THE PROBLEMS OF DISSENT AND JEWISH EMIGRATION IN SOVIET-US DÉTENTE (1968-1975)

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To Andrei Sakharov, Lyudmila Alexeeva, 
and all the brave women and men who are 
not afraid to stand up against injustice…
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Introduction

*Freedom Is Not Given, It Is Taken.*

“Beset on the inside by dissidents demanding the regime to live up to its international commitments and pressed on the outside by leaders like Reagan willing to link their foreign and defense polices to internal Soviet change, leaders in the Kremlin eventually buckled under the strain.” This is how the famous Soviet dissident and activist for the Jewish movement for emigration to Israel Natan Sharansky described the formula for the collapse of the Soviet state.\(^1\) This formula does not allow for a comprehensive interpretation of the rapid collapse of the political system in Soviet Union since it is very difficult to measure to what extent the leaders of the Communist party were concerned about the activities of the dissident movement, and what was the influence of dissident thoughts. But the continuous attempts of secret services to either suppress the movement or get rid of its activist are apparent from the analysis of archival materials available today. This fact suggests that regardless of the real scope of popular dissatisfaction and organized political resistance in the USSR, the Politburo considered it necessary to prevent any manifestations of dissent. The most plausible reasons for such cautiousness are the events in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries where the relatively free spread of revisionist views contributed to serious challenges to the ruling regimes, and even violent uprisings.

\(^1\) Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy. The Power to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 140.
To my great surprise, the pressure from within the Soviet Union is often underestimated by the scholars of international relations. To fill in this gap, I felt obliged to approach Cold War being equipped with the methods provided by historical science. This thesis is an attempt to apply a more historical approach to the study of international relations of recent decades. It implies the extension of analysis of international relations in order to consider other factors, in particular the social one.

The traditional realist interpretation of the period tells us that, given the fact that both superpowers had reached military parity by the late 1960s, human civilization had entered into a principally new stage. The world was dominated by the two economic and military superpowers confessing incompatible ideological beliefs. Each was ready to demonstrate its determination to stand up for its respective ideology by entering into various regional conflicts. With the attainment of the guaranteed mutual destruction, the two states found themselves facing the choice: either to continue the pursuit of volatile Cold War policies which were balancing on a fringe of escalation into the apocalyptic conflict, or to recognize the fatuity of further struggle and to engage in the all-encompassing negotiations and mutual cooperation.

The second option would seem the only rational one for the adherents of the Realpolitik. Therefore, the international situation in the 1970s, characterized by the so-called détente, or peaceful coexistence, is often referred to as one of the best examples of such approach to politics. However, the existence of certain other factors suggests that

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the focus on the inter-state relations is overestimated. The new state of Soviet-US bilateral relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s is an extremely complicated phenomenon which can not be confined exclusively to the interaction between the respective governments. As Marshall Goldman notes, this period was marked by the significant shift in the attitudes of the American businessmen and labor unions towards the Soviet Union. Confronted with the growing competition from the Western European and Japanese allies, U.S. businessmen and labor unions were eager to be involved in a greater cooperation with their Soviet counterparts so as to ensure access to one of the largest consumer markets in the world.\(^4\) Thus, along with the talks on curbing the arms race and nuclear proliferation, trade became one of the pillars of the cooperation between the two states. In the Soviet Union, where all the means of production were appropriated by the state, it was the government that was the major stakeholder and beneficiary in all the trade negotiations. With the agricultural and high-tech sectors experiencing certain problems by the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet state needed to ensure the necessary supplies of equipment and grain, while the United States was the only country in the world that was capable of meeting the Soviet demands.\(^5\)

Apart from all the above-mentioned factors – military, economic – I will attempt to explore one more plausible motivation behind the pursuit of the so-called *détente* in this study. I am inclined to agree with the Jeremi Suri’s position that the governments of the leading powers were not driven exclusively by the notion of the national interest

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\(^5\) Ibid., 37
when launching *détente* project. Domestic determinants should not be missed if one wants to restore the full picture of the early 1970s international politics.

The period encompassed by this study is not long - only several years from 1968 to 1975 – however, the consequences of the events having taken place at that time were determinant for the future of both the Soviet state and the course of the Cold War. On the one hand, the United States was confronted with severe criticism for its intervention in Vietnam, which led to the series of domestic disturbances as well as a decrease in its international prestige. On the other, the USSR has never before enjoined so much international prestige and authority as during its “peace offensive”, i.e. international initiatives aimed at easing the Cold War tensions.

The intentions of the United States government in those circumstances were well researched before. It is widely assumed that along with the necessity to ease Cold War tensions, the US businesses were interested in access to the Soviet market, and therefore were lobbying for rapprochement with the USSR. A more complicated question is what the intentions of the Soviet government were. Following Jeremi Suri’s assumption of the domestic determinants behind *détente*, I assume that the rise of dissident groups was a matter of a great concern for the Kremlin, and that one of the expected outcomes of entering peaceful coexistence with the United States was the curbing of domestic critics.

By the late 1960s popular dissatisfaction with the ruling Communist party in the Soviet Union was not as widespread as in some other Eastern European countries like Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The very idea of allowing a more open historical and political debate presumably was seen as lethal for the regime. Public awareness of the

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long silenced crimes and tragedies of the Stalinist past could have had a destructive potential for the contemporary regime which would have implied severe repercussion for the ruling elites.

In 1962 Nikita Khrushchev personally approved the publication of the Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s book *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch*. This book told the story of the Soviet citizen Shukov who bravely fought in the front of the Great Patriotic War, but ended up imprisoned in the labor camp, which became known under the acronym GULAG. The publication was a part of the larger de-stalinization and “thaw” that was unleashed after the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956. This official approval might have been an attempt to distance the Communist Party and its leaders from the Stalinist crimes, but side effects of the publication were the opposite. Solzhenitsyn in his narrative did not put personal blame for the Communist horrors on Stalin but rather suggested that terror was an intrinsic element of the system which had put forward the goal of a total transformation of a man. The text was published in the literary journal *Novii Mir* [New World], and was available for the large segment of the Soviet readers. Despite the following harsh criticism and animosity, the book became a milestone in the articulation of the dissident sentiment in the Soviet society.

By the middle 1960s, the Soviet authorities reversed the “thaw” and de-Stalinization campaign having realized the potential threat it had brought. However, the dissident literature continued to be published as *samizdat*. The majority of its readers were the young and educated students that distributed *samizdat* through the universities.

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9 Suri, *Power and Protest*, 105
and personal acquaintances. This new generation of young people was particularly receptive of the dissident ideas of the time. They had not experienced the terror of the Stalin’s era, and had not feared to express themselves as much as their parents had. University enrollment became available to the great number of people, and higher education became a mass phenomenon. The growing pessimism among the students over the realities of the Soviet life was not unnoticed by the authorities. With the appearance of a number of prominent writers such as Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Kremlin realized that it is facing a crucially new social phenomenon - the rise of the domestic dissent.

In this work, I will attempt to explore how Soviet dissent became one of the factors of international politics at the time of détente. I argue that the then acute problem of Jewish emigration from the USSR helped the Soviet dissidents find an effective way of attracting the attention of the West, mainly the US government. The appeals to the US government from the Soviet citizens regarding the human rights violations in their country became a widespread phenomenon precisely at the time when both governments were involved in the détente project. In February, 1972, prior to Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union, fifty-seven Jewish dissidents wrote: “We wish to draw your attention to our problems; the lack of opportunity to express our national aspirations, freedom of choice of language and culture and the right of freedom of choice of the land in which to live…We request you, Mr. President, to include a meeting with us, the undersigned, in the arrangements for your trip to the USSR…. “

Having been supported by the

10 Ibid., 112
American Jewish Community and their sympathizers in Congress, such dissident activists like Andrei Sakharov managed to make use of the Jewish emigration issue in order to draw international attention to the domestic problems of the Soviet state. When cooperation between the Soviet Jewish and dissident movements gained momentum in the early 1970s, their unified efforts helped them raise their voice in the international arena.

Chapter 1 - Soviet dissent and the “Global Disruption of 1968”

1.1 The concept of dissent as applied to the Soviet context

In the analysis of the Soviet dissent, one of the major obstacles is the lack of actual institutions and organizations that would set the agenda and structure of the dissident writers and activists. A number of actors in different parts of the USSR were involved in the dissident activities but diverse opinions and lack of institutionalized communication between them makes it difficult both to evaluate the number of the dissenting citizens and to produce a systematic analysis of their views. The collapse of the USSR and the opening of many archives proved the assumption of the scholars of the Cold War period that dissent in the Soviet Union represented a variety of small groups and individual writers which were not always aware of the existence of each other.

Contemporaries such as Andrei Amalrik or Roy Medvedev writing on dissent in the USSR were using the term “opposition” rather than “dissent.” This choice of terminology helped them to embrace all the views different from those of the authorities, including the views of the members of the Communist Party as well. Since the primary focus of this study is the dissident discourse and activities, it is useful to make a clear distinction between the two terms.

The collection of essays *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition*, edited by Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, suggested a pragmatic framework which defined "dissidence" or "dissent" as the development of discourses critical of official ideology and the creation of communication channels outside the official ones. The participants of such discourse do not necessarily pursue any specific political goals. Meantime, "opposition" is understood as a specific form of political resistance by organized parties or groupings. The members of these parties and groupings are supposed to share common ideology or political agenda. Thus, “dissent” remains as such as long as it is neither structured in any form of official organization nor is based on a specific political ideology. From this perspective, I will have to reinterpret some of the classifications made by the Soviet writers in the 1970s so as to focus exclusively on "dissent" and exclude any “oppositional” elements.

One of the key terms used in the study of the Soviet and Eastern European dissent is *samizdat*. *Samizdat* (Russian: самиздат, literary means “self-published”) was the system and the process of the underground copying and distribution of the officially banned literature and other media in the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. The beginning of *samizdat* movement is often connected with the end of the “thaw” period and the fall of Krushchev in 1964. The beginning of the Brezhnev era was marked with the introduction of limitations on personal expression, and the most quintessential event of that period was the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in February, 1966. The prosecution of and harsh sentences for these writers provoked a substantial reaction in

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Soviet dissident circles. This trial stimulated the emergence of a debate between the dissidents over the right of self-expression in the USSR, and the spread of *samizdat* was the most prominent side effect of this debate.\(^\text{14}\) Samizdat played a critical role in the maturing of the Soviet dissent. The technical progress by that time already allowed for the reprinting of typed materials by private individuals, and this opportunity became the cornerstone which ensured the spread of the dissident thought.

In 1969, *samizdat* author Andrei Amalrik offered one of the first insights into currents of Soviet dissent at the time. According to his essay, “Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?,” dissent in the Soviet state was divided between three ideologies: the true Marxist-Leninists, the Christians, and the liberals.\(^\text{15}\) Proponents of the true Marxism-Leninism held that "the regime distorted the aims of Marxist-Leninist ideology" and that the return to the true principles of Marxism-Leninism was essential to restore the "health of the society." The "Christians" argued that principles of Christian morality should be taken as a guiding ideology of the country with the specific emphasis on the Slavophil ideas of the nineteenth century. The third category – the "liberals" – described the proponents of the transition to the democratic society of the Western type. Amalrik mentioned Andrei Sakharov as one of the most essential representatives of the "liberal" current of the Soviet dissent. This division between the ideologies of the dissidents was based on the personal observations of the writer, rather than on any serious analysis. This fact, however, should not diminish his work since it represents one of the very few contemporary sources regarding the issue of dissent. A more comprehensive framework was elaborated by Roy Medvedev in his *Book on Socialist Democracy*, published in


\(^{15}\) Amalrik, 15.
He pointed out to the existence of the opposition within the Communist Party of the USSR (CPSU\textsuperscript{17}, but the genuine dissent, as it is defined by Pollack and Wielgohs, is represented by small groups which Medvedev defined as the "Westernizers." This group is further divided into several currents such as the "Februarists", the "Democrats", the "ethical/Christian socialists", the constitutionalists, the anarcho-communists and different kinds of nationalists. Two of these seem to have been the most influential: the "Democrats" or the so-called “Democratic movement of the USSR”, and the loosely defined group of the "ethical socialists" closely associated with the "Christian socialists." Solzhenitsyn and Sinyavsky might be associated with the latter current. "Democrats" or the “Democratic movement of the USSR”, as defined by Medvedev, seems to correspond to the group of "liberals" in Amalrik's study.

The dominant view taken by the scholars of Soviet dissent is that the so-called Democratic movement, defined as the "liberals" by Amalrik and the "Democrats" by Medvedev, generally represented the majority of the dissidents in the USSR. This claim is present in authoritative studies of Lyudmila Alexeeva\textsuperscript{18}, Ferdinand Feldbrugge, and Frederick C. Barghoorn. The last one goes as far as to identify the dissident movement and the Democratic movement as the same phenomenon\textsuperscript{19}. Without establishing the boundaries of this movement, Barghoorn defined all the major dissident activists - Andrei Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Zhores and Roy Medvedevs, Yuri Galanskov, Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky - as the actual members of the Democratic movement.


