Children of the Nation:
Palestinian and Israeli National Bodies

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Abstract

In this project I examine how Palestinian and Israeli bodies are constructed amidst a number of discourses as national agents. I argue that the figure of the Child in particular is a powerful national symbol that reflects Palestinians and Israeli concepts of gender and national agency, particularly in the time frame of the Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2008/2009. In addition, these national bodies, examined through the act of “being killed” by the “other’s” forces, reflect how Palestinians and Israelis perceive the conflict in question, and how they use these symbols to address the international community. Lastly, I argue that these national constructs, particularly that of the Child, carry within them much ambiguity, that is in turn politicized by both sides in order to serve the respective national discourses and achieve political gains.
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For Amer Shurrab
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Introduction

This project is about bodies of adults, teenagers, and children, as representatives and constitutive of certain kinds of national subjects in the context of the modern Palestinian-Israeli conflict. My argument is two-fold. I first construct the figures at hand with particular consideration of the 2008/2009 Israeli invasion of the Gaza strip and particular attention to the Child’s body. Furthermore, I show how these bodies are situated in a multitude of discourses (medical, religious, national, and international) and how they become carriers of national inscriptions for the purpose of advancing national ideologies, especially in the Palestinian case. Second, I analyze the figures at hand as constructs reflecting a number of ambiguities, which in turn call into question binary concepts (such as Life-Death, Soldier-Child) that are so essential in the structuring of the conflict’s national discourses between Palestinians and Israelis.

In the first chapter I show how a number of discourses create the Palestinian and Israeli national subjects in the context of the ongoing conflict. I argue and demonstrate that death is a central moment for the construction of Palestinian and Israeli national subjects out of dead material bodies. For this purpose I outline how four discourses join and compete in this construction process. The discourses include a generalized medical authority (doctors, hospitals, Israeli forensic institute, and Palestinian morgues), a religious discourse (Jewish and Muslim traditions), national discourses (Israeli and Palestinian), and an international Human Rights discourse. All discourses carry particular ideas about gender, which I show by analyzing the male bodies and the absence of women’s killed bodies from the Palestinian national discourse.

In the second chapter I move from the general adult bodies to the more specific body of the Child. I analyze how the bodies of killed Palestinian children are reclaimed by the
overall Palestinian national discourse, and show the differences in their construction from that of their adult counterparts. I argue that the Child emerges as an especially strong national symbol during the Gaza invasion and takes the form of what I label as the “Innocent Palestinian Martyr Child”. The Child becomes a locus where all four discourses are clearly inscribed on its body, but with an unexpected inclusion of the female child body as a national figure (as opposed to the case of the adult female bodies, who are very rarely included in this national portrayal). In addition, I show how the Child becomes a category inclusive of bodies that are not usually seen as children – such as that of female teens. Furthermore, I argue that this emerging national symbol provides a space for representing both of the male and female Palestinian adults, without their actual presence. In addition, this renewed symbol creates a strong ground for the Palestinian discourse to criticize Israel and access the international community’s human rights discourse. Lastly, I show how the Israeli national discourse responds to the carefully-crafted figure of the Child by incorporating it to the realm of the Terrorist.

In the last chapter I examine the embedded ambiguities in the figure of the Child, such as the blurred lines between who counts as a child and who as an adult, in addition to the presumed innocence this figure carries. I do this through analyzing the case of the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was attacked and abducted while on duty near Gaza in 2006 by Iz al-Deen al-Qassam brigades and remains in their captivity until this day. I argue that through Shalit’s case a number of binaries are put into question through his representations in both the Israeli and the Palestinian discourses, such as: Child-Soldier, Life-Death, and innocence- guilt. Furthermore, the ambiguity is used as a strong political tool to strengthen national discourses on both sides of the conflict and use them for political purposes. Shalit’s case is an example of the competition between Palestinian and the Israeli national discourses to give meaning to an ambiguous body.
Context

The political relationship at hand is absolutely central to this project. At 62, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the oldest and unresolved in modern history, and it is often difficult and unproductive to take a single point in history from which to begin talking about the conflict. In this project, I focus primarily on the 2008/2009 Israeli invasion of Gaza and the images that came out of it, but I do not restrict my analysis or conclusions to it only. I elaborate on this event below, but my project is very conscious of the conflict’s history and aims to look at the Gaza invasion while bearing in mind the long history at hand.

Regionally, Israel has been an internationally recognized state since 1948 with the most well-equipped military in the Middle East. It has ongoing armed conflicts with particularly two groups: Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are largely labeled in the international community as terrorist groups, and engage in militant and armed resistance against Israel. Their acts are considered as terrorism by Israel and a large number of the international community, and are widely believed to be supported by Iran. However, both groups are elected members of their respective governments (Hezbollah in the Lebanese government, and Hamas in the Palestinian parliament).

In 2006, Hamas was elected to the Palestinian Parliament, which sparked wide international dissent, but also tense relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO officially recognizes Israel and rejects militant resistance/terrorist acts. Hamas does neither. The rift between the two rivals reached a peak in 2007, and since then, only Hamas governs the Gaza strip, and only the PLO governs the West Bank. After PLO members were kicked out from Gaza by Hamas (and vice versa), Israel pursued a controversial policy of an economic blockade of the Gaza strip, aiming to weaken Hamas and force it to disarm and halt
its resistant/terrorist activities. The blockade includes a full control of all of Gaza’s ground exits, its shore, air space, food, medicine, building material, and aid. In addition, it includes a full control of movement of Palestinians living in Gaza, and their access to the outside world.

On December 27\textsuperscript{th} 2008 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began a new military operation in the Gaza Strip called Operation Cast Lead. The mission’s goal according to Israel was to heavily undermine Hamas’ strength both in terms of the number of its members and its political influence, and halt the firing of rockets into southern Israel (Barak, 2008)\textsuperscript{1}. The military offensive would last for three weeks, killing 1385 Palestinians out of which 318 were under the age of 18, and 762 civilians, as reported by the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem, 2009). Ten Israeli soldiers were killed in combat including four in friendly fire, and three Israeli civilians (Ibid). During the 22-day invasion Israel was heavily criticized internationally for its excessive use of weapons and targeting of civilians, and Hamas was accused of using civilians as human shields.

Although Israel heavily restricted the international media’s access to the Gaza strip, many images of the aftermath of the attack filled the local and international news and internet blogs. These images centered mostly on showing the large scale of destruction done to Gaza’s infrastructure and Israel’s excessive power as displayed on the bodies of Gaza’s people. Pictures of shot, burnt, and disfigured bodies filled Arabic blogs and international media, with particular attention paid to those of dead young children. It is through such images that one can track key national, religious, and gendered meanings that have an important role in re-creating national subjects.

My relationship and position towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should be mentioned, as one cannot speak of this conflict without positioning oneself towards it. My family was forced to leave their village in Palestine in 1948, alongside thousands of other

\textsuperscript{1} Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak announcement of the operation in a press conference on Dec 27, 2008.
refugees who relocated in neighboring countries. Our family settled in Jordan, and thus, we identify as Palestinians in Jordan\(^2\). In terms of the conflict itself, I subscribe to a political and academic view that sees the relationship at hand in colonial terms, and argues against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.

**Method**
This project begins by looking at the material bodies of people killed in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and then analyzing the bodies and their representations discursively. My analysis draws from images of dead Palestinian children in international newspapers and a handful of Arabic blogs, in addition to cartoon depictions, animated and news videos. I also use a number of authors’ works on the representation of Palestinian and Israeli national subjects.

**Theory**
In this project I employ a theoretical framework that includes Michel Foucault’s (Society Must Be Defended, 1975-76) theory of biopolitics and biopower, together with the Mbembe’s (2003) theory of necropolitics and necropower. Both of these constructs are particularly relevant when speaking about Palestinian and Israeli Life in the status of war and occupation, and for analyzing the importance of Death in shaping power’s effects. In addition, I join Foucault’s (1975) notion of disciplinary power and George Mosse’s (1985, 1993, 1996) work on nationalism’s construction of bodies to provide a basis for analyzing Israeli and Palestinian national subjects. I also make use of Joseph Massad’s (1995 and 2007) theoretical and historical analysis on Palestinian and Arab nationalisms to provide a proper basis for the

\(^2\) No statics are available on the number of Palestinian-identified people in Jordan today, the number of the refugees to Jordan in 1948 is estimated at 200,000. Today’s predictions fluctuate between 40% to 60% of all Jordanians are believed to identify as Palestinian or be of Palestinian descent.
Palestinian national subjects. Lastly, I outline my approach to the concept of “body” and briefly cover the debated theoretical approaches to it in the first chapter.

This theoretical framework serves my argument in a direct manner as it allows me to speak about the construction of bodies in the particular context of a conflict, thereby providing the backbone for my construction processes of the adult and child bodies. In addition, death’s relationship to life and its role as a location and effect of power serves as a solid ground from which the ambiguity that I outline in the cases of Gild Shalit and some of the Palestinian teenager/child bodies stems and gains coherence.

**Power, Life, Death**

Foucault traces the effects of Sovereign Power from the 18th century onwards and argues that under “classical theory of sovereignty” the Sovereign Power controls both life and death of its subjects completely (1976, p. 240), which he summarizes as the “right to take life or let live” (p. 241). Foucault elaborates:

Sovereign Power’s effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill. The very essence of the right to life and death is actually the right to kill: it is at the moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life. (1976, p.240).

However, the effect of power began to gradually change as the 18th century progressed and modernity created a “new technology of power” that was concerned with the living human being and its existence as a living “species” (p. 242). This is what Foucault terms as “bio-power”; the power that is concerned with life (p. 243). Furthermore, Foucault differentiates between his concept of disciplinary power and bio-power through the targeted subject of these powers. In disciplinary power, the targeted subject is indeed the “individual” living human body that gets “trained” and “disciplined”, whereas for bio-power, the target is fact a “population” (p.245). Thus, bio-politics then is approaching “the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political” (p. 245).
In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict Foucault’s disciplinary power can be traced in multiple instances. First, for example, in the case of an Israeli disciplinary power that requires Israeli citizens to participate in military service and in the training of their bodies. Second, in the context of a colonial relationship where Palestinian civilians who live in Israel may resort to self-disciplining and becoming “docile” bodies by not attempting to move to Jewish neighborhoods. Bio-power is equally manifested through debates about who counts as Jewish and thus can be a member of the Israeli state, but also about the high fertility rate in the Palestinian community. As one can already see, all these relations must be read through the lens of the political relationship at hand (occupation by Israel), that creates a mixture of disciplinary and bio-powers exerted in entangled paths. Thus for example, the concern about Palestinians fertility rate for the Palestinian Authority could be both an economic and a racial/national question (i.e. we cannot feed all the citizens we have, and/or we must have more citizens to increase the strength of our nation against the Israeli occupation).

Going further, Foucault argues that differentiating between disciplinary power and biopolitics is important because it marks a significant change in the sovereign’s power over life and death through increasing the importance of a focus on life, and the sidelining of death (p. 247). Moreover, the creation of the power of regularization (such as population counting, etc) essentially changes the previous construct of the sovereign’s power as the “right to take life or let live” to “making live and letting die” (p. 247). Foucault says:

In the right of sovereignty, death was the moment of the most obvious and most spectacular manifestation of the absolute power of the sovereign; death now becomes, in contrast, the moment when the individual escapes all power […] Power no longer recognized death. Power literally ignores death (p. 248).

The above society gives the impression that no war is at stake, which is what Foucault wonders about next. Although, as I have shown above and as will become apparent throughout my work, biopolitics and disciplinary power have a strong role to play in the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians today; death has not been sidelined to the extent Foucault
describes above. On the contrary, because of the context of this conflict, and the political relationship of occupation and war, death actually gains in power and in visibility (through the public funerals of Israeli soldiers and suicide bomber victims, and in the burial process of Tashyee’ on the Palestinian side as I will show in the following chapters).

