

# Does Education Matter for Democracy? An International Comparison of the Effect of Education on Democratic Attitudes and Xenophobia

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## Abstract

*The MA thesis investigates the educational effect on support for civil liberties, support for democratic ideals and xenophobia. The purpose of the thesis is to unravel the connective mechanisms of the educational process and three attitudinal characteristics of democratic citizenship by testing three possible theories for its explanation. The study relies on quantitative measures and employs cross-nationally comparable measurements as a prerequisite of wider generalizations on a large sample of countries around the world. Three general multilevel models are proposed accounting for the political regime type at the macro-level. The models join the micro- and macro- level conclusions in a cross-level analysis of democratic attitudes and xenophobia, using first the individuals and then the national states as the unit of analysis and two aggregated variables for democratic attitudes and one for xenophobia as the dependent variables. While the assumptions of both the psychodynamic theory and the socialization theory about the connective mechanism between the effect of education on democratic norms and values find support in the present analysis, the results suggest that the ideological refinement model needs further rethinking.*

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## 1. Introduction

The stability, legitimacy and effectiveness of political regimes depend on the diffusion of the values which support them within the population. Some indeed argue that the prevailing political culture seems to be more essential for the functioning of political systems than its formal institutional arrangements (Almond and Verba 1963, xiii, Easton 1965, Inglehart 1988, Jaros and Canon 1969, 94). The knowledge of how certain political values become internalized by citizens is therefore crucial. Since schools occupy a large proportion of the time and focus of individuals during the most formative years of their lives, philosophers, political leaders, as well as educators have seen formal educational practices as the key for the grounding of desired political values (Jaros and Canon, 1969, 94). Some scholars (McClosky 1964, Prothro and Grigg 1960, Jackman and Miller 1996, Rothstein 2005) argue that the institutional arrangements, the nature of party systems or the values and behavior of elites have a stronger and more straightforward impact on the stability of democracy than political culture. “As the 'new institutionalism' indicates, the organization of political life has important consequences for the nature of politics generally and interethnic group relations specifically. Institutions shape political conflict by creating opportunities and incentives for elites to mobilize citizens; moreover, they help structure the nature of political discourse” (Weldon 2006, 331). Indeed, empirical evidence does not unequivocally support the belief that a democratic political culture is the necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a democratic regime.

Nonetheless, when looking at multiple historical examples of democratic failures, once a democracy is established, its quality and survival seem to require popular legitimacy, citizen

participation, acceptance of the rules of the game and policies and a necessary resistance to the allurements of anti-system movements and leaders (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, 752). “To maintain the stability of a political system/culture, it must directly or indirectly transfer political knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, values, ideologies and behavioral intentions and predispositions from one generation to another” (Farnen and Meloen 2001, 4). Studying the conditions of effective learning of democratic norms and values, thus, advances our understanding of functioning democratic regimes. Moreover, theorists of democracy have concurred that it is the establishment of appropriate norms in the citizens that is the most reliable and effective method of minority rights protection (Jackman and Muha 1984, 752).

How does educational attainment influence political values? What accounts for the positive effect of education on democratic norms? These are, in a broad sense, the questions the present thesis investigates. More specifically, it provides the answers to the questions whether the positive effect of education on democratic attitudes and the negative effect of education on xenophobia vary systematically across countries or whether they can be regarded as universal, what macro- and micro- level characteristics influence the most the educational effect and whether political system factors and individual characteristics of the higher educated citizens contribute to the cross-national variation. The substantial spread of democratic forms of government during the second half of the twentieth century justifies the interest in empirical research in this area. The identification of the circumstances under which the positive effect of education materializes may provide some policy recommendations for promoting certain values through educational institutions.

At least in democratic political systems, different forms of political participation and the subsequent representation and influence in politics are “systematically biased in favor of more

privileged citizens – those with higher incomes, greater wealth, and better education” (Lijphart 1997, 1). These findings even led some theorists to conclude that the stability of the democratic systems in fact relies substantially on the apathy of the poorly educated. “In most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most undemocratic principles are also those who are least likely to act” (Prothro and Grigg 1960, 294, for similar arguments see also e.g. McClosky 1964). Setting aside the problems of the systematic bias in representation in favor of the higher educated, the following thesis will assess the relative contribution of the well educated to the endorsement of democratic values and therefore to democratic stability.

The positive effect of education on political tolerance towards nonconformity and political tolerance in general (see e.g. Stouffer 1955, Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978), particularly on political and social libertarianism (Stubager 2008, Van de Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004), and the different democratic norms have been credited by many scholars. A greater amount of educational attainment correlates with political participation (Almond and Verba 1963, Milbrath 1965) and embracement of other values regarded as congruent with democracy such as fundamental democratic principles and underlying ideas on which the democratic political system is based (Prothro and Grigg 1960, McClosky 1964, Bobo and Licari 1989). Previous empirical research (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997, Seltzer, Frazier, and Ricks 1995, 134, Vogt 1997) on the effect of education on political tolerance has reported, especially in the White American population but also in some European countries, as one of its most solid findings the negative relationship between educational attainment and hostile least-liked group attitudes. Higher educated individuals seem to show, for example, less support for ethnic exclusionism (Coenders 2001), fewer prejudices against minorities (Schuman et al. 1997) and a lower amount of anti-Semitism (Weil 1985).

The purpose of this thesis is to research the educational effect not on political tolerance in general, usually broadly operationalized in the literature based on Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982, 23) as the “willingness to permit the expression of those ideas and interests that one opposes”, but on democratic attitudes and xenophobia. The reasons why I chose to research only particular determinants of the general notion of political tolerance is that - since I conduct a cross-national analysis - as Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003, 248) have rightly pointed out in a slightly different context, it is feasible that within specific historical circumstances even a citizen holding otherwise democratic values could reach a conclusion that in order to protect democratic institutions, a communist, fascist or a citizen in general disloyal to the democratic state should not be permitted to hold a politically sensitive post. Such restraint is, mostly for historical reasons, in some countries even mentioned in the constitution, as for example in Germany. Apart from these problems usually associated with large-scale surveys, trying to find cross-national patterns in terms of democratic attitudes and xenophobia is difficult due to these attitudes being context-dependent. Respondents in various countries might interpret them differently and thus the variables might measure different aspects. Moreover, the framing of the questions and their different understanding in various contexts poses a serious limitation to generalizations as well. However, “it is the very intention of cross-national comparisons to reveal latent patterns and their determinants, together underlying situational differences” (Weiss 2003, 385). The choice to research democratic attitudes and xenophobia were instead of political tolerance as a whole was thus guided also by the wish to diminish the aforementioned problems. Therefore, I will concentrate on the least controversial and more cross-nationally comparable determinants of democratic attitudes. I use this generic term to summarize general support for democratic principles and civil liberties but also lack of xenophobia, the term I use to summarize the

hostility towards foreigners. Hence, before proceeding to the study of democratic attitudes, it is necessary to stress that both democratic values and xenophobia are seen as an integral part of political tolerance in general, when the latter can be at times predicted by the former.

At first, xenophobia might not seem to be directly negatively connected with democratic attitudes. Nevertheless, democracy is based on certain principles. The crucial and necessary dimension of democracy is freedom, but most theorists (see for example Dahl 1956, Downs 1957, Morlino 2004, Bühlmann, Merkel, and Wessels 2008) stress that democracy also assumes political equality.<sup>1</sup> “Tolerance, like liberty and equality, is a fundamental principle of the liberal democratic creed. It requires citizens to uphold and secure the rights of groups, even those they find objectionable, to participate fully in political, social, and economic life” (Weldon 2006, 331). Therefore, in a democracy majority rule has to be attenuated with minority rights in order to avoid “the tyranny of the majority” (de Tocqueville [1850] 1994, see also Mill [1859] 1986, Dahl 1956). Democratic values in the present thesis consequently refer to placing a high value on aspects of the “democratic creed” such as rule of law, freedom of speech and *also* minority rights. Thus, xenophobia is included in the analysis following Habermas’s *Verfassungspatriotism* (1995) concept and similarly oriented theorists (see for example also Müller 2007) that rely on the assumption that in a democratic community citizens should develop strong attachments to a democratic constitution that is free from any reference to a particular tradition and culture of the nation. Thus, liberal states should be to a certain extent voluntary associations founded on a contract in which citizenship would be ideally based on shared principles of justice and democracy, together with a commitment to

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<sup>1</sup> Additionally, according to Bühlmann (et al. 2008, 7-13) the “basic determinants of democracy” and the three “fundamental principles” are equality, freedom and control, when control is understood as *control by* and *control of* the government.

acknowledge the practical and moral responsibility for the community's dark past (Habermas 1995, Müller 2007). Political tolerance may thus be also defined as the willingness to extend the rights of citizenship to all members of the polity. That is, to allow political freedoms to those who are politically different (Gibson and Bingham, 1982). Entailed in a democratic position is thus a basic respect for other people – including those who deviate from one's own norms. Hence, this thesis sets out to improve this line of previous quantitative attitudinal research and investigates the relationship between educational attainment and support for democratic norms and values. I focus on three realms of democratic norms and values: support for democracy as an ideal regime as well as support for civil liberties and xenophobia, since, as mentioned above, negative attitudes towards minorities and ethnic prejudice can be seen as comparable with undemocratic attitudes.

Even though the positive effect of education on political tolerance has been found in different countries, the universality of the “liberalizing” effect of education has been brought into question by preliminary cross-national studies, since in several countries education was found to be only a moderate determinant of political tolerance (see e.g. Muller, Pesonen, and Jukam 1980, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 1980, Weil 1985, McIntosh, Abele-MacIver, Abele, and Nolle 1995). Moreover, it has been shown that in countries with a short democratic tradition (Weil 1985, Coenders and Scheepers 2003) and religiously homogeneous countries (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002) the effect of education on ethnic prejudice is less strong. Nevertheless, the existing literature still suffers from a substantial lack of cross-nationally comparable empirical evidence since previous studies contain several shortcomings, such as the examination of one country at a time (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995, Hello, Scheepers, and Slegers 2006), using only a small set of countries (Weil 1985, McIntosh et al. 1995) or the incomparability of measurements in cross-national research (Weil

1985). Thus, my prime research interest is the question whether the positive effect of education is universal. In order to provide more general evidence of the positive relationship between educational attainment and democratic attitudes and of the negative relationship between educational attainment and xenophobia and to test it more extensively, the present thesis will employ cross-nationally comparable measurements as a prerequisite of wider generalizations on a large and diverse sample of countries around the world.

Previous studies do not usually seek to explain variances in the effect of education (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 1980) or do not test them systematically at the country level (Muller et al. 1980, McIntosh et al. 1995, Coenders 2001). Firstly, the thesis will document whether the strength of the educational effect on democratic attitudes and xenophobia varies cross-nationally. Secondly, it is then crucial to test how this influence is exerted. General explanations for the association of education and political tolerance - when found - are still controversial and unresolved, as well as those explaining the cross-national variations. Therefore, utilizing several prominent comparative theories, the present thesis will set to test the link between individual and system-level political experiences and the support for democratic ideals within the higher educated. The purpose of the research is to present empirical results of a cross-level, cross-national quantitative analysis of the relationship between education and two types of democratic attitudes and xenophobia. To do so, I propose to construct three general multilevel models with several micro- level characteristics and one macro- level variable using secondary survey data from the World Value Survey 2005 - 2008 wave for the micro-level models and aggregate level data on political systems at the macro-level. The models estimate the characteristics deriving from existing research and join the micro- and macro- level conclusions in a cross-level analysis of democratic attitudes and xenophobia, using first the individuals and then the national states as the unit of analysis and

two variables for democratic attitudes and one for xenophobia as the dependent variables. The purpose of the thesis is to unravel the connective mechanisms of the educational process and various characteristics of democratic citizenship. The models I am proposing explain which micro- and macro- level characteristics give rise to democratic attitudes among the higher educated mass public.

The thesis investigates two main problems. First, I research whether the positive effect of education on democratic attitudes and the negative effect of education on xenophobia can be found universally in 48 selected countries worldwide. Focusing on the relationship between educational and democratic attitudes and xenophobia I address the question how universal is the relationship between levels of education and democratic (positive) and xenophobic (inverse) attitudes? Second, since as I described above I expect the positive relationship between levels of education and democratic attitudes and the negative relationship between levels of education and xenophobia to vary cross-nationally, I examine whether a systematic variation can be found between countries with a long liberal democratic tradition, those with a recent illiberal past, and contemporary undemocratic regimes in regards to the positive effect of educational attainment.

The analysis is distinctive in two ways. First, I will be assessing the educational impact on democratic attitudes and xenophobia across diverse countries. Up till now, most of the previous research has concentrated on one country or a few countries only. In this thesis, in order to provide more general evidence of the positive relationship between gaining an educational degree at various levels and democratic attitudes and to test it more extensively, I employ cross-nationally comparable measurements as a prerequisite of wider generalizations on a sample of 48 countries around the world. Second, I will be testing whether political

system factors play a role in determining the educational effect by including in my analysis countries with different political regimes. In short, the crucial questions of the present thesis are (1) Does the positive effect between educational attainment and dimensions of democratic norms and values vary systematically across countries or can it be regarded as universal? (2) What political system factors and individual characteristics of the higher educated citizens contribute to the cross-national variation, if found, in the educational effect on democratic attitudes?

This thesis focuses on two realms of democratic norms and values: democratic attitudes, which are furthermore distinguished as abstract democratic ideals and more specific support for civil liberties, and xenophobia. In both realms I am expecting, in line with previous preliminary findings, that the impact of the positive relationship between levels of education and democratic attitudes should be higher in more stable democracies that have successfully persisted over time than in hybrid regimes or new democracies as well as non-democratic political systems. This expectation is based on the lack of transmission of values congruent with democracy through education as an institution in hybrid regimes or new democracies. Since several studies have claimed that higher educated individuals usually hold democratic attitudes only in their abstract terms, I also expect that the positive relationship between education and general support for democracy will be considerably higher than the positive relationship between education and support for specific civil liberties.

