, 1-16.

Soloviev, Sergei. Moi zapiski dlja detei moikh, a esli mozhno, i dlja drugikh [My notes for my

Shevyriev, Stepan. “Ob otnoshenii semeinogo vospitaniia k gosudarstvennomu [Concerning
the relationship of family upbringing to the state upbringing].” The Journal of the

Uvarov, Sergey. Desiatiletie Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya 1833-1843 [Ten years
of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment 1833-1843]. St.Petersburg: Typography of
the Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1864.

———. “Doklady ministra narodnogo prosveshcheniiia S.S. Uvarova imperatoru Nikolaiiu I
[The reports of the Minister of Public Enlightenment S. S. Uvarov to the emperor
Nicholas I].” In Reka vremen, edited by Maksim Shevchenko. Vol. 1. Moscow: Ellis
Lak, 1995.

———. Obschii vzgliad na filosofiui slovesnosti [A general overview of the philosophy of
humanities]. St.Petersburg, 1848.

Secondary literature

Aizlewood, Robin. “Revisiting Russian Identity in Russian Thought: From Chaadaev to the
Early Twentieth Century.” The Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 1 (January

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of


Bauman, Zygmunt. “Excursus 1: Ideology in the Postmodern World.” In In search of politics,

Beiser, Frederick. Enlightenment, revolution, and romanticism: the genesis of modern
German political thought, 1790-1800. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press,

———. The early political writings of the German romantics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.

———. The romantic imperative : the concept of early German romanticism. Cambridge

Berger, Stefan, and Alexei Miller. “Nation-building and regional integration, c.1800-1914:
the role of empires.” European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d'Histoire 15,

Berlin, Isaiah. “Russia and 1848.” The Slavonic and East European Review 26, no. 67 (April


Tempest, Richard. “Madman or Criminal: Government Attitudes to Petr Chaadaev in 1836.”
Slavic Review 43, no. 2 (Summer 1984): 281-287.


Zeldin, Mary-Barbara. “Chaadayev as Russia’s First Philosopher.” Slavic Review 37, no. 3 (September 1978): 473-480.