Foucault is aware that the context of war is different. He thus argues that racism, as a bio-political notion (based on biology) is the missing piece in making certain deaths invisible (1976, p. 254). Moreover, the notion of racism works together through biopower and redefines once more the sovereign power’s effect, this time as: “a relationship of war – ‘if you want to live, the other must die’” (p. 255). Therefore, killing becomes allowed through racism, and justified through a bio-political discourse on “evolution” that only gives room for the ‘most fitted’ to survive (p. 257). This is very relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where racism justifies the killing of Palestinians because they cause a threat to the development of the Jewish nation and threaten its Jewish character. Thus, war and racism are inseparable concepts.

What about death as power then? It is here where the theory of necropolitics becomes necessary for approaching my analysis. Achille Mbembe (2003) argues that war “is as much a means of achieving sovereignty as a way of exercising the right to kill” (2003, p. 12), and sees that politics as a whole is actually about death and fighting it, rather than about life and controlling it (2003, p. 20). In other words, he moves away from “only” a biopolitical notion that links killing with racism with biology and with power. Rather, he links killing with the “exercise of power outside the law,” and particularly in the colony (2003, p. 23).

Furthermore, in his analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Mbembe sees the political relationship in colonial terms which renders Palestinian territories as “colonies” where Foucault’s disciplinary and biopower work, but where there is much room for what he terms necropolitics and necropower (2003, p. 29). He explains:
If power still depends on tight control over bodies (or on concentrating them in camps), the new technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the order of the maximal economy now represented by the “massacre”. (Mbembe, 2003, p. 34).

In other words, disciplinary and biopower may still be fully functioning in the colonies, but so is a certain power that dictates death. Resistance, therefore, can be seen as assuming control and power over one’s own death (Mbembe, 2003). Mbembe moves to an analysis of suicide bombers as power over death (necropower) clearly making more room for death in Foucault’s argumentation, and showing that breaking the sovereign power of occupation can be achieved through death (control over one’s own death) (Mbembe, 2003, p. 37).

**Bodies and Nationalisms**

Central to my analysis is George Mosse’s (1985) theoretical work on European nationalisms and their relationship to the nation’s bodies, which he explores largely through the trope of sexuality. I employ Mosse’s work (1985, 1993, 1996) in two ways: as a theory that explores the nationalist ideology’s connection to human bodies; and in particular, as a necessary background for understanding the roots of modern Israeli nationalism, which I discuss below. In the following section I use Mosse’s (1985, 1993, 1996) framework to build a construction of a general modern Israeli national subject (with a focus on the relationship of masculinity to nationalism), and also employ Tamar Mayer’s (2000) work on the militarization of this subject. The joining of the two allows for the mapping of the Israeli male soldier; who is an important figure in this project. In addition, this analysis serves to create a web of meanings from which one can begin to understand the place given to killed Israeli civilians in the Israeli national narrative (explored in detail in Chapter 1). Lastly, the mapping of the Israeli subject provides an entrance point to building the Palestinian subject, which I
handle through joining Joseph Massad’s (1995, 2007) work on the history of Palestinian national subject and his use of the relevant notion of Othering.

First, Mosse is concerned with how European nationalist discourses employ ideas of sexuality and what is masculine and feminine to build the ideal male and female members of the nation (Mosse, 1985). He argues that the categories and stereotypes of the “Modern man” in Europe were born as a reaction to modernity and the radical changes it brought with it, coupled with the rise of the middle class which facilitated the normalization of these stereotypes (Mosse, 1985). This drive toward categorization put together ideas of proper behavior, manners, shape and kind of bodily features, and created a standardized version of “normal” masculinity and man, which were defined against the “abnormal” and the “other” (Mosse, 1993 and 1996). This clearly reflects Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power as located in the body.

Particularly relevant here, then, is that European nationalist movements of the 20th century took use of these constructs and built images of ideal national citizens, as well as images of threats to these ideals (Mosse, 1985). European Jews were constructed as part of the “other”, unfit citizens, who threatened the nation’s cohesion and strength (Mosse, 1993, 1996). Therefore, if the ideal citizen was white, male, built, de-eroticized, and mannered; the Jewish citizen was feminized, weak, sexually deviant, and a threat to the nation (Mosse, 1996).

Furthermore, Zionism as a national movement with an aim to realize the “Jewish State” took shape in the midst of these ongoing constructions of nationhood and its relationship to masculinity. Clearly borrowing from the dominant discourses of the nation-state, the Zionist movement pressed for the creation of an ideal Jewish citizen of the future state (Mayer, 2000). The characteristics of this new citizen, termed The New Jew, stemmed

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3 Massad’s notion of Othering stems from Edward Said’s work on Orientalism (Said, 1978).
from similar ideals of the masculine and fit Modern Man and the exemplary citizen in the new
nation state (Mosse 1993, Mayer 2000).

The New Jew would become militarized starting in the 1930s and 1940s when high
schools increasingly taught students how to “use guns and [...] self-defense techniques”
(Mayer, 2000, p. 292). Furthermore, The Holocaust directly and powerfully threatened the
erasure of Jews and the Jewish nation, and the subsequent War of Independence in 1948
underlined the vital need for strong citizens who will not allow the new nation of Israel to
seize. The notion of the existentialist threat is deeply engrained in Israeli nationalism, and has
been adopted by other discourses in the region against the state of Israel⁴. The existentialist
threat ensures the continued militarization of the modern Israeli citizen. Thus, serving in the
military is considered today a “rite of passage” both into deserved citizenship and
accomplished “manliness”; Mayer explains: “The canonization of the elite military unit
continues to date, and further marks the intense connection between militarism, masculinity,
heroism, and the Jewish nation” (Mayer, 2000, p. 293).

It is here then that we begin to see the figure of the Israeli soldier as a carrier of
national inscriptions, alongside the national civilian citizen. As I will proceed to show in the
first chapter, these ideals and inscriptions follow the figure of the soldier and the associated
national civilian citizen to the moment of death, where they are re-inscribed once more on the
material body of the soldier, and created for the previously “unknown” civilian victim.

Joseph Massad adopts the same theoretical process (that follows the creation of the
ideal and then its “other”) when examining Zionism as national movement in early Jewish
settler communities, and emphasizes the process of “Othering” using Edward Said’s (1976)
concept of Orientalism. Furthermore, Massad looks at the Othering of Oriental Jews from

⁴ Officially recognizing Israel as a state is linked to directly recognizing its “right to exist”. Many forces in the
region including Hamas for example reject this right in its charter, which thus is seen as a threat to the existence
of the Jewish nation. When Iranian President Ahmedinejad casually declared that Israel should be wiped off the
map, he was certainly adopting this discourse.
Yemen and African states by European Jews, who saw themselves as the ideal Jewish citizens in the early Israeli state (Massad, 1996). Oriental Jews were therefore constructed as savages (not mannered and controlled citizens), who are difficult to racially (and culturally) distinguish from Arabs (Massad, 1996). This process of Othering the Oriental Jews facilitates the Othering of Arabs themselves, which only grew stronger as the Arabs were pushed out of the newly-established nation’s borders.

The trope of a Palestinian national discourse emerged much later than the Israeli one. Moreover, the Palestinian national agent was heavily structured in response to a mass rupture of a supposedly unified over-arching Arab identity and nationalism particularly after the 1967 war. The 1967 war, between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Syria and Jordan on the other, was a disastrous loss to the Arab allies as they lost much land and proved that Arab unity was at an ending point. This was a key moment for the Palestinians who realized their Arab identity was no longer sufficient to resist the Israeli state, and thus, it was time to strengthen a Palestinian national discourse. More importantly, the Palestinian-resister was also created soon after 1967, after Palestinians lost hope of help from their neighbors.

Massad’s work on Palestinian national discourses (particularly that of the PLO) links gender and sexuality to nationalism in a similar fashion to that of Mosse’s, but puts it in a framework of the political relationship at hand. Thus, Massad finds that resisting occupation is defined along the lines of masculinity (this is where the figure of the Palestinian resister is created, and particularly that of the Palestinian militant resister) (Massad, 1995).
Chapter 1: Bodies and Citizenship under Construction

In this chapter I explore how the death of Palestinians and Israelis is an event that serves as a central location for Israeli and Palestinian citizenship-construction. I argue and show that through death, and in particular “being killed” by the opponent (either an Israeli or a Palestinian), bodies become reclaimed national citizens with an assigned role in Palestinian and Israeli national ideologies (and therefore, the conflict itself). In this discussion it will become apparent that the corpse alongside the moment of death are used to both create and maintain not only a particular nationalist discourse, but also religion and gender divisions, and societal “morals” connected to them. In addition, this analysis shows the centrality of discourses on gender and sexuality – in the context of death and dead bodies in particular – in sketching the appropriate form of what and who Palestinian or Israeli citizens are. After analyzing the process of making national “citizens” out of dead bodies, I move towards arguing that the body and image of a dead child is emerging as a central representative figure of Palestinian national agency (Chapter 2). The bodies of men are essential in the construction of membership in the nation here, but I also pay attention to the absence of women’s bodies (and the rare cases of their appearance) in serving the national discourse – particularly the Palestinian one.

My work is not interested in handling the concept of citizenship as I find it rather insufficient when speaking about Palestinians and Israelis. This is mainly because a Palestinian state does not exist and is not officially recognized – although Palestinians do carry IDs that label them as such. In addition, many Palestinians who are citizens of other countries (such as Jordan) still identify as Palestinians first even without any documents. The term is equally complicated in Israel, where some Palestinians actually hold Israeli citizenship and are identified as Israeli citizens, although are treated as second class citizens. Therefore, “being an Israeli” does not only include Jewish members of the community, but can include Arab Muslims and Christians. Thus, I use the term “citizen” in a rather simple format to describe membership in either the Israeli community/nation or the Palestinian one.
**Whose Body?**

**Body and Power**

When considering the body, I invoke Michel Foucault’s “body”, which he defines primarily as “object and target of power” (Foucault, 1975, p. 136). Moreover, the Foucauldian body is a site where power expresses itself through controlling and “taming” the body’s movements, expressions, and behavior – known as disciplinary power (p. 136) – as well as controlling its biological functions and capacities – known as bio-power (1976). This relationship between power and body is very evidently expressed in the examples I use in this thesis, from the figure of the Israeli soldier to the trained Palestinian militant both of whom undergo trainings that make their bodies, and what these bodies are capable of, “tamed” and “disciplined” (Foucault, 1975, p. 136-7). In addition, Israeli fears of the Palestinian “demographic bomb”6 reflect anxieties about national and Palestinian reproduction, which are then manifested in state policies and discourses, and thus are an example of bio-power.

Furthermore, power also has a special relationship with the body in the context of this conflict. For example, cases of malnutrition among Palestinians due to Israel’s economic blockade of areas such as the Gaza strip shows how colonial power is manifested directly in the body of the colonized. Likewise, the use of ammunition on Palestinian bodies is equally expressive of this relationship (Pitcher, 1998, p. 13). Linda Pitcher elaborates:

> A detailed explanation of the purpose and effects of ammunition used by Israeli soldiers elucidates the extent to which even the interior of the body cannot escape the superordinate confinement of military occupation. (Pitcher, 1998, p. 13) (Emphasis in original)

Palestinian resistance to the occupation through violence inflicted on Israeli bodies is also an example of the above relationship between body and power in this conflict. Suicide

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6 The Palestinians’ high reproduction rate in comparison to that of the Israelis has been often labeled as a weapon against Israel by both sides. The concept is particularly – but not only – relevant to the Palestinians with Israeli citizenship who have the right of political representation. The fear is that if their number increases they could become a significant bloc in Israeli politics, and thus have more power. The concern is also simply about numbers given the small geographic territory being shared.
bombers certainly aim to literally blast Israeli bodies – as well as their own – out of existence. Likewise, rockets fired from Gaza to Southern Israel aim to kill Israeli citizens, and not just inflict damage to the infrastructure. Yet, these kinds of employments of power on bodies do not usually aim at individual bodies, but rather at a “collective” of bodies, or perhaps a “collective body”. In other words, the targets are either not individualized at all (like in the case of the rockets that are simply fired at “Israelis” and “Israel”), or are in a group (for example, a group of Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint, or a group of Israeli citizens in a café). Therefore, from an armed Palestinian resistance point of view, what constitutes an Israeli body actually has less definable boundaries that somewhat expand beyond the individual material body, thereby making the relationship between power and the Israeli body somewhat vaguer and less situated in the individual Israeli body itself than the relationship between power and the Palestinian body.

