THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN SECURITIZATION THEORY:
HOLODOMOR DISCOURSE AND SOCIETAL SECURITY IN UKRAINE

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Word Count: 17 249

Budapest, Hungary
2010
Abstract

This thesis explores the role of socio-political context in securitization theory. Securitization studies argue that security threats are discursively constructed by societal actors: security is a speech act. The authors of securitization theory – the Copenhagen School of security studies – acknowledge the importance of contextual factors that influence the success of the speech act. Following a number of securitization theorists, this thesis argues that the Copenhagen School’s attention to context is inadequate and demonstrates this by examining a case of securitization of the denial of Holodomor as genocide in contemporary Ukraine. The thesis argues that without contextualizing the Holodomor discourse in a broader Ukrainian identity discourse, its meaning as a societal security threat to a particular variant of Ukrainian identity is not readily evident. This illustrates that, in order to understand the social construction of security, the analyst must look beyond the speech act to uncover the identities of the actors, their power relations, as well as the meaning of security itself.
Acknowledgments

This work owes a great deal to the generous support of many people. I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Paul Roe, for helping me rediscover security studies and providing invaluable and timely feedback. I thank Professor Béla Greskovits for his kind words of encouragement throughout this program and Professor Alexander Astrov for challenging my thinking in more ways than was thought possible. I thank my mother, Iryna Budjeryn, for having high, although not unreasonable, expectations of me, her love and her industrious ways. My husband, James Flynn I thank for his unconditional support and exceptional sense of humor that helped lighten the hardest moments. Most of all, I thank Anna, Lukas and Maria for choosing me as their mother and making everything worthwhile.
# Table of Contents

**Introduction** .......................................................................................................................... 1

**Chapter 1. Securitization and the Role of Context** ................................................................. 8

1.1 The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory ......................................................... 8

1.2 The Role of Context ............................................................................................................ 13

1.2.1. Internalist-Externalist Debate .................................................................................... 15

1.2.2. Audiences and Common Meanings ............................................................................ 18

1.2.3. The Meaning and Logic of Security............................................................................ 21

**Chapter 2. Holodomor: History and Present** ................................................................. 26

2.1. Holodomor: Historical Background ................................................................................. 26

2.1.1. Intentionalist Interpretation of Holodomor ............................................................. 28

2.1.2. Other Explanations of Holodomor ............................................................................. 33

2.2. Holodomor Discourse in 2005-2010 ............................................................................. 35

**Chapter 3. Holodomor Discourse in Context** ............................................................. 45

3.1. The Rise of Ukrainian Identities ..................................................................................... 45

3.2. Ukrainian Nation Building Project ................................................................................. 52

3.3. Holodomor Discourse and Societal Security ................................................................. 62

**Conclusion** ............................................................................................................................... 71

**Bibliography** ............................................................................................................................ 74
The Role of Context in Securitization Theory: Holodomor Discourse and Societal Security in Ukraine

Introduction

Traditionally, security is defined as a freedom from objective military threats to the survival of the state in an anarchical international system. Critical security studies have challenged this conception of security in many ways by widening and deepening the security studies agenda to include referent objects other than the state, as well as sectors of security other than the military. The notion of objectivity of security threats has also been challenged and attention has been drawn to how the label of threat is attached to issues via intersubjective social interaction. The so-called Copenhagen School (CS) of security studies conceptualizes security as a process of social construction of threats that involves a securitizing actor (usually the political elite) performing a speech act that labels a particular issue as threatening to the survival of the referent object and which, once accepted by the audience, legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures to deal with it. Thus, the issue is ‘securitized’ and moved beyond the realm of normal politics into the mode of emergency, hyper-politics.


The securitization framework has been a useful tool to analysts who want to challenge the notion of the objectivity of security threats. The framework is elegant and parsimonious and has generated much academic interest, testimony to which is the number of critiques and debates sparked by securitization, aiming to broaden and further specify the framework in order to increase the framework’s coherence and explanatory power vis-à-vis the multitude of empirical and analytical considerations.\(^3\) One such critique, outlined by Matt McDonald in his overview of securitization studies, is about the importance of the social and political context in which securitization occurs.\(^4\)

The CS argues that security threats are not objective realities that exist outside of their discursive designation as such.\(^5\) Therefore, their focus is on the speech act and its performative power to construct security. At the same time, the CS maintains that the acceptance of the audience is essential in the successful discursive construction of security threats, which posits securitization as an

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Contextual factors, which the CS terms facilitating conditions, help explain why some speech acts are more likely to be accepted by the audience than others. The CS outlines three such facilitating conditions: the proper security grammar of the speech act, the positional power of the securitizing actor and conditions historically associated with the threat. These facilitating conditions, however, are taken as givens that either help or hinder securitization but are not conceptualized as constitutive of the speech acts, which does not sit well with the understanding of security as a social construction.

Thus, there is a tension in securitization theory between the understanding of securitization as a *productive process* by focusing on the performative power of the speech act, and as a *constructed process* by claiming that security is intersubjectively constituted. This tension gave rise to critique by the so-called Second Generation of securitization analysts who argue that in order to better understand why certain securitization moves are successful in certain communities while others are not, it is important to understand the identity constructs of the actors and audiences involved as well as the historical and cultural conditions in which the security discourse takes place. Ultimately, this critique argues for a significant, indeed constitutive, role of socio-political context in securitization theory. As McDonald argues, contextual factors not only impact

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7 Buzan et al., 32.
but in fact condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction
of security.\textsuperscript{8}

Other theorists, like Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel, also argue that
securitization cannot be properly understood outside of the context in which the
actor and audiences are collocated.\textsuperscript{9} Jef Huysmans draws attention to the
unevenness of the CS’s constructive approach, where some social phenomena
are essentially objectified and not treated as constitutive of the securitization
process.\textsuperscript{9} Similarly, Felix Ciuta argues for the need to address social
constructedness of the positional power of the securitizing actor, the identity of
the audience, the significance of the referent object and security measures.\textsuperscript{10}
Indeed, the very meaning of security is contextual. Ciuta, echoing Roxanne Doty
Lynn before him\textsuperscript{11} points out that, despite claiming that security is defined by
actors, the CS effectively brackets the meaning of security as being about
survival, existential threat and extraordinary measures.\textsuperscript{11} Yet, if we treat security
threats, power relations, collective identities and the meaning of security itself as
social constructions, we must not establish them by conceptual definitions but
through contextual analysis.

\textsuperscript{8} McDonald, “Securitization and the construction of security”, 571.
\textsuperscript{9} Thierry Balzacq, “The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context”,
\textit{European Journal of International Relations} 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201; Holger Stritzel, “Towards a
theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond”, \textit{European Journal of International Relations}
\textsuperscript{10} Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the creative development of a security studies
\textsuperscript{11} Felix Ciuta, “Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of securitization
\textsuperscript{12} Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Immigration and the politics of security”, \textit{Security Studies} 8, no. 2
\textsuperscript{13} Ciuta, “Security and the problem of context”, 316.
In keeping with this critique, this thesis will argue that understanding the socio-political context is essential in discerning the security content of certain discourses, especially in societal security field. I demonstrate this by empirically investigating the role of socio-political context in the case of the Holodomor discourse in contemporary Ukraine. Holodomor, also known as the Great Famine of 1932-3, is one of the darkest pages in Ukraine’s history. As a result of Stalin’s policies of industrialization, collectivization and dekulakization, the fertile agricultural areas of eastern and southern Ukraine and Northern Caucasus were struck by a massive famine that took between 5 and 7 million lives. Many in Ukraine believe that the famine was not only targeted at peasants as a class, but also at peasants as the base of the Ukrainian nation. During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in 2005-2010, the issue of Holodomor became highly politicized. Yushchenko and his supporters embarked on a domestic and international campaign to have Holodomor recognized as genocide, which sent many ripples across the Ukrainian society and also angered Russia.

It is not immediately evident why the Holodomor issue should be awarded such urgency or prove so divisive for Ukrainians. It is also not evident why it would be discussed in terms of societal security. Only by locating the Holodomor discourse within the broader context of Ukrainian identity politics, can we begin to see its security content. I argue that the representation of Holodomor as genocide is part and parcel of the Ukrainophone Ukrainian identity emanating
from western Ukraine, which presents itself as the ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity and envisions the future of the Ukrainian state in cultural, ethno-linguistic and anti-Russian terms. Denying Holodomor as genocide constitutes a threat to this identity by preventing it from realizing its political vision. Thus, the case of Holodomor is particularly fitting to exemplify the importance of contextual factors in securitization, since, as I argue, the Holodomor discourse cannot be adequately understood as a societal security threat without contextualizing it within the broader Ukrainian identity discourse.

The discussion of context in this thesis demonstrates that, in the societal security setting in particular, securitizing moves alone may not fully reveal the meaning of security. It is the socio-political context that harbors this meaning. One tangible implication of this conclusion is that analysts risk overlooking important security problems in the making, should they focus on the performative aspects of the speech acts alone. If security analysts, in their quest to understand social phenomena, are to bear any practical relevance for security policy making, help avert or mitigate security dilemmas, they must look beyond the speech act and uncover the meanings, identities and power constellations upon which it builds.

The case study approach employed in this thesis is well suited for the inquiry at hand, since it allows to interpretively investigate the dynamics of a securitization process and its contextual setting in sufficient depth. Since securitization is about the discursive construction of threats, discourse analysis is the obvious
way to study securitization. This is the primary method I employ here. The CS
First, I analyze the Holodomor discourse of 2005-2009 by examining the
securitizing moves themselves, such as the official addresses, statements and
decrees of President Viktor Yushchenko, the main securitizing actor, as well as
the 2006 Law on Holodomor and deliberation surrounding its passing. Then, in
order to set the Holodomor discourse in the broader political and cultural context,
I discuss the Ukrainian identity discourse, analyzing written and oral
pronouncements of Ukrainian political and cultural leaders. In discussing
Ukraine’s diverging societal identities and their representations of Holodomor, I
also draw on some discourse analyses conducted by other analysts, such as
Andrew Wilson’s *Ukrainian Nationalism in 1990s: A Minority Faith* and Catherine
Wanner’s *Burden of Dreams History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, among
others.

The thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the development of
securitization theory and examines the debate about the role of socio-political
context in securitization. Chapter 2 introduces the empirical case of Holodomor
by providing the historical background of the famine and discussing the
contemporary Holodomor discourse in Ukrainian society and politics. Chapter 3
places the Holodomor discourse within the broader context of identity politics in
Ukraine and argues that the meaning of Holodomor denial as a societal security
threat would be misconstrued or missed without contextualization.

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14 Buzan *et al.*, 176.
Chapter 1. Securitization and the Role of Context

1.1 The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School analysts have made a number of important analytical contributions to security studies. Barry Buzan, in his book *People, States and Fear* argues that the state may be threatened in more ways than just military, as traditional approaches maintain, and outlines five such security sectors: political, military, societal, economic, and environmental.\(^{15}\) The state, however, remains the sole referent object – that what is threatened and must be secured.

