

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies

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Abstract

September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center have further demonstrated the need to assess or reassess the migration security nexus as migration has increasingly been viewed as a security problem. Migration to the United States and in the European Union has long been conceived as a threat to ‘social’ security (jobs, welfare, etc.), concurrently endangering identities of local populations. After 9/11, in the United States the issue was framed in connection with the fight against terrorism, where the newly adopted policies and border control targeted specifically Arab and Muslim migrants. Securitization theory, as proposed by the Copenhagen School and later developed by the second generation securitization scholars, is as suitable framework in explaining the phenomenon, as it is based on the inter-subjective threat establishment. The aim of this paper is demonstrate whether the theoretical framework can explain the construction of Muslim and Arab migrants as the ‘other’ though the security/migration nexus. The emphasis on the paper is how the process took place by looking at the construction of the threat through discourse as well as institutional practices. Although, the Copenhagen School’s theory can explain how the process was frame through institutional practices, the framework need to be expanded in order to include indirect threat construction, where certain topics, like ethnic profiling, are absent from public discourse.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	I
TABLE OF CONTENTS	II
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW	6
1.1 SECURITIZATION THEORY: THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL	6
1.2 SECURITIZATION: SECOND GENERATION	11
1.3 SECURITIZATION, MIGRATION AND TERRORISM NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.....	15
1.4 TERRORISM AND MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES.....	18
CHAPTER 2: SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION THROUGH DISCOURSE	21
2.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	22
2.2 SPEECH ACT IN PRACTICE	26
2.3 THE AUDIENCE ‘RESPONDS’.....	34
CHAPTER 3: SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES	39
3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	39
3.2 CONSTRUCTING MUSLIMS AND ARABS AS ENEMIES THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES:	40
CONCLUSION	48
BIBLIOGRAPHY	51

Introduction

September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center have further demonstrated the need to assess or reassess the migration security nexus as migration has increasingly been viewed as a security problem. Migration to Western part of the world, especially the European Union, has long been conceived as a threat to 'social' security (jobs, welfare, etc.) concurrently endangering identities of local populations. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, migration to Western countries became a potential source of physical threat to the American and European populations and a high-priority issue in the political discourse as well as in institutionalized practices. Often 9/11 is perceived as an opportunity to construct security as an existential threat to further control migration through tightening visa regulations, detentions and deportations. If in the European context, the establishment of the terrorism/migration nexus was more or less unsuccessful,¹ in the United States, the link between the two was clearly manifested in the discourse as well as in practices, which belonged to a larger group of policies implemented in the fight against terrorism.

Specific type of migrants to the United States became targets in the fight against terrorism: Muslims and Arabs.² People of Muslim or Arab origin found themselves to be victimized by strict anti-immigration laws, special surveillance in the airports, random detentions and questionings. In the United States, out of approximately 20 rules that were

¹ Boswell, Christina. 'Migration in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitization.' *JCMS* 45.3 (2007): 589-610. Interscience. <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com>

² Stivachtis, Yannis A. 'International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security.' *The Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2, no.1 (2008), 1-24
<http://www.scientificjournals.org/journals2008/articles/1387.pdf> 2

amended after 9/11 relating to immigration laws, 15 exclusively targets Arabs.³ Simultaneously, as shown by the findings of numerous polls conducted after the attacks, resentment toward Muslims and Arabs escalated among the American public. James Der Derian argues that ‘...’terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ were seen not as threats, actions or actors that could be objectively identified, but as signs that constituted a radical ‘Other’⁴ In the United States, however, not only were terrorists categorized as the radical ‘other,’ but the category extended to Muslims and Arab migrants as well.

These developments point to securitization or the construction of specific group of migrants as sources of existential threat. In order to explain and understand the framing of Muslims and Arab migrants as the ‘other,’ potential threats to the American societal and state security, securitization theory, propounded by the Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver) and later developed by scholars like Didier Bigo, Jef Huysmans Mat MacDonald and others provides a possible suitable theoretical framework as it looks at the construction of an actual or potential threat (not an objective or subjective understanding of a threat) through public discourse, institutionalization and bureaucratic practices.

Deviating from the traditional security studies that revolve around state-to-state relations and concentrates on objective threats and military power, in the 1990's the Copenhagen School proposed securitization theory (based on a securitization of an issue through speech act), later extended by scholars such as Bigo, Huysmans, to include bureaucratic routines and the ‘effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional.’⁵ The theory is rooted in the national security discourse where threats and enemies are

³ Cankar, Louis. ‘No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11.’ *Middle East Report* 224 (Fall 2002): 22-29. 26

⁴ Buzan, Barry, Lene Hansen. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge University, 2009. 214

⁵ Buzan et al. 2009, 217

constructed in ways that justify exceptional measures. Buzan indicates that ‘security has a particular discursive and political force and is a concept that does something – securitize – rather than an objective (or subjective) condition.’⁶ Developed in the European context, the securitization theory has been applied to other non-Western settings, but has proved to be less popular in the American context. Buzan in his latest book acknowledges the lack of research available that deals with the phenomenon in the United States.⁷ The research is especially scarce in the assessment of securitization of migration and how the process enabled construction of ‘the other.’

In an attempt to elucidate the link between migration/terrorism in the United States following 9/11, I will examine the way in which migration and specifically Muslim and Arab migration to the United States has been securitized. The stress will be on how as opposed to why securitization took place. The aim of the paper is to see whether the theory is suitable for explaining the construction of Muslim and Arab migrants as threats. The case analyzed in the paper is interesting, as securitization of Muslim and Arab migration to the United States was not achieved discursively as the Copenhagen School would propose; rather, the process was evident in practice. This indicates further need to re-examine the theoretical framework.

The methodology of the research will expand on the securitization theory, including the institutional aspects of the process. In an attempt to unpack the ways and means of securitizing Muslim/Arab migration, the study will employ three different methods. Discourse analysis will be utilized in understanding the formulation of the speech act from September 2001 till 2004. The data mostly comes from Congressional Speeches, public

⁶ Ibid., 214

⁷ Buzan et al., 2009, 216 "In keeping with the US-European difference in the extent to which the concept of security is explicitly addressed, the Copenhagen School has been much more discussed within Europe than in the US, although it has to an increasing extent been applied to non-Western settings (Jackson 2006; Kent, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007).

statements of political elite and radio interviews, in addition to several secondary sources. The evaluation of the public attitude will be based on the polls conducted by Gallup, ABC News, News/Washington Poll, and CNN extending to 2002. Finally, the analysis of the change in the legal system after 9/11 will be evaluated relying on secondary sources and the assessment of the Patriot and Homeland Security Acts. The limitation of the research can be found in complexity of gathering data concerning the border control, although I do include several secondary sources that roughly evaluate the specificities of the proceedings. In addition, although I am using poll findings to estimate the public opinion, the determination of the opinion of the whole society is problematic as it is not a perfect way of assessing the 'audience.'

The study will look at three main aspects of securitization: the construction of Muslim and Arab migrants through the speech act of American political elite, it will assess the perception of the audience and will look at institutionalized practices. According to this sequence, the thesis is organized as follows- In the first chapter, I will review the existing literature about migration and terrorism in the European Union, incorporating the general overview of the securitization theory as formulated by the Copenhagen School and the second generation securitization scholars. In the second chapter, I will utilize discourse analysis in an attempt to analyze the construction of enemies through speeches of political elite and public officials. In the second part of the second chapter, I will assess the perception of the threat by the audience. In the final chapter, I will look at the securitization through border control and other institutionalized practices. Finally, the conclusion will evaluate the explanatory capacity of the theoretical framework and, simultaneously, it will assess the ways in which the securitization plays out in the 'real world' examples. Both the second and the third chapter start with the introduction of the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen

School and the second generation securitization scholars, which specifically outlines the ways in which empirical research should be conducted when studying securitization.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

The present chapter will provide an overview of the development of securitization theory as proposed by the Copenhagen School. The second part of the chapter will dissect the criticisms directed at the singularity of the speech act as a securitizing tool and the one-directional relationship between the speech act, the audience and the securitizing actor. Finally, the chapter will address the available literature on the ways in which the link between migration and terrorism was constructed in the post-9/11 migration in the EU.

1.1 Securitization Theory: the Copenhagen School

The traditional understanding of security revolves around power struggle, military confrontations and threats, where focus is strictly on institutional unit - the state; Deviating from the 'orthodox' interpretation of security, the Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan and Ole Waever), stretched and deepened the concept to include environmental, military, societal, political and economic sectors. Whether one takes the precedence over the other is subjective and contingent on what type of political issues are designated as 'existentially threats' (securitized) at a certain point in time. In international security, for the School, security is about survival. It is when an issue is framed as something that is posing a danger or threat to whatever the referent object might be.

