UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: FRENCH PRODUCT WITH EUROPEAN STAMP

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Abstract

The paper focuses on the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean, i.e. the transformation of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 Mediterranean initiative into the latest Euro-Mediterranean policy of cooperation. It claims that the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean occurred through a complex process of foreign policy-making that involved both the Member States and the European Commission. Moreover, the process of Europeanization was informed by a blending of a European ‘discourse of responsibility’ towards the Mediterranean with the pragmatic reasons that pushed France, Germany, Italy and Spain to become involved in the initiative. Since Europeanization lacks explanatory power for disclosing the intricate European foreign policy mechanisms that lead to the transformation of the French proposal into a European-led policy, the paper brings in intergovernmentalism and discursive institutionalism as a means to render Europeanization more specific and to support the claim that both a normative discourse and a utilitarian rationale have informed the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean.
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Introduction

“We had dreamt of it. The Union for the Mediterranean is now a reality.”¹ These words were uttered in the aftermath of the 2008 Paris Summit that launched the Union for the Mediterranean. Considered to be the brainchild of the hyper-active French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the Union for the Mediterranean represents the newest European endeavor to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean relations.

President Nicolas Sarkozy had proposed during the 2007 Presidential electoral campaign the launch of a cooperative framework between the Mediterranean riparian countries. According to Nicolas Sarkozy, the Mediterranean Union² was supposed to be a political union under French leadership and dealing with issues such as migration, energy or environmental cooperation. Germany, Italy and Spain were reluctant to accept the French initiative. After a negotiation process with these countries, Sarkozy was obliged to accept the Europeanization of his initiative. The Union for the Mediterranean was forwarded at the 2008 Paris Summit that gathered both European and Mediterranean representatives.³

At first glance, the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean is yet another official vow towards a region that shares historical, cultural, economic, political and social ties with Europe. It is well documented that starting with 1970s, the forerunner of the European Union, namely the European Community, had forwarded various policies that were meant to lay the grounds for a closer cooperation between the two Mediterranean shores.

The first signs of the need of a renewed cooperation between the European Union and the Mediterranean region started to show along with the 2003/7 European Union

² This was the name of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperative framework as forwarded by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. Once the French proposal was transformed into a European one, the name was changed in the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’. In order to avoid confusion, the paper will use only the term ‘Union for the Mediterranean’.
enlargement, with the launch of the 2004 European Neighborhood Policy or the failure of the 2005 Barcelona Summit. Additionally, events such as the terrorist attacks from New York, London and Madrid, the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, or the Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood electoral victories in the Palestinian Authority and Egypt respectively proved the need of the European Union to reconsider the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The scholarly milieu has not left unnoticed the Union for the Mediterranean and its place in European Union foreign policy-making. Inquiring into the academic endeavor to understand the emergence of the Union for the Mediterranean, the literature has been either descriptive or prescriptive in accounting for its development in European affairs. Yet, no effort has been directed towards bringing a theoretical input in explaining the emergence of the Union for the Mediterranean, its transformation from French to European initiative or its locus in European foreign policy affairs. These are some blind spots that the present paper aims to address by looking through a conceptual lens at the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Several scholarly endeavors were launched in order to inquire into the overall contribution that the Union for the Mediterranean brought to the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs present a pessimistic view on the Euro-Mediterranean relations and underline that the Union for the Mediterranean fails to bring a substantial change to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Kausch and Youngs regard the overall Euro-Mediterranean policy as a quasi-failure because the Member States and Brussels give too much importance to the security threats that arise in the Mediterranean region.\(^4\) Stephen C. Calleya adopts a different stance than the previous authors, and regards the Union for the Mediterranean as an “exercise in region building.”\(^5\) Calleya claims that the 2008


policy initiative could be regarded as a spring board for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation onwards because of its emphasis on low-politics, on partnership and co-ownership between the two shores. Calleya agrees with the policy recommendations that Kausch and Youngs put forward but adds that special attention should be given to the agency of the Mediterranean countries and the grievances of civil societies.  

More specifically, a bulk of the academic literature emphasized the French actorness into the Union for the Mediterranean. Mireia Delgado presents the French proposal as a struggle of the French leadership to balance between cooperation and individualism in European affairs and Richard Gillespie inquires into the policy-making novelties that the French proposal brings to the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Michael Nash evaluates the French efforts to launch the Union for the Mediterranean and points out that Sarkozy’s proposal should be linked with the French goal to play an important role in European affairs. 

Other authors were interested in the process through which the French initiative was Europeanized and transferred at the European Union. Despite of this interest, these authors fall short in the arranging the emerging of the Union for the Mediterranean within the conceptual framework of Europeanization. Federica Bicchi claims that the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean would not have been possible without the Spanish and the Italian support for the French initiative. Rosa Balfour and Michael Reiter agree with Bicchi that the French-Spanish-Italian cooperation led to the development of the Union for the

Mediterranean but add that the European Commission played a significant role in the launch of the 2008 Euro-Mediterranean initiative.\(^\text{11}\)

It is rather surprising that Europeanization has not been conceptually used in order to explain the transference of the French proposal to the European level. Lately, the concept of *Europeanization* has surged a scholarly appetite for inquiring in both the usefulness of the concept and its potential to be applied to (foreign) policy decision-making in the European Union. Ruben Wong claims that *Europeanization* is a cross-disciplinary concept that draws its roots from institutional theory, comparative politics and globalization.\(^\text{12}\) According to Kevin Featherstone, *Europeanization* could be used both in restrictive terms, as referring only to the European Union and its Member States, and in a broader sense as referring to the linkages exiting between Member States.\(^\text{13}\)

It is commonplace to define Europeanization through *adaptation* or *downloading*. Johan P. Olsen refers to Europeanization as a process of mutual adjustment that affects both the European Union and the Member State and it is a process through which the model of European governance is transferred at the national level.\(^\text{14}\) Robert Ladrech points out that Europeanization is “an incremental process” through which the Member States adjust to the European dynamics of policy-making.\(^\text{15}\) Claudio M. Radaelli has referred as well to Europeanization as a process of adaptation characterized by interactivity and as a means through which both the (future) Member State and the European Union adapt to one


The process of adaptation has been characterized a top-down approach through which the European Union projects its influence on the Member States.\textsuperscript{17} Europeanization has been treated to a lesser extent as a process through which European Member States are able to influence the European Union policy-making. Through a bottom-up approach or uploading the Member States project their preferences and interests at the European level.\textsuperscript{18} Wong claims that the roots of this mechanism of Europeanization are found in “rational choice theories or interests-based accounts of national preferences.”\textsuperscript{19} Hence, through bottom-up or uploading, the process of Europeanization serves the interest of the Member State as a means of helping them to acquire influence in the European Union. Therefore, the Member States might aim to influence European policy-making because they want to enhance their position in the world, want to influence the foreign policy of the other Member States or simply want to use the European Union as an umbrella for reducing the risks of pursuing a controversial policy.”\textsuperscript{20}

The European institutions become important as they serve as fora for legitimacy but also as venues for the meeting between different European interests. This means that the preferences uploaded at the European level might be changed in order to fit the preferences of all Member States. But while the policy proposal might be altered in order to satisfy a common European action, the goal of the Member State that pushed for European policy change remains the same: to use the European Union as an instrument to pursue national interest.\textsuperscript{21} This argument is forwarded by Jacquot and Woll, who claim that the Member


\textsuperscript{19} Wong, “Europeanization of Foreign Policy,” 137.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 140-2.

States project their national interest through a “strategic usage”\textsuperscript{22} of the European Union. This means that the Member State that aims to influence European foreign policy-making might agree to cooperate with the other Member States in order to maximize their chances to influence the European foreign policy. In this context, Member States might choose their own preferred path of action such as building coalitions with their counterparts.\textsuperscript{23}

Nonetheless, the process through which Europeanization takes place remains highly underspecified. Highlighting Europeanization as a process that occurs through uploading or downloading leads to an elusive conceptualization of how policy-making is developed within the dynamic interaction between the European Member States and Brussels. In this context, Europeanization remains an elastic concept that does not offer a clear understanding of how national policy proposals become part of the European Union in order to fit the preferences of all the Member States.

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned considerations, the paper has a two-fold objective. Firstly, it aims to investigate the reasons that led to the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean and to explain the institutional form that the Union for the Mediterranean took after the French proposal was Europeanized. In order to examine both of these elements, the paper scrutinizes the policy-making processes and mechanisms that were put in place in order to secure the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean.

The inquiry into the Europeanization of the French proposal leads to the second objective of this paper. Starting from the previously stated observation that Europeanization remains highly underspecified, lacks explanatory power and does not provide sustainable tools for inquiring into the intricacies of the mechanisms through which policy-making occurs, the paper resorts to the theories of intergovernmentalism and new institutionalism (\textit{i.e.}


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
discursive institutionalism) in order to inquire into the policy-making process that allowed the Europeanization of the French initiative.

This detachment from the traditional accounts of Europeanization merits further explanation. Thus, intergovernmentalism and discursive institutionalism will be used in order to explain the Europeanization of the 2008 policy proposal because the traditional mechanisms of Europeanization, uploading and downloading, are not specific enough in order to help me in examining the processes of policy-making that led to the Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean, to observe the actors involved in this process or to explain the institutional form that the Union for the Mediterranean took once it became a European Union policy. The scarce definition of Europeanization as either adaptation or policy transference is unable to grasp the complex European process Therefore, the two theories mentioned above will serve as tools to render the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean more specific and will allow me to inquire into the processes of policy formation and policy-making that account for the emergence of the latest Euro-Mediterranean framework of cooperation as a European Union endeavor.

