SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION: STRENGTHENING IDENTITY THROUGH WORDS AND IMAGES. THE CASE OF CHINESE MIGRATION TO RUSSIA

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ABSTRACT

A few decades ago the concept of security was focused only on the traditional military threats to the states’ security. However, with the end of the Cold War, the debate of what is to be secured has broadened. In the beginning of the 1990s, Ole Weaver et al, also known as the Copenhagen School, challenged the traditional understanding of the external military threat as the only threat to the state’s security, by arguing that there is a need it to be broadened since, beside the military threats to the state’s security, there are also non-military threats which threaten the state’s security, such as economic, political, societal and environmental threats. That is how scholars and statesmen started to focus their attention not only on external military threats but also on non-military ones. In the present thesis I will apply the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework and some of its critiques in terms of the content and aims of the securitizing move in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the securitization of the Chinese migration to Russia. My findings conclude that the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, although useful in analyzing the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia, displays some narrowness in terms of its understanding of the securitizing move as the latter, as Williams already has noticed, is not only conducted through speech acts but also through the use of images which are aimed to empower the speech act. I also make an attempt for a further contribution to the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization, as the analysis of my case study proves the plausibility of my proposition that by opposing the “Self” to the “Other” collective identity in order to present the “Other” as a societal threat, the securitizing move, beside aiming to receive public support for securitizing the societal threat, also indirectly aims to strengthen the collective identity of the host society.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 1 EXPLAINING THE SECURITY-MIGRATION NEXUS............................... 8
  1.1 SECURITY ...................................................................................................................... 8
  1.2 COPENHAGEN SCHOOL OF SECURITY STUDIES...................................................... 9
     1.2.1 Securitization Theory ........................................................................................... 11

CHAPTER 2 SECURITIZATION OF CHINESE MIGRATION TO RUSSIA: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIZATION THEORY ........................................................................................................ 15
  2.1 SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION TO RUSSIA. LEGISLATION............................. 15
  2.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITIZING AGENTS...................................................... 20
  2.3 SECURITIZING MOVES - SPEECH ACTS ANALYSIS................................................. 21
     2.3.1 Officials ................................................................................................................... 22
     2.3.2 Portraying a Threat: Role of Media and Images ................................................... 25
  2.4 AUDIENCE.................................................................................................................... 31
  2.5 ASSESSING THE CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHINESE MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA................................................................. 37

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................... 42

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 44

APPENDIX....................................................................................................................... 48

Table of Figures:

Figure 1. The structure of employment of Chinese citizens in the Far East
Figure 2. Timeline, Legislative Indicator of securitization, 2000-2008
Figure 3. Public opinion on migration law
Figure 4. Public opinion before and after the securitization measure to take place
Figure 5. Support for the idea “Russia for Russians”
Figure 6. Public attitudes towards Chinese migrants in Russia
Figure 7 Perception of Chinese migrants in Russia. Current trends.
INTRODUCTION

...From the Altai to Malaysian shores
The leaders of Eastern isles
Have gathered a host of regiments
By China’s defeated walls.

Countless as locusts
And as ravenous,
Shielded by an unearthly power
The tribes move north.

O Rus'! Forget your former glory:
The two-headed eagle is ravaged,
And your tattered banners passed
Like toys among yellow children¹…
(V.S. Soloviev, 1 October 1894)

Chinese migration in Russia is highly discussed among politicians, scholars, media and society. Since the early 1990s alleged Chinese “invasion” became a hot topic for media and political discourse². During Putin’s presidency the issue has been widespread at the highest levels.³ Contradictory assessments of demographic, economic and socio-political implications of expanding Chinese presence in the country as well as policies on immigration into the country of Chinese citizens for the future development of Russia is constantly in the field of view of researchers and occasionally becomes the subject of acute socio-political debate. Despite the fact that Chinese migration comprises insignificant percentage of the whole migrant influx, the psychological meaning for Russian society which they pose is considerable. Currently, in the Russian society the fear of expansion of the Chinese migration continues to exist (as will be shown in my survey later on). The main threat posed by migrants, is seen in real or potential violation of the balance (demographic, cultural, criminal, economic).

³ Maria Repnikova, Harley Balzer “Chinese migration to Russia: Missed opportunities,” Eurasian Migration Papers, Number 3, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, p.9
Studies of Chinese migration to Russia have been concentrated mainly on the issues of demography, identity and security. Mikhail Alexeev looked at Chinese migration to Russia from the prospect of the security dilemma which has been incited by the immigration phobia of Russian society.\textsuperscript{4} Zayonchkovskaya analyzes the issue of Chinese migration from a demographic perspective and argues that the People’s Republic of China has a huge migration potential, the realization of which occurs in conditions of market transformation, leading not only to the internal displacement of population, but is accompanied by its noticeable migration outflow from the country.\textsuperscript{5} Villi Gelbras emphasized on the fact that due to the high incidence of various types of trade and labor of Chinese citizens, economic migration from China already has a growing influence on Russia’s regional labor markets.\textsuperscript{6} Larin attempted to look at the historical context of Chinese migration to Russia. Moreover, he goes further and provides the analysis the Chinese migration to Russia form the prospect of investigation of intentions of Chinese migrants to remain in Russia for the long term and thus portrayed typical Chinese migrant in Russia.\textsuperscript{7} Elizabeth Wishnick attempted to examine the Chinese migration to Russia in terms of securitization/desecuritization dynamics elaborated by the Copenhagen School.\textsuperscript{8} However, the issue has not been researched through the lenses of the securitization framework, proposed by the Copenhagen School in terms of analyzing the process of securitization of Chinese migration to Russia, with particular focus on the content of the securitizing move by analyzing the speech act and images, employed by the

\textsuperscript{5} Zh. Zayonchkovskaya “Chinese Immigration to Russia in the Context of the Demographic Situation”, http://gsti.miis.edu/CEAS-PUB/Zayonchkovskaya20030914.pdf, p.1
\textsuperscript{7} A.G. Larin “Kitaiskie migranty v Rossii. Istoriya I sovremennost” |Chinese Migration in Russia. History and Modernity|Vostochnaya Kniga, Moscow, 2009, pp.512
securitizing actors. I suppose that this prospect can provide a fruitful contribution to the existing literature on Chinese migration to Russia.

The prominence of migration as a security threat has been developed in the framework of the securitization theory, which has its roots in the works of Ole Waever and his associates from the so-called Copenhagen School. Scholars have referred to it as the securitization of migration.\(^9\) According to the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, labeling something as a security issue provides it with a sense of importance that legitimizes the right to use extraordinary means to deal with it.\(^10\) The Copenhagen School argues that in order an issue to become securitized, there is a need of securitizing actor which to make a securitizing move by rhetorically presenting something as a threat to the security of an audience (referent object) so that to receive the approval of the audience to securitize a given issue by adopting special measures (beyond normal politics) through which to tackle it. The securitizing move, the Copenhagen School argues, can be regarded as successful only when it succeeds to reach its aim of convincing the audience to approve the proposed securitizing measures and adopts the securitizing measures themselves.

However, as such presented, the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework appears to have some limitations, due to which it was an object of numerous critiques. For example, Williams has argued that the securitizing move is not conducted only through rhetoric (speech act) but also by supporting the speech act with images. Another limitation of the Securitization framework, as presented by the Copenhagen School, can be found in the fact that the securitizing move is only presented as aiming to receive the approval of the referent object for undertaking urgent measures to tackle an issue and their actual adoption.

