NATIONALIST INTELLECTUALS AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHERNESS: A STUDY OF THE
TURKISH EXPERIENCE OF NATIONALISM (1911-1918)

By
Mehmet Can Omay

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Department of Sociology and Social and Anthropology

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First Supervisor: Dan Rabinowitz
Second Supervisor: Prem Kumar Rajaram

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Abstract

Studies of nationalism generally focus the relation between the state activity and construction of nation. However Intellectual activities are a significant part of this construction. By their novels, short stories, poems and theoretical books, Intellectuals articulates the Nation. This study focuses on the construction of “Us” and “the Other” discourse by the Turkish Nationalist Intellectuals between the years of 1911 and 1918. How did the Intellectuals used racial, national and cultural differences in order to construct this discourse is the ultimate focus of the study.
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INTRODUCTION

Social Constructivism has on the agenda of social sciences since the second half of the 20th century. In a very short time constructivists ideas started to fill in new theories and approaches. From religion to gender to homosexuality, to the nations, boundaries and histories, many different aspects of social life are seen as constructed rather than natural entities. Together with those, social constructivist approaches are highly effective in the field of nationalism.

The main theoretical approach in the field which is affected by constructivist ideas is the Modernism. The modernists openly declare that they perceive nationalism and nations as a social construction which came into being after the age of modernity; it is constructed by elites, and is the product of specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism (Smith, 1994, p. 377).

Constructivist ideas also dominate the studies about the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Construction of the Turkish identity is mainly connected with the Turkification process which happened during the Single Party period (1923-1950) (see Atabaki & Zürcher, 2004 and Bali, 2006). According to this view the Turkish identity was the product of the Kemalist State and its cultural reformation program. The dominant forces in this construction were the single party and its elite. However, before the formation of the Kemalist regime in 1923, the nationalist intellectuals act a significant part of this construction. Main aim of this study is to underline the significant role of the intellectual activity in for the construction of the nation by focusing the Turkish experience between the years of 1911 and 1918. The ultimate focus is to understand the relationship between the overriding narrative of Turkish nationalism and the ways in which it depicted its various others.
The years are significant for this construction because the Turkist faction of the Young Turk movement started a nationalist campaign in order to alert the Turkish nation to wake up for their national rights. Within numerous articles, theoretical and historical books, poems and short-stories were published in which, the Turkist thinkers, poets and novelists postulated their idea of the nation. Their works defined the main aspects of “us” (Turks) and the “others” and attributing them with respected special roles, characteristics and tendencies to both. The other is mainly excluded and negative roles had given to them by the Turkist thinkers. I argue that those ideas were the blue-prints for the coming Turkish identity and the nation-state. The political and social vocabulary and the nationalist discourse constructed by the Turkists for the Other’s dominated the Turkish nationalist discourse and affected state policies. So, even though the Turkish identity was actively and formally constructed by the nation-state, the nationalist discourse and the political vocabulary is constructed by the Turkists in a discourse that and was later adopted and reified by the state.

Understanding the “other” is significant to understand “us”. These are two separable entities necessary for the construction of nationhood. Without the Others, it was not possible to construct Us. Nationalism constructs them together, and creates different categories for each. I define the “Racial/National Other” and the “Cultural Other” emerge as the main definitional tools. For the Turkist case the Racial/National Other was the Balkan nations and the non-Muslims inside the Empire. This type of other was important because Turkists believed that these races and nations were always ready to attack the Turks. For them, the nation was surrounded by hostile others.

The cultural other consisted of the Ottoman culture, the over-Westernized Turks, and the Ottoman Islam. They treated the cultural others as the main barrier above the national awakening of the Turks. Within their hybrid structures the Ottoman culture and the over-Westernized Turks was representing a heterogeneous culture which was in contradiction with
the homogenous national one. They treated the Ottoman Islam in the same manner. It was constructed as an other because it was perceived as a major source of backwardness.

In the study a significant role was given to the literature by the Turkists because it was the main weapon for awakening the nation. The study deals with the literature and their role in the construction of others. The study limits itself printed works by five intellectuals: Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, Mehmed Emin Yurdakul, Ömer Seyfetin and Halide Edip Adıvar. Together with many other Turkists, such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, they are defined as the founding fathers of Turkish nationalism.

I picked those names because I argue that they play the major role for construction of the significant others because I argue that they play the major role for the construction of the significant others. Every fragment of others I mentioned above is included in their published books, articles, poems, novels and short stories. I do not divide them between Pan-Turkists and Turkists because the words used interchangeably during and after the World War I. Instead of this division I prefer to use the word Turkists. All the translations of Ömer Seyfettin short stories used in this thesis, except the Boycottage, are made by Prof. Dr. Halil Berktay.
1.1 Main Aspects of the Constructivist Approach to Nationalism

Classifying theories of nationalism is still an ongoing debate in social sciences. It’s getting harder everyday by the emergence of new approaches and theories. The task is hard because various theoretical approaches give a diverse range of answers to questions about nationalism. But if we have to make a basic distinction, we see two basic approaches are dominating the existing literature of nationalism since 1960ies. The basic distinction between theories is based on two umbrella terms which are primordialism, modernism and. More than two grand terms, these are approaches used in order classify various theories with regard to their common characteristics, which enable researchers to compare them systematically.

To begin with, primordialism is an approach, not a theory. It is an ‘umbrella term’ used to describe scholars who told that nationality is a ‘neutral’ part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have immemorial times (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 64). They held that nations were around from ‘the first time’ and were inherent in the human condition, if not in nature itself (Smith, 2009, p. 8). Primordialists argue the antiquity and naturalness of nations. Since nations are natural beings they are tied to emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations for national mobilization, treating them as emotional givens (Conversi, 2007, p. 15). Although nationalism, the ideology and movement, might be recent and novel, nations were seen as forms of extended kinship and as such were ubiquitous and coeval with the family. In other words, nations are ‘primordial’; they exist in the first order of time, and lie at the root of subsequent processes (Smith, 2003, p. 51).

Those views were mainly criticized by modernist theory of nationalism. Modernist approach was mainly a response for the primordialist theorist which took nationalism as a
granted phenomenon. According to modernist approach nations and planned nation-building was essentially a modern process, which found no parallel before the French Revolution. Nations and nationalism both appeared in the last two centuries, which is in the wake of the French Revolution, and they are the products of specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence the bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism (Smith, 1994, p. 377).

Two significant members of the constructivist theories are Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson. Hobsbawm’s constructivism depends on the idea of invented traditions. Nations, according to Eric Hobsbawm, owe much to ‘invented traditions’ which are products of social engineering and are created to serve the interests of ruling elites by channeling the energies of the newly of the newly enfranchised masses (Smith, 2003, p. 48). According to him the nation and its related phenomena are the most significant example of such invented traditions. After the invention, those traditions establish continuity and ‘use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group’s cohesion (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 12). The invented tradition of national community prevented the fragmentation and disintegration caused by rapid industrialization (p. 263-264). This change was rapid and structural, at the same time a changing society made the traditional forms of ruling by sates and social and political hierarchies more difficult or even impracticable. This required new methods of ruling or establishing bonds of reality. According to Hobsbawm the period between years of 1870 to 1914 was the climax of invented traditions (Smith, 2003, p. 80-81).It was nationalism and state, engendered nations, not the other way round; nationalists had to invent myths, traditions, suitable history and the like (Smith, 2009, p. 5).

Another constructivist is Benedict Anderson. Anderson’s point of departure is that nationality and nationalism are cultural artifacts of a particular kind. Emergence of nationalism is related with the birth of print-communities. These print-communities, in turn,
were nourished by the rise of the first mass commodity, printed books especially, after the saturated elite Latin market was supplanted by the much larger vernacular markets (Smith, 2003, p. 79). The second connection provided by the simultaneous mass consumption of newspapers. By the mass consumption of newspapers, internalization of ideas became more significant and easy. Printed books and newspapers should be defined as the main internalization and objectivation for the nation to imagine itself as a community. Through reading these materials the community started the internalization and to construct a common identity.

According to Ernest Gellner, transformation to the age of nationalism came from the changing and reshaping effect of industrialization and modernization. Gellner believed that the social context of nationalism was constructed by the major changes coming from industrialization and modernization, without these grand changes nationalism could not emerge. Those rapid changes brought major changes in the social stratification of Western societies which caused to divisions between classes. It was the state which constructed a “common culture” for the nation in order to create unity. There was a need for cultural homogenization in the modern societies because the new industrial society needed different social structures. Modernity was producing a new type of industrial society, requiring a mobile, literate and numerate workforce, able to engage in semantic work and context free-communication (Smith, 2003, p. 64)
1.2. Discourse, Narration and the Public Intellectuals

Narration and the nation are two inseparable entities since the emergence of nationalisms. Bhaba (1990) defines the point in this way: “from those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west” (p. 1). For him it was “an idea whose cultural composition lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force” (p. 1). The nationalist discourse plays a major role for the construction of nation as a significant symbolic force. It mainly produces the idea of nation as a continuous narrative of national progress and the “primeval presence of the Volk” (ibid.).

The intellectuals have the capacity to “actively develop traditions, institutionalize customs, and define sameness with one another and difference from an other” (Suny & Kennedy, 1999, p. 393).

The nationalist discourse is consisted of signs and representations, and it constructs the nation as it is written and it has to be read as a text by following a semiological root. It includes a narrative which constructs the discourse. Discourses, nationalist discourse in particular, are social constructs; they came into being by historical incidents, everyday life experiences, social changes and interactions, the social life is a narrative. Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, 1992, p. 209) explains the point in this way: ‘Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the authors; other beings cannot’. As the authors of texts, intellectuals also highly contributes two the construction of nationalist discourse.

Ronald G. Suny and Michael D. Kennedy give a very significant role for the intellectuals for the construction of nationhood. According to them (1999):

[A] single poet, or a variable army of scholar-priests may contribute essential threads to a new national tapestry, sometimes quite accidentally, but more, often in the wake of already-existing ethnic communities or prenational dynastic or imperial states, quite
consciously reacting and accommodating to patterns given by others who are then historically privileged as forerunners (p. 384).

