Turkish Europeanness in the Context of Turkey – EU negotiations

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Submitted to
Central European University
Nationalism Studies Program

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary
2009
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Introduction

“The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks ... but we Turks have always consistently moved towards the West ... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative” [Kemal Ataturk]

Today within the EU it is taken for granted that Turkey is affiliated with Europe; moreover, it is often comfortably considered to be somewhat “natural destiny” of Turkey to seek for closer integration, but never actually reach membership within European community – remaining “the sick man of Europe”. However, such static perception is shading the picture, as relation depends on both sides – European Union is shaping and reshaping its identity, thus modifying the opportunities for Turkey to enter the inner space of Europe. Moreover, political thought in Turkey has undergone an intensive dynamics in the last century – considering affiliation to Europe as well.

There are many ways to analyze this complex relationship, yet leaving aside the geopolitical rivalries or economic benefits, the focus of this paper will be the concept of Europeanness, aiming to draw its articulation(s) in today’s Turkey. Object of concern would be defining Turkey’s relation with Europe, embodied by the EU through the prism of identification or belonging. As it is a dynamic concept, its development will be observed through historical parallels as well as through interaction with the EU.

Indeed, Turkey’s belonging to Europe has been explicitly expressed since the birth of the Republic, by choosing the “Western path” as its primary course for foreign policy. After founding the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk implemented political, social and economic reforms according to European models. His vision was that “Turkey would live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization”\(^1\) – that at the time equated the West. However, westernization meant advancement and modernization rather

than sticking to Europe; till 1950s pro-European orientation was driving country’s development; yet since 1960 variety of factors (decolonization, industrialization outside Europe, the relative decline of its global importance) “have blunted the force of the idea of pursuing an exclusively European identity as a sort of national goal.”² During the Cold War Turkey was an important ally of the West and could enjoy various advantages coming from it. Nonetheless, since the collapse of Soviet Union the global distribution of power changed dramatically, and Turkish leaders found themselves in need to adjust to the new international order – and reconsider its relations to Europe: “Turkey’s position in the European economic and political order has been changing at the same time as Europe itself has been undergoing rapid reconstruction.”³

Within the EU from all the definitions of ‘Europeanness’, a civic one can be singled out, according to which identities might emerge and develop around agreement over rules for “peaceful political co-existence, shared cultural norms, and common beliefs”.⁴ It will be argued that this conception is aimed for diffusing by the EU – the question is how this exported ‘Europeanness’ is being accepted.

European Union, though started from coal and steam, ended with elaborated concepts of ‘community’ and ‘identity’. Eventually the concept of ‘Europeanness’ emerged into European Communities/EU discourse, shifting it from merely political-economic to identity based union; especially in the wake of the last to EU enlargements (2004 and 2007) the special attention to European identity was drawn, in the need to strengthen and practically re-integrate the Union. For most of candidate countries it meant possibilities for deeper integration – however, Turkey appears on the edge. On one hand, being a large country with

relatively weak economy, unprotected borders in southeast and problematic human rights regime (and being a Muslim (!) country – though officially it remains in brackets), it has to undergo large-scale reforms, many of which have been implemented already. This gives an impression that EU is the key cause of reforms, and Turkey would have to adapt to EU as it is – including diversity and human rights, i.e., the items that are presented as parts of ‘EU identity’. On the other hand, bearing in mind that Turkey has not always stood so firmly for EU membership, and that pluralization had its inner drives, not necessarily related to EU integration, EU abilities to export its mode of Europeanness could be arguable.

To answer the question on the formation of Europeanness, several steps are necessary, which would resemble the structure of the paper. In the first part the evolution of European identity concept will be discussed, providing a theoretic debate on the nature of the EU and aspects which bring primordial or civic definitions into the stage. Special attention will be drawn to the process of drawing boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as this is related with the space left for Turkey’s accession. Keeping the dual character of analysis in this paper, after examination of the identity development in the EU, similar questions will raised for Turkey. What forces have been driving this country towards Europe? What shaped its relationship in the early 20th century and now? Finally, attempting to link the two seemingly different developments of articulating ‘Europeanness’, match-points along accession talks need to be found. Therefore the third part will focus on Turkey – EU relationship and certain issues where identity policies play a role. One of such issues is human rights, and especially minority rights: while EU is declaring multiculturalism and celebration of diversity, integration of ‘Euroturks’ and other migrants appeared highly problematic. On the other hand, reforms regarding the same minority issues cause great reluctance when it comes to be implemented in Turkey – candidate country. Its impact of shaping Europeanness will be examined.
Part I. Development of European identity

It is worth to start examination of Europeanness from development of this concept on the EU side. In this chapter I will present a theoretic debate on EU integration, attempting to uncover, what kind of Europe different approaches create. It will help in further examination of Turkey’s place in each kind of ‘Europe’, asking what is expected from Turkey in terms of Europeanness. From different approaches I will turn to challenges of EU integration: firstly, legitimacy gap and the creation of *demos*. I will argue that strengthening European identity – even if we talk about the civic notion of agreement over rules for “peaceful political co-existence, shared cultural norms, and common beliefs”\(^5\) – is closely related to closing the boarders and drawing the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, it creates another serious problem – namely, identifying the decisive agency within the EU. Who has a power to define *demos*, inside the EU and during the enlargement process? If the core of EU identification is democratic values, the question how democratic is EU itself is critical. Furthermore, Turkey’s possibilities to enter the club depend largely on the solution to this problem.

1.1. Theoretic debate on the nature of the EU

As EU integration involves a number of complex processes, various disciplines and approaches may be combined in order to explain it. For the same reason, it is necessary to draw a theoretic framework before starting analysis. European integration theory is booming with literature, however, for the purpose of this paper, three perspectives will be suggested: i.e., neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and social constructivism.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Other influential theories, like federalism or new institutionalism will be left aside: the former – because it does not a viable explanation for Turkey – EU negotiations and the later is stressing institutions while here the focus will be on political processes.
1.1.1. Theories and arguments.

As Ben Rosamond claims, for many, “integration theory and neo-functionalism are virtual synonyms.” Indeed, this approach has been integrated into the study of European unification during the last decades – its statements have proven applicable, in a number of spheres. Neo-functionalist premises lay in a belief that European unity may be achieved through incremental, technocratic and functional, but at the same time strategic means. The following scheme might be drawn: international cooperation starts on functional matters, as modern social and economic activities are “not necessarily most efficiently organized to fit in to the boundaries of a state.” It rationalizes integration and creates ‘functional pressures’ for further integration in related sectors, as well as for a stronger European authority. This, as believed by many neo-functionalists, would create a ‘spillover effect’ – economic interdependency would eventually lead to closer relations in other spheres, political and social. Ernst Haas, the leading neo-functionalist scholar, stressed the technocracy’s advantage over ideology: “Converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic and industrial life of modern Europe provided the crucial impetus. The economic technician, the planner, the innovative industrialist, and trade unionist advanced the movement not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the writer.” The ‘neo-functionalist Europe’ is constantly developing, the possible – although not necessary – result being a European federation. It stresses the process rather than the outcome: a position that features in flexibility and contemporary needs.

Liberal intergovernmentalism at one point replicates the former approach: it is a highly pragmatic perspective, claiming no belief in ideology of ‘European unity’. On the other hand, it concentrates on the mechanism rather than the process of integration – quite contrary

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8 Ibid, p.51.
to neo-functionalists. Liberal intergovernmentalism has been called “a single-author theory”, giving credits to Andrew Moravcsik for its development.\textsuperscript{11} He applies a utilitarian approach to international cooperation, claiming that states establish international institutions in order to balance constraints and opportunities in international arena.\textsuperscript{12} Again giving a simplified scheme, operation can be divided into three stages: internally – preference formation at a national level; internationally – intergovernmental bargaining, and institutional choice, which is also favorable for the states, as supra-national authority binds the other parties to the agreement. Thus, a focus shifts from the function to the actor – the state, and the primary goal is satisfied interest of state rather than effective modification of a function. Intergovernmentalists project Europe as a stage of action that provides opportunities for the states; thus, it is a club of statesmen rather than a substantive entity.

Nevertheless, the above presented approaches do not cover one important dimension of European integration – the ideas embedded within institutions and procedures. Indeed, both Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman talked about “building Europe”, which meant more than mere pragmatism. This understanding of European integration is the focus of social constructivism – a theoretic approach that holds European identity being of no less importance than institutions, policies and interests.\textsuperscript{13} Especially the latest stages of EU development witnessed an extensive attention for normative side of integration process: Maastricht treaty and Copenhagen criteria, the proposed Constitution for Europe, as well as creation and improvement of European symbols correspond to the widespread debate on the content of ‘Europeanness’. Social constructivists pay attention to rules and institutions, portraying EU integration as a ‘discursive construct’ which may set constraints for actors.

\textsuperscript{13} C.Archer, p.17.
Thomas Risse points that “rule-guided behavior differs from strategic and instrumental behavior in that actors try to ‘do the right thing’ rather than maximizing or optimizing their given preferences.”\textsuperscript{14} Thus, in certain situations certain (‘appropriate’) rules are chosen and applied – European integration may be seen as a pathway of developing a comprehensive set of rules and norms. European identity, defined by these shared norms, is being constructed and reconstructed, and it is the enlargement of the EU where it materializes: through Copenhagen criteria EU sought to bind admission process to strict regulations.

1.1.2. Significance for Turkey

The three approaches presented above possess different starting points and subjects matter, which will be helpful for understanding uneven Turkey’s integration into the EU. Starting from the first application in 1959, it was implemented incrementally, faster in economic sector (Turkey joined the Customs Union in 1996), yet much slower in the political. Although Turkey has unresolved problems, like relatively weak economy, the ongoing conflict in the southeast and problematic human rights regime, it could become a member of EU by gradually merging functions and deepening interdependence. Despite clearly misbalanced relationship between the two, Ankara can also contribute to several key areas. That could be serving as a “bridge between Europe and Asia”, providing new opportunities for EU diplomacy; energy sector is another sphere, as Turkey has a possibility to supply European countries with gas from Azerbaijan or Iran.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, neo-functionalist explanation was well working in the period around 2000-2004, when public support for the EU in Turkey was greater than in some EU countries and negotiations were in peak. That optimistic period now looks as a beginning of an ‘ideal political integration’, described by Ernst Haas as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift


\textsuperscript{15} Nabucco is a planned pipeline to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Austria via Turkey. However, Russia is attempting to prevent its further construction and remain the only gas supplier for a number of EU countries.
their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand, jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” Thus, although it is hard to imagine Turks shifting their loyalties from the state to the EU, European institutions are seen as a source substituting a state in providing certain goods and functions.

