Memory Politics:
The Use of the Holodomor as a Political and Nationalistic Tool in Ukraine

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Abstract

This thesis serves as an analysis of the construction and use of the Holodomor as the defining cornerstone of Ukrainian national identity, and the creation of a victim narrative through this identity. The thesis addresses the steps taken by Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine to promote this identity, constructed in the diaspora, by seeking the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide by Ukraine’s population, as well as the international community. The thesis also discusses the divergent views of history and culture in Ukraine and how these differences hindered the acceptance of Viktor Yushchenko’s Holodomor policies.
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Introduction

In his *IX Thesis on the Philosophy of History*, Walter Benjamin compares the ever transforming force of time to the Angelus Novus who struggles to keep its body turned towards the past, while change violently drags him forward. This storm, Benjamin, writes ironically, is “what we call progress.”¹ Events are remembered not exactly as they happened; some are seized upon with more vigor than others, while some are consigned to oblivion. Through this process we seek to define who we are, where we have come from, and what we want to be. In the case of Ukraine and Viktor Yushchenko’s administration, this process of creating a national historical memory started with his election as president, and ended with his defeat in early 2010. He used an interpretation of Ukrainian history that sought to give Ukrainians a distinctive identity through historical narrative, claiming that this nation building process would propel the citizenry forward to an era of progress and national stability.² Yushchenko believed recognizing the Holodomor was not only a pressing issue for the county, but also a question of moral responsibility.

He urged Ukrainians to come to terms with its past through the acceptance of this event as genocide, which he considered a vital part of Ukrainian national identity. On 26 November 2008, Victor Yushchenko spoke at the unveiling of a memorial to the victims of Holodomor.

¹ Walter Benjamin’s IX Thesis on the Philosophy of history states: “A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees a single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awake the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skysward. This storm is what we call progress.”
the Holodomor in Kharkiv, one of the most affected areas of the famines, as part of his administration’s efforts to create this memory. He stated, “We are to get to know the truth of our past as only the truth will help us consolidate and build the future. The truth unites wise people, lies cannot consolidate people. We have to give up the historical fear.”3 This scene would replay throughout his term as president in different cities all over Ukraine as part of his attempt to unify the population of the country behind the formation of a Holodomor narrative.

Ukraine’s histories and the peoples4 of Ukraine are sordid and often conflicting. Nevertheless, Yushchenko pushed for the remembrance of the Holodomor as part of his nation building experiment in Ukraine, often dismissing critics of his policies. Collective memory and nation building are complex constructions, often consisting of multiple layers. It is essential to understand how, in this attempt to create this Holodomor memory, many Ukrainian citizens came into conflict with this narrative, and why this memory building faltered under the Yushchenko administration. The current president, Viktor Yanuchovych has taken several steps to reverse Yushchenko’s policies through promoting an identity that accounts for the diversity of the country’s population, and views the Holodomor as a tragedy, but not genocide. Yanuchovych stating in a speech given to the European Union Parliament


Western Ukraine is defined as the areas of Galicia, Ivano-Frankovsk, Lviv, and Ternopol, Bukovina, Trans-Carpathian Region and Volhynia. Eastern Ukraine is defined as Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhans and Zaporizhzhia. The south is defined as Crimea, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa. The center is defined as Cherkassy, Chernihiv, Kheemlnytksy, Kyiv, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytisia and Zhytomyr. Galicia Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine were ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire before World War I. Between World War I and World War II, Galicia and Volhynia were part of Poland, Trans-Carpathia belonged to Czechoslovakia and Bukovina was part of Romania. Western Ukraine, where the majority of Ukrainian peasants resided, did not experience famine in 1932-33 and were not under Soviet rule until 1939. In the east and south of Ukraine, these areas experienced long periods of Russian and Soviet Rule. Ukrainians and Cossacks in these regions became culturally and linguistically assimilated to the Russian population.
that the Holodomor was a “collective tragedy of the Soviet people,”\textsuperscript{5} thus rejecting Yushchenko’s policies that sought to consider the Holodomor genocide. The focus of this research will be the Yushchenko administration’s role, and breakdown of this process of creating a unifying Ukrainian national narrative because of the political, cultural, and historical differences within the country.

\textit{The Trials of Nation Building}

Ukraine’s prospects for developing a functional democratic society seemed bright in 2004. The Orange Revolution, emerging from popular discontent against voter fraud in the presidential runoff election between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, was the first mass protest against corruption within the electoral system since independence.\textsuperscript{6} The dissatisfaction of Ukrainian politicians, international organizations, and voters, illustrated by Orange Revolution protests, served as a catalyst for change. This inevitably resulted in the Ukrainian Supreme Court declaring the outcome of the first run off to be invalid, calling for a new election. Viktor Yushchenko won the second runoff election on the platform of reforming the Ukrainian state, especially tackling crime and corruption. However, much of his administration’s policies belonged rather to the realm of symbolic identity politics. Yushchenko’s administration endeavored to establish a nation building policy based on Ukraine as direct and sole descendent of the medieval Kyiv Rus state, to reinterpret the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement that included controversial figures such as Stepan Bandera, and to promote the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide in Ukraine and to the international community. Many of these policies were divisive within Ukraine. The schisms that this memory and nation building created directly affected the politics and climate of the


\textsuperscript{6} Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84 no. 2 (March-April 2005): 35-52.
country. In *Nationalism*, Craig Calhoun speaks about the difficulty of creating a national identity among groups that may not have a homogenous historical past, especially if their perceived pasts conflict with each other, “the very sense of being a member of a coherent and clearly demarcated group is not simply given by tradition, but raised in certain context—especially when there are either tensions with other groups or efforts by leaders to mobilize followers on the basis of that collective identity.”  

Yushchenko declined to consider cultural and regional differences in the country, and tried to establish a national narrative by using only certain principles that a specific segment of the population deemed legitimate. Viktor Yushchenko was readily voted out of office in 2010, receiving only five percent of the ballots in the primary election against his two rivals, Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. Although Yushchenko’s administration tried, but failed, to seize certain rules, as Michel Foucault explains it, questions still remain on why Ukrainian citizens did not “fall in line” to support these policies. While Ukraine struggles to define itself internally and in the international arena, Yushchenko’s work to address the Holodomor and build a collective remembrance may have been undone by the new government, which has sidelined much of the nation building agenda set by the previous administration. It is important, however, to discuss this construction of memory during the Yushchenko administration in order to better understand where Ukraine has come from and where the Ukrainian state may head in the future.

The method adopted in this thesis centers on two ideas. First, it is relevant to understand how the construction of a national identity through government policies relates to

8 Michel Foucault, *Language Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). “The success of history belongs to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who have used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who have initially imposed them.”
the history of a territory (Ukraine) and its multi-ethnic composition. Second, it is equally important to understand how such policies are deliberately employed through the government’s use of nation building. In his work *Post-Communist Ukraine*, political scientist Bohdan Harasyniv defines nation building as “the sum of policies designated to promote national integration.” Working within this concept, one must further delve into how these policies are constructed by the state through national institutions, and how these constructions are manipulated, evolving to suit specific purposes. This process continued and escalated with Yushchenko’s administration as he urged Ukraine’s diverse citizenry to come to terms with their traumatic past through Holodomor remembrance and acceptance of this account as genocide.

Rogers Brubaker contends that post-Soviet countries develop ethnic rather than civic nationalism, while civic nationalism is seen as a more “westernized” model. Civic nationalism or one that cultivates a cross cultural blending based upon the notion of equally, shared political and social rights, as well as allegiances to certain political and social principles, and is linked to liberalism, democracy, and creation of a stable infrastructure and economy. Civic nationalism reflects a top down dissemination of principles regarding politics, laws, and national celebrations, which a state agrees upon through the use of unified structures. This concept often dismisses that strife that may be present, caused by ethnic, social, or class cleavages. Ethnic nationalism, or nationalism based upon the elevation of a particular group because of their cultural characteristics, promotes a national identity based

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on the prominent group’s language, religion, and territorial history. This type of nationalism often employs the construction of an identity grounded in the continuous history of the group.

Any nationalism, whether it is civic or ethnic, consists of somewhat artificial paradigms, as there are only particular events or people that are deemed as better suited than others to fulfill a national identity. In Ukraine’s multi-ethnic society, the process of nation building is mired in disagreements between groups. Overlapping identities and competing concepts in post-Soviet Ukraine may have caused the state’s weakness, thus creating ethnic pluralism primarily based on regional and linguistic differences, and further hindering the development of civic nationalism.

History, whether it is employed in building civic or ethnic nationalism, or both, is inevitably used to fulfill the goal of justifying the existence of a state, and is manipulated to fulfill political needs. This refashioning of ideas, based on a contentious past, sheds light on disagreements over the chosen principles in contemporary politics and society, especially if these disagreements center around the interpretation of histories.

Victimization narratives are difficult to accept as part of a national story and often times, as with the Holodomor, are more complex and controversial, and can further damage a nation building process. The state may choose to develop a simplistic narration, which creates an atmosphere of further distrust and rifts in society, rather than creating accord. Internal struggles within a multi-ethnic society lead to the clashing of historical narratives

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11 Johann Gottfried Herder defined the theory of ethnic nationalism of the late 18th century. Herder believed that culture was tied to the language, history and traditions of a group. This cultural identity is essential in distinguishing groups from one another. Each group is free to pursue “nationalist goals” based on their distinctiveness as a culture. The Marxist Otto Von Bauer further elaborated on ethnic nationalism. He discusses the use of common territory, descent, language, morals, customs, and history for the legitimate claims of ethnic groups with national aspirations.
and commemoration efforts.\textsuperscript{12} The use of trauma as a nation building tool is not necessarily the best formulation to produce a collective narrative. With this type of narrative, groups try to cultivate a sense of understanding of a traumatic event and may further call for international recognition of the event as genocide. They use their cultural norms, symbols, and morals to present to the outside world by developing this identity.\textsuperscript{13} Several issues may arise with this type of narrative; however, as evident in the Holodomor example, citizens may not want to identify with a narrative that paints a less than flattering picture of victimization, when these identities are supposed to lionize struggle and the overcoming of great odds.

National narratives are supposed to be simplistic, whereas all or most of the citizenry is in general concurrence. However, this is not the case of the Holodomor narrative in Ukraine, and its tentative acceptance as genocide. This narrative may not be accepted by the international community as a valid claim of genocide either. In the particular case of Ukraine, Yushchenko’s claim that the Holodomor be recognized as genocide provoked extreme sensitivity and antagonism on behalf of Russia, and many other states were reluctant to take a firm stand on the issue. Furthermore, this narrative clashed internally. Ukraine’s divergent political and social situations that center on territorial and linguistic divides provides a good example of these multiple and conflicting claims to Holodomor memory. To understand the history of the territory that encompasses present day Ukraine, and to delve into this process of nation building during the Yushchenko administration, an assessment of how Ukrainian scholarship and political parties is crucial, as they have shaped their own versions of a national identity in Ukraine. Narratives, social norms, and histories often align themselves along territorial and linguistic lines. An example is the legacy of Stepan Bandera, who, in western Ukraine, is considered a national hero that combated Soviet occupation and


\textsuperscript{13} See \textit{Collective Traumas: Memories of War and Conflict in 20\textsuperscript{th} Century Europe}, (Brussels: Editions scientifiques Internationales, 2007).
fought for an independent Ukraine. In eastern and southern Ukraine, Bandera is perceived as a Nazi collaborator and traitor. There has been extensive scholarship into Bandera’s legacy. David Marples has focused extensively on the divergent views of this controversial figure and the differences among his legacy in Ukraine.\(^\text{14}\) The genesis story of the Kyiv Rus (9th-13th centuries) has also led to political and scholarly debate in the country; specifically the connection between Eastern Slavic peoples and which group is the “just” heir to this birthright. While some consider the inheritance of the Kyiv Rus passed down to ethnic Ukrainians that migrated westward and created the Galicia-Volynian States (1199-1349), other historiography schools contend that the Kyiv Rus was the cradle of all three Eastern Slavic people (Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian). This legacy continued in the Russian Empire, and later in the Soviet Union. The connection between the three groups is natural, and is the principle component of an “Eastern Slavic brotherhood,” some claim. Yet, another school rejects both the Ukrainophile, Russophile, and Soviet Schools claims, and believes that all three groups developed side by side, and therefore share a history. The differing views of these schools in reference to the Kyiv Rus state will be outlined as a starting point for later discussion of the construction of Ukrainian identity and the Holodomor under Viktor Yushchenko’s administration.

The Ukrainian diaspora also proves to be a factor in the discussion of the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity. This diaspora had a significant role in promoting Stepan Bandera’s promotion as a Ukrainian national hero, the Kyiv Rus-ethnic Ukrainian link, as well as working to convince the international community of recognizing the Holodomor as genocide perpetrated by Stalin's regime. Opponents to the work of Ukrainian nationalists and the diaspora, believe their policies promotes a nationalistic Ukrainian agenda, including disproportionate language policies that do not give Russian the status of a state language in

the country. The focal point of the last chapter will concern the specific case of Yushchenko’s nation building project centering on the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian peasantry. It is not the intent of this thesis to claim that Viktor Yushchenko was solely responsible for the creation of national memory within Ukraine. Earlier Ukrainian presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma both initiated programs aimed at creating a national narrative in Ukraine to promote a Ukrainian identity, including Holodomor remembrance. Yushchenko, however, focused more intently on using policies that were seen as favoring ethnic Ukrainians against the country’s other inhabitants, namely Russian speakers, rather than focusing on the shared history of the multi-ethnic state.