Suny and Kennedy define the nationalist activity of intellectuals as a must for the construction of the nation. “Intellectual activity was absolutely central to this transformative project because of its disproportionately significant role in formulating the discourse of the nation” and according to Suny and Kennedy “nations in the modern sense could not exist before there was a discourse of the nation, that is, before there was an understanding, a language, and a practice of nationness in this modern sense” (p. 394). For them, nations are particular formations that may grow out of ethnic (or civic/territorial) communities, but that “come together and understand themselves as a nation only with the efforts of intellectual and political elites that bind disparate social and cultural pieces together” (p. 393). The political elite and national intellectuals “dissolve differences within the community as much as possible (at least on the discursive level), and elaborate the differences with those outside the community, the “other” ” (p. 393). The relative significance of intellectual practice varies, but intellectuals are the main agents which constructs concepts and categories for the nationhood.

According to Suny and Kennedy (1999) this nation formation first took place when historically as a “universal “discourse of the nation” was being constituted”, this discourse involved “notions of the “naturalness” of the nations” its apposition to other “nations” in “a world in which the “natural” division of the human race was into nations” (p. 393). Then after, “ethnocultural and linguistic distinctions, or civil cultural differences separated one people from another and made possible, in this new discursive environment, claims to territory, political self-representation, and statehood” (p. 394). Rapidly included in this new discursive formation were ideas of popular sovereignty and the requirement that for states to be legitimate they must represent nations. Intellectuals may organize themselves in different ways –through associations through coffee houses, through political parties. The significant
role of the national intellectuals and construction of the should be better if we concentrate on their ideal types:

(a) the formation of the intellectuals – that is, the basis for their claims of superior knowledge; (b) the activity of intellectuals – that is what they do in the name of their superior knowledge, whether organizing social movements or writing poetry; and (c) the products of intellectuals – those various discourses that carry the effects of intellectual beyond his or her ordinary milieu, whether in the oral repetition of the intellectual’s speech, the reproduction and consumption of her poetry, or the mobilization of a movement around the cultural frame the intellectual articulated (p. 403).

Miroslav Hroch (1985) also gives a significant role to the intellectual activity for construction of the nation. According to him nations constructed by professions whose members had a higher education and lived by their intellectual labour and who is characterized in a general way with the term intelligentsia (p. 15). Hroch defines three different strata which contribute to the articulation of the nation. According to Horch: “the first stratum is compromised the elite sections of the intelligentsia, directly associated with the ruling classes. This top stratum included the highest state officials and ecclesiastical dignitaries, the managers of the big estates and the elite of the free professions (lawyers)” (p. 16). Hroch defines the professional groups as a one which, while still outside the wage-labour relationship, did not directly share in political power or engage in economic enterprises; according to him this includes such categories as lawyers and doctors, artists, journalists and scientists (p. 16). According to Hroch the most numerous group was the third stratum of the intelligentsia – those who stood in a relationship of wage-labor. This includes the lower and middle officials and clerics private, state and communal). According to Horch (1985) those are the main social groups who were most easily accessible to national consciousness and
ready earlier than others to become national activists (p. 13). They are the intellectuals or intellectual laborers which has better capacity to construct national programs and national consciousness and popularize those views and ask for national revival (p. 13). National agitation and activities directed towards increasing consciousness are done by the pioneers of the national idea and they are consisted of the intellectuals and intellectual laborers defined above.

Partha Chatterjee (1993) also defines the significant role of the intellectuals and the intelligentsia for the construction of the nation. According to the thinker, “intellectuals plays the significant role of constructing the history of the nation, which was an agenda of for self-representation, for setting out claim for the nation a past that was not distorted by foreign interpreters” (p. 76). This process includes the glorification of the past and the ancestors of the nation, and to create a nationally pure narrative which is going to be read by the members of the nation. But in order to do that, the nationalist history writing has to create categories about “foreign” and “native” (p. 77). This depends on picking the foreign and non-national elements which should distort the feeling of “us”. Others are constructed and their borders shaped and they became distant to the “us”.

Then after Intellectuals and historians creates a new time-line for the birth of nation. This time-line is mainly constructed by dividing the national history according to the reign of different emperors, which Chatterjee terms as “Puranic history” (pp. 77-84). All of these processes make the history as a play of power which tries to construct a much more pure and national history. In Chatterjee’s word (p. 90): “The modern historiography seemed to validate a view of political history as simply the amoral pursuit of raison d’etat ”.
1.3. Discourse and the Construction of the Otherness:

The other is a constructed image of difference which is necessary to define “us”. According to Stuart Hall (1997) “we need difference because we can only construct meaning through a dialogue with the other” (p. 235). In order to construct the meaning, we need to define differences between opposites and binary oppositions. So, the meaning of the other depends on how we define “us”. The binary opposition of us and the other is necessary for the construction of the nationalist discourse, since all cultural systems depend on marking of difference, this discourse also needs oppositions which should construct symbolic boundaries. These boundaries lead the nationalist discourse to construct categories what is pure and normal and what is contrary to these definitions.

In his famous phrase, Stuart Hall defines the discourse as the “sets of ready-made and ‘preconstituted “experiencings” displayed and arranged through language” (p. 322). Construction of the nationalist discourse is the result of the relationship between discourse, knowledge and power. The nationalist discourse is consisted of signs and representations, and it constructs the nation as it is written and it has to be read as a text by following a semiological root. It includes a narrative which constructs the discourse. Stuart Hall defines the discourse and ideology in this way:

The mental frame works – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation –which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense, define, figure out and render intelligible the way the society works (p.26).

Discourses, nationalist discourse in particular, are social constructs; they are the results of historical incidents, everyday life experiences, social changes and interactions, the social life is a narrative in itself. Alasdair MacIntyre (1992) explains the point in this way:
‘Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the authors; other beings cannot’ (p. 209). The nationalist language constructed by the nationalist intellectuals, like any other langue system, includes meaning, signifiers and the signified which constitutes myth in general. Those are the three main concepts used by Roland Barthes (1995) in order to explain the system of communication and messages (p. 109). Myth is a type of speech, and everything can be a myth provided it is conveyed by a discourse. The nationalist language constructed by them, like any other langue system, includes meaning, signifiers and the signified which constitutes myth in general.

According to Barthes “every object in the world can pass from a closed, silent existence to an oral state, open to appropriation by society, for there is no law, whether natural or not, which forbids talking about things” (p. 108). Humans and societies convert reality into speech and this speech turns into a mythical language in the end. Barthes believes that speech included messages, but speech is not only oral speech. It consisted of “modes of writing or of representations; not only written discourse, but also photography, cinema, reporting, sports, shows, publicity, all these can serve as a support to mythical speech” (p. 110). For Barthes all of these are speeches, whether verbal or usual and they are part of the system of communication and they include messages. Those messages are both harmonious of the existing discourses of the times before and they also construct new meanings by themselves. All these aspects include various meanings, but myths and mythical speeches in general are made of a material which has already been worked on, myths presuppose a signifying consciousness as they are constructed above meanings which are already constructed before. The meaning comes from the relation of three terms, a signifier, a signified and the sign (p. 112). Two semiological systems constructs the meaning: a linguistic system, the language (or the modes of representation which are assimilated to it), which Barthes calls the language-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own system;
and myth itself, which he calls metalanguage, because it is a second language, in which one speaks about the first (p. 113).

One of the most significant studies about the other and the discourse is Edward Said’s *Orientalism*. Said (2003) mentions the epistemological character of the relation between of “us” and “the other”. According to him one of the most significant aspects between “us” and the “other” discourse (East and West in Said’s case) comes from the relationship between knowledge and power. Said defines in this way “The knowledge of the other is constructed through an authoritarian relationship; the constructor has an absolute authority and power over the subject who is known” (p. 33). He continues “Knowledge gives power; more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control” (p. 33). According to Said knowledge of the other should be “both academic and practical, and should depend on their race, character, culture, history, traditions, society, and possibilities” (p. 39). After constructing the knowledge negative representations of the other should be constructed, Said gives an example for this kind of negative representation from his own case according to him East is represented by the West as irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, "different"; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, "normal." (p. 41). A different world is constructed by the West for the East in order to dominate.

But the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organized world of his own, a world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence (p. 41). According to Said the Oriental is depicted as “something one judge (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum), something one disciplines (as in a school or prison), and something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual)” (p. 41). This depiction constructs a vocabulary, imagery, rhetoric, and figures. Said mentions in this way
(p. 42): “In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together were a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective”. Said continues: “These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics (p. 42). What happens in the end is the construction of the discourse which creates an “us” and an “other”: “For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them")” (p. 42). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in their world; "we" lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going (p. 44).

According to Norman Fairclough (2006), the discursive analysis approaches surveyed can be divided into two groups according to the nature of their social orientation to discourse, distinguishing 'non-critical' and 'critical' approaches (p. 12). According to him such a division is not absolute. He mentions that, critical approaches differ from non-critical approaches in not just describing discursive practices, but also showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants (p. 12).

Özkirimli (2005) defines three major roles for the role of nationalist discourse. According to him, “the discourse of nationalism divides the world into “us” and “them”” (p. 32). This discourse includes friends and enemies. Second role is that “the discourse of nationalism hegemonizes” (p. 33). It’s about power and domination. The third is that “it naturalizes itself” (p. 33). Values of nation appear as “facts of nature” no longer seen as “social values”.
1.4 Methodology

This study depends on the primary sources of the Turkist writers. As methodology I used Critical Discoursive analysis (CDA) and Imagology. The CDA framework is summarized by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (2001, p. 60) in this way:

1. A problem (activity, reflexivity)
2. Obstacles to its being tackled:
   (a) analysis of the conjuncture;
   (b) analysis of the practice re its discourse
      i. relevant practice(s)
      ii. relation of discourse to other moments?
         - discourse as part of the activity
         - discourse and reflexivity
   (c) analysis of the discourse
      i. structural analysis: the order of discourse
      ii. interactional analysis
         - interdiscursive analysis
         - linguistic and semiotic analysis
3. Function of the problem in practice
4. Possible ways past the obstacles
5. Reflection on the analysis.