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However, it must be noted that when the migration is presented as a societal threat, the securitizing move draws on opposing the marks of the host society’s “self” collective identity to those of the “others’”, the migrants’ collective identity. As Stivachtis notes:

“Groups identify themselves in two different ways. First, they may identify themselves with reference to certain qualities and characteristics they share (common origin, language, history, religion, customs, etc. This may be called “positive identification”. Second, human collectivities may identify themselves with reference to what they are not (negative identification) or in opposition to another group (the “Other”).”

Therefore, based on Stivachtis’ argument I derive the proposition that by emphasizing on the “otherness” which the migrants’ collective identity represents and by opposing it to the host society’s collective identity, the securitizing move, besides aiming to receive the approval of the audience for securitizing the migration issue, as proposed by the Copenhagen School, also indirectly aims to strengthen the collective identity of the host society, or this is the proposed from Stivachtis, “negative identification.”

In order to assess the plausibility of the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework and the above mentioned two critical points regarding the Copenhagen School’s understanding of the securitizing move in terms of its content and aims, I will apply the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework and its two critics in analyzing the process of securitization of Chinese migration to Russia. The choice of analyzing particularly the case of the securitization of the Chinese migration to Russia is based on the fact that the latter has not been researched through the lenses of the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework and more particularly, in terms the content of the securitizing move and the impact on the latter on the host society’s collective identity. The choice the current research’s main focus to be particularly the Chinese migration, I would justify by drawing on the fact that the Chinese migrants’ collective identity considerably differs from the Russian collective identity and

therefore, by analyzing the way in which the Chinese migrants are presented by the securitizing agents in terms of rhetoric and images and by defining whether these words and images had a strengthening impact on the Russian collective identity (negative identification), I will be able to test the plausibility of the derived above proposition that the labeling of the migrants, in the preset case, the Chinese migrants, as posing a societal threat to the Russian society, the securitizing move beside aiming to securitize an issue, also indirectly aims to strengthen the host society’s collective identity by opposing it to the identity of the “other”, the Chinese migrant. Therefore, the contribution which the present thesis aims to make is twofold. First, it will provide a comprehensive research of the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia based on the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, with particular focus on the content of the securitizing move by analyzing the speech act and images, employed by the securitizing actors. And the second contribution of this research is in terms of defining the impact of rhetoric and images for achieving the aims of the securitizing move: receiving approval for securitizing the Chinese migration and strengthening the Russian collective identity.

My thesis will proceed as follows. In the first chapter, I will provide an outline of the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework and some of its critiques. In the second chapter, I will analyze the process of securitization of Chinese migration to Russia by applying the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, as special attention will be devoted to the content of the securitizing move in terms of speeches and images, also I will attempt to define whether the securitizing move had a strengthening impact on the Russian collective identity. In the concluding part, I will summarize my findings and propose a further area of research.
Methodology

In this thesis I employ the following methodology. For the investigation of the construction of the “Other” in the media I chose content analysis as a research method due to following reasons: it is defined as more objective technique of quantitative research,\textsuperscript{12} and it is considered highly helpful in analysis of racial and ethnic minorities in media and presenting stereotypical role portrayals,\textsuperscript{13} it allows implementation of both quantitative and qualitative methods as well as “it looks directly at communication via texts or transcripts, and hence gets at the central aspect of social interaction and provides valuable historical/cultural insights over time through analysis of texts.”\textsuperscript{14} The usage of content analysis technique is of high importance in the research of the ways of construction of “the Other” as well as understanding of “the Otherness” since it provides insights into language use in mass media, therefore the language used in mass media creates stereotypical portrayal of the migrants and migration in general.

For the purpose of analysis of the acceptance (or not) of the securitizing move by the audience I employ the opinion polls of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center as a primary sources. The international Migration Law Database of the International Organization for Migration serves as a primary source in analysis of the migration legislation in Russia, which will allow investigating whether migration in Russia is securitized.

For the purpose of bringing the recent data on perceptions of Chinese migrants in Russian society I used Web-based survey mode, since I found it for the most appropriate. I believe that Web survey has advantages over other methods in my particular case, because it

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 202-203
\textsuperscript{14} “Content Analysis,” Colorado State University, \url{http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/com2d2.cfm} (Accessed on 10/05/2010)
can be considered as most appropriate for the needs of my study, more explicitly it will allow me to draw the picture of the current trend of perceptions of Chinese migrants in Russian society. Among the reasons of the choice of the Web-based survey can be considered cost-effectiveness, time-limit, high response rate, elimination of observer’s subjectivity as well as its utility in my particular case in describing characteristics of large population\textsuperscript{15}.

\url{http://www.statpac.com/surveys/surveys.pdf} (Accessed on 14/05/2010)
CHAPTER 1  EXPLAINING THE SECURITY-MIGRATION NEXUS

In this chapter will be set up the theoretical framework from which my empirical analysis will proceed. For the purpose of answering the research questions of this study first and foremost the linkage of security and migration needs to be outlined. The following chapter seeks to draw the central concepts for understanding of the process of securitization and outlines the theoretical approach which establishes the linkage between migration and security and identity.

1.1 SECURITY

A few decades ago the concept of security was focused only on the traditional military threats to the state’s security. However, with the end of the Cold War, the debate of what is to be secured has broadened. In the beginning of the 1990s, Ole Weaver et al, also known as the Copenhagen School\textsuperscript{16}, challenged the traditional understanding of the external military threat as the only threat to the state’s security, by arguing that there is a need it to be broadened since, beside the military threats to the state’s security, there are also non-military threats which threaten the state’s security, such economic, political, societal and environmental threats. That is how scholars and statesmen started to focus their attention not only on external military threats but also on non-military ones.

\textsuperscript{16} In 1996 McSweeney labeled the works of Buzan and his colleagues as the “Copenhagen School of Security Studies”
1.2 Copenhagen School of Security Studies

The broadening of the concept of security, developed by Copenhagen School is considered to be one of the most significant and genuine attempts in contemporary security studies at redefining the meaning of security. The theoretical framework of securitization theory, proposed by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and their associates, offers valuable insights into the processes of constructing security. Buzan et al. in the book “Security: a new framework for analysis” presented the framework established on the wider security agenda which comprise different security sectors (military, economic, societal, political, environmental) and different levels of interaction (system, subsystems, units, individual etc.).17 The purpose of so doing, as Buzan et al. put it, “to move away from the implicit (and sometimes explicit) placement of the state as the central referent object in all sectors.”18

Nonetheless, the broadening of the security concept and constructed sectoral security raised the number of critics. Didier Bigo questions the sectoral security by naming it a ‘Mobius ribbon’ understanding of security and emphasizes the fact that external and internal security overlap and thus makes it impossible to provide clear distinction between them.19

According to the Copenhagen School, the security is not only about the survival of the state but it is also about the survival of the societal (group) identities.20 The concept of societal security was introduced for first time by Barry Buzan, in his study “People, States and Fear”, where he argues “that the main threats to security come from competing identities

and migration". The scholars of Copenhagen School first introduced new concept of societal security, and brought the concept of identity at stage of the security studies. According to Buzan et al. the concept of societal security is referred to “the level of collective identities and actions to defend such ‘we identities.’” Therefore, Copenhagen School identifies security as a collective unit, more precisely a “specific type of interplay among human collectives which follows the logic of security.” As Jutila explicitly portrays “in state security, the collective is the state, which is concerned with its sovereignty; in societal security, it is the society, which is concerned with its identity.”