Specific cases of Viktor Yushchenko’s projects for discussion include the creation of a Holodomor Law (2006), and later attempts to criminalized denial the of the Holodomor and Holocaust, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, and the Trial of Josef Stalin in 2010, which occurred shortly before Yushchenko lost the election primary. These policies, many assert, while intending to define Ukraine, hardened identities. The use of ethnic nationalism, and an "us versus them" mentality strained relations in Ukraine, rather than bringing the various groups together under one narrative.

The conclusion will focus on why these policies did not translate in building this national identity under Yushchenko. It is critical to look at these different components of Ukrainian identity and the complexities surrounding the use of these different identifying narratives. The collective groups within the modern Ukrainian territory also have separate, as well as intersecting identities that give rise to a multitude of historical narratives, and ideas about how these stories should fit into the nation building project.
Chapter One: The National Identity Formula

National identity is strongly tied to an individual’s perception of him or herself as belonging to a national collective. This is manifested and perpetuated by social practices, political institutions, and the media.\(^\text{15}\) National identity, often times, is shaped by the state, and is essential in the construction of a society that shares the same values, histories, and culture. The molding of a national character involves a “top down” creation of policies that expresses a group’s culture, language, history, and territorial legacy through the likeness of individuals. One of the most important aspects in the formation of a national identity is the use of historical events as a rallying point for groups to express their identification. The use of history legitimizes a specific group’s existence, and through their history, groups are able to define themselves internally as well as externally. As Stuart Hall remarks, “In the modern world, the national culture into which we are born are one of the principle sources of cultural identity. These identities are not literally imprinted into our genes, however we do think of them as part of our essential nature.”\(^\text{16}\) This “essential nature” of the individual is often a defining characteristic of who a person is in reference to a particular group orientation. The individual seeks to find others that share these common characteristics that unites them into a group, and often, expresses not only who they are but also who they are not.

This chapter will discuss the forging of collective memory and the use of a trauma narrative as part of the creation of this identity as it is used in forming a state’s “oneness.” The chapter will also serve to discuss the problems in creating an identity based on a legacy of trauma as a shared narrative.


1.1 Creation of a Collective Narrative

Collective historical narrative and nation building have political, social, and cultural consequences. Throughout its history, the territory of Ukraine has been continuously overtaken and occupied by the Polish, Habsburg, and Russian empires, prior to its incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1922. According to the 2001 census, the ethnic makeup of the country consists of 78 percent ethnic Ukrainian and 17 percent ethnic Russians, with the remaining 5 percent consisting of ethnic groups identifying themselves as Polish, Belarusian, Crimean Tartar, Bulgarian, Jewish, Hungarian and Romanian.\(^{17}\)

As with history and memory, the construction of a national narrative base on a historical event is not bound to stay stagnant; instead, it is continuously changing according to cultural and political needs.\(^{18}\) An essential part of the nation building process and commemoration pertains to the presentation of a unified narrative by the state. The first process in this commemoration is the “invention of tradition,” as Eric Hobsbawm suggests.\(^{19}\) This tradition is developed through a set of rituals and commemorations that serve as constant reminders of the origins of this group, and creates a positioning for the group to present to outsiders. This social positioning ensures certain continuity, and in a sense, the legitimization of the social group based on its connection with the past.

Often times, the individual may give up part of their memory to the whole, as to belong to that group. Group memory creation is essential in a nation building, and Ukraine is not an exception. Collective memory creation is a process. With all processes, this denotes certain steps that must be taken to create this memory. As Maurice Halbwachs asserts, “there


is a sense of rediscovery of memory as time passes and is essential for the individual to create personal narratives and adapt these narratives to fit into a larger collective narrative.”

Choice of group orientation is contingent upon the group’s value system, heritage, and culture. This point of reference offers the outsider a look into the dynamics of the group, as well as their cultural values and agendas and their sense of “place,” or historical consciousness. By positioning the group, memory becomes political. Memory creation by groups are pre-structured because these memories are asserted by this collective which has existing cultural patterns, linguistic discourses, and set social practices.

Halbwachs believed history and memory continuously evolve for a group of people which share a common experience. These experiences of a common group overlap into the experiences of a nation. History can be recreated by a group in order to fulfill the use of collective memory. A fundamental part of this collective memory of a society is the use of communication to relay these ideas with the past. For Ukrainians, as with many former Soviet states, the “rediscovery process” began with the referendum in 1991, as Ukrainians sought to become an independent state. Ukraine had been deprived of a “state” for most of its history, and the fulfillment of this referendum would be a final chapter in a long history as a “stateless nation,” achieving recognition as a legitimate country after years of struggle, marginalization, and trauma. Along with this creation of the state came the need for the creation of a collective narrative, and to discover the past that sought to rectify discrepancies, trauma, and glories of the Ukrainian people.

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23 Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*.
In order for a new collective memory to be implemented, the old memory, along with its related institutions, must be destroyed or modified, to fulfill the country's current social, political, and cultural needs. The state is responsible for creating this memory framework, especially when there is a transition from an oppressive regime to an open society. Cultural norms are negotiated through construction in the search for a usable past and are highly selective in seeking out this past.\textsuperscript{25} After the pronouncement of what the narrative is, these commemorative practices are integrated into everyday culture.\textsuperscript{26} This connection between the past and the present is \textit{supposed} to create a continuum for the society. The most effective way of achieving this goal is through public commemorations. This process started with the inception of the Ukrainian state in 1991 through the renaming of streets and tearing down of statues that glorified the Soviet Union, the rewriting of the national anthem, and the restating of the Ukrainian flag to express these ideals of the new state.\textsuperscript{27}

On account of a well-established Ukrainian diaspora population, Ukrainians in the diaspora believed their version of history would easily transfer to the new state after independence.\textsuperscript{28} One of the essential pieces of the collective identity created in the diaspora was intended to be Holodomor remembrance seeking out recognition of the Holodomor as an act of genocide. This created a sense of nationalism, ethnic identity, and cultural homogeneity in the diaspora. The expectation was this would accomplish the same objective once a newly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger, \textit{The Invention of Tradition}.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ruth Wodak et al., \textit{The Discursive Construction of National Identity}.
\end{itemize}
independent Ukraine was established. Josef Stalin was accused of purposefully planning and executed policies that would lead to the eradication of the peasantry, a group viewed as the “backbone” of the Ukrainian nation. Since the diaspora’s notion of nationalism arose from ethnicity (or the need to define what it meant to be Ukrainian), the use of ethnic aligning impeded the creation of civic nationalism. There was not a free Ukrainian state to create this civic nationalism. The diaspora worked to elevate this event to a central station within Ukrainian history to aid in exposing totalitarian policies of the Soviet Union, and the suffering of the Ukrainian people under this rule. Furthermore, the creation of an independent Ukrainian state was one of the most important objectives of a nation building project for the diaspora.

The creation of this historical process is a way that a society may work through historical injustices that occurred throughout their history. Similar to the diaspora, President Yushchenko used the Holodomor to represent a disruption in Ukrainian history.29 This disturbance ceased development of Ukraine as a democratic and free country. He believed the defining event of the Holodomor is at the center of the struggle of the Ukrainian people. He asserted that the Holodomor was caused by a regime that sought to occupy and eradicate the “Ukrainian way of life,” and symbolizes the destruction of the Ukrainian nation.30 This interruption within the citizenry’s history was a challenge for the new state that was attempting to understand its identity, or identities, as the case turned out to be.

30 Ibid.
1.2 Trauma Narratives: Genocide as Culture, Culture as Identity

Traumatic events of a group's past are often complicated to use as national narrative building blocks that create difficulties of how to express these events in a cultural context. It is also hard to find fitting representations to help preserve them for future generations. This creation of *wirkungsgeschichtte*, or the position and function that the trauma plays into the collective memory of the group, is important for both the victims their descendants, and to present to outsiders in order to understand how the memory is represented during a certain era. This transfer, or post-memory, facilitates a passing on of the survivor’s experience to another generation that is removed from the event itself through public recognition, commemoration, and forums. It is an important part of any memorialization for groups seeking to keep the memory of a tragic event alive to ensure its will not end up in history's oubliette. Post-memory also strives to bring reconciliation to the event and acknowledgement by the public that this tragedy is an important part of a group’s historical narrative. This transfer keeps the claim in the public’s mind, puts pressure on those that could be held responsible, and also gives solace to those that were part of the collective tragedy.\footnote{Pascale R. Bos, “Adopted Memory,” *Diaspora and Memory*, no.13 (2006): 100-01.}

Viktor Yushchenko continued the process of creating a trauma narrative at a more fervent pace during his presidency. Groups within Ukraine questioned the Holodomor narrative’s legitimacy and accused the Yushchenko administration of using Holodomor history and commemoration for political gain. Pierre Nora discusses the inevitable politics of memory that arise in the development of nation building processes.\footnote{Pierre Nora, *Between Memory and History: Les Leuix de Memoire*, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/201/articles/89NoraLieuxIntroRepresentations.pdf (accessed 11 April 2011).} This memory used the existing cultural norms, (mostly constructed within the Ukrainian diaspora), to establish a group narrative in Ukraine. By using established cultural standards, a group can retain a sense
of legitimacy through a historical narrative, whether it involves trauma or not. It becomes less important for a society to look at the actual event as it may have occurred; instead, society selects and packages historical materials that are relevant for current political and cultural needs.\textsuperscript{33} This was important to establish for Ukraine in the post-Soviet era in respects to creating a national narrative, but these collective memories that are used in a nation building project often backfire, especially if there are several viewpoints of the same historical episode, thus the process of integration may actually lead to disintegration.\textsuperscript{34} Societies may not find it appropriate to commemorate this trauma for various reasons. The proximity of the event is part of the too recent past, or too far away from the events occurrence, or the event does not fit into this national narrative for some within the country. This may be especially true in post-Soviet countries, such as Ukraine, that have only recently been made independent and are still in the process of discovering their identities as a state.

Sometimes these constructs are misrepresented and do not agree with individuals or groups in a certain society. It is dangerous for the narrative’s architects to assume that the construction of a past will automatically fit into every citizen’s memory. One must assume that the past may actually come into conflict with this memory, or there may be no connection at all. The key to creating this usable collective past lay in the success of convincing the population of the event’s importance.\textsuperscript{35}

The use of the Holodomor as a central part of this narrative fueled controversy within Ukraine during Yushchenko’s administration because many considered it a negative history. National stories are supposed to celebrate a group. Jie-Hyun Lim notes a significant shift from a “heroic” to an “innocent victim narrative” in the creation of collective memory in

\textsuperscript{33} Mitchell Ash, “Historical Scholarship: Politics of the Public Past and (Semi) Private Memory,” \textit{Justice and Memory}, 86.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
recent decades. This notion of victimhood has become more prevalent as nations construct their identities, especially in the post-Soviet space.\textsuperscript{36} This may be caused by the acknowledgement of genocide by the international community through such documents as the \textit{United Nations Declaration of Human Rights}, or because a state may not want to face their own historical demons that would paint them as the perpetrators. Some critics felt that the Yushchenko administration’s lack of negotiating, or acknowledging other groups’ histories, led to the development of cleavages within Ukrainian society and to the rise of a “crude nationalism.”\textsuperscript{37}

The next chapter discusses the role of the diaspora in the creation of a Ukrainian nationalist history and implementation of Holodomor identity. Through executing a highly organized campaign, the diaspora population was able to gain recognition of the Holodomor in the international community that concentrated on this victim narrative, as well as advocating for Ukrainians behind the Iron Curtain by exposing the Soviet Union’s human rights abuses and policies.


Chapter 2: The Ukrainian Diaspora

Diasporas are defined as ethnic, religious, or cultural communities that do not reside within their historic territories. One of the main goals of these exiled nations\textsuperscript{38} may be to cultivate the creation of a nation-state and an ethnic identity. This elevation of ethnic identity serves to assert the core group identity, and in this creation, may also produce a narrative primarily based on the struggles which the group has endured throughout their history. Diasporas are defined as a “movement or migration of people that share a national or ethnic identity, that leave an established ancestral homeland. Diaspora movements are often caused by a traumatic loss of homeland, a strong ethnic consciousness, a return movement, and a sense of solidarity with ethnic members in other societies.”\textsuperscript{39} The Ukrainian diaspora created a narrative based on the ‘heroic but tragic struggle’\textsuperscript{40} for national independence of the Ukrainian nation. Some in the diaspora asserted that they were deprived of their “rightful” nation-state by a series of tragic events that resulted in the expulsion from their “historic” territorial claim because of the Soviet Union’s takeover.

