EXPLAINING THE SUPPORT FOR CSDP MILITARY MISSIONS: THE CASE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY

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Abstract

The present thesis aims to explain the reasons which drove the United Kingdom and Germany to provide support for the European Union’s military missions under the framework of the Common Foreign and security Policy (CFSP) up to date. The paper applies the theory of Europeanization and Realism theory in order to explain the reasons which determined UK's and Germany's support for the CFSP military missions. The thesis is based on the analysis of UK’s and Germany’s White papers on Defense; statesmanship’s speeches; expeditionary warfare capabilities; strategic ties with third states, bilateral political and economic relations, geographic proximity and unilaterally provided aid in regard to the areas where the CSDP military operations were launched. The thesis argues that Europeanization can play a considerable role in the member state’s decision to support a given EU military mission. The thesis reaches to the conclusion that due to its greater level of Europeanization, Germany supported CSDP missions, whose objectives did not converge with the country’s geo-geo-strategic interests, whereas the UK’s support for the Union’s military missions is best explained by its geopolitical and geo-economical interests in the regions where the CSDP military operations took place.
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INTRODUCTION

Since 2003 the EU has deployed six military missions under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) and proved itself capable to deal with military tasks and shoulder the burden of providing international peace and stability when military engagement is needed. There is a lot of literature on evaluating the CSDP military missions in terms of the negotiation talks preceding their deployment;\(^1\) the way the missions are launched; their activities on the ground and their effectiveness\(^2\). However there is a little literature which explains why the EU members support the EU’s missions\(^3\) and in particular there is no a comparative analysis aiming to explain the reasons driving the EU member states to support the CSDP military missions. Therefore the aim of this research is to contribute to fulfilling this gap by providing a comparative analysis which attempts to shed a light on the main determinants of the EU member states to support the CSDP military missions by contributing with troops on the ground and military personnel. Deriving from Realism and Europeanization theoretical framework, two general hypotheses can be employed in explaining the reasons for the member states’ support for the CSDP missions: 1) It is the state’s national interests which drive its support for the CSDP military operations; and 2) It is the state’s level of Europeanization which determinates its support for the CSDP military missions.

Since the EU does not have standing troops on its own due to the intergovernmental character of the CSDP, the Union has to relay on the good will of its member states to

provide military troops and personnel for undertaking the CSDP military missions. In this regard, the largest contributors to the CSDP military missions are France, Germany and the UK. In terms of the French reasons to support the CSDP military missions, they can rather easily be found in the fact that France is traditionally nationalistic country seeking to dominate the Union by using the CSDP to pursue its national interests and increase its strength which in turn to enable it to play a leading role in the EU. As evidence in this regard, serves the fact that France was the main initiator of the CSDP military missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic, a region traditionally having essential geopolitical and geo-economical importance for France. In this regard, the case of France will not be taken into a particular consideration in the present study as the reasons for its support for the military missions of the Union appear to be quite clear. However, more interesting is the case of the UK and Germany. In terms of the UK, there is a general perception that since 1998, when the Franco-British summit set the foundations of the European common foreign and security policy, the traditionally Euroskeptikal Britain adopted a pro-European foreign and security policy discourse. As for Germany, in general terms it is perceived to be traditionally more Europeanized than the UK. This suggests that the pragmatic geopolitical and geo-economic interests might turn to be not the only possible explanation of UK’s and Germany’s support for the CSDP military missions, but their level of Europeanization may have also had some impact on their decision to contribute to the CSDP military operations. In this regard, the aim of the present research is by providing a comprehensive assessment of the level of Europeanization of both the UK and Germany and, on the other hand, by defining whether they have some geopolitical and geo-economical interests in the regions where the CSDP military operations took place, to provide a comprehensive explanation in terms of the reasons which determined UK’s and Germany’s support for the EU’s military deployments.
In order to test the plausibility of the Europeanization and Realistic explanations for answering my research question I need, on the one hand, to establish the level of Europeanization of the foreign and security policy discourse of the UK and Germany and, on the other hand, to define whether the UK and Germany have some geopolitical and geo-economical interests in the regions where the CSDP missions took place, which in turn will enable me to test the plausibility of the two previously established general hypotheses in defining the determinants of UK’s and Germany’s support for the CSDP military omissions by applying my findings to each mission.

The present analysis will consist of three chapters. In the first chapter after outlining some of the main definitions of the term Europeanization, I will proceed towards assessing the level of Europeanization of UK and Germany. For that purpose I will look at the following indicators: role of the CSDP in UK’s and Germany’s White papers on Defense; speeches of key policy makers and comparison of UK’s and Germany’s investments in expeditionary warfare. The reason for choosing particularly these indicators is the analysis of the first two indicators will enable me to establish UK’s and Germany’s level of Europeanization in terms of foreign and security policy discourse, while the third indicator will enable me to define these two countries’ level of Europeanization in terms of acquired expeditionary warfare which is vital for conducting the CSDP military operations. In the last section of the first chapter I will compare the levels of Europeanization of UK and Germany so in order to establish in which of the two cases the Europeanization is likely to have greater impact on shaping their preferences and foreign policy discourse and hence their decision to provide troops and military personnel for the CSDP military missions. The second chapter will start with a brief review of Realism theory and the deriving from it theories of geopolitics and geo-economics. The last section of the second chapter is dedicated to defining the geopolitical and geo-economical interests of the UK and Germany in regard to the areas
where the EU’s military missions took place. For that purpose, I will look at official governmental documents outlining the geopolitical interests of the UK and Germany; geographic proximity; strategic relations with third countries who have geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the regions where the CSDP military operations took place; bilateral trade ties; unilateral humanitarian and development aid provided to the regions where the EU’s military operations were deployed. In the third chapter I will provide a brief outline of each CSDP military mission and apply to it my findings from the first two chapters in order to explain the most probable determinants of UK’s and Germany’s support for the EU’s military operations. In the end, I will conclude by summarizing my findings and suggesting an area for further research.
CHAPTER 1: EUROPEANIZATION EXPLANATION

1.1 Europeanization. Definition

There is no a conventional understanding of the term “Europeanization” as the latter is employed from different disciplines conceptualizing it in their own way. In this regard, the term “Europeanization” is used in historical, cultural and political context. From historical standpoint Europeanization is conceptualized as the “export” of European political institutions, political practice and “way of life” beyond the European continent mainly through the means of colonization and thus through coercion.\(^4\) In terms of its cultural dimension, Europeanization relates to the European context of the globalization concept and is defined as the process of national identities reshaping in contemporary Europe without necessary replacing them.\(^5\) As for its political context, the term Europeanization is employed for analyzing the political dimension of the European Union. Since the object of the current paper is the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), being one of the EU’s political institutions, the following analysis will be focused on the political understanding of the Europeanization. However, it must be noted that there is a disagreement in terms of conceptualizing the political dimension of the Europeanization.\(^6\) In this regard, the Europeanization is generally conceptualized as a “top-down”, “bottom-up” and twofold process.

From a “top-down” perspective, Europeanization is seen, on the one hand, as the emergence and development of EU institutions tasked to create authoritative rules and, on the other hand, as the process in which EU institutional pressures cause a change at the domestic level.\(^6\) The “top-down” view, presents the Europeanization as a result of the projection of

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domestic policy preferences on the European level. And the third view sees the Europeanization as a two-way or twofold process, presenting it as a process resulting from both EU institutional and domestic pressures. In this regard, Radaelli’s twofold conception for Europeanization defines the latter as: “Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy pragmatics, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared believes and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.”

In general, I understand the Europeanization in terms of “goodness of fit’, and to be more precise, I evaluate Europeanization, on the one hand, in terms of salience of the EU in national conceptions of foreign and security policy, and on the other hand, in terms of salience of Petersburg types tasks in resource allocation. Hence, from Europeanization as a “goodness of fit”, a general hypotheses can be derived as a possible explanation in regard to my research question that it is the goodness of fit between the national and the EU foreign policy interests, or that is the level of Europeanization, which determinates whether or not an CSDP mission will be supported by a particular EU member state.