The usage of intergovernmentalism and new institutionalism to make the concept of Europeanization more concrete in explaining the complex process of policy-making and policy formation at the European Union level requires in itself further explanation. Firstly, the two theories were chosen under the claim that there is a fine connection between Europeanization and integration. More explicitly, intergovernmentalism presents integration as a process in which Member States agree to cooperate through bargaining their pre-defined interests. Thus, one could claim that the decision of Member States to negotiate their interests resembles with the process of Europeanization through uploading because each actor forwards and presents to the other actors his preferences. The link with Europeanization may seem less evident in regard to discursive institutionalism. However, there is a nuanced
relation between the new institutionalist argument that ‘institutions matter’ and Europeanization through uploading. In other words, since Europeanization through uploading regards institutions as meeting place between different European interests, one could claim that this corresponds with the institutionalist claim that institutions are *fora* in which actors engage in policy-making.

Secondly, the two theories are used due to their contradictory explanatory power in regard to policy-making within the European Union. Intergovernmentalism underlines that Member States are the most important actors in the European Union and decisions are taken according to a process of interest bargaining. The Member States are interested in safeguarding their national interest therefore states cooperate only if there is an overlapping of preferences amongst Member States. Moreover, institutions are developed only if they serve the interests of Member States. At the other pole, new institutionalism regards institutions as playing an important role in policy-making and as being able to influence the political output. According to discursive institutionalism, institutions can be the result of political action but also *loci* for policy-making. Moreover, discursive institutionalism detaches from the intergovernmentalist bargaining based on predefined interests and points out that political behavior and action is guided by norms and values.

In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, intergovernmentalism will be used to explain the reasons that impinged on France, Germany, Spain and Italy to cooperate on the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean and to transform it into a European endeavor. All four states negotiated over the 2008 policy initiative according to their national preferences whereas consensus was reached as their interests overlapped. However, intergovernmentalism falls short in explaining the normative discourse that provided impetus for the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean and which was unfolded both at the European and Member State level. In other words, intergovernmentalism does not offer
tools in inquiring into the European Union ‘discourse of responsibility’ towards the Mediterranean neighbors. This value and norm-driven discourse has been displayed over time in the official declarations and documents of the European Union and provides a counter-argument to the claim that Member States are rational actors that act in order to pursue their pre-defined interests.

Asking the question why the Union for the Mediterranean was Europeanized, the paper claims that the conveyance of the French initiative at the European level occurred through a vibrant policy-making interaction between France, the other Member States and the European Commission. Therefore, the paper argues that the French initiative was Europeanized due to a blended process of policy-making that was informed both by domestic national preferences and by a nuanced normative discourse based on the European ‘duty’ to support the Mediterranean region.

A caveat. The paper does not inquire into the French initiative to launch the Union for the Mediterranean or into the reasons that pushed President Sarkozy to forward such a proposal. As the object of inquiry is the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean, the paper focuses on the European processes of policy-making that lead to the transformation of the French initiative into a European policy towards the Mediterranean.

In order to answer the research question of this paper, I will start by explaining the motives that drove the cooperation between France, Germany, Italy and Spain in order to secure the emergence of the Union for the Mediterranean. Through the intergovernmentalist theoretical lenses, the reasons of the above-mentioned states will be unfolded and the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean will be presented as the outcome of a bargaining process between four different stakeholders with different national preferences. Hence, the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean represents as a result of a successful cooperation between different states whose interests overlapped. Discursive
institutionalism will be brought into discussion where the intergovernmentalist agenda leaves off. In other words, discursive institutionalism will be used in order to disclose the norm and value-driven discourse that informed the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean. This normative discourse was present both at the national and European level and has provided impetus for the transformation of the French proposal into a European policy initiative.

Methodologically, the paper looks at the Union for Mediterranean as an in-depth case study analysis by explaining the factors that led to its Europeanization. In this context, the paper will resort to content and discourse analysis as a means to bring to light the subject matter. Content analysis will be used in order to inquire into scholarly books, academic articles and working papers as a means to examine the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean, and to put forward the theoretical framework of the paper. Discourse analysis will be used in order to scrutinize the official European documents and the speeches of the European actors regarding their attitudes and efforts to Europeanize the Union for the Mediterranean.

The paper will be structured in four chapters. The first chapter forwards a brief historical background that arranges the Union for the Mediterranean into the overall Euro-Mediterranean relations. The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of the paper by dwelling on the intergovernmentalist and discursive institutionalist conceptual tenets. The third chapter will claim that the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean occurred as a result of an intergovernmental bargain between France, Germany, Spain and Italy. The four countries fostered different interests in regard to their involvement into the Union for the Mediterranean. The fourth chapter claims that the Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean was informed by the existence of a normative discourse regarding the ‘duty’ of the European Union to support the development of its Mediterranean neighbors. This was a
two-level discourse present both in the European and national official declarations. The paper will conclude by evaluating the main findings and will present further areas of research both in the context of Europeanization and in regard to the examination of the Union for the Mediterranean.
Chapter 1. Historical Background

1.1 From the Global Mediterranean Policy to the Barcelona Process

A historical background of the Euro-Mediterranean relations is insightful in understanding the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean. According to Ricardo Gomez, the Euro-Mediterranean process of cooperation started in the 1970s and has been characterized by a blending between “continuity with responsibility for negotiating and re-negotiating agreements”\(^\text{24}\) between the two Mediterranean shores.

The first European attempts to foster cooperation with the Mediterranean occurred under the dictate of Cold War geopolitics. The European Community was eager to prevent a possible Soviet influence in the region.\(^\text{25}\) Thus, the European Community signed a series of bilateral agreements with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, meant to secure economic and trade association between the involved parties.\(^\text{26}\)

The Global Mediterranean Policy was launched in 1972 as the first endeavor to treat the Mediterranean region as a unit. According to Russell King, the rationale behind the Global Mediterranean Policy unfolds the European attempt to enhance the political stability of the region.\(^\text{27}\) The Global Mediterranean Policy was a cooperative framework designed to deal with social, economic and technical issues within the Euro-Mediterranean region and with the ultimate goal of establishing a free trade area.\(^\text{28}\)

The emergence of the 1973 Arab oil embargo as a consequence of the American decision to support the Israeli army in the Yom Kippur war demonstrated the European

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vulnerability regarding events occurring in the international arena. According to Loukas Tsoukalis, the oil crisis represented a “shift of power towards the South” and made the European countries to push for further political cooperation with the Arab world. Therefore, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was launched as a diplomatic endeavor to foster cooperation between the European Community and Arab League regarding areas such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, socio-cultural or technological cooperation. At a closer look, a case of interdependence was the driving force behind the launch of the Euro-Arab dialogue. Whereas the Arab world supplied the European Community with petroleum, the Community provided technical assistance aimed at supporting the growth of the Arab economies.

The beginning of the 1990s proved the need to rethink the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The Iraqi invasion in Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War, the possible exodus of illegal migrants into the European Community as a consequence of the North African demographic growth, the African economic stagnation and external debt had increased the European vulnerability to changes in the Mediterranean. These changes also provided an impetus for the development of the Renovated Mediterranean Policy and the subsequent European Mediterranean Partnership. Whereas the Renovated Mediterranean Policy proposed minor changes aimed at improving the bilateral relations between the European Community and the Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership proposed a major upgrade of the relations between the two Mediterranean shores.

Signed in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Policy (known also as the Barcelona Process) is a multilateral framework of cooperation. According to the Barcelona Process, joint action between the two Mediterranean shores occurs along three dimensions or baskets:

34 Ibid., 50.
political and security, economic cooperation and socio-cultural relations.\textsuperscript{35} In spite of all expectations, the Barcelona Process was not a successful policy as it failed to improve the socio-economic context of the region or to support the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.\textsuperscript{36}

The subsequent events from the international arena challenged the status of the European external relations. On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks, the Iraqi intervention or the launch of the 2003 European Security Strategy proved that the European Union has to rethink its role in international affairs and its relation with the periphery. The official discourse behind the launch of the European Security Strategy was “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean.”\textsuperscript{37} On the other hand, the European Union accepted ten new Member States in 2004 and was preparing to accept two new members in 2007. This process of enlargement not only challenged the internal dynamics of the European Union but also led to the expansion of the European borders.\textsuperscript{38} Consequently, the European Neighborhood Policy was launched in 2004 in order to avoid “the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{1.2 From the European Neighbourhood Policy to the Union for the Mediterranean}

The European Neighborhood Policy represents an encompassing policy framework reuniting both the Southern and the Eastern European neighbors. It is a cooperative


framework based mostly on bilateralism and is meant to ensure joint action regarding a number of issues ranging from migration, organized crime terrorism and energy security.\(^{40}\)

The failure of the 2005 Summit when most of the heads of the Arab countries refused to participate was the first sign that the Euro-Mediterranean relations have to be reshaped. The 2005-6 Russian-Ukrainian oil gas crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of the European Union states in front of energy disputes in its periphery\(^{41}\) whereas the electoral victories of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Movement of the Society for Peace and Justice and Development Party in Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Algeria and Morocco respectively showed Brussels the need to allow space for dialogue with the Islamist movement.\(^{42}\)

