STATE-PERCEPTIONS OF THE DIASPORA MOVEMENT MILLI GÖRÜŞ IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS

- A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS-

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES DEPARTMENT

BY

ANNA PERVANIDIS

PROFESSOR PÉTER BALÁZS, SUPERVISOR

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

4 JUNE 2009

17,310 WORDS
This thesis concerns itself with the Integration of the Turkish Muslim Diaspora movement Milli Göerues in Germany and the Netherlands and poses the question of why the latter is perceived differently by the state institutions of the two countries. The methodology used in this paper includes the analysis of the yearly reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of both countries. Although similar evidence about the Diaspora movement Milli Göerues is given, the conclusions about the latter drawn by the German state are significantly more negative than the conclusions drawn by the Dutch state. This paper argues that these differences in perception might be attributed to the varying interaction of the Diaspora movement Milli Göerues in Germany and the Netherlands but are to a large extent determined by differing political and institutional traditions of the two countries.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Péter Balázs and John Harbord for their academic assistance for this thesis. I would also like to thank Yavuz Celik Karahan (IGMG) and Yusuf Altuntas (MGNN) for the interesting inside they gave me through their interviews. In particular I would like to thank Evelyn Maib and Maxicen Staley who shared all the stressful and enjoyable moments with me during this past academic year. You are what I call life-quality.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................... ii

Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1

Debate on Integration .......................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER 1 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .................................................. 9

1.2 Milli Görüs Movement in Turkey ................................................................. 10

1.3 The Historical Development of the Diaspora Movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands ........................................................................................................ 12

1.3.1 1970s: Early Beginnings ................................................................. 12

1.3.2 1980s: the Kaplan Schism and Transnational Organization of the Milli Görüs Movement ................................................................. 14

1.3.3 1990s: Establishment of IGMG and Split of NIF ......................................... 15

1.4 Organizational Structure of IGMG today ...................................................... 17

CHAPTER 2: Perceptions of the Milli Görüs Diaspora Movement in Germany and the Netherlands ................................................................. 20

2.1. The Perception of IGMG in Germany: Analysis of Yearly Reports of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) ................................................................. 20

2.1.1 Evidence on the Connection between IGMG and the Milli Görüs Movement Turkey ................................................................. 21

2.1.2 Conclusions by BfV on IGMG’s Stance towards Integration into German Society ................................................................. 23

2.1.2.1 Children and Youth- Activities by IGMG ......................................... 24

2.1.2.2 Citizenship-Claims by IGMG .......................................................... 26

2.2 The perception of NIF/MGNN in the Netherlands: Analysis of Yearly Reports of the Dutch Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (AIVD) ......................................................................................... 27

2.2.1. Similar Evidence with Different Conclusions – Interpretation of BfV’s Evidence by AIVD ................................................................. 28

2.2.2. Use of Alternative Evidence by AIVD ............................................... 30

2.2.3 AIVD’s response to Citizenship claims by NIF/MGNN and Further Conclusions ................................................................. 32

CHAPTER 3: Explanations for Differences in Perception .................................. 36

3.1 The State as an Actor: Integration Policies and Institutionalization of Islam in Germany and the Netherlands ................................................................. 37

3.1.1 Integration Policies and Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands ................................................................. 38

3.1.2 Integration Policies and Institutionalization of Islam in Germany ................................................................. 41

3.2 The Diaspora Movement Milli Görüs as an Actor ........................................ 46

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 53

Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 57
Introduction

Currently 3.5 million Muslim immigrants from Turkey are living in Western Europe constituting one of the largest immigrant groups. The presence of an increasing Muslim minority in Western Europe has posed questions about how to integrate a new cultural-religious group into western-European political and societal structures. In particular with regards to the Turkish Muslim minority which in fact forms a large part of Muslims in Europe the topic of integration became increasingly important after the recruitment of guest-workers in the 1950s 1960s and the realization that Turkish immigrants have come to stay in their host-countries, rather than returning back home. The integration-problematique relates to challenges of nation states to incorporate Turkish Muslim migrants in existing institutional structures as well as to the struggle of Muslim minorities to adjust to Western societal and political systems. Not only differ political strategies of European countries on how to deal with their newly established Turkish Muslim minority, which resulted more or less inclusive approaches towards institutional incorporation of Muslims; also the Turkish Muslim minority is highly heterogeneous within itself. The Turkish Muslim minority is thus divided according to political and religious orientations which have led to the establishment of various Turkish Diaspora organizations. The different ideological orientations of these Diaspora organizations originated in political and religious streams of laic and conservative Islamic ideologies, present in the Turkish political landscape, to which they maintained organizational and ideological links.

This paper will look at the Diaspora organization Milli Görüş and the perception of the latter by the German and the Dutch state. The Diaspora organization originated in the Islamic conservative political movement Milli Görüş in Turkey and has established itself in various European countries in form of a transnational organization. It represents conservative Islam and can be understood as the counter movement to the laic Turkish State. The head-
The organization of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs is the Islamische Gesellschaft Milli Görüs (IGMG), located in Germany maintaining various sub-branches in other European countries, among them the Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF) and Milli Görüs Noord Nederland (MGNN) in the Netherlands. While both Diaspora organizations originated in the Turkish Milli Görüs movement and developed according to similar patterns in Germany and the Netherlands, IGMG and NIF/MGNN are perceived differently by the state institutions of both countries. In Germany, IGMG is considered to represent an organization with anti-integrationist goals and is therefore critically observed by the German Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution). In the Netherlands, NIF and MGNN are both considered to contribute positively to the integration of the Muslim minority by representing an orthodox-Muslim stream moderate Islam. This thesis addresses the question of why such differences in perception of the Milli Görüs Diaspora by the German and the Dutch state persists. Two hypotheses will be looked at which might explain this difference of perception. First, different traditions of integration policies for immigrants after the workers recruitment of the 1950s and 1960s such as the granting of citizenship and the incorporation of Muslim organizations into the political system of Germany and the Netherlands might explain the differing states’ perception on IGMG and NIF/MGNN. Second, IGMG and NIF/MGNN might maintain different stances concerning their willingness to integrate into the societies of their respective host-countries which might influence their interaction in the two countries.

Positive or negative perceptions of IGMG and NIF/MGNN by the German and Dutch state might then be explained by the states’ reaction to the organizations’ different behaviour towards integration.

---

1 NIF and MGNN are referred by the Dutch reports as Diaspora Oranization Milli Görüs and are not separately treated, for this reason this paper will use the acronym NIF/MGNN
Several authors have written about Milli Görüs focusing on different aspects of the movement. Heinz Kramer\(^2\) and Ostergaard-Nielsen\(^3\) focused on the transnational political practices of the Diaspora Milli Görüs movement and the links maintained between the Diaspora movements and the Milli Görüs movement Turkey. Abdullah\(^4\), Heimbach\(^5\) and Kandel\(^6\) have conducted research on Milli Görüs in the German context of the development of Islam in Germany comparing the Diaspora organization Milli Görüs to other Turkish Islamic organizations whereas Lemmen\(^7\) set a particular focus on the organizational structure of IGMG in Germany. A large part of the literature has referred to the German BfV as a source in order to identify main characteristics of IGMG in Germany. Recent literature has challenged this approach. In particular Werner Schiffauer\(^8\) criticizes the stance of BfV, claiming that the latter maintains a too critical approach towards IGMG not recognizing the attempts by the latter to prove its willingness to integrate into German society and providing for selective evidence which could be used against the organization.

The methodology used in this paper will expand on the criticism posed by Schiffauer through a critical analysis of the reports from 1998 to 2008 of the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution in Germany and the Netherlands and their argumentation used in order to justify positive or negative approaches towards the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs. In order


\(^4\) M. Abdullah, Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland (Wien: Styria Verlag, 1981); M. Abdullah, Was will der Islam in Deutschland (Gütersloh: Gütersloh Verlagshaus Mohl, 1993)

\(^5\) M. Heimbach, Entwicklung der Islamischen Gemeinschaft in Deutschland seit 1961 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001)


\(^7\) Thomas Lemmen, Islamische Vereine und Verbände in Deutschland (Berlin: Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitisches Forschungs- und Beratungszentrum der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002); Thomas Lemmen, Muslime in Deutschland. Eine Herausforderung für Kirche und Gesellschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001)

\(^8\) Werner Schiffauer ‘Verfassungsschutz und Islamische Gemeinden’, in Uwe Kemmesies (Ed.) Terrorismus und Extremismus – der Zukunft auf der Spur (München: Luchterhand-Verlag, 2006)
to gain information about the organizational connections between IGMG and NIF/MGNN and their stances towards integration, I conducted interviews with the chairman of IGMG Yavuz Celik Karahan in Cologne and the leader of MGNN Yusuf Altuntas in the Netherlands, analyzed documents of IGMG and NIF/MGNN and used various articles and books as secondary sources. My research is limited due to money and time constraints so that I will only look at an institutional level of state perception with a strong focus on the Federal Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, thereby not addressing perceptions on a societal level.

This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter contains a historical outline divided into three subsections which will elaborate on the Islamic political goals of the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey, the historical development and interconnection of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands, as well as today’s connection between IGMG and its sub-branches NIF/MGNN. The second chapter will analyze reports of the two Offices for the Protection of the Constitution of the German and the Dutch state the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and the Algemene Inlichtingen - en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). Although similar evidence of the Diaspora Movements Milli Görüs maintaining a link to the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey exists, state-perceptions of the Diaspora movement diverge significantly in both countries. The German state claims IGMG to maintain a “double agenda” through which IGMG officially states to embrace democratic values of the German society; in reality however, the BfV claims, the organization maintains anti-integrationist goals expressed by their free-time activities for children and teenagers and citizenship claims put forward by IGMG. The Dutch state does not assume NIF/MGNN to maintain such a “double agenda”, thereby relying on alternative evidence such as official statements of NIF/MGNN which accordingly prove the pro-integrationist stances of NIF/MGNN. The third chapter will look at two indicators to which the different state-
perceptions of the Diaspora Milli Görüs movement can be attributed. The first section will look at the integration policies of the German and the Dutch state. Hereby it will be focused on the granting of citizenship by the respective states and the policies on inclusion of the Muslims in the political structure of both countries. The first part of the second section will look at the free-time activities offered by IGMG and NIF/MGNN in Germany and the Netherlands through which differences ideological stances towards integration might be noticed which could explain for the more negative perception of the German government versus a more positive perception by the Dutch government. The second part of the second section will look at three indicators of organizational connections between IGMG and NIF/MGNN which might point to similar or dissimilar ideological approaches of IGMG and NIF/MGNN towards integration. Finally a conclusion will be drawn which will evaluate the validity of the above named hypotheses against the research findings of this thesis.