## 2. Theoretical background

The research on political socialization deals with acquired political values, attitudes, opinions, or cognition and the linked questions “to or by whom, under what conditions, and with what consequences” (Farnen and Meloen 2001, 3) are they being taught. The family, peer group and formal education have been considered the most important agents of political socialization (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, 752, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Andolina, Jenkins, Zukin, and Keeter 2003). However, studies of political socialization do not usually directly compare the relative effect of parents in contrast with the relative effect of formal education (Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst, and Gerris 2004, 3, Pedersen 1996). As an exception to this, Hello et al. (2004) verify empirically in a Dutch panel study on liberal values and ethnic distance that the educational effect is the most important socializing agent even when compared to parental influence. Similarly, Niemi, Ross and Alexander (1978) have previously found in the United States that “college students in particular, and college-age youth in general, do not represent an exception to the findings in the political socialization literature of low to moderate intergenerational similarity of political values” (Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978, 517). On the other hand, the authors have found that “aggregate comparisons of the college and noncollege youths confirm that as a group the college students are substantially more liberal and less conformist than the noncollege youths on most of the [*social and political*] issues” (Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978, 512). These findings can be interpreted as being completely in line with the above mentioned Hello et al. (2004) study, suggesting that the educational effect has more substantial influence on political tolerance and political and social liberalism than parents, since there is no significant difference between parental

influences on neither of the group. However, college students' views are substantially different in their views from noncollege youth.

Higher educated individuals have often been found to be more willing to be politically engaged in terms of electoral turnout (for an excellent overview of empirical studies reporting the correlation between educational attainment and political participation see Lijphart 1997), more participative in civic life (Hillygus 2005, 25), more socially and politically liberal (Hyman and Wright 1979, 60, Lipset 1981, Inglehart 1977), more supportive of civil liberties (Bobo and Lincari 1989, Kingston, Hubbard, Lapp, Schroeder, and Wilson 2003), more tolerant and subjected to less ethnic as well as anti-Semitic prejudice (Vogt 1997, Selznick and Steinberg 1969) and more disposed to multicultural education (Seltzer, Frazier, and Ricks 1995). Especially in regards to the White American society after the Second World War, the positive relationship between educational attainment and various forms of tolerance has been one of the most consistent and solid findings in social research (Weil 1985, 458, Coenders and Scheepers 2003, 314, Kingston et al. 2003, 53, Hillygus 2005, 25).

The first approach on how to improve previous research concerns the nature of the data. Behind such general statements about the higher educated strata a number of prerequisites are necessary. There have been only few studies (for an exception, see for example Weil 1985 on the relationship between education and anti-Semitism, or Coenders and Scheepers 2003 on the relationship between education and various forms of ethnic exclusionism) that have empirically tested whether such a negative relationship of education with various measures of intolerance<sup>2</sup> is universally valid or varies systematically across countries. Weil (1985, 459)

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<sup>2</sup> What I call here collectively "intolerance" is in fact different measures of anti-Semitism, nationalism, ethnic exclusionism, xenophobia etc.

stresses that a large number of findings seem sufficient in order to reject the conclusion that the educational effect on values is universal and suggests that such an effect is liable to differences between countries. Thus, the positive effect of education is “sufficiently widespread for us to consider it a norm [only!] under certain circumstances” (Weil 1985, 459). However, Weil himself acknowledges that his findings are suggestive rather than conclusive, due to the lack of cross-national comparability of the data used in his research. Coenders and Scheepers (2003) overcame this problem by drawing on cross-nationally comparable measurements from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995 in 22 countries. Furthermore, their study on the relationship between education and ethnic exclusionism also questions the role of the political regime and the religious heterogeneity of a country on the relationship. The countries are separated into three distinct groups: countries with a long-lasting liberal democratic tradition, interrupted liberal democratic tradition (such as Germany, Spain, Japan and Italy) and recently established democracies. The authors conclude that the effect of education is significantly smaller in recently established democracies as compared to countries with a long-lasting liberal democratic tradition. Similarly, the effect of education is smaller in those where the liberal democratic tradition has been interrupted (Coenders and Scheepers 2003, 337).

In certain aspects, my approach draws on Coenders and Scheepers’s (2003) study. However, I improve on their previous empirical research in several ways. First, Coenders and Scheepers were concerned with the effect of education on various form of ethnic intolerance, whereas the present thesis analyzes the effect not only on ethnic intolerance represented by xenophobia, but also on democratic attitudes in general. Second, I am using more recent survey data drawn from the World Value Survey 2005 - 2008 wave. Data from the year 2005 - 2008 enables me to investigate more properly whether the effect of the political regime has

an impact on ethnic intolerance, since in the year 1995 when the survey used by Coenders and Scheepers was conducted, the post-communist European countries were still undergoing a process of transition to democracy and citizens' attitudes towards, for example, immigrants, could be strongly influenced by the so-called "cultural shock", since they had nearly not been exposed to foreign influences for almost forty years. In 2003 such a problem should not be encountered anymore, but on the other hand, the effect of the previous political regime should be still present. Moreover, the sample of the countries I investigate is more than twice as high, thus covering a wider spectrum. Secondly, to investigate the effect of the political regime on the effect of education, a multilevel analysis is performed, which I find more appropriate for this type of research than a comparison of several multivariate linear regressions used by Coenders and Scheepers, since the same individual trait may have a different effect on one's behavior depending on a systematic difference between the individuals' home countries. In accordance with the socialization theory, I expect to find that the slope of education will vary along the political regime divide.

The second improvement concerns the reasons behind the association of schooling with democratic norms and values. What is less evident in the theoretical and empirical literature is *why* educational attainment associates with many miscellaneous social and political attitudinal outcomes and what factors are behind it. My purpose is to unravel the connective mechanisms of the educational process and various characteristics of democratic citizenship. Schools are often regarded as the main social institutions where tolerant and liberal values are transmitted (Selznick and Steinberg 1969, Vogt 1997). "This educational effect has been interpreted as a universal *liberalizing effect* of education, since it has showed up in different countries time and again" (Hello et al. 2004, 254). Thus, for example according to the socialization theory, the longer an individual is part of the education system, the more he is exposed to liberal

democratic values and principles of tolerance and therefore should be more inclined to tolerance himself. However, my intent is not to test the full range of theories explaining the educational impact. For the purpose of this thesis, I will be concentrating on testing Selznick and Steinberg's socialization theory hypothesis, Jackman's ideological refinement theory and partially the psychodynamic theory drawing on Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950).

Nevertheless, the effect of education on political tolerance, democratic attitudes, and prejudice is very complex and multidimensional. For instance, albeit Vogt (1997) concludes that educational attainment overall increases tolerance, he notes that the effect varies according to the particular dimensions of tolerance. Thus, higher educated individuals seem to, for instance, tolerate left-wing groups much more than they tolerate right-wing groups. Such an effect does not appear within the less educated (Vogt 1997, 67–103). Similarly, largely in response to Stouffer (1955) who predicted that rising levels of education among American citizens will lead to the upswing of tolerance, Sullivan and his associates (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982, Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, and Piereson 1981) argued that research on political tolerance has generally been content-biased by using only groups of leftist persuasion as a dependent variable.

The relationship between education and tolerance is, according to Sullivan et al. (1982), an artifact produced by the preselection of groups of reference to measure tolerance. If tolerance is seen as a political objection towards a group or an idea, citizens in the United States with less education were more opposed to groups on the left such as communists, atheists and socialists. Somehow paradoxically, these groups were mostly used as a point of reference for the measurement of tolerance by the researchers. When groups from the right have been

included in the study, the relationship between education and tolerance was considerably reduced (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982, Wilson 1994, Mondak and Sanders 2003). On the other hand, Weil (1984, 964) criticizes Sullivan and his associates for shifting the focus of the dependent variable from the group to be tolerated to the extent of disapproval. Moreover, Weil also claims the proposed dependent variable is ahistorical, since it is impossible to compare levels of tolerance within time or space. Nevertheless, Weil acknowledges that Sullivan et al. did in fact developed a measurement of tolerance, but claims that it contains problems which they do not seem to appreciate. What should be noted here, however, is the fact that the entire debate was concerning the population of the United States. One could assume that the tolerance of leftist groups among the higher educated could produce different results in, for example, post-communist countries. Such possible differences are one of the reasons why more cross-national comparisons are needed in order to test whether conclusions about the effect of higher education can be seen as universal.

What should be emphasized is that education often has no effect on certain democratic political commitments. Almond and Verba (1963) reported a lack of correlation between education and certain forms of attachment to democratic values in Italy and West Germany in line with Muller, Pesonen and Jukam (1980) that found a lack of correlation between education and freedom of assembly in Western Germany and Austria. Similarly, Jackman and Muha (1984) found a lack of correlation between education and over forty out of forty-three items measuring intergroup beliefs, feelings, personal behavior predispositions, and policy orientations. McIntosh et al. (1995) found in their study of ethnic tolerance in post-communist Romania and Bulgaria a positive effect of education on tolerance in Romania, but in Bulgaria the effect of education on tolerance was mediated through political ideology. The Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (1980) report showed that education had no effect on certain anti-

Semitic opinions in the Czech, Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian samples. However, these studies do not develop detailed theoretical explanations for these findings and usually go beyond the data presented for plausible explanations (Weil 1985, 459). Moreover, these previous studies suffered from several shortcomings, such as the examination of one country at a time (Hello, Scheepers, and Slegers 2006, Gaasholt and Togeby 1995), using only a small set of countries (McIntosh et al. 1995, Weil 1985) or the incomparability of measurements in cross-national research (Weil 1985). In order to provide for more evidence of the positive relationship between years of schooling and democratic attitudes and to test it more extensively, the research project will employ cross-nationally comparable measurements as a prerequisite of wider generalizations on a large and diverse sample of countries worldwide.

## 2. 1 Competing explanations about the effect of education

Why does education have such a powerful influence on the internalization of democratic norms and the reduction of negative intergroup attitudes? Generally, there have been three possible interpretations of such an effect of education; (a) the psychodynamic theory sometimes also referred as the “cognitive-psychological theory” explains it by better educated people’s higher personal security and therefore more tolerance to diversity (Adorno et al. 1950, Lipset 1981), (b) the “ideological refinement” model’s interpretation of education being correlated with social status and therefore representing class interest and (c) the socialization theory’s explanation of the educational effect with the hypothesis of the better educated being exposed to the “Enlightenment” or official culture (Selzenick and Steinberg 1969). Thus, these three explanations address three different levels, embracing the complete list of possible

levels of influences on an individual. The “psychodynamic theory” perspective explains the effect of education stressing the individual, personality level of influence. The “ideological refinement” model operates within the family and class level of influence. Finally, the socialization theory emphasizes the political, system level of influence.

Following Adorno et al.’s influential work *The Authoritative Personality*, the “cognitive-psychological theory” or “psychodynamic theory” argues that education develops individuals cognitive competence and cognitive sophistication enabling one to better understand that the principles of equality apply to all (Prothro and Grigg 1960, 291). Consequentially, higher educated strata will be more willing to tolerate disliked groups. In addition, several studies (Selznick and Steinberg 1979, Scheepers, Felling, and Peters 1990, Van de Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Stubager 2008) have found a strong negative relationship between educational attainment and authoritarianism, showing that more educated individuals are less authoritarian. Thus, the cognitive-psychological theory explains the positive effect of education on political tolerance by various personality dispositions, such as better educated people’s higher personal security, less authoritarianism and dogmatism acquired throughout the course of studies and therefore their respective higher tolerance of diversity. The basic idea is that since education furthers personal feeling of security, obtained from the immediate surroundings, higher educated are more capable of handling deviations from their own way of life and therefore show more tolerance towards other outgroups, for example ethnic minorities. Naturally, the main problem with this assumption is the fact that it does not account for the self-selection bias. Certain personality types, for example individuals already “predisposed” to be more tolerant by their personality, might actually be the ones drawn to seek more education. The problem of self-selection seems difficult to avoid in a research

design other than a longitudinal panel study. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does not allow me to test for this type of self-selection bias.

Jackman and Muha (1984), in line with neo-Marxist and other conflict theories, maintained that the tolerance of the better educated is in fact a sophisticated tool, or ideology, to legitimize and maintain the *status quo* of their economic class. Similarly, Bowles and Gintis (1976) claimed that the educational effect mirrors the impact of social class, since schools primarily reproduce the stratification system. Education is thought to socialize people to accept as legitimate the limited roles to which they are allocated. However, some scholars (see e.g. Weil 1985, 460) argue that Jackman and Muha fail to empirically demonstrate that the general principles of the better educated are in fact more adequate expressions of group interests. Likewise, Kingston et al. (2003) concluded that when controlled for class (both class origin and current class position) the class-education connection is doubtful. Because schools, according to the above presented theories, are essentially seen as certifying social class background, a confirmation of a strong version of this argument would mean that when controlling for family socio-economic origin there should be a little net effect of education. However, what Kingston et al. (2003), have found is that controlling for family socio-economic background reduces the effect of education only modestly. Thus, these findings suggest that there exists a rather weak version of Jackman and Muha's argument. On the other hand, it is still important to control for the effect of social class position and income level in the proposed multivariate analysis while testing the educational effect.

