

Trade and Regionalism: The European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in a comparative perspective

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ABSTRACT

With a growing number of regional organizations, integration tendencies in different regions have been gaining salience. Nevertheless, the field lacks detailed comparative analyses.

The main aim of this thesis is to conduct a comparative research of two somewhat different regional organizations. Firstly, the European Union as the most developed integration project in the world, by many seen as a model of integration, and secondly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the most viable regional organization in that part of the globe. Whilst, at face value, both organizations do not seem to have much in common, there is a considerable amount of evidence that ASEAN might be emulating, copying, or echoing the European experience.

Therefore, this work aims to explore, firstly, the evidence by looking at ASEAN's institutional design and comparing it to the European counterpart in order to see what is the extent of those similarities. From this, in order to answer the research question, it will examine EU-ASEAN trade relations as the possible cause of the observed developments in Southeast Asian integration.

The major findings of this thesis are twofold. Firstly, similarities in design between ASEAN and the EU are found. While they do not indicate that ASEAN is copying or emulating the EU, they provide the support for the claim that ASEAN looks at the EU and is introduces similar solutions. Secondly, it is found that economic relations and trade have been the strongest linking factors between those two organizations.

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List of abbreviations

ACC	ASEAN Coordinating Council
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC	ASEAN Political-Security Community
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
AS	ASEAN Secretariat
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASCC	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+3	ASEAN member states + China, Japan, South Korea
ASEAN+6	ASEAN member states + China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASMBs	ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies
CEU	Council of the European Union
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FTA	Free trade area
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

1. INTRODUCTION

It is an interesting fact that the Association of South East Asian Nations has not gained much attention in IR comparative studies so far. This, however, does not mean that Southeast Asia is not present in IR studies at all. In fact, there are many, often very detailed works dealing with the causes, circumstances and development of ASEAN, but all of them are limited. In other words, most scholars locate their research in the context of East Asia's specific history and unique circumstances prevailing in that part of the world. Such studies are, undoubtedly, a vital contribution, as they aim at trying to catch the mechanisms and governing rules of a particular setting.

That East Asia, of which South East Asia is a part, is a very peculiar case should not be surprising. For decades, it has been driven by conflicts, coercion and a pursuit for hegemony. Even today, regional stability is often threatened and security issues remain high on the agenda, as many questions are not resolved yet. The emergence of China, the future of the US presence, the case of Taiwan, the role of Japan, or even the South East China Sea disputes can be potential flashpoints threatening regional stability in the future. Indeed, many scholars point to this direction and stress the complex nature of East Asian setting.¹

Nevertheless, all those works concentrate and explore only that one setting and do not try to find broader patterns among different regions. This is a serious gap in the literature.

¹ See: J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, Allen Carlson, eds., *Rethinking Security in East Asia. Identity, Power, and Efficiency*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Rethinking Japanese Security. Internal and External Dimensions*, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order. Instrumental and Normative Features*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003); Rex Li, *A Rising China and Security in East Asia. Identity construction and security discourse*, (New York: Routledge, 2009).

Comparisons can help in grasping similarities, enabling generalizations across various examples and creating wider models.² Therefore, their importance should not be overlooked.

1.1. The importance of regionalism in Europe and Southeast Asia

Today, it cannot go without noticing that for many years the EU has been the most integrated and the most state-resembling kind of cooperation between states. There are serious reasons for that. Firstly, it was the first to start in the beginning of 1950's. Secondly, the EU supranational framework today often requires conformity from member states. Moreover, by many scholars the EU is seen as a model of integration, which others follow or at least should follow.³ One example of such opinions is the voice of William Wallace⁴, who sees the EU even as "(...) the archetype of regional integration." Although such opinions are controversial, they have severe implications for the regionalism studies and pose many questions about the future of other regional groupings.

On the other hand, it can be observed that a need for a regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has been existing for some time now. Currently, there are many regional regimes in that part of the world, however ASEAN remains the most interesting. Brought to live in 1967, it is one of the oldest examples of regional cooperation, preceded only by a few others. It is its long history and the ability to survive in a very demanding East Asian setting that makes it an attractive object of study.

With much caution, one could say that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in certain aspects resembles the EU. It is the biggest and most developed project in this part of the world

² Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), preface.

³ John McCormick, *The European Superpower*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 134; Nam-Kook Kim, "Europe and East Asia: Holistic Convergence or Fundamental Skepticism" in: Nam-Kook Kim, ed., *Globalization and Regional Integration in Europe and Asia*. (Surrey: Ashgate. 2009), 105.

⁴ William Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 1.

and was established merely ten years after the birth of the European Community. Despite only ten-year difference, however, progress and pace of integration in ASEAN has been considerably slower. Today, its development is far behind the institutionalization of the EU, as the organization remains mostly of an intergovernmental character.⁵ One can give an answer that the Southeast Asian setting is very different from its European counterpart.⁶ If one holds to this, then a different character of ASEAN integration would be a logical consequence. Yet, with a growing importance of regionalism and interstate cooperation, many questions and doubts about the direction in which ASEAN will go in the future open up. Will it develop into a unique community and follow the ASEAN Way or accept other models of integration by shaping its structure and framework according to already established patterns?

Some questions about the future of ASEAN can be at least partially answered by looking at the organization itself. For many years, ASEAN was very proud of the, so-called, ASEAN Way of integration based on consensus, lack of binding norms, and informal cooperation. In fact, that is what, according to the majority of voices, made ASEAN so prevailing and, cautiously saying, successful.⁷

However, the examination of the contemporary Southeast Asian regionalism can lead to a feeling that ASEAN is looking at the European model of integration. Sheldon W. Simon implies even that ASEAN's aim may be to try to "emulate" the EU.⁸ Official sources present recent policy developments in ASEAN as "an inspiration" by the EU. One example of such source comes from within the EU. One can read there "the ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007,

⁵ Geoffrey B. Cockerham, "Regional Integration in ASEAN: Institutional design and the ASEAN Way", *East Asia* 27, no. 2, June 2010, 165-185

⁶ Although opposite opinions are also present. See: Mark Beeson, „Rethinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in comparative political perspective”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no. 6, December 2005, 969-985.

⁷ Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 127-128.

⁸ Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism" in: David Shambaugh, Michael Yahuda, eds., *International Relations of Asia*. (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 206.

(is) an EU-inspired constitutional document that aims to make ASEAN a rules-based organization.” And later on, “ASEAN is doing this in its own way, but clearly considers the EU as a source of inspiration.”⁹ On the other hand, policy-makers in ASEAN themselves point to the fact that they have to learn from the European experience. One of such statement was made by Surin Pitsuwan, the Secretary-General of ASEAN. In 2009, Pitsuwan said, “the European Union has been and remains our inspiration, not our model. Not yet, anyway.”¹⁰

Furthermore, the EU itself undertakes policies which aim at promoting EU-style of cooperation in Southeast Asia.¹¹ This is visible, for example, in the “Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership” from 2007 and following Plan of Action, which clearly states that:

This PoA (Plan of Action – *M.L.*) will also support ASEAN integration, through helping to realize the end-goal of the establishment of ASEAN Community by 2015, consisting of three pillars, namely ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, through, inter alia, the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) and subsequent plans to achieve the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II.¹²

Nevertheless, the debate concerning the possibility of grafting the European experience to other regions has many faces in the literature, leaving aside the fact this discussion has been going on for a while. One of the reasons for this is that it is crippled by the lack of comparative studies. It would be very hard to disagree with Katzenstein and Huber’s

⁹ “EU-ASEAN: ever closer”, EU press release, IP/09/834, 27/05/2007, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/834&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (last accessed 27 May 2010).

¹⁰ “ASEAN goal: To be like EU”, 1 March 2009, available at: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090301-191647/ASEAN-goal-To-be-like-EU> (last accessed on 14 May 2010); see also: a speech of Rodolfo C. Severino, the former ASEAN Secretary General, ASEAN website, <http://www.aseansec.org/2849.htm> (last accessed 06 May 2010)

¹¹ Alfredo C. Robles Jr., “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union” in: Heiner Haeggli, Ralf Roloff and Juergen Rueland, eds., *Interregionalism and International Relations*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101-102.

¹² “Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EUASEAN Enhanced Partnership” available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asean/docs/action_plan07.pdf (last accessed 07 May 2010).

arguments about the scarcity of regional comparative studies in general and the possible huge benefits this kind of research brings to the science.¹³

In Katzenstein's words, the possible pay-offs stemming from a comparative research are a valuable contribution to knowledge, as they help in understanding "how the world works".¹⁴

By searching for similarities and differences, they allow generalizations and constructions of broader models, or testing patterns that already exist. Both paths can be a valid research input.

In EU-ASEAN case, the possible benefit is even more promising. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, as previously stated, not much concern has been given so far to a comparative research of Southeast Asian regionalism. Secondly, ASEAN seems to take from European solutions and, with obvious reservations as to the extent of EU's influence and attraction, this has possible big implications for regionalism studies and models of integration.

In other words, it could mean that regional models unify and in the future one can observe one widely accepted model of integration. Undoubtedly, this is a very far-fetched assumption, however, such possibility cannot be excluded without conducting more detailed comparative studies.¹⁵ This research is an introduction. By taking one case, it aims to look for similar patterns. Last point is commonsensical. As regionalism itself gathers in importance, it naturally triggers a need for comparisons and critical evaluation.

Yet, a research aimed at comparison of regional integration would not be valuable enough if an attempt, at least, was not made to try to explain why these similarities happen. This is the more interesting, as, even at face value, European and South East Asian experience and history seem to diverge, not to converge. Since the initial conditions were different in both

¹³ Katzenstein, *A World...*, ix; Evelyn Huber, "The Role of Cross-regional Comparison", *APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organizes Section on Comparative Politics* 14, no. 21, 1.

¹⁴ Katzenstein, *ibid.*

¹⁵ A point made by Joachim Jens Hesse, "The European Union as a Model? Forms, Functions, and Policy-options for Regional Co-operation" (lecture, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 28th May 2010).

cases, any similarities in design would be surprising if they were to happen without any linking cause.

1.1. Research question and methodology

My research question goes as follows. What institutional similarities between the EU and ASEAN exist and why are they observed? My first hypothesis is that ASEAN is only inspired by the European experience and does not copy/emulate the EU. The second hypothesis is that economic relations between the EU and ASEAN foster similarities in the institutional framework between these two organizations.

The way this research will be conducted is that, firstly, I will outline the debate on regionalism and theoretical framework used. Then I will provide a brief historical background on the EU and ASEAN with an emphasis put on regional circumstances and their importance in development of integration. Next, I will examine similarities in design. I will compare the envisaged ASEAN Communities with the pillars of the EU (as they existed prior to December 2009) and the institutions of ASEAN, namely the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, and the ASEAN Secretariat with EU's equivalents. Thirdly, I will look at the trade relations between EU and ASEAN in order to analyze the tendencies. Lastly, by looking at both sets of data conclusions will be made. My main sources will be legal documents – the ASEAN Charter from 2007, the Blueprints of ASEAN Communities juxtaposed with the treaties establishing the European Union, and statistical data concerning trade. The latter will be extracted from official EU and ASEAN sources.

The importance of possible findings is twofold. Firstly, as the ongoing debate seems to be sharply divided into proponents and adversaries, providing a case study of the possible relationships between institutional frameworks of the EU and ASEAN can shed more light on

the issue and contribute to the debate itself. Secondly and most importantly, if findings of this case study prove to be positive then this could have a considerable influence on the existing models of integration. Undoubtedly, the extent of this phenomenon cannot be exaggerated, as this work is based on one case study, thereby can be merely a basis to a further research.