The Copenhagen School provides a referent object that is distinct from the formulations provided both by the so called 'traditional' security studies, which is purely

state-centric, and Critical Security Studies, which is mainly concerned with individual or global aspect of security.⁸ Buzan and Waever explain the logic behind choosing the middle scale. Traditional security studies ignore and are not equipped enough to incorporate in their theoretical framework other threats that do not necessarily stem from the state. When dealing with the system end of scale, establishing security legitimacy is difficult as seen in historical cases of the attempt to construct all of humankind as a referent object during the Cold War.⁹ An individual approach, on the other hand, does not provide enough room for construction of security through speech act or securitization, since ‘the micro end of the spectrum, individuals or small groups can seldom establish wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about security to and of themselves, but few will listen.’¹⁰ Buzan and Waever argue that when dealing with societal security ‘a society is basically to be conceived of as both: necessarily to some degree more than the sum of its parts, and not reducible to individuals.’¹¹ The Copenhagen School was thus the first one to concentrate on nation and society as a referent object in the security studies.

The Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework rejects the conception of security as an objective and steady entity and opts for more constructivist approach, where security is constructed through discourse.¹² What comprises an existential threat is relative and subjective since any securitization is context-specific and depends on political choice. According to the School, an issue does not in and of itself constitute a security problem.¹³

⁸ Buzan et al. 2009, 213

⁹ Buzan et al. 6

¹⁰ Buzan, Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 36

¹¹ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 18

¹² Buzan et al., 2009, 213

¹³ Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. “Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies.” *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 2 (1997), 241-250
<http://jstor.org/stable/20097477> 246

Thus security is seen as a self-referential practice; this claim, however, does not presuppose the fact that real threats do not exist. Ackleson brings nuclear weapons as an example: some states such as France and Britain possess nuclear capabilities, but that in and of itself does not make it a security threat.¹⁴ Under different circumstances, the issue could be framed or constructed in an opposite way. As it follows from the logic, political context is vital for nuclear weapons to become securitized. Threats are not seen as problems that will threaten individual life, but it can be understood ‘in relation to the particular character of the referent object.’ For example, migration can be established as a security threat to the societal problems, or identity of a polity. Establishment of a threat varies from state to state and is different across time. If states like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Burma politicize religion, France and the United States will avoid doing the same. USSR and Iran will securitize culture, but others like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom will not. Societal security, with which I will be dealing with in connecting to migration deals with the idea of ‘we,’ the people, sharing a certain type of identity, however identity is conceptualized.

Securitization is a construction of threat by taking the issue outside of ‘normal’ politics and framing it in a way that legitimizes emergency measures. Securitization, thus, is ‘an extreme version of politicization.’ The process brings forth the importance of authority in constructing threats and enemies through speech act and consequently involves adoption of emergency measures.¹⁵ The nature of threats enables the actors to mobilize the public in order to legitimize breaking rules and using force, if deemed necessary. Extraordinary measures taken in dealing with a securitized problem can be ad hoc or institutionalized. If a threat is

¹⁴ Ackleson, Jack. "Constructing Security on the U.S.-Mexico Border." *Political Geography* 24 (2005), 165-184. www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo .

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 214

recurrent, it is more likely that extraordinary measures be institutionalized.¹⁶ It might be argued that institutionalization of threats can bring back an issue to the normal politics, but this is not the case. The necessity of dramatizing a threat, which is necessary in the initial stage of securitization, disappears because it takes a more implicit form as it is assumed that the issue is already in the 'area of urgency.'¹⁷ Here, it is necessary to clarify who exactly securitizing actors are in the process of construction of an existential threat.

The securitizing actors, those formulating the speech act, include political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups.¹⁸ In other words, securitizing actors are political figures who are in a position to shape or significantly influence the ways in which an audience or a specific targeted public perceives issues such as security. Securitizing actors rely on the speech act as a tool to fulfill a successful securitization. Rooted in the language theory, security, according to the School, can be regarded as a speech act. A successful speech act is composed of two elements: language and society, 'both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes the speech.'¹⁹ Weaver argues that the security is not something that refers to something more real; utterance itself constitutes a threat. Although it is not necessary to say 'security,' to establish an existential threat, by saying it, state of emergency is declared to tackle the problems.²⁰ Discourse is where an issue is framed as a high priority and is dramatized in order to justify extraordinary means. Only the utterance, however, is insufficient for a successful securitization. A significant audience has to accept the issue as an existential threat, since, at least in a democratic system, the 'out of the ordinary' measures have to be justified.²¹ Buzan and

¹⁶ Buzan et al, 1998, 27

¹⁷ Buzan et al., 1998, 28

¹⁸ Buzan et al., 2009, 214

¹⁹ Buzan et al., 1998, 32

²⁰ Buzan et al., 1988

²¹ Ibid., 27

Waever argue that ‘a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization-this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.’²² In a democracy it must be explained in the public sphere why something constitutes a security problem and why therefore breaking rules are necessary and legitimate. The speech act reduces public influence on this issue, but in democracies one must legitimize in public why from now on the details will not be presented publicly (because of the danger of giving useful information to the enemy and the like). The Copenhagen School argues that placed to exists where violation of rights is acceptable without necessary justification from the public, but in a liberal-democracy, rhetoric is a crucial element in taking an issue from normal politics. Only in this case is securitization successful.²³ In addition to the securitizing actor and the audience, there are facilitating factors, which do not in and of themselves securitize and issue, but they help the process. For example, a polluting company, in the environmental sector, is neither a securitizing actor not the audience, but it can push the process of securitizing environmental issues.²⁴ Therefore, there are three main elements, (which I will extend on in the following chapters) that are necessary for a successful securitization: referent objects, securitizing actors and functional actors or facilitating conditions.²⁵

As a result, securitization is a type of a trilogy: securitizing actor, the audience and facilitating conditions. The specific ways of securitization, will be addressed in the following chapters.

²² Ibid., 25

²³ Buzan et al., 1998, 24

²⁴ Ibid., 36

²⁵ Ibid., 36

1.2 Securitization: Second Generation

Popularity of securitization theory has inevitably generated much criticism among security studies scholars. One of the main criticisms deals with the relationship between the audience and the securitizing actors, emphasized by Thierry Balzacq and Atsuko Higashino. Scholars such as Michael C. Williams look at the ways in which authority is framed during securitization process. In her work, Lene Hansen asks whether a security move can be of a 'silent' nature, extending on the gender perspective in the security studies. Green Cowles analyzes the conditions, which should be in place in order for a securitization to be successful. Jef Huysmans scrutinized the difference between politicization and securitization of an issue and Didier Bigo argued that speech act is not the sole securitizing tool and institutionalized part of securitization and every-day practices of police and customs personnel should be considered.

For the purpose of understanding the peculiarity of the relationship between the audience, which perceived Muslim, and Arab migrants as threats and the lack of public justification for their profiling, the thesis will examine the works of Balzacq in order to understand why and how the relationship between the audience and the actors took shape in a certain way. In addition, to fully understand the process of securitization of immigration to the United States, the thesis will rely on the work of Huysmans and Bigo.

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the

best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them.”²⁶ Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered.²⁷ Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital.²⁸ He indicates:

In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization.²⁹

This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

One of the main objections was directed at the limitation of speech act as a primary or sole securitizing method. Bigo and Huysmans both brought to light the need to go beyond the mere speech act approach to securitization and look at alternative ways in which issues

²⁶ Balzacq, Thierry. ‘Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context.’ *European Journal of International Relations*. 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-20. Sagepub. <http://ejt.sagepub.com>

²⁷ Balzacq, 173

²⁸ Ibid.,

²⁹ Ibid.,

can be constructed as existential threats. Drawing on Foucault and Bourdieu, Bigo's approach in addition to the speech act, stresses the significance of the institutionalization of the field of security.³⁰ Bigo uses migration as an example of a threat in an attempt at developing a more coherent theoretical framework, since migration can serve as a clear example of how threats are constructed through speech act as well as in every day practice, whether through border patrol, visa regulation, and other surveillance techniques. Bureaucratic routines, for example, border patrolling, show the effects of securitization that become 'continuous rather than exceptional.'³¹ Both scholars include institutionalization of the field of security and the construction of threats in various practices. Surveillance networks and data-mining help build a 'security state' where everyone is under surveillance.