Unsatisfied with the mere widening of security agenda, the CS took at the referent object itself. In their book *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda for Europe*, the CS authors include society alongside the state as a referent. While acknowledging approaches that place referent objects on individual and global level, the authors intentionally keep the referent on the mid-level of analysis, at the collective unit, which is only slightly less (a national minority) or more (a regional structure) than the state.\(^{16}\) While state security has sovereignty as the main criterion, societal security is about the survival of identity: “if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as ‘us’”\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\) Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 116-134.
\(^{17}\) Wæver et al., 25-26.
One of the reasons for regarding society as a referent object was to account for both integrational processes in the West and disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the East, where the main focus of new insecurity became the society rather than the state.\(^{18}\) The duality of state and society as referent objects reflected “the dissolution of the traditional state system and the dispersal of political authority across multiple levels.”\(^{19}\)

While *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* became an important addition to the critical approaches in security studies, it also gave rise to one of the main critiques of the CS\(^ {20}\). In his review of the book, Bill McSweeney argues that ‘society’ and ‘identity’ are matters of processes and negotiations in a state of constant social construction and charges the CS with the reification of these concepts and hence threats to them.\(^ {21}\) While the CS authors maintain that societal identity is a process and a product of social construction and argue that societies possess a “high degree of social inertia [and] continuity often across generations”\(^ {22}\), McSweeney’s critique nevertheless highlighted the need to elaborate on just how exactly threats to society and identity are constructed.

Thus, the social construction of security threats became the focus the CS’s next major work *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. The book synthesized the

\(^{18}\) Weaver *et al.*, 2-4.
\(^{19}\) Wæver, “Securitization and desecuritization”, 67.
\(^{20}\) Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen”, 489.
\(^{22}\) Wæver *et al.*, *Identity, Migration*, 21
CS’s previous work on security sectors and societal security with the theory of securitization, developed earlier by one of the CS’s main contributors Ole Wæver. The securitization framework maintains that issues become regarded as security by being spoken of as security, being put into security terminology.

This challenge[d] the notion of security threat as an objective reality that exists prior to language, something that it is simply out there to be discovered and dealt with. Instead, Wæver argues, treating something as a security issue is always a choice – a political choice. This choice is realized through a discursive practice of labeling something a 'security' threat.

Wæver’s reconceptualization of security begins from within the traditional (state-centric, military threat- and survival-focused) security discussion, which he uses to outline security as a field of practice, where, historically, states threaten each other, wage wars and defend their independence. This security field is identifiable through a certain set of actions and codes, and driven by specific logic characteristic to it: “Urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political “we” from dealing with any other questions.”

From inside this traditionally conceptualized field, Wæver draws on J.L. Austin’s language theory to explain the social constructedness of threats. Yet the underlying – traditional – logic of security as being about urgency, existential

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23 Wæver, “The EU as a security actor”, 251.
26 Wæver, “Securitization and desecuritization”, 50.
27 Ibid., 51.
threat and extraordinary measures remains central to the securitization framework. This becomes a litmus test for knowing that we are dealing with security and not something else.

Based on this clear idea of what constitutes the essence of security, securitization studies outlines its mission as gaining a precise understanding of “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions.”

While security is still about existential threats, the understanding of what constitutes a threat is necessarily socially constructed by linguistic means. Wæver conceptualizes security as a *speech act*:

> In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act... By uttering “security,” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

By being labeled in this particular way, the issue becomes *securitized*, which signifies its spatial move from the realm of normal politics to a hyper-politics or even above politics. It enters a security field which is governed by the security logic of urgency and extraordinary measures.

Since state and society cannot perform a speech act themselves, they are always spoken for. In the case of the state, the securitizing actors are the power

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28 Buzan, *et al.*, 32
29 Wæver, “Securitization and desecuritization”, 55.
30 Buzan *et al.*, 23.
holders, the political elite of the state.\footnote{Wæver, “Securitization and desecuritization”, 54.} In his earlier writings on securitization, Wæver effectively argued that, imbued with legitimacy by the virtue of their position, the power holders label an issue ‘security’ in a rather top-down self-referential way: “a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders”\footnote{Ibid., 56.} But in the case of society, such automatic securitization becomes problematic. Societal securitizing actors or institutions must have some sort of legitimacy to speak on behalf of the society. Without an \textit{a priori} positional power to speak security, the legitimacy of these actors can be assessed only retrospectively by examining to what degree the society backed up the speaker, enabling the success of the speech act.\footnote{Ibid., 70.} Thus, Wæver introduces the role of audience, which buys into the utterances of the securitizing actor, casting securitization as a process beyond the singular instance of the speech act.

The role of audiences in securitization is further expanded in \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis}. There, securitization is explicitly recast as a process of negotiation between a securitizing actor and his audience: “the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” since securitization can never only be imposed.\footnote{Buzan et al., 25.} Only the consent of the audience legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures, which involves breaking the rules of normal politics in dealing with the threat.\footnote{Ibid.}

In this way, the security discourse – the
speech act and its acceptance or non-acceptance by the audience – reveals the intersubjective nature of securitization.

1.2. The Role of Context

Will all utterances of the security actor be accepted by the audience? If not, then what determines which speech acts are accepted and which are not? In order to answer these questions, the CS introduces the category of facilitating conditions which influence the success of the speech act. Wæver outlines three such conditions. The first is that the internal structure of the speech act must follow a certain set of security grammar rules, that is, use the rhetoric of existential threat, point of no return and possible solutions. The second condition is the positional power or the social capital of the securitizing actor, who must possess legitimate authority, although not necessarily official one, to perform a security speech act. The third is conditions historically associated with the issue that is being securitized into a threat, like “tanks, hostile sentiments or polluted waters”. Thus, a “successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech.”

36 Wæver, “The EU as a security actor”, 252. also Buzan et al., 32.
37 Wæver, “The EU as a security actor”, 252-3.
38 Ibid., 253.
39 Buzan et al., 32.
Wæver, however, cautions that while contextual factors can help or hinder securitization, they can never determine it. Securitization is a type of political interaction and as such involves agents such as actors and audiences making political choices by performing a speech act and granting acceptance respectively. In a manner of Arendtian politics, securitization transpires in the space between the subjects and facilitating conditions are just another variable that may either constrain or enable this process. In essence, contextual factors are exogenous to the securitization theory.

This, however, is at odds with the claim that security is socially constructed. If the threats are socially constituted by performative speech, how can we treat facilitating conditions as exogenous givens? By claiming that security is always constructed, the CS opens a Pandora’s box of constructivism, which cannot logically be contained within some elements of the social phenomenon but not spread to the other. And if audiences, their identities, the power relations in which they engage and the meanings with which they operate are all socially constructed, context becomes critically important. Thus, there is a tension in the securitization theory created by the claims that security is both socially constructed and performed in a speech act. The following section takes a more detailed look at the debate about the role of socio-political context in securitization theory and outlines the main contributions made to the debate by the Second Generation securitization analysts.

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40 Wæver, “The EU as a security actor”, 252.
41 Buzan et al., 31.
1.2.1. Internalist-Externalist Debate

Security discourses do not happen in a vacuum. As McDonald points out, security speech acts are set firmly in a particular social and political context which affects the process of securitization and determines why in some communities some types of issues are more likely to be successfully securitized than others.\footnote{McDonald, “Securitization”, 570-573.} Ronnie Lipschutz also highlights the connection between security and its context by saying that “[d]iscourses of security… [are] the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them.”\footnote{Lipschutz, \textit{On Security}, 8.} So is security context-shaping or context-dependent, then?

The Second Generation securitization analysts outline two ways in which to conceptualize the role of context in securitization. According to Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel, depending on analytical stance toward the relationship between the speech act and the context in which it happens, there is an \textit{internalist} and an \textit{externalist} view of securitization.\footnote{Balzacq, “The three faces of securitization”, 180-184.} The internalist approach, toward which the original authors of securitization seem to gravitate, emphasizes the security speech act event which possesses its own performative power, creates its own meaning and thus shapes the context.\footnote{Stritzel, “Towards a theory of securitization”, 359.}
Following L.J. Austin, Jacque Derrida and Judith Butler, the internalist take on securitization focuses on the *moment* of the security utterance as an illocutionary act, that is, a type of speech that is simultaneously an action. From this theoretical standpoint, the actors and structures themselves must be performed to exist in the first place, thus they are constituted retrospectively by the speech act. As Balzacq highlights, this posits that the word ‘security’ itself possesses agency since “it conveys a self-referential practice instantiated by discourses on existential threats that empower political elites to take extraordinary measures to alleviate ‘insecurity’.”

Thus, if the speech act conforms to certain internal-linguistic rules and falls upon favorable external conditions, it produces a change in context: a formerly secure place becomes insecure and measures are taken to reestablish security. As Wæver puts it: “A speech act is interesting because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that is not already in the context. It reworks or produces a context by the performative success of the act.” In short, the speech act alters the context. Facilitating conditions are there merely to enable or hinder the performative power of the security speech act.

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46 Balzacq, 177 and Stritzel, 360.
47 Stritzel, 361.
48 Balzacq, 181.
49 Ibid., 180.
50 Wæver, “The EU as a security actor”, 286.
The focus on performative power of security, however, does not sit well with the claim that securitization is intersubjective and contingent on the acceptance of the audiences. This tension forces the CS to conceptualize the intersubjectivity of the securitization in a rather narrow way, more as a mechanical ping-pong interaction between actors and audiences, where the role of audiences is reduced to a yea or neigh reaction to a security speech act. The audience is there to evaluate the effectiveness of the speech act, and hence the success of securitization as a whole can only be known in hindsight.

This, however, tells us little about what kind of security speech acts the audiences are likely to accept and why. Can we not anticipate what kinds of issues are likely to be securitized in what contexts and with what degree of success, before the act of securitization is complete and the damage that may be wrecked by it is done? As McDonald points out, internalist view of securitization does not help us understand why certain representations of threat resonate with some audiences and not the others. Wæver himself concedes that understanding the conditions of securitization would make it possible to foresee and prevent security spirals and dilemmas. Yet, herein lies the contradiction: if we wait around for the performative speech act to construct a threatening situation – which prior to speech cannot be said to exist, according to Wæver and the language theorists – it might be too late to do the foreseeing and preventing. In addition, as McDonald notes, security may be constructed over time through a

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51 McDonald, 564.
52 Wæver, “The EU as a security actor”, 253.
range of incremental processes and the narrow focus on the moment of intervention is not able to account for such situations.\textsuperscript{53}

The externalist view of securitization maintains that the conceptual consistency and explanatory power of securitization theory is considerably enhanced if we award a greater significance to contextual factors. If any sort of communication is taking place between actors and audiences in the course of securitization, it must appeal not only to objects that might make security claims credible, but also to common identities and meanings embedded in the context in which securitization takes place.

