The Curse of Interdependence

Explaining the Realpolitik-oriented Policy Behaviour of European States towards Immigration from the MENA Region

By

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to find out whether Keohane and Nye’s concept of interdependence can be regarded as a useful tool to better understand the emergence of restrictive migration policies of the EU Member States with regard to illegal immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). To find this out the concept is used as the basis for the following research question: Does the degree of interdependence of EU Member States with regard to immigration affect their policy behaviour? The results show that the degree of interdependence towards MENA influences the EU Member States to a large extent in their policy formulation.
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Introduction

Immigrants – Please stay out! This is how one can summarise the hostile attitude among European states towards immigrants in the last decades characterised by increasingly restrictive national migration and visa policies. The purpose is to impede the entrance of those foreigners who are not wanted. And these are usually unskilled workers and people from poor countries who then try to enter the “Fortress of Europe” illegally.¹ The European governments’ negative reactions to the currently high influx of illegal immigrants from North Africa as a result of the upheavals in that region reflect this resentment among Western governments. While Italy seems overburdened by the streams of refugees arriving at the small island of Lampedusa, other EU Member States are reluctant to share the responsibility of dealing with the incoming refugees. Ever stricter and more secure border policies deny refugees the right to seek for asylum.² Worse, finding strategies to rescue the increasing number of refugees trying to reach Europe on boards are seemingly neglected. The governments of European states seem to turn a blind eye on moral and ethical obligations. Recent reports of refugee boats drowning in the Mediterranean raise the question to what extent European states are engaged in human rights protection and humanitarian rescue.³ What comes to the fore is the question of how this behaviour of the protection of national interest can be explained.

In the academic debate different theories and frameworks have been developed to better understand the reasons for restrictive migration policies on the national and European

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¹ In this work the terms “illegal”, “irregular” and “undocumented” immigrants are used interchangeably
level. Economic perspectives suggest that policies become more restrictive in times of economic slowdown resulting in fewer demand for labour in the domestic market. According to Jef Huysmans, restrictive migration policies are the result of the “securitization of migrants”, meaning that migrants are constructed as a threat to public order, national identity and welfare. The concept of interdependence – mainly coined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s – has been developed to analyse increasing dependencies and interdependencies between different actors in world affairs. It is used to describe how states are able to exert power or how and why existing regime change changes. It has also been used to explain the interdependence of states with regard to global migration patterns. However, as to my knowledge, it has not been applied yet to find explanations for the increasingly restrictive policies against illegal immigration. Therefore, the overall purpose of this thesis is to find out whether the concept of interdependence can be regarded as a useful tool to better understand the emergence of restrictive migration policies. In other words, can the concept of interdependence explain the increasingly realpolitik-oriented behaviour of many EU countries with regard to immigration? To find this out the concept is used as the basis for the following research question: Does the degree of interdependence of EU Member States with regard to immigration affect their policy behaviour?

The underlying hypothesis that shall help answer this research question is that the more interdependent a state is with regard to illegal immigration, the more realpolitik-oriented are their migration policies. The independent variable of this hypothesis – i.e. the degree of interdependence - is thereby measured on a rating scale which I have established to evaluate the degree of interdependence of states towards immigration from the Middle East and North African (MENA). The MENA region whose geographical scope varies among scholars and politicians is here defined as all Mediterranean countries south to Europe, i.e. the Maghreb,
Mashreq and Turkey. I selected this region as the geographical area of focus since many migrants try to reach Europe from there.

The structure of this thesis is the following. The first Chapter introduces the concepts of realpolitik and interdependence as the theoretical and methodological basis of the analysis. In Chapter two, I will present the quantitative framework which I have developed on the basis of the concept of interdependence as a means to rate the interdependence of the EU Member States with regard to immigration from the MENA region. In the third Chapter, the policies of Member States are examined in order to elucidate which states show realpolitik-oriented behaviour. The insights of these examples are used in the final conclusion to answer the research question.

1. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

To be able to test the hypothesis the concepts for the dependent and independent variables will be operationalized in the following two sections. The dependent variable that shall be explained is the type of policy Member States conduct. With regard to illegal immigration states are expected to pursue realpolitik the meaning of which is clarified in the next subsection. The next section deals with Keohane and Nye’s concept of Complex Interdependence. It serves as basis for the operationalisation of the interdependent variable in Chapter 2 for which I have elaborated a quantitative framework. The methodology for this quantitative analysis and for the final testing of the hypothesis by means of empirical data in Chapter 3 is introduced in the third section of this Chapter.
1.1. The Meaning of Realpolitik

Realpolitik is a type of policy-making which is driven by egoistic, pragmatic and material rather than ideal, norm-driven and moral principles. The term is borrowed from German and means “the politics of the real, [whereby] it refers to the realist’s determination to treat politics as they really are and not as the idealist would wish them to be.” The origin of realpolitik can be traced back to the early thoughts of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau who are seen as the forerunner of today’s realism and neorealism. Machiavelli’s most popular work that laid the foundations for this political thinking is “The Prince” (written 1513, published 1532) in which he explains that “a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary”. This early realist thinking was adopted by realist and neorealist scholars to explain the behaviour of states in the international system. Accordingly, states are rational actors who are mainly concerned with their own survival and aim either to maximize power (offensive realism, propagated by Mearsheimer) or security (defensive realism, propagated by Waltz). I do not intend to go into further detail of realism and neo-realism which is not necessary for the purpose of this paper. Yet the mentioned (neo-)realist assumptions about states are crucial for the understanding of realpolitik-oriented policies which are exclusively driven by the desire to realise national interests regardless of ethical or moral concerns.

In terms of historical examples, realpolitik is associated with Otto von Bismarck’s balance-of-power diplomacy, Adolf Hitler’s strategy in Munich and Henry Kissinger’s

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6 Original title in Italian: II Principe
7 Chapter XV of The Prince, cited in Skinner and Price, p. 55
Middle East diplomacy in the 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to examine realpolitik in the context of the fight against illegal immigration. It is investigated whether and to what extent EU Member States adopt nowadays realpolitik-oriented policies with regard to irregular immigration from the MENA region. In this context, realpolitik-oriented means that states collaborate with regimes that do not comply with their own norms and values or that states directly or indirectly neglect and/or breach these norms and values to which they have committed themselves as members of the EU and international treaties. Considering the past policies of the EU Member States towards the dictators of North Africa this implies the negligence to address human rights abuses and democratic deficits vehemently enough. Whether there are Member States in the EU acting in this way with regard to migration policy and border control is examined in the empirical analysis in Chapter 3. In the hypothesis, the policy-form of realpolitik is, hence, the dependent variable which shall be explained. The independent variable which serves as the manipulated value for testing the hypothesis is interdependence. The next section will elaborate on the origin and basic framework of this concept.

