Narratives of Collective Memory: Turkey as the Greek Cypriots’ Other

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Submitted to
Central European University
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In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Word Count: 15726

Budapest, Hungary
2011
Abstract

This study will investigate the ways in which stereotypical representations of Turkey are being articulated in the discursive spaces of historiography and the press in the Republic of Cyprus and it will suggest that these originate from and, at the same time, are being reinforced through collective memory. I argue that the Turkish identity functions as an empty signifier for the Greek Cypriot historical discourse. There is an ongoing competition for a hegemonic articulation that would establish a definite set of parameters for this identity. Thus, the Self/Other dynamic here is rehashed in the sense that there is an obsession for defining the Other, so that the identity of the self could be more evident. Greek Cypriot discourses and narratives of history and identity base their articulations on the implicit relationship with the constructed Turkish identity, which serves in turn as the ultimate marker of self perception.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Emel Akçaltı for her comments and suggestions on the topic. I am also grateful to Ágnes Tóth for her help and patience. Finally, I am thankful to all those who didn’t let me forget that learning is meant to be a game, a combination of sense and nonsense.
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Introduction

Admittedly, memory holds a key role in the shaping of a nation’s identity and in determining its policy choices. Perceptions about the Self and the Other are often rooted in the past that is translated in collective memory. Nation-states, notably, rediscover over time their past through memory, in order to construct a common history. But collective remembering does not only relate to the past and the present. It also plays an important role in setting the scene for the way a social group projects itself into the future. Although it is very hard to grasp the operation of collective remembering, undoubtedly the memory of the past is externalized and objectified as narratives.

If we now try to picture the map of Cyprus, the image that comes to mind is familiar and yet somehow unsettling: a thick line divides the island in two parts. The way we conceptualize the territory of Cyprus reflects one of the most persistent and thorny problems in contemporary international relations. During the 37 years since the Turkish military intervention the island has witnessed multiple internal and external efforts at solution. Put simply, in the Greek Cypriot list of friendly and hostile nations, Turkey belongs to the latter. The relationship between the two countries is tormented by memory. Most aspects of Greek Cypriot politics are influenced by the past they share with Turkey. Different manifestations of this past, notably negative images of Turkey are a permanent reference point in narratives of the Greek Cypriots.

The overarching question that guides this thesis is: what makes everyday politics in Cyprus so much permeated by images of the past? In other words, why is the mainstream

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1 A notable example of the way collective memory is often brought in contemporary politics can be found at the way national traumas operate. See: Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).
political and media discourse in Cyprus exaggeratedly concerned with history? This concern with the past generates a distinct nuance of Cypriot politics, which is characterized by pronounced nationalism and identity-based anxieties. This nuance often translates into an increased attention paid to, and at times hostility towards the way in which other international actors negotiate Cyprus’ history and present identity. For example, in the foreign policy agenda of Cyprus, Turkey holds the most prominent place. At the same time, in the wake of EU accession, predominant voices of the political discourse claimed that the Union was seeking to “impose imperialist plans” and allow the island to be _de facto_ split.

The main argument of this paper, in a nutshell, is that the answer to these questions lies in the way the Cypriot collective memory is being articulated in various discursive spaces. Collective memory plays a crucial role, to the extent that it informs and conducts the subjective perceptions of the Greek Cypriot population in certain directions. At the same time, collective memory is the foundation on which the Greek Cypriot identity is being constructed in and through different discourses and narratives of the past.

My hypothesis is, therefore, that negative representations of Turkey originate from the Greek Cypriots’ collective memory. Having this in mind, this thesis will focus on this collective memory, and will explore an array of powerful images of the past by analyzing two forms that such narratives take: the official historical discourse (the official, undisputed, and accredited ‘story’ of the past) that generates and reinforces the collective identity; and the discourse of the mass media, in which history is juxtaposed with contemporary and ongoing events, to generate a set of narratives that constantly articulate and interpret the present events in the light of the established identity. These two sets of discourses are of course not exhaustive, but they are representative for the general manner in which collective memory and identity discourses are articulated. In a way, the historical narrative lays out the structural parameters of this collective memory.

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6 Olga Demetriou, “Catalysis, Catachresis: the EU;s impact on the Cyprus Conflict”, in _The European Union and Border Conflicts. The Power of Integration and Association_, edited by Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 64 – 93
memory, the general and determined landscape of the metaphors, crucial events, stories and so on; and at the same time, the media narrative constitutes the locus where to some extent innovation is possible, obviously within the given parameters of the historical narrative. That is to say, while history remains static and rigid, within the media the elements of the discourse get transformed and adapted to suit the contemporary realities. This transformative power lies in their ability to draw attention on certain issues over others, in setting the agenda. The same goal is achieved by the media’s role in defining which voices and opinions will have greater weight. Before communicating the selected issues, the media shape them, frame them in a way that makes some aspects more salient than others.

The endeavors of this thesis to answer the previously outlined questions are informed by an interpretative methodology. Explicitly distancing itself from a positivist distinction between subject and object, this thesis prefers a constructivist epistemology, in the largest sense, which sees knowledge as a product of ongoing processes of intersubjective constructions and discursive articulations. What is considered as (social) ‘reality’ cannot be accessed through objective instruments of analysis that claim to be able to break the subject of study into fragments, and then reassemble them to generate a coherent vision of what is ‘really’ out there. Instead, an interpretative methodology is based on the epistemological assumption that the separation between subjects and objects of research is artificial. Knowledge can never be absolute, and researchers can never claim an objective and neutral standing point from which they conduct their analyses. Rather, knowledge and reality are in a perpetual process of construction. The meanings of objects, facts, events, ideas and territories are never pre-determined, but always negotiated within social groups, among the subjects. Therefore, this thesis is informed by the

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general ethos that ‘what is real’ is always a narrative articulated from a certain standpoint; moreover, the access to that narrative can only be achieved through the subjective interpretation that others give to it. There is no genuine reality out there that the researcher has objective unmediated access to. There are instead several interpretations, sometimes complementary, sometimes divergent, but every time mediated by the respective subjectivities of the social actors involved in those interpretations. This is why this thesis cannot claim to say the ‘Truth’ about the way collective memory shapes the Greek Cypriot collective identity. It can only present how this identity is constructed subjectively at different social levels. It can only follow the mechanisms through which certain hegemonic discourses articulate this identity from certain standpoints.

The discourses, ‘the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice’, over Turkey take place in the public sphere through the reproduction of the generally accepted history and the media, among others. Collective memory is a constitutive, pervasive part of popular and elite narratives that interact with each other and are transformed into policy decisions. Within these public discourse loci, the collective memory’s path dependence on earlier commemorations and its inferred specificity (dependence on the moment) can be traced. The empirical study of collective memory is able to provide a more accurate and useful picture of the nature of the perceptions of Turkey that determine future foreign policy attitudes. Thus, the interpretive methodology will seek to explore, identify, and interpret the sometimes hidden meanings that make up the self-conception of Greek Cypriots vis-à-vis Turkey, forming at the same time the country’s perception.

In my analysis I will draw upon the idea that whatever being objects acquire stems from discursive (in the sense of meaningful use) constructions. In critically reading such elements of narratives, I will use the theoretical tools provided by the concepts of empty signifier and the

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11 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2001), 105
logic of equivalence, as developed in Laclau and Mouffe’s critical theory of discourse. This theory argues that there can never be a fully hegemonic discourse, because of the impossibility of achieving a totality of the subjective position within a society. Different discourses may compete for hegemony, they may at times achieve it, but only for a limited time, after which every discourse will be contested and replaced by another one. An empty signifier is thus that element of the discourse that has a contested meaning. The signifier becomes empty of meaning when there is a multitude of competing discourses that try to articulate a hegemonic sense for it. Examples of these include ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ or ‘peace’. The logic of equivalence is a discursive strategy for achieving hegemonic meanings. It operates by establishing similarities and discursive alliances between different subject positions, usually through establishing intractable oppositions with an overarching articulation. This logic is behind the Self/Other binary on which the Greek Cypriot identity is based.