2. Literature review

In this chapter, I will outline the broad debate on regionalism. By presenting main assumptions, claims and different strands of regionalism studies existing in the literature, my aim is to show three major things. Firstly, that regionalism itself is a growing and promising area of research. Secondly, that regionalism itself is not a homogenous issue and one can differentiate many subtypes and many distinct theories of integration. Thirdly, I will focus my attention on parts that are missing in the debate of Southeast Asian regionalism – lack of comparative analyses.

2.1. Regionalism and integration

What can be said about regionalism in general is that it has been gaining more and more attention and popularity. As a consequence, studies on regionalism have become very popular in recent decades.¹⁶ Moreover, with growing importance of regionalism, also links between regional blocs have gained in complexity and salience. There are even voices claiming, “institutionalized relations between world regions, i.e. interregionalism, have become a new phenomenon in international relations.”¹⁷

The main strength of interregionalism lies in the fact that it tries to catch to logic and characteristics of different interregional relations and put in into some structured context. This field of research is still in its infancy, however, its growing importance in the future is rather

¹⁶ See: Heiner Haenggi, Ralf Roloff and Juergen Rueland, eds., *Interregionalism and International Relations*, (New York: Routledge, 2006); William Wallace, *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); Finn Laursen, ed., *Comparative Regional Integration. Theoretical Perspectives*. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn. Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹⁷ Haenggi, Roloff, Rueland, 3.

certain, because the world observes an increasing popularity of regional integration projects.¹⁸ In the end, the intensified regional cooperation brings more need for research aimed at studying connections and dialogues between different regions in order to find possible patterns. This study aims at contributing to this field.

It is noteworthy that throughout the latter half of the 20th century, new forms of regional cooperation could be observed on every continent, spreading from Europe, which can be called the mother of the contemporary regionalism, to Africa, both Americas and Asia. In general, scholars differentiate two waves of regionalism. The first started in 1950's and lasted until early 1970's.¹⁹ The second wave came in the late 1980's/early 1990's as a response to dramatic political changes in the world.²⁰ What can be said is that there is no region today in which we could not find an institutionalized cooperation between states. This is probably why some scholars see regionalism as universal phenomena today.²¹

The rationale of increasing international cooperation is usually seen to lie in the growing complexity of the contemporary world, including security affairs, the growing number of international actors, and, maybe most importantly, globalization, to which all other factors can be subsumed. In other words, as globalization proceeds, it triggers certain reactions from actors who want to either minimize its consequences or benefit from it. In this case, regional groupings can be a manifestation of both: they can be created in order to grasp benefits or escape negative consequences.²²

¹⁸ Ralf Roloff, "Interregionalism in theoretical perspective. State of the art" in : Heiner Haenggi, Ralf Roloff and Juergen Rueland, eds., *Interregionalism and International Relations*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 26.

¹⁹ Samuel S. Kim, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia", *Journal of East Asian Studies*, no. 4, 2004, 41.

²⁰ Ibid., 43-44; Haenggi, Roloff, Rueland, "Interregionalism. A new phenomenon...", 3.

²¹ Heiner Haenggi, Ralf Roloff and Juergen Rueland, eds., *Interregionalism...*, 4.

²² See: Juergen Rueland, *The European Union as an Inter- and Transregional Actor: Lessons for Global Governance from Europe's Relations with Asia*, National Europe Centre Paper No. 12; Haenggi, Roloff, Rueland, *Interregionalism...*, 5; Mark Beeson, *Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia. Politics, Security and Economic Development*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 217-237.

Two concepts are important when studying regional integration - regionalism and regionalization. With some minor reservations, this distinction is widely accepted in literature of regionalism studies.²³ Regionalism is a state-led activity, a top-down approach, where states form certain formal groupings and institutions in order to support regional identity. On the other hand, regionalization is a bottom-up approach. It is natural in the sense that it happens without supervision, being just a consequence of economic and political interdependence. In ASEAN's case, we can observe that both phenomena have been existing and overlapping. The same is true for the European Union, where state-led policies intertwine with growing coherence between individuals and economies.

What should be also said about regional blocs is that notwithstanding their growing popularity, the intra-bloc cooperation has been gaining momentum as well. In other words, we can observe two processes. Firstly, what has been already said, there is a growing popularity of regional groupings. Different authors provide different summaries and numbers here. For instance, John McCormick summed up all major integration associations.²⁴ The data presented by him shows that currently there are 17 such associations in the world, starting with the European Union (then in a form of its predecessor – the European Community of Coal and Steel). Other examples are Council of Arab Economic Unity (1957), Central American Common Market (1960), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967), Latin American Integration Association (1980), Arab Maghreb Union (1989), North American Free Trade Area (1994) and African Union (2001).²⁵

²³ Julie Gilson, *Asia meets Europe. Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting*, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002), 2-3; Christopher M. Dent, *East Asian Regionalism*. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 13-14; Samuel S. Kim, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia", *Journal of East Asian Studies*, no. 4, 2004, 40-41; Ellen L. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 14-17.

²⁴ John McCormick, *The European Superpower*. 135.

²⁵ Ibid.

Secondly, cooperation within blocs has progressed and deepened. What usually started as an economic cooperation gradually transformed and gained a political dimension. In this respect, the European Union is the brightest example. In the very beginning, the European Communities were an economic project, aimed at bolstering internal trade and gradual lift of customs between members.²⁶ Only later, did the political dimension start playing a growing role, eventually leading to the contemporary supranational character of the EU. EU's supranationality makes it a unique organization, because so far nowhere else in the world a similar level of state integration can be observed. At the same time, in Southeast Asia integration still remains mostly on an intergovernmental level.

2.2. The European Union in theoretical framework

The emergence of the European Communities triggered a long-lasting theoretical debate, in which scholars have tried to come up with a theory that could explain the phenomenon of the post-WWII Europe. When integration started in 1950's, Ernst Haas proposed a neo-functional theory with the spillover effect.²⁷ However, when after the promising start integration slowed down in 1960's, intergovernmental approach, in which state's sovereignty is what matters the most, gained importance.²⁸ In general, depending on the pace of integration, those two approaches have been exchanging places.²⁹

Nevertheless, what is the major flaw of European integration theories is that they are only applicable to the European setting. William Wallace points to a very important issue that all integration theories aimed at explaining the phenomenon of integration were constructed

²⁶ See: Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan, *European Union Politics*. 3rd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); David Phinnemore, Alex Warleigh-Lack, eds., *Reflections on European Integration. 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast. A History of European Union*. (London: Boulder, 2004).

²⁷ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 50-73.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 130-135.

²⁹ Walter Mattli, "Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes", *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 1, 5-6.

around the European experience.³⁰ In this respect, Finn Laursen goes as far as to saying that theories of integration are biased because they concentrate on European experiences and only a few attempts to graft them into other sets of conditions have been undertaken so far.³¹

2.3. ASEAN's experience

In ASEAN case, things have been progressing quite differently. A lot of attention has been given (Acharya, Beeson) to the ASEAN Way of integration. What lies behind this term is the superiority of state sovereignty and not-binding form of cooperation based on informal meetings and consensus. In fact, ASEAN has been famous for its low level of institutionalization and modest resources.³²

As far as ASEAN is concerned, attempts to employ integration theories and explain its origins have been very rare. Scholars tend to limit their research only to the East Asian setting and underlie its uniqueness and differences. What stems from this is the feeling that East Asia requires a unique approach, because it is not comparable to any other region. This view is represented, for example, by Amitav Acharya.³³ Opposite views are uncommon. One example of a recent research focused on Southeast Asian integration is the work of Geoffrey B. Cockerham, who quite successfully applied intergovernmental model to ASEAN.³⁴

In general, three things can be said about ASEAN. Firstly, there is a growing integration in this region. Its pace is, of course, slow, but cooperation among member states gradually

³⁰ Wallace, *Regional Integration...*, 1-2.

³¹ Finn Laursen, *Comparative Regional Integration...*, 3-10.

³² More on the ASEAN Way see: Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for Identity...*, 128; Alastair Iain Johnson, "Socialization in International Institutions. The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory" in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, eds., *International Relations Theory and Asia-Pacific*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 107-165.

³³ Although the author suggests that there is a growing universalism in Asia in regard to IR theories. See: Amitav Acharya, "Theoretical Perspective on International Relations in Asia" in: David Shambaugh, Michael Yahuda, eds., *International Relation of Asia*. (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 57-58.

³⁴ Geoffrey B. Cockerham, "Regional Integration in ASEAN: Institutional Design and the ASEAN Way", *East Asia* 27, no. 2, June 2010, 165-185.

entails more and more areas. Secondly, ASEAN has not been studied extensively from theoretical perspective, as far as integration theories are concerned. Thirdly, it is not certain how ASEAN will develop, especially having in mind last developments, namely the introduction of the ASEAN Charter.

2.4. European model of integration and Southeast Asia

This brings us to the ongoing debate concerning the role of the European model in regionalism studies. Is the fact that the EU is perceived as the most advanced model of regional cooperation a convincing prerequisite to see it as a role model for other organizations? Nicole Alecu de Flers and Elfriede Regelsberger note:

Although not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty on European Union (The Treaty of Maastricht from 1992 – *M.L.*) as one objective of the EU's role in the world, the EU and its member states hope that their model will be adopted by other regions/groups of states, thus fostering intra-regional processes and actors elsewhere.³⁵

In the case of ASEAN, the debate on the applicability of European solutions is starkly divided. Firstly, some scholars tend to negate the possibility of any form of European-type model of integration in Southeast Asia.³⁶ Interesting account was raised by Peter Drysdale, David Wines and Brett House, who very sharply differ between two types of regionalism – European and Asian and claim “the contrast between Asia Pacific region and Europe could not be stronger”.³⁷ On the other hand, there are voices that shyly advocate some kind of resemblance and similarities between the EU and the ASEAN. For instance, Julie Gilson sees the importance of interregional cooperation between the EU and East Asia in building

³⁵ Alecu de Flers, Elfriede Regelsberger, “The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation” in: Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, eds., *International Relations and the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 319.

³⁶ Nam-Kook Kim, 86.

³⁷ Peter Drysdale, David Wines, Brett House, “Europe and East Asia: a shared global agenda?” in: “Peter Drysdale, David Wines, eds., *Europe, East Asia and APEC. A Shared Global Agenda?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10.

regional identities in the region.³⁸ Other opinions stem from a legal approach. Analyses of ASEAN legal framework show that some regional solutions are similar to what can be observed, in a more developed form, in the EU.³⁹ In Nam-Kook Kim's words, we can refer to the proponents' view as "holistic convergence" and call the strand represented by adversaries as "fundamental skepticism".⁴⁰

Some other scholars, for instance Mark Beeson, seem to stay in the middle trying to escape stark divisions. In fact, Beeson's account is very interesting in this matter. On one hand, Beeson sees similarities in the regional setting between European integration, when it started, and the situation in East Asia today.⁴¹ However, on the other hand, he seemed to reject this claim later on, when he analyzed ASEAN institutions and came to conclusion that there was not any institutional similarity between them.⁴² In this respect, he seems to have contradicted himself. Simply put, if the regional settings are comparable, then the outcomes, *ceteris paribus*, should be also comparable. However, Beeson seems unsure about that.

2.5. Other explanations of integration

Leaving the debate on grafting the European experience aside, we can look at other explanation of integration. The theory of economic integration proposed by Bela Belassa is not as Europe-biased as other theories, which have been mentioned previously. It consists of four distinct stages. Firstly, states decide to establish a free trade area among themselves, in

³⁸ She sees the long and rich history of relations between Europe and East Asia, and Europe's colonial presence as factors strengthening Asian identity. See: Julie Gilson, *Europe meets Asia...*, 31-35.

