FOUCAULDIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY: A POSTSTRUCTURALIST READING OF “HEARTS AND MINDS” IN IRAQ

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Abstract

In this paper I propose analyzing the strategy of “hearts and minds”, which informed American counterinsurgency in Iraq post-invasion. I seek to do this through a Foucauldian lens for two reasons. First, “hearts and minds” is a strategy that requires engaging techniques belonging to two types of power, a power that kills life and a power that protects life. In this sense, the paper is interested in finding out whether sovereign power cooperates with biopower and if the two can be balanced. Second, it is interested in exploring the elements related to this strategic concept, insurgency in relation to insecurity and population in relation to development, and thus find out how these elements react when there is an incompatibility between the two forms of power.

The question that this research raises then is the following: what does “hearts and minds” as an expression of the security-development nexus found in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine reveal about the relations of power and resistance in Iraq after 2003?
Acknowledgements

This thesis is more of an intellectual exercise than a significant piece of writing within the field of IR. It is a shy attempt to grasp the field of IR and make a modest contribution in what concerns one of its subfields. But this would not have been possible without the thoughtful and careful supervision of my teachers. Each provided relevant information and a certain type of support that was most needed during my months spent here.

I am very grateful and indebted to... Professor Merlingen for filling in the theoretical gaps where most needed... Professor Papkova for being empathetic and considerate when most needed... Professor Nagy for teaching me how to read between the lines and question the law...Professor Kalb for presenting a different perspective on social issues... Professor Roe for providing guidance when most needed, for answering all the questions always with a smile regardless of when and how they were raised, and finally, special thanks for supporting this venture.

Also, in the warmest manner possible, I would like to mention my three really good friends who if they read this, will recognize themselves and who should know that I care for them a lot and that I appreciated all the good vibes and the fun, the panic and the stress, the long talks and the impetuous debates, that were usually caused by one of us but in a way perceived by all.

Special consideration to my friends and family at home, particularly my sister and my mom who have more faith in me than I do.

Coffee, very much appreciated 😊
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Q'aeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual (Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24)</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIG</td>
<td>Iraqi Interim Government</td>
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<td>ITG</td>
<td>Iraqi Transitional Government</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WOT</td>
<td>War on Terror</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most interesting, most studied and most contested notions is power. The classical theory relegates power to the sphere of states which means that power derives from one channel, the sovereign, and is usually exercised in a top-down manner on the subjects inhabiting its territories. However, this theory was contested by Michel Foucault. Although not writing from an IR perspective, Michel Foucault nevertheless penetrated the field with his accounts on modern form of power and modern form of politics. Power happens\(^1\), power functions\(^2\) and circulates\(^3\), power is a relation that entails resistance but which does not divide between those who have it and those who do not\(^4\). Another important contribution was his claim that modern politics encourage a form of power which is essentially positive, which administers life and encourages its development\(^5\) however in pursuing regularization and development, this power is also equipped to assail life. This new form of power appeared along with modern politics which he calls biopolitics.

By defining politics as biopolitics and contesting the traditional way of seeing power, Foucault has created a favorable terrain for questioning and redefining complex issues such as security and war, population and development, forms of life and forms of resistance. He thus opened the terrain to scrutinize wars waged by liberal states in relation to their perpetual quest for security and stability. Foucault’s ideas became particularly relevant and explanatory in the

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
post-Cold War era, when order and politics suffered profound transformations. Numerous scholars drew upon and elaborated on his ideas producing systems of analysis that became relevant for explaining the ever increasing and fragmented world.

The IR subfield in which Foucault’s accounts on power and biopolitics is most relevant is that of peace and war, particularly new forms of war such as the ‘war on terror.’ One of the most discussed issues within biopolitical literature is the invasion of Iraq, the works of Julian Reid⁷ or Michael Dillon⁸ being a case in point. Both authors argue that the invasion should be analyzed and understood in a biopolitical frame, since it is interplay between the sovereign power and the biopower that shaped the decision to wage a war on Iraq. They propose understanding this war as a necessary consequence of the ‘liberal way of rule’⁹ however what they do not address in their work is the effects of the invasion. How should one understand the success of the invasion but not analyze the failure of the occupation?

The US had a well defined agenda in what concerned the invasion, and regardless of the multiple and changing justifications for waging the war, the assumption was that it will be short and Iraq will change rapidly into a fully-functional democracy, a liberal state integrated and connected with all the other liberal states. However, this was not the case. Instead, the US was dragged into a conflict that was impossible to contain. The subsequent years are best described by a constant struggle of the US forces to contain the ever deteriorating situation. What was at stake was the Iraqi population, since they were the ones deciding whether the regime is

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⁹ Ibid.
legitimate or not. But the population was the target of the insurgents as well. The main struggle was therefore between insurgents and the Coalition forces, the objective being the Iraqi population. Such an exposure of forces, relations of power and resistance should not be left unexplored. When analyzing the facts, the Iraqi population emerges as central, to both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Both sides employed a number of methods to influence and/or control the people, among which the most puzzling one is the “hearts and minds” informing the American counterinsurgency.

In this paper I propose analyzing this strategy through a Foucauldian lens for two reasons. First, it is a strategy that requires engaging techniques belonging to two types of power, a power that kills life and a power that protects life. In this sense, the paper is interested in finding out whether sovereign power cooperates with biopower and if the two can be balanced. Second, it is interested in exploring the elements related to this strategic concept, insurgency in relation to insecurity and population in relation to development, and thus find out how these elements react when there is an incompatibility between the two forms of power.

The question that this research raises then is the following: what does “hearts and minds” as an expression of the security-development nexus found in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine reveal about the relations of power and resistance in Iraq after 2003?

To properly address the issue of reconstruction in Iraq in the context of the ongoing conflict the paper will rely on the arguments of Marc Duffield, who in his work discusses the existence of a security-development nexus which ultimately can lead to war.¹⁰ However, he does

not address the issue of reconstruction in Iraq, nor the specificities of the military strategies employed there and it is by answering this gap that the present paper attempts a modest contribution.

Exploring this issue will ultimately provide a broader understanding of the behavior of both states and non-state actors, rationales informing decisions, strategic thinking and policy making. The Foucauldian approach is particularly useful when dealing with apparent contemporary paradoxes such as wanting to help but doing harm, promoting development and reconstruction but increasing military forces and nurture violence instead, and finally, fighting for the hearts and minds of people when initially these people were seen as unimportant and even disposable in the political sphere.

The paper seeks to explore the above mentioned issues throughout three chapters. The first chapter advances the idea that politics today is biopolitics and thus any political action, including conflicts, should be reconceived accordingly. This theoretical perspective is provided by examining Foucault’s key concepts, which then are scrutinized in the second part of the chapter, when engaging with the work of IR scholars whose world views were shaped by Foucault. The aim of the chapter is to provide the tools with which to grasp complex forms of power, including resistance, in the context of post-war reconstruction. The second chapter puts theory aside and presents the situation in Iraq, from the perspective of the population, which becomes the linkage point between technologies of power and resistance. “Hearts and minds” as the main strategy defining American counterinsurgency, will be questioned in the context of the war-torn Iraq. This chapter identifies the events that led to the paradoxical situation of seeking stability through security and development, however at points failing on both. Finally, the third chapter brings together theory and empirics and conceptualizes “hearts and minds” as the
expression of the security-development nexus, showing that if either security or development is not properly addressed then winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population can not fully succeed, which in the end explains why Iraq was undergoing a serious crisis for more than three years following the invasion.

This research is a qualitative one and does not claim to come out in the end with definite answers and this is for two reasons. First it is driven by a broad question (power relations in Iraq) which can not be fully treated in a paper of such short length and second, the nature of the subsuming question is exploratory and interpretive. However, knowing these limitations what this paper does is to provide a theoretical frame that is befitting for grasping such complex relations (numerous power centers and resistance among civilians, insurgents and armed forces) and focuses on explaining a particular strategy that seems to drive the ongoing conflict in Iraq.

Within the postructuralist frame, having in mind the multitude of perspectives and connections that can be done, what remains to be done is to try to best understand a particular situation, even if ultimately that means asking more questions.
CHAPTER 1 – A WORLD VIEW

“Those that like this sort of thing will find this the sort of thing they like – those who do not, will not.”"\(^{11}\)

Playful and vaguely sarcastic, this quote is used by Jarvis to describe the way one relates to poststructuralist theories. He seems to suggest that it is just a matter of choice when affiliating with this perspective. However, it is more than just affinity when one assumes a poststructuralist stance. Those who embrace such a perspective do so because, through poststructuralist theories, they attain explanations that make sense of the insecure, ever changing and fragmented world. It is an alternative reading of the modern (post-modern) world, one that reacts to contradictions and tries to decipher them instead of suppressing or veiling their existence. Clear cut answers and solutions are not what poststructuralists are after. Instead, their inquiry is for the sake of obtaining better explanations. They try to grasp the changes and they seek to make connections between parts and in the end they aspire to present the image of what is actually happening.

Within what has became known as ‘poststructuralism’ there are several strands, well summarized by Jennifer Edkins in her book Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. Edkins places deconstructivism, post-colonialism, feminism, the psychoanalytical approach and the Foucauldian approach in the sphere of critical theories and she shows how they all converge when rethinking the ‘political’.\(^{12}\) By questioning ‘politics’ and the ‘political’, these theories have found their way in the field of IR. The strand that has received

\(^{11}\) Chris Brown, preface to *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*, by D. S. L. Jarvis (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), IX.

\(^{12}\) Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In* (CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1999), 1.
the maximum attention among IR scholars is the one originating in Michel Foucault’s political thinking and, although difficult to place his ideas in one theoretical frame, he is generally known for conceptualizing power, introducing the notion of ‘governmentality’ and describing modern politics as ‘biopolitical’. Despite the increasing interest in the applicability of his ideas and the thriving literature in this particular direction, poststructuralism in general and biopolitics in particular, are still controversial and marginal for most of IR scholars. This paper seeks to show that applying these ideas is useful in answering questions such as the one raised by this research.