Jackman (1978) has also suggested that the liberalism of the better educated is only superficial, adopting only abstract notions of tolerance and not specific policies and specific contexts. In short, university graduates might declare a tolerant position because they know

that university graduates are expected to hold such positions. They continue to express themselves in such a way because they know their position in the society depends on this type of attitude. Consistent with Jackman's argument, Meyer (1977) holds the view that people act in ways their educational attainment "expects" them to act – for example, to hold liberal, "progressive" views. As Weil (1985) points out, although the reasons for which better educated give socially desirable (liberal, tolerant) answers might be somewhat hypocritical, one can assume that the holders of such, even though only apparent, opinions might prefer such influences more than those who give sincerely illiberal responses. Additionally, if one expects the higher educated strata to be the bearers and leaders of official ideologies, their public will to support liberal statements - even when not internalized privately - gives additional legitimacy to these views (Weiss 1977, 1984). To test whether there is a substantial difference among the highly educated between support for democracy in the abstract and support for specific civil liberties in practice, the analysis makes a distinction between two forms of democratic values when testing the educational effect.

According to Selznick and Steinberg (1969) democratic values, rather than emerging from the cognitive development and individual personality or the defence of the *status quo*, are mediated by the transmission of the official norms and values of the society throughout the educational system. "The libertarian values are simply transmitted to those who happen to enroll in educational institutions" (Stubager 2008, 330). Consequently, this leads Selznick and Steinberg to distinguish between the "official" culture of a country and the "unofficial" or "common" culture. They argue that the "official" culture of the United States has for a long time been organized around democratic values and is unprejudiced and enlightened. In contrast, the "common", "folk" culture is characterized by pre-scientific, pre-humanitarian values and prejudiced beliefs. By pursuing education, individuals become exposed to

dominant (scientific, democratic) values which in consequence countervail their cognitively simplistic beliefs. Weil (1985) as well as Coenders and Scheepers (2003) extend and test this hypothesis in a more general framework, when they hypothesize that the values transmitted by the educational system *should always* reflect the existing regime form. Thus, the educational systems of countries with liberal democratic traditions should disseminate democratic norms and values. On the other hand, the effect of educational attainment on democratic attitudes should not be evident or should be significantly smaller in countries with undemocratic regimes or shorter democratic legacy.

Another possible explanation of the positive educational effect on attitudes congruent with democracy, connected with the socialization theory, might be that it is the content of education that is influential in shaping future political attitudes of individuals. Different authors claim different ways of transmission of values through the educational system. For example Pascarella and Terezini (1991) and Jacobsen (2001) emphasize the effect of interactions among students and teachers, when new students adapt the values held by their peers and teachers and are thus informally socialized into holding liberal value positions. Others see as the primary effect the actual teaching of liberal values and tolerance (Hyman and Wright 1979, Jenssen and Engesbak 1994). In fact, Hillygus (2005) has found that a curriculum that develops language and civic skills is influential in shaping participation in American society. On the other hand, Langton and Jennings (1968) have found that taking classes in civic education has no effect on citizenship or political development in most of young adults in the United States. There also exists evidence (see e.g. Slomczynski and Shabad 1998) that civic education classes result in the rejection of extreme political attitudes among students in both directions. That is to say, extreme undemocratic but also extreme pro-democratic attitudes of individuals become more inclined towards the average. Slomczynski

and Shabad (1998) have demonstrated such an effect on postcommunist Polish high school students. Similarly, Finkel and Ernst (2005, Abstract) have found among South African high school students that “exposure to civic education per se had weaker effects on democratic values and skills; for these orientations, what matters are specific factors related to the quality of instruction and the use of active pedagogical methods employed by civics instructors”. Moreover, while the previously mentioned studies are focusing on the effect of civic education classes in children or young adults, Finkel (2003) has conducted a similar study on the adult population in Poland, South Africa and the Dominican Republic. The results have shown that while the impact of civic education is relatively large on political participation, its impact on the support for democratic values is too low to be considered. The differences between individuals who had been subjected to civil education and those who had been not were statistically insignificant for all the three countries. Thus, one might conclude that the positive effect of education on democratic attitudes and ethnic tolerance is due to some other factor than curricula content, at least with regards to civil education classes. However, it should be acknowledged that for example Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen (1975) as well as Niemi and Junn (1998) in a more recent study present some evidence that leads to the belief that civic education classes do in fact have an impact. Niemi and Junn choose to emphasize in their interpretation the importance of civic education classes, without acknowledging that there might be other important factors (for a critique of their interpretation see for example Torney-Purta 1999). Nevertheless, although accounting for the actual curricular content might also be revealing, this issue is an impossible task for the present analysis, given the fact that the number of countries under analysis is forty-eight and the task would require a careful analysis of the curricula undertaken in each country.

## 2.2 Research question, hypotheses and objectives

As mentioned above, there are several possible explanations for the strong and persistent educational effect on political tolerance. Most of these explanations refer to factors that, to certain extent, mediate the direct effect of educational attainment on democratic attitudes. One should therefore account for these factors that may explain the strength of the educational effect derived from the aforementioned theoretical traditions and perspectives.

The educational effect on democratic attitudes has been documented. However, firstly, it has been usually empirically tested only in democratic countries and, secondly, the small amount of preliminary evidence suggests that the effect might vary cross-nationally. Socialization theory explains the positive effect of education with the better educated being exposed to the official culture or, in other words, “enlightenment”. Following Selznick and Steinberg’s (1969) socialization theory and Weil’s (1985), Coenders and Scheepers’s (2003), and Farnen and Meloen’s (2001) preliminary evidence I expect the positive relationship of education to vary cross-nationally according to several political system related factors.

Coenders and Scheepers (2003) found that the relationship between education and ethnic intolerance depends on the democratic longevity of a country. Likewise, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) also found that political tolerance within the general mass public is higher in democracies that persisted over time. These findings are in line with the socialization theory that suggests that school transmits liberal and democratic values through the country’s “official” culture. Thus, the positive educational effect on political tolerance can not be expected in countries where the political regime is not, or has recently not been, democratic. Therefore, I expect the political regime of the country to have an influence on the level of the relationship between education and democratic attitudes. I expect to find that the

positive effect of education on democratic attitudes will vary along the democratic longevity divide.

In addition Lijphart (1977) and also Weil (1985) argue that in pluralistic societies political elites must take the lead in promoting peaceful accommodation among the different population segments. Since socialization theory suggests that political elite behavior partly forms the political culture of the given community which is in turn transmitted through the educational system, one might expect that in countries with ethnic and religious heterogeneity the impact of education on political tolerance will be higher. From the structural point of view, the size of the minority population in a country compared to the majority is linked to attitudes towards ethnic relations (Olzak 1983, Horowitz 1985) and prejudice (Allport 1954). Moreover, some scholars have argued that “majority group members who live in close proximity to minority group members or who work in equal status occupations with minority group members are less prejudiced than those who are without this kind of contact” (McIntosh et al. 1995, 948). On the other hand, it should be noted that for example Coenders and Scheepers (2003) did not find, contrary to their expectations, that religious heterogeneity influences the relationship between education and various measures of ethnic exclusionism. Furthermore, some have argued that the “perception of threat from the minority group increases with minority group density, since increased casual contact increases opportunities to confirm stereotypes” (McIntosh et al. 1995, 948).

Drawing on previous studies and particularly on Coenders and Scheepers (2003) and Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003), I shall test the socialization theory hypotheses using political systems’ characteristics as macro-level measures such as the persistence of democracy over time. Based on the above mentioned expectations, the first hypotheses can be drawn

considering the political regime of the country to have an influence on the level of the relationship between education and democratic attitudes. The relationship is expected to be stronger in countries with long and stable democratic traditions.

*H<sub>1</sub>: The political regime of the country will have an influence on the variation of the relationship between education and democratic attitudes.*

The main research question will be answered:

*R<sub>1</sub>: What macro- and micro- level characteristics influence the most the positive educational effect on democratic attitudes and xenophobia?*

The research question, even though up to this point based on the implicit expectation that the effect of education may vary across countries in ways that produce differential effect on attitudes, stays valid even when such a variation will not be found. However, there are theoretical arguments to expect the cross-national variation. From the socialization theory point of view, “if we assume that in different countries different values should be transmitted through the educational system” (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002, 6) than one should expect cross-national variance of the effect of education on democratic attitudes and xenophobia. Similarly, if, in line with the “ideological refinement model”, one interprets education as correlated with social status and, in line with the “cognitive-psychological theory”, one may also assume that the higher the level of education of individuals, stronger

their ego, which in turn makes them less likely to perceive disliked groups such as ethnic minorities as a threat, then it is likely that “there may be cross-national variances in the extent to which people feel their position to be threatened by ethnic minorities” (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijssberts 2002, 6) and consequently it is likely that there will be cross-national variance in the effect of education on xenophobia.

*H<sub>2</sub>: The relationship between personality and support for democratic norms and values will be complementary to the positive effect of education on democratic norms and values.*

The “ideological refinement model” interprets education as correlated with social status and therefore representing class interest. Moreover, the liberalism of the better educated is also interpreted as only superficial. Following Kingston et al.’s (2003) operationalization the class interest hypothesis should be tested by looking at whether controlling for parent’s socio-economic background as well as current class position will affect the positive relationship between education and democratic attitudes. If so, controlling for past and current class position, the net effects of education should be small. The second hypothesis should be tested by drawing on Sullivan et al.’s (1982) conceptualization of democratic norms at two different levels of abstraction; on one hand more generalized support for democracy and on the other hand support for civil liberties. The research should also establish the relative importance of socio-economic status for the explanation of the educational effect on democratic attitudes. In line with the ideological refinement theory I hypothesize that the direct effect of education on democratic attitudes will be explained to a large degree through the indirect effect of socio-economic status.

H<sub>3</sub>: *The relationship between socio-economic status and support for democratic norms and values will be complementary to the positive effect of education on democratic norms and values.*

H<sub>4</sub>: *The positive relationship between education and general support for democracy will be considerably higher than the positive relationship between education and support for specific civil liberties.*

Figure 1 in Appendix A represents the diagram of the theoretical model for the explanation of the educational effect on the three dependent variables.

### 3. Data, measures and model specification

The study I am proposing relies on quantitative measures. I use the data from the World Value Survey 2005 – 2008 wave in order to test my hypotheses. Even though opting for only one wave of the survey reduces the sample size, I chose this option because one of the purposes of the analysis is to tackle the issue of the influence of the political system. Since many countries, for example, the Central/Eastern European ones have undergone changes in their respective political systems since 1981, it would be hard to classify countries according to the full democracy/flawed democracy/authoritarian regime divide if I had to use all the data available in different years. Maximizing the number of country-years in the analysis by including all possible data points from 1981 to 2008 would create a severely unbalanced and multiple-times interrupted panel because the WVS studies are largely ad hoc in terms of what countries are covered in the various waves. I decided to avoid this and focus on a single wave of the WVS in the light of the difficult and partly unresolved statistical issues in how one can deal with estimation issues in a macro-micro dataset that includes some contexts, just slightly changed, as many as three, four or even five times, some others at just one or two times, and yet others multiple times but with radical changes in their score on the main independent variable (for example the democratic vs. authoritarian nature of their political system) along the way. Moreover, the interpretation of the data would be difficult regarding democratic attitudes since there may be a strong transition effect in some countries. Therefore, only the 2005-2008 wave will be analyzed here.

The World Value Survey (WVS) conducts cross-national attitudinal research in a vast number of countries, including countries from almost all world regions and with different economic

and political regime background. Thus, it provides valuable information about individual political beliefs and attitudes in a broad spectrum of nations.

The 2005 - 2008 wave survey was conducted in 56 countries, however 8 countries<sup>3</sup> carried out only a reduced version of the official questionnaire. Therefore, 48 countries having carried the complete questionnaire will be subjected to the analysis. For the list of the countries included in the analysis see Table 1 in Appendix B. Data for Germany are analyzed separately for the old Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) and the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) due to their immense differences in political and economic developments since Second World War. Overall, the countries included in the WVS represent one of the largest and most diverse samples of nations available for studying political attitudes cross-nationally. The study includes several long lasting democracies, recently democratized countries, and some only partially democratic nations. The countries also differ in the industrial/nonindustrial, ethnic and religious homogeneity/heterogeneity and unitary/federalism dimensions as well as with respect to the immigration history. These countries do not represent the entire globe since a global coverage of countries is still an impossible task. At the same time, a set of countries as diverse as possible should allow for a systematic test of my hypotheses. What is more, there is also at least one country representing each one of the world's cultural groups in the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 64). Thus, this sample of nations allows me to examine the interplay between micro and macro- level sources of democratic attitudes. In every country, a random sample

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<sup>3</sup> Countries having carried a reduced version of the official questionnaire include: Colombia, France, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, Netherland, New Zealand, Russia, and United Kingdom.

was taken of the population with respondents 18 years and older. The number of respondents for each country can be found in Table 1 in Appendix B.

### 3.1 Micro-level model

The first part of the analysis aims at estimating three different models of democratic attitudes using individual-level data in 48 countries. I was able to construct, using the World Value Survey, measures of support for democratic ideals, support for civil liberties and xenophobia in line with most previous studies.

Selznick and Steinberg (1969), Lipset (1976) or Plant (1965) have argued that those who major in humanities or social sciences are less likely to be anti-Semitic, and also less authoritarian, and more likely to be liberal or willing to participate in student protests than those who obtained a degree in natural sciences. In order to test this hypothesis, the World Value Survey allows me to distinguish between the type of education a respondent has received, for instance whether the respondent went to a technical/vocational type of secondary school or to the university-preparatory type. On the other hand, the World Value Survey does not provide information what major did the respondent undertake while at university.