³⁹ Colin Y.C. Ong, *Cross-Border Litigation within ASEAN. The Prospects for Harmonization of Civil and Commercial Litigation*. (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 31-111; Laurence Henry, "The ASEAN Way and Community Integration: Two Different Modes of Regionalism", *European Law Journal* 13, no. 6, November 2007, 857-879; Dominic McGoldrick, "The ASEAN Charter", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 58, January 2009, 197-212; Geoffrey B. Cockerham, "Regional Integration in ASEAN...".

⁴⁰ Nam-Kook Kim, 105-106.

⁴¹ Mark Beeson, "Rethinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in comparative political perspective", *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no. 6, December 2005, 969-985.

⁴² Mark Beeson, *Institutions of the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN, APEC, and beyond*. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 17-37.

which import tariffs for goods originating from other member states are lifted, but states retain the right to conduct independent tariff policy for goods coming from outside the area. Second stage is customs union, where a common customs policy is introduced. Third step adds free movement of goods, services and labor within the area to the first two. The fourth step embraces a total unification of markets and institutions within a region.⁴³

The strength of economic approach to regionalism lies in the fact that this method is applicable with minor reservations to every regional organization in the world, notwithstanding possible differences between them. For instance, the European Union became customs union in 1958 and a single market was established in 1993.⁴⁴ ASEAN, on the other hand, became a free trade area in 1993⁴⁵ and will be a single market in 2015.

The reasons for the wide applicability are probably twofold. Firstly, the economic integration approach is a very broad concept and does not offer in-depth explanation of micro-scale level processes. Secondly, this approach concentrates merely on economic issues existing between states. It does not involve or aim to explain a political dimension of integration, assuming its inferior role to economy.

2.6. ASEAN – the need for comparisons

As the reality shows that there is some empirical evidence connecting ASEAN the European Union, comparisons seem inevitable. For instance, ASEAN institutional framework, according to last agreements, in the following years is to be shaped on the basis of three-pillar structure, a resemblance to the three pillars of the EU. Moreover, the ASEAN Charter from 2007 gave ASEAN a legal personality, established ASEAN Summit meetings twice a year, set

⁴³ Ludo Cuyvers, “Contrasting the European Union and ASEAN Integration and Solidarity” (paper presented at the Fourth EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue “EU and ASEAN – Integration and Solidarity” European Parliament, Brussels, 25-26 November 2002).

⁴⁴ Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast ...*, 233-262.

⁴⁵ Colin Y.C. Ong, *Cross-Border Litigation...*, 25.

a flag, anthem and official day of ASEAN. More interestingly, the ASEAN Minus X formula is an important step away from consensus, so characteristic for intergovernmental-type of organization, which, at least until recently, ASEAN without any doubt was.⁴⁶ Some scholars present even more interesting arguments. For example, Colin Y.C. Ong points to a somewhat interesting coincidence that ASEAN Free Trade Area was launched on 1st January 1993, the exact same date as the launch of the European Single Market.⁴⁷

However, this literature review has showed that the theoretical debate concerning this problem is unclear. Firstly, regionalism itself is a complex phenomenon. Secondly, in the case of ASEAN, scholars provide different scenarios and it seems that there are more adversaries than proponents of any sort of coherence between it and the EU. To repeat Nam-Kook Kim's metaphor, we rather observe "fundamental skepticism" than "holistic convergence". The weak point of so-doing is that, as it has been indicated in the introduction, researchers and policy-makers limit themselves to general claims saying that ASEAN might be imitating, may be inspired by Europe, or *vice versa*, without deeper analysis in the observed reality.

Having this in mind current changes in ASEAN, the scarcity of comparative analyses between European and Southeast Asian regionalisms is somewhat surprising. Without more detailed comparative studies of the case, which can shed more light on possible similarities and, most importantly, their causes, one cannot hope for progress in this field.

⁴⁶ Cockerham, 175-176, 182.

⁴⁷ Colin Y.C. Ong, *Cross-Border Litigation within ASEAN. The Prospects for Harmonization of Civil and Commercial Litigation*. (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 25.

3. Theoretical framework

It is puzzling why ASEN might look at the EU, a remote and very different region from Southeast Asian perspective. Therefore, in order to explain why this happens, a theoretical perspective must be presented. One can look at this from realist, constructivist or liberal standpoint.

3.1. Realism

The opening assumption of every realist thought is anarchy, in which all states are embedded. Anarchy is the ultimate driving force of states' actions because it creates uncertainty and every state's basic goal is to survive in a hostile environment with other states trying to do the same. That is why states use their resources and develop capabilities – to be stronger and be able to resist. They can care either about absolute gains (classical realism) or relative gains (neo-realism). They can also be power-maximization actors (offensive realism) or develop as many capabilities to be able to survive (defensive realism).⁴⁸

Realists dismiss the importance of regionalism in Southeast Asia. In Acharya's words, “during the Cold War, Realists paid little attention to Asian regional institution and dialogues (...).”⁴⁹ They have been always preoccupied with a balance of power. This was the more important as the East Asia region was highly unstable. This balance was provided by the United States. Any strong regionalism could change the order of power and threaten this balance. In fact, it was not before the end of world's bipolarity when regional groupings in East Asia gained in importance.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Joseph Grieco, “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics”, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, (Westview: Boulder, 1997), 163-177.

⁴⁹ Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives...”, 63-64.

⁵⁰ Beeson, *Regionalism and Globalization...*, 217-237.

Acharya raised also another interesting realist point that potentially hindered Asian multilateralism (regionalism). In short, in order to stabilize regional order, multilateralism would have to be supported by strong states, which there is only few in East Asia. That is why it is better to keep world powers involved in the region as the balance-providers.⁵¹ This can explain the long-lasting and enormous presence of the USA there. However, the turmoil of 1990's, the emergence of China, the uncertainty about the future of US activity in the region, brought a dramatic change in power relations in East Asia. As a consequence, the role of ASEAN as a collective-security formation grew, not to mention the increasing salience of other regional arrangements in the region (ARF, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, APEC). However, this rise of integration tendencies was hard to explain by realists.

If one takes the realist's perspective to support the answer to the question about causes, ASEAN's development has to be seen as the EU exercising its power and influence in that region. Indeed, the presence of the EU in Southeast Asia has been growing, which could be explained by realists by the need to find another stable balance involving all great world powers. However, this perspective does not find much support in the reality.

Firstly, EU's presence is limited and for many years it has been based merely on economic cooperation.⁵² Some could say that this itself is enough to exert influence on the region, however, there are three points that seem to dismiss the validity of such claims. Firstly, economic relations between the EU(EC) and ASEAN have been very unbalanced. Secondly, the EU is not strongly interested in acting as a stabilizer in Southeast Asia. This is proved by the European Security Strategy from 2003, where regions being of a direct interest to the

⁵¹ Acharya, "Theoretical...", 63.

⁵² Anthony Forster, "The European Union in South-East Asia: continuity and change in turbulent times", *International Affairs* 75, no. 4, 1999, 743-758; Radja Oudjani, "EU-ASIA relations", 336-338; Alfredo C. Robles Jr., "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. Limited interregionalism", 110-111.

European Community are clearly outlined. Southeast Asia is not one of them.⁵³ Thirdly, realists are most interested in capabilities and resources. It should be noted that the EU as a whole is not a major source of hard, realist-type of power able to project its interest in so distant regions.⁵⁴ Conversely, the EU is rather a soft power. However, even from this standpoint the hypothesis of seeing the EU as projecting its regionalism in Southeast Asia is hard to defend, as the achievements of the European soft power there are modest.⁵⁵

In short, Southeast Asia region does not lie in the scope of its direct interest, nor the EU does have capacities to project its power and promote its own method of regionalism there. Therefore, realism cannot provide a convincing explanation to the question

3.2. Constructivism

When it comes to East Asian regionalism, constructivist perspective offers possibly bigger payoffs than realism. Main assumptions of constructivist thought are social interaction and socialization of norms and values through a process of learning.⁵⁶ According to Acharya, constructivism helps in answering “a number of key puzzles about Asian security order”, as it put stress on collective identities formation.⁵⁷

In fact, in the case of ASEAN, constructivism is a useful concept. ASEAN’s origins can be convincingly explained by newly independent states searching for regional autonomy and identity.⁵⁸ In this light, the non-binding character of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration can be

⁵³ For areas remaining in EU’s direct interest see: the European Security Strategy: *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003 available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (last accessed 07 May 2010).

⁵⁴ John McCormick, *The European Superpower*.

⁵⁵ One example of such „projection” of EU’s soft-power in ASEAN is Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia. See: Giovanni Grevi, “The Aceh Monitoring Mission: towards integrated crisis management”, *The European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, no. 65, December 2005, 21.

⁵⁶ Alice Ba, Matthew J. Hoffmann, “Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes”, *International Studies Perspectives* 4, 2003, 15–33.

⁵⁷ Acharya, “Theoretical ...”, 70.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

seen as a shared belief in the superiority of state sovereignty. This common identity is being further supported by the colonial heritage of Southeast Asia. Yet, more importantly, constructivism can explain well the ASEAN Way of integration, as stemming from the specific cultural and normative setting prevailing in the region.

What can constructivism say about EU-ASEAN case? As norms, values and identities are of the most importance here, firstly, one should focus attention on the differences in regional settings between Europe and Southeast Asia and then analyze whether any transmission of norms (socialization) could be possible and if yes, then to what extent.

From constructivist perspective, ASEAN and the EU are two different modes of integration, embedded in different sets of values and norms. Europe has well-established democracies and an effective legal system with high institutionalization, whereas Southeast Asia with its famous ASEAN Way, small amount of institutionalization and sovereignty pooling is very different in terms of norm and values.

On the other hand, one should note that stable EU-ASEAN relations since 1970's could have acted as a perfect tool in transmission of European values (democracy, institution-building etc) into the East Asian setting. However, then the question remains - how effective are these processes? On one hand, since the birth of EU-ASEAN relations, summits and mutual visits have been taking place. ASEAN has its representation to the EU at an ambassadorial level, new fora of exchange are being established, i.e. Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum. All these should have helped in regional integration.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Manfred Mols, "Cooperation with ASEAN: A success story" in: Geoffrey Edwards Regelsberger, Elfriede Regelsberger, eds., *Europe's global links: the European Community and inter-regional cooperation*. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 66-83.

Nevertheless, the salience of those relationships has been often undermined by researchers, so have been their achievements (EU-ASEAN, ASEM).⁶⁰ In Alfredo C. Robles Jr. words, “it is fair to say that ASEAN-EC cooperation has not (as yet) given a decisive impetus to regionalization in Southeast Asia.⁶¹ That undermines the likelihood of socialization and transfer of norm and values. Therefore, also constructivism does not provide a clear and convincing argument to explain the case.

3.3. Liberalism

Liberalism is the third grand theory of international relations, although it is not as well delineated in the theoretical debate as realism and constructivism, as its assumptions remain often fuzzy.⁶² Nevertheless, it remains a powerful explaining tool. From this perspective, states are self-interested utility-maximizers and rational actors pursuing their own goals.

There are three main theses of liberalism: freedom, growing international cooperation and modernization/progress.⁶³ Classical liberalism rests on three pillars: commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, liberal institutionalism.⁶⁴ Commercial liberalism assumes that interdependence caused by trade between states decreases the possibility of war by increasing its costs to all parties. Republican strand’s main assumption is that democracies do not fight among themselves (or at least they go to wars far less often than autocratic regimes). Lastly,

⁶⁰See: Radhia Oudjani, „EU-ASIA Relations”, 333-338, 344-345; Anthony Forster, “The European Union...”.