\textsuperscript{17} Further in the text – Party.


despite their serious disagreements on a wide range of domestic and international issues. This framework seems to be rather simplistic since a number of dissenting activists were far from embracing the Western notion of democracy and thus can not be qualified as the "democrats" or the "liberals."

In view of this, Feldbrugge's study *Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union* adopts a more elaborative framework which takes into consideration the diversity of the dissenting views while singling out some traits which are characteristic of a large group of dissidents referred to as the "Democrats." Feldbrugge argues that this group rejects Marxism-Leninism and does not regard itself as socialist. It also criticizes the economic management of the country and advocates civil rights and democratic procedures. Feldbrugge mentions that the term "Democratic movement" is sometimes used to refer indiscriminately to the entire political opposition including the Marxist-Leninists, but for the convenience’s sake he suggests to use the term "democrats" or "Democratic movement" to refer only to the dissidents that can not be classified as Marxist-Leninists, socialist or nationalists, and that are not members of any formal political group.

According to Feldbrugge, this group appears to be the largest amongst the participants of the dissident movement. This claim, shared by the prevailing number of the Soviet dissent scholars, might be indirectly supported by the large number of *samizdat* authors that call themselves members of the Democratic movement or at least address the issue raised by other members of the Democratic movement. In order to have a clear understanding of the scope of activities and writings which can be united under

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the umbrella of the Democratic movement, Feldbrugge introduced the time element into
his analytical framework. He assumed that to understand the interconnection between the
different dissident writings of the early 1970s and to trace the development of the
Democratic movement itself, one needs to explore the chronology of the domestic
political events which had incited and shaped the dissent.  

The Daniel-Sinyavsky trial in 1965-1966 is routinely regarded as the impulse for
the drastic intensification of the dissident activities in the country. The present study,
however, will employ the Feldbrugge’s argument that the beginning of the genuine
dissident discourse was ushered in by the emergence of two documents – the so-called
Sakharov’s Memorandum (*Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual
These two pieces became milestones in the intellectual framing and development of the
dissident discourse and served as points of reference for many political *samizdat*
writers. For instance, Sakharov’s views set the major directions for the dissident thought for the
course of several next years. The ideas of his Memorandum were discussed and
elaborated on by, for instance, Amalrik, R. Medvedev, as well as by "numerous

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21 F. J. M. Feldbrugge, *Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union* (Leyden: A. W.
Sijthoff, 1975), 115.
22 Rudolf L. Tokes, *Dissent in the USSR: politics, ideology, and people* (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975), 3; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in
the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007),
190; Alexeeva, *Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR: noveishii period*, 240; Leonard Schapiro, *Political
opposition in one-party states* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 202; *They Chose Freedom*, Directed
[http://www.newsru.com/russia/01dec2005/film.html]; Valeria Novodvorskaya’s interview to the
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9_P9le5ijQ&feature=related].
representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonian SSR” in their statement released in 1968.\footnote{23}

_The Program of the Democratic Movement_ which appeared in _samizdat_ in October 1969 is to a certain degree a more controversial but not less influential document.\footnote{24} The ideas expressed in the document set a specific discourse which was taken by the other dissident writers who argued and commented on the Program. The editors of the document were not known but the influence of the ideas and proposals put forward made many writers adopt the language of the Program and proclaim themselves adherents of the Democratic movement. The authenticity of the Program was obliquely confirmed by numerous _samizdat_ documents which addressed and discussed certain points of the Program.\footnote{25} It also shows that the many _samizdat_ writers accepted the Program as one of the core texts of the dissident movement regardless of who it was actually written by.

This study will analyze the discourse which sprang out of these two documents (Sakharov’s memorandum and the Program), assuming in line with the Feldbrugge’s argument, that this discourse represented the mainstream opinions and debates of what became known and often referred to as the Democratic movement of the USSR. In is turn, this movement, as it has been demonstrated above, came to be perceived as a major force of Soviet dissent.

In a structural sense, the development of the Democratic movement was centered on several groups that were advocating the ideals of civil rights proclaimed in the

\footnote{24} Program of the Democratic Movement of USSR (Amsterdam: Fond Imeni Gertsena, 1970), HU OSA 300-80-1, Box 888.  
\footnote{25} F. J. M. Feldbrugge, 112-114.
Program. Most significant of these are the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR and the Human Rights Committee. The first one was established in 1969, the latter in 1970. The official establishment of these two organizations did not mean that dissent was becoming an organized opposition since the members of these organizations were not united by common political goals or ideology. Such organizations served rather as a platform which could assist the communication between the dissidents help them in reaching the Soviet and foreign audiences. On this purpose, both Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, and the Human Rights Committee made good use of the possibility to appeal to the International Institutions and foreign governments regarding domestic human rights violations in the USSR.

1.2 Soviet-US détente and its interpretations

The domestic developments in the USSR were paralleled with the new phenomenon unleashed in the late 1960s – early 1970s in the international relations, namely détente. This French term literally means the relaxation of the tensions and is often used to refer to the developments in the relations between the communist and capitalist worlds in the second half of the 1960s – 1970s. There exists a wide range of views on the time span and spatial scope of the détente. This study will focus primarily on Soviet – American interactions as essential component of détente.

The problem of defining and conceptualizing détente received significant attention from the scholarly circles over the last decades. Examination of different
aspects of détente has led to the emergence of a diverse spectrum of interpretations offered by a variety of theories of international relations.\textsuperscript{26}

Chronologically, the Nixon administration was the first to use “détente” in relation to the international situation of its time, and by the time of the Ford presidency this term already disappeared from the vocabulary of the American politicians.\textsuperscript{27} The term corresponded to the Soviet concepts of “peaceful coexistence” or razryadka mezhdnarodnoi napryazhennosti [discharge of international tensions], used by the officials in Moscow. The two sides did not, however, agree whether “détente” in American discourse and razryadka in the Soviet one did actually have the same meaning and implications for the foreign policy.

On the US side, a widespread agreement that the United States need an improvement of the relations with the Soviet Union existed since the time of the Eisenhower presidency. However, there was no consensus over the question of what measures should be undertaken to implement such an improvement. The US policy toward the USSR was characterized by the tension between the desire to promote democratization of the Soviet regime and cooperate on a number of salient international problems such as arms reduction, prevention of nuclear war and a broader economic cooperation. The previous strategy of containment elaborated by George Kennan after


World War II was not abandoned entirely. Détente was rather aimed at containing the Soviet expansion with effective and not expensive means that would not imply mobilization of enormous military resources. Unlike containment, détente implied that the United States and the Soviet Union had interests that were common to both states and that the pursuit of these interests could be achieved only by cooperation. This cooperation, as détente went on, did not eliminate the problem of inherent ideological contradictions.\(^{28}\)

The basic contradiction lay in the sphere of expectations and motivations behind détente. While the White House saw the policies of détente as the combination of the containment, prevention of war and achievement of vital agreements with the Soviet authorities on security and economic issues, the Kremlin’s motivations were quite different. The very notion of “peaceful coexistence” often used as the synonym of “détente” had a very different historical connotation in the Soviet ideology. Originally, this concept appeared in the early 1920s when it became evident that the export of communist revolution had failed. The peaceful relations with the Western world were necessary for “buying off” the capitalists, as Stalin put it in 1924.\(^{29}\) The belief in imminent war and, therefore, the need to postpone this war so as to ensure the military superiority of the USSR, had been present in the minds of the Soviet strategists for decades. By the 1970s, new factors emerged that compelled the Soviet authorities to revive and further develop the concept of “peaceful coexistence.”

Harry Gelman distinguished four major motivations behind the reintroduction of “peaceful coexistence” into the Soviet official discourse: the rise of and the threat coming


from mainland China, the long desired security conference in Europe, the domestic economic difficulties and the need for the import of technologies, and, finally, the talks on arms reduction. This interpretation seems to stem from the realistic understanding of the behavior of the state; however, one should be cautious in applying such theories to a country which seriously took on the messianic role of spreading its domestic ideology around the globe. The author seems to underestimate or totally ignore the ideological background of détente from the Soviet side. The expectation of the imminent war with the West did not disappear, at least on the rhetorical level. In 1972, Brezhnev stated:

We have been constantly fighting for détente and we have already achieved much. Today in our talks with the largest states of the West we aim at agreement, not at confrontation. And we will do everything to make the [Conference on European Security and Cooperation] proclaim a declaration on the principles of peaceful coexistence in Europe. This will postpone the war by twenty-five years, probably even by a century. To this end [the war with the West, author’s cursive] we focus all our thoughts and activities of our Foreign Ministry and public organizations of our country, as well as those of the allies.

The same facts were pointed out by the US expert in Eastern Europe F. Stephen Larrabee, when he tried to summarize the results of the course of new international policies in 1975 in a special research prepared for Radio Free Europe. Détente, in his interpretation, proved to be accompanied by the limitations on freedom of expression rather than

loosening of these restrictions in the USSR. Among the major outcomes of the policies of détente for the Soviet state, he distinguished an increase in the power and authority of the secret police, the sharpening of the ideological struggle, and a crackdown on dissent and nonconformist views. In the Soviet official doctrine, “peaceful coexistence”, as a feature of détente, was supposed to apply solely to the inter-state relations and to exclude any convergence with the West on the ideological front.  

The chief Soviet ideologue, Michael Suslov, explicitly stated the Soviet official view of détente in the following passage:

I must stress, comrades, that in all our ideological work we must permit no weakening of any sort in the struggle against reactionary bourgeoisie ideology. With the changes in the world situation in favor of socialism, the hopelessness of any attempts to bring military, economic, or political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union or the socialist commonwealth as a whole becomes more obvious. This being the case, the struggle becomes more and more acute in the area of ideology, an area in which there is not, and can not be, peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism.

Thus, the domestic policies were not subject to any changes, and the point was made clear by the CPSU officials. The rhetoric of the ideological struggle was not only maintained, but even intensified. This was reflected not only in the numerous speeches of the officials in Kremlin, but was supported by the extreme spending on propaganda, which, according to some estimates, ten times exceeded similar expenditures of the

In this way, a number of well-known dissidents within the USSR came to realize that détente is employed by the Soviet state to improve its economic performance and international reputation while imposing harsher restrictions on any kind of political freedoms.

Not only the motivations of the Soviet Union for the pursuit of détente, but also the unprecedented scale of the cooperation between the superpowers created the preconditions for challenging the existing approaches to international politics. The classical realist paradigm of the theory of international relations was widely criticized for lacking a comprehensive interpretation. One such critic, Steve Weber, had summarized and at the same time criticized the realistic approach to the nature of détente. He argued that the realistic vision of the international system as anarchic and thus limiting the cooperation to marginal fields did not account for the structural changes which had been brought by the strategic arms limitations talks and other mutually restricting obligations taken on by both sides. According to his argument, the pursuit of détente policies had resulted in the significant structural change of the international political system, and this change could not be fully perceived from the realist perspective.

Given the complexity of the phenomenon of détente, contemporary scholars, that were critical of the realist paradigm devoted much of their attention to the fact that the two power poles on the international stage were dragged into unprecedented mutual cooperation. In 1983, Stephen Krasner summed up the ongoing debates over the essence

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of a newly emerging "regime theory." This theory, developed in the aftermath of détente, tried to explain the new international processes by emphasizing that certain periods of cooperation between the states are possible and conditioned by the creation of the "regimes," i.e. the "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations in a given issue-area."\(^{36}\) The signing of the trade and arms treaties between the US and the USSR, as well as the agreement on the basic principles of US-Soviet relations, reinforce our understanding of détente as a phenomenon which appeared to contradict the traditional realistic approaches of Cold War scholars.

The current thesis is based on the argument that traditional, state-centered interpretations of the motivations behind the foreign policy are not sufficient without considering the domestic determinants. To understand the conditions at the time of détente, one has to pay attention to the fact that several post-Second World War decades witnessed the rise of new actors in the international relations. In the age of mass media, non-governmental organizations and individual actors became capable of influencing public opinion on the issue of international relations. Speculating on the international role increasingly played by the individuals, such as peace activists, religious and community leaders, writers and other public figures, Daniel Papp concluded univocally: "Individual can matter."\(^{37}\) Even greater influence was acquired by the non-governmental organizations. Along with religious, national and political movements, non-governmental organizations were moved to the forefront of debates over the international issues. Despite the limited influence such actors had on state-centered international order, the


very fact of their involvement justifies the necessity to examine the extent of their role in the foreign policy making.

Through the mass media, particular individuals and non-governmental actors gained the opportunity to address the masses of people and call upon the governments to adopt certain policies or criticize the existing ones. While in the Western societies such activities could often be exercised through conventional media channels, in the Soviet context the role of such media was mostly allotted to *samizdat*, the materials published and distributed outside of officially approved channels. With the increase of the number of documents of the *samizdat* at least five times between 1965 and 1968\(^38\) the authorities became increasingly more concerned over the potential threat to the stability of the regime which these documents and their authors were presumably representing\(^39\).