The study is structured as follows: in the first chapter I will expose the main theoretical considerations and concepts that inform the argument. These considerations are focused on the concept of collective memory and its interplay with the notions of identity and narrative. This chapter will present the main arguments of the literature and will attempt to refine them by illustrating them with the “case” of the Greek Cypriots. In the second chapter I lay out the historical context as well as the parameters of the contemporary debates. This will take the form of an explicit attention paid to the forms of narrative generated within and by state-sponsored historiography. The third chapter will be more empirically-oriented and it will explore the ways in which stereotypical images of Turkey manifest themselves in the Greek Cypriot press. I will argue that the mass media is reinforcing the official historical narrative, while at the same time, recreating that narrative. Finally, I will draw conclusions and point out directions for future research.

14 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics
Chapter 1: On collective memory, identity and narration

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will first outline the theoretical viewpoints related to collective memory that constitute the background of the study. I will then relate the concept of collective memory to the formation process of a Greek Cypriot identity in Cyprus, a peculiar state of two (some might argue three) different ethnic communities. Finally, I will relate the notions of memory and identity to concept that constitutes the main focal point of this study, the concept of narrative.

1.2 On collective memory

Memory has acquired an increasing importance as a study object of social sciences in the later years of the 20th century. However, memory studies lack a coherent theoretical and methodological framework and they are rather defined in terms of topics of inquiry. Despite of these problems, I consider collective memory as a privileged vantage point from where to investigate the process of identity formation of the Greek Cypriot community vis a vis Turkey. In this part I will sketch, without being exhaustive, a framework of collective memory highlighting the aspects that inform this study. I will look at its formation and at the processes that govern the formation, preservation and transmission of its content.

I will be discussing collective memory as the social experience of constructing the meaning of the shared past. In doing so, I follow Halbwachs’ argument that memory originates and operates within the society. He argues that people normally acquire, recall, recognize, and


localize their memories within the society. The individuals “determine and retrieve their recollections” from their social context within which the past assumes its meaning. In Halbwachs’ analysis, every individual’s memory relates to a group, from the smallest, such as families, or the neighbourhood, and extending to include the nation. In this sense, collective memory originates from shared communication within such groups about the meaning of the past.

According to Páez, Basabe and González, an adequate definition of what Halbwachs considered collective memory is the cross-generational oral transmission of collective events. Jeffrey Olick agrees on the importance of language, dialogue and narrative in making remembering a collective activity.

Jan Assmann departs from Halbwachs’ theory and relates memory, society and culture under the term cultural memory. One of the characteristics of a group’s cultural memory is that it “preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity.” The group becomes conscious of its self-image, of what constitutes its identity and what is foreign through memory. Another distinctive feature of Assmann’s cultural memory is its ability to reconstruct. It is not just an archive: the social knowledge of the past is being related to the contemporary context. In fact, as Michael Kammen claims, societies do not faithfully record their pasts, rather they reconstruct them according to the needs of contemporary culture. Thus, each society transfers images and narrations of the past and in this sense it is being

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18 Ibid, 38
19 Ibid, 43
24 Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, 129
25 Ibid, 130
27 Jedlowski, “Memory and Sociology: Themes and Issues”
institutionalized. However, at the same time, every society adjusts collective memory to its given context, the needs of its time.

But how are these needs defined? In this study, collective memory will be explored “as a subjective experience of a social group that essentially sustains a relationship of power”. I will focus on the politics of memory that are at times, as Colfino stresses, “politics of identity”. Clearly, collective memory has many dimensions and cannot be reduced to its political use, it is however relevant for this analysis. Since the focus is on the public discourse in Cyprus, inevitably political elites enjoy great visibility within the public sphere. In the literature, two approaches to politics can be identified. According to the first approach, “politics is largely a function of history, based on the harnessing of memory and appeals to identity”. An alternative approach suggests that a shared sense of the past, partly or mostly imaginary, can shape politics. Either way, politics and its agents often influence a society’s perception of the past and the formation of collective memory. As Jedlowski acutely observes, “the collective representations of the past are designed to give legitimacy to a society’s beliefs and to inspire their projects, thus legitimising the elites that represent them: the more complex a society and the greater the number of elites competing to dominate it, the more the past becomes the subject of strategies seeking to impose the representations that conform most to the dominant interests.”

In the collective memory of the Greek Cypriots’, the problem of cultural trauma holds a central position, even among generations that did not experience it. In Neil Smelser’s definition, a cultural trauma is a widely accepted by the group memory of an event that displays certain characteristics. The event has to be loaded with negative affect and to be perceived as indelible, creating to the group the feeling that its cultural presuppositions and it very existence are being

28 Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method”, 1393
29 Ibid.
31 Ibid
32 Jedlowski, “Memory and Sociology: Themes and Issues”, 34
threatened. As it will become clear in the following chapter, the traumatic historical events in Cyprus have been embedded in the collective consciousness and persist in the memory of generations that have no direct experience or recollections of them. Marianne Hirsch coined the term postmemory to describe this phenomenon and she argues that nevertheless, these experiences are so deeply transmitted to them that they seem to constitute memories in their own right. The past in this case is not mediated by recall, but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation. The way collective memory affects new generations is of particular importance because it determines the ways in which groups project themselves toward the future.

1.3 Collective memory and identity

In the previous part I laid out a theoretical framework for studying collective memory. As John R. Gillis argues, the concept of identity depends on the idea of memory, and the other way around. Anthony Smith even states that “one might almost say: no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation.” However, here I will opt for a broader discussion of identity as a social construct. The object of this part is to discuss how the Greek Cypriot identity is defined. To a great extent the self image of the Greek Cypriots is built upon their perception of Turkey as the hostile Other. The interpretation of Turkey as a threat and a security risk is deeply engraved in the collective memory and it is embedded in the Greek Cypriot public discourse.

Historically, the identification of Turkey as the Other for the Hellenic world can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire and to the struggles for independence. Within the highly

35 Rafael Z. Narváez, “Embodiment, Collective Memory and Time”, 66
36 Cited in Peter C. Seixas, *Theorizing Historical Consciousness* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 5
diverse Ottoman society, religion was the main identifier in a quite loose structure. In fact, the fall of the Empire is partly attributed to the lax attitude towards religious minorities, who held control of the economic life. This is just an expression of the antagonistic relations and the bitterness between Greeks and Turks. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) marks a significant moment in their relationship: it set the conditions for the population exchange and these conditions were largely based on the populations’ religious beliefs. The Treaty failed to take into account the individuals’ personal identification that did not necessarily match the pattern “Muslim equals Turk, Orthodox equals Greek”. A similar conceptualization occurred in the case of Cyprus under the British rule and it will be explored in the next chapter.

The question of identity is described in very simple spatial terms by Anssi Paasi\(^{39}\): we are here, they (the Others) are there. There is a clear-cut distinction in between, and even if they live here (like in the case of diasporas), they are different from us. Gearoid Ó Tuathail further elaborates on this idea: “the struggle over geography is also a conflict between competing images and imagining, a contest of power and resistance that involves […] the equally powerful […] force of discursive borders between the idealized Self and a demonized Other, between ‘us’ and ‘them’.”\(^{40}\) For Foulcault, “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power.”\(^{41}\) In this respect the case of Cyprus is a curious one, since Greek and Turkish Cypriots share the territory - and the power- not only with each other, but also with the British and, most importantly, with their ubiquitously present ‘motherlands’.

If we accept the fear for the demonized Other and the strong correlation between Self and nation (those who share the same identity, that are identical to us), we can better understand the need for identification with the motherlands. In Cyprus, as the following chapter will show, a

\(^{38}\) Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the modern: the cultures of nationalism in Cyprus* (London – New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 16


distinct Cypriot national identity failed to emerge. It is true that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been sharing the same territory and coexist in what we can generally call a peaceful manner. Despite of the fact that Turks and Greeks were sharing the same space, the feeling of kinship was lacking, they were not part of the same folk. Their fear of the Other reinforced their longing for national identification and possibly contributed in them strengthening the ties with Turkey and Greece respectively.

The issue of the motherlands brings up another interesting feature related to the political meaning of Cyprus’s territory and the notion of otherness. Cyprus stands on the borders of the European Union and yet its Europeanness has not been contested during the process of enlargement, it became accepted as part of the Western world. Turkey, on the other hand, stands so close, and yet so far: it belongs to Asia, to the East. This is in line with Agnew’s idea that “‘blocs’ of space [...] have been understood in terms of the essential attributes of different time-periods relative to the idealized historical period experience of one of the blocks: the West. Hence territories are named as ‘primitive’ vs, ‘advanced’ or ‘backward’ vs.’modern’.”