**Body in Language, or Body in the Morgue?**

Judith Butler (1993) and Susan Bordo (1998) also use the Foucauldian body, yet with evident differences. Simply put, Butler is often interpreted as arguing that bodily material has history of its own and therefore a body cannot be conceptualized before language first (Butler, 1993) and (Heckman, 1998). Whereas Bordo is seen as closer to the “materiality” of the body, and is concerned with how cultural norms and values are written on the body itself through examining social phenomena such as anorexia (Bordo, 1998) and (Heckman, 1998).

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7 The Israeli military also does not always treat Palestinian targets as individuals, this point applies mostly to the use of ammunition which can be seen as targeting particular places in the body of the Palestinian (joints, head, etc), and are not as random. Palestinians throwing stones, or firing rockets, do not have the same degree of targeting.

8 Michel Foucault argues that the invention of the rifle contributed to the disciplining of bodies as well, particularly when speaking of soldiers. Foucault says the rifle “gave greater value to the soldier’s skill; more capable of reaching a particular target, it made it possible to exploit fire-power at an individual level” (1975, p. 163). Foucault shows that the type of weapons used – as a method of exerting power – actually plays a major role in the definition of a body and its borders.
Considering both views highlights a concern, one that Caroline Bynum phrases as the issue of “the body dissolving into language” (Bynum, 1995, p. 1). Moreover, although she argues there is no one single concept of a body, Bynum expresses concern over the disappearance of “bodiliness”, or literally the flesh, from the writings and talks about the body (p. 2-8). Bynum clarifies that “in much of [feminist theory] writing, body refers to speech acts or discourse” (p. 4). The tricky part here is of course the question of essentialism; once we approach the body materially we risk falling into essentialist-based understandings of it (p. 28). Furthermore, Lori Allen (2009) echoes Bynum’s emphasis on the material body particularly in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and argues that Palestinians hold on to that approach because it gives a sort of a basis for communicating their struggle with the rest of the world:

Although many academics in the last quarter of the 20th century may have rejected any notion of the body existing prior to social and semiotic categories (of gender, sex, and skin color), it is exactly this conception of the presocial body – and therefore, of the body that exists before or outside of social divisions – that Palestinians strive to hold on to. Theirs is an effort at creating intersubjectivity, conveying the force of the blow, and insisting on the humanity they share with their interlocutors. With the bodies of the martyred dead and injured, they show that they belong to the same sympathy-deserving category of the human. (Allen, 2009, p. 172)

My work here depends on and starts with the materiality of the body and hopes to bring the “bodiliness” in as well, even if briefly. Yet much of my analysis will move to approach the body discursively, as I am concerned with how the bodily material becomes a national subject, which is a process of inscription.

In approaching the body and being conscious of the essentialist question, Bynum brings in the body that dies and argues that it is the moment of death which had been largely neglected by theorists that expands our view of the body beyond labels of sex and gender, and therefore provokes more questions about the construction of identity (Bynum, 1995). A similar position can be read from Allen’s quote above that includes both the dead and alive
(“martyred and injured”) as subjects with subject positions. In this sense, I agree with Bynum on the centrality of the moment of death in constructing identity, and I will show how the event of death is absolutely pivotal to the construction of a national identity in the form of Palestinian and Israeli citizen and martyr.

It is important to emphasize that I do not use just any “body that dies” (Bynum, 1995), but specifically bodies that are perceived to have been killed as a direct or indirect result of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Because of the reason of death, these bodies become Israeli “sacrificed” citizens and Palestinian “martyrs” of the nation after the moment of killing. Among these are Israeli victims of suicide bombings, Israeli soldiers killed in combat (and sometimes natural death), Palestinian civilians killed in Israel’s military attacks, Palestinian civilians who die as a result of occupation (for example: being prevented from reaching a hospital by Israeli checkpoints), Palestinian militia members including Hamas members, and lastly, Palestinian children.

**Discourses at play**

There are multiple discourses that work together and compete during the construction of a Palestinian or Israeli citizen at the event of death. These include the Palestinian and Israeli national discourses, the Jewish and Muslim religious discourses, and a Medical discourse that rests upon the belief in medicine and doctors as sources of truth. A forth discourse is the international community’s view of the conflict, particularly in Human Rights terms, and as expressed by multiple transnational NGOs and government bodies including organizations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations. All these discourses are heavily interlinked and work either in collaboration or opposition, and it is through tracing some of the shifts in their dialogues where I argue one can begin to see the changes in the construct of the Palestinian citizen in particular after the Gaza invasion.
Further, in both of the Israeli and the Palestinian national discourses the civilian’s body obtains a new meaning and a privileged status only after the moment of killing, and is granted that meaning through the act of death. This is reflective of Katherine Verdery’s (1999) argument that civilian bodies or “regular folk” are as necessary to a construction of a national past and identity as the remains of famous leaders although non-famous bodies serve to highlight different values or beliefs about a national identity than bodies of politicians for example (Verdery, 1999). Verdery explains:

Other ways of accomplishing this reevaluation involve reburying or otherwise drawing attention to the nameless, known only to their families, friends, and neighbors. Through them, not individual/national biographies but entire social categories are deposited or associated with different sets of values. (Verdery, 1999, p. 20)

Along the same lines of logic, although a Palestinian civilian and a suicide bomber are both “martyrs” after death, they still send two very different messages that “martyrdom” itself allows for: the civilian highlights the injustice of “being killed” and still labels it as a resistance, whereas the suicide-bomber highlights the necessity of armed resistance in the fight against Israeli occupation. Both of these meanings cater to maintaining the construction of the Palestinian “homeland” as an unjustly occupied place longing for liberation, and Palestinians as unjustly victimized and occupied people in a constant struggle.

Similarly, the bodies of an Israeli civilian and a soldier are both re-appropriated as sacrifices for the nation: the killed civilian underscores the victimhood and the need for self-defense, and a killed soldier justifies the need to continue protecting Israel’s independence and security. To further illustrate the process of re-appropriation of Israeli/Jewish bodies into national narratives, I review the connection between the national and religious discourses in the Israeli case, and turn to Meira Weiss’s (2001) research on Israeli bodies that were killed in two suicide bombings in Israel in the mid nineties.
Israel’s national bodies

The body of an Israeli soldier is seen differently from that of an Israeli civilian killed in a suicide bombing although both represent the national citizen (Weiss, 2001, p. 47). The soldier is seen as the protector of the nation prior to his death, whereas the Israeli civilian does not have this status prior to death, and only reaches the position of a “sacrificed” citizen when killed by a Palestinian. Moreover, Weiss explains this is because “wartime transforms individual bodies into social bodies” (p. 55), thus, the body of the Israeli citizen is taken over by a national discourse and reclaimed as a national “sacrifice” for the continued liberty and independence of Israel, in a similar fashion to that of the soldier’s (p. 54-56).

In her analysis Weiss shows how the flesh and body parts become integral locations on which national Israeli identity is written and “inscribed” (p. 37). Nationalist, religious, and medical discourses collaborate and compete to create and maintain an identity and attach it to the bodily remains: if the remains are Jewish then they are used to serve the nationalist discourse (p. 47).

In addition, if the body remains are found to belong to a soldier, the process of handling them changes so as to inscribe another part of the nationalist discourse on the appropriate body, which in this case privileges soldiers with a higher respect, and requires that their bodies not be dissected for any reason at all and “untouched” (p. 47-48). Soldiers are already privileged national agents and symbols, and obtain some of this status from the religious discourse, because of the Judaic notion of “Sacrifice”:

In modern Israel, the biblical legacy of Abraham serves as a paradigm for times when Israelis must risk their lives and the lives of their children for the preservation of their faith and people. The Sacrifice provides a cultural stamp through which Israeli existence is perceived. It is a very selective adoption of Jewish symbolism by the contemporary Israeli establishment. (Weiss, 2001, p. 54-55)

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9 In Weiss’ work we can also see how the collected remains are put together to construct an individual unit that represents one body (and especially in the case of the soldiers, whose remains are holier than the rest).
Tamar Mayer sees such religious connotations as tools to link soldiers and their mission with a higher cause, and thereby “men become God-like in their military endeavors” (Mayer, 2000, p. 297). However, Israeli national discourse also operates somewhat separately from the Jewish discourse if we take into account non-Jewish soldiers. For example, Youssef Mouadi who was a member of the Druze faith – a separate branch of Islam adopted by some Arabs – and a soldier in the IDF, was killed during the Gaza invasion by friendly fire. The friendly fire does not appear to have taken away from his status as a “fallen” and “sacrificed” soldier, and an Israeli TV news report of his funeral shows a combination of a military funeral with Druze burial customs (Nouakchottguy, 2009). Moreover, Mouadi’s casket was draped in the Israeli flag, and uniformed IDF soldiers were present to fire the honoring shots. At the same time, a group of religious men led a prayer over Mouadi’s body in Arabic reciting Islamic phrases and Druze prayer gestures (Ibid). Thus, although the category of the “Israeli soldier” gains its special status from the Jewish religious discourse, it appears to still award its status to whomever falls under that category (both in life and death).

Furthermore, it is in the forensic institute– where the remains are first brought in – that the national “borders” between who counts as an Israeli and who as a Palestinian, who is “only” a Jewish civilian citizen and who is a soldier-citizen are re-written on the remains (Weiss, 2001, p. 54). During the same time, the media and politicians use their power to drive the nationalist discourse of the “fallen” bodies for the nation; and the religious discourse of the “sacrificed” bodies who gave their life for its survival (p. 54).

The challenges this bodily material poses however are many, one of which is how to tell an Arab male from a Jewish male if both are circumcised and share a similar skin tone. Another is certainly how to tell an Arab female from a Jewish one if neither or both are veiled. These questions point to the limits of using the already-inscribed history on bodily
material as a source of truth and information, which is a tension in the process of construction that will resurface again in this discussion.

What I find particularly striking and specific to the Israeli national body, however, is the amount of detail, care, and attention, described by Weiss that is paid to ensuring that the body is given its material history back (i.e. identified as Jewish, soldier, or civilian), and constructed as an individual both through being put in one bundle, and having one coffin. In his discussion of missing Israeli soldiers and their burying and commemoration processes, Danny Kaplan adds to this point and shows that anonymous bodies do not quite exist in Israeli national narratives, and that even if they are “unknown”, they are not treated as such (Kaplan, 2008, p. 416). Kaplan explains that “commemoration rituals for war dead present a notable example of the process whereby one’s fellow citizens, technically anonymous strangers, are transformed into friends” which is necessary to “reproduce an emotional bond among citizens that is central to the nation-state” (p. 414).