According to Chouliaraki and Fairclough (p. 60) “CDA begins from some perception of a discourse-related problem in some part of social life. Since I was focusing on the otherness I decided the discourse-other relation as the problem. The analysis of the conjuncture (p. 60) was the late Ottoman society and relations between different ethnicities. The structural change was the birth of nationalism inside the Empire. The discourse used by the Turkists was the result of a social practice, rise of nationalism and ethnic hospitality inside the Ottoman Empire. I looked for how this structural change turned into images of discourse. The methods of Imagology are used to understand the constructed ‘typical’ used by the Turkists in order to define the otherness.

Imagology is defined as the “field of our mental images of the other and of ourselves (Beller & Leerseen, 2007, p. xiii). I tried to find out the images which “characterize the other (hetero-images) and those which characterize one’s own domestic identity (self-images or
auto-images) (p. xiii) in the primary sources I used. The Imagology techniques I used are explained inside the text.
Chapter 2. Race, Culture and the Otherness

2.1 Turkish Identity and the Turkists

Emergence of the Turkish identity is mainly related to the strong state tradition in Turkey. According to this mainstream view, it was the strong state tradition and the lack of civil society which manufactured the national identity. Metin Heper (1976) explains this state tradition in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey by focusing the dominant power of the bureaucracy in the ruling mechanism. According to him, politics and culture of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic was strongly state centered and state is the ultimate mechanism which dominates other spheres of social life (pp. 509-514). According to Şerif Mardin (1969), the state dominance was the result of the lack of civil society inside the Turkish Republic which was inherited from the Ottoman Empire (pp. 258-259). Çağlar Keyder (1987) continued the same tones and defines the state-centered political and cultural life in Turkey with the existence of a bureaucratic-class which reconstructed itself from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire until the recent times in Turkey. These ideas repeated itself in myriad studies on the emergence of Turkish Identity. However, these views give primary importance to state bureaucracy and other state apparatuses in establishing and reproducing national ideologies and boundaries, and the significant role of the intellectual activity is overlooked. For the Turkish case, this role was done by the Young Turks. It was the Kemalist single-party who constructed the nation-state and the new Turkish identity. But the corpus of this new identity was implemented by the Young Turk movement and especially the Turkist branch of the movement played a significant role. The political and social vocabulary of this reform period was constructed by the Turkists (Zürcher, 1984, pp. 19-45).
Hobsbawm (1992) defines the nationalism in this way: “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (p. 9). Hobsbawm also states that ‘nationalism belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period’ (p. 9).

The emergence of Turkish nationalism coincided with the most incongruous era of the Ottoman Empire, the period of its dissolution. The period in which Turkish nationalism, between 1908 and 1918, became a major ideological part of the Empire was the period of traumas. A.L Macfie (1998) abstracts the period in these words:

The Principal stages on the road leading to Ottoman collapse, in the period of the Balkan and First World Wars are not difficult to identify. In 1908, following the so-called Young Turk Revolution, which brought about a restoration of the First Ottoman Constitution of 1878, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the administration of which it had acquired in 1878; while Bulgaria still nominally a tributary state of the Ottoman Sultanate, proclaimed its independence; and Crete announced its enosis (union) with Greece. In 1910-11 the Albanians rose in revolt, and in 1911 Italy occupied Tripolitanya (Libya). In 1912-1913 a league of Balkan states, made up of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, launched an assault on the Ottoman Empire, with the object of expelling the Ottoman Turks from their remaining territories in Europe. This task the Balkan League very nearly accomplished (p. 3).

The dissolution continued with the expelling of the Ottomans from Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia, parts of Eastern Anatolia between the years of 1917 and 1918. In the Armistice of Mudros (1918), which ended Ottoman World War 1, Ottomans forced to demobilization of the greater parts of their armed forces by leaving the Arab provinces, Azerbaijan and Transcaucasia, and allied forces occupied strategic points in eastern Thrace, including Turkish straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) (pp. 2-3).
All these traumas were met with hostility among the Ottoman Intellectuals and in the society. Halide Edip Adivar (2005) explains the situation after the Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

It was the first shock to the childish belief that once a New Turkey arose the powers and the aggressive little nations who surrounded her would allow for the difficulties of the reform period, and give her at least a short time to find herself. I remember the wild demonstrations in Istanbul, the speeches and the street gatherings, the discarding of fezzes because they were Austrian manufacture. Solemn vows of the eternal boycott of Austrian goods appeared in all newspapers (p. 301).

I argue that those incidents had a double effect on the Turkist Intellectuals. First of all, the significant amount of loss of land in the Empire convinced the Turkists about the power of nationalism. Nationalism was giving strength to nations in the Europe and the Balkans who used to be the parts of the Ottoman Empire. All of these nations started to construct their nation-states on the basis of their racial and national differences. The Turkists concluded that this was the universal pathway for the modernization which had to be also followed by the Turks. A new Turkish identity had to be constructed which would depend on the national and racial characteristics of Turks, and Turkish culture.

Secondly, it engendered a “traumatic memory” among the Turkist Intellectuals (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003). This was the type of memory which “causes to narratives in which the key elements of the trauma are stressed and repeated” (p. 100). The new Turkish identity designed by the Turkists and its relation to the others was the result of the traumatic incidents the Turkists were witnessing at the time. I argue that, this newly constructed Turkish identity over-emphasized the hostility of racial/national others which were perceived as always ready to attack the Turkish homeland. Taner Akçam (2004) makes similarly analysis
and terms this peculiar aspect of Turkish identity as “The Middle Position” (p. 40).

According to him:

Turkish national identity already contains an aspect of siege mentality and sees Anatolia as the last refuge against the hostile environment surrounding it and the bloodletting that it has experienced on its borders. It was this siege mentality and perception of Anatolia as the last refuge that played an important role in Turkey’s policies towards the Armenians that were different from those taken toward other nationalities, and their culmination in genocide (p. 40).

According to the Turkists, all the surrounding nations of Turks already constructed their nationhood. However, the Turks were still ignorant of the significance of the national spirit. This late nationalization created a catch-up mentality in the nationalist Intellectuals. This mentality affected the new Turkish identity and its relation with others. Akçam defines this state of mind by these sentences:

Even Istanbul served as a capital city for the Ottomans for centuries. The historical process of the late 18th and 19th centuries, however, created a strong sense of insecurity in the Ottomans. Due to the multiethnic character of the Empire, the Ottoman ruling elite was unable to offer a stable national identity to replace this insecurity. Turkish nationalism, as a political movement, arrived only in the 20th century. This late arrival of the national identity created chronic self-doubt and constant vacillation between exaggerated praise of one’s value on the one hand, and suffering from an inferiority complex on the other (p. 52).

I argue that the Turkists perceived the ultimate reason behind this fall as the absence of the theorization of others within the Turkish society. According them, the Turks had to realize the boundaries of their nation and the only way to achieve this is to impose the idea of the others via Intellectual activity. This was main Turkist aim. They otherized the racial/national
differences, the hybrid Ottoman culture, over-Westernized Turks and the Ottoman Islam. The new Turkish identity was going to be constructed on the exclusion of these.

2.2 Racializing and Nationalizing of the Otherness:

Racial and national otherness is used by the Turkists in order to construct the external boundaries of the Turkish identity. Racial terms and categories are not used to construct racial-hierarchies between different ethnicities. The Turkists did not focus on the racial hierarchies but they used the categories of race and nation in an exceptionalist way. Exceptionalism is briefly defined as the uniqueness of nations. According to Fredrickson (1995), it is the tendency to define that “every nation is the product of its particular history” and “one nation departs from a general pattern manifested by all the others” (p. 4). According to this view, each nation has its own history, religious practices, ethnic and cultural differences. Exceptionalism is used in order to construct prototypical nationhood and to generate stereotypes and generalizations about the other (Lindisfarne, 2002, p. 203). Together with that, it used to define national boundaries as stable and natural (p. 203). The Turkists, in my opinion, used racial and national exceptionalism in order to divide the existing political and social structures according to the racial and national categories. Under the effect of the social-Darwinism, they believed that people from different races and nations were in an endless conflict with each other and each nation was acting to maximize its own interests. Nations were solid and complete unities. However, there were also races acting as the bigger units of solidarity. This terminology divided the world between races which were in constant social and political conflict. Slav race, Turkish race, and Yellow race were the units which were used in the exceptionalist tones.
Young Turks were familiar with the European racial ideas since the late 19th century. Racial ideas became a part of the Young Turk nationalist discourse and political and social vocabulary in the early 20th century. However, terms such as millet (nation), kavim (ethn-national group), kavimiyet (nationality-nationalism), and cinsiyet (stock, sex) were already being discussed as early as the mid-1860s (Karpat, 2001, p. 334). Millet, previously used to refer solely to the Christians, was appropriated by the Muslims as the “national” name of all those who shared Islam. These have been the words used in Islamic political thought for centuries (Mardin, 2000, p. 81). However, Turkists offered a new political and social language for the Empire, which would serve as a mediator to achieve their major utopia; to form a secular homogenized nationhood which should save the Empire from dissolution.

“Others” of the nation.