However, for the last few years the public support for the EU in Turkey has dropped, and new chapters in negotiations can not be opened for political reasons. Despite of the fame and success of neo-functionalism in previous decades, now it can only partly explain the process of Turkey’s integration. Yet in the short perspective neo-functionalist scenario remains an option for Ankara: while negotiations are problematic both seeing it from intergovernmental level and identity questions, they are continuing at functional level.

On the other hand, the agency question needs to be addressed when talking of European integration. Neo-functionalism seeks for transcendence or at least the restraint of the state; nonetheless, it is certain states that take pro/con positions regarding Turkish membership, thus interstate level should not be excluded in this case. Moravcsik’s three-stage scheme provides explanation for a ‘strategic Europe’. By recognizing the importance of internal formation of ‘national interest’, liberal institutionalism lets domestic interests to the stage, i.e., smaller groups, business, party rivalries – pluralism within the state has to be acknowledged. Nonetheless, this theory allows domestic forces only as a “filter between the structural incentives of the international economy and the national preferences in European integration.” Indeed, though domestically diverse, within the EU governments act as if their state had a unitary approach: Council of Ministers with veto power where ‘vital national interests’ seemed to be endangered, is the best example within the EU structures.

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Liberal intergovernmentalism reminds that Turkey might be excluded from the definition of Europeanness at all three stages: European, national and popular. At a European level Turkey is accepted as a candidate state; however, public opinion does not support such position, and it is governments – the decisive agents – that have to balance it. What is more, anti-Turkish stance has been used in political struggles for local votes in EU countries, as will be shown in the following parts of this chapter.

Social constructivism fills the gap of argumentation against Turkey: indeed, when it comes to which countries are eligible to be ‘in the club’, identity is of vital importance. If neo-functionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists let Turkey in, provided it brings strategic benefits, constructivists would demand more: that it would be able to commit itself to the rules and norms, which are regarded to be ‘European’. In other words, Turkey should share ‘European identity’.

It must be said that EU and European identity should be distinguished. People might feel attached without belonging to the EU and vice versa – especially when a number of European countries do not belong to the alliance. However, EU has taken over the concept of ‘Europeanness’: as Laffan suggests, “the EU as an active identity builder has taken successfully achieved identity hegemony in terms of increasingly defining what it means to belong to ‘Europe’.”18 It is easy to agree that effective and legitimate EU polity needs some degree of identification. Yet in public discourse EU and Europe is used interchangeably, and Turkey’s denial to enter the Union equates misrecognizing it as a ‘European’ country. This remains as a sharp question, even though social constructivism conceptualizes collective identity as “historically contingent, tenuous and a subject to constructions and reconstructions.”19

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18 Cited in T. Risse, p. 169.
19 T.Risse, p. 167.
1.2. Emergence of European demos

During the first decades of development of European Communities neo-functionalist approach prevailed, which holds that economic integration would finally spill over to other spheres: citizens would grant their loyalties to EU institutions, as these would prove to be more efficient in ensuring the wellbeing. Indeed, instrumental and strategic motives that seemed to drive EU integration contain some credence: until now it is “economic-based cooperation, i.e., the internal market program, or Pillar I of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties”, where integration is best-established. Moreover, even in the Declaration on European Identity, signed in 1973 by the heads of member states, common identity is seen to appear automatically “...as a function” of concrete steps of integration.

However, neo-functionalists often ignored the widening gap between the elites and the citizens, who have been far more skeptical about multi-level integration. Thus, as integration deepened, the question of legitimacy arose. As George Voskopoulos noticed, “The European integration process started as a conscious elite venture but remained an elite issue for too long, thus alienating European peoples from political leaderships. It has been a sacred cow not to be touched by anyone other than elites.” Therefore, ways had to be found how to make people more personally bound with EU and its matters. It was understood that further integration demands for greater popular support, which could be achieved by strengthening wider European identity, a substance, like common culture which glues the society into community. From here the notion of ‘Europeanness’ arose – an all-encompassing motto that supposed to enter the daily lives of EU citizens. As mentioned above, Europeanness carries a

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23 Clive Archer, p.11.
strong civic basis. Thus, to solve the puzzle of internalizing Europeanness as a civic concept, defining *demos* is one of the most important issues – as well as it is a political issue, when it comes to the rights and duties of citizens.

Consequently, political elite engaged in building European polity, gradually abandoning the expectation of its somewhat automatic appearance: “…integration can never be achieved on purely economic or political arguments. <…> Citizens must be brought to feel that they inhabit a single territory, with no internal borders and a common external one.”

Collective European identity has been embedded in rules, norms and structures: one of the most notable tools for democratization of the EU was introduction of direct EU Parliament elections. Symbols were seen as to perforce a particularly important role in this process. Embracing state symbols like European passport, currency, European flag, anthem or European day altogether marked a step out from functionalist approach.

Thus symbols were brought to create a common space of identification for citizens. They meant to embody a substance of conscious identification, towards which the ‘shift of loyalty’ predicted by functionalists was to happen. Among others, borders also carry a strong symbolic meaning: by its nature being exclusive, borders are “not simply lines on maps where one jurisdiction ends and another begins... Borders are political institutions: no rule-bound economic, social or political life can function without them.” Indeed, borders are needed for successful functioning of institutions – and by extension, the more prerogatives institutions poses, the bigger is importance of clearly set boundaries of their jurisdiction. Therefore while EU integration was deepening, border regulations hardened accordingly: Schengen

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agreements created a common space of mobility, and at the same time marked an outer EU border, symbolic boundaries transforming into practical.

Schengen treaty established a border regime that embodies difference between the ones ‘in’ and ‘out’, thus institutionally justifying hardening of boundaries. But it is not just institutional level where such segregation is accepted: in fact, otherness has been proposed as a precondition to enforce the presence of ‘Europeanness’ in everyday interactions. P. Odermatt refers to an actual proposal that advocated for utilizing the EU borders as another symbol of EI: the main feature would be not just erasing internal borders – but strengthening the external ones.\(^{28}\) Delanty replicates this statement raising the idea of “…a European ethnos emerging around an identity based on exclusion, a supra-nationality, where the reference point is non-European”\(^{29}\). Needless to say, such distinction ‘European’/’non-European’ is problematic from the beginning, as there is no one to draw an ultimate border line. Nonetheless, even at the speculative level, it brings unrest to ambiguous regions, Turkey being the first in a row.

Adding more to the primordial criteria the geographic belonging to Europe, the EU’s official policy is to welcome every European country which wishes to join.\(^{30}\) At a first glance, it corresponds to the inclusive nature of other standards, like Copenhagen criteria. However, when it comes to the actual definition of European frontiers, the problem arise that will surely be included in future discussions in Brussels. As William Wallace puts it, “Europe is a movable set of myths and images, <…> there is no idea of Europe common to all European states, and therefore also no agreement on where Europe ends.”\(^{31}\) Indeed, most of candidates from the Eastern side of Europe tried to move themselves on a discursive level more to the West, distancing from ‘really Eastern’ neighbors. When it comes to Turkey, geography comes

\(^{28}\) P. Odermatt, p. 229.
as one of unofficial ‘obstacles’ for accession: in the words of Giscard D’Estaing, “Its capital
is not in Europe, 95% of its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country.”
Indeed, geography played a role in enlargement, including non-democratic Vatican and not
extending to Israel; Morocco applied for joining in 1987, but was denied on geographic
belonging basis – yet Turkey did not share Morocco’s fate and was accepted as candidate,
therefore the argument of geographic belonging can no longer be used against Turkey’s
membership. On the other hand, being always on the edge, it carries a sense of ‘frontier
identity’, being able to combine elements from the Western and Eastern civilizations.

Coming back to the question of demos formation, a question remains, what are the
qualities of the EU citizen and how it is defined. Additionally, it has implications on Turkey’s
candidacy, given that the rights and beneficiaries might be extended to almost 90 million
people. The evolution of EU citizenship took place in conjunction with the principle of free
movement of goods, capital and labor: starting with Treaty of Rome, regulations developed
rapidly, already in 1968 stating that citizens from other member state had “the right to take up
available employment in the territory of another Member State with the same priority as
national of that State.” Significantly, it coincided with the peak of guest-workers, big part of
whom came from Turkey: who were also migrants, but being perceived as ‘temporary
residents’, have never been intended to be included into polity.

Started with rights, such as freedom of movement, formation of European demos
continued this course. Neunreither adds that citizenship in the EU is in fact provided with
many qualities: “when they [citizens – R.S.] cross a border, they are traveling citizens; when
they take up a job, they are working citizens; when they buy a piece of soap or a jar of jam,

32 “Turkey Entry Would Destroy EU”, BBC, 8 Nov 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm>,
[viewed 24 May 2009].
33 W. Wallace, p.79.
34 The theme of merging civilizations will be more elaborated in the next chapter.
35 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of October 15, 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the
Community, OJ, No. L257/2, cited in Rey Koslowski, “EU Citizenship”, in Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell
they are consuming citizens.”36 Every segment of daily life has been labeled as citizen activities, providing beneficiaries for each of these segments: consumer protection, minimum safeguards, etc. However, “though it might be very useful, it leaves out the basic quality of citizens: that they are political beings. Citizens in the European Union’s approach are the object of caretaking policy-making, not its subject.”37 Thus, even though Europeanness is understood as a polity – it is a passive polity from the very beginning, providing its demos with a rather limited means of participation: citizens are the receivers of goods rather than members bound by duties.

Another way of defining and representing a ‘European self’ is to set guidelines the ones who are willing to join the union: enlargement policies reflect how otherness has been institutionalized. EU leaders bound themselves by Copenhagen criteria: it was somewhat logical extension of the rules and norms operating within the EU to be applied in the relations with the outsiders. EU leaders determined to accept the new members according to the more tangible criteria than culture, history or geography. These criteria – political, economic and legislative alignment – have been also constructed in such a way as to request solely institutional integration from the candidate state. Applicant governments must prove they are able to follow the rules and principles of the ‘European community’ – that once more backs a civic-based definition of ‘Europeanness’ that has been chosen here.

Nevertheless the logic of appropriateness does not always function in reality. Copenhagen criteria set only general principles of accession, yet some of them are very vague (like the one of democratic regime) or even contradictory (for ex., compliance with environmental regulations and competitiveness).38 What is more, in many areas that are...

36 K. Neunreither, p. 2.
37 Ibid, p.3.
monitored in the candidate countries, EU law is virtually non-existent, and practices of member states highly divergent – the best example could be minority rights, on which more attention will be paid in later chapters. Bearing all these obstacles in mind, EU enlargement could be called a political bargaining rather than a rule-bound and formally defined process. Needless to say, for the candidate countries this creates a complex of exclusion; and as the EU has come to equate Europe, the outcomes of keeping out certain countries – especially Turkey – are even more severe.