The identity can be threatened by a number of factors, such as migration, cultural flow, and integration. As Buzan explicitly puts it, the societal security “can be threatened by whatever puts its ‘we’ identity into jeopardy.” The Copenhagen School approach to societal security has been frequently criticized. I will outline some of them. McSweeney emphasizes that the concept of societal security can indirectly lead to the insecurity of others (migrants), as being perceived as threat to the host society. However, Ayoob argues that in number of cases the state itself creates the insecurity of the society.

The identity of society has been researched from different prospects. However, for the purpose of my study I bring one of the recent pieces, which I consider for tremendously relevant for the current research. Yannis Stivachtis brings to the attention very important

thinking, he argues that the concept of identity can be determined, in my case strengthened, by the existence of the oppositional identity “the Other” and referring to it. More explicitly, he states that “human collectivities may identify themselves with reference to what they are not (negative identification) or in opposition to another group (the “Other”)” As Klein et al also note, the oppositional conception of identity in the securitization theory “who we are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others.” This notion is of particular importance for this study and allows to analyze whether the securitizing move had a strengthening impact on the Russian collective identity. In the next section, I will provide an outline of the securitization theory and some of its critics.

1.2.1 Securitization Theory

Securitization theory acknowledges that securitization process is socially constructed and intersubjective. According to the securitization theory, labeling something as an existential threat, thus creating a security issue, securitizing actor seeks to legitimize the right to use extraordinary means to deal with it. In analyzing the essence of security, securitization theory of the Copenhagen School aims at understanding “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (…) why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions”. The authors of the securitization framework contend that studying security implies examining how processes of discursive and intersubjective social practices construct threats within a political community justifying the need for emergency measures.

29 Ibid.p.3
The securitizing actor, being an individual, group or organization, is responsible for delivering a speech act in which an issue or group is designated as a threat to a community. The process of creating the threat defined as a “securitizing move”, including the discursive presentation and the actor-audience interplay, is a significant but not the vital part of assessing the result of a securitization. For securitization to be successful, and this means moving an issue beyond the normal politics and requirement of acceptance of the particular audience.\(^\text{32}\) Therefore, the purpose of a speech act in the process of securitization is inextricably linked to the acceptance of the audience allowing the securitizing actor “to break free of procedures he or she would otherwise be bound by …”.\(^\text{33}\)

Securitization framework has been chosen as a theoretical framework of this study due to the fact that securitization theory provides explicit theoretical foundation for understanding the security-migration nexus. By providing effective proposal that territorial borders create such phenomenon as migration the theory offers the concept of social construction of threats and provides a number of referent objects which can be referred in order to establish the existentiality of a threat. Moreover, the theory provides a guideline in terms of identification of securitizing agents in securitization of migration.

As it was already noted, the securitization theory has been an object of numerous criticisms. Some of the critics of the theory are in terms of its definition of identity,\(^\text{34}\) others have focused on analyzing its normative implications.\(^\text{35}\) Williams, for example, expressed his main criticism of the theory in terms of the speech act. In this regard, as it was outlined above, according to the analytical framework of securitization theory, the creation of a threat is

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p. 25.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 24.


contingent on the exercise of a speech act by the authoritative actor wherein an issue is presented as dangerous for the survival of the referent object. Consequently, the call for urgent measures to tackle the designated threat is born out through the communication between the securitizing actor and a relevant audience. This framework is, however, constrained by two conditions: one related to the structure of the speech act itself, and the other to the social position of the securitizing actor. More specifically, the structure of the securitization requires that

Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) internal, linguistic-grammatical—to follow the rules of the act (…), and (2) the external, contextual and social – to hold a position from which the act can be made.

This implies that the securitization as a discursive process enables a space for connecting the power relations of the institutional position of a securitizing actor with the embedded normative structures, rather than explaining the consent of the public only through the nature of a speech act.

Nevertheless, it is in the field of communicative means and the question of the language act as a sole transmitter of the message that lies at the base of our challenge to this position. In the framework of the Copenhagen School the act is perceived only in linguistic terms, the position of the securitizing actor is based on the spoken act of emergency, and the effect of this move is evaluated in terms of rhetorical success to enable the extraordinary measures. Yet as this paper shows in the case of securitization of Chinese migration to Russia, the communicative environment in which the threat is constructed becomes increasingly structured by visual factors. As Michael Williams effectively points out, in this environment “speech acts are inextricable from the image-dominated context in which they take place and

37 Ibid.,p.32.
through which meaning is communicated". 38 In particular, the images used by the media and mixed with particular rhetoric to the public tend to shape public opinion and create particular perception of Chinese migrants in the society. Thus the role of media in the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia does not have exclusively informative and neutral character, but rather proactive in creating the negativism towards Chinese migrants, moreover the reproduction of meanings through providing textual material combined with the images is aimed to reinforce shared norms, values and thus collective identity of Russian society. In the next chapter I will attempt to provide the analysis of the role of media in the securitization process of Chinese migration in Russia by the content analysis of the number of Russian national newspapers and analysis of the images.

In this chapter will set up the theoretical framework from which my empirical analysis will proceed. For the purpose of answering the research questions of this study first and foremost the linkage of security and migration needs to be outlined. The following chapter seeks to draw the central concepts for understanding of the process of securitization and outlines the theoretical approach which establishes the linkage between migration and security and identity.

CHAPTER 2 SECURITIZATION OF CHINESE MIGRATION TO RUSSIA: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIZATION THEORY

The present chapter will examine the process of securitizing the migration in Russia through the lenses of Securitization theory as presented by the Copenhagen School as a special focus will be given to the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia. The chapter will include also analysis of the images used at the stage of the securitizing move. In the first section, I will explore the changes in the migration law during the presidency of Putin and will see whether the migration is securitized in Russia. After, I will proceed toward establishment of securitizing actors, which for the purpose of my study I divided into two groups, namely political agents and media agents. The next section will outline the securitizing moves of the officials and media, which will be aimed to investigate the process of the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia. Then, I turn to the analysis of the visual manifestation or the images in Russian press. Finally, I conclude the chapter by establishment of the audience and the analysis of the audience’ perceptions towards Chinese migrants.

2.1 SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION TO RUSSIA. LEGISLATION

The Russian government has revised its immigration laws several times within the time period that my study covers. Throughout the presidency of Vladimir Putin migration policy had undergone number of changes. I laid out these changes in three stages according to the years and character of transformation.
I. 2001-2005: move towards securitization

The Law on Citizenship was adopted in 2002, significantly tightened the requirements for the granting of citizenship. It canceled item for an automatic granting Russian citizenship to all interested citizens of the former USSR. In 2002, there were made amendments to this law, namely the waiting period for citizenship was increased from five to eight years, as well as was introduced an examination on the Russian language for all applicants. Also in 2002 was adopted stricter law "On Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation," which introduced a number of bureaucratic obstacles for the foreigner to obtain work permit and residence registration. Also was introduced a quota system of foreign labor. Thus the Government of the Russian Federation annually determines the need to attract foreign workers, but also takes into account not only the number of migrants, but their profession, qualifications, citizenship and other economic and social criteria.