1.2 Assessing the level of Europeanization of the UK and Germany

The White papers on defense are official governmental documents defining the main security and defense issues in front of the state and suggesting solutions for their tackling. In other words, the Defense White paper lies down the fundaments on which the state’s foreign and security policy is based, which makes a perfectly relevant source on which I can draw for defining the key features of the German and British foreign and security policy and compare them to those of the EU in order to asses the level of Europeanization of UK and Germany in terms of security.

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The current section consists of three sub-sections and aims to find out whether UK’s or Germany’s Defense White paper displays more Europeanization. The first two sub-sections are respectively dedicated to identifying the key features of UK’s and Germany’s foreign and security policy by analyzing their White Paper on Defense in terms of the following indicators: functions assigned to the ESDP; other terms to which the national interests are linked; unilateralism versus multilateralism; military versus civilian power preferences; and attitudes towards the US and NATO. In the third part, after having established my findings in terms of each indicator, I proceed towards assessing the level of Europeanization in security terms of UK’s and Germany’s Defense White paper by comparing the extend to which the British and German foreign and security policy stands converge with those of the EU.

1.2.1 Assessing the level of Europeanization of UK’s 2003 White Paper on Defense

In December 2003, the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) published a White Paper assigning a central role to the United States in UK’s foreign and security policy.

The ESDP is mentioned overall six times in the document. In terms of the way the UK regards the development of the ESDP, the MoD White Paper assigns a pro-NATO role to the ESDP, as the document guarantees UK’s commitment to the development of EU military capabilities as long as they are used only to complement NATO, not to counter-balance it, “The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability to complement NATO, rather than competing with it.”8

The British Defense White paper refers eight times to the UK’s national interests. According to the document, the UK will engage in military operations only when its national interests requires it to do so: “National interest, proximity and responsibility will be among

the key factors in determining what, if any, role the UK’s Armed forces should plan to have in dealing with any crises.” In terms of the regions for which the UK feels responsible to provide security, its Defense White Paper suggests that military assistance will be provided only to the areas which represent a British national interest: “For planning purposes, we will as a force focus on those areas where we have strong historical ties and responsibilities.”

In regard to other terms to which the British national interests are linked, it should be noted that UK’s White Defense paper does not speak about the British security interests in terms of the European interests, but in terms of the entire Western security interests: “The UK recognizes the preeminence of NATO as the alliance upon which Europe and North America depends for collective defense and global crisis management.”; “…Europe and those regions immediately adjacent - the Near East, North Africa and the Gulf – are likely to continue to have the most significant bearing on both our own and wider Western security interests.” This suggests that Britain associates its security not only with the European security interests but also with the interests of NATO and the US, in particular

The British White paper shows a preference of the UK to act in a multilateral manner for achieving its foreign and security policies goals. However, unilateralism is also favored by Britain, as further in the document is expressed the readiness of the UK for defending its interests to undertake military actions unilaterally or bi-laterally, together with the US: “UK forces can expect to conduct operations alongside and integrated with US, NATO, European, UN or other forces under various command arrangements, as well as purely national operations.”

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9 Ibid
10 Ibid. p. 5
Accessed: 05/05/20010, 14:20
12 Ibid. p. 5
13 Ibid. p. 19
The document notes that the UK is a leading contributor to the ESDP and regards the military force as a key tool for achieving UK’s national interests: “Defense is an essential part of achieving the Government’s wider Foreign and Security Policy objectives both through military operations and defense diplomacy.”\(^\text{14}\); “Our armed forces will remain a crucial and important element of our national response to a diverse range of threats and crises that may impact on the UK and our global interests.”\(^\text{15}\) In this regard, for more efficient protecting of UK’s national interests, the document calls for a more significant emphasis to be made on the projection of force: “Defending the UK, protecting our interests overseas, dealing with the proliferation of WMD and addressing the threat from international terrorism require a clear focus on projecting force, further afield and even more quickly than has previously been the case.”\(^\text{16}\) Hence, the UK appears to fall under the military dimension of the civilian-military power continuum.

The MoD White paper regards the UN, NATO and the EU as the main international organizations providing peace and security. However, the UN is defined as not capable enough in handling international security crises, “We need to be realistic about the limitations of the UN and the difficulties of translating broad consensus on goals into specific actions, particularly where proactive military intervention is concerned.”\(^\text{17}\) In terms of the EU, as previously mentioned, its recent missions and capability development process are regarded by the UK as having limited and not enough efficient role in providing the international peace and security. Based on that, the UK defines NATO as the main security provider of the UK and the rest of the world: “The UK recognizes the preeminence of NATO as the alliance upon

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p. 2
\(^{15}\) Ibid. p. 19
\(^{17}\) Ibid. p. 6
which Europe and North America depends for collective defense and global crisis management.”

1.2.2 Assessing the level of Europeanization of Germany’s 2006 White Paper on Defense

The 2006 German White Paper on Defense calls for German foreign and security policy based on international security cooperation: “…It will be crucial to retain the capability for collective defense and for conducting intensive military operations”. Furthermore, the document reaffirms Germany’s commitment to close cooperation with the EU and NATO: “Germany is a member of the European Union and of the North Atlantic Alliance, and as such a partner and ally to be counted on”.

In regard to the ESDP, the latter is totally eleven mentioned in Germany’s Defense White paper. The document calls for more considerable role of the EU in providing its own and the international security: “The European Union itself must contribute to its security to a greater extent than in the past. Only a strong, united Europe capable of action on security matters can help to shoulder responsibility in overcoming the challenges to collective security.” Furthermore, the German White Defense paper assigns a pro-European role to the ESDP, as it suggest that developing EU military capabilities enables the EU beside complementing, also counter-balancing the Alliance: “Efficient cooperation on armaments in Europe is conducive to European security policy goals, furthers the development of force capabilities, and strengthens the position of the European Union both in competition with the United States of America and as its cooperation partner.” A further evidence for convergence between the EU and Germany’s foreign policy views is their position in favor of

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. p. 28
21 Ibid. p. 33
22 Ibid. p. 39
a more balanced Euro-Atlantic relationship. In this respect, the German Defense paper suggests that in future NATO’s policies should not be unilaterally dominated by the US but instead a collective decision making based on consensus should be adopted: “The Alliance can only fulfill its tasks if its members show the same political will to analyze the relevant security problems in a collective approach, to decide by consensus and then to take joint action.”

In terms of the German national interests, the latter is mentioned fifteen times in Germany’s Defense White paper. The document, on the one hand, assigns to the German military force (Bundeswehr) traditional functions of preserving the German national interests: “Bundeswehr’s tasks derive from the constitutional requirements, from its mission, and from the German security and defense policy objectives.” On the other hand, the White Defense paper notes that Germany shares the EU interest of more capable Europe, able to provide its security on its own and in this regard the German Defense paper tasks the Bundeswehr’s with the duty to serve to the European interests as well: “The Bundeswehr plays a major role in the process of integration and confidence building in Europe through multinational cooperation at EU and NATO level. It promotes, as a result, also the political goal of an independently capable Europe.”

As for the other terms in which Germany refers to its national interests, the latter are linked to the European interests: “The European Union stands for political stability, security and prosperity in Germany and its other member states...It remains the pre-eminent political goal of Germany, therefore, to strengthen the European Union as the core of the European area of stability and to push ahead with the process of European integration.”

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23 Ibid., p. 32;
24 Ibid., p. 53
25 Ibid., p. 32;
26 Ibid., p. 33

http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/en
Germany and Europe. Additional instance of convergence between Germany’s and EU’s interests can be found in the highlighted by the German Defense paper shared interest of the two entities in terms of maintaining close relationship with the US. In this respect, Germany refers to the enhanced Trans-Atlantic cooperation as essential not only for its own national security, but for the security of whole Europe: “The central goal of German foreign and security policy continues to be to shape the transatlantic partnership in the Alliance with the future in mind, and to cultivate the close and trusting relationship with the USA. Now and in the future, the fundamental issues of European security can be only addressed together with the USA.”

In other words, the German White Paper on Defense presents Germany’s national interests as completely matching with the EU interests.