The above-mentioned dynamics from the Euro-Mediterranean region served as a launching pad for the development of the Union for the Mediterranean. The first thoughts about Union for the Mediterranean were uttered during the 2007 French presidential campaign. Nicolas Sarkozy, the then center-right French Presidential candidate forwarded his views on a future European project regarding the Mediterranean region and a new European-Mediterranean cooperative framework.\(^{43}\) Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that a new framework of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation should aim to incorporate the Southern and Northern riparian Mediterranean states under French leadership. In this context, Sarkozy invited Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus to join France in a renewed attempt to foster cooperation with the Mediterranean countries.\(^{44}\) The Presidential candidate underlined that the

\(^{40}\) Dannreuther, “Developing the Alternative to Enlargement,” 187.
\(^{44}\) Reiter, “From the (French) Mediterranean Union to the (European) Barcelona Process,” 320-2.
Mediterranean Union (as it was called in its early stages) would be a different entity from the other Euro-Mediterranean projects. This new Mediterranean institutional framework was “to work closely with the European Union” and would “develop in future common institutions with Brussels.”45

Sarkozy found it very difficult to convince his European counterparts of the soundness of his proposal. The Nordic countries, Germany and the United Kingdom proved reluctant towards the French proposal.46 After several bilateral meetings between Germany and France, Nicolas Sarkozy agreed with Angela Merkel to downscale the initiative. Germany asked the Commission to draft a proposal that would envisage a new European policy towards the Mediterranean region. The 2008 Paris Summit forwarded the new Euro-Mediterranean cooperative framework under the name ‘Barcelona Process: The Union for the Mediterranean’, policy which covered the twenty-seven European Member States and Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Israel, Jordan, Croatia, Egypt, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, the Arab League and Libya as an observer.47

The Union for the Mediterranean is regarded as complementary to the Barcelona Process but there are several novelties that the Union for the Mediterranean brings to the Euro-Mediterranean fora. It places the emphasis on low politics issues such as maritime pollution; improvement of transport and communication links; the development alternative sources of energy; support for small business activities or the launch of the Mediterranean University in Slovenia.48 Regarding the political cooperation between the European Union

46 Balfour, “The Transformation”, 100-1.
47 Reiter,”From the (French) Mediterranean Union to the (European) Barcelona Process,” 319.
and the Mediterranean region, the Union for the Mediterranean is based on partnership, cooperation and co-ownership. Therefore, the highest political body of the new Euro-Mediterranean is the G-Med, which is formed from Head of States and Governments who are likely to meet biannually. The workings of the Union for the Mediterranean are to be supervised and coordinated by a mechanism of co-presidency gathering a European and a Mediterranean member respectively. The Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean is in charge of forwarding project proposals for the development of social and economic ties between the two Mediterranean shores. The European Commission is to closely cooperate with the Secretariat and the Joint Permanent Committee, the latter serving as a link between the Mediterranean states and the political bodies of the Union for the Mediterranean.49

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Intergovernmentalism

The 1960s-1970s were marked by a diminishing of the European integration process and by a recurrence of national interests in European politics. Several developments from the European political stage such as the difficult relation between the Gaullist France and the European Community, the 1965 ‘empty chair crisis’ or the 1966 Luxembourg ‘Compromise’ proved that the European Member States are very interested in safeguarding their national interest when European Community issues are raised.50

It was in this historical context that Stanley Hoffmann developed the theory of intergovernmentalism. In essence, intergovernmentalism is a critique of neofunctionalism. Arguing that integration is not likely to be driven by the interests of elites groups, Stanley Hoffmann underlined that the process of integration occurs through a convergence of national interests.51 Moreover, intergovernmentalism represents a response to supranationalism and its emphasis on the role of supranational institutions as driving forces behind European integration. According to Hoffmann, supranational agents and institutions enjoy a limited authority because “international cooperation, the accompanying rules that guide it and the institutions that frame it”52 are the result of a process of bargaining between the Member States. According to Lebow, bargaining is defined as “a search for advantage through accommodation. When states bargain, they try (…) to exchange proposals in search of mutually acceptable agreements.”53 Put it differently, bargaining occurs whenever players that

50 Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 75.
foster conflicting interests become aware that reaching an agreement would serve their interests.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, the core assumption of intergovernmentalism is that national governments are the most important players in the process of European integration. Concerned both to promote and to safeguard their national interests, Member States are likely to bargain according to their domestic preferences and concerns, whenever decisions are to be taken at the European level. Hoffmann believes that national governments empower supranational institutions as long as this serves their national interests. Despite emphasizing national preferences as driving forces behind the process of integration, Hoffmann rejects the realist perspective on national interest. By claiming that “international politics cannot leave aside what happens within the units,” Hoffman defines national interest as “constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences and domestic forces and rulers all play a role.” In other words, Stanley Hoffmann regards national interest in less parsimonious terms by looking into how national interests are built throughout history and how they are shaped according to domestic preferences. Hence, the European policy is informed by domestic preferences.

Intergovernmentalism would claimed that the Union for the Mediterranean was Europeanized as a result of bargaining between the most important players in European affairs and who foster specific national interests. In other words, the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean is explained as a consequence of overlapping national interests of Member States.

54 Puchala, “European Integration,” 319.
55 Bache, George and Bulmer, Politics, 12-3.
57 Ibid.
2.2 Discursive Institutionalism

The ‘new’ institutionalist scholarship is united in the assumption that “institutions do matter” and that they are likely to influence the output of political action. The neo-institutionalist scholarship developed in the early 1980s, starting with the seminal contribution made by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, who pointed out that institutions are very important in the “collective life of the social context of politics.”

The neo-institutionalists regard institutions both as a result of political action and as agents that shape the behavior of political agents. Put it simply, the institutions are likely to enjoy relative autonomy and to influence, constrain or determine the behavior of political actors. In fact, institutions are not just arenas in which politics are made but they can enhance the political outcome by acting as a linchpin between the preferences of the actors and the political output. Despite of these unifying assumptions, the neo-institutionalist scholarship represents a blending of different strands of thought: sociological, historical, rational choice, normative in or discursive institutionalism.

Discursive institutionalism represents a recent approach in the neo-institutionalist theoretical agenda. Vivien A. Schmidt agrees with Olsen and March that institutions are more than a locus for policy-making because institutions can themselves influence political output. Schmidt adds that institutions are either ‘given’ (arenas for actors to engage in policy-making) or ‘contingent’ (“the result of agents’ actions”). As its name suggests, the novelty that discursive institutionalism brings to the neo-institutionalist agenda is that it emphasizes the role of “ideas and discourse in politics.” Discursive institutionalism does not refer only to

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58 Rosamond, *Theories*, 113.
60 Rosamond, *Theories*, 114.
63 Ibid., 303.
the ‘text’ of the discourse but also at the (institutional) forum in which the discourse is conveyed. Or, in Schmidt’s own words, discursive institutionalism focuses both on the “substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional context.”

One step further, discursive institutionalism moves from a policy-making based on rational interest and presents political action as being infused by a normative behavior. In this context, political action is guided through logic of appropriateness that unfolds what one should or should not do. This recalls March and Olsen’s observation that the actions of the actors are guided by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and not through a ‘logic of consequentiality’, which is characteristic of a rational calculated behavior. In this context, discursive institutionalism recalls even the conceptual tenets of normative institutionalism because the latter emphasizes as well the “centrality of values and norms in political analysis.”

Furthermore, discursive institutionalism and normative institutionalism are united in their assumption that political behaviors and emerging policies represent outcomes of pre-existing norms and values that underpin the functioning of society and institutions. Whereas Vivien A. Schmidt underlines that “policies resonate with a deeper core of principles and norms of public life (...) or with the long-standing ones in the societal repertoire”, Daniel C. Thomas claims that “pre-existing norms and commitments” contribute to political outcome.

Both Schmidt and Thomas agree that policy-making in accordance with pre-existing norms and values gives legitimacy to political action. Hence, Thomas emphasizes that legitimacy of political outcome is secured through “joint actions, consistency and

coherence” with pre-existing norms in policy-making. Vivien A. Schmidt underlines that the legitimacy of political action gains meaning in a policy sphere within which policy actors “engage in coordinative discourse” by elaborating and forwarding “policy ideas.”

Schmidt adds that individuals such as policy entrepreneurs act in a “coordinative sphere” in order to legitimize their actions and to secure collective behavior. The term “policy entrepreneurship” was coined by John W. Kingdon. The author described the policy entrepreneur as an “advocate for a proposal or for prominence of idea.” Various authors drew inspiration from Kingdon and expanded the notion of policy entrepreneur. Thus the policy entrepreneur has been tagged as a “political actor that promotes policy ideas”, as an actor that aims to “change the direction and flow of politics” or as “career professional that propels innovations in line with their policy goals.” Andrew Moravcsik turns towards supranational entrepreneurs and underlines that they are pivotal in international negotiations through the persuasive manipulation of information and ideas.

Policy entrepreneurs should benefit from the existence of certain ‘policy window’ in order to forward their ideas. This translates into the emergence of a certain opportunity that allows for the policy entrepreneur to forward his ideas and to affect policy-making. In other words, the political entrepreneur should benefit from a “vacuum” in the process of policy-making in order to push for its own preferences to be listened and taken into consideration at

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69 Thomas, “Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches,” 344.
71 Ibid.
the highest level of decision-making. Similarly to a ‘policy window’ Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones claim that the policy entrepreneur has to benefit from a “policy venue” in order to be able to launch his ideas and push for innovation. In addition to innovation, Moravcsik underlines that the tasks of the supranational entrepreneurs is to negotiate and mediate policy proposals on behalf or for national states.