In 2004 was added Article 322.1 in the Criminal Code of Russian Federation amended "Organization of illegal migration", were increased penalties for violations of immigration regulations for violation of the rules of stay (residence) of foreign citizens or stateless persons, the rules of engagement and use of foreign workers and illegal employment in the Russian Federation.

II. 2005-2006: shift towards the liberalization

Had shown a failure of politics has undergone revision in March 2005, when the decision was taken to the Security Council, headed by the President of Russia, on its liberalization, reorientation to attract immigrants.42

In 2005, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia conducted so-called immigration amnesty, which allowed to legalize seven thousands illegal migrants by excluding bureaucratic barriers, namely simplifying the procedures for obtaining work permits and residence registration. This practice had for its purpose to legalize only migrants who came from former Soviet Republics, as the head of External Labor Migration of the Federal Migration Service, Vyacheslav Postavnin stated “We would not be able to issue a work permit, for example, to Chinese, who entered the territory of Russia, because they violated the border, and with the CIS countries we have visa-free relations. We set ourselves the task of simplifying bureaucratic procedures within the framework of existing legislation.”43

In 2006 was adopted a Federal Law "On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation"44, also were made number of the amendments and supplements to the federal laws on citizenship and legal status of foreign citizens and stateless persons and others. These changes removed number of obstacles concerning the procedure for obtaining residence registration, from that moment migrants should not provide data about the person who invited him, nor the certificate about the housing area of the

42 Official web-site of the President of Russian Federation
43 Kirill Vasilenko, Vremya Novostei, 27.01.2006, Demoscope Weekly, 233-234, February 6 - February 19
44 International Organization for Migration, International Migration Law Database
proposed place of residence (before the minimum housing area of the place of residence had to be minimum six square meters). The applicant will be enough to tell the address of the proposed place of residence, the Federal Migration Service will check it in database and the stamp of residence registration will be issued immediately. However, it is needed to emphasize here that simplification of procedure was only for migrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) countries.

In addition at the same time was approved a State program to promote voluntary relocation of compatriots from abroad back to Russia.\textsuperscript{45}

To sum up, the liberalization had been aimed only towards the migrants from the countries which have visa-free regime with Russia, so Chinese migrants still had to go through the bureaucratic obstacles in obtaining residence registration and work permit.

\textbf{III. 2007-2008: back towards securitization}

In 2007 came into force a resolution of the government, which restricted foreign access to certain areas of trade,\textsuperscript{46} according to which the proportion of foreigners among traders at the market till April 2007 should not exceed 40\%. Since April 2007, all migrants are prohibited to work in the markets, and they are also are not allowed to sell alcohol and medicaments.\textsuperscript{47}

After the resolution came into force millions of Chinese migrants who were employed in the field of trade lost their jobs. As can be seen from the table below, in 2002 there were 70\% of Chinese migrants employed in the trade, and in 2005 - 64\%. Moreover, as a result

\textsuperscript{45} International Organization for Migration, International Migration Law Database \url{http://www.imlodb.iom.int/search.do?action=search&LinkItem=dl&languageId=en&classDescription=NationalInstruments&searchType=advanced&Country=Russian+Federation} (Accessed on 17/05/2010)


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
majority of them suffered financial losses, since they had to sell their goods at low prices and leave Russia.\(^{48}\)

**Figure 1. The structure of employment of Chinese citizens in the Far East (in %)\(^{49}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of employment</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yevgeny Zagrebnoy “Economic organization of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East after the collapse of the USSR”

From the outlined above it can be seen that during the presidency of Putin, in terms of legislative measures dealing with the migration, migration policy of Russia had undergone number of changes. Firstly, when Putin came into power there was a shift towards securitization, however the measures undertaken had proved to be inefficient, thus Putin made a change in legislation towards management. However, the liberalization was aimed only to bear on migrants from CIS countries, so the Chinese migration had remained securitized. Therefore, it can be drawn the conclusion, that the government of Russia followed more rational direction towards management of migration, namely by quota allocation to allow certain number of high qualified and low qualified people to enter and work in the country and by simplification of rules for obtaining residence registration and work permit for migrants coming from CIS countries to establish the profile of migrants who are preferred in the country.

\(^{48}\) Maria Repnikova, Harley Balzer “Chinese migration to Russia: Missed opportunities,” Eurasian Migration Papers, Number 3, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, p.17

In the table below, it can be seen the chronology of the changes in the legislation concerning migration policy of Russian Federation, which can serve as a picture of securitization measures undertaken during the presidency of president Putin and thus can be considered as the legislative indicator of securitization of migration in Russia.

Figure 2. Timeline, Legislative Indicator of securitization, 2000-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL LAW NO. 62 OF MAY 31, 2002 “ON CITIZENSHIP OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL LAW NO. 115 OF JULY 25, 2005 “ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF FOREIGN CITIZENS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>CRIMINAL CODE OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDED ARTICLE 322.1 “ORGANIZATION OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION” 28 DECEMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>FEDERAL LAW &quot;ON MIGRATION REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS AND STATELESS PERSONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION&quot;, 18 JULY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITIZING AGENTS

For the purpose of this study I divided the securitizing agents in two groups: political agents and media. The established securitizing agents are not argued to be the only one who can perform as securitizing actors as indicated in the previous chapter, but it has been done with the purpose of achieving more comprehensive picture of securitization process of Chinese migration to Russia and see how they present “the other,” more explicitly to investigate whether they employ distinctiveness and incompatibility between the “Self” and “Other” identity.
In my case the politicians and the media appear to be the most influential securitizing agents, which makes the rhetoric and images employed by those actors the most relevant indicators which my analysis is based on.

The political agents, identified as the securitizing actors, are the government officials who are in power. In this study leaders of the opposition are also recognized as the political agents. I acknowledge that other agents can be also identified and play role in the securitization process, however my establishment of the securitizing agents falls under the logic that in case of Russia the most influential political securitizing agents appear to be government officials and local officials, who are in power, due to the fact that they hold the authority to adopt and implement legislative measures.

In this study the identified political agents are: the President, Opposition leaders, and governors of the cities/towns. Media is identified as an influential securitizing agent for the reason that it actively influences society's attitude towards this or that problem, helps design the emotional background of perception. Media not only reflect the image of the migrant, who has emerged in public opinion, but to actively shape it. Moreover, it has power and tools to reach people through more channels than politicians can.

2.3 SECURITIZING MOVES - SPEECH ACTS ANALYSIS

In this section I attempt to outline the securitizing moves of the officials and media, which will be aimed to investigate the process of the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia. Firstly, I bring the speeches of the officials, namely the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin and the local officials, secondly I consider it as important to bring the rhetoric of the opposition, namely the Liberal Democratic Party of Zhirinovsky, which I will use as one of the indicators for proving my main argument.
2.3.1 Officials

During his visit to Blagoveshchensk, a city on the border with China, in 21 July, 2000 Putin speaking to residents stated that “If in the near future we do not take practical steps, then in a few decades Russian population will be speaking in Japanese, Chinese, and Korean.”\textsuperscript{50} In this speech the president is warning the people of Blagoveshchensk about the threat to the Russian language, culture, identity. He implied that if we will not take the practical measures now, the Russian language and identity can diminish in few decades. Here we can establish the fact that Putin implies to the collective identity of Russian nation as a referent object presenting it in terms of survival, thus he states directly, as Waever explicitly puts it, “we will no longer be us, no longer the way we were or the way we ought to be true to our identity.”\textsuperscript{51} Consequently, he calls for measures to deal with a threat, which as he portrays is Chinese, Japanese, Korean language, which means that he calls for securitizing migration.