In regard to the favored way of action, Germany, as noted in its Defense paper, bases its foreign and security policy on multilateralism: “German security policy is multilateral in character. Together with the member states of the European Union, Germany is committed to effective multilateralism.” That suggests that Germany is most likely to engage in operations either conducted under the ESDP, or within NATO.

In its Defense paper, Germany regards itself rather as civilian power, as it does not consider the use of military force to be the most effective solution to the contemporary security threats: “The chief determinants of future security policy development are not military, but social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only through multinational cooperation. It is therefore not possible to guarantee security by going it alone, or with armed forces only.” Instead a softer preventive approach towards international security threats is proposed in Germany’s White Paper on Defense: “Credible

28 Ibid., pp. 21-22
29 Ibid, p. 22
deterrence, backed up by defense, policing and intelligence measures to prevent proliferation, plus effective control of exports remain important elements for containing this risk.”\textsuperscript{30}

Regarding the German attitudes towards NATO and the US, Germany expresses a clear commitment to Alliance: “The transatlantic partnership remains the bedrock of common security for Germany and Europe. It is the backbone of the North Atlantic Alliance, which in turn is the cornerstone of German security and defense policy.”\textsuperscript{31} However, the German Defense paper suggests that in future NATO’s policies should not be unilaterally dominated by the US but instead a collective decision making based on consensus should be adopted: “The Alliance can only fulfill its tasks if its members show the same political will to analyze the relevant security problems in a collective approach, to decide by consensus and then to take joint action. It is therefore crucial that the Alliance’s political and military transformation is continued successfully.\textsuperscript{32}

1.2.3 Comparison of UK’s and Germany’s Defense White papers’ level of Europeanization

In this, last, sub-section, I will summarize my findings in regard to the key features of the British and German foreign and security policy and compare them to the EU stands in this regard. The results of my comparison will enable me to define level of Europeanization of UK’s and Germany’s White Paper on Defense and establish whether the British or the German Defense White paper displays more Europeanization.

In terms of the functions UK and Germany assign to the ESDP, in the case of Britain, the analysis of its Defense White paper shows that the UK calls for ESDP which does not counter-balance NATO but only supplements it. However, in the case of Germany, the ESDP is regarded as a tool beside complementing, also balancing NATO. At this point, the German

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p. 28 \\
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p. 24 \\
position matches with the view of the EU, as the latter, besides calling for closer Euro-Atlantic cooperation, allows a possibility the ESDP to be used for balancing NATO and the US, in particular: “Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence”.33

Regarding other terms to which the two countries link their national interests, in its White Papers on Defense, Germany speaks about its national interests in fully European terms. However, the UK links its national interests with the Western interests as a whole. This suggests that the UK identifies its national interests not only with those of the EU but also with the interests of the US and NATO, which shows that there is an element of the British national interest which cannot be reduced into the European interest and this element can be found in UK’s special relationship with the US.

As for the unilateralism versus multilateralism indicator, the British Defense White paper allows a possibility for undertaking unilateral or bi-lateral military missions (jointly with the US) for achieving UK’s foreign and security policy objectives. In contrast, Germany prefers to act in a concert and regards the effective multilateralism as a fundamental principle of its foreign and security policy. Thus, Germany would prefer to act either within NATO, or in the ESDP, whereas, the UK, besides preferring to act in a multilateral way, also considers unilateral use of force in pursuing its national interests. Here, a further convergence appears between Germany and the EU, as the latter, alike Germany, advertises multilateralism as one of the leading principles of its foreign and security policy.

In terms of civilian or military power preferences, the UK, as noted in its Defense White paper, invests heavily in developing military capabilities and regards the projection of military force as a key tool in resolving international security issues, such as international

terrorism and proliferation of WMD. Hence, the UK can be regarded as a military power. In contrast, Germany’s support for a greater emphasis on civilian means in tackling the current security threats, places it closer to the civilian power image of the EU, as in its security strategy the Union shares the German view that the use of military force cannot provide efficient resolution to the contemporary international security issues: “…None of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means.”

In regard to the attitudes of the UK and Germany towards the US and NATO, both countries, likewise the EU, regard NATO and the US, in particular, as having crucial importance for their own and the international security and call for enhanced Euro-Atlantic cooperation. However, a major difference between the UK and Germany appears to be the fact that the UK seeks to maintain a leading role in NATO, whereas Germany calls for more equality among the NATO member states, as it condemns a unilaterally-led NATO and suggests that in future NATO’s policies should be a result of a collective decision making based on consensus. In this respect, the German view for more equality among the NATO member states matches again with the EU vision, as in its security strategy, the Union calls for more balanced Euro-Atlantic relationship: “Our aim should be an effective and balanced relationship with the USA.”

From the above analysis, follows that compared to the UK, Germany’s national interests, set out in its Defense White paper, convergence with those of the EU to a greater extend. Hence, the main conclusion to which the current section reached is that the German White Defense paper displays more Europeanization in security terms than the British Defense paper.

1.3 Assessing the Level of Europeanness Displayed in Foreign and Security Policy Speeches of the UK and German Statesmen

The present section assesses the level of Europeanization which the British and German statesmen demonstrated in their foreign and security policy speeches from 1999, when the ESDKP was launched in Helsinki, to 2009, when the most recent ESDKP mission was deployed. The analysis defines the way the UK Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers and their German counterparts in their foreign policy speeches regarded the ESDKP and NATO. The findings of the section will demonstrate that by the end of 2009, despite the fact that a certain decline was indicated in Germany’s level of Europeanization in terms of government top-officials’ foreign policy speeches, the country still retained a greater level of Europeanization in comparison with the UK owing to the rather Euroskeptical views expressed by the British key policy makers.

1.3.1. Assessing the Level of Europeanness of UK under Blair and Brown

In May 1997, the British labor party won the country’s general elections and its leader, Tony Blair became UK’s Prime Minister, a post which he retained until 2007. In the beginning of his premiership, Prime Minister Tony Blair had sought to improve UK’s relations with the EU and in his foreign policy speeches he had taken a balanced position towards the EU and NATO/US. For example, in one of his speeches, PM Tony Blair stated: “We have finally done away with the false proposition that we must choose between two diverging paths - the transatlantic relationship or Europe. For the first time in the last three decades we have a government that is both pro-Europe and pro-American.” However, later on Blair’s support for the US in the 2003 Iraq War, proved a shift in his balanced foreign policy, as he decided to align the UK rather with the US than with Germany and France, who

favored diplomatic solution of the Iraq crises. An instance for Prime Minister Blair’s pro-American foreign policy course can be found in the preference he expressed for a continuous strong relationship with the US: “...The truth is, for Britain, it is always right for us to keep our partnership with America strong.” As a further example for Blair’s pro-NATO based foreign policy can be pointed his support for the US/NATO to be the main framework for security cooperation, expressed in 2006 at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council where Blair suggested to the US: “My advice is: always be in the lead, always at the forefront, always engaged in building alliances, in reaching out, in showing that whereas unilateral action can never be ruled out, it is not the preference.” This undoubtedly shows that UK under Blair favored US dominated Euro-Atlantic partnership, which made closer the British relations with the US, but, on the other hand, weakened UK’s ties with her pro-European partners, France and Germany.

In June 2007, Gordon Brown succeeded the post of British Prime Minister from his predecessor, Tony Blair. In terms of foreign policy, Prime Minister Gordon Brown appeared to share the pro-Atlantics foreign policy views of his predecessor, which can be found also in the British White Paper on Defense adopted from Blair’s cabinet in 2003. Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s foreign policy speeches demonstrate his pragmatic, rather than integrationist approach in shaping UK’s foreign policy and thus prove a continuity of his predecessor’s pro-NATO foreign policy. As an evidence for Brown’s pragmatic approach to international relations can be regarded his first foreign policy speech as UK Prime Minister in which he calls for working together with international organizations but does not subsume the UK into them: “Through our membership of the European Union […] and the Commonwealth, and through our commitment to NATO and the UN, we have the capacity to work together with

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37 Blair, Toni, UK Prime Minister, Speech on foreign policy at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in London, 13 November 2006; [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6145454.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6145454.stm)
38 Blair Toni, UK Prime Minister, Speech on the Middle East to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (1 August 2006); [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9948](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9948)
all those who share our vision of the future.”