**Debate on Integration**

The presence of 15 million Muslims in Europe and the further influx of Muslim migrants to European societies make the integration of Muslim Diaspora minorities an important issue that is widely discussed in European literature. The term integration will be understood in this paper according to the definition put forward by Myron Weiner who points out two conditions which determine integration. First Weiner points to “the extent to which a society is willing to absorb migrants and, therefore puts in place policies that grant migrants and their children the same legal status as that of the native population.” The second condition is attributed to the
“willingness of the migrants themselves to accept membership, both in the legal sense and by adopting a new identity”. ⁹

The above-mentioned conditions for successful integration of minorities to take place indicate efforts on behalf of two sides, the state or government and the migrant community. With regard to government action as a factor for the successful integration of Muslims in European societies, it is subject to further debate how policies should respond to Muslim immigrants and to what extent. John Rex argues that host-country governments should develop policies, according to which tolerance and cultural diversity may develop. Accordingly, policies should respond to “cultural values which separate groups regard worth pursuing, and which do not threaten either the culture of other groups regard as worth pursuing and which not threaten either the culture of other groups or the shared public political culture”. ¹⁰ The above-named understanding of policy approaches emphasizes the necessity of acceptance of cultural values in the policy process. This agrees with the argument put forward by Ostergaard-Nielsen, who points to the particular importance of inclusiveness of political systems and institutional contexts in order to avoid societal marginalization of Muslim minorities. ¹¹ Other authors such as Jytte Klausen claim that it is not only the inclusiveness of already established political systems that provide for a significant factor for successful integration of Muslim minorities, but the adaptability of the latter to Muslim migrant claims. Accordingly, “religious pluralism is a new social fact that has yet to be fitted into legal frameworks and public practices,” ¹² thereby predicting that European political systems will change in response to interest representation of Muslim minority groups. ¹³

---

¹¹ Ostergaard-Nielsen, 265
¹³ Ibid, 3
necessity of adaptation to the claims of Muslim immigrant groups put forward by Klausen is subject to criticism within the debate around integration.

According to Bhikhu Parekh, success of integration of Muslims into western societies can thus not only be accomplished by the change of Western European political systems, but requires more efforts on behalf of the Muslim minorities to adjust to European societal structures. Thus, Parekh argues Muslim migrants must develop an understanding that “integration involves accepting and adjusting to the secular culture of European society.”

His claim corresponds with Bassam Tibi’s argument that “integration of Europe’s Muslims depends on the adoption of a form of Islam that embraces Western political values.” In order to avoid political and societal marginalization of Muslims in European societies, he suggests that European Muslim Diaspora communities should develop a liberal understanding of Islam which he calls “Euro-Islam,” defined as a “form of Islam that is compatible with liberal democracy, individual human rights, and civil society.” As regards the actions on behalf of the state, Tibi sees a danger in the societal marginalization of Muslims through exclusionary political systems, which do not grant Muslim immigrants the possibility to become active members of the civil society of their host-country. On the other hand Tibi points to the danger of the extensive political acceptance of Muslim customs and claims, which run counter to the secular and democratic understanding of European society.

The section above has elaborated on a debate on the success of integration of the Muslim minority in Europe which represents two competing sides of argumentation. While Rex, Oostergard-Nielsen and Klausen considered the adaptability and inclusiveness of political systems as most significant factor for successful integration, Tibi and Parekh...

---


16 *ibid*, 191

17 *ibid*, 191
consider the willingness to adapt to European values as decisive, in order to grant successful membership of the civil society of their host-country.

Within this debate, I position myself close to the understanding of integration put forward by Weiner who attributes significance to both the political framework and the willingness of Muslims to participate within this framework, as both arguments are valid and yet highly interlinked. While political systems can only include Muslim minorities within their framework if the Muslim Diaspora shows efforts to participate in this system and thus not acts counter to European values, it is political systems which open up venues for participation. Closed political systems might therefore not acknowledge the potential for integrationist action on behalf of the Muslim Diaspora as their possibilities of participation are delimited from the beginning. At the same time no objective evaluation exists which determines when Muslim migrant communities actually show willingness to integrate. After all it is the government of the respective host-country that Muslim minorities live in that defines what the expectable parameters of Muslim communities’ religious character are and which factors determine their willingness to integrate. Different perceptions of Governments of Muslim migrant communities are thus existent, as will be shown by the analysis of official state documents of the Netherlands and Germany on the Muslim Diaspora organization Milli Görüs. These differing perceptions can, according to my findings, not only be attributed to different interaction of Milli Görüs within both states, but are to a large extent determined by the political culture and tradition of religious integration within the political systems of Germany and the Netherlands.
CHAPTER 1 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will provide for a historical background necessary for the understanding

The chapter will be divided into three sections. First it will be elaborated on the origins and Islamic political goals of the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey in which the today’s Diaspora movement Milli Görüs originated. The section will show that the Islamic political goals of the Turkish Milli Görüs movement were not compatible with western democratic standards which will provide the reader with an understanding of why the Diaspora Milli Görüs movement was associated with conservative Islam. Second, an overview of the establishment and historical development of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands will show, that first, the two movements originated in the Milli Görüs movement Turkey and second, the two Diaspora movements in both countries were highly interlinked from its early beginnings in the early seventies to the nineties. Third, it will be elaborated on the organizational structure of the head-organization of today’s Diaspora movement Milli Görüs. The organizational structure of IGMG will show that the two Diaspora movements Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands are interlinked through a modern transnational network system of which IGMG represents the head-organization maintaining several sub-branches among which the two Dutch branches NIF and MGNN are placed. It will be focused on three indicators through which an organizational link is established between IGMG and its regional organizations which will be tested according to the case of NIF/MGNN.

The three above mentioned sections of this chapter not only provide for background information necessary for the understanding of the subject matter, but should trigger the following question in the mind of the reader: If the origins of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs are similar in the Netherlands and Germany, if its historical development shows that
the two Diaspora movements were connected to Milli Görüş Turkey as well as to each other and finally if one sees that the latter interconnection still exists through contemporary organizational structure of IGMG, one might assume similar ideological stances of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüş in the Netherlands and Germany which relate to ideological stances to the Milli Görüş movement Turkey. How can one explain then the differently perception of the movement by the German and the Dutch government?

1.2 Milli Görüş Movement in Turkey

The Milli Görüş movement was first introduced by the Turkish politician and former Prime Minister of Turkey (1996 – 1997) Necmettin Erbakan. The movement entailed two ideological concept introduced by the Erbakan’s book published in 1973 in Turkey, namely Milli Görüş which translates as “national view” and Adil Düzen meaning ‘just order’. The concept of ‘just order’ relates to the idea of the establishment of a world that is, in opposition to the ‘wrong order’ that is the “liberal view” (Liberal Görüş) and the “left view” (Solcu Görüş), based on justice as proclaimed by Islam. The term Milli Görüş is central to this idea as it indicates that a worldview based on Islam would function as a motor for the realization of such ‘just order’. Such world view in turn is linked to a national ideal that is the establishment of a “new Greater Turkey” following the example of the Ottoman Empire. The objective of the Milli Görüş movement includes the abolishment of secular society and the (re-) orientation of Turkish and ultimately the global society towards Islam as an exclusive way of life. It thus claims justice and Islam to be inseparable, indicating that political and social models which are not based on Islam automatically translate into injustice and

\[^{18}\text{Flip Lindo, “Activiteiten en doelstellingen van Nederlandse organisaties gelieerd aan Milli Goerues” (paper presented to the Ministry of Wonen, Werken en Integratie, Amsterdam, Netherlands, October 14, 2008), 14}\]
\[^{19}\text{Lemmen, 2001,45}\]
\[^{20}\text{Heimbach, 114}\]
despotism. Necmettin Erbakan claims in a newspaper article that only an all encompassing “‘Islamic civilization’ is able to brake the materialistic power of the ‘unbelievers’ and guarantee peace and freedom for humankind”.21.

In political terms the Milli Görüş movement first found expression through the anti-laic-party Milli Nizam Partisi (party of national order) founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. In line with the ideological concept of Milli Görüş the party propagated the introduction of social, economic and political system based on an Islam and re-orientation of society through extensive religious education in schools, religious radio shows, as well as the fight against the destruction of moral and spiritual values of society and the return to original national qualities of the Turkish society.22. Soon after its establishment the Milli Nizam Partisi, was abolished by the Turkish state in 1971 on grounds of its anti-laic stance. In the following years the party was re-established under different names which were subject to subsequent abolishment by the Turkish military, i.e. the Selamet Partisi (1972-1980), Refah Partisi (1983-98) and the Fazilet Partisi (1997-2001) finally the Saadet Partisi (2001). Despite its opposition by the Turkish government, Erbakan proved to be relatively successful as political leader. In the 1973 Turkish parliamentary elections the Selamet Partisi gained 11.8% of the electoral votes and was member of the government in coalition with the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party) in which Erbakan became vice-premier minister. Until 1978 two further government coalitions followed with the Adalet Partisi in which Erkaban also became vice-premier.23. Erbakan proved to be successful in the elections of 1995, after which the Refah Partisi formed the government in coalition with the Doyru Yol Partisi in which Erbakan took over the office of prime minister from 1996-1997. Due to a political bans, temporary imprisonment and house detention on behalf of the Turkish state made the continuous representation of Erbakan as party official impossible. Despite his

21 BfV, 2005, 215
22 Heimbach, 114
23 Lindo, 14
temporary inability to hold a political function, Erbakan was and still is considered the figurehead of the Milli Görüş movement and the today’s Saadet Partisi.24

As has been elaborated on above the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey does, due to its anti-Western conservative Islamic ideology not embrace European democratic values. The maintenance of a close historical connection between the Turkish Milli Görüs movement and the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands would suggest that both Diaspora movements are not considered to represent “Euro-Islam” as understood by Tibi, as they might maintain the same ideological stances as Milli Görüs Turkey. The next section will elaborate on this assumption.

1.3 The Historical Development of the Diaspora Movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands

Below a historical overview about the establishment of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands will be given thereby pointing to two observations to be made. First, the movement was in its establishment and development connected to the various political parties of the Turkish Milli Görüs movement that have been mentioned above. Second, from its early beginnings, the Diaspora movements in Germany and the Netherlands maintained a close organizational connection to each other which increasingly manifested itself over the years. The section below will be divided into four subsections which will elaborate on the movement’s development in a chronological order from its beginnings in the 1970’s until today.

1.3.1 1970s: Early Beginnings

Along the recruitment policy of western European countries, the first followers of the Erbakan movement in Turkey organized themselves in their new host-communities in the 1970s. The

24 Heimbach, 114
first formal organization of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs established itself in Germany under the name *Türkische Union Deutschland* in 1972.\(^\text{25}\) Also in the Netherlands followers of Erbakan began to gather and develop activities, yet, in both countries the organizational structure of associations and communities that were established among the Turkish Diaspora was weak, so that religious activities were mostly held in houses or old factory buildings, which developed into so called “backyardmosques”.\(^\text{26}\) Whereas the organizational degree of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Germany developed rapidly, the Netherlands maintained a relatively low degree of organization until the end of the 1980s, and was strongly dependent on developments in Germany from which most important transnational-organisational steps were taken. For this reason it will be often referred to organizations and developments in Germany which can however be considered as assigning the general direction of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in the Netherlands as well.