1.2.2. Audiences and Common Meanings

To begin with, the role of audiences must be understood beyond the mere reaction to the security speech act: we must investigate their identities and the social dynamic in which they partake. In fact, Balzacq argues that effective securitization is contingent on a perceptive audience.\textsuperscript{54} Securitization is successful only when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a “common structured perception of an ominous development” which is necessarily highly context dependent.\textsuperscript{55} In order to “move the audience’s attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing action

\textsuperscript{53} McDonald, 564.
\textsuperscript{54} Balzacq., 182
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 179, 181.
need to resonate with the context within which [the] actions are collocated."\textsuperscript{56} Thus, the analyst must focus on securitization as a discursive, back-and-forth negotiation \textit{process} between the securitizing actor and his audience with the socio-political context providing the reservoir of common meanings and power constellations that shape the debate.\textsuperscript{57}

Commenting on the role of audiences in societal security setting in particular, Roxanne Lynn Doty echoes McSweeeney’s critique and argues that the formulation of societal threats can take many forms other than differentiation between a fixed definition of self and other.\textsuperscript{58} The focus must be shifted to the process through which societal identity itself as well as threats to it are given meaning.\textsuperscript{59} The same development may be threatening to one identity but not to other. Thus, as McDonald notes, understanding audiences and their identities is instrumental to understanding why certain securitizing moves are intelligible and legitimate and others are not.\textsuperscript{60}

This is not meant to strip the speech act of its performative power, but rather to commit the analyst to studying not only the immediate securitization discourse but also the social field in which it takes place.\textsuperscript{61} Both Stritzel and Balzacq include the performative aspects of the speech act and its ability to shape context in their analysis; however, they argue that the speech acts themselves cannot be

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 181.  
\textsuperscript{57} McDonald, 572.  
\textsuperscript{58} Doty, “Immigration and the politics of security”, 80.  
\textsuperscript{59} McDonald, 571.  
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 572.  
\textsuperscript{61} Balzacq, 178.
very well abstracted from the context. Stritzel proposes to reconceptualize securitization by taking into account “the deep embeddedness of security articulations in social relations of power without which its dynamics and non-dynamics cannot be understood.”

His concept of embedded securitization encompasses three forces of securitization: (1) the performative force of the security speech acts, (2) their embeddedness in existing discourses and (3) the positional power of actors who influence the construction of meaning.

While both speech acts and actors are embedded in the context, they still possess the power to produce new meanings, thereby influencing the context in return.

Balzacq also concedes that knowledge acquired through language, written or spoken, is one of the ways in which the meaning is generated. However, he argues that we cannot disregard the cultural meaning, that is, knowledge acquired historically through previous experiences and interactions.

Stritzel describes context as having a socio-linguistic dimension, more immediately related to the creative power of the speech act and the reservoir of analogies, similes and contrasts at its disposal; and a socio-political dimension, which encompasses sedimented social and political structures that produce the positional power of actors involved in the process of constructing meanings.

Balzacq’s cultural meaning seems to permeate both elements of Stritzel’s context, as a repository of historically generated meanings operationalized by the

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62 Stritzel, 365.
63 Ibid., 370-371.
64 Balzacq, 183.
65 Ibid., 183.
66 Stritzel, 369.
speech act and the source of structural power constellations. The CS themselves claim that the meaning of security “lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others.” However, as Felix Ciuta notes, uncovering implicit meanings can be done only through context-focused interpretive analysis.

1.2.3. The Meaning and Logic of Security

Ciuta notes that although CS claims that security is intersubjective and socially constructed, within the securitization framework only threats are constructed by being rhetorically dressed in pre-defined security language and pegged to the referent object, while referent objects themselves, along with securitizing actors, audiences and security measures, as well as the very meaning and logic of security are taken as definitional givens. Yet, any interaction cast in intersubjective terms cannot be divided into parts that are socially constructed and others that are not. The CS identify themselves as radical constructivist by maintaining that security is always a matter of political construction; they are also alarmed by the possibility of making security entirely self-referential and “losing the essential quality of the concept of security: if security is everything, it becomes nothing.”

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67 Buzan et al., 24, italics added.
68 Ciuta, 316.
69 Ibid., 308, 317.
70 Ibid., 308; Huysmans, 493-4.
72 Buzan et al., 27.
The CS’s solution to this problem is to freeze the definition of security along traditional lines of existential threats and survival\(^{73}\) and identify intrinsic logic characteristic to security as a field of practice, outlined earlier in this chapter. The CS argue that they are justified in doing so, without losing their constructivist credentials, since many socially constructed phenomena, societal identities and the logic of security among them, get sedimented as structure and become relatively stable as practice\(^{74}\), which allows the analyst to operate with these social constructs without objectifying them on the one hand, or rendering the analysis completely fluid on the other. Thus, while the CS are radically constructivist towards one category of social phenomena such as discursive formulation of threats, they are only somewhat constructivist toward other categories such as social identities and structures\(^{75}\). This, as Jef Huysmans calls it, dualistic constructivism leads to a disconnect between a process of securitization and a process of self-identification of agents (actors, audiences, or society) and systems (the organization of the relationship between these agents)\(^{76}\). According to Huysmans, however, introducing a mutually constitutive dynamic between identity and security would benefit the CS framework, especially in the realm of societal security\(^{77}\).

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\(^{73}\) Ciuta, 307-308.
\(^{74}\) Buzan, “Rethinking security”, 19, Buzan et al, 205.
\(^{75}\) Huysmans, 493.
\(^{76}\) Ibid., 494.
\(^{77}\) Ibid.
In addition, as Ciuta points out, the CS’s argument about the sedimentation of social identities and structures is only the more reason to embrace a contextual study of security without the fear that suddenly everything will become security. If the actors are the ones defining security yet they operate with “limited practical baggage, sedimented in contextually legitimate narratives and logics of action,” there is no need to be concerned that contextual analysis will necessarily result in conceptual overstretch. In other words, the analyst must arrive at the conclusion that certain structures and identities are socially sedimented through a contextual research rather than by conceptual bracketing.

To say that security is constructed is to argue for the importance of context. Ciuta’s hermeneutical approach argues that not only the meaning of threats and identities of actors are rooted in the context, but the very meaning of security is contextual. Doty also argues that the CS falls short of reconceptualizing the underlying security logic; like other concepts in social sciences, security has no fixed meaning, but rather results from specific socio-political practices in specific circumstances. Thus, according to externalists, it is the social field with its broader political and social discourses which generates meanings, constructs identities and harbors power constellations that constitute actors and their speech acts.

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78 Ciuta, 320-2.
79 Ibid., 321.
80 Ciuta, 317.
81 Ibid., 309-11.
82 Doty, 92.
83 Stritzel, 367.
To sum up, while the CS conceptualizes securitization as an intersubjective process and acknowledges the role of contextual factors in this process, in order to accommodate the performativity of the speech act, it ultimately downplays the role of audiences and socio-political context in which the securitization discourse transpires. Yet, to understand securitization as a truly constructive and not productive process, it must be set in the context of broader socio-political discourses. As McDonald puts it, we cannot fully understand what underpins and legitimizes particular forms of securitizations without understanding the roles of historical, cultural and identity narratives in shaping and conditioning the security discourse.\textsuperscript{84} Moreover, as Ciuta demonstrates, if we agree that security is intersubjective and socially constructed, then the context is where we have to look for the very meaning of security.\textsuperscript{85} One of the ways to understand how the context shapes security is to investigate the dynamics of securitization empirically.

The following chapters explore the role of context in securitization by examining an empirical case of the recent securitization of Holodomor in Ukraine. Chapter 2 provides historical background on Holodomor and outlines the historiographic debate on the causes of the famine, as well as presents the recent ascendance of the issue of Holodomor to the political stage. Chapter 3 argues that the denial of Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people presented a societal security threat to a particular reading of Ukrainian identity. While the politicization of

\textsuperscript{84} McDonald, 573.
\textsuperscript{85} Ciuta, 304.
Holodomor in 2005-2009 by the speech acts and institutional moves of President Viktor Yushchenko occasionally allude to its security content, the meaning of the Holodomor issue as a societal security threat is not entirely evident from these securitizing moves alone. Only locating the Holodomor issue in the historical and socio-political context will fully reveal its ‘securitiness’ and explain the tensions it had caused and may cause in the future.
Chapter 2. Holodomor: History and Present

2.1. Holodomor: Historical Background

Holodomor (from Ukrainian holod – hunger, starvation and mor – death, plague) refers to the famine that occurred on the territory of Ukraine in 1932-33. Famines were not uncommon throughout the history of Eastern Europe. What makes this one different is its sheer scale, the fact that it had been long denied and the claim that it was intentionally engineered by government policies. The fact that the famine of 1932-33 took place – in Ukraine as well as other parts of the Soviet Union – was denied by the Soviet regime, and no mention of it was included in the Soviet history books until late 1980s. Thus, during the Soviet period, most of the work on the famine was carried out by scholars in the West, including Ukrainian Diaspora.

During the Gorbachev years, the facts about Holodomor started emerging, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Holodomor became a subject of increased academic and also political interest in Ukraine. Beyond the establishment of the fact that the famine actually existed, which is denied now only by a handful of die-hard communists in Ukraine and Russia, there is little agreement among historians and laymen on what had been its causes and repercussions.
The opening of the Soviet archives in 1990 allowed the researchers to access many documents unavailable earlier. However, as with any event that happened some 70-odd years ago, establishing the facts has proven difficult providing ample room for interpretation. There is even no generally accepted figure for the number of lives taken by the famine: the estimates range from 1.5 million to as many as 10 million people in Ukraine alone.\footnote{Official Soviet statistics estimated the population decrease in 1933 at 1.7 million with 1.5 million Ukrainians (Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Holodomor 1932-33 jak henotsyd: prohalyny u dokazoviy bazi (Holodomor of 1932-33 as genocide: gaps in argumentation)”, Den, February 17, 2007, http://www.day.kiev.ua/177403/ (accessed May 13, 2010)); Robert Conquest estimates the number of victims at 5 million (Conquest, 306); Encyclopedia Britannica puts the number at 6-8 million (“Famine 1932-33”, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/30078/Soviet-Ukraine#ref=ref404577|Ukraine (accessed May 24, 2010)); Ukrainian officialdom puts the figure close to 10 million (Ukrainian National Remembrance Institute, http://www.memory.gov.ua/ua/262.htm (accessed May 24, 2010)).} Similarly, the explanations of its causes range from poor harvest and unfortunate side effects on the Soviet policy of collectivization, to deliberate extermination of peasants as a class or even Ukrainians as a nation by the Stalin regime. Depending on which explanation is adopted, the meaning of Holodomor for contemporary Ukrainians ranges from a tragedy to genocide.

It is generally agreed that one of the causes of the famine was the effect of Stalin’s aggressive Five Year industrialization plans, for the financing of which vast quantities of grain were needed for export. This was to be achieved by the policies of collectivization and dekulakization\footnote{Dekulakization – a Soviet policy of eradicating, by killing or deportation, of the peasant elite, or kulaks, as ‘enemies of the people’, which in effect became the instrument of eliminating not only ‘wealthy’ peasants but anyone resisting collectivization and grain requisitions. From 1930-7, a total of 6.5 million peasants had perished as a result (Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow, 306).} as a result of which vast quantities of grain were requisitioned from the peasants. Yet the historians disagree.
whether the famine was intentionally masterminded by the regime or whether it was an unintended, albeit tragic, consequence of other social or natural phenomena.