It seems a valid claim that this labelling extends to the island’s inhabitants, were the Turkish Cypriots are often carrying the “stigma” of their relationship with Turkey, country of “the most barbaric people”.

These are essentially two sides of the same coin. For the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots, it is enough that the Turks are ‘there’ to feel threatened. Note here that this threat does not necessarily stem from any direct relation with reality, but it is rather deeply rooted in the collective imaginary and has become a fundamental element of their self-perception. Heraclides describes this condition as a constitutive feature of the Greek self: “the collision in all fields is

42 John A. Agnew, Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), 32
43 According to Spyrou’s ethnographic fieldwork with Greek Cypriot elementary schoolchildren, this is a stereotypical construction of the Turks informed by school learning and not only. His insight is particularly relevant to this study, since it provides evidence on identity construction and collective memory instilling in generations that have no direct experience and thus no recollection.of living on the island before its partition. Spyros Spyrou, “Images of ‘the Other’: ‘The Turk’ in Greek Cypriot children’s imaginations”, Race Ethnicity and Education, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2002): 264
considered inevitable and necessary. Otherwise Greece and Greeks will not exist or their existence will worth nothing. I believe that this is very much the case for Greek Cypriots too; their national identity is constructed vis-à-vis Turkey. Not by chance, “concepts such as Greek Cypriot nationalism and Greek nationalism (i.e., of the Greek Cypriots in the island) are used interchangeably”.

Sociologist Anthony Giddens developed the concept of ontological security as the individuals’ basic need for ‘a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual’. The notion of ontological security is closely related to an individual’s understanding of the self, since “Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves”. They do so ‘by routinizing their relations with significant Others’. According to Jennifer Mitzen, states also engage in ontological security seeking within a society that essentially is a shared cognitive ordering of the environment. In this system, potential identity threats coming from powerful external actors in a hostile environment play a crucial role.

Inevitably, the perceived Turkish security threat is a permanent reference point in the domestic and in the foreign policy of Cyprus. This process of securitization is “essentially intersubjective”, since the political choice of presenting Turkey as a threat coincides with the subjective perception of the community. A paradigmatic expression of can be found in the name assigned to Northern Cyprus. In the public discourse in both Greece and Cyprus the use of the capitalized word ‘Katechomena’ (‘Occupied’, i.e. territories) is preferred over other designations of Northern Cyprus. This methodical use of language is significant, because of the mutually

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44 Alexis Heraclides, Η Εκκλησία και ο 'εξ Ανατολών Κιλικος', (Athens: Polis, 2001), 41
46 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 243
48 Ibid
49 Giddens in Mitzen, ibid, p. 348
constitutive nature of the shared meaning of language and its context, our social world. It is an essential “part of the socialization of individuals into certain ‘national’ identities and ‘geographical/historical consciousnesses’.”

The analysis made so far emphasized some of the aspects of the Greek Cypriot perception of Turkey. It is not my intention to suggest that this image represents the entire Greek Cypriot society. On the contrary, the attitudes of the Greek Cypriots differ significantly. But I believe that Turkey remains a persistent point of reference in the public discourse of the Greek Cypriots and in the process of their self-identification. The country is both framed and perceived as a permanent threat. This is manifested in all aspects of life, raging from the foreign policy agenda of Cyprus, where the defense against a potential aggression on behalf of Turkey holds the most prominent place, to education. As a result, this perception is deeply rooted in the Greek Cypriots’ hearts and minds.

1.4 Collective memory and narrative

“As historians, social scientists, or (for that matter) prophets and bards weave narratives of the second order—stories that connect the individual mind to the social world—they create artifacts that soon take on a life of their own. These stories, told and retold, furnish the stock from which individual life narratives can be constructed. In other words, the story of an individual life usually plays off of one or more historically and socially transmitted narratives, which serve as prototypes of the elaboration of personal identity. […] the story of one’s individual life

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53 Just to mention one dimension, they have a less negative attitude towards Turkish Cypriots than they have toward Turkish immigrants. See: Liana Danielidou and Peter Horvath, “Greek Cypriot Attitudes Toward Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Immigrants”, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 146, No. 4 (2006): 405–421.
depends on the larger stories of the community to which one belongs. That community, in turn, crystallizes around a stock of common memories revivified in stories.\footnote{Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman eds., Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), xxii-xxiv}

In this short passage, Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman tell us a lot about the character and the role of narrative. First of all, narratives can derive from both formal (presumably objective, such as history) and informal (subjective, such as people’s memories) sources, and can be written and oral. Second, these narrative constructs – artifacts, stories - exist independently of those who create them. Third, narratives are communicated from generation to generation through common memories that are told and retold. Barthes confirms the ubiquity of narrative: “there is not, there has never been anywhere, any people without narrative; all classes, all human groups, have their stories\footnote{Roland Barthes and Lionel Duisit, “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative”, New Literary History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1975): 237}. Last, they form the basis to an individual’s identity and at the same time they are the glue that holds the community together.

Therefore, the narrative, the discourse, is a device of social action conducive to a shared contextualization of words and acts among the members of a group. This allows us to infer that identity, collective memory and narrative are closely interrelated. We can also assume that the written and the oral are indispensible forms of both collective memory and narrative. Although written and oral prove narratives deficient in the remembrance of things past, in reconstructing the lost moment, both forms seek to recuperate knowledge and make sense of the past. In the following chapters of this study I will focus on two distinct types of written narrative, the historical narrative and the press narrative. These two sets of discourses are of course not exhaustive, but they are representative for the general manner in which collective memory and identity discourses are articulated.

History aims at providing an accurate record of past events, the truth. But the quest for truth lies behind the notion of memory too: “For Plato […] the notion of anamnesis
(recollection) implied that memory is the golden path to the highest intellectual and spiritual truths a human being could know. After all, the Greek word for truth, “ἀλήθεια”, indicates the situation where things are not forgotten. It seems then that history and memory are intertwined and mutually constitutive. Every historical account is conditioned by the narrator’s context, thus socio-political forces and prevailing ideologies. Since history is, as every narrative, an artifact, it is created “by someone for somebody” and with some purpose. In addition, its narrator carries, as every individual, her own memories. It is often impossible to be proof against memory. In its turn a society’s memory becomes, as it was argued earlier, institutionalized and, at the same time, it is itself a historical phenomenon. Moreover, memory is porous and thus not immune to history. The dominant narratives of a society inevitably penetrate it. However, history is considered to be the official, undisputed, and accredited ‘story’ of the past and in this quality it generates and reinforces the collective identity.

The press, on the other hand, holds an important role in the individuals’ everyday lives in modern societies. The existence of strong links between media, ideology and identity is widely accepted. In his influential work Public opinion, Walter Lippmann states: “Universally it is admitted that the press is the chief means of contact with the unseen environment. And practically everywhere it is assumed that the press should […] every day and twice a day […] present us with a true picture of all the outer world in which we are interested.” The advent of the press made memory a public affair since the narrative logic of the press relies on shared cultural knowledge and past experience. The same conditions that were discussed above in

58 Ibid, 5
59 Brockmeier, “Remembering and Forgetting: Narrative as Cultural Memory”, 19
60 Think about the role of education or of the media.
63 Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices”, 114
relation to history apply to the press as well. In the press, history is juxtaposed with contemporary and ongoing events, to generate a set of narratives that constantly articulate and interpret the present events in the light of the established identity. The press is all about credibility and, in its quality of narrating the present, it can be said that the press is history in the making.

In a way, the historical narrative lays out the structural parameters of collective memory, the general and determined landscape of the metaphors, crucial events and stories and at the same time, the press narrative constitutes the locus where to some extent innovation is possible, obviously within the given parameters of the historical narrative. That is to say that while history remains relatively static and rigid, within the media, the elements of the discourse get transformed and adapted to suit the contemporary realities.

With regard to the case of the Greek Cypriots, the main narrative in all its forms is constructed around enduring modes of representation of the past, the Self and the Other. The dominant discourse is built around a story of animosity that emphasizes the conflictual relationship of the two communities and are, more often than not, one-sided. This is not to say that there this discourse is never challenged, but such alternative narratives are frequently silenced. The search for identity does not allow much space for deviation from what the group deems to be acceptable, the irreconcilable difference between the Self and the Other.
Chapter 2: Historical Narratives

2.1 Introduction

In Greek, the word “στορια” is used interchangeable to mean both “history” and “story, tale”. Most collective units, notably nations and states, have stories about themselves, memories that encourage certain forms of thinking and acting and discourage others. In the case of Cyprus, these myths –or narratives- are often contradictory. In order to understand how the Cyprus problem became fundamentally a problem of collective remembering and forgetting, a look in the past is necessary. The way Phillips puts it, “History is, after all, essential for the creation of the collective memory. This chapter is about the history and the story of Cyprus.