In May, 2003 in his speech to Federal Council president Putin stated “The laws adopted were aimed to bring order to migration inflows, making them transparent. What happened does not contribute to solving these problems, but rather creates serious problems for many people… We need not restrictions and obstacles; we need an effective immigration policy beneficial for the country and convenient for people, especially for the people of the Commonwealth of Independent States, for those who are close to us and with whom we understand each other, who speak the same language. These are people who belong to our common Russian culture.”\textsuperscript{52} In this speech Putin, first of all acknowledges the ineffectiveness


of the strict amendments which had been made to the federal laws in 2002, and admits that this changes in migration policy created even more problems for many people. Also the president emphasized in his speech the fact that these amendments caused problems for people especially (my emphasis) from CIS countries. Further, he stressed that migrants from CIS countries are close to Russians linguistically and culturally. Thus the president portrayed the migrants preferred in the country. Therefore, the changes in the legislation, as it was outlined in the beginning of the present chapter, showed the same tendency, namely steps undertaken towards the liberalization of the migration had been targeted only the migrants of the CIS countries, and not in any way aimed for Chinese and other migrants, who are linguistically and culturally different from collective identity of Russian nation.

Vice speaker of the State Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky in his interview to the correspondent of the newspaper “Permskie novosti” in November 2003 stated that “… any migration is, to some extent, evil… they are [migrants] are of another culture, another way of thinking… As for the Chinese, I do think that they are danger for our country.”\(^53\) From the above said the position of this leader can be drawn, which is extremely warning and hostile (unfriendly?) towards migration. Therefore, in his rhetorics, Zhirinovsky not once employed such harsh portrayal of the Chinese migrants as a threat to Russia. In December 2003, he promised “to expel all Chinese”\(^54\) in his pre-election speech to Russian population. Accordingly, it can be drawn the conclusion that the fact that Zhirinovsky stressed on the cultural difference of the host society (Russian) and migrants, thus he implies to the collective identity of Russian nation as a referent object and its survival being threatened.

The local officials also did not stay silent on the problem of Chinese migration to Russia. As one of examples, in 2003 January 2003, governor of Khabarovsk, a city bordering China, Viktor Ishaev had been warning population and president that “the army” of the unemployed people in China is one and a half times more than all Russian population.\footnote{My translation. Russian daily newspaper Gazeta http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/01/22/gubernatoryp.shtml (Accessed on 14/05/2010)} This way Ishaev, indirectly implied to the probability of the “army” of Chinese jobless people to inflow in Russia. By stating that this “army” is one and half times more than total Russian population, he draws the picture threatening the identity of Russian nation and its survival.

Furthermore, in 2001 Valeriy Manilov, the vice Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, had been concerned that Chinese genes are stronger than the Russian, as he explicitly put it “If the Chinese man will marry Russian woman, the child will be Chinese, if Russian man will marry Chinese woman - also Chinese.”\footnote{Kommersant Russian daily newspaper N 135 (22265) 01.08.2001 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=276754 (Accessed on 14/05/2010)} Manilov in his speech expressed concern about intermarriages between Chinese and Russian, thus he clarified that the sooner or later the presence of Chinese migrants in Russia could turn into new Sino-Russian generation. One of probable analysis of Manilov’s speech can be that he implies to the collective identity of Russian nation as a referent object presenting it in terms of survival, thus he states that the Russians will no longer be Russians and the identity of Russian nation will diminish.

In this section I have presented that a number of securitizing actors pushed for securitization of Chinese migration in Russia. I outlined the role of these political agents in the society, and the time when the securitizing move had been made, also the speech acts were analyzed in terms of establishment of the referent object which the securitizing actors
implied to. It is needed to emphasize here that the securitizing move (speech acts) by itself does not securitize migration. Thus, in the next section I will analyze the role of media.

2.3.2 Portraying a Threat: Role of Media and Images

Mass media plays a great role in creation, propaganda and influencing the public opinion. Public opinion is largely formed not in the process of direct communication, but as a result of images created by the mass media. The media actively influence society's attitude towards this or that problem, help design the emotional background of perception. Media not only reflect the image of the migrant, who has emerged in public opinion, but to actively shape it. On this basis purpose of this section is to identify general trends of the materials on the topic of Chinese migrants/migration, the main features of "image" of the migrant, which is formed on the pages of Russian newspapers. Particularly, I will look at the way how “the Other” is constructed in mass media in Russia in case of Chinese. For answering this question I will use content analysis as a research method, which is focused on examination of the content of the 3 national newspapers, assessment of the way of construction of "the Others" and analysis of how it can influence the perception of the Chinese migrants in the Russian society. For doing so I find it for more effective to divide this section into two parts, firstly I will analyze the textual material and then I will attempt to present the image of Chinese migrant, portrayed by the media.

Content analysis was conducted on the material of the three articles from three different national daily socio-political newspapers with a circulation of more than 16 million, 27 million and 10 million copies respectively: “Vremya MN,” “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” and “Vzglyad.” The articles analyzed are: Evgeniy Vasiliev, “Siberia is boosted by
migrants”\textsuperscript{57} in Vremya MN, 19.10.2001, Vladimir Vorsobin, “Will Chinese inhabit Siberia and the Far East?”\textsuperscript{58} in Komsomolskaya Pravda, 11.11.2003 and Gennadiy Nechaev, “Neighboring threat”\textsuperscript{59} in Vzglyad, 04.08.2005. As categories of analysis were used words: pronouns (we/our/us referring to Russians vs. they/them/their referring to Chinese), term “migrant” (as well as other terms associated with this category such as illegal, gasterbeiter (guest worker), non-Russian, guest, narrow-eyed and others), as well as most of the text of the articles. Picture elements presented in the articles also were used as not main but additional category. In the analysis I looked at existence of the words as well as frequency of its usage in the article. Also was measured intensity of the reference of other categories associated with the category of "migrant", which results in creating a certain image. However, for more effective analysis was considered not only the availability of these techniques, but also the context of their usage, which allows the evaluation of emotional intensity.

The analyzed articles have headlines which from the beginning can create a negative background for the perception of information: “Siberia is boosted by migrants,” “Neighboring threat” and “Will Chinese inhabit Siberia and the Far East?”

In the article “Will Chinese inhabit Siberia and the Far East?” the analysis of the “words - pronouns” category (We, our, they, their, us - referring to “we/us/our” – Russians and “they/their/them” – Chinese) shows that the division among us and them exists, moreover it is rather well-established. Nonetheless, “the We” construction is dominating - 75% of the usage, while “the They” construction is – 25% of the usage. (See the diagram 1

\textsuperscript{57} Original title - Evgeniy Vasiliev “Sibir prirastae migrants” in Vremya MN, 19.10.2001
In the context of its usage it can be assumed that “the We” construction is dominating with the intention of establishment of leading position of “us”- the Russians.