Furthermore, the psycho-dynamic theory argues that the higher the level of education of individuals, stronger their ego, which in turn makes them less likely to perceive disliked groups such as ethnic minorities as a threat and therefore increases their ability to tolerate diversity (on the empirical account of the explanatory power of perceived threat to ethnic distance see e.g. Hello, Scheepers, and Slegers 2006). Unfortunately, the World Value

Survey does not contain a measure of perceived threat from least-liked groups. On the other hand, as Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003, 248) argued based on the findings of Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus (1982) and Gibson and Gouws (2002) “because threat is regularly found to be an exogenous determinant of political tolerance (...), its omission should not unduly bias (...) [*the*] estimates of other predictors in the model”.

In order to test the hypothesis of higher education being in fact more a class-interest variable than having an independent impact by itself the socio-economic status of the respondents should be also taken into account. For example the literature on tolerance of ethnic minorities points out as one of the arguments for higher educated stronger tolerance of ethnic minorities their economic security arising from their higher economic status, which in turn leads to the higher educated being less exposed to competition from, often low skilled, ethnic minorities (Stubager 2008, 333, see also for example Lipset 1981, Jenssen and Engesback 1994). The argument is “supported empirically by the fact that higher education *ceteris paribus* leads to a more secure labor market position and higher earnings” (Stubager 2008, 333).

Thus, in order to test for the relative importance of all the aforementioned theories one has to take them into account when constructing the micro- level model.

### 3.1.1 Dependent variables: Dimensions of Support for Democratic Ideals, Support for Civil Liberties and Xenophobia

As mentioned previously, scholars have questioned the relationship between abstract democratic ideals and actual support for an implementation of civil liberties (such as freedom of speech or freedom of assembly), especially when these policies are in favor of disliked groups. According to the “ideological refinement model” one can find a considerably higher

support for abstract principles of democracy than for their concrete application at an individual level (see for example Jackman 1978, McClosky 1964, Prothro and Grigg 1960, McClosky and Brill 1983). For example, Jackman (1978) but also Sears, Hensler and Speer (1979) demonstrated similar problems related to issues of ethnic tolerance such as busing and desegregation. On the other hand, it should be noted that for example Sullivan et al. (1982) have criticized this approach and demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between abstract principles of democracy and concrete applications of these principles at the individual level. Moreover, Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski (1984) as well as later Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, 58-69) argue in regards to racial attitudes and racial equality that the “principle-policy puzzle” (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) of the well-educated arises from the fact that their belief systems are cognitively complex, which leads them to take a broader range of factors into account in arriving at a preference and evaluating government policy (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 68, Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1984). Nevertheless, in order to test for the ideological refinement model, it is crucial to distinguish between support for abstract democratic ideals at one hand, and support for their concrete application on the other.

*Support for democratic ideals.* In order to distinguish between two levels of abstraction and thus allowing me to test whether a substantial difference between the support for abstract and specific democratic principles within the higher educated exists I had to clearly distinguish between the two levels of abstraction. The measurement of democratic ideals is in line with Sullivan et al. (1982) and Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003), reflecting a more generalized level of support for democratic ideals and principles. The indicator is created by using one item measuring how much importance does the respondent attribute to living in a democratic political regime from a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 10 (absolutely important). This item

thus enables me to measure the respondent's support for democracy as an ideal regime (see Appendix B for details). Consistent with my conceptualization, a preliminary analysis shows that support for democratic ideals is high in the 48 countries with an average of 8.67 on the 10-point scale for all the respondents, when those with a completed university degree (the highest educational variable) show an average support of 9.03 compared to those with complete primary school (the lowest educational variable) of only 8.51. On the other hand, the relative effect of educational attainment on the dependent variable can be really assessed only with a regression analysis.

*Support for civil liberties.* The Support for civil liberties indicator is an additive index measured by the value respondents attach to the protection of free speech compared to other values such as maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions and fighting rising prices. Clearly, while "protecting the freedom of speech" is a necessary prerequisite of a democratic political regime and of political tolerance, the other values do not necessarily have to be present in a democratic society. Therefore, the proposed measure reflects accurately the respondent's support for civil liberties essential for a functioning of a democratic regime. The "Free Speech Index" is similar to the conceptualization developed by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) and includes two questions. Respondents were asked which of the given values they consider the most important. Consequently, they were asked to choose between the remaining values what would be their second choice. Thus, I created the "Free Speech Index" by attaching a value of 1 if the respondent's first choice has been the protection of free speech versus other values and a value of .5 if the respondent's second choice has been the protection of free speech versus other values. Thus, the "Free Speech Index" scale ranges from 0 (indicating no priority for the protection of free speech versus other values) through .5 (indicating medium priority for the

protection of free speech versus other values) up till 1 (indicating high priority for the protection of free speech versus other values) (see Appendix B for details). A preliminary analysis points out to the fact that the theory of higher educated individuals being supportive of only abstract democratic ideals might prove wrong since while the average score of the “Free Speech Index” for all the respondents from 48 countries is .21 those with a completed degree scored on average .28 compared to those that only completed primary school with an average score of .17. However, further analysis is still needed in order to assess the possible rejection of at least one part of the “ideological refinement model”.

*Xenophobia.* What authors usually define as xenophobia (see for example Heywood 1997) is the insistence on the need of maintaining cultural purity and traditions, something which may lead to perceiving immigrants and strangers as a threat, thereby promoting or at least giving a semblance of legitimacy to racism and xenophobia. There is a sharp division between “us” and “them” and sometimes this split is carried to the extreme as “they” are the foes that need to be hated or ridiculed. Once “they” are clearly identified, the awareness about “us” is strengthened and the identities are experienced with more intensity. According to Heywood (1997, 114) we can thus observe a type of “negative integration”. The conceptualization of xenophobia for this study was made in line with what Weiss (2003, 388) actually defines as ethnic intolerance. Such attitude includes “longing for ethnic homogeneity and territorial dominance, anxious mistrust, and rejection of foreigners” (Weiss 2003, 388). Thus, the variables used to create an additive index to measure xenophobia reflect the respondents’ subjective definition of the in-group and out-group and the strength of the respondents’ perception of immigrants and “strangers” as threat. The index is created by using six questions asking respondents to choose who they would not like as their neighbors, whether employers should give priority to local nationals over immigrants and about immigration

policies (see Appendix B for details). The reliability of the scale measured with Cronbach's Alpha after taking into consideration only respondents from a majority group in each country has a value of  $\alpha = 0.633$ .

The indicators of the dimensions of democratic ideals, support for civil liberties and xenophobia are shown in Table 3.

### 3.1.2 Independent variables

*Educational attainment.* Educational attainment was measured by means of the international educational classification scheme of the World Value Survey. In many countries, the obtained level of education turns out to be a better measure than years of schooling (Braun and Müller 1997). The respondent's level of education was measured by three variables. The nation-specific categorical variable was unfortunately not available for all the countries. The variable measuring age the respondent left school was highly problematic. It does not say a lot about the respondent's educational level, since the age of leaving school may not be comparable across countries, especially if the respective educational systems are too different. Moreover, each additional year of schooling is assumed to have the same consequence as any additional year. However, a nonlinear effect should be more appropriate, since one could expect to find a difference of the school's influence between the years in transition from for instance secondary school to university than in the years within secondary school. This influence can be detected only if education is represented as a set of discrete categories, not as a continuous measure. Therefore, the variable used for the analysis is the one with the same categories for all countries. It is the best available proxy for a respondent's level of education. Nine categories were used in the World Value Survey's classification: no education, incomplete

primary school, complete primary school, incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type, complete secondary school: university-preparatory type, some university level education without degree and university-level education with degree. For further analysis the variable has been dichotomized, leaving the categories no formal education and incomplete primary school as the reference category. There are mainly two reasons why two original categories and not one were chosen as the reference category. Firstly, I believe the impact of those two categories on political attitudes should be roughly similar, since as described above there are reasons to expect that the main difference on attitudes is formed by completing a certain level of education. Secondly, if the reference category would be for example solely no formal education it would be a very small category with a very special social composition and overrepresentation of certain groups such as older women living in developing countries. Merging the two lowest categories should help to reduce this bias. In other words, since models relying on dichotomized variables capture the effect of the variables compared to the baseline category, it improves the efficiency and accuracy of the estimates when the reference category is composed from more respondents.

The main reason why the variable measuring the highest educational attainment of the respondent has nonetheless been dichotomized for parts of the analysis is the fact that such arrangements allows for distinguishing between the impact of various schools with different curricula but the same degree. The distinction would be impossible if the variable would have been treated as a scale. Since several scholars pointed to the possibility of such a distinctive impact, it is necessary to account for this possibility.

*Socio-economic status.* To measure respondent's socio-economic status I combined several variables. Firstly, I used a variable that indicates whether a respondent is currently employed. The respondents that were unemployed were further divided into four categories: retired/pensioner, housewife not otherwise employed, student, and unemployed. Those employed were further divided into three categories: full time employee, part time employee and self employed. To avoid small class frequencies, I combined the categories "unemployed" and "other", resulting into six nominal class-classifications. Moreover, the variable was dichotomized. That is, the original variable was decomposed into as many variables as it contained categories, minus one used as a reference category which in this case has been the category student. Secondly, a subjective respondent's self-evaluation about his class status was also included as a measure of socio-economic status. The variable asked the respondent to describe what class does he belongs to dividing the respondents into five categories – upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class and lower class, used as a reference category. This variable was used as an alternative to the commonly used income variable, which in the WVS was measured by income deciles scales applicable to each country. This way, cross-national comparability within countries is achieved. However, since the respondents were asked to include all incomes within a household, it is impossible to distinguish between single-person households and other households with more members but the same household income. Therefore, the self-evaluating class variable has been used as the best proxy for income.

*Psychological variables.* The hypothesis of higher educated individuals being less authoritarian and having more self-esteem which in turn lowers their political intolerance should be tested by including measures of various personality dispositions. However, the World Value Survey does not provide many psychological variables. Moreover, for example

in order to test for the self-selection bias of the individuals with higher education longitudinal panel data would have to be analyzed. The relative importance of authoritarianism as well as the importance of self-esteem, which both should act as mediators between the educational effect and democratic values, should be established. Since an important part of the feeling of security is a sense of control over one's life (Stubager 2008, Lipset 1981, Weil 1985, Jenssen and Engesbak 1994) and a sense of "mastering one's own life situation" (Stubager 2008, 330) a variable asking the respondent to indicate how much freedom of choice and control does he feel he has over the way his life turns out using a 10-point scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" has been used. Furthermore, to measure the feeling of perceived threat from other people and thus indirectly the self-esteem of the respondent two more variables have been used. One variable asked the respondent whether he thinks most people would try to take advantage of him if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair using a 10-point scale where 1 means "people would try to take advantage of me" and 10 means "people would try to be fair". The second variable asked the respondent whether generally speaking he would say that most people can be trusted or that he needs to be very careful in dealing with people using the possibilities most people can be trusted and need to be very careful as possible answers.

One should thus expect mastering one's own life and trust in people to act as mediating or complementary variables between the effects of education on the three dependent variables. Higher level of education should lead to higher feeling of mastering one's own life and higher trust in people.

In addition to the independent variable described above a set of control variables was included in the model, starting with two demographic variables: *age* and *gender*.

*Age.* Age has been proven to be one of the traditional predictors in attitudinal research and of political tolerance, social and political liberalism and xenophobia in particular. Young people have been found more generally politically tolerant than older generations (see for example McClosky and Brill 1983, Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 1978, Coenders and Scheepers 2003). Moreover, one can expect that in regimes with a short democratic tradition, as for example the European postcommunist countries, older people will in general have a stronger tendency to xenophobia, since they were not exposed to foreigners and different cultures during most of their life. Moreover, one could also expect, in line with the socialization theory, that younger respondents who attended part of their education already in the new democratic regime should show a higher embracement of democratic attitudes, since schools have already been, at least partly, transmitting to them the values of the new regime. Thus, since age has been shown to be an important predictor of miscellaneous attitudes congruent with democracy in democratic regimes, and is also expected to have an impact in post-undemocratic societies, it should be included in the analysis.

*Gender.* Stouffer (1955) and similarly Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) found in their studies on the American population that males are more tolerant than females, even when controlled for education, religiosity, and working status. In line with these findings, McIntosh and Abele Mac Iver (1992) showed similar patterns for Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) challenged these conclusions by demonstrating that when the target group was the respondent's "least-liked" group, no significant gender differences were found. Nevertheless, gender constitutes one of the most

traditional control variables that are differently correlated with education in different contexts, and hence a control for its possible effects should assist a more accurate estimation of the true effects of education. In the present analysis gender was coded as 0 = male and 1 = female.

Next, the variables *religious denomination* and *church attendance* were also included among the controls.

*Religious denomination* was included since religion is often seen as establishing values in its followers that do not allow for compromise or consensus (Wald 1987, 267-69). Thus, some indeed argue that religion is not congruent and compatible with democracy that, among other things, relies on the acceptance of unorthodox values and practices of the others by the citizenry (Jelen and Wilcox 1990). “Psychologists of religion point to inherent conflicts between strong religious conviction and democracy” (Canetti-Nisim 2004, see also for example Hunsberger 1995, Schwartz and Huismans 1995). Empirical evidence tends to support these claims. Few studies have shown that members of diverse religious traditions tend to define political tolerance quite differently (Jelen and Wilcox 1990). Moreover, it has been also empirically proven that the stronger people subscribe to religious particularism, the stronger their prejudice is (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002) and as religious affiliation decreased, political liberalism increased (Nelson 1988, Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). The variable religious denomination was decomposed into eight categories – Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox (Russian, Greek etc.), Jew, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist, keeping the category Other as the reference category.