2.1.1. Intentionalist Interpretation of Holodomor

Of the intentionalist literature, a major, now classic, work about the famine is *The Harvest of Sorrow* by the British historian Robert Conquest, published in 1986. Conquest argues that the terror-famine, as he called it, was deliberately masterminded by Stalin and his henchmen to crush two elements seen as irremediably hostile to the regime: the peasantry of the USSR as a whole, and the Ukrainian nation.\footnote{Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3.}

Conquest summarizes the events of 1932-33 as follows:

> Then in 1932-33 came what may be described as a terror-famine inflicted on the collectivized peasants of the Ukraine and the largely Ukrainian Kuban (together with the Don and Volga areas) by the methods of setting for them grain quotas far above the possible, removing every handful of food, and preventing help from outside – even from other areas of the USSR – from reaching the starving. This action, even more destructive of life than those of [collectivization and dekulakization] of 1929-32, was accompanied by a wide-ranging attack on all Ukrainian cultural and intellectual centers and leaders, on the Ukrainian churches. The supposed contumaciousness of the Ukrainian peasants in not surrendering grain they did not have was explicitly blamed on nationalism: all of which was in accord with Stalin’s dictum that the national problem was in essence a peasant problem. The Ukrainian peasant thus suffered a double guise – as a peasant and as a Ukrainian.

> Thus there are two distinct, or partly distinct, elements before us: the Party’s struggle with the peasantry, and the Party’s struggle with the Ukrainian national feeling.\footnote{Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, 8.}
Conquest traces this dual capacity of the Ukrainian peasant – as a social/class enemy and as an embodiment of national resistance – to the absorption of the Ukrainian lands by the Russian crown in the 17-18th centuries. As a result of it, Ukrainian peasantry lost both economic freedom and the freedom of cultural expression, culminating in the Ems edict of 1876, which outlawed Ukrainian language.\(^90\) While the majority of the Ukrainian elite were either eradicated or assimilated, the peasantry remained the main repository of the Ukrainian national feeling.\(^91\)

In this dual capacity, as a social and national enemy, the Ukrainian peasant found himself the target of the new Communist regime. To be sure, the Bolsheviks held all peasantry in contempt, yet Conquest argues that while the assault on peasantry was waged throughout the agricultural areas of the Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan, Belarus and areas in Russia itself, Ukraine was treated with special severity, since Stalin realized well the connection between nationality and the peasantry: “The nationality problem is, in its very essence, a problem of the peasantry.”\(^92\)

The special severity with which Stalin enforced grain requisitions in Ukraine and ethnically Ukrainian Northern Caucasus manifested itself in 1932 in a number of decrees which essentially condemned peasants to starvation. The decrees established devastatingly high procurement targets for grain and other foodstuffs,

\(^{90}\) Conquest, 29-30.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid., 28.  
\(^{92}\) Conquest, 217-9.
sanctioned unconditional confiscation of grain from the ‘kulaks’ and ordered to execute on spot those attempting to steal ‘socialist property’, which included gleaning. In November 1932, when the countryside lay barren and famine loomed large, the second procurement plan was announced, followed by the third on in November.

Moreover, as starvation began on the mass scale in early 1933, the regulation against unlicensed movement and a ban on employment of peasants in industry became more rigorously enforced: the countryside was virtually sealed off. By May 1933 some five million people had perished in Ukraine alone, with another two million in the North Caucasus and other regions, according to Conquest’s estimations. While Conquest’s access to the Soviet archival material had been limited, a more recent study by a French-Ukrainian team of sociologists, who perused Ukrainian and Russian archives, puts the number of victims at 4.6 million, very close to Conquest’s estimate.

All the while, right in the vicinity of starving villages, granaries were bursting with grain, and in 1932-33, 1.8 million tons of grain had been exported, enough to feed five million people for a year. The inefficient and dilapidated Soviet transportation system was often incapable of coping with the requisitioned grain:

93 Conquest, 223-5.
94 Conquest, 247.
95 Ibid., 306.
thousands of tons of unshipped grain stood rotting in railcars. In fact, Conquest’s analysis shows that the main culprit of the famine was less the exports than the grain held in ‘reserves’.

While establishing whether the famine constituted genocide of the Ukrainians was not the aim of his work, Conquest suggests that such a charge is not without merit. Referring to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Conquest writes: “It certainly appears that a charge of genocide lies against the Soviet Union for its actions in the Ukraine. Such, at least, was the view of Professor Rafael Lemkin who drafted the Convention.”

An Italian scholar Andrea Graziosi focuses more immediately on the state-peasant struggle, which he calls the Great Soviet peasant war. The famine of 1932-33, according to Graziosi, resulted from the growing grain requisitions and the collectivization, yet was not consciously pre-meditated per se. At the same time, he asserts that once the famine was there, Stalin used it to teach a lesson to the peasants who had waged the quiet war against the Soviet power and concedes that, in Ukraine and other non-Russian grain producing areas, Stalin used the famine to uproot what he believed to be nationalism's natural breeding ground.

98 Graziosi, The Great Soviet Peasant War, 57.
99 Conquest, 265.
100 Ibid., 272-3.
102 Graziosi, The Great Soviet Peasant War, 66.
103 Ibid., 67.
An American scholar, James E. Mace, Conquest’s collaborator on *The Harvest of Sorrow*, also argues that the famine was intentionally targeted at the Ukrainian people, emphasizing the continuity between the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural and political elite in late 1920 and the destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry in the 1930.\textsuperscript{104} Michael Ellman of the University of Amsterdam argues that the famine falls under a more relaxed definition of genocide.\textsuperscript{105} Ellman provides evidence that the deportation targets for 1932-33 had been drastically reduced and argues that starvation was conceived as a more cost-effective way to terrorize the population of the USSR into submission, which had been Stalin’s objective.\textsuperscript{106} A number of Ukrainian scholars such as Volodymyr Hryshko, Stanislav Kulchytsky and Yuri Shapoval explicitly claim that the famine had been premeditated and intentional and constituted genocide of the Ukrainian nation.\textsuperscript{107} However, other historical interpretations of the famine claim that it was not intended but rather a tragic result of economic mismanagement and environmental factors.

\textsuperscript{106} Ellman, 663.
2.1.2. Other Explanations of Holodomor

A British-Australian team of scholars, R.W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft argue that the famine was an undesirable aftereffect of the aggressive industrialization plans for which Stalin’s regime had to bring the countryside under control via collectivization and dekulakization. While reordering agriculture in this way, no one in the regime – from Stalin to the party members sent into the countryside – understood agriculture: they overestimated harvest figures and the collection plans imposed in 1931-2 were based on this misjudgment: “The chaos in administration and in agriculture, and the demoralization of many peasants, were the context in which grain production deteriorated.”

The authors also found that in the face of these difficulties, the Politburo, albeit reluctantly, made significant although insufficient concessions to the countryside throughout 1932 and 1933 and even diverted some of the grain back to the starving in a form of humanitarian relief. This leads them to a conclusion different from that of Conquest: while not absolving Stalin from responsibility for the famine, the authors claim they uncovered the story of the Soviet leadership struggling with a famine crisis “which had been caused partly by their wrongheaded policies, but was unexpected and undesirable.”

109 Ibid., 435.
110 Davies and Wheatcroft., 440.
111 Ibid., 441.
An American scholar Mark Tauger attributes the famine mainly to a natural disaster.\textsuperscript{112} Tauger concedes that food exports during the crisis added to its severity, as did rapid industrialization, collectivization and dekulakization, which shifted the demographics in favor of the industrial workers, who did not produce their own food.\textsuperscript{113} However, the most important causes of the famine were environmental factors, such as drought, poor weather conditions and the over-exhaustion of soil.\textsuperscript{114} In his review of the Davies and Wheatcroft book, Tauger writes that the perspective of famine as genocide “is wrong. The famine was not limited to Ukraine or even to the rural areas of the USSR[…] and it was far from the intention of Stalin and others in the Soviet leadership to create such a disaster.”\textsuperscript{115}

It is beyond the scope of this work to fully engage with the ongoing historiographic debate on Holodomor. The purpose here was to outline the main events of the famine and present the different interpretations of these events. The following section concerns the politicization of Holodomor in modern-day Ukraine and the drive for recognition of Holodomor as genocide which occurred under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in 2005-2009.

\textsuperscript{113} Tauger, “Natural Disaster”, 4.
\textsuperscript{114} Tauger, 8-20, 36-47.
\textsuperscript{115} Quoted in David Marples, “The great famine debate goes on…”
In 2005 the issue of Holodomor entered the political sphere when the then newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko in his radio address in the commemoration of Holodomor called for the international community, as well as domestic political forces, to recognize Holodomor not only as a national tragedy but as an organized crime against the Ukrainian nation. What followed was a government sponsored national and international campaign to have Holodomor recognized as an act of genocide committed by the Soviet Union against the Ukrainian nation.

Viktor Yushchenko was not the first Ukrainian president to commemorate Holodomor. In 1991, Ukraine’s first President Leonid Kravchuk in his first foreign interview to Der Spigel touched upon the issue of the famine, claiming that he had received some information (presumably from the newly opened archives) which showed that constant and systematic extermination has been committed against Ukraine by the Stalinist machine. In September 1993, Kravchuk publically commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of Holodomor, and beginning in 1998, under Kravchuk’s successor, Leonid Kuchma, a date for annual public commemoration was established.

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The commemoration of Holodomor had been set for every third Sunday of November.\textsuperscript{118} Beyond this, however, little political attention had been allotted to Holodomor, until Yushchenko’s turbulent ascent to power during the Orange Revolution in 2004, following which the issue of Holodomor entered the domestic and international political battleground. In his 2006 and 2007 decrees on the commemoration of the Holodomor Remembrance Day, the President ordered various government agencies to step up efforts: regional government to open archives, compile lists of victims, uncover mass graves and erect monuments; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intensify efforts in recognition of Holodomor as genocide by the international community; the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to facilitate the touring of Ukrainian artists, singers and theatre productions abroad to “disseminate the truthful information about the tragedy of Holodomor…”; the State Committee of Television and Radio to ensure the mass media broadcasting of documentaries and other programming about this tragedy.\textsuperscript{119} During Yuschenko’s presidency, no foreign dignitary could visit Ukraine without paying tribute to the victims at the Holodomor Memorial. President’s official website included a section on Holodomor, and under his auspices the National Remembrance Institute was established to focus primarily on Holodomor-related

\textsuperscript{118} Bilinsky, “Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 genocide?”, 154
projects. The year 2008, marking the 75th anniversary of Holodomor was declared the year of Holodomor commemorations, with many public events held across the country. In 2009, the Ministry of Education incorporated a more extensive account of Holodomor as genocide into the textbooks.