Discursive institutionalism would claim that the Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean is the result of a normative discourse unfolded within the institutional context of the European Union and has developed throughout time. Therefore, the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean is informed by the presence of a value-driven discourse that recalls the existence of previous European commitments towards the Mediterranean.

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Chapter 3. Consensus at the Highest Level: France, Germany, Spain and Italy Seal the Mediterranean Deal

This chapter will inquire into the bargaining process that took place between France, Germany, Spain and Italy in order to Europeanize the Union for the Mediterranean. Drawing on the intergovernmentalist theoretical agenda, the chapter will support the claim that the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean is the result of the overlapping national interests of Member States.

3.1 Franco-German Axis of Cooperation in European Affairs

The Franco-German intergovernmental bargaining was informed by the strong national interests that both countries brought into the process of negotiating the Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean. The German national interest was informed by the need to preserve the traditional Franco-German cooperation, to secure harmony of interests in the European Union, to ensure that European Union (and Germany as the major contributor to the European budget) will not finance a quasi-European policy and that the German bilateral agreements will not be undermined.

The bilateral relation between Germany and France represents a trademark in European politics. Starting with the 1967 Élysée Treaty, the Franco-German cooperation has been the driving force behind the process of European integration. The Franco-German bilateral cooperation based on bargaining was reflected in the 1994 Essen Council when the future launching of the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership “emerged as a quid pro quo for

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the pre-accession strategy"\textsuperscript{82} for the upcoming European enlargement towards the East. The Essen Declaration underlined the strategic significance of the Mediterranean area and the need to develop a European custom-made policy for the region in the near future. One year later, the Barcelona Process: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched.\textsuperscript{83} In addition, the Essen Council represents a landmark in the Franco-German relation as it lays the foundation of what is called the “South-East equilibrium.”\textsuperscript{84} According to Tasche, the South-East agreement was forwarded in order to assure France that Germany does not aim to increase its influence in the European Union at the expense of the other Member States (implicitly, France) and that all future European affairs are to be agreed by both Berlin and Paris. In addition, the Essen Council proposed the elaboration of the so-called ‘proximity strategies’ that were used to forward the subsequent endeavors regarding the foreign policy of the European Union towards the neighboring periphery. It was under the umbrella of these ‘proximity strategies’ that the future European Neighborhood Policy was developed. Primarily designed for the Eastern neighbors of the European Union, Germany and the other Member States were persuaded by the Southern European states to also involve the Mediterranean countries.\textsuperscript{85} The European foreign policy based on ‘proximity strategies’ gains further meaning if read under an intergovernmental-driven rationale. States follow their national interest but they sometimes see themselves pressured to accommodate their preferences according to the interests of the other states.

Having in mind the above-mentioned considerations, Germany’s initial reluctance to the French endeavor to launch a (Mediterranean) foreign policy proposal outside the traditional Franco-German cooperation is justified. In 2007, when President Sarkozy

\textsuperscript{82} Hyde-Price and Jeffrey, “Germany in the European Union,” 700.


\textsuperscript{84} Thérèse Carolin Tasche, “The Project of a Union for the Mediterranean – Pursuing French Objectives through the Instrumentalisation of the Mare Nostrum,” \textit{L’Europe en formation} 356 (2010), 63.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 58-59.
presented his policy proposal regarding the Union for the Mediterranean, Germany was holding the Presidency of the European Union. Germany did not react and waited for this proposal to be tabled at the traditional biannual summit that was yet to occur between France and Germany. But as Nicolas Sarkozy did not show any intention to discuss the proposal with Angela Merkel and he turned towards Spain and Italy for further support for his proposal, the German Chancellor publicly displayed her dissatisfaction with the French initiative. Hence Angela Merkel highlighted that the European Union should not reflect a “Europe of private functions.”

Merkel’s conviction that Sarkozy’s actions are undermining the Franco-German relation is disclosed in her presentation of the Union for the Mediterranean as a “corrosion of the EU in its core area” that could lead to “explosive forces in the EU that I would not like to see.”

One step further, the German desire to preserve harmony of interests in the European Union represents another reason for Berlin’s negative reaction to the French decision to act as outside the umbrella of the European Union. Germany has traditionally been the promoter of unity and common interest amongst the European Member States. According to Hyde-Price and Jeffery, the German emphasis on European cooperation and harmony of European interests are rooted in the historical background of Germany. Not only that Germany had to learn from its tragic past but also it witnessed the political benefits of European integration. Therefore, Germany has “developed a European way of thinking” that infuses its foreign policy and behavior in the European Union.

It is in this context that Germany took a hard stance against the Franco-Italian-Spanish exclusive cooperation regarding the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean.

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89 Ibid.
Reacting to the Franco-Italian-Spanish cooperation and the meeting of Nicolas Sarkozy, Silvio Berlusconi and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in Rome, Angela Merkel declared that “If there are group-specific co-operations within the EU, those have to be open to all member states. Europe can only succeed jointly. Let's not forget that, even if some discussions are cumbersome.” Angela Merkel’s words echo a process of Europeanization in which all the Member States have to be involved in a new proposal even though the initiative originates from a country or a group of countries. Therefore, the European fora should be open to all European Member States in order for them to forward their preferences. In this context, Angela Merkel declared that “we want to offer to all member countries the possibility to participate. We should have a reinforced co-operation. I am convinced that all European countries are interested in this.”

A further motive in explaining the unwillingness in accepting the French proposal is explained through the German reluctance to support a policy that does not involve all the Member States but is funded by Brussels. Traditionally, Germany is the most important contributor to the European budget. Thus, it is not surprising that Berlin wants to be part of all European policies, especially the ones that involve financial aid. It was in this context that Angela Merkel rejected a policy that would not fall under the umbrella of the European Union but would be possibly funded by Brussels. Angela Merkel was very explicit in this concern: “It cannot be that some countries establish a Mediterranean Union and fund this with money from European Union coffers.” Angela Merkel is not the first German Chancellor that is wary in regard to funding towards the Mediterranean region. In 1995, Helmut Kohl, along

90 Angela Merkel quoted in “Berlin Rejects EU ‘Corrosion’.”
with the Netherlands and United Kingdom, has tried ineffectively to oppose the increase of financial support towards the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{94}

The budgetary issues that the French proposal raised have made the United Kingdom and Sweden to coalesce with the German position. The British and the Swedish leadership agreed with Angela Merkel that launching the Union for the Mediterranean could possibly lead towards a situation in which financial support would be offered for a quasi-European policy that does not reflect the common interest of the Community. In addition, both Sweden and the United Kingdom feared that a new Mediterranean policy might lead Brussels towards diverting funding from the Eastern neighbors towards the Southern ones.\textsuperscript{95} Federica Bicchi supports the claim that the role of Germany was essential in the process of Europeanizing the French initiative. According to Bicchi, by opposing the initiative and acting as a “veto player through fence-sitting the proposal”\textsuperscript{96}, Germany has actually succeeded to attract the attention of the other European actors. Moreover, the traditional leadership position that Germany has in the European Union has persuaded the other Member States such as the Nordic ones to support the German stance.\textsuperscript{97} Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden feared that the European trade policy or the aid policy should be renegotiated if only some of the European states are part of the French proposal.\textsuperscript{98}

In addition to the financial reasons, Germany was reluctant towards the adoption of a new Euro-Mediterranean policy. Tobias Schumacher underlines that Germany was satisfied with the format of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership because it brought the opening of the markets for German products.\textsuperscript{99} In this context, the bilateral German-Libyan agreement stands out. Whereas Libya is the second largest source of oil for Germany, the latter is the second

\textsuperscript{94} Schumacher, “German Perspectives,” 14.  
\textsuperscript{95} Balfour, “The Transformation,” 100.  
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 7.  
\textsuperscript{99} Schumacher, “German Perspectives”, 15-6.
arm exporter to Tripoli.\textsuperscript{100} In other words, a possible French-led initiative in the European Union could have undermined not only the already existing bilateral relations between Germany and the Mediterranean countries but also the benefits that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership brought to the German economy. A French initiative would have meant more bargaining power for France with the Maghreb countries, and less influence for Germany in the region.

In spite of all these initial motives that made Germany to reject the French proposal, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to launch the Union for the Mediterranean. In the aftermath of their informal meeting that secured the agreement between Sarkozy and Merkel, the two politicians declared that: “It's obvious that we always find agreements when it matters.”\textsuperscript{101} This declaration recalls the long-standing cooperation between France and Germany and hints at the fact that the two countries are able to cooperate and forward joint actions. The agreement could be considered a success for German foreign policy because Sarkozy accepted the downscaling of his initial proposal according to German preferences. Therefore, according to the German preference, the Union for the Mediterranean would be an improved policy based on enhanced partnership and co-ownership between the two Mediterranean shores and under the auspices of the European Union. In the same time, the French initial grievances were not forgotten. When forwarding the propositions for a Union for the Mediterranean, President Sarkozy claimed that “Barcelona did not attain its objectives.”\textsuperscript{102} The official document that was forwarded by the Commission and that


\textsuperscript{102} Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours à Toulon.
established the Union for the Mediterranean echoed Sarkozy’s words: “new efforts are needed in order to transform the Barcelona objectives in tangible results.”