*Church attendance*. The frequency of church attendance shows, to a certain degree, the level of orthodoxy of the respondent. Surveys carried out in Belgium (Duriez, Luyten, Snauwaert, and Hutsebaut 2002) and in Israel (Arian, Nachmias, Navot, and Shani 2003, Peres 1995)

found that religious orthodoxy predicted non-democratic and intolerant attitudes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that for example Photiadis and Biggar (1962, 672) find that religion has a positive impact on prejudice through church participation, whereas a negative impact through orthodoxy. Thus, one should account not only for religion in the regression analysis, but also for church attendance. The church attendance variable was decomposed into six categories according to the respondent's answers to the question how often the respondent attends religious services these days apart from weddings and funerals. The categories were more than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, with "never", "practically never" and "less often" collapsed into the reference category.

### 3.2 Macro-level model

I use the 2005-2008 World Values Survey to obtain indicators for the micro-level concepts. I then combine the survey data with information about the political regime type and the systems' democratic stability in order to assess the macro-level predictors for democratic attitudes and xenophobia. I pool the countries according to their political regime and freedom in 2008, the year when the last surveys were conducted for the World Value Survey dataset in order to have the latest accurate information about the political regime in each country during the time of survey. As indicators I use *Freedom in the World 2009* report (Freedom House 2009) which "reflects developments that took place in the calendar year 2008" (Freedom House 2009), *Global Report (Polity IV 2009)* and *Democracy Index* (Economist Intelligence's Unit 2008). The democracy ratings appear in Table 2 in Appendix C and Figures 2, 3, and 4 in Appendix D. The Freedom House assigns each country one of the three groups: Free, Partly free and Not free. The Polity IV ranking divides the countries into six

categories: Full democracy, Democracy, Open Anocracy, Closed Anocracy, Autocracy and Failed/Occupied. The *Democracy Index* separates the countries into four distinct categories: Full democracy, Flawed democracy, Hybrid regime and Authoritarian regime. I distinguish three groups of countries: Free full democracy, Flawed democracy and Authoritarian regime when in the Free full democracy group there are typically long lasting democracies, in the Flawed democracy group countries with a recent illiberal past and in the Authoritarian regime group we find countries that are currently undemocratic. Given the fact that sometimes it was hard to distinguish whether a country should be subscribed into the flawed democracy or the authoritarian regime type group I also used the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2008* (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008), more specifically its Democracy Status Index, an international ranking of 128 developing and transition countries of their respective way to democracy. I chose not to use the more common Bertelsmann's Status Index (SI) that ranks the countries according not only to their democracy ratings but also aggregates the scores with the current state of market economy of the respective country, since contrary to the authors' beliefs I do not regard democracy and the state of market economy as interdependent and for the purposes of the present analysis the ratings of democracy were more appropriate. Thus, when faced with the problem whether for example the combination of the categories Partly Free – Democracy – Flawed Democracy should be given the same value as the combination Free – Democracy – Hybrid regime the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008* helped me to assign the respective countries to one of the category according to the scores it provided. The thresholds for the two groups were; 0 – 6.5 Authoritarian regime, 6.5 – 9 Flawed democracy and 9 – 10 Free full democracy. The shortcoming of the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* lies in the fact that it provides scores only for countries that are considered developing or in transition. However, this shortcoming did not constitute a substantial problem to the ranking

because the countries missing were typically long lasting democracies subscribed to the Free full democracy category, typically scoring Free – Full democracy – Full democracy on the three indexes and thus not posing any problems to their subscription to one of the categories.

The reason why I chose to decompose the macro- level variable into three discrete categories instead of using a continuous measure provided by for example the aforementioned *Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008* or also by Freedom House is the fact that although the continuous measure should provide less measurement error than a dichotomized variable and therefore the results may become clearer, according to the socialization theory it should not be as much the relative nuances between the different levels of democracy among the countries under analysis that should affect the impact of education but more likely the passing of a certain threshold (as for example from authoritarianism to a flawed democracy). Multilevel models with a dichotomized level-2 variable also “perfectly capture any clustering by subgroups that may exist in the data, since the dummy variables 'absorb' the unique variation among the subgroups” (Steenbergen and Bradford 2002, 220). Another advantage is the fact that “these models can be implemented easily within a standard OLS regression framework” (Steenbergen and Bradford 2002, 220).

### 3.3 Method

Since the psychodynamic theory and the ideological refinement model claim that the effect of education on the dependent variables under analysis is mediated through the effect of the personality and the economic class position of the higher educated a simple bivariate correlation among the educational variables and the respective personality and socio-economic variables should provide an initial assessment about the two hypotheses. The results

are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. The results confirm the initial expectation in that having a university degree shows the strongest positive relationship with a feeling of mastering one's own life, believing that people will try to be somehow fair when dealing with the respondent, and thinking that people can be trusted. The second highest correlation of the three psychological variables can be found with having some university education without degree and the association proceeds as expected. However, although significant, the strength of the association between the variables is very weak. The majority of the correlation coefficients in the table are significant. The bivariate correlation results for the education variables and the respondent's self evaluating class variables follow a very similar pattern. Having a university degree is associated with the upper class the most out of all the educational variables. However, the association, although significant, is small. Obtaining a university degree is significantly more associated with the respondent's evaluation of being part of the upper middle class when  $r = .238$ . This may be due to the fact that even within the general population, very few individuals would constitute the category. Nevertheless, these results cannot be taken as evidence of the association between higher education and certain personality type or class belonging, because the analysis does not control for any other possible co-founding factors neither at the individual level nor at the country level that are not controlled for. They provide a general assessment whether a possible association between the variables may exist. This is the reason why a multilevel regression is needed as an appropriate method of analysis, since controlling for individual characteristics, possible confounding factors and the country political system will allow me to provide a more accurate picture of the relationship between educational attainment, personality, class belonging and the three dependent variables.

To research the relationship between support for democratic ideals, support for civil liberties, xenophobia and the aforementioned characteristics of individual respondents within all the countries a multilevel regression analysis has been applied. What follows is the description of the individual- level (level-1) models.

**Model 1:**

Support for democratic ideals =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$  educational attainment +  $\beta_2$  personality +  $\beta_3$  sex +  $\beta_4$  age +  $\beta_5$  socio-economic status +  $\beta_6$  religious denomination+  $\beta_7$  church attendance + e

**Model 2:**

Support for civil liberties =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$  educational attainment +  $\beta_2$  personality +  $\beta_3$  sex +  $\beta_4$  age +  $\beta_5$  socio-economic status +  $\beta_6$  religious denomination+  $\beta_7$  church attendance + e

**Model 3:**

Xenophobia =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$  educational attainment +  $\beta_2$  personality +  $\beta_3$  sex +  $\beta_4$  age +  $\beta_5$  socio-economic status +  $\beta_6$  religious denomination+  $\beta_7$  church attendance + e

When we brake down the model to all the variables used in the analysis the level-1 models are:

**Model 1:**

Support for democratic ideals =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$  complete primary school +  $\beta_2$  incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type +  $\beta_3$  complete secondary school: technical/vocational type +  $\beta_4$  incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type +  $\beta_5$  complete secondary school: university-preparatory type +  $\beta_6$  some university level education without degree +  $\beta_7$  university-level education with degree +  $\beta_8$  control over one's life +  $\beta_9$  threat from other people +  $\beta_{10}$  trust in people +  $\beta_{11}$  sex +  $\beta_{12}$  age +  $\beta_{13}$  employed full time +  $\beta_{14}$  employed part time +  $\beta_{15}$  self employed +  $\beta_{16}$  retired/pensioner +  $\beta_{17}$  housewife +  $\beta_{18}$  unemployed/other +  $\beta_{19}$  Roman Catholic +  $\beta_{20}$  Protestant +  $\beta_{21}$  Orthodox +  $\beta_{22}$  Jew +  $\beta_{23}$  Muslim +  $\beta_{24}$  Hindu +  $\beta_{25}$  Buddhist +  $\beta_{26}$  attending religious service more than once a week +  $\beta_{27}$  attending religious service once a week +  $\beta_{28}$  attending religious service once a month +  $\beta_{29}$  attending religious service only on special holy days +  $\beta_{30}$  attending religious service once a year +  $\beta_{31}$  attending religious service never or practically never + e

**Model 2:**

Support for civil liberties =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$  complete primary school +  $\beta_2$  incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type +  $\beta_3$  complete secondary school: technical/vocational type +  $\beta_4$  incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type +  $\beta_5$  complete secondary school: university-preparatory type +  $\beta_6$  some university level education without degree +  $\beta_7$  university-level education with degree +  $\beta_8$  control over one's life +  $\beta_9$  threat from other people +  $\beta_{10}$  trust in people +  $\beta_{11}$  sex +  $\beta_{12}$  age +  $\beta_{13}$  employed full time +  $\beta_{14}$  employed part

time +  $\beta_{15}$  self employed +  $\beta_{16}$  retired/pensioner +  $\beta_{17}$  housewife +  $\beta_{18}$  unemployed/other +  $\beta_{19}$  Roman Catholic +  $\beta_{20}$  Protestant +  $\beta_{21}$  Orthodox +  $\beta_{22}$  Jew +  $\beta_{23}$  Muslim +  $\beta_{24}$  Hindu +  $\beta_{25}$  Buddhist +  $\beta_{26}$  attending religious service more than once a week +  $\beta_{27}$  attending religious service once a week +  $\beta_{28}$  attending religious service once a month +  $\beta_{29}$  attending religious service only on special holy days +  $\beta_{30}$  attending religious service once a year +  $\beta_{31}$  attending religious service never or practically never + e

**Model 3:**

Xenophobia =  $\beta_0$  +  $\beta_1$  complete primary school +  $\beta_2$  incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type +  $\beta_3$  complete secondary school: technical/vocational type +  $\beta_4$  incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type +  $\beta_5$  complete secondary school: university-preparatory type +  $\beta_6$  some university level education without degree +  $\beta_7$  university-level education with degree +  $\beta_8$  control over one's life +  $\beta_9$  threat from other people +  $\beta_{10}$  trust in people +  $\beta_{11}$  sex +  $\beta_{12}$  age +  $\beta_{13}$  employed full time +  $\beta_{14}$  employed part time +  $\beta_{15}$  self employed +  $\beta_{16}$  retired/pensioner +  $\beta_{17}$  housewife +  $\beta_{18}$  unemployed/other +  $\beta_{19}$  Roman Catholic +  $\beta_{20}$  Protestant +  $\beta_{21}$  Orthodox +  $\beta_{22}$  Jew +  $\beta_{23}$  Muslim +  $\beta_{24}$  Hindu +  $\beta_{25}$  Buddhist +  $\beta_{26}$  attending religious service more than once a week +  $\beta_{27}$  attending religious service once a week +  $\beta_{28}$  attending religious service once a month +  $\beta_{29}$  attending religious service only on special holy days +  $\beta_{30}$  attending religious service once a year +  $\beta_{31}$  attending religious service never or practically never + e

The “e” error term at the end of each of the above equations is assumed to follow a normal distribution centered around zero, while the beta coefficients are estimated empirically. All beta coefficients except the constant and the effects of education are assumed to be constant across the countries in the analysis, which makes little substantive difference in the results except that it allows for a faster estimation of the statistical models. The effects of education and the constant are assumed to vary “at random” across countries – note that “at random” is merely statistical jargon here and does not exclude the possibility of finding systematic patterns in the variance.

The key goal of the analysis is of course to determine how the effects of education may be influenced by the nature of the political system.

The level-2 models that address this question include the estimated effects of education as their dependent variables and the macro- variable, that is to say the type of political regime, as the key independent variable. Two versions of the multilevel model will be presented for each of Support for civil liberties, Support for democratic ideals and Xenophobia. The first three models use two dichotomies to capture the effects of political system type: one contrasting the category “Free full democracy” with both “Flawed democracy” and “Authoritarian regime”, and the second contrasting all democracies together with authoritarian regimes. The next three models use a dichotomized independent variable collapsing “Free full democracies” and “Flawed democracies” and contrasting them with “Authoritarian regimes” as a reference category. Therefore, the multilevel model’s equation for the first three models is;

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{ full democracy} + \gamma_{02} \text{ flawed democracy} + \delta_{0j} \quad (1)$$

and

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} \text{ full democracy} + \gamma_{12} \text{ flawed democracy} + \delta_{1j} \quad (2)$$

Equation (1) models the intercept of the level-1 model and Equation (2) the effects of education. Taken together, the two equations comprise the level-2 model, where  $j$  refers to a particular level-1 model and  $i$  may run from 1 to 7, depending on whether the model in question includes just one scale or as many as seven dummies to measure educational attainment. The  $\gamma$ -parameters denote the fixed level-2 parameters and “full democracy” and “flawed democracy” denote the level-2 predictors. The  $\delta$ -parameters in the models are the disturbances, which are again assumed to follow a normal distribution to allow for an identification of the model parameters. Hence, (1) and (2) do not make the assumption that the level-2 predictors account perfectly for the variation in the level-1 parameters (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 222). The three multilevel models are fully characterized by the level-1 models (in this case the regression models for each of the three dependent variables described above) and the level-2 models shown in (1) and (2).

The multilevel model for the version when the original macro- level variable was dichotomized and only the authoritarian regime was kept as a reference category is;

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{ full democracy} + \delta_{0j} \quad (3)$$

and

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} \text{ full democracy} + \delta_{1j} \quad (4)$$

As Coenders and Scheepers (2003) point out, when studying attitudes of individuals on ethnic intolerance such as the attitude towards ethnic minorities, one should make a distinction between respondents from the majority group and those from the minority in each country. It is clear that the answers of the respondents from the minority group on variables measuring ethnic exclusionism will probably differ from those respondents that are part of the majority group, thus affecting the overall results. For this reasons, the respondents that were part of a minority group in their respective country were omitted from the analysis of xenophobic attitudes.