Securitization of migration in Europe has been discussed by numerous critical security studies scholars in the past decade or more and the general consensus has been that migration to the Western European countries has been increasingly framed as existential threat to European societies. The problem was being linked to various problems such as jobs, housing, and welfare system, in addition to more intangible things like societal values, identity and cultural homogeneity.³² These types of societal problems are fought through migration control. When considering migration in the light of securitization theory, Bigo argues that other mechanism such as bureaucratic procedures (exclusion vs. inclusion), profiling of groups (e.g. migrants) and particular security technologies (e.g. visa, identity control and registration) can be tools in an attempt to categorize and formulate 'the others,' which are

³⁰ Buzan et al., 2009,

³¹ Faist, Thomas. 'Extension du domaine de la lutte': International Migration and Security before and after 11, 2001. *International Migration Review*, 36, no. 1 (2002) 7-14 Jstor. (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149523>)

³² Huysmans, Jef. 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.' *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-777. Interscience. <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com>

potential threats to the security of a society.³³ The author adds that securitization, which is part of everyday practices, technologies, which are continuous and not exceptional like the speech act, are created through political struggles.³⁴ Securitization of migration, according to him, is the result and not the cause of the development of technologies of control and surveillance. Risk profiling, visa regulations, border-control, designation of international and non-territorial spaces in airports³⁵ and ways in which the division between societies are placed in opposition with migrants. Bigo explains the fear, anxiety and the risk that migration causes among people is due to the conception of the state as an entity that contains the polity. It is the fear of losing control that drives politicians and political elite to maintain clearly defined territorial boundaries.³⁶ Politicians try to provide security to a nation who feels psychological unease that follows inflows of migration. In a democratic system, the speech act is used by the governing elite in a way to justify the existential measures. Bigo stresses governmentality part of securitization, where political elite makes an illusion of providing security and protection to the public, in an attempt to conceal their failures.³⁷ In line with Bigo's conceptualization of security, Huysmans argues that enunciating security is never innocent or neutral. The idea later in the chapter is challenged by scholars, such as Boswell, who argues that political elite could be, but is not always pursuing power maximization.

Now that the theoretical framework and its criticisms have been established, it is important to turn to how the theory and its adjustments are helpful in explaining the amalgam of between securitization of migration and terrorism in speech act and policies and every-day practices. The question addressed in the following part is whether anti-terrorist agenda

³³ Karyotis, Georgios. 'European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: the Security Migration Nexus.' *Innovation* 20, no. 1 (2007), 1-17. Informaworld. <http://www.informaworld.com>. 3

³⁴ Bigo, Didier. 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives* 27 (2002) Special Issue.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.

³⁶ Bigo, Didier (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives* 27 (Special Issue): 63-92

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3

proved to be a tool for more austere forms of migration control and how the threat was constructed in the European context. This will provide a basis to expand the theoretical framework to the United States case.

1.3 Securitization, Migration and Terrorism Nexus in the European Union

As mentioned in the introduction, securitization of migration and its connection with terrorism has been analyzed extensively in the European context and to a very limited extent in the United States. Unlike in the United States, which is proud to present itself as the ‘a country of migrants’ and thus frame the issue as only effecting ‘social’ problems and not identity, the securitization of migration to the European Union has been observed for decades now and has been constructed both as a threat to the identity as well as being linked to drug trafficking, housing, jobs, and so on. The big question for the security studies scholars addressed in the aftermath of 9/11 was to what extent these trends changed. The primary question posed was if the catastrophic events formed a link between migration and terrorism, where anti-terrorist agenda was used in order to justify tightening measured against migrants (a pre-existing desire). And if this was the case, what was the process and how does the securitization theory explain the newly-emerging dynamics.

Some of the works done in linking migration and terrorism in the European Context belong to Huysmans, Andrew Neal, Christina Boswell and Georgios Karyotis. Huysmans looks at securitization of migration and asylum policy through speech act in the British parliamentary debated. He concludes that although there was a securitization move present in the debate in the aftermaths of the 9/11 attacks towards linking migration and terrorism, soon

afterwards, the reluctance to link the two became obvious and soon subsided all together.³⁸ Karyotis, looking at both speech act and practices in the EU, argues that in the EU 9/11 attacks did not initiate new insecurities, or uncertainties in connection with the migration policy, but the actions and the framing was the continuation of the trend that existed prior to the attacks.³⁹ In line with this argument, but stressing the continuous nature of security construction in the EU before and after 9/11, Christina Boswell argues that the link was short-lived.

Looking at securitization of migration after 9/11 in the European context, Boswell contends the orthodox notion that there was a tight link between migration and terrorism.⁴⁰ According to her, several factors served as obstacles in connecting irregular migrants and new entrants to terrorism, since an overview of public debate and policy practice remained unchanged by the anti-terrorist agenda. The same thing could be said about what was taking place on a policy level. There was an attempt at establishment of counter-terrorism agenda through, for example, data gathering of migrants, both on the EU and national levels.⁴¹ The policy has been the most prevalent in the establishment of monitoring and gathering data on migrants. She points out that, paradoxically, migration policy has been used for fighting terrorism than other way around.⁴² Andrew Neal has a similar point when addressing the issue of securitization and risk at the EU border. He argues that European external borders agency FRONTEX, is not the manifestation of institutionalization of linkage between

³⁸ Huysmans, Jef and Alessandra Buonfino. 'Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in parliamentary Debates in the UK.' *Political Studies*, 56, no. 4 (2008): 766-788. Interscience. <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com>

³⁹ Karyotis, 1

⁴⁰ Boswell, 589

⁴¹ Boswell, 590

⁴² *Ibid.*, 590

migration and terrorism after 9/11 and subsequent bombings in Madrid and London, but rather the failure of making such an association.⁴³

How can this be explained? Firstly, Boswell finds the answer in that the most of the terrorist suspects were EU nationals and thus there was little possibility to associate them with migrants. In a larger overview of the securitization theory, in order to explain the absence of the link between migration and terrorism, she emphasizes the inability for the security studies literature to fully address the dynamic involved in legitimization of security practices through the speech act that has emerged since September 11, 2001. This is due to two factors: the lack of an adequate theory of organizational action and the ambiguity of the differentiation between system of politics (political parties concerned with legitimizing and mobilizing people for state action) and administration (policy practice).⁴⁴ The first point refers to the Bigo's and Anastassia Tsoukala's idea that political parties and politicians are power-maximizers necessarily driven by self-interest, of increasing their power by creating the illusion that they are providers of security and protection.⁴⁵ The second point that she criticizes is that in the process of legitimizing their action, politicians try to avoid scrutiny, or 'freeing themselves from the requirement of public legitimization' thus there is no necessity of justification of all the measures taken in tackling an 'existential' problem. Finally, she concludes that the relationship between system of politics and administration, as framed by the securitization theory, fails to see alternative ways of framing issue, since public legitimization does not have to serve as a precondition for securitization practices.⁴⁶ She

⁴³ FRONTEX- is a new external border agency for the EU (Council of European Union, 2004), which defines its purpose to be "coordination of intelligence driven operational co-operation at EU level to strengthen security at the external borders." FRONTEX, here, is used as a case study "for investigating the development of EU security discourses, practices and policies, specifically to explore whether migration from outside the EU has been represented and constructed as a security threat." 333

⁴⁴ Boswell, 590

⁴⁵ Scott, 1995; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; March and Olsen, 1994

⁴⁶ Boswell, 593

criticizes the one-way flow of practice and the speech act. Policies can be implemented without being discussed in public and the causality between the speech act and the practices should not be confined to a one-way relationship. In the EU context, ‘a resistance to securitization within parts of the administration could make politics cautious about adopting securitization discourse, as this could create unmanageable public expectations.’⁴⁷ Lastly, Andrew Neal also criticizes causality between speech act and practice, as, ‘much of what is done in the EU in the name of security is quiet, technical and unspectacular, in and just as much does not declare itself to be in the name of security at all.’⁴⁸ The perceptions of the dynamics proposed by the Boswell and Neal will In the further assessment of the dynamics between the audience and the securitizing actor in the United States.

1.4 Terrorism and Migration in the United States

In his opening chapter of his latest book *The Maze of Fear*, John Tirman quotes Oscar Handlin, who in his 1951 succinctly summarized the nature of migration to the United States, identifying it with the American identity. In his 1951 book, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that made the American People*’ he writes: ‘Once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America,’ he wrote. ‘Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history.’⁴⁹

As mentioned above, migration to the United States has not been as strongly constructed as a threat to national identity, as in the case of the European Union. Did anything change in the aftermath of 9/11?