In this respect, the section has two objectives. First, drawing closely on Foucault’s work the relevant concepts will be mapped out providing thus the theoretical basis for the paper. The second is to engage with the work of several scholars which translated and showed the applicability of Foucault’s ideas in the field of IR.

1.1 How does Foucault help?

“*What I’ve written is never prescriptive either for me or for others – at most it’s instrumental and tentative.*”\(^{14}\)

As this quote suggest, Foucault can not and should not be labeled. His writing erupted in several directions, within and against numerous theoretical frames. The term poststructuralist is used for the sake of orienting the reader within the IR theories, where Foucault is perceived as a


\(^{14}\) Ibid.
poststructuralist. But, he is not a theoretician and he has not claimed to have had developed theories\textsuperscript{15}, methodologies or fixed systems of thinking. In this light, his thoughts on power, particularly war and politics should not be seen as a theory, for they are not. However, his work is particularly relevant for IR scholars in that he successfully conceptualized modern politics and modern power, provided a tool which if used, has analytical force in understanding changes and relations of power and resistance.

This thesis is interested in using and elaborating on two of Michel Foucault’s central themes: governmentality and power. This means engaging with types of power, practices and relations of power, resistance, and finally modern politics as biopolitics; all revelatory for understanding contemporary linkages between politics, war and security.

The above mentioned notions will be tracked in the Lectures at the College de France, all relevant for tracking down the changes that allow us to define Western liberal societies today as being biopolitical in the light of their governmentalization. Second, a number of articles compiled in the volume Power will serve to conceptualize and understand modern power and governmentality. And finally, where further clarifications are needed, interviews or compendiums will be used.

Foucault describes his endeavors to understand ‘the governing’ as a “historical analysis (...) of the art of government”\textsuperscript{16} and shows how the idea of ‘governing’ (not simply ruling) first appeared in the 16th century. In a very simplified manner, the historical developments that Foucault has identified can be schematized in the following way: the state of justice (16th century, ‘reason of state’ and rational principles) is transformed into an administrative state in the 18th century leading thus to a society of regulation and disciplines (police, schools, hospitals, hospitals,

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15} Foucault, Security, 1 where he mentions that he “put[s] forward a few proposals that should be understood as indication of choice or statements of intent, not as principles, rules or theorems.”}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{16} Foucault, Power, 324.}
census, mortality, birth rate, correction of deviant behaviors), which then develops into a state of
government, where new techniques, technologies of power and regulatory mechanisms are
required in order to properly administer life (technologization, medicalization, development,
apparatuses of security, controlling risk and threats).\textsuperscript{17} This last stage is where we find ourselves
today. It is a very elusive reality because it incorporates all the previous models but with extra
additions – new structures, new mechanisms and new techniques. In Foucauldian language this
means that today’s politics is biopolitics and that governmentality has replaced the former ways
of administering the population of a State. In other words, territorialities, resources and
boundaries have lost their traditional significance. Today they are reconceived according to the
life of the population, the accepted way of living, and the new types of danger, both national (i.e.
drug trafficking, human trafficking, employment, health, insurance) and global (terrorism,
poverty, environment).

Each system has viewed political power in terms of “seizure”\textsuperscript{18}, however, along with the
fundamental changes of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the nature of power has changed as well. The
contemporary world, especially the ‘Western’ world, exhibits a power that appears and manifests
differently; a power which is also apprehended differently. Oversimplifying the matter, the
power over death was incorporated by the life-administering power and then gradually
transformed into a power that today administers, optimizes and multiples life.\textsuperscript{19} It does so
through various channels, because today’s power is not centralized anymore. It appears both in
the state apparatuses as well as in the non-governmental sector (NGOs, education, informal
economy).

\textsuperscript{17} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 212-219.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
In order to ‘grasp’ power, Foucault claimed that one has to first understand how power happens\(^\text{20}\) and secondly, acknowledge that societies do not deal with a single form of power. Indeed, power comes in various forms, differs in intensity and sets several objectives which produce various effects, ranging from positive ones to extremely negative ones. This happens because power “functions”\(^\text{21}\) and “circulates”\(^\text{22}\) and even though, at times, it can dominate, ultimately it is not about domination: “Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power.”\(^\text{23}\) Power is about relations and therefore it necessarily involves “the other(s)”.

This assessment of power and politics challenges the relatively enduring idea that the political power is located in one center, that it is possessed and dominates. Confronting this traditional view of understanding power described as “right [of the sovereign] to take life or let live”\(^\text{24}\), Foucault starts a debate with significant consequences. When the state began to administer the life of its population (health, wealth, longevity)\(^\text{25}\) the classical theory of sovereignty was questioned. The latter had to limit itself and adjust to the new realities if it wanted to survive. By allowing disciplinary power and biopower\(^\text{26}\) (developed on the basis of disciplinary power) to emerge, the sovereignty became responsible for the population it managed and it became in its own interest to improve this collective form of life. In order to perform these functions the sovereign had to use a certain type of power which was by now biopower. But as mentioned previously, biopower does not replace the classical political power. The sovereign

\(^{20}\) Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 103.
\(^{21}\) Foucault, *Society*, 29.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
\(^{23}\) See Ibid. for further explanations.
\(^{24}\) Foucault, *The Reader*, 259.
\(^{25}\) See Foucault, *Security*, 70.
\(^{26}\) Foucault, *Security*, 1: “set of mechanisms though which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power.”
power which generally speaking retains the ‘right to kill’\textsuperscript{27} was complemented with the right of “making live and letting die”\textsuperscript{28}. The two compete and complement each other: sovereignty over death vs. regularization of life\textsuperscript{29}. This latter form of power (biopower) intervenes at the level of generality and seeks to establish equilibrium within the society by organizing and normalizing it.\textsuperscript{30} Modernity introduces then a power that values human life, a power that cares, protects and constructs around life, on life and for life; a power that is used to harbor, produce and regulate life. The implication of these findings is that modern politics has to operate now through a new type of power that is dispersed between both state authorities and non-state authorities. It is a power that is both positive and negative, it contains the sovereign power, disciplinary power and the biopower and therefore it harbors life and kills it in the same time.

This being said, we have to understand ‘life’ and population, the causes of these changes for they “unblocked the art of governmentality.”\textsuperscript{31} By acknowledging the fact that the population has its own dynamic (interacts, moves, communicates and resists) the sovereign, seen as the State in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, was ‘forced’ to take into account several processes and thus limit its power. The population was no longer “a collection of subjects of right”\textsuperscript{32} who had to blindly obey the sovereign’s will. This development produced significant changes in the relation in the sense that the sovereign was no longer concerned with how to say no to its subjects but rather how to say yes to desires.\textsuperscript{33} This move was possible only in the light of the events of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century - freedom, liberalism, capitalism.\textsuperscript{34} Foucault argues that the art of government emerged

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Foucault, \textit{Society}, 240.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid. 247.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Foucault, \textit{Security}, 249.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., \textit{104}.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 70.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 73.
\item \textsuperscript{34} See Ibid., 48: “The game of liberalism - not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their course (…) so that reality develops.”
\end{itemize}
only when the population was problematized\textsuperscript{35} by the sovereign power. It is only when the population became the object of the sovereignty, hence politicized, that governing was truly possible for the first time. To actually govern a state, Foucault argues, means more than exercising the right of a sovereign. Governmentality\textsuperscript{36}, understood as “techniques and procedures for directing human behavior”\textsuperscript{37} had to encompass sovereignty and manage effectively the population. Governmentality, necessarily linked to the population constitutes thus the biopolitical system.

What all of the above show is that politics nowadays is indeed different, irrespective of the name given to it. Foucault sees it appropriate to call this type of politics centered on life biopolitics and defines it as a form of politics which comprises both classical ‘sovereign power’ (seizing, holding and exercising power, boundaries, homeland security) and ‘biopower’ (productive, managing, developing, constructing and reconstructing, educating), powers that interplay in a very visible manner in most of western societies in the form of ‘governmentality.’

However, governing properly requires new techniques, technologies of power and regulatory mechanisms, such as: the deployment of apparatuses of security, race, and governmentality. Security, within the frame of biopolitics, seeks to organize, normalize and develop the society, by eliminating any kind of threats, uncertainties and arbitrary elements\textsuperscript{38} while governmentality\textsuperscript{39}, distinct from sovereignty, seeks to preserve the state but mostly looks for the “preservation of the relation of forces”\textsuperscript{40} inside its realm. Racism\textsuperscript{41} is the basic

\textsuperscript{35} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 215.
\textsuperscript{36} See more about the history of governmentality in Ibid., 219-220. Also see Foucault, \textit{Security}, 76: “government is basically much more than sovereignty, much more than reigning or ruling (…) absolutely linked to the population.”
\textsuperscript{38} Foucault, \textit{Security}, 44.
\textsuperscript{40} Foucault, \textit{Security}, 296.
mechanism of power because it serves as a legitimizer for certain actions that governmentality might undertake in order to preserve life, including ‘killing’. What this means exactly, is that governmentality presents a type of power that is prepared to transform or eliminate every disruptive element that could threaten and endanger the existing order. Some forms of life need correction but if they resist correction, they must be annihilated. This form of politics therefore, reserves the right to draw the line between who is worthy of living and who is not, who needs to be sacrificed in order for the whole, not just to live, but live well.”

More precisely, race refers here to the mechanism that allows the construction of the ‘others’ (i.e. the immigrants, the poor, the insurgents). At a global level, race means allowing constructions such as ‘rogue states’ or ‘failed states’ to become legitimate in the eyes of their makers. To sum up then, biopolitics is concerned with “control over relations between the human race, human beings (…) as species (…) as living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live.”

What happens to disruptive elements is another question that Foucault was concerned with. Resistance, also a central theme in his work and the last to address here, becomes relevant for this paper especially when dealing with a peculiar dynamic of forces such as the one exiting in Iraq. Power is about action and it is always relational: it is produced and produces and therefore it can not be seen without resistance, without “the other” refusing to submit, obey, acknowledge and so on. Although Foucault did not elaborated on the way resistance happens, one thing is clear: “those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system”.