First organizational steps were taken in Germany, so that in 1976 a first umbrella association called *Türkische Union Europa* (Avrupa Türk Birligi) was established bringing together several of the Diaspora Milli Görüs associations. This organization was established on behalf of Necmettin Erbakan in 1976 and can be considered the precursor of the today’s IGMG. It renamed itself to *Islamische Union Europa e.V.* in December 1982. The latter Union was, next to activities in Germany also concerned with the development of Turkish immigrants in Europe, aiming at developing a first European wide concept for the organization of religious life of Turkish immigrants in their host communities, while at the same time maintaining its link to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement. According to several authors the *Islamische Union Europa e.V.* was a conglomerate of national-religious groupings

\(^{25}\) Lindo, 14  
\(^{26}\) *ibid*
that were closely linked to the Turkish *Milli Selamet Partisi* party, operating according to their political and ideological aims.\(^{27}\)

### 1.3.2 1980s: the Kaplan Schism and Transnational Organization of the Milli Görüs Movement

During the 1980s The Diaspora Milli Görüs movement Europe was subject to internal differences over the political and ideological orientation personified in Cemaleddin Kaplan, who had been the leader of the German *Türkische Union Europa e.V* for several years. Against the background of the Iranian revolutionary movements in the late 70s, Kaplan favoured a more radical revolutionary pan-Islamic orientation of the *Türkische Union Europa e.V.* under his leadership. Although the Kaplan movement was able to gain a number of followers in both the Netherlands and Germany, Kaplan faced considerable criticism within the Milli Görüs communities in both countries. This lead to the division of the *Türkische Union Europa* in 1984 and the establishment of a new organization representing the more moderate stances of Islam in 1985 called *Avrupa Milli Görüs Teskilatları* (AMGT).\(^ {28}\) The Kaplan schism took also place within mosque communities in the Netherlands and was of significance for two reasons. On the one hand it testified the AMGT’s connection to the *Refah Partisi*, as in order to appease the critical conflict situation within the Milli Görüs community in Europe well-known imams and charismatic speakers of the *Refah Partisi* were sent from Turkey to Germany.\(^ {29}\) On the other hand, the Kaplan-schism showed that the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in the Netherlands and Germany distanced itself from more radical approaches as proclaimed by Kaplan. This distancing was of historical significance and will be referred to later in the following chapter.

\(^{27}\) Lemmen, 2001, 67; Heimbach, 115  
\(^{28}\) Vereinigung der Neuen Weltansicht Europa; Lindo, 15-16  
\(^{29}\) *ibid.*,17
Throughout the 1980s, considerable efforts were made by the AMGT headquarter in Cologne to build up a network of regional and local organizations of the Turkish migrant communities from all over Europe. These attempts lead to the establishment of the first formal federation of Milli Görüs, the Müslüman Cemiyetler ve Cemaatlarý Federasyonu (MCCF, de Federatie van Verenigingen en Gemeenschappen can Muslims) in the Netherlands on request of the German AMGT in 1981.\textsuperscript{30} An important reason for the increasing transnational orientation of AMGT was the growing realization of migrant communities in Western Europe that the initial expectation of them to return to Turkey might not become reality, but that they will live permanently in their new host-country societies. In expectation to raise their children within Western societies, the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs was seen as opportunity by Turkish migrants to provide for an organization that would offer a framework for the maintenance of cultural and religious values. At the same time, the desire of the headquarter AMGT in Germany, which remained influenced by Turkey to unite Milli Görüs followers in Europe gave the incentive to organize itself transnationally.\textsuperscript{31} Although the German AMGT and the Dutch branch MCCF, which was renamed Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF), primarily focused their agenda on the followers of their Diaspora movement in their respective host-country communities, links to Turkey were maintained through conferences and speeches of Refah party members held at events in Germany and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{1.3.3 1990s: Establishment of IGMG and Split of NIF}

In December 1994, AMGT changed its name and structure again splitting itself into Europäische Moscheebau und –Unterstützungs Gemeinschaft e.V. (EMUG) and the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs e.V (IGMG) where the former is concerned with

\textsuperscript{30} This organization was renamed in 1987 to Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF); Lindo,18
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 20
\textsuperscript{32} ibid
finances and the latter with cultural, religious and social goals of the organization.\textsuperscript{33} Despite the restructuring of the organization, the IGMG maintained its link with the Milli Görüs movement Turkey, as Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, the nephew of Necmettin Erbakan became secretary general of IGMG in 1996.\textsuperscript{34}

Meanwhile, the Milli Görüs sub-organization of IGMG in the Netherlands, above referred to as NIF divided itself in two organizations in 1997. The Northern Dutch Milli Görüs mosque communities newly established itself under Milli Görüs Noord-Nederland (MGNN), whereas the communities in the South of the country maintained the name NIF. Milli Görüs representatives claimed that the division took place for organizational reasons, due to the growing number of mosque communities and the geographical distance of the former regional headquarter of NIF. Other sources claim, that ideological divergence between NIF and MGNN might also have played a role.\textsuperscript{35}

The historical outline of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands has shown that throughout its development the movements in Germany and the Netherlands were connected to each other and both movements were connected to the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey. At the same time most significant organizational establishments took place in Germany which then performed a transnational lead triggering the formation of similar structures in the Netherlands. Below it will be elaborated on the organizational structure of IGMG which is of high relevance for this paper for two reasons. First, it will become clear that historical connections between IGMG and NIF/MGNN still exist today in form of a network structure headed by the IGMG. Secondly, background information about the organizational linkages between IGMG and its Dutch branches NIF/MGNN is necessary in order to find indicators which will prove or disprove the initial assumption that IGMG and

\textsuperscript{33} Lemmen, 2002, 41
\textsuperscript{34} Lemmen, 2002, 46; Lindo, 22
\textsuperscript{35} Lindo, 28
NIF/MGNN have the same ideological stances on integration, which might explain for the different perception of these organizations in Germany and the Netherlands respectively.

1.4 Organizational Structure of IGMG today

IGMG is organized according to three levels: the head-organization IGMG located in Cologne Germany; IGMG’s regional sub-branches and local mosque-communities. The lowest level of the organizational structure represent mosque communities and women- and youth-departments exist. Mosque communities and women- and youth departments exist in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Norway counting a total number of 87,000 members.36 The second unit are the regional offices into which the local mosque communities are bundled. Overall 30 European regional sub-branches exist of which 15 are placed in Germany four in France and Austria respectively and two in the Netherlands, namely NIF NIF and MGNN. According to information provided by IGMG, regional offices built a link between the IGMG central office in Cologne and the local communities. On the other hand, they are responsible for the coordination of religious- and educational work, the coordination of Imams to the local communities as well as the organization of cultural events.37 The third unit is represented by the IGMG central office in Germany which builds the head of the overall organizational structure. It is concerned with the provision of the strategy for fundamental guidelines and the organizational coordination of religious-, educational- as well as social services. The activities of IGMG headquarter are divided into six subject areas: Irshad (religious guidance), Organization, Secretary General, Education, Women’s Department and Youth Department. The division into these subject areas applies mostly to the regional sub-branches. Thus,


37 ibid, 11
NIF/MGNN engages similarly to IGMG in educational work, women and youth activities. Below it will be briefly elaborated on the activities of these departments in order to provide for an idea of what kind of content these activities maintain as they will be referred to in the next chapter.

The educational department concentrates on the training of children. Part of the educational work is religious education, the learning of the languages of the host-countries as well as homework tutoring. The Women’s department is concerned with activities for women in society focusing on religious as well as language education, through tutorials, training, and conferences on marriage, parenting and health. The youth department offers classes on for instance Qur’an religion, language classes, job application courses, sporting activities, youth journeys, computer classes. In the last chapter, projects of the women and youth departments will be looked at in order to find out in how far the content of the projects of NIF/MGNN differ from IGMG projects as a possible explanation for the different perception of the IGMG and NIF/MGNN by the government of Germany and the Netherlands respectively.

As has been mentioned above, the IGMG headquarter is concerned with the provision of strategies for a fundamental guideline for its regional sub-branches in order to foster the internal ideological coherence of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in Europe. The analysis later in this paper focuses on three strategies used as a tool to provide regional sub-branches with such fundamental guidelines and ideological orientations. First, the Irshad department considered the “main and central duty” of IGMG is, responsible for the education, training and supervision of the imams within the community, which are then distributed to the various regional sub-branches of IGMG. Second, the department of the secretary general is

---

38 ibid, 27-29
39 Ibid, 37-39
40 Ibid, 43
41 Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goereus, 23-25
responsible for the appointment of the leaders of the regional sub-branches. Third, the latter
arranges the distribution of internal media, which includes the establishment of a website of
IGMG www.igmg.de, an internet radio www.igmg.fm and monthly journal *IGMG
Perspective*.\(^{42}\) The last chapter will analyze the above mentioned three strategies as indicators
of how strongly IGMG and NIF/MGNN are connected in order to determine whether the
assumption that similar ideological stances towards integration prevail holds true. Until this
current point however, the historical development of the Milli Görüs movement and the
organizational structure of IGMG have shown a considerable amount of common
developments and inter-linkages through which we might expect that the governmental
reactions towards the movement in Germany and the Netherlands would be similar. The
following chapter will establish that this was not the case, as the perceptions of the Diaspora
movements Milli Görüs differ considerably in the two countries. The chapter below will
analyze the argumentation used by the German and Dutch governments in order to justify
their perception in their yearly reports of the Federal Offices for the Protection of the
Constitution of Germany and the Netherlands.

\(^{42}\) *Ibid*, 13, 35
CHAPTER 2: Perceptions of the Milli Görüs Diaspora Movement in Germany and the Netherlands

The analysis of annual reports from the two Federal Offices for the Protection of the Constitution from the years 1998 to 2008 demonstrate, that despite the similar historical development of the IGMG and the NIF/MGNN in their respective countries the German government considers IGMG as anti-integrationist whereas the Dutch government regards NIF/MGNN as a pro-active part of Dutch civil society. The argumentation on IGMG in the reports of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BFV) of the years 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006 will be compared and contrasted to the argumentation of the reports by the Dutch Algemene Inlichtingen - en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) of the years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2007, and 2008. Although the reports analysed are not reports from the same years\(^{43}\), a clear pattern of argumentation could be noticed which makes a comparison valid.

2.1. The Perception of IGMG in Germany: Analysis of Yearly Reports of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)

The BfV reports observe that IGMG officially claims to accept basic principles of western democracy the organization’s actual aims are different, thereby maintaining a “double agenda”. According to BfV, IGMG intends to abolish laicism in Turkey by introducing an Islamic order of state and society through the support of the Milli Görüs associated parties in Turkey, which contrasts official statements of IGMG to accept the democratically free order of the German state. BfV is justifies its claim according to a particular argumentative

\(^{43}\) Due to availability and lacking information about NIF/MGNN in the Dutch reports of the years 2002 until 2006
structure. First, BfV provides the reader with evidence about IGMG’s connection with the anti-democratic Milli Görüs movement in Turkey. Secondly, from this evidence BfV draws conclusions about IGMG’s stance towards integration in today’s German society. The sections below will elaborate on this argumentation.

2.1.1 Evidence on the Connection between IGMG and the Milli Görüs Movement Turkey

According to BfV reports a connection between IGMG and the Milli Görüs movement Turkey is not only testified through its historical development, but still exists today. Two sources of evidence are given. First, BfV establishes that personal connections between IGMG functionaries and party functionaries of the Milli Görüs exist. These personal connections can, according to BfV be seen through the appearance of Necmettin Erbakan either personally or through telephone simulcast at IGMG events in for instance Cologne-Münigersdorf in 1999, Arnhem in 2002, in Hasselt in 2006 and through the presence of Milli Görüs associated party-functionairs, holding speeches during IGMG mass events at which more than 10.000 people.