The Holodomor campaign did not receive uniform reception across Ukraine. According to the survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2007, the majority of Ukrainians (63%) supported the recognition of Holodomor as genocide. However, the survey also reflected significant regional disparities on the subject: while 85% of respondents from western Ukraine supported the recognition of Holodomor as Ukrainian genocide, only 35% of eastern Ukrainianians did so, with the center and the south in the middle with 76% and 55% respectively. Of those who thought of Holodomor as genocide, only 26% (including 40% in western Ukraine) believed it had been targeted against ethnic Ukrainians rather than the whole population of Ukraine at the time.

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120 Ukrainian National Remembrance Institute.
124 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
125 Ibid.
The popular perceptions of Holodomor seemed to have reflected its political representations. Yushchenko, with electoral support in western and central Ukraine, advanced unequivocal representation of Holodomor as genocide and likened Ukraine in 1932-33 to a “vast death camp”\textsuperscript{126} In a 2007 \textit{Wall Street Journal} article, Yushchenko wrote:

There is now a wealth of historical material detailing the specific features of Stalin’s forced collectivization and terror famine policies against Ukraine. Other parts of the Soviet Union suffered terribly as well. But in the minds of the Soviet leadership there was a dual purpose in persecuting and starving the Ukrainian peasantry. It was part of a campaign to crush Ukraine’s national identity and its desire for self-determination.\textsuperscript{127}

However, the political forces representing eastern and southern Ukraine were opposed to such reading of the events. Petro Symomenko, the head of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which enjoys electoral support in the east, denied that there was any deliberate starvation in 1932-33 and accused President Yushchenko of using Holodomor to stir up inter-ethnic hatred and strain relations with Russia.\textsuperscript{128} While communists represent an ever-decreasing number of Ukrainians (in the last 2006 elections they took only 3.6% of the votes\textsuperscript{129}), their opinion about Holodomor has been shared by the Party of Regions which also has an electoral base in the east and the south, and which constitutes the single

\textsuperscript{127} Quoted in Finn, “Aftermath of a Soviet Famine”.
\textsuperscript{128} Sheeter, “Ukraine remembers famine horror”.
largest faction in the Ukrainian Parliament, with 34% of the seats. According to its leader, the now President of Ukraine, then leader of the opposition and the arch-rival of Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, Holodomor did not constitute genocide: “It happened on the territory of many countries. Maybe in Ukraine it had a greater effect, as Ukraine is a more agricultural country.”

The divisions in the representations of Holodomor made themselves obvious during the deliberation of the bill of Law on Holodomor of 1932-33 introduced by President Yushchenko to the Parliament in November 2006, the law that would recognize Holodomor as genocide. The Communist Party and the Party of Regions chose to boycott the bill, with Yanukovich insisting that the word “tragedy” most fittingly described the famine. The support of the Socialist party, with the voter base mostly in central Ukraine and among older population, and which at the time was in a coalition with the Communists and the Party of Regions, became essential to have the majority necessary to pass the bill into law. After negotiations, a compromise in wording of Article 1 was reached: “Holodomor […] is genocide of the Ukrainian natsia (closest in meaning to English ‘ethnic nation’)” was replaced with “genocide of the Ukrainian narod (closest to English ‘civic nation’). In this reading, the law was passed on November 28.

130 “Novyi sklad Verkhovnoi Rady”.
131 Quoted in Finn, “Aftermath of a Soviet Famine”.
132 Finn.
In 2009, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a criminal investigation against the perpetrators of Holodomor and brought the case to the Kyiv Appeals Court. The SBU investigators incriminated Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and four other high-ranking Soviet and Ukrainian officials of that time in intentionally organizing Holodomor-genocide. Although the court upheld the conclusion of the investigators of Holodomor as genocide, it had to dismiss the case, since according to the Ukrainian criminal code, diseased persons cannot be tried and convicted of crimes.

In addition to the domestic sphere, the issue of Holodomor has been politicized internationally. Despite Yushchenko's repeated assurances that Holodomor was not being blamed on Russia but on the totalitarian regime that no longer exists, the representation of Holodomor as genocide has caused significant tensions in relations with Russia. Prior to Yushchenko's campaign, a score of national governments had recognized Holodomor as genocide, including US, Canada and Australia, largely due to the efforts of the Ukrainian Diaspora. In 2003 on the 70th anniversary of Holodomor, Ukraine issued a Joint Declaration at the United Nations co-signed by 26 nations, which described Holodomor as a terrible

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135 Kyiv Appeals Court.


tragedy but excluded any mention of genocide.\textsuperscript{138} Since 2005, however, the Yushchenko administration stepped up the effort, ultimately unsuccessfully, to have Holodomor recognized as genocide by international organizations.

In 2008, the European Parliament recognized Holodomor as a crime against humanity, but stopped short of calling it genocide.\textsuperscript{139} In 2007 and 2008, Ukraine attempted to have the United Nations General Assembly recognize Holodomor as genocide. Both attempts were thwarted by Russia which have been increasingly irked the Ukraine’s new line. In the October 2008 press conference, following the removal, under the Russian pressure, of the Holodomor issue from the agenda of the UN General Committee meeting, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Vitaliy Churkin said that the Russian Federation viewed the Ukrainian government’s repeated attempts to place the issue of Holodomor on the UN agenda and turn it into genocide against the Ukrainian people as “an acute confrontation”.\textsuperscript{140} While acknowledging that a famine did take place in the 1930s, Russia has been maintaining that it affected not only Ukraine but also other parts of the Soviet Union, and, as the legal successor of the USSR, has been resisting implication in a deliberate act of genocide.


The account of the politicization of Holodomor above does not represent a clear-cut case of securitization as defined by the CS. While there is a securitizing actor – President Yushchenko – and discernible securitization moves – the presidential decrees and the Law on Holodomor –, no extraordinary measures per se ensued, except perhaps for the attempted criminal case against Stalin and his henchmen. While the process has been characterized by certain intensity and a sense of urgency, the issue never transcended politics and was decided in the open democratic fashion by an elected Parliament.

Yet, there is a detectable ‘securitiness’ about the issue: in the words of President Yushchenko, having Holodomor recognized as an act of genocide was not only a matter of historical justice but had implications for the future of the country: “It is impossible to build a common future without learning from the past.”\(^\text{141}\) In his 2009 address, Yushchenko called Holodomor the single most tragic page in Ukrainian history and explicitly stated that the “truth [about Holodomor as genocide] is the only way toward the moral healing and dignified future [of the nation]”\(^\text{142}\) Most certainly, not having Holodomor recognized as genocide would not disseminate Ukrainians physically or pose threat to the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. Yet the references to the construction of a certain future which would be impossible without the recognition of Holodomor as genocide allude to


the presentation of the Holodomor issue as an issue of societal security. In Wæver’s discussion of societal security, the existential threat to society is defined in terms of identity, its ability to live as ‘us’. Yushchenko’s pronouncements suggest that Ukrainians would not be able to go on, to live as a certain future should the denial of Holodomor as genocide continue.

Why did Yushchenko consider the issue of Holodomor so important for Ukraine and pursued it despite domestic divisions, and objections from Russia, relations with which had already been strained by the gas disputes and Ukraine’s courtship of NATO and the EU? Why would recognizing Holodomor as genocide bear on Ukraine’s ‘dignified future’? And can we confidently say that it represents a case of securitization of a societal threat? Can we at all discuss the issue of Holodomor in security terms?

The following chapter argues that without looking into Ukraine’s historical and socio-political context, we will not be able to understand the securitiness of the issue of Holodomor in contemporary Ukraine. The securitizing moves alone and the rhetoric of the speech acts disclose little about the significance of Holodomor, nor do they sufficiently allude to its security content. The positional power of the securitizing actor, President Yushchenko, also does not tell us the full story, since Yushchenko’s approval ratings had fallen drastically even among his western-central Ukrainian supporters and reached just 4% by the end of his

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presidency. Only when we locate the Holodomor discourse within a broader socio-political context, do we begin to understand why this particular discourse is taking place and that a security issue is being constructed. In order to uncover the security content of the Holodomor discourse we must view it through the prism of identity politics in Ukraine and the project of nation-building of which it is an integral part.

3.1. The Rise of Ukrainian Identities

We have created Ukraine; now we have to create Ukrainians. This paraphrasing of Massimo d’Azeglio’s aphorism about the Italian state after its unification seems fitting to describe the nation-building processes in Ukraine after its independence in 1991. For in essence, while the country’s post-1991 borders more fully correspond to its historical ethno-linguistic territory than during any previous episodes of statehood, and while ethnic Ukrainians constitute 78% of the population, deep regional schisms run through the Ukrainian society. These regional divisions have repeatedly manifested themselves in voting patterns, and domestic and foreign policy preferences. Some 8 million ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, mostly in Crimea and Eastern Ukrainian regions, representing the single largest national minority at 17.3% of the population. However, it is not this significant Russian presence that is the primary source of Ukraine’s internal divisions: the differing historical experiences of the Ukrainian regions have resulted in different definitions of ‘Ukrainianess’ among the ethnic Ukrainian population itself.

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147 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
As in many other parts of Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian national movement gathered momentum by the second half of the nineteenth century. At the time, ethnic Ukrainian lands were divided between two empires, with the smaller western part consisting of Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia under the Habsburg rule and the rest of modern-day Ukraine – under the Russian tzar. The liberal Habsburg nationalities policy created favorable conditions for the development of the national consciousness, culture and civil society in western Ukraine, while the territories under the Russian rule suffered far more severe oppression of Ukrainian language and culture, not to mention any Ukrainian political expression. This destined western Ukraine, and Galicia in particular, to become the flag-barer of the Ukrainian national idea.

Nevertheless, at a critical historical junction at the end of WWI, which marked the collapse of these two empires, both formerly Habsburg and Russian ethnic Ukrainian dominions made a bid for independence. After the October 1917 revolution in Russia, the Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukrainian acronym UNR) was proclaimed in Kyiv in November 1917. Shortly after, in December 1917, the Soviet Ukrainian state was declared by the Bolsheviks in the eastern city of Kharkiv. As the Habsburg empire collapsed, the Western Ukrainian People’s

149 In effect, the Ukrainian state that emerged from the Russian empire was a succession of three separate administrations: UNR (November 1917 to April 1918), the Hetmanate (April to December 1918) and the Directorate (December 1918 to December 1919). (Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 11). For the purposes of simplicity I continue referring to the Kyiv-based Ukrainian state as UNR.
Republic (Ukrainian acronym ZUNR) came into existence in Lviv in November 1918.

UNR and ZUNR declared unification in January 1919, but succumbed to internal divisions (ZUNR was dominated by the national conservatives and UNR by leftists at the time) and external pressures. In July 1919, ZUNR was overpowered by the Polish army and until 1939 western Ukraine remained a part of the interwar Polish state. UNR fell to the Bolsheviks who after several attempts finally took Kyiv in late 1920 and in December 1922 its territory formally joined the Soviet Union as Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Transcarpathia was occupied by the Czechoslovak troops in April 1919 and the short-lived Ukrainian administration in Bukovyna was crushed by the Romanian forces in November 1918.