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41 See Foucault, Society, 255: "It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population."
42 See Foucault, Security, 44 where he argues that biopolitics seek to organize, normalize and develop the society, by eliminating threats or uncertainties.
43 Foucault, Society, 245.
44 Foucault, Territory, 2.
45 Ibid., 44.
they are unmanageable they are no longer part of the population. When seeking to understand power relations, resistance has to be the starting point because it is the “chemical catalyst”\(^{46}\) that “bring[s] to light power relations [and] locate their position.”\(^{47}\) Nowadays, all types of resistance are present however the ones against subjectivity and submission prevail in front of the ones against domination or exploitation which were prevalent in 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) centuries.\(^{48}\)

To sum up so far, first life of the populations is central to politics today, at least in Western type politics; second, power cannot exist where there is no life form to influence or control (a life which correspondingly can refuse to be influenced or controlled); and third, by analyzing power relations within a society one can effectively analyze and therefore understand society\(^{49}\). Foucault offers the conceptual vocabulary and the adequate tools to address contemporary complexities such as multiple forms of power, web of power relations, resistance and liberal governance. However, one has to bear in mind that Foucault’s ideas are open to interpretation and further development, for what he wrote was exploratory without seeking to create theories. The next section will therefore treat the work of those who sought to further or his ideas and who by doing so brought Foucault’s ideas into the field of IR.

\(^{46}\) Foucault, *Power*, 329.  
\(^{47}\) Ibid.  
\(^{48}\) Ibid., 331.  
1.2 Beyond Foucault

“Foucault is fallible. Fallibility in a thinker makes you question what you are getting from a thinker (...) what you want from a thinker (...) A thinker, a fortiori Michel Foucault, is not there to tell you what to think. He is there to provoke you into thinking. Thinking which is both with and against the thinker.”

A number of IR scholars are acquainted with Foucault’s work and have discovered the relevance of Foucault's ideas in studying international relations (i.e. camps, prisoners, poverty, economical, cultural or political divisions, NGOs and humanitarian aid). When writing about, against or corroboratively with Foucault, they continued his work, filled in some gaps and developed theories and systems of analysis based on his philosophical and political thinking. In the end, this is the group of writers informing the poststructuralist approach in IR. This section will only sift through the extensive literature in order to narrow down the topic and get to what is relevant for this paper: war, war on terror (WOT), population, development and security. In the end, the literature review will point to insurgency in Iraq where such an approach should have been applied but has not yet been done.

The main contester and in the same time supporter of Foucault's work is Giorgio Agamben who in Homo Sacer accepts Foucault’s claim that politics has become biopolitics by taking life as a central element but disagrees that the state was gradually pushed aside by governmentality and that the sovereign power was gradually circumscribed by the biopower.

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51 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University: 1998), 12.
Despite overlapping on some aspects, it is the differences between the two that gave birth to most of the current literature on biopolitics. Among scholars who regard them as incompatible are Mika Ojakangas, Thomas Lemke, Andrew W. Neal and Michael Dillon, the latter having a relatively moderate position on Agamben’s inconsistency with Foucault. Dillon admits that Agamben is “betraying Foucauldian biopolitics” but sees no problem in such a move because “there is a value in it.” Agamben, by re-thinking biopolitics brings back the notion of power over death, allowing us therefore to understand how in order to “promote, protect, and invest life, it [biopolitics] must engage in a continuous assay of life.”

Following this path a number of scholars see them as compatible, among which Marc G. Doucet and Miguel De Larrinaga who identify a “dual existence of sovereign power and biopower” especially when discussing human security as the concept informing humanitarian interventions. They conclude that biopower has to ‘make live’, while sovereign power, through racism decides which category is suited for being subjected to “technologies of health and welfare” and consequently dispose of the unnecessary category. In a similar vein, Gergely Romsics and Erzsébet Strausz, though not mentioning Agamben in their piece, argue that sovereignty and governmentality interact, and they “combine with each other in various ways at

56 Ibid., 37.
57 Ibid., 43.
58 Ibid., 41.
60 De Larrinaga and Doucet, 519.
61 Ibid., 519.
62 Ibid., 520.
different sites and events of world politics\textsuperscript{63}; in others words this means that both types of power coexist, each with its specific pattern.

Following this direction, Foucault’s and Agamben’s work can certainly be placed in a constructive dialogue. In the end, if Agamben and Foucault are read differently, as Dillon recommended, then it is possible to see how Agamben’s “nomological reduction of life”\textsuperscript{64} complements “Foucault’s biologised life”\textsuperscript{65}, which in the end opens terrain for new discussions and further developments in modern political theory.

Putting aside the wide array of positions on how Foucault’s and Agamben’s philosophical foundations are or are not compatible, what matters for IR theories in general and postrstructuralist theories in particular, is to see how they become relevant for explaining particular events related to war, occupation, natural disasters or asymmetrical conflicts. In this respect, a number of scholars went beyond abstraction and developed concrete systems of analysis based on empirical studies. Contemporary problems such as poverty and famine\textsuperscript{66}, detention and institutionalized torture\textsuperscript{67}, migration, refugees and internally displaced people\textsuperscript{68},


\textsuperscript{64}Michael Dillon, “Cared To Death”: 45.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid.


camps\textsuperscript{69}, fear and traumas\textsuperscript{70}, media and perceptions\textsuperscript{71} or humanitarian intervention\textsuperscript{72} have all been subjected to biopolitical analyses. These endeavors show that a Foucauldian frame is indeed useful in shedding light on some of these issues. However, what is of interested here is to see how such frames were used in matters of war, security and development.

A considerable amount of work concerning WOT, with a particular focus on Iraq, comes from Michael Dillon and Julian Reid. In what concerns reconstruction and development in the (in)secure Iraq the key author is Mark Duffield.

Dillon wrote an impressive number of articles and books, in which he is addressing the issue of security and war in a biopolitically dominated world. The main argument that transpires in all his writings is that "peace becomes the extension of war through the discourse of security."\textsuperscript{73} He goes one step beyond Foucault and links war and peace, life and death, creating and killing in a consistent manner, arguing that biopolitics is waging war precisely because of the way it understands life\textsuperscript{74}. Dillon further explores the notion of 'race' by coupling it with fear and risk, and by doing so he articulates what was silent in Foucault's work: that making life is "always a lethal business"\textsuperscript{75} and that liberal peace is the extension of war only through security discourses, where security emerges from fear\textsuperscript{76} and it necessary involves 'race'.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{72} See Duffield, DeLarrinaga and Doucet.
\textsuperscript{73} Michael Dillon, Security, Race and War," in \textit{Foucault on Politics, Security and War}, 176.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 195.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{77} Dillon, “Security, Race and War”: 176.
In what concerns WOT, Dillon’s argument is that it emerged out of a “biopolitics of contingency in the west.”\(^{78}\) Essentially this means that the west finds itself in a situation where threats to the existing order can rise from any direction. While promoting democracy (a political system which assures a certain way of living freely) western liberal states have noticed the existence of different systems (theocratic or authoritarian) which were clearly not functioning according to Western prescriptions and Western rules. More so, they were resistant to transformations, regulation, and optimization. This contrast placed western liberal states in a situation of uncertainty which heightened their insecurity. Numerous terrorist attacks confirmed this predicament. In relation to global terrorism, as Dillon aptly describes the situation, modern liberal states have only the “certainty of [their] radical uncertainty.”\(^{79}\) The quest for security is thus deepened especially because security means not just eliminating existing threats, but also emerging and potential ones.\(^{80}\)

Considering the issue of national and human security in the U.S De Larrinaga and Doucet present a similar claim. They argue that national security is incorporated in a logic of security that now "has the globe as its referent for threats that ultimately remain irremediable."\(^{81}\) All of this seems to point out that indeed security was broadened but it happened according to the logic of biopolitics. Threats are coming from everywhere, they are directed to life as such, and require specific answers which are related to both the sovereign power and the biopower\(^{82}\). Terrorism for example was addressed by engaging techniques belonging to both these powers: pre-emptive

\(^{78}\) Dillon, “Governing Terror”: 8.

\(^{79}\) Ibid. 9.


\(^{81}\) De Larrinaga and Doucet, 524.

\(^{82}\) See Ibid., 518 – 519: where they explain that security becomes concerned not only with protecting the sovereign but also with the people at the individual level, societal level, national or global level.
intervention and post-conflict reconstruction; deciding to eliminate some forms of life on one hand and develop another form of life on the other hand.

All of this shows that security also involves transforming life for the sake of life itself. In a joint article with Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Dillon takes the matter further and questions these security practices, practices that followed the biopoliticisation of the modern regimes. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue, in a Foucauldian fashion, that biopolitics is inevitably linked with security, and therefore when biopolitics change (due to specific contingencies) so do security practices. By having life, and thus population as their referent object, new security practices emerged which did not cancel out the traditional ones, and which are concerned with surveillance, analysis, profiles, patterns and probabilities. All of this is possible only when the population is free to circulate, act and react, which also makes them a potential disruptive force and therefore a peril to the existing order. Such is the case in post-war Iraq. What seemed to be ‘marginal life’ becomes now increasingly important for the biopoliticised security. In practice, this means that the Iraqi population with their behavior, attitude and reactivity has become central in the war on terror not only for the insurgents but also for counterinsurgency strategies.

WOT is the newest form of war that the West is engaged with and its complexity and indefinite character should not be reduced to interpretations that favor sole sovereign centers, despite the fact that the sovereign power is in some cases of utmost importance. This notion has been advanced as early as 2005 when Reid called for a Foucauldian approach in order to understand the mechanisms of the war. He rejects the ‘return of the imperialism' thesis and argues that WOT should not be seen as a revival of the sovereign power. He further argues that

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84 Ibid., 267.
85 See Ibid. 286: “Marginal life seems no longer ‘marginal’ but, as with failed states, rogue states and terrorizing dissidents coursing through the capillary infrastructures of global society (...) marginal life emerges as central.”
only studying the complex relation between sovereign power and biopolitical power will make WOT in the end more comprehensible.