1.2. *Theoretical Framework: Conceptualisation of Interdependence Theory*

The debate on interdependence can be traced back to the post-World War II period and began to become a focus of many analytical works in the beginning of the 1970s. It was a response to new and changing developments for which the traditional theoretical frameworks could not provide satisfactory explanations anymore. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye belonged to the first and most influential scholars in this new research field. They maintained in “Transnational Relations and World Politics” of 1972 that growing transnational relations in the form of international communication, finance, trade and transportation leads to dependence and interdependence between states as well as between states and non-state
actors. Interdependence here means the growing inter-linkage of multiple actors over great distances in different regions of the world. In their subsequent book “Power and Interdependence” (1977) Keohane and Nye attempted to formulate a coherent theory – which they called “Complex Interdependence” – to analyse these interdependent structures and relations in world politics. Without totally rejecting realist theory, they suggested that the latter’s three core assumptions cannot explain all situations in an interdependent world. Therefore, the scholars revised the three realist assumptions by maintaining that (1) not only states but also non-state actors influence world affairs; that (2) the diminishing importance of “hard politics” of military security leads to an increasing importance of “low politics” in the economic and social sphere; and that (3) the use of military force has developed into an inefficient and too expensive instrument. Under these new circumstances in an interdependent world, political processes are not determined merely by the possession of military capabilities anymore but by the “distribution of power resources” in specific “issue areas” varying from military and economy to trade and monetary issues. The position and importance that anyone of these issue areas has on political agendas is thereby affected by existing problems, politicisation and struggles among interests groups at international and domestic level.

The theory of Complex Interdependence consists of two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. Sensitivity refers to the “degree of responsiveness” of a state to changes and events abroad and is measured in “the volume of flows across borders” and “the costly effects of changes in transactions.” What this sensitivity fails to explain are the costs involved to change and adjust existing policies to these external changes, i.e. the vulnerability

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13 Ibid., 26.
14 Ibid., 28.
15 Ibid., 10.
of a state. This dimension is assessed by the “relative availability and costliness of [...] alternatives” and the “costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time.”

Since both sensitivity and vulnerability might differ across states and in the course of time, the degree of interdependence varies among states. Keohane and Nye stress that vulnerability is, thereby, more significant than sensitivity since less vulnerable states have the possibility to reduce their dependence by switching to available alternative policies. Consequently, the power to exert influence on the other actors in an interdependent relation depends on the degree of sensitivity and vulnerability. In an “asymmetrical” interdependent relation, the actor that is less dependent on the other can use this as a source of power to influence bargains over a certain issue to its own benefits.

This thesis does not deal with the implications of power relationships that the Keohane and Nye provide. Nor does it elaborate on how states use their power against other actors. As mentioned already above, I rather investigate whether an interdependent relationship (here between the EU states and the MENA states) affects the behaviour of one side (here the EU states) and to what extent this interdependence leads to realpolitik-oriented behaviour on this side. This is in accordance with Keohane and Nye’s statement that “interdependence affects [...] the behaviour of states.” Derived from the insights from Keohane and Nye’s theory, it can be assumed, in accordance with the hypothesis, that highly interdependent EU states behave in a realpolitik-oriented way in order to reduce their sensitivity and vulnerability with regard to illegal immigration. The theoretical framework of interdependence is used to operationalise it for the subsequent analysis. The methodology and methods that are used for this analysis are described in the following section.

16 Ibid., 11.
17 Ibid., 13.
18 Ibid., 9.
19 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 5.
1.3. Methodological Framework

In testing the hypothesis it is scrutinized whether there is a link between the degree of interdependence (i.e. the independent variable) and a realpolitik type of policy (i.e. the dependent variable). The meanings of realpolitik and interdependence have been already clarified above. With regard to the former, I specified how this form of policy making becomes evident in the area of illegal migration. This understanding is necessary in order to know after which features and type of behaviour to look in the later evaluation of member states’ policies in the empirical part of Chapter 3. Interdependence, i.e. the independent variable with which policy behaviour shall be explained was is measured by means of a quantitative assessment that I have elaborated on the basis of Keohane and Nye’s theory of interdependence. In the next Chapter, this concept of interdependence is operationalised in order to be able to manipulate it for testing the hypothesis. The variable is thereby manipulated in terms of the degree of interdependence, i.e. whether higher or less interdependence affects the policy orientation. For the assessment of the degree of interdependence of each Member State, I elaborate a quantitative assessment with the help of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependencies are measured. Required data and statistics for this assessment are taken from the European database “Eurostat”. Thereby, these two dimensions are assessed by allocating cardinal numbers to the Member States according to their degree of sensitivity and vulnerability. The sum of these provides the overall interdependence which shows the ranking of the Member States according to their degree of interdependence. Thus, the sum of overall interdependence serves as ordinal numbers. This is only a very simplified assessment since not all factors that contribute in reality to the interdependence of states with regard to illegal immigration are considered. Nevertheless, the avoidance of too much complexity is necessary in order to be able to ensure that the assessment of interdependence is feasible.
In Chapter 3 the validity of the findings of this quantitative analysis are put to a test by examining the immigration and border policies of several Member States. This empirical evaluation is done by a contextualised analysis meaning that several examples on Member States’ reactions to illegal immigration are gathered and evaluated. In the conclusion, the degree of interdependence of certain Member States and their policy behaviour are compared to gain an insight into the relationship between these two variables. In the next Chapter, the assessment of the degree of interdependence is undertaken in order to be able to make this final comparison later on.
2. Operationalisation of Interdependence for Illegal Immigration

The meaning of interdependence was already clarified. The acquired understanding of the concept serves as a basis for assessing which EU Member States are relatively more interdependent with regard to the Maghreb than others. The indicator for the assessment of states’ interdependence is illegal immigration from this region towards the EU. The choice of this issue is based on its importance and salience for European states. First, immigration policy is an important policy field with which they want to control who is allowed to enter and reside in their territory. Illegal immigrants are unwelcomed because they are perceived as a threat to national economy, social welfare and the integrity of the nation’s identity. Consequently, states are interested in managing and containing the influx of undocumented migrants. Second, the salience of this topic is also reflected on EU level. In the European Council meeting of December 2005, for instance, the heads of state and government agreed on “concrete priority actions” to curb the influx of undocumented migrants from the southern Mediterranean countries. In 2010, the heads of state and government stressed again in the Stockholm programme that “[a]s regards the Union for the Mediterranean, it will be necessary to enhance the work [...] particularly regarding migration (maritime), [and] border surveillance.” Furthermore, the “need to strengthen the management of migratory flows” and “to address illegal immigration” is stressed in all bilateral Association Agreements and Action Plans concluded with the Mediterranean countries in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In sum, migration is a crucial policy field for states with which they intend to control and preferably prevent illegal migrants from entering their

territory. At the same time, this problem of illegal immigrants has been acknowledged especially with regard to illegal immigrants from the Maghreb. This makes it to a useful indicator for the assessment of interdependence of EU countries towards North Africa.