In response to the accusation by BfV that the appearance of party-functionaries at IGMG events would prove a close ideological connection between IGMG and Milli Görüs, IGMG officials claim that the relationship to Turkey must not be seen in ideological but in cultural terms. Accordingly, the presence of speakers is a way of maintaining personal contacts to the movement IGMG originated from thirty years ago. As IGMG represents a heterogeneous society Milli Goerues does not determine the strict ideological direction of

---

44 BfV – Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz. Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999 (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innen, 1999) 166
47 BfV, 2006, 164, 243; BfV, 1999, 166; BfV, 2005, 218
48 In this case it was talked about the Kurtulmus speech at the Uniday 2009, Dortund
IGMG in Europe so that the majority of the IGMG members do not maintain a close relationship to the ideology of Necmettin Erbakan.\textsuperscript{49} BfV considers such official statements of IGMG functionaries as representing part of the ‘double agenda’ as mentioned above and can thus not considered as reliable source. BfV concludes that a real distancing of IGMG from the Milli Görüş movement could has not taken place.\textsuperscript{50}

The second source of evidence used by BfV to draw a connection between the IGMG and the Milli Görüş movement in Turkey is the newspaper 	extit{Milli Gazete}\textsuperscript{51}. The 	extit{Milli Gazete} is a Turkish newspaper associated with Milli Görüş as its articles represent the traditionalist Necmettin Erbakan and the ideological stance of the 	extit{Saadet Partisi}.\textsuperscript{52} The newspaper has its main editorial department in Istanbul, maintains however a European editorial branch with its editorial head-office in Germany. According to BfV which printed several extracts of the newspaper in its reports, 	extit{Milli Gazete} promotes an absolute and anti-reformist understanding of Islam\textsuperscript{53} is reluctant to reform its understanding of Islam\textsuperscript{54} and maintains anti-Semitic as well as anti-western positions\textsuperscript{55}. The significance of 	extit{Milli Gazete} for the analysis of BfV reports lies in the assumption that 	extit{Milli Gazete} can not only be understood as closely connected to the 	extit{Saadet Partisi} but in fact forms the mouthpiece of IGMG.\textsuperscript{56} BfV supports this assumption by listing evidence of professional connections between 	extit{Milli Gazete} and IGMG such as the chairmanship of former executive director of Milli Gazete Yusuf Isik\textsuperscript{57} of IGMG from April 1999 until April 2001.\textsuperscript{58} Further evidence used by BfV relates to 	extit{Milli

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with IGMG chairman Yavuz Celik Karahan on May 8, Cologne, Germany
\textsuperscript{50} BfV – Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz. Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2005)219
\textsuperscript{51} Translated as ‘national newspaper’
\textsuperscript{52} BfV, 2001, 145
\textsuperscript{53} BfV, 2004, 214
\textsuperscript{54} BfV, 2005, 218
\textsuperscript{56} BfV, 2005, 221
\textsuperscript{57} resignation of Ali Yüksel as chairman of IGMG on 8 April 1999
\textsuperscript{58} BfV, 2001, 215; BfV, 1999, 164
Gazete being advertised at IGMG events\textsuperscript{59}, the promotion of Milli Gazete subscription and selling of publications of its columnist through the IGMG book catalogue\textsuperscript{60} and the publication of events organized by IGMG in the newspaper.\textsuperscript{61}

Again, according to IGMG official statements, IGMG neither supports radical Islamic views, nor does it support anti-Semitic stances. It thus condemned September 11 terror acts in a press release in Milli Gazete\textsuperscript{62} and distances itself from Anti-Semitist stance.\textsuperscript{63} In response to the accusation that Milli Gazete represents the ideologies of IGMG, the latter claims not to maintain personal nor organizational connections to Milli Gazete and that the newspaper does not have any influence on the activities of IGMG. BfV reports acknowledge that IGMG was not found to use violence in the enforcement of its belief.\textsuperscript{64} Nevertheless, it considers the above official statements not to reflect reality and concludes that “Given these close interwoven relations, statements of the “Milli Gazete” can be seen as representative for the understanding of Islam and for the ideological orientation of IGMG”.\textsuperscript{65} The part above has indicated that BfV has laid down connections between the Turkish Milli Görüş movement and the IGMG today. In the following it will be explained how BfV uses this evidence to draw conclusions concerning the IGMG’s interaction in German society today.

\textbf{2.1.2 Conclusions by BfV on IGMG’s Stance towards Integration into German Society}

BfV draws two conclusions from its established evidence for the connection between IGMG and the Milli Görüş movement in Turkey. First, BfV claims activities offered by IGMG to children and youth to aim at anti-integrationist goals. Second, BfV considers citizenship

\textsuperscript{59} BfV, 2006, 245
\textsuperscript{60} BfV, 2001, 215; BfV, 2005, 220
\textsuperscript{61} BfV, 2004, 214; BfV, 2004, 215
\textsuperscript{62} BfV, 2001, 216
\textsuperscript{63} BfV, 2004, 217
\textsuperscript{64} BfV, 2001, 215
\textsuperscript{65} BfV, 2004, 214
claims by IGMG to represent an attempt to pursue the introduction of political Islam into the German democratic system. Below both conclusions will be analyzed.

2.1.2.1 Children and Youth- Activities by IGMG

As has been mentioned in the first chapter, children and youth- activities organized by IGMG are extensive, ranging from Koran courses to sport events, handcraft classes, computer classes to private tutoring for school homework. According to the understanding of IGMG the offer of these activities contributes to the integration of Turkish youth into German society as they give children and teenagers perspectives and opportunities to spend their time wisely and not fall into patterns of drug-abuse or criminality. Particularly in earlier BfV reports, BfV takes a very critical stance on these activities. In its 1999 report it states that under the guise of Islamic educational work the IGMG aims at depriving Turkish youth from influence of Western pluralist society. Accordingly, IGMG educates their youth according to a Koran and Sharia-oriented Islamist way of thinking, thereby hindering integration of Turkish Muslims with German society. With respect to Islamic education, Koran courses offered by IGMG in school holidays are observed by BfV particularly critical. BfV’s 2001 report claims that the distinction between Muslims and Non-Muslims builds the pedagogical guideline of the educational work of IGMG. Therefore, the IGMG’s activities convey that the “Turkish youth who does not live according to the laws of Islam, just as the non-Muslim youth, therefore implicitly also the German youth, are accused of depravity and decadence.” As the quote above shows, BfV considers the educational work and youth activities of IGMG to counteract integration, by IGG drawing a distinction between the Islamic community they live in and the non-Islamic society of Germany. Noticeably, BfV reports do not quote any actual content of

---

67 BfV, 1999, 164
68 BfV, 2004, 215
69 Ibid, 220
the books used by IGMG for their education. Rather they refer to the background of IGMG that has been established earlier, namely the personal connection between functionaries of the Mill Görüs movement and the anti-western statements made by Milli Gazete. This background is considered to serve as evidence by BfV to justify the assumption of anti-integrationist action by IGMG. The fact that IGMG considers itself as contributing to integration through its activities for children, which accordingly, have a religious foundation, but do not aim at counteracting integration, is merely considered as an action of ‘claims-making’, which fits the pattern of the IGMG ‘double agenda’.

Another interesting observation that can be made in this context concerns the change of language used to describe IGMG and its educational work in BfV reports. While BfV describes IGMG as “extremist foreigner-organization”. in its report 1999 and refers to the latter as Islamist in its reports of the years 2001 and 2004, the 2005 and 2006 reports do not use any of these terms only containing a footnote at the general description part of the organization, stating that “It cannot be assumed that all members of IGMG pursue or support Islamist goals”. The softening of the language against IGMG might suggest that the educational work of IGMG has changed from pursuing extremist goals to ‘only’ anti-integrationist. Relying on the evidence given within BfV reports this conclusion cannot be drawn, as none of the reports mentions any action of IGMG at all but uses evidence for accusations against IGMG based the connections of the organization with the Milli Görüs movement Turkey. Following this argumentation, the change of IGMG from ‘extremist’ to ‘anti-integrationist’ would have to be based on the fact that either Milli Görüs party functionaries did not appear at IGMG events anymore or that Milli Gazete could not be brought into connection with IGMG anymore. The reports have shown that neither of these developments took place. This suggests that that claims against IGMG in terms of them

70 BfV, 1999, 163
71 BfV, 2001, 214; BfV, 2004, 211
72 BfV, 2005, 215, (foodnote 175); BfV, 2006, 239
representing an extremist organization or pursuing Islamist goals could not be proven over the long run. Therefore, perceptions of IGMG by BfV might not unquestionably objective but are influenced by broader images about Islam and an inherent understanding of integration that has manifested itself in the German political structure.

2.1.2.2 Citizenship-Claims by IGMG

The second conclusion drawn by BfV is that efforts made by IGMG to motivate its members to acquire citizenship, in fact represents an attempt by the organization to realize its political Islamic goals through democratic means and manifest itself in the German political landscape. According to IGMG functionaries the organization maintains the right to practice their religion on the basis of Art. 4 GG, which lays down the basic right of freedom of religion and religious practices. BfV refuses the application of this law to IGMG as “the reference of Art 4 GG intents, that it should be deemed legitimate and constitutionally acceptable to aspire a state which is constructed according to norms of the Koran and the Sharia and which therefore repudiates the free democratic basic order”. In its 2001 report, BfV argues, the position of IGMG and its claim to represent Islam cannot be solely understood in religious terms. It aims at connecting political and religious convictions within their interpretation of Islam and therefore goes in line with aspirations of Turkish Islamist parties. Thus BfV claims that “IGMG aims at spreading Islamist ideologies through the freedom of religion in the societal life of the Federal Republic of Germany”. Accordingly against the background of the re-Islamization of the Turkish state as proclaimed by Necmettin Erbakan, IGMG intends to establish itself as political power in Europe. As a proof of this aspiration BfV mentions the IGMG “citizenship campaign” through which the Turkish minorities in Europe were motivated to acquire the citizenship of their respective countries in order to actively

73 Grundrecht auf Freiheit der religiösen Überzeugung und der Religionsausübung
74 BfV, 1999, 165
75 BfV, 2001, 117
participate in societal and political life within their host-countries. According to BfV, the intention of the citizenship campaign is to influence IGMG members politically.\textsuperscript{76} BfV concluded

“The recommendation for the acceptance of the German citizenship aims at the acquisition of rights and not at the acceptance of the democratic constitutional order and its orientation of values, as well as at the unrestricted appreciation of legal order, as, according to IGMG, the willingness to integrate of Turkish Muslims should find its limits where their religion, culture and national identity are touched upon.”\textsuperscript{77}

The reaction of BfV to citizenship claims made by IGMG fits the pattern of tBfV’s perception of IGMG pursuing a ‘double’ agenda. Thus citizenship-claims are not interpreted as efforts to integrate by active participation in German political life, but merely as guise of IGMG to pursue greater undemocratic goals by creating a basis for political power in Germany. Thus although the language used in the reports of BfV concerning the description of the IGMG became somewhat softer the claim of BfV remains constant: the IGMG strives for establishing a modern picture in official statements by refusing to be associated with the Turkish Milli Görüs movement. In reality however the organization’s commitment to the free democratic basic order must be considered as questionable and contradictory as shown by the continuity of links between the Milli Görüs movement and IGMG. According to BfV lack of commitment to democracy leads the IGMG to pursuing a “Rückzugsmentalität” (withdrawmentality) which results in the active refusal of integration into German society.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{2.2 The perception of NIF/MGNN in the Netherlands: Analysis of Yearly Reports of the Dutch Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (AIVD)}

This section above has shown how negatively IGMG is perceived by BfV on grounds of the claim the organization pursues a ‘double agenda’. The validity of the conclusions by BfV cannot be assessed here. BfV conclusions can however be evaluated by contrasting them to

\textsuperscript{76} BfV, 2001, 119
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid
\textsuperscript{78} BfV, 2006, 247
the conclusions drawn in the reports by AIVD about the Milli Görüş Diaspora community in the Netherlands, the NIF/MGNN. In the following, the yearly reports of AIVD will be analyzed which will show that, in contrast to the BfV, AIVD has a rather positive picture of the European Diaspora movement Milli Görüş in the Netherlands. Although similar factual evidence is given, AIVD does not see the connections between the Dutch NIF/MGNN and the today’s Turkish Milli Görüş movement and does therefore not consider the actions pursued and claims made by the organization as anti – integrationist. Instead, alternative sources of evidence are used to prove the positive development of NIF/MGNN within the Dutch society.