A closer look to the events and ideologies of the past is useful, for it demonstrates the ways in which Cyprus is not just a political problem, but also a problem of conflicting identities, of remembering and forgetting. Historical understandings are an important component of collective memory. Through history it becomes clear “how memories are used and abused for political action and formation of group identities. The historical narrative is inextricably linked with a society’s identity, since it sets a boundary between members of a group who share the common past and the Others, those who don’t. The historical narrative “is selective in nature and carefully organized to offer explanations about the position of the Self and the Other in the world.”

As a result of the ethnic conflict, in Cyprus opposing narratives, a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot, have been articulated and sustained. And, like it happens with every historical narrative, the ones on Cyprus too include and exclude different facts. The two sides considering

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64 Robert Phillips, History Teaching, Nationhood and the State: a Study in Educational Politics (London: Cassell, 1998), 2
66 Peter C. Seixas, Theorizing Historical Consciousness, 6.
important different instances of the conflict and often the same instance is charged with two completely different meanings. Their stories/histories are full of misinterpretations of each other’s intentions and goals. A comparison of these narratives or a thorough analysis of the Greek Cypriot one exceeds the purposes of this study. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to briefly delineate some striking characteristics of the Greek Cypriot narrative. For the sake of clarity, I assume here that the official (as expressed in documents, party policies, national historiographies and education, commemorative practices etc.) and the unofficial (people’s stories) narrative by and large converge. The characteristics described below dominate the narratives, but this does not mean that there are no other approaches and interpretations of history.

The narrative of the Greek Cypriots is in principle “egocentric”, in that it focuses on their own struggle and achievements. At the same time, acts of violence are often silenced. The historical narrative is built through a process of selective amnesia; the black pages of history would undermine the ideal image of the Greek Cypriot self. With regard to the collective memory of future generations, this attitude aims at instilling pride. In Nietzsche’s words, “Forgetting is essential to action of any kind, just as not only light but darkness too is essential for the life of everything organic. […] it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting.” But while the own violence is often forgotten, the violence of the Other is always remembered. “We” are always the victims, and hardly ever the instigators.

What follows is a brief account of the history of Cyprus, starting from the colonial period under the British until after the island’s independence and the most significant effort for a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Annan Plan. In the literature, the conflict is often explained as a consequence of the rise of nationalism among Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, the British colonial rule had a considerable role in fostering this dichotomy between

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Cyprus’ two communities and is largely responsible for the failure to create a distinct, Cypriot identity for the island’s inhabitants. The purpose of the chapter is to contextualize the historical background and social framework within which memory is created and re-created, allowing identity to take shape. Not by chance, collective memory often becomes one with history, “a convenient piece of shorthand which sums up the rather complex process of selection and interpretation.”

2.2 The Colonial Past

Cyprus has a long and turbulent history. Throughout the ages, the island of copper has been dominated by Assyrians, Persians and Greeks, has been part of the Roman and of the Byzantine Empire and has been sold to the House of Lusignan. In 1571, the Ottoman Turks captured Cyprus from Venice. In 1878 they leased the island to Britain that annexed it in 1914. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, Ataturk renounced any sovereignty claim over Cyprus as part of the effort to reach a settlement with Britain in the aftermath of the World War.

The British contributed greatly to the rise of Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalism. For the colonists, Cyprus was seen as a solid unit, with populations that spoke different languages and had different religious beliefs and “These people they called Cypriots.” But for these people the label “Cypriot” indicated only their origins, it was not perceived as “a significant designation of identity.” In the Greek Cypriot side, the strength of the Hellenic identity is manifested in the

70 Pollis, Adamantia, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, (1973) and Christopher Hitchens, Hostage To History: Cyprus From the Ottomans to Kissinger (London: Verso, 1997)


72 According to Stefanidis, the process of Greek nationalism “accelerated during the period of British colonial rule”. See: Ioannis D. Stefanidis, Isle of discord: nationalism, imperialism and the making of the Cyprus problem (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1999), 229. British policies, such as the politicization of separate religious communities, for instance, increased their segregation. See: Pollis, Adamantia, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus”, 581

73 Bryant, Imagining the modern: the cultures of nationalism in Cyprus, 21

74 Ibid
requests for Enosis (union) with Greece. These demands led to the 1931 riots that resulted in the burning of the Government House, a clear expression of anti-colonial sentiments. Harsh measures that limited significantly the lives of the people in both communities were introduced. It should be noted here that the Greek government led by Eleftherios Venizelos characterized the 1931 actions as “criminal excesses” and advocated instead the view of self-government for the island within the British Empire. For Venizelos, Britain would eventually decide that it just needed a base in Cyprus, Greece would be willing to concede it and this would bring the much desired Enosis. The British, on the other hand, seemed to have no such intentions at that time. On the contrary, they believed that a policy of divide et impera could guarantee their dominion and their role of mediator between the ethnic groups of the island competing for the resources they controlled.

With the advent of the World War II, the relations between British and Greek Cypriots improved, a result related to the fact that Greece allied with Britain, while Turkey remained neutral. The alliance with Britain raised hopes for Enosis among the Greek Cypriots, but after the end of the war, these were once again not met. On one hand, after the war Greece was left weak and unable to provide all the support the Greek Cypriots were hoping for. On the other hand, the disintegration of the colonial system increased the strategic importance of Cyprus, which could function for Britain as a bridge to the Middle East. The Greek Cypriot demands gained again ground in 1950, when in a plebiscite organized by the island's Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, ninety-six percent of the participants voted in favour of Enosis. During the same year, Makarios, who was to be the independent island's first President a decade later, was elected Archbishop. For the British, however, the communist AKEL was considered to be a more serious threat,

considering the party’s intention to collect signatures from Cypriots favouring "Enosis" for submission to the U.N.\textsuperscript{79}

In 1954, Greece asked the United Nations to recognise the Greek Cypriot’s right to self-determination. In the meantime, in Cyprus an underground organization was taking act on April 1955. The aim of EOKA\textsuperscript{80} was to conduct an armed fight against the British colonial power in Cyprus. The organization emerged from the Greek Cypriot right factions and was led by Colonel George Grivas, an ardent supporter of the Enosis. EOKA enjoyed the support of the Church, since Grivas managed to convince the Archbishop Makarios to commit himself to armed action. Under the British colonial rule, the church was a very important institution for the Greek Cypriot society and its support to the EOKA and the Enosis movement certified their adherence to traditional values\textsuperscript{81}.

In response to the internationalization of the Cyprus issue by Greece and to the terrorist actions of EOKA, Britain pushed for Turkish support\textsuperscript{82}. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots feared that the Greek Cypriot attempts for Enosis would put an end to the British support transforming them into an oppressed minority\textsuperscript{83}. While for the Greek Cypriots the union of the island with Greece meant freedom, liberation from the colonial rule, for the Turkish Cypriots it meant enslavement\textsuperscript{84}. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots gradually identified themselves with Turkey’s political symbols\textsuperscript{85}.