“\textquote[39]{Our common self-interest as nation states can be realized only by practical cooperation}”\textquote[40]{In this regard, Gordon Brown recognizes the strategic importance of the transatlantic relationship due to which he regards the relationship with the US as UK’s “most important bilateral relationship.”} In terms of the EU, this suggests that Prime Minister Brown preferred not to identify the UK with the EU but to regard the Union just as one of UK’s partners. Furthermore, alike his predecessor, PM Brown acknowledged and supported the US leadership on the international arena: “American leadership is and will be indispensable.”

The continued pro-Atlantisist orientation of the UK under PM Brown crystallizes also in the words of the British Foreign Minister David Miliband who in one of his speeches regards NATO as the organization on which the UK and its allies should continue counting on as their main security provider: “\textquote[NATO provides a commitment to collective defence. The Article 5 Guarantee and the integrated military structures reassure each and every one of our Allies that their borders are inviolable. Backed by the political and military might of 26 democracies, including Canada and crucially the US, it is a commitment that builds confidence at home and allows us to focus on addressing new threats abroad.]\textquote[42]{This, on the other hand, demonstrates the Euroskepticism of the UK in terms of the ability of the EU to provide UK’s security.}"

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\textsuperscript{39} Brown, Gordon, UK Prime Minister, Foreign policy speech, published on Mon 12th Nov 2007, in speech at the Lord Mayor of London’s banquet; \url{http://www.epolitix.com/latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/gordon-brown-foreign-policy-speech-in-full/?no_cache=1}

\textsuperscript{40} Brown, Gordon, UK Prime Minister, Foreign Policy Address, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 18.04.2008; \url{http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK+Library+and+Museum/News+and+Press/Prime+Minster+Gordon+Brown+Delivers+Major+Foreign+Policy+Address+at+Kennedy+Library.htm}

\textsuperscript{41} Brown, Gordon, UK Prime Minister, Foreign policy speech, published on Mon 12th Nov 2007, in speech at the Lord Mayor of London’s banquet; \url{http://www.epolitix.com/latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/gordon-brown-foreign-policy-speech-in-full/?no_cache=1}

\textsuperscript{42} Brown, Gordon, UK Prime Minister, Foreign Policy Address, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 18.04.2008; \url{http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK+Library+and+Museum/News+and+Press/Prime+Minster+Gordon+Brown+Delivers+Major+Foreign+Policy+Address+at+Kennedy+Library.htm}

\textsuperscript{43} Miliband, David, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference - 02/07/2009, \url{http://www.securityconference.de/David-Miliband.215.0.html?&L=1}
\end{flushleft}
Blair’s and Brown’s cabinets favored NATO’s supremacy in providing the international security and regarded Europe rather as a partner than as an entity encompassing UK’s interests. Hence, under Blair and Brown, UK’s foreign and security policy can be characterized as rather pro-NATO, remaining at the same time somehow Euroskeptical.

1.3.2 Assessing the Level of Europeanness of Germany under Schroder and Merkel

In September 1998 a German government was formed by a coalition between the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the Greens. For Federal Chancellor was appointed SPD’s leader, Gerhard Schröder. The Red/Green government remained in power till 2005 when Chancellor Schroder was succeeded by Angela Merkel, leader of the CDU (Christian Democratic Union).

In terms of foreign and security policy, Chancellor Schroder favored rather pro-European course, as in his foreign policy speeches he called for united and stronger Europe which to be able to better shoulder the responsibility of providing international peace and security and be considered as an equal partner to NATO: “Deepening and widening the European Union and increasing its ability to take political action will bring us closer to our main goal, our goal of a strong Europe, which can be a stronger partner for the US in our joint efforts to overcome the global challenges of our time...We therefore need the greatest possible degree of transparency, and close and early coordination between the European Union and NATO.”44; “The partnership between Europe and America, I am sure, will also in the future prove its worth in our ability to come to compromises and common solutions.

should our opinions differ.”\textsuperscript{45} A further evidence for Chancellor Schroder’s pro-European based foreign policy is the fact that in his speeches he regarded the German foreign policy as deriving and inseparable from the European interests and based on the favored from the EU principle of multilateralism: “German foreign policy is policy in Europe, for Europe and from Europe. Together with our European partners we want to continue resolutely along the path to European unification.”\textsuperscript{46}; “…No country in the world can successfully tackle the new international challenges on its own. We need a strong and effective multilateral system for this, one which provides a reliable framework for cooperation and solidarity between states and guarantees good global governance.”\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, in contrast to his British counterpart, Tony Blair, who regarded NATO as the supreme organization in providing the international security, Chancellor Schroder preferred to consider the UN to be the supreme international security organization: “…We have to work together to strengthen the United Nations as the central organization for safeguarding world peace.”\textsuperscript{48} Here must be noted that the EU, alike Germany under Schroder, also regards the UN as the supreme authority in providing international peace and stability and, in this regard, the Union has many times called for strengthening the UN. This is additional evidence which allows determining the foreign policy of Chancellor Schroder as pro-European.

In 2005 Chancellor Schroder was succeeded by the CDU leader, Angela Merkel, who is currently undertaking her second mandate as a Federal Chancellor of Germany. In terms of

\textsuperscript{45} Schröder Gerhard, Federal Chancellor, Speech at the 37th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 02/03/2001;\textsuperscript{46} Schröder Gerhard, Federal Chancellor, Speech at the 37th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 02/03/2001;\textsuperscript{47} Schröder Gerhard, Federal Chancellor, Speech at the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, 02/12/2005;\textsuperscript{48} Schröder Gerhard, Federal Chancellor, Speech at the 37th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 02/03/2001;
foreign policy, Chancellor Merkel remains dedicated to Germany’s traditional commitment to European integration and cooperation with NATO: “…Atlantic partnership and European integration remain the pillars of Germany's security policy for me.” 

In contrast to her British counter-part, Merkel has integrationist foreign policy approach as she subsumes Germany and its interests to the EU: “Only if we act jointly and purposefully do we Europeans have any chance of bringing our interests and goals to bear in the world” 

However, as expressed in some of her more current foreign policy speeches, Merkel does not any more regard the ESDP as possibly competing NATO (a possibility, stated in the 2006 German White Defense paper). An evidence in this regard is, for example, Chancellor Merkel’s speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference in 2009 in which she said: “I regard the European Security and Defence Policy as a new form of cooperation with NATO…I don't regard this as rivalry, I don't regard it as a competition.” 

Yet, despite excluding the possibility Europe to compete NATO through the ESDP, Merkel remains in favor of a more balanced Euro-Atlantic relationship based on debates and joint decision-making: “…We have to decide on a case-by-case basis after joint analysis and deliberations what kind of mission is most suitable…NATO has to be a forum for political debate.” 

Moreover, the traditional preference of the German government for multilateralism was reaffirmed also from the current Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle in his inaugural speech: “We should not be

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arrogant by looking for alternative methods, but rather understand that our policy is always most successful when it is carried out side by side with our partners.”

From the above analysis of the German government speeches from Schroder to Merkel follows that under Schroder and his successor, the German foreign policy has been based on commitment to European integration, multilateralism and support for Euro-Atlantic cooperation. Therefore, in rhetorical terms Germany’s foreign policy can be described as multilateral and integrationist in character.

To sum up, under Blair and Brown, the UK pursues pragmatic self-interest based foreign policy. Brown continued his predecessor’s pro-Atlantic foreign and security policy and at the same time remained rather pessimistic towards the EU and its ability to provide Britain’s security. On the other hand, Schroder’s and Merkel’s administrations, despite the latter disregarding the possibility the ESDP to compete NATO, which brought some decline in the level of Europeanness of its 2006 Defense White paper, remained committed to the European integration and called for more balanced Euro-Atlantic relationship, subsuming at the same time the German interests into the EU. Hence, the present section reached to the conclusion that, regardless the fact that currently there is a certain decline in its level of Europeanization in terms of Governmental foreign policy speeches, Germany appears to display a greater extend of Europeanization than the UK.