2.2.1. Similar Evidence with Different Conclusions – Interpretation of BfV’s Evidence by AIVD

Generally speaking the parts in which NIF/MGNN is mentioned are considerably shorter in length than the parts of BfV’s reports speaking about IGMG. In many reports, NIF/MGNN is not even mentioned such as in the documents of the years 2002 until 2006. On the one hand this already indicates a less critical stance of AIVD towards the organization. On the other hand for reasons of lack of information about the stance of AIVD on NIF/MGNN in the above named timeframe, the following analysis will be based on the reports of the years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2007 and 2008 as well as other recent documents published by AIVD about NIF/MGNN that are of interest for this analysis.

To begin with, despite the differences between perceptions of the European Diaspora movement Milli Görüş that will be explained in the following, BfV reports and AIVD reports maintain a similar starting point according to which the actions and claims of the former are evaluated. Thus, similarly to BfV reports AIVD reports refer to NIF/MGNN, although in much shorter notice, as an organization which has originated in the Milli Görüş movement in

79 The yearly report 2003 contains one sentence about Milli Görüş
Turkey, maintaining a link to its head-organization in Cologne, the IGMG.\(^{80}\) AIVD reports also notice the initial focus of the Milli Görüs Diaspora organization to be directed towards the democratic Islamization of the Turkish state. From this starting point onwards the interpretations of evidence given diverge significantly. The evidence given by BfV which establishes the basis of the argument that IGMG can be considered to pursue anti-democratic goals is also given in the Netherlands is however not interpreted in the same way by AIVD. First, the appearance of politicians of parties associated with the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey, has taken place at IGMG events held in Germany but also in the Netherlands. Such event has for instance taken place in the Dutch city Arnhem in the year 2002, at which Necmettin Erbakan even appeared personally. The report of AIVD of the year 2002 did however not even include any reference to NIF/MGNN at all. In virtually none of AIVD reports analyzed, were IGMG events taking place in the Netherlands mentioned and thus not used as evidence to prove that NIF/MGNN maintained a link to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement. The sole exception that does briefly mention that Milli Görüs party representatives were present at IGMG events in the Netherlands is AIVD 1998 report. And even then the report concludes the NIF/MGNN as an organization has gained significant independence over the years, so that the orthodox and political character of Milli Görüs has not led to isolation and self marginalization of NIF/MGNN.\(^{81}\) The second evidence given by BfV, namely the existence and distribution of *Milli Gazete* among IGMG members is similarly neglected by AIVD concerning NIF/MGNN. Although the European version of *Milli Gazete* European maintains its editorial head-office in Germany, the newspaper is


\(^{81}\) AIVD,1998, 15
“immediately delivered over all Europe with a supplement related to the situation of the migrants in which the political tone and vocabulary are often more radical “.82 The newspaper, available in both Germany and the Netherlands, is not mentioned in any report or document by AIVD, and is thus not used as evidence for a link between the Turkish Milli Görüş movement and NIF/MGNN. Resulting from the fact that AIVD does not consider Milli Gazete and IGMG events as evidence from which further conclusions about the anti-integrationist stance or anti-democratic aims could be drawn, the overall picture of NIF/MGNN is predominantly positive. Below it will be elaborated on the argumentation AIVD uses in order to justify their positive stance towards NIF/MGNN. It will become clear that this argumentation is based on alternative evidence used by AIVD in its reports.

2.2.2. Use of Alternative Evidence by AIVD

Throughout its reports, AIVD explicitly mentions that NIF/MGNN is considered to have proven its large resistance towards radical anti-democratic stances. Although, the reports reveal, that more radical political- Islamic streams might be existent within NIF/MGNN and that the possibility of radicalization of individual visitors of the mosques of the organization can not be excluded83 these streams have only restricted influence over the movement as a whole.84 As a testimony, to this AIVD refers to two sources of evidence. First, the historical development of the Diaspora Community Milli Görüs, and in particular the Kaplan schism, has shown that more radical ideologies take place outside of the European Milli Görüs organizations.85 At this point, reference should be made to BfV who, although the split between the Milli Görüs movement and the more radical Kaplan movement has first and


83 AIVD, 2007, 43; AIVD, 1998, 1
84 AIVD, 2008, 34
85 AIVD, 1998, 14
foremost taken place in Germany, did not consider the split to represent a sign for a positive development of IGMG. The second source of evidence, which is listed by AIVD testifying the non-radical and pro-integrationist stance of NIF/MGNN refers to the organization’s official statements. In AIVD 2001 report for instance, the official response of NIF/IGMG to the September 11 attacks was considered to represent a sign of NIF/MGNN distancing itself from terror by arguing

“In particular the political-Islamic Milli Görüs organization has publicly denounced the attacks in a quick an adequate manner. Thereby it has positively directed the emotions and concerns that also appeared in the Turkish and Kuridish migrant community in the first weeks after September 11. At the same time it prevented the emergence of a breeding ground for tensions between Islamic migrant communities as well as between Islamic communities and the Dutch society.”

The quote above indicates a positive approach taken by AIVD towards the interpretation of the official statement by NIF/MGNN after the attacks of 9/11 which stands in stark contrast to BfV conception of IGMG’s denouncing public statement on 9/11, which was not interpreted as commitment to integration but as an attempt to evoke the false impression of integration.

More recently, AIVD 2008 report states with a similarly affirmative tone, that the response of NIF/MGNN to the outcome of the anti-Islamic movie *Fitna* by PVV rightist parliamentarian Geert Wilders has shown to be of moderate nature, testifying NIF/MGNN’s reluctance to support radical positions. The two examples show that official positions of NIF/MGNN are not observed critically by AIVD but are taken as valid indicator for a positive pro-integrationist development of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs.

In addition to that, AIVD maintains its position in this respect, against external perception of NIF/MGNN to radicalize by the Dutch media-landscape. The Dutch newspaper *Telegraaf* for instance published an article on September 7th 2008, claiming NIF/MGNN to

---

86 AIVD, 2001, 31
87 Schiffauer, p.6
88 AIVD, 2008, 34
maintain close links with extremist organizations. It thereby referred to affairs concerning the building of the Western mosque in Amserdam, a project led and initiated by MGNN in cooperation with the Dutch government. Accordingly, a regional Dutch office for the protection of the constitution (RID) and AIVD were in possession of a document which demonstrated that the Dutch Milli Görüs maintained connections with extremists and financers of terrorism.\(^{89}\) In response to the above named article, AIVD published a letter on its website stating that

> Neither the RID nor AIVD have established a report with such content […] IVD does not possess concrete evidence that Milli Görüs is affected by serious radicalization, extremism or terrorism. Milli Görüs belongs to the conservative orthodox direction of Islam, whereby aims are pursuit in an open, democratic and non-violent manner”\(^{90}\)

The statement above once again affirms AIVD’s position of non-suspicion towards Milli Görüs, in the absence of clear evidence of radicalization, reminding the reader of the legality of the “conservative orthodox direction of Islam” within the framework of freedom of religion.

### 2.2.3 AIVD’s response to Citizenship claims by NIF/MGNN and Further Conclusions

Following AVID’s positive stance on NIF/MGNN as outlined above, its position towards political aspirations of the organization is not observed with a critical eye, such as it is the case in Germany, but rather recognizes the development that has taken place within the

---

\(^{89}\) Joost de Haas and Dennis Naaktgeboren, “Görüs toch ontmaskerd?,” Telegraaf, September 7, 2008, Domestic section.

Diaspora movement Milli Görüs towards an increasing interest in Dutch politics. AIVD points out that parts NIF/MGNN have increasingly developed a tendency to pursue the realization political goals of the own Diaspora position. The 1998 report distinguishes between two groups. The first group is formed by first generation migrants who still orient themselves quite exclusively towards Turkey seeking for ideological support within the framework established by the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey and further pursued by IGMG in Germany. The second group includes NIF/MGNN members of the second and third generation that see their future increasingly in the western society. This group claims rights concerning their political-religious orientation within their direct social environment pursuing interest in Dutch politics. In this context AIVD report states that NIF/MGNN is part of a grouping that look for opportunities of how to better articulate their interests within the Dutch political spectrum. On May 31 in 2001 the Turks Comité Nederlands has been established, consisting of representatives of several Turkish immigrant organizations, which aim at increasing the effectiveness of their interest representation by claiming an increased number of Turks in municipal council up to 200 until 2002 via elections. A report published by AIVD in 2004 confirms the growing interest of various Islamic streams to take an active role in Dutch politics, among them NIF/MGNN. With respect to this development the report states “In principle it is not impossible that a democratic-political Islam can take shape in the short or long run. The way how Christian-democratic parties in Europe have developed has shown that political movements with religious foundation are viable and an important contribution to the (continuous) existence of European (and also Dutch) democratic legal order. In recent times, several indicators for such developments (even if in early stages) could be noticed; an example is the Turkish Islamic Milli Görüs movement.”

91 AIVD, 1998, 15
92 AIVD, 2002, 31
The quote above indicates a general openness towards political participation of Muslim minority groups, thereby not excluding the more conservative part of the spectrum of Muslim Diaspora community. This contrasts the more suspicious approach taken by BfV in response to the ‘citizenship campaign’ by IGMG constituting another example of AIVD’s more open attitude towards claims and actions by the European Diaspora movement Milli Görüs.

Despite its impression that NIF/MGNN’s contributes positively to Dutch societal life, AIVD reports do not deny the possibility of negative changes within the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs in general. On the one hand, AIVD states, the future orientation of NIF/MGNN could be influenced by developments of the Milli Görüs movement in Turkey through possible frustration within NIF/MGNN if Necmettin Erbakan does not manage to increase the political influence of the Milli Görüs movement through parliamentary elections in Turkey. This might result in more radical stances of NIF/MGNN members in the Netherlands. On the other hand, European Milli Görüs organizations might be negatively influenced by the position of Islam in Western Europe. AIVD 1999 report states “the label of fundamentalism that is often times put upon Milli Görüs, with all the negative connotations that come along with it, can lead to its isolation and radicalization”. At this point the report refers to the differing perception of IGMG in Germany versus the Dutch perception of NIF/MGNN in the Netherlands, pointing at the German assumption of IGMG maintaining a ‘double agenda’ of pretended democratic attitudes, but pursued anti-integrationist goals. The reasons indicated for possible radicalization are interesting as they take into account the possibility of Muslims developing anti-democratic and even extremist pattern of behaviour as a response to social marginalization. The reference to Germany in this context might indicate a hidden claim on behalf of AIVD that German maintenance of suspicion can have negative effects on developments of IGMG in Germany.