⁶¹ Alfredo C. Robles Jr., “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ...”, 102.

⁶² Mark W. Zacher, Richard A. Matthew, “Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands” in: Charles W. Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 107-108.

⁶³ Ibid, 109-111, 117.

⁶⁴ That is the view presented by Amitav Acharya. However, Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew introduce a more detailed typology of liberalism: See and compare: Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives...”, 66-67; Zacher, Matthew, “Liberal International Theory...”, 120-137.

liberal institutionalism claims that states establish international institution in order to decrease costs of cooperation and secure it.⁶⁵

What connects all types of liberal thought, however, is the prevalence of economy in interstate relations.⁶⁶ This comes from the fact that exchange of goods (trade) is the fundament of international relations and has a huge impact on the international arena. In other words, the reason why states cooperate is that it is beneficial for them and produces wealth. As cooperation grows, it creates interdependence⁶⁷, and this “creates pressures for common policies, and hence for procedures whereby countries discuss and coordinate actions that hitherto were regarded as being of domestic concern exclusively”.⁶⁸ Institutionalization of this cooperation happens because of the uncertainty and possibility of cheating, which institutions should prevent.

According to Acharya, in case of East Asia the commercial liberalism (interdependence) and liberal institutionalism (institutions) are the most salient approaches. Democratic peace theory (republican liberalism) is of no valuable importance in that region, because it requires existence of democratic states. However, he concludes that, in general, liberal thought has not been applied to a great extent in that region.⁶⁹ Truly, liberal thinkers would have hard times trying to explain the emergence of ASEAN, where economies of member-states-to-be were neither congruent, nor interdependent. This explains also why ASEAN Free Trade Area was established only in 1992. It took time for the economic interdependency to appear.

⁶⁵ That is the main dilemma of liberalism. States as self-interest, utility-maximizing actors care only about their interests. Even if the cooperate, then the risk of cheating is very high. This problem is known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. See: Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23-68.

⁶⁶ Acharya, “Theoretical...”, 66.

⁶⁷ A detailed study on interdependence was written by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. See: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).

⁶⁸ Zacher, Matthew, 125.

⁶⁹ Acharya, “Theoretical...”, 69.

It has been said in the previous sections that realist perspective cannot convincingly explain the current policy developments in ASEAN, due to the small EU's influence in that region. Regarding constructivism, a transmission of norms and values could strengthen Southeast Asian regionalism and bolster similarities. However, the main weak point of constructivist approach is that in order for the norms to be transferred a channel of transmission has to exist. Yet, cooperation in political and cultural terms between the EU and ASEAN is relatively modest, therefore socialization processes also remain questionable.

Liberal tradition precludes the prevalence of trade exchange. In other words, the more trade between two organizations, the more interdependent they are, the less likely is a conflict between them and the bigger importance of institutions. Logically, interdependence can also foster coherence between trading parties, because in this way transaction costs can be reduced and cooperation can be more effective. Liberalism presumes also the superiority of the pursuit for wealth in interstate relations.

Therefore, I argue that liberalism is the best approach to explain why similarities occur, as trade has been a strong linking factor between those two organizations. The mechanism of this is as follows. Firstly, economy is the most important area of integration for ASEAN, which will be showed in the next chapter. Secondly, EU-ASEAN trade has been very high in numbers, therefore it has created economic interdependence between them. In the end, this created a need for similar design in order to decrease costs of cooperation and further support trade, which is beneficial for ASEAN. Moreover, ASEAN's recent steps can be seen as aimed at achieving, in a long term, the level of wealth and development observed in the EU. Simply put, the more EU-alike, the more chances for attaining European level of development.

4. Historical perspective of European and Southeast Asian regionalism

In this chapter, I will outline the history of the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The main reason to do this is to show that these two organizations have somewhat different origins and have developed in two distinct ways. This is necessary to show how far from each other they were in the beginning.

4.1. The European Union

Although different manifestations of European integration can be traced back centuries ago, European regionalism in the contemporary meaning of this term has started only after the devastating experience of the Second World War. Before, Europe had been a mixture of independent and rivaling states with many long-lasting and smoldering conflicts. These conflicts had gained on severity after the First World War, when many new countries had appeared the European map, as a consequence of the demise of European empires and spread of democracy.

WWII brought a major change in European international relations. Firstly, there was a German question to resolve. In other words, how to manage German economic recovery and at the same time guarantee security and peace in Europe.⁷⁰ Secondly, the international arena was heavily shuffled at the brink of the Cold War, with the emerging communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe and the democratic West. Moreover, two superpowers appeared – the USA and the USSR, both possessing nuclear armory. Europe was caught in between those superpowers.

⁷⁰ John R. Gillingham, "The German Problem and European Integration" in: Desmond Dinan, ed., *Origins and Evolution of the European Union*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 56-81.

Integration was seen as a possible solution. Plans for European integration had started to appear as early as in late 1940's, however it was not before 1952 when they eventually materialized in the form of the European Community of Steel and Coal. By tying up steel and coal sector in six member states (France, Germany, The Netherland, Luxemburg, Belgium, Italy) it was hoped that any future conflict on a mass scale between them would not be possible. From theoretical perspective, the ECSC was aimed at fostering interdependence between states, which would make the cost of war unbearable for any country – a classical commercial liberalism perspective. This was also strengthened by the fact that cooperation started in coal and steel sector, the very fundament of every classic war planning at that time. Therefore, a political goal was to be achieved by economic means.⁷¹

From 1952 onwards, European integration has been progressing and deepening to become a unique supranational state-resembling entity, as it is known today. In 1958, the European Economic Community and the Euroatom were established and by the late 1960's ambitious plans for introducing a common currency and single market were charted.⁷² During 1970's the pace of integration slowed down due to adverse economic situation, however, in mid-1980's it was back on the track again. In the meantime, the number of member states increased from initial six to twelve.

The next major leap came in 1992 when the European Union was established with its famous three-pillar structure. The first pillar – the community – was based on supranationality, while the other two – foreign policy, and home and justice affairs were an intergovernmental

⁷¹ The result in a form of ECSC was preceded by the famous debate of the “founding fathers” of European integration, whether post-WWII Europe should be eventually one big federal state or just a loose cooperation organization. The winning stance was something more than loose cooperation, but far more less than a federation.

⁷² Those plans had to be revised in 1970's when the oil crisis, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and economic downturn hit the world markets. Desmon Dinan, *Europe Recast...*, 125-126.

cooperation.⁷³ In 1993, the EU became a single market and again an agenda for a single currency was established. Eventually, it was realized in 1999.

Simultaneously with deepening integration inside the EU, new members were accepted. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 1995. In 2004, the largest EU enlargement took place (7 Central and Eastern European states plus Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta). Today, the EU has 27 members and with the recent institutional developments (The Lisbon Treaty) scope of integration was extended to a higher level. For instance, institutionalized cooperation in the area of foreign affairs with one European foreign affairs minister, which has always been a very sensitive matter⁷⁴ or embracing new fields by the QMV (Qualified Majority Voting)⁷⁵, have been introduced

However, this does not mean that the European integration was a smooth success story. It has had its failures as well. The rejection of the European Defence Community by the French parliament in 1953, the Luxembourg crisis in 1966⁷⁶, British skepticism towards European integration, lack of institutionalized cooperation in the areas of defense and foreign affairs before the Maastricht Treaty, fragile relations with NATO, the failure of the European Constitution in 2005 are only a few examples. This shows that the road of European integration has not always been successful. In fact, it has encountered many bumps and obstacles on the way to the European Union, as it is known today.

⁷³ Ibid., 253-256.

⁷⁴ And for many years member states averted any formalized cooperation in security or foreign affairs issues. See: Michael E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 63-89, 117-175.

⁷⁵ The Qualified Majority Voting is a proportional scheme of decision-making in the EU, in which no unanimity is required, only majority of votes.

⁷⁶ See: Dinan, 107-108.

4.2. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The history of East Asia is probably one of the most interesting and oldest among all regions and continents. Trails of regionalism could be also traced back centuries ago.⁷⁷ Similarly as in Europe, contemporary regionalism in East Asia started after the WWII.

Nevertheless, the situation in the post-WWII Southeast Asia was somewhat different from Europe. The region was entangled in decolonization, emerging nationalisms between just formed states and failed attempts of grand pan-Asian regionalism.⁷⁸ Contrary to Europe, there had not been much of a stable and democratic tradition, and many states gained independence for the first time only when decolonization progressed. Moreover, Southeast Asia was immersed in geopolitics and the great powers rivalry – the USA, the USSR, emerging China, the regional hegemony of Japan, and post-colonial states, which still had a lot of influence there.⁷⁹

Where Southeast Asia could resemble Europe after the WWII was the two-bloc rivalry – communism, which for a long time casted its shadow on the region, and the West, represented by the presence of the USA. Nevertheless, in view of some scholars geopolitics was, in fact, the catalyst of limited regionalism in East Asia, contrary to what happened in Europe. For example, Mark Beeson claims that in East Asia, “American power has primarily had a *constraining* rather than an enabling impact on process of regionalism.”⁸⁰

Different setting resulted in a different history. Although the efficiency of ASEAN has been questioned for many years, Acharya refers to it as “the first viable regional organization in the

⁷⁷ Collin Y.C. Young, *Cross-Border...*, 3-7.

⁷⁸ Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for identity. International Relations of Southeast Asia*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 78.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Perspective”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no. 6, 2005, 979; Mark Beeson, *Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia*, 218.

history of Southeast Asia”.⁸¹ However, the phrase “first viable” does not mean that ASEAN was the first organization there. In fact, it was preceded by the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) established in 1961, to which Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines had acceded. ASA was not a long-lasting project, as it was dissolved in 1962. However, it was a very important precedent of regional integration in that region.⁸²

After the demise of ASA and never realized project of another organization – Maphilindo, in 1967 in Bangkok the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was brought to life by five founding member states – Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. According to the Bangkok Declaration, the main goal of ASEAN was to achieve more wealth and stability through economic cooperation. This could find some support in facts. According to Acharya, to understand the reasons, we have to look at the whole region. With the spread of communism and the great powers rivalry, Southeast Asian states were prone to external influences. It was thought that the best way to contain communism, was to fight poverty.⁸³

Acharya provides also an interesting account on the origins of ASEAN. Firstly, according to him it was the next step of regional identity building. In this sense, ASA acted as a first layer, which made ASEAN possible.⁸⁴ Secondly, ASEAN was a reflection of international trends in integration and the change from macro-level organization (e.g. the Organization of American States, the Arab League) to micro-level groupings.⁸⁵ However, at the same time no one in Southeast Asia thought of ASEAN as a model following Europe. Simply put, ASEAN was a product of local circumstances.

⁸¹ Acharya, *The Quest...*, 78.

⁸² Beeson, *Regionalism...*, 218.

⁸³ Acharya, *The Quest...*, 80.

⁸⁴ A view shared also by Mark Beeson. See: Beeson, *Regionalism...*, 218.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 86.

The most important thing, however, is that two major areas underlie the origin and development of ASEAN – economy and security. With much caution, one could compare this to Europe in 1950's and 1960's. However, in Europe political (security) aim was to be realized by economic means. In Southeast Asia, conversely, security issues were the overarching goal, notwithstanding the Bangkok Declaration putting “economic growth, social progress and cultural development” on the first place. Mark Beeson's claim gives the best picture of this – “although the emphasis (...) is on encouraging economic development, prosperity and technical cooperation, the sub-text is all about enhancing security (...)”.⁸⁶ Bolstering economic development could have been one of the main goals, but “promoting regional peace and stability” has been at least of the same, if not a greater importance.