1.4 Assessing the Level of Europeanization of the UK and Germany in terms of Acquired Expeditionary Warfare Capabilities

The aim of this section is to establish UK’s and Germany’s level of Europeanization in terms of silence of the types of acquired weaponry systems with the “Petersberg Type tasks”, adopted by the Council of the WEU in the nineties and including the following types of tasks

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to be undertaken by the CSDP: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In regard to the CSDP, that would mean that the Petersberg tasks prescribe the member states to invest in acquiring expeditionary warfare systems on which the Union can eventually draw for conducting its military missions abroad. Therefore by comparing the number of expeditionary warfare units acquired by the UK and Germany in 1999, when the CSDP was launched in Helsinki and the end of 2009, when the last CSDP mission was launched, I would be able to establish the level of Europeanization which is displayed in the number of expeditionary warfare units which they had in 1999 and 2009. I am aware that these capabilities can be used also for NATO missions, but, however, they can be used also for EU military missions enables me to consider the number of acquired expeditionary warfare units as relevant indicator for assessing the level of Europeanization of the UK and Germany.

Table 1: “UK’s and Germany’s Expeditionary Warfare Equipment in 1999 and 2009 (in Units)”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expeditionary Warfare Systems</th>
<th>Acquired Units from the UK in 1999</th>
<th>Acquired Units from Germany in 1999</th>
<th>Acquired Units from the UK in 2009</th>
<th>Acquired Units from Germany in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Warfare</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Warfare</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td><strong>1754</strong></td>
<td><strong>1668</strong></td>
<td><strong>1774</strong></td>
<td><strong>1164</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-1.14</strong></td>
<td><strong>-30.22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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\(^{54}\) NATO and Non-NATO Europe, The Military Balance, 99: 1, pp. 30 — 103, 1999

As the above table shows, in 2009 there the number of UK’s and Germany’s acquired expeditionary warfare units declaimed, respectively with 1.14 % and 30.22% as compared to 1999. However, it also should be noted that the quite significant difference between the UK and Germany in regard to the number of their expeditionary warfare units is due to the fact that in the last years Germany has suffered financial hardships owing to the adoption of the euro, which drove it to shrink its military budget to only 1.5 % of its GDP. On the other hand, the UK did not have to considerably reduce its defense spending, which usually varies from 5.5 % to 6 % of its GDP. Despite that, the UK also registered some decline in its arsenal of expeditionary warfare capabilities. However, more important is the fact that the greater decline in Germany’s acquired expeditionary warfare units does not display lesser level of Europeanization, as the country, despite its financial constrains, succeeded to maintain considerable expeditionary warfare capabilities which, given the limited scope of the CSDP military missions, allowed it Germany to considerably contribute to the CSDP military operations.

To sum up, in terms of foreign and security policy discourse, Germany appears to be more Europeanized than the UK. In regard to the level of Europeanization displayed in the number of acquired expeditionary warfare, despite the advantage of the UK, Germany maintains the needed expeditionary capabilities to equally back the limited in scope CSDP military missions, which does not bring decline in its level of Europeanization. Therefore the conclusion to which the present chapter reached is that Germany displays greater level of Europeanization than the UK. In this regard, three main propositions derive from this chapter in regard to the UK and Germany: 1) Deriving from Germany’s greater level of
Europeanization, we can expect that Germany will be more supportive for CSDP missions; 2) The UK will be supportive for a given CSDP missions, if the mission is in the interest rather of NATO/US than of the EU; and 3) The UK will not support missions in which NATO/US has no interest. Now, let me turn to the next chapter, where will be defined whether the UK and Germany had national geopolitical and geo-economical interests in the regions where the CSDP missions took place, so that to test the plausibility of the Realistic hypothesis of my research.
CHAPTER 2: REALISTIC EXPLANATION

2.1 Realism. General Review

Realism is based on five main assumptions. First, states are the main actors in the international system. Second, states are perceived as rational actors as they aim to maximize gains and minimize costs. Third, international anarchy is the principal force shaping the preferences and behavior of the states. Fourth, states in the anarchical world are predisposed towards conflict and competition and often fail to cooperate, even when they face common interests to do so. And fifth, international institutions affect the opportunity for cooperation only marginally.

In other words, according to Realism, each state’s primer priority is to guarantee its survival in the anarchical international system where all states represent a potential threat to the individual state’s security. However, that does not mean that security cooperation among states is unlikely to occur. Quite on the contrary, Realism does acknowledge that states have an interest to cooperate militarily and economically. In this regard, Mearsheimer notes that cooperation among states is driven by the gains it brings to the cooperating states. However, he argues that such cooperation has a limited character due to the always existing uncertainty towards the intentions of the other states driving them to a permanent security competition. As Waltz puts it, in the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today’s

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57 Waltz in Grieco
58 Ibid.
59 Aron in Grieco
60 Waltz in Grieco
friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy. In such a self-help system, Mersheimer notes, states cannot depend on others to rescue them when their survival is threatened.

In order to mitigate the uncertainties of the anarchical system, which makes the risk of war permanent, Realists suggest that the state must strive to control and shape its external environment in order to mitigate the uncertainties and increase its security. The assumption here is that the state can guarantee its survival only by maximizing its power as the more powerful a given state is the more influential it will be towards the other states and the more capable it will be to deter and coerce them, which in turn will increase its security. Therefore, Realists regard the state’s power as a determinant of its security.

Realism distinguishes two main dimensions of the state’s power – military and economical. Strengthening the military power and enhancing the national economic base, according to Realism, constitute the state’s geo-political and geo-economical interests, playing an essential role for its survival and prosperity. In regard to the geopolitical interests, it should be noted that there is no a conventional understanding in terms of their definition. However, I understand geopolitical interests as the interests of the state to project its power abroad in order to increase its security and enhance its ability to coerce and influence the course of other states, which aims to increase the state’s security. Geopolitical practices have given rise to privileged areas that play a particular role in the foreign policy of individual states. For instance, Latin America is a region of strategic importance for the US; the former Soviet countries shape an area with a key importance for the Russian foreign policy; Africa has traditionally been regarded as a privileged region where France and the UK prefer to project power, driven from their particular interest in that area. As for the state’s geo-economical interests, it should be noted that Realists do not particularly focus on the states’ economic relations, since their main attention is on power and security issues. Yet, Realism

does acknowledge that the national economic base is a key pillar of the power of the state and based on that, Realism argues that states use economic relations and access to natural resources abroad to enhance their national economic base and, hence, maximize their power and security.

To sum up, according to the Realistic perspective, due to the permanent uncertainties of the anarchical world, states are driven to constantly seek to maximize their military and economic power, as the only means to increase their security, which drives them to constantly compete for establishing regional and, if possibly, global hegemony. Therefore, Realists argue, the most powerful states would cooperate only if that cooperation would enhance their military and economic strength. In other words, the international cooperation is regarded only as a tool for achieving national goals. As Alan and Milward put it, international institutions serve mainly national rather than international interests.⁶³ Therefore, in terms of the CSDP, Realists argue that it is an instrument of the major powers in the EU /the UK, France and Germany/, which they employ to pursue their national geo-political and geo-economical interests, and hence maximize their security and prosperity. In this regard, from Realism and more particularly, from theories of geopolitics and geo-economics, derives the general hypotheses that a country supports CSDP mission only if the latter is planned to be lunched in a region representing geopolitical and/or geo-economic interest for the given country.

In order to test the plausibility of the Realistic hypothesis in explaining the reasons for UK’s and Germany’s support for the CSDP missions, it is necessary at the first place to be established whether the UK and Germany have some geopolitical and/or geo-economical interests in the Western Balkans and Africa, and more particularly in the countries where the CSDP military missions took place, namely those are Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RD Congo), Chad and the Central African

Republic (CAR). Defining the whether the UK and Germany have geopolitical and/or geo-economical interests in these regions will be the purpose of the remaining two sections of this chapter. My findings will allow me to establish the role, if any, which the UK’s and Germany’s geo-political and/or geo-economical interests played in their decision to support the CSDP missions in Macedonia, BiH, RD Congo, Chad and the CAR.