Thus, during the interwar period, ethnic Ukrainian territories were under the sovereignty of four different states, with only the Ukrainian SSR having a degree of cultural and political autonomy. Therefore, interestingly, in 1920’s, facilitated by the Soviet policy of indigenization, the focus of the Ukrainian cultural life shifted to the Soviet Ukraine where a broad Ukrainianization had been launched in education, cultural and even religious spheres. In western Ukraine, right-wing Polish government reneged on its promises of autonomy for Galicia and

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151 Ibid., 13.
152 Indigenization (Ukr., korenizatsia) – Lenin’s, policy instituted in 1921, which allowed greater cultural autonomy to non-Russian parts of the USSR.
instituted repressive cultural policies. Such persecution far from eradicating Ukrainian nationalism only radicalized it and contributed to an anti-Polish terrorist movement.

By the early 1930s the cultural revival in the Soviet Ukraine ended in Stalin’s purges and was followed by the Great Famine of 1932-33, which resulted in the shift of population to the urban centers. In the industrialized cities of eastern Ukraine, the newly arrived peasants were exposed to more direct and aggressive Soviet propaganda and ideology. Many Ukrainian-speaking peasants over time assimilated to the Russian language or to surzhyk, a dialectic mixture of Russian and Ukrainian and Soviet way of life. In addition, the experience of common suffering, fighting and victory in WWII became a powerful identity marker bonding Ukrainians and Russians, as well as other Soviet nationalities. These demographic and social changes, as well as the common historical experiences inadvertently resulted in the changes of identity in the Ukrainians living in the Soviet state.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union annexed Galicia and Volhynia as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, followed by northern Bukovyna and southern Bessarabia in 1940. Transcarpathia was incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine in 1945 and in 1954 Krushchev completed Ukraine in its present borders by

\[\text{Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 15.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Wanner, Burden of Dreams, 43.}\]
\[\text{Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 17.}\]
transferring ethnically predominantly Russian Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. The absorption of western Ukraine proved to be a double-edged sword: while Stalin intended to personally crush the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism by imposing an especially harsh rule there and killing or deporting hundreds of thousands of people, the Soviet oppression only served to bring the anti-Russian side of west Ukrainian nationalism to the fore. With the anti-Soviet military insurgency in Galicia snuffed out or driven into immigration by the mid-1950s, the Ukrainian national movement took a form of civic and cultural resistance, leaders of which were sent to Soviet prison camps in two waves of mass arrests in 1965-6 and 1972-3, and later, in 1989, formed the core of the national democratic movement Rukh.

By the time Ukraine was assembled in its present borders, the identity gulf between the west and the east was already formidable. When Krushchev’s education reform in 1958-9 gave parents a free choice for the language of their children’s school, the number of students in Ukrainian schools began to decline rapidly and by 1989 constituted only 48% of all children, most of them in western Ukraine and in rural areas. David Laitin, in his survey of the Russian speaking populations of the non-Russian former Soviet republics, maintains that while all non-Russian republics came under assimilation pressures during the post-WWII period, most maintained what he calls “unassimilated bilingualism”, where both

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159 Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 18.
160 Ibid., 52-57.
161 Ibid., 18.
162 Ibid., 21.
the titular language and Russian were used each in their own realm. However, “in eastern Ukraine, Belarus and in a number of industrial cities outside of Russia, there were unambiguous trends toward full assimilation.” Ukrainian, as a Slavonic language closely related to Russian, became particularly targeted and far more vulnerable to assimilation than the Turkic, Baltic or Caucasian languages spoken elsewhere.

Thus, by the time Ukrainian national revival movement gained momentum again in late 1980s – not surprisingly led by Galicia – the population of Ukraine spoke two languages and carried three distinct identities criss-crossing linguistic and ethnic markers: Ukrainophone Ukrainians comprising 40% inhabiting western and central regions of Ukraine, Russophone Ukrainians – 34% mostly in the east and south and Russophone Russians about 20% of the population, mostly in Crimea and the Donetsk region. Among the non-Russian Soviet Republics, Ukraine had the highest proportion of ‘denationalized’ ‘Russified’ population.

The Ukrainophone western Ukrainian identity retained a strong anti-Russian element: the more radical elements saw Russia as the main threat to the survival of the Ukrainian nation, whether in the guise of Russian imperialism or

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164 Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 44.
165 Wanner, 13.
166 Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 22.
167 Wanner, 13.
168 Hereinafter, references to Ukrainophone, western Ukrainian, nationalist identities are used interchangeably; similarly, Russophone, east and south Ukrainian and anti-nationalist refer to the same broad identity.
the Soviet totalitarianism and doubted that post-Soviet Russia would shed what they claimed at be its imperialistic and chauvinistic habits. The Russophone Ukrainians however, strongly identified themselves with the Soviet Union and viewed Russia as a kindred entity. According to a 1995 survey, while 75% of the population of the western city of Lviv identified themselves with Ukraine, only 30% of the inhabitants of the eastern city of Donetsk did, a further 33% of whom attributed themselves to the USSR.

Table 1. Ethnic and Ethno-Linguistic Composition of Ukrainian Regions in the early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ethnic balance (Ukrainian-Russian), %</th>
<th>Linguistic balance (Ukrainophone-Russophone), %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>93.0-5.3</td>
<td>95.0-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>93.9-4.5</td>
<td>82.1-17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>88.8-7.6</td>
<td>73.5-26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>79.7-15.6</td>
<td>45.8-54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>88.2-10.1</td>
<td>56.8-43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>59.3-36.1</td>
<td>13.4-86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>65.0-23.6</td>
<td>13.9-86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>25.8-67.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72.7-22.1</td>
<td>43.4-56.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172 Adopted from Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 23.
Thus, as Ukraine approached independence, the interplay between the two identities of the ethnic Ukrainian population, the Ukrainophone and the Russophone, was destined become as important as between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. 173 These regional identity divisions have also been perceived in foreign academic and political circles. For example in the early 1990s, a CIA report predicted the disintegration of the country along the deep identity faults. 174 Almost two decades after Ukraine’s independence, its disintegration is yet to happen, however, the different Ukrainian identities have time and again remained the reason and subject of Ukraine’s political discourses.

3.2. Ukrainian Nation Building Project

Ninety per cent of the Ukrainian population voted in favor of Ukraine’s independence in the December 1991 referendum. However, past the establishment of the new state, the different identities comprising Ukrainian society proposed different content for the idea of Ukrainian statehood and the vision for its future. The Russophone groups in eastern and southern Ukraine viewed Ukraine as a truly multiethnic state with no individual or ethnic group or region, such as Galicia, having the prerogative to dictate official standard to the rest of the country. 175 Many of them viewed Russia and Ukraine as belonging to

175 Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 149.
a single cultural space and having the same ‘mentality’\textsuperscript{176}. Geopolitically, they sought closer economic and political ties with Russia and the CIS\textsuperscript{177}

Nationalists, however, based in Ukrainophone western regions, viewed the independent Ukraine as the centuries-long struggle for self-determination of the Ukrainian people finally come to fruition: like the Baltic nationalists they advocated the idea of the Ukrainian ‘homeland’ and the special status of Ukrainians as a titular nation with the right for cultural self-preservation\textsuperscript{178}. Contrary to their eastern and southern compatriots, westerners sought to escape from the Russian culture, mentality and language by seeking closer ties with Europe\textsuperscript{179}.

The single most important national content for Ukrainian statehood came from Rukh, a moderate nationalist party originating in the western city of Lviv\textsuperscript{180}. The civil rights agenda pursued by nationalist dissidents in western Ukraine through 1960s and 1970s, served to largely de-radicalize Galician nationalism and Rukh, overwhelmingly supported by the western Ukrainians but soon gaining popularity among Kyiv intelligentsia\textsuperscript{181} pursued a laudably inclusive campaign program that succeeded in winning 24% of the seats in 1990 Parliamentary elections\textsuperscript{182}.

Rukh’s 1992 program emphasized that Ukraine is a multinational state, whose

\textsuperscript{177} Abdelal, 111.
\textsuperscript{178} Wilson, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 149.
\textsuperscript{179} Shulman, “Nationalist sources”, 384.
\textsuperscript{180} Abdelal, \textit{National Purpose}, 110-111.
\textsuperscript{181} Abdelal, 109.
\textsuperscript{182} Wilson, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 24, 148.
society is historically, ethnically, and politically heterogeneous, which posited Ukraine as a civic, rather than purely ethnic nation.\textsuperscript{183}

Despite the official rhetoric, in the realm of public discourse, there remained a popular feeling among Ukrainophone Ukrainians and a conviction among many Rukh leaders that the ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity is defined primarily in ethnolinguistic cultural terms.\textsuperscript{184} As one of the Rukh’s leaders and a former dissident Mykhailo Horyn’ summarized: “We see Ukraine as a national state. This means that [both] its form (language, attributes, structure of power and so on) and content should be Ukrainian. Ukraine is the state of the indigenous Ukrainian nation.”\textsuperscript{185}

The lack of enthusiasm for the Ukrainian national idea of Russophone Ukrainians has been attributed to the loss of ethnolinguistic identity at the hands of Russia, which often went against the self-perception of the ‘Russified’ Ukrainians. As anthropologist Catherine Wanner observes:

Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians tend to see their Russian-speaking Ukrainian brethren as “victims” of oppressive imperial and Soviet cultural politics. Nationalists frequently depict the historic relationship between Ukrainians and the Russian and Soviet states in terms of cultural subjugation, economic exploitation, forced assimilation, and genocide. Russified Ukrainians, on the other hand, often feel that through inter-marriage, mobility, and the media, they freely assimilated to Russian culture.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 148.
\textsuperscript{185} Quoted in Wilson, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 150.
\textsuperscript{186} Wanner, xix.
For nationalists, however, the perception that the Ukrainian state was the result of Ukrainian national self-determination and that this state must protect collective rights and cultural heritage of the nation became the rationale for the ‘nationalizing project’, in order to “incorporate [the] heterogeneous population into a newly defined Ukrainian nation.” This was to happen in accordance with the ethnolinguistic, western Ukrainian definition of ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity and hinged on de-Russification and de-Sovietization of the Ukrainian population. The sheer scale of ‘Russification’ was perceived as a threat to Ukrainian national survival and the Russian-speaking minority was likened to South African apartheid that usurped power, despised and oppressed the national majority.