Recalling the 1994 Essen declaration that secured cooperation between France and Germany in European matters according to a *quid pro quo* negotiation process, the Franco-German agreement was presented in the European media as a clear result of bargaining amongst the most powerful states in the European Union. Apparently, Germany accepted the French proposal under the substantial concessions that France made in regard to the CO2 gas emissions agreement. As both of the countries are known for their car industry, they agreed that the limit of gas emissions should be settled according to the weight of the car. France produces small cars, and is likely to fulfill all requirements in the near future, whereas the German car industry is concentrated on bigger and more polluting cars. Nonetheless, the German industry would be hardly affected as it benefits from an escape clause that accepts the gas emission level of big cars as long as the producers balance their car production with small vehicles. Thus, Germany remains highly privileged in this context.

In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, the Franco-German negotiation regarding the Union for the Mediterranean represents a case of intergovernmental bargain. Even though Sarkozy aimed to be the sole leader in the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean, the French President could not ignore the German opposition. The Franco-German acquiescence to each other’s preferences led to the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean. Even though both countries had different motives and different perspectives regarding the launch and the Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean, France and Germany reached an agreement that satisfied both parties: Germany succeeded to

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103 Déclaration commune du sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée [Common Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean].
secure the unity of the European Union and to safeguard the Franco-German traditional relation and France gained the support of one of the most influential actors in the European Union. In addition, the Union for the Mediterranean seems to have been a tit-for-tat policy in which the Union for the Mediterranean was forwarded in exchange for the French consent to the German proposal regarding the European Union’s policy on gas emissions restrictions. The later claim enforces the intergovernmental bargaining policy process that stood behind the Union for the Mediterranean and the Franco-German negotiating process.

3.2 Franco-Spanish-Italian Cooperation: Steering Group for the Mediterranean

Both Spain and Italy were interested in joining the French proposal regarding the Union for the Mediterranean. Despite of their common desire to limit the French increasing influence in the Mediterranean (especially in the context of Franco-Algerian relation), their energy concerns and their desire to see the Union for the Mediterranean under the umbrella of the European Union, the two countries fostered different views on the Union for the Mediterranean. While Spain saw the Union for the Mediterranean as a grandiose project, Italy regarded it as a technical body meant to secure the implementation of projects concerning socio-economic issues. Furthermore, Federica Bicchi presents both Italy and Spain as entrepreneur states that wanted to leave their footprint on the policy format of the Union for the Mediterranean. The French desire to act alone represented a surprise especially for Spain. During the Barcelona Process, Spain and France cooperated in drafting and launching the European Mediterranean Partnership. But the Union for the Mediterranean did not display the same rationale. According to Bicchi, the French choice of action runs counter the traditional European foreign policy-making towards the Mediterranean when the Southern European countries usually cooperate in the launch of a Euro-Mediterranean policy.\footnote{Bicchi, “Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations,” 7.}
The Spanish foreign policy towards the Mediterranean has always been a walk on a tight rope between its energy and strategic interests that infused its cooperation with the Arab and Maghreb world and paying debt to the harmony of European interests. This specificity of the Spanish foreign policy has been reflected as well in Madrid’s approach on the Union for the Mediterranean. Spain’s involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean was informed by its desire to secure a European multilateral framework of dealing with threats that originate from the Mediterranean region, by the desire to re-launch the Barcelona Process, by the aim to limit French interests in the Mediterranean and by the Spanish need to safeguard energy security.

According to Closa and Heywood, Spain’s multilateralism is based on the fact that Spain is unable to financially support unilateral initiatives in dealing with the Mediterranean region.107 This is reflected in the 1995 Spanish foreign policy breakthrough. Then Spain succeeded to convince the European Member States to launch the Barcelona Process. As a Southern European country, Spain faces a substantial flow of migrants as a consequence of poverty, authoritarian regimes or fundamentalism.108 Therefore, Spain chooses to favor a multilateral approach both because of financial reasons but also because multilateralism is useful in dealing with threats that originate in the Mediterranean.

The need to deal with threats that originate in the Mediterranean region became central to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s foreign policy. Zapatero tried to revive the Mediterranean orientation in the Spanish foreign policy and push it on the European agenda. Not only did Zapatero want to detach from the previous administration led by José María Aznar (who supported bilateral cooperation between Spain and the Maghreb countries) but

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108 Ibid.
also to give Spain a well deserved place in European affairs.\textsuperscript{109} Zapaterro outlined his priorities in the 2004 electoral bid. The future Prime Minister pointed out that he is committed to a “global policy in the Mediterranean region that promotes dialogue and cooperation with all the countries of the region.” He added that “we have to return to our Mediterranean policy and re-launch the Barcelona Process.”\textsuperscript{110} This declaration reflects not only the Spanish desire to secure a multilateral engagement in the Mediterranean region but also to re-invent the Barcelona Process.

The Spanish commitment to breathe life into the Barcelona Process was seen in 2005 when Spain convinced the United Kingdom to co-organize a ten-year anniversary summit on the European Mediterranean Partnership. The Summit was marked by failure because most of the heads of the Arab states refused to participate.\textsuperscript{111} In fact, the only achievement of the 2005 Summit was the signing of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, which was previously advocated by Tunisia and Egypt.\textsuperscript{112}

Against this background, the Union for the Mediterranean was seen as a viable solution for reinventing the Barcelona Process and for securing Spanish footprint on a new Euro-Mediterranean policy. The Spanish leadership forwarded a grand vision on the Union for the Mediterranean. Regarding institutions, the Spanish proposal featured a Euro-Mediterranean Council, a Parliamentary Assembly, a Commission or an institution that would manage the financial aid offered to the Mediterranean region. In terms of political and economic actions, Spain proposed a Union for the Mediterranean that could deal with energy security cooperation, cultural cooperation, dealing with environmental problems and with migration issues. In this context, the Spanish proposal was significantly different from the

\textsuperscript{111} Kausch and Youngs, “The end of the vision,” 964.
French one. The innovative element proposed by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs was that he emphasized the need of free movement of people as a prerequisite for the economic integration of the Euro-Mediterranean region.113

Furthermore, Spain was reluctant to a possible French influence in the Mediterranean region. After having gained relative influence in regard to the foreign policy of the European Union towards the Mediterranean, Spain feared that France might steal the spotlight. Therefore, Spain attempted to Europeanize the French proposal. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos advocated an improvement of the Barcelona Process and the involvement of all the European Member States. Thus the Spanish Minister proposed the “building of a true geopolitical space through the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Union.”114

The Spanish dependency on energy played an important role in Madrid’s decision to be involved in the Union for the Mediterranean. Spain has always been committed to support the energy security of the European Union (and Spain). The insular geographical position makes it difficult for Spain to have access to continental gas and oil supplies. Therefore, Spain is dependent on Mediterranean energy resources. Highly dependent on gas from Algeria, Spain has both aimed to enhance cooperation with the Maghreb countries but also to cooperate with the European Union in regard to the process of diversification of energy supplies. On the one hand, Spain has entered in bilateral agreements with Libya, Egypt, Oman, Qatar aimed at securing the import of liquefied natural gas. On the other hand, Spain has pushed for solidarity amongst the Member States in regard to energy security and has persuaded its counterparts to enter into an enhanced energy security dialogue with Algeria.115 Spain left its fingerprints on the European policy towards Algeria because it succeeded to

114 Miguel Ángel Moratinos quoted in Escribano and Rodriguez, “Who fears the Union for the Mediterranean?,” 25.
influence the European Commission in pushing the Algerian state-owned energy giant to rule out its clause according to which gas could not be sold to third parties and Spain could not enjoy the benefit of being a transit country.\footnote{Pérez and Vaquer I Fanés, “Spain and the Genesis of Europe’s new energy policy,” 4.} The Spanish energy policy reflects the same double-edged advocacy in regard to Madrid’s Mediterranean-oriented foreign policy. On the one hand, Spain aims to secure its national interest in the Mediterranean region and security of supplies. On the other hand, the Spanish leadership is committed to support the European bid for building a common energy market and for securing energy-driven solidarity amongst its Member States. Spain’s involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean should be read as a reflection of national interest that mixed the Spanish desire to be a significant player in the Mediterranean region with Madrid’s concern with a possible French growing involvement in the region and with Spanish concerns regarding energy security.

Italy’s foreign policy regarding the Mediterranean and its desire to join the Union for the Mediterranean is informed by a national interest that bears resemblance with the Spanish foreign policy. Hence the motives that informed the Italian leadership to join the Union for the Mediterranean were energy security, development of a multilateral framework for dealing with threats that originate in the Mediterranean and limitation of French influence in the Mediterranean region.