⁴⁷ Boswell, 606

⁴⁸ Neal, Andrew, W. The Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX. JCMS. 47, no. 2. (2009): 333-356. <http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/frontier/prassi/neal.pdf> 193

⁴⁹ Tirman, 2004, 87

Migration to the United States and the connection with terrorism has not been broadly the discussed in the light of securitization theory. There are few who address the issue of securitization after 9/11, but they are not addressing the link between the two. Tirman describes the ways in which the conception of migration changes, since the 9/11 attacks. In the United States, migration has long been connected to security, but mainly it was considered to be a threat to ‘social’ security, (jobs, welfare, housing, etc.) After the attacks, however, terrorism was framing the discourse and practices about migration. He underlines: ‘The fear-thus far, unfounded-that al Qaeda will sneak across the ‘unguarded’ 2,000 mile border accounts for the urgency. In fact, the House bill is called the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005.’⁵⁰

Migration to the United States and the connection with terrorism has not been broadly the discussed in the light of securitization theory. There are few who address the issue of securitization after 9/11, but they are not directly addressing the link between securitization, migration and terrorism. Although not dealing with the issue specifically, Bryan Mabee’s succinct analysis concerning discourse part of securitization that came prior to the establishment the Department of Homeland Security. He utilizes speech act of securitization theory in order to assess the way in which security changed in the aftermath of 9/11, and how the treats were presented with the establishment of the Homeland Security. Basing his theoretical framework both on speech act and practices, he argues that the terrorism has an

⁵⁰ Tirman, John. ‘Immigration and Insecurity: Post-9/11 Fear in the United States.’ MIT Center for International Studies. http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_Tirman_Immigration_6.06.pdf

enormous influence on the policy-making and the war on terror was often quotes as a mean of justifying ‘out of the ordinary’ measures. His analysis, however, excludes the discussion of migration and terrorism per se. Existential threats, special nature of the threats. A dramatic change of the way security is viewed in the United States.

The question that I would like to ask is whether after 9/11, migrants have been securitized (through the speech act and practices) in connection with terrorism. If they have been, how did and is the process taking place and what are the dynamics between the audience, the securitizing actors and the policies. The connection between migration and terrorism will be the most obvious in analyzing Muslim and Arab migrants and to United States. Gerstle point out that ‘the link (migration security) stems from the profiles of the nineteen attackers in those four airplanes. All of them were in the United States on temporary visas, three of which had expired. All of them were from the Middle East, mostly Saudi and Egyptian, and all of them were Muslim.’⁵¹ The question that I am posing is to what extend this has triggered the construction of Muslim and Arab migrants to the United States as existential threat.

The case is interesting for the securitization theorists, as the established speech act tried to ‘desecuritize’ or bring the Muslim Arab identity and their migration back to the normal politics, while among all the immigrants, institutional practices and newly adopted legal systems were targeting Arab and Muslims specifically. It is peculiar that the anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiment grew so much amongst the American people that they were ready to justify profiling among of these groups of migrants.

⁵¹ Gerstle, Gary. ‘The Immigration As Threat to American Security: A Historical Perspective.’ In *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11*, 87-109, edited by John Tirman. New York: The New Press, 2004. 2

Chapter 2: Securitization of migration through Discourse

In this chapter I will discuss how the discourse about migration in general and specifically Arab/Muslim migration was framed through speech act during the Bush Administration, starting from September 2001 onwards. I will provide a detailed overview of how speech acts should be assessed while conducting an empirical study. The theoretical part will delve into frameworks proposed by the Copenhagen School. Secondly, I will look at three speeches of President Bush soon after 9/11 concerning the linkages between migration and terrorism. Subsequently, I will assess the ways in which President Bush framed the issue of Muslim/Arabs and migration in three of his speeches. As it becomes obvious, the speech act clearly tied terrorism with migration and constructs migrants as security threats. The discourse, however, does not provide legitimization of anti-immigration policies towards Muslims or Arabs; even more, it tries to even desecuritize the issue, by bringing it back to the normal politics. The message is clear when President Bush, a securitizing actor, emphasized the American identity as tolerant and accepting. Finally, the chapter will try and bring light to the connection between the establishment of the speech act by the political elite and the response of the audience. Are they compatible? Does the audience accept whatever is proposed by the elite rhetoric (a necessity for the success of securitization)? These will be the questions addressed in the analysis of polls that are used to assess the American public opinion about Muslim and Arab migration in the aftermaths of 9/11, 2001. The method that will be employed will look at public polls and trends after September 11, 2001.

2.1 Theoretical background

The Copenhagen School in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* maps out the specifics of how to conduct empirical research on securitization. Securitization mainly includes the need to identify: who securitizes, what threat is securitized, who are the referent objects (the audience), why an issue is securitized, what are the consequences, and under what condition is securitization successful.⁵² Waever and Buzan propose the idea that success of speech act is contingent on the combination of language and society: the inherent characteristics of speech, and the audience that identifies with and recognizes the speech. The third aspect of the process is the presence of facilitating conditions. Speech act has to rely on the grammar of security and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and the ways of dealing with the problem. Not everybody is privileged to articulate security, thus, securitizing actor, should necessarily be in a position of authority, (although not necessarily as official authority). While studying securitization, it is vital to make a distinction between those who have the power and authority to securitize and those who are deprived of it.⁵³ What constitutes a security threat is formulated by those who have the authority of forming speech act.⁵⁴ But, who exactly are the actors? In most cases it is easier to identify the referent object (audience) than the securitizing actor.⁵⁵ The range of actors can vary from individuals, to bureaucracies, or, for example, to the state. There are instances where the speakers overlap and one actor is representing another. For example, Buzan *et al.* argue:

It is usually more relevant to see as the ‘speaker’ the collectivities (e.g. parties, states, or pressure groups) for example, France-materialized-as-de Gaulle

⁵² Buzan et al., 1998, 32

⁵³ Stritzel, 365

⁵⁴ Buzan et al., 1998, 40

⁵⁵ Ibid., 40

rather than the person de Gaulle. If one wants to downgrade the role of the analyst in defining actors, one option is to let other actors settle the matter. Other states treated de Gaulle as acting on behalf of France and held France responsible for his acts; thus, in the world of 'diplomatic France' was constituted as the actor (Manning 1962; Waever forthcoming-c).⁵⁶

To know who is in power to securitize, it is vital to understand whether individuals or the organizations are 'generally held responsible by other actors.' It is thus crucial to look at who speaks on whose behalf and under what conditions; who they represent. Sometimes an individual or an entity can speak for something else. For example, states have conditions of who can speak on its behalf. Whatever a government says, it represents the state and thus the two become synonymous.⁵⁷ Presidents, for example, can speak on the behalf of the state or a nation, when referring to 'American people' as the audience. President Bush addressing a nation and the Congress will undoubtedly have the authority to speak and try and convince the audience that certain extraordinary measures are essential in dealing with existential threats.

Power is not confined to the actor, but lies in the hands of the audience. Thus, 'security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects not with the subjects, but among the subjects.'⁵⁸ The Copenhagen School (CS) points out the ways in which an individual and humankind are inappropriate as referent objects. As a consequence, the School chooses the middle scale of limited collectivities (states, nations, and civilizations), which are the most suitable for the securitization theory as 'durable' referent objects. The success of choosing the limited collectivities lies in the fact that they 'engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction strengthens their 'we' feeling. Because they involve a reference to a 'we' they social constructs operative in the interaction among

⁵⁶ Ibid., 41

⁵⁷ Ibid., 41

⁵⁸ Buzan et al., 1998, 31

people.’⁵⁹ Other entities like firms, bureaucracies, and political regimes, cannot establish security legitimacy ‘in terms of a claim to survival.’⁶⁰

The relationship between the referent object and the securitizing actor is summarized in the following manner by the CS:

The difference between actor and referent object in any specific case will also usually mean there is a separate category of ‘audience,; those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue. One danger of the phrases securitization and speech act is that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act (Huysmans 1996).⁶¹

This overview gives us the conception of the division between the actor and the audience, and the emphasis is on the importance of the perceptions of the audience: whether their consent will legitimize actors’ actions or not. For the purpose of explaining the case examined in the thesis, the American people can be viewed as the audience. The ‘American people’ are granted the power to choose to either be convinced that the security measure taken against migrants, in this case.

In the process of constructing a successful threat through speech act, there are two elements that should be looked at: firstly, the internal or linguistic-grammatical part should be considered, where certain procedures that the actor has to undergo have to be taken into account. In addition, the external element should not be left out; certain circumstances should exist, or ‘the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.’⁶² The external condition of successful securitization is connected with threat. There are facilitating conditions, which do not

⁵⁹ Ibid., 36

⁶⁰ Ibid., 39

⁶¹ Ibid., 41

⁶² Buzan et al, 1998., 32

necessarily bring about securitization, but they play on the sentiment and emotion and can be used in the process of securitization. They can vary from massive influx of migrants to environmental catastrophes to financial crisis. Buzan *et al.* sum up the conditions, which are vital for the success of securitization:

After thus subdividing the social, external speech-act conditions into actor authority and threat related, we can sum up the facilitating conditions as follows: 1. The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, 2. The social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor-that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in securitizing attempt, and 3. Features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization.⁶³

The attacks on the World Trade Center serves as an appropriate circumstance to consider securitizing migration and especially Muslim and Arab migration, as the terrorists were mostly migrants from predominantly Muslim countries.

It is crucial to note that speech act does not necessarily utilize the concept 'security', and if it does, then it does not necessarily point to the existence of securitization. An issue that is designated as an existential threat and is dealt with accelerated measures takes priority over other problems and allows for breaching of rules. When it comes down to the type of material that security studies scholars should look at, the Copenhagen School argues that because security is never hidden in speech acts, a scholar who is interested in speech act, does not need to look at everything, especially at obscure texts, but rather look at important debates.⁶⁴ For clearer understanding of the process, several examples of speeches by public officials, presidents, bureaucracies can be sufficient to see whether and how threats are constructed.