**Palestinian national bodies**

Palestinian national and religious discourses also draw differences among the killed bodies based on their identities prior to death, and also their method of death. Moreover, for the Muslim religious discourse the body of a Palestinian suicide bomber differs from that of the dead Palestinian civilian, even though both are considered a “martyr”. Furthermore, although they both gain the status of a martyr, the difference is that the suicide bomber builds toward gaining that status (through becoming affiliated with a particular militant group, and eventually participating in an “operation”), whereas the Palestinian civilian does not have that goal of working towards achieving martyrdom. Thus, in this sense, the civilian body gives the impression that it has no meaning until the moment of its death. The emphasis on “being killed” is very important, a martyr in mainstream Sunni Islam is someone who had been killed in battle (and some interpretations include someone who has been killed unjustly, or at no
fault of their own). This required a re-definition to include suicide bombers, who are not killed, but who kill themselves, and thus commit suicide, which is a crime under Islamic law.

In order for killing to be accepted then, it has to be reconstructed in terms of “sacrifice for the nation”. Here is where we see an intersection with a militant Palestinian national discourse that rests upon the idea of resisting occupation by defending the land, and sacrificing oneself for the liberation of the nation.

Furthermore, the remains of Palestinians who were killed either by Israeli raids or in confrontation are constructed as martyrs of the nation through first dying itself, and second in burying rituals. Thus, any Palestinian Muslim, whether practicing or not, who has been killed by the Israeli military is labeled as a martyr and undergoes the proper religious processes of burial for a martyr, which include not washing the body because a martyr’s blood is considered pure (as opposed to someone who died of natural causes, whose body must be washed); and being buried in the clothes they have died in (as opposed to pieces of white cloth)\textsuperscript{10}. The body then must be buried within a day, and is carried by masses of men only to its final resting place in a process called \textit{tashyee’}.

In short, what happens in the burial rituals, then, is that as soon as the moment and reason for death are identified (i.e.: body is identified as having been killed, which first requires witnesses before requiring the medical discourse to show how the body has been killed) the process of identity construction is taken over by a both nationalist and religious discourses, and is enacted by the witnesses themselves, families, doctors, and political organizations.

This appropriation is perhaps most evident in the breaking of the second rule, where the now “martyrs” are frequently \textit{not} kept in their original clothes, but either wrapped in white

\textsuperscript{10} These are largely Sunni based rules of barrier that do have a diversity across the Muslim world. This raises questions on how and when are Christian Arabs are considered martyrs, and if their burial processes include similar nationalist use of discourse.
cloth, with mostly an added Palestinian flag, and/or the national Palestinian Kufiyeh, and/or a flag of one of the brigades or political factions. The first rule is also sometimes broken when the face of the deceased is cleaned (which is the only part of the body that shows).

In my opinion, these changes in the processes of burial reflect a dialogue between the Muslim religious discourse and the Palestinian nationalist discourse that has very visibly re-appropriated the moment of death and the burial processes to advance its ideology, which is similar to the above mentioned Israeli national bodies. Furthermore, the changes certainly reflect nationalist propaganda that is not aimed only for the Palestinians themselves, and/or as an opposition to Israeli occupation, but for the eye of the international community as well who is watching from their home TV screens usually. Thus, it is telling that both breaks in the rules are heavily related to the construction of the image of the body on public display: the face is still used as an identifier or marker for the remains and a representative of the “humanness” (Allen, 2009) and “bodiliness” of that which lies in the colored cloths, and the white cloths claim the remains as Palestinian and Muslim. Therefore, the communicating of the “martyr” image and the political message of a collective resistance to the occupation coupled with anger and grief, is best done at the public accompanying of the dead body to its grave, or what is called tashyee’ (which is indeed what has frequently gained the attention of international media given that protests often happen during or after the public trip, and that often political militia members appear in the crowd with black masks and guns). What is most relevant here is that the tashyee’ is not a religiously inscribed duty, but rather a societal collective activity that has been taken over by a Palestinian nationalist discourse.

Finally, one can trace the use of a medical discourse as the source of knowledge and truth in images of these same bodies, where the causes of death (bullet or burns) are purposefully made visible. This kind of image is often prevalent during large-scale Israeli attacks such as the 2009 Gaza invasion and the 2006 Lebanon attacks. Many of the images
coming from Gaza were taken in hospitals, and sometimes with doctors carrying the dead bodies (in case of children or teenagers). The effect is to not only add legitimacy to Palestinian civilian claims that they have been targeted unjustly, but also to criticize Israel’s disproportionate use of military power on civilians (which is also made most evident by the large number of images of dead children). This construction relies on anonymity of the body (Allen, 2009, p. 172), which is contrast to the Israeli national principle of “no anonymous bodies” discussed above, and aims to communicate a message of sympathy and grief, but also of shock (Allen, 2009).

Where are the Women?

The fact it is only men who are allowed to accompany the body has meanings both in the religious discourse and the nationalist one. In a simple sense, the inability to participate in the construction of these images in the funeral shows that mainstream understandings of Sunni religious rules of sex-segregation (alongside social customs) must be maintained even in the event of death. It also shows that Palestinian women are not national agents in the same way as men. Joseph Massad reaches this conclusion and pushes it by tracing the disqualification of the Palestinian female as a national agent to the creation of the state of Israel where Palestine, the land, was raped, and therefore disqualified from making legitimate children (Massad, 1995, p. 472). Massad argues that “territory was replaced by paternity”, which means that women’s role in discourses of nationalism becomes seen as “secondary and supportive” (Massad, 1995, p. 472). What Massad missed however, are the times when women do indeed take up national positions usually reserved for men. In this context, this includes female militant fighters, and ones who strive for achieving the state of martyrdom through a suicide bombing mission, but not killed adult female civilians.
Moreover, Massad brings reproduction into the picture and redefines it as a masculine duty (men become responsible for ensuring the nation survives) thereby arguing that “Palestinianess” is always conceived in masculinist terms (1995). Massad therefore puts forth an image of overarching masculinity when speaking of Palestinian nationalism, which Simona Sharoni complicates in her work on “Gendered Identities in Conflict: The Israeli-Palestinian Case and beyond” (Sharoni, 1995). In her analysis of rape Sharoni successfully argues that discourses on Palestinian women who have been survivors of rape by Israelis have been changing in a way that redefines women as active agents of resistance to occupation in the context of the Intifadas (Sharoni, 1995). This is important because it allows for conceptualizing Palestinian female agency that is based on redefining female sexuality. At the same time, however, it is evident here that female sexuality is still appropriated by a nationalist discourse, and issues of rape were only brought up in the context of resistance to Israeli occupation. In other words, this discussion of national female agency – which Massad constructs alongside reproductive roles and Sharoni alongside female sexuality – is in the context of living female subjects. The question then is if it is handled differently in the case of dead female subjects.

The immediate answer upon first impression is that yes, sex and gender segregation rules do apply at the moment of death (of adults) as well. In every single website that I have visited, images of a *tashyee*’ of a Palestinian woman were almost non-existent, with a couple of notable exceptions that I will analyze below. However, numbers of women killed in the Gaza invasion of 2008/2009 are recorded, and news reports do mention these statistics. For example, B’Tselem’s report on the same invasion divides the casualties in accordance with gender, age, and “combatant” status, and reports that 107 women over the age of 18 were killed in the Israeli attacks (B’Tselem, 2009, p.1). It appears, therefore, that Palestinian women killed in Israeli attacks do not receive a public *tashyee*. But why the absence?
If we adopt Massad’s (1995) framework of tracing female national agency to the reproductive role, the explanation for leaving women out of a public *tashyee’* would be that by showing them as dead reproducers of the nation (and dead reproducers of the nation’s defenders), then a rather serious threat to the nation’s very existence is communicated. In addition, a failure of the already-masculinized national agent to “defend” the nation and “its” reproducers is also communicated. Therefore, the national discourse is evidently in charge of maintaining its ideology in place and does so by aligning itself with religious rules and cultural expectations on sex-segregation and thus, keeping the women out of this particular construct.

This argument is upheld if we analyze the rare *tashyee’s* that are in fact depicted publically. One case is particularly relevant here. It is that of 60-year old Mariam Ayyad, who was reportedly killed by Israeli soldiers while attempting to protect a number of Palestinian students living in the same building as her from being arrested in the West Bank (Atallah, 2008). The three discourses immediately took effect: first, the medical discourse intervened to confirm the cause of death, which was determined to be a break in the skull caused by the Israeli soldiers who pushed Ayyad to the ground (Al Quds City, 2008). Second, the religious discourse was also present in the burial procedure, which included wrapping Ayyad in white burial cloths, and dubbing her as the “Martyr of the last ten days [of Ramadan]” (Atallah, 2008). Third, the Palestinian national discourse was also in full effect as the picture shows Ayyad warped in a yellow flag belonging to a Palestinian political faction (Atallah, 2008). Furthermore, a video from Ayyad’s *tashyee’* shows a group of men carrying her body and chanting Islamic verses (SREAH86, 2008). How is it explicable then that a body of a female is carried by men and constructed as a national martyr?

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11 The last ten days of Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting, are believed to be the holiest. In addition, mainstream Sunni Islam believes that anyone who dies in Ramadan automatically goes to heaven.
In my opinion, Ayyad was able to be constructed as a national martyr precisely because of her being perceived as lacking the major female contribution to the struggle: more children. In other words, her age allows for the assumption that she is no longer a female national symbol as she cannot bear children. The contradiction however is that her death is spoken about in terms of a “wedding” (which is also repeated in the case of female suicide bombers) (Atallah, 2008). Her son is quoted as saying: “The Quran did not leave her hand, she earned martyrdom, yesterday was a true wedding for her; she was martyred in the last ten days of Ramadan and close to the Aqsa mosque” (Atallah, 2008). A wedding is a symbol of celebration, which is often applied to narratives on martyrdom to make it a death that is “celebrated” and distinguish it from regular death (which is to be mourned). The symbol is particularly powerful when speaking about young martyrs (women and men), because marriage is seen (socially and religiously) as a duty, a privilege and a bliss, all of which the young martyrs – and especially the suicide bombers – “gave up”. However, Ayyad was not young nor single. As a matter of fact, she was portrayed as a grandmother and mother in the reports (with adult children) and not as a figure that has given up the prime years of her youth to achieve martyrdom. Therefore, in my opinion, it is her age and reproductive status that allowed her to be included in this area of Palestinian national symbology, and allowed her to receive a public tashyee’.

Women Suicide Bombers

There have been a few women suicide bombers in Palestinian history that continue to be celebrated as Martyrs. Most of these women conducted their operations between 2002 and 2008; during the second Palestinian Intifada\(^\text{12}\). The majority of these women were single and

young, with the exception of Reem Riyashi, a married mother of two, and Fatema al-Najjar age 57 (La Voz De Aztlan, 2010) and (al-Fateh, 2007). These women are very visible in the discourses on martyrdom; from news articles, blogs, and videos, to street namings, they are well known in the Palestinian national discourse and are often represented together and commonly dubbed as the “Brides of Palestine”\textsuperscript{13}.

Moreover, their representation is certainly more frequent and more visible than that of the civilian female martyrs. A part of this is due, once again, to the difference between a suicide bomber and a civilian victim in the intention of death. However, because of the nature of their death – a suicide bombing inside Israel – it appears that their bodies do not receive a public \textit{tashyee'}\textsuperscript{14}, yet they are still made very visible in the national discourse.


\textsuperscript{14} During my research I could not find any images or videos from a \textit{tashyee’} of a female suicide bomber.
Chapter 2: The Innocent Palestinian Martyr Child

Close to midnight on Dec. 29th 2008, the second day of the Israeli Operation Cast Lead, three missiles struck the house of Balousha family in the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza, killing five of their daughters as they were asleep, and injuring both parents and their remaining three children (Macintyre & Ghazali, 2008, para.1-2). All five sisters, ages between 4 and 17, were taken to a hospital nearby, where pictures were taken of them as they lay wrapped in white cloth on the morgue’s metal boards in preparation for burial (para.3). Next morning thousands of Palestinians would come out in a massive tashyee’ to accompany the family on its way to bury its daughters and denounce Israel’s bombing, which Israel claimed was meant for a nearby mosque where Hamas members were present (para.6).