The racial ideas of Turkists were oriented by bio-organism which defines the society as functioning organism. As one of the founding father of the movement Ahmed Riza expressed it, "society is a complex organism dependent solely upon natural laws. This body is subject to cyclic illnesses." (Hanioglu, 1995, p. 208). According to him, social problems could be healed through an application of scientific methodology. More than those, the Young Turks were adherents of popular biological materialist theories of the mid-nineteenth century, which were based on racial distinctions. One of the most popular among Young Turks Gustav Le Bon’s war against democracy was an attempt to protect the superior race—white, European—from the danger of mob rule." (p. 208) Letourneau examined the evolution of various subjects within different races. Together with that, Edmond Demolins's book A quoi tient la superiorite des Anglo-Saxons drew the interest of the Young Turks, even though its examination of superiority was not drawn from a biological perspective; later leading Young Turk Sabahaddin Bey became a disciple of Demolins (p. 208).
The dominant Young Turk discourse balanced between Ottomanism and Turkism. Ottomanism was a state policy which tried to prevent rise of ethnic nationalism inside the empire. A policy which was created “in order to respond to the challenge of ethnic separatism, during the second half of the Tanzimat era Ottomanism was refashioned as an ideology promoting equality among Ottoman ethnic groups” (Hanioglu, 2001, p. 5). This state policy was trying to create an Ottoman identity and an Ottoman nation which should be above any other ethnic or religious identity. All Ottoman citizens were going to be equal among the Ottoman constitution. According to Karpat (2001) Ottomanism was:

Aiming to produce “equality” between Muslims and non-Muslims and to center political unity on common Ottoman citizenship, it transformed the subjects of the sultan into citizens of the state and opened the way to turn religious faith into a personal matter” (p. 12).

However Ottomanism could not prevent the rise of ethnic nationalism inside the Ottoman Empire. Various ethnic groups of the Empire continued to define themselves with their national and ethnic identities. The Young Turk movement tried to remain in an Ottomanist political vocabulary in order to prevent any more dissolution inside the Empire. Even though nationalist ideas were part of the Young Turk discourse, it was the Turkists who openly demanded to construct a new homogenized nationhood under these ideals.

The Turkist political thought, defined Ottomanism as a failure which was delaying Turk’s national awakening. According to them the boundaries of the nation had to be contained with belonging to the same race, same language, same culture and history. Those who did not fit to this scheme and those who did not volunteer to Turkify themselves were the “others”. That was a significant change for the Ottoman context because the classical social system of the Empire, the Millet system set the boundaries between different ethnic groups according to religious distinctions. The Millet was a system, under which “the religious
community had a legal status, stemming directly from basic Islamic principles, according to protection to the peoples of the Book, that could not be altered by the government” (Karpat, 2001, p. 280). The official identity for non-Muslims in the Ottoman state was determined by “membership in one of the three culturally autonomous religious communities, or millets; the Orthodox one included the Western Christians, mostly the Slavs in the Balkans; the Armenian millet represented the Eastern Christians; and the Jews belonged to their own millet” (p. 310). Even though the Millet system had ethnic divisions inside, religion was the main point of social organization. In the state level society was divided between “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”.

Instead of a language with religious differences, the Turkists have taken the race and ethnicity to their center of comparison between different social groups. The others were racialized and nationalized in their political and social language. According to them nation was depending on the unity of religion, language, race, history, customs and manners (Arai, 2002, p. 191). Nation and race were the basic categories in which the politics and social relations based on. The others were the ones who did not belong to those categories.

It was Yusuf Akçura, leading advocate of the Turkist movement, who openly offered race and natşon to be the basis of Young Turk politics and future of the nation in his political manifesto Three Ways of Policy. Akçura was deeply “impressed by his professors at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques such as Albert Sorel and Émile Boutmy, Akçura tried demonstrating the “power” of the concept of the “nation.” (Hanioglu, 2001, p. 295). According to him the nation was: “consisted of a racial and cultural homogeneous community which was united by social consciousness (Akçura, 2008, p. 18). In order to prevent the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a new politics which depends on the racial and national unity of Turks had to be formed. According François Georgeon, Akçura’s usage of race was simply different than the race as biological differences. Georgeon mentions that together with the racial and
biological differences, Akçura’s racial understanding also dealt with the cultural differences such as language, customs and religion (Georgeon, 2005, p. 43). So “race” was a package of culture, ethnicity and biological differences and those were the main borders of the nationhood and all Turkish races should be united under one state. In 1914 he wrote that “nations have one race, one language and one culture” (Akçura, 1999c, p. 82). These were the main boundaries of being native and foreign, “us” and the “other”. But under the multi-ethnic structure of Ottoman Empire those boundaries was so ambiguous. According to him the, in 19th century ideas of nation and races became significant, 19th century was the “century of nationhood” (Akçura, 1999b, p. 150). Ottomans facing this reality with spread of nationalist and racial ideas in the Empire, and especially in the Balkans. Within the spread of those ideas, other races started to be in conflict with Turkishness. For example, for Akçura (1999a), there were two races and cultures were fighting in the Balkans, the Slavic and the Turkish race:

The Ottoman army is now fighting in the Balkans with the Christian Slav race.
This army is the south-wing of the Muslim world and the western-wing of the Turkish army. Now those two armies are fighting with each other bluntly, and they represent two different branches of the Balkanian history; they represent two different cultures, two different civilizations and two different ideas (p. 404; translation mine).

All the nations who didn’t realize the significance of those was going to disappear from history. Nations (Turks) who didn’t realize this truth and didn’t take account differences between other races was in a naive and childish situation. Turkist Halide Edip Adivar (2005) symbolizes those nations and Turks especially, with a naïve little girl, incognizant of boundaries and didn’t realize the importance of nation:
What did that mean to the little girl? She had not entered yet that narrow path where religion and language as well as racial differences make human beings devour each other. The little girl was still in a world where the joy of life is heart fusion and natural existence (p. 27).

For Akçura, because the racial differences inside of the Ottoman Empire it was practically impossible to unite all these races under the Empire any more. All the races inside the Empire had different histories, customs and religions and those differences were essential. Akçura believed that there were not any commonality between an Ottoman Christian Serb who lives in the Kosovo plains and a Bedouin Arab who lived in the Nejd desert (Georgeon, 1999, p. 57). According to Akçura, when the Turks started to follow a political pathway which depended on racial unity of the Turks, the Ottoman Empire should dissolve its dissolution and for certain extend non-Turkish Muslim races should be Turkified:

By such a policy all Turks living in the Ottoman Empire would be perfectly united by both ethnic\(^1\) and religious bonds and the other non-Turkish Muslim groups who have been already Turkified to a certain extent would be further assimilated (Akçura, 2007; cited in Thomson, 1992, p. 174).

Under the category of race and nation Turkists were constructing the discourse of “us” and “the other”. But once the national and racial the Turkist poet Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1969a) was ready to declare that their race puts Turks in a superior position than the others. He defied it in his poem *On The Way to War*:

I’m a Turk, my religion, my race is supreme
My breast is full of fire
Anyone who considered himself as human

\(^1\) Akçura used the word *Irk* in the original text (Akçura, 2007, p. 23). Which means “race” in Turkish.
Should be a slave of his fatherland! (p. 41; translation mine)

Yurdakul defined the racial other as an enemy. According to him the other was a snake-eyed enemy which spreads fire, this was an alarm for the Turks to wake up and define their borders with the others. In his poem *Death to the Other*, Yurdakul (1969b) uses these words:

There is a foreign face which I don’t like
Whenever I see this face, I looked his/her eyes
It spreads me fire like a snake’s two eyes
This face makes a wound in my national pride

I don’t know why these eyes looking at me feloniously
The way it looks has a violent animosity
It humiliates me like a stateless prisoner
And it tries to exile me from the land
Which I came into the world (p. 122; translation mine).

One of the most significant texts which define the Turkist disbelief to solidarity of Ottoman nations shows itself in Ömer Seyfettin’s articles. As a Turkist, Seyfettin had one of the strongest tones to the racial and national differences. According to him the 19th century was the period of otherness. All nations started to define their others and they focused their differences between themselves and the other (Seyfettin, 2001, p. 44). They were using racial and national categories in order to construct other, and the world politics started to be organized according to racial differences. The Slav Russians was in conflict with the Japanese because they were afraid of the rise of the yellow races, Japanese afraid of the white race to dominate the world politics (p. 47). The white race was the supreme power in the world politics for centuries because they were the earliest race to understand their differences from
the others. Turks, as a race, had to adopt the significance of race and nation and construct it’s others. According to Seyfettin Turks were still insisting on the unity of Ottoman nations and that was the main ethos. Seyfettin defines his point in a sarcastic way:

Supposedly the Revolution was made not only by Turks, but all the Ottomans. I mean Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbian, Vlahs, Jews, Albanians and other Ottomans… 10 July was named as the “Ottoman Revolution”. For Albanians the day was a national pride (p. 331).

But it was the age of race and nationhood. All the “other nations” have realized it except the Turks:

The Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, Armenians, Albanians have national ideals, national literatures, national languages, national ends, national organizations. All these nations are very foxy. They trick Turks by saying the phrase “We are truly Ottomans” but they force the Turks to degenerate Turkish language, literature, even they convince the Turks to change scientific books and to clean the words “Turk and Turkey” from history and geography books. The Turks are leaving their nationhood behind and follow the Ottomanist principals, but those Christians are gathering around their own patriarchates for their own national goals (p. 331).

The Turkists used the racial/national other in other to mark the differences between the Balkan nations and the non-Muslims and the Turks inside the Empire. They popularized the racial and national categories with their written works. They stressed the uncompromised racial and national struggles under the influence of the European racial theories and Social Darwinism. Following positivism and social Darwinism, Turkists believed that the law of evolution is one of gradual progress (Hanioglu, 2001, p.38). The meaning of this is that the racial and national conflicts were universal and should repeat itself in any time and space.
World politics and social life was consisted of constant struggles. Social life was an arena of struggle in which the weaker nations and races was going to be eliminated by the powerful ones (Ünder, 2002, p. 429). Following those ideas Young Turks constructed an “other” for Turkishness which was always going to be in a conflict with “us”. Because of that, “us” always had to be alerted and ready for struggle. It should be ready and alerted for the enemies from within and outside.