94 AIVD, 1998, 14
95 ibid
96 ibid
To sum up, the approaches by BfV and AIVD towards the European Diaspora movement Milli Görüs differ significantly in terms of their interpretation of actions and claims made by IGMG and NIF/MGNN. In Germany the presence of Turkish Milli Görüs party members and the distribution of Milli Gazete among IGMG members have served as argumentative basis in order to prove IGMG’s strong link to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement which leads to the organization’s pursuance of anti-democratic goals under a democratic disguise through its Youth activities and political participation claims. In the Netherlands, although evidence is similarly existent, the presence of Milli Görüs party members and the existence of Milli Gazete in the Netherlands have not been interpreted as representing a dangerous link of NIF/MGNN to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement. Therefore official statements and claims for political participation were not seen through the lens of suspicion assuming a ‘double agenda’ The following Chapter will look at indicators which might explain for the different approach taken by BfV and AIVD towards the European Diaspora movement Milli Görüs.
CHAPTER 3: Explanations for Differences in Perception

The chapter above has demonstrated the significant difference of perception of the Milli Görüs Diaspora organizations in the Netherlands and Germany. I will look at two indicators which might explain for this phenomenon. On the one hand, the difference of perception might be explained by looking at the state as an actor. In this case, the perceptions of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs could be part of a broader legal framework of the respective country such as the integration system for immigrants and the position of religion and Islam in the given state structure. A generally more integrative state system towards migrants and Islam might thus explain a less sceptical view of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs by the respective state, whereas a less integrative system might explain a more critical view of the latter. The expectation would be then, that the Netherlands maintain a more integrative system than Germany as the former country’s views were less sceptical towards the European Diaspora movement Milli Görüs.

On the other hand, the difference of perception might be explained by looking at the Diaspora organization Milli Görüs as an actor. Thus different action of IGMG in Germany and NIF/MGNN in the Netherlands might explain for a more positive or negative perception of the organization by the respective state. In this case, more commitment to integration and willingness to positively contribute to society by the Milli Görüs Diaspora organization in the respective country might result in a more positive view of the organization by the government. If the Diaspora organization shows less initiative to integrate or even acts anti-integrationist, this would result in a negative view of the organization by the government. In our case, we might assume that IGMG acts less oriented towards integration, as its organization and youth actions were claimed to have negative tendencies by BfV. NIF/MGNN would then be assumed to act significantly more directed towards the integration
as its evaluation by the Dutch government was more positive. The section below will look at different integration policies and the stance of Islam in the Netherlands and Germany as an explaining factor for the differing perception of IGMG and NIF/MGNN by the two states.

3.1 The State as an Actor: Integration Policies and Institutionalization of Islam in Germany and the Netherlands

By looking at the integration system of Germany and the Netherlands it will become clear, that significant differences between the two state systems prevail. The tradition of the pillar system of the Netherlands has resulted in early attempts by the government to accommodate cultural religious and political demands of immigrants after the Dutch worker recruitment policy of the 1950s and 1960s, which led to the institutionalization of Islam into the Dutch political structure. Such institutionalization of Islam might serve as an explanation for the positive view of the Dutch government on NIF/MGNN. In Germany on the other hand efforts to pursue an integrationist policy towards Turkish labour migrants were taken relatively late. In particular, the acquisition of citizenship rights, which allow for political participation, was facilitated only in the end of the 1990s and is still comparatively more difficult than in the Netherlands. The reluctance of BfV to positively interpret the ‘citizenship campaign’ by the IGMG might be result of a general reservation to grant citizenship in Germany. In contrast to the Netherlands the institutionalization of Islam has only recently taken place due to the non-granting of the Körperschaftsstatus to Muslim communities which might serve as an explaining factor for the suspicion of BfV against the educational and free-time activities of IGMG. Below it will be elaborated on the Dutch integration policies and institutionalization of Islam against the background of the pillar system, followed by a section on the German system.
3.1.1 Integration Policies and Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands

The state system of the Netherlands is characterized by its historical tradition of pillarization. The Dutch pillar system originally emerged between 1500 and 1600 in the Netherlands as an attempt for consensus building in social and political life between the Catholic and Protestants which historically formed the most significant societal cleavage in the Netherlands. In order to accommodate the political and societal aspirations of each of the two confessional groups, considerable autonomies were granted to each zuil (pillar) such as autonomies in labour relations, education and religious activities. Education formed the most important part of the pillar system, as it granted the constitutional right of confessional schools to be subsidized by the state. The pillar system, by granting a relatively large degree of autonomy to different groups of society, provided for a ground of acceptance of cultural and religious differences. The pillar system developed further in the beginning and the middle of the twentieth century, at which time the secular pillar (socialist or liberal) gained importance. From the 1960s onwards, the system lost significance due to the increasing developments towards de-Christianization and the rise of the welfare state. Nevertheless the tradition of the pillar system which indicates the relative acceptance of ethnic and cultural differences as part of Dutch societal structure through the accommodation and institutionalization of religious groups within the political system still forms the basis of today’s integration system of immigrants.

An indication for the lasting effects of the pillar system is the introduction of an inclusive minorities policy “inclusive Minderhedennota” of 1983, after the recognition by the

---

97 Art 192 of the Dutch constitution of 1917
98 G.Üzüm, “Dutch Nationalism and the question of foreigners in the Netherlands” (Master’s thesis, Sabanci University, 2007), 58-75, 61,64
99 Ibid, 61
100 Østergaard-Nielsen, 2002, 270
government, that workers, that had been recruited in the 1950s and 60’s would remain in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{101} The outspoken aim of the minorities policy was “achieving a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development”.\textsuperscript{102} In other words, integration of minorities was understood in a relatively liberal sense, allowing for the retention of cultural customs and practices by immigrant groups. This liberal understanding of integration might explain for the positive view of the Dutch state on NIF/MGNN. Below, three areas of the inclusive minorities policy will be focused on, which will elaborate on this claim.

Firstly, part of this policy was, in the tradition of the \textit{pillar system} and in line with Art 23 of the Dutch constitution the granting and subsidization of faith-based primary and secondary schools. As a result forty Islamic primary schools and two Islamic secondary schools with roughly 7500 students have been established which, apart from their regular curriculum maintain the right to devote particular attention to religious education and the development of Turkish or Moroccan language and culture.\textsuperscript{103} Secondly, the Dutch state fosters the organization of minorities along their religious lines through the funding of mosques, and Islamic broadcasting corporations.\textsuperscript{104} A most recent example for the building of a state-funded mosque is the Western Mosque in Amsterdam, a common project of the Dutch government and the Dutch Diaspora organization Milli Görüs. Thirdly, the Dutch state encourages Muslim organizations to take an active part in Dutch politics. First, the Dutch integration policy allocated quotas according to which ethnic groups should be employed in

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{102} ibid
\textsuperscript{103} Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst. De democratische Rechtsorde en Islamitisch Onderwijs:Buitenlandse Inmenging en Anti-integratieve Tendensen (Den Haag: Ministrie voor Binnenlandse Zaken, 2002)22
\end{flushleft}
public jobs in municipalities and the Dutch government, thereby opening up civil service positions for foreign residents. Second, the Dutch government offered the opportunity for the establishment of forums of consultation, dialogue and common policy-making for Muslim organizations. There are three umbrella organizations comprising several Muslim groupings, namely the Dutch Consultation of Ethnic Minorities, the Contact Body of Muslims and the Government and the Contact Group Islam. The latter two have recently been recognized as official partners of the government discussing topics related to the role Islam in Dutch society and integration in three monthly meetings with the minister of Housing and Integration. Third, political participation has been fostered by the Dutch state through the relative ease to obtain Dutch citizenship. With the introduction of the naturalization law in 1985, children born in the Netherlands and residing there since birth were able to acquire citizenship automatically. The conditions for the application for naturalization are relatively lax, as the requirements preceding residency on Dutch territory amount to only five consecutive years. Nevertheless the applicant has to be considered a ‘participating citizen’ with a reasonable knowledge of the Dutch language, which is tested by a naturalization test since 1\textsuperscript{st} of April of 2003. Between 1992 and 1997 it was even possible to maintain a double nationality which was however abolished in October 1\textsuperscript{st} 1997. Nevertheless the fact that naturalization became slightly more difficult through the citizenship test and the non-granting of double nationality in the past years did not lead to less political participation of immigrants in general as political participation is made possible on a municipal level through the granting

---

105 Statham and Koopmans, 6
106 Landelijk Overleg Minderheden (LOM)
107 Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO)
108 Contactgroup Islam (CGI)
of local voting- and candidacy rights to foreign residents, even if they do not hold Dutch citizenship.\footnote{111 Statham and Koopmans, 6}

The section above has shown that the Netherlands has pursued an integration policy based on the approach of cultural acceptance. This approach has led to the funding of Muslim education, the political participation of Muslims in Dutch politics through and beyond the granting of citizenship, as well as the representation of Muslim organization on a governmental level through institutions which provide for dialogue with Muslim umbrella organizations. The relative high degree of institutionalization of Islam in Dutch state structures and society might have lead to a generally more positive view of Islam by the Dutch state, which would explain for the less critical view of AIVD on NIF/MGNN in their reports. The desire of NIF/MGNN to become politically active and offer educational and youth activities has according to this explanation not been evaluated with suspicion by AIVD, as the opportunity of Muslim education and political integration has already been established by previous integration policies of the Dutch state. Below, I will look at the German integration policy as an explanatory factor for the critical evaluation of IGMG activities in Germany. Thereby I will particularly focus on the granting of German citizenship and the legal status of Islam within the German state structure.

### 3.1.2 Integration Policies and Institutionalization of Islam in Germany

As has been analyzed BfV was particularly suspicious about the educational activities of Milli Görüs and its claim for political participation through the acquisition of citizenship. Below it will be argued that the tradition of relative restricted granting of citizenship in Germany might explain for the reluctance of BfV to interpret the ‘citizenship-campaign’ initiated by IGMG in a positive light. Likewise, the current position of Islam in Germany is characterized by the non-granting of the legal \textit{Körperschaftstatus} by the German government to Muslim
organizations. The lack of this legal status results in the inability of Muslim organizations to engage in Islamic education in German public schools and to gain official status as a dialogue partner with the German state. The relative low institutionalization of Islam in Germany might provide for a possible explanation of BfV’s suspicion for educational religious activities by IGMG.

As mentioned above the Netherlands have applied a relatively inclusive policy of multicultural immigrant incorporation at a relative early point of time during the 1980s. Germany on the other hand, despite its factual great influx of immigrants due to its recruitment policy of the 1950s and 1960s and the further influx of migrants due to the family reunification law in the 1970s claimed not to officially represent an immigrant country up until the end of the 1990s. Due to the political denial concerning immigrants, Germany engaged in the active pursuance of integration policy in particular towards its Turkish Muslim minority relatively late.  