In the article “Siberia is boosted by migrants” the analysis of the “words-pronouns” category shows that the division among us and them exists, furthermore it is to a certain extent well-established. We can see the soft “They” construction, which is presents 55% of the usage, while “the We” construction is 45%. (See diagram 2 in Appendix)  It can be assumed that “the They” construction is used for formation of the category “the Other” and as a result creates the negative perception of migrant as stranger, different form us, even enemy.

In the article “Neighboring threat” the analysis of the “words-pronouns” category shows that the division among us and them exists, furthermore it is to a certain extent well-established. Unlikely the previous article here we can see the stable “They” construction, which is dominating and presents 77% of the usage , while “the We” construction is 23%. (See diagram 3 in Appendix)  It can be assumed that “the They” construction is used for formation of the category “the Other» and as a result creates the negative perception of migrant as stranger, different form us, even enemy.

Another category analyzed is term “migrant,” as well as other terms associated with this category such as illegal, gasterbeiter (guest worker), non-Russian, guest, narrow-eyed and others. The frequency of usage of these terms and metaphors is very high. Here I decided to compare the frequency of usage of these terms between these three articles. In the article “Neighboring threat” the frequency of usage of this category is – 50% (the term illegal (migrant), gasterbeiter (illegal guest worker), narrow-eyed, Asian are frequently used), while in the articles “Siberia is boosted by migrants” and “Will Chinese inhabit Siberia and the Far East?” is – 20% and 30% respectively. (See diagram 4 in Appendix).
However, this does not show that these articles are less negative to Chinese migrants, but likely not to show the construction of “the Other” in the text.

As it was shown above with the help of analysis of such categories as pronouns (we/our/they) and terms such as illegal, guest, non-Russian, Asian and others the construction of “the Other” takes place in newspapers which reads Russian society. Moreover, the dichotomy of “We” and “They” is the tool which is the most frequently used in mass media for differentiations and a categorization of images of migrants. It allows to place priorities and to set a stable manner of a narration of “the Other.” Division into "them" and "us" strengthens effect of negative perception of the information, and as it is shown in this case – roots of a negative image of the migrant. All this creates the problem of coexistence of migrants and Russians in the publications of the central press, which is mainly based on essential construction of the “the Other” - all those who in any real or imagined features (language, physical appearance, a behavior manner, etc.) differs from the population of the host society. Using possibilities which give the modern mass media and journalists maintain feeling of vulnerability of the society and give rise to migrantophobia and sinophobia, mixed up with nationalism and intolerance.

In the next section I will analyze the images, which I suppose to be important contribution to linguistic framing. Thus, it can be considered to be an important factor to take into account in order to give a full picture of the role of the media in the shaping of people’ perception of Chinese migrants in Russia.

2.3.2.1 Images

The aim of this section is to analyze the visual manifestation or the images that newspapers evoke for people. However, it should be noted here that the visual expression of
migration should not be considered without the words that are presented either. I suppose that visual framing facilitates to the perception of the textual material by the reader or viewers of television news. Thus it might be considered as a fruitful contribution to linguistic framing.

Firstly, I turn to the analysis of the picture element of the article analyzed above namely, “Will Chinese inhabit Siberia and the Far East,”60 The illustration represents to the reader the image of the migrant with oriental features (the eyes/oval face) and a frightened expression on his face, carrying a pushcart with the background of the on-going construction of Orthodox church. The picture can invite reader to the negative perception of the following textual information. First of all, it presents clear association about activity mainly carried out by Chinese migrants in Far East of Russia as well as the title presented under the picture says: “In Far East every construction is with Chinese face”, what makes the industry of construction as mainly activity of Chinese migrants. It can be assumed that the title presents to the reader the message that Chinese migrants occupy the potential workplaces of local population. Also the picture presents the clash of cultures/religions, it is probable that the author of the picture kept in mind the religiousness of Russian society. In this way, with the help of visual information a very definite image of the migrant is formed.

The other picture elements I analyze are taken from the collection of articles called “Chinese Threat”, prepared by the Creative Union “Truth.”61 Collection includes articles dated from 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2006. The articles contain number of illustrations, most of which enclose an image of the faces with oriental features, looking distinctly Asian, apparently Chinese. The visual segment of the article titled “Perspectives of Sinification (Kitaizaciya) of Russia” presents to the reader three people with distinctly Asian facial

features, two are warmly dressed and one is in military uniform with a gun. All of them are looking forward and the guy in military uniform with explaining glance shows something in front of them. It can be assumed that the action takes place in Siberia, as the snow can be noticed on the picture and man in uniform explains to the other what the perspectives of Sinification of Russia are. Presumably the picture is aimed to evoke reader a parallel with Chinese threat, which has been already posed in the title.

One of the articles presents a caricature, which illustrates a person of Asian facial features with a knife and fork in his hands, who presumably is going to have a lunch. Interestingly enough, the served food distinctly looks like Russian state on the map. Presumably, the picture demonstrates the Russian population and state as a referent object and thus implies to its survival.

Another article titled “We are growing nation, and we really sooner or later will come here.” The text is accompanied with the visual representation of the Chinese army. Usually the images of army and policy that displayed when migration is discussed are considered to be just illustrations of the words, however it might be also very important for visualizing the picture that securitization frames.

To sum up, the above provided analysis proved the Copenhagen School’s Securitization theory to be a plausible and very useful tool in analyzing and explaining the process of securitization of Chinese migration to Russia, as all phases of the securitization process, as proposed by the Copenhagen School, from the securitizing move to the adoption of securitization measures and the actual securitization of the issue, successfully apply in the case of securitizing of Chinese migration to Russia. However, the above analysis also proved that images should also be considered as an important tool of the media in transformation of the information to the audience (population). Images aim to portrait the
Chinese migrants’ identity in pictures and show how distinct and opposing to the Russian “We” identity it is and hence bearing a threat to the Russians’ societal security. By showing to the Russian public the image of a Chinese who is about to eat a piece of meat with the shape of Russia, the securitizing agent urges the society’s attention to the Chinese who are planning to invade not only the Far East, but the whole country and by so doing the securitization move shows the Chinese migrants not only as threatening the societal security of the Russian society but also as being a potential existential threat to the state’s security. However, by showing the piece of meat (Russia) untouched yet by the Chinese, the securitizing move implies that it is still not late Russia to be saved and hence preemptive securitizing measures are needed to be undertaken. This proves that the use of images has a considerable impact not only for receiving the approval of the audience for special measures to be undertaken

In order to analyze the impact of media, its textual and visual representation of Chinese migration as a threat to collective identity of Russian nation and its survival in the securitization process and strengthening the collective identity of the Russian nation, in the next part of the present chapter I turn to the analysis of the audience’ perceptions towards Chinese migrants.

2.4 AUDIENCE

The audience I establish in this study is the mass audience, which refers to the population of Russia, or it is the Russian nation, which the politicians are entitled to represent. Firstly, I turn to analysis of the acceptance of the securitizing moves outlined above by the audience. For this below I present Figure 3, which provides the relevant
empirical data for analysis of the acceptance/approval of the securitizing measures by the audience.

Figure 3. Public opinion on migration law
Do you think migration law in Russia should be soften/the same/tightened?

| Immigration laws should be soften, especially the registration of migrants coming to Russia | 14 |
| The immigration laws should be the same as they are now | 17 |
| The laws on immigration should be tightened | 40 |
| Immigration should be stopped completely | 9 |
| Difficult to answer | 12 |

Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 2004

As the first table shows, 70% of the Russians support the securitization of the migration in the country. The second table shows that 80 out of 92 respondents support the securitization of migration in general, as 49 of them call for stricter immigration laws or closing the borders for migrants.