2.3. Representations of the Otherness:

Suny and Kennedy (1999) define the significant relation between the historical contexts and articulation of the nation by the nationalist Intellectuals. According to them, these contexts are “the times of rapid social transformation”, “explicit social struggle”, “quiet resistance”, and “apparent social transformation”, each of them strongly effect how intellectuals imagine the nation (p. 37). The historical context of the Turkist case might be regarded as the “the times of rapid social transformation”. The 19th century was the period of dissolution for the Ottoman Empire. Various ethnic elements of the Ottoman Empire started to declare their independence and formed their own nation-states. The nationalist wave started from the Balkans, and the Greek Independence followed by the separation of the Serbians, Bulgarians, Romanians and more. The non-Muslim communities inside the Empire, such as Greeks and Armenians, continued the outspread of nationalism.

The result of this rapid disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was the “perception of an external threat among the Turkish community” (Cagaptay, 2006, p. 4). During the end of the century, dissolution gained much more momentum. Soner Cagaptay defines it in this way: “The perception of vulnerability among the Turkish Muslims climaxed during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Then, in a matter of a few months, the Empire lost 69 percent of its
population and 83 percent of its territory in Europe” (Cagaptay, 2006, p. 6). These are the main historical contexts which affected the Turkist imagination of the “other”.

Based on the aforementioned reasons, The Turkist representation of “others” depended on the images about the Balkan nations and the non-Muslims within the empire. Since those were the earliest nationalized ethnic groups inside the empire, the Turkist racial / national other depended on their representations. Representations were used to highlight the differences between various ethnic groups. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1997) defines the difference as ambivalence. According to him, the difference should be both negative and positive and “it is both necessary for the production of the meaning, formation of the language and culture and for social identities” (p. 238). However in the Turkist case, difference was only attributed to its negative meaning. Turkists used the difference in order to construct many barriers between different ethnicities. This type of representation is defined by Hallam and Street (2005) as “hierarchical order of representation” which “privileges some” and “marginalizes or discredits the other” (p. 7). Representations are relations of power, they are used to “mark, assign and clarify” (Hall, 1997, p. 259).

One of the most significant representations of the otherness is defined as “ethnotypes”. Ethnotypes are mainly discourses and images constructed about the others, which include “stereotypical characterizations attributed to ethnicities or nationalities and commonplace” (Beller & Leerseen, 2007, p. xiv). As Beller and Leerseen state; “ethnotypes take shape in a discursive and rhetorical environment; they are representative of literary and discursive conventions, not of social realities” (p. xiv). The imaginated discourse “(a) singles out a nation from the rest of humanity as being somewhat different or ‘typical’, and (b) articulates or suggests a moral, characterological, collective-physiological motivation for given social or national features” (p. xiv). It suggests charaterological explanations for
cultural difference. Hall (1997) defines stereotyping as a “key element in the exercise of symbolic violence” (p. 257).

The Turkist representation of others includes various negative ethnotypes for different Balkan nations and non-Muslims. Instead of constructing different categories and ethnotypes for each ethnic group, Turkists created two; the Turks and the others. The other includes every non-Turkish group inside of the Empire, or the ex-members of the Ottoman Empire, like Bulgarians. So there are no stereotypes or negative depictions constructed exclusively for the Bulgarians, Greeks, Arabs or Albanians, but the negative other image embraced them all. The Turkist discourse has a holistic attitude about the national or racial others. All of the non-Muslims of the Empire, or neighboring nationalities (Balkanian mainly) are depicted as killers, rapists or traitors due to their being “servants” of Europe. They used these negative images in order to supply “naturalization”. It is defined by Stuart Hall (1997) as a “reprentional strategy designed to fix ‘difference’, and thus secure it forever” (p. 245; italics in original). It is for constructing natural boundaries between different races which are beyond history, permanent and fixed. For each nation is “naturally” working for its own benefits, they are perceived as “natural” enemies.

One of the most common themes in the Turkist representation of the other is to depict them as the “enemy inside”. This theme is generally used for the non-Muslims inside the empire. According to this representation, non-Muslims were the allies of the external enemies of the empire. Imitating to be Turkish allies, deep inside they were the foes as believed by the Turkists. This type of representation is defined as “the foreigner” by Corrian Albrecht (2007). According to Albrecht, “foreignness operationalizes otherness and alterity in a relational sense. Thus, the foreign is not an objective quality of whatever is distant, strange, unknown, unfamiliar or rare, but relative vis-à-vis the observer’s subjective experience of knowledge. It
is part of a given social reality and, as such, subject to historical and cultural change” (pp. 326-327).

In the first type of representation, the Turkists accentuated the economic relations in order to construct the foreigner image. The non-Muslims of the Empire were used as the stereotype for this construction. According to this view, the non-Muslims were exploiting the Empire’s economy together with the European capitalists. They were the secret allies of European powers inside the Empire. This theme is constructed on the image which represented a hostile image of the other, because the other was not in collaboration with the Turks, but perceived as the allies with the Europeans.

Yusuf Akçura (2006) represented the non-Muslim Ottomans (Christians and Jews) as the close allies and domestic servants of the European states. According to him, the non-Muslim Ottomans were under the protection of the European states, claiming a national separation from the Empire (p. 134). The non-Muslims were economically better than the Muslims and Turks, and devoted their energies to forming their own nation states. So, they are depicted as the enemy within, who were in coalition with the enemy outside. Akçura explains his view in this way:

Since the end of the 19th century, the non-Muslims, the Ottoman Greeks and the Armenians have been under the protection of the foreigner European Capitalists and politicians. Those capitalists and politicians decided to give the parts of the Empire, dominated by Turkish population, to the Greeks and the Armenians. The eastern parts of Anatolia will be given to the Armenians and the western parts to the Greeks. Those ethnicities will be the ruling class and the Turks will become the ruled, the second class (p. 134; translation mine).

For Akçura, the non-Muslims were exploiting the economy of the Empire. As they gained power, Turks lost their power gradually. Especially the Ottoman Christians were
constantly acquiring more economic power because they became an ally of the European capitalist system which was exploiting the Ottoman economy and politics. For Akçura the non-Muslims were the local agents and the pioneers of the European invaders:

Two centuries ago, the Ottoman Empire had a much harmonized economic system. Its system collapsed due to various reasons. Beginning from the 19th century, European capitalism started to plunder the economy of the Empire. The pioneers of those invaders were the non-Muslims of the Empire (p. 163; translation mine).

The Ottoman non-Muslims were economically controlling the strategic areas of the Empire. All of these economic powers were coming from their agreement with the European capitalist societies to exploit the Ottoman economy together. The cities and towns, and all other strategic parts of the Empire were under this economic invasion. The non-Muslims owned European passports and these passports were protecting them against the Empire’s laws. As Akçura points, the Turks were excluded from this economic system:

Within the total support of the European capitalists, their non-Muslim allies gained the total financial and trading control of the major Ottoman towns and cities. The capitulations\(^2\) were the fortes of those invaders, providing them a shelter at the times they could not openly achieve their aims. Free from all laws and procedures, the European protection and the European passports, supplied the non-Muslims a total economic freedom (p. 164; translation mine).

Ömer Seyfettin (2007a) repeated the same attitude in this way:

And in any case, what effect could words have at this point? Bankruptcy had actually set in, and was approaching its conclusion. All trade, wealth, money and affluence had passed into the hands of foreigners. Capitulations were an institution of expropriation, an engine of execution slowly, gradually killing a nation. Nobody could see the truth;

\(^2\) Free trade laws between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.
nobody could even decide upon at least a line of retreat in order to escape the approaching disaster (pp. 87-88).

In his short story *Enemy of the Boycotage*, Seyfettin offered the Turks to stop shopping from the local Greek shoppers and only buy Turkish goods. When they consumed import products, they were sending all of their money to mainland Greece. The money spent by the Turks would be used by the Greeks to construct a naval force. Unless the Turks stopped shopping the Greek import goods, inside of the Empire, according to the dystopian foreshadowing of Seyfettin, “churches were going to replace mosques” (p.373; translation mine).

Sexualization of otherness was a significant theme in Turkist representations. Sexual violence is used as great “metaphors” in order to demonize the other. Schick argues that “as a metaphor, however, sexual violence also provides a symbolically dense representation of territorial appropriation and of the inability of men to defend their territory and their manhood” (Schick, 2007, p. 277). Insulting women and sexual violence is depicted as “an assault to national honor” and “nationalist discourse uses images of women’s bodies to mark national and communal boundaries” (Pettman, 1996, p. 51). Any kind of sexual harassment, rape and sexual violence is used to sexualize the national conflicts.

Sexualization of otherness is also used by the Turkists in order to define national boundaries. This metaphor is especially witnessed in the short stories of Ömer Seyfettin. Seyfettin used this metaphor in order to depict Bulgarians and Bulgarian nationalists as sexual violators against the Turkish women. His short story *A Pure White Tulip* (Seyfettin, 2007a, pp. 9-41) is a significant example of this type of constructing the otherness. The story starts with the scene that the Bulgarian soldiers invaded the Serres district of the Ottoman Macedonia during the Balkan Wars of 1912. The Bulgarian soldiers were pleasantly welcomed by the Christians of the territory who have been hating the Turks of the region for so long. Seyfettin narrates this encounter in this way:
This utterly unexpected rout had gone to the head of the city’s Christians. The men gathered on the corners, and the women were hanging out of their windows, smiling as they stared at these bunches sneaking guiltily past, as if they were watching a free and very entertaining movie. As for the Greek kids, it was as if these terrible urchins had finally found the opportunity to express the hatred for the Turks that they had been infused with from the cradle (p. 10).

After this nice welcoming, the garrison commander of the Bulgarian soldiers Major Radko Balkaneski comes to the city. His duty was “managing the plundering of the city and the massacring of its population under established rules and procedures” (p.11). After entering the city Balkaneski stated to manage his plans:

Looking at the soldiers milling around below him, he started reviewing his plan in his mind. The Turks of Serres were very rich. Now those that hadn’t been able to flee would be rounded up, and tortured to extort all the money that they had in their vaults or bank accounts; then they would be forced to make all their properties over to Bulgarian schools as if they were ransoming themselves, and finally they would be baptized into Christianity prior to being murdered (p. 11).