Diasporas often chooses strategies\textsuperscript{41} that are nationalistic, as well as cosmopolitan. Nationalistic policies include the formation, and preservation, of a distinctive national identity through language, culture, and historical narrative. Cosmopolitan identity is forged through intellectual work and international recognition of the group. This often includes the creation of departments in major universities, and the study of the literature, language, and history to legitimize the group as distinctive from others. This recognition may extend to policies and actions aimed at promotion and international recognition of the historical

\textsuperscript{39} Vic Satzewich, \textit{The Ukrainian Diaspora}, (London: Routledge, 2002), 15.
\textsuperscript{40} Susanne Lachenicht and Kirsten Heinsohn, \textit{Diaspora Identities: Exile, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Past and Present}, 8.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 9.
injustices from the group’s past. This serves to rectify the past injustice, as is the case with several groups asserting claims of genocide against their kin long-ago. Examples of this include the Armenian diaspora’s work to promote genocide by the Turks in 1915, the Jewish diaspora’s work to promote the Holocaust, and the Ukrainian diaspora’s claim of genocide by the Soviet power.

2.1 The Creation of a Diaspora Identity

National identity formation is important to discuss in terms of the creation of diaspora identity. Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith argue whether a nation is a primordial or of modernist construction. Gellner believes that a group becoming a nation is based upon certain factors that lead to group asserting its right of self determination in order to form a national identity. Anthony Smith asserts a more primordialist view. Members of ethnies usually have a link, sometimes symbolic, with a specific territory. Nation’s members share a collective experience, which is only understood by using preceding ethnic ties. Binding elements include language and historic territory, as well as historical myths associated with the nation. Ernest Gellner believes nations sometimes do and other times do not have these primordial ties, or navels as he terms it. This navel is not essential in the creation of a nation, Gellner argues. He uses the case of the Estonians as an example of a nation not having a navel. Estonian identity was created by Estonians in the late nineteenth century, based upon the Estonian nation creating the “other.” Estonians did not identify with their German, Swedish, or Russian overlords. There was a separate Estonian literature, language, and folk culture that elites used to establish this identity. The Ukrainian identity, similar to that of the Estonians, and many other groups in East-Central Europe and beyond, is based upon the notion of the

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other. Ukrainians were tied to the land and the subjects of mostly Polish, Habsburg, or Tsarists control. At the time when, in the late nineteenth century, many Ukrainian immigrants settled in the United States and Canada, a comprehensive nation building process swept through western Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism made its first linguistic, cultural, and political demands there.

Both Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson go into great detail in their discussions of the purposeful construction of memory and a national narrative. Anderson believes this constructionist view of nationalism is an attempt to link the past with the present in order to show continuity, although in fact there may be no connection with the past at all. Events are reinterpreted, or simply manipulated, to fulfill a nationalistic ideal as communities are based on certain perceptions selected by themselves, in spite of more realistic standards.

Ukrainians outside of Ukraine have formed a different nation from those in Ukraine because of differing geographical, political, and social constellations. By focusing on the Holodomor, the diaspora was able to unite the Ukrainian population overseas around a collective historical background that defined Ukrainians in the diaspora as a cohesive national

44 Like the Estonians, elites in the west of Ukraine sought to establish a national consciousness through promotion of Ukrainian literature and language in the latter half of the 19th century. Poets such as Taras Shevchenko that glorified the peasantry as the foundation of the Ukrainian nation became an important national symbol for Ukrainians. Language and education was also important in this revival.

45 For a more in depth discussion about the construction of national memory, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities and Eric Hobsbawm’s The Invention of Tradition are often cited. Anderson’s book, considered one of the first works of its kind in nationalism studies, seeks to look at how nations construct their identity through the process of remembering and forgetting (omitting), and how specific events shape the national consciousness and narrative. Hobsbawm’s book studies how memory is constructed through rituals and symbols. Both authors contend that in modern times, nations have purposefully constructed traditions that may seem to be ancient, but rather are a recent addition to the national narrative to fulfill a need. In the Ukrainian case, both the diaspora and Viktor Yushchenko’s administration, have used events and traditions to create a historical memory through not only Holodomor remembrance, but also by embracing the Ukrainian language, culture and ties to the homeland.
group, whether this was their identifying factor or not.\textsuperscript{46} This group defining moment is important in any nation’s formation. The process is always deliberate in forging a collective identity. Gellner comments, “diaspora groups can effectively assert themselves, given their transference of symbolism, nationalism, as well as construction of a shared experience.”\textsuperscript{47} The most binding identity of the Ukrainian nation outside of Ukraine happened years after the late nineteenth century national revivals that were largely based on language and literature of the culture in Europe. In the diaspora’s vision, the collective suffering of the Ukrainian people under the Soviet regime, and more specifically, the promotion of the Holodomor as an act of genocide, served as a bonding force that was essential in creating this identity.

Ukrainian immigration to North and South America\textsuperscript{48} began roughly in 1880. It parallels many similar movements by groups in eastern and southern Europe of the nineteenth century. This first wave consisted of mostly labor and farmers migrants.\textsuperscript{49} Immigrants left areas of eastern and central Europe that traditionally are considered homelands of Ukrainians.

\textsuperscript{46} The experiences of immigrants are varied, depending on the time period of the immigration, the factors contributing to the immigration, and where the immigrant population settled once they came to the new country. Sometimes this experience includes severing ties with the home country to assimilate into the new host country. In other instances, the immigrant population strengthened, or created an identity that was not as prominent within the country of origin. For Ukrainian immigrants, many found solace in creating a new national identity that would continue to play a powerful role in their lives. There are elements of a classical migration from the home territory to North America as well as elements of a diaspora within the Ukrainian population. However, the resettling of the Ukrainian population is not purely one or the other; but rather a combination of diaspora, based upon political oppression, as well as immigration, based up the idea of seeking better economic opportunity. Most of the population that left to seek economic opportunity was not as strongly tied to the creation of the Ukrainian identity abroad. This population had a tendency to assimilate quicker within society, but kept cultural traditions, such as religious affiliations and symbolism that is familiar but not necessary part of a quest to fulfill a greater group identity.

\textsuperscript{47} Ernest Gellner, \textit{The Warwick Debates}.

\textsuperscript{48} In the 1890s, Ukrainians immigrated to Brazil and Argentina for mostly agricultural opportunities and to the United States and Canada to work in mainly industry and mining. They were later influenced to move to primarily the United States and Canada by the work of Dr. Joseph Oleskiw, who was highly critical of the treatments of Ukrainians in Brazil and Argentina and believed there were better economic opportunities in the United States for industrial workers and Canada for farmers.

\textsuperscript{49} Vic Satzewich, \textit{The Ukrainian Diaspora}, 23.
This area spreads from the region of Galicia and Bukovina in the west that was part of the Austria-Hungarian Empire through the Russian Empire. The first wave of immigrants settled mostly in agricultural areas to establish small farms, or worked in industries such as mining and steel production. The second wave, starting about 1920 and lasting into the 1930s, coincides with the end of the First World War, the Ukrainian War of Independence, and the subsequent incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet Union. These immigrants, again, consisted of labor migrants, but also of political refugees. The third wave, starting in 1940 and lasting into the early 1950s, again, coincides with the beginning and ending of a world conflict, and the start of the Cold War. This wave also included many displaced persons and political refugees attempting to escape the Soviet regime, as well as those seeking economic opportunity.

In the years following the arrival of the first, second, and third waves, some Ukrainians in the United States, Canada, and smaller groups in Argentina and Brazil, set out to form a Ukrainian identity based upon their language, cultural ties, and the remembrance of a collective suffering, including the most recent events under the Soviet regime. To them, the Holodomor remembrance signified the creation of collective memory of an event that defines the Ukrainian nation for the Ukrainian community living abroad.

With such varying educational, social, and even cultural backgrounds, Ukrainians in the diaspora often succumbed to infighting between groups, primary based upon religion, political affiliation, and even territorial divisions that fractured Ukrainian’s ideas of a

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50 Ibid., 25.
51 Ibid., 27.
52 With the emigration of many Ukrainian intellectuals and nationalists who called for a free and independent Ukrainian homeland, the elites started to effectively build a mosaic-like identity based upon pieces of Ukrainian history, literature figures, collective suffering and a standardization of the language.
collective identity.\textsuperscript{53} There was no common territory, collective experience, language, culture, or religion to pull from; instead Ukrainian intellectuals outside of Ukraine were now forced to find common ground within a group whose politics, culture and social backgrounds, in some instances, were quiet divergent.

Through this collective experience of an “injustice” done by an outside force, Stalin’s Soviet regime, Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine created an identity based upon this suffering, and also advocated it for Ukrainians behind the Iron Curtain. After independence in 1991, the diaspora community continued to be an important part of the rebuilding of Ukraine through economic, political, and social action that promoted Ukraine’s establishment as a democratic society. This advocacy ranged from supporting Holodomor remembrance to petitioning the international community to declare the Holodomor an act of genocide by the Soviet Union against ethnic Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{54} To understand the case for genocide asserted by

\textsuperscript{53} Intellectually, the second and third waves of Ukrainians were part of different segments of society than the farmers and laborers of the first wave. These individuals were better educated and part of an urban intellectual class that had fled Ukraine because of they were affiliated with the Ukrainian independence movement or suffered under Soviet policies. The different movements however, did not always see eye to eye, even though they were after the same goal of the establishment of an independent Ukraine. This different experience of what it meant to be Ukrainian was difficult to lend itself to social cohesion. Religion often created suspicion in groups. In the western territories of Galicia and Bukovina, Ukrainians were either Ukrainian Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox, while those who came from the Russian Empire could be either Russian or Ukrainian Orthodox. The Ukrainian Catholic groups were suspicious of the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox groups, while neither the Ukrainian Catholics nor Ukrainian Orthodox groups trusted the Russian Orthodox groups that came from the south and eastern territories. Dialects of Ukrainian also differed, depending on where the person was from originally. Some dialects intermixed Polish while others mixed more Russian words to create a hybrid language, referred to as \textit{surzhik}.

\textsuperscript{54} World Congress of Free Ukrainians (now Ukrainian World Congress), established in 1967, was very vocal about creating a commission to inquire about the Holodomor as an act of genocide. In 1984, The International Commission of Inquiry Into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine was established. The commission majority was unable to affirm the existence of a preconceived plan to organize a famine in Ukraine, in order to ensure the success of Stalin’s policy. However, the commission majority did conclude that Soviet authorities, without actively wanting the famine, most likely took advantage of it to force peasants to accept policies of collectivization they strongly opposed. The congress’ work now focuses on promote social services, education, cultural and international affairs, human trafficking, as well as promoting inquiries into the human rights abuses in Ukraine during the Soviet Union.
the Ukrainian diaspora, and later the Yushchenko administration, a brief discussion of the historical background of the Holodomor, as seen by diaspora nationalists, is necessary.

2.2 The Ukrainian Diaspora’s Holodomor Narrative

Between 1929 and 1933, an estimated seven million Ukrainians died in the Holodomor.\(^55\) Josef Stalin instrumented various policies to force peasants throughout the USSR to move to collective farms and to fulfill the so-called New Economic Plan, implemented in 1928, which called for the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union, including the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.\(^56\) Starting in 1925, Ukrainian peasants within Ukraine SSR, and elsewhere in the Soviet Union, were the target of a policy known as *korenizatsiya*, or a process of nativization aimed at forcing them to accept the new Soviet collectivization system. That process also included programs encouraging literacy and education, as well as promoting ethnic elites to places of power within the Soviet structure.\(^57\) This policy also sought to reverse the trend of Russification that took place under the Russian

\(^55\) The number of causalities caused by the Holodomor (mass starvation, disease) ranges from 2 million to 14 million. Scholars have long debated the accuracy of the 1937 Soviet census that would put the number of dead at around 2 million in Ukraine. In Robert Conquest’s book, *Harvest of Sorrows*, he puts the death toll at around 14 million. The United States Congress in their report, *The Commission on the Ukrainian Famine*, published in 1988, determined 8 million people died. However, many Canadian Ukrainian organizations, such as the Ucrainica Institute in Canada have put the number at 10 million. The Yushchenko administration also used 7 to 10 million as their guiding number.

\(^56\) Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, (New York: Basic Books, 2010). Snyder’s book looks at the area caught between Stalin and Hitler as part of his discussion of the crimes perpetrated by both regimes. His discussion begins in Ukraine with the Holodomor. His book is somewhat controversial because it rewrites the historiography of the Second World War. He asserts that both the policies of Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin and the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were responsible for 14 million deaths within the territory of the “Bloodlands.”

\(^57\) Under the guidance of Mykola Skrypnyk’s Soviet leadership encouraged a national renaissance in literature and the arts in Ukraine. Communists gave a privileged position to manual labor, the largest class in the cities, where Russians dominated. The typical worker was more attached to class identity than to ethnicity. While workers were promoted to positions of status, Stalin worked to target the Kulaks (wealthy peasants) that he considered dangerous capitalists bent on destroying the collectivization and modernization of Ukraine.
Empire. For a brief period of time, these policies saw the revival of Ukrainian language, literature and culture.

The majority of peasants, however, defied the Soviet attempts of collectivization. The farmers resisted nativization and collectivization by restoring to sabotage, which included letting grain stores rot, refusing to plant fields, and even slaughtering livestock. As the process of collectivization and nativization continued against their will, the farmers continued to rebel. Together with other factors, such as the 1931 drought, rapid industrialization, and the Soviet policy of confiscating grain stores from farmers to meet planned quotas, the Ukrainian and Russian populations, mostly in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine SSR starved, died of contagious diseases, like typhus and typhoid fever, or were forced by Soviet authorities to remain in disease ridden villages without contact with the outside world.