Energy security has always played an important role in the Mediterranean orientation of the Italian foreign policy. However, not only energy, but also several other traits ensure the resemblance between the Italian and the Spanish foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Just like in the Spanish case, Italy’s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is underpinned by Rome’s desire to play an important role in European affairs and to counterbalance European unilateral initiatives in regard to the Mediterranean region.
Despite that Italy supports a common European Union foreign policy towards the Mediterranean by having participated in all previous Euro-Mediterranean policy frameworks, the Italian leadership has also tried to secure bilateral agreements with the Mediterranean states. The bilateral agreements have gained more specificity in the 1990s, when Italy became vulnerable to new threats such as migratory flows, terrorism or energy shortages. For example, Libya and Algeria represent traditional partners both regarding the management of migration and energy security.\textsuperscript{117}

The most interesting case of bilateralism remains the Italian-Libyan agreement and the attempt of the Italian leadership to normalize the relations with Ghaddaffi both at the Italian and at the European level. On the one hand, Italy secured cooperation with Libya in regard to the construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries. On the other hand, the Italian leadership has used the entrepreneurial assets of Romano Prodi as a President of the European Commission to advocate cooperation between the European Union and Libya. Prodi supported the development of different channels of communication between the European Union and Libya and provided support for the Libyan membership in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.\textsuperscript{118} In this sense, Romano Prodi declared that “we must also start taking an interest in the positive signals coming from Libya, a country that could be involved in sub-regional integration”\textsuperscript{119} In 2008, Italy and Libya signed a bilateral agreement (“Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya”) which was meant to bring security cooperation regarding energy and migration at a higher level.\textsuperscript{120} Energy security is very important for Italy because it depends in a proportion of 86\% on external sources. Tunisia is

\textsuperscript{117} Valter Caralluzzo, “Italy and the Mediterranean: Relations with the Maghreb countries,” \textit{Modern Italy} 13, no.2 (2008): 118-21.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 122.
the main gas provider to Italy and is followed by Algeria and Libya. Italy has invested for a long time in the Algerian gas market and infrastructure and secured cooperation between the Italian energy giants and the Algerian companies.\textsuperscript{121}

The Italian leadership regarded the Union for the Mediterranean as a possible framework that would secure Italy against the flow of migration that originates in the Maghreb region and would enhance the Italian-Mediterranean energy cooperation. At the same time, the Italian leadership maintained its multilateral orientation in foreign policy but supported a stronger European involvement in the Southern periphery.\textsuperscript{122} The Italian Foreign Minister, Massimo D’Alema declared that “we are not against it in principle. However, we must seriously discuss what this proposal means and entails. The right approach to the problem is to reinforce the European Union’s Mediterranean policy because the center of Europe must move towards the South.”\textsuperscript{123} The above mentioned declaration should also be read as an attempt to reject the French unilateralism in the Mediterranean region. Claiming the transference of the European core towards the south reflects not only the Italian multilateral commitment, the Italian leadership shares the Spanish fears that France might gain influence in the Mediterranean region.

The Italian willingness to participate into the Union for the Mediterranean recalls the Spanish motives to join the 2008 policy framework. Hence, the Italian leadership was guided by pragmatic reasons in joining the French proposal. Energy security, desire for a multilateral framework and need to limit the possible French influence in the Mediterranean have informed the Italian bargaining leverage in negotiating the Union for the Mediterranean. The Spanish-Italian agreement to cooperate with France gained official recognition during the

\textsuperscript{121} Tassinari and Holm, “Values and Security,” 17.
\textsuperscript{123} Massimo D’Alema quoted in Ibid., 165.
2007 December bilateral meeting in Naples, where Romano Prodi and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero agreed to join President Sarkozy in the launch of the Mediterranean initiative.\textsuperscript{124}

The meeting in Naples paved the way for the 2007 Rome Summit when France, Spain and Italy agreed to cooperate in forwarding the Union for the Mediterranean. At the Summit, the three countries agreed on the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean thus involving all the European Member States.\textsuperscript{125} The three Southern European states presented the Union for the Mediterranean as a cooperative framework aimed towards the Mediterranean countries but that would not open space for future membership: “The Union should be based on the principle of cooperation and not integration.”\textsuperscript{126} In addition, the 2007 Rome Summit Declaration supported the development of policy framework that will be based on “partnership on an equal footing between the Mediterranean rim countries” which will give special attention to daily contacts between people and to the business sector.\textsuperscript{127} After France secured the support of Italy and France alongside Germany, the Union for the Mediterranean was launched in Paris, on July 13\textsuperscript{th} 2008. The summit was attended by all the representatives of the involved parties and opened a new chapter in the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

In hindsight, The Union for the Mediterranean represents a case of intergovernmental bargain between Member States. Recalling the Franco-German cooperation and the Franco-Italian-Spanish agreement, the Union for the Mediterranean represents a policy framework in which the Member States negotiated according to their own pre-defined interests. Against this background, the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean is the result of a process

\textsuperscript{124} Carbone, “Between ambition and ambivalence,” 164.
\textsuperscript{125} Balfour, The transformation,” 100-2.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
of interest negotiation that secured the accommodation of the national preferences of Member States.

Hence, France, Germany, Italy and Spain became involved in the Union for the Mediterranean guided by their national interest. Nicolas Sarkozy aimed to develop a new policy towards the Mediterranean but understood that this could only be secured through cooperation with other Member States. Spain and Italy became involved because they wanted to limit French involvement in the region, to secure the development of a European multilateral framework and the safety of energy resources. Germany was reluctant to accept the French proposal because it ran against the traditional Franco-German cooperation and the European harmony of interests. The German involvement occurred later as France accepted the umbrella of the European Union for the new policy proposal and Sarkozy had agreed to make concessions in regard to the European agreement on gas emissions treaty.

All four countries had different views on how the Union for the Mediterranean should look but none of them had succeeded in influencing entirely the institutional framework. France wanted the development of a political union that included only the riparian Mediterranean states and that is developed outside the European Union. In the end, the Union for the Mediterranean is guided by a political body but gathers all the European Union Member States and sixteen Mediterranean states. The German and Italian interests were fulfilled as the Union for the Mediterranean develops under the auspices of the European Union. In line with the Italian requirements, the Union for the Mediterranean is a ‘technical union’ with a Secretariat that is involved in processes of project implementation. Germany succeeded to secure the development of a framework that is based on partnership between the two Mediterranean shores. The preferences of Spain were accommodated as well because the development of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the establishment of Anna Lindh Foundation were partially in line with the 2007 Moratinos proposal.
Looking at initial preferences of Member States, at their process of negotiation through high-level meetings and at both the initial and the final institutional framework of the Union for the Mediterranean, one could support the claim that the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean occurred through an intergovernmental bargain. Germany, France, Italy and Spain hosted pre-defined interests which were negotiated in order to reach consensus in regard to the Union for the Mediterranean. However, the intergovernmental bargain is not able to explain the ideational aspect that existed and exists in the European discourse in regard to the Mediterranean region. Throughout time the European Union and the Member States have developed a norm and value-driven discourse that has informed the Euro-Mediterranean relations and has served as well the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean.
Chapter 4. The European Responsibility for the Mediterranean

This chapter will present the ideational aspect that lead to the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean. Drawing on discursive institutionalism, the chapter will claim that the transformation of the 2008 French proposal regarding the Mediterranean into a European one was the result of a European ‘discourse of duty and responsibility’ that was unfolded within the declarations of both national and supranational policy entrepreneurs. In other words, the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean occurred against a pre-existing normative discourse regarding the European obligation to support the development of the Mediterranean region.

4.1 The Normative Discourse of the Commission

The normative discourse of the European Commission regarding the duty of the European Union to support the Mediterranean region has been informed by two major elements. On the one hand, the European Commission developed a discourse that presented the European Union as a paternal figure that has to support the development of the Mediterranean region and to offer rewards and privileges to the Mediterranean partners that commit themselves to reform their countries. On the other hand, the discourse of responsibility of the European Union towards the Mediterranean region has been informed by the existence of mutual interests and of historical and cultural ties between the two Mediterranean shores.

However, before supporting theses arguments it is important to understand the origins of the normative discourse of the Commission, by pointing out the specificity of this European institution. It is already a truism to present the Commission of the European Union as a supranational institution that represents the overall interest of the twenty-seven Member
States. Within the Commission, decisions are taken on the basis of a collegial bargain and on the existence of a certain *esprit de corps* amongst Commissioners. According to Menon and Weatherill, the Commission has been regarded as the epitome of the European institution that aims to “promote the Community interest.”

Originating in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Commission is regarded as the engine behind European integration and as the “guardian of the common interest.” The European Commission acts as an arena for achieving consensus and is perceived as an impartial and apolitical actor that plays an important role in policy making. In this context, the European Commission is regarded as an institution that “tames the preferences of the Member States,” by acting as a mediator between the divergent interests of the Member States.

These elements have led John Peterson to point out that the Commission hosts a normative trait which fuels and is fueled by the Commissioners’ responsibility to secure that the objectives of the European Union such as the creation of a “peaceful, prosperous, and united Europe” are respected, promoted and safeguarded. Peterson adds that the performance of the Commission and of the Commissioners should be evaluated against the fulfillment (or not) of the normative goals of the European Union. Keeping John Peterson’s arguments in mind, it is insightful to recall here Andrew Moravcsik’s definition on supranational entrepreneurship. Therefore, drawing on Moravcsik, the Commissioners represent entrepreneurial agents that promote and safeguard the interest of the European Union.