Having chosen the policy area with the help of which interdependence is measured, the indicators have to be operationalised, which requires a detailed definition of what sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence means for illegal immigration. The factors are the following: First, for sensitivity this is done by means of the geographic location of Member States. Second, vulnerability is measured through the size of the countries’ economy and population.

2.1. Sensitivity Interdependence

To begin with, the sensitivity of EU countries to immigration flows is determined by their geographic closeness to the Maghreb. Recalling that sensitivity stands for “liability to costly effects imposed from outside”\textsuperscript{23}, this implies that the closer states are geographically located to the MENA the more sensitive they tend to be because undocumented immigrants have to overcome a smaller distance and fewer challenges to reach their territories. Accordingly, the Mediterranean Member States, i.e. Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus, are expected to be most sensitive because they are separated only by the sea from the African continent. Only these six countries receive irregular immigrants who try to reach their shores clandestinely by boat. In addition to them, there is one non-Mediterranean state that is close to the region. Indeed, even if it does not have a Mediterranean Sea border, Bulgaria shares parts of its south-eastern border with Turkey, i.e. with a Middle Eastern country. Since Greece also

borders directly on Turkey, two countries of the EU have land borders with the Middle East region. In consequence, besides the Mediterranean countries Bulgaria can be expected to be very sensitive as well. Even though the illegal boat trip and the border crossings are not the only ways to enter Europe, they are useful indicators for the geographical closeness since sharing external (sea) borders of the EU with this region is a characteristic that distinguish the seven Member States from all other EU states and brings them closest to the MENA region.24 In contrast, the non-Mediterranean countries are protected by these seven Mediterranean countries so that it is less likely that undocumented immigrants from MENA arrive in their territories. In the following, this “closeness-hypothesis” for sensitivity is further strengthened by providing empirical evidence for it.

There are principle routes that illegal immigrants from this region use in order to reach the shores of the northern Mediterranean countries. A first option is to depart from Libya or Tunisia to the Italian islands of Lampedusa and Sicily or to Malta.25 This route is called Central Mediterranean route by the “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex)”26 which indicated in its latest report of July-September 2010 that “there were more detections of nationals from north African countries (Tunisians, Egyptians, Algerians).”27 A second option is to go from Northern Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar to the Spanish mainland. Illegal migrants whose departure points are Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara and southern Morocco try to reach to the Canary Island, i.e. Spain. According to Frontex, which combines the two last options under the Western Mediterranean route, “most detected nationalities were Algerian, Moroccan, Cameroonian

24 Alternatives possibilities to enter Europe are visa overstay or with false documents by plane or by ferry; see Hein de Haas, “Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends,” Migration Information Source, November 2006, accessed May 15, 2011, http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=484
and Guinean.”

In addition to the boat journey, it is also possible to reach Europe on the North African mainland by entering the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila situated in Morocco.

Turkey represents another possible point of departure – whereby immigrants from Africa and Asia either go in boats from Istanbul and Mersina to Greece and to a lesser extent Italy or cross the Greek-Turkish border on foot. In recent years, this way of entering Europe has grown in popularity for undocumented African migrants as a result of effective containment policies and surveillance measures at the Italian and Spanish coasts as well as through bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya and between Spain and Morocco and Senegal.

According to Frontex, of all irregular immigrants that were caught while entering Europe, almost seventy-five per cent were trapped in Greece, with an growing number from North Africa. Another EU Mediterranean state that is not far away from the MENA mainland constitutes Cyprus. It is neither integrated in one of Frontex Mediterranean routes nor greatly associated with illegal boat-immigration in the media or official documents. A reason for this is probably the negligence of this issue by both the Cypriot government and press. However, if one may trust a recent WikiLeaks source, the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Frank Urbancic, described Cyprus in 2009 as the “back door” to the EU due to the lack of border enforcement against illegal aliens who enter Cyprus in the areas administered by

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29 BBC News, Key facts: Africa to Europe migration; Hein de Haas, Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU.


32 The effectiveness of containing illegal immigration by means of the bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy refers to the time before the conflict between the Gaddafi-regime and Libyan rebels broke out in 2011.

33 The Economist, Border burden Greece; Frontex, FRAN Quarterly Issue 3, 12-13.

34 Albania is the other departure country of illegal migrants toward Greece

Turkish Cypriots and then cross the Green Line, the UN-patrolled buffer zone, into the Republic of Cyprus and the EU. He goes on to explain that the immigrants either enter the northern Turkish part from Syria with the ferry or in small boats. This is in accordance with a release that the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington D.C. published already in May 2005. According to this release "[t]he main wave of illegal immigrants comes through the occupied areas." Considering the geographic location it is not surprising that Cyprus is chosen as destination point by illegal migrants from MENA even if it is not a Schengen country yet. Finally, there is the possibility to enter the EU via the Turkish-Bulgarian border. Like Cyprus, Bulgaria is no member of the EU Schengen area yet. One obstacle to Bulgaria’s entry is according to a recent statement of the Civil Liberties Committee rapporteur of the European Parliament, Carlos Coelho illegal, illegal migration between Bulgaria and Turkey as well as Greece.

A factor that adds to the sensitivity caused by geographic closeness represents the provisions of the Dublin II Regulation concerning asylum application. According this EU law, the Member State that irregular migrants enter first are responsible for examining the asylum application, provided that the other hierarchically higher criteria do not apply. In this

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40 European Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national
41 Asylum seekers generally enter countries as illegal migrants before they make an application for receiving refugee status. If they are considered as refugees they are not illegal anymore and have to be protected under the rules of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
42 These are family unity, possession of a valid residence document or visa from another Member State, or legal entry in a European Member that does not require a visa from this national
way, EU Member States with an external European border principally tend to receive a higher number of illegal foreigners they are responsible for. In the case of migrants from MENA these tend to be the EU Mediterranean states and Bulgaria. A source supporting this argument for three EU Mediterranean States is a Commission report “on the activities of the EURODAC Central Unit in 2009” according to which most “persons who irregularly entered the territory of the European Union, before applying for asylum” in another country did enter in “Greece and Italy and to a much lesser extent, Hungary and Spain”. The sensitivity of the European Mediterranean countries towards sudden events in the North African countries was recently illustrated by the high influx of illegal migrants caused by the outbreak of the revolutionary turmoil in many Northern and Middle Eastern countries since January 2011. The overthrow of the Tunisian ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the weakening of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s sovereignty over great parts of the Libyan territory combined with the internal conflict there led to a loosening of the formerly strict border controls in these two countries. As a result, not only a huge number of new refugees but also illegal economic migrants have succeeded in reaching the European Mediterranean countries via boat. Indeed, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees announced in April of this year that more than 20,000 boats from Tunisia arrived in Lampedusa and more than 800 from Libya in Malta, causing an overload of these islands’ reception capacities. In a Joint Communiqué of April 19, 2011, the Mediterranean countries Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain, expressed their concerns on this sudden mass influx from North Africa and their specific sensitivity to receiving illegal migrants from there. They stressed that

44 The EURODAC system was established in 2000 collect and compare fingerprints of asylum seekers and some categories of illegal immigrants and, thus, to facilitate the application of the Dublin II Regulation. (see under http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/133081_en.htm
the current emergency situation with regard to the massive illegal immigration flows and movements of possible beneficiaries of international protection brings upon the Mediterranean Member States additional social, economic, administrative and demographic burden, to [...] the already existing intense and continuous migratory pressure at the south eastern external borders of the EU.47

Besides this statement underlines the fact that geographic closeness plays an important role in the sensitivity towards the MENA region – or in this case only North Africa – it also reveals that there is awareness and concern for this sensitivity among the governments of these Mediterranean states.