Members of the Ukrainian diaspora have pushed for investigations into the Holodomor since the first reports surfaced. Western journalists were slow to report the story, if the story was reported at all. When questioned, the Soviet government vehemently denied reports regarding the situation in Ukraine.


Nationalism and anti-Soviet values evolved specifically in the areas of Galicia. The area of Galicia that contained the majority of the Ukrainian peasantry and did not experience famine in 1932-33 because they were not under Soviet rule and were not affected by collectivization policies.

59 Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov denied the existence of the famine and alleged Polish agents were attempting to create a “famine scare.” Gareth Jones reported on conditions in the Soviet Union in a story for the Manchester Guardian and the New York Evening Post. Many news outlets were reluctant to run his reports on the famine. Walter Duranty famously ran a story in The New York Times, denying the existence of a famine in the Soviet Union, with the headline of “Russians Hungry but not Starving,” disputing Jones’ accounts. Jones stood by his story, but his pleas for international intervention fell on deaf ears. Jones has been elevated to a hero by the Ukrainian diaspora for his reporting on the famine and his attempt to get the international community involved. Duranty, on the other hand, later won a Pulitzer Prize in 1932 for his reporting on the USSR. There were calls for the revocation of the prize by the Ukrainian diaspora and others that suffered under Stalin. The committee, however, did not rescind the award.

60 Johan Dietsch, Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture, (Lund: Lund University, 2006), 122.
Since that period, the diaspora has worked systematically so that this event would not be forgotten by the international community. Ukrainians living abroad have set up commemoration days, pushed for recognition of the Holodomor as genocide by the international community, and reminded them of the “oppression” of the Soviet regime with all the means they had at their disposal.

In the early in the 1970s, academic scholarship in North America began to tackle the Holodomor. This included the establishment of several centers at high profile colleges, such as Harvard and Saint Andrews, to specifically study Ukrainian history and culture. The term Holodomor, coined in the 1970s, brings two words together “holod” meaning hunger and “mor” meaning death or extermination, in an attempt to legitimize the event as a terror policy in attune with the horrors of the Holocaust. The Soviet Union repeatedly accused many scholars of falsifying evidence, doctoring photos, and concocting first-hand accounts in an attempt to deny the existence of famines in the USSR, stating it was caused by environmental conditions and not policies, until 1983. Pressure by Ukrainian diaspora groups led to the recognition of the Holodomor as at least a criminal act by the Stalinist regime by several governments, including the United States, Canada, and Brazil, which contain large Ukrainian diaspora populations. As more information was divulged about Stalin’s policies, more scholars analyzed sources available and interviewed witnesses of the event, as has been done by historians interested in the personal experience of Holocaust survivors. Robert Conquest’s book, Harvest of Sorrows, published in 1989, was the first significant scholarly work to

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61 The term Holodomor was first used to describe the Ukrainian Famine by several Ukraine diaspora groups in the United States and Canada.

62 Fifteen countries have recognized the Holodomor as genocide. They are as follows: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Georgia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, The Vatican, and Poland. Six countries have recognized the Holodomor as criminal act by Stalin’s regime: United States, Argentina, Chile, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Spain. These are independent of a UN resolution that states the Holodomor was a criminal act of the Stalin regime.

63 Robert Conquest’s book was a widely read study on the Holodomor. Conquest concluded that the famine in Ukraine was an act of genocide of the Ukrainian nation by the Soviet Union. He criticized western journalists and governments that refused to intervene on behalf of the Ukrainian
consider the Holodomor genocide by the Soviet Union against, specifically, the Ukrainian peasantry. Ukrainian famine victims’ accounts left some historians skeptical, but were applauded by others, such as James E. Mace, the head of the *US Commission on the Ukrainian Famine*.64 Most of these memoirs add important detailed descriptions to the peasants during the famine. His scholarship into the subject sparked the start of more thorough scholarship and debate on the status of the famine as genocide in the West. His book was greeted with applause by members of the Ukrainian diaspora.

64 *Famine Genocide in Ukraine: 1932-1933*


The purpose of the United States Commission on the Ukrainian Famine was to study the famine by gathering all available information about the famine, analyzing its causes and consequences. Based on testimony heard and staff research, the Commission on the Ukraine Famine makes the following findings:

―There is no doubt that large numbers of inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasus Territory starved to death in a man-made famine in 1932-1933, caused by the seizure of the 1932 crop by Soviet authorities. The victims of the Ukrainian Famine numbered in the millions. Official Soviet allegations of “kulak sabotage,” upon which all ‘difficulties’ were blamed during the Famine, are false. The famine was not, as is often alleged, related to drought. In 1931-1932, the official Soviet response to a drought-induced grain shortage outside Ukraine was to send aid to the areas affected and to make a series of concessions to the peasantry. In mid-1932, following complaints by officials in the Ukrainian SSR that excessive grain procurements had led to localized outbreaks of famine, Moscow reversed course and took an increasingly hard line toward the peasantry. The inability of Soviet authorities in Ukraine to meet the grain procurements quota forced them to introduce increasingly severe measures to extract the maximum quantity of grain from the peasants. In the fall of 1932 Stalin used the resulting ‘procurements crisis’ in Ukraine as an excuse to tighten his control in Ukraine and to intensify grain seizures further. The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 was caused by the maximum extraction of agricultural produce from the rural population. Officials in charge of grain seizures also lived in fear of punishment. Stalin knew that people were starving to death in Ukraine by late 1932. In January 1933, Stalin used the ‘laxity’ of the Ukrainian authorities in seizing grain to strengthen further his control over the Communist Party of Ukraine and mandated actions which worsened the situation and maximized the loss of life. Pavel Postyshev had a dual mandate from Moscow: to intensify the grain seizures (and therefore the famine) in Ukraine and to eliminate such modest national self-assertion as Ukrainians had hitherto been allowed by the USSR. While famine also took place during the 1932-1933 agricultural year in the Volga Basin and the North Caucasus Territory as a whole, the invasiveness of Stalin’s interventions of both the Fall of 1932 and January 1933 in Ukraine are paralleled only in the ethnically Ukrainian Kuban region of the North Caucasus. Attempts were made to prevent the starving from travelling to areas where food was more available. Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-1933. The American government had ample and timely information about the famine but failed to take any steps which might have ameliorated the situation. Instead, the Administration extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government in November 1933, immediately after the famine. During the Famine certain members of the American press corps cooperated with the Soviet government to deny the existence of the Ukrainian Famine. Recently, scholarship in both the West and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union has made substantial progress in dealing with the Famine. Although official Soviet historians and spokesmen have never given a fully accurate or adequate account, significant progress has been made.‖
existing scholarship on the Holodomor, revealing the dismal living conditions in Ukraine during the famine. The purpose of these studies were to help Ukrainians within the diaspora build a case for genocide under the *United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide*.

### 2.3 The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of Genocide and the Case of the Holodomor

The Holodomor was a controversial project, given the history of the term “genocide.” The United Nations officially defined genocide in 1948 under the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide (UNPPCG)* as a response to the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime during the Second World War, and other acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide which occurred in the twentieth century. This convention was a subsection of the larger *United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR)*, which outlined the fundamental acceptance of basic human rights, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” 65 This document codified what was already happening in the larger international arena; those responsible for crimes against humanity were to be held accountable for their actions, extending from an individual level through a collective level. The international community defined genocide as an aggravated form of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other acts committed against a civilian population based on their political, racial, or religious background. 66 Such framework

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has been given the status of international customary law since the declaration came into force in January 1951. By defining genocide, the United Nations established the framework for many groups that had been victims of oppression and annihilation to make claims on the basis of UNPPCG. These claims have often come into conflict with historical narratives of communities within the country where such claims are made, as well as the perceptions of the international community, and even with the declaration itself.

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide outlines the responsibilities of the international community when deciding if a historical incident should fall under the auspices of the UNDHRR. Claims made by individual groups, such as the Ukrainian diaspora and later, Viktor Yushchenko’s government in Ukraine, have come into conflict with the Soviet Union and its successor state of Russia. According to the Ukrainian diaspora, and Viktor Yushchenko’s administration, there was an attempt by the Stalinist regime to destroy at least a part of the Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian peasantry. The convention allows for victims to assert for their right for the truth about past human rights abuses. Since remote historical injustices are more difficult to prove because of sealed archives, conflicting accounts, inaccurate statistics, or because too much time has passed, in many instances groups are reaching out to rectify these injustices as

67 “International Customary Law,” Legal Dictionary Online, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/International+Law (accessed 18 March 2011). States may choose to follow certain policies under a “sense” of legal obligation, but it does make it binding international law. States also must view it as obligatory to follow the customary law, and they must not believe that they are free to depart from it whenever they choose, or to observe it only as a matter of courtesy or moral responsibility. Criticism against international customary law is directed at the varied ways states may use in their interpretations of issues.

68 International governments have recognized the Russian Federation as the successor state of the Soviet Union.
part of a nation building process. These “events of shame,” and recognition in the international arena serve to act as closure for the victim group.\textsuperscript{70}

The leading arguments regarding the Holodomor as genocide revolve around several pieces of evidence. The key points are as follows: 1) All regions within what was the borders of Soviet Ukraine experienced famine\textsuperscript{71}. 2) Other regions of the Soviet Union such as Moldova, Belarus, and the Russian regions immediately to the north of Ukraine did not experience significant rates of population decline and were also provided with grain to feed their populations, while Ukraine was not. 3) Stalin did not use the Soviet Union’s grain reserve, or take any other measures to supply Ukrainians with food, while supplying other areas affected with grain, as in the cases of Far East Russia, Siberia, Moldova and Belarus.\textsuperscript{72}

The charge against the Soviet Union was based upon the belief that the Ukrainian peasantry was targeted, and thus can be classified as genocide, per the UN Convention. According to the \textit{UNPPCG}, “the Convention does not limit the notion of genocide to an intention to destroy the whole group; it is sufficient that the desire to eliminate concern only a part of the group.”\textsuperscript{73}

It should be understood that Ukraine SSR was not the only area affected by Stalin’s policies of collectivization. Throughout the Soviet Union during this period, several famines raged, including ones in Siberia, central Asia and Kazakhstan, in addition to Ukraine. This is one of the main cases against declaring the Holodomor genocide because it affected an array

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 41.


The most affected regions in Ukraine SSR were as follows: Vinnitsya Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, Oddessa Oblast, Cherehiv Oblast, Dniperpythonsk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, and Donetsk Oblast. According to in 80\% of the victims were Ukrainian, 5\% Russian, 2\% Jewish, 1\% Polish, and the remaining 12\% a mixture of Moldavians, Belarusians, Hungarians, and Germans.


\textsuperscript{73} Roman Serbyn, “The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 as Genocide in the Light of the UN Convention of 1948,” \textit{The Ukrainian Quarterly} 50, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 184.
of people within the Soviet Union and did not target a specific population. 74 With the additional famines throughout the Soviet Union, several scholars argue that it was the collectivization policies aimed at all peasantry, regardless of their ethnic background, therefore not limited to the Ukrainian peasantry. It is suggested that the policies within the Soviet Union may qualify as democide rather than genocide because Stalin’s policies did not seek to eradicate on particular population, but rather any population that went against the collectivization policies of the regime, thus making it an event that annihilated entire populations within the USSR, rather than a specific group. 75 This is the main argument used by Viktor Yanuchovych, the Russian government, as well as other politicians and academics, which will be discussed in a later chapter. All of these parties that disagree with the claim that the Holodomor agree that the famines occurred in the USSR during 1932-1933, but believe there was no systematic program to eradicate the Ukrainian peasantry over another group.