Politization of Copenhagen criteria has certain implications in the domestic context of the EU member states. “Imagined borders can, at times, turn into real borders”\textsuperscript{39}, as cultural stereotypes might indeed create ‘walls in our heads’, influencing political decisions of the elites. Willing to gain public support, politicians also used the card of ‘defending from the invasion of the other’ (which in many cases means defending the rights and advantages of citizen-consumer), thus tightening already rather closed boundaries, both in symbolic and practical level. This will be further elaborated in the last chapter.

\section*{1.3. Cultural elements in European identity}

Civic elements appear dominant in shaping European identity – through symbols, political rights and structures, as well as embedded in Copenhagen criteria; however, since Maastricht EU leaders were seeking to create a sense of belonging that reaches beyond formal incorporation in structures – to find a substance for European culture, based on common values and goals.

In the process of drafting Constitution for Europe, 2003, Romano Prodi set up a reflection group in Brussels, which had to examine spiritual, intellectual and cultural foundations of Europe, feeling the need to include it in the Preamble. “Prodi’s concern has been to identify and think through the fundamental principles that provide the basis on which

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
all the citizens of the European Union can live together. New rules of coexistence, he believed, can be used to create a real community for peoples and civil society in a Europe living in freedom with its neighbors.”

It resembles Dahl’s definition of democracy – a “system of fundamental rights”, that is, the system of rights that are not necessary for the functioning of democratic institutions, but tend to develop in democratically governed communities. It was thought that reference to “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights”, “common destiny” and the motto “United in Diversity” would be appealing to people. However, what they came up with was soon tried by EU citizens – neglecting the document in French and Dutch referenda.

As democracy deficit was leading EU into stagnation, further elements binding citizens had to be found. On 25 March 2007, the Berlin Declaration marking the EU’s 50th anniversary highlighted its main ideals: the individual, human dignity and equality of men and women, as well as peace and freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Nonetheless, once again these elements, though perfect for political cooperation, were admitted insufficient to bind citizens: Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed the necessity of finding “Europe’s soul” – as a “crucial prerequisite for further integrating the Union”. Thus, the importance of other elements, exceeding Copenhagen criteria, has been recognized.

It would be a mistake to say that A. Merkel was the first to refer to European identity beyond human rights. Though cultural policies are exclusively member states’ prerogative, EU had engaged in building somewhat unifying culture that would strengthen social and political cohesion. Its main documents refer to cultural inheritance of Europe – though on the

44 Sarah Seeger, “Communicating European Values – the German EU Presidency and the Berlin Declaration”, Aktuell, Nr.6, April 2007.
other hand, R. Baubock draws attention to the point that ‘any common list of historical roots is always meant to demarcate and exclude (e.g. Judaism and Islam).’\textsuperscript{45}

Probably the most controversial – though extremely crucial, especially after 9/11 events – cultural element is religion. Indeed values like democracy, representative institutions and human rights constitute what Ch. Taylor calls “republican components of political identities”\textsuperscript{46}, while religion falls into ‘primordial’ category. Yet even though modern liberal democracies are built on secularism, religion – like culture – plays an important role in everyday life of many citizens, and is unlikely to be left aside. As A. Merkel mentioned in her speech, republican principles are not enough to evoke loyalty – it is directed “to a particular historic project that aims to realize them.”\textsuperscript{47} ‘Christian foundations of Europe’ have almost appeared in the Preamble of Constitution for Europe.

Indeed, though officially religion is not used as an argument, integration of Muslim immigrants in EU countries has a significant relation both with EU integration and enlargement processes. The word \textit{immigrants} should be underlined here, as though Muslim populations has been living in Europe for centuries, globalization and mobility increased both their presence and visibility. Additionally, as Muslims in Europe fall into category of national minorities – and thus can expect different protection under international law – there is no agreed regulation of immigrants’ rights. Even though there have been attempts to promote the ‘best practices’ of dealing with immigrant workers, Kymlicka points that many states in “both the West and the developing world continue to view migrants as ‘foreigners’ who are

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, p.9.
'temporary' residents, and the international community has been unable or unwilling to challenge that perception."\textsuperscript{48}

European ideal of celebrating diversity appeal to the ‘old’ national minorities – but it is arguable whether it applies to numerous immigrants. Ch. Taylor warns about the emerging (or existing) ambiguity, as problems in reaching consensus on human rights “are now being reproduced within our Western democracies, just as immigration increasingly diversifies us.”\textsuperscript{49} Thus, Muslim immigrants shake our comfortable reality not only questioning the primordial components of European identity (Europe within borders of former Christendom), but also the republican ones – related to minority rights.

In this chapter the main conceptual problems regarding European identity within the EU have been examined. Starting from theoretical debate, social constructivism appeared to be the only approach which has something to say about Europeanness: both neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism ignore identity question, or at best treat is as a secondary matter. Yet the ‘logic of appropriateness’ will be helpful when analyzing the minority right regime and its relation to European identity.

Nonetheless, the two remaining approaches also contribute with some insights: while it is European \textit{demos} which supposedly shapes and realizes Europeanness in everyday interactions, in reality there is not much space left for the actual participation of citizens. They are provided with rights and goods, but not the tangible voice in politics. Therefore, important exchange of ideas and political support is happening on the states’ level. Provided with big powers in the EU matters\textsuperscript{50} state governments are balancing between national interest protection within the organization, and ensuring public support at home. Thus even though

\textsuperscript{49} Ch. Taylor, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{50} It should be also mentioned that citizens normally do not have much say in the matters of foreign policies – and state-EU relations are being conducted through Ministries of Foreign Affairs.
European identity has been attempted to conjunct with rules, norms and principles its politicization is also undeniable. It is best seen in application of Copenhagen criteria during EU enlargement process: although some areas are defined rather precisely, others – like democracy or minority rights protection – are left for political will.

Minority rights will be touched upon later, as it is an important issue concerning Turkey’s integration. In addition, it is closely related to conscious elite’s efforts to promote European identity among citizens: through symbols, and – borders. Exclusiveness became one of the controversial characteristics of Europeanness: expected to feature in civic values like democracy and human rights, which are in nature universal, in the end it was shaped by separating itself from the ‘other’ – which is not civil, and by definition not ‘European’ enough to join the club. It creates a complicated context for its most contested candidate Turkey: it has to take these aspects into account, at the same time developing its own understanding of Europeanness. Certainly, I do not imply Turkey to be a unified agent and have a single perception towards this issue and in the next chapter various doctrines of Turkish Europeanness will be examined.
2. Europeanness in Turkey

Just as the concept of European identity was developing within the EU, similar questions were being raised in Turkey – a country seemingly destined to be ‘on the edge’. In fact, the very aspect of being a borderland has made the issue of belonging highly sensitive and debatable. While in the beginning of the 20th century it meant embracing certain characteristics associated with the West (like secular democratic rule, Latin alphabet, particular dress code, etc.), recently negotiations with the EU became an indication of Westernization. Recognition is of particular importance: as EU has principally overtaken the mission to define Europeanness, admission into alliance presupposes acceptance and affirmation of Turkey’s European identity.

However, to answer the question what is the actual relation between the EU identity policies and Turkey’s interpretation of Europeanness it is necessary to examine how understanding of Europeanness has been developing in Turkey. The first part of this chapter will present how this concept was represented in the early political thought, which is still influential nowadays. The writings of Ziya Gokalp and ideology developed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk will serve as a ground for the discussion. The later has become an official state dogma, establishing a certain definition of Turkishness and its relation to the West. However, focusing on creation of an integral state Kemalists left certain groups on the margins, and it was precisely these marginalized social spheres that challenged – as well as shaped – Turkish modernization project.

2.1. Europeanness in early Turkish political thought

Turkey’s relation to Europe historically has been ambivalent:, on one side being part of Mediterranean region it engaged in active interactions through “war, commerce,
intermarriage, architectural design, the intermingling of cuisine and myriad other ways”\textsuperscript{51}; yet on the other side as a Muslim Ottoman Empire it always remained ‘a sick man of Europe’. Thus Selim Deringil in his article asks a legitimate question: “was the Ottoman Empire/Turkey in Europe but not of Europe?”\textsuperscript{52} What could actually make Turkey ‘European’?

2.1.1. Legacy of Ziya Gokalp

From Turkish side, on the other hand, since the decline of Ottoman Empire Europe was perceived both as a threat and an example – even today in the process of the ongoing negotiations with the EU, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan publicly regretted Turkey taking the immorality from the West “that is incompatible with our [Turkish – R.S.] values”\textsuperscript{53}. One of the most prominent Turkish thinkers of early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Ziya Gokalp, who made a great influence on evolution of Kemalism and the modern Republic of Turkey, also distinguished what should be taken from the West and what must be preserved: “only the material civilization of Europe should be taken and not its non-material aspects”.\textsuperscript{54} In other words, a balance should be achieved by adopting science and technology of the West and spirituality of the East.\textsuperscript{55}

Gokalp definitely rejects a huntingtonian notion of ‘the clash of civilizations’: “...people belonging to different religions may belong to the same civilization. <...> Thus, no civilization can ever be called after religion.”\textsuperscript{56} For him Islam has never been an obstacle for Turkey’s closer integration with Europe – on the contrary, he saw religion as irreplaceable ground for moral values, necessary for the wellbeing of a nation. On the other hand, in order

\textsuperscript{51} Selim Deringil, “The Turks and ‘Europe’: The Argument from History”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No.5, September 2007, p. 710.
\textsuperscript{52} S. Deringil, p. 709.
\textsuperscript{56} Ziya Gokalp, p. 306.
to accommodate it to modern civilization, he advocated for separation of religion and state: achievements of civilization lay on positivist premises rather than non-material sphere. Positivism played a significant role in Turkish thought, as it helped to explain the success of the West bypassing Christianity.\textsuperscript{57} It is an additional reason why the idea of secularism finds such a support in Turkey.

Instead he defines civilization in rather functional terms: “the sumtotal of the institutions found commonly among different societies which belong to different cultures and religions.”\textsuperscript{58} In other ways, civilization reflects certain ways of thinking and acting, which are transmitted through tradition and education. What is more, it is not static and eternal, but rather experience cyclic evolutions, with a beginning and an end; in such context, a nation can shift from the declining to the ascendant civilization and remain a nation. As for Turks, Gokalp describes them as moving through several ‘civilizations’: from Far East to Eastern – by actual arrival to Anatolia; and the move from Eastern to Western civilization is also desirable – which could be implemented by overtaking certain institutions and models.