A major reason why states are concerned about their sensitivity to receive illegal immigrants and why they do not want to have them in their countries is the economic burden. As explained in Chapter 1.1., sensitivity is expressed through “costly effects” as a result of changes in another region of the world. These immediate and inevitable costs are caused, for example, by rescuing boats in distress, by providing food and accommodation to already arrived immigrants and by financing their status determination and eventual extradition. Indirect costs for the economy might emerge through the damage of tourism in regions where many undocumented persons arrive. All these kinds of costly effects are assumed to affect closer EU Member States to a greater extent since illegal immigrants from the MENA arrive to their territories first. The influx of thousands of immigrants in Italy and Malta as a result of the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt illustrate this. It has set the governments of the Mediterranean countries greatly under pressure while the remaining Member States, not affected by high immigrant influx have been reluctant to share the burden.

In the previous sections, the reasons for the Mediterranean countries’ and Bulgaria’s sensitivity due to their closeness to MENA region were identified. Among the six Mediterranean countries with southern external borders five of them – Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain – have been identified as very sensitive. Portugal can be seen relatively less sensitive in comparison to the other Mediterranean states because it neither belongs to the traditional routes of illegal migration from the MENA region nor was it identified as major destination in the consulted official European documents and Frontex reports. The reason for this is probably that Portugal’s shores are in comparison to Spain’s too far away from the Moroccan mainland. Together with Bulgaria, these six geographically sensitive Member States face twenty-one less sensitive Member States in a European-wide context.

2.2. Vulnerability Interdependence

After I have assessed sensitivity in the previous part, in the following section I deal with the assessment of the Member States’ vulnerability. As defined above, vulnerability is an actor’s ability to make adjustments to new situations in an effective, rapid and cost-effective way, whereby the availability of alternatives plays an important role. For the measurement of vulnerability interdependence, I use a simple and straightforward categorization with help of two factors. The first indicator is the economic size of the European countries. It is assessed in GDP per capita\textsuperscript{48} which shows country’s wealth and richness in terms of standard of living and development as well as its economic growth and strength. Economic wealth allows a country to bear costs caused by illegal immigrants more easily. In other words, the wealthier a state, the higher its budget and means mitigate the costs and consequences caused by already entered illegal immigrants. First, immigrants even though they entered illegally have the right

\textsuperscript{48} GDP per capita is calculated the following: GDP of the nation divided by the total population.
to apply for asylum under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees\textsuperscript{49} to which all EU Member States belong. Accordingly, the countries must finance the costs and personnel needed for assessing these applications and providing initial housing for the asylum seekers. Second, Member State must provide protection and pay for basic needs such as housing, food and integration in form of language courses and education for acknowledged refugees. For those applicants who are rejected and can be sent back to the country of origin without any concerns in accordance with international law the member states must pay the transportation. Third, EU Member States with external borders have additional expenditures on preventing further illegal influx through enhanced border controls. These are some examples of costs a state might have to bear. Wealthier states that have more money available also have more means and alternatives for the same number of illegal immigrants. The proportion wealthier states spent of their total budget for the same number of illegal immigrants is smaller in comparison to the proportion of poorer states’ budget. Consequently, it is assumed that the most vulnerable states are those with the poorest economies because the governments of these states have a smaller budget due to less direct and indirect tax revenues.

The second indicator for vulnerability interdependence is the size of a Member States’ population. In this case the vulnerability is reduced with increasing size of population. Foreign immigrants in countries with a large population make up a smaller proportion of the total population. Since foreigners and especially illegal ones are often seen as threat by the citizens to employment, social wealth and national identity, it is easier to integrate immigrants when they do not seem to outnumber the national population or – in more realistic and less extreme terms – constitute a relatively big part of them.\textsuperscript{50} A recent example illustrating this negative effect was already mentioned before with the case of Lampedusa. Even though the

\textsuperscript{49} Also known under the short versions “1951 Convention” and “Refugee Convention”

\textsuperscript{50} This topic is discussed in great detail in the literature on securitization (of migrants); see works by, amongst others, B. Buzan, O. Wæver, D. Bigo, J. Huysmans and G. Karyotis.
Italian population is in total larger, limiting the view only to Lampedusa, the high influx of North African immigrants has threatened the Italian islanders because the number of immigrants exceeded the number of the island’s population. As a consequence, Lampedusa’s citizens started to protest setting the Italian government under great pressure.\(^5\) This has made any integration or the uncomplicated processing of the immigrants’ asylum applications impossible and set the government greatly under pressure.

As the above analysis has shown, Member States might differ greatly in their vulnerabilities. In theory, there is a possibility that non-Mediterranean Member States that are little sensitive with regard to their location might become as interdependent as Mediterranean States because of their relative higher vulnerability. It follows that the Mediterranean states might not be the only ones that are interdependent with regard to the MENA region. For instance, in economic terms, poorer Central and Eastern European states can be seen as more vulnerable than Italy, which belongs to the richest EU Member States and the Group of Eight (G8). Similarly, the six Mediterranean states cannot be treated all the same. It would not be logical to equate Italy with the smallest European states such as Malta and Cyprus. In the subsequent section, the overall interdependence for each of the twenty-seven Member States will be assessed. Therefore, I categorize states’ sensitivity and vulnerability in accordance with these three indicators of geographic distance from MENA as well as with their economic and population size. This will provide an overview of which EU states are relatively more interdependent than other.

\(^5\)Insert source
2.3. Assessment of overall Interdependence

As already explained in Chapter 1.2., the interdependence is assessed by allocating to them cardinal numbers according to their different degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability. The resulting three numbers (one for sensitivity and two for vulnerability) are then added together in order calculate the interdependence for every Member States. In this way, an overview is given about the position or rank of the individual states in the scale of interdependence. Since the higher the allocated number the higher the sensitivity and vulnerability, the states with the highest sum are the most interdependent.