The Ukrainian diaspora’s endeavor to commemorate, and bring attention to the Holodomor through international recognition, was an attempt at the community to build a leuix de memoire 76—a place for symbolic memory where a collective heritage is represented. They sought to create the idea of a Ukrainian nation outside of the traditional homeland of Ukrainian during the Soviet Union. The use of the Holodomor by the diaspora, first as an assertion of a binding identity, and then later a claim of genocide, set up a framework for the Yushchenko administration’s claim to this legacy. This created tensions in Ukraine, prompting many to question Viktor Yushchenko’s nation building techniques. The following chapter serve to identify the factors that prohibited the administration’s creation of this narrative within Ukraine under the Yushchenko administration though a review of the

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75 Ibid.
differing schools of historical thought and political parties, and the linguistic and cultural cleavages in Ukraine.
Chapter Three: Historiography and Political Parties of Ukraine as an Independent State

Ideologies often play a critical role in the creation, identification, or obscuring of social categories. Ideologies can maintain, or undermine historical narratives. These ideologies, entrenched in political and social posturing, can serve as a catalyst that further pushes groups apart and creates social tensions.\(^77\) Differing political and historical opinions often clash while attempting to construct a national narrative. Ultimately, a narrative’s development is influenced by current political objectives. This construction may become a monologue, where societies are handed a narrative, rather than a dialogue, where there is an open discussion about the narrative’s construction.\(^78\) Some of these tensions may be the result of the lack of a strong civic nationalism within the country, which propagates the creation of strong regional or linguistic ties in the country instead. As Timothy Snyder comments,

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Most eastern European countries have some form of central historical agency, funded and controlled by the state with some mixture of lustration (government policies of limiting the participation of former communists) prosecution, documentation and commemoration. Precisely because the history of these lands are so complex, this is a particularly dangerous mix…Because the work of historians in such instates is in obvious ways dependent upon political direction, but the selection of cadres and their development into scholars can be problematic.\(^79\)
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The use of arguments traditionally associated with post-Soviet historiography is designed to expel Soviet historiography from the former countries of the Soviet Union, thus allowing for a creation of their own national identity. Academics may see it as “rehabilitating the past,” while in fact, it may only serve to create difficulties regarding identity and memory. The key to creating a usable collective national narrative lay in the success of convincing the


\(^79\) Timothy Snyder, “Politics of History in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Modern European History 8 no.2 (September 2010), 142.
population of the importance of this story. It is risky for a nation to assume that the construction of a past will automatically fit into every citizen’s memory. It is difficult for a group to unite as a state when there are deep historical divides that hinder the consensus of the group. The deep differences in historical memory are often times too difficult to look beyond, and spill into the political arena. Political groups seek to influence the country’s direction by using its past to fulfill this historical narrative and are influenced by these diverse schools of history.\(^{80}\) These schools have been subject of discussion within the academic world, especially when it relates to Ukraine’s national history and construction. This is evident in the way that Ukrainian memory took shape in the diaspora, and since its independence as state.

The past has influenced the commemoration of several controversial figures and events in the diaspora and then later, their development in independent Ukraine. Ukraine’s “genesis story” of the Kyiv Rus state has courted debate in the academic world throughout this construction process. In his article, “Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism,” Benedict Anderson comments on nationalist’s use of an ancient past as way to show legitimacy, “In the line of official discourse, the older the Past the better.”\(^{81}\) Ancient pasts show a continuum of a civilization, and serve to create an identity of a group that has survived, despite challenges, setbacks, and occupation that may have occurred in its history. The discussion of the Kyiv Rus State, because of the disputed claims by several historiography schools, serves as a launching point for later discussion of the Holodomor in Ukrainian memorial politics.

\(^{80}\) Academics have labeled and categorized four groups of historiography in post-Soviet Ukraine. There are obvious degrees of which academics may prescribe to each of the school’s ideals, as there are always degrees of political affiliation that may be less or more extreme.

Andriy Portnov comments,

In Ukraine, the presence of several different regional centers with their own version of history fosters the preservation of pluralism in the public sphere and ensures that no version of history dominates throughout all the territories of Ukraine. This pluralism arises from the interaction of different views of the past, each of which, taken separately, is fairly one-sided.82

The dissimilitude in schools of thought, political parties, and historical remembrance echoed through school curriculum, national commemoration ceremonies, and ultimately in the media, where commemoration and quests for recognition of certain narratives lead to political and social cleavages in Ukraine.

Some of this tension denotes a lack of a stable government in Ukraine and the creation of regional nationalism based upon ethnic, political, and linguistic lines. Yaroslav Hrytsak looks at the effects of nationalism in Ukraine, and found it to be a unique case within post-Soviet states that is based primarily on ethnic and regional difference. These two factors also correlate to political preferences, and preferences concerning differing historical accounts in Ukraine.83 These contrasting historiographies generate political wrangling within the country, as seen with the construction of Kyiv Rus and Holodomor narratives. This may speak to the weakness of Ukrainian political actors and the distrust that the citizens of Ukraine have for their national government in general.84 Polarizing historical thought also


84 See Liudmilla Shanghhina, Ukraine’s Middle Class as a Public Actor, (Kyiv: Razumkov Centre National Security and Defense, 2008).

In 2002, two years before the Orange Revolution, those Ukrainians who identified themselves as members of the middle class were surveyed about trust and politics. Only 15.9 percent of those surveyed trusted political parties. The statistics regarding trust of government officials found that only 8.7 percent supported the president in 2002. In a Gallup Poll conducted in September 2007, Ukrainians expressed their dissatisfaction and an outright lack of confidence in their government institutions. Only 8 percent of the population claimed to have confidence in their national...
serves to weaken this nation building process. Extremes of the Russophile and Ukrainophile Schools that may serve to exert nationalist’s viewpoints exacerbate these differences, rather than celebrating the multi-ethnic population of Ukraine. The weakness of the Eastern Slav narrative, which accounts for the country’s multiple identities, has fallen short of establishing itself because it lacks a defining stance on commemoration and historical narrative. Elevation of the Ukrainophile narrative over the others has caused several stumbling blocks in this path to nation building. It is viewed as serving nationalist goals, first of the diaspora, and later, in Ukraine. This narrative, constructed in the West during the Soviet Union, strived to build a history that was exclusive of Ukrainians and that omitted Tsarist and Soviet narratives of history, thus marginalizing the indigenous Russian population in Ukraine.

3.1 History as Politics in Ukraine

These four schools of historiography are important to look at when discussing the genesis story of the Kyiv Rus and, in the next chapter, the politics of Holodomor remembrance. It is important to look at the political parties involved and their platforms that sometimes mirror the historiography. While these four school center on academia, there is a transfer from the elite academic world to that of the popular realm through the dissimilation of these narratives by political parties. Along the way, these narratives are altered and simplified so that they can be understood by the common citizen, and certain principles elevated to be used for political intentions.
3.1.1 The Soviet and Russophile Schools

The Sovietphilosophic School came to prominence during the Soviet Union. It prioritized Russia as the leading eastern Slavic nation, believing there is not a national exclusiveness to Ukrainians.\(^8^5\) The Sovietphilosophic School believes that dissolving the Soviet Union was an unnatural turn away from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in a cultural and political union. The Soviet Union promoted the Russian language as dominant within the Soviet space. There was also a natural mingling of the different ethnic groups with Ukraine SSR, which promoted the idea of a “Slavic brotherhood,” with Russia serving as protector over the two lesser groups of Ukrainians and Belarusians.\(^8^6\) This school promotes an eventual reunification of Ukraine with Russia and Belarus, and a return to the system of communism found in the USSR.\(^8^7\)

Ukraine’s Communist party, while not very successful in elections, or powerful in the Ukrainian government, promotes the Sovietphilosophic view. Most of the support for the Communist Party is from older citizens in the south and east of Ukraine, and the party has little or no support by younger Ukrainians.\(^8^8\) Supporters tend to look at the Soviet Union in terms nostalgia, citing polices of the Soviet Union were necessary and justified in order to fulfill the need to create a successful Soviet State.\(^8^9\) Many policies, including those under Josef Stalin, are rationalized in the name of progressive development of the Soviet people.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideological base of the Soviet School was severely


\(^8^6\) Taras Kuzio and Stephen Shulman

\(^8^7\) Taras Kuzio, “National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine,” 408.


marginalized. Historian Taras Kuzio points out, the Sovietphile school is “not a useable history for an independent state.”

Similar to the Sovietphile School, the Russophile School strives to promote a natural relationship with Russia and Belarus. The Russophile and Soviet Schools’ prominence during the USSR folded both Ukraine and Belarus’s histories into that of the larger history of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, thus impeding the study of Ukrainians, or Belarusians as separate groups. The school believes the union of the three countries is only natural because of their shared ethnic bonds, histories, language, and religion. There are no separate ethnic groups between Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, and the three independent states are atypical. Russophiles tend to believe that Russian is a “higher” language than Ukrainian, and more cosmopolitan than the more rural and “corrupted” Ukrainian language. Some in this school believe that Russification policies preserved the Ukrainian language from further corruption, and possible destruction, because of the similarities.

3.1.2 The Ukrainophile School

The Ukrainophile School emerged out of the nineteenth century nationalist movement and the Ukrainian diaspora. It is aligned with the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Prevalent in Ukrainian departments and research centers in the United States and Canada, it created an alternative to the Russophile and Soviet Schools’ historical viewpoint. The

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91 Taras Kuzio, ‘National Identities and History Writing in Ukraine,” 408.
93 Mykhailo Hrushevsky was a Ukrainian nationalist and historian who wrote multiple works on Ukrainian culture, history, literature and a ten volume work entitled, *The History of the Ukrainian-Rus*, one of the first works that puts the heirs to the Kyiv-Rus principedom as the Galician-Volnya State, creating a continuous history for the Ukrainian nation that dated back to the 9th century.
Ukrainophile School is viewed by the Soviet, Russophile, and Eastern Slavic Schools as nationalist and anti-Russian. The Ukranophile School promotes a specific agenda of Ukrainian history as separate from Russia’s, thus making Ukrainian history priority as a nation building tool.

During Viktor Yushchenko’s administration, the ideology of the school was endorsed by the Our Ukraine party and bloc, which promoted Ukraine’s relationship with the West and membership in the European Union and NATO. The bloc consisted of majority Ukrainian nationalist political parties, including the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. This bloc was most popular in central and western Ukraine, including Kyiv. They were often accused of promoting an aggressive Ukrainianization policy sought to marginalize the Russian speaking population. After the Orange Revolution, Our Ukraine united with Yulia Timoschenko’s bloc to establish the Orange Coalition. The bloc later collapsed because of political wrangling and ideological splits within the coalition in 2008. Timoschenko’s bloc is still intact, and enjoys most support from the west and center of the country.

3.1.3 Ukranianization

Ukrainization is a policy of promoting and facilitating the development of the Ukrainian language and culture in various areas of society, including education, government and commemoration efforts. Since the Russian language was favored in public life across much of Ukraine SSR over the long eras of Russian and Soviet domination, Ukrainianization

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96 “Poll: Political forces of Tigipko, Yatseniuk, Communist Party in Top 5 of April Rating of Parties,” *Kyiv Post*.
policies endorse Ukrainian as the sole language of the country. The Ukranophile School that promotes this agenda views Russia's historical influence on Ukraine negatively. Russians were accused of oppressing Ukrainian culture and language. The Russian language was artificially placed in a dominant position, thus creating a hierarchy based on language that extended to cultural and political norms. The assertion of the Ukrainian language and culture strove to give a voice to ethnic Ukrainian to “reclaim” their past. In doing so, they connected Communism and Soviet power with Russians inside and outside of Ukraine. This externalizing of Soviet and Russian culture and history from Ukraine serves to distinguish and promote ethnic Ukrainian history.

Part this separate Ukrainian and Russian identities also promote stereotypes within society. Ethnic Ukrainians that adopt the views of the Ukranophile School may view themselves as more “European” than Russians, freedom loving, and open minded, while Russians tend to be viewed as backwards, close-minded, anti-democratic, and “foreign.” Those in the Russophile School may view Ukrainians as amoral, selfish and somewhat nationalistic. Ethnic Russians in Ukraine may refuse to go along with Ukranization policies because they believe in the special bond between the groups. Russian is the language of the predominant majority of urban populations in the eastern, southern, and even some central regions, and is a part of the everyday culture, media and the printed press in major cities. Many people speak Russian as their mother tongue on an everyday basis, including those who identify themselves as Ukrainian. However, the push of Ukranization seeks to promote only one indigenous language of the country—Ukrainian.

98 Anna Fournier, 417.
99 “Ukranization: Issues and Arguments.”
100 Anna Fournier, 419.
3.1.4 The Eastern Slavic School

The centrist school is the Eastern Slavic School. This school’s lack of definable framework is somewhat problematic for scholars. The historian closely tied to this school is Petro Tolochko, director of the Institute of Archeology at the National Academy of Science in Kyiv. The Eastern Slavic School negotiates the middle ground by asserting that Ukrainians and Russians share similar and overlapping histories within the territory of modern day Ukraine. They believe that the Russian and Ukrainian languages are both national languages of the country because of this historical legacy, thus both should be recognized as official languages. They see Ukraine as the natural buffer between Europe and Russia, and many view the territory as home to multiple and fluid ethnic identities and reject any notion of Russia’s “elder brother” role.

The Party of Region advocates the creation of strong ties with Russia as natural ally in mutual regional cooperation. While most popular in the south and east of the country, members do not have a particular loyalty to Russia and consider themselves Russian speaking Ukrainians, and indigenous to the territory of Ukraine, however, external political loyalties regarding Ukrainian “special” relationship with Russia are another matter. The “Creoles,” as Yaroslav Hrytsak terms them, is a group that can be determined to fall into the Eastern Slavic School and possibly to support the Party of Regions. Hrytsak further elaborates on this hybrid union,

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102 Anna Fournier, 416.
103 “Poll: Political forces of Tigipko, Yatseniuk, Communist Party in Top 5 of April Rating of Parties, Kyiv Post."
The “Creoles” are responsible for the prevailing ambivalence in Ukrainian politics. Thus Ukraine claims to adhere to democratic values but remains highly authoritarian; it seeks to enter the European Union but maintains close ties with Russia, and so on and so forth.¹⁰⁴

Current president Viktor Yanukovych hails from the Party of Regions. Supporters of the party propose a language law that would include Russian as a state language alongside Ukrainian, and establishing Ukraine as a federation. They are often tied to the creation of regionalist ideology. Most of their support comes from middle aged Ukrainians and retirees, and residents of urban areas in the east and south.¹⁰⁵

### 3.2 Ancient Ties: The Kyiv Rus Debate

Since Ukraine’s independence, each of these groups claims a different historical claim concerning the “ancient” origins of the Kyiv Rus State. The Ukrainophile School believes Ukrainians are a separate ethnic group from Russians and Belarusians, while the Russophile School holds fast the idea that all Eastern Slavic groups were “born” out of the Kyiv Rus civilization. The legacy of the Kyiv Rus either shows continuity with Russians and Belarusians, or splits these three groups, depending on which group’s narrative is presented.