⁶³ Ibid., 33

⁶⁴ Ibid, 177

2.2 Speech Act in Practice

Deriving from the speech act logic, it is thus important to assess securitization that is explicit and is performed by an actor, who is invested with authority. In this section, with some help from the secondary literature, four speeches by President Bush is analyzed as he is articulating security on the behalf of the state, as it was the case with De Gaulle and France. Unlike the European context, where the linkage between migration and terrorism was more or less unsuccessful, in the United States, the linkage was obvious in President Bush's speeches. Boswell indicates that in the European Union, although there was a securitization move, in the late 2001 discourse of fight against terrorism through migration policies was absent from the debates. The absence of the linkage between migration and terrorism was partially due to the fact that majority of the suspected terrorist were European nationals.⁶⁵ Huysmans argues a similar point how debates about migration/terrorism nexus in the British parliament faded already in the early 2002. This proved to be the case, for example, because the debates concerning the introduction of identity cards through by incorporating terrorist rhetoric turned out to be counterproductive 'for those seeking to introduce surveillance practice.'⁶⁶ Karyotis argues that the debates and practices were continuous and little has changes after the 9/11 attacks, which Neal argues that the lack of the migration/terrorism nexus in the public debate is due to the fact that what is done in the name of security can have a 'quiet' form.

⁶⁵ Boswell, 600

⁶⁶ Huysmans, 2008, 34

President Bush delivered a speech on the October 29, 2001 deviates from the usual framing of migration and links terrorism and migration. Tirman argues that “migration has long had security implications, but mostly linked to ‘social’ security – jobs, welfare, etc. Today it is the threat of terrorism that frames the debate. The fear-thus far, unfounded- that al Qaeda will sneak across the ‘ungrounded’ 2,000-mile border accounts for the urgency.”⁶⁷ President Bush underlines that although the United States is a country that welcomes legal migrants to study and work, nevertheless there are people who come to hurt Americans and those should not be welcomed. In an attempt to control migration, visa policies will be tightened and there is a justification of surveillance in the following sentence.

We're going to tighten up the visa policy. That's not to say we're not going to let people come into our country; of course we are. But we're going to make sure that when somebody comes, we understand their intended purpose and that they fulfill the purpose that they -- on their application.⁶⁸

Here, President Bush is cautious not to be severely targeting all immigrants, but simultaneously, he justifies the actions that will follow the attacks. He goes on:

Well, I haven't seen the numbers, but my view of the mood of the country is, is that the country understands we've entered into a new period in our history. And that there is a -- that lives are simply not going to be as normal as they were in the past. And that so long as there is terrorist activities in the world and aggression toward our country, that people are going to have to be diligent and on guard, and they are.⁶⁹

When he mentions that American lives are not going to be ‘normal’ is an explicit formulation of the state of exception that requires and justifies emergency measures.

Now, having said that, the American people are very patient, and they appreciate the efforts of the government, and they appreciate the efforts of our

⁶⁷ Tirman, 2

⁶⁸ The White House. (2001/10/29) President Increases Immigration Safeguards. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011029-15.html> 1

⁶⁹ Ibid., 1

military. They understand better than most, better than the world, that this is going to take a long period of time, and they are prepared for this.⁷⁰

Speaking on the behalf of the “American people’ is a way to justify the means that are going to be used to tackle the migration problem. Because all Americans understand the urgency of the problem, they will also understand the measures that will be taken.

He adds how the United States was the ‘most generous country in the world,’ that allowed people to ‘achieve a dream,’ but they never realized that people would take advantage of such a system. Here, the distinction between migrants as the ‘evildoers’ and Americans as victim of their own hospitality is apparent and further reinforce the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us.’

A more direct and obvious link between migration, security and terrorism is clear in the Presidential Directive-2, which is evident in the title as well, ‘Combating Terrorism through Immigration Policies.’

The United States has a long and valued tradition of welcoming immigrants and visitors. But the attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that some come to the United States to commit terrorist acts, to raise funds for illegal terrorist activities, or to provide other support for terrorist operations, here and abroad. It is the policy of the United States to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the United States.⁷¹

The statement shows that President Bush constructs migration as an existential threat to the society and in the further speech proposes extreme measures, to ‘1) deny entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity; and 2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the

⁷⁰ Ibid.,1

⁷¹ White House (2001/10/29) Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 9 <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-2.html> 1

United States.’⁷² The necessity of extreme measures materializes in the word ‘aggressively.’ Framing of migrants as ‘aliens’, which is mentioned twice in two sentences, indicates the division between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the aliens, those who are unlike us, foreign and thus dangerous. Again, this technique of construction of migration as a problem and as a terrorist threat carries the message that American’s have been so welcoming that the system was abused by the alien terrorists and the threat is continuous and requires emergency measures.

In the speech concerning immigration delivered on October 10, 2001, President Bush refers to the changes that will take place, such as visa regulations will be tightened to the extent that it will be made sure that the people who do acquire visas will be in the country for the purpose indicated on their application. In the end he emphasizes: ‘I also want to remind my fellow Americans as we round up the evildoers, as we look for those who might harm our fellow Americans, we must remember not to violate the rights of the innocent. Our war is not against a religion. Our war is against evil.’⁷³ The distinction of evil and religion and the innocent and the evil is clearly articulated. This leads to the analysis of the relationship between Arab/Muslim identity, migration and terrorism present in discourse.

As it is obvious from the discourse that speech act formulated by the political elite (government officials) that terrorism and migration to the US were linked directly terrorism. On the other hand, connecting migration to Muslim and Arab migrations as terrorists was strictly avoided. President Bush, in his speech delivered to a joint session of Congress and the Nation on 20 September 2001 highlights that US response (border control, migration policies, and such) would not be aimed at Muslims or Afghan people and terrorist and Arabs would not be perceived as evildoers. Although, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, President

⁷² Ibid., 1

⁷³ White House (2001/10/10) ‘Islam is Peace,’ says President <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011010-3.html>

Bush was using rhetoric that employed expressions like ‘us,’ ‘them,’ ‘they,’ ‘evil,’ ‘those people,’ ‘demons,’ ‘wanted: dead or alive,’⁷⁴ nevertheless, the explicit formulation of the link between terrorist, migrants and people of certain ethnicity is absent from his speeches. Gary Gerstle indicates that President Bush distanced himself from his predecessor Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt in a way that he deems discrimination and stigmatization of an ethnic, religious or cultural group because of the small number of terrorists as unacceptable and calls for the abolishment of link between the two.⁷⁵ President Bush impels the audience (the American people) to do the same and be compassionate and inclusive: ‘I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.’⁷⁶ According to this logic, in practice visa regulations, border control should not be directed to Muslim and Arab migrants or American Arabs and Muslims. Whether this is the case, is questionable at the point. Repeated and specific mentions of Muslims and Arabs stand out: ‘We must be particularly vigilant against racial discrimination in any of its ugly forms. Hitler will try again to breed mistrust and suspicion between one individual and another, one group and another, one race and another, one government and another.’⁷⁷ The same mistake should not be repeated, but the institutional practices tell a different story.

⁷⁴ Merskin, Debra. ‘The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush. *Mass Communication and Society*, 7, no. 2 (2004): 157-175. InformaWorld <http://www.informaworld.com>

⁷⁵ Gerstle, 107

⁷⁶ White House (2001/ 09/20) ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.’ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

⁷⁷ Schildkraut Deborah J. ‘The More Things Change...American Identity and Mass and Elite Responses to 9/11’ *Political Psychology*. *International Society of Political Psychology* 23, no. 3 (2002): 511-535. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org>

In his speech concerning the educational partnership with Muslim nations, on October 25, 2001, he once again mentions how Islam and terrorism should not be perceived as one and the same thing.

Americans believe in patriotism. We don't believe in prejudice. We're determined to fight terror. That's what we're going to do. And we're equally determined to build ties of trust and friendship with people all around the world -- particularly with children and people in the Islamic world.⁷⁸

He goes on to reiterate that 'We are not at war with Muslims. We don't have a beef with Muslims. We want to be friends with Muslims and Muslim children.'⁷⁹

It is very important for us to combat evil with understanding. It's very important for us re-enforce our message in all ways possible to the people in the Islamic world that we don't hold you accountable for what took place. As a matter of fact, we want to be friends. The average citizen in America harbors no ill will toward you. As a matter of fact, the average citizen in America would like to do everything we can to explain what our country is about, to explain what our future is about. And this is a great way to do this, in my judgment.⁸⁰

This is as much directed towards Muslims population, as it is to the American people, to distance one issue from another.