Despite the fact there is still no verifiable data testifying the scale of public engagement with reading *samizdat* materials, the number of reports to the highest echelons of the Communist Party\(^40\) that warned of the dangers of the spread of these materials, and the multiple arrests of dissidents following these reports, directly show that the authorities had actually perceived dissent as a serious internal challenge.

This perceived threat raises the question whether certain aspects of the Soviet foreign policy were related to the rise of domestic dissent. In this regard, political

\(^{38}\) Feldbrugge, 2.

\(^{39}\) See, for example, the protocol of the Central Committee of CPSU. Dated April 21, 1971. Available on the web site of the “Soviet Archive”, compiled by Vladimir Bukovsky. (Accessed April 30, 2010) [http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/dis70/ct2-71.pdf]; also “Sakharov Archive”, [http://www.yale.edu/annals/sakharov/sakharov_list.htm].

\(^{40}\) See the section 3 “Suppression of Dissidents” on the website of the “Soviet Archive” [http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/dis70/dis70-r.html].
scientists and scholars of international relations have come to a relative consensus that the internal strains regularly have an impact on the foreign policies of the state. Dissent itself in the Soviet context did not represent a serious societal strain due to its localization and sporadic nature. However, the official images of the dissidents were constructed around the belief that the threat was plausible,\textsuperscript{41} and thus the strain was assumed by the government to be present or yet to come. Daniel Geller put forward a hypothesis that the presence of such societal strain, even an imagined one, exists in the direct positive correlation with the measured foreign conflict behavior.\textsuperscript{42} This mechanism operates through the self-preserving policies of the threatened political elites aimed at domestic unification of a nation against the external enemy. Any kind of potential turmoil thus can be suppressed by drawing public attention to the external challenges.

This concept, at first glance, does not seem to have relevance to the foreign policy of the USSR since the rise of the local dissent and the domestic problems in the Warsaw Treaty member states did not lead to any escalation of the international tensions, but rather brought the period of relative tranquility in the European politics. The peculiarity of the situation was that the exploitation of the image of the opposite side as the potentially aggressive force had been used by each side ever since the end of the Second World War. In my view, the weakness of the Geller’s concept lays in its inability to estimate the time span over which the image of the external enemy can be employed as the national unifying tool. By the time détente entered the political and scholarly discourse on the both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the two states had already depleted the

\textsuperscript{41} The idea is developed by Walter Parchomenko in his study \textit{Soviet Images of Dissidents and Non-Conformists} (New York: Praeger, 1986).
potential of the “external challenge” rhetoric. The United States was exhausted by the
war in Vietnam, and the government’s calls for the containment of communism had the
result opposite of the one predicted by Geller. The violent domestic student riots, anti-
war protests and drastic intensification of the civil rights movement could be pacified
only by the adoption of less interventionist policies. Meantime, in the USSR and its
satellites, the rising dissent was emerging as reaction to the oppressive domestic and
expansionist foreign policies of Kremlin. For instance, the invasion of Czechoslovakia
led to one of the few public protests ever conducted in the Soviet Union.

In this way, I argue that Geller’s concept is applicable to the détente policies in a
quite opposite way. As long as the unifying force of the eternal threat is depleted, and the
domestic strain proves to be rather a reaction to the persistence of existing expansionist
foreign polices of a state, further escalation of the international tensions might lead to the
deepening of the domestic crisis. In the United States this crisis was real and visible. In
the Soviet Union the extent of the potential of domestic turmoil is hardly possible to
evaluate; however, the analysis of the Communist party documentation shows that the
threat was present at least in the imagination of the leaders of the state.

This argument does not discard other interpretations of the motivations behind
détente. For the Soviet side, the economic constraints or the need to limit the
overspending in military sector definitely played their role. But given all the challenges
that domestic dissent presented for the international stance and prestige of the Soviet
state, it can also be ranked as one of the crucial factors for the Soviet authorities to launch
détente with the United States.
1.3 “The Global Disruption”: détente vs. dissent

To examine the hypothesis of the domestic determinants behind the bilateral détente between the USSR and the USA, a special insight has to be made into the nature of dissent and protest of the time in both states. These developments have received different interpretations. Paul Berman argued that this was the power of ideals and fury against social injustices that brought people around the world to the streets or to the underground publishing houses. He distinguished several different types of revolutions that were unleashing at the same moment in different parts of the world. Student uprisings, anti-war street actions, occupations of universities, feminist, gay, ecological, African-American and other movements constituted the so-called type of “insurrection in middle-class customs” which presented the political insurrection. This type of revolution was closely connected to the “spiritual revolution” which brought the cultural and religious changes, particularly in the field of popular music and in the role of the Catholic Church.

Rebellion against Western imperialism, on the one hand, and the revolt against the Communist dictatorships, on the other, constituted the most feasible types of revolutions since they presented a real menace to those who these insurrections were directed against. At a first glance, these two types of revolutions, as singled out by Berman, seem to be contradictory to each other. The resistance against “totalitarianism” in Europe was paralleled by the spread of “totalitarianism” outside Europe. But these revolutions can not be understood in the classical dichotomy of democratic West – totalitarian East. All these

revolts shared the same aspirations. The protesters and dissenters on the both sides accused the domestic political elites of the betrayal of the democratic traditions of the West and the leftist revolutionary traditions of the Soviet block respectively. The participants of the global uprising shared the same vision of the new age when the power is shifting from the elites to the masses, and the two systems converge in the economic and political sense.

Jeremi Suri shares Berman’s view that the revolts around the world were not separated events. Suri suggested that the term “Global Disruption of 1968” to refer to the complex of developments that had its peak that year. He held to idea that the bipolar stand-off, which had established huge military and bureaucratic machines on both sides, alienated the citizens from their governments. The Cold War created the precondition of the public anger, and the late 1960s, early 1970s became the bifurcation point when this anger poured on to the streets, as it was the case in the United States, or to the pages of the dissident literature, as it happened in the Soviet Union. The peculiarity and the explosiveness of this period were the result of the intersection of the different social and political trends that emerged in the aftermath of the World War II.

First of all, the number of young people aged 15-29 drastically increased between 1955 and 1975, following the post-war baby boom in the United States and the Soviet Union. Instigated by the Cold War-related militarization and bureaucratization, these young people started to challenge the perceived hypocrisy of the elites and the existent injustices. The demographic trend of the post-war decades is not the only factor behind the emergence of the “Global Disruption.” Starting from 1950s, both the American and the Soviet universities were accepting much higher numbers of the students. Over the

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period of 1955-1970, enrollment rates in higher education intuitions rose in both countries. These rates more than doubled in the Soviet Union, and tripled in the United States. In the Soviet Union alone, the number of the scientists rose from 162,500 to 665,000 between 1950 and 1965.\footnote{Suri, \textit{Power and Protest}, 89, 270.}

The growth of the universities networks, and rapid surge in the number of students and scientists provided an efficient infrastructure for the dissemination of the dissident ideas. In the Unites States, this contributed to the emergence of the massive student movements imbued with the ideas that had been spread through the networks of universities. In the Soviet Union, the possibilities for the public display of discontent were quite limited; therefore the dissent took the form of underground and unorganized phenomenon.

In view of the world-wide proliferation of the dissident thoughts, which challenged the very credibility and the authority of the ruling elites, Jeremi Suri suggested the direct link between détente and the domestic disobedience in both Cold War camps. Since the popular discontent was not localized to any particular country, and kept spreading around the globe, the US and the Soviet governments were highly interested in calming down the domestic turmoil. The previous decade of the 1960s has seen the relative stabilization on the world arena, following the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. Nuclear war did not seem to pose an apocalyptic threat anymore, but the global standoff continued. The United States got bogged down in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union had to face harsh critics amongst its allies over the invasion of Czechoslovakia.\footnote{Ibid., 1-6, 8, 204.}
Therefore, in Suri’s argument, Moscow and Washington needed to involve in a closer cooperation to calm down the domestic and international criticism.

Détente became a necessary if not the only plausible way to avoid the severe escalation of the civil discontent. The old methods of unifying the nation from within through the construction of the image of the certain external threats could not function anymore. The turmoil in the United States and growing civil disobedience in the Soviet camp was to great extent the reaction to block politics and Cold War confrontation. Therefore, the leaders on the either side of the Cold War divide had to come to a negotiating table in order to contain the pressure from the masses. As Jeremi Suri puts it, both sides saw the opportunity that a closer cooperation could have strengthened their stances while discrediting domestic challengers. In this way, Soviet – American détente was supposed to serve the purpose of establishing the new world order which would ensure the preservation of the current status quo, and thus eliminate the threats to the ruling elites in both states.

In this argument, the proponents of détente and the dissident activists proved to be on the different sides of the barricades. While the leading world governments adopted the policy of détente in order to restore and maintain international and domestic order and stability, the masses of young people demanded reformation of the existing order. Therefore, the dissidents and protesters of diverse denominations opposed détente as the archaic “concert of powers”, reactionary to the progressive ideas.

This work will analyze how the dissident groups within the Soviet Union reacted to détente and the actions did they took to oppose it when this term entered the political and intellectual discourse of the Soviet and American establishment in the late 1960s.
Following the argument of Jeremi Suri, this study will attempt to demonstrate that predominant view of détente amongst the Soviet dissidents changed over the course of several years between 1968 and 1975 paralleling the growing awareness of the dissidents that “peaceful coexistence” between the superpowers might be directed against the domestic disobedience. The dominating discourse in the dissident writings and speeches shifted from excitement over the prospects of the new Soviet-American rapprochement to the disillusionment and severe criticism. I will argue that the dissidents came to perceive détente as a threat to the cause of the Soviet human rights movement. Leaders of the Soviet Democratic movement believed that continuation of the cooperation between the two states in its contemporary form would mean a serious blow to the observance of international human rights obligations which the Soviet state had taken on. This cooperation was also seen as a tool for muting the overall human rights situation in the USSR. The more dissidents were seeing détente as directed against them, the more they mobilized themselves for campaigning against it.

Internationally known dissenters, such as Andrei Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn or Lyudmila Alexeeva, reached out to American public opinion in an attempt to raise the concern over the plausible threats to the observance of human rights in the Soviet Union. But the most significant outcome of this campaign were the appeals to the United States government and Congress which called for political action in order to challenge the Kremlin’s authority.
Chapter 2 - Problems of Détente and Jewish Emigration in Soviet Dissident Discourse

2.1 Soviet dissidents on détente: the original expectation and the disillusionment

The previous chapter has argued that antagonism between the proponents of détente, on one side, and the proponents of the social reforms in the USSR, on the other, can be clearly seen from today’s perspective. For this study, it is essential to trace back how the new relations between the superpowers were perceived then by both critics and proponents of détente. The concern over the repercussions which détente might have brought to the cause of the civil rights in the Soviet Union emerged almost immediately after the rapprochement between the two states started. These concerns were not originally intended to undermine détente since the prospect of a new world order had been cherished by many of the leading Soviet intellectuals. The convergence between the two systems, which the dissidents considered to be a necessary element of détente, was also seen by them as an important step in empowering the West to stand up for civil rights in the USSR. In line with the Jeremi Suri’s concept of the détente having been one of the tools to curb the domestic dissent, I will use the works of the dissidents published both in the United States and the USSR, as well as contemporary studies, to

Fred Warner Neal brings the argument of Stephen F. Cohen which ascertained that the large group of the dissidents was adherent to tougher American policies towards the USSR on the issue of human rights, having lost hope that any domestic opposition might project any influence onto the Soviet government over the issue of human rights. The increased cooperation between the two states, and as a result the growing inter-dependence, thus might have enabled the US government to gain more leverage over the issue of Soviet domestic affairs. See the argument in Fred Warner Neal, *Détente or Debacle: Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations* (New York: Norton, 1979), 23.
analyze the points of criticism directed against détente and raised by the Soviet dissidents in their works, as well as their repeated warnings to the Western governments about the possible dangers of allying with Moscow.

The diverse spectrum of dissent in the USSR represented a number of different, often contradictory views on international politics and, particularly, Soviet-American cooperation. The dominant trend, however, was that of the process of slow disillusionment with the policies of détente. The original enthusiasm was obvious in the two basic documents which proved to be key texts for the dissident discourse in the Soviet Union. Both the Program of the Democratic movement of the USSR and Sakharov’s 1968 Memorandum contained references to the prospects of the international cooperation and détente. The Program, first published in 1969 as samizdat in the USSR and a year later in Amsterdam, did not specifically mention the term “détente”, but the document contained passages which were clearly favoring the new phase of relations between the Cold War camps. The authors of the Program argued that the foreign policy of the USSR of the previous decades had been based on the “socialist-imperialist doctrine” which promoted the subjugation of the “weaker peoples”. In the view of the dissidents behind the document, the USSR should have renounced this doctrine of militarist communism and turn into the peaceful democratic state with the “humanist international behavior.” For this purpose, the Soviet authorities were supposed to withdraw the troops from all the Warsaw Pact member-states and guarantee the non-interference into the domestic affairs of these countries. The international treaties which had been signed under the pressure from Moscow were to be revised under the supervision of the United Nations, and the state monopoly on trade should be terminated.
“Reconciliation and convergence with the capitalist countries for the purpose of friendship and cooperation”, as the Program proposed, should have been followed by the full disarmament, international inspections of the disarmament process, the reunification of Germany, the revision of the international borders in Europe by the special international commission, free flow of information and free emigration. The last suggestion of the dissidents behind the Program – the right to free emigration - was yet to become a hot debated issue in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Such views as those expressed in the Program were characteristic of a large group of dissidents by the end of the 1960s. The assumption that cooperation and “thaw” in international relations will bring about the same trends in the domestic policies of the Soviet state was largely accepted. Convergence and détente for the dissidents were unthinkable without the internal changes. The disillusionment over the hope that this was the way détente would work came several years later.