To begin with, the sensitivity of Member States is calculated in relation to their geographic location to the MENA region. The closer a country, the more sensitive it is. Four categories can be identified. The first most sensitive group comprises the five sensitive Mediterranean Member States and Bulgaria that were identified in Chapter 2.1. They are closest to the MENA region and share external EU borders – either by sea or land – with the MENA countries. Therefore, they receive four points on their sensitivity-account. On the reasons elucidated in Chapter 2.1., Portugal is a less sensitive Mediterranean state and is, therefore, considered as part of the second group. This second group comprises the neighbouring countries that share borders with the Mediterranean states, i.e. Austria, Romania, France and Slovenia. Illegal immigrants who did arrive in one of the countries of the first group but did not intend to stay reach these neighbouring countries next. They receive three points. The next group, which receives two points, includes those Member States that are separated by one country from the Mediterranean countries. These are from north-west to south-east Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The remaining states belong to the final and least sensitive group. They are separated by more than one buffer
country and/or by the Northern Sea from the Mediterranean countries and receive one point on their sensitivity-account.

Next, I categorize the economic size of the Member States in terms of GDP per capita in four sections. The data for the GDP per capita is derived from the statistic database “Eurostat”. It is widely used, recognized as reliable source and the data is comparable to statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The data is taken from the years 2001 to 2010. This time span is in accordance with the period that is looked at in the empirical study of Chapter 3. Table 1 below gives an overview on the ranking of the Member States in GDP per capita according to their average calculated from the period from 2001 until 2010 (see last column on the right). In Graph 1 this table is additionally visualised in a bar chart (see next page). Both show that the Member States vary greatly in their economic size. The “older” Western and Northern Member States’ GDPs per capita is generally higher in comparison to the GDP per capita.

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Table 1: Ranking of EU27 according to their average in GDP per capita (in €) for the period from 2001 to 2010

<table>
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Graph 1: Ranking of EU27 according to their average in GDP per capita (in €) for the period from 2001 to 2010
capita of the “newer” Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) that joined the EU in accession rounds of 2004 and 2007. Luxembourg has by far the strongest economy with one of the highest living standards among states belonging to the OECD. This situation is explainable according to the OECD report of 2010 by Luxembourg’s role as a “major financial centre” which “has been crucial to the development of its economy and [...] has come to play a large role in economic activity, employment and government revenues.” The gap between this Benelux country and Romania - one of the poorest European Member States – with a difference of €76,400 GDP per capita in the year 2010 is huge. Categorizing these two extreme examples into different sizes – Luxembourg is certainly a big state while Romania is a small or even a micro-state according to their GDP per capita. For the categorization the average of GDP per capita of the period from 2001 to 2009 is used. The year 2010 is excluded as no data is available for Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Utilising the average makes it easier and more straightforward to divide the states according to their sizes than it would be by using all figures from 2001 to 2010. Indeed, since the GDP per capita of all Member States has risen between the 10-year-period it is difficult to indicate sections for the different categories. For instance, if the threshold for the big states is set at €30,000 GDP per capita, Finland would not belong to this category in the years 2001-2004 while it would do so in the years 2005-2010. The Netherlands and Sweden represent similar cases. Therefore, the average is used to deal only with one number that comprises the overall economic size of the countries during the analysed time span. Even though Luxembourg’s economy is almost twice as big as the second largest EU economy, it cannot be considered as being the only “big state” since it represents an exception and it would seem that the other strong economies of the EU are rather small, which is not the case. Consequently, as a first category for the “big states”, €30,000 GDP per capita serves as a threshold. According to the

54 OECD Economic Survey of Luxembourg, 13
average GDP per capita, the seven first EU Member States in Table 1 belong to it. The next category, i.e. medium-sized states, goes from above EU27-average of €22,522 to €30,000 per capita. To this group belong five states. Hence, thirteen Member States have a GDP per capita higher than the average of all twenty seen EU states. The third category’s threshold is located at €10,000 while the EU Member States’ GDP per capita of the last category lays under €10,000 and ranges from €3,211 for Bulgaria to €8,533 for Estonia (see last column, Table 1).

As explained above, the wealthier a state, the less vulnerable it tends to be. Since the allocated number decreases with declining vulnerability, the wealthiest states of category 1 get one point while category 3 receive three, category 2 two and category 1 one point on their vulnerability-account.

Finally, I undertake the categorization of the Member States according to their population size. This factor is a so-called “fixed size” because it does not change dramatically over longer periods of time and is relatively easily calculable. Therefore, it is sufficient to refer to the Eurostat data of a single year, here 2009, instead of calculating the average number of a longer period like in the case above. An overview of all Member States is seen in Table 2 (next page). For the categorization states are distinguished in large, medium, small and micro-small; a categorization proposed by Baldu Thorhallsson. Since a major gap in population size is between Spain and Italy the first threshold is set between them at around sixty million citizens. Hence, the first category of “large states” comprise Italy and all Member States with a population above it, i.e. Germany, France, the United Kingdom. The next group of “medium-sized” comprises only Spain and Poland. They form a separate category since there is a major gap between the category above and below them. Between Poland and the subsequent seventh biggest peopled state, Romania, this gap exceeds sixteen million citizens.

56 Thorhallsson, The Size of States in the European Union, 9-10
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**Table 2:** Ranking of EU27 according to their population (at January 1, 2009)
million people which. This third category is with eighteen states the biggest group within the EU. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta with a population of less than one million citizens can be seen as micro-small states. Similarly to the size of the economy and for the reasons described earlier, states with a bigger population are less vulnerable. In consequence, the points for the vulnerability-accounts have to be allocated with four points for the large-sized states in descending order, giving medium states three points, small states two points and micro-small states four points.

Having categorized the states’ sensitivity with regard to geographic location and their vulnerability according to their economic size and population size, the overall interdependence can be measured. The results are shown in Table 3 (next page). It tabulates the states according to their “Overall Interdependence” (column 5) which is the sum of the sensitivity interdependency and the vulnerability interdependencies (column 2-4). According to this sum of “Overall Interdependence”, the states can be categorized now in different groups ranging from low to highly interdependent. A four-category-method is used here. In theory, the highest number of points a state can receive for its overall interdependence is twelve, i.e. four points for each of the three factors. Since only the Mediterranean Member States (excluding Portugal) and Bulgaria can receive four points with regard to geographic location, only this group can receive the full amount while the others’ highest reachable sum is eleven. The lowest amount of points for non-Mediterranean states is three and for Mediterranean states six. Overall, there is a possible interval from three to twelve points. In Figure 2, the states of the 4 groups are categorized
### Figure 2. Overall Interdependence

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<td>(8-10 points)</td>
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<td>(5-7 points)</td>
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additionally in geographic areas. It illustrates nicely that, with the exception of Italy, all seven Mediterranean Member States and Bulgaria, which that are most sensitive in receiving immigrants from MENA, belong to group three and four and, thus, to the more interdependent states. This is not only because of their high sensitivity but also because they tend to have a high vulnerability with regard to both economic and population size. The most interdependent states, with eleven points are, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Malta. For the two insular states their micro-small population size and their relatively small economy (category 3) are the reasons for this. In case of Bulgaria it is the reverse since its GDP per capita is smaller and its population bigger in comparison to Cyprus and Malta. The remaining three Mediterranean states (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) are in group three. Portugal still reaches this group despite its lower sensitivity in comparison to the other Mediterranean states because of its low economic and population size. Italy, which belongs to group two has a relatively low interdependence in spite of its high sensitivity as a Mediterranean state. This is thanks to relatively strong economy, which is slightly above the EU27-average, and through its fourth biggest population in the EU. Consequently, the Italian state belongs in economic terms to the second category, i.e. to the second lowest vulnerable group, and with regard to its population to the large-sized states with the lowest vulnerability.