In his speech to the Remarks at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. September 17, President Bush once again urged his fellow Americans to understand the distinction between Islam and terrorism. In fact, he argues that Islam and terrorism are incompatible since Islam is peace: 'the face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent

⁷⁸ The White House. (2001/10/25) President Launches Education partnership with Muslim nations. Washington, DC. <http://georgewbush.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011025-2.html>

⁷⁹ Ibid., 1

⁸⁰ Ibid., 1

peace. They represent evil and war.’⁸¹ The stress on ‘every race’ and a universal approach to Islam in the following sentence stresses the necessity to be tolerant: “When we think of Islam, we think of a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and solace and peace. And that's made brothers and sisters out of every race -- out of every race.”⁸² He underlines exceptional inclusiveness, which is an integral part of the American identity, and which cannot be easily forgotten: “Women who cover their heads in this country must feel comfortable going outside their homes. Moms who wear cover must be not intimidated in America. That's not the America I know. That's not the America I value.”⁸³ He goes on to underline the American value system and the reasons of its greatness, where exclusion on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion would be intolerable. ‘This is a great country. It's a great country because we share the same values of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do. They're outraged, they're sad. They love America just as much as I do.’⁸⁴ Once again, President Bush stresses the uniqueness and the tolerant nature of American values, which are admirable to other parts of the world and which should not be underestimated.

During the NATO summit 2004, President Bush denied the ‘clash of civilizations’ between the Islamic world and the West, which is important in the way especially post-9/11 discourse revolved around the distinction. He mentioned:

Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is

⁸¹ White House (2001/10/10) ‘Islam is Peace,’ says President <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011010-3.html>

⁸² Ibid., 1

⁸³ Ibid., 1

⁸⁴ White House (2001/09/17) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html>

not the exclusive club of a single religion; it would expose the "clash of civilizations" as a passing myth of history. Fifteen years ago, an artificial line that divided Europe -- drawn at Yalta -- was erased. And now this continent has the opportunity to erase another artificial division -- by including Turkey in the future of Europe.⁸⁵

The rhetoric present in this section has domestic implications. When Bush underlines the absence of the 'clash of civilizations,' and the need to further erase the line between the West and the Islamic world, he implicitly refers to the United States, as he in this case speaks on the behalf of the state.

Overall, President Bush's rhetoric can be seen as inclusive to Muslims and Arabs, where the fight is directed at terrorists specifically, and not against migrants of Arab or Muslim background. This, however, does not mean that Muslim/Arab travelers or migrants to the United States were not attacked in public, but the case has been openly condemned by even the most conservatives. Schildkraut indicates the case when Republican John Cooksey mentioned in a radio interview that people wearing 'diapers on their heads' should be subject to more scrutiny while traveling on airlines (Alpert & Walsh, 2001). His words, however, were severely criticized by the *Washington Post* and columnists in his home state's *Times-Picayune* of New Orleans. Louisiana Republicans criticized the statements, despite the fact that he was still supporting ethnic profiling. Schildkraut emphasizes that this has been the only point till 2002 (when the article was published) that public officials made such open remarks 'that so blatantly recall the prevailing norms of an earlier era.'⁸⁶ Although, there are other instances where President Bush speaks about migration, where he is arguing for more 'control' at the borders, simultaneously, he is arguing that Islam, terrorism and Arabs and Muslim migrants should not be ascribed to the same category.

⁸⁵ Bush, G.W. 'George Bush addresses the NATO summit in Turkey'.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/29/eu.nato1>

⁸⁶ Schildkraut, 522

When comparing elite rhetoric and audience responses to the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the attacks of September 11, Debora Schildkraut argues that due to the change in the American identity, elite rhetoric is vastly different than is the response of the audience or Americans. According to the author, ‘domestic developments’ do not revolve around ethnic or cultural themes and it is not likely that this will change. Diversity and social and political changes in the past fifty years demonstrate that what it means to be American, thus ethnic-based policies are avoided.⁸⁷ Thus, if Americans consider themselves to be inclusive and ethnically diverse, it will be harder to justify actions that would be based on ethnicity, religion or race. Although, there is still some degree of identification of White Americans as ‘true’ Americans, nevertheless, there is a counterforce of inclusive tradition that challenges this conception of American identity. According to this logic, it would not be very likely to consider identifying Muslim or Arab migrants as security threats and directly linking them to security issues like terrorism. Schildkraut mentions: ‘examples of this counterbalancing force include George W. Bush’s immediate plea for Americans to avoid ethnic profiling and intense media commentary promoting a multiethnic conception of American identity.’⁸⁸

Another question is how the response of the audience to the issue. What problem do they see in immigration of Muslims and Arabs and how does this translate to their notions of ‘extreme measures’ that should be done in pursuit of defending the security.

2.3 The Audience ‘Responds’

The audience part of securitization is important, since a successful securitization takes place only if the audience accepts what is securitized and how this is done. It is peculiar that although Bush tried to convince the public about the distinction between terrorist migrants and Muslim/Arab migrants, the audience was ready to frame Arab/Muslims immigrants as

⁸⁷ Schildkraut, 532
⁸⁸ Ibid., 520

threats already in the late September. Cankar points out that ‘shortly after the attacks of 9/11, public opinion polls showed widespread support for the special treatment of Arabs in America.’⁸⁹ The intensity of the events, and the fact that the images of two planes crashing into the World Trade Center, ‘embedded them in the public consciousness.’⁹⁰ It is argued by some scholars like Michael Williams, the US government needed little justification or legitimization through rhetoric due to this type of response from the public.

Public opinion maintained that immigration in general should be decreased. In an October/November poll when asked about the level of migration to the United States, 33 percent of the respondents answered that the current level of migration should be maintained. More than half of the respondents (around 52 percent) thought that immigration should be decreased and only eight percent thought that immigration should be increased.⁹¹ When looking at the public opinion about immigration policies in the fight against terrorism, Spencer relies on the polls conducted in 2001 and argues that there is a high level of support among the public for such a move. He points out that not long after 9/11, 89 percent of the respondents thought that it is acceptable to detain immigrants. In addition, he emphasizes the racial profiling of people from the Middle East that is evident among the findings. The same poll found that 72 percent gave their consent for ethnic profiling and men who looked Middle

⁸⁹ Cankar, Louis. ‘The Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Arab and Muslim Community in the United States.’ In *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11*, 215-238, edited by John Tirman. New York: The New Press, 2004 225

⁹⁰ Mabee, Bryan. ‘Re-imagining the Borders of US Security after 9/11: Securitization, Risk, and the Creation of the Department of Homeland Security.’ *Globalizations* 4, no. 3 (2007): 385-397

<http://www.informaworld.com> 390

⁹¹ Moor, Kathleen M. ‘United We Stand’: American Attitudes toward (Muslim) Immigration post-September 11th. *The Muslim World*. 92 (2002): 39-58 <http://macdonald.hartsem.edu/articles/mooreart1.pdf> 43

Eastern (TNS Intersearch 2001). 92 percent were for restricted immigration rules in the fight against terrorism (opinion Dynamics Poll 2001).⁹²

A poll conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs at the University of Illinois in December 2001, shows that 70 percent of Illinois residents were ‘willing to sacrifice their civil rights to fight terrorism, and more than one-quarter of respondents said Arab Americans should surrender more rights than others.’⁹³ Two Gallup polls conducted in late September, 2001 shows that majority of Americans were supporting profiling of Arabs, even those who are American citizens, and the majority favored using special security checks while Arab/Muslim boarded planes. A March 5, 2002 CNN/Gallup/USA *Today* poll found that nearly 60 percent of Americans favored reducing the number of admissions to the US of immigrants from Muslim countries and an August 8, 2002 Gallup poll found that a majority of the American public said that there are ‘too many’ immigrants from Arab countries.⁹⁴ Two ABC News/Beliefnet polls show the rise in unfavorable view of the religion from 24 percent in January 2002 to 33 percent in 2002. In addition, people who said that Islam does not teach to respect other faiths rose from 22 percent to 35 percent.⁹⁵

The Time/CNN taken after September 11, when asked whether they would allow federal government to ‘hold Arabs who are U.S. citizens in camps until it can be determined whether they have links to terrorist organizations,’ 31 percent gave a positive answer. In the Newsweek Poll when asked whether United States government ‘should put Arabs and Arab-Americans in the country under special surveillance,’ 32 percent of the respondents answered

⁹² Spencer, Alexander. ‘Using Immigration Policies as a Tool in the War on Terror.’ *Crossroads*. 7, no. 1. (2007): 17-53 http://www.webasa.org/Pubblicazioni/Spencer_2007_1.pdf 45