The story received much local and international publicity, and multiple pictures of the dead sisters’ bodies, their families, and their tashyee’, were circulated in local and international media. Similar stories would fill the media in subsequent days as the number of civilian casualties rose, with particular attention to the bodies of children. By the end of the operation various NGOs published the number of killed civilians and attentively noted the number of children in their statistics. Among others, B’Tselem, a Human Rights NGO based in Israel, reported that among the 1,385 Palestinians killed, “318 were minors under age 18” (B’Tselem, 2009, para. 1).

In this chapter I aim to further explore how the process of reclaiming the child’s body as a Palestinian national symbol occurs, particularly in the context of the Gaza invasion. I argue that in the midst of national, religious, and medical discourses; and considering primarily the two moments and processes of construction outlined in the previous chapter (moment of discovery, and burial); the dead Palestinian Child falls in as a perfect carrier of nationalist inscriptions. Moreover, the image of the Child masks or makes irrelevant gender
differences which has the effect of maintaining an idea of a single national representative subject in which Palestinian men and women can feel represented, and also creating a symbol that can communicate the Palestinian struggle to a wider and more internationalized audience (because it relies on an international discourse of childhood as will be explained). This is important because it shows a shift in the use of Palestinian national symbols (i.e. the forwarding of the Dead Child as a central Palestinian national figure, particularly in the context of the Gaza invasion). In this sense, the child becomes a renewed and redefined national symbol that I label as the “Innocent Palestinian Martyr Child”.

In making the dead child a national symbol, a similar construction process as the one outlined in the previous chapter for the adult martyred bodies occurs, which I will further examine here. However, there are also a few nuanced differences that in my opinion serve to place and construct the child as the renewed national symbol. In the following section I follow this process of construction.

**Making Room for the Child: Fitting the Child into the Discourses**

In order for the dead child’s body to get reclaimed as a symbol and a member of the nation, he/she must be fitted into the three main discourses that construct the adult bodies as national ones: the medical discourse (includes local and international doctors working in Palestinian hospitals), the mainstream Sunni religious discourse, and a generalized Palestinian national discourse (not specific to Hamas or Fatah\(^\text{15}\)). In addition, ideas about a child’s sexuality play an important role in maintaining the child as a unifying symbol, as I will explain below.

\(\text{15}\) Gaza is mainly ruled by Hamas, but there are a few factions in Gaza itself that are considered militant organized groups. Sometimes these groups – such as Islamic Jihad – also reclaim the dead bodies as their own by placing their own flags on them. This happens when the killed person is known to be a member of that group, but sometimes in the cases of children, these groups might put their flags on anyway and lead the *tashyee’* as a political rally.
1. Medical discourse
First, the medical authority is called upon by the Palestinian nationalist discourse as is the case with the adult martyred bodies, to reaffirm the method of death, which means confirming that the children have been killed, if necessary. In Balousha’s case, the cause of death (and therefore killing) was the bombing of their house, and no further details were necessary (such as if the girls died because of suffocation, or bleeding, etc). To add legitimacy, the pictures taken at the hospital’s morgue were still circulated and considered, alongside images from the tashyee’, as the primary caption of the entire event\(^{16}\) (see Picture 1). Thus, the medical discourse is used to confirm the death/killing, which is then used as basis for building the “martyr” label.

The most noticeable difference in cases of children’s bodies that I see is that there was a larger appeal to the medical authority (by the Palestinian national discourse) in the Child’s construction as “martyr”. This was evident through the repeatedly particular focus on describing the precise method of killing if available. In general, the voice of the medical discourse has been called upon to provide proof and legitimacy to claims of Israeli violence committed against Palestinian bodies as was seen in the previous chapter. With rising local and international allegations against Israel accusing it of using unconventional weapons that amount to committing war crimes, the medical voice was vital for making the bodies speak of the violence committed against them and providing “medical proof” that the wounds are excessive. For example, in an Aljazeera English article a German and a Norwegian\(^{17}\) doctor were quoted as announcing the appearance of a new weapon (fatal bullet) they have observed

\(^{16}\) For example, The Independent’s cover picture was from the morgue (Independent, 2008), the Telegraph’s was from the tashyee’ (Amoore & Knellm 2009) Pictures from other moments, such as from the burial itself, were very rare if non-existant. In addition, multiple blogs reposted the main picture taken in the hospital’s morgue.

\(^{17}\) The fact these doctors are international usually has the effect of serving as a more reasonable and believable voice of authority.
in injured bodies of Palestinians throughout the 3-week invasion (Aljazeera English, 2009). Similarly, an article in The Telegraph covering the injuries some Gaza children suffered during the Israeli invasion quoted primarily medical professionals as they described in length the types of bullets, their entrance points, and effects they had on the bodies of the children (Amoore & Knell, 2009).

Furthermore, if the cause of death was not a clear bullet hole for example, the medical discourse still served its purpose of providing legitimacy by being present in the discourse, through pictures for example – such as in the pictures taken in the hospitals morgues. A particularly striking example of this is a picture of two Palestinian doctors in white coats carrying two dead Palestinian children in their arms (see Picture 4). The children have blood stains on their clothes but it is unclear how they died. However, the observer knows the children have been killed, because of the blood on the one hand, but also because the doctors are not rushing, and rather walking down the hallway to deliver the bodies either to the family or the morgue. In short, more attention is paid to the body of the child itself and the event of its death. Therefore, in the cases of children, pictures of wounds, burns, or bullet holes, alongside doctors’ and medical personnel’s statements and presence in the pictures, are used to “prove” that the death was in fact a “killing” (McGreal, 2004).

This is important because a proof of a “deliberate killing” allows the body to be constructed as a martyr, while at the same time, turning the international community’s gaze toward the scope of brutality committed against Palestinians (which is particularly horrific when seen through the bodies of children). This has multiple effects discussed in the in the section below on the international gaze.

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18 Similar stories about the kinds of weapons used against Palestinians are usually communicated by the medical authorities
19 See for example the Guardian’s article “Palestinian Doctors Despair At Rising Toll Of Children Shot Dead By Israeli Army Snipers”, May 20th, 2004. The article includes a number of statements from doctors describing bullet wounds that killed or injured children (McGreal, 2004) .
2. Religious discourse

Second, the religious principles related to the treatment of dead bodies, and specifically dead female bodies and burial procedures of martyrs also apply immediately. Like their adult countertypes, children’s bodies are not washed if they are killed, and are either buried in their own clothes or in white cloth and/or a Palestinian national garment (kufiyeh or flag). For example, the five Balousha sisters were left in their original clothes, and then wrapped in the white burial attire. The differences begin to emerge if we consider the inclusion of female-sexed bodies in the images of the Martyr Child. Moreover, only the youngest sister, Jawaher, has her hair showing (age 4), 3 of the sisters have only their faces showing with their hair covered for what appears to be a reflection of the veiling custom in Sunni Muslim tradition, and one is fully covered. It is generally agreed upon that the practice of veiling in Sunni Islam is done once the female reaches puberty; however, some families choose to veil their daughters at a younger age. The fact that Jawaher (4) does not have her hair covered, and her 8 year-old sister does, begs for an explanation. It is possible that the 8 year-old reached puberty early, and it is also possible that the family has its own age-marker for veiling.

However, Jawaher not being veiled falls into the “innocent martyr child” image neatly, because by not being veiled she is at once confirmed as a Child (not adult) since she does not “require” veiling. Her female gender is thus ignored, which as I argue above helps make her a less specific category (of “female”, as opposed to her sisters) but rather an overarching symbol that represents a general “human” – but not just any human, a “Child” and a “Palestinian” as we will see. Moreover, adult women are largely absent from these circulated images, and if females appear, it is in the form of a child. The question is then, who is a child?

The religious discourse recognizes females as adults earlier than most of internationally recognized laws, and therefore, the religious discourse cannot explain why

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20 There are two versions of the picture one in which the older sister’s face is showing, and one in which she is fully wrapped.
these pictures of 3 or 4 “adult” females are present. The paradox is that the religious discourse identifies them as adults through the veiling, but at the same time joins with the national discourse to identify them as children through emphasizing they are under 18. In this sense, the veiled sisters fall into a gray zone, a place between religious adulthood and international/national childhood. In my opinion, this problem is not necessarily resolved as much as it is sidelined through the amount of attention paid to Jawaher as the main representative of the sisters. Not only is she placed in the middle on top of her 4 sisters, but in two more pictures she is seen as “paraded” by her relative as he holds her above his head facing a large crowd. Thus, she remains unveiled (despite the fact her 8 year old sister is), emphasizing her joint childhood status under both religious and national/international law.

In addition, some of the sisters have their names taped to the middle of their bodies, with the most visible one being Jawaher’s label, that reads “The martyred Jawaher Anwar Balousha”\(^\text{21}\). Wrapping the body in white cloth could possibly call into question the martyrdom itself, which is what the label serves to reaffirm in part, but as discussed in the previous chapter, it is an increasingly prevalent “break” of the burial rules for martyrs. Thus, Jawaher now is not only a Palestinian “killed” child, but a Muslim martyr Palestinian child. Being represented as a Muslim Martyr has an appeal to the larger Muslim world, and not just the Arab one. In fact, dead Christian children are never visible as “Christian”, which raises the question if they are visible at all.

\section*{3. Palestinian National discourse}

Lastly, the national discourse is already functioning with the use of the religious word “Martyr” and the construction of Jawaher as a gender-less child to represent all [Muslim] national citizens, but gains full strength during the tashyee’ which essentially becomes a political rally. Like the adult martyrs, the bodies of the children are sometimes covered with

\^21 My translation
Hamas flags, and political slogans denouncing Israel are shouted alongside some religious phrases. For example, what is telling of the nationalist discourse take over the bodies, is that the pictures from the moments after the Balousha sisters were taken out of the morgue include the bodies of the sisters as wrapped in green Hamas flags on top of the white cloths (see Picture 2). What was more telling however, is that the family’s uncle denounced Hamas for politicizing the tashyee’ and felt it was turned into an anti-Israel rally (Macintyre & Ghazali, 2008, para. 10)22.

4. Child’s sexuality

What is central to the use of the image of the child by Palestinian nationalist discourses is the perceived asexuality of the child. With the rise of the Arab nationalist discourse in the end of the 19th century; the Arab Modernist Project aimed to restore its history and civilization in what Massad sees as the “context of a declining Turkish Empire and surging Turkish nationalism, [and] Arab Renaissance in full swing.” (Massad, 2007, p. 53-55). Further, Similarly to Mosse (1985), Massad argues that the question of sexuality and proper sexual conduct was linked with morality in this context of trying to write history and being faced with the Abbasid period’s sexual texts, in addition to being affected by Orientalist perceptions and Victorian values (Massad, 2007, p. 53-55). If we follow Massad’s thesis, then once sexuality is linked with morality, proper behavior and sexual practices are defined, which must include women’s sexuality and reproduction. Such morality also includes ideas about children and their proper sexual conduct. In his works on sex as a discourse of knowledge and power, and sexuality as a “transfer point for relations of power”, Michel Foucault argues that a child’s sexuality became linked with improper behavior and morality, which caused an obsession with keeping a watchful eye on the child and ensuring it would not

22 Although notions of pan-Arabism are still used to drum up support for the Palestinian national cause, they are not present at all in Palestinian representations of their own dead children.
display any kind of sexual conduct (Foucault, 1978, p. 103-104). Therefore, a child is
differentiated from an adult in the sense that it is not supposed to have any sexual desire,
which in turn ensures the labeling of any sexual activity between an adult and a child as
something not only punishable by law, but also as unwanted by the child (Foucault,
Hocquenghem, Danet, & Hahn, 1978 and 1979)23. In this sense, a child is directly linked to
purity and morality, making the child an asexual being, and part of an innocent and
“vulnerable population”, that must be protected by the adult population (Foucault,

How do, then, the child’s asexuality, morality, and innocence apply to the Innocent
Martyr Palestinian Child? First, it is the child’s perceived asexuality (both in the context of
Arab morality and what Massad (2007) terms “Victorian-informed” morality) that renders its
image so pure and innocent, and thus underscores that its death is unjustified, which feeds
directly into Palestinian national (and anti-colonial) discourses that aim to communicate the
injustice of the Israeli occupation and the validity of their struggles. In addition, the child’s
killing is constructed as the ultimate red-line by Hamas, and is used as legitimate justification
for crossing the same ultimate red-line and labeling it as justified resistance to the Israeli
occupation and invasion.