Gokalp, like a number of thinkers of his time, based his advocacy for turning to the West on actual evidence of European political, economic and military advantage\textsuperscript{59}. Indeed, it was the complex of inferiority that shaped Turkish position towards ‘European powers’, both in the beginning of 20\textsuperscript{th} century and for the last few decades. Modernization theories contain a popular idea of evolutional society development, according to which our world witnesses a constant movement towards a modern society, and that is the only way for countries to achieve well-being, i.e., modernization is both a fact and a value.\textsuperscript{60} Additionally, there are certain criteria to measure the ‘level of modernity’ and make comparisons between the countries. All this well applies to Turkey. At first advancement to European political and

\textsuperscript{58} Ziya Gokalp, p.303.
\textsuperscript{60} N.T. Madan, „Secularism in its Place“, \textit{The Journal of Asian Studies}, Vol.46, Nr.4, 1987, p.748.
economic level meant religious and national independence, while later issues of recognition and lifting the social standards came to dominance. Yet regardless of motivation, development and progress defined the desirable path towards Europe. As an outcome, westernization meant advancement and modernization rather than sticking to Europe: till 1950s pro-European orientation was driving country’s development; however, since 1960 variety of factors (decolonization, industrialization outside Europe, the relative decline of its global importance) “have blunted the force of the idea of pursuing an exclusively European identity as a sort of national goal” — which nonetheless was again reinforced on the occasion of Turkey’s bid to the EU.

Westernization (or Europeanization) as modernization thesis could only have been implemented after separation of cultural heritage that meant to be preserved, as mentioned above, and those institutions that constitute the foundation of civilization. In my opinion, this is a highly problematic issue that Gokalp and his predecessors failed to solve for over a century. Although modernization is usually understood as consisting of such inevitable elements as extinction of traditional communities, plural society, democratization, secularism, growing industrialization, etc., - it is yet a challenging task to implement it without conflicting with the population’s core values that are to be protected, i.e., the ‘non-material aspects of civilization’. All encompassing reforms capture every sphere, and here is the weak point of Gokalp’s ideas: indeed, he does not give a mechanism, how culture should be distinguished from other parts modernization, or how it should be modernized at the same time ensuring harmony and continuity. Recognition of religion, that could become a bridge linking elite and mass, failed to be incorporated into the new state. Gunduz Aktan, a retired diplomat, recapitulates the result of it stating: “The process of Ottoman collapse has wounded us deeply in our souls. For our survival we had to abandon important parts of our culture, and to adopt

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the values and institutions of the West. This was an inevitable process but it brought with it a deep identity crisis.”

2.1.2. The Kemalist project

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic, was highly influenced by Ziya Gokalp. They both shared the ultimate goal of turning towards the West: Ataturk’s vision was that “Turkey would live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization” – which at the time equated Europe. Kemalism, an ideology developed during his years of ruling, set the principles of the regime, also known as ‘six arrows’: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolutionism or reformism. They have been incorporated into Constitution in 1930s, and remain there today reflecting the foundations of the state – therefore, some of them need a deeper consideration: it is important how the aim of Westernization has been disclosed in these principles.

Kemal Ataturk and his followers had a rather unique chance to create a new state after the War of Independence (1919-1922). Different from the reformers of Ottoman times, Kemalists chose a “cognitive and political negation” of the old regime, aiming to model the new one on different – European – outlines. Republicanism being chosen as a form of rule already signified the break with the past as it ended the sultanate.

Nationalism. However, a broad set of reforms realizing the Kemalist modernity project was based on a cultural/ideological axis. A way out of identity crisis was found in nationalism – here Ataturk’s reforms appear entirely comprehensive with Gokalp’s ideas. Nationalism as an ideology was exactly perceived as a European legacy: “The most powerful force over the mind of this age is the ideal of nationalism.” A nation had to become the

64 M.B. Altunisik, Ozlem Tur, p.16.
65 Z. Gokalp, p. 47.
source of identifications for the citizens of the new Republic, a substance which carried the core values of the society. Therefore, the goal was to create a unitary nation, redefining ‘Turkishness’ from what in Ottoman times meant simply ‘uneducated person’ to a title one should be proud of.

Underlining the aspect of construction, Ayse Kadioglu calls it a ‘manufactured identity’. Just as Ziya Gokalp believed the primary task for sociologists to be determining “what the Turkish people already possessed or lacked to be a modern nation”, so he held it was the duty of elites to transform the popular consciousness by top-down project. Atatürk's reforms in dress codes, his adoption of the Latin alphabet and the Gregorian calendar and his formulation of a civil, penal and commercial code and a constitution based upon several West European models all illustrate his commitment to such project.

Finally the very Turkish national identity was formulated and formally incorporated into the 1924 constitution, Article 88, defining it in an inclusive manner: “The people of Turkey, regardless religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship”. However, even though it intended to create a thin layered civic identity in the process the regime increasingly turned to the assertion of ethnic nationalism. In order to unite forty nine and a half millets (peoples) living within the borders of the newly created entity history, language and ethnography were invoked. Differently from clothing or calendar, it touches upon rather deep identity layers: new history books provided a reconstructed version of common history of the new nation, and the so-called Sun Language Theory claimed Turkish to be the first language, from which all other languages developed. This created rather a uniform model for a ‘patriotic Turk’ that nonetheless ignored cultural heritage of national minorities, to start from Kurds as the biggest group. For them there was no place left within the ‘manufactured identity’, which left the only

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66 A.Kadioglu, p.177.
67 Z.Gokalp, p. 22.
68 The ‘half-millet’ refers to Roma, who have not been favored neither in Ottoman Empire, nor in Turkish Republic. H.W.Lowry, p.11.
way – assimilation. To ensure the effectiveness of nationalizing policies the Settlement Law (Iskan Kanunu) was adopted in 1934, aimed at resettling some of Kurdish tribes – officially it was called “a tool to create a homogenous sense of national identity.”

- Religion. Another cornerstone for the new Republic was laicism, based on the above mentioned positivist ideas that embodied European ideals. According to A. Adnan Adivar, “the domination of positivism of the West was at that time so intense that one can hardly call it thought. It should be termed rather the 'official dogma of irreligion'.” Scientific positivism firstly meant rejecting religion, based on simple modernist logic: religion refers to backwardness, stagnation and reluctance to reform, while secularism is a part of modernity, development and progress. Finally these principles have been incorporated into Turkish national identity: Turkishness came to mean advancement, and by that to stand out from the rest of the Muslim world.

As Kemal Ataturk stated in one of his interviews, “Here, we do not believe in mixing religion with political affairs. <...> The Turks are not fanatics. Of course, there are Hodjas among us, as in every nation, who try to stir up the people, but we must and we will keep them in hand.” This actually meant taking over the control of religious institutions and incorporating them into the state apparatus: for this reason the Presidency of Religious Affairs, Diyanet, was established in 1924, responsible for religious education, training of clergy, maintenance of mosques and other matters subject to the sphere of piety. While it was meant to keep down the unrests with religious claims, that were rising frequently (up until nowadays religious issues provoke the core cleavages within Turkish society), in this

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69 M.B. Altunisik, Ozlem Tur, p.20.
71 H.W.Lowry, p.10.
way Islam remained a part of a new Turkish identity. Pushed to private sphere and under strict state provision, Muslim religious background was allowed to exist forming a linkage to the past, a cultural continuity that could be acceptable in the modern state.

However, at the same time a particular form of Islam, i.e. Sunni, came to be more favored than others. While Jews and Christians have been recognized and provided with certain distinct legislations (like the new provisions of Family Code, etc.

73), another Muslim group Alevi, today comprising circa 20 percent of Turkey’s Muslim population, was ignored. Diyanet served Sunni Muslims, while Alevi did not fit into the official picture of a ‘patriotic religious Turk’; just as ethnicity was to be unitary, so Sunni Islam comprised the other important part of ‘non-material aspects of civilization’. As a result, Alevi have been downgraded to a ‘cultural group’ – this problematic aspect of nation building and religion will be touched upon in the next chapter.

- Statism. The state elites engaged in nationalizing project aiming to build a state that draws legitimacy from the nation. One of the ‘six arrows’ – populism – precisely means that “state sovereignty lies with the people.”

74 Defining Westernization as nationalism, secularism and market economy, Kemalists did not put much emphasis on democracy. In fact, it was seen as the society needs to be transformed so as “to prepare it for the road to democracy”.

75 Thus Kemalist reforms were not just wide-ranging, but also were implemented through effective central authority, not avoiding forced measures. Such reforms found justification in Ziya Gokalp’s contemplation on the methods of Peter the Great: “While Russians, until then, were generally believed to be incapable of any progress, they began after these forced reforms to progress very quickly.”

76 In other words, they were ‘liberated’ from Eastern civilization and introduced to the Western one, as the thinker believed. Drawing

74 M.B. Altunisik, Ozlem Tur, p.20.
75 Ibid, p.22.
76 Z. Gokalp, p. 311.
parallels to current situation, strong statist tradition is apparent (it will be examined in the next chapter).

Here A. Giddens’s notion of a nation-state as a ‘bordered power container’ can be recognized. According to this author, monopoly of violence is easiest legitimized and most successfully implemented in a nation state; on the other hand, only after state gains monopoly over violence, peace and security can be ensured within its borders.  

Such approach also paved the way to establishment of official identity, which aimed to turn everyone to ‘Turk’ not just on civic level, as contemporary admirers of Kemalism claim but also in cultural sphere.

While this approach is first applied when dealing with Kurdish question, the roots of it also trace back to Kurds, when during Ataturk’s period the first uprising of Sheikh Sait, a Kurdish tribal leader, took place in Eastern Turkey in 1925. Although that period was marked by political power struggles, Kurdish revolt could be called a turning point in state formation: “the convergence of religious, ethnic and tribal discourse and action in the rebellion realized the worst fears of the Kemalists, as they signified a challenge to their secular, unitary and modern national state project.” This event strengthened Ataturk’s commitment to centralized rule backed by powerful military; for years even existence of Kurdish minority has been denied and today it also holds Ankara back from initiating more favorable legal environment for Kurdish cultural development. Bitter experience with Kurdish rebels brings reluctance to accept multicultural practices, and arguments of the EU counter deep established fears of threat to state integrity. Paradox situation appeared: Turkish leaders and scholars argue that membership in the EU would fulfill Ataturk’s aim of Turkey’s westernization; yet at the same

78 To name a few, such approach can be found in Sina Aksin, Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic. The Emergence of the Turkish Nation From 1789 to the Present,(New York: New York University Press, 2007).
79 M.B. Altunisik, Ozlem Tur, p.17.
time Kemalist ‘six arrows’ appear at odds with what is now considered as the core of ‘Europeanness’ within the EU.

The founding fathers of Turkish Republic held that civilizational differences occurred through different paths of modernization: it created different mentality, set of ideals, as well as different lifestyles. Advancement of the European powers encouraged them to model Turkey’s development according to European framework. However, as Ziya Gokalp underlines, success comes with a condition that a nation would adopt a civilization “in its entirety as a system“ – which first Kemalists and their predecessors failed when they downgraded democracy, and now – multiculturalism, to the second plan. The ‘non-material’ aspects of civilization, institutionalized as state nationalism and Sunni Islam, were meant to be preserved as the substance that keeps people together and provides identification and legitimacy for the regime – nevertheless, uniform Turkishness excluded significant parts of society thus creating a problematic context for further development of state-society relations.