132 Tsakatika, “Claims to Legitimacy”, 212.  
134 Ibid., 49.
Turning now towards the relation between the Commission and the Mediterranean region, the involvement of the Commission in the European policy towards the Mediterranean was limited before 1990s. According to Bicchi, the entrepreneurial role of the Commission was restricted in the development of the 1970s Global Mediterranean Policy. However, the Commission has succeeded to be involved in the Renovated Mediterranean Policy by successfully advocating the development of multilateral cooperation between the two shores and the involvement of private actors in building bridges of cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean region.\(^{135}\)

However, the turn of the century has brought the Mediterranean into spotlight regarding the relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean region. Undoubtedly informed by the post-9/11 security discourse, the Commission became more present in Mediterranean-oriented affairs.\(^{136}\) The discourse of the Commission in regard to the Mediterranean became informed by the presentation of the European Union as a paternal figure that has the responsibility to help their neighbors but also to offer them with rewards if the Mediterranean partners are willing to reform their states. Romano Prodi’s discourse is insightful because he pointed at the European Union to support its neighbors as “changing times impose greater responsibilities, and the responsibilities of the European Union at this time could not be weightier.”\(^{137}\)

Both Romano Prodi and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for External Relations and Neighborhood Policy, underlined the backwardness of the Mediterranean countries and the support that the European Union is willing to offer to their Southern


neighbors. Romano Prodi underlined the underdevelopment of the Mediterranean region by claiming that it “is still unable to develop its own personality on the world stage.”\textsuperscript{138} The same line of thinking was maintained by Benita Ferrero-Waldner who pointed out that the European Neighborhood Policy is a policy meant to help the neighboring countries to achieve sustainable results: “The European Neighborhood Policy is about helping our neighbors towards their own prosperity, security and stability.”\textsuperscript{139} The paternal figure is even stronger in yet another declaration made by Benita Ferrero-Waldner as she underlined that “The «European Family» must be open, above all to its immediate neighbors.”\textsuperscript{140}

The presentation of the European Union as a fatherly figure in relation to its Mediterranean neighbors is further unfolded within the European officials’ discourse regarding the policy of reward that Brussels practices in relation to its neighbors. For example, José Manuel Barroso presented the neighboring countries (implicitly the Mediterranean ones) with the possibility of an enhanced partnership under the conditionality of reform: “the closer you want to be in the European Union, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations.”\textsuperscript{141} In talking about the European Neighborhood Policy in 2005, Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s discourse unfolded the building of a relation based on European possible rewards for the European neighbors. The European neighbours are to be “rewarded with greater incentives and benefits”\textsuperscript{142} or “In

\textsuperscript{138} Romano Prodi, “Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action” (speech, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain-la-Neuve, November 26, 2002).
return for their taking meaningful steps to strengthen the rule of law, good governance, and human rights and democracy, we offer our neighbors new opportunities to share in the European Union's Single Market, closer co-operation on energy and transport links and a chance to participate in EU programmes.”

According to Clara Portela, the discourse of Ferrero-Waldner regarding the need to reward the European neighbors that engage in reforms is informed by the Commissioner’s worldview that the European Union is a benign and a soft power that offers benefits to its neighbors.

One step further, the normative discourse of the European Union to support the development of its neighbors in informed by the claim that there are mutual interests that unite the two Mediterranean shores. Referring to the European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner pointed out that this policy characterizes a “win-win situation.” One year prior to the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean, Ferrero-Waldner declared in a conference on the Mediterranean region that “we want to work together to pursue our mutual interests.” Ferrero-Waldner further added that “our neighbors are important to us. You are our closest partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs and migration. We want a relationship which better reflects that.”

Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence), 2.


147 Waldner-Ferrero, “Helping ourselves through helping our neighbors.”
The existence of a mutual interest between the North and the South regions of the Mediterranean is undoubtedly informed by the existence of historical and cultural traits between the two Mediterranean shores. This has been evident in the discourses of Romano Prodi and Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The European Commissioner for External Relations and Neighborhood Policy claimed that “we must build on our historical links to the South (…) by building new, deeper relations to our neighbors.”\textsuperscript{148} The relation between the European duty to support the Mediterranean and the historical relation between Europe and the Mediterranean is even stronger in Romano Prodi’s discourse. According to the former President of the Commission, “to build the new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe's cradle, would clearly be a grave mistake.”\textsuperscript{149}

Moving from the normative discourse that informs the development of the Euro-Mediterranean relations to the propositions of discursive institutionalism that emerging policies are informed by previous made commitments and pre-existing norms and values, one is able to recognize that the policies of the European Union are informed by path dependency. In this sense, Romano Prodi claimed that the need of the European Union to bolster its commitment towards the Mediterranean is infused by “the idea of belonging together (…) which is already implicit in processes under way (…) such as the Barcelona Process.”\textsuperscript{150}

Therefore, the entrepreneurial endeavors of Romano Prodi in involving the Mediterranean region in the European Neighborhood Policy were based on the responsibility of the European Union to support the development of its periphery and on the existence of an already agreed framework of cooperation between Brussels and the Mediterranean partner countries.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner discourse echoed Prodi’s speeches regarding that the cooperation with the Mediterranean is built on previous agreements. Ferrero-Waldner pointed out that all the twenty-seven Member States should be involved in order to strengthen the

\textsuperscript{148} Walder-Ferrero, “Helping ourselves through helping our neighbors.”
\textsuperscript{149} Prodi, “A Wider Europe.”
\textsuperscript{150} Id. “Europe and the Mediterranean,” 3.
relation between the European Union with the Mediterranean countries. Benita Ferrero-Waldner declared that “ideas, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Union proposed by President Sarkozy, could add political momentum for regional cooperation and are welcome. They should build up on experience gathered and structures established by the existing regional policies like the Barcelona Process, Euromed and the European Neighbourhood Policy.”¹⁵¹

One year later, the European Commissioner declared the following: “the political impulse is welcomed. The aim is to build on the achievements of the Barcelona Process to intensify our cooperation (…) around the Mediterranean, a region that we share.”¹⁵²

To conclude this section, the discourse of supranational entrepreneurs such as Jose Manuel Barosso, Romano Prodi or Benita Ferrero-Waldner is insightful in understanding not only the norm and value-driven discourse of the Commission (and European Union) towards the Mediterranean but also to inquire into the discursive institutionalist conceptual agenda. As presented above, normative traits of the Commission is useful in understanding what the values are that inform the development of cooperative framework within the Euro-Mediterranean region. The Commission’s discourse on unity, peace and prosperity is reflected in the official declarations of the European Commissioners that express the duty of the European Union to support the Mediterranean countries. In line with a discursive institutionalist approach, the discourse of the European officials unfolds the existence of certain norms, values and pre-existing commitments that inform the building of the Euro-Mediterranean relations and provided impetus for the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean.


¹⁵² Id., “The European Union and its place in the world in the current agenda” (speech, College of Europe, Bruges, April 7, 2008).
4.2 The Added Value of National Policy Entrepreneurs

Not only the discourse of the Commission offers insights in capturing the normative aspect of the European discourse towards the Mediterranean but also the Member States have developed a value-driven discourse. The speeches of the Spanish, German, and French officials have been informed by a similar normative discourse that is present at the European Union level. In this regard, the responsibility towards the Mediterranean region is corroborated with the preservation of the European unity amongst its members and with the historical ties that exist between the two regions.

Angela Merkel’s declarations disclose the European responsibility to support the Mediterranean: “One thing has to be clear. Northern Europeans also share responsibility for the Mediterranean, just as the future of the borders with Russia and Ukraine is an issue that concerns those living on the Mediterranean.”\(^{153}\) These declarations highlight not only the need of the European Union to conduct politics jointly but also the duty of the European Union towards its Southern (and Eastern) neighbors. The German discourse on the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean brings to light Germany’s normative commitment to support the development of the European neighborhood.

Furthermore, the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, has forwarded a normative discourse that revolved around the European Union’s duty towards the Mediterranean. Zapatero was keen on underlining that Spain and the European Union should have a “committed foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region (…) and to exercise more responsibility in the Mediterranean region, to continue opening up to Africa.”\(^{154}\) Zapatero added that “the Mediterranean holds a very important part of our history, our presence, and

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\(^{153}\) Angela Merkel quoted in “Berlin rejects EU ‘Corrosion’.

above all, our future."  

Hence the normative discourse of the Spanish foreign policy has been corroborated with the European responsibility to act in the Mediterranean with the longstanding historical tradition that exists between the two shores. While both the German Chancellor and the Spanish Prime Minister have forwarded a discourse that revolved around the European duty to support its Southern neighborhood, the Spanish discourse added that there are historical ties that link the Euro-Mediterranean region. Furthermore, Nicolas Sarkozy presented the same discourse that his counterparts forwarded, *i.e.* European duty to support the Mediterranean region in light of existing historical and cultural ties.

Despite that Nicolas Sarkozy has initially thought to launch the Union for the Mediterranean as a French sole action, an inquiry into Nicolas Sarkozy’s speeches regarding the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean unfolds the existence of a discourse that places value on the historical and cultural affinities between the European Union and the Mediterranean. In turn, this discourse informs the European duty to cooperate with the Mediterranean region. In Tangiers, Morroco, Nicolas Sarkozy claimed that “By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and spiritual sources, but also from its future.”  

Previously in a speech presented in Toulon, Nicolas Sarkozy claimed that the Mediterranean region is “the birthplace of the European man (...) the place where the European man returns to his origins, thoughts and identities.” 

According to Jean-François Daguzan, Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in Toulon has revolved around a discourse based on historical and mythical arguments in order to secure not only the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean but also a rediscovery of the Mediterranean region in European politics.