Second, it is only in the Child’s image that we are allowed to bring in a female body
as constitutive of a legitimate civilian (non-suicide bomber) national agent similar in status to
the male adult martyr. This is based on establishing a link between sexuality and gender, and
presuming if the gendered body is not sexual then it is not gendered. Alternatively, perhaps
one way to explain the validity of the presence of a female body is by claiming that a body’s
identity as a killed Palestinian body is paramount to its gender, but only insofar as it is

23 Original citation: published in: Michel Foucault: politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writings.
Ed. by Lawrence D. Kritzman. (New York: Routledge, 1988). Translated by Alan Sheridan, with the title
"Sexuality Morality and the Law.

36
identifiable as a child. Thus, the body’s identity as a Child is absolutely central in this case, which brings back the tension that the religious discourse has with displaying a female body, and thus its need to attempt to resolve it by creating it as a child to fulfill the national discourse’s need in advancing its ideology under national events (invasion of Gaza, and occupation). In addition, the image of the child thus has the potential to create a unifying effect where women and men can both see themselves as national agents through it (after all, a child is also considered a “product” that men and women “create together”). In other words, the child, and specifically the Martyr Muslim Palestinian Child, creates the space for women and men to participate in claiming national agency.

To sum up, the differences between constructing the bodies of adults and those of children serve multiple purposes, all of which join to create the image of the Innocent Martyred [Muslim] Child as a national Palestinian symbol. I now elaborate on how these images of “innocence” alongside “childhood” are maintained, and appealed to, in the international community’s gaze.

**International Discourse and the International Community’s Gaze**

The images of the Israeli invasion on Gaza quickly spread across international media, and many of them included pictures of injured or killed children in addition to those of adults. Protests and rallies quickly spread in various cities across the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The images and slogans used in these rallies denounced Israel for its attacks, and particularly for its brutality against children.

**Suffering and the “Politics of Immediation”**

In her analysis of Palestinian national discourse and representations during the second Intifada, Lori Allen argues that the Human Rights (HR) discourse coupled with local and international media “have transformed the way Palestinians represent themselves to each
other and to the international community” (Allen, 2009, p. 161). I argue this is certainly true after the Gaza invasion as well, given the emergence of the Child as a central national figure. More specifically, Allen sees that the Palestinian national agent relies heavily on representations related to “the sympathy-deserving suffering human” (p.162) to create what she called a “politics of immediation”\(^{24}\) through which the Palestinian’s plight for justice is communicated to the international community (Allen, 2009, p. 161-163). She elaborates:

> This contest which uses visual proof of damaged bodies and images of human suffering as primary tools, remains central to Palestinian nationalist representations. Through a focus on bodies and the blood, guts, and flesh to which so many are reduced to by Israeli violence, the physical common denominators all human beings share are thrust before the world’s eyes. Palestinians are staging claims to a humanity shared in common with the international community, and therefore, to their status as deserving of human rights. They are condemning Israeli immorality and, simultaneously proclaiming the righteous nature of their own victimization. Their argument hinges on what counts as proof of suffering and on the presumed connections between suffering and political entitlement. (Allen, 2009: 162)

Although Allen focuses mostly on the notion of suffering as a medium for communication and deriving sympathy from the international community, I see this politics of immediation as taking a different shape in the Gaza invasion context. Not to be misunderstood, I do see the notion of suffering as majorly central to the Palestinian national discourse, but I see it as central to the discourse of the living Palestinians. Images of dead children still contribute to the suffering of living Palestinians of course, but I argue that in the Child’s image the focus was not as much on the pain of the loss, as much as it was on the fact there is a targeted and “killed” child. Therefore, the suffering and pain form a background as the pictures repeatedly made the dead child’s body the central focus in representative images of the Gaza invasion.

Pictures of relatives crying and mourning were indeed included; often, the dead bodies are laid on the ground and the crying relatives are pictured by their side (See picture 3). There

\(^{24}\) Allen defined the “politics of immediation” as a combination of “human rights (an ideology, language, and system of institutions), visuality (a sensory perception, aesthetic system, and range of image objects produced and circulated in large part by broadcast media), and affect (a way of feeling, experiencing, and reacting to experiences) (Allen, 2009, p. 162).
is little physical contact in these images apart from kissing the child when it is being carried to the grave. For example, in the pictures of the five Balousha sisters in the morgue, a female relative stood by their sides, tying the knots on the white cloths (see picture 1). One has the impression she is almost standing as if not to be in the way of the camera’s gaze as it “take full account” of the death of the child. Evidently, this process is part of the politics of immediation, but instead of images of suffering, it is the dead bodies that are the central message communicated. Moreover, representations of suffering (women and children fleeing their homes, men rushing shot relatives to the hospital, etc) constitute the backbone of Palestinian nationalist discourse as Allen argues above. However, the dead child in a sense constitutes the “end” or final, most extreme, image in that discourse, mainly because of the national and international ideas about the Child representing the future of the nation.

Here I do not mean to claim that this image is simply staged, but rather, I aim to point to nuances that can be read within the framework of a gaze, that ensures the communication of grief and horror in a particular way. The hope carried in this message is that the horror of the situation (a child dead due to excessive violence) is received, which would immediately call out for a reaction – which is in line with Allen’s argument (Allen, 2009). If the message is received, then it becomes linked to the Palestinian national struggle, and pushes the observer closer into taking a political stand.

**Children of the World**

In this section I will briefly comment on an international discourse around children, and then demonstrate further how the medical, religious, and national discourse access the

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25 Tying the knots on the white burial garment is part of the religious process for burial. What makes my claim stronger is that there are no pictures whatsoever of the girls as they are being wrapped in the white cloths, and only one image of the woman (presumably the mother) tying the final knot on [presumably] each body. What the latter pictures show is that the finals knot was not tied on the youngest girl (Jawaher) –thereby exposing her face all throughout the tashyee’.

39
former, and therefore how the image of the Innocent Martyr Palestinian Child gains full status as a Palestinian national symbol.

First, the death of a child falls into a much larger internationalized human rights (HR) discourse that considers children as the ultimate innocent victims of circumstances inflicted upon them (this goes not just for war images, but also for images of hunger and malnutrition). Multiple conventions exist to protect the Child’s basic needs, such as the Child’s Rights Convention, and multiple NGOs work towards that goal such as UNICEF and Save The Children.

Therefore, considering the international community’s gaze, any violence against a body that is constructed as that of a child is necessarily considered disproportionate, and any dead child is seen as falling outside of the realm of sense. Thus, when there is a dead Palestinian child, these “principles” are applied to the image of the child, and the international HR discourse is by default required to respond because its principles are being challenged and broken. At the same time – and this is a key point – the body of the child is constructed under and for this internationalized discourse’ gaze.

In the funeral discussed above, the bodies of the five sisters were all carried in the arms of male family members, as opposed to what is prevalent in the tashyee’ of adults where they are placed on a board or a carrier (See Picture 2). Some pictures showed only Jawaher being carried in the arms of a relative, and the rest of the sisters were placed in carriers. In my opinion, such a gesture once more emphasizes their “childhood” status, because it replicates a kind of an intimacy and care given to children specifically that is present for example in images of carrying children to bed. Thus, the act of carrying the child both re-emphasizes that it is a child, and its pre-supposed innocence.

An example that shows the incorporation of the Innocent Martyred [Muslim] Palestinian Child into a wider international discourse on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a
picture series from the BBC that included six pictures from protests in Paris, London, Washington D.C., Germany, and Lebanon, half of which used the image of the child (BBC, 2009). In one of the picture from Washington D.C. protestors mimicked the tashyee’ of a martyred child using a doll wrapped in white cloth with the Palestinian flag and kufiyeh on top (and being carried by a woman this time) (Ibid, picture 2). This picture echoes the same lines of construction of the “real” Palestinian Martyr Child particularly because the “doll” is being carried and paraded in the same manner as in the real tashyee’. In addition, the white cloths clearly mark the doll as “dead”, and the Palestinian flag ensures we know it’s a national symbol. Lastly, the doll’s gender is not clear at all – it is a bald doll that emphasizes the body is a Child, and thus, the gender is once more insignificant and makes the doll stand in as representative of all Palestinians under occupation or invasion.

In a second picture from Germany, a male protestor carried a doll wrapped in white cloth with fake “blood” on its face (Ibid, picture 5), once more emphasizing the doll has been “killed” and is a “martyr”. In the last picture from a rally in Southern Lebanon, protestors gathered around coffins covered with the Israeli flag and soldier helmets, organized by Hizbollah (Ibid, Picture 6). In the middle of the “Israeli” coffins lay a coffin with a skeleton showing, and behind it was a large picture of a Palestinian injured child with blood streaming down his/her face. The picture also had the map of Gaza, and the word “Gaza” was written in red letters imitating the blood. The slogan on the picture said: “the blood of Gaza’s children write.. Israel will cease to exist”, which shows the use of children as justification for militant struggle against Israel.

The images in themselves do reflect the use of the Martyred Muslim Palestinian Child, but what is more telling is the fact that the media (BBC) is selecting these images to focus on, and thus, clearly subscribing to the internationalized discourse on violence against children,
that the Palestinians themselves are attempting to access to gain recognition for their plight (Allen, 2009).

**Requesting legitimacy for Palestinian Life**

At the same time, through constructing the death of the child, the Palestinian national discourse actually aims to prove the value of the child’s life in the eyes of the international community. Moreover, the death of a Palestinian child gives meaning and value to Palestinian life as something whose killing should be punishable under [possibly international] law. Thus, the Palestinian national discourse is appealing once more to the international community to practice its power, by attempting to legitimize and clarify why it should take a stand against Israeli occupation.

Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) concept of bare life is important in this process of appealing. In Agamben’s terms, bare life is a life that if killed, would not constitute a murder or perceived as one (Agamben, 1998). Thus, in this framework, for the Israeli military Palestinian life is rendered killable without it being murder, in the name of the state’s protection (from terrorist attacks for example) and its survival (against the “Palestinian demographic bomb”). Therefore, for one, the Palestinian child is used to reconstruct Palestinian life as a life whose killing would be considered a murder, and two, it aims to put the Israeli occupation’s sovereign power into question through appealing to the international law that maintains that violence against children is punishable. This is what I argue is attempted in these sets of images that came out of the Gaza invasion for example.

Going back to the second location of construction – the burial of the child – one can see this appeal at play. The presence of the child in the mass of people is likely to add legitimacy (in the international eyes/gaze) to the anger communicated by the chanting masses
and/or any following protests that chant asking for “justice” not only for the child but for the entire case of the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

**The Battle over the Child: Israeli response**

One way Israeli representations have striven to contest the construction of the Innocent [Martyr/Dead] Child has been through incorporating the Child into the realm of the Terrorist and argue that it can never be trusted because its innocence is subject to manipulation. Images of children with explosives for example are used to make that point, which then directly critiques the Palestinian family and particularly Palestinian motherhood that is held responsible for the child’s upbringing. This critique is very powerful because if one can construct the child as a terrorist, then not only does the entire society follow (because how can a child be a terrorist if it wasn’t taught terrorism), but also the future of the society will be that of terrorism. In other words, if the children are seen as the future, and the family as the nation’s main unit, then the future society is one where terrorism grows as the children get older, and subsequently, where it breeds and creates a terrorist nation.