The second part of the citation of Gunduz Aktan reflects how significant the legacy of Ataturk’s reforms is: “Ataturk became a legend because he symbolized our national identity in his person, not only because of his extraordinary success, but because his legend was a way we could get over our identity crisis.“ The preamble of Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, which is non-amendable, calls him “the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero“.

Indeed, he became an icon when he was still alive, and today Kemalism is still an official state ideology, even though it arguable how compatible with the realities of Turkey’s society it actually is. This issue will be tackled in the next part.

80 Z.Gokalp, p.304.
2.2. Alternative actors and their Europeanness

The previous chapter gave a brief analysis of how Turkey’s official version of national identity and Europeanness originated. As it was shown, Atatürk’s doctrine and reforms, leading towards modernity, that at the time equated European realities, ended up with unsolved controversy and ambiguity. Although sacrificing democracy for the sake of the ‘well-being of the nation’ well complies with the spirit of the first half of the 20th century, state nation building and active policies in religious matters led the elites to embracing primordial elements into the understanding of modernity.

Eventually the unsettled aspects of the official Turkishness returned to the surface in the form of the denied ethnic and religious groups. In this part the case of Kurds will be more explicitly elaborated, seeking to evaluate their impact on the character of the Turkish state. Being aware that other contested groups – like Alevi – also brought their impact, they will be included in the following chapter. Nonetheless, the Kurdish question requires a special attention, as it embraces the problematic aspects of the main above mentioned principles of Turkish state building: statism (centralization – both political and economic), national identity (the question of inclusion), and also secularism.

2.2.1. Ethnicity and social spaces: the Kurds

In the previous part the assertion was laid that the Turkish state has denied Kurdish identity for a long time (actually, from mid-1920s till late 1980s it was an official claim83). Indeed, it is a strong statement that needs some clarification, in order to avoid the simplistic explanations that it was Kurdish nationalism against the Turkish one that caused such exclusion and led to today’s armed conflict. Further examination shows a series of factors related directly to the Kemalist quest for modernization (and Westernization) rather than mere nationalist clashes.

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Kurdish tribes, settled in territories now belonging to Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, in Ottoman Empire enjoyed a broad autonomy and networking possibilities. During independence wars Kurds were fighting on Ataturk’s side and supported him during the first days of the Republic; Kurdish sheikhs sat in the first Grand National Assembly. However, when centralizing reforms took place, it faced the growing discontent in the eastern Kurdish areas, which eventually led to uprisings, like the mentioned rebellion led by sheikh Sait in 1925\(^84\); the chain of laws and policies pushing Kurdish identity to the margins followed through the later decades. Both ethnicities were taught to be descended from a pure Turkish race; as this was supported by the Sun Language theory, Kurdish language was downgraded to a ‘dialect of Turkish’ and eventually prohibited – even though at a time 3-4 percent of Kurdish population spoke any Turkish\(^85\); local authorities have been replaced by the appointees by the central government and even mentioning the Kurdish case could lead to punishment.

The roots of this enduring conflict lay in Turkish identity building process: a number of accounts on Kurdish resistance concluded that it was not explicitly national\(^86\), yet Kurds found themselves standing on the ‘path to Western civilization’ as the social spheres where Kurdish identity could unfold appeared the main subject of reform. In Turkish state discourse interpretations of Kurdish question could be grouped into three main categories that are linked to these social spheres: reactionary politics, tribal resistance and regional backwardness\(^87\).

- **Reactionary politics (Islam).** In the Ottoman times the a-national logic conditioned the unity\(^88\); through loyalty to the religious authority and symbolic spiritual leader, Caliph, Kurds constituted a part of Islamic state, this institution kept the balance in the

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\(^86\) R.O.Wilson and W.F.Tucker; M, Yegen.

\(^87\) M.Yegen, p. 216-227.

\(^88\) Ibid, p.220.
country. Therefore, its functioning was even more important for minorities as Kurds than to Turkish population, which later constituted the basis for the new nation. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 was the cornerstone to begin secularization reforms, however, the unifying basis was destroyed as well and new ways have not been found for Kurdish inclusion. Thus it was not accidentally that Sheikh Sait rebellion happened in 1925, a year after reforms towards secularism: since the early stages Kurdish nationalism and religion became intertwined very closely.

What is more, the study of Olsen and Tucker of Sait rebellion suggests that it was not the national claims that lead Kurdish movements – otherwise, if the Kurds were really seeking for independence, the best time for revolt was 1922, the year when the Kemalist government was close to extinction. However, “the Kurdish sheikhs’/tribal leaders’ sense of nationalism was not articulate or defined, although a consciousness of community certainly existed.”\(^{89}\) In this sense Kurdish movement could indeed be called ‘reactionary’: starting from discontent with reformist policies, it grew to what is today an active and persistent political-militant faction with clear ethno-national awareness.

- **Tribal resistance.** The issue of leadership is highly significant: first unrests were stirred by Kurdish sheikhs, who rightfully feared of losing the basis for legitimation of their power due to disestablishment of Islam.\(^{90}\) Another major aspect of reforms concerned centralization – which even more directly shake the institution of provincial Kurdish leaders. The National Assembly adopted the Basic Organization Law in 1921, which during the war announced the creation of locally elected domestic councils that would have certain prerogatives in the matters like education, health, economy, agriculture, public works and social welfare\(^{91}\) - proposing an early equivalent of today’s regional municipalities. However,

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\(^{89}\) R.W.Olson and W.F.Tucker, p.198.

\(^{90}\) Being religious as well as political leaders, sheikhs were entitled to collect taxes. R.W.Olson and W.F.Tucker, p.200.

the law has never been implemented – on the contrary, policy priorities in the south eastern Turkey concerned with security and public order, conducted by highly centralized authorities.

The politics of centralization threatened more than ambitions of Kurdish religious and political elites: it aimed to change the very communal – organizational relations of Kurdish population, which was based on tribes. As Mesut Yegen puts it, “a confrontation between central power and Kurdish tribes was inevitable since the logic of centralization required the extension of central administration and therefore elimination of the tribal organization of the Kurds.”92 It is worth to remember that effective central authority was essential for implementing the wide-ranging Kemalist modernization reforms, eventually leading Turkey to ‘the rightful place in the midst of contemporary civilization’.

However, gradually tribal organizations became the main spaces of resistance to the extending powers of the center. It creates a paradoxical relation between tribalism and nationalism: as Bruinessen stresses, “Kurdish nationalism and tribal and religious loyalties stand in an ambivalent relation to each other.”93 Again, it is difficult to claim that the very first uprisings were of extensive national character; nevertheless, the articulation of ethnic-based politics coincided with the tribal politics, and was fed by it. I am reluctant to claim it as a ‘national’ movement, as in political theory it creates the problem of unit: among Kurds themselves seeking for independence there is no unified assumption who should constitute the nation, should it be all Kurds of the region, or tribes of Turkey, and if so – whether all tribes or just the ones supporting the cause; the Kurds settled in the cities constitute another group, especially grown during the Cold War, with Turkey’s industrialization. Nevertheless, ethnicity element grew only stronger with external pressure, and traditional networking could be seen as both the object and the mean of resistance.

92 M.Yegen, p. 221.
• **Regional backwardness.** The Kurdish social space belongs to the periphery just as their space of economy. In the times of Ottoman Empire Kurds enjoyed the relative economic integration of the Kurdistan: the centers of their economic activities were Allepo, Damascus and Baghdad – the Middle Eastern cities; yet after the collapse of the Empire national borders were drawn and Kurds were required to turn to Turkish economic centers, like Istanbul and Izmir.\(^{94}\) This requirement, which was the integral part of nationalizing and centralizing project, also met a confrontation from the Kurdish side: networks with the other side of the border were maintained, even if it was illegal according to the new order.\(^{95}\) It is significant for national identity formation, as activities like smuggling signified the resistance to the Turkification of economic space. Additionally, it indeed was a *de facto* challenge to the nation building project, and concerning today’s situation border protection is one of the important issues regarding negotiations with the EU.

According to Ismail Besikci, since Ankara appeared “unable or unwilling to attack or subvert the economic bases of Kurdish sheikhs, they merely attacked the Kurdish language and Kurdish culture.”\(^{96}\) Centralization, coming together with an ethnic-national (Turkish) content, demanded that “everything that recalled a separate Kurdish identity was to be abolished: language, clothing, names and of course the tribes themselves.”\(^{97}\) Kurdish realities did not fit to the model of contemporary center – periphery relations, and therefore they were neglected – eliminated. Being subjected to assimilation in order to implement Kemalist nationalizing project, Kurds found themselves captured in the discursive cleavages like: traditionalist/modernist, central/periphery, reformist/reactionary; their pro-religious tribal strive contributed to escalation of these cleavages. On the other hand, Kurds challenged

\(^{94}\) M. Yegen, p. 223.
\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{97}\) Bruinessen, p. 242.
Westernization project both in action – and in theory. That is, the modernization thesis, according to which nationalism and secularism are the elements of the same transformation process, overlooks the relationship between nationalism and religion, as well as continuity of tribal social sphere to the growing national awareness.

Drawing boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, determining otherness helps to maintain ones identity. While otherness became the reference point in the EU to define Europeanness, as opposed to America and radical Islam, in Turkish case it was Kurds that become the signifiers of the ‘other’. They were the ones who are bringing the country backwards with their traditional lifestyle, embedded religiousness and illiteracy.

Mesut Yegen notices the importance of the context in which the certain discursive formation takes place. In the first part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the Turkish state discourse was subjected to the notions of westernization/modernization, nationalism, secularism and centralization. Today Kurds are still the signifiers of tensions between past and modernity – only from the other side. The contemporary discursive context is oriented towards a set of different values, such as pluralism, multiculturalism, or, in the EU terms, ‘unity in diversity’. Therefore, Turkey’s modernization project is being judged according to the way Ankara is treating its minorities. Shift in European countries from unitary nation-states towards a more heterogeneous mode (at least at the rhetoric level) is required by external pressures to be experienced in Turkey as well.