But as narrated by Seyfettin, his real task was different; to find the best Turkish maidens of the town in order to rape them:

All that would take half an hour at most. But a difficult task remained: to discover who was the town’s most beautiful Turkish maiden… They had brought him nine girls or around fourteen or fifteen who had been picked from Cuma and from Osenova. In his tent he had had their clothes taken off so that he could see their bodies; he hadn’t liked them (p. 11).

But Radko did not like the girls he saw who were either peasants or sick. He gave those girls to his soldiers as a present:
Two of them were relatively good-looking, but they were very thin and had malaria. Seven were virtually peasants. They had thick arms, legs, waists. They were crying at the top of their voice, and trying to cover their faces with their work-roughened hands. Growing angry at their loud crying and sobbing, he had turned all of them over to the soldiers of the battalion. They then had divided them among themselves, so that there was one for each platoon. Stripping them naked, forcing them to drink wine and to dance, they amused themselves all night… Passing through in the morning, from on top of his horse Radko had seen these girls’ bayonetted corpses in the ditch by the road… (p. 12).

After invading the city, Balkaneski planned the organization of the rapes of the women. He made laws for raping; according to this plan “Turkish maidens would be distributed among the soldiers, and in order to prevent any rivalry or fighting between the men, neighborhoods would be allocated on a company basis. Then after each company would take turns with the girls in its allocated area for a whole week, and patrols to be set up by the komitacis would make sure that nobody committed any transgressions”(p. 12). Radko gives an order that “it was forbidden to spend a whole night with a girl, or to drink rakı or wine” (p. 12). According to this plan “an enlisted man would remain in a girl’s room for an hour at most, and after he had finished it would be the turn of the next soldier in line” (p. 12).

Radko wanted to have the whitest Turkish girl in the town, and he learned that it was Haci Hasan’s daughter Lale. He started to dream about her “White… White it was… that his thoughts turned to. This Lâle in the “white” column had to be the most beautiful” (p. 29). He goes to her house and forcefully makes her open the door. During his attempt to rape her, she jumps out of the window and dies. Disappointed with her unexpected death, Radko decides to rape her dead body:
“Before she grows cold,” he muttered to himself, “before she grows cold…” This priceless corpse was still warm. Before she gets cold… Mightn’t it be possible to have at least a partial sampling of who knows how unique and exceptional a taste could be had of her untarnished love, her untouched virginity? He thought no further. He was afraid that she might grow cold quickly. He took her delicate corpse, with her shoulders bruised, with her blood invisibly clotted, with her hair entangled over her chest and breasts, into his arms. With the deliberate calm of a treacherous Satan abducting a little angel that had somehow fallen asleep while worshipping her Allah in a distant corner of heaven unfrequented by damsels and believers\textsuperscript{3} alike, he slowly walked up the same stairs that he had descended at a run. He entered the room. He laid Lâ’lî’s dead body down on the same bed with rumpled sheets where she had been twisting and turning, alive, only a minute earlier (p. 39).

In her poem, Halide Edip Adivar (1999) symbolized the losses of the Army with the emasculation of the nation. According to her, the Balkan nations were not virile enough to beat the Turkish masculinity which was represented by the Turkish army whereas the Bulgarians were represented as the former gardeners of the Turkish nation:

The muddy foot of our gardeners has risen in order to profane the honor and religion of the Ottomans. They beat the masculinity of the army; they take its guns, rifles and cannons. The Europeans are waving hands to those little Bulgarians who have no history and past. Even in its most feeble times, The Turkish army has always been respected by the world (p. 33; translation mine).

Another favorite theme used by the Turkists is, as I coin it, the “Sleeping us vs. the awakened other”. The Turkists represented Turks as a sleeping nation which has not awakened yet. However the others are represented as have already awakened and become

\textsuperscript{3} Huriler ve mûminler… in the original.
nationalized. This type of representation is defined as “Honour/Shame distinction” by Josep Leersen (2007). According to him, “notions of honour demonstrably govern behavior, and are especially pronounced in areas and situations where the state cannot enforce its monopoly on legitimate violence” (p. 334). In the Turkist case, the Turks were in shame because the nation has not awakened yet of which the boundaries were constantly being beaten by the awakened others.

This theme is used in many poems and short stories by the Turkists. One of them is Mehmed Emin Yurdakul’s *Lullaby* (1969c) which represents a lullaby written for the sleeping nation. The didactic lullaby whispers the nation messages which dictate that it is time to wake up and defend the national rights against the other:

Lullaby, the fatherland is miserable lullaby;
Lullaby, look, the Iraq is heartsick lullaby;
Lullaby, Rumelia is in mourning lullaby;
Lullaby Anatolia is desolate and ruined lullaby;

Lullaby there are desolate homes lullaby;
Lullaby there are cities which are in prison lullaby;
Lullaby there are districts waiting for your call lullaby;
There are chains waiting to be broken lullaby.

Lullaby the great days have come lullaby;
Your race is calling in you lullaby;
A spiritual sound has risen up lullaby;
It’s calling for the Turan. (p. 133).
Another theme of the Turkist is about the relation between “innocent and naive Turks” and the “awakened other”. Theis theme is mainly protagonized by a moral character. The moral character is the one who acts on the basis of national ethics and morals (Leersen, 2007, p. 285). It is the one which depends on the reflection of the inner evaluations and standards on what should or should not be done, or what is right or what is wrong (p. 285). This theme is mainly used in short stories. It is mainly about how the Turks trusted to the other and how he is betrayed. The betrayed one is glorified in this case due to her / his deep devotion to nationhood. In this theme, The Turks are represented with their credulity and even stupidity. The Turks always trust the other with innocent feelings such as love and friendship; however the other is always represented as monomaniac and obsessed with nationhood. The other is represented as the one who always acts according to the needs of the nationhood.

The short story of Ömer Seyfettin (2007c), *The Refrain*, is one of the most significant examples of this type of representation. The story is about an Ottoman civil servant who is sent to Ottoman Macedonia by the Government. He is extremely bored because he is sent to this peripheral area by the central administration. Of days and days of constant inner dialogues, one day he hears a song which is sung by a girl on the neighboring house. The song includes the following Bulgarian words:

Nash, nash

Tsarigrad nash…

Ras, va, tri (p. 57).

After hearing this song, the Turk develops a platonic crush on the Bulgarian girl. He dreams of her for days and he hears the same girl singing the same song for a multitude of times during the story. The civil servant dreams that the girl is singing a love-song:

I love you very much,

I love you very much.
I have crossed the Balkans and the Shipka Pass
to come to you (p. 59).

He fantasizes of her singing passionately this song to him. His fantasy comes to a halt as he learns that he is appointed by the government to another district of Rumelia. Before leaving the city he attempts to find her, but he fails to do so. He wants to learn about the meaning of the song before leaving and asks it to a local and he learns that the song is a Bulgarian nationalist march which tells the capturing of Istanbul:

It will be ours, it will be ours,

Istanbul will be ours one day… (p. 63).

The same theme is also found in Mehmet Emin Yurdakul’s short story, *Turkish Land* (1999). It tells the story of a storm in a Turkish village. Two Ottoman Christians who are passing by the village decide to stay there due to the heavy storm. They knock on one of the houses where they are welcomed pleasantly by the villagers. However, the Christian woman is uneasy because of this unexpected visit. She discloses her uneasiness to her friend via following words:

Don’t fall asleep. Don’t forget that we are in a Turkish village. If the hostler told them that we were in the bank and have a diamond in our bag, they are going to butcher us like sheep and burry us under the snow. Everybody would think that we were suffocated under the snow (p. 293; translation mine).

The negative images of Christians were used in a positive manner. They were messages to the Turks that they should be hostile to the others and they should never forget their national emotions and feelings. Whenever they should be naïve and innocent, the other would always be hostile and never forgets differences among nations.
Chapter 3. Otherization of the Culture:

3.1 The Ottoman Culture as the Other:

“The cultural other”, as I coin it, is constructed by the Turkists in order to define the cultural boundaries of the nation. The others defined by the Turkists were the Ottoman culture, over-Westernized Turks, and the Ottoman Islam. These three types were used by the Turkists in order to exclude the internal others. For the Turkists, the Ottoman culture was heterogeneous and hybrid, due to its inclusion of “foreign cultures”, such as the Arabic and Persian cultures, and undisciplined. The Ottoman culture, according to the Turkists, was the result of a “cultural hybridization”. This term is explained by Smith (2008) as “the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices” (p. 3). I argue that, in the Turkists’ case, the “existing practices”, as defined by Turkist intellectuals, was the “Turkish culture”, and it was “recombined” with the “Arabic and Persian culture” under the Ottoman culture. The result was a hybrid identity with new practices. In the level of hybrid identity, “the identities are not assimilated or altered independently, but instead elements of cultures are incorporated to create a new hybrid culture” (p. 3).

The Turkists believed that in order to discipline the national culture (Turkish), the foreign elements (Hybrid Ottoman culture) had to be excluded from the national one, and the culture had to be re-organized. Therefore, the Turkists called for a cultural selection. The over-Westernized Ottoman Turks, who shared cosmopolitan identities and manners, were also perceived by them as heterogeneous and hybrid. They were hybrids because their culture was mixed with the European manners and behavioral codes.
Ziya Gökalp was one of the major Turkist theorists who devoted his intellectual activity to the representation of the Ottoman culture as “the other”. In other words, he engaged “Cultural Turkism” (Parla, 1985, p. 25). The starting point of Gökalp’s cultural analysis depends on a dual cultural structure which has been existent in the Ottoman Empire since the 15th Century. Gökalp mentions two layers of culture; the popular culture of the Turks and the heterogeneous culture of the Ottoman elite. Following Durkheimian sociology, Gökalp states that the national culture is the main binding element which creates solidarity. It was the main social institution which connected all the individuals of the society, providing harmony and national solidarity. In his terms:

Nation is not a race, not a horde, not a geographical or political unity or will to live together. Nation is the solidarity of the people who shares the same language, religion, manners and ethics. Turkish villagers define it as “the people who fits my language and religion” (Gökalp, 2009, p. 22).