2.2 Defining the Geopolitical Interests of the United Kingdom and Germany in the Western Balkans and Africa

This section identifies whether the UK and Germany have geopolitical interests in the, where the CSDP military operations took place. In the present section I will attempt to establish whether the UK and Germany have geopolitical interests in the Africa and the Western Balkans in general and in the countries where the CSDP operations were launched, (Macedonia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; RD Congo, Chad and CAR) in particular. In order to define whether the UK and Germany have geopolitical interest in the above mentioned areas, I look at historical facts; foreign policy stances towards the particular region expressed in UK’s and Germany’s official government documents as well as at strategic partnerships with third countries whose interests in the Western Balkans and/or Africa can possibly shape indirect geopolitical interests for Britain and Germany.

1.2.1 Defining the UK’s and Germany’s Geopolitical Interests in the Western Balkans

In regard to the UK, the latter does not appear to have some geopolitical interests in the Western Balkans. An evidence in this regard is UK’s lack of specifically stated interest towards the Western Balkans in UK’s 2006 White Paper defining the country’s international priorities, where the as most important partners of the UK are regarded the US and the EU: “The partnership between Europe and the US will be central to the UK’s – and the world’s –
security and prosperity.” 64 As far as the Western Balkans region is concerned in the
document, the region is regarded as an area which stabilization is important for the European
security in general: “While many of the threats we face will originate beyond Europe, risks to
security in Europe will persist. We will need to stay engaged in the Balkans…” 65

In contrast to the UK, for Germany the Western Balkans region traditionally has played
an important role in its foreign policy due to the region’s geographical proximity in regard to
Germany. The interest of Germany to establish hegemony in the area was demonstrated in the
two world wars and Germany’s close relationship with Yugoslavia. As more recent examples
for Germany’s continuing geo-strategic interests in the Western Balkans’ can be pointed
Germany's unilateral recognition in 1991 of the secessionist states of Slovenia and Croatia as
well as the re-stated in Germany’s 2006 White Defense paper geo-strategic importance of the
region for Europe, in general, and for Germany, in particular: „Peace and stability in the
Western Balkans are important prerequisites for Europe’s security. This is in Germany’s
special interest due to its proximity to the region.” 66 Germany is the most important political
and economical partner of Macedonia, which owes to the fact that since its independence,
Macedonia has traditionally enjoyed Germany’s support, examples of which are the German
support provided to Macedonia in handling with its refugee problem during the Kosovocrisis
and also during the 2001 Macedonian crisis. Germany also has helped the process of Euro-
Atlantic integration of Macedonia. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the latter regards
Germany as one of its most important foreign policy partners, which is due to the support
Germany have been providing to Bosnia and Herzegovina aiming to stabilize the country and

65 Ibid., p. 19

66 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr”, Federal Ministry of
Defense, p. 47, October 2006; http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcmi/04_Sp9SPykssyo0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QpZKd4k3Ng70Bcm82Cbu9voqRlY5XMoNHClGVlUUm	g65GfnmrvvRgX5AgiHuiwKglANqFwol/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUI3QS80SYVFLzZlRF8zNDA57yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%
2PW26UVKKG765INFOEN%2Fcontent.jsp
put it on the path of its economic development and Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore a conclusion can be made that, Germany satellites the Western Balkans by investing heavily in the region and maintaining close political and economical ties with the comprising it countries which allows it to maintain regional hegemony.

2.2.2 Defining the UK’s and Germany’s Geopolitical Interests in Africa

Generally, the UK has geopolitical interests in Africa. As evidence for that can be pointed the 2006 UK White paper on the UK international priorities, defining Africa as one of the priorities of the British foreign policy: “Because of the scale and nature of its problems, its impact on UK interests and our moral obligation to act, Africa will be an urgent priority in the next decade.” A further evidence for UK’s geo-strategic interests in Africa can be found in the fact that since 1998 the country has worked with France to establish a cooperative hegemony in certain areas in Africa, namely those are the British former colonies in south and eastern Africa, among which Sudan; Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya etc. The Franco-British cooperation towards Africa, signed at the 2003 Franco-British Summit, is based on relations of reciprocity, which suggests that the UK would support France where the latter is interested to engage militarily, whereas the UK can expect French support for its own initiatives in Africa.

It must be noted that the Democratic Republic of Congo (RD Congo), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) as former French colonies, are a traditional area where France prefers to project its power, especially in the case of RD Congo with its significant diamond, oil and copper resources. However, the conflict in these countries, which took place at the end of the last century, threatened the security and stability of Sudan, which as one of

the British former colonies and with its oil recourses and considerable territory, represents a geopolitical interest for the UK. In this regard, an argument can be made that the UK supported the French proposal for launching the CSDP military missions in RD Congo, Chad and CRA, not because of some special geo-strategic interests in this particular countries, but rather because, on the one hand it wanted to ensure the security of neighboring Sudan, and on the other hand, by supporting the French, Britain expected that the former will pay back in future by supporting eventual British projects. Therefore, a conclusion can be made that the UK has indirect geopolitical interests in regard to RD Congo, Chad and CAR as those interests derive from its direct interests in third countries in the region, influenced by the conflicts in RD Congo, Chad and CAR, and from its commitment to establishing jointly with France a cooperative hegemony in Africa.

Unlike the UK, Germany does not have particular geopolitical interests in Africa as it does not seek domination in the region. Germany regards Africa rather as a potential equal partner to Germany and Europe than as a region where it seeks to create its satellites. The policy which Germany applies towards Africa aims to help the continent to become a global player and equal partner to the EU by developing its potential and taking the responsibility of providing its own security. This stance of Germany towards Africa is stated in the German foreign policy guidelines towards Africa, characterized by a dual approach calling for: “Strengthening Africa's ability to take responsibility for its own affairs: we are not presenting blueprints for modernization. Africa is now developing them itself. We support these endeavors…We support the African Union by strengthening its ability to lead peacekeeping missions and developing crisis management capacities…We need equal partners who are confident but also tolerant…Our Africa policy is committed to the principles of the EU Strategy for Africa drawn up in cooperation with Africa. Under this
Strategy we work together with Africa as equal partners. In terms of RD Congo, Chad and CAR, Germany maintains bilateral diplomatic relations with each of them. As in the case of Chad, besides France, the only other EU country to maintain an embassy in Chad is Germany. As a main condition for the good bilateral relations with RD Congo, Chad and CAR, Germany places respect for human rights, introducing democratic institutions and upholding to the rule of law.

To sum up, from the above analysis follows that the UK seeks to dominate certain areas in Africa and hence it has indirect geopolitical interests in RD Congo, Chad and CAR as their stability is important for neighboring Sudan and other areas, where the UK has direct geopolitical interests. Furthermore, UK’s indirect geopolitical interests towards these central-African countries are enhanced by its official commitment to back the French interests in Africa and expect the same in return from France. In contrast to the UK, Germany does not appear to have particular geopolitical interests in Africa as it does not seek dominating the region but rather helping it to develop its own economy and military capabilities so that in future not to be dependant on European military assistance and economic aid but to be able to provide its welfare and security on its own.

2.3. Defining the UK’s and Germany’s Geo-economical Interests in Africa

In order to evaluate the geo-economic interests of the UK and Germany in regard to the above mentioned regions, I will look at bilateral trade cooperation; unilateral development assistance and humanitarian aid provision. By summing up the previous and current sections’ I will be able to conclude the chapter by defining whether the UK and Germany have particular geopolitical and/or geo-economic interests in the Western Balkans and Africa and

more particularly in the African and Western Balkan countries where the CSDP missions took place.

2.3.1 Defining the UK’s and Germany’s Geo-economical Interests in the Western Balkans

The UK’s trade with Macedonia in 2007 and 2008 accounted for about €94 million. Some of the major UK companies in Macedonia are Johnson Matthey, Imperial Tobacco, QBE, Mittel Steel, Binani Group etc. Since the last two years the UK stopped delivering unilateral aid for Macedonia, as the amount of unilateral development aid provided to Macedonia by the UK from 2004 to 2008 is only £ 2 219. The trade cooperation between the UK and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) until some years ago was quite underdeveloped. Over the past few years it steadily increased as British exports to BiH in 2008 amounted to £ 20.5 million, whereas BiH exports to Britain in 2008 amounted to £ 22.5 million. Currently, there are 30 UK companies represented in BiH, which is a relatively small number. The UK unilateral development aid provided to BiH from 2004 to 2009 amounts for £ 21 498.