As Will Kymlicka puts it, the “twin process of diffusing multiculturalism and minority rights are fundamentally reshaping the traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, nationhood and citizenship.”\textsuperscript{98} The next chapter is concerned how Kurdish population, along with other minorities, fit into the Europeanization discourse. I will argue that the notion of

Europeanness that is embedded in the EU institutions and expressed through enlargement policies, by using Kurdish (as well as other minorities’) agency along Turkey – EU negotiations is actually modifying Turkey’s modernization project set by its founding fathers.
3. Turkish Europeanness and Copenhagen criteria

The previous chapters analyze two seemingly separate developments: the articulation of the notion of ‘Europeanness’ in the EU and in Turkey. Apparently debates within both (territorial) spheres differ significantly. While in the EU defining European identity has been taken as a challenging task by a number of politicians, whose efforts have been finally documented in treaties of Maastricht, Constitution for Europe, Lisbon Treaty and others; in Turkey, however, it is associated to the course of modernization set by the founding fathers of the Republic. Despite the changed nature of the EU and its member states, as H.Kramer notices, political circles as well as mass media “rarely discuss whether Turkey is willing and ready to endorse the EU model for what it truly is and not for what it represents to traditional Kemalists.”99 The area where this clash of understandings is probably most apparent is the protection of minority rights. On one side, for the EU it reflects the celebration of diversity and the taken mission of spreading democratization and multiculturalism outside its borders. Yet in Turkey the concept of pluralism opposes the very core of Kemalist nation-building reforms, which constituted the foundations for Turkey’s modernization. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to reveal the mechanism, how EU is modifying Turkey’s modernization project, using such tools like multiculturalism diffusion and minority rights protection.

Keeping the structure used in previous chapters, first the EU identity policies and efforts to transmit, export its understanding of Europeanness will be touched upon, followed by examination of its relation with identity and minority policies in Turkey.

3.1. Democratizing mission: establishing Europeanness ‘abroad’

In the first chapter two spheres have been presented where Europeanness, as it is understood within the EU, is expressed: on one hand, the debates within the union add to its development, and through discursive exchanges it becomes internalized by the elites, mass

media and citizens – the *demos*. On the other hand, relations with the non-EU actors, firstly the bordering states, has become another equally significant area where European identity is articulated. Given the importance of otherness in the very framing of what it is to be ‘European’, interactions are giving a chance to articulate and at the same time reshape Europeanness. That is, by time the rules for ‘peaceful political co-existence, shared cultural norms, and common beliefs’ – that, as agreed before, constitute the civic notion of Europeanness – have been changing in these interactions. What is important for this paper, the change is expected on both sides: within the subject state as well as in the EU.

There is extensive literature about the development of multiculturalism and pluralization in Europe. Although the focus here will be on the other side, Turkey, some space should be devoted to the very mechanism of interaction, that is – how the EU is spreading the civic values embedded in its foundation. My argument is that a rather aggressive manner of what could be called ‘external identity policies’, division among EU member states on the subject of Turkey’s membership and politicization or double standards of what should be left to the sphere of norms and values hardens the possibilities of successful communication.

### 3.1.1. Minority rights diffusion

As agreed above, EU external identity policies here will be related to Copenhagen criteria and most specifically, the regime of minority rights. Although a number of other policies and agreements could also serve as an object for analysis, this paper will be limited to the former ones, as it gives a focused systemic view and is most revealing in Turkey’s case.

EU regulations on minority rights have been characterized by ambitious aims, experiments and politicization. The fall of Communism marked a new phase of ideas on state-minority relations, as Western Europe found itself in the new global political context as well as surrounded by a number of new states in Eastern Europe. European response to this could
be best characterized by a hope of spreading peace and democracy, or a will “to do something” – which resulted in the internationalization of minority rights and standards.

The collapse of Soviet Union brought violent conflicts in the Caucasus and the Balkans. W. Kymlicka notices that at the time it was not clear how much potential these conflicts had to spread: “In the early 1990s many commentators feared that ethnic tensions would spiral out of control in wide swaths of post-Communist Europe.” It was seen as EU as an outside party could be the one that brings stabilizing changes into the space of competing nationalisms. Since then attention was explicitly directed towards de-securitization of minority issues – especially significant in the light of Yugoslav wars of dissolution, where EU (then EC) attempted first internationalization of minority issues (ending up with a failure). In this light it is not surprising that protection of minority rights has been included into the list of minimum requirements for candidate countries. As the political criteria states: “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”.

However, reflecting on the active interference of European Commission in minority rights protection of the candidate states, I would neglect humanitarian concern as a motivating basis for action: although it best mobilizes public support, governments were not moved by minority sufferings at other time or in other places. As Simms points out, “German interests <…> pertain to Europe and German security: European integration, the stability of Russia, and immigration, to name but a few. <…> …interests lying not in Africa, but in Europe and

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100 Will Kymlicka, p.171-173.
its periphery”\textsuperscript{104}. German position undoubtedly reflects that of the other West European states. A rather convincing reason to engage in minority rights was the fear that escalating ethnic conflicts would encourage large-scale refugee flows into Western Europe\textsuperscript{105}, also causing economic instability. Additionally, reconfiguration in world powers – namely, the fall of USSR – gave Europe a chance to enter world politics as a new strong player. Western Europe took a chance firstly experimenting its soft power on Eastern European countries. Internationalizing minority rights meant that new states willing ‘to join the club’ had “to meet ‘European standards’ regarding the treatment of minorities”, i.e., to prove that it “has left behind its ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ and ‘tribal nationalisms’, and is able to join a ‘modern’ liberal and cosmopolitan Europe.”\textsuperscript{106} That is, meeting the minority rights’ standards has been equated with obtaining a kind of ‘European identity’, understood in an inclusive terms of liberal democracy.

\textbf{3.1.2. Twofold Europeanness}

EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) is a good example of the forceful manner in which EU is accomplishing its assumed mission. What most of CEE share with Turkey is a strong commitment to nation-state and national culture protection. This concept is established in a number of laws and/or constitutions. However, EU has made abolition of these laws paramount for accession, as they by nature disadvantage the cultures of minorities in CEE. Therefore, candidate states found themselves in ambivalent situation: they were forced to choose between the goals of long-term well-being (provided by membership in the EU) and protection of their own culture\textsuperscript{107}. Since both are related to identification of these states – as the sense of belonging to Europe and efforts to situate

\textsuperscript{104} Brendan Simms, “From the Kohl to the Fischer Doctrine: Germany and the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession, 1991-1999”, in \textit{German History}, Vol.21, No.3, 397.
\textsuperscript{105} W.Kymlicka, p.174
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Michael Johns, “Do As I Say, Not As I Do”: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights”, \textit{East European Politics & Societies}, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, p.685.
national culture within the European context – pressures from the EU might be seen as interference in the identity policies of sovereign states.

As a result such practice creates an unbalanced relationship between the two parties, as EU is allowed to experiment, and candidate countries – solely to accept and adapt. However, Eastern European countries regarded it seriously, as their elites saw membership in the EU as ‘the only way’\(^{108}\). The fact that internationalization of minority rights has been adopted for Eastern Europe is also visible in EU demands from Turkey. The same mechanism follows: monitoring, selecting minorities of attention and red flagging the laws and policies that discriminate and undermine the opportunities of minority group members. The main difference is the reaction of Ankara: being less isolated and dependent than CEE, Turkish elite seems less vulnerable to pressure, as they see it more of a pragmatic interest of the EU rather than good wishes to protect minorities. After all, it is the fate of the state rather than that of subject minority that is questioned\(^{109}\): after joining the alliance EU loses effective instruments to impose legal regulations on member states. Latvia could serve as an example: while during negotiations treatment with numerous Russian minority improved, after acceptance to the EU positive trends have undergone some deterioration – mainly due to the fact that EU lacks of effective monitoring inside system.

Indeed, EU minority policies towards candidate countries challenge the notion of ‘the logic of appropriateness’ brought by social constructivists. Although wrapped in a normative language, it indeed carries strong political motivation. Regulations of minority rights in European international law have a long history: already the League of Nations endorsed specific instruments for minorities in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as Southeastern countries like Turkey or Iraq. In words of Patrick Thornberry, “a carpet of treaties and


\(^{109}\) M. Johns, p.692.
declarations” aimed at defending ‘racial, religious or linguistic’ minorities – however, he also adds that “the system described but did not define minorities.”

Throughout the 20th century minority rights regulations have been shifting between group and individual, generic and targeted rights; it is generally the sovereign states that define the rights of minorities under its jurisdiction – that is exactly the case in Western Europe. However, from candidate countries – firstly CEE and now Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – compliance to what is called ‘European standards’ is expected.

While pressing the candidate countries to apply a bouquet of new regulations, the Western OSCE countries, most of which are members of the EU, have “no conception of how to apply such policies in relation to their own minorities or of accepting such a level of international regulations in the affairs of the state.” That is, demands for candidate countries exceed the actual existing legal framework within the EU. One example could be Turks in Germany: even though many of them have stayed in Germany for generations, speak German and feel German, and their official number estimates around 2 million, Berlin refuses to count them as a minority, motivating on their recent arrival. Restrictions to Turks refer to voting, jobs in civil service or military, and even expulsions for illegal activities. To add, France and Greece do not admit national minorities to exist on their territories – even though French have permitted linguistic autonomy in Corsica. At the same time Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, that grew after Soviet occupation, received a special attention from the EC, going so far as to call for lifting of the demands for naturalization.

Though initially formulation of general standards was aimed, EU ended up with separate institutions on monitoring minorities within the Union (The European Monitoring

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112 Ibid.
113 M.Johns, p.693.
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, set up in 1997) and in the candidate countries (European Commission is issuing annual reports that include sections on minorities – however, it relies on other international organizations, namely OSCE and CoE).\footnote{European Commissioner on Enlargement, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key_documents_en.htm>}. This institutional separation also generates an environment of different, twofold treatment. While universal norms and rules build the foundation of this alliance, EU has discredited itself with double standards on minority rights.

As noted, ‘meeting European standards’ in the field of minority rights has come to mean a rather fluid compliance to the interests of member states. For the sake of objectivity, it must be marked, that the EU as an institution indeed is heavily dependent on its member states, especially when it comes to enlargement. Yet, as Moravscik’s intergovernmentalism notices, neither EU institutions, nor governments of member states should be perceived as uniform actors. Not going into details, as it is a step away from the topic of this paper, it should still be mentioned that the division among EU member states exists by interestingly linking perceptions on (1) EU integration, (2) minority rights and (3) Turkey’s acceptance. It can be clearly seen as the classic ‘federalists’ Germany and France are at the same time the biggest opponents to Turkey’s accession, while not-so-much a team player Britain officially supports Turkey’s bid.\footnote{“Turkijos narystės Europos Sąjungoje pasekmės Lietuvai”, [„What Does Turkey’s Membership in the EU Mean to Lithuania“], \textit{Strategic Study Centre}, a study ordered by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004.}  It could be explained in a way that British restraint from deep integration allows the growing diversity within the union – furthermore, heterogeneity is even useful, as then cultural (or primordial) side of Europeanness should have to be diminished.\footnote{Ibid.}

Commenting on it the observation of Thomas Jansen is useful: he distinguished three difficulties that restrain EU from forming a substantial sense of identity: firstly, the failure to
adopt a European constitution, or its ‘finalité politique’, secondly – disagreements over geographical frontiers discussed in the first chapter, and finally, the ambiguities regarding to the EU’s raison d’etre, as the peace, which served as the primary driving force, now is taken for granted in the Western Europe.\footnote{118} There is observable lack of force for deeper integration as well as the consensus how far it should actually take: economically, politically – and geographically. It is this division that allowed French president Giscard D’Estaing (ar kaip jis) to make his famous statement that admitting Turkey would be “the end of Europe”\footnote{119} – it was addressed both to Ankara as well as to other European capitals.