Looking at the rest of states (i.e. neither Mediterranean nor Bulgaria) it is noticeable that all the remaining CEECs except Poland belong to the second most interdependent group,
i.e. group three. Hence, like the Mediterranean states and Bulgaria they are situated in the upper half of overall interdependency. The relatively high interdependence of these eight CEECs can be traced back to their high vulnerability with regard to GDP per capita which is rather low in EU context. Indeed, all of them except Slovenia and the Czech Republic belong to the fourth category in economic size meaning that they are most vulnerable. With regard of their population they are relatively small in EU context as well. As a consequence, the eight CEEC are always ranked as third or fourth most vulnerable group. Poland is the only CEEC that belongs to group two and is, thus, rather low in interdependence. This is explainable through its lower vulnerability with regard to its population size. In fact, the big Polish population makes it to a medium-sized state whereas the rest of the CEECs are small-sized. Poland shares the second group with the Western and Northern EU countries, i.e., France, Germany, Austria, the Benelux, the three Scandinavian states and Ireland. All of them are low in sensitivity due to their geographical distance from MENA and low in vulnerability with regard to economic size due to their high GDP per capita. As only Mediterranean state, Italy also belongs to this second least interdependent group. Finally, the United Kingdom stays alone in the first group and is least interdependent Overall, it can be summarized that with the exception of Poland and Italy all Mediterranean states and CEECs are more interdependent than the Western and Northern members of the EU.

After having assessed the Member States’ interdependence in the case of illegal immigration, I turn in the next chapter to the empirical assessment of Member States’ policy behaviour with regard to illegal immigration form the MENA region. In this way it can be evaluated whether the hypothesis is true that the Member States, which have been identified above as more interdependent, pursue a more realpolitik-oriented policy.
3. Empirical Examples: Realpolitik to Fight Illegal Immigration

In the previous section, I have assessed the interdependence of the EU Member States on MENA with regard to illegal immigration. Before that, the meaning of realpolitik was clarified. In the following, I will show how these realpolitik-oriented tendencies become apparent in Member States’ behaviour in the two policy areas. This will provide an insight into whether the hypothesis holds that more interdependent countries tend to pursue realpolitik policies. As explained in section, the states that are doing this for the sake of national interests act in opposition to the values and norms they have adhered to as members of the European Union.

The best way to illustrate this interrelation would be to have an in depth study of one or two EU countries in one particular foreign policy issue towards one country of the MENA region. Unfortunately, available data on concrete policies is limited, especially with regard to confidentially treated information on foreign policy decisions. Moreover, the fact that many websites were only available in the local languages made it difficult to find information across the twenty-seven EU Member States. Therefore, I will represent empirical examples in broader terms comprising several EU countries, the whole MENA region and several policy areas or themes respectively. This does not provide us with one or two specific and in depth example(s) of a realpolitik-oriented Member State. Nonetheless, by looking at various issue areas of several EU countries – even if in a less detailed way - we will acquire a sufficient insight into which states adopt realist policies with regard to the MENA region. In this way, the hypothesis can be tested in a satisfactory manner.

States are, in general, reluctant to accept the unhindered influx of illegal immigrants. Governments use different strategies to protect their countries against unwelcome foreigners. On the one hand, they implement direct measures such as border controls and visa restrictions to hinder illegal immigrants from entering. Other strategies combat illegal immigration
indirectly. An example is the support of stable conditions and good living standards in the sending state in order to take away the reasons to head for Europe. The latter option of development aid is not in itself wrong. However, if the amount of money for development aid is little in comparison to other expenses to combat illegal immigration more drastically, states pursue their interest in a realpolitik-oriented way. In this case, the development aid probably has merely the purpose of distracting from the states’ real intentions. These are some examples of how realpolitik-oriented behaviour can be revealed in governmental actions. I stress that I do not oppose the right of governments to control their borders against illegal immigrants. Nevertheless, this right is only reasonable as long as the methods do not violate basic rights and values they have adhered to as member of international treaties and the EU. If they do so, they adopt a highly realist behaviour aimed at securing their own national interests regardless of other consequences. If the hypothesis is correct, states being highly interdependent with regard to illegal immigration tend to act in this way. According to the results of the quantitative analysis, these are the Mediterranean Member States except Italy and the CEECs. In contrast, Italy as well as the Western and Northern European states, which are relatively less interdependent, should stick to policies that do not run against certain rights and values. In the following I will illustrate how these realpolitik-oriented tendencies become apparent in different ways.

3.1. Collaboration with Autocratic Regimes

One of the most obvious examples of realpolitik-oriented behaviour is the collaboration with dictatorial regimes to protect itself against illegal immigration.\footnote{Other reasons for collaboration with the MENA regimes have been the fight against terrorism, economic interests and energy resources. Since I am interested in the cooperation with regard to the containment of illegal immigration these areas are not considered in great detail in this section.} Before the democratic upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya broke out this year, Member States were
willing to support rulers such as Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi regardless of their suppression of basic human and civil rights. Some critics and politicians might argue that contact with these regimes is necessary in order to be able to positively influence these rulers in the first place. However, this argument can be judged as rather doubtful. The majority of European governments have consciously failed to criticise human rights’ violations and the absence of democratic structures or, at least, they have not expressed their concerns vehemently enough. Instead, they often cultivated friendly relationships with the dictatorial regimes and established bilateral agreements with them. The benefits European leaders received in exchange were the North African regimes’ willingness to prevent people from departing for Europe from their shores and to readmit those who had entered the EU from their country.