As for Germany, the latter has traditionally been among the main trading partners of Macedonia. In 2009, bilateral trade declined compared with the previous year, to EUR 700 million, a result of the global financial crisis, due to which brought Macedonia registered 12% deficit. Germany is also one of Macedonia’s biggest aid donors. Since 1992, the Macedonia has received more than 160 million euros from Germany. In regard to BiH, it must be noted that Germany was among the first investors in production in BiH. Germany is

73 Federal Foreign Office, Bilateral Relations, FYR Macedonia; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Mazedonien.html
also one of the top-three trading partners of BiH. In 2007, a German-Bosnian/Herzegovinan Business Association was set up. Germany is also BiH’s largest bilateral donor of development aid.74

From the above analysis follows that the UK does not appear to have special geo-economical interests in the Western Balkans and more particularly with regard to Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as UK’s trade relations and especially its unilateral aid for the region turn to be relatively insignificant. In contrast, Germany invests heavily in the region and maintains close bilateral trade relations with Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, being at the same time one of the largest aid providers of unilateral aid for the region, which suggests that Germany has particular geo-economical interests in the Western Balkans region.

3.3.2 Defining the UK’s and Germany’s Geo-economical Interests in Africa

Most of UK’s aid is provided through the Common Humanitarian Fund, managed by the UN, which in 2008 provided around $150 million, almost 50% of which provided by the UK, to address the most urgent needs. The UK also provides multi-year funding to international humanitarian non-governmental organisations.75 In terms of bilateral trade cooperation, UK exports to the Democratic Republic of Congo account for £26.89 million in 2006, whereas Congo’s exports to the UK over the same period were worth £9.74 million in the same year.76 As for Chad, UK exports in the first half of 2009 were worth almost £8.0

74 Ibid., Bosnia and Herzegovina; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01Laender/BosnienHerzegowina.html
million, whereas Chadian exports to the UK over the same period were worth £0.55 million.\textsuperscript{77} UK exports to the CAR in 2007 were £ 0.586 million and £0.829 million for 2008, whereas CAR's exports in goods to the UK were worth £1,415 in 2007 and £68,998 in 2008.\textsuperscript{78} From 2004 to 2009, the UK’s unilateral humanitarian aid for RD Congo, Chad and CAR, respectively amounted £152 141, £ 9471 and £ 4208, whereas the development aid provided by the UK was worth £187 830 for RD Congo, £ 3 310 for Chad and £ 2 739 for the CRA.\textsuperscript{79} It should be noted that compared to this rather insignificant unilateral aid provided by the UK to these three African countries, since 2004 the Sudan, which represents a special interest for the UK, has received £334 million (of which about £174 million has been for Darfur) and this makes the UK Sudan’s second largest bilateral humanitarian donor.\textsuperscript{80} Furthermore, in terms of bilateral trade relations, the UK exports of goods to Sudan increased with £ 24 million for 2007 to £142 million for 2008.\textsuperscript{81}

In regard to Germany, its trade ties with the RD Congo are not well developed. There are only a few German investors active in the country. Germany imports crude oil and timber from the RD Congo and exports machinery, motor vehicles, ironware, household goods and chemical products. As a result of the unrest caused by the civil war in 1997, Germany discontinued its bilateral development cooperation with the Republic of Congo. However, Germany provides development support through the European Development Fund aimed to

\textsuperscript{81} UK Trade & Investment, Sudan, 29/09/2009; https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti/appmanager/ukti/countries?_nfls=false&_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=CountryType1&navigationPageId= sudan
stabilize the country’s economy, improve its infrastructure and establish a constitutional state based on the rule of law.\textsuperscript{82}

Alike RD Congo, the civil war in Chad in 2008 led to discontinuing the German unilateral aid for the country. Germany is planning to resume its bilateral cooperation with Chad in 2011-2012. Yet, humanitarian and development aid programmes continue to carry on.\textsuperscript{83} The fact that the civil wars in RD Congo and Chad resulted in their removing from Germany’s list of development cooperation partners shows that Germany does not pursue some particular geopolitical interests in the region. Rather, Germany’s aid for Africa aims to develop and democratize the region in order the latter to develop its potential of becoming a stable and equal partner to the EU and take on its own responsibilities. This aim of Germany can be found also in the guidelines of Germany’s African policy, adopted in 2006, which state: “Our Africa policy is committed to the principles of the EU Strategy for Africa drawn up in cooperation with Africa. Under this Strategy we work together with Africa as equal partners. The donor/recipient mentality must become a thing of the past.”\textsuperscript{84}

Germany’s bilateral trade with the CAR is insignificant, both imports and exports accounting less than 1 million euros. Regarding Germany’s unilateral development assistance provided for the CAR, from 1960 to 1999 the country received approximately 210 million euros. In the year 2000 the German Government decided to refrain from entering into any new commitments for development cooperation projects in the CAR until completion of the projects that are currently being implemented. However, at the regional level, Germany continues to support development cooperation projects in the CAR. For instance, Germany provided 10 million euros to support the first phase of Central Africa’s HIV/AIDS prevention

\textsuperscript{82} Federal Foreign Office; Bilateral Relations, Congo, June 2006; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/KongoRepublik.html
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, Chad; October 2009; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Tschad.html#t1
\textsuperscript{84} Federal Foreign Office, Guidelines for Germany’s Africa Policy, pp. 2-3 June 2009, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/Afrikapolitik.html
programme and 23 million for the period 2009 - 2012 to fund a CEMAC HIV/AIDS prevention programme. In the Boguila region, during 2008-2009 the German government provided 1 million euros funding to support a project for improving the health-care system. Germany supports also humanitarian-aid projects conducted by the UN’s World Food Programme, the Red Cross and various non-governmental organizations. Germany provides considerable aid to the African region. However these commitments are made to serve the German and also European interest of helping Africa to step on its feet and become a more equal partner, carrying the burden of its own responsibilities. In other words, Germany’s policy towards Africa aims to emancipate the region, not dominating it, as the latter appears to be an aim pursued by the UK and France.

In terms of UK’s and Germany’s geo-economic interests in Africa, the above analysis suggests that the in general the UK does have geo-economic interests in Africa, as it provides almost half of the region’s aid and maintains quite developed trade ties with the areas representing a geo-strategic interest for it. However, UK’s bilateral trade relations with RD Congo are not significant, as with regard to Chad and the CAR they appear to be rather symbolic and the same can be said for UK’s unilateral aid to these three countries. In regard to Germany, its bilateral ties with RD Congo, Chad and the CAR are quite insignificant as well as its unilaterally provided aid for the region. However, Germany provides considerable aid through the EU aid package for Africa, which shows that Germany does not have special economic interests in the region. The fact that most of Germany’s aid for Africa is provided through the EU, shows that Germany does have special geopolitical and geo-economical interests in Africa but despite that supports the EU’s efforts to stabilize, democratize and develop the region.

The analysis provided in the previous two sections showed that in regard to the Western Balkans, the UK does not have special geopolitical and geo-economical interests, whereas Germany appears to have both special geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in the area. In terms of Africa, the UK appears to have general geo-strategic interests in the whole region as special geopolitical and geo-economical importance the UK assigns to the countries from south and eastern Africa, whereas the former French colonies, RD Congo, Chad and the CAR, have indirect geopolitical and rather insignificant economic importance for the UK. Therefore a general conclusion can be drawn that the UK pursues cooperative hegemony in Africa (together with France), whereas Germany seeks regional hegemony in the Western Balkans, which suggests that an area of particular geopolitical and geo-economical interest for the UK is Africa, whereas for Germany special geopolitical and geo-economical interests represent the Western Balkans’ region. In the following last chapter, I will apply my findings from the present and the previous chapter and attempt to explain the reasons which drove the UK and Germany to support the CSDP military missions in the Western Balkans and Africa.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS

In the present chapter firstly, I will provide a brief outline of the six CSDP military missions up to date and then based on the already established level of Europeanization of the UK and Germany and their geopolitical and geo-economical interests in the regions where the CSDP military missions were deployed, I will provide an argued explanation in regard to the reasons which played the main role in UK’s and Germany’s decision to provide troops and/or military personnel in support of the CSDP military operations.