In the present analysis, the ethnic group of the respondent was measured by a construction of a variable from two variables asking separately whether the mother or father of the respondent were immigrants to the country. In order to select citizens that were part of the majority ethnic group of a specific country, I constructed a variable dividing respondents into two categories according to their answer to the two questions, omitting those who's either one of the parents was an immigrant. A new variable grouping all the respondents being part of a majority ethnic

group in their corresponding country was therefore constructed, setting aside all the other respondents from any further analysis. Table 2 in Appendix B summarizes the data on the final sample size and percentage of respondents from majority groups for the analysis on xenophobic attitudes for each country.

As in most datasets, the information has been missing on some cases on some of the used variables. A simple listwise deletion of such cases would exclude a large fraction of the original sample, since when analyzing multiple variables listwise deletion removes cases with missing value on any of the variables. Since the sample size for the multilevel model on xenophobia has been already reduced due to the exclusion of the respondents from ethnic minorities, further loss of data would not be desirable. Therefore, dealing with the missing values seemed more appropriate. The method used was the Bayesian estimation analysis (see for example Asparouhov and Muthén 2010, Browne and Draper 2006) and the missing data correction has been done by estimating the variance of the independent variables.

The analysis at the macro-level, in order to account for the effects of national-level variables on aggregate levels of tolerance across countries that are independent of (or in addition to) the effects of the individual-level variables (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), shall be conducted by Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). The reason why to conduct the analysis by using HLM is that when the multi-level structure of the data is ignored, it creates several statistical problems. The main advantage of a multilevel model is the fact that multilevel models allow for cross-level interactions. The concept of levels and their interactions is the key purpose of the approach, since one may estimate the interactions between individual's characteristics and the context. For example, ignoring the fact that individuals are clustered within countries may generally cause standard errors of conventional

OLS regression coefficients to be underestimated which in turn may lead to an incorrect confirmation of hypotheses. Because HLM does not make the assumption that all of the macro-level variance is accounted for, the coefficients associated with macro-level variables tend to be more accurate and more conservative estimates (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). HLM allows in a single, comprehensive model to isolate the independent effects of both individual and country-level variables, while also testing for interaction effects between the two levels - between country characteristics and effects at the individual level.

Another reason why the multilevel approach is necessary is the fact that the cases in the database differ not only on the individual level but also on macro-level grounds. In this respect, it is likely that a random respondent from one country is more similar to another random citizen from the same country than she is to a random respondent from any other country. When using Ordinary Least Squares with nested data (the respondents are nested within countries in this case), one violates the assumption of independence between observations and, more importantly, the assumption of independence between errors – the errors are likely correlated among co-nationals unless a full set of country dichotomized variables is added to the model.

Multilevel models (or hierarchical models or mixed-effects models) have another important advantage to the simple linear regression: we can actually see how much individuals from different countries differ; and, moreover, these differences can be modeled accordingly. The *full democracy* and *flawed democracy* variables had the specific aim of modeling such differences; therefore, they were used as a macro-level predictor of the intercept. The intercept, in this situation, shows the baseline level of democratic attitudes and xenophobia of the average citizen from the sample (for example, since the variables are centered around their

national means in the multilevel analysis, a zero value on each of the independent variable corresponds to the “average person” in each national sample).

The two level regression analyses for the three continuous dependent variables were run using the Mplus software version 6.

## 4. Analyses and Results

### 4.1 Effects of the individual level variables

The following discussion presents the findings regarding the main effects of the individual level variables, that is to say the effects that tend to occur in an “average country” from the sample of the countries used for the analysis. Although these effects are not directly relevant for the hypotheses, their exploration is necessary prior to an examination of the results how these effects vary by the political system type of a country, which is the main question of the present thesis and which will be explored in the next section of this chapter.

Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix C show the results of a two-level regression analysis for the three dependent variables with a random slope with one and two dichotomized macro- level variables. Table 5 presents the results of the three multilevel models with one dichotomized macro- level variable (Full democracy), whereas Table 6 presents the results of the three multilevel models with two dichotomized macro- level variables (Full democracy and Flawed democracy). As can be seen from the tables, the difference in the results for the individual level variables following the difference usage of the macro- level variables is rather small. Thus, the effects of the individual level variables will be described together for both versions of the macro- level variables.

Focusing on the impact of specific predictors Tables 5 and 6 show that the coefficients for the educational variables are in the expected direction for all the three dependent variables. What is more, respondents with a completed university degree are considerably less xenophobic, more supportive of civil liberties and support the general idea of democracy more than those in any other of the lower educational categories. In the cases of all the three dependent

variables, the results show that the general pattern is that the effect of education becomes higher with each degree obtained gradually with the highest difference being between the two extreme categories regarding degrees. This finding is in line with previous research discussed in the preceding chapters pointing to the fact that higher educated individuals tend to be less xenophobic, more supportive of civil liberties and more supportive of democratic ideals compared to lower educated. Therefore, the results support previous empirical findings. On the other hand, what comes out as a little bit surprising is the fact that there seems to be one exception to this rule for all the three dependent variables. The incomplete university preparatory type of high school has a higher effect than the complete technical type of high school. In other words, completing a technical type of high school has a smaller impact on positive attitudes even compared to not completing the university preparatory type. It is also shown that compared directly between the categories of complete and incomplete secondary school, the university preparatory type has a bigger positive influence for all three of the dependent variables. This fact may be pointing to the confirmation of the theory that the actual type of school matters for the effect of education on the development of democratic values. Thus the argument of Selznick and Steinberg (1969), Lipset (1976) or Plant (1965) that those who major in humanities are holding considerably more democratic values compared to those who major in natural science seems to be valid. In order to draw such a conclusion from the present analysis, one of course has to assume that the university preparatory type secondary school is a similar type of school to the humanities curricula, and the technical type of secondary school is close to the natural science curricula. Intuitively, this seems to be the case. The differentiation between the two types of schools is, however, subjected to the respondent's self selection and one should keep in mind that the subscription to one of the two categories might still be subjected to cross-country incomparability in what

respondents in each country understand as university preparatory type and technical type. Moreover, to provide a clearer evidence of the different effect of schools with different curricula it would be useful to distinguish also between types of university degree schools. Although this could bring even more supporting evidence, unfortunately, the World Value Survey does not provide such a possibility and thus the presented results should be taken only as pointing to a possible differentiation. Therefore, the presented findings are only suggesting that accounting for different type of education might be useful when conducting research of the educational effect on political attitudes.

All the educational variables achieved statistical significance.<sup>4</sup> In line with my expectations, a university degree is the strongest predictor from all the individual characteristics used in the model to measure the respondent's inclination for support for civil liberties and democratic ideals and for being less xenophobic. Having a university degree is the strongest predictor for all the three dependent variables after accounting for all other individual level characteristics. The fact that a university degree is the strongest predictor within all the educational variables as well as other individual characteristics even for support for civil liberties may point to a possible rethinking of one of the ideological refinement model's assumptions put forward mostly by Jackman (1978) and Schuman, Steeh and Bobo (1985) arguing that while the well educated are supportive of abstract principles, they fail to put forward their specific applications. Two reasons might be behind this difference in conclusions. While Jackman was mostly concerned with the differences between the embracement of abstract positive principles in racial attitudes and the support for their actual policy implementation, the

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<sup>4</sup> However, the variable completed primary school achieved statistical significance only at the  $p < 0.1$  level for all three dependent variables for the version of the multilevel model presented in Table 6 and for the dependent variable *support for democratic ideals* in the version of the multilevel model presented in Table 5.

differentiation of the two levels of abstraction I provide in the present analysis is concerning general democratic ideals and support for the principle of free speech. It is possible that in the year 1978 when Jackman's study has been published specific policies regarding desegregation were not considered a necessary condition for a functioning of a democratic regime even by the highly educated. One should take into account the time period context. Even the United States, a country considered fairly democratic since the beginning of the century compared to the world's standards at each given time, have long suffered from racial segregation. Thus, while the well educated in general agreed that the principle of equality applies to all, the specific policies regarding desegregation might not have been perceived as a necessary condition to democracy, but might have been given similar importance for the functioning of a democratic regime as for example fighting economic problems. Therefore, by researching the support of civil liberties on a dependent variable that emphasizes the right for freedom of speech one might obtain different results due to the fact that freedom of speech can be perceived as a specific policy absolutely necessary for any functioning of a democratic regime. Moreover, it should be noted that even in regards to racial attitudes, for example Sullivan et al. (1982) have criticized Jackman's approach and demonstrated that there in fact is a strong relationship between abstract principles of democracy and concrete applications of these principles at the individual level. Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski (1984) and later Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, 58-69) demonstrated that the "principle-policy puzzle" (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) in racial attitudes of the well-educated arises from the fact that their belief systems are cognitively complex, which leads them to take a broader range of factors into account in arriving at a preference and evaluating government policy (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 68, Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1984).

The effect of the psychological variables is rather small, but significant in all cases for all the dependent variables except for the variable measuring the respondent's perception of mastering his life and support for civil liberties in both types of the multilevel models. Overall, the results indicate that individuals who are more secure about themselves and do not feel threatened by other people are less xenophobic, more supportive of civil liberties and more supportive of democracy as an ideal regime, as well as those who believe they have control over their lives are less xenophobic and more supportive of democratic ideals than other respondents. Thus, one might conclude that the psychodynamic model suggesting that higher educated individuals are more supportive of democracy and civil liberties and less xenophobic because of their higher personal security, stronger ego and feeling of less threat from other groups cannot be rejected and thus can be classified as complementary to the effect of education. However, one should also still keep in mind that the effect of these variables is small.

The gender variable shows interesting results. While men tend to be more supportive of civil liberties than women, women show fewer xenophobic attitudes than men. All effects of gender were statistically significant except for the dependent variable on support for democratic ideals. One might interpret these results as that men tend to be more liberal when it comes to the application of specific democratic policies, whereas women tend to be more tolerant towards other groups of people.

The effect of age is rather small, but significant for all the three dependent variables. What may be considered surprising is the fact that for support of democratic ideals the results suggest that older the respondent is, more supportive of democratic ideals he is. One may intuitively expect the results to show the same pattern as for xenophobia and support for civil

liberties, where the results indicate that the younger the respondents, more supportive of civil liberties and less xenophobic he is. The effects of this direction are in accordance with previous findings (see for example McClosky and Brill 1983, Nunn, Crocket, and Williams 1978, Coenders and Scheepers 2003). However, no strong conclusions can be drawn from the results, since the respective coefficients, although significant, are small.

The results for the two variables measuring the socioeconomic status of the respondent – current employment status and self evaluation of class – seem to provide quite puzzling results. While the results of current employment status are significant in all categories for two of the dependent variables – support for civil liberties and democratic ideals – and for most of the categories regarding xenophobia, the surprising fact is that they are all negative. This means that current employment status – whether it is for example employed full-time or employed part-time as well as being a housewife or unemployed – has a negative effect on support for civil liberties and democratic ideals, and for certain categories that achieved significant results also on xenophobia, compared to being a student (the reference category). Thus, this results seem to suggest that the ideological refinement model may need rethinking. Regarding the class self-evaluation variable the results were significant for all the categories only regarding the effect on support for civil liberties. However, the coefficients are rather small. What may be considered puzzling is the fact that for xenophobia, contrary to my expectations, being a member of the upper class (the highest category) means the embracement of more xenophobic attitudes. This result points out the need for a further more detailed investigation between class and xenophobia, since further analysis could disprove the theory of economic security leading to higher ethnic tolerance, a theory based on an assumption that the higher educated are less exposed to competition from, often low skilled,

ethnic minorities (see for example Stubager 2008, 333, Lipset 1981, Jenssen and Engesback 1994).

The findings that non-Christian religion groups have a stronger effect on xenophobia are in line with previous research (Scheepers, Gijssels, and Helmenstein 2002) that has shown that, in Europe, people belonging to non-Christian denomination tend to dissociate themselves from prejudice. The Buddhist and Jewish religion proved to have the strongest effect within the religious categories for xenophobia, showing that respondents of Buddhist and Jewish religion are less xenophobic. This could be explained with the fact that when looking at the set of countries under analysis and their prevailing official religious denomination, Jewish and Buddhist respondents could tend to perceive themselves as being part of a minority, and therefore not associate themselves with the in-group/out-group feelings as strongly as respondents from the majoritarian religious denominations. For example, Jewish respondents are in countries outside Israel usually part of the minority, which might be in fact, in Europe, also valid for respondents with a Muslim denomination, and even though the model controlled for respondents from minority groups, for the lack of available data it is possible that the respondents are for example third generation immigrants. This could explain their overall inclination to openness towards other groups.<sup>5</sup> What is noteworthy is the negative relationship between xenophobia and the Christian Orthodox religion and the Jewish religion and support for democratic ideals.

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<sup>5</sup> Thus, the observed effect of the religious variables for xenophobia may be presumably deflated by the adjustment of the sample when some respondents were eliminated from the analysis due to being a minority in the country given the fact that either one of the respondent's parent has been an immigrant to the respondent's respective country. However, people that are a religious minority were still included due to lack of data.