Russophone Ukrainians have been presented as having a ‘Little Russian syndrome” as denationalized beings who, as a result of Russian-Soviet policies, no longer knew who they really were. As one of Ukrainian publicists Oleh Orach argued, Russification of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine did not happen by itself, but was the result of the persistent policies of Russian tzars and Kremlin ideologues. “The majority in [these regions] are Ukrainians

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187 Wanner, xviii.
188 Ibid., 75.
189 Ibid.
190 “Little Russians” an ethnonym used to describe Ukrainians of Tsarist Russia and is perceived as derogatory by the nationalists.
191 Arel, “Ukraine: The temptation of the nationalizing state”, 159.
192 Quoted in Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 153.
who have lost their language and culture as a result of the colonial status of Ukraine.\footnote{193}{Wilson, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 153.}

In addition, cultural Ukrainianization became linked with Ukraine's advancement toward democracy. A prominent Ukrainian political scientist and commentator Mykola Riabchuk argues that Russification and Sovietization left Ukraine a deeply dysfunctional post-colonial Creole state.\footnote{194}{Riabchuk, 53.} He maintained that the only way for Ukraine to embark on the "European way of development" was if the Ukrainophone identity, which is essentially anti-Soviet, achieves an upper hand.\footnote{195}{Ibid., 64.} In the nationalist narrative, Ukrainian cultural identity became associated with a path of development along Western civic values, such as democracy and even individualism.\footnote{196}{Wanner, 82.} The ‘proper’ cultural identity went hand in hand with the ‘proper’ civic identity: it would be impossible to build democracy without Ukrainianization.

While the nationalists never commanded political leverage to single-handedly implement the ‘nationalizing’ project they deemed vital for Ukraine’s survival as an independent state, their ideas did find political expression. During the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk in 1991-94, nationalists entered into alliance of convenience with national communists.\footnote{197}{Wilson, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 25} President Kravchuk, himself a former communist ideologue, adopted anti-Russian rhetoric and stressed the importance
of promoting Ukrainian language and culture. While the newly ‘nationalized’ communists reigned over economic and industrial policy, the national democrats had obtained positions in cultural and educational sphere which resulted in remarkable advances in Ukrainian language and culture. For example, the number of schoolchildren instructed in Ukrainian increased from 48% in 1990 to 63% in 1993.

While the ‘Ukrainianization’ was introduced far more gradually in the Russian-speaking regions than in the west and center, the policy met resistance in the east and south, which increasingly perceived that the Ukrainian state was being set on a nationalist course. It also became associated with Kravchuk’s disastrous handling of the economy. Thus, in 1994 presidential elections, Kravchuk lost to Leonid Kuchma, a native of eastern Ukraine and a former director of the Soviet missile factory, who was supported by the Ukraine’s Russophone population of the east and south and its large industry. Rejecting Kravchuk’s cultural nationalism, Kuchma campaigned for stabilizing the economy and introducing Russian as a second state language. He also pledged to forge a strategic partnership with Russia, relations with which had been strained under Kravchuk: “Historically, Ukraine is part of the Euro-Asian cultural and economic space. Ukraine’s vitally important national interests are now

198 Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 143.
199 Wanner, 80.
200 Riabchuk, 49.
201 Wanner, 84; Riabchuk 49; Arel, 158.
concentrated on this territory of the former Soviet Union." While Kuchma argued his policies would only strengthen the Ukrainian state, western Ukrainians perceived him as Ukraine’s ‘Lukashenko’, a threat to Ukraine’s independence who will return Ukraine under the Russian influence.

The 1994 presidential election, when the support for Kuchma dropped into single digits in Galicia and Kravchuk’s support similarly dwindled in Crimea, demonstrated just how polarized Ukraine’s regions and their identities were. This pattern of polarization would resurge with every presidential and parliamentary election in Ukraine, most clearly manifesting itself during the 2004 Orange revolution. At the same time, whether from east or west, the leaders of Ukraine seemed to realize that such divisions are hindering, if not threatening, the development of the country.

Thus, once president, Kuchma seemed to uphold the need for some type of Ukrainian nation-building project. It was the content for the nation-building project proposed by Kuchma that differed from that of nationalists, by stressing the strengthening of statehood through economic stability and growth as well as geopolitical balancing. While the pace of Ukrainianization slowed significantly, Kuchma did not entirely reverse the course started by the national democrats.

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204 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 143.
205 A reference to Belarus’s pro-Russian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
206 Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma, 54-55.
207 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 145.
He reneged on his promise to make Russian a second state language and himself learned Ukrainian. In 1996, the Ukrainian Parliament, dominated by pro-presidential parties, adopted the new Constitution that still designated Ukrainians as a titular nation and Ukrainian language as the only official language of the state, thus reinforcing the centrality of ethno-linguistic versus purely civic character of Ukrainian statehood.

Still, the Ukrainian cultural nationalists felt their vision of Ukrainian statehood threatened. In 1995, a number of Ukrainian writers, scholars and cultural activists issued a Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia, which claimed that the “centuries-old policy of “Ukraine without Ukrainians” – a policy aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian nation” had reemerged with Kuchma’s administration. Moreover, Kuchma’s second term in the office was marred by growing authoritarianism and a crackdown on media, most notably the Gongadze affair. The business elite or oligarchs, mostly from the Russophone regions of Ukraine, who amassed great riches through corruption, hidden state subsidies and dubious privatization deals, gained significant political influence. For western Ukrainians, the advancement of the Russophone Ukrainian identity reconfirmed the perception of its anti-democratic character and became associated with the advancement of corrupt and unpatriotic business and political

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208 Originally, Ukrainian had been declared the official state language of the Ukrainian USSR in 1989 (Wanner, 84).
209 Quoted in Riabchuk, 50.
210 In November 2000, the opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze was found beheaded outside of Kyiv, ostensibly on Kuchma’s orders.
elites, as well as the Russian influence in Ukraine, ultimately undermining not only ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity, but even Ukraine’s sovereignty.²¹¹

Political opposition to Kuchma gradually consolidated and in preparation for the 2002 parliamentary elections, Viktor Yushchenko, a former central banker and Kuchma’s one-time prime-minister, formed an election block uniting a number of parties, including the old national democrats. The new opposition differed from that of the early 1990s Rukh-style cultural nationalism. Yushchenko was a native of eastern Ukraine but he spent his student years in the western city of Ternopil, which he claimed made him ‘more Ukrainian’.²¹² On the one hand, he carefully avoided nationalist rhetoric, including the language question, in an attempt to bridge the divide between country’s east and west.²¹³ On the other, in opposing the Kuchma regime, he was unable to surmount identity divides. Even the name of Yushchenko’s party block, “Our Ukraine”, is telling: it juxtaposed the real, ‘our’ Ukraine with ‘their’ Ukraine, a country constructed in accordance with the ‘foreign’ vision of Kuchma, his government and, by extension, the population that backed them.²¹⁴

Growing societal tensions erupted into mass popular protests of the Orange revolution, which challenged the victory of Kuchma-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych in the rigged 2004 presidential elections and eventually ended in the

²¹² Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 14.
²¹³ Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 14.
²¹⁴ Ibid.
victory of Yushchenko. Like Kuchma in 1994, Yanukovych made promises to make Russian the second state language. Yanukovych’s election campaign was specifically exploiting eastern Ukrainian phobias about western Ukrainians, connecting Yushchenko and his coalition to the Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with the Nazis during the WWII.

Kremlin’s unconcealed support for Yanukovych was also meant to appeal to those Ukrainians who affiliated Ukraine with Russia. All this added to the fears of western Ukrainians, reminiscent of 1994, that Ukraine is drifting steadily towards the Russian sphere of influence, which for them meant the end of Ukraine’s independence. Thus, the language question, the appeals to historical representations and the relationships with Russia, again resurfaced as a point of contention: while Yanukovych campaigned under the slogans like “Ukraine – Russia: Stronger together,” Yushchenko’s supporters help up slogans like “Away from Moscow!”

Having assumed office in 2005 after the re-run of the rigged elections, in which he enjoyed the overwhelming support of western and central Ukraine, Yushchenko claimed his priority was to unite the country, to overcome regional divisions that nearly tore the country apart. It seems the attention and urgency

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215 Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 155.
217 Petrov and Ryabov, “Russia’s role in Orange revolution”, 156.
218 Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 93.
219 Ibid., 36
awarded to the issue of the recognition of Holodomor as genocide was one such way to rally the whole country behind a tragedy that had affected primarily the east and south. This, however, proved a formidable task: the historical representation of Holodomor advanced by Yushchenko proved more divisive than uniting, since for eastern Ukrainians it became inadvertently linked with the advancement of the nationalist western Ukrainian identity with the vision of Ukrainian statehood they perceived as threatening.

3.3. Holodomor Discourse and Societal Security

People often look to the past to formulate the future. As Wæver points out, ‘national identity’ as a discursive construction needs to draw on a reservoir of myths, stories and historic representations. So in Ukraine since its independence, debates about historical representations, Holodomor chief among them, have become part and parcel of the discourse between the Ukrainian identities about the vision for the Ukrainian state. In the late 1980s, Holodomor, alongside Chernobyl, became the most important historical event mobilized by the nationalist leaders in justification of Ukraine’s independence as symbol of the victimization of Ukrainians under the Soviet rule.

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220 Weaver et al., 30.
221 Wanner, xxiv.
222 Ibid., xxv.
For Ukrainian nationalists, the tragedy of Holodomor extended beyond the lives lost. The Ukrainian peasantry was viewed as the base of the Ukrainian culture: destroying them meant robbing the nation not only of its physical base, but of its identity – culture, language, customs and historical memory, breaking its spirit, destroying its ‘soul’. In this way, Holodomor became the single most important event that explained why the eastern and southern Ukrainians became ‘denationalized’, ‘Sovietized’ and ‘Russified’, all of which now presented a threat not only to Ukraine’s language and culture, but to its sovereignty as well. As a Ukrainian Diaspora scholar Yaroslav Bilinsky concludes: “Had it not been for the incorporation of the more nationally minded and less physically decimated Western Ukrainians after 1939, the Ukrainian nation might have never recovered from the Stalinist offensive against the main army of the Ukrainian national movement, the peasants.” This reinforced the representation of western Ukrainians as the bearers of the ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity that had the good fortune to escape the same physical and cultural obliteration as that suffered by the east and south.

Thus, Holodomor, understood as an integral part of the centuries-long Russian effort, whether Tzarist or Soviet, to suppress Ukraine, became embedded in the narrative of the ‘genuine’ Ukrainophone identity. Denying that Holodomor had been genocide and threatened the very survival of the Ukrainian nation meant denying the ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity, replacing it with the Russified.

223 Wanner, 43.
224 Ibid., 43.
225 Bilinskiy, “Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 genocide?” 156.
Sovietized identity which had emerged after the Holodomor. Recognizing Holodomor as genocide meant countering the threat of failure of this ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity to be fulfilled politically and build a democratic, European future for Ukraine.

On the other hand, for the Russophone Ukrainians who identified themselves with the Soviet past, the incrimination of the Soviet regime – the same regime in the name of which they had heroically fought the Nazis – in a crime against humanity meant incriminating a part of their identity. They were also incensed by the perceived attempts of Yushchenko to highjack and appropriate for Ukrainians a tragedy that affected many other peoples of the Soviet Union with whom they felt solidarity. In addition, they disliked how the issue continuously angered Russia with whom they sought closer relations. Thus, the advancement of the representation of Holodomor as genocide presented a threat to their identity.