3.1 Explaining the UK’s and Germany’s Support for the CSDP Military Missions in the Western Balkans

CSDP Military Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Concordia

In August 2001, a NATO force was deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to collect and destroy weapons and ammunitions of ethnic Albanian groups in order to provide a secure and stable environment for introducing the political reforms mandated by the Ohrid Framework Agreement making it possible the government to take over security functions in FYROM. On 31 March 2003 for the first time the military instrument of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy toolkit was used by deploying the Union’s first-ever ESDP military operation, a peace-keeping operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM “Concordia”), taking over from a NATO force. The operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities for its implementation. The core

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aim of EUFOR “Concordia” was to contribute to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.\(^{87}\)

**CSDP Military Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EUFOR Althea**

Few months after Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992, a brutal ethnic conflict between Bosnian Muslims, Croat Bosnians and Bosnian Serbs took place in the country. In order to restore the security, a NATO military intervention was deployed in the region. The war continued until 1995, when the Deyton peace agreement was signed. After completing its mission of restoring the peace and preventing another civil war in Bosnia, on 2 December 2004, NATO formally concluded its Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in the country and handed over peace stabilization tasks to a European Union force (EUFOR). The mission of the EU’s Operation Althea has been to ensure continued compliance with the 1995 peace agreement and contribute to a secure environment and Bosnia’s efforts towards European integration.\(^{88}\)

Both the UK and Germany contributed with troops on the ground and military personnel to the CSDP military operations in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In terms of UK’s support for the EU military deployments in the region, it can be argued that the UK provided its support to the above missions driven by indirect geopolitical interests as it aimed to relieve the US from its military engagement in the region and enable the US to withdraw its troops from the Balkans and send them to Afghanistan and Iraq where the US force was experiencing overstretch. In regard to Germany, its support for the EU’s military operations

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in the Western Balkans can be explained by both the Europeanization hypothesis, as the mission aimed to bring stability in the European neighborhood, and the Realistic hypothesis, as Germany has direct geopolitical and geo-economical interests in the Western Balkans deriving from Germany’s aim to establish regional hegemony in the region. In the following last chapter of the present research, I will provide a brief outline of the CSDP military missions and apply the findings which were established in the present and the previous chapter in order to provide an argued explanation of the main drivers of UK’s and Germany’s support for the CSDP military missions.

3.2 Explaining the UK’s and Germany’s Support for the CSDP Military Missions in the Western Balkans

CSDP Military Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Artemis

In 1998 the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became a scene of violent confrontations between Ugandan and Congolese armed forces, backed by local tribal militias, with the involvement of several neighbouring countries. The war displaced millions of people from their homes or drove them to seek asylum in neighboring countries. After the UN mission in DRC, MONUC, proved unable to resolve the conflict, UNSG Kofi Annan asked France to lead a multinational force to intervene before more UN troops were deployed on the ground. With the support of the UK in advocating the deployment of EU force in DRC, France succeeded to convince the EU member states to support EU military engagement in the area under the framework of ESDP. On 12 June 2003, under the legal basis provided by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) and the Council's Joint Action (5 June 2003), the EU launched a military mission, named “Artemis”, in the DRC. The main
objective of Artemis was to assist restoring the security and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia, DRC.\(^{89}\)

**CSDP Military Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo EUFOR RD Congo**

In 2002 the international community’s determination to resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo succeeded to reach peace between the conflicting parties and the latter decided to form a government of the national unity which to organize the conduct of democratic elections, planned to take place in 2006. In December 2005 the UN requested from the EU military assistance for overseeing the elections in DRC. In March 2006, the EU Council approved EU support to the UN mission in DRC (MONUC) and proceeded towards planning its military engagement in terms of command structures and contributing states. On 25 April 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006), authorising the temporary deployment of a EU force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DRC. In June 2006 EU’s forth military operation under the ESDP, codenamed EUFOR RD Congo, was launched.

**CSDP Military Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic EUFOR Tchad/CAR**

For decades intra-national and regional clashes have taken place at the borderland between Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Libya. Since 2003, more than 240,000 Sudanese refugees and almost 45,000 refugees from the CAR have fled to eastern

Chad, forced by the Darfur conflict. Furthermore, the tensions between the communities in the region increased with the approximately 180,000 Chadians displaced by the civil war in the eastern Chad. All this led international organizations and NGOs to call the international community to engage and provide peace and security in the area. On 25 September 2007, after receiving green light from the authorities of Chad and the CAR, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1778, authorizing the deployment of UN civilian and police operation, MINURCAT in order to provide protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law, and secure regional peace. On 15 October 2007, urged by France, the Council of the EU decided to provide military assistance to the UN Mission, MINURCAT, by launching operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Provided with the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (of 25 September 2007), the European mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA took place from 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009. The main objectives of EUFOR Tchad/RCA included protection of the civilians and the UN personnel and to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. At the time of its full deployment the mission reached 3700 troops on the ground.

**CSDP Military Mission off the Coast of Somalia EU NAVFOR Somalia**

Somalia is one of the poorest and most unstable countries in the world, which experts regard as the main cause for the recently emerging phenomenon of Somalian piracy. Since 2007 the number of pirate attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden, through which passes most of the trade between Europe and Asia, has increased tremendously. Furthermore, victims of pirate attacks in the region have also been ships carrying humanitarian aid by the

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World Food Programme for the civilian population in Somalia. In order to protect its interests and improve the humanitarian situation in Somalia, on 10 November 2008 the EU decided to deploy in Somalia an EU naval force (EU NAVFOR Atalanta). EU NAVFOR Atalanta was tasked to protect the vessels of the World Food Programme delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; to protect vulnerable vessels in the area and to ensure deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea.\(^2\)

All four CSDP military missions in Africa were supported by both the UK and Germany with troops on the ground and/or military personnel in the Operation Headquarters and naval assets for the mission off the cost of Somalia. Regarding UK’s support for the EU’s military operations in RD Congo, Chad and CAR, it is best explained by the British indirect geopolitical and geo-economic interests in these countries, based on the one hand on their geographical proximity to areas where the UK has direct geopolitical and geo-economical interests, and on the other hand, on UK’s relationship with France which is based on reciprocity and aims to establish Franco-British hegemony in Africa, which suggests that the British had indirect interest to support the French initiative for launching EU military missions in the French former colonies, expecting that France will pay back by backing future British projects. In terms of Germany’s support for the CSDP military missions in RD Congo, Chad and CAR, it cannot be explained by the realistic hypothesis as Germany does not have particular geopolitical and geo-economical interests in Africa. Therefore Germany’s relatively high level of Europeanization appears to be a plausible explanation for the country’s support the CSDP military operations in the region. As for the British and German support for the EU naval mission off the cost of Somalia, it was mostly motivated by geo-economical reasons as both countries’ shipping suffered many losses caused by the piracy in the area.

CONCLUSION

The general conclusion which can be drawn from this research is that in regard to the UK, its support for the CSDP military missions can be explained by its geopolitical and geo-economic interests, whereas in the case of Germany, its level of Europeanization turns to be a considerable driver of its support for the CSDP military missions. However, I am aware that domestic politics also have played a role in Germany’s decision to provide support for the military operations of the EU. For example, preventing the eventual asylum-seekers from entering the country and increasing the otherwise significant number of former Yugoslavs living in Germany can be another plausible explanation for Germany’s support for the CSDP missions in the Western Balkans. In this regard, I have to underline the fact that the findings of in terms of my research question are based on testing hypotheses derived from Europeanization and Realism theoretical frameworks and therefore I do not claim to have encompassed in the present research all possible reasons which drove the UK and Germany to support the EU’s military operations. In this regard, I would suggest a further research of the present topic to be based on other frameworks of analysis. For example, looking at domestic politics can potentially reveal other plausible explanations in terms of the determinants of UK’s and Germany’s support for the CSDP military operations.
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