⁹³ Cankar, 225

⁹⁴ Louise, 23

⁹⁵ Cankar, 225

yes.⁹⁶ News/Washington Poll when asked whether they would give police the power to stop anyone on the street who looks Arab or Muslim, 44 percent of the respondents gave a positive answer, 28 percent said that they give consent to the government to profile Muslims as they are the primary suspects of in terrorist activities and 39 percent said that there are more suspicious of people they think to be of Arab descent.⁹⁷ The result of the poll show the success of securitization of Arab/Muslims as security threats to the society, however, these answers include Arab-Americans as well. An ABC New/Washington poll taken in October of 2001 found that 44 percent of respondents said that they are willing to invest the power in the police to stop anyone at random, if they look like they might be Arab or Muslim. 28 percent gave a positive response when asked if they thought being Arab or Muslim should be taken into account in profiling of suspected terrorists, and 39 percent said that they have become personally suspicious of people who resemble Arabs or Muslims.⁹⁸

Basing the assumption on the polls, the audience, was for profiling Arab/Muslim migrants, in opposition to what President Bush urged them to do. The Securitization through speech act migration was present, as discussed in the above chapter, but, concurrently, there were no racial or ethnic undertones were absent. Ethnicity and Religion were not securitized in the speech act. The opposite can be argued about the audience. Several authors tried to incorporate visual imagery of 9/11 terrorist attacks to understand their influence on the public perception of the enemy.⁹⁹ Balzaq's idea of discursive context should be considered here, as

⁹⁶ Schildkraut, 525

⁹⁷ Ibid., 526

⁹⁸ Ibid., 525-26

⁹⁹ Michael Williams (2003) claims that television images of the attacks were crucial in shaping the 'dominant perceptions of security in the American context.'⁹⁹ Lene Hansen (2007) relies on the example of the controversy about the Danish cartoons, to make a similar point. Matt Macdonald explains that the extensions of the theory, however, are more contested than it seems. In this case, the actor is not the state or political elite, but artists and the media. This contests the idea of the intentionality of threat construction, and the legitimization of existential threat,⁹⁹ which is outside of the scope of the paper.

Muslim and Arabs have been stereotypes as brutal, evil and irrational through various ways prior to 9/11, as indicated by Debra Merskin.¹⁰⁰

The following chapter elucidates how Muslims and Arabs were securitized through institutional practices. The further analysis shows that while securitizing migration and terrorism, specific group was 'silently' securitized, needing no construction in the public discourse.

¹⁰⁰ Merskin, 164

Chapter 3: Securitization of Migration through Institutional Practices

In this chapter of the thesis I will provide a brief overview of theoretical framework relying on Bigo and Huysmans about migration and how it can be securitized through practice and for what reasons. An in the following empirical study, I will argue that specifically Muslim and Arab migrants were excluded on the level of institutional practices, which was absent in the speech act. The securitization practice of immigrants, especially those of Muslim/Arab identity, is obvious on the institutional level and through bureaucratic practices and profiling of groups. What explains the gap between the two? Isn't justification need in order for the audience to accept a threat as existential and have no objections to 'emergency measures?'

3.1 Theoretical Background

Bigo and Huysmans argue that the conceptualization of securitization through discourses of drama and emergency leaves out the bureaucratic routines and the 'effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional.' According to Bigo, a series of established practices is at times a better way of understanding threat construction than speech acts that legitimize emergency measures. These actions are hardly legitimized in advance as there is little discussion of these matters.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Williams, 570

This becomes obvious at borders, where the concrete everyday practices are undertaken by the police and groups of 'security professional.' Drawing on Foucault and Bourdieu, Bigo explains that 'networks of surveillance and data-mining help to create a 'security state' where everybody is under electronic surveillance.'¹⁰² Huysmans in his 2006 book *The Politics of Insecurity* explains that the most suitable approach in understanding securitization of migration is relying on discourse analysis as well as technological and technocratic practices, which help in the exclusion of certain types of migrants and asylum seekers in the European Union.

3.2 Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies through Institutional Practices:

After 9/11 there were several and quite clear ways in which Arabs and Muslims were targeted through institutional practices and border patrol at home (the United States) and at the US border. Although, the rules and laws that were amended after the attacks were intended for migrants in general, majority of them specifically dealt with Muslims and Arabs. Cainkar explains how these provisions and legal changes were implemented, without the need for public debate:

The United States government implemented a wide range of domestic legislative, administrative, and judicial measures in the name of national security and the war on terrorism after the terror attacks of September 11. Most of them were designed and have been carried out by the executive branch of government, with little a priori discussion or debate.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Bigo, Bigo, Didier (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives* 27 (Special Issue): 63-92.

¹⁰³ Cainkar, 2004, 215

This statement, once again, shows the difference between the speech act and the practices and the lack of necessity of justifying severe measures taken against the Muslim and Arab migrants.

Although, other immigrants became victims of the new law-enforcement, for example, those coming from Latin America, the laws were most ‘ferocious’ to Arabs and Muslims trying to enter the border.¹⁰⁴ Alexander Spencer points out the existence ‘immediate backlash’ and the related measures that were aimed at immigrants in general in the U.S., for example, the increase in personnel at their borders, stricter visa control and such.¹⁰⁵ These changes are targeting all migrants and visitors to the U.S., but the difference in ethnic profiling is evident in, for example, the following statistics. As a result of conducting a research concerning the decrease in the number of immigrants to the U.S., the study found that in fiscal year 2002 that visas awarded to Muslims and Arabs decreased 39 percent. The same trend is evident in other parts of the world, but not on the same scale. Europe experienced 15 percent decrease; Asians (excluding special registration countries) experienced a 24 percent decrease, and Africans, a 23 percent decrease.¹⁰⁶ In around 20 rules that were introduced in the aftermath of 9/11, 15 were targeting Arabs.¹⁰⁷ In the above mentioned statistics, the difference between migrants in general and of specific religion and ethnic background is clear.

Executive Order 9066 does not refer to a specific ethnic group, but gives way to ethnic-based policy implementation, where restrictions can be applied based on migrant’s country of origin. In line with this, the ethnic based approach in policies is apparent when FBI randomly conducted interviews of 5,000 men who came from the Middle East to the

¹⁰⁴ Tirman, 1

¹⁰⁵ Spencer, 21

¹⁰⁶ Cainkar, 2004, 222

¹⁰⁷ Cainkar, 2002, 26

United States.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the visa application process has become extremely lengthy and difficult. Even a non-immigrant visa, which could be acquired in several days or weeks, the process, might take months.¹⁰⁹

Karen C. Tumlin argues that there are five main ways or policies in which administration has put the two: immigration and profiling together. First, it was manifested in the arrests, which were made immediately after the terrorist attack. Second, the voluntary interviews conducted by Department of Justice, where DOJ planed to interview 5,000 men who were in the age range of eighteen and thirty-three and who were not citizens and were coming from countries with ‘al Qaeda presences.’ The third way in which profiling is obvious is in creation of ‘special registration’ or National Security Entry and Exit Registry System (NSEERS). The fourth way in which the merging of immigration policy and profiling took place severely affected asylum seekers. The policy Operation Liberty Shield, propounds that “that asylum seekers fleeing persecution in one of thirty-four ‘al Qaeda’ nations may be immediately detained while their claims are adjudicated.’ The overall number of refugees admitted to the United States significantly decreased since 2001. In 1999 the United States admitted 85 006 refugees, 72 515 in 2000, 68 426 in 2001 while only 26, 622 were let into the country in 2002 and 28 306 in 2003 (Refugee Council USA 2003).¹¹⁰ The final result or manifestation of the policy was to deport illegal immigrants under the ‘Absconder Apprehension Initiative.’

Susan Akram and Maritza Karmely add on to the list of ways in which the newly adopted policies ‘criminalized’ migration and point out that after 9/11 is that the state and local authorities have been granted authorization to enforce the immigration laws for the first

¹⁰⁸ Schildkraut, 520

¹⁰⁹ Tirman, 2005, 2

¹¹⁰ Spencer, 36

time.¹¹¹ The changes became obvious in the acquisition of nonimmigrant visas as well. In October 2001, there was a mandatory twenty-day hold on all nonimmigrant visa applications, mostly belonging to men between the ages of eighteen to forty-five from twenty-six Muslim countries. These applications needed formal approval in Washington, and the applicants were not notified of the time limit. These provisions had influenced everyone from students, to professors and researchers, Fulbright Scholars, medical and chemotherapy patients, artists, and musicians, and businessmen.¹¹²

Homeland Security Act was undoubtedly the most prominent manifestation of fight against terrorism through migration. Above mentioned Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, named ‘Combating Terrorism through Immigration Policies,’ was issued by President Bush on October 29, 2001, that bureaucratically linked immigration and security. The directive proposed to ‘deny entry into the United State of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity; and to locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the United States.’¹¹³