One of the most significant blows to détente that emanated from the Soviet dissident movement was made by Andrei Sakharov. Initially, the academician was enthusiastic about the prospective of détente and convergence of two systems. He indirectly referred to these issues in the name of his essay *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, given that “peaceful coexistence” and “détente” were often used as synonyms and interchangeable notions. In that essay, published in *samizdat* in 1968, and later on in the West, Sakharov literally proposed the plan of the future convergence of the socialist and capitalist systems. The core idea of his plan was that in the coming ten years

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48 *Program of the Democratic Movement of USSR* (Amsterdam: Fond Imeni Gertsena, 1970), 63-64., HU OSA 300-80-1, Box 888.
the victory of the leftist internal forces in the Western countries would lead to the need of convergence with socialism while the multiparty system and the heated political debates would emerge in the Soviet and Eastern European societies. Having overcome the alienation, the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to solve many of the world’s problems including hunger and the arms race. Such cooperation, in Sakharov’s plan, might have led to the establishment of world government by the end of the 20th century. These developments would have been paralleled by the all-encompassing technological and scientific revolution, which could have been successful only if the concern for the “human values of moral, ethical and personal character” had been observed. Amongst the necessary preconditions for the implementation of this master plan was the emergence of the “worldwide interest of intelligentsia, the working class, and other progressive forces in a scientific democratic approach to politics, economics, and culture.”

The idealist perspective of the academician was summarized in his statement that “the goal of international policy is to insure the universal fulfillment of the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man.’” In the same spirit of hope, Sakharov participated in the writing of the letter to the Central Committee of the CPS in March 1970. The letter, also signed by famous dissident historian Roy Medvedev and mathematician Valentin Turchin, was an attempt to encourage the leaders of the USSR to improve the economic

50 Ibid., 71.
51 Roy Medvedev – famous political activist, historian, dissident. He was born in 1925 in Tbilisi. In 1958-1961, he was working for the Academy of the Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR. From the early 1960s Medvedev was an activist of the dissident movement, was excluded from the CPS for the publication of his book “Let the History Judge” in which he denounced Stalinist crimes. For more information, visit the web site of the History Project “Khronos” [http://www.hrono.ru/biograf/bio_m/medvedev_roi.html] (accessed May 30, 2010).
management of the country and to particularly “consider the international consequences of democratization if it is adopted by our country.” Democratization, as the authors claimed, would not only benefit the Soviet society but would also enhance the international prestige of the country. These attempts of Andrei Sakharov to appeal to the top leadership of the USSR with the demands of democratization testify to his initial belief that the new rapprochement with the West would bring the imminent changes within the Soviet Union. Later on, contemplating his original enthusiasm, the academician recognized that he was “a little idealistic.” By 1972, his disillusionment was obvious when he repented of having been deluding himself: “I wrote from what I call a position of abstraction. Now I know many more things and am a much more disappointed man. I called myself a socialist then but now I have modified my beliefs… I am not a Marxist-Leninist, a communist. I would call myself a liberal.”

Another dissident activist, Andrei Amalrik, adopted a less optimistic position towards détente from the very beginning. In 1969, he argued that “friendship” between the two states does not actually benefit the United States, and the real convergence might have happened only if “serious democratic moves” would have been made by the Soviet authorities. At that moment, as Amalrik perceived it, cooperation between the US and the USSR benefited mostly the latter due to economic and political gains that the Kremlin acquired from the improvement of the relations with the White House.

Similar pessimistic attitude to the prospect of détente was present in two other crucial samizdat documents of the late 1960s – the so-called letter from the numerous

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53 Feldbrugge, 97.
54 Amalrik, 55-56.
“representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonians SSR" and the essay “Vremya Ne Zhdet!” [Time Will Not Wait!], signed by the two citizens of Leningrad, S. Zorin and N. Alekseev. Both texts were widely circulated as samizdat and criticized Sakharov’s scientific approach to politics, arguing that Soviet authorities would not be capable of the proposed changes in their international and domestic policies.\footnote{Donald R. Kelley, “The Soviet Debate on the Convergence of the American & Soviet Systems,” \textit{Polity} 6, no. 2 (Winter, 1973): 174-196, 190-191.}

By 1973, Sakharov articulated the essence of the change in his position to a more skeptical one. In his interview to foreign media in August 1973, he stated that he had supported détente since it was capable of reducing the risk of war. At the same time, the contemporary convergence, being political rather than ideological, might have been potentially threatening. He warned that the Soviet government could take advantage of détente to strengthen its economic and administrative might. The Soviet Union, a country “behind a mask,” is capable of dangerously unpredictable actions, and the West must avoid letting the USSR achieve military superiority while continuing the policies aimed at promotion of a more open society.\footnote{Andrei Sakharov, \textit{Andrei Sakharov: Memoirs} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 386.} The ongoing Helsinki Conference\footnote{The Helsinki Conference represented multilateral negotiations which started in the capital of Finland in November 1972. The working phase of the conference, which involved the high representatives of thirty-five European countries, including the United States and the USSR, lasted from September 1973 to July 1975. The agreements signed as the result of the Conference, were divided into three sections which encompassed all the major dimension of international relations in Europe at that time. First section – “Security in Europe” – consisted of ten principles of inter-state relations: respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality, non-resort to the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlements of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, cooperation among states, and fulfillment of international obligations. Second section was called “Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment”. Third section – the most controversial one – was called “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields”. This section implied inter-states cooperation in provision of contacts among people, dissemination of information, as well as cultural and education exchange. The innovative clauses of this section were advocating the}
attempts of the US Congress to push the Soviet government for more liberalization were interpreted by the academician as steps in the right direction. Nevertheless, as far as freedom of thought is concerned, the results of the international convergence proved to be rather negative. Sakharov claimed that the two trends, international changes and intensification of domestic suppression, are correlated. The West needs to understand that the unconditional cooperation with the USSR will mean capitulation before the anti-democratic regime.

As it has already demonstrated in this study, this position of Sakharov was not as radically anti-détente as the views of certain other dissidents, but the mere fact of raising the concern regarding the political freedoms in the USSR and tying this issue to the perspectives of détente provoked a furious campaign against the scientist in the Soviet media. Despite the fact that this campaign was not long-lived, Sakharov made an attempt to clarify his position on the East-West relations and the domestic policies of the USSR. In a statement published in the Western press later that year, he recalled that he had always been a supporter of the efforts to maintain international peace and curb the arms race. Convergence between the two systems, he argued, is the only solution to the world problems, and this process should be paralleled by democratization, freedom of information, exchange of ideas, respect to human rights and freedom for movement. His freedom of movement of people, ideas, and information. For more information, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 474-475.

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concern was related to the fact that the ideal of détente was far from the real policies pursued by the Western and Soviet governments. He called attention to “the dangers of seeming détente, which is not accompanied by the growth of trust and democratization.”

In this way, Sakharov’s position might seem ambivalent, but it seems more consistent and clearer when put in the context of his previous statements. Initial excitement expressed in the earlier articles was substituted with more critical position after his expectations of détente did not come true, particularly given the fact that he had denounced the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He was favorable of the idea of détente, which in his view implied peaceful coexistence, comprehensive cooperation between the two systems, and the negotiations on the disarmament. These realistic goals in the works of Sakharov were tightly connected to the theoretical objectification of the necessity of convergence between the two systems. Apparently, the idea of convergence was attractive to neither camp. From the Soviet side, the convergence would mean more openness. Certain symbolic moves were made in this direction when the USSR stopped jamming foreign radio stations in September 1973 and agreed on some concessions regarding the emigration problem. These developments were greatly influenced by the pressure from the West and the necessity from the Soviet side to show more willingness to cooperate. But this move was not followed by any other signs that the Soviet government was ready for more openness.

To sum up, the general attitude of the dissident movement towards the possibility of convergence or détente had never been hostile. Most would have welcomed genuine

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détente which meant convergence of the two political and economic systems as well. The
difference in their views lay in the dimension of theory and practice. Sakharov’s idealism
was manifested in his sincere hope that internal change was possible and in his
continuous efforts to reach to the Soviet officials. He believed that ideological
convergence would be a process parallel to inter-governmental détente. The opposite
opinion, or rather fear, which soon after prevailed in dissident circles, was that the Soviet
authorities would not only ignore the demands for democratization but, on the contrary,
intensify domestic oppression. Despite the fact that these fears immediately came true,
and large scale persecution was launched in the early 1970s,
the new phenomenon of
Soviet life – name the rise of the Jewish dissent – provided a vital impetus for the
continuation of the dissident debates and activism which became a factor of international
politics.

2.2 The emergence of the “Jewish question” in the Soviet
dissident discourse

The right to emigrate, mentioned in the “Program of the Democratic movement”
was not specifically mentioned by Sakharov in his 1968 Memorandum or in other
documents of the broader dissident movement of the late 1960s. However, this issue
started to receive significant attention of many dissidents by the beginning of the 1970s.

63 See for example F. Stephen Larrabee’s report “Détente and Human Rights” made for the Radio
Liberty/Radio Free Europe; dated May 2, 1975, RL 182/75; HU OSA 300-80-1, Box 964, p. 1-3.
On pages 1-3 he argues that “despite Soviet interest in international détente there has been a
hardening of the internal line and further restrictions of freedom of speech and other human
rights”. During the several years of détente in the early 1970s, the Soviet domestic life was
characterized by “an increase in the power and authority of the secret police…, a harsher cultural
policy…, a greater stress on ideology and the sharpening of the ideological struggle…, a
crackdown on dissent and nonconformist views”.

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The issue of emigration was closely tied to the issue of the “repatriation” that many Soviet Jews were advocating at the time. As this study will show, the issue of the Jewish emigration, and emigration in general, proved to be one of the serious challenges to the process of détente, and the debates over emigration were very closely tied to the debate over the nature of détente.

In the aftermath of Khrushchev’s “thaw,” the Jewish cultural life started to re-emerge within the Soviet Union. The political element of this phenomenon became evident immediately after the Six-Day War in the Middle East. Benjamin Pinkus calculated that almost 5.5 thousand people signed the petitions for emigration to Israel over the decade after the 1967 War, most of them between 1968 and 1973.64 Much larger numbers – tens of thousands - did not sign the petitions but still applied for emigration. All these applicants did not constitute a united force since most of them were acting being unaware of the existence of each other. Jewish activism was rather centered in small “cells” or companies of friends and acquaintances.65 Just as Soviet Democratic movement, the Jewish movement was scarcely a unified phenomenon. Moreover, this movement was divided over the strategy the Jews should follow. Two major trends can be distinguished within the Jewish movement of the time: the “cultural revivalist” trend and the “emigration” trend. The proponents of the first one ascertained that the “repatriation” was not the only way to preserve the culture of the Soviet Jewry. Instead, they believed that the Jewish community and culture could be sustained within the USSR

without emigration. For this purpose, the “cultural revivalists” organized a variety of events aimed at promotion of the Jewish culture. Their activities included the study and teaching of Hebrew, Judaism, and other aspects of the Jewish culture. Most of them were concentrated in the big cities, such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Riga, where the density of population could provide for the sufficient number of Jews who would be able to arrange such activities. The second - “emigrationist” - current was more numerous, and their major goal was *aliyah* i.e. they did not focus on the development of the Jewish life in the USSR and believed that only “repatriation” can save the Soviet Jewry from oblivion. The proponents of the two ideas were not strictly divided. Thus, they were often publishing their thoughts in the same *samizdat* periodical *Evrei v SSSR* [The Jews in the USSR] as well as some others.

Given the differences in the agendas of different Jewish groups within the USSR, terminology needs to be clarified so as to avoid confusion. This study explores the views of the second - “emigrationist” – current, which is often routinely referred to as the “Jewish movement” in most studies. This thesis, as well as majority of other studies, is using the term “Jewish movement” to refer to that specific, though largest, current of this movement which can be better described as “Jewish movement for repatriation to Israel.” However, this study does not intend to change the terminology since it is already deeply rooted in the literature on the Soviet Jewry.

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67 *Aliyah* (In Hebrew “ascent”) means the emigration of the Jews from Diaspora to the State of Israel after 1948. The notion of *aliyah* is one of the major underpinnings of the Zionist ideology.