Italy, for instance, has always cultivated friendly diplomatic relations with Libya – even during the time when Libya was widely isolated on international level due to U.N. sanctions imposed against it since the beginning of the 1990s and despite the fact that the regime was actively supporting terrorism. Italian governments turned a blind eye on these issues for the sake of pursuing its national interests with the help of the North African state. Indeed, there are several bilateral Italian-Libyan agreements, such as the police cooperation agreements in the fight against illegal immigrants of 2000 and 2007. The latter was only

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effectively implemented by the Libyan side in May 2009, after Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was willing to sign the Treaty on “Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation.”\textsuperscript{61} Since 2009, joint Italian-Libyan patrols are policing along the coasts of Libya for which Italy provides naval boats. In addition to this, an expensive satellite system which is co-financed by Italy and the EU is used to detect illegal immigrants.\textsuperscript{62} Italy also does not hesitate to return illegal migrants who departed from Libya. While international criticism has forced Italy to stop this extradition of illegal immigrants from its territory since 2006, the Italian government started to intercept boats already in international waters in order to send them back to Libya. The Italian Ministry of Interior Affairs even admitted this in public.\textsuperscript{63} These methods are heavily criticised by non-governmental organisations for several reasons. Libya is known for treating illegal migrants and refugees in inhuman ways and for depriving them from basic rights. Indeed, there are reports on rape and assassinations of immigrants. In some cases, illegal immigrants and refugees were abandoned in Libyan deserts while other were sold to smugglers or detained for years in Libyan prisons without any asylum seekers’ procedures.\textsuperscript{64}

Moreover, Libya did not sign the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1968 Protocol so that it is not bound to protect refugees under international law. Considering these facts, the Italian


government clearly acts immorally by collaborating with Libya to combat the influx of illegal immigrants. Another point to consider is that the Italian state itself violates international law it has committed itself to. In contrast to Libya, Italy is member of the 1951 Refugee Convention so that the policy of returning boats to Libya or to Libyan patrolling boats without assessing the identity of the people on board constitutes a breach of international asylum law if refugees are deprived from their right to apply for asylum.\(^\text{65,66}\)

In addition to its link to Libya, Italy had similar readmission and joint border control agreements with the Tunisian ruler Ben Ali since 1999. Between 2003 and 2007 these two states intercepted several boats on the High Sea and sent them back to the African continent. Thereby, the two governments refused to report whether refugees were on board or what happened to the immigrants in Tunisia where they might have been abandoned at the Saharan borders.\(^\text{67}\) Italy also concluded regular readmission agreements with Algeria in 2006 and Egypt in 2007. With the former, it also cooperates in a joint patrolling mission since 2009.\(^\text{68}\) Overall, it is hardly doubtful that Italy has been inclined to prevent illegal immigration from reaching its border by collaborating with the North African regimes for the sake of its national interests. This is a sign of realist-oriented behaviour especially because Italy remained silent with regard to the violations against various international and human rights law committed by the Libyan regime. More than that, with its activities on the High Sea, Italy has consciously violated international and human rights law.


\(^{66}\) Refugees from Eritrea and Somalia have accused Italy before the European Court of Human Rights because they were not given the opportunity to claim asylum in Italy (Hirsi and Others vs. Italy (Application No. 27765/09)).


Besides Italy, Spanish governments have also been eager to keep good relations with the North African countries in order to curb illegal immigration from the African continent and especially from Morocco. Spain has been most of the time rather uncritical and silent in issues such as the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the unfair election in the case of Tunisia. One reason for Spanish reservation is the wish to collaborate with these authoritarian leaders in illegal immigration issues. Indeed, Spain grants Tunisia preferential treatment in trade and economic cooperation since the 1990s in exchange for which the Tunisian leader Ben Ali controlled the borders and prevented Tunisians and African transit migrants to head for Europe. As far as Morocco is concerned, there is a bilateral agreement since 2003, according to which Spain compensates the North African government several hundred millions of dollar for collaboration in the combat against illegal migration from Morocco to Spain. Moreover, besides the Maltese President, the Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos was the only high official of an EU state to attend Gaddafi’s fortieth anniversary in power in 2009. These two examples have shown that two countries that are very sensitive to the North African continent have been willing to collaborate with regimes despite various human rights concerns. I do not intend to deny here that the geographic closeness is a major factor for these bilateral collaborations. Other non-Mediterranean states that do not have external borders with the MENA region do not really need to conclude bilateral agreements for the combat against illegal boat migrants. Nor do I claim that other EU states have not attempted to keep good diplomatic relations with the Egyptian, Libyan and Tunisian dictators.

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Indeed, many other European leaders such as the French President Sarkozy, the former German chancellor Schröder and his successor Merkel as well as the former British Prime Minister Blair used to hold good and friendly diplomatic relations with these rulers and welcomed them to official state visits until the recent democratic upheavals in the MENA region. However, these bilateral contacts were mainly based on other intentions than the fight against illegal migration. Even though these policies of non-Mediterranean states are not denied, they do not fit exactly in the analysis of this section which deals exclusively with the connection of interdependence and realpolitik behaviour with regard to illegal immigration. Thus, considering bilateral agreements and cooperation to curb illegal immigration, the Mediterranean states Italy and Spain are identified as very real-politik oriented. The next section about border controls will reveal a similar picture even though realist features can be found in the behaviour of other states as well.

3.2. Extensive Border Control

The border controls which were discussed already in the context of bilateral agreements between EU and North African states have also been introduced and increasingly intensified in many other forms on the external European borders. Spain, for instance, has erected highly technically equipped fences around its enclaves Ceuta and Melilla with €48 million and €12 million of construction costs alone. Moreover, the “Integral System of Exterior Surveillance” (SIVE) which automatically detects boats leaving Morocco’s or the Canary Island’s coast was implemented in 2002 in order to impede illegal migration through the Strait of Gibraltar. While Spain is in principle allowed to control its borders, it does not have the


74 Stefan Alscher, “Knocking at the Doors of ‘Fortress Europe’,” 12
authority – as stated by Amnesty International and European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) – to do that beyond its territorial waters.\textsuperscript{75}

Greece is also intensifying the controls at its borders with Turkey which has become the main entrance point for illegal immigrants to Europe. Similar to the walls around the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Greece plans to erect fence along parts of the Turkish-Greek border. Additionally, the Greek government has requested help from the European border-managing organisation that supplements to the national control of the EU’s external borders (Frontex) to guard and monitor its borders.\textsuperscript{76} These restrictive measures are certainly also implemented because the severe economic crises in Greece makes it impossible for the country to cope with the high number of illegal immigrants within its territory of which Greece suffers. Despite this economic and financial concerns, the inhuman and degrading treatment of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants by the Greek authorities is, nevertheless, unacceptable and against European values and human rights. The majority of European Member States, therefore, decided not to return illegal immigrants and asylum seekers to Greece even if this was legally possible under the Dublin II Regulation (see 2.1.).\textsuperscript{77} The moral concerns and human rights’ concerns to sent migrants back to Greece was confirmed by a judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in January of this year where the Court condemned Belgium, which intended to return migrants to Greece, for not having considered the degrading treatment in Greece.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} “Human rights organisations urge EU governments to adapt border management to ensure that refugees can reach Europe”, ECRE, February 24, 2010, http://www.ecre.org/files/2010_02_24_PR_AI_CEAR_ECRE_Borders_EN.pdf
The border control agency Frontex is another issue that shows the realpolitik orientation of EU governments. Frontex has come often under criticism. Indeed, it has been accused in various reports of ECRE and Amnesty International for its failure to comply with European and international asylum and human rights law, for its lack of transparency, accountability and independent monitoring of its work, as well as for its tendency to act beyond its legal competences by extending its operations to international waters.\textsuperscript{79} The resentment against this Frontex has also let civil societies to become active as well. There are various anti-Frontex blogs on the internet\textsuperscript{80} and anti-Frontex-demonstrations are organised.\textsuperscript{81} The most recent so-called “Anti-Frontex Days” took place from the sixteenth to the twenty-third of May of this year in front of the headquarters in Warsaw.\textsuperscript{82} The realpolitik-oriented implication in this case is that Frontex’s policies are tolerated and allowed by the EU and its Member States even though they run against many legal and normative bases. The increasing support of the EU states is also reflected in Frontex’s growing budget financed by EU money, a regular contributions from the Schengen countries and voluntary contributions from Member States.\textsuperscript{83} Additionally, EU Member States also help support operations of Frontex. In the sea operations of 2008 and 2009, the Mediterranean countries Italy, Portugal and Spain were leading actors, with Malta and Greece being involved to a lesser extent.\textsuperscript{84} Besides them, many states without Mediterranean Sea borders participated in a few operations, including the