In August 1955 the British convened the London Conference, asking Greece and Turkey to participate. The invitation made clear the division between the two communities and the direct involvement of the motherlands in reaching a compromise over Cyprus’ feature. However, no

\textsuperscript{80} Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών - The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
\textsuperscript{81} Kyriacos C. Markides, “Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus”, \textit{American Ethnologist} Vol. 1, No. 2 (1974)
\textsuperscript{82} For Britain’s reaction, see Giannos Kranidiotis, \textit{Το Κυπριακό Πληρέσμα} (Athens: Themelio, 1984).
\textsuperscript{83} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{ Cyprus: A Troubled Island} (CT, United States: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 58
\textsuperscript{84} Necati Ertekün, \textit{The Cyprus Dispute} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 2
\textsuperscript{85} Moragan, “Cyprus and the clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms”, 606
agreement was reached, since Britain was suggesting a project for the island’s gradual self-government that was unacceptable for both Greece and Turkey. Greece was not willing to accept anything less than self-determination and Enosis, while the Turkish government favoured the continuation of the British rule. Right after the conference, it was made clear that Britain was not willing to accept the principle of self-determination as universally applicable, but in the light of certain considerations, exceptions could be made.86

The London Conference worsened the relations between Greece and Turkey and it was followed by riots against Istanbul’s Greek minority.87 Ironically enough, EOKA became even fiercer in the light of these events. Although a peaceful settlement was sought through negotiations with Makarios, these soon collapsed and the Archbishop was exiled in the Seychelles on March 1956. In this context, by 1957 the Turkish government openly suggested the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey88 and the paramilitary organization TMT89 was formed. One of the movement’s founders was Rauf Denktaş and its aim was to counter EOKA. The intercommunal violence reached its peak in the summer of 1958.90

Meanwhile the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan put forward a plan for a new constitution that would not alter Cyprus’ international status, but at the same time would allow for considerable participation in the island’s government for the two communities.91 The plan was initially rejected, but all sides were anxious for a settlement and willing to negotiate. On February 1959 and on February 1960 Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Britain, Greece and Turkey signed the London- Zurich Accords of Treaty and Guarantee. On August 16, 1960, the

88 Attalides, M., *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979), 8
89 Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati - Turkish Resistance Organization
independent and sovereign Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed, with Britain retaining sovereignty over two enclaves.

Stavrinides in his account of the 1960s controversies stresses the role of the Greek and Turkish leadership in creating images of the Other. The Greek side promoted, consciously or unconsciously, their views of the Turks. According to the first approach, they were seen as a minority of greedy people that managed to obtain a privileged position in the Constitution thanks to an Anglo-Turkish conspiracy. This led the Greeks to resort to arm rebellion, in order to claim their legitimate rights. In the second approach, the Turks were seen as an uncultivated folk that was being led to disaster by their self-interested leadership. The Turkish side on the other hand, portrayed the Greeks as violent people, long-standing opponents of the Turkish nation that used cunning and force to achieve their Enosis goal, causing the established constitutional order to crumble.\footnote{Stavrinides, Zenon, \textit{The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood} (Wakefield, 1975)} The next part explores this period that led to the 1974’s dramatic events.

2.3 The Independent Republic of Cyprus and the 1974 conflict

The London- Zurich Accords were perceived by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as a series of compromises, with which none of the parties was satisfied.\footnote{T.W. Adams, , “The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution”, \textit{The Western Political Quarterly}, Vol. 19, No. 3. (1966): 475} The constitution reflected a reality that was largely a British creation.\footnote{Pollis, Adamantia, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus”, 593} It practically institutionalized the two communities of Cyprus\footnote{Ibid, p. 594} and failed to create any sense of shared identity and common purpose.\footnote{Pollis, “The social construction of ethnicity and nationality: the case of Cyprus”, 79} The Greek Cypriots, represented by Makarios, accepted the Constitution, but they were dissatisfied with the virtually equal political status and the privileges the Turkish minority was granted. The feeling was that the settlement has been imposed by force majeure. During December 1963, the Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriots. This period became known as Bloody Christmas. Under
these circumstances, the political crisis that followed came as no surprise. Makarios suggested thirteen amendments to the Constitution that were clearly favoring the Greek Cypriots and thus were rejected by the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot governments.

The Turkish Cypriots perceived the amendment proposal as a provocation and this led to an outbreak of violence that lasted for several months. To keep the violence from spreading further, the British forces assumed a peacekeeping role. In fact, it was the General Officer Commanding the British forces in Cyprus, Peter Young, who drew a separation line between the two communities of Nicosia using a green pencil. The United Nations intervened after the request by British and Cypriot leaders and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus became operationally established on 27 March 1964. Britain eventually accepted the creation of a UN force as a final option allowing the British government to be relieved of the sole burden of peacekeeping in an increasingly hostile environment. Eventually, the Turkish Cypriots set up their own state-like structures, since they were not represented in the government, and they had settled in different areas of the island.

The military coup of April 1967 in Athens had profound political consequences for Cyprus. During the following years, the regime’s relations with Makarios were constantly deteriorating due to his insistent resistance to Greece’s interference in Cyprus’ domestic affairs. He also had to face internal opposition by the supporters of Enosis. On July 15, 1974 militants and Greek officers in Cyprus managed to overthrow Makarios and install a regime led by

97 For detailed information, see Zaim M. Necatigil, “The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
The circumstances were ideal for Turkey. The first phase of the Turkish invasion lasted for ten days, from the 20th to the 30th of July. The Greeks managed to contain the Turks and a cease fire followed. But the inability of the junta to stop the Turkish invasion brought its fall in Greece and caused the resignation of Nicos Sampson that the regime had appointed as President of Cyprus.

In mid August the three guarantor powers were summoned in Geneva by the British Foreign Secretary, James Callahan, but the negotiations were not fruitful. The Greek side asked for 36 to 48 hours for consultations over the Turkish proposals, but the Turkish Foreign Minister refused. On August 14 the Turkish army proceeded with a second full-scale operation, again on the grounds of restoring constitutional order. However, the constitutional order in Cyprus had been already restored. The Turkish army occupied 37 percent of Cyprus, creating the status quo. The partition line that divides up until today the two communities is referred to as the Attila line, after the name of the Turkish operation.

The nationalism of both Greece and Turkey is largely responsible for the tragic events of 1974. However, it is noteworthy here to briefly examine the attitude of Britain and the U.S. during the invasion. According to Woodhouse, three factors contributed to Britain’s reluctance to act during the 1974 events. First of all, the Greeks had only themselves to blame for the situation. Second, the danger of a war with Turkey that could be avoided, since the Treaties allowed for action, but there was no obligation. The starting point of the U.S. involvement is in 1955. Their priority was to prevent a conflict among the members of NATO. There is evidence that the US government knew about the imminent Greek Cypriot coup against Makarios in 1974.

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103 Grivas who had been in Greece returned to Cyprus in 1971. With the support of Athens’ Junta, he organized the movement EOKA B that was meant to counter Makarios’ anti-Enosis practices.


107 Süha Bölükbaş, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American relations and Cyprus (Lanham - Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), 18
Kissinger’s Realpolitik became the dominant approach to the Cyprus issue and partition prevailed.

2.4 The Day after the Partition

The partition and the re-settlement of the populations was followed by the establishment of the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus in 1975 and later, in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, played an instrumental role in the institution of the new state, since he believed that only the status of independent state could safeguard the Turkish Cypriot interests in the event of a confederation with the Greek Cypriots. The creation of the TRNC is, according to the U.N. Security council, legally invalid and until today it is recognized as a state only by Turkey. However, the division did not only have material, but also psychological consequences for the Greek Cypriots. Before the 1974 invasion, the Turkish Cypriot community had the feeling of being is exile in their own homeland. In the post-1974 period, this feeling was reversed: most aspects of the Greek Cypriot perceptions and politics, notably their foreign policy, are influenced by the moment of the Turkish invasion.

After the partition, the U.N. kept pushing for a solution, but the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders were caught in a deadlock, with both sides advocating their national claims as legitimate under international law. While the Turkish Cypriot side was suggesting a confederation with a weak central government, the Greek Cypriots’ preferred solution was a central government that would guarantee the island’s unity. Another concern of the Turkish Cypriots was related to the Greek Cypriot’s focus on the freedom of movement, freedom of

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settlement and the right to own property. They feared that, by making use of such rights, the Greek Cypriots could in a way overpower them.

The issue of property and settlement is a very prominent one in terms of discourse. The Greek Cypriot citizens that had to leave their homes due to the 1974 events perceive themselves and are framed in the official discourse as refugees. It is not only a matter of representation of the past, since something very tangible, the actual place, becomes politically contested. The slogan “I do not forget and I struggle” is deeply engraved into the conscious memory of every Greek Cypriot. The phrase is reproduced even in the school textbooks. In Keller’s words, it is more than a slogan, it is a campaign aimed to ensure that future generations will not accept the status quo of a divided homeland. Although these generations did not experience the coexistence of Greeks and Turks and they don’t necessarily have direct memories of the painful partition, their collective memory is being formed around the patterns of the Turkish injustice. However, it is important to stress here that after the partition, the Greek Cypriot identity is been often contested in favor of a distinct Cypriot identity. Cypriotism originates in the left and underlines the commonalities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and envisions a bicomunal federation with a “transnational” Cypriot citizenship.