At the same time, the common reading of Holodomor, shared by Yushchenko with the western Ukrainians, reinforced the representation of the eastern and southern Ukrainians as victims of the Soviet oppression. In his decrees and pronouncements, President Yushchenko repeatedly appealed to the ‘reestablishment’ or ‘dissemination’ of the ‘historical truth’ about Holodomor as genocide. Yet, implicitly, it is the truth which ‘Russified’ Ukrainians cannot

226 2006 and 2007 Presidential decrees on the commemoration of Holodomor and public addresses on the on Holodomor Remembrance day.
possibly know or remember since historical memory was one of the casualties of Holodomor. In his 2005 radio address, Yushchenko said:

[Holodomor] was a real war against the nation. [...]The Soviet regime knew that this was the only way to wipe out the national memory. [...]What kind of a people can live without the memory? It is a tumbling weed without roots. No family, no tribe. No past and no future. It is the kind of people that can be easily manipulated, easily enslaved.

Even today our society reaps the bitter fruit of the loss of memory. Nonsense, but the execution of millions of people is still a matter of discussion: was it a famine or was it a poor harvest? Was it a crime or was it negligence?

Thus, the recognition of Holodomor as genocide in Law on Holodomor in 2006, by the Ukrainian Parliament, the highest democratically elected institution representing the Ukrainian society as a whole, was the single most important way to establish the national ‘truth’, to attach a single meaning to this historical event, and therefore to define the common Ukrainian identity. Yet this definition is cast along the lines of the ‘genuine’ Ukrainophone identity of the west that still remembers the historical ‘truth’.

The boycotting of the Law on Holodomor by the political party representing the Russophone regions of the country was not considered as a disturbing, worrying occurrence, but as sadly expected, understandable and almost inconsequential. As the director of the National Remembrance Institute and a Yushchenko supporter Ihor Yukhnovskiy said: “[S]outhern and eastern regions of Ukraine suffered the most from Holodomor, entire villages died out [...] [227]. They were

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227 President Yushchenko, Radio Address, November 26, 2005.
resettled with other people, in particular families from Russia and Belarus. Today, their descendents will not vote for the recognition of Holodomor [as genocide]. They did not experience it.”\textsuperscript{228} For Yushchenko and his supporters, recognizing Holodomor as genocide was the truth everybody was expected to learn, yet only certain ‘genuine’ Ukrainians could know to star with, and therefore define it for everybody else. Denying Holodomor constituted a threat to the ‘true’ Ukrainian identity, the impossibility to build the future it wants.

Thus, the Holodomor discourse is an integral part of the Ukrainian identity discourse, where advancement in western Ukrainian identity threatened eastern Ukrainian identity and visa versa. As discussed above, since Ukraine’s independence, this identity discourse, at times intensifying and at times ebbing away, presents a constant backdrop to Ukraine’s efforts in building its future as an independent state. At various times, especially during elections, issues like language and relations with Russia reemerge with renewed intensity and are cast in societal security terms by political actors and the audiences they represent. The treatment of Holodomor is one such issue to be highly politicized in 2005 reaching its greatest intensity in 2006, during the adoption of the Law on Holodomor.

\textsuperscript{228} Ihor Yukhnovskiy, Interview, \textit{ZaUA.org}, March 4, 2010, \url{http://zaua.org/pg/article/solodko/read/18196/Igor_Juhnovskyj_Suverenna_Ukrajina_vynykla_vnaslidok_pojednanna_administratyvnyh_aparativ_UNR_i_URSR} (accessed May 26, 2010), translation – MB.
It is within this context that we can fully understand the significance of the Holodomor discourse of 2005-2009 and begin to think about it in societal security terms. The Holodomor-genocide denial as a societal security threat was not constructed in a precise, time-bound sequence of security speech act – audience acceptance – extraordinary measures, as the CS maintains. This essentially traditionalist logic of security may still best account for the traditional military type of threats. A societal security setting, investigated here, reveals a different, more subtle pattern of securitization, for which the CS framework is ill-equipped to account. As McDonald suggests, the issue became constructed as security over time in a number of incremental moves: by Ukrainian Diaspora during the Soviet times, by the national democrats during the late 1980s-early 1990s and finally through Yushchenko’s speeches and decrees which gradually built up the issue until it reached its full intensity during the deliberations of the Law on Holodomor in 2006.

Even then, its meaning as a societal security threat is not clearly discernable from Yushchenko’s speech acts alone. Without contextualizing the issue it is easy to cast it as nothing more than a debate about historical justice. Yet, as this work demonstrates, this would be to miss the point and leave many questions unanswered, such as why Yushchenko thought it so important as to risk exacerbating domestic divisions and angering Russia. As Ciuta argues, it is the context that harbors the meaning of the issue as a security threat. So the

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229 McDonald, 564.
230 Ciuta, 317.
issue of Holodomor, devoid of ‘securitiness’ in isolation, gains its meaning as a societal security threat when placed within a wider societal security discourse transpiring between the two Ukrainian identities. It is one of a series of political manifestation of an ongoing fear harbored by Ukrainophone Ukrainians of being engulfed by the Russophone culture and thus lose their chance to construct a Ukrainian state in accordance with their vision. In that, Holodomor issue and its security content on the one hand and the Ukrainophone identity, on the other, are mutually constitutive, which illustrates Huysmans’s point about the mutual constitution of identity and security.

The figure of Yushchenko looms large in this account of the Holodomor discourse, yet his positional as a president could not warrant him the support of eastern Ukrainians, demonstrating the limitations of the positional power, even official one, of the securitizing actor. Yushchenko was not a nationalist per se, and as pointed out earlier, at times deliberately avoided divisive nationalist references in his campaigns. He was also acutely aware of the regional divisions and the need to unite the country. The Holodomor campaign might have been envisioned as just such unification effort, a show of solidarity with the eastern and southern Ukrainians who suffered most terribly during the Holodomor. Yet the Russophone Ukrainians remained unconvinced by his rhetoric of building a ‘common’ future and drew instead on their deeply sedimented perceptions of western Ukrainians and the Soviet past.

Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen”, 494.
At the same time, Yushchenko’s himself came to uphold an uncompromising representation of Holodomor as genocide: “It is important to realize that politics were behind the genocide. It’s terrifying to know that the only aim of that experiment was to exterminate Ukrainian people,” he said in an interview to the

_BBC_ It is beyond the scope of this work to investigate avenues through which Yushchenko personally socialized into this particular reading of Holodomor. Partly, the issue of Holodomor was personal to him: Yushchenko’s own grandfather was one of 600 people in his village who died during the famine.

Whatever Yushchenko’s personal or official motivations, it was the common meanings and identity constructs, the significance of which Balzacq stresses, and which have been contextually generated, that ultimately imbued the Holodomor discourse with a discernable ‘securitiness’.

Yushchenko’s pronouncements appealed to the representations of Holodomor that directly resonated with the Ukrainophone audience. Yet, as Doty argues, it is misleading to view securitization as an instrument that power holders can use to gain control over an issue, as the CS’s internalist approach to securitization suggests. Securitizing actors, such as Yushchenko, often speak on half on certain audiences and securitizations themselves originate from within the ‘masses’, in this case, the societal identities of Ukraine’s different regions, and

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233 Fawkes, “Legacy of Famine”.
234 Balzacq, 182.
235 Doty, 73.
236 Ibid.
then, in turn, reverberate with these audiences based on their deeply rooted identity constructs.

To sum up, the analysis of the Ukrainian identity discourse presented in this chapter allows us to fully appreciate the significance of the Holodomor discourse in contemporary Ukraine and discern its security content which is not readily evident from the speech acts of President Yushchenko alone. It is in the context that the ‘securitiness’ of the Holodomor discourse resides. Understanding the deeply sedimented identity markers of the audience, especially the perception of the advancement of Russian political and cultural influence as threatening to (a particular version of) Ukrainian identity and the state it wants to create, helps understand how the recognition of Holodomor as genocide adds to the countering of that threat. It also explains its urgency, the effort behind it and, ultimately, the political cost Yushchenko was willing to incur because of it.
Conclusion

In this thesis I argued for the importance of socio-political context in securitization theory by illustrating, with an empirical case of the securitization of Holodomor in Ukraine, how embedding the speech acts in the historical, political and societal context helps us better understand the construction of threats and uncover their security content, which otherwise may not be easily discernable. It also demonstrates that, in a societal security setting, securitizations may follow a different, more subtle pattern than that conceptualized by the CS.

Securitization of the denial of Holodomor as genocide by President Yushchenko in 2005-2010 and the measures adopted to counter it were constitutive of the ongoing societal security discourse, in which identity markers, such as language, history and relations with Russia, and the consequences they bore on the future of the Ukrainian state have been recurrently securitized by politicians and societal actors. The representation of Holodomor as genocide harbored by the nationalistically minded western, and to a lesser degree, central part of the country, became part and parcel of the ‘genuine’ Ukrainian identity which had to be advanced not only to ensure that the country develops along democratic, ‘European’ lines, but even that Ukrainian nation and its state survive at all.

The CS has pioneered an important way of thinking about security and the constructed nature of threats. Yet, as a score of Second Generation
securitization theorists pointed out, concentrating on the performative power of the security speech act will not allow us to fully understand how security is constructed, what speech acts are likely to be successful and how the audiences themselves are shaping security discourses. By contextualizing the Holodomor discourse in the broader societal identity discourse, this research demonstrates how the actors, their audiences, the meanings of historical representations they operate with, as the speech acts themselves are mutually constituted. Such contextualization makes it possible to better understand the dynamics of the particular security discourse, its outcomes, as well as improve the predictive power of securitization theory. Indeed, the very security content of the issue may be detectable only through contextualization. As with the Holodomor speech acts, securitizing moves alone are often not enough to understand a situation in security terms. This is particularly true of societal security issues, since the construction of threats to identity is often more nuanced and subtle than the traditional military threats to the sovereignty of the state.

The contextualization of societal security threats presents an interesting subject for further research. Among other things, as Huysmans pointed out, it has consequences for the discussion of the very meaning of security, since the way actors think of societal security and construct threats to identity may follow a different logic than that of the traditional state-centric security field embraced by the CS. In addition, the discussion of Ukrainian identity politics presents an interesting opportunity for further research into the interplay, pointed out by 

\footnote{Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen” 494.}
Doty\textsuperscript{238} between societal and state security. In the Ukrainian case, the difference in visions of the state proposed by the two broad societal identities comprising Ukraine affect the perceptions of security threats to the state, especially when it comes to the relations with Russia.

As Cuita mentions, to argue that context matters in understanding social phenomena is nothing new.\textsuperscript{239} The more interesting question is how it matters. This thesis has demonstrated that context matters in uncovering identities of actors and their audiences, the power constellations which they constitute and the meanings with which they operate. Contextual analysis of security discourses improves the theoretical consistency of securitization theory by evening out its constructivist approach to include not only threats, but also actors, audiences and the meaning of security in a constructivist analysis. This will expand the concept of securitization in interesting directions outlined above, allowing it to explain a greater variety of social phenomena, as well as improve its predictive power.

\textsuperscript{238} Doty, 78.
\textsuperscript{239} Cuita, 318.
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