The biopolitics of the WOT has been addressed thoroughly by Reid and the central argument is that the liberal way of rule entails a liberal way of war or alternatively, that peace making today risks becoming a "kind of war machine." Undoubtedly, the effects of this are most visible in the conflict torn Iraq. Before even refining this argument together with Dillon in *Liberal Way of War* (2009), Reid has argued in *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror* (2006) that liberal modernity although shaped by the ideal of peace is in fact "defined in epochal terms not only by the recurrence of war, but by a gradual increase in military capacities among liberal societies for the violent destruction of human life." In addressing this paradox, he advanced the idea that liberal way of life requires accosting life that is inimical in order to make sure that a certain peaceful order prevails. WOT should be seen as the manifestation of such a practice.

The Iraqi case is referenced in most of the academic ventures concerning WOT in relation to modern form of politics, new practices of security and the changed nature of warfare. But if we understand the WOT, the mechanisms underpinning it or how certain technologies and techniques allowed it to happen, does this mean that we will immediately understand the current situation in Iraq? The answer would have to be no. Unfortunately, the literature concerned with the actual occupation and reconstruction is far less developed than in the case of invasion. However, one can find a good starting point in the explorations of Marc Duffield who seeks to understand the type and role of power present in humanitarianism, security and development in relation to both the sovereignty and the governmentality.

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87 Ibid., 107.
88 Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror*, 2.
89 Ibid., 6.
Humanitarianism, development and security are all linked together by and within the “hidden solidarity between governance and sovereignty” which blurs the line between humanitarian aid and military intervention, between reconstruction and conflict management, between socio-economical development for the civilians and the targeting of the rebels. This idea was articulated by Duffield as early as 2001, in his book *Global Governance and The New Wars* however not explicitly in biopolitical terms. There he sought to pinpoint the new relationship between conflict and development in terms other than imperialistic behaviors. He argued, same way as Reid does now, that an imperialist theory is limited in that it denies the possibility of seeing how the “nature of power and authority may have changed radically.” He points out that power is not limited to the sovereign rather it manifests in various ways through various actors, among which international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, military or commercial sectors. These complex relations of power developed in response to the newly articulated concerns of the liberal states, which is instability at their borders. Specifically, this means that ‘underdevelopment’ came to be seen dangerous in the context of the increased global interdependence. Once underdevelopment was defined as a threat, designing solutions was the next step: “resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way to avoid future wars.” Humanitarian intervention and aid relief, reconstruction and development programs became thus central activities in 21st century politics.

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90 Duffield, “Carry on Killing”: 16.
92 Ibid., 11.
93 See Ibid. 126: where he explains in detail how underdevelopment, poverty, criminality is linked to violence, conflicts and war.
94 Ibid., 34.
95 Ibid., 34.
Duffield further explains how liberal governance incorporated the notion of “liberal peace”\(^96\) which in its turn entails a “liberal war.”\(^97\) This argument holds up because in the quest for stability, and thus peace, liberal societies are ready to intervene in the life of other societies through various means - aid, structural adjustment, loans, debt relief, expertise -, and ultimately wage war if necessary.\(^98\)

In the end, what Duffield does is to highlight the intimate and mutually reinforcing relationship between security and development in the context of conflict and identify how this newly formed relationship shapes policies, aid relief, (I)NGO activities or military operations.

In a very recent article, Duffield reinforces these ideas and tries to understand the effects of this novel intersection which he calls “development-security nexus”\(^99\) by reconceiving them biopolitically. Duffield shows how in the 1990s aid was redefined as a strategic tool in conflict management and how, if properly used, it can “draw divided communities together, foster collective goals and strengthen those local interests that support peace.”\(^100\) He also highlights the fact that development is a “liberal technology of security”\(^101\) that is most visible nowadays in counterinsurgency.

The premise informing Duffield's more recent research is that the liberal world functions according to the logic of biopolitics, which inevitably incorporates certain logics of security directed toward the population. In this sense, wars have become more encompassing because states are now in pursuit of developing and administering life, not just simply protecting it.\(^102\) Duffield speaks here about a “new security terrain [which] is characterized by a radical

\(^{96}\) Ibid., 11.  
\(^{97}\) Ibid., 15.  
\(^{98}\) Ibid., 34.  
\(^{100}\) Ibid., 57.  
\(^{101}\) Ibid., 61.  
\(^{102}\) Duffield, “Carry on Killing”: 7.
interdependence and interpenetration in which even the most distant ‘pre-modern’ borderland unrest can have serious consequences for the homeland.”

In order to deal with such threats, new strategies were allowed to flourish among which pre-emptive wars, preventive wars and humanitarian interventions. This is the contemporary biopolitical twist which provides the argument for justifying interventions that disregard the principle of sovereignty, interventions that otherwise would be ‘unjust’ and ‘illegal’. The regime change in Iraq can be read this way, or in Duffield’s words as a “developmental act of governance.”

In addition to this, Duffield agrees with most poststructuralist scholars that power is not centralized and that in fact it is more of a “design (…) diffuse and inclusive” which is neither positive nor negative. Sovereign power manifest itself under ‘global governance’ through regimes of dispossession, annexation, colonization, privatization, commerce or central planning, all of which contribute to the redrawing of the global spheres of influence according to the liberal-democratic ideals. Biopower on the other hand is more contradictory because it seeks to limit the sovereign power but in the same time it is functioning within and sometimes in accordance with it – it fluctuates between protecting life as it is from the actions of the sovereign or develop it and therefore transforming it according to the sovereign’s will (i.e. funding NGOs).

However, despite touching upon the civil-military complex, what remains relatively unproblematized in Duffield’s work is how this new formed linkage (development-security)

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103 Ibid., 14.
104 Ibid., 16.
105 Ibid., 4.
106 Duffield adopts this term from Dillon and Reid, 5.
107 Ibid., 10.
108 Ibid., 11.
influences actual military strategies, particularly counterinsurgency techniques which are known to address both civilians and insurgents. Moreover, it became clear from the literature reviewed here, that when referring to Iraq (in the context of WOT) the focus is on the invasion and its immediate effects and less on the particular struggles, strategic changes and opposition to these changes.

This paper, adopting a Foucauldian approach and drawing closely on Reid’s and Dillon’s notion of ‘liberal way of war’, coupled with Duffield’s theory about development, will address this latter issue in a concrete manner. It will question the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy in Iraq in relation to both western form of counterinsurgency and Iraqi reaction to it.
CHAPTER 2 – A DISPUTED ARENA

“…and start doing what Americans do best – take history by the neck, wrestle it to the ground and begin to shape the future.”\footnote{Atwood in Duffield, \textit{Global Governance}, 128.}

So far, this paper has outlined the theoretical frame in which it will work. It presented the concepts and the theoretical perspective that will be used for grasping complex realities that exhibit multiple forms of power and networks of resistance, realities where changes are continuous and always with uncertain results. This section however wants to put theory aside and bring forward a reality of this sort – the Iraqi case.

war that is hard to contain. It is war-torn country where new conflicts emerge while former
ones are reignited.

On the top level we have the government, foreign advisors, and Iraqi forces trying to
manage the country and institute order. On the bottom level, we see the population struggling
with poverty that takes over. However, what influences the country the most is neither the
government nor the civilians but the permanent irregular war between insurgents and
counterinsurgents for the civilians. This war is located between the political and the social,
nevertheless connected with both. Insurgents and counterinsurgency forces, besides dealing with
one another are confronting a shattered Iraq and a confused population as well. Strategies are of
utmost importance here. “Hearts and minds” is a particular strategy that was put in place by U.S
COIN and it is relevant in this context because it marks a significant change in the Iraqi
operation theater.

The question would be then how to present such a situation and how to make sense of the
complex relations unfolding there. Answering this is a two-stage process best grasped through
historical analysis. This chapter deals with the first stage of it, the historical exploration. The
second stage of the historical analysis, which is the interpretive analysis, will come in the
following chapter where the nature of the events will be explored according to the established
Foucauldian frame. Historical analysis, as a method is especially useful if one wants to look at a
certain number of events which involve both single actors and group actors, state-actors and non-
state actors and peculiar dynamics for which no one or nothing can be held fully accountable.
This is precisely what this paper meets when looking at Iraq. Such events need to be connected

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and interpreted and this move can be done by employing a historical analysis. Following the narrative of both insurgents and counterinsurgents according to a criterion - in this case life (a way of living) - will in the end reveal a facet of the history that would not have been visible otherwise. Basically, a historical approach facilitates an analysis from various angles and finally, through interpretation, it allows bringing these directions together into one coherent image.

Cameron G. Thies offers useful guidelines on how to proceed with such an analysis. The historical analysis is based on historical documents, divided into primary and secondary sources. Here, the primary sources will be mostly used to establish the status quo. It is what Thies considers to be the basic information.\(^{115}\) They will create “statements that are relatively free of interpretation, hence they are accorded a relatively high level of consensus on the part of scholars”\(^{116}\). The months of siege, the effects and the changes in COIN doctrine (‘the manifest events’\(^{117}\)) will be described in constant reference to these sources. As for the changes in the COIN practice and the dynamics of insurgency, the paper will rely on both primary sources (official documents, political documents, reports) and secondary sources which will guide the interpretative process (non-official documents, newspapers, think thanks).

In moving forward, this initial stage of the investigation will be done in three steps. First, it will briefly describe the invasion of Iraq, the initial reactions to it and its long-lasting effects. Second, it will provide a short overview on what counterinsurgency is, with a special emphasis on American counterinsurgency\(^{118}\) and how strategies developed. Third, it will describe the

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\(^{116}\) Ibid., 353.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.

\(^{118}\) When addressing the Institute for Public Policy Research in January 2009, Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt stated: "We have always been part of a Coalition and have conducted our operations under the leadership of the Americans, and for the benefit of the Iraqi people." The UK COIN and US COIN are at points different but a differentiated analysis falls out of the scope of this paper. Because the UK COIN is coordinated by
development of US COIN in Iraq and discuss the military and social implications of the existing strategies, among them “hearts and minds.”