The participants of the Jewish movement by the beginning of the 1970s did not have a serious infrastructure apart from the *samizdat* publications, and therefore many of them were operating in cooperation with Soviet Democratic movement. In fact, 60-70 percent of the Soviet democrats were either Jewish - such as Pavel Litvinov, Larisa Bogoraz, Victor Krasin, Pyotr Yakir - or married to Jews or Jewesses. But, as Joshua Rubenstein, an American scholar and journalist, observed the “Jewish problem” was not a primary concern of the Jewish members of the Democratic movement, and the most of the Jewish activists of the Democratic movement rarely acted exclusively on the behalf of the Jewish community. Meantime, as far as the participants of the Soviet Democratic movement are concerned, the issue of Jewish emigration became rather an instrumental tool in their campaign for attracting the Western attention to the violations of the human rights in the USSR. Another important aspect of the interaction between the Jewish and the Democratic movements was that many of the Soviet Jews, including those participating in the Democratic movement, were actually not interested in emigration. Six decades of communist hegemony had totally changed the identities of many of the Soviet Jews. As a result, most Soviet Jews regarded themselves more Russian than Jewish. Therefore, for many of the Jewish participants of the Democratic movement, the cause of emigration was purely political, and constituted rather a part of a larger problem of reforming the Soviet domestic polices. Out of approximately 3,000,000 Jews living in the Soviet

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Union in 1969, only 381,000 spoke Yiddish. The number of applicants for emigration was still high enough to be ignored. Due to the enormous attention which this issue had attracted in the world, the problem of Jewish emigration united both the Jewish and the Democratic movement. These two movements had different goals, the first one, to revive Jewish culture in the Soviet Union, or merely to acquire the exit visa, and the latter to instigate the domestic reform within the Soviet Union. However, the campaign for emigration or *aliyah* occurred to be a unifying cause which was appealing to the activist of both movements regardless of their final goals or personal motivations.

The overlapping of the Jewish movement with the Democratic Movement can be illustrated by the analysis of the *samizdat* publications of the time. *Samizdat* became one of the most, if not the most, crucial aspect of the dissident activities since it helped spread the ideas of the different movements. In this respect, Jewish *samizdat* publications have always been regarded as a part of a broader dissident *samizdat*. The plight of the Soviet Jewry was often addressed in different *samizdat* publications, including Amalrik's famous “Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984.” The same was confirmed by Lyudmila Alekseeva, a famous Soviet and Russian dissident and human rights champion, who recollected in her memoirs that amongst the supporters of the Jewish demands for the right to emigrate, non-Jews were not rare even though the Jews still constituted the majority.
The cooperation between the activists of the Democratic and the Jewish movements can be clearly identified through the analysis of the major samizdat periodical of the 1970s – *Khronika Tekhuscheikh Sobityi* [The Chronicle of Current Events].

Starting from the 13th issue of the *Chronicle* on April 30, 1970, almost each issue of the bulletin contained information on the latest developments within the Jewish movement, and other articles connected to the question of emigration to Israel, or larger problems of Jewish life in the USSR. Some articles in the *Chronicle* were republished from another samizdat periodical *Iskhod* [Exodus] which devoted all its attention to the issue of emigration to Israel. On August 31, 1970, the *Chronicle* republished the report form *Iskhod* according to which the large numbers of the Jews from Riga, Vilnius, Minsk, Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and other cities had been involved in a letter-writing campaign demanding their right to emigration to be observed. Among the addressees were the General Secretary of the United Nations, the Chairperson of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, the Chairperson of the International Organization of Red Cross, Prime Minister of Israel Golda Meir, the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Presidium of the 14th Convention of Komsomol [Communist Youth Union], the Soviet Attorney General, as well as parliaments of

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75 *Chronicle of Current Events*, as one of the active members of the Democratic movement Lyudmila Alexeeva recollected later, became the herald of the dissident movement. The bulletin was aimed at the recording of all the violations of the human rights in the Soviet Union. It was being published during the period of 1968-1983, and became the cornerstone of the Democratic movement. Over this time, the bulletin had more than sixty issues. Many of the compilers of the periodical were arrested, and when in 1983 the last editor of the Chronicle Yuri Shchikhanovitch was arrested, the Chronicle ceased to exist.


76 This periodical had four issues in 1970 and 1971. Feldbrugge, 53.
different, mostly Western countries.\textsuperscript{77} The large scope of the Jewish letter-writing campaign was evident throughout the entire existence of the \textit{Chronicle}, especially in the first half of the 1970s. From the 17\textsuperscript{th} issue on December 31, 1970, the \textit{Chronicle} regularly had a special section dedicated to the activities of the Jewish movement as well as lists of the Jews persecuted for their desire to leave.\textsuperscript{78}

It would not be correct to assume that the Jewish underground activists were preoccupied exclusively with the problem of emigration. The fact that many of them collaborated with the Democratic movement demonstrates that the issue of emigration was perceived by many Jews as a part of a larger context human rights situation in the USSR. This way of conceptualizing the issue provided for the certain match of the aspirations of the Jewish and non-Jewish dissident activists. By unifying their efforts, the both movements managed to attract significant attention from the Western public and governments as well as from the State Security Committee (KGB). This match was a peculiar characteristic of the dissident movement in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{79}

Given the lack of sufficient coordination within the Jewish movement at the time and the lack of unified position, this work focuses on the activists of both the Democratic and Jewish movements regardless of the perceived Jewishness of these people. It is of no importance for the current study whether the advocates of the right to emigration did or did not identify themselves as Jewish. In its struggle for the human rights in the Soviet

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\textsuperscript{77} The 15th issue of the Chronicle of Current Affairs, available on web site of the Soviet/Russian human rights and educational non-governmental organization “Memorial” [http://memo.ru/history/diss/chr/].

\textsuperscript{78} The issue from 17\textsuperscript{th} to 32\textsuperscript{nd} of the Chronicle of Current Affairs from the period 1970-1974, available on web site of the Soviet/Russian human rights and educational non-governmental organization “Memorial” [http://memo.ru/history/diss/chr/].

Union, the Democratic movement supported the cause of *aliyah*, and often acted on behalf of the Soviet Jewry. Valery Chalidze, one of the founders of the Moscow Human Rights Committee, had often addressed the problems of the Jewish movement, and in 1970 he participated in the writing of the so-called "Letter of the 39" which was circulating in the *samizdat* as well as published abroad. The letter represented a quintessence of the Democratic Movement’s views on the issue of the Jewish emigration. It emphasized that the Jews were facing very specific problems in the Soviet society: "...young Jews do not know how to read Jewish books because there are no schools in the Soviet Union where a Jewish language is taught." Meanwhile, the demand for the right for “repatriation” was justified in the text by referring to the Soviet law which, according to the authors, guaranteed the right for the choice of citizenship and country of residence. This strategy of asserting the right of the Jews to emigrate by referring to the Soviet law which, as the Democratic movement insisted, provided the right to emigration for all the citizens, became the major characteristic of the way Democratic movement addressed the "Jewish question." By raising the issue of emigration, the Soviet dissidents were in fact advocating the necessity to take use of détente in order to elaborate such international policies which would put the issue of human rights – with the right of emigration as the most important at the time – in the center of the inter-governmental negotiations and world public opinion.

The position of Sakharov on the issue of emigration was crucial for several reasons. First, he had a huge authority and moral weight in any debate over the domestic issue in the USSR. Unlike some other prominent dissidents, like Alexander Solzhenitsyn,

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80 Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, 44.
81 Rubenstein, 166.
82 Ibid., 166 – 167.
he did not employ religious-mystic rhetoric; at the same time, his views could serve as a point of reference for the Western governments since he, unlike for instance Roy Medvedev, had denounced Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The influence and authority that Sakharov possessed were obvious for the masters of the Kremlin as well. Since 1968 and up till the end of 1974, KGB submitted eighty-six reports to the Central Committee of the Communist Party regarding the activities of Sakharov and his close colleagues. In 1971, when the academician already had doubts whether détente would imply the convergence on the ideological front, for the first time he directly addressed the issue of emigration, criticizing the Soviet government for failing to observe the human rights standards. In an appeal to the Supreme Council (Soviet) of the USSR, which was transmitted by foreign radio stations, he insisted that the law on emigration should be revised so as to allow free emigration and ensure the right of the Soviet citizens to reside abroad. The “Jewish” context of the appeal was clear. The academician mentioned that he had drawn his attention to the issue as a result of the “trials of recent months,” mentioning among others, the “1970 Leningrad case” when several Soviet citizens were sentenced to severe punishments for an attempt to leave for Israel by hijacking a plane.

Almost unanimous condemnation of the failures of détente to provide for the growing attention to the humanitarian problems was interrupted in October, 1973, by the dissident historian Roy Medvedev. His views set out in the samizdat article “Problems of

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Democratization and Détente” radically contradicted those of the dissident majority. He praised the great role played by the Soviet Union in the establishment of a new, more peaceful world order, and argued that the improvement of the relations between the Cold War camps was beneficial for the entire humankind. With regard to the Democratic movement, Medvedev resented that “the unprincipled and objectively provocative character” of behavior of some of the well-known dissidents is in no way helpful to the cause of democratization. On the hotly debated issue of emigration, and particularly the demands of the Jewish movement for emigration to Israel, the famous historian held to the opinion opposite to that of the other leading dissidents:

The strength of various democratic tendencies was also reduced by the noticeable easing of emigration to Israel. Under the influence of the new situation, even those Jews and their relatives who not long before had actively worked for the enlargement of civil rights and liberties in the USSR and had no intention of leaving the country, began to emigrate. Very recently, dispatch abroad of dissenters from other non-Jewish nationalities has also begun, although still experimentally.

In general, Medvedev supported the ideas of the Democratic movement but he harshly criticized the “extremist” tactics used by some participants of the Democratic movement, including Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. He also opposed the strategy of singling out the issue of Jewish emigration out of all the human rights problems in the Soviet society. Admitting that détente was accompanied by harsher restrictions imposed on the dissidents, he suggested that these restrictions are merely a result of a certain

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85 Feldbrugge, 167.
conservative fraction within the Soviet Communist Party, and that détente should be continued regardless of these temporary obstacles. Nevertheless, democratization was possible, but in the argument of Medvedev such a process can be only started from “above.” In the conditions of the passivity of the working class and large segment of intelligentsia, any dissident activities and pressures from “below” would not result in the swift transition to democracy.

The appearance of this article is interpreted by many scholars of dissent in the Soviet Union as an important, though controversial development of the dissident discourse. For this study, it is essential to put the publication into the framework of the dissident discourse despite the fact Roy Medvedev can not be literally considered a dissident. Departing from the definition in the first chapter, the dissident movement is supposed to be comprised of the individuals confessing non-Marxist beliefs. Medvedev did not fit into that definition since he always thought of himself as a Marxist, and this is what finally brought him back to the ranks in the Communist Party in 1989. Apparently, for the dissident discourse of that time, it was not of the highest significance which ideology the participants held to. It is clear that Medvedev addressed the same issue as most of the dissidents did, and the number of responses in *samizdat* to the article of Medvedev testifies to that.

Replies to Medvedev were immediately published by Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, the participant of the Jewish and Democratic movements Mikhail Agursky, dissident writer and future émigré Vladimir Maksimov, and mathematician Valery Chalidze. All the replies were full of resentment, and attacked Medvedev’s position on different grounds.

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87 Ibid.
88 The course of the debates concerning the Mededev’s article between the Soviet dissidents was outlined by Barghoorn, 72-86.
Sakharov in his “Statement on R. and Zh. Medvedevs” claimed that in his publication Medvedev set himself against all those who pursue “moral struggle for the human right to freely live and think.” The position of Medvedev, “explicitly appealing to the so-called leftist forces is mistaken.”