\textsuperscript{84} Cyprus rejected the conditions of the FRONTEX operations
geographically distant Scandinavian and Baltic countries. Member States also seem to be eager to facilitate the work of the border-control organisation in other ways. For instance, in the legal basis of a civil-military project, which is supposed to become operational in 2013, they reject amendments by the European Parliament and omit concrete and strong hints to human rights. Hence, the EU and its Member States support an organisation and practices that are highly criticised and contested from a normative and human rights’ point of view.

In addition to supporting and engaging in activities violating against European and international law, many Member States have recently revealed their willingness to curtail the achievements of free movement within the EU territory - thus questioning the level of integration at EU level. This discussion was triggered by the Franco-Italian dispute which broke out in April of this year as a result of the revolution in Tunisia and subsequent immigration streams to Europe. France reintroduced temporary border controls in order to stop Tunisian immigrants from entering its territory via the French-Italian border. The Tunisians have received temporary residence permits from the Italian government that wanted to get rid of the responsibility to all illegal immigrants and refugees coming from North Africa since January. Currently, Italy and France supported by most other Schengen states including Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Malta intend to revise the Schengen rules and relax its provisions on the re-establishment of inter-state border controls in certain situations. Denmark did not wait and just positioned the police on its borders to Germany by exhausting the current legal basis. Even though they do not want to re-instate border

86 These countries are more involved in the operations on land. The reason for why they contribute to the sea mission even though they are geographically far away from the Mediterranean would requires further research which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
supervision permanently, it seems that Member State’s try to regain sovereignty over their borders in order to hinder high numbers of immigrants from entering their territory.

Overall, with regard to border control realist features are not only revealed in Mediterranean countries’ policies. The other Member States also support Frontex and fail to prohibit it from using certain questionable methods. Unfortunately, the available data is not sufficient to get a complete picture of whether some Member States support Frontex more than others or whether some express criticism in internal debates. Merely a few direct and open calls for an enhancement of Frontex’s competencies can be fined in the media such as the of the address of Greek and French towards the Spanish EU Presidency in the first half of 2010. Despite this limitation of information, it has become evident, nonetheless, is that not only the Member States, which are sensitive due to their geographic closeness, support the activities of Frontex in the Mediterranean Sea. This support for Frontex in general can be traced back to other reasons. For instance, since CEECs are more sensitive to immigrants crossing the EU’s external land border to Eastern Europe while some Member States such as France, Germany and the U.K. tend to be traditional destination countries due to language reasons or existing family ties, they are generally interested in tougher controls of EU’s external borders. The general interest among EU states to prevent immigrants to reach one of the Mediterranean countries from MENA has been successfully accomplished in the past years since the number of arrivals via boat went down dramatically. However, the UNHCR reproves the EU and its Member States for its strict policies on its external borders because “Europe should not forget that among those seeking to enter the EU are people who need international protection.” Hence, the EU Member States act against the Refugee Convention

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to which they are members by restrict the rights of those immigrants who are should be allowed to enter the EU in order to seek international protection in one of the EU countries.

The foregoing empirical assessment has revealed the realpolitik-oriented policies of some EU Member States with regard to border control and migration policies. In the subsequent conclusion the acquired knowledge is compared with the degree of interdependence of the Member States that were analysed above in order to evaluate whether the hypothesis has to be falsified.
Conclusion

The purpose of the foregoing analysis was to gain insight into the understanding of realpolitik-oriented behaviour of EU Member States with regard to illegal immigration from MENA to the European continent. Keohane and Nye’s concept of interdependence was, thereby, used as the basis of the evaluation. The following question served as a guideline for this investigation: Does the degree of interdependence of EU Member States with regard to immigration affect their policy behaviour? The underlying hypothesis is that EU states facing high interdependence pursue a realpolitik-oriented policy in order to mitigate the negative consequences of their interdependence. Realpolitik in the context of illegal immigration was defined as neglecting or even breaching norms and values to which the EU states have committed as members of the EU and various international human rights treaties. The empirical assessment of Chapter 3 has depicted several examples for realpolitik behaviour. Italy and Spain, for instance have concluded bilateral agreements with dictatorial regimes of Libya and Tunisia to benefit from support in the combat against illegal migration. At the same time, the two Mediterranean states remained rather silent with regard to human rights violations and democratic deficits in these North African countries. It seemed that the realization of their national aim to prevent illegal boat immigrants from reaching their shores was more important. Also Greece has been accused to treat illegal immigrants and refugees badly acting, thus, in violation to human rights. In the cases of Spain and Greece, this realpolitik-oriented behaviour confirms the hypothesis since Spain has been characterised as relatively high interdependent with regard to MENA. The high degree of sensitivity to receive immigrants from North Africa combined with its greater challenges to cope with this influx due to its high vulnerability has prompted Spain to neglect moral and value based-concerns and to adopt realpolitik. In contrast, Italy’s policy behaviour challenges the hypothesis. Even
though the Italian state ranks rather low in interdependence it is a rather strong supporter of realpolitik measures. One reason for this is certainly the current large influx of immigrants which puts high strains on the country. The same is illustrated in case of the seemingly substantial support of Frontex by both high interdependent and low interdependent Member States.

The cases of Italy and Frontex show that not all scenarios in which states act against the values and human rights they have adhered to can be fully understood by the concept of interdependence. Like most models, the concept of interdependence cannot explain for everything. Nevertheless, it can be regarded as a valid basis to assess and explain state behaviour. It needs to be extended, however, to explain for those cases that are committed to realpolitik-oriented behaviour despite low interdependence. Moreover, other countries should be investigated more in depth with regard to political agenda and their immigration practices in order to substantiate the validity of using the concept in the area of immigration policy and the quantitative measurement which I have undertaken on the basis of the concept.
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