First, up until 1999 citizenship was granted only to children who had at least one parent who was a native German which implied that children that had non-German parents but were born in Germany did not automatically gain citizenship. A reform of the German citizenship law on the 15th of July 1999 changed the previous framework, allowing children that were born in Germany to gain citizenship by birth as long as their parents have lived in Germany for more than eight years. Double citizenship was being discussed and particularly favoured by the leftist side of the German political spectrum; it was however never introduced, so that it remained generally expected to abandon former citizenship with the acquisition of German citizenship. In 2008 a new immigration act came into force which

113 Steinhard, 2007, 544
114 ibid
introduced a country wide standardized test. In addition, German law allows for particular “attitude tests”, testing the stances of Muslims towards democracy, postulated by the politically conservative German Länder, Baden-Württemberg and Hessen. Both, the national as well as the Länder tests were highly criticized as discriminatory against Muslims and constitutionally not justified on grounds of the argument that Muslims were put under a “scandalous and generalizing suspicion”. In comparison to the citizenship law of the Netherlands the German citizenship law can be considered as being rather restrictive. Not only are German residence requirements for naturalization three years higher than in the Netherlands, but also the application of citizenship tests differs considerably in terms of their discriminative content. Finally, the Netherlands have used the tool of citizenship in order to foster integration of their Muslim minority much earlier, so that the possibility of double citizenship, even if abolished later on, was already tested between 1992 and 1997, two years before the first reform towards an easier acquiesce of citizenship has taken place in Germany. The hesitance of the German government to grant citizenship has not only hampered the political participation of Muslim migrants in German politics but was according to Schiffauer the outcome of the fear of the German state to loose control over its own democratic processes through the granting of political power to Muslims and in particular orthodox Muslims such as IGMG members. Bringing this into context of the critical stance of BfV towards IGMG ‘citizenship’ campaign, the latter might be explained by a general tradition of reluctance to grant citizenship to immigrants and in particular Muslims as could be seen through the Citizenship test.

116 Gesinnungstest
118 Schiffhauer, 111; Kramer, 80
Second, BfV’s suspicion towards IGMG pursuing a ‘double agenda’ and the critical stance towards the educational and free-time activities offered by IGMG must be seen in a broader context of the stance of Islam within the political state structure in Germany. Whereas Islam has been politically institutionalized in the Netherlands, German authorities have only recently encouraged the establishment of Muslim political platforms that serve as dialogue partner to the German state. No policy exists however which provides for subsidization or funding of Muslim organizations and the possibility of Muslim education in public or private schools, as it is the case in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{119} The relatively low degree of institutionalization of Islam in the German state structures can be explained by the non-granting of the \textit{Körperschaftsstatus}\textsuperscript{120}, translated here as ‘status as a cooperation’. The \textit{Körperschaftsstatus}, grants religious- and ideological communities official recognition as religious communities under German law and thereby constitutes the practical realization of the right of religious freedom. So far, the \textit{Körperschaftsstatus} is granted to the Catholic and Protestant churches and other Christian sub-branches but is withheld to Muslim organizations.\textsuperscript{121} This non-granting of the \textit{Körperschaftsstatus} has been argued to ascribe to formal and legal requirements that Islamic organizations do not fulfil, which relate to the organizational structure of Muslim communities, their numbers of members and the diversity of Muslim organizations in general. Two consequences result from the lack of the \textit{Körperschaftsstatus} that are of significance in explaining why BfV has a more critical stance towards the educational activities of IGMG. First, Muslim communities do not maintain the right to engage in welfare work or youth welfare service in the sense of a representing a social institution with financial support of the government. Second, Muslim organizations are not

\textsuperscript{119} Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001, 270
\textsuperscript{120} or \textit{Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts}
\textsuperscript{121} Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, “Neuere Entwicklungen im Verhältnis von Politik und Religion im Spiegel Politikwissenschaftlicher Debatten,” Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/KVIMDT,3,0,Neuere_Entwicklungen_im_Verh%FCltnis_von_Politik_und_Re
gerion_im_Spiegel_politikwissenschaftlicher_Debatten.html.
recognized as formal dialogue partner for societal or official governmental institutions, which indicates that effective cooperation between the two parties cannot take place, resulting in the practical impossibility of Islamic education to take place in German public schools.\(^{122}\) Despite the lack of formal cooperation the German government, has put increasing efforts in the dialogue with Islamic communities in recent years. In 2006, the German state set up the German Islam Conference\(^ {123}\) which constitutes an annual meeting of government officials discussing topics related to the position of Islam in Germany such as the building of mosques, headscarves, Islamic education in public schools, media and Muslims Islam in schools, with representatives of various Muslim umbrella organizations. Among the partaking organizations is the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the Koordinationsrat der Muslime which also represents IGMG as one of their members.\(^ {124}\)

To sum up the comparison between of integration policies and the degree of institutionalization of Muslims in Germany and the Netherlands provides us with the following results: whereas Muslim education, political participation through and beyond citizenship and cooperation between Islamic organizations and the Government has been established in the Netherlands at a relative early stage, the granting of political rights through citizenship in Germany took place at a relatively late point of time. With concern to the cooperation between Islamic Organizations and Government institutions the German government has taken first steps in recent years. Nevertheless, the withholding of the Körperschaftsstatus stands in the way of the further institutionalization of Islam, in terms of the possibility of funding of Muslim organizations which engage in youth activities and the teaching of Islam in public schools. Linking these results to the initial question of why the


\(^{123}\) Deutsche Islam Konferenz

Diaspora movement Milli Görüş is seen less critically in the Netherlands, than it is in Germany, the findings above serve the initial expectation outlined in the beginning of this chapter. The critical observation of IGMG’s youth activities and citizenship-claims by BfV takes place in a political environment of the German state, in which the acquisition of citizenship is relatively difficult and the institutionalization of Islam has barely taken place. On the other hand the more positive evaluation of AIVD of NIF/MGNN takes place against the background of a relative high institutionalization of Islam in the Dutch political state structure. Therefore the two differing political backgrounds of the Netherlands and Germany might be an explanatory factor for the differing perception of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüş in the two countries. As mentioned earlier, a second explanation for the different perception of Milli Görüş by German and the Netherlands will be looked at. In the following chapter I will look at the Diaspora Movement Milli Görüş as an actor.

### 3.2 The Diaspora Movement Milli Görüş as an Actor

As the analysis of BfV reports have shown, that IGMG was mainly criticized for free-time- and educational activities for children and teenagers. In order to attribute the negative evaluation of educational and free-time activities by BfV to IGMG behaviour, one would assume that IGMG’s topics, content and aims of these activities are somehow less aimed at integration than those of NIF/MGNN’s youth activities. By looking at the possibility of IGMG and NIF/MGNN to interact differently in their respective environment we might find evidence which disproves the initial assumption made in the first chapter that IGMG and NIF/MGNN maintain similar ideological stances towards integration. Below some examples of IGMG and NIF/MGNN activities will be given which will show that according to the information given by IGMG and NIF/MGNN, activities are similarly positively directed.
towards the societal integration of Islam into the society of the Germany and the Netherlands respectively.

Concerning the activities of NIF/MGNN, in particular the Northern branch of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs is active. The Dutch government has several long-term projects with MGNN such as the debate series called “courage against radicalism”, “emancipation to the fore” and “Leadership of women”. These projects particularly strengthen the role of women in Dutch society. Furthermore, the Youth organization of MGNN organized projects directed towards integration into Dutch society such as the project “Visitors group Umut and Amal” which organizes young Milli Görüs members to visit young prisoners of the age of twelve to eighteen in jail, who do not receive visitors on a regular basis and thus have few contacts to the outside world. Similarly, IGMG women and youth departments organized several projects, such as a short-film competition under the motto “Youth and Society” for youth in the age between 13 and 30, a creative competition-project for women with the name “yesterday, today and future of Muslims” and „knowledge competition event for women and girls” in the years of 2008 and 2009. In each of these projects topics and contents were explicitly related to themes around integration, involving discussion on how Muslims can positively contribute and participate in the development of German society. Particularly interesting was the creative competition contest, which involved the interviewing of migrants from the first generation which came to Germany before the 1980s under the theme of a Mohammed “the best among you is the one, who is most useful

125 Lindo, 12
for humankind”. The task was to create a short film about how “European Muslims” can best apply this task to the year 2008.

The evidence given through the topics that are discussed during the activities organized by IGMG does not lead to the conclusion that the organization actively counteracts the integration of Muslims into German society. The most significant difference that can be noticed between women and youth-actions by the Dutch Diaspora organization Milli Görüs and IGMG is that the former engages in projects in cooperation with the Dutch government, which can however be explained by the differing opportunity structures for Islamic organizations in Germany and Netherlands, as has been elaborated on in the previous section. Yet it is not possible to draw conclusions about the aims and stance towards integration of IGMG through information given at the organization’s website. Looking through the glasses of BfV, the counterargument to such analyses would be that information given by IGMG about Youth projects would serve the purpose of the maintenance of a double-agenda. In order to disprove this argument, in debt sociological research on the organization’s current activities would have to be conducted, which goes beyond the scope of the research for this paper. For this reason, I will look at an indirect factor, namely the organizational connection between IGMG and NIF/MGNN by which similar or dissimilar intentions behind youth-actions provided by the organizations might be established.

As mentioned in the last section of the first chapter, IGMG forms the head-organization of its Dutch regional branches, MGNN and NIF. If the organizational control by IGMG over these sub-branches is high, one might conclude, that ideological perceptions, and stances towards societal integration cannot differ to a significant extent. This would mean that the reason for the different perception of the Diaspora Milli Görüs organizations by BfV and AIVD might mainly be attributed to the variances in the integrationist system and the institutionalization of Islam in the respective countries. If IGMG’s control over its sub-
branches is rather low, the possibility of different stances towards societal integration of IGMG and NIF/MGNN would be more likely, which in turn could lead to more or less integrative interaction within the youth-activities mentioned above on a sociological level. Three factors will be focus on, in order to find out whether a tendency towards a rather high or rather low degree of control on behalf of IGMG over its Dutch sub-branches exists: the appointment of Imams, the appointment of regional leaders and internal media distribution. At this point I shall briefly mention why I chose these factors as indicators for the analysis. First, if imams are distributed to the Netherlands by IGMG, this would mean, that the head-organization would maintain the power of choosing the people who lead the Friday prayers within NIF/MGNN mosques and supervise the religious education of NIF/MGNN youth. This power of choice would have a significant ideological influence on NIF/MGNN followers, as Imams are likely to affect the interpretation of Islam by the organization’s members, which might have an effect on their willingness to integrate. Similarly, If IGMG maintains the exclusive power of appointment of the leadership of the Dutch regional branches the appointed leadership of NIF/MGNN might not differ significantly in ideological terms from the leadership of IGMG. As the regional leadership acts as a representation of the regional organization and is therefore responsible for the organization’s interaction with the government, integrationist or anti-integrationist stances might by leaders have a high potential to influence the perception of the respective government on the organization. Finally a high interconnectedness between IGMG and its regional sub-branches through IGMG media would make ideological proximity of IGMG and NIF/MGNN more likely.