The results for church attendance are somewhat puzzling. Regarding xenophobia, the effects are significant only in as much as those who never attend church are less xenophobic. This seems to be in line with previous findings that argued that more frequent church attendance leads to higher prejudice (Duriez, Luyten, Snauwaert, and Hutsebaut 2002, Arian, Nachmias, Navot, and Shani 2003, Peres 1995). On the other hand, all the other categories for xenophobia did not reach statistical significance and therefore one may not draw any firm conclusions. However, for the dependent variable support for civil liberties the results indicate that attendance in church leads to less support for civil liberties, once again in line with the aforementioned previous findings. Nevertheless, when comparing the respective coefficients the effect suggests that attending church more or less frequently does not affect the strength of the negative effect of church attendance on support for civil liberties. The results for support for democratic ideals show a different pattern from the support for civil liberties, when the two significant results point to the fact that attending church once a week and only on holy days leads to more support for democratic ideals. This would seem to confirm Photiadis and Biggar's (1962, 672) findings that religion has a positive impact on prejudice through church participation, whereas a negative impact through orthodoxy, but the puzzle comes from the fact that attending church once a week is already intuitively pointing to a certain level of orthodoxy of the respondent. Other categories for the dependent variable "support for democratic ideals" were not significant.

#### 4.2 Effects of the macro level variables

One of my primary interests is in the ability of the political system factors to increase levels of democratic norms and values (less xenophobia, support for civil liberties, and support for

democratic ideals). In order to test whether any macro-level characteristic (different type of political regime) explains any cross-national variation in the dependent variables even after controlling for the effects of individual-level characteristics, I added to the survey data the political regime indicator constructed according to the criteria explained in the methodology chapter. There were two multi-level models estimated for each of the dependent variables – one contrasting the free full democracy to the other contrasting two types of political regimes “free full democracy” and “flawed democracy”.

Firstly, the results show that for the attitudes on xenophobia and support for civil liberties the political system of the country matters. That is to say that if the respondent lives in a country that is fully democratic he has a higher chance of being less xenophobic and more supportive of civil liberties than when a respondent is from either a flawed democracy or an authoritarian regime. The political regime type is thus a significant predictor of both, xenophobia and support for civil liberties. On the other hand the regime type variable is not significant for support of democratic ideals. Thus, the results point to the fact that general support for democratic ideals within the respondents is not influenced by the regime type of a country that the respondents come from.

The effect of the political regime on xenophobia becomes even higher when the free full democracy regime type is contrasted solely to all the other regime types. Moreover, the second type of the level-2 model shows that when a respondents comes from a country with a flawed democracy regime type he has a higher chance of being less xenophobic than a respondent coming from a country with an authoritarian regime. Therefore, the results seem to point out to the fact that citizens from full democracies and flawed democracies tend to be less xenophobic than citizens from authoritarian regimes. These results are in line with my

initial expectations and the socialization theory, suggesting that the “official culture” of a country has an impact on citizen’s attitudes.

Similarly, the free full democracy regime type has a significant effect on support for civil liberties. Respondents from free full democracies are more likely to support civil liberties than respondents from other types of political regimes, be it flawed democracies or authoritarian regimes. However, what might come as surprising is the fact that when a respondent comes from a flawed democracy, the effect of the political regime type on his attitudes regarding support for civil liberties does not reach statistical significance. This result is pointing to the fact that there is apparently no higher probability of supporting civil liberties when a respondent comes from a flawed democracy in respect to a respondent from an authoritarian regime. This result might be due to the fact that respondents from flawed democracies, that is to say from countries with either a recent democratic tradition and countries where democracy is not functioning well, might be sceptical to the application of democratic principles in practice.

The most surprising results were obtained for the effect of the political regime on support of democratic ideals. While the results for full democracy did not reach statistical significance in neither of the two types of the level-2 model and so the two models do not allow me to draw any conclusions about the impact of a fully democratic regime on respondent’s support for democratic ideals when compared to respondents coming from a flawed democracy or an authoritarian regime, the results for flawed democracy were statistically significant at a 0.01 level. What is however surprising is the fact that the obtained coefficients seem to point out to the fact that the flawed democracy regime type influences negatively the support for democratic ideals when compared to the effect of an authoritarian regime. This results,

although contrainuitive, might be due to the same reason described previously. While respondents from an authoritarian regime might be regarding democratic regimes as highly desirable due to the lack of democracy in their respective countries, respondents from flawed democracies may be undergoing some feelings of disappointment about democracy given its practical malfunction in their respective countries. Thus, the political regime type seems to be predicting to a certain extent each of the dependent variables. Therefore, both - education at the individual level and the political regime type at the macro- level - are predictors of xenophobic attitudes, support of civil liberties and support for democratic ideals.

However, one of the important interests of the present thesis is also the question whether the effect of education varies across countries. That is why the level-2 models addressing this question include the estimated effects of education as their dependent variables and the macro- variable, that is to say the type of political regime, as the key independent variable. Two versions of the multilevel model will be presented for each of Support for civil liberties, Support for democratic ideals and Xenophobia. The first three models use two dichotomies to capture the effects of political system type: one contrasting the category “Free full democracy” with both “Flawed democracy” and “Authoritarian regime”, and the second contrasting all democracies together with authoritarian regimes. This is why any cross-level interactions were omitted from the model, as these would reduce the residual variances for some effects more than for others and hence the residual variance would not give, in the presence of micro- and macro- level interactions, a mirror image of the total cross-country variance of these effects. As can be seen from Tables 5 and 6, all random effects for the educational variables were significant at the 0.01 level, which suggests that there is a considerably high variance across countries regarding the educational effect. This may lead to the conclusion that the educational effect varies across countries according to their political

regime type. However, higher education still remains the strongest predictor for the three dependent variables at the individual level.

## 5. Conclusion

The present thesis synthesizes several arguments in the literature regarding the effect of education on democratic norms and values. The literature on the educational effect has been usually limited in its geographical scope and concentrated on countries located in Western Europe or on the United States of America, thus providing only partial evidence of the education effect on democratic norms and values. Moreover, previous studies have almost without exception provided empirical results only for countries with long democratic traditions. On the contrary, the countries included in the present analysis represent one of the largest and most diverse samples of nations available for studying political attitudes cross-nationally. The study includes several long lasting democracies, recently democratized countries, and some only partially democratic nations. The countries also differ in the industrial/nonindustrial, ethnic and religious homogeneity/heterogeneity and unitary/federalism dimensions as well as with respect to their immigration history. Forty-eight countries were included in the analysis of support for civil liberties and support of democratic ideals, and thirty-five countries were included in the analysis of xenophobia.

Three main prominent theories have been tested in order to provide more general evidence between the link of education and several attitudes congruent with democracy, specifically support for civil liberties, support for democracy as an ideal regime and the lack of xenophobia.

The “psychodynamic theory” perspective explains the effect of education stressing the individual, personality level of influence on the positive effect of education on democratic norms and values. It emphasizes the fact that attending school leads to changes in one’s personality, thus leading to higher security and higher cognitive capabilities of an individual.

According to the psychodynamic theory the effect of education on democratic norms and values is thus mediated through the effect of specific features of the personality of the higher educated. One should therefore expect mastering one's own life and trust in people to act as mediating or complementary variables between the effects of education on support for civil liberties, support for democracy as an ideal regime and lack of xenophobia. Higher level of education should lead to higher feeling of mastering one's own life and higher trust in people. The results have shown that the hypothesis received some support but failed to live up to the expected potential. Thus, the variables operationalizing the psychodynamic model appeared with significant effects in the analysis, but failed to provide strong mediating effects. The results confirm the initial expectation in that having a university degree shows the strongest positive relationship with a feeling of mastering one's own life, believing that people will try to be somehow fair when dealing with the respondent, and thinking that people can be trusted. However, the respective effect of personality on support for civil liberties, support for democratic ideals and the rejection of xenophobia is rather small. Therefore, one should conclude that the assumptions of the psychodynamic theory cannot be rejected and can be classified as complementary to the effect of education.

Since one of the ideological refinement model's claims is that the effect of education on the dependent variables under analysis is mediated through the effect of the economic class position of the higher educated, the analysis was also assessing the impact of the socioeconomic status on the effect of education. However, although significant, the strength of the association between higher education and socioeconomic status is very weak. These results cannot be therefore taken as evidence of the association between higher education and class belonging.

The ideological refinement model has also suggested that the liberalism of the better educated is only superficial, adopting only abstract notions of tolerance and not specific policies and specific contexts. To test whether there is a substantial difference among the highly educated between support for democracy in the abstract and support for specific civil liberties in practice, the analysis makes a distinction between two forms of democratic values when testing the educational effect. The results show that education proves to be a strong predictor not only for support for democratic ideals in the abstract, but is also the strongest predictor for support for specific liberties, in the present analysis formulated as freedom of speech versus other conflicting values. Thus, the general assumptions of the ideological refinement model may need some rethinking.

The socialization theory holds that the values transmitted by the educational system should reflect the existing regime form. Thus, the educational systems of countries with long liberal democratic traditions should disseminate democratic norms and values to a significantly higher extent than countries with authoritarian regimes or shorter democratic legacy. While education remained the strongest predictor of democratic norms and values among all individual level characteristics even when controlling for the political regime type, the assumption of the socialization theory that the political regime might influence the effect of education proved true. One can thus observe a large cross country variance of the effect within regime types. Moreover, another possible explanation of the positive educational effect on attitudes congruent with democracy, connected with the socialization theory, that it is the content of education that is influential in shaping future political attitudes of individuals was to a lesser extent also tested. However, the presented findings are only suggesting that accounting for different type of education might be useful when conducting research of the educational effect on political attitudes.

To conclude, the psychodynamic model assuming that higher education is connected with certain personality types and stronger self confidence, which in turns has a mediating impact on the educational effect on democratic norms and values proved to be valid in weak sense, and thus can be taken as a complementary factor to the educational effect.

On the other hand, the two assumptions of the ideological refinement model do not seem to stand. The assumption that higher educated individuals are hypocritical in their support for democratic norms and values and thus while supporting the abstract notions of democracy they are not favorable of specific democratic policies when they conflict with other values did not prove valid. Education has been found to have the strongest effect on specific civil liberties even when controlled for other individual level characteristics. The assumption that the higher educated support for democracy is in fact a hidden socio-economic class conflict attitude did also not prove to be valid.

The socialization theory suggesting that the effect of the positive relationship between higher education and the official culture of the country found support in the analysis. Not only it has been shown that in general when citizens live in free full democracies, they are considerably more likely to be less xenophobic and supportive of civil liberties than citizens from other political systems (flawed democracies and authoritarian regimes) and that in addition, citizens living in flawed democracies are considerably more likely to be less xenophobic than citizens living in authoritarian regimes. The analysis also enabled me to conclude that the educational effect, while remaining to have the strongest impact on democratic norms and values within the individual level characteristics, is subjected to country variation, thus suggesting that the type of political regime might have an impact on such an effect. However, further analysis

would be needed to assess exactly the extent of this influence and the appropriate effect of specific regime types.

Appendix A




Figure 1 - Theoretical model for the macro-level analysis

## Appendix B

**Table 1 - List of countries, number of respondents and type of political regime**

Country	Number of Respondents	Freedom House Score of 2008	Global Report 2008	Democracy Index 2008	BTI 2008	Overall classification of political regime
Andorra	1003	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Argentina	1002	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	7, 85	Flawed Democracy
Australia	1412	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Brazil	1500	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	7, 95	Flawed Democracy
Bulgaria	1001	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	8, 70	Flawed Democracy
Burkina Faso	1534	Partly Free	Open Anocracy	Authoritarian Regime	6, 25	Authoritarian Regime
Canada	2164	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Chile	1000	Free	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy	9, 30	Free Full Democracy
China	2015	Not Free	Autocracy	Authoritarian Regime	3, 15	Authoritarian Regime
Cyprus	1050	Free	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Egypt	3051	Not Free	Closed Anocracy	Authoritarian Regime	4, 40	Authoritarian Regime
Ethiopia	1500	Partly Free	Open Anocracy	Hybrid Regime	4, 13	Authoritarian Regime
Finland	1014	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Georgia	1500	Partly Free	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	6, 85	Flawed Democracy
West	988	Free	Full	Full		Free Full

Germany			Democracy	Democracy		Democracy
East Germany	1076	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Ghana	1534	Free	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	8, 10	Flawed Democracy
Guatemala	1000	Partly Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	5, 90	Authoritarian Regime
India	2001	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	8, 10	Flawed Democracy
Indonesia	2015	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	6, 45	Flawed Democracy
Italy	1012	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy

Table 1. Continued

Country	Number of Respondents	Freedom House Score of 2008	Global Report 2008	Democracy Index 2008	BTI 2008	Overall classification of political regime
Japan	1096	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Jordan	1200	Partly Free	Closed Anocracy	Authoritarian Regime	3, 98	Authoritarian Regime
Malaysia	1201	Partly Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	5, 33	Authoritarian Regime
Mali	1534	Free	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	7, 25	Flawed Democracy
Mexico	1560	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	7, 45	Flawed Democracy
Moldova	1046	Partly Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	6, 85	Flawed Democracy
Morocco	1200	Partly Free	Autocracy	Authoritarian Regime	4, 40	Authoritarian Regime
Norway	1025	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy

Peru	1500	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	6, 60	Flawed Democracy
Poland	1000	Free	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy	8, 80	Flawed Democracy
Romania	1776	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	8, 55	Flawed Democracy
Rwanda	1507	Not Free	Closed Anocracy	Authoritarian Regime	3, 67	Authoritarian Regime
Serbia	1220	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	7, 75	Flawed Democracy
Slovenia	1037	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy	9, 70	Free Full Democracy
South Africa	2988	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	8, 60	Flawed Democracy
South Korea	1200	Free	Democracy	Full Democracy	8, 85	Free Full Democracy
Spain	1200	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Sweden	1003	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Switzerland	1241	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Taiwan	1227	Free	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy	9, 45	Free Full Democracy
Thailand	1534	Partly Free	Open Anocracy	Flawed Democracy	5, 10	Authoritarian Regime
Trinidad Tobago	1002	Free	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy		Free Full Democracy