In fact, political cooperation in ASEAN was slowly progressing and in 1971 in Kuala Lumpur the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality was established among ASEAN member states. In 1976, during an ASEAN Summit in Bali, the ASEAN Concord Agreement and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation were signed. They brought more cooperation in the area of security⁸⁷, however, more importantly they set up a code of inter-state behaviour, a basis of the ASEAN Way.⁸⁸ For forty years of its existence, ASEAN has been also growing. Today, it has ten members. In 1984, Brunei joined the organization. In 1995 Vietnam acceded. Burma (Myanmar) and Laos joined in 1997, followed by the accession of Cambodia in 1999.

On the other hand, economic cooperation has been also progressing.⁸⁹ In 1977, ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement was introduced, which lowered tariffs in intra-ASEAN trade. In the last decades, economic cooperation has gathered a new momentum, especially after the

⁸⁶ Beeson, *Regionalism...*, 218.

⁸⁷ There were even proposals of establishing a joint security council, but they have never materialized. See: Acharya, *The Quest...*, 95.

⁸⁸ Most important of which was non-interference. See: Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 24 February 1976, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm> (last accessed 18 May 2010).

⁸⁹ Beeson, *Regionalism...*, 220-221.

demise of the Cold War. This led to the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992.⁹⁰ The second catalyst was brought by the 1997 financial crisis, which swept many ASEAN economies of their feet and resulted in even a bigger need for coordination.⁹¹

It has been said before that scholars often disagree with the claim that ASEAN economies were convergent, however, the reality shows that these states might have many things in common in economic terms. Proponents of this view point to the fact that they all pursue similar development strategies and all are export-oriented.⁹² However, on the other hand, there are also differences – level of development, different approaches to foreign direct investments and a big competition among member resulting in low intra-ASEAN trade. In short, economic standing in ASEAN is very complicated. Wealthy states can be seen next to poor region, and the regions itself is prone to shocks.

In the late 1990's first plans for deepening of integration in ASEAN appeared. They ultimately led to the project of the ASEAN Communities envisaged in 2003, and the vision of one ASEAN Community in 2015. These plans resulted also in signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, the first legally binding document outlining the ASEAN institutional structure.

To sum up what has been said in this chapter. Initially, those two regionalisms were very different. Firstly, Southeast Asia setting was more complicated and more uncertain with the enormous importance of geopolitics. Secondly, Europe and Asia had different traditions of statehood, cooperation and democracy.⁹³ Thirdly, due to the cumbersome mixture of powers and uncertainty, in the case of ASEAN security goals not economic, were of the most importance. In Europe, security issues were also important, but integration was mainly in

⁹⁰ Ibid., 221.

⁹¹ Beeson, "Rethinking Regionalism...", 979-980.

⁹² Acharya, *The Quest...*, 89.

⁹³ Interesting here is the opinion of Julie Gilson, who traced back the European influence in the region exerted through colonial dominance. See more: Julie Gilson, *Asia meets Europe...*, 33-37.

economic sphere (later it spilled over and embraced politics as well). One of the reasons for the modest cooperation in economy in ASEAN was the fact that Southeast Asian economies were not highly interdependent. Today, this interdependence grows, however security issues still remain high on the agenda. Lastly, integration in Southeast Asia is still in early stages, when compared to the European Union. On one hand, this could be seen as a failure of integration in Southeast Asia. However, on the other side this low level combined with the specific ASEAN Way of regionalism could be the culprits of ASEAN's viability. As many questions are raised about its efficiency, one shall not forget about the fact that ASEAN has been existing for more than forty years and all its members were able to avoid conflicts and, in due time, slowly strengthened mutual bonds.

5. EU-ASEAN institutional comparison

In this chapter, I will examine the institutional similarities between ASEAN and the EU. I will start with comparing the European Union⁹⁴ with ASEAN Communities. After this, I will proceed to a comparison of ASEAN institutions – the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, and the ASEAN Secretariat. This step is necessary to see what is the extent of ASEAN “inspiration”, therefore, provide the answer to the first part of the research question.

5.1. ASEAN Communities

Preamble of the ASEAN Charter from 2007 explicitly mentions the creation of three ASEAN Communities: the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.⁹⁵ It is a repetition of 2003 provision in the ASEAN Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II).⁹⁶ Concord II also explicitly stated that ASEAN would be structured on the basis of three pillars.⁹⁷

First thing that should focus our attention is that the envisaged ASEAN Communities look similar to the European Union. In the EU, up to December 2009, one could also observe three pillars – the European Union, foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs.

Furthermore, article 20 of the ASEAN Charter states that “as a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus”. This can be seen as a

⁹⁴ It is important, however, to note the fact that by the European Union I mean the Union prior to the Lisbon Treaty. The reasons for that are that the treaty moved integration further and abolished the three-pillar structure of the Union. Moreover, it has been introduced only in December 2009, therefore, its achievements are still “fresh”.

⁹⁵ “The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations”, 20 November 2007, 2, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf> (last accessed 18 May 2010).

⁹⁶ “The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)”, 7 October 2003, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm> (last accessed 18 May 2010).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

reflection of the ASEAN Way of integration, as consensus is required consent of all members before a decision could be made. Consensus requires that decision-making process shall continue until all parties are satisfied.⁹⁸

In that respect, decision-making in the EU is also to a great extent based on consensus. Dorothee Heisenberg notes that 81% of decisions in the EU is made in that way.⁹⁹ However, there is a difference. In the case of the EU, when consensus fails there are formal procedures of voting that can help in concluding a decision. In ASEAN, such formal procedures do not exist. The only provision of the Charter concerning this is that in case of the impossibility of reaching a consensus, the ASEAN Summit may decide on how a specific decision could be made.¹⁰⁰

However, an interesting feature can be observed in the Charter, namely the ASEAN Minus X formula, according to which member can opt out from an arrangement if there is a consensus to do so. This method is limited only to implementation of economic commitments.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the fact that it concerns economic agreements echoes the framework of the first pillar of the EU, in which decision concerning economic matters (and many more) can be concluded using a majority voting mechanism. It is not an intention to say that EU's majority voting scheme is similar to the ASEAN Minus X formula, as the latter is a much less complicated mechanism with different aims. The point is that this formula is a step away from the intergovernmental lowest common denominator, in which the pace of integration is

⁹⁸ Henry, 867; Dominic McGoldrick, "The ASEAN Charter", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 199.

⁹⁹ Dorothee Heisenberg, "The Institution of Consensus in the European Union: Formal vs informal decision-making in the Council", *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 44, 2005, 66.

¹⁰⁰ Article 20 of the Charter.

¹⁰¹ Article 21.2 of the Charter.

dependent on consent of all parties. With ASEAN Minus X formula, some states can deepen integration, leaving other more time to join them.¹⁰²

Other two ASEAN Communities, the Security Community and the Socio-Cultural Community, are deprived of such mechanism. Thereby, they remain of an intergovernmental character. In the EU, the second and third pillar was also an intergovernmental cooperation requiring consent of all members in every decision.

Furthermore, the Charter gave ASEAN a legal personality.¹⁰³ Therefore, since 2007 the Association can be a party to international agreements. This is explicitly provisioned in the article 41.¹⁰⁴ Today, ASEAN may conclude agreements on its own, similarly to the EU, although the competence in deciding on this stays within the competence of member states. In the EU, the Commission (EU body independent from member states) is vested the right to conclude agreements on behalf of the EU. In the case of ASEAN, such steps, although very limited in scope, are important. They may be another manifestation of a gradual stepping away from pure intergovernmentalism.

The last remark in this section considers the goal of current ASEAN agenda. All three ASEAN Communities (economic, security, socio-cultural) “are expected to work in tandem”¹⁰⁵, and result in establishing a single ASEAN Community by 2015. The European Union has been also one entity comprised three pillars. A very similar pattern can be observed in ASEAN.

¹⁰² See: Christopher M. Dent, *East Asian Regionalism*, 106-108.

¹⁰³ Article 3 of the Charter.

¹⁰⁴ Article 47.2 of the Charter.

¹⁰⁵ Article 2 of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, 20 November 2007, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/21083.pdf> (last accessed on 17 May 2010).

5.1.1. ASEAN Economic Community

According to the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) shall be established by 2015.¹⁰⁶ The Blueprint of the AEC was concluded in November 2007. Interestingly, from the standpoint of previously discussed economic integration theory we can observe that, both the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, follow the same path of integration – from a free trade area to a single market. The only difference here is the pace. While the EU established the European Single Market in 1993, the ASEAN single market is to be established by 2015.¹⁰⁷ Surprisingly, some proposals advocating the establishment of a common market in ASEAN were announced as early as in 1970's.¹⁰⁸ One can recall the plans for a single market in Europe charted in 1970's. In other words, integration in ASEAN is far behind the European framework, but trends seem to show that, it will follow a similar path of economic integration as Europe.

A closer examination of ASEAN single market shows that it will be based on five core elements: free flow of goods, free flow of services, free flow of investment, freer flow of capital and free flow of skilled labor.¹⁰⁹ Free flow of goods means that all internal tariffs and non-tariff barriers will be lifted and customs in member states will be integrated, albeit not unified.¹¹⁰

In comparison, the European Single Market is established on four core elements – free flow of labor, goods, capital and services. This means that there is no a single trade barrier within the EU and the whole territory acts as a single market. Both projects look somewhat similar.

¹⁰⁶ Initially, in 2003 AEC was to be established by 2020, however, this plan was later revised.

¹⁰⁷ Even in ASEAN it is called “a European-style single market”. See: “ASEAN Summit to Create Single Market, Inks Historic Deal with China”, <http://www.aseansec.org/afp/88.htm> (last accessed 05 May 2010) .

¹⁰⁸ Collin Y.C. Young, *Cross-Border...*, 55-57.

¹⁰⁹ Article 9 of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint.

¹¹⁰ Article 13, 14, 17.

In ASEAN case, the difference is that when it comes to capital and labor movement the envisaged agenda speaks of “freer” capital movement and free flow of “skilled” labor. The existence of the limitation on capital flows might be, however, due to the still live experience of the Asian financial crisis from 1997.¹¹¹ Moreover, although the AEC will be based only on the free flow of skilled labor, Henry points to the fact that ASEAN’s attempts to regulate matters of immigration, both skilled and unskilled, have been visible for some time.¹¹²

In the EU, immigration had been a part of the third pillar and only the Treaty of Amsterdam from 1997 moved it to the first pillar. Without any doubt, ASEAN stays far behind the EU in this area, however, some similar patterns can be observed. These patterns can be further strengthened, as EU is running a 5-mln-euro worth initiative called EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme, which aim is to support the development of a common border and migration management policies in ASEAN.¹¹³

The AEC will also embrace cooperation in such fields as competition policy in all ASEAN member states¹¹⁴, consumer protection¹¹⁵, development of infrastructure, including transport and energy cooperation¹¹⁶ All this could be observed before in the first pillar of the European Union which included, among other things, competition law, consumer protection, cooperation in the areas of transport, energy and telecommunication.

Some major differences are that so far there is no plan for introducing a single currency in Southeast Asia, although such initiatives have been made in the aftermath of 1997 financial

¹¹¹ Laurence Henry, “The ASEAN Way and Community Integration”, *European Law Journal* 13, no. 6, November 2007, 871.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 870-871; see also: “The ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters”, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/16572.htm> (last accessed on 19 May 2010).

¹¹³ See: Fact Sheet to Press Release “Programmes Worth Ten Million Euros Launched to Enhance ASEAN-EU Cooperation”, 15 July 2008, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/21745.pdf> (last accessed 25 May 2010).

¹¹⁴ Article 41 of the AEC Blueprint.

¹¹⁵ Article 42 of the AEC Blueprint.