Figure 4. Public opinion before and after the securitization measure to take place
How do you assess the decision of the government on April 1, completely forbid foreigners (those who are not citizens of Russia) to trade in tents and in the markets?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do you assess the decision of the government on April 1, completely forbid foreigners (those who are not citizens of Russia) to trade in tents and in the markets, as well as non-store retail?</th>
<th>November 2006 (before the adoption of the law)</th>
<th>January 2007 (before the adoption of the law)</th>
<th>April 2007 (after the adoption of the law)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely, positive</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather positive</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather negative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely, negative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center

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According to the data above, the majority (3/4) of the respondents supported the laws aiming to regulate the migration. This clearly shows that the vast majority of the Russians support the securitizing measures. In other words, this support can be regarded as the approval of the audience of the proposed securitizing measures towards the migrants.

Figure 5. Support for the idea "Russia for Russians"
Do you support the idea "Russia for Russians"?

![Graph showing support for the idea "Russia for Russians" over time from 1998 to 2002. Support, Against, Not interested, Did not think about that, Do not know categories are plotted.]

Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center

It is clear from the above diagram that compared to 1998 (before the securitizing move to take place), the percent of Russians who favored the idea of “Russia for Russians” in 2000 and 2001 (when the securitizing move took place) increased, whereas the percentage of those who in 1998 were against securitizing the immigration issue decreased. Therefore, an argued conclusion can be made that compared to 1998, after the securitizing move in 2000, the Russians began to place a higher value on their collective identity, as the number of those who were for securitizing the migration increased, whereas the number of those who in 1998 were against securitizing the issue, in 2001 decreased. However, it should be noted that the speech act and the images were regarding negatively and as threatening predominantly the Chinese migrants, whereas the much more significant in number migrants from the CIS countries were not regarded by the statesmen and the media as threatening the Russian

identity. An evidence in this regard can be pointed the fact that In May 2003, in his speech to Federal Council president Putin stated: “We need an effective immigration policy beneficial for the country and convenient for people, especially for the people of the Commonwealth of Independent States, for those who are close to us and with whom we understand each other, who speak the same language. These are people who belong to our common Russian culture.”

The fact that Putin stressed on the fact that migrants from CIS countries are close to Russians linguistically and culturally, the president portrayed the migrants preferred in the country. Therefore, a plausible assumption can be made that the stress on the Chinese migrants’ as the “others”, who do not speak the Russian language and do not share the Russian collective culture and identity and therefore threaten our “sameness” contributed significantly to strengthening the Russian identity by supporting the motto “Russia for Russians”. That clearly shows that the securitizing move, by opposing the Russian society’s “We” identity to the migrants “Other” identity, besides receiving the approval of the audience to securitize the migration in the country, also indirectly succeeded to strengthen the Russian identity.

Figure 6. Public attitudes towards Chinese migrants in Russia
How did your perception towards Chinese migrants in Russia change?

![Public attitudes towards Chinese migrants in Russia](image)

Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center

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The data above adds a further evidence in favor of the argument that the securitizing move indirectly strengthens the Russian collective identity, as in 2000 and 2001 after the securitizing move took place, the negative perception of the Chinese migrants received wither support among the Russians. This suggests that the securitizing move by opposing the “sameness” to the “otherness” aims to create xenophobic feelings towards the “others” and this also implies that the Russians started to place a higher value on their distinct identity, incomputable with the “other”.

Another indicator which demonstrates strengthening the Russian identity with as a result of the securitizing move is the support for nationalistic parties. In the case of Russia, such a party is the “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia”. In the 1999 parliamentary elections the party received 5.98% of the votes, whereas at the elections in 2003 (after the securitizing move took place) the party received double support (11.45%). That shows that the securitizing move by presenting the migrants, and more particularly the Chinese migrants, as a societal threat to the Russian collective identity triggered nationalistic feelings in the Russian society, the latter by feeling its identity threatened decided to increase its support for the nationalistic parties, which regard themselves as the “defenders” of the nation.

To sum up, the above analysis demonstrates that after the securitizing move took place in 2000, the public support for securitization of the migration issue increased, whereas the support for its desecuritazation decreased; the support for the nationalistic conception “Russia for Russians” denying the presence of “Otherness” within the Russian borders increased also quite significantly in the first years after the securitizing move took place; the negative perceptions of the Chinese migrants also considerably broadened among the Russians and last but not the least, the support for the nationalistic party of Vladimir Jirinovski, “Liberal

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67 Russian Daily Newspaper 19.05.2010 http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2010/05/19/focus/479264
Democratic Party of Russia” doubled at the 2003 elections as compared to the results from 1999. This all suggests that the securitizing move brought strengthening of the Russian collective identity since the Russians started to place higher value on their collective identity. Therefore, the proposition I established in terms of the securitizing move as indirectly aiming to strengthen the “We” identity of the Russians, turns to be plausible. Let me now turn to the next section where I will attempt to provide a more recent picture of the way the Chinese migrants are perceived in Russia.
2.5 ASSESSING THE CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHINESE MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA

In this section it is important to provide the recent data and analysis of the perception of
the Chinese migrants by the Russian society. For doing so I have conducted the online-survey
which will allow to see the current situation. In my survey I asked the questions, such as
“what one word you associate with Chinese people?”; “what personal quality you dislike in
Chinese people?” and other. The questions are close-ended, based on one dimension, contain
almost all possible answers and constructed based on multiple choice type, in order to make it
easier for respondent to answer.

The first question of the survey asks: “From which part of Russia are you?” Majority
of respondents indicated that they are from Central part of Russia- 55%, from the West of
Russia are 30% of respondents, 10% are from the East and 5% are from the South, there
were no any respondents from the North of Russia.

The second question of the survey “Are there many Chinese in your town?” presented
the following results: 46% responded that there are not many Chinese in their town, 36%
said that almost there are no Chinese in their town, 18% indicated that many Chinese live in
their town, there were no respondents who said that there a lot of Chinese in their town.

The third question of the survey “Are you familiar with the culture of China?” has its
purpose to analyze how many respondents are familiar with the culture of China. 35% of
respondents indicated that they know something about the culture of China, but wish to
know more. This can show that Russian society is interested to learn about the culture of
China. The equal number of respondents said that they are familiar with culture of China
from the history classes at schools - 25% and 25% indicated that they know a bit or don’t
know anything about the culture of China. 10% of respondents do not know anything and are not friendly towards the culture of China.

The forth question is “What one word do you associate with Chinese people?” has its goal to analyze the level of perception Chinese people as “the Other” by the Russian. In possible answers I included in positive and negative words, which can be used in association with Chinese people by the Russians. Also neutral word is used such as ‘shuttle-trader’, since it is broadly used in mass media in Russia in description of Chinese people. However, it is not considered to be important and popular answer of response, since only one respondent chose this answer. 25% of the respondents associate the word ‘narrow-eyed’ with Chinese, 17% indicated that Chinese are ‘the Other,’ different from ‘Us’, 14% chose the word ‘clever’, 4% perceive Chinese as ‘migrant,’ equal number of respondents associate Chinese with word ‘illegal worker’ – 9% and word ‘polite’ – 9%, the word ‘yellow’ chose 6% of respondents, 3% chose word ‘friendly’ and 3% associate word ‘threat’ with Chinese people. For more proper and accurate analysis, I decided to divide the answers in 2 groups: negative and positive. In the table presented below can be seen the answers which are considered to be negative and positive, and the percentage of respondents who chose this or that answer as well as the total percentage of negative and positive answers.