3.2. Changes in Turkey

Given the dynamics of changing international environment, Turkey-EU negotiations could be seen as a two-ways street: while debates on Turkey have a transformative power on the EU, negotiations process also brings similar impact on Turkey, transforming the dominant interpretation of democracy and modernity.

The success of implementing necessary democratization reforms in Turkey to a large extent depends on the degree to which “the EU’s treatment of Turkey as a potential full and equal member is fair and objective.”\footnote{120} For this reason, it was suggested that the same criteria and the same mechanisms of evaluation would be used for Turkey as for other candidate countries.\footnote{121} However, at this day this assumption seems doomed to fail at least for two reasons: firstly, as was shown, candidates from CEE were subjected to double standards, which does not ensure fair judgment neither for them, nor for Turkey, if the same scheme was followed; secondly, admission of Bulgaria and Romania, which in many areas are still


\footnote{121} Ibid.
standing behind Turkey, already discredited any illusion of a rule-driven judgment. At the same time, the norms of impartiality and universality have been undermined: Turkey is being regarded as a special case, instead of applying universal requirements; also, a number of EU member states’ leaders are distancing Turkey’s membership differently from other candidates, basing it on primordial criteria, like religion or geography.

Bearing this in mind, it is apparent that Ankara faces difficulties in accepting European identity as based on norms and values, while the very same norms and values are being undermined at the time of negotiations.

3.2.1. Minority challenge in Turkey

Returning to the idea raised in the previous chapter, the issue of minority integration has become a signifier of tensions around the conceptions of state sovereignty, nationhood and citizenship. While in Germany and Western Europe it tested the efficiency of multiculturalism policies, in Turkey the content of modernization project came into question. The mechanism and the current situation can be seen from Ankara’s uneven policies towards Kurdish – as well as other – minority groups.

What raises no doubts for those following Turkey’s accession process, is that in the last decade the country has implemented a wide range of reforms, and although many of them are related to internal processes and domestic demand for a change, pressure from the EU undoubtedly added to its efficiency – as well as, I would argue, to certain characteristics.

• Suppressions. One more reason why Kurdish minority is the most suitable for examination is an extensive attention to its case from the EC: Kurdish minority falls best into the category of concern to European elites – i.e., the category of national minorities, involved in ethnic conflict. As noted previously, Turkish state employed repressive measures to suppress the emerging Kurdish identity and various forms of its expression. Language being the main element of difference, it got restricted by law extensively: Nathalie Tocci claims that banned
from the year 1983 till 1991, the usage of Kurdish language both publicly and in private was penalized; and amendment of Anti Terror Law in 1995 made it “no longer an automatic offence”.\textsuperscript{122} In 1998 the Report by EC also says Kurdish is “no longer banned in the context of cultural activities” – only in political usage.\textsuperscript{123} However in 2002 and later Reports explicitly covered cases when people, who were listening to Kurdish cassettes or gave Kurdish names to their children, were subjected to persecution. Therefore, the problem arises repeatedly, and it indicates a certain level of inconsistency: both in reporting, and in the policies applied.

Similar situation can be observed in the field of public activities. The Turkish constitution adopted in 1982 contains several articles directed towards Kurdish movements – even though they are not mentioned. Article 57 declares that political activities ought to promote “the indivisibility of the national homeland”; Article 89 adds to it stating that “no political party may concern itself with the defense, development or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture; nor may they seek to create minorities within our frontiers or to destroy our national unity.”\textsuperscript{124} Based on these articles, as well as the Penal Code provisions, political activities have been closely observed, and any usage of Kurdish language or manipulation on Kurdish issue penalized. In the 1990s a number of Kurdish parties have been outlawed by the state, and the only one operating today – HADEP – is experiencing strict limitations accusing it of having “organic ties with the PKK”.\textsuperscript{125}

Legally reference to minorities – especially applying to Kurds – has been criminalized in the Law of Political Parties, according to which political parties “shall not claim that there are minorities based on national or religious or cultural or confessional or racial or linguistic

\textsuperscript{125} N.Tocci, p.18.
differences” (Art. 81(a)).\textsuperscript{126} Thus, they are not allowed to speak their language, and their parties lobbying for improvement of Kurdish situation face difficulties on daily basis. It could be claimed that while after creation of the Republic Kurdish question challenged the Kemalist quest for modernization, so today it stands as a litmus paper of what kind of modernization will be chosen in future. Turkish government is seeking to hold a firm hand on minority policies, interpreting it as a precondition for state integrity; while the EU is testing its democratizing power, concentrating rather extensively on minority issues – by affecting this policy area it could to some extent influence state identity formation as well. Therefore, the development of Europeanness seems inseparable from power and, as Moravscik asserted, from interest.

- **International pressure.** So far international pressure on Turkey has been successful to a certain extent. To this day there is no single law defending minority rights in Turkey; instead, a number of laws indirectly addressing minority issues have been used against minority members, “who have sought to promote minority rights or to address the issues of minorities in general.”\textsuperscript{127} Every Report on Turkey starts with a statement: “Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and does not recognize minorities other than those mentioned in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.”\textsuperscript{128} All these regulations are clearly inconsistent to international standards of minority rights; however, when it comes to the EC monitoring, it is not that clear to what extent the EU is eligible to put forward its expectations for Turkey. That is, so far the EU’s Reports have focused primarily on ensuring classic individual civil rights – e.g., freedom of speech, right to association, conscience, non-discrimination, and property. Yet to this date it is


not clear, whether the EU will leave it this way, making exception because of specific circumstances (the ongoing violence in the southeastern part, the depth of the Kemalist legacy, etc.) or would it insist on positive minority rights norms as a condition for the accession: such as education in Kurdish, Kurdish political parties or usage of their language in local governments where they form, a significant percentage of the population. It is this dilemma that makes EU’s approach look unsystematic and inconsistent, as was shown in the discussion on minority rights regime and Progress Reports.

However, the relation between increase of constructive dialogue of Ankara and Brussels and the positive reforms towards minorities is apparent: the year 2003 was the time when the implementation of reforms already became visible, and one of the features of this timing was the increased usage of Kurdish in publications, as well as public events, like conferences and concerts – especially in predominantly Kurdish populated areas.\textsuperscript{129}

- **Article 301.** Among other significant reforms one could be called the symbolic victory of the international pressure. It is the case of amending the Article 301 of the Penal Code, which initially criminalized public insult of ‘Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly’ as well as “the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security structures”\textsuperscript{130}, i.e., defended the prestige the main state institutions and ‘Turkishness’ defined by the same authorities; and only in April 2008 it was amended to claim the insult of Turkey, the Turkish ethnicity, or Turkish government institutions to be illegal – all because of the pressure of the EU and after long negotiations. What is interesting, it came to force in 2005 to replaced Article 159, criticized by the EC and such NGOs like Amnesty International – however, its basic principles


(penalizing the acts that that insult or belittle state foundations or state institutions) appeared in the amendment – until 2008. This article has become the basis for dozens of trials, some of them being of a high-profile that were followed by extensive international coverage. It deserves some attention in this paper as well.

Being aware of temptation for exaggerated criticism, short presentation of few cases may provide a clearer view. The trials of famous Armenian-origin journalist and editor Hrant Dink and novelist Orhan Pamuk are probably the most well-known ones: the former was brought to court for his articles on Armenian identity that were seen as ‘denigrating Turkishness’, and the later – for a statement said in an interview given to Swiss newspaper (Tages Anzeiger): “30,000 Kurds and a million Armenians were murdered. Hardly anyone dares mention it, so I do. And that’s why I’m hated.”\textsuperscript{131} Although in the conflict in Southeastern Turkey clearly there have been victims on both sides, including big numbers of civilians, escalation of this issue or opposition to the military’s actions is regarded adversely, as it subtracts the legitimation of wide ranging measures the state has applied – including emergency regime, that severely restricts the rights of inhabitants of that area. Additionally, any allusion to Armenian genocide triggers a sensitive reaction from state authorities. This was the case of Hrant Dink as well: indulged in criticizing the official conception of Turkish identity, he was tried twice, the convictions based on interpretations of his metaphors as denigrating. “This is a political decision because I wrote about the Armenian Genocide and they detest that, so they found a way to accuse me of insulting Turks”\textsuperscript{132}, - he stated in one of his interviews. His statement about detesting appeared rightful, as the journalist was assassinated by a 17-year-old nationalist Ogün Samast in January 2007 – after he was found


\textsuperscript{132} “Journalist Convicted on Charge of Insulting ‘Turkish Identity’”, Committee to Protect Journalists: Defending Journalists Worldwide, New York, 12 October, 2005.
guilty under Article 301. Public trials, although once he was acquitted, pointed him and stigmatized as a ‘potential enemy’, that finally led to a kind of lynch trial, sharpening the questions of minority integration and freedom of speech.

The fate of Orhan Pamuk was different: although he faced restrictions at home, the Nobel Prize winner was finally acquitted, and his case contributed to escalation of the legitimacy of Turkish Penal Code and Article 301 internationally. It also brought attention to a number of other cases, when people were tried for expressing their thoughts or adding to public discussion on the sensitive topics like the identity of minorities in Turkey, both recognized and the ones uncovered by the Lausanne Treaty.

What is important, “insulting Turkishness” was usually called a broader than official interpretation of ethnic constitution of the state, mentioning Kurdish problem or the Armenian massacre of 1915 (not even necessarily calling it genocide); another facet of the penalized statements often was criticism to the state-established narrow understanding of these issues. Therefore, opposing to the system as well as to its product was incorporated into the Penal Code, in order to defend the prestige of the institutions listed in the article. It reflects the very core of what could be called ‘a state identity’ (which is though in many occasions used in a rather fluid way): articulated in Kemalist principles and embedded in Ataturk’s established institutions, it is seen as threatened by any sort of criticism. The prominent Turkish lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz, who brought a number of writers and intellectuals to court, explains it with complaint: according to him, most of these people are “insulting Ataturk, cooling the people’s willingness to serve in the army, you know.”

Coming back to the discursive context, such regulation is aimed to save and restrict the certain discourse in which the current institutional structure can persist. Although in Turkey there is yet little debate on the eventual loss of part

of sovereignty in case the country joins the EU, the cases like the debate on Penal Code show that the tensions already arise.