2.1 Iraq - An Overview

“The tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.”

Iraq has had a particularly troubled position in the international arena since the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 when United Nation Security council imposed financial and trade restrictions. These restrictions cumulated with the effects of the Saddam regime and the Gulf War, have weakened the country tremendously. Due to international interventions the next ten years showed some signs of relief, however they did not last because a U.S led coalition invaded Iraq again in 2003 allegedly for the existence of WMD. This move has thrown Iraq into chaos by deepening the already existing problems. It destroyed the infrastructure, created a power vacuum, opened up the space for ethnic and tribal confrontations, caused displacement and aggravated poverty, and finally damaged almost irreversibly the already shaken population.

Debates concerning the future of Iraq were already in progress long before the terrorist attacks. The only constrain for US and Britain, states that were favoring aggressive policies,
was the lack of the legal basis to start such an operation. The UN Charter,\(^{122}\) justifies force in only two circumstances, and neither were present at that moment: there was no actual or imminent armed attack coming from Iraq nor did the Security Council authorized the use of force in the name of international peace and security. This was a well planned pre-emptive war and not a response: “We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later (...) on the streets of our cities.”\(^ {123}\)

Initially, the justification resided in WMD. Later on, when the evidence of WMD was disputed\(^ {124}\), the discourse has shifted to 'regime change'.\(^ {125}\)

But regardless of the reasons, the invasion took place, WMD were not found and the regime was changed, however not yet into a democracy\(^ {126}\). And all of this at an incredible cost. Due to the controversy surrounding the invasion, and the almost complete collapse of Iraq\(^ {127}\), the US came out worse than ever before: the anti-American feelings increased and so did the terrorist attacks and the intensity of insurgency.\(^ {128}\) The international support and public support has suddenly diminished. While international money was flowing into the country\(^ {129}\) the security was almost non-existent and living conditions were worsening for locals, military troops and aid


\(^{127}\) More in the Senlis Council, 36.


\(^{129}\) See for example Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).
workers. Humanitarian work was limited and population was suffering due to forced displacement and generalized violence.

Presumably all of this happens in the early stage of an invasion however it is not supposed to last. The U.S administration thought that removing Saddam will pave the way for democracy while the local population will fully support such an act. But the US Government and US Army overlooked a number of important issues, such as the history of the country, the character of the people, the already precarious economy and the latent forces striving for political visibility. Moreover, they did not formulate coherent plans for the reconstruction phase before the invasion. In addition to these shortages in strategy, fundamental mistakes were done in the subsequent processes. Therefore instead of successfully building a democracy, the Coalition found itself trapped into a conflict zone with a very scattered and suspicious population.

First, overly securing the ‘Green Zone’ was such a mistake. Performing humiliating body search and identity check at its entrance, preventing thus the free movement of Iraqis, has fueled anger and bitterness. Second, during these years of struggle for finding a direction, the population had little to do with the reconstruction of their own cities. The shock of the invasion, the following repressive policies and the harsh economical changes, made the Iraqi people “awed spectators.” The rapid privatization deeply affected Iraqis who could not compete with the powerful foreign investors. Most of the economy was in American hands while corporations (i.e. UNHCR, Global Report 2004 – Iraq, 327.

Ibid., 326.

The American Military Center, the International Zone. The area was always delimited by razor wire, fences and numerous checkpoints, which prevent foreigners to enter the area. More at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/baghdad-green-zone.htm (accessed December 5, 2010).


Demos, 14-15.

Halliburton, Blackwater) were creating the rules of the game.\textsuperscript{136} Finally, the funds destined for reconstruction were usually mismanaged – one example being the construction of the biggest U.S embassy in the world in the midst of a shattered city.\textsuperscript{137}

The invasion did not produce the changes that the American government was expecting. Broadly speaking, the invasion was successful (the “shock & awe” military scheme) but the occupation was not. Reconstruction has failed.\textsuperscript{138} Seven years have passed and the world is still struggling to contain the easily explosive situation in Iraq. One such struggle is that against the insurgents. In the early stages of the occupation, when the Coalition was focusing on its own security, the people in Baghdad were facing urban warfare on their own. Insurgents, terrorists, former military cadres, and furious citizens were one extreme while on the other side one could identify the poor, the hopeless, the widows and the orphans - the ‘collateral damage’. The position of the latter category however is still undecided, and they are the focal point for both insurgents and counterinsurgents, they are the central theme in both democratic practices and subversive acts.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 344-352 ; Chomsky, 56-57.
\textsuperscript{138} This is not to say that positive trends do not exist or that humanitarian and development projects are all a failure.
2.2 “Search and Destroy”\textsuperscript{139} or “Hearts and Minds”? \textsuperscript{140}

“If you can control people by force, it’s not so important to control what they think and feel. But if you lose the capacity to control people by force, it becomes necessary to control attitudes and opinions.”\textsuperscript{141}

The purpose of this section is to show what role COIN has in asymmetrical conflicts, why do COIN operations end up being of utmost importance nowadays and indicate why operations sometimes fail despite facing weaker 'enemies'. This chapter will therefore proceed in analyzing counterinsurgency and insurgency on three levels. First, an account on what insurgents and counterinsurgents do - theirs aims and predominant tactics. Second, a brief history of US COIN and developments, since it is relevant to trace the changes and the events informing the current strategies (i.e. "hearts and minds"). Third, identifying US view on counterinsurgency operations nowadays.

To begin with, counterinsurgency is part of a very complex form of modern warfare that departs from the rules of conventional warfare. It does so mainly because it is a form of action that seeks to address insurgents, which usually have no access to technology or proper infrastructure, lack military capability and therefore adopt unconventional methods which are hard to predict or control. These two sides form one type of conflict which is very irregular and unbalanced – in military terms, an asymmetrical conflict. According to the latest Field Manual (FM) published by the US Army, insurgency is "an organized, protracted politico-military

\textsuperscript{139} A military strategy used in the Vietnam War which involved searching, finding and eliminating the enemy, followed by the immediate withdrawal of the forces.

\textsuperscript{140} The slogan for the campaign designed to win the support of the Vietnamese people.

\textsuperscript{141} Chomsky, 22.
struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control”\textsuperscript{142} whereas counterinsurgency is “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”\textsuperscript{143} What differentiates this internal war from a conventional one is, as David Galula noted, the fact that it is always the insurgent who initiates such a move. Counterinsurgency is always just a response, an "effect."\textsuperscript{144}

Galula was a French officer and scholar who provided one of the first systematic analyses of irregular and asymmetrical wars, and whose work now largely informs the official documents released on counterinsurgency. He is notable for identifying the population as the key element in this type of conflicts\textsuperscript{145}. Insurgents seek to eliminate the authorities by creating insecurity that in the end will delegitimize the latter in the eyes of the population. In this sense, insurgents are disruptive in order to turn people against the government - a government that is considered responsible for the security of its people. Counterinsurgents on the other side seek to contain them and maintain the order, but in the same time are preoccupied with not 'losing' but 'winning' over the population.

This idea is reflected also in the FM where one of the key objectives of COIN is to gain the support of the host nation’s (HN) population.\textsuperscript{146} This goes contrary to conventional military operations where the target is never the population. This means that a COIN operation can be successful simply by winning over the population, making the environment secure and thus diminish the potential spread of the insurgents, without even being necessary to engage in

\textsuperscript{142} FM, 1-1.
\textsuperscript{143} FM, 1-1.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{146} FM, 8-2.
combat with the insurgents. However, in practice this is not so easy. Security is hard to obtain in a conflict area and if HN forces fail to provide it, the population might "seek security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups." One of the main tasks of the COIN is therefore to execute offensive and defensive operations as well as stability operations, the latter including: civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic and infrastructure development.

COIN is therefore acting on two fronts. It has to understand the masses and address their needs and simultaneously fight the 'enemies' and understand their motivations. This is now the guiding principle of US counterinsurgency, at least at a declaratory level, and it has always been the case since COIN emerged as a defined practice in the aftermath of World War II (WWII). Back in the 60s when the US was involved in the Vietnam War the same fundamental principle was articulated in their COIN doctrine, especially by adopting and further developing the “hearts and minds” strategy” This change in doctrine was the consequence of US previous experience and Britain’s performance in Malayan insurgency.

“Hearts and minds” was frequently misunderstood among politicians and theoreticians, despite the fact that the army defined it always in the most pragmatic terms: “‘Hearts’ means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless (...) Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.” In one paper released recently by RAND - key center for formulating discourse in the US - Austin Lang performs a thorough investigation of what “hearts and minds” actually meant since its inception. He comes up with a similar

147 FM, 3-11.
148 FM, 1-19.
149 The US forces were relatively successful when combining small-scale military operations with civilian-oriented programs in the Philippine-American War or Germany, Japan after WWII.
conclusion. For the US army it means: “Reform and good governance combined with judicious police and military action (...) Close coordination between military, police, and civil authority [as] a prerequisite for success.”\textsuperscript{151} Basically, this means defining and maintaining order, administering the population while striving to get rid of the perturbing elements. This requires legitimacy, and this is in the end what “hearts and minds” refers to.