¹¹⁶ Articles 46-57 of the AEC Blueprint.

crisis¹¹⁷, nor there is an effective dispute settlement mechanism (like the former European Court of Justice) in place¹¹⁸. However, the greater importance of the AEC, when compared to other pillars, supported by the existence of the ASEAN Minus X formula, and a similar path of integration leading to the establishment of a single market, is a strong indication in favor of echoing the European experience.

5.1.2. ASEAN Political and Security Community

In the chapter on history, it was said that the security issues were, in fact, the rationale for establishing ASEAN in the first place. However, most scholars agree that as far as political cooperation is concerned ASEAN's achievements remain relatively modest, even having in mind the questionable efficiency of ASEAN in general.

If one compares this to the European experience, it will show that for many years political and security cooperation in Europe also remained relatively small in size (in the form of the European Political Cooperation¹¹⁹). Only the Maastricht Treaty institutionalized it as the Common Foreign and Security Policy – the second pillar of the EU. In ASEAN, politics was the rationale of integration. Nevertheless, achievements in this area have been modest due to lack of binding norms, clear institutional framework and the rule of non-interference.

ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation (APSC) Blueprint was adopted during the 14th ASEAN Summit in 2009. The main goals of the APSC are political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for promotion

¹¹⁷ See: Ooi Sang Kuang, "The ASEAN currency and exchange rate mechanism task force", available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap17r.pdf> (last accessed 19 May 2010); Srinivasa Madhur, "Costs and benefits of a Common Currency for ASEAN", *Asian Development Bank - ERD Working Paper*, no. 12, May 2002.

¹¹⁸ Although the Charter's provisions indicate that such mechanism shall be established. On the importance of having an effective dispute settlement mechanism in a single market see: Collin Y.C. Ong, *Cross-Border Litigation...*, 25-31.

¹¹⁹ See: Michael E. Smith, *Europe's...*

and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, forging shared norms and common mechanisms, and preserving and enhancing peace and stability in the region.¹²⁰ When looking at the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and provisions concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, common points can be observed. The main goals of CFSP were creating and maintaining common values, enhancing international security, developing democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹²¹ One can spot that most of goals overlap – respect for democracy and rule of law, promotion and support for human rights, importance of common norms and values and enhancing international/regional stability.

Furthermore, the blueprint envisages activities aimed at conflict prevention and resolution¹²² and post-conflict peace building¹²³, a field in which the EU has been very active – a very new arena for ASEAN. Some examples of ASEAN members being involved in such activities have been observed already, e.g. the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia conducted by the EU and ASEAN, support for democratization in Myanmar and UN operations in Cambodia and East Timor.¹²⁴ Furthermore, this is the more striking as it breaks one of the fundamental rules of ASEAN existence – non-interference in internal affairs of member states. The APSC will certainly strengthen further such activities and bring the political cooperation to a higher, more institutionalized level.

Lastly, the APSC, when ultimately established, will remain an intergovernmental cooperation. It means that consensus will be a mandatory way of decision-making, unless a different way

¹²⁰ Article 7 of The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 1 March 2009, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/5187-18.pdf> (last accessed 18 May 2010).

¹²¹ Article 11.1 of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) - the Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, EU Official Journal, C 325 , 24/12/2002 P. 0005.

¹²² Articles 17,18 of the APSC Blueprint.

¹²³ Article 23 of the APSC Blueprint.

¹²⁴ Henry, 874.

will be decided by the superior ASEAN body – the ASEAN Summit¹²⁵. This is a possible backdoor for introducing a different decision-making scheme, however no clear exemptions are explicitly stated in the ASEAN Charter. The second pillar of the European Union, initially, was also a purely intergovernmental cooperation.

5.1.3. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

Perhaps the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), the third pillar of ASEAN, has the least in common with the former third pillar of the EU. In the EU, the third pillar focused on cooperation in the area of home and justice affairs, namely: immigration, asylum policy¹²⁶, combating drugs, combating international frauds, cooperation in civil and criminal matters, customs and police cooperation.¹²⁷ The ASCC's scope is considerably wider. According to the Blueprint of the ASCC from 2009, cooperation will embrace human development, social welfare and protection, social justice and rights, environmental sustainability, building the ASEAN identity and narrowing the development gap.¹²⁸

What is interesting, however, is the fact that when we juxtapose the scope of the ASCC and the AEC with the first and the third pillar of the EU, we can observe an interesting pattern. The first pillar of the EU entailed not only economic but also social, cultural, developmental, educational, environmental cooperation, EU-citizenship and brought all of them to the community (supranational) level. When we look at the ASCC we can observe that its areas of interest include almost the same issues – development, ASEAN identity, culture, education (human development), and environment. In the case of ASEAN, however, all these issues remain in the third, intergovernmental pillar. The scope of cooperation seems similar. Only

¹²⁵ Article 20.2 of the ASEAN Charter.

¹²⁶ Then transferred to the first pillar.

¹²⁷ Article 29 of the Treaty of Maastricht.

¹²⁸ Article 9 of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, 1 March 2009, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/5187-19.pdf> (last accessed 18 May 2010).

the distribution of competences among ASEAN Communities is different when compared to the EU.

5.2. ASEAN Institutions

The ASEAN Charter establishes a clear but vague structural framework of the organization. What is, however, important about the Charter in the first place is that it is the first legally binding document clearly outlining ASEAN institutional framework. It does not mean that it was the first legally binding document concluded by ASEAN member states. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) from 1976 is an example of previous agreements. Although TAC laid the fundamentals and outlined the rules of the ASEAN Way, it did not concern ASEAN *per se*.

According to the Charter, ASEAN bodies are the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Coordinating Council, ASEAN Community Councils, ASEAN Sectoral Ministers Bodies, Secretary-General, the ASEAN Secretariat, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, ASEAN National Secretariats, the ASEAN Human Rights Body and the ASEAN Foundation.¹²⁹ While at face value these bodies may bring little resemblance with the EU, at least some patterns of similarities can be observed by looking some of them, namely the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council and the ASEAN Secretariat, in more details.

5.2.1. ASEAN Summit

According to the Charter, “the ASEAN Summit shall be the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN”.¹³⁰ Its main duties are to “deliberate, provide policy guidance and take decisions on

¹²⁹ Article 7-14 of the ASEAN Charter.

¹³⁰ Article 7.2(a) of the Charter

key issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives of ASEAN, important matters of interests to Member States (...).”¹³¹ The members of the ASEAN Summit are the heads of states or government of the member states.¹³² It is, therefore, the highest body of ASEAN, which is responsible for setting goals and direction of cooperation. The Summit itself was not introduced by the Charter. It had existed before, brought to live by the Declaration of ASEAN Concord I from 1976¹³³, however it was not before the Charter when the ASEAN Summit was eventually included and described in a legally binding form.¹³⁴

When looking for a European equivalent or model for the ASEAN Summit, the most appropriate is the European Council. According to the Treaty of Maastricht, “the European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political guidelines”.¹³⁵ In this sense, the European Council should be seen as a goal and direction-setting body for the whole European Union.¹³⁶ It comprises the head of states or governments of the member states.¹³⁷

Therefore, both – the ASEAN Summit and the European Council – are bodies that envisage and direct the pace and scope of integration. Both comprise the heads of states or governments and both should meet twice a year. Moreover, up until December 2009, the presidency in both were conducted by the member state holding the presidency (the EU), or the chairmanship (ASEAN).

¹³¹ Article 7.2(b) of the Charter

¹³² Article 7.1 of the Charter

¹³³ “Declaration of ASEAN Concord I”, Indonesia, 24 February 1976, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm> (last accessed 16 May 2010).

¹³⁴ See: Henry, 861.

¹³⁵ Article 4 of the Treaty of Maastricht.

¹³⁶ With the Lisbon Treaty a major change was introduced – the President of the European Council, who together with the President of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, takes part in the meeting of the European Council.

¹³⁷ Article 4 of the Treaty of Maastricht.

Chairmanship is another interesting feature included in the Charter. According to article 31, each member state shall serve the chairmanship for one year based on alphabetical rotation. The member state acting as the chairman shall chair the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils and the ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies.¹³⁸

In comparison, in the European Union (prior to the Lisbon Treaty) there was the Presidency held by every member state on a six-month basis. The country holding the Presidency chaired the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers) and the European Council Summits.¹³⁹ Both EU presidency and ASEAN chairmanship have a considerable amount of responsibilities in common.

5.2.2. ASEAN Coordinating Council

The ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) is the second most important body of ASEAN outlined in the Charter. It comprises the ASEAN foreign ministers¹⁴⁰ and its main duty is to coordinate the implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit¹⁴¹. It shall meet at least twice a year.

Comparing the ACC to the European Union, one should see it as an equivalent of the Council of the European Union (CEU). More precisely, the former General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which comprised the EU foreign ministers. In the EU, the European Council can have different compositions depending on what is on the agenda – from the abovementioned GAERC (now split into the General Affairs and External Relation

¹³⁸ Article 31 of the ASEAN Charter.

¹³⁹ According to the article 4 of the Maastricht Treaty: “The European Council shall meet at least twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Head of State or Government of the Member State which holds the Presidency of the Council.”

¹⁴⁰ Article 8.1 of the ASEAN Charter.

¹⁴¹ Article 8.2(a), 8.2(b) of the ASEAN Charter.

Councils) to more specific meetings – agriculture, transportation, health. In every case, those meetings comprise the equivalent EU members’ ministers responsible for these areas. Moreover, the CEU is one of the main legislative bodies in the EU (second being the European Parliament).

In the case of ASEAN Coordinating Council, it is hard to say that it has a legislative power, as the Charter remains very obscure and vague on this. Nevertheless, the ACC is responsible for implementing the decision of the ASEAN Summit and in this respect can be seen as an equivalent of the CEU, which is also responsible for implementing the general goals set out by the European Council.

Moreover, the Charter envisages ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies (ASMBs), being in charge of implementing “the agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit under their respective purview”.¹⁴² Annex 1 to the Charter lists all ASMBs – starting from ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting¹⁴³, ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry, ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting etc.¹⁴⁴ ASMBs will act in a similar manner to different Council formations.

The Charter oversees also ASEAN Community Councils comprising the councils of all three ASEAN Communities. It remains silent, however, on what will happen in 2015 when one ASEAN Community will be established. In the current ASEAN framework, all ASMBs shall be under the purview of the relevant ACC.¹⁴⁵ That is a difference compared to the EU, where

¹⁴² Article 10 of the ASEAN Charter.

¹⁴³ Laurence Henry stresses out the importance of this meeting, growing since the establishment of AFTA. See: Henry, 861.

¹⁴⁴ Annex 1 to the ASEAN Charter.

¹⁴⁵ Article 9.2 of the Charter.

all pillars had a common institutional framework, acting on different bases depending on what matters were discussed.

Nevertheless, a similar pattern of general (foreign ministers) and sectoral meetings dealing with area-specific matters can be observed. Moreover, both in the EU and ASEAN they work along the lines and goals previously set out by the heads of state or government of member states.

Another thing, which is similar in both organizations, is provisioned in the article 12 of the Charter, namely the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPRA). Every member state is obliged to appoint a permanent representative in the rank of an ambassador to ASEAN. These representatives shall support, among other things, work of the ASEAN Community Council and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies.¹⁴⁶ Apart from the trivial thing – the name, which is very close to the European equivalent, both bodies have similar scope of duties, most important of which is the preparation and support of meetings of the councils of ministers.¹⁴⁷

5.2.3. Secretary-General of ASEAN and ASEAN Secretariat

Perhaps the ASEAN Secretariat (AS) is the body, which is the least suitable for comparisons, as it is still closer to a secretariat of an international organization than an entity, which could be compared with the supranational and independent character of the European Commission. Firstly, it is not independent from member states, contrary to the EC, where commissioners act on behalf of the community, not on behalf of the countries from which they come. Moreover, not all member states have their representation in the AS, as it is in the EU with 27 commissioners. The Secretary-General, according to the Charter, is appointed for a five-year

¹⁴⁶ Article 12.2 of the Charter.