In the Ottoman case, as also posited by Gökalp (Gökalp, 2005, p. 25), it was the cultural duality that impeded the emergence of the national solidarity within the boundaries of the empire. According to him, this duality had to be deconstructed in accordance with the rise of the Turkish culture as the only national culture for the Ottoman Empire. In order to achieve this, the Arabic and the Persian elements had to be expurgated from the Turkish culture. Those foreign influences, coming from the Ottoman culture, are, as I term it, the “cultural others” of Turkist ideology. Selection of what to be expurgated from the national culture, in Gökalp’s view, should be the duty of the Turkist intellectuals (Gökalp, 2004, p. 43).

According to Gökalp the unity of hars (culture) and medeniyet (civilization) was the main source of the national solidarity. “Culture” is defined by Gökalp as the “sum of institutions that create solidarity and interconnect individuals of a society” (Parla, 1985, p. 29). “Civilization”, on the other hand, is a set of institutions which linked the “upper strata of
one society to the upper strata of other societies” (p. 29). The institutions referred by Gökalp should be summarized as “language, literature, music, architecture, law, and military and civil administration” (p. 29). For Gökalp, “culture” was corresponding to the national culture. The nation had its own characteristic qualities such as religion, ethics, laws, reason, aesthetics, language, economics and techniques all of which were the constructors of the national solidarity (Gökalp, 2005, p. 19). “Civilization” represented the cosmopolitan and international culture, which, at the times it was not in accordance with the same cultural characteristic qualities, was perceived as degenerating the national one. “Civilization” was regarded above the national culture for it was a production of the elite networks of each nation or society. In this framework, Gökalp perceived the Ottoman culture as a part of the Arabic-Persian Civilization (p. 14).

In order to explain his thesis, Gökalp focuses on the diachronic evolution of the Ottoman culture. According to him, the Ottoman culture generated by the Ottoman elite was one of the significant examples for the degeneration of culture. Gökalp believed that the Ottoman elites were still representing the “pure Turkish culture” at the time the Ottoman Empire was established (Gökalp, 2005, p. 12). In terms of the cultural elements stated above such as language and literature, the early Empire showed Turkish cultural qualities. However, by the penetration of the other cultures, the elite culture gradually lost its authenticity, turning into an amorphous mixture of Persian and Arabic cultures. In Gökalp’s point of view, national solidarity could only be achieved with a monolithic culture consisting of single language and customs. The remedy for this, according to Gökalp, was the exclusion of the Arabic and the Persian cultural elements from the Turkish culture (Ünüvar, 2002, p. 30).

With the Arabic-Persian influence, Eastern Civilization started to dominate the Ottoman elite’s culture. Nevertheless, at the same, Turkish people tried to resist this by ardently implementing the Turkish kars (culture) via establishing Turkish mythology, and
Turkish literature in Turkish language, and producing Turkish music by using Turkish instruments such as *saz* and *bağlama* (Gökalp, 2004, p. 43). However, since the Ottoman culture was the valid culture in state circles, its influence on the Turkish culture was inevitable (Gökalp, 2005, p. 21).

This double-culture dominated the Empire for centuries which, according to Gökalp, was the major reason behind the decline of the Ottoman Empire (p. 28). Gökalp defines his view in this way: “The ruling cosmopolitans constituted the Ottoman class and the ruled Turks constituted the Turkish class. Those two classes were in constant antagonism. The Ottoman class considered itself as the ruling nation and perceived the Turks as the ruled” (Gökalp, 2009, p. 35; translation mine).

The Turkish *hars* (culture) had to be the only and dominant culture and the Arabic-Persian elements had to be expurgated from the national Turkish culture. Gökalp mentions his cultural selective stance as follows:

> After establishing a lexicon based on the Islamic *umma* terminology, we have to abstain from the usage of the Arabic and the Persian words because the Arabic and Persian penetration into the language is not limited with the terminology. Myriad trivial Arabic and Persian words have penetrated into our language. Not only they have penetrated into Turkish language on the basis of words but also they have, by amalgamation of the noun phrases and prepositions, have turned Turkish into a hybrid language (Gökalp, 2004, p. 36; translation mine).

Therefore, he called for a Turkification of the language. If the structure of the Turkish language would not allow this process due to the scarcity of words, he suggested an artificial insertion of new Turkish words. The Arabic and Persian words in the Ottoman language were to be replaced by those newly constructed pure Turkish words.
Another dimension of the “otherization” project the Turkists were constructing was embodied in the cosmopolitan over-Westernized Turk image which depended on the urban elite of Istanbul and was heavily influenced by European manners and culture (Mardin, 2006, p. 142). The cosmopolitan image is used, by the Turkist intellectuals, to invoke hostility to the national culture and values. Peter Goßen (2007) explains how this negative usage of the cosmopolitan image is implemented in various occasions in this way: “the negative view of cosmopolitan as someone who irresponsibly neglects the needs of his immediate surroundings has been activated repeatedly over the last two centuries for purposes of legitimizing xenophobia, anti-Semitism and national chauvinism” (p. 311). The cosmopolitan was defined as a figure which was against the national interests and loyalties. I argue that the over-Westernized Turk figure was intentionally constructed by the Turkists and might be interpreted as an initiator of a “typicality effect” in the Ottoman society. “Typicality effect”, as posited by Goßen, refers to “on the one hand an individual conforming to a type, on the other hand it refers to that individual and type thereby saliently standing out from the normal default value” (p. 451). The over-Westernized Turks were considered as Turks, but, at the same time, they were standing out from the normal default value due to their over-engagement with the European culture.

The Kenan character in Ömer Seyfettin’s short story Primo perfectly fits to this negative usage of the cosmopolitan. The story’s plot is the Turco-Italian war of 1911. Kenan, married to an Italian woman, was an inhabitant of the cosmopolitan Ottoman Salonica. Seyfettin depicts him in this way:

He was famous in foreign and Levantine circles for the loathing that he felt for Turkishness as equivalent to bigotry and beastliness, the extent to which he detested this uncivilized Turkishness, and also for his smooth mastery of European manners, his refinement, his gay and joyful outlook. He had finished his education in Paris. Upon his
return home ten or eleven years ago -- as with all those coming back from Paris -- he too had made his way to Izmir on a fat salary, there to marry a beautiful Italian girl whom he had happened to fall in love with… (Seyfettin, 2007a, p. 220).

A believed freemason and cosmopolitan, Kenan was critically portrayed by Seyfettin as a fervent antagonist of the clash of races and nations, and an ardent supporter of the eternal peace of mankind:

He for his part had always hated war. The philosopher who said: “War is life itself,” he regarded as nothing but a red monster. He hated Darwin, too, for demonstrating, through science and experiment, that the act of “struggle” in the organic world was also necessary and indispensable for society, for mankind. A dream of “humanity,” that idyllic poem shared by all those lazy, cowardly and sick thinkers who immersed themselves in illusions without ever touching upon reality, was also his own true confession and belief (pp. 221-222).

Kenan, a typical portrayal of an over-Westernized Turk, had disbelief for national manners and culture. Seyfettin overtly depicted this cosmopolitan character which had a supra-national identity as “he recognized neither tradition, nor past, nor country, nor ethnicity. Like all wretched idiots with sick souls and minds, he presumed to reject the theory of race and environment” (p. 221). Kenan’s over-exaggerated belief for universal peace can be perceived through Seyfettin’s following sentences:

An ideal notion of “virtue and humanity” that he really had no clear understanding of, these two vague and general words that actually had no fixed, exact meaning, had come, like a wild and vicious religion going against all reason and logic, all science and truth, to paralyze his mind, to kill his soul, and to leave him like a living, moving cadaver (p. 221).
His naïve belief for the eternal peace was challenged when Italy invaded Ottoman Libya. Due to his deep devotion to European civilization and cosmopolitan ideal, *sine qua non* qualities to be considered as an over-Westernized Turk, he was unable to express his national emotions regarding the Italian invasion. He had a national epiphany:

He was now coming to understand that he had been deceived all his life by false and untenable ideas, that the idea of belonging to no ethnicity or nation, the dream of “internationalism and freemasonry,” was an idiocy so ridiculous as to force anybody capable of a little thought to break down in tears; a bit unwillingly,

-- What am I ?...

he started asking himself, though he did not dare reply :

-- I am Turkish !..,

instead wanting to cry in his rage and shame at realizing that up till now he had been nothing but a worthless corpse whose soul had been held captive (p. 225).

But his cosmopolitanism and European admiration was an obstacle for him. He could not openly declare his Turkishness. He only tried to say that he was Turkish:

Wasn’t he, too, a humble servitor, an obedient servant, a chattel slave of these Europeans who were all totally in alliance among themselves in wanting to remove the Turks from the face of the earth ? Didn’t he worship Europeans, including European customs, traditions, upbringing, manners, milieu, and society ? Wouldn’t he have been immensely proud, or even gone virtually mad with joy, if he had ever happened to receive even the most insignificant medal or honor from foreigners ?...(p. 225).

In the end of the story, Kenan re-claimed his Turkish identity and left his Italian wife. His son Primo, half Italian and half Turkish, also claimed his Turkishness.

Ahmet Nihat, another portrayal who shows similar characteristics with Kenan, is narrated by Seyfettin in his short story *The Bastard* (Seyfettin, 2007a, pp. 278-289). The
"Bastard" tells the story of a spontaneous encounter between two Turkish people in Cairo. The nameless narrator of the story is unexpectedly introduced to a man in a fashionable European clothing and hat. He introduces himself as Pierra Dubois, a French and Catholic, though in decent Turkish. The storyteller asks if he were Ottoman or Muslim, all of which were replied negatively by this atypical man. Unsatisfied with the answers, the narrator digs deep into the identity of Ahmet Nihat who has introduced himself as Pierra Dubois. The storyteller thought that he was one of those Turks, who thought that

“religions, customs, manners, and races were all myths, nations are switchable affected by education and common benefits, humans start belonging to the nationality of which manners and customs were imposed on them, and adoption of the European manners is the only perceived way to be civilized” (p. 283; translation mine).