Overall, it can be said that in the historical narrative of Cyprus two distinct stories of victimhood and collective pain are remembered. In the Turkish Cypriots’ version, the period of suffering ends in 1974, but for the Greek Cypriots this is exactly the point when it begins, and it continues up until today. Ever since, each party of the conflict tells to the world its version of the story. It comes therefore as no surprise that in the post-1974 era, all efforts to reach a compromise brought no results. In the international arena, a political solution is sought to what is thought to be a political problem. But, as the analysis reveals, the reality is far more complex.

112 Calotychos, “Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Difference at the Heart of Cypriot Identity and Its Study”
113 Aside from the role of external powers, that has been discussed throughout the chapter.
Arguably, one of the most important developments was the official application of Cyprus in the EEC on 4 July 1990. In June 1993, the EU Commission's official Opinion reported that the island's integration implied a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question. The relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were strained, since the entire island was being represented in the accession negotiations by the Greek Cypriot government. Despite all obstacles, the entire island, even without the participation of the TRNC, joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. Few weeks before the Greek Cypriots had rejected what arguably seemed the most promising diplomatic effort to reach a compromise: the UN Plan for settlement.

2.5 The Annan Plan Referendum

During the 37 years since the Turkish military intervention the island has witnessed multiple internal and external efforts at solution, but none seemed as promising as the Annan Plan. The talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots under UN auspices aimed to devise the plan had start in 1999, but its final version was only released on March 31, 2004. Two referenda were held by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on April 24, 2004. The results were surprising: while the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the settlement, the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots opposed it.

The Plan sought to establish a federal state under the name United Cyprus Republic modelled on the status of Switzerland. The legislative and executive power was regulated in a way that allowed for equal participation of the two parts to the decision making and thus overcoming the problem of numerical supremacy of the Greek Cypriots. Although different concerns were expressed by the Greek Cypriot side to explain to explain the rejection of the Plan, the role of

security concerns was of paramount importance. As it was pointed out in the Report of the UN Secretary-General published after the referenda, “fears regarding security and implementation appear to be prominent among Greek Cypriots - based, to a significant extent, on historic distrust of Turkish intentions.” It is therefore worth referring more in detail to the way the Annan Plan tried to address security concerns.

The demilitarization of the island would be gradual. Eventually the number of soldiers would be reduced to 950 for the Greek contingent and 650 for the Turkish contingent. Cyprus, Greece and Turkey should monitor the procedure aiming to total withdrawal. A UN peacekeeping operation would have the task to monitor the implementation of the Agreement. Greece, Turkey and Great Britain shall remain the guarantor powers. The special ties of the country with Greece and Turkey were to be maintained, but secession or any form of partition was prohibited. The Plan does not include provisions changing the status of the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia – the place the President of the republic of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias, called a “colonial bloodstain.” Issues of property claims (that can also be interpreted in terms of security) should be addressed in a comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respecting the individual rights of both dispossessed owners and current users. Thus, the Plan was aimed to go beyond militarization aspects, addressing also problems of individual security between the two ethnic communities.

In spite of all these provisions aimed at minimizing the fears of both sides, the plan failed to do so in the case of the Greek Cypriots. I argue that this failure is due to the broader issue of the self-conception of Greek Cypriots vis-à-vis Turkey and therefore Turkish Cypriots. In the case of a referendum, public sentiment is not just an important input for foreign policy

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115 Pg. 20, Paragraph 84, Report of the UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 28 May 2004
decisions, but it actually produces decisions. The public sentiment is heavily conditioned by collective memory and the recollection of powerful images of Turkey influences preferences and attitudes in Cyprus. I argue that the political decision of rejecting the Annan Plan is directly linked to the Turkish threat perception that dominates the collective imaginary of the Greek Cypriots.

To assess the workings of this perceived threat, let me now take a closer look at the role of the Greek Cypriot leadership. Although during the negotiations over the final version of the Annan Plan the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash had refused twice to accept a compromise (in 2002 and 2003), the Greek Cypriot side was also expressing reservations. Kofi Annan explicitly refers to the doubts of the President of the Greek Cypriots, Tassos Papadopoulos, in his 2003 Report. The Plan had the support of the international community and of the political leadership of Greece and Turkey, represented by Prime Ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kostas Karamanlis respectively. Nonetheless, before the referenda, both Denktash and Papadopoulos asked the two communities to reject the plan.

Although it would be interesting to analyze the positive vote of the Turkish Cypriots such an explanation is beyond the purposes of this study. Therefore, I shall limit myself here to the Greek Cypriot decision to vote against the settlement. At this point becomes evident the role of geopolitics as a useful tool for foreign policy analysis that reminds us the political meaning of the place. Papadopoulos’ encouragement to reject the Plan definitely had an influence in the result, given that “those individuals who inhabit offices in the state play a special role in constructing the meaning of ‘the national interest’.” But here identities are of outmost

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importance, since these “are the basis of interests”\textsuperscript{121}. The framing of the Annan Plan’s provisions as posing a serious security threat legitimates political action against it. As it was mentioned before, a core element of the Greek Cypriot identity is the security-related perception of Turkey as a threat. These two considerations determined in my view the outcome of the referendum.

The importance of security for the Greek Cypriots is documented in a survey made by Eurobarometer and published in the autumn of 2004. While persons living in Northern Cyprus appeared to expect that the main benefit from joining the European Union would be economic stability (77%), for the Greek Cypriots the most important thing the country gained from its EU membership is security (73%). Moreover, they associate the EU much more with peace (59% vs. 8%), while those in the northern part of the island associate the EU more with economic prosperity (54% vs. 20%)\textsuperscript{122}.

Following the referendum’s negative result, Tassos Papadopoulos wrote a letter to the United Nations’ Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlining the Greek Cypriot security concerns. Pinar Tank (2005) selects and discusses three aspects mentioned by the Greek Cypriot side: the issue of the Turkish troops, the right of intervention under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the doubts over implementation. On the question of the Turkish troops Tank argues that the security assurances the troops “provide for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are proportionally less than the perceived threat they represent for the Greek Cypriot community”\textsuperscript{123}. In her view, their symbolic presence and the insistence on Turkey maintaining the guarantor power status can be interpreted by the Greek Cypriots as indicative of an imminent threat and allows to their leadership to securitize the issue. As for the doubts regarding the proper implementation of the

\textsuperscript{121} Wendt in Weldes, ibid, 282
\textsuperscript{122} National Report Cyprus- Executive Summary, Eurobarometer 62 (2004), 1
Plan’s provisions, Tank contends that it is in the interest of the United Nations and the European Union to monitor and ensure the smooth adoption of the settlement’s content.

Although in principle I agree with Tank’s analysis and rational arguments, such considerations are questionable when confronted with the Greek Cypriot understanding of the situation. The essence of the Greek Cypriots’ identity is intrinsically connected to the existence of the Turkish Other that is perceived as a constant threat for the security of their territory. In the case of the referendum, the interpretation of the Annan Plan as not providing sufficient security guarantees was also suggested by the Greek Cypriot leadership. The result was an overwhelming rejection of the proposed settlement. Greek Cypriots are trapped in their own geopolitical imagination of Turkey. If the Greek Cypriot national identity and their geopolitical imaginary were different and Turkey were not perceived as a threatening aggressor, the island’s leadership would not have securitized the Annan Plan. In that case the result might have been different.
Chapter 3: Press Narratives

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to the study of the narrative regarding Turkey as it emerges in the media through the analysis of newspaper articles that appeared recently in dailies circulating in the Republic of Cyprus. It will specifically discuss a number of articles taken from newspapers circulating in the Republic of Cyprus in Greek language. The purpose of this focus is that dailies published in Turkish or in English address a different readership. Newspapers with high circulation were preferred, since they reach more readers. The selected articles appeared in the print and the online edition of the newspapers. The assumption is that especially younger age groups in Cyprus might show a preference for the electronic format. These audiences, with no direct experience and thus recollection of the partition or of life in Cyprus before the conflict, are of particular interest for this study. Although a direct assessment of their perceptions over Turkey is beyond the focus of this work, taking their media preferences into account can help get a more complete picture of the information such groups might be receiving. In selecting the dailies, their political allegiance did not play a role. The underlying assumption is that the narratives related to the Greek Cypriot collective memory do not differ significantly with political affiliation. Also, when it comes to the solution of the Cyprus problem, all Greek Cypriot parties seek the most favourable constitutional and territorial settlement possible and set as an indispensable condition the withdrawal of Turkish forces.