This debate between the dissidents was widely publicized in the Western media, and its consequences even reached the US Congress. But this, “internationalist”, aspect of the Soviet dissident activism will be thoroughly explored in the next chapter. The intensification of the Jewish émigré movement and the lifting of this issue to the international level by the Soviet Democratic movement were the characteristic features of that peculiar period in the international history and Cold War. Given the specificity of the Jewish Diaspora, dispersed all over the world, and concentrated significantly in the United States, the issue of the Soviet Jewry opened a window of opportunity for the Soviet Democrats to reach out to the West and draw attention to the entire problem of silencing the human rights violations in the USSR during the initial stage of détente in the early 1970s. The question of whether the West should put more pressure on the Soviet authorities in the question of the Jewish emigration thus mirrored the diverse views of what should constitute détente. On one side, those favoring contemporary détente did not support the claims of pressuring the Soviet government for more freedom, and particularly, for the freedom to emigration for the Jews; while those who believed that true détente was only possible if accompanied by convergence of the two systems and the democratization of the Soviet one, were advocating the US government should try to pressure the Soviet government on the

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domestic problems, and particularly the numerous demands of the Jewish movement to allow for free emigration.
Chapter 3 - The Soviet Dissidents and the Jewish emigration

3.1 American Jewish Community: Politicizing the Issue of the Soviet Jewry

The first efforts to address the plight of the Soviet Jewry were originally launched in the United States after the Second World War. In 1950, the American Jewish Yearbook for the first time mentioned the persecution of the Jews in the Stalin’s Soviet Union. The enlisted persecutions included threats, arrest and deportations of the former members of Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee after its dissolution in 1948, as well as some Yiddish writers, the assassination of the Committee, Solomon Mikhoels, on Stalin’s order in a staged car accident.\footnote{Distressed by these developments, the National Community Relations Advisory Council, one of the leading American Jewish non-profit organizations, and the American Zionist Council convened a meeting of major national Jewish organizations. The outcome of the meeting was the decision to launch a rally under the sponsorship of a number of Jewish organizations in order to mobilize "world public opinion against Soviet anti-Semitism."\footnote{The reasons to conduct such rally were abundant. The several years prior to the death of Stalin became known as “black years” for many Soviet citizens, particularly for the Jews. The American Jewish Community as}}\footnote{Gennady Kostyrchenko, \textit{V plenu u krasnogo faraona : politicheskie presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie : dokumentalnoe issledovanie} [In Captivity of the Red Pharaoh: political persecutions of the Jews in the USSR during the last Stalin’s decade: documentary research] (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 97.} Distressed by these developments, the National Community Relations Advisory Council, one of the leading American Jewish non-profit organizations, and the American Zionist Council convened a meeting of major national Jewish organizations. The outcome of the meeting was the decision to launch a rally under the sponsorship of a number of Jewish organizations in order to mobilize "world public opinion against Soviet anti-Semitism."\footnote{Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chernin, \textit{A Second Exodus: the American Movement to Free Soviet Jews} (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, University Press of New England, 1999), 21.} The reasons to conduct such rally were abundant. The several years prior to the death of Stalin became known as “black years” for many Soviet citizens, particularly for the Jews. The American Jewish Community as
well as Congressmen and Presidential Administration were aware that of the anti-
cosmopolitan campaign, or “witch hunt”, which preoccupied the official press and the
minds of many of the Party functionaries during the last two years of Stalin’s rule. In
1952, during the Slansky’s trial in Czechoslovakia, fourteen leading Czech communists,
eleven of who were Jewish, were denounced as “Trotskyite-Titoist, Zionist, bourgeois-
nationalist traitors.” This trial set the background for the coming escalation of state anti-
Semitism and anti-Jewish campaign in the Soviet Union. A year later, the Jewish Doctors’ trial took place in the USSR

On this background, the U.S Senate passed a resolution in July 1953 which
condemned the ways Soviet government and its "puppet states" treated the religious
minorities including the "increasing persecution of the people of the Jewish faith." This
was the beginning of a campaign, conducted by the American Jewish Committee,
American Zionist Council, and Jewish Labor Committee, aimed at raising the awareness
on the anti-Jewish events in the Communist camp. However, such sporadic campaigns in
the 1950s were not sustained and constituted a variety of different protests rather than a
comprehensive strategy. The attempts to appeal directly to the Soviet authorities
regarding the existing concern over the plight of the Soviet Jews did not prove

92 Solomon M. Swartz, Evrei v Sovetkom Soyuze s Nachala Vtoroi Mirovoi Vioni (1939-1965),
[The Jews in the Soviet Union from the Beginning of the Second World War (1939-1965)] (Niu-
successful\textsuperscript{94} and starting in the late 1950s, the American Jewish groups adopted the strategy of pressuring the U.S. government to directly influence the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{95}

By the beginning of the 1960s, the growing concern in the West, and particularly in the United States, over the oppression of the Jewish population of the USSR forced the American Jewish groups to address the higher echelons of the US government. In summer 1963, at the insistence of the several Jewish organizations, these concerns were conveyed by President John Kennedy to the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In October 1963, Senators Jacob Javits and Abraham Ribicoff along with Arthur J. Goldberg, the associate justice of the Supreme Court, had a personal meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. The meeting was dedicated solely to the Soviet policies towards its Jewish citizens. Still, all these attempt to use "quiet diplomacy," i.e. attempts to push the Soviet government without making the issue a public matter, did not have any significant consequences. Apparently, they became convinced that these pursuits still needed more publicity in order to attain any success. Therefore, the strategy had to be changed to create the environment where an organized long-term campaign might be launched.

A milestone in this direction was reached in April 1964 when the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, comprised of twenty-four American Jewish organizations, was established. The aim of the Conference, which was later transformed into the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), was to "mobilize public opinion

into the world wide moral force which will save the [Soviet] Jewish Community.” This implied the organization of a number of events, rallies and conferences all over the world, from Europe to Australia. But the American Jewish Community did not confine itself to public demonstrations – it tried to involve the US government as much as possible. Starting from 1958, when the Senator Jacob K. Javits, a prominent advocate for Soviet Jewry, made his first significant statement in Congress on Soviet anti-Semitic policies, more and more Congressmen became involved in the discussions of the Soviet official handling of the Jewish minority. Over the course of 1960s, the members of the NCSJ repeatedly appealed to the Secretary of State, national conventions of the Democratic and Republican parties, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the President, providing for the increased awareness of the American officials and the public regarding the Soviet “Jewish problem.” Their activities also involved the sponsorship of multiple community protest rallies all over the United States, which were often supported by students, aimed at greater media and public awareness.

3.2 Senator Jackson’s Proposal Brought to the Floor

The new era in the debates over the fate of the Soviet Jewry began in August 1972 when the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR enacted a new regulation according to which the potential emigrants who had acquired a state-guaranteed free

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97 Yaacov Ro’i, 145.
98 Chernin, 39-41.
higher education in the Soviet Union had to compensate for it by paying the so-called "diploma tax." The amount of this tax ranged from 4,000 to 25,000 rubles which amounted to five to seven years of an average engineer’s salary, so the tax was impossible to pay the tax without help from external donors.\textsuperscript{99} There is little doubt that this new Soviet regulation was primarily directed against the increasing number of Jewish applicants, many of who had received the higher education. The adoption of this new regulation prompted an NCSJ emergency meeting in order to discuss the recent developments in the USSR. At this meeting, as a reaction to the continuous oppression of the Jewish culture within the USSR and the new bureaucratic obstacles introduced by the Soviet authorities for the would-be emigrants, Senator Jackson suggested a proposal which, as he argued, would pressure the Soviet authorities to allow for a freedom of emigration.\textsuperscript{100} The proposal was a response to the ongoing trade negotiations between the US and Soviet governments. One of the points of negotiation was granting the USSR the status of the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) . In October of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the trade agreement providing for reciprocal MFN treatment. The East-West Trade Relations Act, authorizing such treatment, was supposed to be introduced in Congress in 1972. After learning that Senator Jackson intended to attach to the legislation some conditions which would regulate the possibility of granting MFN status to the USSR, the US President Richard Nixon withdrew the Act. Hoping that the


stir over the trade agreements with the Soviet Union would calm down by the beginning of the next session, the President re-introduced virtually the same document next year, this time known as Trade Reform Act of 1973. Henry Kissinger, then national Security Advisor, and one of the major proponents of détente between the United States and the USSR, was convinced that trade with the Soviet Union would “leaven the autarchic tendencies of the Soviet system,” and therefore was the major proponent of granting the MFN status to Soviet Union.101

But Senator Jackson held different views. He demonstrated significant persistence and attached his conditions to the re-introduced Trade Reform Act.102 The essence of the proposal was that MFN status would not be granted to non-market economies which restricted the right of emigration. This proposal, supported by the NCSJ, was introduced in Congress on October 4, 1972, for the first time as an Amendment to the East-West Trade Relations Act, and then re-introduced on March 15, 1973, as an Amendment to the new Trade Reform Act. The text of the Amendment did not mention specifically Soviet Union, but in the context of the time, there was no doubt which state it was referring to. The operative paragraph stated:

…no non-market economy country shall be eligible to receive most-favored-nation treatment or to participate in any program of the Government of the United States which extends credit or credit guarantees, directly or indirectly,


during the period beginning with the date on which the President of the United States determines that such country

1. denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate to the country of their choice;

2. imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose whatsoever, or

3. imposes more than nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice...

In the House of Representatives, the major advocate of the Amendment was Charles Vanik. The first discussions of the proposed conditions under which the USSR might acquire MFN status were welcomed by the both chambers of the Congress. By March 1973, seventy-six Senators and 238 representatives agreed to become the cosponsors of the future legislation. However, the U.S. administration stood in its way. President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger opposed the adoption of such legislation on the grounds that it would impede the implementation of détente.

For them détente was not a goal in itself. Contrary to the views of the Soviet dissidents, the US administration never had a plan of turning détente into the new world order that would be based on humanitarian values. Raymond Garthoff claimed that for Kissinger the entire concept of détente was an exercise in manipulating “incentives and penalties”. The increasing cooperation would result in the greater involvement of the

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USSR in the agreements and negotiations with the United States, and thus lead to the increased inter-dependence. For the purpose of introducing such penalties or incentives in order to manipulate Soviet behavior, the United States was to demonstrate a unified, centralized position on the issue of the bilateral ties. As long as Congress had been issuing the non-binding declarations expressing concerns over the violations of human rights in the USSR, there was no threat to the implementation of détente the way Nixon and Kissinger desired. When the Congress unexpectedly decided to adopt an binding legislation, which would subjugate an important question of East-West trade to the observance of human rights, Nixon and Kissinger saw it as a menace to the prospect of détente and the American role in the world. If the long-lasting binding pressure on the Soviet Union was adopted, there would be less space for negotiations, and the Kissinger’s tactic of “quiet diplomacy,” aimed at pushing the Soviets during the negotiations behind closed doors, would be over.

On April 18, President Nixon and Kissinger held a meeting with principal cosponsors of the Amendment - Senators Jackson, Ribicoff, Javits, Mansfield, Scott, and Aiken – in order to persuade them that “quiet diplomacy,” i.e. negotiations behind “closed doors” with the Soviet government, was more beneficial for the Jewish cause. After reading the two unsigned communications with Moscow in which the Kremlin allegedly agreed on the suspension of the “diploma tax” and on keeping the level of emigration not less than 35,000 a year, two of the Senators – Mansfield and Scott – sided with the President.\(^\text{106}\) In order to reinforce its first success in the battle against the Amendment, Nixon and Kissinger held one more meeting regarding the issue the next

day, this time with the leaders of the American Jewish Community, major proponents of
the Amendment. This meeting was one of the crucial points in the debates over the
adoption of the Amendment. The Nixon administration seemed to weaken the firmness of
the leaders of the Jewish Community over the necessity of the Amendment. The major
argument of the President’s message read to the fifteen Jewish leaders by Kissinger was
that the Kremlin had agreed to fully rescind the imposition of the tax on the would-be
emigrants. Indeed, the “diploma tax” was suspended in April 1973, and the number of
the permissions to leave at least doubled in 1972 as compared to 1971. Given these
positive trends, some of the leaders of the American Jewish Community were inclined to
agree that the Nixon Administration might manage the problem without imposing
sanctions on the Soviet Union. As Rabbi Hertzberg recollected later that year, after this
meeting “the American Jewish leadership [decided that it] is not for the enactment of the
Jackson Amendment —... it will result in the closing of doors of Russia.” As a result,
following the meeting in the White House, the representatives of three leading Jewish
organizations, represented at the meeting in the White House – the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the National Conference on Soviet
Jewry, and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds - released a statement
which “asked the help of the president for the 100,000 Soviet Jews who had been refused

107 Korey, 102.
109 According to the data of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the number of the Jewish
emigrants form the USSR rose form 13, 022 in 1971 to 31, 681 in 1972. Laurie P. Salitan,
Politics and Nationality in Contemporary Soviet-Jewish Emigration (1968-89) (London :
Macmillan, 1992), 108.
110 Rubenstein, 179.
111 Orbach, 140.
exit visas,” but failed to make any reference to the proposed Amendment. This statement created an uncertainty whether the Jewish Community would continue its support of the Amendment. The executive committee of the NCSJ was supposed to clarify its position during the meeting which had been scheduled for the April 26. Several days prior to this meeting, a heated debated was unleashed on the future of the Amendment, given the seeming reluctance of NCSJ to continue its support.

In view of this, on April 21, Representative Robert F. Drinan, one of the advocates of the adoption of the Amendment in the House, expressed his hope that the Jewish leaders would not surrender to the pressure from the White House, and “will remain unyielding and proclaim once again to the entire world that the Congress and the people of the United States will not grant to Russia those trade concessions for which it clamors until that nation guarantees to all individuals in the Soviet Union that right to migrate which is a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.” Two days after, the Kremlin itself made a serious move to undermine the positions of the proponents of the Amendment, when Leonid Brezhnev assured the seven members of the Senate Commerce Committee, then visiting Moscow, that the “diploma tax” was repealed.