**Figure 7 Perception of Chinese migrants in Russia. Current trends.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Percentage of responses</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Percentage of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrow-eyed</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Clever</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, different from us</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>Polite</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal worker</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>71%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>26%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fifth question of the survey “What personal qualities do you like in Chinese people?” presented the following picture: 33% of respondents chose ‘hard worker’ as the personal quality which they like in Chinese, 21% like ‘respect to the traditions’, 15% chose the answer ‘collectivism’, 13% like ‘ambition’ in Chinese and 13% chose ‘friendliness and politeness’ as the personal quality which they like in Chinese people, however 5% of respondents said that Chinese do not have any special quality.

The last sixth question was posed as “oppositional” to the previous question and formulated the following way “What personal quality you dislike in Chinese people?” The following answers were chosen by the respondents: aggressiveness-22%, greed-22%, love of gain-21%, indifference-16%, toadeating-13%, and cowardice-6%.

I will turn to the analysis of the collected data from the conducted Web survey and will attempt to explore whether the Chinese migrants perceived as “the Other” in Russian society.

For the analysis the questions were divided in two groups. Group A includes the following questions: from which part of Russia are you? Are there many Chinese people in your town? Are you familiar with the culture of China? And Group B contains such questions as what word do you associate with Chinese people? What personal quality do you like in Chinese people? What personal quality you dislike in Chinese people? Group A is aimed to create a basis for analysis of the group B.

Group A is expected to discover the background of the respondents and what grounds they have for perceiving or not perceiving the Chinese people as “the Other”. Majority of respondents (55%) indicated that they are from the Central part of Russia and 30% are from the West, this show that the great majority of the respondents do not live in the regions
bordering with China, which are known to be a place of living of majority of the Chinese people residing in Russia. This assumption can be proven by the analysis of the next question of this group “are there many Chinese in your town”, where 46% of respondents indicated that there are not many Chinese living in their towns and 36% said that there are almost none of them. This may show that in that regions which are not bordering with China, not many Chinese people live, however the survey cannot provide legitimate information of the situation in that regions. Nonetheless, the collected information may show that the respondents did not interact with many Chinese people, since it has been found that the majority of the respondents do not know much about the culture of China, however 35% of them are willing to know more. It can be assumed that the respondents living in the regions with small number of Chinese people, not interacting much with them and lacking the knowledge about the culture of China, are more likely to perceive the Chinese people as “the Other” and are likely to have more negative image about Chinese migrants than positive.

Group B is aimed to investigate perception of Russians towards Chinese. There has been found that 71% of the respondents associate the Chinese with negative words, when 26% with positive. Also it should be taken in consideration that the word ‘narrow-eyed’ (chosen by 25%) is the feature which can be referred to the term “the Other” and is considered to be direct indicator for “the Otherness”, what both with the optional answer ‘the other different from us’ makes significant number of respondents - 42%. All that proves that currently Chinese are perceived as the “the Other” different from “Us.”

From the aforementioned, a conclusion can be drawn that nowadays quite significant level of “the Otherness” exists in Russian society in the case of Chinese migrants in Russia. It can be assumed from the conducted survey that the reasons of the perceiving the Chinese
people as “the Other” can be cultural differences, lack of knowledge about the culture of China among Russian people, appearance differences (such as facial features, ex. narrow eyes) and the other. The image of Chinese in Russian society is proved to be more negative than positive, what creates a serious foundation and increasing level of racism and xenophobia in Russia. Moreover, it generate sinophobic attitudes among Russian people, which is considered to be the reason of high level of negativism in majority-minority relations and represent an obstacle of adaptation of Chinese migrants in Russian society.
CONCLUSION

The analysis provided in the present research shows that the Copenhagen School’s Securitization theory is a plausible and very useful tool for explaining and analyzing the securitization of Chinese migration to Russia. However, the analysis also proved that the securitizing move is not conducted only through speech act but also by supporting the speech act with images, as noted by Williams, which images are employed to portrait the Chinese migrants’ identity in pictures and show how distinct and opposing to the Russian “We” identity it is and hence bearing a threat to the Russians’ societal security. By showing to the Russian public the image of a Chinese who is about to eat a piece of meat with the shape of Russia, the securitizing agent urges the society’s attention to the Chinese who are planning to invade not only the Far East, but the whole country and by so doing the securitization move shows the Chinese migrants not only as threatening the societal security of the Russian society but also as being a potential existential threat to the state’s security. However, by showing the piece of meat (Russia) untouched yet by the Chinese, the securitizing move implies that it is still not late Russia to be saved and hence preemptive securitizing measures are needed to be undertaken. Therefore, the use of images has a considerable impact not only for receiving the approval of the audience for special measures to be undertaken, but it also indirectly strengthens the collective Russian identity, employed together with the speech act. As demonstrated above, the audience’s support for securitizing the migration, its negative perception of the Chinese migrants, its support enhanced nationalistic feelings (support for the conception “Russia for Russians” and for nationalistic parties) and all of this development taking place at the time during and after the securitizing move, suggests that when the latter presents something as a societal threat by opposing the “We” to the “Other” and calling for securitizing the “Other”, it also indirectly strengthens the collective identity of the host society.
The theoretical implications to which the above analysis of the securitization of Chinese migration reached, suggest that the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework, while a useful instrument for analyzing the securitizing of Chinese migration to Russia, in order to even more comprehensively explain the latter, should be extended in terms of, as noted by Williams, taking into consideration beside the speech act also the images when analyzing the securitization move, as they are actively used in addressing the issues which need to be securitized and, on the other hand, when the securitizing move presents a societal threat which needs to be securitized, it can be suggested that the approval of the audience for undertaking securitizing measures may turn to be not the only aim which the securitizing move pursues, but there can be also an indirect aim which the securitizing move strives to achieve, namely strengthening the collective identity of the host society by opposing its collective identity to this of the “Other”. Here is the time to acknowledge that, put in this way, it is also possible that the securitization of the collective identity of the Russian host society may not result only in strengthening the “self” identity but at the same time it may, possibly, strengthen the identity of the “Other”. However, this is an area, which I would propose for a further research.
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APPENDIX

Figure 8. Process of securitization

Content analysis of media
The analysis of the “words-pronouns” category


**Article 3** – Gennadiy Nechaev, “Ugroza po-sosedstvu”, Vzglyad, 04.08.2005

**Diagram 3.** The 'words-pronouns' category

**Comparison of three articles on the basis of frequency of usage of the “term” category.**

**Diagram 4.** The frequency of usage of the 'terms' category
The analyzed images (Source: Collection of the articles “Chinese Threat” by the Creative Union “Truth,”

Image 1. In Far East every construction is with Chinese face.

Image 2. Perspectives of Sinification (Kitaizaciya) of Russia

Image 3. The Chinese are taking power in Russia

Image 4. We are growing nation, and we really sooner or later will come here