Journalists hold an important role when it comes to collective remembering. They act as an interpretative community; hence they can shape the public’s memory through their

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124 With regard to the chosen newspapers, Phileleutheros enjoys the highest circulation in the RoT, Politis comes second and hosts articles written by Turkish Cypriots as well. Alithia and Politis can be characterized as liberal.

126 I will examine not only the actual content of the articles, but also their inferred meanings. It is not my intention to provide an authoritative picture, but an interpretation of the messages contained in the articles and relate it to the effects it could have on the Greek Cypriots’ collective memory and to the process of conflict resolution. I will identify the discourses that are at work when the press covers general issues concerning Turkey. The object is to verify whether the image of the country that emerges in the everyday public sphere of the RoC matches the characteristics assigned to Turkey through the historical narrative.

Narratives, as it was discussed previously, are never neutral and this is particularly valid in the case of the press. Much like with the writing of history, there is a selection process regarding the news we actually read. And just like with history, different stories emerge. For instance, the same event can be presented under completely different light by a more liberal or a conservative newspaper, or in the newspapers of different countries. In any case, the reader ends up with a skewed and judged view of the world, a certain representation of the facts. By presenting narratives, the press becomes narrative itself.

The information that is made available through the press reaches a wide and diverse public in an indirect way, percolated through the point of view of the mediators. In this sense, the news stories are the result of a series of communicative events. A fact occurs, but is has then to be produced and eventually consumed. The press is replicating events infused with ideological underpinnings, influencing social relations and identities. It controls and produces knowledge and manufactures images. In order to convey meaning, the press often utilizes references to the readers’ cultural background.

The next question is who has access in the press’ narrative, whose voice is being heard. Apart from the journalists’ pivotal role, the arena of the press is dominated by the political

126 The way journalists can give shape to the public’s collective memory, see Barbie Zelizer, Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media and the Shaping of Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
128 Norman Fairclough, Media Discourse (Hodder Arnold Publications, 1995), 2
Therefore, the press narratives are greatly conditioned by the political narratives. The political narratives are sequentially determined by pre-existing social and historical conditions,\textsuperscript{130} and, as it has been argued in this study, collective memory has a considerable impact on the formation of history and on holding the society together.

It is important here to remember that in order for the media to secure their credibility and professionalism, they have to abide by specific ethical rules and standards. Since the language used by the press has to be “politically correct”, most articles more often than not seemed to contradict at first glance my hypothesis that representations of Turkey are heavily conditioned by collective memory and thus negative images of the country tend to emerge. At the same time, by manifesting negative representations, the press reinforces collective recollections. This is why when analysing a media text, the aim is to go beyond denotations and try to understand how representations are being negotiated. The chosen articles did not necessarily make it to the front page. The main criterion of selection was to show that, despite the surplus of checks and balances in the media, negative representations of Turkey persist. The analysis will confirm that there exists a dialectical relationship between collective recollections and press narratives.

3.2 Representations of Turkey in the Greek Cypriot Press

In this part I will examine how Turkey’s representations are being narrativized in the Greek Cypriot press and the ways these narratives relate to collective memory. I look at seven articles that appeared from the 20th to the 30th of May 2011 in the print and online edition of four dailies published in Greek. Although the research covered a short period of time, there was a significant amount of articles related to Turkey. I believe that this might be because of the Greek Cypriot elections, held on May 22nd, or it could be associated to the imminent Turkish elections.


\textsuperscript{130} Pierre Bourdieu, \textit{Language and symbolic power} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 120-121
The research cannot control the actual effect of this variable due to time constraints. Two of the reports are treating speeches given by the Archbishop Chrysostomos and the President of the RoC, Dimitris Christofias. The selected articles address different issues, but they share one common feature: in all of them Turkey is being represented, in a direct, or in a more subtle way, as a negative image. The critical reading of the Greek Cypriot press narratives is aimed to analyze these “familiar forms of sense making” and shed light in the workings of collective memory in relation to Turkey. The close analysis that follows will make clear that the ways in which events are being framed in the press evoke traumatic memories and reinforce the image of Turkey as an aggressor and constant threat.

The relations between the conflict’s parties hold a central position in several news stories. Although my analysis was focused on articles written during a very short period of time, the frequency of texts presenting news regarding the relations between Greece and Turkey was high. This allows for two observations. On the one hand, this shows the interest of the RoC public in the affairs of Greece. On the other hand, the press seems to have a special interest in the troublesome aspects of this relation. For instance, on the occasion of WikiLeaks’ revelation on the tension created between Greek and Turkish vessels, under the title “Wikileaks presents the Turkish version on the tension between Greek and Turkish warships in 2008.” The headline explicitly points out that only the Turkey’s point of view is expressed on the expense of Greece.

A similar report informs the reader that the Aegean problems are part of the pre-electoral agenda of the ruling party in Turkey. The article also reports that the current leader of the of

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No author, “Τουρκική ειθνική για την ένταση μεταξύ ελληνικών και τουρκικών πολιτικών το 2008 παρουσιάζει το WikiLeaks” [Wikileaks presents the Turkish version on the tension between Greek and Turkish warships in 2008], *Phileleftheros*, 24.05.2011, [http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/%CE%95%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1/23/68982](http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/%CE%95%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-%CE%95%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B1/23/68982) (accessed May 30, 2011)
133 No author, “Το Αιγαίο μέρος του προεκλογικού στην Τουρκία” [The Aegean part of the pre-electoral (i.e. campaign) in Turkey], *Alithia*, 20.05.2011
the Democratic Party, Namık Kemal Zeybek, claimed in a pre-electoral talk that two Greek islands, Agathonisi and Pharmakonisi, are Turkish and are under Greek occupation since 2004. Moreover, according to the article, executives of the Democratic Party tried to visit the two islands, but they were not allowed to enter without a passport. The officials had to return to Turkey and they stated that unfortunately, the citizens of Turkey need passports in order to visit their own lands. It goes without saying that such episodes evoke memories of invasion and reinforce the image of Turkey as an aggressor and a constant threat.

Another relevant issue covered by the Greek Cypriot press was a supposed proposal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Dimitrios Droutsas, on behalf of his counterpart, Ahmet Davutoğlu, for a joint visit in Cyprus’ occupied territories. The article states that Athens “categorically denies” that there was ever put forward such a suggestion and that the official position is that unless the Turkish occupying forces withdraw, a solution can be sought for all Cypriots. Davutoğlu had stated that he had suggested the visit in the Turkish daily “Zaman”. If we try to decode the message, the Turkish Minister appears to have lied and, as a consequence, a negative quality is being extended and attributed to all Turks. The comparison between this news report as it appeared in a Greek Cypriot and in a Greek daily reveals an substantial difference of content that shows a lot about the way press narratives are constructed. The story appears in the exact same way in the article of the Greek newspaper, but there is additional information that is omitted in the Greek Cypriot article. In the Greek daily the last section of the article mentioned that “Zaman” corrected the mistake, saying that the suggestion was hypothetical.


134 No author, “Κατηγορηματική διάβρωση: Δεν υπάρχει πρόταση για κοινή επίσκεψη Δρούτσα-Νταβούτογλου στα εκτεθέμενα, λέει η Αθήνα” [Categorical denial: There is no suggestion for common visit Droutsas- Davutoğlu at the occupied (i.e. territories), says Athens], Phileleftheros, 21.05.2011

http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/%CE%95%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-%CE%9A%CF%8D%CE%80%CE%81%CE%4F%CF%82/22/68678(accessed May 30, 2011)

135 No author, “Διαφάνεια πρόταση για κοινή επίσκεψη Δρούτσα-Νταβούτογλου στα κατεχόμενα” [Denied the suggestion for common visit Droutsas- Davutoğlu at the occupied], Ethnos, 21.05.2011

One of the prevalent issues in the Greek Cypriot press has to do with the imminent elections in Turkey. In an article entitled “The Turkish Elections and the Constitution”, it is suggested that political instability in the country will increase due to the initiation of succession to the AKP’s leadership. It is also argued that the risk of Turkey turning into a “tyranny of the majority is not just a vague scenario, but a very probable turn of events, if Turkey abandons the goal of EU integration and pursues the one of becoming a regional or global power. It seems that the worse case scenario is being presented as a tangible possibility.