Ahmet Nihat's insistent claim for Frenchness was challenged by the narrator who ended up saying that “but you are not French or Catholic, you are a bastard” (p. 289; translation mine). In the end, he concludes that the Turks who deny their Turkish identities, such as Ahmet Nihat, are all bastards (p. 289).

Both Kenan and Ahmet Nihat are depicted as the other with hybrid identities. They are intentionally depicted as cosmopolitan figures, in an incessant adoption of the European codes and manners. Kenan intentionally Europanized himself by marrying an Italian wife and excessively imitating the European manners. Ahmet Nihat, sharing the same state of mind, even changed his Turkish name to claim his European identity. Both of these figures are culturally in betweens portrayed by Seyfettin, one of the influential Turkist writers. They both, as the Turkists believed, had to make a choice between the homogenous national culture and the hybrid cosmopolitan one.
3.2. The Ottoman-Islam as the Other:

I argue that the Turkist view of the Islam was a variation of the Orientalist discourse, following the definition of Orientalism as “the idea of defining the other (East) in a net of negative stereotyping” (Thum, 2007, p. 390). Turkist imagination of the Islam in practice had Orientalist manners. They repeated and approved the constructed dichotomies of the Orientalist discourse which tends to see the Orient as having negative qualities such as “inefficiency instead of organization, laziness rather than working ethnic, fanaticism rather than reason” (p. 389). For the Turkists the reason behind these was the misconception of the Islamic religion by the Muslims.

They defined the Ottoman Islam as a “cultural other” as in their perception, it was Islam and its universal *Islamic ummah* principle that fueled the main challenge against the rise of Turkish nationalism. The Turkists argued that, instead of defining themselves with ethnic or racial identities, Turks were emphasizing their Islamic Identity (Gökalp, 2004, p. 58). The Turkists believed that nationalism replaced religions in the 19th century. Religion became a part of national identity of which existence became tied to nations. Islam should be adopted to meet the contemporary needs of the age of nations. Muslim identity had to be a part of the national identity. Akçura defines it in this way:

> The dominant current in our contemporary history is that of the nations. Religions as such are increasingly losing their political importance and force. Religion is increasingly becoming less and less social and more and more personal. Freedom of conscience is replacing unity of faith. Religions are renouncing their claims to being the sole director of the affairs of the communities and they are becoming spiritual forces leading hearts towards salvation. Religion is nothing more than a moral bond between the Creator and the created. Religions, therefore, if they are to maintain any of their
social and political importance can do so by becoming a helper and even a hand-maiden to the national unities (Akçura, 2007; cited in Thomas, 1992, p.164).

Turkists were modernists who wanted to create a new modern country which would be guided by scientific ideas such as laws of nature and laws of physics (Gökalp, 2004, p. 69). This was coming from their devotion to the positivist and materialist ideas of the 19th century. Great majority of the Turkists were graduates of the modern schools which were formed as a result of the modernization of the Empire. They graduated from modernized imperial schools of engineering, medicine and administration founded around the middle of the century (Keyder, 1987, p. 50). Also, many of them graduated from the new military academies and technical schools of which main aim was the modernization of the army. Those were the main institutions which brought materialist and positivist ideas to the Empire. There are many reasons behind the popularity of positivism among the Young Turks. The most important is that positivism, which claimed to be a new religion, became an ideology for which the Young Turks, who were trying to replace religion with science (Hanioglu, 2001, p. 307).

In order to supply a modern nation, national identity had to be constructed above the religious one, and then the religion itself had to be modernized. In order to distance the Turks from religious identity, Turkists depicted Ottoman Islam, which had been valid for centuries, as “the other” for the nationhood. Ottoman religious education system, Islamic state and the caliphate, and the Imam negatively represented as sources of backwardness by them. In order to achieve progress and in order to construct a modern nation, effects of religion over the society had to be limited. They constructed this other in order to make comparison with the Islam they were longing to construct and the existing Ottoman Islam which necessitated a reformation.

The source of backwardness was not the Ottoman Islam particularly, but it was the universal exercise of Islam. This discourse was Universalist; according to Turkists wrong
application of Islam brought all societies backward and underdeveloped wherever it repeats its existence. Because of the false interpretations of Islamic religion and rituals, Muslim communities were underdeveloped and unmodern. Halide Edip Adivar (1985) defines it in this way: “The real Islam asks the unity and peace among the people, and it is immortal. Superstitions and bigotry is not the Islam. The real Islam only comes from the Allah” (p. 32; translation mine). According to Akçura the existing Islam was in ignorance and darkness because production of knowledge was limited with the religious scholars. Those scholars dominated the intellectual life of the East (Akçura, 1999a, p. 101). Reading, writing and every kind of intellectual activity was prohibited for the common people. In many Islamic countries quality of knowledge was low, common people didn’t know the basis of Islam, Islamic laws and history of Islamic civilisation. Many didn’t know Arabic, since the Kuran wasn’t translated to their national languages, and religion was blocking national awakening, Islam was keeping masses ignorant (p. 101).

The same thesis was found also in the short story of Ömer Seyfettin which was called the Mehdi. The story is about the dialogues of an atheist Turkish nationalist and a religious scholar. The plot of the story is a train which is organized for the exclusion of the Turks from the Salonica after the Greek invasion. The dialogues of the nationalist and the Imam are significant for understanding how the existing Islam defined as the other:

Religions are capable of overthrowing one universe, and in its place creating another. It is religion that moves the basics of all actions by individuals, and which provides the great outlines of social life. But Islam corrupts the communal and national inclinations of its adherents, causing all of them to live in the unseeing blindness of a dark bigotry. Look, I hold all Islam currently on earth witness to my word… Hundreds of millions of Muslims and our nation of fifty million Turks, too, are still writhing in the grasp of myths and superstitions that originated thirteen or fourteen centuries ago (Seyfettin, 2007a, p. 302).
The universalist speech which depicts the existing Islam as the source of all Muslims backward is seen again. The Christians which understood the power of nationhood are defeating the Muslims which were still defining themselves with their Islamic identities:

The Turks of Russia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rumelia, Khiva, Bukhara, Iran, Turkestan, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, India, Egypt, Tripoli, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, the Great Sahara, Zanzibar, Java, Somalia, Sumatra… Shall I keep counting? In short, all Islam is today under the yoke of developed, advanced, powerful Christian nations… Only our Turkey still enjoys a pretense of independence. But what an independence!.. It cannot undertake even a ten-cent raise in its customs duties. It cannot conclude a treaty on its own with its enemies. It cannot enter the Christian schools in its capital. In short, all these factors that we have studied in Islamic History as having brought more than a hundred other Islamic states to ruin and enslavement, are still operational in Turkey. When the same laws act upon the same things, the consequences, too, are bound to be the same. Therefore, it is certain that like other Islamic states, Turkey, too, will perish, that its name will be erased from history, and that like all other Muslims, we Turks, too, will end up loyally praying to our Christian masters who will soon be capturing Istanbul, thus leading our lives, like our co-religionists, in slothful bigotry, ignorance and ignominy, and… (p.303)

The Turkists demanded reformation of the Islam. According to them the Ottoman Islam had to modernize and became compatible with the science and reason. Gökalp (2004) formulated his point in this way “We have to get the science and technique of Europe and construct a ‘modern Turkish Islam’ (p. 32). As he perceived that Islam was the religion of reason, he believed in a harmonious cohabitation of Islam, science, and modernization.
According to him, this cohabitation necessitated the effacement of the Arabic language from the scene and the adaptation of the national language for the religious practices.

Turkists attacked religious education which, according to them, was a source of backwardness. On the other hand, as stated by Gökalp (2004), the teachers of the religious high-schools believed that science was illicit due to its exclusion of the religious doctrines from its curriculum. However, according to Gökalp, the religious high schools should have included scientific education to their curriculum (p. 71). Akcura shares Gökalps’s thoughts and calls for a reformation for the religious education. According to him, New European education, which depended on reason and science, had to be instructed for the new Turkish generations. He envisioned a new Turkish Islam which would be scientific and modern, a reformulated religion that would give priority to science (Georgeon, 2005, p.148).
CONCLUSION

Nationalist discourse is not fixed, it should change in time but it is extremely constructed. This construction should come before the construction of the nation-state. As Hobsbawm declared “nationalism comes before nations” (Hobsbawm 1992: 10). Nationalist Intellectuals plays a very significant role in this articulation. They construct a valid history for the nation and define the borders, inclusions and exclusion of belonging. Together with those, following constant or historical ethnic hostilities they also construct “the others”. Those “others” were used in order to define “us”. In order to construct those, a special language is formed by Intellectual activity. This language or discourse concluded various images for the others.

The Turkish case is also compatible with what is written above. Before the formation of the nation state, the Turkist intellectuals already designed the basic categories for the nation and constructed the others. Those others should be divided under two main headings; the racial/national other and the cultural other. Both of them constructed in order to define the limits, insiders and outsiders. Racial/national others were the Balkan nations and the Ottoman non-Muslims. Those were the earliest parts of the Ottoman society which started nationalist movements since the beginning of the 19th century. The Turkists represented them with negative images, however underneath this hostility there was a secret envy. Turkists used racial/national others in order to show the Turks how to be behave nationally. The racial/national others were acting for national benefits.

Together with that cultural others were the real elements which Turkists demanded to abolish. It was the Ottoman culture, Super-Westernized Turks and the Ottoman Islam. The Turkists perceived those as the greatest barriers behind the national awakening. The Ottoman culture and Super-westernized Turks were hybrid structures. For the Turkists, the first was the
replica of the Arabic-Persian culture. The second was a mixture of Ottoman Culture and European culture. The Ottoman Islam was also depicted as an other because it was binding Turks to the Islamic ummah of the world. Since nationalism was depended on defined borders, a supra-national identity was a shackle for nationalist awakening. Ottoman Islam was also keeping the society backwards because for the Turkists it was hostile to the science and reason.
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