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112 Korey, 103.
114 Orbach, 141.
3.3 The Role of the Soviet Dissidents in the Debate over Jackson’s Proposal

The first half of 1973 seemed to be tremendously successful for the Nixon Administration in its struggle with Congress. The originally well-received idea of Senator Jackson was losing its popularity, in part due to the efforts of the Soviet government itself. At the crucial point one hundred Soviet Jewish activists sent a letter to the US Congress and the American Jewish leaders regarding the adoption of sanctions against the Soviet Union. This letter was received on April 23, during the short period between the Nixon’s message to the Jewish Community and the meeting of the NCSJ when the future support of the Amendment would be decided. The signatories to the letter pointed to the fact that emigration for the individuals with higher education was still a difficult task:

In short, the system of detention of Jews is based on the selectivity principle. The authorities explain this selectivity to those outside the borders of the USSR by stating that the emigration of the detained persons may, allegedly, harm the security of the state... Yet, an unbiased analysis, which we have been demanding in vain, of each concrete case of prevention from emigration would undoubtedly show the complete noninvolvement of the detained persons in matters of state security. Aside from this, persons who have applied for an exit visa are automatically excluded from the life of the society and become useless for the society.

What is the real reason that the authorities are issuing permanent refusals and detaining thousands of other people in the country for years and years? The real
aim of such a selective policy is to create a wide enough category of the so-called “refused ones.” Their tragic fate is to serve as a frightening example for the many thousands of Jews who want to, but do not dare to, start applying for emigration.\footnote{Schroeter, 364-365.}

Some of the leading scholars in the field, including William Korey, William W. Orbach and Henry L. Feingold, have expressed the opinion that this letter was the turning point in the debate preceding the April 26 NCSJ meeting. On that day, despite all the tension between the different fractions, NCSJ, as a principal supporter of the Amendment, decided to continue its promotion of its adoption.\footnote{Korey, 104.}

However, the Nixon Administration did not give up and continued its support of the expansion of trade with the USSR as an instrumental tool in the pursuit of détente. On September 10, 1973, during his testimony to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee regarding his nomination as Secretary of State, Kissinger referred to Administration’s efforts to influence the Soviet treatment of the Jews through "quiet diplomacy" which implied the conduct of negotiations "behind closed doors" in order to allow for a greater emigration of the Jews.\footnote{Colin Shindler, Exit Visa: Detente, Human Rights and the Jewish Emigration Movement in the USSR (London: Bachman & Turner, 1978), 80.} As he later recalled, the Nixon Administration did not mean to oppose the effort of Congress to stand up for human rights in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the campaign for the Jewish emigration in the Congress was very much in line with the pursuits of the White House to push the Kremlin for more freedom of movement for the Soviet citizens. Nixon himself was one of those who originally encouraged

\footnote{Colin Shindler, Exit Visa: Detente, Human Rights and the Jewish Emigration Movement in the USSR (London: Bachman & Turner, 1978), 80.}
Jewish emigration, but, as Kissinger testified, the president “drew the line at subordinating all East-West relations to the issue of Jewish emigration.”\footnote{118} In 1974, when addressing the Senate Finance Committee, Kissinger made a very clear statement regarding his attitude towards tying the protection of human rights in USSR to the bilateral détente: “We can not accept the principle that our entire foreign policy – or even an essential component of that policy such as normalization of our trade relations – should be made dependent on the transformation of the Soviet domestic structure….Let us remember that we seek détente with the Soviet Union for one overwhelming reason, both countries have the capability to destroy each other – and most of the rest of the world in process….”\footnote{119} In other words, Kissinger, as one of the architects of détente between the United States and USSR, was explicitly against of the direct inclusion of the humanitarian problems into the current bilateral negotiations with the Kremlin. In his understanding, détente between the two superpowers did not necessarily imply domestic change in the Soviet Union, or at least negotiations on the issue of human rights.

An opposite view was held by many of the participants of the Soviet Democratic Movement. While the Soviet Jewish movement in the USSR was, in its largest part, pushing solely for the right to emigration, the activists of the Democratic movement insisted that true détente can begin only if the right to emigrate for everyone, including the Jews, as well as other human rights, will become a serious matter for international attention. In this stand-off between the Nixon Administration and the Congress, I argue, the Soviet Jewish and Democratic movements played a vital role by openly calling upon Congress to continue its support of the Amendment.

\footnote{118}{Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 754.}
\footnote{119}{Colin Shindler, 86.}
Along with the petition from leading Soviet dissidents to the US Congress and Jewish Community, the views of Professor Andrei Sakharov represented another authoritative voice from the Soviet Union which encouraged the Congressmen to continue their efforts. In July, 1973, Sakharov gave an interview to the correspondent of the Swedish Radio, in which he warned of the dangers of the way in which détente was implemented: “Possibly the foreign world will soon accept our rules of the game. That would be very bad.” When answering the question what can be done in order to avoid the repercussion of the contemporary state of affairs, Sakharov pointed out that, first of all, the Soviet system needs to be changed, and the most important of these changes would be ensuring the right to emigration. The same attitude was expressed by the academician in his interview to the Western media correspondents in late August. Sakharov said that, in his view, the Amendment was aimed not only at the protection of the right of emigrate for the Jews, although this Amendment is “often cited in the context of Jewish emigration”. This context, in his view, was “totally justified” since the Jewish cultural life and the problems the Jews had to face in the Soviet society were conditioned by many specific historical factors which were peculiar for Jewish history, especially on the territory of the USSR.

A more elaborate vision of the necessity to promote the right to emigration for the Soviet citizens was offered by Sakharov in his open letter to the US Congress dated September 14, 1973, just four days after Kissinger’s speech at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. This time Sakharov explicitly endorsed the adoption of Jackson’s proposal.

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and repeatedly claimed that détente might become successful only if the human rights conditions in the Soviet Union would be improved. He mentioned that tens of thousands of Soviet citizens of different nationalities had been seeking to leave the country for a long time. Among them, the situation with the Jews was particularly tragic. The failure to ensure the right to emigrate, as Sakharov put it, would have destructive “consequences… for international confidence, détente, and the entire future of mankind.”¹²² This idea can be traced through all the Sakharov’s statements on the Amendment. Contrary to Kissinger, he believed that humanitarian questions should be solved as a part of détente, and only in this case should the idea of détente survive.

Such views were shared by some of the participants of the Jewish movement of the USSR, who were also actively involved in the Democratic movement, and placed the issue of emigration in the context of the contemporary international developments. The previous chapter mentioned the famous essay of Roy Medvedev dated October 1973, in which the author set himself against all the attempts of the Soviet dissidents and US Congress to push the Soviet government for more freedom of emigration. The debate which sprang from that letter in Soviet dissident circles was thoroughly covered by the Western media. Despite the fact Medvedev dedicated the largest part of his article to the issue of détente itself, the replies from other dissidents and the coverage of these replies in the West was mostly focused on the problem of Jewish emigration, and the US Congressional efforts to push the Soviets for more freedom of movement. This focus and narrowing down of the debate to the issue of Jewish émigré testifies how crucial the

future of the Jackson’s proposal was for both supporters and critics of détente. The debate over this proposal was a symbolic manifestation of the different attitudes towards détente.

In November, a new article of Sakharov appeared in samizdat. He stated that he could not agree with Medvedev’s downplaying of the importance of freedom of emigration: “I am convinced that… [freedom of emigration] is necessary not only for those leaving, but also for those staying.”\(^{123}\) This rigid insistence on the primary importance of the right of emigration that was advocated by the Soviet dissidents with such zeal was later explained by Lyudmila Alekseeva, one of the allies of Sakharov, and an active participant of the Democratic movement. As she reasoned, for the dissidents the right of emigration was the basic right since it enabled all citizens who are not satisfied with the domestic polices, to leave the country whenever they wanted. Once citizens could freely move for good out of the country at any point, they could be empowered to voice their criticism towards the government due to the fact they can always escape persecution for political reasons through emigration.\(^{124}\)

Sakharov’s persistence in supporting the right to emigration was supported by some other outspoken Soviet activists. Mikhail Agursky, an activist of both movements, criticized the position of Roy Medvedev for his opposition to Congressional efforts to adopt the sanctions against the Soviet Union. Medvedev’s position was that détente would ultimately lead to domestic change in the USSR, and that any sanctions would only bring negative results. External pressure, in his argument, could bring only limited

\(^{123}\) Sakharov’s Statement on Medvedev published in samizdat, November 20, 1973. HU OSA 300-80-7 Box 286. AC N 1505.

benefits: “Pressure from outside can play both a positive and a negative role. It may in some cases restrain our agencies of power from certain deeds, and in other cases it may, on the contrary, provoke them into undesirable action and thereby hinder the democratization of Soviet society.” In line with Kissinger’s policy of “incentives and punishments”, Medvedev believe that the problem of emigration could be negotiated “behind closed doors,” and the bringing of this issue to public attention would put the Soviet government in the difficult situation, when it can not make concessions anymore. Therefore, Sakharov’s position and his appeal to the US Congress were described by Medvedev as “a mistaken step, both tactically and substantively.”

Another active member of both the Democratic and Jewish movements, Mikhail Agursky, in his publication in the Russian émigré periodical Russkaya Misl’ [Russian Thought] denounced Medvedev’s arguments, claiming that the domestic policies of the USSR did not depend on bilateral rapprochement with the United States. Western public opinion was one of the few deterrent factors which could still influence the inner life of the Soviet society and the Kremlin’s policies. The “Soviet opposition” should attract Western attention to the injustices of the Soviet system not only for the sake of its own goals but as a warning to the rest of the world. The issue of emigration - one of the salient domestic Soviet challenges of the time - represented, in Agursky’s view, a great opportunity to reach the West. In this regard, he argued, the opponents of Jackson’s Amendment within the United States were working against the traditions of the American people. In line with Sakharov, Agursky was arguing about the necessity to push for the right to emigration for everybody, but he also specifically mentioned that one can not

take away the “Jewish” context of the Amendment: “It would be a great good for both the USSR and the Soviet Jewry if the Jews would not be prevented from emigration….”

As was mentioned earlier, the debate over the détente and Jackson’s Amendment within the Soviet dissident circles caused significant interest in the Western media. On November 25, 1973, the *International Herald Tribune* published an article which outlined the “quarrel” between the leading dissidents. While having highlighted the points of both sides of the debate, the author of the article devoted much more space to the argument of Sakharov and his supporter Agursky. The article did not miss the opportunity to state that the debate is connected to the contemporary efforts in the Congress to impose sanctions on the trade with the Soviet Union, and that Sakharov and Agursky were in favor of such sanctions.

The internal and external pressure on the US Congress led to the passing of the Amendment in the House on December 11, 1973 by a large majority – 319 to 80. Kissinger’s and Nixon’s efforts – with Nixon sending at the last moment a letter to the Speaker of the House advocating the rejection of the Amendment – did not succeed. Their defeat was accompanied by the large-scale campaign launched by the Soviet dissidents and American activists in order to promote the adoption of the Amendment. The most authoritative periodicals – such as French *L’Express*, German *Der Schpiegel*, US-based *International Herald Tribune* and *New York Times*, the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter* – conducted interviews with Sakharov and other dissidents or republished such


stories from other sources. In 1974, after the Amendment was already approved by the House of Representatives, another expert journal *Foreign Affairs* published an 18-page long article with the summary of the development of the Soviet dissent and the stir over the Jackson’ Amendment. Abraham Brumberg, the author of the article, gave his interpretation of the reasons why Sakharov had been advocating the Amendment: first, “the Jackson Amendment serves as a symbol of the kind of policy Sakharov believes that the west must follow”; second, freedom of movement is one of the basic human rights; third, the “abandonment of the policy of principle” and rejection of Jackson’s proposal would be “a betrayal of the thousand of Jews and non-Jews”; fourth, the most crucial argument in favor of the Amendment is that “the untrammeled right to emigrate would eventually force the Soviet Union to adopt measures that would discourage the desire of Soviet citizens to leave their country – that is, to reform the system in the direction of greater freedom and material welfare.”

Regarding the position of Medvedev, the author claimed that he had brought some “closely reasoned arguments.” However, these arguments were not welcomed by the large number of the dissidents. Even Solzhenitsyn, who had kept silent on the issue of Jewish emigration before, was quoted in the article as siding with Sakharov on that issue and encouraging the external pressure on the Soviet authorities. Without taking sides, the article raised an important question, resonating with the concerns of the Soviet activists - at what price should détente be pursued? And the answer should have been clear from the passage in which Brumberg quoted a famous

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130 Ibid., 793.
Polish-born American Jewish activist Samuel Pisar, who has been advocating new type of relations with the East while continuing the protection and advocacy of human rights in the Communist camp:

> What are we asking Sakharov is to tell us… the conditions under which he thinks we can agree to move forward along the path of détente… We urgently need to know precisely what he thinks about that question…“\[131\]

Sakharov’s position was clear. So was the one of the participants of the Soviet Jewish movement.