The analysis of the historical narrative emphasized that the Orthodox Church had a leading part in Cyprus’ political scene. Still today, the Church has a strong presence in the life of the island, seeking active involvement in the shaping of policy over the Cyprus problem. The recent comments of the current archbishop, Chrysostomos II, painted Turkey in dark colours. In a ceremony held to unveil a bust of Makarios, he stated that the Cypriot Hellenism will never succumb to brute force, give in to blackmail and accept as irreversible the situation created by Attila. Chrysostomos continues his speech with a reference to the concessions made by Makarios with the hope of finding a solution, and claims that the Archbishop’s decision was not designed to create today’s situation. Revisionist historiography blames Makarios for seeking to unwind the settlement reached with Turkish Cypriots and the narrative of the Church attempts to negotiate this representation. In the same speech the Archbishop Chrysostomos also notes that talks on the Cyprus problem are being conducted in an extremely bad climate for the Greek Cypriots, with the Turkish occupation army and the settlers remaining in the island. Moreover, the number of the settlers keeps increasing, he adds. The Turkish nationals that started coming to Cyprus

after the 1974 events are still considered to be a foreign element, even by the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot leaders perceived the immigration of Turks as a campaign of colonization meant to alter the island’s demographic structure. As it will be discussed more in depth in the analysis of the next article, the issue of the settlers has become very prominent lately. Fears of being outnumbered by the settlers are reinforced by statements like this one.

When it comes to the Cyprus problem, conservative and liberal factions of the society seem to have a common narrative structure describing the conflict, where Cyprus is the protagonist, Turkey the antagonist and, in their agon, the struggle of the former is ennobling. At an event organized by the Cypriot Federation of Australia and New Zeland in Sydney, the speech of the RoC President, Dimitris Christofias, moved along these lines. In the article published in Phileleutheros, the President referred to the challenges awaiting Cyprus after the imminent elections in Turkey. Christofias stated that the new leadership might have already reached a compromise with the Turkish military. The President noted that part of the Turkish army shows irredentist tendencies in Cyprus, while a part of the Kemalist establishment considers Cyprus to be an extension of Anatolia, an attitude he characterized “anachronistic”. The President’s statement can be interpreted as an effort to recontextualize the Kemalist identity, traditionally associated to modernization. At the same time, the military and the Kemalists are portrayed as able to set aside their differences when it comes to their hostile stance toward Cyprus.

Christofias speech is particularly rich in themes. His next comment was related to Turkey’s desire for EU accession and he stressed that the country should first be modernized and change its mentality. This discourse perpetuates Turkey’s image as a backwards country, whose
mentality does not agree with the Western worldviews. Turkey is being presented as trying to impose a solution that serves its own interests and keeps Cyprus hostage, the President said. The codification used reproduces a victimization framing of Cyprus that does not allow the Greek Cypriots to see beyond their own traumas and to empathize with Turkey’s desire for EU accession. The next comment puts the intransigent identity of Turkey in comparison to that of Cyprus. Christofias underlines that “We” are in favour of compromise and flexibility.

In the same speech Chrystofias assigns a distinct role and identity to the Turkish Cypriots than the Turkish one. A left-wing politician, Chrystofias resonates here the Cypriotism ideology, saying that the Turkish leadership imposes harsh economic measures that affect the Turkish Cypriots and violates their right to express their complaints on the increasing number of Turkish settlers and on Turkey’s interference with their domestic affairs. Indeed, recently Erdoğan accused the Turkish Cypriots of insulting Turkey and he called upon the Turkish Cypriot leadership to hold accountable those responsible. Several newspapers in Turkey came out with the headline “Who do you think you are?” It becomes clear at this point that the notion of a Turkish Cypriot identity is ambiguous. The Turkish Cypriot national identity has undergone significant transformations, especially during the last decade. Nevertheless, beyond the way the Turkish Cypriots identify themselves, both Turkey and the RoC seem to imbue these words with their own meanings.

Referring back to Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptual framework, I argue that the Turkish identity functions as an empty signifier for the Greek Cypriot historical discourse. There is an ongoing competition for a hegemonic articulation that would establish a definite set of parameters for this identity. Thus, the Self/Other dynamic here is rehashed in the sense that there is an obsession for defining the Other, so that the identity of the self could be more evident.

144 For an analysis of the identity transformations that took place within the Turkish-Cypriot community in Northern Cyprus in the last decade, see: Emel Akçal, “Getting Real on Fluctuating National Identities: Insights from Northern Cyprus”, Antipode, forthcoming (2011)
Greek Cypriot discourses and narratives of history and identity base their articulations on the implicit relationship with the constructed Turkish identity, which serves in turn as the ultimate marker of self perception.
Conclusions and Future Research Directions

This study suggested that the way the collective memory of the Greek Cypriots as articulated in the discourse is greatly responsible for the production and the persistence of negative representations of Turkey. At the same time, these representations heavily condition the Greek Cypriot identity. Powerful images of the past condition the present and mould the future of Cyprus. In order to support this claim, the thesis used collective memory as its overarching theoretical framework, and it explored its interplay with the concepts of identity and narrative. The analysis focused on a range of negative images of Turkey, as these manifest themselves within two, central in everyday life, forms of narratives: the generally accepted historical narrative, the past, and the media narratives, the present as it appears in the press. The main concern underpinning the entire study was to uncover the abstruse and yet powerful narratives regarding Turkey that evoke and at the same time reinforce collective memory. These narratives create an Other in relation to which this collective memory is being framed.

During the course of this study, several problems were posed by the abstract nature of collective memory. However, the research confirmed the initial hypothesis that the recollection of negative images of Turkey, established through historical narratives, dominates the present through the narrative of the press. With regard to the present, it pointed out that collective memory is highly political and omnipresent in the public discourse. The study exposed the ways in which collective memory informs future preferences, since it affects the perceptions not only of those who lived and have memories of a certain traumatic past, but also of new generations with no direct experience.

The critical examination of the image of Turkey within the two discursive spaces of historiography and the press disclosed the impossibility of empty signifiers, which evidences that the burdens of traumas continue to reside in Cyprus’ collective memory. It was not the aim of this study to present a definitive account on the way collective memory shapes the Greek Cypriot
identity. Moreover, with reference to the empirical part, the limited time available for the completion of the research did not allow for a more systematic examination of the press narratives. It would be therefore plausible to expand the time span of the research in order to get a more complete image.

Nonetheless, the study underlined the pervasiveness of collective memory through the narratives, helping us understand how, in technical terms, it serves ideological functions in the Greek Cypriot society. The coding of the collective memory over Turkey through empirical examples of images of the country that permeate everyday life in the RoC can be used to explain the current status of the relations between these two countries and beyond. It can be inferred that there is a correlation between collective memory and the resolution of the conflict: it seems that the Greek Cypriots’ memory constitutes an obstacle in the attempts for peaceful coexistence. The research provides critical standards by which the representations of the past in the present can be judged with relation to the future and to the possible attitudes of the Greek Cypriots.

In dealing with such a vast topic, the research has left unexplored several aspects that could be addressed by future research. One possible direction of research could deal with the ideological context, more specifically with the idea that “We” have fallen victims of the Other and the resulting ready-made fear of a constant threat. What seems to be the most intriguing characteristic of this victim/victimizer dichotomy is that it is being unproblematically accepted by generations of individuals that did not experience the events that led to that. And yet, like in the case of the Greek Cypriots, they accept vague negative images as the factual reality.

Another issue that is related to this study has to do with the processes of change of collective memory in general. If we accept that time is the most encompassing medium for change and eventually it can even alter the course of something as established as history, then what makes collective memory so static and keeps it hostage to stereotypical depictions of the Other?

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Concluding this study on the collective memory of the Greek Cypriots, I would like to point out that meaning can be negotiated, in spite of the considerable difficulties, by negotiating our relationship with the Other. But in order to do so, we first need to be able to overcome feelings of injustice and understand that “human beings everywhere do terrible things to each other.”

146 “Everyone negotiates relationships in order to negotiate meaning.” Michael Carrithers, Why humans have cultures: explaining anthropology and social diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)

147 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 103
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