While mostly centered on an academic debate, claims by each of these groups are important to study as a precursor to the Holodomor debate, especially with reference to the Eastern Slav and Ukrainophile Schools. While the Eastern Slav School may not be popular in academia because of its “multiple allegiances,” the Party of Regions is one of the most powerful political parties in Ukraine. These academic debates and allegiances made by each group to Ukrainian history become important when discussing Holodomor remembrance under Viktor Yushchenko’s administration.

3.2.1 The Kyiv Rus: Russophile and Soviet Schools and the “Slavic Brotherhood”

For the Russophile and Soviet Schools, the Kyiv Rus’ legacy shows that Ukrainian nation did not desire an independent state, but rather a united nation with Russia and Belarus in an Eastern Slavic brotherhood. After the collapse of the Kyiv Rus State, there was a transfer of the culture of all three Slavic groups—Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian to Moscow, and the Russian Empire were tasked in preserving and guiding the members of this nation. This natural inclusiveness of this history was set into motion by the signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1694 \(^\text{106}\) that reunited these groups with the Russian crown.\(^\text{107}\) The Russophile School emphasizes that Ukrainians are regional branches of the Russian people, and only appear as a group after the collapse of the Kyiv Rus state in the fourteenth century. After this collapse, the Eastern Slavic people were unnaturally broken and scattered throughout the territory of eastern and central Europe. The integration into the Russian Empire was natural continuum and mended a broken bond between the groups.

3.2.2 The Kyiv Rus: Ukrainophile School and the Claim of Separateness

The Ukrainophile School in contrast, does not see an ethnic connection within the groups. The school also proposes that Ukrainians has better claim to the legacy of the Kyiv Rus state as a separate identity from other Eastern Slavic groups. Linguistically, they emphasize, Ukrainian is more similar to the language spoken in Kyiv up to the thirteenth century than Russian.\(^\text{108}\) They also challenge the notion of Moscow as the “cradle” of the

\(^{106}\) Council of Pereyaslav was a meeting between the representative of the Russian Tsar and Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the leader of Cossack Hetmanate. During the council Bohdan Khmelnitsky with his troops accepted the allegiance of the Tsardom of Russia.

\(^{107}\) Taras Kuzio, “Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of the Kyiv Rus in Ukraine,” 40.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.
Eastern Slavic people, arguing that Kyiv is almost two times older than Moscow, and therefore the legitimate heir to the Kyiv Rus state.\textsuperscript{109} In addition, the Ukrainophile School sees a continuance with the Kyiv Rus state and Christianity not in Moscow, but in the Galician-Volynian state, which was independent from Russia until the late eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{110} According to Ukrainophile historiography, this reunification that began with the Treaty of Pereyaslav between the groups was not sought, but rather forced upon them. The treaty’s consequences served to cut Ukrainians off from their ties with Roman Catholic Poland, bring them closer to the Orthodox Church, marginalized the Ukrainian language, reinstated serfdom, and was viewed as justification by the Russian Empire as bringing the Ukrainian people’s historical territory under the control of the Tsar. \textsuperscript{111} This hearkens back to the victimization narrative that is promoted in Ukrainophile historiography. The ethnic Ukrainian peasantry is forced to bow to an aggressive Russian empire, and later the Russophile Soviet Union. This type of narrative gives a historical legacy to Ukrainians as victims and Russians as perpetrators; while Ukrainians were a peaceful agrarian society, they were, by historical circumstance, at the mercy of the aggressive Russians and the changing tides of history.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} “Galician-Volynian State,” \textit{Encyclopedia of Ukraine}, http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages%5CG%5CA%5CGalicia6VolhyniaPrincipalityof.htm (accessed 05 May 2011). A state founded in 1199 by Roman Mstyslavych, the prince of Volhynia from 1170, who united Galicia and Volhynia under his rule. The Romanovych dynasty ruled the state until its demise in 1340. In the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, the territory was taken over by the Lithuanian kingdom, and later, was incorporated into the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state, until it was taken over by the 16\textsuperscript{th} century.
\textsuperscript{111} Taras Kuzio and Stephan Shulman.
3.2.3 The Kyiv Rus: The Eastern Slavic School: Navigating the Middle

The Eastern Slavic School remains the middle ground in the debate. Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians, were all culturally and linguistically influenced by the Kyiv Rus state. Starting in the thirteenth century, the three groups naturally drifted apart. This separation caused deviations in culture, language, and tradition. The Eastern Slav School seeks a history that recognizes the birthplace of the Kyiv Rus in Kyiv, but also wishes for the recognition of the three groups’ overlapping heritage. They believe all three groups are important in providing a historical narrative to the territory of present day Ukraine. They desire recognition of the Russian people’s cultural influence, and history in Ukraine through the Kyiv Rus ties.

The Kyiv Rus legend serves as an appropriate example of historical memory construction in Ukraine. Although the focus of this debate is more tied to academia, it offers a chance to look at the differing historical schools, and how the Kyiv Rus legacy plays into contemporary Ukrainian nation building and the viewpoints of differing groups in Ukraine. These competing historical schools are based heavily on regionalism and ethnic identity as a defining factor. These factors extend to the political landscape in Ukraine. Andriy Portnov remarks,

Thus, in present-day Ukraine, one can find, admire, or fear the coexistence of different and sometimes opposite, narratives of historical memory. Despite the evident lack of dialogue between them, and the regional asymmetries of memory, the very fact of the existence and public competition of several visions of the past marks the essential differences between Ukraine and its neighbors on both the western and eastern sides of its borders.112

While both the Soviet and Russophile Schools have been severally marginalized in the creation of a state narrative, the Ukrainophile School dominates this process. The Eastern Slavic School, because of its “multiple allegiances,” has not been as successful in constructing this national narrative.

In the next chapter, the Holodomor narrative and how it evolved in the nation building process in Ukraine will take center stage. Ukrainophile domination of this national construction influenced legislation, commemoration, as well as political, academic, and cultural life. The complications of historical narratives divergent of the Ukrainophile School called into question the claim of the Holodomor as an act of genocide, and the use of this narrative as a facet of Ukrainian identity by several groups, nationally and internationally. Several factors play into the questioning of Viktor Yushchenko’s administration elevating the Holodomor to the status of national narrative, including using such a tragic event to define a nation, and the nationalistic undertones of the project. History serves as a foundation for issues regarding language and culture. It is challenged by groups asserting their “historical claim” to Ukrainian history.
Chapter Four: The Long Shadow of the Holodomor

During his presidency, Viktor Yushchenko set out to convince Ukrainian citizens to accept the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people. Yushchenko believed that this internal recognition would aid in rectifying the disparate history of the Ukrainian citizenry, uniting them as one country. He also claimed that the search for truth was not aimed against other states or nations, “Revival of our heritage is not aimed against anyone. We don’t want to humiliate any of nations or states.”\(^{113}\) Those within Ukraine, as well as in Russia, did not take his words to be genuine. They accused the president of using the Holodomor to push a nationalistic agenda that sought to strengthen ties with the West and shake off the Russian government’s influence within the country. They were also weary that the President’s claims would subsequently create policies that marginalized the Russian population in Ukraine.

Viktor Yushchenko’s claim lay in studies conducted by mostly western historians during the Soviet regime. In Felix Wemheur’s article detailing the histories of Chinese\(^{114}\) and Ukrainian remembrances of their famines, he discusses the creation of the Holodomor narrative in the Ukrainian diaspora and how it later influenced an independent Ukraine,

The atmosphere of the Cold War and the discourse about the genocide thesis in North America influenced the new narrative of Ukraine, which is highly politicized and emotionalized. This discourse of victimization has succeeded in the creation of the


\(^{114}\) Felix Wemheur’s article compares the remembrance of the Ukrainian famine with that of the famine caused by Chairman Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” campaign. As with Stalin’s collectivization policies, Mao sought to create commune farms. At first, as with the Soviet Union, the government blamed the famine on natural condition such as drought conditions, for the famines of 1958-1961. Scholarship outside of China however, blames the policies to collectivize farms and new planting techniques for the deaths of between 20 and 43 million people.
national narrative because it was able to take up the communicative “underground memory” that survived during the Soviet era in the families and villages.  

Those in Ukraine during the Soviet period did not “forget” about the horrors of the famine, instead; they kept their accounts and memories of the event, hidden through the creation of an underground “personal memory,” which survived in the regions and villages affected by the famine. There was no official narrative in the Soviet Union of, or even an admittance that a famine raged in the Soviet Union, until the 1980. Even then, the famine was discussed in the terms of tragedy and rationalized as a casualty of Stalin’s ignorance of his collectivization policies.

“History wars”, Evgeny Finkle stresses, characterize the landscape of nation building after the collapse of the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe in many countries. The deconstruction of the Soviet past, the reclaiming of the stolen past, and the search for “truth” are regular topics discussed when post-Soviet countries seek to fill in the “blank spots” of history. This has also led to an eruption of genocide narratives, Finkle asserts, in countries including Georgia, the Baltic States, and Ukraine. These victim narratives have led to several international, as well as national issues within these countries, and are not immune to criticism and questioning by both the country’s citizenry, as well as the international community, specifically the Russian government that claim Russians are unjustly targeted as scapegoats. As discussed in previous chapters, Ukraine has not been immune to the internal rifts created by this nation building process. In reality, the situation in the country is one of the best examples of the complexities of nation building in the former Soviet Union.

116 Ibid., 37.
118 Ibid.
The “starving identity,” as several Russian journalists termed it, formed first in diaspora, and shaped the Yushchenko administration’s nation building agenda. The identity attempted to elevate the Holodomor as a defining narrative, while negating Ukraine’s complex past and continuing regional, ethnic, and linguistic differences. Ukraine is not a unique case, of course. Several examples in the post-Soviet and communist space include the creation of institutes of remembrance in countries such Poland and Georgia, and under the Yushchenko administration, in Ukraine. These institutions seek to find the “truth” out about Nazi and Soviet crimes committed in their countries. Governments established commemoration days throughout former communist countries to remember the victims of the regimes. By creating such remembrance based on victimhood, this template seeks to give legitimacy to the claim of these states as victims, to seek global recognition of their tragedies by international organizations and states, and perhaps, to seek legal action against their perpetrators through trials, legislation, and reparations. As Evgeny Finkle further assesses, even when these bids of genocide go unrecognized by the international community, the international community still must address the genocide claims, thus creating a “global discourse on that state.”

Ukraine’s independence brought about a need to define what the country was internally as well as to the international community. As Leniod Kuchma stated during his presidency, “We made Ukraine, now we need to make Ukrainians.” His words reflect a need to establish a collective narrative that would define those who reside in Ukraine under one history. In 2003, the Verkhovna Rada passed the first resolution since the independence of Ukraine, declaring the Holodomor was a deliberate act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. The resolution blamed Stalin and the Soviet government for organizing and executing

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119 On the third Saturday of November each year in Ukraine, citizens remember the victims of the Holodomor.
120 Evgeny Finkle, 56.
121 Ibid.
policies that would lead to the extermination of the Ukrainian peasantry.\textsuperscript{122} The same year, under president Kuchma, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry began a campaign for international recognition of the Holodomor as genocide in the United Nations. Twenty six states, including Russia, passed a declaration of defining the famine as a national tragedy that caused 7 to 10 million deaths in the Soviet Union, but stopped short of calling the famine genocide.\textsuperscript{123}

With the election of Viktor Yushchenko in 2004, the president launched the public campaign for remembrance, “Ukraine remembers, the World recognizes.”\textsuperscript{124} It was an intense lobbying effort undertaken by his administration to have international organizations, such as the European Union, United Nations, as well as other nations, including Israel,\textsuperscript{125} to recognize the Holodomor as genocide. Yushchenko continuously paralleled the Holodomor with the Holocaust in commemoration speeches given during his term as president and established 2008 as the “Year of Holodomor Remembrance in Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{126}

Viktor Yushchenko’s methods were questioned both internally and externally. Politicians charged he was insensitive to the history of the all of the Ukrainian people and did not account for the multiple ethnic groups in the country. Some academics applauded the release of Soviet archives, while other such as Timothy Snyder, questioned the methods of control that were chosen to interpret this memory.\textsuperscript{127} Still other episodes in his

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{122} The Holodomor law was passed 28 October 2006. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Website, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article%3Fart_id=72980&cat_id=32589 (accessed 10 May 2011).
\item\textsuperscript{123} Felix Wemheur, 48.
\item\textsuperscript{125} Israel does not recognize the Holodomor as genocide.
\end{itemize}
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administration led to debates on the political level. The creation of the Holodomor Denial Law (2006) courted controversy and further divided the nation because of its somewhat nationalist view of the Holodomor. Adding fuel the fire was the trial of Josef Stalin, under the guidance of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), which brought about criticism from Ukraine’s neighbor to the east, Russia. The Russian government was highly critical of Yushchenko’s nationalist policies and accused him on several occasions of trying to provoke a fight with the country.