Despite acknowledging the positive effects of developmental practices and civilian-oriented operations instead of large-scale military operations, the US actions in the field rarely matched the doctrine.\textsuperscript{152} Both in Vietnam and later on in Afghanistan this was the case. Winning the “hearts and minds” of the people failed to a great extent in both these cases precisely because COIN operations did not function according to the “hearts and minds” strategy but rather conventional military action. Most of the problems with COIN arise from the fact that their operations function according to iterative solutions, since they can’t establish goals beforehand\textsuperscript{153} which means that slipping into conventional fighting is very likely. More so, insurgents have the advantage of developing at a faster pace than the forces countering them due to their mobility, anonymity, knowledge of the geographical area and understanding of the cultural background, whereas COIN remains institutionalized and has to be aware of the existing legal frame and humanitarian percepts. In this sense, COIN has to keep up and acknowledge the fact that their field requires constant adapting and constant learning. It is a “dynamic relationship”\textsuperscript{154} which requires a quick analysis and constant changes according to the moves of the insurgents.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} Long, 6.
\textsuperscript{153} FM, 4-7.
\textsuperscript{154} FM, 3-25.
\textsuperscript{155} FM, 3-25.
However this is a reality recorded only recently\textsuperscript{156} in the doctrine. It is only the latest manual, published in 2006, after having the Iraqi experience, that sees COIN as functioning according to a “learn and adapt” imperative and admits that guidelines can and should be provided but not final schemes and definite military stratagems.\textsuperscript{157}

Nowadays the American COIN is, at least at a declaratory level, "beyond pure combat."\textsuperscript{158} Social, political and economical developments seem to take precedence over direct combat and deployment of military forces. Security is thus redefined: it is not only about eliminating the threats, but also about preventing disruption and providing the right conditions for a certain way of living well. However, this is not what happened with the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), despite the fact that a “hearts and minds” campaign was set in place even before the invasion took place. The first stage was mainly conventional and only after prolonged conflicts and ambiguous results did the US Army started thoroughly question the role of the Iraqi people, their social and cultural background and accordingly (re)design a different approach.

To sum up then, COIN becomes of utmost relevance in war-torn areas where there is a power vacuum and several factions strive to gain control while the foreign or local forces struggle to maintain the newly-formed and fragile order. One side contests it while the other defends it, all from the perspective of its legitimacy. People become important for legitimizing or contesting the provisional government, and they will do one or another based on a combination of socio-economical factors. COIN operations are therefore bridging politics, people and security.

\textsuperscript{156} The outbreak of insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq stirred the interest of US officials, military staff and scholars in insurgency and counterinsurgency.
\textsuperscript{157} FM, 1-21 to 1-27.
\textsuperscript{158} FM, 1-19.
2.3 “Angry Hearts and Angry Minds”

“...but the campaign has become too complicated to understand. There are too many perspectives, too many actors, and too many front lines (...).”\textsuperscript{159}

Once the invasion took place, the US became responsible for managing the country. The US forces were supposed to provide security, governance and foster development. However, for a long time, two components were mismanaged. Security was hard to secure in most of the areas, and for most Iraqis it was missing entirely.\textsuperscript{160} Development, on the other hand, was ignored in the months following the invasion and placed second to everything else in the next years.\textsuperscript{161} This situation opened up the terrain for resistance, terrorism and insurgency which in the end called for the primacy of COIN.\textsuperscript{162}

Establishing a relation between the population, the insurgents and the HN forces\textsuperscript{163} is almost an impossible task because of the numerous political factions, divisions between ethnic and religious communities, and increased sectarianism. However, at a general level it is possible to operate with three main categories: the population, seen as neutral or “fence-sitters”\textsuperscript{164}, the resistance, in the form of insurgents, dissatisfied people, terrorists (AQI), criminals, armed groups and extreme political and religious factions, and finally the COIN forces, composed of members of the Coalition and in some areas incorporating Iraqi militias as well.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[159] Mackinlay, 1.
\item[160] Diamond, 288.
\item[161] Diamond, 289.
\item[163] HN forces refers to any of the forms of government: provisional (CPA), interim (IIG), transitional (ITG), current federal government of Iraq, COIN operations, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
\item[164] FM, 4-7.
\end{footnotes}
The insurgency in Iraq is seen by the US Army as a new form of revolutionary movement that went national and transnational, AQI being representative. Instead of being simply conspirational, military-based, urban or identity-focused, the insurgents in Iraq have a composite approach which means that they use “different approaches at different times.” Moreover, the motivation is not always political and their causes may change.

Besides the insurgents, parts of resistance are also the Iraqis who engage in criminal activities (drug and human trafficking, kidnapping), subversive groups supporting the former regime, or people who are simply discontented and decide to act on their own. These former categories are not always linked to an organization, however they are an excellent tool for the insurgents whose main objective besides discrediting the government is to recruit more people and thus increase their capacities. People are the insurgent's main resource.

COIN on the other side is rather transparent, however their role is fairly more complicated because they have to be ready “both to fight and to build” depending on the existing situation. The nature of COIN is reactive when dealing with insurgents and integrative when dealing with civilians. COIN's main task is to address "all aspects of the local populace's concern" and prevent them from becoming part of the insurgency. This requires bringing together a number of players and coordinate their roles in the best manner possible so as to provide security, diminish poverty, create jobs, build infrastructure and houses, provide relief and chances for a better life. US military forces, multinational forces, US and other

165 FM, 1-1.
166 FM, 1-5 to 1-8.
167 UNHCR, Country of origin information - Iraq, 16.
168 FM, 1-19.
169 FM, 2-2
government's agencies, (I)NGOs, multinational corporations and contractors, and finally HN civil and military authorities\textsuperscript{170} are the main COIN participants identified by the FM.

As for the people, those who have not taken sides yes (not actively, at least) they are confronting poverty and violence and experience “exclusion, trauma, and humiliation”\textsuperscript{171} which in the end makes them “powerless.”\textsuperscript{172} In addition, when the US entered Iraq, troops lacked knowledge about the Arab culture and Iraqi history, which led to a series of actions that were perceived as degrading, insensitive, disrespectful and in some cases very domineering (i.e. brutal arrests in public, looting not prevented, encouraged and in cases performed by soldiers, detention, etc). This has fueled the anti-American feeling\textsuperscript{173}. Also, as Demos think thank argued, it caused trauma that generated hostility\textsuperscript{174} against the foreign occupation and later on against the national government. In any case, depending on which side is held responsible, the population will lend its support to the other side because it is seen as an alternative. When seeking to contain the move towards insurgency, COIN has to address both socio-economic factors and psychological ones (i.e. frustration, anger), the latter being frequently forgotten. The new FM acknowledges that focusing “on the population, its needs and its security”\textsuperscript{175} constitutes a successful practice however for the first part of the occupation, the needs and security of the occupation forces were far more important than those of the civilians. This was conducive to further divisions, strengthened physical and psychological barriers and alienated the people more.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{170} FM, 2-4
\textsuperscript{171} Demos, 12
\textsuperscript{172} Demos, 12.
\textsuperscript{174} Demos, 15.
\textsuperscript{175} FM, 1-29.
\end{flushleft}
Until 2006 COIN has failed in numerous missions, organized resistance became more and more problematic and the climate was still one of acute insecurity. The initial assumption was that the war would be short\textsuperscript{176}, however, as Michael Gordon explains, this quick and violent strategy “helped foster the very quagmire that the Bush administration had hoped to avoid.”\textsuperscript{177} As the previous chapter showed, the notions of stability operations and the importance of the population, which are elements informing the “hearts and minds” strategy, were already present in the US COIN doctrine before invading Iraq. The RAND analysis of the US military manuals and handbooks confirms this\textsuperscript{178}. However, despite the existing doctrine and the experience gained in Afghanistan, the US forces conducted a conventional assault in March 2003 and maintained a predominantly militarized approach as late as year 2006. In this period COIN operations were mixed, military at points (i.e. Fallujah) but pacifying at others (i.e. discussion in Al-Anbar). These uncoordinated actions, but mostly the prevalence of the militaristic approach, had significant consequences. First, they increased the number of subversive, terrorist and insurgent activities and second, they made the population more sympathetic towards the insurgents and more susceptible to recruitment.\textsuperscript{179} Such operations were for example Operation Kennesaw Dragon in November 2005 or Operation Swarmer near Samarra in 2006.\textsuperscript{180} In both cases conventional tactics were used and this made the operations disastrous in what concerned winning and loosing human terrain. Doctrinal COIN however produced positive results. For example, partnering with Iraqi security in Anbar was conducive to more security, build-up and population’s cooperation.

\textsuperscript{176} Six months according to Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.
\textsuperscript{177} Gordon, 71.
\textsuperscript{178} RAND, 20-23.
\textsuperscript{179} See Demos, 15-16 where they present the siege of Fallujah (April 2004) and show that between 25000-30000 people joined the resistance.
\textsuperscript{180} For details check Long, 23.
What remains to be quickly documented in this section is the construction that is central to the US COIN doctrine - “hearts and minds.” Despite the idea being supported by the COIN doctrine, the actions associated with winning “hearts and minds” were either missing in the first part of the occupation or poorly implemented. It is a similar situation with what Robert Komer, key pacifier in Vietnam, has pointed out in the 70s: “Equally striking is the sharp discontinuity between the mixed counterinsurgency strategy which U.S. and Government policy called for from the outset, and the overwhelmingly conventional and militarized nature of our actual response.”\textsuperscript{181}

Considering the differences between regions, the various religious and militia groups, the multifarious issues that permeate the social stratum, one should not place the blame entirely on the US COIN forces. However, if implemented with more consideration these operations would have obtained slightly better results.

After three years however, seeing that violence is not decreasing, the US COIN had to redesign and rethink its strategies for Iraq. This resulted in 2006 with a new FM which, according to RAND, is more nuanced and by far better than the previous ones. Several issues are problematized here, among which the role of the networks and the importance of integrating civilian and military activities\textsuperscript{182} along with gathering intelligence so as to understand the context, the people, their motives and causes.\textsuperscript{183} Several positive changes did occur in the Iraqi theater after 2007, and some of them are the consequence of the struggle to overlap doctrine and practice. This would be then the turning point, when the “hearts and minds” became indeed a phrase guiding the stabilizing process in Iraq.

\textsuperscript{181} Komer in Long, 27.
\textsuperscript{182} FM, chapter 2, 2-1 to 2-14.
\textsuperscript{183} FM, chapter 3, 2-1 to 2-35.
However, what still remains unanswered is why such a late change? Why precisely in 2007 and not earlier considering the practical experience gained in the past by the US COIN? What went wrong on the way to rebuild Iraq?\footnote{To pose the same question that Diamond asked when considering democracy building in Iraq.}
CHAPTER 3 – COUNTERINSURGENCY THROUGH A FOUCAULDIAN LENS

“...power relations are rooted in the whole network of the social.”