Not accidentally proponents of strong statism refrain from supporting the EU accession talks: it is demanding for political integration into a rather different system, which by effect would mean big changes of Turkish institutional, social and economic structures. The views of K. Kerincsiz on the EU are much revealing. As he explained in one interview, “The Turk is not a race to live with the European. <…> The Easterner has to insult himself and degrade his own culture to ingratiate himself with the West.”\textsuperscript{135} Although he claimed the implementation of Article 301 was not intentionally anti-EU, for some time Penal Code was an obstacle in Turkey-EU negotiations. Moving it away actually meant a relative liberation of Turkishness from strict state supervision. Just as in the EU countries a variety of groups have been participating in the dynamics of what today resulted in ‘European norms and values’, if Turkey is moving closer, the marginalized fractions of its society are expected to be given a better standing and a voice to express their realities.

However, even though Article 301 was amended in the end\textsuperscript{136}, pressure from the EU brought as much impetus for reform, as sharpened the friction between Turkish nationalists and pro-Westerners. As BBC reporter in Turkey Chris Morris claims, “Support from abroad for the Kurds, or for the Armenians, is still seen in quite serious political circles as part of a long term plan to weaken and divide the Turkish republic.”\textsuperscript{137} As to illustrate such mistrust, during the negotiations over Article 301 Dutch European Parliament member Joost Lagendijk, a frequent official observer of Turkish affairs who participated in such events as O.Pamuk’s

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} It was replaced by the Law 5759 on 30 April 2008 and now the terms “Turkishness” and “Republic”, were amended as “Turkish Nation” and “Republic of Turkey” – hoping in such a way to get it narrowed down. Kaan Karcilioglu, “Turkey: Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code Amended”, IRIS Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory, May 2008, <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2008/6/article28.en.html>, [viewed 20 May 2009].
trial, was called a “foreign invader” by Kerincsiz; not limiting himself with words, the lawyer leveled charges of insulting the Turkish military against the Dutch politician.\textsuperscript{138} It could be evaluated as an effort to alienate J. Lagendijk as the other, the ‘arrogant westerner’, denigrating Turkish values and Kemalist legacy – which would by definition mean opposition to Turkey’s aspirations for achieving a ‘rightful place amidst contemporary civilizations’. Indeed, while J. Lagendijk’s actions do not show such intentions, but quite on the contrary presents him as a partner of Turkish pro-Western intellectuals, the image prescribed to him by Kerincsiz is becoming rather stereotypical in reaction to EU’s hesitations towards Turkey.

Ultra-nationalist followers of Kemalism appear in ambivalent situation: on one side, Kemalist legacy directs Turkey towards the West (in the very words of Ataturk, “The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks <...> but we Turks have always consistently moved towards the West <...> In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative”\textsuperscript{139}); but on the other, reforms required by the EU may be seen as undermining important parts of this legacy. Although the early modernizers were concerned with keeping the balance between modernity and tradition, or “Western materialism and Eastern spirituality”\textsuperscript{140}, the nationalist tendencies embedded in state structure and legal structures do not reflect the awakening of national consciousness intended by thinkers like Ziya Gokalp. Just as in the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Kemalist ideology was the major force of reform, today it calls for reservation and places its apologists into defensive position: as Kemal Kerisci explains it, Turkish Euroskeptics see the EU as “an intruder or a threat to a way of life they have long been accustomed to.”\textsuperscript{141} Just like Kurdish movements firstly were brought together by the need to defend their social spaces, which were seen old-fashioned and lagging behind the modernity.

\textsuperscript{140} A.Kadioglu, p.183.
\textsuperscript{141} K.Kirisci, p.12.
standards, today’s nationalist-Kemalists find themselves defending notions which in Europe, at least at the rhetoric level, are no longer seen as an example to be followed: state-centrism, homogeneity and nationalism are quite the opposite to what A. Merkel in her speech in Berlin, 2007, has listed as ‘European values’.

Therefore, two visions of Europeanness could be distinguished among Turkish elites: the one articulated by Euroskeptics (I refrain from calling them ‘Kemalists’, as previous analysis might suggest, and further I will explain why) and the other being more pro-integrationist. The first conception could be called “Sevres syndrome”, which refers to a widely spread above mentioned conspiracy theory that the West is aiming to weaken and divide Turkey, just as Western powers indeed intended after the First World War. The treaty of Sevres was drawn by the winners of war that had to divide Ottoman Empire, and the territory today comprising Turkey, between Armenia, Greece, Kurdistan, as well as the zones of the Western powers.\footnote{K. Kirisci, p.15.} It did not come into practice, as Turkey succeeded to have the Lausanne Treaty signed in 1923, which undermined Sevres – but to substantiate the mistrust and suspicion Sevres is often recalled as a historical argument. Therefore, building the understanding of Europeanness on such premises could only be explained from intergovernmental approach and using the language of realpolitik. It refers to a threat rather than opportunity, and unconditional adjustment to ‘European standards’ are by no means in concord with Ataturk’s vision of strong and respectful Turkey.

The problem, however, is that major changes have already started within the Turkish society, as well as the elites. For many people – like Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink and others – Europeanness embodied by the EU means new prospects and opportunities. This is already evident in the new discursive spaces that opened in the process. Kemal Kirisci gives an
example of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) today “unashamedly referring to Turkish citizens of ‘Kurdish origin’ or ‘descent’ instead of naming it ‘a Southeastern problem’. According to the scholar, “That is just one manifestation of how those reforms have trickled down to today.”¹⁴³

Taken the pro-integration stance, it refers to Europeanness as modernization – to some extent resembling the ideas of Ataturk and Ziya Gokalp. From this position reforms brought along with negotiations with the EU are seen as the means to maintain association with the ‘contemporary civilization’ – an interpretation that could be called ‘Kemalism revised’.

The two interpretations of Europeanness differ both in goals and the means to reach it. Seemingly, the one that will come to dominate elite’s minds in Ankara might turn accession talks – although much depends on Brussels as well, as has been shown. However, for a conclusion, I would like to give a longer citation by Chris Morris, which combines both visions into a future-telling prediction: “If Turkey passes all the reforms which the EU demands it will emerge in 10-15 years as a completely different country, – politically, economically, and socially. It is not inconceivable that a growing number of Turks will then turn round and say ‘Wait a minute – we’ve achieved what we wanted, we’ve changed our country, we’re successful and stable, we no longer have a pressing need to join the EU.’”¹⁴⁴


Conclusion

This paper had a challenging aim to overview and analyze in over fifty pages the processes that have been happening through the last hundred years – or actually even longer. What is more, the task was raised to combine two developments, namely in Europe/EU and in Turkey, which differ in a number of dimensions, one being a multi-national inter-state entity, basically ‘possessing’ the discursive power to define European values (Europeanness); while the other is a borderline state struggling to find its proper place in the region and to determine its relationship to Europe. Nonetheless, the assumption was maid that these two processes are connected closely, and the analysis proved it to be correct.

The EU leaders engaged themselves in building ‘Europe’ which would mean more than shared functions or pragmatic interests: indeed, the normative side of the integration process deserves no less attention, as it is the ‘European values’ of democracy, pluralism, human rights and freedoms that form the basis for officially defined ‘Europeanness’ of the EU. As social constructivists like Thomas Risse point, EU integration could be portrayed as a discursive construct which sets constraints for actors, in the form of norms and rules\textsuperscript{145}; that is, it is adopting of certain version of Europeanness that drive EU integration and enlargement.

While normative adaptation might already cause difficulties to candidate countries, unofficially the characteristics of Europe tend to include primordial elements next to civic. In the need of filling the lack of legitimacy, a broad set of policies that intend to ‘turn to people’ have been applied. Stepping from neo-functionalist hopes of the success of spill-over effect, denied by Euroskepticism in referenda for key integration documents, EU appears as a polity united by symbols, certain common qualities inside and boundaries as differences from the

\textsuperscript{145} T.Risse, p.163.
outside. Indeed, otherness has been proposed as a precondition to enforce the presence of ‘Europeanness’ in everyday life. For candidate countries like Turkey it creates a complex of exclusion: while civic criteria are adoptable, the cultural elements like religion or geography are likely to serve as a basis for Turkish exclusion. If in this way Europeanness is being framed by a reference to non-European, Turkey is likely to be the one.

Such manipulation shifting from civic to primordial elements brings unrest Ankara and its subjects. Moreover, it adds to politicization of Copenhagen criteria, which could be called ‘external identity policies’: it is best seen from the first, political, criterion and most specifically, the rime of minority rights. Concerned with somewhat missionary diffusion of peace and freedoms, EU attentively follows the minority rights and freedoms in every candidate country, practically placing the possibility of membership on country’s ability to apply the suggested standards. However, the problematic circumstance is the lack of such regulation in member countries: applying double standards for accession process stimulates mistrust and reservations in candidate countries. While the Central and Eastern European countries accepted such rules not having much choice, for Turkey a game ‘do as I say, not as I do’ does not apply so easily.

The founding fathers of Turkish Republic looked at Europe as a model for political, economic and social advance; analyzing the writings of Ziya Gokalp or the Kemalist reforms it becomes clear that Europeanness meant modernization rather than actual bonding with Europe. Having Europeanization/modernization set as a goal, Kemalists indulged in an all-encompassing revolution in the young Turkish Republic that touched every segment of social life – from clothing to national unification. As Ziya Gokalp stated, “Civilization is a book to be written internationally: each chapter containing the culture is a single nation.” Nation building, in compliance with the spirit of the time, was seen as a precondition for state’s unity
and integrity, as well as effective government and abilities of advancement. However, strong state tradition has prevailed and today similar premises are being applied, especially when it comes to minority policies.

In the nation building process both civic and primordial elements were used, in this way marginalizing and alienating certain groups, the first target being Kurdish community. They did not fit into the project of modernization, among other reasons – because of occupying the most traditional social spaces. However, today Kurds are gaining extensive attention from the EU and again come to challenge Turkey’s Kemalist modernization project. Negotiations on the rights for this ethnic group are touching much broader issues, actually transforming the dominant interpretation of democracy and modernity in Turkey.

On one hand, it gives possibility to appear what I have called a ‘revised version of Kemalism’. Europeanness in this interpretation remains attached to modernization, and Europe/EU – an example of advancement. For certain period, especially in 2003 – the period of warm relations between Turkey and the EU – such approach was predominant among Turkish elites. The reforms were taking place and relative cultural freedom to Kurds has been granted. However, double standards, politicization of the Copenhagen criteria and unwillingness shown from certain EU politicians added to Euroskeptic voices in Turkey. The seed of mistrust, commonly named ‘Sevres syndrome’ forms the articulation of Europeanness that is detached from Kemalist vision of strong and prosperous Turkey. This prospect sees the EU as the threat rather than opportunity, and adjustment to Copenhagen criteria – as strategic withdrawing rather than advancement. At this moment it is difficult to say which these interpretations are going to dominate future negotiations – nevertheless, it will undoubtedly have an impact of its outcomes.
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