4.1 Politicizing the Holodomor: Legislation under Viktor Yushchenko

Viktor Yushchenko’s push to have the Holodomor declared genocide strongly polarized the political parties and population in Ukraine. Yushchenko’s administration, and his majority coalition in the Verkhovna Rada, pressed forward with legislation that stated it was illegal to deny the Holodomor as genocide in Ukraine. Several political parties saw these policies as a purely nationalistic move, determined to marginalize Ukraine's ethnically Russian population. The Party of Regions believed that this declaration would create cleavages within Ukraine along territorial and ethnic lines.128

This resolution was controversial for several reasons. Opponents challenged the wording of the bill. The original and rejected bill stated, “An act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation,” while the passed resolution stated, “An act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.”129 The term nation as opposed to people is politically and ethnically loaded. Ukrainian nation seems to allude to only ethnic Ukrainians as victims, leaving ethnic

Russians as the “out group,” and possibly could be interpreted as the perpetrators. This use of exclusive nationalism seeks to elevate one group over the other, through culture, religion, or ethnicity, and to dominate the public sphere. Although ethnic Russians also were victims in the famine in Ukraine, and throughout the Soviet Union, the use of nation in the first draft of the bill can be evaluated as an attempt to exclude them from this collective historical narrative.

Article 1 of the resolution used terminology that criminalized the actions of the Soviet government, stating that the policies deliberately killed millions by starvation, thus blaming the famine not on a natural phenomenon, but rather Stalin’s policies. Although this type of resolution endorsed what had already been passed during Kuchma’s administration, Article 2 went much further, stating that public denial of the Holodomor was illegal. The original legislation also hinted that there would be an additional law to criminalize this denial, however that clause was omitted because of the controversy surrounding such an action.\textsuperscript{130} The resolution also cited the international recognition of the famine by several countries and the definition of genocide by the UNDHR. Furthermore, the victims of the famine were considered compatriots that sacrificed themselves for the “Ukrainian nation.”\textsuperscript{131}

The resolution’s passing did not come easily, however. Viktor Yanukovych and 200 members of the Verkhovna Rada, mostly hailing from the Russian speaking east and south, abstained from voting on the measure. They objected to the phrasing of the bill that described the Holodomor as genocide against Ukrainians and not a “tragedy of the Soviet people.” The abstaining members were a bit leery of using the words genocide, fearing it would drive a wedge between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Stanislav Kulchitsky, a professor of history, believed the legislation contained the correct phrasing and was appropriate to the

\textsuperscript{130} “Yushchenko Signs Holodomor Bill into Law,” Russia and CIS Presidential Bulletin, 29 November 2006.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
historic situation in Ukraine involving the Holodomor. He commented, “The mechanism was different in Ukraine. It was not industrialization or modernization; it was cold-blooded killing by hunger.” While Viktor Yanuchovych agreed that the famine was the cause of Soviet polices, him, along with many other believed, “It happened on the territories of many countries. Maybe in Ukraine it had a greater effect, as Ukraine is more agricultural country.” There was an obvious lack of a common identity between those who voted for the legislation and others who abstained along ethnic and territorial lines in the Verkhovna Rada. This did not faze Yushchenko, however; as he sought to create this narrative based on genocide, and furthered his pursuit of international recognition.

In 2007, president Yushchenko pushed for a law to criminalize the denial of the Holodomor and the Holocaust in Ukraine, and to add the amendment to the Criminal and Procedural Codes of Ukraine. The Law Enforcement Legislative Support Committee recommended it proceed to the Verkhovna Rada for consideration. The proposed law stated,

The public denial of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine as a genocide against the Ukrainian People and the Holocaust as a genocide against the Jewish people would impose a penalty of 100 to 300 time the untaxed minimum income level, or a custodial sentence for up to two years, for the public denial of the fact of the Holodomor in Ukraine as genocide against the Ukrainian people and the Holocaust as genocide against the Jewish people, and for preparing and dissemination of materials containing such denial.

The offenses were deemed prosecutorial by the SBU. Yushchenko further added that the passage of such a law would “comply with the European democratic standards and further promote Ukraine’s prestige in the world.” This sparked outrage on several levels. The obvious outrage came from the media, especially those who were critical of Yushchenko’s policies because they believed this was an attack on their right to free speech. Journalists, academics, politicians, and even ordinary citizen’s opinions were endangered. The wording

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133 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
within the legislation was broad enough to be interpreted several ways, as “Holodomor denial” was not clearly defined. The attack on civil liberties was somewhat rationalized by Volodymr Moisyk, a Ukrainian Supreme Court judge. He believed the legislation to be in total compatibility with the Ukrainian Constitution, whereas national security superseded the need for free speech. Denying the Holodomor as genocide was a threat to national security—it was as simple as that.

He further compares the Holocaust denial laws in ten European countries, where it is criminally liable to deny the Holocaust. While there may be a need for such laws to exist in reference to the Holocaust because of the absurd claims of Holocaust revisionists, this “denial law” seems more grounded in the Yushchenko’s administration attempt to silence those that may not believe the Holodomor was an “exclusive” Ukrainian event, but rather a large scale famine that was caused by totalitarian policies of Stalin. These beliefs are more in line with democide rather than genocide. Some, such as Petro Symoneko, head of the Communist Party during Yushchenko’s presidency, believed there was “not any deliberate starvation,” but he is in the minority. Stalin’s plans were to “break” populations that showed resistance to collectivization, by any means necessary.

The passing of this law also contradicts the reasons behind opening up of Soviet archives by the SBU in the “search for truth.” One view of the famine, and of Yushchenko’s polices, was presented by Pyotr Romanov in an article in *Rianovosti*. Written in December 2008, he discusses the politicizing of the famine narrative by Yushchenko:

Doubtless, the 1932-1933 Holodomor is a terrible tragedy; and the memory of its victims deserves every respect. I have read the speeches of President Yushchenko and the law on Holodomor and I agree with many aspects. However I cannot agree when the discussion of Holodomor involves time-serving political consideration and unsophisticated, albeit bellicose radical Ukrainian nationalism. This mixture of sincere human suffering, outright politicking and uneducated hostility is the most deplorable aspect of the discussion.\(^\text{136}\)

Russian President Medvedev commented,

> It just so happens that those who disagree with the law will fall under criminal persecution, like it used to be during the totalitarian era, further citing the use of the Holodomor to test out patriotism and loyalty and to achieve certain political goals, while at the same time accusing the country of trying to separate itself from Russia, a country that Ukraine has been united with for centuries.

Medvedev further stated that laws would never be able to provide historical justice, or pay tribute to the victims of the famine.\(^{137}\) One political analyst in Ukraine, Viktor Pirozhenko, criticized the administration for framing policies that “favor ethnic Ukrainians…reviving neo-Nazism in the country and falsifying history.” He commented, “This perception of the famine was meant to motivate nationalists. Its negative aspect was used as a weapon to point the finger at Moscow. It was caused by the Kremlin’s policies way back then, and it concerned the whole of Soviet Union.”\(^{138}\) Pirozhenko claimed he was harassed by the SBU on several occasions at his workplace at the Kyiv-based CIS institution after he wrote an article questioning Yushchenko’s motives in Holodomor policies. He argued that the policies were nationalistic and gave a false view of history, as well as favor ethnic Ukrainians.\(^{139}\)

Others also criticized Yushchenko’s initiatives, arguing that the Soviet policies during the famine were implemented by Ukrainians within the Soviet government; therefore the Holodomor cannot be recognized as genocide.\(^{140}\) Sergey Shvedko, an editor for the eastern Ukrainian newspaper *Rodne Priazovye*, questioned the administration’s assertion that the famine was genocide and would have faced possible jail time under the *proposed* amendment

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\(^{139}\) Ibid.

\(^{140}\) Ibid.
to the criminal code of Ukraine, which criminalizing Holocaust and Holodomor denial. 141

Shvedko states in his defense:

I fully agree that famine rocked many parts of the Soviet Union and it was caused by criminal negligence of the country’s leadership. What I don’t agree with is that it was directed solely against Ukrainians. I base this thinking on international law and historic facts.142

He further claimed Yushchenko’s policies of creating this national Holodomor narrative were creating rifts in Ukrainian society and politics along ethnic and territorial lines. Shvedko was sued under the controversial Holodomor Law (2006) by Ukrainian businessman and Our Ukraine Donetsk district branch head, Vasily Kovalenko, for his stance on the famine. Kovalenko reasoned that Shvedko’s article questioning the exclusivity of the famine to Ukrainians was “criminal[ly] negligent,” because it “humiliated national dignity and insulted the memory of Holodomor victims.”143 He further stated, “My demands are backed up by Article 1 of the 1932-1933 Holodomor law that recognizes the famine to be genocide against the Ukrainian people and Article 2 qualifying denial of the Holodomor to be genocide and a violation of law.”144 Shvedko pointed out in his defense that Article 2 designates that denial of the fact of Holodomor unlawful, not denial that it was genocide.

The Donetsk court that heard the arguments refused to grant the private lawsuit. They believed Shvedko did not violate the law by expressing his opinion. Shvedko commented on the court’s decision after the dismissal, “The fact that the court sided with the journalist who voiced his civil position confirms once again that in a democratic state, viewpoints and thoughts of a person cannot be an illegal act regardless of how much certain forces would

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141 The legislation criminalizing “Holodomor and Holocaust denial” did not make it to the Verkhovna Rada for a vote.
144 Ibid.
Several human rights organizations in Ukraine, and internationally, applauded the decision by the court. They also noted that the lawsuit should not have been brought to consideration in the first place because the law works to restrict an individual’s freedom of speech and is especially dangerous for journalists. The lawsuit brought by Kovalenko against Shvedko shows the polarizing effect that the Holodomor narrative had on Ukraine along political lines. Furthermore, it questions the motives of the Yushchenko administration in the creation of this law that hindered the rights of journalists to express their opinions. Perhaps this was a litmus test for all parties involved to see how effective this law was. The outcome, while it may have tested the boundaries of the law, was a victory for journalists and a defeat for Yushchenko’s policies.

4.2 Top Down Nationalism: The Release of Soviet Documents and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory

In January of 2009, the SBU declassified about 800,000 of pages of documents from the Soviet era (1917-1989) including personal testimonies, trials, and other government documents detailing policies under the Soviet regime. Yushchenko hoped that by releasing the documents, this would renew the fight to gain recognition of the Holodomor as genocide in the international community. Opposition to the opening of the documents was very little, but those who did question the opening feared it was another ploy by the administration to

convey a one-sided nationalist history and would create further tension with Russia and the Russian speaking population in Ukraine. Since the SBU was in charge of what documents to release, some believed they would omit documents that may not support Yushchenko’s Holodomor position. Control of the catalogue of documents was supposed to be transferred from the SBU to the planned Ukrainian Institute for National Memory, but this never happened.148

Modeled after the Polish Institute of National Remembrance,149 the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was headed by one of Viktor Yushchenko’s allies, Ihor Yukhnovskyy,150 and sought to study the Soviet regime in Ukraine, with specific emphasis on the Holodomor. Unlike similar institutes in eastern and central Europe, the Ukrainian institute would not be headed by an independent authority, such as with the case in Poland, but rather

148 Andriy Portnov, “Post-Soviet Ukraine Dealing with its Controversial Past,” 154. “The archives of the Soviet secret service were never removed from their Ukrainian heirs (SBU) to the special archive under the Institute for National Memory. A draft law was written that would have provided for such a transfer but it was never even debated in Parliament.”

149 The Polish Institute of National Remembrance Website, http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/en/1/2/Institute_of_National_Remembrance__Commission_for_the_Prosecution_of_Crimes_agai.html (accessed 17 May 2011). The Institute of National Remembrance was created to address issues which are considered essential to the legislative power in Poland, primarily to preserve the memory of:

1. The losses which were suffered by the Polish Nation as a result of the World War II and the post-war period;
2. Patriotic traditions of fighting against occupants, Nazism and Communism;
3. Citizens' efforts to fight for an independent Polish State, in defense of freedom and human dignity;

and to fulfill:

1. The duty to prosecute crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes;
2. The need to compensate for damages which were suffered by the repressed and harmed people in the times when human rights were violated by the state. This is the expression of belief that no unlawful deeds of the state against its citizens can be protected by secrecy or forgotten.

150 “Ukrainian Scholar to head National Remembrance Institute,” BBC Monitoring, Kyiv.
by the Ukrainian government.\textsuperscript{151} This project was part of a larger remembrance project that included a Candle of Memory Monument.\textsuperscript{152} The institute was promoted as a “world class historical complex including a large museum, research center for scholars, library and archive space and electronic databases, attesting to the tragedy of the Ukrainian people.”\textsuperscript{153} International leaders urged the government to build the institute first, then the monument because of the value of the research that an institute would allow. The reverse happened, however, and the monument was completed in 2008. There had yet to be blueprints created for the institute’s design.