In the previous chapter I have dealt with historical facts seeking to explore the situation in Iraq in an objective manner. The invasions and the immediate years were briefly discussed while pointing out the present situation in Iraq which is defined to a great length by insurgency. Then the role of counterinsurgency was pointed out, with a particular emphasis on US COIN, its doctrine and practice, and finally it described in what manner US COIN and Iraqi resistance intersect. It is now time to proceed to the second stage of the analysis, which is to understand what informs present military strategies, particularly COIN techniques which are known to address both civilians and insurgents. In other words, explain why practice is not in accordance with doctrine, why and what caused changes in both doctrine and practice and finally understand where the "hearts and minds" strategy fits in the context of security, development and war. The interpretive part - the actual analysis of historical facts - will come out in this chapter.

Historical analysis was the preferred method because it facilitated the exploration of an area that has not been fully discovered yet and because through it I was able to find an (alternative) explanation for what has happened in the recent past. This means, in Suganami’s words, that “we fill the gap by telling a story of how the transition took place”. The 'story' in this case sees life (two ways of living competing for shaping the life of the majority) as central

185 Foucault, Power, 345.
and through this lens it seeks to decipher the forces shaping Iraq today. A second reason for using this method is that by reviewing the facts I managed to identify the key elements that need to be connected in order to provide insight. The elements were stressed out and they refer to: the Iraqi people, the HN forces (ISF, IIG, ITG) and the resistance. What connects these broad categories is the notion of "hearts and minds" which resides in the US COIN doctrine, which in its turn is the expression of the security-development nexus. Same way as Foucault sought to "describe the diverse relations between objects, statements, concepts and strategies (...) describe transformation in these relations (...) correlations (...)"\(^{187}\) this paper will seek to understand power and resistance by connecting all of the above elements.

### 3.1 Biopolitics in action

Where life is improvable, biopolitics specifies continuous revision and reform. Where life is however obdurately resistant to biopolitical revision, biopolitics specifies correction and punishment. Where life simply exceeds biopolitical rationalization and technological governance - wherever life proves itself biopolitically unclassifiable or incalculable - biopolitics terrorizes life and, in many varied ways, specifies death."\(^{188}\)

In extremely broad terms, what this paper tries to do is to analyze power in Iraq. If accepting that power is not located in one place, that it is flexible and variable, then the paper would have to analyze all forms and manifestations of power in the ever changing scenery of

\(^{187}\) Neal, p. 42.
\(^{188}\) Dillon, "Security, Race and War": 167.
Iraq. This is, if not impossible, then certainly and endless analysis. However, analyzing power in a Foucauldian way means exploring forces\textsuperscript{189} which thus gives me the possibility to analyze a particular set of forces, namely those determined by insurgents.

The starting point is the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 which as shown earlier was possible due to the nature of western politics today and the new understanding of what makes the world secure. While Foucault was talking about changes at the level of the state (sovereignty incorporated in governmentality) a number of scholars among which Duffield, Dillon and Reid transposed this idea at the level of the international. For them, globalization created new relations among Western states which, became known as global liberal governance. Duffield defined it as "networks and linkages that bring together different organizations, interest groups and forms of authority in relation to specific regulatory tasks."\textsuperscript{190} In this light, if something can not be regulated and controlled then it is potentially dangerous and it must be treated accordingly. This is what shapes the ‘new wars.’\textsuperscript{191}

Such logic drove the US when invading Iraq. The intervention aimed to discipline, which in practice meant changing the regime and eliminate the threat of the 'underdevelopment'.\textsuperscript{192} But despite changing the regime, the problem of development\textsuperscript{193}, and along with it internal and international security, have remained unresolved. A series of mistakes which were already mentioned in chapter two have upheld this situation and at points even deepened it. What was not discussed earlier is the way to understand these mistakes knowing that US are aware of the role reconstruction, aid and security have in establishing stability. I would argue that these faulty moves are the consequence of the interplay between sovereign power and biopower. Both

\textsuperscript{189} Dillon and Guerrero, 272. \\
\textsuperscript{190} Duffield, \textit{Global governance}, 44. \\
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 6 \\
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 113-117. \\
\textsuperscript{193} Senlis Council, 38.
powers are present within the US Government however at points, one dominates in the detriment of the other. Sovereignty was exercised in Iraq in its most pure form (torture, imprisonment, deliberate killings) especially in the first part of the conflict which ended with a "victory" in May same year. But despite combat operations being halted the population's fury was growing. So did the number of attacks on the foreign occupational forces. The situation was worsening on both sides. Managing the Iraqis was not as easy as initially thought. Changing the 'way of living' so as to resemble the western one was not yet possible. Building democracy, opening markets and liberal government was also not yet possible. Hence, a reconsideration of the events was needed. At this point, one can identify a similar pattern with that which Foucault identified as happening in the 18th century. It is after several strategic failures, human and financial loses that the sovereign US realized it has to limit itself in order to survive. The people, now free from Saddam, were also free to react and voice their concerns. The Iraqi people became important in this struggle and they needed to be pacified. With the invasion and the subsequent power vacuum, the US became responsible for the Iraqis and finally, it has become in its own interest to pacify them, reconstruct and develop their 'milieu' and guarantee for their security. For pragmatic reasons, it became necessary to improve this collective form of life.

The quote at the beginning of this section summarizes well the type of politics existing today and the type of actions it prescribes. This overlap between the sovereign power and the biopower, at points disciplinary power, is most manifest in COIN operations. And since insurgency is what defines now the Iraqi space, COIN has become especially vital for both US security and the Iraqis.


195 This is informed by Foucault's account on freedom, which briefly put is that power can not exist without resistance whilst resistance can not exist if the subject is not free to make decisions on its own. See Foucault, Power, 342: “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.”
3.2. Reading Counterinsurgency

“...production and destruction are so closely entwined in modern economic processes.”

As hinted in the previous chapter, it is the interplay between sovereign power and biopower that this paper takes into consideration when analyzing US policies, discourses and actions in relation to the insurgents in Iraq. This move is informed on one hand by Foucault's accounts on power - multiple forms of power overlapping within governmentality, capable of being both positive and negative – and, on the other hand, by Dillon's, Reid's and Duffield's contributions on how liberal peace (liberal way of rule) requires war (liberal way of war) and how sovereign acts receive legitimacy by allowing and sometimes encouraging biopower to function.

I have started this chapter by saying that there are three key elements that should be connected through “hearts and minds”, where the strategy is a manifestation of the new security-development terrain. This analysis will be done on three levels which follow the chronology already established in chapter two. The violent invasion produced almost instantly a type of resistance with which American forces are still struggling even today. Insurgency was accompanied and fuelled by a sudden increase of terrorist acts, suicide attacks, anti-Americanism, discontent and refusal to accept the legitimacy of, and thus refuse to collaborate with the foreign forces temporarily managing the country. This is one aspect of the resistance which generally speaking comes in various forms and with different levels of intensity. It will be

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196 Walker, p. 132.
the first component to be scrutinized under a biopolitical frame. Second level refers to counterinsurgency, which after the experience of the failed occupation had to reevaluate its position, scope and methods. The third level is the population, the referent object of both insurgency and counterinsurgency but also the central element in biopolitics. Once each element is placed in the wider context of Iraq, it is possible to see how “hearts and minds” connects and addresses them all: supported by COIN, directed against the insurgents while addressing the population.

The first to emerge after the invasion was the resistance. This paper is not interested to establish the legitimacy of these moves and as such, this section will not contain normative judgments on the matter. What it does however is to confirm what Foucault meant when he said that power can not exist without resistance. The reasons for resistance are numerous, informed by personal experiences or other people’s experience, ranging from social to political factors. Identifying the right reasons is a difficult task as the Demos report and FM proved. Suicide killings, bomb attacks, sabotage, intimidation tactics, harassment and killing officials, kidnapping or coercion are just some of the means that insurgents use to destabilize the system.\textsuperscript{197} What unifies all these actions, regardless of the reasons conducive to them, is the resistance to a certain power, namely the refusal to submit to “forms of subjectivity and submission.”\textsuperscript{198} Analyzing this relationship and what resistance is directed to reveals that insurgency is more than an asymmetrical war waged with subversive means just because the lack of military capacity. It also shows that it is more than just socio-economical issues that lead to discontent. Insurgency is contesting the HN forces because of the liberal order the government seeks to impose. By doing so, they fall out of the category of population and become the

\textsuperscript{197} UHNCR, \textit{Country of origin-Iraq}, 14.
\textsuperscript{198} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 331.
‘disruptive’ elements. They are defined as the “life [which] is inimical to life”\(^{199}\), the ones that can not be reformed and thus have to be killed in order for the rest to live well: “If the people of Fallujah rise up in protest then they must be killed, even if they are hundreds, for they are acting against Iraq (…) bombing the city to save it – killing Iraqis to save them.”\(^{200}\)

But the realization that some terrorist networks are incredibly adaptable and expansive (i.e. AQI)\(^{201}\) led the US to orient its actions more towards preventing resistance form happening rather than simply containing it, which meant including the population in its politico-military calculations. Insurgents are therefore a force capable of changing the nature of politics. Particularly in the case of Iraq, the organized movements of resistance become the “centers of political creativity.”\(^{202}\)

In response, counterinsurgency became a strategy aiming to eliminate the resisting -form of life and shape, develop and sustain another form of life – the “fence-sitters”. COIN is to be understood then as “the new biopolitical mechanisms of security technologies”\(^{203}\) which, as Dillon explained, is a mechanism concerned with the arbitrary, the character of the behavior and the economy. COIN is the mechanism employed by the global liberal governance to address the ‘underdeveloped’ and deal with the ‘resistant elements’ in the same time. A cost-benefit calculus is therefore necessary to see which life can be developed and which not. This also demands a categorization between those worthy of investing and those deemed unworthy, taking into consideration that: “killing, or the imperative to kill, is acceptable only if it results not in the

\(^{200}\) Freedland in Duffield, “Carry on Killing”: 3.
\(^{201}\) Senlis Report, 25.
\(^{203}\) Dillon and Guerrero, 278.
victory of political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race.”