¹⁴⁷ Henry also notes that. See: Henry, 861.

term and shall be assisted by four deputies.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Secretariat does not have an executive power. According to the Charter, it, among other duties, facilitates and monitors progress in the implementation of ASEAN agreements, participates in meetings of ASEAN councils.¹⁴⁹

There are, however, three areas in which the Secretariat could be seen as acting in a manner similar to the Commission. Firstly, it participates in meetings with external parties and presents views of ASEAN on these meetings.¹⁵⁰ This can be seen as representing the Association outside, something that also the Commission does through Directorate-General for External Relations.¹⁵¹ Secondly, a point noted by Laurence Henry, the Secretariat can make informal proposal or recommendations.¹⁵² The scope of these instruments are very modest, to say at least, when juxtaposed with the competences of the Commission. Nevertheless, the power to make proposals and recommendations in the name of the Association can be an indication of a gradually increasing role of ASEAN vis-à-vis member states.

Thirdly, during Charter negotiations it was proposed that the Secretariat should be empowered to sign “non-sensitive” agreements on behalf of the member states.¹⁵³ This was later abandoned and not included in the final version of the Charter. However, in reality the Secretariat has signed certain less important agreements on behalf of the Association throughout the years, i.e. the cooperation agreement between ASEAN and the International

¹⁴⁸ Article 11 of the Charter.

¹⁴⁹ Article 11.2 of the Charter.

¹⁵⁰ Article 11.2(d) of the Charter.

¹⁵¹ European Commission External Relations website, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/external_relations/index_en.htm (last accessed 22 May 2010).

¹⁵² Henry, 863.

¹⁵³ “Report of The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the Asean Charter”, 18, available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/16012007/ReportOfTheEminentPersonsGroup%28EPG%29OnTheAseanCharter.pdf> (last accessed 22 May 2010).

Labor Office.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, some agreements signed with external parties are signed by member states, which is indicated by their names, followed by the statement “member state of ASEAN”. In Henry’s view, this brings up a question whether we can observe European-style mixed agreements.¹⁵⁵ These mixed agreements in the EU are signed by member states and by the EC(EU). Again, in ASEAN’s case, a similar tendency can be observed, although very limited in scope.

Summing up what this analysis has showed a few points have to be made. Firstly, institutional similarities between the EU and ASEAN can be observed, both in the design of the ASEAN Communities and institutional framework. Secondly, their scope is not big enough to claim that ASEAN is copying/emulating the EU’s solutions. It is a plausible claim, however, to say that ASEAN echoes/is inspired by the European model of integration, adjusting known solutions to its needs. Thirdly, it has to be borne in mind that the ASEAN Communities are still to develop, their frameworks can evolve and, possibly, more similarities can be observed in the future.

¹⁵⁴ “Cooperation agreement between ASEAN and the International Labor Office”, 20 March 2007, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/ILO.pdf> (last accessed 28 May 2010)

¹⁵⁵ Henry, 866-867.

6. EU-ASEAN economic relations

Having proved that a degree of similarities between the EU and ASEAN exists, it is time to explain the puzzle of why this happens. Therefore, the last chapter will be focused on examining economic and trade relations between the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This flows from the theoretical perspective presented earlier. The purpose of this examination is to show that economy and trade have been the most salient factors connecting those two regions in the last decades, therefore, provide the explanation to the observable similarities between the EU and ASEAN.

6.1. The EU and ASEAN – an overview

In economic terms, the European Union is one of the largest entities in the world. Comprising 27 members and inhabited by more than 450 million people, it is world's leading economic force. It is also the biggest in terms of GDP, which in 2009 reached 14.5 trillion US dollars.¹⁵⁶ Both EU's exports and import belong to the highest globally, respectively 1.9 trillion and 1.6 US dollars, giving Europe again the leading role in the world trade.¹⁵⁷

ASEAN's territories are inhabited by almost 600 million people living in ten member states. Nevertheless, ASEAN's economic position in the world is considerably weaker than its European counterpart. ASEAN's GDP amounts to 1.5 trillion US dollars, more than ten times less than the EU. In *per capita* terms, this difference is even bigger (37,000 vs. 2,500 US dollars).¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, total trade in all ASEAN states amounted to 1,7 trillion US dollars in

¹⁵⁶ The CIA World Factbook, available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html> (last accessed 25 May 2010).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ ASEAN Community in Figures 2009 Report, 11-12, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ACIF2009.pdf> (last accessed 25 May 2010).

2008¹⁵⁹ (imports and exports combined), compared to 3,5 trillion US dollars in the EU. ASEAN is also known for very stark differences in development level among its member states, with Singapore's GDP *per capita* oscillating around 37,000 US dollars on one side, and Myanmar's GDP *per capita* of around 500 US dollars.¹⁶⁰

What stems from this brief introduction, are clearly visible differences in economic development and performance between those two regional organizations. The EU is one of the most developed regions in the world. On the other hand, ASEAN comprises mostly (with the exception of Singapore and Brunei Darussalam) of relatively poor countries. Nevertheless, the majority of ASEAN members have been experiencing a rapid development in last decades, which could lead to closing of the developmental gap. The rapid development has, however, certain drawbacks, like fragility and high exposure to shocks. They were revealed during the 1997 Asian financial crisis

6.2. Economic linkages between the EU and ASEAN

EU-ASEAN relations date back to 1972 when a Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN was established.¹⁶¹ Therefore, dialogue between those two organizations is one of the longest inter-regional dialogues in the post-WWII world. Nevertheless, it was not before 1980 when those relations were institutionalized in the form of the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement. Although this cooperation had a political undercurrent, the agreements stressed out three fields of interest: commercial, economic cooperation and technical assistance.¹⁶² This shows that, in fact, economics lay in the core of EC(EU)-ASEAN relations from the very beginning.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 21.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 11; however some sources (i.e. the CIA World Factbook) note that developmental differences in the EU are also enormous, ranging from 7,000 to 78,000 US dollars. See: The CIA World Factbook.

¹⁶¹ „ASEAN - EUROPEAN UNION Dialogue”, ASEAN website, available at: <http://www.aseansec.org/5612.htm> (last accessed 25 May 2010).

¹⁶² Ibid.

Although, in due time, EU-ASEAN cooperation has embraced more and more fields, and dialogue was extended to non-economic matters, i.e. Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) which started in 1996 between the European Union and the whole East Asian region, or ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which started in 1994 and brought together all ASEAN members, the USA, the EU, Russia, Australia and others, it seems that EU-ASEAN cooperation's core has remained close to economic and developmental affairs.

This is supported by evidence. In late 1990's and 2000's, new initiatives were undertaken aimed at dealing with the problems of globalization and facilitation of trade flows.¹⁶³ Moreover, new developmental programs aimed at fostering growth and regionalism in Southeast Asia were launched, i.e. ASEAN Project for Regional Integration Support (APRIS), the European Commission-ASEAN Regional Co-operation Programme on Standards, Quality and Conformity Assessment, or even EC-ASEAN Energy Facility Programme, Technology Transfer for Energy Cogeneration from Biomass in ASEAN Countries (COGEN Phase III).¹⁶⁴ According to EU sources, developmental aid for Southeast Asia in the next years will exceed 1.3 billion Euros.¹⁶⁵ In economic terms *sensu stricto*, one of the most important initiatives was the Trans Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) started in 2003. The main goals of it are "achieving practical improvements in EU-ASEAN trade and supporting ASEAN's own integration ambitions".¹⁶⁶

One of the consequences of TREATI was that, by some, it was seen as a first step to a possible preferential trading agreement between the EU and ASEAN in the future.¹⁶⁷ In fact,

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ "EU-ASEAN: ever closer", EU press release, IP/09/834, 27/05/2007, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/834&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (last accessed 27 May 2010).

¹⁶⁶ "TREATI – Work Programme and Progress Report", Brussels, December 2007, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/december/tradoc_137414.pdf (last accessed 30 May 2010).

¹⁶⁷ „ASEAN - EUROPEAN UNION Dialogue”

in 2005, the Vision Group of ASEAN-EU Economic Partnership was established and its main goal was to look into the possibility of establishing an FTA between two organizations. The 2006 report of this group emphasized the salience of economic relations between the EU and ASEAN, both in the areas of trade and investments, including FDI (Foreign Direct Investments). Moreover, it found introducing a FTA a feasible and promising solution.¹⁶⁸ This plan was further revised and establishment of a FTA was postponed due to the unstable situation and human rights violations in Myanmar. Instead, the EU decided to conduct talks about FTA's on a bilateral basis with ASEAN members.

Nevertheless, all this shows that the economic dimension of EU-ASEAN relations is still the most important area of this dialogue. Many initiatives for fostering this dimension have been undertaken in the last decade. Although political component and ties have also grown, its achievements lag behind.

6.3. EU-ASEAN trade exchange 1995-2009

The importance of economy is further proved when one looks at trade. Official EU Statistics show that the EU is one of the biggest trading partners for ASEAN.¹⁶⁹ In 2006, trade between EU and ASEAN represented 5% of world trade. In 2008, ASEAN was EU's 5th largest major export and 6th biggest import trading partner. This statistics places ASEAN behind such giants as China or the USA, but before Japan on the list of EU's trading partners. ASEAN's trade with the EU placed the latter on 3rd position, after China and Japan, in ASEAN's statistics.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ "Report of the ASEAN-EU Vision Group: Transregional Partnership for Shared and Sustainable Prosperity", Ha Noi, Vietnam, 10 May 2006, 3-6, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/may/tradoc_128860.pdf (last accessed 25 May 2010)

¹⁶⁹ In 2008, the EU was ASEAN's 2nd biggest trading partner. The European Commission website, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/asean/index_en.htm (last accessed 02 May 2010).

¹⁷⁰ „ASEAN. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 22 September 2009, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/113471.htm> (last accessed 25 May 2010).

Moreover, trade between those two organizations has been growing in the last years with a rate of 4% annually.¹⁷¹ Sources also point to the fact that the EU is the largest investor in ASEAN countries with 27% of total FDI inflows on average from 2001 to 2005.¹⁷²

Furthermore, ASEAN statistics show that trade with the EU has been high in numbers for decades. In 1995, the EU was 2nd exporting market and 3rd trading partner, accounting for 18% of ASEAN's external trade. This data points also to a high growth rate of this trade and FDI flows before 1995.¹⁷³

A further examination of the available data shows EU-ASEAN trade in more detail. The data analyzed here covers the period between 1995 and 2009. The reasons for this are fourfold. Firstly, although the European Union was established in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht did not enter into force before the end of 1993 (on 1st November, European Economic Area was established even later – 1st January 1994). Therefore, even if we observe similarities in design and link it to trade as the causal link, then those similarities could only happen after the EU was in place. Otherwise, there would not have been an example to follow. Secondly, cooperation in ASEAN has gained momentum only in 1990's, especially in economic terms (AFTA in 1992). Thirdly, first signs of ASEAN's new integration momentum did not appear before late 1990's/early 2000's. Fourthly, data for this time is relatively widely accessible and accurate.

Analyzed data shows three major things. Firstly, in the 1995-2009 period trade flows between ASEAN and the EU have been showing an upward tendency. In 1995, imports from ASEAN member states to the EU amounted to 35.5 billion Euros, while EU's exports to ASEAN reached 31.1 billion Euros. In 1997, there was a sharp downturn in exports to ASEAN due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which hit hard many ASEAN economies, however imports

¹⁷¹ Ibid.


¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ "ASEAN - EUROPEAN UNION Dialogue".

achieved a positive growth rate. The second slight downturn is visible in 2001, again due to economic slowdown in the world.

On the other end, in 2008 total EU’s exports (27 member states) to ASEAN (10 members) achieved 55.3 billion Euros. That shows 76% increase when compared to 1995 (average annual growth rate of 5%). EU’s imports from ASEAN in 2008 amounted to 79.2 billion Euros, which is more than two times more than in 1995 (increase by 129%). In 2009, a downward tendency could be observed to yet another slowdown in the world economy. The graph below depicts these trends. Detailed numbers can be found in the Appendix 1.

Graph 1: EU’s imports and exports from/to ASEAN, 1995-2009.



The last observation is an increasing trade deficit in EU-ASEAN trade. In 1995, the EU’s exports/imports deficit amounted to 3 billion Euros. In 2008, this negative balance reached more than 23 billion Euros, more than seven times bigger than in 1995. This proves that EU-ASEAN trade is highly imbalanced. Furthermore, the structure of flows from EU to ASEAN and from ASEAN to the EU is different. While EU imports mostly raw materials and low-tech goods, it exports highly processed commodities. This is one of the consequences in developmental level between the EU and ASEAN.

There are a few important remarks, which can act as a summing up of this chapter. The data presented shows the salience of economic relations, which lie at the core of EU-ASEAN partnership. This claim has strong arguments. Firstly, from the very beginning economy lay in the centre of EU-ASEAN cooperation. Secondly, trade flows between EU-ASEAN locate both organizations as major trading partners. Thirdly, these flows have been growing for the last years, therefore both regions have become more interdependent. Fourthly, the imbalances have also been growing, which can lead to a conclusion than the EU is more important for ASEAN than ASEAN for the EU. In other words, ASEAN is more dependent on trade with the EU, than the EU is dependent on exports to ASEAN. Fifthly, the EU is also a big donor of developmental help to ASEAN and undertakes many joint initiatives aimed at promoting regionalism in Southeast Asia.

7. Conclusions

This thesis departed from stressing the importance of regionalism in the contemporary world. It underlined the valuable contribution of comparative analyses and the lack of thereof in regionalism studies. By taking two examples of regionalism, it aimed at analyzing the similarities between them and explain their causes. On one side is the European Union, the most institutionalized form of regional organization. On the other hand, we have the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the most viable regional organization in East Asia.

Those two models were usually seen as having little in common. The EU with a very high level of institutionalization and supranationality is seen as a unique organization, even a model of integration. On the other hand, ASEAN has been famous for the ASEAN Way, low level of institutionalization and typical intergovernmental character. However, in the recent years ASEAN has been progressing to become a more institutionalized project. Therefore, questions about its future have been raised. Scholars and policy makers have been stressing out the possible role of European model in shaping ASEAN. However, all claims have been formulated on a high level of generalization without deeper insights into the actual processes. This is the wide context of this thesis.

The analysis has been conducted in the following way. Starting from reviewing the current and historical achievements in the field of regionalism, it has been showed that it is a complex phenomenon, which gains on importance as cooperation and integration tendencies strengthen. An insight into different explanations of integration has been also presented to show that, so far, it has been usually seen as a Europe-centric phenomenon, and the attention given to other projects was not satisfactory. Most importantly, however, it has been showed that comparative analyses of European and Asian regionalism have not been popular. This is a

baffling conclusion, having in mind the enormous importance of such research in creating wider comparisons, patterns and models.

Next, the theoretical framework has been presented. By reviewing all major IR theories, the author aimed at showing that neither realism, nor constructivism could be a useful toolbox to the explanatory part of this study. It has been argued, though, that the explanation can be supported by liberal tradition.

This led to the examination of the current ASEAN setting. By looking at the recent policy developments, agendas and legal framework, similarities in design between the EU and ASEAN have been sought. Lastly, following the theoretical framework, an examination of EU-ASEAN economic relations brought a closer perspective on their importance in the dialogue between the EU and ASEAN.

Therefore, it is possible now to give the answer to the research question introduced in the beginning of this thesis. What institutional similarities between the EU and ASEAN exist and why are they observed? The major findings of this thesis can be divided into two fields, following two hypotheses presented in the introduction.

The analysis of the envisaged ASEAN Communities shows that certain parts of this design have much in common with solutions known in Europe. Establishing three communities, serving as pillars of cooperation and integration, with the economic pillar being superior to others is a clear resemblance to the three-pillar structure of the EU prior to the Lisbon Treaty. A similar path of economic integration in the ASEAN Economic Community, although characterized by a slower pace, can also be observed. The introduction of the ASEAN Minus X formula can be seen as a first sign of going away from the ASEAN Way and intergovernmentalism. Other pillars (the ASEAN Political-Security Community and the

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community) will remain for the time being at the intergovernmental level, similarly to the second and third pillar of the EU.

Moreover, institutional similarities with the EU framework have been observed in the design of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Although the intergovernmental spirit in ASEAN is still salient, there have been signs of growing independence of the organization vis-à-vis member states. They are visible in the ASEAN Secretariat. The ASEAN Summit, being the superior ASEAN body comprising the head of states and governments of member states and meeting twice a year to establish general policy guidelines for the Association bears a strong resemblance to the European Council. Lastly, ASEAN Coordinating Council and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies will act in the similar manner to the Council of the European Union.

Therefore, the first hypothesis has been tested - ASEAN does not copy the EU, but is inspired by the European experience. Similarities in design between the EU and ASEAN exist. However, the scope of them, as presented above, does not allow formulating claims about ASEAN copying or emulating the European model. In fact, it is highly unlikely that ASEAN will copy the European Union. Current developments require to refrain from such claims. Even if the EU would like to see other regions imitating its way of integration, it is very doubtful in the case of ASEAN. Therefore, inspiration and echoing – yes, copying and imitation – no. Conclusions as to why ASEAN does not copy the EU are that both organizations had very different origins and history. ASEAN, being embedded in a different setting cannot replicate the EU. However, it tries to adopt similar solutions.

The second finding is that economic relations remain the most salient linking factor between two organizations. Evidences have been presented in this thesis. Firstly, economic links

between the EU and ASEAN have been very strong since the establishment of mutual relations. Secondly, agreements on economic and developmental matters have been high in numbers, with many joint initiatives and programs undertaken. Furthermore, both organizations are connected by a high stock of trade, which has been showing an upward tendency in the last decades. While it is not the aim to dismiss the importance of EU-ASEAN political dialogue, the numbers and statistics show that trade connections and economic interdependency overshadows developments in other areas.

The superiority of economic dimension in EU-ASEAN relationship supports the argument presented in the theoretical section of this thesis. ASEAN is progressing in integration and introducing the EU-inspired institutions and ideas (i.e. communities) because it is strongly connected to the EU by trade ties. The logic of this is as follows. Existence of economic ties creates interdependency between the EU and ASEAN and moves the latter closer under the influence of the former. This is finds support as economic relations are the strongest in EU-ASEAN case. Moreover, ASEAN, being a rational and wealth-pursuing actor, wants to bolster this ties, because it is beneficial for its member states, as imbalances in trade exchange show. This can be done by shaping its framework in a similar way to the EU. It can reduce the costs of cooperation and, in a longer term, bring a high level of development, another thing that liberal utility-maximizing actor pursues. This mechanism explains why ASEAN tries to echo EU solutions, providing the explanation to the puzzle and validating the second hypothesis of this study.

The last word should be devoted to the limitations of this thesis and possibilities for further research. Firstly, this thesis embarked on researching one case within regionalism studies – EU-ASEAN comparison. While it showed a considerable amount of common points between the recent ASEAN agendas and the EU, it is an impossible endeavor to formulate general

claims about unifying models of integration and the role of economic interdependency in these processes, based on only this example. In order to further support, or dismiss these claims, more research examining different cases and organizations should be conducted. Thereby, this study has only indicated a certain possibility of explanation.

Secondly, this thesis focused on economy as the explanatory factor. While it not examined in detail, it did not undermine the possible influence of political and cultural components in explanation of the problem. However, to give a plausible claim about their importance another study embedded in different theoretical assumptions and supported by them would have to be conducted.

Lastly, the ASEAN Communities are still a to-be-fully-introduced project. Therefore, changes in design and different approaches, more or less inspired by others, are still possible. Therefore, further analyses of the ASEAN agenda and comparisons should be conducted to create and keep a detailed insight in the complicated phenomenon of Southeast Asian regionalism.

8. Appendices

8.1. Appendix 1 European Union's trade flows with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1995-2009)

GEO/TIME	1993 ¹	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Exports																
Brunei	588	624	1093	1063	69	261	273	162	154	331	161	108	169	1302	170	162
Indonesia	4067	5854	7000	8283	3865	3382	4544	4572	4614	4222	4791	4770	4982	5425	5952	5230
Cambodia	n/a ²	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	72	116	106	120	94	110	126	135	152	150	123
Lao	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	26	32	45	32	37	39	63	38	28	55	65	91
Myanmar	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	111	121	118	89	91	54	77	84	81	163	104	91
Malaysia	3985	2420	3474	4374	6086	6501	8515	9478	8478	8401	8751	9237	10254	11321	11555	9686
Philippines	1730	2291	3251	5095	3147	3307	4505	4643	3344	3363	3588	3610	3719	3957	3743	2951
Singapore	7593	10904	12298	13520	10911	12542	15776	15211	14849	14252	16097	17243	19416	20344	21797	20166
Thailand	4958	8492	8502	7805	5217	4763	6602	7709	6931	6423	6999	7908	7266	7875	8445	7627
Vietnam	486	750	1296	1158	1062	1096	1284	1840	1895	2070	2243	1890	2368	3579	3351	3724
EXPORTS	23407	31335	36914	41298	30494	32077	41778	43842	40513	39249	42880	45014	48418	54173	55332	49851
Imports																
Brunei	397	263	416	544	299	101	174	55	81	51	74	73	53	69	12	26
Indonesia	5035	6109	7107	8330	8955	9175	11480	11451	10976	10405	10349	10756	12197	12732	13476	11590
Cambodia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	270	361	491	516	499	597	526	665	680	729	765
Lao	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	94	113	139	150	147	126	138	144	147	130	136	138
Myanmar	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	171	227	413	497	445	388	460	287	306	262	184	156
Malaysia	6247	9156	9419	10799	12243	13908	18275	17161	16121	15749	15594	15977	17748	18065	17438	14609
Philippines	1886	2420	3474	4374	6086	6557	9194	7992	8477	7100	6872	6494	6395	5611	5333	3797
Singapore	6427	8760	9276	11510	12535	13635	17378	15134	14292	14843	16860	18361	19209	18397	16086	14572
Thailand	5675	6625	7596	8616	9337	10558	13514	13124	11980	11808	12886	13008	14624	16524	17353	14209
Vietnam	544	1150	1435	2246	2612	3339	4269	4734	4696	4800	5275	5532	6862	7803	8484	7669
IMPORTS	26211	34483	38723	46419	52332	57883	75197	70789	67731	65769	69105	71158	78206	80273	79231	67531
Balance	-2804	-3148	-1809	-5121	-21838	-25806	-33419	-26947	-27218	-26520	-26225	-26144	-29788	-26100	-23899	-17680

Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade>, May 2010; Brid Brennan, Erik Heijmans, Pietve Vervest, *ASEM Trading New Silk Routes*.

¹ Data presented in ECU (European Currency Unit), ECU/EUR ratio – 1:1

²Not a member.

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