While the complex had yet to be built, the monument was dedicated on 22 November 2008, where Yushchenko again pleaded with the Ukrainian nation to “come to terms” with the Holodomor in order to move as one united Ukraine.\textsuperscript{154} In his speech, he stated his reasons behind his quest:

> It will be a resurrection of our memory, purification from lies and filth. It is to be pure and honest work—only such work can help bring a just national order and decent living condition in Ukraine. We must dress Ukraine in a neat shirt and remove the symbols of totalitarianism from her body.\textsuperscript{155}

This continued “resurrection of Ukrainian memory” would take another dramatic turn with the Josef Stalin’s trial in early 2010.

\textsuperscript{151} The Institute of National Remembrance in Poland is headed by a president for a five year term, independent from the government of Poland.

\textsuperscript{152} Svitlana Korenovska and Morgan Williams, “Candle of Memory: Ambitious Holodomor Project,” Unian 11 October 2008, http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-283587.html (accessed 10 November 2010). “Located in the Park of Eternal Glory with the Alley of Heroes, the monument is an artistically stylized candle-like structure with a flame on top. There are also two angels on both sides of the passage leading to the memorial.”

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Pirozhenko calls a huge Holodomor monument erected in the center of Kiev a multi-million dollar mistake.

4.3 Digging up the Ghosts of the Past: Stalin’s Trial

The Yushchenko administration continued its push to declare the Holodomor genocide under the condition of the UNDR and tried Josef Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Stanislav Kosior, Vlas Chubar, Mendel Khatayevych in a Kyiv court in January of 2010, where they were found guilty. Yushchenko’s choice of a trial was a move by his administration to take the Holodomor out of the political realm and put it into the legal arena in hopes that a guilty verdict would legitimize the claim that the Holodomor was intended genocide.

The trial infuriated the Russian government. Boris Gryzol, the Speaker of Russia’s Duma, expressed outrage over the proceedings stating, “The idea of Holodomor and the idea of Soviet genocide against the Ukrainian people in the 1930s is absolutely groundless,” adding that Yushchenko was trying to pick a fight with Russia in order to court votes for the upcoming presidential election. The Russian government has admitted that the mass famine was caused by the actions of the state and that Stalin’s collectivization policies were to blame for the famine throughout the Soviet Union from 1932-33, but has always denied it was a deliberate genocide.

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159 Ibid.
Preparation for the trial began with the opening of the archives by the SBU in 2009. In the spring of 2009, the SBU’s head, Valentyn Nalyvaychenko, met with representatives from the World Congress of Ukrainians (UWC) to discuss the future trial of the six men. With the opening of the archives, Nalyvaychenko stressed, “Ukraine now has collected enough evidence to bring a criminal case on the fact of the famine, which was artificially created by the Bolshevik regime and cause mass death of citizens.”\textsuperscript{160} Representatives from the UWC were present to help prepare the evidence for trial. The executive secretary of UWC, Stephan Romaniv, believed that this was a progressive move towards establishing historical justice.\textsuperscript{161} By December of 2009, Yushchenko reported to the press that the SBU had almost completed its investigation into the Holodomor, and would be turning over its evidence to the Prosecutor General’s office shortly thereafter for trial.\textsuperscript{162} Some of the evidence against Stalin and others, according to Nalyvaychenko, included the presence of special military army unites. Descriptions of localities within Ukraine to target, the use of “black boards,”\textsuperscript{163} planned blockades aimed at certain areas in Ukraine, detailed plans of seizures of grain and other food that was subsequently sent to Italy, Egypt, Greece and France, as well as a restriction of free movement of the peasantry.\textsuperscript{164} A lot of these documents, he argued, held Stalin’s signature:

\begin{quote}
The material and the verdict of guilty begins with Stalin. His surname is mentioned there, and his personal signature and personal secret instructions, and everything related to the preparation for committing genocide in our territory and the crime itself and its commitment from January 1933 till June 1933… In the course of the investigation, Ukraine received absolute evidences of committing crimes against
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{160} “SBU Brought Criminal Case on the Fact of Committing Genocide in Ukraine.”
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
humanity by the USSR top officials. Genocide in Ukraine in 1932-33 is proved by 3,685 Soviet classified documents, including with Joseph Stalin’s signature, and many other papers, as well as 933 mass burial places of genocide victims.165

According Nalyvaychenko, the documents were also sent to international courts and organizations.166 The SBU director also stated that in order to collect proofs of genocide of Ukrainians in other countries during the famine, the SBU investigators have submitted petitions on retaining legal assistance from law enforcement agencies of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Italy, the United States, Germany, Austria and Poland to bolster the case against the men.167

The trial kicked off in January 2010, during the last breaths of Yushchenko’s presidency. The deliberators, consisting of a SBU officer, a prosecutor and a judge. After all the evidence was presented the verdict took a mere two and a half hours to deliberate.168 They met in secret and discussed their findings only after they reached their verdict. The men found all those on trial guilty of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Viktor Yushchenko praised this verdict as “symbolic.”169 “This decision restores the historical truth and gives a chance to build Ukraine on fair and democratic principles”, he further added.170 Since the defendants were all dead, the court could not pass a sentence on them, but noted that this decision was strictly legal and not of a political dimension.171 The court also cited the UNDHR as a guideline for their verdict. They further justified the trial because under

165 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
UNDRH, there is no time limit on when charges can be brought against individuals accused of human rights violations.\textsuperscript{172}

Historian Timothy Snyder however, criticized Yushchenko’s use of a “modern troika” to deliberate this verdict and believed this tactic “summon[ed] the spirit of Stalinism that it was meant to dispel.”\textsuperscript{173} Snyder suggested that historical study would better be served if Ukraine and other former Soviet governments cooperated through sharing archival resources and participated in joint research, rather than conducting such trials that hearkened back to tactics used by the Soviet regime. The verdict came out four days before the first round of presidential elections. Yushchenko had come in fifth in the primary and had not qualified for the general election. Perhaps Yushchenko thought the trial would bolster his sagging poll numbers, but by January 2010 it was a moot point. A better option may have been to ask an international tribunal to look at the evidence rather than keeping the “trial” localized, as Snyder suggested. This may have help to bolster the claims of genocide in the international community. By keeping it in Ukraine, and putting the SBU, the inheritor of the KGB in charge almost mineralized the impact of such a trial.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
Conclusion

The myriad of actors involved in the debate over Ukrainian identity and the Holodomor consists of a complex cast. It includes the Ukrainian diaspora, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians within Ukraine, international organizations and states, scholars, and politicians, all of which sought to influence the construction of Ukrainian state identity. This thesis narrows the study of the construction of Holodomor memory by focusing the diaspora’s building of the narrative as well as on several examples of President Viktor Yushchenko’s administration, which endorsed this identity in an attempt to create a national Holodomor narrative. The thesis also looked at the promotion of the Holodomor as genocide by both the diaspora and Viktor Yushchenko, exploring the case for, and against deeming the Holodomor genocide against the Ukrainian peasantry.

Ukrainians outside of Ukraine constructed the victim narrative and fought to have the Holodomor classified as genocide by the international community. This exclusive national identity was employed to set Ukrainians apart from Russians through language, culture, historical roots of the Kyiv Rus state, and ultimately, through the narrative of the Holodomor. The Ukrainian diaspora sought to externalize Soviet and Russophile history, and create an identity for the exiled Ukrainians by advancing the study of the suffering of “their people” under the Soviet regime. By creating such a narrative, Ukrainians in the diaspora were able to paint a black and white picture of victim and perpetrator, and ultimately, did not have to account for their own complex and controversial pasts.

With the independence of Ukraine, the diaspora expected, and perhaps thought they deserved, a place at the table in the Ukrainian nation building process. To their surprise, however, their aid was met with a mixture of acceptance and scoff. Nationalists welcomed
their view of Ukrainian history that carried on an identity through the Soviet Union and they picked up the victim narrative as if it was their own. Ethnic Russians in Ukraine, however, thought this was an attempt to marginalize them as a group. In an article from *The Economist* dated from January 2001, the trials of the diaspora and their relationship with Ukraine are highlighted, and show this struggle over Ukrainian identity is an evolving and ever present issue,

The real problem is a completely different view of history. Most diaspora activists are from western Ukraine, swallowed by the Soviet Union only in 1939. Some people there decided that the Nazis were the lesser of two evils and fought alongside them; almost all are fiercely anti-communist. Guerrilla warfare carried on until the 1950s. The rest of the country, by contrast, is more nostalgic for the Soviet Union, and less anti-Russian—despite Stalin’s artificial famine, which killed millions in the 1930s. Ukraine’s independence brought about a shift in historical memory and the need to rewrite a national narrative. Various policies under Viktor Yushchenko’s leadership were implemented to create this new internal narrative that adopted the diaspora’s account as its blueprint.

Memory never stands alone, and by showing a current of victimization throughout their history, groups can present themselves as “righteous,” while others may be perceived as “evil.” The restoration and commemoration of the suffering that Ukrainians endured under Stalin’s regime was a crucial part of this memory building process.

The past returns, not as a sum of facts, but as a construct based on the narrative that reflects the group’s preferences and contemporary values. The creation of a national identification based upon a traumatic narrative is a difficult task to undertake for any group. In Ukraine, this narrative was further complicated by differing schools of history, political

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174 “Ukraine’s Diaspora Blues,” *The Economist.*  
affiliations, ethnic, linguistic, and territorial allegiances, which were not prone to accept the Holodomor as genocide and rejected Yushchenko’s policies that sought to squash this account. The question remains of why did Viktor Yushchenko push so diligently for the Holodomor to be recognized as genocide? Holodomor legislation used strong language that was bound to cause ethnic schisms and create ethnic Russians as an out group, even though Yushchenko denied any such intention. Furthermore, the attempted passage of legislation to make Holodomor denial illegal went against democratic principles that Ukraine has struggled to instill in its government since independence. It constituted a slap in the face for freedom of speech and was too easily justified by paralleling Holodomor denial and Holocaust denial laws in other European states.

The opening of the archives and the creation of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory brought hope and excitement to scholars eager to delve into the newly available resources, however, the legislation supported by Yushchenko all but negates the creation of meaningful scholarly debate and research into the issue. One sided versions of events seemed to belittle the “search for truth” and Ukrainian unity that Yushchenko encouraged. Furthermore, the direction of the research had already been established by the Yushchenko administration long before the release of the Soviet documents. There is enough research to conclude that the famine was part of Stalin’s terror policies, but to a degree that the Ukrainian population was ‘targeted’ is still up for a debate, considering the destructiveness of Stalin’s collectivization policies during 1932-33. There must be recognition of other affected by this tragedy.

177 In December 2010, the Council of Europe stopped short of describing the Holodomor as genocide; but it condemned the actions of Stalin and the Soviet government. As of 2011, The United Nations still has not recognized the Holodomor as genocide; however, the General Assembly passed a declaration that provides some important language regarding the famine. It attributes the famine to “the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime” and estimates the death-toll at seven to ten million.
Viktor Yushchenko did not construct the Holodomor narrative, but his efforts to bring to the forefront an already contentious issue led to further cleavages within Ukraine. This process was supposed to create reconciliation with the past and historic injustices but instead, it created more questions than answers and more separation than understanding. Ukrainian historian, Georgiy Kasianov, questioned Yushchenko’s use of the Holodomor in creating an identity: “Why did they choose the Holodomor? I agree it was a tragedy, it was bad…and it needs to be remembered. But to make it your central national symbol? To tell about how people ate their children? To tell about how you were destroyed and you just sat there passively and didn’t resist? Is that really how you’re going to create a citizenry?”

Others thought that accepting the Holodomor as genocide went a few steps too far. Ukrainophile historiography was created to combat Soviet and Russophile historiography in an era where the west was demonizing the Soviet Union and vice versa. This Ukrainophile view of history, as with the Soviet and Russophile views, is outdated and no longer is work in the present, especially the USSR a defunct state.

There is also much more to Ukrainian identity than the Holodomor. The focus should be on building a national historical narrative that uses the distinct language and culture of the all groups within Ukraine, as well as giving due recognition to the tragedy of the Holodomor. If all segments of this history are not represented, as seen in this case, the potential for a schism within the communities is inevitable. These blank spots of history should be filled in, but this should be done through open rational discussion and not through poorly constructed nationalistic “hot headedness.”

It is the sense of being a part of a group with a common past that creates a national story for citizens of a state to claim as their history. Memory, history, and nationalism are all

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powerful forces that shape this collective psyche of a group. These forces can come together to bind a society, but they can also create tears in this collective fabric of the country as well. The fate of every nation-building project is dubious until there are clear and straightforward terms with which the majority of the populations agrees. This nation building project under Yushchenko did not create a defining narrative for the Ukrainian citizenry. Although Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine do have a shared and overlapping identity and history, the politics behind the administration’s policies seemed to take center stage and marginalized the actual task at hand—that of nation building. “A community”, as Alan Finlayson notes, “is a group of people who draw on the same set of resources when articulating their sense of identity.”179 This attempt to create a community united by a common sense of identity through the creation of Yushchenko’s Holodomor policies seemed to further divide Ukraine rather than unite them as one.

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