Table 1. Continued

Country	Number of Respondents	Freedom House Score of 2008	Global Report 2008	Democracy Index 2008	BTI 2008	Overall classification of political regime
Turkey	1346	Partly	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	7, 05	Flawed

		Free				Democracy
Ukraine	1000	Free	Democracy	Flawed Democracy	7, 35	Flawed Democracy
Uruguay	1000	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy	9, 90	Free Full Democracy
United States of America	1249	Free	Full Democracy	Full Democracy		Free Full Democracy
Vietnam	1495	Not Free	Autocracy	Authoritarian Regime	3, 15	Authoritarian Regime
Zambia	1500	Partly Free	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	6, 80	Authoritarian Regime
Total	67268					

**Table 2 - Final sample size and percentage of respondents from majority groups for the analysis on xenophobic attitudes**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Sample size</b>	<b>Percentage of respondents from majority</b>	<b>Final sample size</b>
West Germany	978	89,7%	877
Italy	994	98,3%	977
Spain	1195	93,3%	1115
USA	1191	88,3%	1052
Canada	1625	75,4%	1226
Mexico	1552	95,6%	1483
S Africa	2988	94,9%	2836
Australia	1392	70,7%	984
Norway	1022	94,1%	962
Sweden	994	87,9%	874
Argentina	993	84,1%	835
Finland	1009	98,8%	997
S Korea	1195	99,6%	1190
Poland	998	96,9%	967
Switzerland	1228	83,3%	1023
Brazil	1489	96,9%	1443
Chile	978	97,3%	952
India	1905	88,9%	1694
East Germany	1069	91,7%	980
Slovenia	1031	90,7%	935
Bulgaria	1000	97,9%	979
Romania	1748	99,3%	1735

Taiwan	1227	99,2%	1217
Turkey	1342	94,1%	1263
Ukraine	976	96,9%	946
Uruguay	998	90,4%	902
Ghana	1528	93,9%	1435
Moldova	1039	93,9%	976
Georgia	1479	98,2%	1453
Thailand	1529	98,0%	1499
Indonesia	2011	99,2%	1995
Vietnam	1495	96,7%	1445
Serbia	1194	86,3%	1030
Morocco	1194	97,7%	1167
Jordan	1195	77,0%	920
Cyprus	1048	88,3%	925

Table 2. Continued

Country	Sample size	Percentage of respondents from majority	Final sample size
Trinidad and Tobago	1001	81,9%	820
Andorra	996	58,0%	578
Malaysia	1201	95,9%	1152
Burkina Faso	1510	95,6%	1443
Ethiopia	1474	98,6%	1454

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Mali	1471	93,1%	1369
Rwanda	1500	88,9%	1334
Zambia	1407	83,5%	1175
<hr/>			
Total	52614	92,1%	67268

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Table 3 - Indicators of Dimensions of Support for Democratic Ideals, Support for Civil Liberties and Xenophobia

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**Support for democratic ideals**

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(1) How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

On this scale where 1 means “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?

(1) not at all important

.... (2 – 9)

(10) absolutely important

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**Support for civil liberties**

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(1) If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?

(1) Protecting freedom of speech

(0) Maintaining order in the nation

(0) Giving people more say in important government decisions

(0) Fighting rising prices

(2) And which would be the next most important?

(0.5) Protecting freedom of speech

(0) Maintaining order in the nation

(0) Giving people more say in important government decisions

(0) Fighting rising prices

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**Xenophobia**

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(1) On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you

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would not like to have as neighbors?

(1) People of a different race

(0) if mentioned

(1) not mentioned

(2) Immigrants/foreign workers

(0) if mentioned

(1) not mentioned

(3) People of a different religion

(0) if mentioned

(1) not mentioned

(4) People who speak a different language

(0) if mentioned

(1) not mentioned

(2) When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY NATIONALITY) people over immigrants. Do you \*

(0) agree

(1) disagree

(3) How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? \*

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*Notes:* Variables marked with the symbol \* had to be further recoded from their original coding in order to make the measurements comparable.

## Appendix C

**Table 4 - Bivariate relationship between levels of education and personality characteristics (Pearson's r)**

Education	Control over one's life	People will try to take advantage	Most people can be trusted
Completed primary	-.021**	-.014**	-.029**
Incomplete secondary/technical type	-.013**	.000	-.030**
Incomplete secondary/university preparatory type	.018**	-.018**	-.016**
Complete secondary/technical type	.034**	.003	-.019**
Complete secondary/university preparatory type	.024**	.014**	.011**
University education without degree	.044**	.015**	.039**
University degree	.069**	.054**	.106**

Notes: \*\* denotes  $p < .01$

**Table 5 - Bivariate relationship between levels of education and respondent's class self-evaluation (Pearson's r)**

Education	Upper class	Upper middle class	Lower middle class	Working class
Completed primary	-.019**	-.100**	-.015**	.060**
Incomplete secondary/technical type	-.018**	-.057**	-.031**	.081**
Incomplete secondary/university preparatory type	-.004	-.030**	.014**	.078**
Complete secondary/technical type	.000	-.008*	.000	-.006
Complete secondary/university preparatory type	.002	.048**	.048**	-.029**
University education without degree	.010**	.084**	.038**	-.049**
University degree	.053**	.238**	.039**	-.146**

Notes: \*\* denotes  $p < .01$ , \* denotes  $p < .05$

Table 6 - A Multi-level Model: Macro and Micro level predictors of dimensions of Xenophobia, Support for civil liberties and Support for democratic ideals on individual characteristics with the country level variable Free full democracy/Flawed democracy & Authoritarian regime

Predictors	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates
	Xenophobia	Support for civil liberties	Democratic Ideals
<b>Fixed effects</b>			
<i>Individual-level</i>			
Intercept	3.530**	0.865**	7.165**
<b>Education</b>			
Completed primary	0.090**	0.068*	0.063 <sup>+</sup>
Incomplete secondary /technical type	0.161**	0.194**	0.173**
Incomplete secondary /university preparatory type	0.215**	0.237**	0.345**
Complete secondary /technical type	0.173**	0.231**	0.327**
Complete secondary /university preparatory type	0.283**	0.263**	0.451**
University education without degree	0.369**	0.300**	0.555**
University degree	0.457**	0.402**	0.667**
Incomplete primary (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Control over one's own life</b>	0.008**	0.003	0.093**
<b>People will try to take advantage</b>	0.012**	0.008**	0.026**
<b>Most people can be trusted</b>	0.104**	0.027*	0.048**

<b>Sex</b>	0.031**	-0.033**	-0.012
<b>Age</b>	-0.001*	-0.002*	0.008**
<b>Current Employment</b>			
Employed full time	-0.007	-0.091**	-0.031 <sup>+</sup>
Employed part-time	-0.059**	-0.066*	-0.067**
Self employed	0.001	-0.065**	-0.024 <sup>+</sup>
Retired	-0.059**	-0.081**	-0.030 <sup>+</sup>
Housewife	-0.063**	-0.131**	-0.052*
Unemployed + other	-0.046**	-0.054*	-0.045*
Student (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Self evaluation of class</b>			
Upper class	-0.101**	0.046*	-0.012
Upper middle class	0.004	0.077**	0.008
Lower middle class	0.018 <sup>+</sup>	0.028*	-0.006
Working class	0.005	0.027*	0.018
Lower class (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Religious denomination</b>			
Roman catholic	0.023	-0.017	0.084**

Table 6. Continued

Predictors	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates
	Xenophobia	Support for civil liberties	Democratic Ideals
Protestant	0.041*	0.042*	0.102**
Christian orthodox	-0.053**	0.034	0.041 <sup>+</sup>
Jewish	0.151**	0.074 <sup>+</sup>	-0.103**
Muslim	0.117**	0.033	0.080**
Hindu	-0.013	0.004	0.006
Buddhist	0.153**	-0.024	0.008
Other religion (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Church attendance</b>			
More than once a week	-0.012	-0.015	0.009
Once a week	-0.005	-0.046**	0.032*
Once a month	0.016	-0.025 <sup>+</sup>	0.019
Only on holy days	-0.001	-0.028 <sup>+</sup>	0.034*
Never	0.046**	0.010	0.016
Once a year	0.002	-0.030 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003
Less often (reference category)	-	-	-
<i>Country level</i>			
Full democracy	0.566**	0.329**	0.106
<b>Random effects</b>			
Intercept	0.444**	0.172**	0.303**
Completed primary	0.018**	0.020**	0.027**
Incomplete secondary/technical type	0.033**	0.016**	0.016**
Complete	0.019**	0.005**	0.011**

secondary/technical type			
Incomplete secondary/university preparatory type	0.044**	0.024**	0.023**
Complete secondary/university preparatory type	0.062**	0.006**	0.031**
University education without degree	0.074**	0.057**	0.040**
University degree	0.099**	0.065**	0.050**
	44	49	49
<b>Number of countries</b>	(with Germany splitted)	(with Germany splitted)	(with Germany splitted)
<b>Number of individuals</b>	52614	67268	67268

*Notes:* \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, +p < .1; Higher values indicate less xenophobia, more support for civil liberties and more democratic ideals. Entries are Bayesian estimation coefficients estimated with Mplus 6.

Table 7 - A Multi-level Model: Macro and Micro level predictors of dimensions of Xenophobia, Support for civil liberties and Support for democratic ideals on individual characteristics with the country level variable Free full democracy/Flawed democracy

Predictors	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates
	Xenophobia	Support for civil liberties	Democratic Ideals
<b>Fixed effects</b>			
<i>Individual-level</i>			
Intercept	3.244**	0.835**	7.518**
<b>Education</b>			
Completed primary	0.087 <sup>+</sup>	0.056 <sup>+</sup>	0.055 <sup>+</sup>
Incomplete secondary /technical type	0.163**	0.171**	0.160**
Incomplete secondary /university preparatory type	0.215**	0.234**	0.334**
Complete secondary /technical type	0.175**	0.217**	0.316**
Complete secondary /university preparatory type	0.286**	0.242**	0.442**
University education without degree	0.371**	0.283**	0.551**
University degree	0.468**	0.391**	0.657**
Incomplete primary (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Control over one's own life</b>	0.008**	0.005	0.093**
<b>People will try to take advantage</b>	0.012**	0.010**	0.026**
<b>Most people can be trusted</b>	0.105**	0.027*	0.049**

<b>Sex</b>	0.029**	-0.033**	-0.011
<b>Age</b>	-0.001*	-0.001*	0.007**
<b>Current Employment</b>			
Employed full time	-0.000	-0.109**	-0.029*
Employed part-time	-0.051**	-0.081**	-0.066**
Self employed	0.008	-0.083**	-0.022 <sup>+</sup>
Retired	-0.050*	-0.108**	-0.028 <sup>+</sup>
Housewife	-0.056**	-0.146**	-0.050**
Unemployed + other	-0.039**	-0.067**	-0.043**
Student (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Self evaluation of class</b>			
Upper class	-0.101**	0.050*	-0.004
Upper middle class	0.003	0.076**	0.001
Lower middle class	0.017	0.029*	0.000
Working class	0.005	0.027 <sup>+</sup>	0.025 <sup>+</sup>
Lower class (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Religious denomination</b>			
Roman catholic	0.020	-0.027	0.104**
Protestant	0.036**	0.029 <sup>+</sup>	0.122**

Predictors	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates	Unstandardized estimates
	Xenophobia	Support for civil liberties	Democratic Ideals
Christian orthodox	-0.060**	0.017	0.062*
Jewish	0.153**	0.059	-0.093**
Muslim	0.117**	0.017	0.103**
Hindu	-0.022	-0.006	0.015
Buddhist	0.156**	-0.028	0.020
Other religion (reference category)	-	-	-
<b>Church attendance</b>			
More than once a week	-0.015	-0.020	0.007
Once a week	-0.008	-0.048*	0.031*
Once a month	0.013	-0.026 <sup>+</sup>	0.017
Only on holy days	-0.005	-0.028 <sup>+</sup>	0.034*
Never	0.042**	0.011	0.016
Once a year	0.000	-0.029 <sup>+</sup>	0.002
Less often (reference category)	-	-	-
<i>Country level</i>			
Full democracy	0.874**	0.334*	-0.216
Flawed democracy	0.467*	0.005	-0.547**
<b>Random effects</b>			
Intercept	0.432**	0.174**	0.260**
Completed primary	0.019**	0.021**	0.027**
Incomplete secondary/technical type	0.036**	0.012**	0.018**
Complete	0.018**	0.005**	0.014**

secondary/technical type			
Incomplete secondary/university preparatory type	0.043**	0.029**	0.027**
Complete secondary/university preparatory type	0.059**	0.006**	0.032**
University education without degree	0.070**	0.053**	0.038**
University degree	0.096**	0.061**	0.050**
	44	49	49
<b>Number of countries</b>	(with Germany splitted)	(with Germany splitted)	(with Germany splitted)
<b>Number of individuals</b>	52614	67268	67268

*Notes:* \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , + $p < .1$ ; Higher values indicate less xenophobia, more support for civil liberties and more democratic ideals. Entries are Bayesian estimation coefficients estimated with Mplus 6.

Appendix D




Figure 2

Free Partly Free Not Free

Source: Freedom House 2009.




Figure 3

Source: Polity IV. 2009. *Global Report 2009*, 12.




Figure 4 - Democracy Index Map for the year 2008 according to the Economist Intelligence's Unit Democracy Index for 2008

Source: Economist Intelligence's Unit. 2008. *Democracy Index*.

Full Democracies

10-8

8-7.95

Hybrid Regimes

6-4.5

4.5-3.95

Authoritarian Regimes

3.95-2

2-0

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