The U.S. Patriot Act introduced on October 26, 2001 enabled the attorney general to arrest and prosecute aliens when deemed necessary. He would only have to declare that the suspicion exists in involvement in terrorism to ‘justify the potentially indefinite ‘mandatory detention’¹¹⁴ and the suspicion can be based on person’s spoken words. Another way of ‘controlling’ terrorist activities is through the introduction of special registration, implemented through the Patriot Act.¹¹⁵ The aim of the act is to tighten exclusion at the US border, in pursuit of maintaining internal security. ‘It requires ‘certain’ nonimmigrant aliens

¹¹¹ Akram, Susan M. and Maritza Karmely. “Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a distinction without a Difference?” U.C Davis Law Review. 38, no. 3 (2005) 609-699. InformaWorld. <http://www.informaworld.com>

¹¹² Cainkar, 2004, 222

¹¹³ Ibid., 216

¹¹⁴ Cainkar, 2004,

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 217-221

to register with the U.S. immigration authorities, be fingerprinted and photographed, respond to questioning, and submit to routine reporting requirement for immigrants who are from ‘al Qaeda’ countries and those who are not legal permanent residents. The targeted aliens were male visitors aged sixteen to sixty-four from twenty-three Muslim-majority countries, plus heavily Muslim Eritrea and North Korea. Special registration was required both of Persons already in the United States and of those newly entering. It was announced that this program would include everyone (all visiting aliens), but this never happened. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security announced the cancelation of the program.¹¹⁶ When asked, government authorities avoided explaining to why these people specifically from these countries were selected for the program. At times they stated that these countries (whose citizens and nationals were required to register) were selected because of the presence of al Qaeda there, although countries with no known al Qaeda presence were included, and countries with proven al Qaeda presence, such as Germany and England, were excluded.¹¹⁷ INS fact sheets tried to clarify the matter by stating, ‘registration is based solely on nationality and citizenship, not on ethnicity or religion,’¹¹⁸ Pamela Jackson underlines that through these changes and the lack of integration of the immigrant populations because of the fight against terrorism, further divide and isolation of these groups is a likely outcome,¹¹⁹ something that will reinforce the ‘us’ ‘them’ dichotomy.

Gerstle indicates the specific cases where Arab and Muslim immigrants were singled out and targeted not as much through the immigration restriction acts, but through a series of administrative acts undertaken by federal authorities. For example, months after the attacks,

¹¹⁶ Cainkar, 218

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 218

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 219

¹¹⁹ Jackson, Pamela Irving and Roderick Parkes. ‘Globalization and the Securitization of Immigration Policy: Competing Influences on Immigration Integration Policy in Germany, France, and the United States.’ *Human Architecture Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*. IV Special Issue, (2006): 131-146
<http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20IV%20Special/JacksonParkes-FM.pdf> 144

the government obliged immigration officials to conduct interviews with five thousand men who were coming from the Middle East or other Muslim countries. Some of these interviews lead on to the deportation of those questioned. Subsequently, in February 2003, the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) began to fingerprint 44,000 immigrants coming specifically from Arab and Islamic countries. Gerstle sums up succinctly: ‘A federal noose has tightened around Muslim and Arab immigration, giving the government the ability to choke it off altogether.’¹²⁰

Pamela Irvin Jackson, referring to John Tirman and argues that the Patriot Act and the Homeland security provisions dealing with immigration, attacked Muslim men in America. Jackson emphasizes the construction of the ‘other’ effect present with the introduction of these provisions:

In the status of Muslim immigrants in America is becoming apparent, isolating them further from mainstream society, with doubts about their ‘legality, utility and social or cultural acceptability.’ – “cultural securitization” national identity is thus defined in contradiction to the ‘other’ of the ‘outsider.’ Cultural securitization results, in part, from national actors’ attempts at self-legitimization in an unstable setting.¹²¹

The ‘cultural securitization,’ has an enormous effect on the construction of specific ethnic or religious group into ‘others.’ Tirman goes on to underline once more that the securitization of immigration policy is not without ethnic discrimination, as significantly more than half of the Pakistanis, Iranians, and Arabs when asked about the changes in the way they have been treated after 9/11 responded that they have been victims. According to

¹²⁰ Gertstle, Gary. “The Immigrant As Threat to American Security: A Historical Perspective.’ In *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11*, 87-109, edited by John Tirman. London, New York: The New Press, 2004.

¹²¹ Pamela Irvin Jackson, 132-33

him this ‘may reflect the impact of harsher immigration policies, rhetoric, news media coverage, and vigilante groups.’¹²²

September 11, 2001, transformed the landscape of global security, none more than borders and immigration. The topography of citizenship, belonging, and suspicion instantly changes for Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. They drew the sharp attention of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence services, and that continues.¹²³

In addition, many of migrants were detained for crimes without being charged, some were deported for minor violations. Student visas began to be harder to obtain. “Another 500 people have been charged with immigration violations,” said a Washington Post investigation last year,’ after an initial report linking them to terrorism or homeland security threat” was released.¹²⁴ In November, the Justice Department declared that they were going to interview some 5,000 individuals who specifically came to the US from Arab and Muslim countries since January 1, 2000 on non-immigrant visas. In a short period of time the number grew to additional 3,000 persons.¹²⁵ On top of this, everyday confrontations, searches and examinations in international airports demonstrated the anti-immigration approach to Muslims and Arabs on a smaller scale.

The re-emergence of racial profiling in the federal law enforced after 9/11, according to Tumlin, has been the core of the immigration and immigrants policy. Not all citizens are equally considered to be suspect of terrorist acts, immigrants from nations with purported ties to al Qaeda.’ This type of profiling merges immigration with nationality, religion and terrorism and targets immigrants from nations with sizable Muslim populations for selective enforcement of immigration laws. The combination of Muslim/Arab identity and immigrant

¹²² Tirman, 3

¹²³ Ibid., 1

¹²⁴ Cainkar, 2002, 27

¹²⁵ Ibid., 27

status already signifies danger of terrorism; ‘immigration status alone, without these nationality or religion plus factors, does not trigger heightened scrutiny.’¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Tumlin, Karen C. “How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy.” *California Law Review* 92, no. 4 (2004), 1173-1239 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3481320>. 1186

Conclusion

It is being argued that 9/11 marked a further securitization of migration in the Western countries, based on the fear of terrorism. As argued by Boswell, Neal, and Huysmans, the public discourse, and to some extent institutional practices was not include the linkage of migration and terrorism in the European Union. In the United States, 9/11 marked the migration/terrorism nexus became apparent both in speech act as well as in institutionalized practices. Looking closely to the institutionalized practices, it becomes evident that Muslims and Arabs were more severely targeted than any other migrants through newly-implemented policies and every-day practices. Their construction as the 'others,' is obvious in the way the audience perceived the issue. The linkage between terrorism and the Muslim other, on the other hand, was completely absent from the discourse. Even more, President Bush on many occasions tried to de-securitize the Muslim 'other,' in reference to ethnicity and religion, and urged the public to do the same. How can this development be explained by the Copenhagen School?

According to the securitization theory propounded by the Copenhagen School, the speech act is crucial to legitimize the constitutional exceptionalism of special policies; it has to make an audience 'tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise be obeyed.'¹²⁷ This is true especially in liberal democracies. Although there are placed where the violation of rights is accepted and where acts performed on the account of security do not require legitimization, this is not characteristic of democratic systems.¹²⁸ The thesis put this claim under the question mark.

¹²⁷ Buzan et al., 1998, 25

¹²⁸ Buzan et al., 1998, 24

In the context considered in the thesis, the dynamics between the audience and the actor do not play out in this one-way causal relationship. What we have witnessed in the case of Muslim and Arab non-citizens is that there is a gap between the speech acts (where the linkage of Arab/Muslim migrants to terrorism was absent) and the policies targeting Arab and Muslim immigrants and framing them as potential terrorists are contradictory. This required re-conceptualization of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. In order to understand the absence of speech act, it might be necessary to consider the context, which according to Matt Macdonald remains under-theorized by the Copenhagen School. It should also be kept in mind how the American identity and the shift in more liberal understanding of what being American means, influences how much can be articulated about 'the other' in public. In addition, it will be helpful to look at the context of discourse, as mentioned by Balzacq, where Muslims and Arabs have been constructed as threats and this is embedded in the discourse for decades and simultaneously in the public consciousness. Simultaneously, it is also important to mention that the relationship between speech act and practice, where speech act legitimizes practices, does not necessarily have to be a one-way-directional relationship. Boswell mentions 'administrative agencies may adopt *securitarian* practices without a prior green light from political discourse, as indeed the case of data utilization at EU level implies.'¹²⁹ Thus, Copenhagen School's securitization theory should be extended to look at more flexible way of threat construction that is available among the second generation theorists. In addition, it will be helpful if the theory will look closely at how one issue for example migration leads to securitization of another issue (Muslim/Arab identity), because as the case demonstrated, especially in liberal democratic societies, the actor will try and avoid targeting specific type of migrants explicitly, but can perform securitization in practice.

¹²⁹ Boswell, 606

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