In 1974, the looming perspective of the Congress adopting the sanctions on trade with the Soviet Union forced Kissinger to change tactics in 1974. Having received unofficial assurances from the General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, that the flow of the emigrants would be sustained at the level of up to 40,000 a year, Kissinger decided to use this promise to influence Senator Jackson directly. In a series of meetings and letters, Kissinger and Jackson negotiated the number of future emigrants which, as Jackson insisted, should be allowed to leave the Soviet Union annually. The main irony of these negotiations was that the Soviet government was not a party to it and was not aware that the two US politicians are deciding *between themselves* how many emigrants should the USSR allow. After proposing initially the rate of 100,000 per year, Senator Jackson agreed to reduce it to 60,000 which was still much higher than the Soviet

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government had promised Kissinger in private discussions.\footnote{Buwalda, 100-106; Raymond L. Garthoff, 454-458.} It still remains unclear to what extent was the Soviets ready to make concession when negotiating the Jewish emigration with Kissinger.\footnote{Feingold, 141} The Soviet Ambassador, Andrei Gromyko, conveyed the message to Kissinger that even the number of 50,000 would be tolerable for the Soviet government, emphasizing that this suggestion would hold as long as these settlements between the two governments remain unofficial and private.\footnote{Buwalda, 104.} But they did not. In September, the Los Angeles Times and the International Herald Tribune were already writing about the prospects of the coming “Soviet-American agreement […] that would facilitate large-scale emigration to Israel.”\footnote{US-Soviet Pact on Jews Expected” In International Herald Tribune (September 8, 1974). HU OSA, 300-80-1, Box 1187.} When, at the insistence of the Senator Jackson, this information was published, it did not lead to the renunciation of the Amendment. The fact that the Soviet government allegedly agreed to satisfy to a certain degree the demands of the proponents of emigration did not eliminate the determination of Congress to adopt the binding legislation addressing the problem of emigration. The possible waiver of the Amendment, in case if the Soviets would stick to the allegedly agreed rates of emigration, was expected to be the only concession from Congress. In September of 1974, the New York Times published the letter from the Soviet Jews, who had been refused the right to emigrate, in which they warned the US government about the untrustworthiness of the Kremlin. They stated that the verbal agreement of the Soviet side to maintain the emigration rates could not be relied on, and thus a formal way of overseeing the compliance of the Kremlin to its promises had to be established.\footnote{Feingold, 137.}
October, Sakharov sent a new letter to the US Congress, Henry Kissinger and Senator
Jackson reiterating the necessity to adopt the Amendment. On November 4, another
letter from the Soviet Jewish activists appeared in the *International Herald Tribune*. One
hundred signatories to the letter appealed to the Senator Jackson regarding the practice of
the Soviet authorities of punishing those who had applied for emigration by drafting them
into the military. Finally, on November 21, nine leading Jewish activist sent an open
letter to the new President of the United States, Gerald Ford, in which they outlined the
recent policies of the Soviet government aimed at reduction of emigration.

With the ambivalence of the Soviet government on the issue, and the unclear
manipulations of Kissinger who had resorted to secret diplomacy and “behind the
curtains” negotiations with some Congressmen, both chambers of the US Congress
resolutely voted in favor of the Trade Reform Act on December 20. Gerald Ford,
despite his adherence to the improvement of relations with the USSR, was more
supportive of the Jewish cause than his predecessor. On January 3, 1975, he signed the
Trade Reform Act, and thus Jackson’s proposal, which is still known as the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment became law. The results of the enactment of the Amendment are
controversial since the immediate response from the Soviet side was the drastic decline in

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137 Sakharov’s Letter to the US Congress, Henry Kissinger and Senator Jackson (October 1974) HU OSA Box 878.
138 “Plea to Jackson by Soviet Jews” in *International Herald Tribune* (November 4, 1974) HU OSA, 300-80-1, Box 878
139 Korey, 109.
140 Garthoff, 459.
142 As it was mentioned prior, the major advocate of the Amendment in the House of Representatives was Charles Vanik. Therefore, the Amendment was named after both its major sponsors in both chambers of the Congress.
143 Orbach, 153.
emigration in 1975.\textsuperscript{144} But, at the same time, the adoption of the legal restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union by the US Congress was the first time the USSR was confronted with \textit{de-facto} economic sanctions imposed as punishment for the domestic violations of the human rights.

The adoption of this legislation was not the end of the fight for many of the Soviet Jewish and non-Jewish activists. Détente, which was seriously challenged by the introduction of the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, did not end up in 1975, and the issue of human rights, as well as its particular case - Jewish emigration – were acute until the end of \textit{perestroika}.

In June 1975, Sakharov completed his new \textit{samizdat} essay “Concerning the Country and the World” (“O Strane i Mire”).\textsuperscript{145} As the author himself says in the text, the work does not represent an “optimistic futurology,” as it had been the case with his previous writings, but rather the “dangers, errors, and dramas of the day.”\textsuperscript{146} He criticized many of the leftist Western liberals for indifference to the violations of human rights in the USSR and warned against unilateral disarmament.\textsuperscript{147} The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was described as “an act of historical significance which continued the best democratic and humanistic traditions of the American people.” But this measure would not be effective, in his opinion, unless the Western governments overcome their disagreements, and adopt a unified stand towards the “totalitarian character” of Soviet society. Despite

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\textsuperscript{144} According to the data from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 34,733 Jews were allowed to emigrate in 1973; 20,628 in 1974; and only 13,221 in 1975. Cited in Laurie P. Salitan, \textit{Politics and nationality in contemporary Soviet-Jewish emigration, 1968-89} (London : Macmillan, 1992), 108.


\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 20

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 79
\end{flushleft}
the temporary backlash related to the falling rate of emigration, his position on the Amendment remained unchangeable. The ensured right to leave any country, including his own, he argued, was a precondition for a more open Soviet society. Consistent pressure that had been carried out on the Soviet government had made the process of emigration, at least the Jewish one, easier. The temporary drop in the number of permissions to leave the country, Sakharov argued, was not a Soviet response to the adoption of the Amendment, but rather the result of discrepancies and lack of unity in the Western position regarding the violations of human rights in the USSR. Regardless of technicalities and difficulties connected to the slight possibility to actually force the Soviets to live up to the standards set up by the text of the Amendment, he felt that success had been achieved. The very process of the debates over the Amendment drew enormous attention to the domestic practices of the Soviet state and, indirectly, questioned the legitimacy of cooperation between the two political camps, which were so different in their approaches to the human rights. And for the first time during the Cold War the humanistic ideals were set as the highest standard of the international politics. As Sakharov summarized the meaning of the Amendment and debates about it, “the question of the free choice of country of residence happened to be a significant test for the course of détente”.

148 Andrei Sakharov, O Strane I Mire, 56.
Conclusion

The analysis in this work was conducted in the intersection of the studies of Soviet dissent and the history of international relations. Departing from the Jeremi Suri’s hypothesis that détente was, among other things, directed at the suppression of the domestic civil disobedience, including the one in the Soviet Union, I tried to show that the predominant view of détente amongst the Soviet dissidents changed over the course of several years between 1968 and 1975. It paralleled the growing awareness of the dissidents that “peaceful coexistence” between the superpowers might have been directed against them.

The dominating discourse in the dissident writings and speeches shifted from excitement over the prospects of the new Soviet-American rapprochement to disillusionment and severe criticism. I argued that the dissidents came to perceive détente as a threat to the cause of human rights in the Soviet society. One of the most illustrative examples is Sakharov’s statement published in the Western press. He recalled that he had always been a supporter of efforts to maintain international peace and curb the arms race. Convergence between the two systems, he argued, is the only solution to the world problems, and this process should be paralleled by democratization, freedom of information, exchange of ideas, respect for human rights and freedom of movement. His concern was related to the fact that the ideal of détente was far from the real policies pursued by the Western and Soviet governments. He called attention to “the dangers of
seeming détente, which is not accompanied by the growth of trust and democratization.”

As I have argued, the views similar to Sakharov’s were dominant in Soviet dissident circles. Leaders of the Soviet dissident movement believed that continuation of the cooperation between the two states in its contemporary form would mean a serious blow to the observance of international human rights obligations which the Soviet state had taken on. This cooperation was also seen as a tool for muting the overall human rights situation in the USSR. The more dissidents were seeing détente as directed against them, the more they mobilized themselves to campaign against it.

Since the rise of dissent and emergence of détente were simultaneously unfolding phenomena, the period of early 1970s gives us the unique opportunity to explore how the dissidents, particularly the participants of the Soviet Democratic movement, became the actors influencing international politics. Détente, which allowed for the greater cooperation between the government of the United States and Soviet Union, created also an environment in which the citizens of both states became capable to increasingly communicate with each other. Since the plausibility of international conflicts did not seem to be imminent threat anymore, the US public started to show greater interest in the domestic circumstances of their eastern rival. The war in Vietnam was over, and the prospects of the international relations seemed to be more positive ever since the end of the Second World War. American mass media got the chance to explore not only the military achievements of the Communist camp, but its domestic problems as well.

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For the American public, the Soviet dissidents were one of the most important sources of information regarding the internal problems of the USSR apart from Soviet official news agencies. Soviet dissident views were republished in numerous newspapers and magazines, thus influencing the American public opinion as well as lobbying groups.

In my view, Soviet dissidents in cooperation with the Western NGOs successfully used the issue of the Jewish emigration to Israel to put pressure on the Soviet authorities regarding the problem of human rights’ observance. This statement does not downplay the role of the American Jewish movement. In fact, it was the persistence of the American Jewish activists that allowed thousands of the Soviet Jews to freely move to Israel. However, this issue would have never acquired such great attention if it had not been for the voices from within the Soviet Union. The views of the Jewish and non-Jewish dissident activists on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain, and their publicity in the West, were crucial for they were the first-hand witnesses, victims, and the immediate objects of the controversy. Bearing that in mind, and hoping for international attention, the Soviet Jews had long cherished the hope that the West, and primarily the United States with its influential Jewish Diaspora, would interfere and put the relevant pressure on the Soviet regime. With the advent of détente, the hope that increased cooperation and relaxation of the international tensions, inducing the Kremlin to make some concessions, forced hundreds of the dissidents in the USSR to start appealing to the West asking for help.

Since these appeals were conveyed not only by the members of the Jewish movement, but by the broader Soviet dissident movement, it had a serious impact for both the USSR’s position on the world stage and the bilateral détente between the Cold
War rivals. In 1974, after repeated demands from the Soviet activists and with the direct involvement of the American Jewish community, the US Congress *de-facto* imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union as a “punishment” for the restrictions on the freedom of movement.

Following the adoption of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the dissident struggle for the human rights was not over. In 1975’s Nobel Prize speech, Sakharov’s wife read her husband’s message blaming détente for inspiring “intellectual parasitism” of the “totalitarian states”.

Another vociferous critic of the politics of détente was Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In 1975, after the emigration to the United States, he delivered a number of speeches regarding the domestic situation in the USSR, human rights violations and the contemporary international situation, particularly the course of détente. On June 1975, the Soviet writer outlined the history of the mass violations of the human rights in the USSR over the several preceding decades, and bluntly criticized the concessions that had been made by the West in favor of the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. Solzhenitsyn, agreeing with Sakharov, claiming that détente is necessary “as air”. But the way détente has been pursued was not the way Solzhenitsyn implied it to be: “[We need] true détente… and if this word had been already discredited, we have to find another term”.

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150 A. Sakharov, *Alarm and Hope*, ed. Efrem Yankelevich and Alfred Friendly (New York: Knopf, 1978), 9-10. What is actually meant herein the presupposed intellectual decline that inevitably will be the result of the intellectual bondage, conformism and the power of pitiful bureaucracy. Without intellectual freedom, Sakharov argued, there can be no development of literature, art and other humanistic fields.


152 Ibid., 223
With the adoption of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the problem of Jewish emigration lost its prominence for the Democratic movement. The collective petitions, letters and public addresses were still being made but the primary focus of the dissident activism shifted to another issue. Starting from 1975, the new active members – Lyudmila Alexeeva, Nathan Sharansky – along with Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn and others concentrated on the compliance of the Soviet practices with the recently signed Helsinki Agreements.

It is clear that with the adoption of the economic sanctions on the USSR the problem of emigration was not solved.\(^{153}\) However, in my view, for most Soviet Jewish and non-Jewish activists the Amendment was not a goal in itself. As I have demonstrated, the Soviet authorities were ready to allow a freer emigration prior to the adoption of the Amendment. I concluded from the debates within the Soviet dissident circles that the goal of the campaign for Jewish emigration was a different one. With all the aversion to the so-called détente, most participants of the Soviet Democratic movement along with a number of prominent Jewish activists attempted to challenge the principles by which international politics is driven. The codification of the human right – the right to emigration – in the US law set a precedent of the inter-state relations being regulated not only by economic, military or other considerations but by humanistic standards.

Thus, I claim that prior to 1975, it was the issue of Jewish emigration that made the Soviet dissent a significant factor of Soviet-US bilateral détente. Whether the adoption of the Jackson - Vanik Amendment was a right decision or not is beyond the field of this study. But what is obvious in this work is that détente, so much opposed by

\(^{153}\) As it was cited earlier, according to the data from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 34,733 Jews were allowed to emigrate in 1973; 20,628 in 1974; and only 13,221 in 1975.
many human rights activist all over the world, did not manage to overcome the repercussions of the “Soviet Jewry question.”
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