In this sense, the occupation was the result of an erroneous cost-benefit calculus – the overly militarized invasion and the use of excessive force caused more problems than expected. Rather than successfully change the regime and pull Iraq out of the sphere of ‘rogue states’ the US accomplished the contrary – made it the most insecure area to live in. It did not eliminate the threat but instead made it actual. The sovereign power present at the moment of invasion found itself in the occupation in a very precarious position which required an immediate answer. In order to make Iraq secure and thus proceed with development, the US needed to change its strategy. This required the limitation of the sovereign power and the promotion of the biopower. However, this is a delicate balance of a complex relationship that is not always successful, one which was only partially obtained within COIN in late 2007.

“Hearts and Minds” within COIN is the expression of such an interplay of powers. It is perhaps the best expression of how power functions in a biopolitical society since it comprises both the right of the sovereign power to take life as well as the power to manage the population by employing techniques that sustain and develop life. COIN is therefore the manifestation of both positive and negative types of power simultaneously.

The core of COIN doctrine is to promote development and self-sustainability for the sake of security. Good living conditions as well as security are essential for winning popular support, which if obtained makes governance close to normalcy possible: “The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and

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Foucault in Dillon, “Cared to Death”: 41.
nonmilitary means”\textsuperscript{205}. If the governance is seen as legitimate then the society can be shaped according to the way of living that the government deems proper. In the case of Iraq, coarsely speaking, the liberal way of life was promoted first by CPA, than by IIG and ITG, the last ones being backed up by the US Government. However, as mentioned in chapter two, the doctrine did not always coincide with the practice and it was only after prolonged conflicts and dismal losses that COIN sought to reconcile the two by placing development of life in its center for the sake of security. In practice, the strategy informing the COIN doctrine (wining over the population) was disregarded, however after analyzing the results of the operations where conventional military tactics were used, the US Army realized that civilian oriented actions prove to be more useful. Ultimately, as Duffield argued, the way to avoid war is “to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies” which is possible only having the support of the people. This seems to be the lesson that the US Army had to re-learn\textsuperscript{206}.

To sum up so far, while theoretically populations are of utmost importance to COIN operations, the Iraqi population was largely ignored in the initial stages of the occupation. Resources were allocated to fight and contain insurgents, eliminate resistance and maintain security and safety for coalition troops. This, among other factors\textsuperscript{207} caused the intensity of violence to increase\textsuperscript{208} which in the end made Iraqis even more disillusioned by the ongoing events in their country and thus prone to insurgents’ influence\textsuperscript{209}, the latter being concerned with rallying people against the established government.

\textsuperscript{205}FM, 1-21.
\textsuperscript{206}See the FM, 1-21 to 1-28, where new principles on how to run COIN operations are added to the historical ones, principles derived directly from years of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.
\textsuperscript{207}These factors, despite interesting and thus deserving further consideration, are out of the scope of this paper.
\textsuperscript{209}Senlis Report, 58-62.
Because the population is important for the insurgents and because controlling violence and creating stability requires political control, which in Western terms means legitimacy through popular consent, the Iraqi population re-emerged as a focal point of COIN strategy. This is to say, that the shift from conventional military actions to civilian oriented actions can be read as the shift from the preponderance of methods belonging to the sovereign power to methods employed by the biopower. Again, drawing a parallel with Foucault’s account on the transformations occurring in the 17th and 18th century, one could say around the year 2007 Iraqis managed to “unblock the art of governmentality.” By this I mean that the population, due to a number of factors - insurgents, core of the COIN doctrine, failure of conventional operations, the blurring of the line between security and development – managed to determine US Government to revise its attitude, limit the exercise of sovereign power and allow the techniques of the biopower to start managing and administer life in Iraq. This would be then one way of looking at the changes in the attitude of the US Government in general and COIN practice in particular. However, this does not exclude further analysis on resistance and the ongoing struggles between insurgents and counterinsurgents.

So what does “hearts and minds” as an expression of the security-development nexus found in COIN doctrine reveals about the relations of power and resistance in Iraq after 2003? “Hearts and Minds” is one of the strategies used by governmentality to promote stability which requires both security and development. It is therefore a strategy that combines techniques of the sovereign power and techniques of the biopower in order to address the entire spectrum of problems afflicting Iraq. In order to understand the rationale behind it and the way it functions in practice, the strategy had to be placed in the context of biopolitics. “Hearts and Minds” in COIN practice is the response to the constantly increasing violence which could not be contained only

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210 Foucault, *Power*, 104.
by military means. The population has a huge role in shaping the political system by simply deciding to be with or against it and as a consequence the HN forces, through COIN, have to do more than simply hunt down the elements contesting the political system – they have to make sure that the population will not drift away and lend their support to the insurgents. And this makes “hearts and minds” promote a power that manages, educated, constructs and harbors life as much as it eliminates life.

Engaging with Reid’s work, particularly with his proposition to study WOT by analyzing the relationship between the biopower and the sovereign power, made it possible to conceive Iraq and the forces shaping it through a biopolitical lens. By deeming Iraq as insecure to the world due to the fact that it does not function according to Western liberal imperatives (undeveloped, uncooperative, different regime) allowed the invasion in the first place. In the same vein, the violent measure employed by the US forces in the early stages of the conflict followed by attempts to reconstruct and redefine Iraq, can be explained by the forces driving modern politics today, which is to say types of powers competing and facing resistance, sovereign power clashing biopower in the battle to create stability.

The invasion, regime change and reconstruction are ways to deal with the threat in a world where security informs development and vice-versa. In this sense Dillon was right when arguing that “peace becomes the extension of war through the discourse of security.”\textsuperscript{211} War was necessary and justified in order to eliminate the threat, secure the world and thus obtain global peace. The same applies to COIN when dealing with resistance. Insurgents are a threat to the newly formed government and in order for the government to flourish it needs the support of the people. However, the people will not support the regime if this regime causes more insecurity and instability. Therefore, stability needs to be obtained in order to win the “hearts and minds” of

\textsuperscript{211} Dillon, “Security, Race and War”: 176.
the people, which in the end will support the regime. This will lead to a government capable to manage its population, capable to contain internal threats, which ultimately means stability for the country and the world. Indeed, as Dillon argued making life is “always a lethal business”\textsuperscript{212}, however, in the context of Iraq this is understood as: making western forms of life is a lethal business.

In summarizing the findings of this paper, I will put forward the story of power and resistance in Iraq from the perspective of the population, which in the end contributes in shedding more light on recent history.

Very simply put, the changes in the COIN operation are the result of the resistance whereas the nature of the changes are due to the already accepted view in the western world that security can not be obtained without development whereas development can not be obtained without security. The actions occurring in the first three years of the occupation were not functioning according to the acknowledged nexus between security and development mainly because the sovereign power was victorious in ‘battling’ the biopower. Put differently, the decisions to focus on security, construct military bases and employ force on everyone that was a potential threat was taken in the detriment of development, reconstruction and civilian oriented projects. In conclusion, the relative failure of COIN operations is due to the fact that “hearts and minds” as a strategy, though defining actions on paper, was not informing the actions on the field.

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 168.
CONCLUSION

The paper aimed to understand not “sudden irruptions (...) but (...) their historical conditions of possibility.”

This paper raised the issue of a particular strategy within US COIN, namely “hearts and minds” in Iraq. Specifically, the research was interested in finding out what an analysis of “hearts and minds” will reveal in relation to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq. The paper first argued that “hearts and minds” is the best example of how governmentality functions in a biopolitical context. This has been done by unpacking the construct and showing how at its core one will distinguish prescriptions for both a positive power that seeks to create life and a negative one that seeks to kill inimical life. Second, it analyzed the purpose and the objectives of the strategy and showed how “hearts and minds” informs current COIN operations. The purpose of “hearts and minds” is to win over the population that is susceptible to alternative resistant forces, by providing security and development, which in military terms is a ‘stability operation.’ This revealed the fact that “hearts and minds” is not just a strategy emerging out of the biopolitical principles defining currently the Western world but it is also the point where security and development should meet.

All these findings in the end sough to illuminate some of the aspects of the failure of the occupation in Iraq. Security and development, though needing and enforcing each other in order to reach stability, could not have happened in tandem in Iraq due to the fact that sovereign power and biopower were competing within COIN. This competition had consequences on both the people and the insurgents, which caused a new set of actions, reactions and thus a new set of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{213}}\] Neal, 36.
problems. The main finding is that once the two forms of power agreed to cooperate, around the year 2007 when fostering life became at least as important as eliminating insurgency the cycle of violence was finally broken. A similar analysis of Iraq, only more extensive, containing more recent facts and one that includes other aspects as well, for example identities, religion or political parties, might reveal even more about the degree in which the invasion was a successful but the occupation a failure.

Admittedly, one of the shortages of this analysis is that at points it might seem convoluted whereas in others parts, arguments might seem contradictory. However, this is bound to happen, perhaps in a lesser degree to an experimented writer, considering that the components identified in this analysis - population, insurgents, governing forces - are in a complicated, hard to grasp, yet intimate relationship. They all influence each other, even if only indirectly and thus it is hard to pin point a particular configuration of forces. More so, by trying to locate these key elements within the frame of a theory that in itself is not yet fully explored – Duffield’s nexus – has made it even harder to maintain clarity.

On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction and as it became visible throughout the paper, engaging with Foucault is not supposed to lead to exact results or concrete answers. The merits of such an approach is that it encourages reading events that are not necessary in a causal relationship, events that seem unrelated but which if connected provide insight on the matter. This “pluralization of horizons”\textsuperscript{214} that Foucault is advocating through a critical historical analysis is therefore an approach better equipped to answer to the challenges of the modern world, one of such challenges having been addressed in this paper - the failure to reconstruct Iraq.

\textsuperscript{214} Neal, 38.
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