The case of Gaza’s children saw some reactions from the Israeli side that included defending the principle of collateral damage and the warnings issued to civilians to evacuate their homes, accusing Hamas for using civilians and children as human shields, and also, reviving and using the Child Terrorist image and discourse. An example of the last response is a small series of T-shirt fashion that was circulated in a number of IDF units after the Gaza attacks (Blau, 2009) . These custom made T-shirts that carried personal drawings and slogans supposed to depict aspects of the soldiers’ military experience, and thus carry within them many counter-discourses (Ibid). Many of the T-shirts depicted Palestinian women and children, with messages revolving around reproduction and sexuality (Ibid). However, for the
purposes of this discussion, one particular T-shirt is very relevant\textsuperscript{26}: it carries the image of a Palestinian boy with what can be seen a surprised and certainly innocent look on his face, carrying a rifle larger than him, and centered in the middle of the shooter’s “bull’s eye”. The slogan says: “the smaller the harder” (Tikun Olam Blog, 2009)\textsuperscript{27}. This image not only acknowledges but appropriates the “innocence” as irrelevant, which is seen in the boy’s face and his awkward relationship to the rifle he is carrying (because he is not aiming it). The picture however, does not show a dead child, but rather depicts the decision making process in killing the child. The soldier who drew it explained that the slogan refers to the difficulty of “morals”, in addition to the physical challenge posed by the child’s small size (Ibid). Therefore, from another point of view, because none of these images actually depicted a dead child, but rather the process of making these decisions to kill, it shows the anxiety that the Innocent [Martyr/Dead] Child continues to bring in by forcing to be accepted an form of “un-killable” Palestinian life that must exist, and whose killing is at least, very controversial.

In conclusion, I have analyzed the image of the Palestinian Martyr Child within a set of national and international discourses, and argued that this particular construct has emerged as strong national Palestinian symbol that redefines gendered representations in the Palestinian national discourse. I believe what is so central about this image is that it continues to cause anxiety, and of course, that this is only accomplishable at the moment of death. Most importantly however, it offers new insights into the Palestinian national symbol-making process, and the dialogue with the Israeli national discourse in the context of this conflict. In the next chapter I aim to use this construct to further show some of the ambiguities it encompasses, and what the effect of these ambiguities are.

\textsuperscript{26} A second intriguing image that handles my analysis of the “terrorist child-terrorist society” is one that “depicts a Palestinian baby, who grows into a combative boy and then an armed adult, with the inscription, “No matter how it begins, we’ll put an end to it.” (Blau, 2009)

\textsuperscript{27} This blog reported an original Haaretz article which is no longer available in Haaretz online archives.
Chapter 3: The Ambiguous Child
The case of Gilad Shalit

On October 1st 2009 Israeli TV broadcasted a Hamas-produced video of kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit showing him alive and healthy, and temporarily suspending 3 years of speculations about his living status again (Haaretz Service, 2009). The video was part of a prisoner swap deal, whereby Israel released 20 female prisoners in exchange for information and proof of Shalit’s life (Ibid, para.2). Over the following months new indirect negotiations mediated by Egypt would take place between Hamas and Israel to secure the release of Shalit in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, with little success. At the time of writing this section, Shalit was still in Hamas captivity, and the doubts about his life were back, keeping him placed in the category of the “missing” Israeli soldiers.

In this section I look at the case of Gilad Shalit as an ambiguous national figure that calls into question the binaries of Life-Death, Child-Soldier, Soldier-Human, and Innocent-Guilty through the representations of him in Israeli and Palestinian discourses. I begin with exploring how Shalit fits into the previously outlined Israeli national discourse (as a soldier), and comment on how he becomes part of a unique an ambiguous category (by being missing). I also outline the differences and similarities between being “missing” and “captured”. I then move to place him in each of the above binaries and outline where and why he becomes an ambiguous figure. My argument is that Shalit’s ambiguous status is actually a space for strong competition between Israeli and Palestinian discourses on the figure of the Child and its components (such as Death and Innocence). By that I mean that both parties attempt to use the construct to the advantage of their own discourses, and use it to in a way that either undermines or reinforces the binaries or the ambiguity, depending on for whom (Israel or Hamas) the binary of ambiguity is more important and at what point.

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28 Three letters had been sent to Shalit’s family supposedly written by him, before the 2009 video.
29 The last round of negotiations was mediated through Germany.
Between life and death: the missing and the captured

In his analysis of the commemoration of missing soldiers in Israel, Danny Kaplan (2008) explores the question of what happens to Israeli commemoration rituals when the materiality of the body – which as I have shown has been central to the construction of the living and the dead, adult and child figures on both sides – is absent. He argues that the cases of the missing create even stronger feelings of national identification and solidarity among a wide array of Israeli national subjects (soldiers, citizens, and even international Jewish organizations) precisely because of the missing’s position in between life and death (Kaplan, 2008). This ambiguous status provides potential ground to identify with the missing as a soldier serving his country, as a targeted Jewish citizen, as a son of a family, and as a possible friend.

Moreover, what is most accentuated in the case of the killed soldier as we have seen is precisely the national sacrifice, and the act of death. For a missing soldier, however, his sacrifice is in a sense yet-unachieved, thereby placing him in an ambiguous position toward the nation; one where the definition of sacrifice must be kept flexible in case of his return.

Similar strong feelings of identification occur in the case of a captured soldier, such as Shalit. There is even more potential for stronger identification, precisely because material signs of life show up sporadically, dispelling for a moment the ambiguity surrounding the soldier—such as Shalit’s voice recording on the first anniversary of his kidnapping. Yet the ambiguity is never fully dispelled and soon enough it dominates again. As for the captured soldier’s sacrifice, it is also yet-unaccomplished, nor is there a wish to achieve it, quite the contrary; there is a push to block it (through efforts to retrieve the soldier, and discursively in media portrayals and discourses about soldier). The effect of this overarching ambiguity is that Shalit, in a sense, is “kept alive” in the absence of materiality and/or its depiction.

30 To the best of my knowledge and research, there are no missing Israeli women soldiers.
through his constant presence in the news. Moreover, his sacrifice is redefined as the time he has spent in captivity. This is made visible by reiterating his age at the time of capture and celebrating his birthday publically, and keeping count of the number of days he has been in captivity\(^{31}\).

In the following section I will address Shalit’s case in more detail and point to the ambiguities between his status as Soldier and Child, national Citizen-soldier and international Human, and Innocent and Guilty.

**Shalit as a Soldier**

As was already shown in the first chapter, the Israeli soldier is an elevated national figure (the “son” of the nation, guardian of its borders), whose death is constructed as a sacrifice for the life of the nation. Moreover, the Israeli military is an institution where one can prove their membership in the state, and gain the privileges that come with such a position, from economic security to a highly respected social status (Kanaaneh, 2009)\(^{32}\). Furthermore, being an Israeli soldier is a position built on perceptions of masculinity and a male-figured “national hero” (Mayer, 2000), which are supposed to communicate messages of strength, invincibility, and determination. Such messages are evident for example in the Israeli Defense Forces mission statement which is: “To defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state of Israel. To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of terrorism which threaten the daily life” (IDF, 2010). Therefore, the figure of the Israeli soldier becomes the carrier of such values and their living manifestation. So do these values still apply to the captured soldier?

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31 See for example the follow website dedicated to Shalit that has a running clock in large black bold numbers, above a statements that says: “GILAD IS STILL ALIVE” ([http://www.habanim.org/en/index_en.html](http://www.habanim.org/en/index_en.html)) (Habanim, 2007).

32 Kanaaneh’s research is about non-Jewish soldiers who join the Israeli military for a number of reasons, among which are economic, but also to gain recognition as valid members of nation (2009).
Shalit in the Israeli Discourse

Gilad Shalit has been represented as an Israeli soldier both by the IDF and by Hamas, however, with curious differences in tones. In the Israeli and international press, several circulated pictures of Shalit show him in loose military uniform with a gun rested over his shoulder, standing casually and innocently, and smiling. Following pictures from the same scene show Shalit standing in front of a museum monument composed of 4 soldiers and a military tank (Meissner, 2006), which serves to re-emphasize his soldier-identity and belonging to the IDF. Another picture of Shalit shows him again in light army uniform, with a baseball cap on and glasses, giving once more a rather casual portrayal (Caltech, 2006). Further pictures of Shalit depict him in civilian clothes, bearing more of a serious look. The depiction of Shalit in his uniform does indeed highlight his status as an Israeli soldier, however, his relaxed posture appears to be sending a different message. In my opinion, these portraits underline three things; Shalit’s status as a member of the Israeli military “Bund” and the shared soldier-community (Mosse, 1985), his status and link to the every-day regular citizen, and lastly, his child-like innocence that places him closely in the realm of the “victim”.

Moreover, showing Shalit as a “laid back” soldier with an awkward relationship to his attire and gun, reclaims him in part as a member of the general Israeli population who the military is responsible for defending. Shalit, being a member of the military, has that role as well. However, because of his status as “sometimes undead”, and therefore “not yet sacrificed”, Shalit is in an ambiguous position towards his status as soldier, and becomes the object that needs defending/rescuing, just like the Israeli nation. Thus, in a sense, Shalit’s duties as “defender” of the nation are suspended by virtue of him being in captivity, yet; at

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the same time, his identity as a “defender” is still maintained in his portrayal as a soldier. This shows yet another part of the ambiguity in Shalit’s status.

One way to attempt to handle this ambiguity is through an increased focus on Shalit as an Israeli citizen and as a “human”, and bringing to the forefront his family and friends. The focus on Shalit as an “ordinary” member of the nation not only addresses all Israelis and creates him as a bonding national figure, but it also speaks to the international HR discourse that sees his “humanness” as prior to his status as a soldier, and therefore gains international recognition for his plight. This is for example reflected in the debate on Hamas not allowing the Red Cross to see Shalit, which is perceived (by the international community and Israel) as inhumane and unjust. Moreover, the Red Cross (and Israel) create an image of Shalit that defines him in humanitarian terms; someone who is a “human” under international law and therefore entitled to a set of rights, among which is medical care and “humane” imprisonment conditions. In this sense, Shalit becomes a citizen of the world, and this image is used to criticize Hamas for its unlawful treatment of the captured soldier. The effect, therefore, is that Shalit’s status as a solider is sidelined – but not erased – in favor of a HR one, which in turn undermines Hamas’ proclaimed “legitimate” act of resistance (of kidnapping Israeli soldiers).

That said, Shalit still cannot be removed from the realm of the soldier completely especially given that he may at any point actually become a sacrificed soldier. Thus, he remains hanging between life and death, international “civilian citizen” and soldier, victim and sacrifice; Kaplan elaborates:

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34 Not only as a bonding figure, but also as a “friend”. Danny Kaplan argues this happens through commemoration processes of dead soldiers where “commemoration rituals for war dead present a notable example of the process where one’s fellow citizens, technically anonymous strangers, are transformed into friends” (Kaplan, 2008, p.414). I argue that it is the same for captured soldiers, where Shalit also becomes “a friend”.