Concerning the distribution of imams by IGMG the following results were found. IGMG receives most of their Imams from Turkey, who were educated at Turkish state Universities. After further educational seminars for these Imams taking place in Germany the latter are sent to IGMG regional branches, which again forward them to local mosque
In the case of the Netherlands however, the opportunity of ‘Imamobleiding’ (Imam Education) exists, subsidized by the Dutch government. According to the head of MGNN Yusuf Altuntas thus only 20\% of the employed Imams at MGNN are distributed by IGMG with decreasing tendencies. With concern to the appointment of leadership to its regional sub-branches the MGNN change of leadership that took place in 2006 represents an interesting case. As claimed by several Dutch newspaper articles, the suspension of former leaders of MGNN Ismail Eryiyit and Üzeyir Kabaktepe was the result of IGMG interference, in order to regain influence over the Dutch branch. Accordingly IGMG’s motivation to do so was to ‘ideologically redirect’ MGNN as the latter has taken too progressive and integrative stances towards Dutch society over the years. As opposed to this public assumption the current leader of MGNN Yusuf Altuntas states that “the change of leadership of MGNN took place because of internal differences concerning the Western-mosque project”. This claim corresponds with the findings of a research report by the institute for Migration- and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam in 2008 which states that the replacement of leadership of MGNN in fact took place on request of the MGNN administration and leaders of mosque communities, which were dissatisfied with the leadership of Eryiyit and Kabaktepe due to lacks of financial transparency concerning the Western-mosque project. In more unexceptional circumstances the regional leadership is also not simply imposed by the German headquarter but consultations with functionaries in mosque-communities about their preferences concerning the leadership of the respective region take place.

Lastly, with regard to the internal media distribution the following could be observed. As mentioned in the first chapter, IGMG maintains three sources of media for its members.

---

129 Interview Karahan
130 Interview with MGNN directeur Yusuf Altuntas on May 7, Amersfoort, the Netherlands
132 Interview Altuntas
133 Lindo, 5
134 ibid
First the irregularly appearing newspaper *Perspektif*, secondly the internal radio station IGMG fm\textsuperscript{135} and finally IGMG website. Whereas sources could not be found which provide information about how many members of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs read IGMG website or the *Perspektif* or listen to IGMG fm, another interesting observation could be made which might tell us about the usage of these media: all of the above mentioned media are distributed mostly in Turkish and German language. The origins of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs make the use of Turkish as internal language self-evident. Nevertheless, as Altuntas points out\textsuperscript{136} the language of content of the above mentioned media disregard the fact, that in particular the younger members of regional branches of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs which are not located in Germany speak neither German nor Turkish fluently. For this reason, IGMG distributed media might not be of interest for particularly younger members of Milli Görüs, marginalizing the connective power of the latter.

The analysis of the three indicators of appointment of Imams and regional leaders, as well as media distribution suggests that GMG maintains a considerable degree of organizational control over its Dutch sub-branches. The degree does however not seem so strong as to exclude the possibility that no ideological differences exist between IGMG and NIF/MGNN which could lead to different interaction of the organizations on the ground. Thus although regional leaders are appointed by IGMG headquarter, the example of the leadership appointment of MGNN in 2006 has shown that regional members have significant influence over this process. The power over distribution of Imams by IGMG seems rather minor, due to the opportunity given by the Dutch state to educate the latter locally. Finally, the power of convergence through media is hampered by the language of its content. The findings above correspond to research conducted by Werner Schiffauer and Marfa Heimbach on the organizational structure of Milli Görüs, who argued that IGMG was never able to build up

\textsuperscript{135} IGMG fm, “Koetue Aliskanliklardan Sakinalim”, IGMG fm, http://www.igmg.fm/
\textsuperscript{136} Interview Altuntas
real centralized, top-down coordinated organization. Accordingly, regional organizations maintained a certain degree of autonomy, so that the head-quarter in Cologne had to satisfy itself with the loyalty but not complete dependence of the local communities.\(^{137}\)

The conclusion to be drawn in the context of the question of why Milli Görüs Diaspora organizations are perceived differently in the Netherlands and Germany is difficult. On the one hand, the integrationist policies and the institutionalization of Islam in Germany and the Netherlands seem to provide for a reasonable explanation for the difference of perception of IGMG in Germany versus NIF/MGNN in the Netherlands. The section above has shown however, that despite the fact that the content of youth activities of IGMG and NIF/MGNN seem not to differ to a significant extent by its outer appearance, the organizational control of IGMG towards its Dutch regional sub-branches leaves significant leeway for the organizations to ideologically diverge and interact differently in their respective contexts. The usage of locally educated Imams in the Netherlands instead of IGMG distributed Imams has shown that the opportunities provided for Muslims by the Dutch state constrains the organizational convergence between IGMG and NIF/MGNN. As the German leader of IGMG puts it: "The problems of a regional branch of IGMG in Germany that has to deal with the German office for the protection of the constitution are different form those of a regional branch in the Netherlands which is invited for lunch at the Prime Ministers office every couple of weeks".\(^{138}\)


\(^{138}\) Interview Karahan
Conclusion

The historical chapter has shown that the origins of the Diaspora movement Milli Görüs are similar in the Netherlands and Germany, its historical development shows that the two Diaspora movements were connected to Milli Görüs Turkey as well as to each other and that the latter interconnection still exists through contemporary organizational structure of IGMG. The assumption was that similar ideological stances of the Milli Görüs movement in the Netherlands and Germany prevail which relate to ideological stances to the Milli Görüs movement Turkey. These ideological orientations suggest anti-western and thus anti-integrationist stances of both IGMG and NIF/MGNN. According to this assumption, we expected similar perceptions of IGMG and NIF/MGNN by the German Dutch state to prevail.

The chapter on the comparison of the yearly reports of BfV and AIVD have shown however that those perceptions of IGMG by the German state differ considerably from the perceptions of NIF/MGNN by the Dutch state. Two important findings have been made. First, the evidence available according to which BfV and AIVD draw conclusions about the integrationist or anti-integrationist stances of IGMG and NIF/MGNN are nearly the same in both countries. Thus, speeches by Milli Görüs party functionaries were held in both Germany and the Netherlands and the newspaper Milli Gazete is likewise available in both countries. Both IGMG and NIF/MGNN maintain democratic and pro-integrationist stances in their official statements. BfV concluded that IGMG maintains a “double agenda” according to which IGMG citizenship claims and its youth-activities must be considered to maintain anti-integrationist goals. AIVD, by focusing on alternative sources of official statements on behalf of NIF/MGNN concluded that NIF/MGNN contributes positively to Dutch civil society. The second important finding relates to the first, namely that given the different interpretation of similar sources available to BfV and AIVD one might not be able to simply assume that because of its historical connections to Turkey the ideological stances of the Diaspora
movement Milli Görüs in Germany and the Netherlands maintain anti-integrationist stances, otherwise AIVD would not have had such a positive picture about NIF/MGNN.

These two findings brought about the question, how these differences of perception by BfV and AIVD could be explained. The first hypotheses put forward that the German State and the Dutch state might maintain a different perception on IGMG and NIF/MGNN respectively due to the fact that the Netherlands and Germany have different traditions on integration policy and differ in terms of their institutionalization of Islam into state institutions. The analysis of the third chapter has shown that the German state engaged into integration policies at a relatively late point of time and maintained a relative reluctance to grant citizenship. This might explain for the negative evaluation of the “citizenship campaign” by IGMG. Concerning the institutionalization of Islam into political institutional structures of the German state the latter has only recently taken place and is still limited due to the reluctance of the German state to grant the Körperschaftsstatus to Islamic Organizations. As an effect, Islamic education is not granted in public schools, which might explain for the suspicious stance of BfV towards educational and youth activities offered by NIF/MGNN. The Dutch state on the other hand has established integration policies at a relatively early point of time and has maintained a relative open policy towards the granting of citizenship, even granting the possibility of political participation of immigrants that do not hold citizenship at a local level. The positive attitude of AIVD towards political participation claims put forward by NIF/MGNN might be a result of a generally rather open attitude of the Dutch state towards political participation of foreigners. Against the tradition of the pillar-system the Dutch state has opened up opportunity structures through state funding of Muslim education and cooperation with the Dutch state, which led to the relative high incorporation of Islam in Dutch political and institutional structures. This institutionalization of Islam might have led to a less suspicious stance of the Dutch state towards Muslim education and free-
time activities provided for by NIF/MGNN. In this respect, the first hypothesis might hold true.

The second hypothesis was that different perceptions of the German and the Dutch state might be attributed to different ideological stances towards integration by IGMG and NIF/MGNN respectively. Thus, although it could not be simply assumed that IGMG and NIF/MGNN act anti-integrationist due to their historical link with Turkey, the possibility still existed that NIF/MGNN diverged significantly in terms of ideological stances towards integration from IGMG which might result in different activities of the organizations with more or less integrative approaches in the respective countries. The analysis of documents about activities provided by IGMG and secondary sources about youth-activities in the Netherlands and Germany did not lead to the conclusion that IGMG maintained more anti-integrationist stances than NIF/MGNN. However, as secondary sources about these activities were lacking in the case of activities offered by IGMG, the research was limited to information given by the organizations’ website. Arguing from the perspective of BfV, such information would not be credible and final conclusions could not be drawn. For this reason it was looked at the organizational connections between IGMG and NIF/MGNN with a focus on the appointment of leadership and imams, as well as internal media distribution. The analysis of the three factors provided for the conclusion that the organizational interconnection between IGMG and its Dutch sub-branches were so close as to exclude the ideological divergence of IGMG and NIF/MGNN which might influence their willingness to integrate into the societies of their host-countries. At the same time the different political environment and opportunity structures given to Muslims in Germany and the Netherlands constrain the inter-organizational connection between IGMG and NIF/MGNN which gives NIF/MGNN further leeway to ideologically diverge.
Coming back to the initial research question posed in this paper of why the German and Dutch state perceive their respective Milli Görüs Diaspora movements differently both the political institutional traditions of Germany and the Netherlands as well as the different ideological stances of IGMG and NIF/MGNN might play a role and can not be seen separately from each other. The case of the Milli Görüs movement has shown that both the willingness of Muslim minorities to integrate as well as opportunity structures provided by the state are important factors to lead to the successful integration of Muslim minorities in Western societies. At the same time however it remains difficult to objectively determine what the parameters are according to which Muslim minorities should behave in order to show their willingness to integrate. It is the respective state, which is driven by its own interests and political institutional traditions that defines where active social marginalization by Muslim minority groups through the maintenance of their religious-cultural traditions ends and the willingness to integrate begins.
Bibliography

Abdullah, Muhammad. Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland. Wien: Styria Verlag, 1981

Abdullah, Muhammad. Was will der Islam in Deutschland. Gütersloh: Gütersloh Verlagshaus Mohn, 1993


Bade, Klaus J. and Weiner, Myron “Migration Past Migration Future.” In Islam in Europe. Integration or Marginalization?, edited by Robert J. Pauly JR. USA: Ashgate Publishing Company Burlington, 2004


De Haas, Joost and Naaktgeboren Dennis, “Görüs toch ontmaskerd?.” Telegraaf, September 7, 2008, Domestic section


Interview with MGNN directeur Yusuf Altuntas on May 7, Amersfoort, the Netherlands

Interview with IGMG chairman Yavuz Celik Karahan on May 8, Cologne, Germany