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155 Zapatero, “In Spain’s Interest.”
157 Id., Discours à Toulon.
Furthermore, the French claim that Europe is responsible to support the Mediterranean region is present in the following excerpt: “in the name of our children, who, one day, will ask us to account for what we have done, I invite all the heads of State and government of the Mediterranean rim countries to meet in France in June 2008 to lay the foundations of a political, economic and cultural union founded on the principle of strict equality between the nations bordering the same sea: the Mediterranean Union.”\textsuperscript{159} However, Sarkozy was keen in not discarding the previous European commitments in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, Sarkozy added that “wanting the Mediterranean Union doesn’t mean wanting to erase history, doesn’t mean starting off again from scratch. It means taking history from the point it’s reached and continuing it, instead of forever going back over it.”\textsuperscript{160}

Nicolas Sarkozy’s endeavors to launch the Union for the Mediterranean could be regarded as entrepreneurial efforts made by taking advantage of two policy windows. On the one hand, Sarkozy was the French presidential candidate with considerable odds to win the 2008 elections and on the other hand, France was preparing to hold the Presidency of the European Union in the upcoming year. Corroborating these opportunities, Sarkozy presented the Union for the Mediterranean as a project that would play an important role in French politics and within the French presidency of the European Union.

In hindsight, looking into the speeches of the national representatives of the Member States, there is the possibility to recognize the existence of a value and norm-driven discourse. The German, Spanish and French discourses have revolved not only around the responsibility of the European Union to support the development of the Mediterranean region, but they have also dwelled upon the already existing commitments between the European Union and the Mediterranean region. This discourse has also been present at the level of the European Union. The latter’s policy towards the Mediterranean has been constructed throughout time,

\textsuperscript{159} Nicolas Sarkozy, “State Visit to Morroco.”
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
on the basis of elements such as support for the less developed Southern neighbors and the need to develop cooperation between the two Mediterranean shores which share mutual interests and the duty of the European Union to act due to pre-existing historical and cultural ties. This discourse was recalled by Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s declarations in regard to the Union for the Mediterranean and the positive response that the Commission gave to the French initiative.

Returning to the theoretical tenets of discursive institutionalism, this chapter has unfolded the norm-driven discourse that exists in the institutional web of the European Union regarding the Mediterranean region. Discursive institutionalism claimed that the role of policy entrepreneurs is pivotal in capturing the normative-oriented discourse that is present in an institutional framework. Hence, the chapter has presented the Commission as an institution that is both driven and gives birth to a normative discourse. More specifically, the discourse of the Commission towards the Mediterranean has been channeled according to a ‘discourse of responsibility’ to support the development of the Mediterranean region. This has been unfolded both by claims of European duty towards the Mediterranean and by claims that cooperation should occur as there are pre-existing agreements that provide impetus for joint action. Moreover, a normative discourse could be traced also at the level of Member States. Official declarations made by Angela Merkel, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and Nicolas Sarkozy have offered insights in capturing the ideational aspects that guided their involvement in the Union for the Mediterranean.

Having these considerations in mind, it is fair to point out the crucial role that the European Commission played in the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean. In fact, the European Commission has drafted the 2008 Union for the Mediterranean. Recalling the responsibility of the Commission to maintain stability, prosperity and peace in the European Union and in its periphery and the commitment for cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean
region is reflected in the institutional design of the Union for the Mediterranean. As previously stated, the Union for the Mediterranean is a cooperative framework based on partnership, co-ownership and equality that supports the development of the Mediterranean region through implementation of projects that enhances the daily life of the Mediterranean people. The Union for the Mediterranean recognizes the existence of the previous commitments between the Mediterranean and the European Union such as the Barcelona Process and the European Neighborhood Policy and presents them as pillars for the latest Euro-Mediterranean policy. In addition, the Union for the Mediterranean recognizes that the Euro-Mediterranean region shares the historical and cultural bounds but also the responsibility to support the development of the region.

Against the previous chapter of this paper, the present one has been focused on the presentation of the norms, their origin that inform the Euro-Mediterranean relation and the commitment of the European Union to support the development of the Mediterranean partners. In this context, the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean is informed by the existence of previous European commitments towards the Mediterranean and by the existence of a normative discourse in building the Euro-Mediterranean relations. This discourse has been forwarded through the declarations made by both national and supranational entrepreneurs. Both have underlined the responsibility of the European Union to support the Mediterranean region through various arguments that range from the presentation of the European Union as a paternal figure to the duty of Brussels to pay debt to the historical and cultural ties that link the Euro-Mediterranean region.

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161 See Déclaration commune du sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée (Common Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean).
162 Ibid.
Conclusion

The paper has dwelled on the transformation of the 2008 French initiative into a European policy proposal. Therefore, the paper presented the motives that provided impetus for the Europeanization of President’s Sarkozy’s proposal that called for the development of a new policy towards the Mediterranean. Additionally, the paper has unfolded the changes that the French initial proposal suffered in order to fit the requirements of all the Member States of the European Union. In order to disclose these elements, the paper has inquired into the mechanisms of foreign policy-making process that have informed the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Hence the paper claimed that the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean has occurred as a consequence of a mixed process of policy-making that involved the existence of specific national interests brought by the Member States at the discussion table on the Mediterranean and the presence of a pre-existing discourse on the European duty to support the development of the Mediterranean region. In order to support this claim, theories of intergovernmentalism and discursive institutionalism were brought into discussion in order to render the conceptual framework of Europeanization more specific and to present the intricate web of relations that were established between Member States in order to secure that launch of the Union for the Mediterranean as a European endeavor.

Intergovernmentalism and discursive institutionalism provided competing explanations on the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean. While intergovernmentalism underlined the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean as a result of overlapping interests between France, Germany, Italy and Spain, discursive institutionalism inquired into the normative discourse of European and national policy entrepreneurs. The discursive institutionalism has disclosed a value and norm-driven driven informed by the European responsibility/duty to support the development of the
The intergovernmentalist approach has presented that France, Germany, Italy and Spain had strong interests in the transformation of the French initial proposal into a European one. While Nicholas Sarkozy has regarded the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean as a sole channel to see his proposal launched, Germany has regarded the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean as natural outcome of the German desire to maintain the unity of the European Union and the Franco-German traditional cooperation. However, pragmatic reasons have provided impetus for German involvement in the latest Euro-Mediterranean policy. Angela Merkel did not want to see Germany, the highest contributor to the European budget to pay for a quasi-European policy gathering only the riparian Mediterranean states. In addition, Germany aimed to safeguard its bilateral agreements. Italy and Spain accepted to be involved in Sarkozy’s proposal because they feared a possible increased French leverage in the Mediterranean region that could damage the Spanish and Italian energy interests in the region. The national interests of these countries have coalesced and have lead to the transformation of the French proposal into a European one. This has been obvious in the fact that the institutional framework of the Union for the Mediterranean reflects the accommodation of the different French, Spanish, Italian and German preferences.

However, intergovernmentalism does not explain the presence of a pre-existing normative discourse that has been disclosed at the European level and has informed the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean. A closer look in the declarations of supranational and national policy entrepreneurs offers the possibility to grasp the existence a European ‘discourse of responsibility’ towards the Mediterranean region. Both the European Commissioners and national officials have stressed the responsibility of their countries and of
the European Union to support the development of the Mediterranean region. Hints of this normative discourse can be found in the text of the declaration of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Drawing on these considerations, one could point out that each theory provides a sound explanation in its own. Despite of their contrasting views regarding the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean, intergovernmentalism and discursive institutionalism seem to talk to rather then undermining each other. As the European foreign policy-making process is intricate and informed by different national interests, it is difficult to dismiss the utilitarian and pragmatic reasons the informed the participation of France, Germany, Spain and Italy to the Union for the Mediterranean. Financial interests in the European Union, energy interests or desire for prestige and leverage in the Mediterranean represent powerful arguments that support an intergovernmentalist agenda in explaining the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean. In the same time, empirical evidence showed that the European foreign policy is influenced by a norm and value-driven discourse based on the European sense of duty to support the Southern neighborhood. Both national and supranational officials have disclosed a normative discourse regarding the Mediterranean region that has in turn informed the transformation of the French proposal into a European one. At this point, it is fair to acknowledge that the explanatory power of these theories is useful in providing an overall explanation for the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean and for the complex mechanisms of policy-making that were put to work in the process of Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Thus, the paper represents an added-value to the literature on the emerging and Europeanizing of the Union for the Mediterranean. This is due to the fact that the Europeanization of the Union for the Mediterranean has been arranged within a conceptual framework of discursive institutionalism and intergovernmentalism in order to capture the
array of mechanism (and actors) that contributed to the Europeanizing process. Nevertheless, the Union for the Mediterranean and its place in European politics represent vast topics that merit further research.

First, further inquiry is needed in understanding the link between Europeanization and integration. As the literature remains divided in regard to how these concepts talk to each other, there could space for researching the similarities (and potential different) aspects that bring supranationalism or rational choice institutionalism closer to mechanisms of Europeanization through uploading. Furthermore, the link between discursive institutionalism and Europeanization should be further researched in understanding how the discourse of different policy entrepreneurs influences the processes of Europeanizing different policies. In this context, discursive institutionalism could provide tools for giving agency to bottom-up processes of Europeanization.

Second, this paper left out the inquiry into the motives of the European Union to launch a ‘union of projects’ for the Mediterranean and policy framework that largely refers to low politics issues such as pollution or other environmental issues. This could be interpreted either as sign that the Mediterranean countries have lost their importance in European politics or because the Member States are still unable to put aside their national interests and launch a real political commitment towards the Mediterranean.

Third, a corollary area of research would be an inquiry into the other side of the Union for the Mediterranean coin. In other words, research is needed in understanding the motives of the Mediterranean countries to join the Union for the Mediterranean and also the perception that the Mediterranean people have in regard to the Union for the Mediterranean.
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