36 I don’t mean to imply that it is only Hamas that sees kidnapping soldiers as a legitimate act of resistance.
One the one hand, [the missing soldiers] represent a strong presence and the prospect of returning to everyday life. On the other hand, they signify heroic sacrifice similar to that of the fallen soldiers. (Kaplan, 2008, p.414)

Shalit however represents a bit of a different case than the missing Israeli soldiers. This is because he is not entirely missing – the Iz al-Deen al-Qassam brigades have captured him, and have given what is considered “proof of life” through the letters, voice recording, and video of Shalit (Mitinick, 2009). This is in stark contrast for example with the most infamous case of still-missing Israeli air force pilot Ron Arad, who was captured in 1986 by a Shi’a militia in Lebanon, and never heard from again (Kaplan, 2008, p. 417). At the same time however, questions about Shalit’s life arise constantly and especially after long periods of absence. For example, the time between Gilad’s capture and the voice recording was one year. Thus, Shalit is an ambiguous case who keeps drifting between “missing = dead” and “captured = alive”, and thus assumes different positions when represented as a national figure. This ambiguity is particularly useful and has been used by Hamas for political gains. I explain below.

**Shalit in the Palestinian Discourse**

For the Palestinian discourse, Shalit’s identity as soldier is always at the forefront of his representations, before considering him as “only” human. In the first video of Shalit alive, he is filmed dressed in his green soldier attire, emphasizing his Soldier identity. In an animated movie about him that Hamas made for Palestinian children, he is also depicted in his military outfit, and speaking about his status as a captured soldier who hopes the Israeli government would free him.

However, treating Shalit in line with at least some international HR principles is necessary for maintaining Hamas’ access to the same discourse when it needs to use it against Israel, and for maintaining an image of a resistance movement and not a terrorist one. As we have seen, the HR discourse relies heavily on materiality and bodily representations (of
death, hunger, suffering, etc). In addition, in the case of a captured soldier, his health and medical condition become an essential and constant concern, manifested through questions about his injuries and nutrition.

For example, after the failure of the last round of negotiations, Iz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades – affiliated with Hamas’ militant wings - released another video in April 2010 (Telegraph, 2010). This time it was not of the living Shalit, but rather an animation cartoon about Shalit’s imprisonment, depicting his father as he is waiting for Israel to free his son. At one point the video shows Shalit’s father receiving the body of his son in a coffin covered with the Israeli flag, only to wake up and realize it was a nightmare, but that Shalit is still in captivity. The video ends with him saying: “There’s still hope”. The received message was that Hamas is pushing Israel to not delay in reaching a deal to free its soldier, and was received with much anger from the Israeli government and Shalit’s father who called it “psychological warfare” (MacCarthy, 2009). Soon afterwards Mahmoud al-Zahhar – a Hamas spokesman – criticized the video and said that it “does not reflect Hamas’ official policy” (Maan News, 2010). He also added: “we did not, and will not, kill captive Israeli soldiers.. our religion and morals prevent us from doing so” (ibid.)37. This was a clear appeal to an international audience and discourse, using the local religious discourse to ensure the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle would not be tarnished by the production of such a video that suggests an inhumane treatment of Shalit. But also, the effect of this statement is to confirm Shalit’ living status, which –once more – dispels the ambiguity between Life and Death for one more moment.

Therefore, Hamas finds itself caught in a contradiction in the representation of Shalit; on the one hand Hamas wants to keep Shalit as a soldier and treat him as such for its national purposes (displaying power and ability to defend Palestinians, drawing attention to prisoner 37 My translation
treatment in Israeli jails, and achieving a prisoner-swap deal), but on the other, it must respond to the HR discourse that keeps tugging Shalit away from the soldier status to the “human” and “material” status. Thus, Hamas is also haunted by the materiality of Shalit, which is used to prove his “human-ness”, as opposed to “soldier-ness”.

More significantly however, is that Hamas statement goes against al-Qassam’s video message. Moreover, al-Qassam brigades were relying on the power of Shalit’s ambiguity between Life and Death to push Israel to strike a deal (by representing the fact that Shalit’s father still does not know what happened or what will happen to his son). However, Hamas must have felt this policy was too costly and too undermining of its own need to keep the international community on its side (for the same purpose of gaining legitimacy for criticizing Israel), and thus, it emphasized and insisted that it won’t kill captured soldiers. At the same time however, Hamas did not entirely let go of the power of this ambiguity, given that it still did not allow the Red Cross to visit Shalit, or provide another [material] proof of his life. Therefore, it is very clear then that this ambiguity surrounding Shalit’s life and death is not only caught up with another binary of Citizen-Soldier vs. Human, but also that it has tremendous political power and is used very effectively as a bargaining tool in this conflict.

**Shalit as a child**

As is already apparent; interestingly, Shalit sometimes is represented as a child in both Israeli and Palestinian contexts, and challenges again the previously constructed question of “Who is a child?”. The concern about his age and the number of years he has spent (or lost) in captivity always bring the idea of “youthfulness” forward. In other words, Shalit is seen as forced to waste his youth away. Going back to the picture of him in uniform, one can see that this awkward “casual” or laid back posture also communicates innocence; which as we’ve
seen is a heavily drawn-upon notion in the Martyr Child image. A blogger\textsuperscript{38} on a website about Shalit commented on Shalit’s photo and summarized a prevalent sentiment: “Look at this young man being held captive by terrorists in Gaza. Sure, he has a gun, but is otherwise skinny, geeky, and doing his duty protecting Israel from destruction” (Meissner, 2006). Describing Shalit as “geeky” and “skinny” serves to challenge the Israeli national discourse that claims strong bodies as defenders of the nation. This is a very conscious and contradictory move that aims to highlight Shalit’s innocence by distancing him from the category of soldier, especially given Shalit is always one step closer to becoming a sacrificed member of the nation. Thus, the contradiction that seems to appear again is that between the status of a soldier, in comparison to that of the civilian, but this time, the Child.

Another method of placing Shalit closer in the realm of the Child is reflected in the publishing of one of his pieces of writing from age 11 by two artists in Israel (Habanim, 2007). The story was about two animals (a shark and a fish) that do not like each other and how they resolved their differences. The artists turned the story into an art illustration reportedly to keep Shalit alive in the media and not “forget” about him (Habanim, 2007), as some Israeli politicians such as PM Olmert and PM Netenyahu have been accused of. At the same time, however, the event brings Shalit back to childhood and creates him as an innocent national subject, worth rescuing, precisely because he is connected to his 11 year-old self who is an innocent child.

The effect of insisting on Shalit’s childhood can be read as an undermining image to the Palestinian Martyr Child. Moreover, representing Shalit as an Innocent Child matches Hamas’s use of Innocence to highlight the Israeli injustices of killing the Palestinian Child, and therefore attempts to place both constructs at a competing level (which would then make Hamas be subject of similar criticism).

\textsuperscript{38} I believe the blogger is American
Here’s where the ambiguity of Life and Death strikes again as a very powerful tool to criticize Hamas, this time in combination with the Innocence construct. Unlike the Martyred Innocent Palestinian Child, Shalit is not [yet] a killed Innocent Child, rather, he is an Innocent Child captured for 4 years on the brink between Life and Death. Thus, terror is now not only the actual killing and death of the Child, but terror is also keeping the Child between Life and Death (and the entire related Israeli population, who now strongly relates to Shalit, is also “terrorized” by not knowing if Shalit is alive or dead). Ironically then, any attempt that Hamas makes at confirming Shalit’s life actually reinforces the fact that it is keeping a “Living Child” in captivity, and thus reinforces its “terrorist” activity, and does not [necessarily] place it in the good eyes of the International HR discourse as it hoped.

Lastly, as for Hamas’ representation of Shalit in relation to the Child construct, he is represented as a weak soldier, and sometimes as a child. The example of the latest animated video about Shalit strongly emphasizes his character as a “son” of the father in the video. Noam Shalit (Gilad’s father) is depicted yearning for his son and waiting on the Israeli government to do something to ensure he is brought back. Therefore, Shalit here is represented as a “Child”, who may or may not be “killed”, and thus remains “yearned for” but could become “mourned”\(^ {39}\).

Furthermore, in the video made for Palestinian children that Hamas produced, Shalit is having a conversation with a Palestinian boy, and is depicted as crying and calling on his dad for help, whereas the little boy is not crying and even offers Shalit advice on how to convince his government to come for him and set him free (through hoping that Hamas would catch more soldiers and his case becoming a part of a recognized phenomenon) (Atlasshrugs2000, 2009)\(^ {40}\). Hamas clearly was aiming at a redefinition of Palestinian

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39 This image brings into mind the representations of the Martyr Palestinian Child, who is also “mourned”, and especially in the public tashyee’ by the male figures.

40 My translation
childhood for national purposes in this video, by depicting the Palestinian child as stronger than the “adult Israeli soldier”.

However, the line is blurry between depicting Shalit as a crying adult, or a crying child. Moreover, the “crying adult” image aims to dispel the claim to strong and invincible masculinity that underlies the national figure of the Israeli soldier. Therefore, one can see that through blurring the lines between “weak soldier” and “crying child” Hamas and al-Qassam Brigades are actually relating to multiple audiences at once; from the Palestinian children who are taught they are strong, to the Israelis who are told their soldiers are weak.

In sum, I have shown the multiple sites of ambiguity in Gilad Shalit’s status; from Life-Death, Innocence-Guilt, Soldier-Child, Soldier-International Human, to Crying Adult-Crying Child. I have argued that these constructs are binaries which come together in the case of Shalit in the form of multiple ambiguous statuses. This ambiguity, I argue, has a very serious and strong political potential, particularly in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and depending on how it is used by which side, and for what purposes. From my analysis, it is evident that both Israel and Hamas (and Al-Qassam Brigades) take advantage of the ambiguity in Shalit’s case to serve their national discourses and/or to manipulate the other’s discourse under international sight.
Conclusion

The aim of this project has been two-fold. First, to examine how national Palestinian and Israeli bodies become caught among a group of discourses that inscribe their meanings on bodies at the moment of death, in order to promote the respective national ideologies in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I have demonstrated how a generalized medical discourse, alongside Muslim and Jewish religious discourses, and Palestinian/Israeli national discourses in the context of an internationalized Human Rights paradigm all work to give the dead bodies a particular combination of meanings that very visibly reflects the Palestinians’ and Israelis’ understanding of the conflict and their relationship to it. I believe these constructs are particularly powerful as they shed much needed light on how Palestinians and Israelis approach this conflict.

In particular, I have shown how the body of the child becomes a national figure in its own right and of special importance. I argued that the Child is an increasingly prevalent Palestinian national figure, especially in the context of Israel’s 2008/2009 invasion of the Gaza strip, and that it has been heavily used as a symbol to communicate the injustice of the Israeli occupation to the international community. In addition, I argued that the construct of the Child serves as a symbol where both Palestinian women and men can see themselves represented in especially potent ways. This comes in opposition to the usually highly gendered representations of symbols of nationalism, with the men as the nation’s defenders, and the women as the nation’s mothers. Therefore, this research contributes to a much needed exploration of the signification of gender identities in – particularly – the Middle Eastern context.

Second, I argued that the figure of the Child is actually one that tries to reinforce certain dualities, such as childhood vs. adulthood, innocence vs. guilt, and child vs. soldier.
However, I argued that the resulted effect is actually that the figure of the Child carries a number of ambiguities that question the above dualities. The case of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit is a good example of such ambiguities, seeing that Shalit becomes at once Child and Soldier, Innocent and Guilty, and Alive and Dead. These ambiguities are then used in the highly charged context of the conflict to undermine the “other side’s” intertwines discourses, and as I have shown, to undermine or question international legitimacy.

It is the effects of these ambiguities that merit further inspection. How does the ambiguity effect the gender divisions in place? What is the effect of its questioning of Life and Death, and thus biopolitics and necropolitics, on the political relationship at hand? Can it predict further changes in national gendered symbol-construction? All these questions, if explored, would contribute not only to a better understanding of national symbol-making in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but also to a more complex understanding of the conflict itself, and to a much needed exploration of the changes in gender identities and representations for Palestinians and Israelis – particularly in the context of modern colonization.
Bibliography


